[1] G.R. No.
L-44702 July 30, 1979 respondent, claiming to be the nearest of kin of the deceased, moved for
FACUNDO A. DALISAY, Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of
the late AMADO B. DALISAY, petitioner, vs.THE HON. FRANCISCO Z .
CONSOLACION, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Davao, Branch II, and ANICETO S. DALISAY, respondents.
Remedial Law; Estates; Judicial Administrator of Estate; Removal of Judicial
Administrator; The fact that an administrator owes money to a decedent is not
ground for his removal; Reasons.—The Court is of the considered view that if the
foregoing allegations are sufficiently substantiated, after appropriate proceedings, the
removal of petitioner would be legally justified. Therefore, rather than insist on the
ground relied upon by His Honor in his order under review, which to Us appears to
be quite flimsy, considering that the mere fact that an administrator happens to owe
money to the decedent is not in itself a ground for his removal, and in this case the
evidence does not seem indubitable that petitioner’s claim of payment was made in
bad faith or in an obvious attempt to defraud the estate, it would be fairer for all
concerned for respondents to proceed against petitioner on the basis of the above-
quoted charges against him. In this connection, it is to be noted that in the
considerations of His Honors order of June 14, 1976 herein-above earlier quoted, it is
not definite that petitioner’s explanation was malicious and inherently unfounded. In
any event, the petitioner has not refused to pay; he only asked for some liberality so
he could pay in installments. Surely, such proposal could not have converted him
into a debtor in bad faith. The point of integrity raised by respondent court appears a
little harsh. Otherwise stated, We find the ground for which petitioner has been
removed to be rather precipitate. From which, it results that the orders herein assailed
constitute grave abuse of discretion and should be set aside.
BARREDO, J.:
Petition for certiorari and prohibition impugning the order of respondent court
of August 16,1976 removing petitioner as judicial administrator in Special
Proceeding No. 1986, Court of First Instance of Davao Branch II, the
Instestate Estate of Amado Dalisay y Bangoy, and the order denying
reconsideration thereof.
According to the allegation of the petition filed below, Amado Dalisay y
Bangoy died on September 1, 1975 in Davao City; he was a bachelor without
descendants or ascendants, whether legitimate or otherwise apparently,
without any forced heir; he left personal and real properties worth about One
Million (P1,000,000) Pesos; and he died intestate. The petition prayed for the
issuance of letters of administration to the Clerk of Court Atty. Eriberto A.
Unson. After due notice and hearing, respondent judge selected and
appointed petitioner from among several nominees of the parties, as the
judicial administrator of the estate. Aniceto S. Dalisay, herein private
₯Special Proceedings (Rule 82- Rule 83)
reconsideration, but His Honor denied said motion holding inter alia that:
Upon its finding that, of all the would be administrators herein recommended,
Facundo Dalisay appears to be the most qualified and suitable in that he not
only enjoyed the confidence of the decedent, but also because up to the
death of the latter, he appeared to have been managing and overseeing the
affairs of the estate and therefore is in a position to better handle the
preservation of the entire estate for the estate.
Corresponding letters of administration were accordingly issued to petitioner
on March 15, 1976. An attempt of private respondent to appeal from said
appointment was later withdrawn.
Because certain properties happened to be in the possession of herein
private respondent, petitioner moved for delivery thereof to him but this
motion was denied by the vacation judge then acting in place of herein
respondent judge. Apparently, respondent Aniceto Dalisay must have
submitted some kind of inventory at least of the properties in his possession,
for on May 31, 1976, respondent judge issued the following order:
The inventory submitted by Aniceto Dalisay shows that a promissory note
was executed by Facundo Dalisay on August 18, 1973 with the
information that there is no record of payment.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, Facundo Dalisay is hereby directed to appear
before this Court on June 10, 1976 at 8:30 A.M. to explain and produce
receipts of payment of said promissory note if there is any in his
possession. SO ORDERED.
Then on June 14, 1976, H-is Honor issued another order, which is self-
explanatory, thus:
This refers to the Order of the Court dated May 31, 1976, requiring
Facundo Dalisay to appear, and explain or produce receipts of
payment for the promissory note in the amount of P10,000.00 which he
executed in favor of the late Amado Dalisay on August 18, 1973, which
appeared in the reports submitted by Aniceto Dalisay per Order of this
Court.
In the hearing, Facundo Dalisay admitted that he signed the promissory
note after the execution of the Deed of Sale (Exhibit "A" — Motion-Facundo
Dalisay) of 2 motor vehicles in his favor. Facundo Dalisay further admitted
that he was not able to pay the installments in the manner set forth in the
promissory note but he was able to pay it all.
Page 1 of 40
 When asked to produce any receipt of the payments he made, Facundo
Dalisay claimed that he did not get any receipt, because he and the late
Amado Dalisay are like brothers. If this is so, then why did the late Amado
Dalisay require him to sign a promissory note?
Again, if the claim of Facundo Dalisay is true since the Deed of Sale stated
that the consideration was already paid, why did not the late Dalisay return
the promissory note to him, gratis et amore, or after he (Facundo Dalisay),
had fully paid the same,
In the face of the, record, the explanation of Facundo Dalisay does not
merit any serious consideration.
WHEREFORE, Facundo Dalisay is hereby directed to pay the intestate
estate of Amado Dalisay the sum of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos
within a period of sixty (60) days from receipt of this order. SO ORDERED.
Petitioner asked for reconsideration of the foregoing order, explaining that he
had already paid the amount in question but since he "was precluded from
testifying" thereon under the prohibition against testimony of survivors, he
proposed that he be allowed to pay the same in monthly installments of
P500.00. To this motion, respondent countered with a motion asking that
petitioner "be removed or allowed to resign" because his failure to pay "may
be considered as evidence of abuse of trust and confidence." (Annex K of
petition). Petitioner filed a rejoinder, Annex L of the petition, contending that
there was no legal ground for his removal. Resolving the incident, His Honor
relieved petitioner as judicial administrator reasoning out thus:
The deceased Amado Dalisay as the preliminary record of the case
will show, left a considerable estate, consisting principally of income-
producing urban and agricultural lands, with some personal properties.
In considering the appointment of a judicial administrator, this Court
took into account that the said person must be a man of utmost
integrity. Primarily cause of the full trust and confidence that the
deceased had apparently shown on the face of the Special Power of
Attorney dated August 15, 1963 to Facundo Dalisay and of the
Affidavit dated June 2, 1974, he was appointed by this Court as judicial
administrator.
It is sad to state that administrator Facundo Dalisay did not measure
up to the standard of integrity and character the Court required and
expected of him.
₯Special Proceedings (Rule 82- Rule 83)
Due to the sizeable and valuable estate with considerable income, the
judicial administrator must have a character to resist temptation for
personal gain which is open to him in such a position. He must
therefore be, "like Ceasar's Wife above suspicion."
His explanation stated in the aforestated motion for reconsideration
that he "never denied his obligation under the promissory note but
claimed payment," is a posture, under the circumstances shown during
the hearing, that does not speak well of the character expected of a
judicial administrator.
Thus, under the said circumstances as shown during the hearing,
administrator Facundo Dalisay appears to be unsuitable for the
position as judicial administrator and his continuance in the position
would work to the disadvantage of the said estate. Coupled with his
account with the estate in the Amount of P10,000.00, his relief from the
position is necessary.
It is the position of petitioner that in so relieving him of his position as judicial
administrator, respondent acted in grave abuse of discretion. He points out
that it was actually he who revealed the existence of the promissory note —
and this allegation is not denied by respondents — and that if his claim that
he has already paid the amount in question has not convinced the court, it
cannot be said that it is so entirely and totally incredible that it could be
considered as justifying His Honor's conclusion that petitioner has not lived or
measured up to the standard of integrity and character of a judicial
administrator.
On the other hand, respondent posits that petitioner, not being in any way
related to the deceased, was appointed merely in the exercise of the court's
discretion and cannot therefore claim any "proprietary and/or pecuniary right
to insist in administering the properties now under custodia legis." In other
words, the point raised is that respondent judge should also have wide
discretion in removing him.
Before passing on such conflicting claims of the parties, it may be mentioned
here that in a motion dated May 10, 1979, private respondent prays that he
"be allowed to file a motion with the probate court for removal of Facundo A.
Dalisay as administrator on grounds different from the ground upon which he
was relieved by the probate court." It is alleged in said motion that:
III. Private respondent Aniceto S. Dalisay would like to file a motion with the
Probate Court for removal of Facundo A. Dalisay as administrator for acts
committed prior and subsequent to his relief as administrator by the Probate
Court, grounds different from the ground upon which he was removed by the
Page 2 of 40
Probate Court, hoping that with two cases pending against him, the
termination of one will bring about his early removal as Administrator. But
because of the temporary restraining order issued by this Honorable Court
enjoining the respondent Judge from further proceeding with Special Case
No. 1986, leave of this Honorable Court is necessary. The following are
some of the grounds upon which he will predicate the motion.
IV. Facundo A. Dalisay neglected to perform an order of the Court and duties
expressly provided by the Rules of Court. These are grounds for removal of
administrator pursuant to Section 2, Rule 82, Rules of Court. In the order of
the Probate Court dated June 27, 1977, the last paragraph thereof states:
"The judicial administrator is hereby warned that disbursement of any nature
without prior approval of the Court shall be chargeable on his personal
account."
A xerox copy of the order of the Probate Court dated October 13,
1977, quoting the order dated June 27, 1977, is enclosed herewith.
V. From the above-quoted order, leave of court is necessary before Facundo
A. Dalisay makes any disbursement, otherwise the same is chargeable to
him.
VI. It appears from the account of administrator Facundo A. Dalisay from
March 16, 197 7 to March 15, 1978, and March 16, 1978 to March 15, 1979,
submitted to the Probate Court, that he gave cash advances to himself, his
bookkeeper and Atty. Primo O. Orellan, his counsel. in the total amount of
P22,064. 10 without authority from the Probate Court and although no fees
have yet been allowed them by the said court. He gave himself a monthly
allowance of P500.00 and Atty. Orellan P300.00.
VII. Under Section 1, Rule 85, Rules of Court, the administrator is
accountable for the. income of the estate. Facundo A. Dalisay failed to collect
P21,755.03 from five (5) tenants from Coronon, Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur,
representing the shares of the estate from copra; P8,917.11 from two (2)
lessees from Panabo, Davao del Norte, and Barrio Lasang Licanan, Davao
City, representing the share of the estate from ramie, and P33,600.00 from
two (2) lessees at Binatan, Digos, Davao del Sur, and Sirawan, Sta. Cruz,
Davao del Sur, representing unpaid rentals from 35-1/2 hectares of
agricultural lands as shown in his annual accounts from March 16, 1977 to
March 15, 1978, and March 16, 1978 to March 15, 1979 submitted to the
Probate Court.
VIII. As also shown in the said annual accounts, Facundo A. Dalisay has
not been collecting rentals from the residential and/or commercial lots
₯Special Proceedings (Rule 82- Rule 83)
situated at Claro M. Recto Street, Davao City, belonging to the estate,
occupied by him, his counsel Atty. Primo O. Orellan, his brother and
relatives-in-laws of the latter, and his sister.
IX. Facundo A. Dalisay failed to protect the estate from spurious claims. In
fact, he was biased in favor of, if not in connivance with, some claimants.
X. Facundo A. Dalisay padded his expenses for travel and inspection as
shown in his annual accounts from March 15, 1977 to .March 16, 1979.
XI. Facundo A. Dalisay committed perjury when he testified in court on
March 29, 1979, during the hearing of the claims of Desiderio Dalisay that
he does not know Aniceto S. Dalisay.
The Court is of the considered view that if the foregoing allegations are
sufficiently substantiated, after appropriate proceedings, the removal of
petitioner would be legally justified. Therefore, rather than insist on the
ground relied upon by His Honor in his order under review, which to Us
appears to be quite flimsy, considering that the mere fact that an
administrator happens to owe money to the decedent is not in itself a ground
for his removal, and in tills case the evidence does not seem indubitable that
petitioner's claim of payment was made in bad faith or in an obvious attempt
to defraud the estate, it would be fairer for all concerned for respondents to
proceed against petitioner on the basis of the above-quoted charges against
him. in this connection, it is to be noted that in the considerations of His
Honor's order of June 14, 1976 herein above earlier quoted, it is not definite
that petitioner's explanation was malicious and inherently unfounded. In any
event, the petitioner has not refused to pay; he only asked for some liberality
so he could pay in installments. Surely, such proposal could not have
converted him into a debtor in bad faith. The point of integrity raised by
respondent court appears a little harsh. Otherwise stated, We find the ground
for which petitioner has been removed to be rather precipitate. From which, it
results that the orders herein assailed constitute grave abuse of discretion
and should be set aside.
Accordingly, the petition is granted and the orders mentioned at the outset of
this decision are hereby set aside, without prejudice to respondent court
acting, as the facts and the law may warrant, on the new move of private
respondent for the removal of petitioner. The restraining order heretofore
issued is hereby lifted and respondent court is now free to act on all the
incidents for which leave of this Court is being sought in various motions to
that end. Costs against respondent.
Page 3 of 40
[2] G.R. No. L-27657 August 30, 1982
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE JULIANA
REYES, PAULINA SANTOS DE PARREÑO, special adminstratrix, vs.
GREGORIA ARANZANSO, appellant.
Succession; Motions; Ouster of a person of the right to intervene in an
intestate proceeding as an heir is not a ground for revocation of her authority to act
as an administrator of the estate.—It stands to reason that the appellant having been
appointed regular administrator of the intestate estate of Juliana Reyes may be
removed from her office but only for a cause or causes provided by law. What is the
law on removal? It is found in Rule 82, Section 2, of the Rules of Court which reads
as follows: x x x It is obvious that the decision of this Court, cited in the appealed
order, that Gregoria Aranzanso, among other persons, is without right to intervene as
heir in the settlement of the estate in question is not one of the grounds provided by
the Rules of Court.
Same; Same; Same.—The decision denied to Gregoria Aranzanso the right to
intervene in the settlement proceedings as an heir of Juliana Reyes. But an
administrator does not have to be an heir. He can be a stranger to the deceased. In
fact, in one of her motions Paulina Santos de Parreño proposed the appointment of
the Philippine National Bank as special administrator. (Record on Appeal, pp. 144-
146.) We hold that the intervention of Gregoria Aranzanso in the settlement
proceedings is not in the capacity of heir although she might be one if her direct
attack on the adoption of the two girls should succeed. We have authorized such
direct attack in G.R. No. L-26940.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:1äwphï1.ñët
This case is about the all-too-familiar problem as to who shall administer the
estate of the deceased. It exposes human nature in its most naked form —
acquisitive.
Juliana Reyes died intestate. Her substantial estate is still being settled in
Special Proceedings No. 34354 of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
Branch IV. The settlement has spawned a number of litigation which has
reached this Court and includes not only the instant case but also other
cases with the following docket numbers: 23828, 26940 and 27130.
The estate had only special administrators until Gregoria Aranzanso who
claims to be a first cousin of the decedent asked that she be appointed
regular administrator. Her motion provoked counter motions, oppositions,
replies, rebuttal and rejoinder which take up 120 pages of the printed record
₯Special Proceedings (Rule 82- Rule 83)
on appeal and which demonstrate the zeal of the various counsel in
espousing their clients claims to the estate which as aforesaid is substantial.
On January 29, 1966, the Court issued an order appointing Gregoria
Aranzanso as regular administrator and relieving Araceli A. Pilapil as special
administrator. The order reads:
This incident refers to the appointment of the regular
administrator or administratrix of this intestate of the late
Juliana Reyes de Santos.
This proceeding was instituted upon petition of the late
Simplicio Santos on November 25, 1957, after the death of
the decedent on October 21, same year. On August 22,
1959, Simplicio Santos was appointed as Special
Administrator with the bond of P5,000.00, and acted as such
until his death on July 1, 1962. A special proceeding was
likewise instituted for the settlement of his estate (Sp. Proc.
No. 50994, of this Court) by persons claiming to be the
children of Simplicio Santos, in which Dominador Santos and
Zenaida Diaz Vda, de Santos were appointed as
administrator and administratrix, respectively. On August 1,
1962, Araceli Pilapil was appointed special administratrix of
this intestate upon petition of the late Aurora Santos and
Paulina Santos. It appears that Araceli A. Pilapil has no
relation to the decedent, except as attorney-in-fact of Paulina
Santos.
On August 3, 1963, Filomena Santos de Lagunera through
counsel, filed a motion for the appointment of a regular
administrator. On December 13, 1963, this Court in an order
issued directed the parties to show cause why this case
should not be set for hearing for the appointment of a regular
administrator. Because of the length of time that had already
elapsed since the filing or institution of this proceeding on
November 25, 1957, without a regular administrator having
been appointed, this Court issued an order on October 4,
1965, ordering the setting of the case for hearing on October
11, 1965, for the appointment of the regular administrator or
administratrix.
On October 9, 1965, Paulina Santos filed a motion praying
that she be appointed as regular administratrix, but in the
interim apparently because she is out of the country, asked
Page 4 of 40
 that the special administratrix Araceli A. Pilapil be appointed
in the meantime. On October 9, 1965, the surviving spouse
of the late Simplicio Santos, Zenaida Diaz Vda. de Santos,
and her son, Simplicio Santos, Jr., filed a motion praying the
Court that Atty. Olimpio Capalungan be appointed as the
regular administrator. In the hearing on October 11, 1965,
the oppositors Consuelo and Pacita Pasion proposed the
appointment of the former as the regular administratrix
although in subsequent hearings withdrew in favor of
Gregorio Aranzanso. On October 12, 1965, oppositor
Gregorio Aranzanso proposed that she or her son-in-law
Manuel Cariaga be appointed as the regular administrator or
administratrix, as the case may be. The oppositors are the
nearest surviving relatives of the decedent Juliana Reyes
who died without issue, being first cousin. In the hearing of
October 15, 1965, persons claiming to be the children of
Simplicio Santos proposed the appointment of Dominador
Santos as the regular administrator.
Hearings were held and the parties adduced their respective
evidence to support their contentions, but only the oppositors
presented oral evidence to show that the properties under
administration are the paraphernal or exclusive properties of
the decedent Juliana Reyes. To further support their
contention the oppositors presented numerous exhibits
consisting of certified true copies of torrens titles issued in
the name of the decedent Juliana Reyes. Paulina Santos
adopted most of these exhibits presented by the oppositors
and objected to some, while the heirs of Simplicio Santos
adopted also some of the exhibits presented by the
oppositors and adduced four (4) exhibits, to support their
contention.
It appears from the evidence presented that the properties
under administration are the paraphernal properties of
Juliana Reyes, but there are also evidence that the late
Simplicio Santos, through a general power of attorney,
allegedly sold some lots owned by the decedent Juliana
Reyes Santos to Paulina Santos, Dominador Santos,
Eduvigis Santos, and a certain Jose F. Sugay. All these lots
numbering six in all were later on reconveyed by the
aforementioned alleged vendees to Simplicio Santos. The
evidence further shows that Paulina Santos and the late
Simplicio Santos, while this proceeding had already been
instituted and in utter disregard of the law, executed on May
12, 1958, "Extra-Judicial Partition with Sale" covering a
₯Special Proceedings (Rule 82- Rule 83)
property of the decedent in Baguio City. The oppositors
claim that these sales are fictitious and would, together with
the said extra-judicial partition, automatically disqualify
Paulina Santos, Dominador Santos and Atty. Olimpio
Kapalungan to be appointed as regular administrator or
administratrix of this intestate as obviously they have
adverse interests against the estate. If appointed as regular
administrator or administratrix, naturally they will not institute
proceedings to recover those properties which were illegally
transferred or sold. This leaves only oppositor Gregoria
Aranzanso as the person most qualified to be appointed
regular administratrix.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby appoints Gregoria
Aranzanso as the regular administratrix of this intestate
estate with a bond of P15,000.00, and upon submission and
approval thereof, let letters of administration issue. ....
Motions for reconsideration of the order were filed but the presiding judge
held firm "considering that most of the movants have adverse interests
against this intestate estate." (Order of February 16,1966, pp- 140-141,
Record on Appeal.)
But the opposition was persistent; it refused to give in. And so on June 20,
1966, the court which incidentally was presided by a different judge issued an
order which reads as follows: 1äwphï1.ñët
On May 26, 1966, the petitioner Paulina R. Santos de
Parreño filed an omnibus motion for an order: 1äwphï1.ñët
(1) Declaring that the oppositors Gregoria
Aranzanso, Demetria Ventura, Consuelo
Pasion and Pacita Pasion have no right to
intervene in this intestate estate proceeding;
(2) Ordering Gregoria Aranzanso and
Demetria Ventura to return to the estate the
sum of P14,000.00 received by them with
the authority of this Court;
(3) Revoking the appointment of Gregoria
Aranzanso as regular administratrix and
ordering her to render an accounting of her
administration;
Page 5 of 40
 (4) Appointing the petitioner Paulina R.
Santos de Parreno special administratrix of
the intestate estate of her late mother,
Juliana Reyes de Santos; and
(5) Revoking the previous order of May 9,
1966 allowing the regular administratrix to
make extensive repairs on the building
belonging to the estate situated at the
corners of Barbosa and R. Hidalgo Streets,
Quiapo, Manila, and ordering her to return to
the estate the sum of P28,040.00 which she
was authorized to withdraw from the funds
of the estate deposited with the Philippine
Trust Company.
In view of the decision of the Honorable Supreme Court
rendered on February 28, 1966 in S.C. G.R. No. L-23828,
'Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos vs. Gregoria Aranzanso,
et al,' which decision declared that the oppositors Gregoria
Aranzanso, Demetria Ventura, Consuelo Pasion and Pacita
Pasion are without right to intervene as heirs in the
settlement of the estate in question and that said oppositors
were enjoined permanently from withdrawing any sum from
the estate in the concept of the heirs and from intervening in
this proceeding, and which judgment of the Supreme Court
has already become final and executory, the oppositors
aforementioned, more specially the administratrix Gregoria
Aranzanso, have lost their right to intervene in this case and
the latter to perform any act of administration in the present
proceeding. As a matter of fact, if we have to construe strictly
the mandate of the aforementioned judgment of the
appellate Court, it would seem that the oppositors never had
any right at all to intervene in this case. Such being the case,
the Court after weighing carefully the circumstances
surrounding this case, has arrived at the conclusion that the
aforementioned decision of the appellate Court has stripped
off the oppositors of any semblance of personality which they
may have acquired in this instant proceeding.
WHEREFORE, and finding the omnibus motion filed by
Paulina R. Santos de Parreño on May 26, 1966 to be well-
taken, the same is hereby granted.
The oppositors Gregorio Aranzanso, Demetria Ventura,
Consuelo Pasion and Pacita Pasion are declared to be
₯Special Proceedings (Rule 82- Rule 83)
without any right to intervene in this intestate proceeding
and, henceforth they should not be allowed to take part
therein.
GREGORIA ARANZANSO and Demetria Ventura are
ordered to return to the estate the sum of P14,000.00 which
they received by virtue of the order of this Court dated
October 2, 1965.
The appointment of Gregoria Aranzanso as regular
administratrix pursuant to the order of this Court dated
January 29, 1966 is revoked and she is ordered to render a
final account of her administration within ten (10) days from
receipt hereof.
Paulina R. Santos de Parreno is appointed special
administratrix of the intestate estate of the late Juliana Reyes
de Santos and upon her filing a bond in the amount of
P2,000.00 and the corresponding oath of office, letters of
special administration be issued to her. ....
A motion for reconsideration of the order was denied which prompted
Gregoria Aranzanso to appeal the order to this Court with a lone assignment
of error, to wit: 1äwphï1.ñët
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REMOVING THE
APPELLANT AS REGULAR ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE
INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE JULIANA REYES AND
THE REVOCATION OF HER APPOINTMENT IS
CONTRARY TO LAW.
There is merit in the appeal, As indicated in the lone assignment of error, the
only issue in this appeal, is whether or not the lower court was justified in
revoking the appointment of Gregoria Aranzanso as the administrator of the
intestate estate of Juliana Reyes. Alien to the issue is the question of
preference — whether it should be Gregoria Aranzanso who is a first cousin
of the decedent or Paulina Santos de Parreño who is an adopted child of the
decedent — in receiving letters of administration.
It stands to reason that the appellant having been appointed regular
administrator of the intestate estate of Juliana Reyes may be removed from
her office but only for a cause or causes provided by law. What is the law on
removal? It is found in Rule 82, Section 2, of the Rules of Court which reads
as follows: 1äwphï1.ñët
Page 6 of 40
 Sec. 2. Court may remove or accept resignation of executor
or administrator. Proceedings upon death, resignation, or
removal.— If an executor or administrator neglects to render
his account and settle the estate according to law, or to
perform an order or judgment of the court, or a duty
expressly provided by these rules, or absconds or becomes
insane, or otherwise incapable or unsuitable to discharge the
trust, the court may remove him, or, in its discretion, may
permit him to resign. When an executor or administrator
dies, resigns, or is removed the remaining executor or
administrator may administer the trust alone, unless the
court grants letters to someone to act with him. If there is no
remaining executor or administrator, administration may be
granted to any suitable person.
It is obvious that the decision of this Court, cited in the appealed order, that
Gregoria Aranzanso, among other persons, is without right to intervene as
heir in the settlement of the estate in question is not one of the grounds
provided by the Rules of Court.
Let it be recalled that in G.R. No. L-23828, Paulina Santos, et al. vs. Gregoria
Aranzanso, et al., 123 Phil. 160 (1966), a collateral attack on the adoption of
the two girls was not allowed under the following facts:
When Juliana Reyes died intestate, Simplicio Santos filed in the Court of First
Instance of Manila a petition for the settlement of her estate. In said petition
he stated among other things that the surviving heirs of the deceased are:
he, as surviving spouse, Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos, 27 and 17 years
of age, respectively. In the same petition, he asked that he be appointed
administrator of the estate.
Gregoria Aranzanso, alleging that she is first cousin to the deceased, filed an
opposition to the petition for appointment of administrator. For her grounds
she asserted that Simplicio Santos' marriage to the late Juliana Reyes was
bigamous and thus void; and that the adoption of Paulina Santos and Aurora
Santos was likewise void ab initio for want of the written consent of their
parents who were then living and had not abandoned them.
The Court of First Instance decided the point in dispute, ruling that the validity
of the adoption in question could not be assailed collaterally in the intestate
proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. 34354). The order was appealed to the Court of
Appeals.
The Court of Appeals reversed the appealed order, finding instead that the
adoption was null and void ab initio due to the absence of consent thereto by
₯Special Proceedings (Rule 82- Rule 83)
the natural parents of the minor children, which it deemed a jurisdictional
defect still open to collateral attack.
Stating that, "The principal issue on the merits in this appeal is whether
respondents-oppositors Aranzanso and Ventura, could assail in the
settlement proceedings the adoption decree in favor of Paulina and Aurora
Santos," this Court gave a negative answer.
Thereafter, this Court rendered judgment which insofar as relevant reads as
follows: 1äwphï1.ñët
Wherefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is hereby
reversed and the order of the probate court a quo sustaining
the adoption, dated April 6, 1959, is affirmed. Respondents
Gregoria Aranzanso and Demetria Ventura as well as
Consuelo and Pacita Pasion are declared without right to
intervene as heirs in the settlement of the intestate estate of
Juliana Reyes. ....
The decision denied to Gregoria Aranzanso the right to intervene in the
settlement proceedings as an heir of Juliana Reyes. But an administrator
does not have to be an heir. He can be a stranger to the deceased. In fact, in
one of her motions Paulina Santos de Parreno proposed the appointment of
the Philippine National Bank as special administrator. (Record on Appeal, pp.
144-146.) We hold that the intervention of Gregoria Aranzanso in the
settlement proceedings is not in the capacity of heir although she might be
one if her direct attack on the adoption of the two girls should succeed. We
have authorized such direct attack in G.R. No. L-26940.
WHEREFORE, the order of June 20, 1966, removing Gregoria Aranzanso as
administrator is hereby set aside and she is reinstated as administrator of the
intestate estate of Juliana Reyes. Cost against the appellee.
SO ORDERED.
Page 7 of 40
[3] G.R. No. L-2804            September 20, 1949
In re Petition for probate and administration of the will of Paula
Tiangco, deceased. MANUEL EUGENIO, petitioner-appellant, vs. JOSE
TIANGCO, oppositor-appellee.
1. JUDGMBNT; "RES JUDICATA"; ONCE AN ISSUE Is FINALLY DECIDED,
IT CANNOT BE LITIGATED ANEW.—Once an issue in a case has been raised and
finally decided, it cannot be litigated anew.
2. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ; EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS;
ADMINISTRATION REVOKED IP WlLL DlSCOVEREDJ SECTION 1, RULE
83, INTERPRETED.—Section 1 of Rule 83 of the Rules of Court clearly means that
notwithstanding the letters of administration issued in an intestate proceeding, if any
interested party could produce a will of the deceased and could prove its due
execution, letters testamentary or of administration would be issued and that the one
previously granted would, accordingly, be revoked.
OZAETA, J.:
Paula Tiangco died in Malabon, Rizal, on September 27, 1947, leaving
properties allegedly worth less than P30,000. She is survived by her husband
Dr. Benito Cruz, a sister, and nine nephews and nieces.
In or about October, 1947, Jose Tiangeo, one of the surviving nephews,
instituted intestate proceeding No. 442 in the Court of First Instance of Rizal
and applied for letters of administration of the estate of the deceased. Manuel
Eugenio, Purificacion Eugenia, Abelardo Eugenia and Milagros Eugenio,
other nephews and nieces of the deceased, opposed Tiangco's petition for
letters of administration, alleging that the deceased in her lifetime had
executed a will which, according to their knowledge, information, and belief,
was then in the possession of the surviving husband, Dr. Benito, Cruz, and
prayed that the latter be required to produce the last will and testament of the
deceased for probate by the court.
In view of that allegation, Judge Oscar Castelo ordered Dr. Benito Cruz to
appear before the court on November 27, 1947, at nine a. m., and to produce
the last will and testament of Paula Tiangco. In compliance with that order Dr.
Benito Cruz appeared before the court and manifested that he had no
knowledge of the existence of the alleged will and that he never had it in his
possession. In view of that manifestation the court ordered the oppositor
Manuel Eugenio to present evidence of the existence and due execution of
the alleged will.
₯Special Proceedings (Rule 82- Rule 83)
After hearing the evidence adduced by the oppositor, Judge Castelo entered
an order on December 20, 1947, declaring that it had not been proven that
the deceased Paula Tiangco had left a will and appointing Jose Tiangco
administrator of the properties left by her.
Instead of appealing from said order Manuel Eugenio, on January 24, 1948,
filed a petition in the same court for the "probate and administration of the will
of Paula Tiangco," alleging that the deceased executed a last will and
testament sometime in the year 1943 and that said last will and testament
"has been and still is in the possession of her surviving husband, Dr. Benito
Cruz," and praying that the latter be ordered to produce and present to the
court the last will and testament of the deceased Paula Tiangco so that it
might be probated, and that letters testamentary be issued to the petitioner,
In view of that petition Judge Ambrosio Santos ordered Dr. Benito Cruz to
deliver said last will and testament to the clerk of court within five days.
The respondent Dr. Benito Cruz informed the court in writing that he had no
knowledge of the existence of the alleged will and that he never had it in his
custody; that the nonexistence of said will was res judicata, the same
question having been submitted to and decided by the court in intestate
proceeding No. 442, from which decision or order the petitioner Manuel
Eugenio had not appealed. In view thereof, respondent Benito Cruz asked for
the dismissal of the petition for probate. To said petition for dismissal the
respondent attached the pleadings, the transcript of the evidence, and the
order of Judge Castelo in intestate proceeding No. 442.
After considering the written arguments of both parties on the motion for
dismissal, Judge Ambrosio Santos entered an order sustaining said motion
and dismissing the petition for probate. The case is now before us on appeal
from said order.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his petition for
probate, and cites section 1 of Rule 83, which reads as follows:
SECTION 1. Administration revoked if will discovered. Proceedings
thereupon. — If after letters of administration have been granted on
the estate of decedent as if he had died intestate, his will is proved
and allowed by the court, the letters of administration shall be
revoked and all powers thereunder cease, and the administrator shall
forthwith surrender the letters to the court, and render his account
within such time as the court directs. Proceedings for the issuance of
letters testamentary or of administration under the will shall be as
hereinbefore provided.
Page 8 of 40
There can be no question that under the above-quoted provision of the Rules
of Court, if the appellant had found the alleged will and had proved its due
execution, the letters of administration issued to the herein appellee Jose
Tiangco in intestate proceedings No. 442 would have been revoked and said
intestate proceeding would have been converted into a testamentary
proceeding. But appellant had not done so. He did not even allege that he
had found the supposed will. In his petition for probate he merely repeated
and sought to litigate anew his contention in intestate proceeding No. 442
that the surviving husband, Benito Cruz, had the alleged will in his
possession and again asked the court to order him to produce it.

Having been raised in issue and finally decided adversely to the herein
appellant in intestate proceeding No. 442, that same question of whether or
not Benito Cruz had the alleged will in his possession cannot be litigated
anew. To countenance the procedure adopted by the appellant would be to
permit him to trifle with the court and harass his opponent.

There is no analogy between the present case and that of Cartajena vs.
Lijauco and Zaballa, 38 Phil., 620, cited and relied upon by the appellant. The
question presented in that case, as stated by the Court, was: "May an
administrator of an estate of a deceased person continue to administer the
estate after a will of such deceased is proved and allowed?" In that case,
pending petition by Lijauco and Zaballa for the appointment of an
administrator of the estate of the deceased Tomasa Nepomuceno, Cartajena
presented a will in the court and asked that it be admitted to probate. Lijauco
and Zaballa were appointed administrators, but after the will was admitted to
probate the letters of administration theretofore granted to Lijauco and
Zaballa were revoked, in conformity with section 657 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, now section 1 of Rule 83.

Counsel for the appellant has misunderstood the abovecited rule. Applied to
this case, it clearly means that notwithstanding the letters of administration
issued in intestate proceedings No. 442, if the appellant or any other
interested party could produce a will of the deceased and could prove its due
execution, letters testamentary or of administration would be issued and the
appointment of appellee Jose Tiangco as administrator would be revoked.
The order appealed from is affirmed, with costs.

₯Special Proceedings (Rule 82- Rule 83) Page 9 of 40

[4]G.R. No. 74618. September 2, 1992.
ANA LIM KALAW, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, THE HONORABLE RICARDO B. DIAZ and ROSA
LIM KALAW, Respondents.
Special Proceedings; Settlement of Estate; Accountability of Administrator;
Rendering of an accounting by an administrator of his administration within one
year from his appointment is mandatory.—The rendering of an accounting by an
administrator of his administration within one year from his appointment is
mandatory, as shown by the use of the word “shall” in said rule. The only exception
is when the Court otherwise directs because of extensions of time for presenting
claims against the estate or for paying the debts or disposing the assets of the estate,
which do not exist in the case at bar. Furthermore, petitioner’s excuse that the sala
where the intestate proceeding was pending was vacant most of the time deserves
scant consideration since petitioner never attempted to file with said court an
accounting report of her administration despite the fact that at one time or another,
Judge Sundiam and Judge Tiongco were presiding over said sala during their
incumbency. Likewise, her subsequent compliance in rendering an accounting report
did not purge her of her negligence in not rendering an accounting for more than six
years, which justifies petitioner’s removal as administratrix and the appointment of
private respondent in her place as mandated by Section 2 of Rule 82 of the Rules of
Court.
DECISION
NOCON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary
injunction to annul and set aside the decision dated December 27, 1985 of
the then Intermediate Appellate Court 1 affirming the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27 in Special Proceeding No. 84520 removing
petitioner Ana Lim Kalaw as administratrix and appointing private respondent
Rosa Lim Kalaw in her stead as the administratrix of the estate of their late
father Carlos Lim Kalaw.
It appears on record that Carlos Lim Kalaw died intestate on July 8,
1970.chanrobles.com:
On June 8, 1972, Victoria Lim Kalaw filed an amended petition for the
issuance of Letters of Administration with the then Court of First Instance of
Manila in Special Proceeding No. 84520 naming Ana Lim Kalaw (63 years
₯Special Proceedings (Rule 82- Rule 83)
old), Victoria Lim Kalaw (57 years old), Pura Lim Kalaw (53 years old) and
Rosa Lim Kalaw (43 years old) as the surviving heirs of the late Carlos Lim
Kalaw.
On April 25, 1974, the trial court issued an order appointing petitioner Ana
Lim Kalaw as special administratrix. Consequently, petitioner filed a
preliminary inventory of all the properties which came into her possession as
special administratrix of the estate of her late father on June 3, 1974.
On October 6, 1977, the trial court issued another order appointing petitioner
as the judicial administratrix of said estate and a Letter of Administration was
issued to the petitioner after the latter took her oath of office on November
11, 1977.
Thereafter, Jose Lim filed a motion to require petitioner to render an
accounting of her administration of said estate which was granted by
respondent Judge Ricardo Diaz in an order dated December 8, 1982.
On July 1, 1983, respondent judge issued another order requiring petitioner
to render an accounting of her administration with the express instruction that
said order be personally served upon the petitioner since the order dated
December 8, 1982 was returned to the Court unserved. However, said order
was also not received by the petitioner.
On January 31, 1984, private respondent Rosa Lim Kalaw together with her
sisters Victoria and Pura Lim Kalaw filed a motion to remove petitioner as
administratrix of their father’s estate and to appoint instead private
respondent on the ground of negligence on the part of petitioner in her duties
for failing to render an accounting of her administration since her
appointment as administratrix more than six years ago in violation of Section
8 of Rule 85 of the Revised Rules of Court. The motion was set for hearing
on February 10, 1984.
On February 21, 1984, respondent judge issued another order requiring
petitioner to render an accounting within 30 days from receipt thereof which
she did on March 22, 1984. She likewise filed on the same date, her
Opposition to the motion praying for her removal as administratrix alleging
that the delay in rendering said accounting was due to the fact that Judge
Carlos Sundiam, who was the judge where the intestate proceeding was
assigned, had then been promoted to the Court of Appeals causing said sala
to be vacated for a considerable length of time, while newly-appointed Judge
Joel Tiongco died of cardiac arrest soon after his appointment to said
vacancy, so much so that she did not know to whom to render an accounting
report.
In their Rejoinder and Manifestation, private respondent and her co-movant
Page 10 of 40
alleged that the ground relied upon for petitioner’s removal was not the delay
but her failure or neglect to render an accounting of all the properties which
came into her possession as required under Section 1 of Rule 83 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
On January 4, 1985, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
"From the foregoing, the Court finds that Administratrix Ana Lim Kalaw
violated the provisions of Section 8, Rule 85 of the Rules of Court for not
rendering an account of her administration within one (1) year from date of
receipt of the letters of administration and this constitutes negligence on her
part to perform her duty as Administratrix and under Section 2, Rule 82 of the
Rules of Court, neglect on the part of the administratrix to render her account
is a ground for her removal as an administratrix. Finding the instant motion to
remove Administratrix to be meritorious and well-taken, the same is, as it is
hereby, GRANTED.
WHEREFORE, Administratrix Ana Lim Kalaw is hereby REMOVED as such
Administratrix of the Estate of the late Carlos Lim Kalaw." 2
On September 2, 1985, Petitioner, without waiting for the resolution of the
motion for reconsideration with the trial court, filed a Petition for Certiorari
with Preliminary Injunction or Restraining Order with the then Intermediate
Appellate Court to annul and set aside the following Orders issued by
respondent Judge Diaz, as follows:
"a. Order dated January 4, 1985 removing the Petitioner as Administratrix of
the estate of the late Carlos Lim Kalaw;
b. Order dated April 30, 1985 denying Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration
of the Order of January 4, 1985;
c. Order dated May 13, 1985 appointing private Respondent Rosa Lim
Kalaw, as Administratrix of said Estate;
d. Order dated June 19, 1985 directing the tenants and/or lessees of the
Carlos Lim Kalaw building to deposit the rentals in court and authorizing
private respondent to break open the premises in said building." 3
On December 27, 1985, the appellate court rendered a decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads: "WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is
DENIED. However, respondent Judge is directed to require private
respondent Rosa Lim Kalaw to post the appropriate administrator’s bond
within ten (10) days from notice hereof. With costs against petitioner." 4
On January 21, 1986, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said
decision which was however denied for lack of merit on May 12, 1986.
₯Special Proceedings (Rule 82- Rule 83)
Hence, this petition alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
appellate court in sustaining respondent Judge Diaz’ order removing her as
judicial administratrix considering that she had already submitted an
accounting report covering the period from December, 1977 to December,
1983 in compliance with respondent’s Judge order.
Section 8 of Rule 85 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that:
"SEC. 8. When executor or administrator to render account. — Every
executor or administrator shall render an account of his administration within
one (1) year from the time of receiving letters testamentary or of
administration, unless the court otherwise directs because of extensions of
time for presenting claims against, or paying the debts of, the estate, or for
disposing of the estate; and he shall render such further accounts as the
court may require until the estate is wholly settled." chanrobles law library
The rendering of an accounting by an administrator of his administration
within one year from his appointment is mandatory, as shown by the use of
the word "shall" in said rule. The only exception is when the Court otherwise
directs because of extensions of time for presenting claims against the estate
or for paying the debts or disposing the assets of the estate, which do not
exist in the case at bar.
Furthermore, petitioner’s excuse that the sala where the intestate proceeding
was pending was vacant most of the time deserves scant consideration since
petitioner never attempted to file with said court an accounting report of her
administration despite the fact that at one time or another, Judge Sundiam
and Judge Tiongco were presiding over said sala during their incumbency.
Likewise, her subsequent compliance in rendering an accounting report did
not purge her of her negligence in not rendering an accounting for more than
six years, which justifies petitioner’s removal as administratrix and the
appointment of private respondent in her place as mandated by Section 2 of
Rule 82 of the Rules of Court. 5
As correctly stated by the appellate court:
"The settled rule is that the removal of an administrator under Section 2 of
Rule 82 lies within the discretion of the Court appointing him. As aptly
expressed by the Supreme Court in the case of Degala v. Ceniza and
Umipig, 78 Phil. 791, ‘the sufficiency of any ground for removal should thus
be determined by said court, whose sensibilities are, in the first place,
affected by any act or omission on the part of the administrator not
comfortable to or in disregard of the rules or the orders of the court.’
Consequently, appellate tribunals are disinclined to interfere with the action
taken by a probate court in the matter of the removal of an executor or
administrator unless positive error or gross abuse of discretion is shown.
Page 11 of 40
In the case at bar, the removal of petitioner as administratrix was on the
ground of her failure for 6 years and 3 months from the time she was
appointed as administratrix to render an accounting of her administration as
required by Section 8 of Rule 85 of the Rules of Court." 6

As to petitioner’s contention that she was denied due process when she was
removed as administratrix since no hearing was held on the motion for her
removal, this does not deserve serious consideration. The appellate court’s
disposal of this issue is in accordance with the law and evidence. Said the
Court: "Petitioner’s contention that her removal was without due process is
certainly not borne out by the records. There has been a hearing and, in fact,
several pleadings had been filed by the parties on the issue before the order
of removal was issued. Thus, the motion to remove petitioner as
administratrix was filed on January 3, 1984, which motion was set for hearing
on February 10, 1984. Petitioner filed an opposition to the motion on March
22, 1984. This was followed by a Rejoinder and Manifestation filed on April 6,
1984 by private Respondent. The order for petitioner’s removal was issued
on January 4, 1985, or after almost a year from the time the motion to
remove her was filed. Not satisfied with this order, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration on January 14, 1985, to which motion private respondent
filed an opposition on January 25, 1985. Petitioner filed a rejoinder to the
opposition on February 18, 1985. Respondent Judge issued his order
denying the motion for reconsideration on April 30, 1985. This recital of
events indubitably disproves petitioner’s allegation that she was not afforded
due process." 7
WHEREFORE, finding no merit in the petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with preliminary injunction, the same is hereby DENIED. Costs
against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

₯Special Proceedings (Rule 82- Rule 83) Page 12 of 40

[5] G.R. No. 74769 September 28, 1990
BEATRIZ F. GONZALES, petitioner, vs. HON. ZOILO AGUINALDO, Judge
of Regional Trial Court, Branch 143, Makati, Metro Manila and TERESA
F. OLBES, respondents.
Special Proceedings; Settlement of Estate; Appointment of Administrator; The
principal consideration in the appointment of an administrator of the estate of a
deceased person is the interest in said estate of the one to be appointed as
administrator.—ln the appointment of the administrator of the estate of a deceased
person, the principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the
one to be appointed as administrator. This is the same consideration which Section 6
of Rule 78 takes into account in establishing the order of preference in the
appointment of administrators for the estate. The underlying assumption behind this
rule is that those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy, economical
administration of the estate, or, on the other hand, suffer the consequences of waste,
improvidence or mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential
motive to administer the estate correctly.
Same; Same; Same; To justify removal of an administrator, there must be
evidence of an act or omission on the part of the administrator not conformable to or
in disregard of the rules or the orders of the court.—While it is conceded that the
court is invested with ample discretion in the removal of an administrator, it however
must have some fact legally before it in order to justify a removal. There must be
evidence of an act or omission on the part of the administrator not conformable to or
in disregard of the rules or the orders of the court, which it deems sufficient or
substantial to warrant the removal of the administrator. In making such a
determination, the court must exercise good judgment, guided by law and precedents.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A temporary residence outside of the state,
maintained for the benefit of the health of the executors' family, is not such a
removal from the state as to necessitate his removal as executor.—The above facts,
we note, show that petitioner had never abandoned her role as co-administratrix of
the estate nor had she been remiss in the fulfillment of her duties. Suffice it to state,
temporary absence in the state does not disqualify one to be an administrator of the
estate. Thus, as held in re Mc Knight's Will, a temporary residence outside of the
state, maintained for the benefit of the health of the executors' family, is not such a
removal from the state as to necessitate his removal as executor. "x x x. It seems
quite clear that a temporary absence from the state on account of ill health, or on
account of business, or for purposes of travel or pleasure, would not necessarily
establish the fact that an executor 'has removed' from the estate, within the intent of
the statute. The learned surrogate was evidently satisfied that the sojourn of these
executors in New Jersey was nothing more than a departure from the state for the
benefit of relatives, not designed to constitute a permanent change of abode, and
contemplating a return to New York as soon as the purpose of their absence should
be accomplished. In this view, I am inclined to think that he was right in refusing to
₯Special Proceedings (Rule 82- Rule 83)
hold that he was constrained to revoke the letters by the provisions of the Code to
which I have referred. I therefore advise an affirmance of the order."
Same; Same; Same; Same; Removal of an administrator does not lie on the
whims, caprices and dictates of the heirs or beneficiaries of the estate, nor on the
belief of the court that it would result in orderly and efficient administration.—
Finally, it seems that the court a quo seeks refuge in the fact that two (2) of the other
three (3) heirs of the estate of the deceased (Teresa Olbes and Cecilia Favis Gomez)
have opposed the retention or re-appointment of petitioner as co-administratrix of the
estate. Suffice it to state that the removal of an administrator does not lie on the
whims, caprices and dictates of the heirs or beneficiaries of the estate, nor on the
belief of the court that it would result in orderly and efficient administration. In re
William's Adm'r., the court held: "A county court having appointed a stranger
administrator as expressly authorized by Ky. St. 3897, after the relatives of decedent
had lost their right of precedence, could not remove the appointee merely because of
the request of relatives and the belief upon the part of the court that the best interest
of deceased would be thereby subserved, since the administrator had such an interest
as entitled him to protection from removal without cause."
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari which seeks to annul, on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion, the Order of the respondent Judge, dated 15 January
1985, cancelling the appointment of the petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales as a
co-administratrix in Special Proceedings No. 021 entitled "In the Matter of the
Intestate Estate of Ramona Gonzales Vda. de Favis," Branch 143, RTC,
Makati, Metro Manila; and the Order of 15 May 1985 denying reconsideration
of the same.
The facts are:
Special Proceedings No. 021, pending before the court a quo, is an intestate
proceeding involving the estate of the deceased Doña Ramona Gonzales
Vda. de Favis. Doña Ramona is survived by her four (4) children who are her
only heirs, namely, Asterio Favis, Beatriz F. Gonzales, Teresa F. Olbes, and
Cecilia Favis-Gomez.
On 25 October 1983, the court a quo appointed petitioner Beatriz F.
Gonzales and private respondent Teresa Olbes as co-administratices of the
estate.
On 11 November 1984, while petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales was in the
United States accompanying her ailing husband who was receiving medical
treatment in that country, private respondent Teresa Olbes filed a motion,
dated 26 November 1984, to remove Beatriz F. Gonzales as co-
Page 13 of 40
administratrix, on the ground that she is incapable or unsuitable to discharge
the trust and had committed acts and omissions detrimental to the interest of
the estate and the heirs. Copy of said motion was served upon petitioner's
then counsel of record, Atty. Manuel Castro who, since 2 June 1984, had
been suspended by the Supreme Court from the practice of law throughout
the Philippines. 1
After the filing of private respondent's aforesaid motion, respondent Judge
Zoilo Aguinaldo issued an Order dated 4 December 1984 which required
Beatriz F. Gonzales and the other parties to file their opposition, if any,
thereto. Only Asterio Favis opposed the removal of Beatriz F. Gonzales as
co-administratrix, as the latter was still in the United States attending to her
ailing husband.
In an Order dated 15 January 1985, respondent Judge cancelled the letters
of administration granted to Beatriz F. Gonzales and retained Teresa Olbes
as the administratrix of the estate of the late Ramona Gonzales. The Court,
in explaining its action, stated:
. . . In appointing them, the court was of the opinion that it
would be to the best interest of the estate if two
administrators who are the children of the deceased would
jointly administer the same. Unfortunately, as events have
shown, the two administrators have not seen eye to eye with
each other and most of the time they have been at
loggerheads with each other to the prejudice of the estate.
Beatriz F. Gonzales has been absent from the country since
October, 1984 as she is in the United States as stated in the
motion and opposition of Asterio Favis dated December 11,
1984, and she has not returned even up to this date so that
Teresa F. Olbes has been left alone to administer the estate.
Under these circumstances, and in order that the estate will
be administered in an orderly and efficient manner, the court
believes that there should be now only one administrator of
the estate. 2
Petitioner moved to reconsider the Order of 15 January 1985. Her motion
was opposed separately by private respondent Teresa Olbes and another co-
heir Cecilia Gomez. In her manifestation and opposition to petitioner's motion
for reconsideration, Cecilia Gomez stated that it would be pointless to re-
appoint Beatriz F. Gonzales as co-administratrix of Teresa Olbes, as the
former would be leaving soon for the United States to attend to unfinished
business. Moreover, she expressed satisfaction with the manner respondent
Teresa Olbes had been managing and administering the estate.
₯Special Proceedings (Rule 82- Rule 83)
In his Order dated 7 May 1986, a part of which is hereunder quoted,
respondent Judge denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration for lack of
merit. He said:
xxx xxx xxx
After a consideration of the motion for reconsideration and
the oppositions thereto, the court believes and so holds that
it should be denied. The court in its discretion has issued its
order dated January 15, 1985 cancelling the appointment
and the letters of administration issued to Beatriz F.
Gonzales and it reiterates the same for the best interest of
the estate of the deceased. It is noteworthy that of the four
heirs of the deceased, one of them being the movant Beatriz
F. Gonzales, two of them, namely, Cecilia F. Gomez and
Teresa F. Olbes, opposed the motion. The other heir Asterio
Favis, did not file or make any comment to the motion. As
can be gathered from the oppositions of Cecilia F. Gomez
and Teresa F. Olbes, the reappointment of Beatriz F.
Gonzales as a co-administratrix would not be conducive to
the efficient and orderly administration of the estate of the
deceased Ramona Gonzales vda. de Favis. 3
Petitioner contends before this Court that respondent Judge's Order dated 15
January 1985 should be nullified on the ground of grave abuse of discretion,
as her removal was not shown by respondents to be anchored on any of the
grounds provided under Section 2, Rule 82, Rules of Court, which states:
Sec. 2. Court may remove or accept resignation of executor
or administrator. Proceedings upon death, resignation or
removal — If an executor or administrator neglects to render
his account and settle the estate according to law, or to
perform an order or judgment of the court, or a duty
expressly provided by these rules, or absconds, or becomes
insane, or otherwise incapable or unsuitable to discharge the
trust, the court may remove him, or in its discretion, may
permit him to resign. . . .
While appellate courts are generally disinclined to interfere with the action
taken by the probate court in the matter of removal of an administrator, 4 we
find, in the case at bar, sufficient cause to reverse the order of the probate
court removing petitioner as co-administratrix of the estate.
The rule is that if no executor is named in the will, or the named executor or
executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person
Page 14 of 40
dies intestate, the court must appoint an administrator of the estate of the
deceased 5 who shall act as representative not only of the court appointing
him but also of the heirs and the creditors of the estate. 6 In the exercise of its
discretion, the probate court may appoint one, two or more co-administrators
to have the benefit of their judgment and perhaps at all times to have
different interests represented. 7
In the appointment of the administrator of the estate of a deceased person,
the principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the
one to be appointed as administrator. 8 This is the same consideration which
Section 6 of Rule 78 takes into account in establishing the order of
preference in the appointment of administrators for the estate. The underlying
assumption behind this rule is that those who will reap the benefit of a wise,
speedy, economical administration of the estate, or, on the other hand, suffer
the consequences of waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have the
highest interest and most influential motive to administer the estate correctly. 9
Administrators have such an interest in the execution of their trust as entitle
them to protection from removal without just cause. 10 Hence, Section 2 of
Rule 82 of the Rules of Court provides the legal and specific causes
authorizing the court to remove an administrator. 11
While it is conceded that the court is invested with ample discretion in the
removal of an administrator, it however must have some fact legally before it
in order to justify a removal. There must be evidence of an act or omission on
the part of the administrator not conformable to or in disregard of the rules or
the orders of the court, which it deems sufficient or substantial to warrant the
removal of the administrator. In making such a determination, the court must
exercise good judgment, guided by law and precedents.
In the present case, the court a quo did not base the removal of the petitioner
as co-administratrix on any of the causes specified in respondent's motion for
relief of the petitioner. Neither did it dwell on, nor determine the validity of the
charges brought against petitioner by respondent Olbes. The court based the
removal of the petitioner on the fact that in the administration of the estate,
conflicts and misunderstandings have existed between petitioner and
respondent Teresa Olbes which allegedly have prejudiced the estate, and the
added circumstance that petitioner had been absent from the country since
October 1984, and up to 15 January 1985, the date of the questioned order.
Certainly, it is desirable that the administration of the deceased's estate be
marked with harmonious relations between co-administrators. But for mere
disagreements between such joint fiduciaries, without misconduct, one's
removal is not favored. 12 Conflicts of opinion and judgment naturally, and,
perhaps inevitably, occur between persons with different interests in the
₯Special Proceedings (Rule 82- Rule 83)
same estate. Such conflicts, if unresolved by the co-administrators, can be
resolved by the probate court to the best interest of the estate and its heirs.
We, like petitioner, find of material importance the fact that the court a quo
failed to find hard facts showing that the conflict and disharmony between the
two (2) co-administratrices were unjustly caused by petitioner, or that
petitioner was guilty of incompetence in the fulfillment of her duties, or
prevented the management of the estate according to the dictates of
prudence, or any other act or omission showing that her continuance as co-
administratrix of the estate materially endangers the interests of the estate.
Petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales is as interested as respondent Olbes and the
other heirs in that the properties of the estate be duly administered and
conserved for the benefit of the heirs; and there is as yet no ground to
believe that she has prejudiced or is out to prejudice said estate to warrant
the probate court into removing petitioner as co-administratrix.
Respondent Judge removed petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales as co-
administratrix of the estate also on the ground that she had been absent from
the country since October 1984 and had not returned as of 15 January 1985,
the date of the questioned order, leaving respondent Olbes alone to
administer the estate.
In her motion for reconsideration of the Order dated 15 January 1985,
petitioner explained to the court a quo that her absence from the country was
due to the fact that she had to accompany her ailing husband to the United
States for medical treatment. 13 It appears too that petitioner's absence from
the country was known to respondent Olbes, and that the latter and petitioner
Gonzales had continually maintained correspondence with each other with
respect to the administration of the estate during the petitioner's absence
from the country. 14 As a matter of fact, petitioner, while in the United States,
sent respondent Olbes a letter addressed to the Land Bank of the Philippines
dated 14 November 1984, and duly authenticated by the Philippine
Consulate in San Francisco, authorizing her (Olbes) to receive, and collect
the interests accruing from the Land Bank bonds belonging to the estate, and
to use them for the payment of accounts necessary for the operation of the
administration. 15
The above facts, we note, show that petitioner had never abandoned her role
as co-administratrix of the estate nor had she been remiss in the fullfilment of
her duties. Suffice it to state, temporary absence in the state does not
disqualify one to be an administrator of the estate. Thus, as held in re Mc
Knight's Will, a temporary residence outside of the state, maintained for the
benefit of the health of the executors' family, is not such a removal from the
state as to necessitate his removal as executor.
Page 15 of 40
 . . . It seems quite clear that a temporary absence from the SO ORDERED.
state on account of ill health, or on account of business or for
purposes of travel or pleasure, would not necessarily
establish the fact that an executor "has removed" from the
estate, within the intent of the statute. The learned surrogate
was evidently satisfied that the sojourn of these executors in
New Jersey was nothing more than a departure from the
state for the benefit of relatives, not designed to constitute a
permanent change of abode, and contemplating a return to
New York as soon as the purpose of their absence should be
accomplished. In this view, I am inclined to think that he was
right in refusing to hold that he was constrained to revoke the
letters by the provisions of the Code to which I have referred.
I therefore advise an affirmance of the order. 16

Finally, it seems that the court a quo seeks refuge in the fact that two (2) of
the other three (3) heirs of the estate of the deceased (Teresa Olbes and
Cecilia Favis Gomez) have opposed the retention or re-appointment of
petitioner as co-administratrix of the estate. Suffice it to state that the removal
of an administrator does not lie on the whims, caprices and dictates of the
heirs or beneficiaries of the estate, nor on the belief of the court that it would
result in orderly and efficient administration. In re William's Adm'r., the court
held:

A county court having appointed a stranger administrator as

expressly authorized by Ky. St. 3897, after the relatives of
decedent had lost their right of precedence, could not
remove the appointee merely because of the request of
relatives and the belief upon the part of the court that the
best interest of deceased would be thereby subserved, since
the administrator had such an interest as entitled him to
protection from removal without cause. 17

As the appointment of petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales was valid, and no

satisfactory cause for her removal was shown, the court a quo gravely
abused its discretion in removing her. Stated differently, petitioner Beatriz F.
Gonzales was removed without just cause. Her removal was therefore
improper.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order of the court a quo dated
15 January 1985 removing petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales as co-administratrix
in Special Proceedings No. 021, entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate
of Ramona Gonzales Vda. de Favis" and the Order of the same Court dated
15 May 1985 denying reconsideration of said Order, are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Petitioner is ordered reinstated as co-administratrix of said
estate.

₯Special Proceedings (Rule 82- Rule 83) Page 16 of 40

[6] G.R. No. L-225             February 26, 1946
MAGDALENA COBARRUBIAS, recurrente, vs. ARSENIO P. DIZON,
BUENAVENTURA OCAMPO, y LA PHILIPPINE TRUST COMPANY,
recurridos.
1. ALBACEAS Y ADMINISTRADORES; NOMBRAMIENTO; REVOCACION.—
El poder del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de dejar sin efecto el nombramiento de un
administrador, cuando se haya obtenido el nombramiento mediante representaciones
falsas o incorrectas, es indiscutible. El cargo de administrador es uno de confianza.
Tan pronto como pierde su confianza en la integridad del solicitante, el Juzgado está
plenamente justificado en revocar su nombramiento de administrador.
2. PARTES; RENUNCIA DE su DERECHO, INTERÉS Y PARTICIPACIÓN;
RETIRO DE DICHA RENUNCIA DESPUÉS DE APROBADA POR EL
JuzGADO; CASO DE AUTOS.—Cuando el Juzgado declaró en su orden de agosto
28, 1945, que todas las propiedades mencionadas en la solicitud de julio 5, 1945 tal
como fué enmendada, pertenecen a las menores R y C, tuvo en cuenta todas las
declaraciones hechas por la recurrente bajo juramento en su moción de julio 20, 1945
y aprobó "la renuncia a favor de ellas por M. C. de todo su derecho, interés y
participación que tenga y pudiera tener en los bienes dejados por la finada P. L."; y
toda tentativa de retirar dicha renuncia después de aprobada por el Juzgado es
improcedente. La actuación judicial no es tela de Penélope que se teje y se desteje, a
gusto de una de las partes.
PABLO, J.:
En la actuacion especial No. 70686, titulada Intestado de la Finada Pilar
Leyba y Cobarrubias, iniciada el julio 5, 1945, la solicitante Magdalena
Cobarrubias presento en la misma fecha una mocion urgente, alegando que
la di funta Pilar Leyba tenia depositadas sys alhajas que valen P4,500 en en
apartado de seguridad del Banco de las Islas Filipinas; que dicho banco
notifico a todos los interesados que retirasen el contenido de su apartado
dentro del mas breve tiempo posible, por lo que ella pidio ser nombrada
administradora especial, y que fuera autorizada para retirar dichas alhajas
del banco. En su solicitud Magdalena Cobarrubias hizo constar que ella era
la unica heredera forzosa de la finada Pilar Leyba. Aceptando como buenas
estas alegaciones, el Honorable Juez Dizon en la misma fecha, julio 5, 1945,
nombro a Magdalena Cobarrubias administradora especial bajo fianza de
P200.
En julio 6, 1945, autorizo a la administradora especial a retirar del apartado
de seguridad del banco las alhajas depositadas con instrucciones de dar
₯Special Proceedings (Rule 82- Rule 83)
cuenta al Juzgado dentro del termino de cuarenta y ocho horas del resultado
de su gestion.
En julio 13, la solicitante pidio al Juzgado que ordene "la suspension de la
publicacion y el aplazamiento de la vista de la solicitud de autos, señalada
para el 28 de julio de 1945, hasta nueva orden," porque ella "desea tener
tiempo para arreglar con sus coherederos una particion extra-judicial."
En julio 17, 1945, el Juzgado al enterarse de los verdaderos hechos que son
contrarios a las alegaciones hechas por la solicitante en su solicitud y en su
mocion urgente, dicto una orden revocando la de julio 5, 1945, nombrando a
Magdalena Cobarrubias administradora especial, y la de julio 6, 1945,
autorizando a ella a retirar del banco las alhajas.
En julio 19, la solicitante presento un escrito alegando que ya que el
Juzgado "ha dejado sin efecto su auto de fecha 5 de dicho mes y año," pidio
que el Juzgado ordenase la cancelacion de la fianza de P200 y su
devolucion al abogado de la solicitante.
En julio 20, la solicitante presento una solicitud enmendada — y
debidamente jurada — en la cual alegaba "Que las unicas herederas de la
finada Pilar Leyba y Cobarrubias, son sus hijas llamadas Rosario y
Carmencita" y hacia "constar que renuncia a favor de estas dos menores
Rosario y Carmen, todo derecho, interes y participacion que tenga o pudiera
tener en los bienes dejados por la finada Pilar Leyba."
En la vista celebrada el julio 28, 1945, el abogado de la solicitante pidio que
este expediente de intestado No. 70686 se convirtiese en expediente de
tutela de las menores Rosario y Carmen, añadiendo que
esta peticion se funda en que las referidas menores Rosario y
Carmen son las dueñas absolutas de todas las propiedades
descritas en la solicitud de este expediente . . . y pido que sea
nombrado tutor de dichas menores . . . (t. n. t., pag. 3).
Obrando de acuerdo con las pruebas presentadas en la vista ya citada, con
la declaracion de la solicitante en su mocion enmendada y con la peticion del
abogado de la solicitante, el Juez Dizon dicto su orden de agosto 28, 1945,
declarando que todas las propiedades mencionadas en la solicitud de julio 5,
1945 tal como fue enmendada, pertenecen a las menores Rosario y Carmen,
de nueve y seis anos de edad; que la parcela de terreno con una casa de
materiales fuertes ha sido ya transferida a nombre de dichas menores; que
los muebles correspondientes a las partidas 2, 3 y 7 han sido ya vendidos
por la difunta; que no hay otra propiedad que debia ser administrada en
Page 17 of 40
nombre de dicha difunta; y para proteger los intereses de dichas menores, Magdalena Cobarrubias de todo su derecho, interes y participacion que
ordeno, de acuerdo con la peticion del abogado de la solicitante, que el tenga y pudiera tener en los bienes dejados por la finada Pilar Leyba"; y toda
expediente de abintestado se convierta en un expediente de tutela. tentativa de retirar dicha renuncia despues de aprobada por el Juzgado es
improcedente. La actuacion judicial no es tela de Penelope que se teje y se
En agosto 29, la solicitante pidio la reconsideracion de dicha orden, y desteje, a gusto de una de las partes. La declaracion judicial de herederos
despues de varias transferencias pedidas por las partes, el Juez Ocampo en que pide la recurrente en su informe suplementario ya no tiene razon de ser.
enero 2, 1946, la denego. Si la solicitante "ha renunciado ya a favor de las menores Rosario y Carmen
todo su derecho, interes y participacion que tenga y pudiera tener en los
bienes dejados por la finada Pilar Leyba," y esa renuncia ha sido aprobaba
Acude ante este Tribunal Magdalena Cobarrubias con una solicitud de
por el Juzgado en su orden de agosto 28, 1945, ¿que interes o participacion
certiorari contra los Jueces Dizon y Ocampo y la Philippine Trust Company,
aun le queda a ella? Absolutamente nada. Es inutil, pues, toda discusion
pidiento la anulacion de las ordenes de julio 17, 1945, agosto 28, 1945 y
sobre quienes son los herederos de la finada Leyba. Las declaraciones de la
enero 2, 1946.
recurrente que ella "era la unica heredera forzosa" (solicitud original); que
"queria arreglar consus co-herederos una particion extra-judicial" (Mocion de
En cuanto a la orden del 17 de julio, revocando el nombramiento de la julio 13, 1945); "que las unicas herederas de la finada Pilar Leyba son sus
recurrente como administradora especial y revocando la orden que autoriza hijas llamadas Rosario y Carmencita" y "que renuncia a favor de estas dor
a ella a retirar del banco las alhajas depositadas, el Juzgado no abuso de su menores todo derecho, interes y participacion que tenga o pudiera tener en
discrecion, ni obro fuera de su jurisdiccion. El poder del Juzgado de Primera los bienes dejados por la finada Pilar Leyba" (Mocion de julio 20, 1945), le
Instancia de dejar sin efecto el nombramiento de un administrador, cuando ponen en una situacion insostenible.
se haya obtenido el nombramiento mediante representaciones falsas o
incorrectas, es indiscutible. Cuando el Juzgado nombro a la recurrente
Se deniega la peticion con las costas contra la recurrente.
administradora especial con autorizacion para retirar del banco alhajas
avaluadas en P4,500 bajo una fianza de P200 tuvo en cuenta su alegacion
esencial de que "era la unica heredera forzosa de la finada." No habia
peligro de posible malversacion; podian aun nombrarla sin fianza. Pero al
recibir informe de que esta alegacion era inexacta. informe confirmado por la
mocion de la misma solicitante que pedia la "suspension de la publicacion y
aplazamiento de la vista" porque deseaba "tener tiempo para arreglar con
sus co-herederos una particion extrajudicial," el Juzgado tenia sobrados
motivos para revocar dichas ordenes aun sin notificacion a la administradora:
el intestado no se incoa a beneficio de los administradores sino de los
herederos. El Juzgado debia obrar inmediatamente y no poner en peligro.
con su indiferencia, las alhajas. Si dejaba pasar algunas horas, sin tomar
accion drastica, podian seer retiradas las alhajas avaluadas en P4,500 por la
administradora especial que estaba solamente afianzada en P200 en
perjuicio de los intereses de las menores. El celo demostrado por el Juzgado
estaba bien fundado. El cargo de administradora especial es uno de
confianza. Tan pronto como perdio su confianza en la integridad de la
solicitante, el Juzgado estaba plenamente justificado en revocar su
nombramiento de administradora especial y anular su autorizacion para
retirar las alhajas del banco.

Cuando el Juzgado declaro en su orden de agosto 28, 1945, que todas las
propiedades mencionadas en la solicitud de julio 5, 1945 tal como fue
enmendada, pertenecen a las menores Rosario y Carmen, tuvo en cuenta
todas las declaraciones hechas por la recurrente bajo juramento en su
mocion de julio 20, 1945y aprobo "la renuncia a favor de ellas por

₯Special Proceedings (Rule 82- Rule 83) Page 18 of 40

[7] G.R. No. L-26694 December 18, 1973
NELITA MORENO VDA. DE BACALING, petitioner, vs. HECTOR LAGUNA,
HON. VALERION ROVIRA, Judge, Court of First Instance and HON.
JUDGE ROSENDO BALTAZAR, Judge, City Court of Iloilo, respondents.
Settlement of estate; Contracts entered into by administrator binding upon his
successor.—It is elementary that the effect of revocation of letters testamentary or of
administration is to terminate the authority of the executor or administrator, but the
acts of the executor or administrator, done in good faith prior to the revocation of the
letters, will be protected, and a similar protection will be extended to rights acquired
under a previous grant of administration.
Leases; Lessees are not possessors in good faith and are not entitled as of
right to reimbursement of expenses to transfer house to another place.—The rule is
well-settled that lessees, like petitioner, are not possessors in good faith, because
they knew that their occupancy of the premises continues only during the life of the
lease, and they cannot as a matter of right, recover the value of their improvements
from the lessor, much less retain the premises until they are reimbursed. Their rights
are governed by article 1678 of the Civil Code which allows reimbursement of
lessees up to one-half of the value of their improvements if the lessor so elects.
Due process; No denial of due process where guardian ad litem of minor
children duly notified of issuance of demolition order.—There is evidence to show
that Acting Fiscal Alfonso Ihemberger, guardian, ad litem of the minor children of
the late Ramon Bacaling, has been duly apprised of the issuance of the assailed
special order to demolish, as shown by the certification of the counsel for petitioner
at the foot of his opposition filed with the CFI of Iloilo and as also shown by the
certification of private respondent’s counsel at the foot of his opposition likewise
filed with the same Court.
Certiorari; Meaning of grave abuse of discretion.—“Grave abuse of
discretion” means such capricious and arbitrary exercise of judgment as is
equivalent, in the eyes of the law, to lack of jurisdiction. Even mere abuse of
discretion is not sufficient by itself to justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari. For
that purpose the abuse of discretion must be grave and patent, and it must be shown
that it was exercised arbitrarily or despotically, which is not the case made out by the
present petition.
Dilatory tactics; Dilatory tactics of parties subject to court’s condemnation.—
The present petition smacks of a dilatory tactic and a frivolous attempt resorted to by
petitioner to frustrate the prompt termination of the ejectment case and to prolong
litigation unnecessarily. Such conduct deserves the vigorous condemnation of this
Court.
ESGUERRA, J.:
₯Special Proceedings (Rule 82- Rule 83)
The petitioner seeks a writ of certiorari with preliminary injunction to annul an
Order of Hon. Rosendo Baltazar, as Judge of the City Court of Iloilo, dated
June 30, 1966, ordering the demolition of the residential house of petitioner. 1
Assailed likewise is an Order, dated August 25, 1966, of Hon. Valerio V.
Rovira, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, stationed at Iloilo City,
approving said demolition.2
II.Facts of the Case
Private respondent Hector Laguda is the registered owner of a residential
land known as lot No. 3508 situated at La Paz, Iloilo City 3 many years back,
petitioner and her late husband, Dr. Ramon Bacaling, with the acquiescence
of private respondent Laguda, constructed a residential house on a portion of
said lot fronting Huevana Street, paying a monthly rental of P80.00. 4 Unable
to pay the lease rental from July 1959 to September 1961, totalling
P2,160.00, an action for ejectment (Civil Case No. 6823) was filed by private
respondent Laguda against petitioner in her capacity as judicial administratrix
of the estate of her late husband, Dr. Bacaling, in the City Court of Iloilo City. 5
The filing of said case spawned various court suits.
Petitioner on July 23, 1962, filed certiorari proceedings in this Court (G.R. No.
L-20061) but was dismissed for lack of merit on August 3, 1962. 6 With this
setback, petitioner on November 12, 1962, filed with the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction (Civil Case
No. 6162) but the same was dismissed on December 1, 1962. 7 Unsuccessful
in her motion for reconsideration, petitioner went to the Court of Appeals by
way of certiorari but her petition was dismissed by that Court on March 7,
1967.8
Suffering from these series of legal reverses, the petitioner entered into a
compromise agreement on July 29, 1964, with private respondent Laguda
relative to Civil Case No. 6823. 9 Said agreement inter alia, provides as
follows:
1. Defendant (petitioner herein) agreed to vacate the premises and remove ...
the residential house therefrom ... before December 31, 1966;
2. For the use and occupation ... of the said premises ... from June 1964 to
December 31, 1969, the said defendant will pay plaintiff a monthly rent ... of
Eighty (P80.00) Pesos per calendar month ...;
3. Upon failure of defendant to comply with any ... provision of the amicable
settlement within ... fifty (50) days ... the plaintiff shall be entitled to
"immediate execution to restore plaintiff in possession of the premises and to
recover all the unpaid monthly rents from June 1, 1964 until said premises
are vacated" by defendant;
Page 19 of 40
 4. Defendant "waive her right, under Sec. 6, Rule 39, Rules of Court, to
bar enforcement of the execution of the judgment in the case at anytime
within one year from December 31, 1969".
In a decision dated July 30, 1964, the City Court of Iloilo City approved the
amicable settlement and enjoined the parties to comply with its terms. For
failure of the petitioner to satisfy the conditions of the settlement within the
50-day period, private respondent Laguda moved for execution which the
Court granted on July 7, 1965. 10
On July 14, 1965, petitioner moved for reconsideration to quash the writ of
execution, but before the Court could resolve the motion, petitioner on July
19, 1965, served notice of her intention to take the case to the Court of
Appeals. 11 Meanwhile on July 23, 1965, respondent Laguda filed an
opposition to the petitioner's July 14, 1965, motion, alleging that as judicial
administratrix as of July 29, 1964, she was legally authorized to enter into the
amicable settlement which was the basis of the decision dated July 30, 1964,
of the City Court of Iloilo sought to be executed and, therefore, her act was
binding upon the present judicial administrator, Atty. Roberto Dineros, who
replaced petitioner upon her discharge as such on November 28, 1964. 12
Denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration and to quash writ of
execution on September 30, 1965, the City Court however, held in abeyance
the enforcement of the alias writ of execution until the Court of First Instance
of Iloilo stamped its imprimatur considering the pendency of Special
Proceedings No. 1469 and of the fact that the properties involved therein are
in custodia legis. 13 Thereafter, on October 25, 1965, private respondent
Laguda moved the Court of First Instance of Iloilo in Special Proceedings No.
1469 for the approval of the City Court's order of execution which was
granted despite petitioner's opposition. 14 With the denial of petitioner's
motion for reconsideration on December 4, 1965, a petition for certiorari with
preliminary injunction was brought before the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No.
36939-R) which dismissed the same on January 18, 1966. 15
On April 14, 1966, the respondent City Judge of Iloilo City issued an alias writ
of execution upon representations of private respondent Laguda, copies of
which were served sheriff upon the petitioner and Atty. Roberto Dineros in his
capacity as judicial administrator of the estate of the deceased, Dr. Ramon
Bacaling, in Special Proceedings No. 1469. 16
On June 30, 1966, a Special Order of Demolition was issued by the
respondent City Judge upon motion of private respondent Laguda and over
petitioner's opposition, subject, however, to the approval of the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo in Special Proceedings No. 1469. 17 Upon the denial of
petitioner's motion for reconsideration, respondent Laguda on July 12, 1966,
₯Special Proceedings (Rule 82- Rule 83)
filed a manifestation in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo in Special
Proceedings No. 1469, praying for the confirmation of the Order to demolish
the house under custodia legis. 18
On August 4, 1966, petitioner interposed an opposition alleging:
1. That she was no longer in control of the estate funds when the
stipulated obligations in the amicable settlement became due and
payable;
2. That the residential house to be demolished is worth P35,000.00 for
which she is entitled to reimbursement as a builder in good faith, in
addition to reasonable expenses they may incur in transferring the same
to another place; and
3. That the guardian ad litem of the minor children was not notified of the
motion for the issuance of an order of demolition; 19
On August 25, 1966, respondent Laguda by way of reply disputed petitioner's
claim and supported the legality of the court's ruling. 20 On the same date, the
probate court in Special Proceedings No. 1469 approved the order of
demolition of the house in controversy. 21 Impugning the said Order as
violative of the provisions of Sec. 14, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court, and of
the constitutional mandate on due process, petitioner moved to reconsider
the same but the motion was denied by the Court on September 26, 1966. 22
Frustrated in her effort to set aside the Order of Demolition, petitioner brought
this present action of certiorari with preliminary injunction. Upon giving due
course to the petition, this Court issued a temporary restraining order on
October 21, 1966, to prevent the enforcement of the order of demolition in
Special Proceedings No. 1469 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, but
when served upon the respondents, the building in question was already
partially demolished. 23 Upon petitioner's posting a bond of P1,000.00, this
Court on November 10, 1966, issued a writ of preliminary injunction
restraining the herein respondents from proceeding with the order of
demolition, until further orders. 24
III. Issues of the Case
The issues raised in the instant petition boil down to the following:
1. Whether or not the acts of the petitioner as judicial administratrix prior
to her discharge or removal are valid and binding upon her successor;
Page 20 of 40
2. Whether or not petitioner is a builder in good faith and, therefore, entitled
to reimbursement, and/or reasonable expenses that may be incurred in
transferring the house to another place;
3. Whether or not due process was denied to the minor children of deceased
Ramon Bacaling, and petitioner in connection with the motion for the
issuance of the order of demolition.
IV. Discussion
Petitioner claims before this Court that since she was no longer the judicial
administratrix of the estate of her late husband, Dr. Ramon Bacaling, and
was no longer in control of estate funds when the stipulated obligations in the
amicable settlement became due and payable, the special order of
demolition could not be enforced.
Such a view is not tenable. Under Section 3, Rule 82 of the Rules of Court,
petitioner's lawful acts before the revocation of her letters of administration or
before her removal shall have the same validity as if there was no such
revocation or removal. It is elementary that the effect of revocation of letters
testamentary or of administration is to terminate the authority of the executor
or administrator, but the acts of the executor or administrator, done in good
faith prior to the revocation of the letters, will be protected, and a similar
protection will be extended to rights acquired under a previous grant of
administration. 25
In connection with the petitioner's contention that she be considered a builder
in good faith and, therefore, entitled to reimbursement in addition to
reasonable expenses that may be incurred in transferring the house to
another place, the same cannot stand legal scrutiny. The rule is well-settled
that lessees, like petitioner, are not possessors in good faith, because they
knew that their occupancy of the premises continues only during the life of
the lease, and they cannot as a matter of right, recover the value of their
improvements from the lessor, much less retain the premises until they are
reimbursed. Their rights are governed by Article 1678 of the Civil Code which
allows reimbursement of lessees up to one-half of the value of their
improvements if the lessor so elects. 26
It is next urged by petitioner that there was a denial of process for failure of
private respondent to notify the guardian ad litem of the minor children of the
deceased Ramon Bacaling, of the motion for execution.
A perusal of the pleadings yields the conclusion that petitioner failed to meet
the burden of demonstrating that there was denial of due process. On the
contrary, there is evidence to show that Acting Fiscal Alfonso Illemberger
guardian ad litem of the minor children of the late Ramon Bacaling, has been
₯Special Proceedings (Rule 82- Rule 83)
duly apprised of the issuance of the assailed special order to demolish, as
shown by the certification of the counsel for petitioner at the foot of his
opposition dated August 4, 1966, 27 filed with the Court of First Instance of
Iloilo, and as also shown by the certification of private respondent's counsel
at the foot of his opposition dated September 15, 1966, 28 likewise filed with
the same Court.
V. Conclusion
The petitioner is not entitled to the writ of certiorari. In the case at bar, there
is absolutely no showing that the respondent courts acted so "arbitrarily",
"despotically" or "capriciously" as to amount to lack of jurisdiction in issuing
the questioned orders.
"Grave abuse of discretion" which is a ground for certiorari means "such
capricious and arbitrary exercise of judgment as is equivalent, in the eyes of
the law, to lack of jurisdiction." 29 Even mere abuse of discretion is not
sufficient by itself to justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari. For that
purpose the abuse of discretion must be grave and patent, and it must be
shown that it was exercised arbitrarily or despotically, which is not the case
made out by the present petition. 30
There is something more to be said about the nature and apparent purpose
of this case which has its genesis in the case for illegal detainer (Civil Case
No. 6823) brought before the Iloilo City Court. What transpired therein
presents a glaring example of a summary proceeding which was deliberately
protracted and made to suffer undue delay in its disposal. It was originally
filed on September 13, 1960; 31 it reached the appellate courts five (5) times,
twice before the Court of Appeals 32, Once before the Court of First Instance
of Iloilo 33, and twice before this Court. 34 The present petition smacks of a
dilatory tactic and a frivolous attempt resorted to by petitioner to frustrate the
prompt termination of the ejectment case and to prolong litigation
unnecessarily. Such conduct on the part of petitioner and her counsel
deserves the vigorous condemnation of this Court, 35 because it evinces a
flagrant misuse of the remedy of certiorari which should only be resorted to in
case of lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion by a inferior court. A
recourse of this kind unduly taxes the energy and patience of courts and
simply wastes the precious time that they could well devote to really
meritorious cases.
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the instant
petition should be, as it is hereby, dismissed.
The writ of preliminary injunction issued by this Court on November 10, 1966,
is immediately set aside. 36
Page 21 of 40
 37
Treble costs against the petitioner for the reasons above set forth.

₯Special Proceedings (Rule 82- Rule 83) Page 22 of 40

[8] G.R. No. L-46945             January 20, 1940
Intestado del Finado Juan Oronce. CALIXTO ORONCE, administrador-
apelado, vs. ANSELMA LAPUZ, recurrida-apelante.
1. ALBACEAS Y ADMINISTRADORES; RENDICIÓN DE CUENTA;
FACULTAD DE LOS JUZGADOS DE PRIMERA INSTANCIA DE CASTIGAR
POR DESACATO.—Los artículos 231 al 240, inclusive, del Código de
Procedimiento Civil son aplicables a los Juzgados de Primera Instancia tanto cuando
ejercen jurisdicción general como cuando funcionan como tribunales de
testamentaría. El artículo 611 del mismo Código de Procedimiento Civil no priva a
los Juzgados de Primera Instancia que conocen de asuntos sobre bienes de difuntos
de su facultad inherente de castigar por desacato de conformidad con las
disposiciones de los artículos 231 al 240, sino que amplia y ratifica dicha facultad.
La circunstancia de que la apelante había sido removida ya de su cargo de
administradora y que había sido nombrado otro en su lugar, no privó al Juzgado de
su facultad de requerirla que presentara la cuenta de los productos de los inmuebles
que continuó administrando aun después de haber cesado de su cargo.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.—Durante el tiempo en que continuó administrando los inmuebles
hasta que los entregó al nuevo administrador, la apelante continuó siendo
administradora de facto y estaba sujeta a las órdenes directas del Juzgado de
conformidad con el artículo 677 del Código de Procedimiento Civil que requiere que
el administrador rinda cuenta de todos los productos de los inmuebles que hubiese
administrado.
IMPERIAL, J.:
Por irregularidades que cometio durante el desempeño de su cargo de
administradora judicial del Intestado del finado Juan Oronce, la apelante
Anselma Lapuz fue removida de su cargo el 30 de agosto de 1932 y en su
lugar fue nombrado el apealdo Calixto Oronce. A instancia del nuevo
administrador, la apelante fue requerida por auto del 19 de marzo de 1934
que rinda cuenta dentro de veinte dias de los frutos de los bienes inmuebles
que continuo administrando desde el año 1932, cuenta que debia
comprender el periodo de tiempo desde el referido año 1932 hasta la fecha
en que hizo entrega al nuevo administrador de los mencionados bienes. La
apelante fue notificada del auto, mas no lo cumplio ni presento la cuenta.
Entonces el apelado pidio al Juzgado que se la requiera a la apelante que
expliqueporque no debia ser castigada por desacato. La apelante se opuso a
la mocion alegando que ya habia rendido su cuenta, que fue aprobada; que
ya habia cesado de ser administradora, y que el Juzgado no tenia ya
jurisdiccion sobre ella. Por auto del 11 de enero de 1937 el Juzgado de
Primera Instancia de Pampanga, que entendia del Intestado, desestimo las
₯Special Proceedings (Rule 82- Rule 83)
objeciones de la apelante y la hallo culpable de desacato y la impuso la
multa de P50 con prision subsidiaria en caso de insolvencia, con la
advertencia, ademas, de que si continuaba desobedeciendo la orden seria
reducida a prision hasta que la cumpla. La apelante se excepciono de este
ultimo auto e interpuso la presente apelacion.
La apelante sostiene que el Juzgado erro al declararla culpable de desacato
por los motivos siguientes: porque el articulo 232, parrafo 1, del Codigo de
Procedimiento Civil no es aplicable y bajo el articulo 611 el Juzgado no tenia
facultad para castigarla por desacato por no haber presentado la cuenta
requerida; porque el Juzgado carecia ya de jurisdiccion sobre su persona por
haber dejado de ser administradora; y porque ella ya presento su cuenta que
fue enmendada varias veces y aprobada finalmente el 1.º de agosto de
1932.
Los articulos 231 al 240, inclusive, del Codigo de Procedimiento Civil son
aplicables a los Juzgados de Primera Instancia tanto cuando ejercen
jurisdiccion general como cuando funcionan como tribunales de
testamentria. El articulo 611 del mismo Codigo de Procedimiento Civil no
priva a los Juzgados de Primera Instancia que conocen de asuntos sobre
bienes de difuntos de su facultad inherente de castigar por desacato de
conformidad con las disposiciones de los articulos 231 al 240, sino que
amplia y ratifica dicha facultad.
La circunstancia de que la apelante habia sido removida ya de su cargo de
administradora y que habia sido nombrado otro en su lugar, no privo al
Juzgado de su facultad de requerirla que presentara la cuenta de los
productos de los inmuebles que continuo administrado aun despues de
haber cesado de su cargo.
Aparece efectivamente que la apelante habia presentado su ultima cuenta el
24 de octubre de 1931, que fue enmendada el 16 de diciembre del mismo
año y el 11 de mayo de 1932, y que fue aprobada por el Juzgado el 1.º de
agosto de 1932; pero habiendo ella continuado administrando los inmuebles
durante los años 1932 y 1933 es indudable que estaba obligada a rendir
cuenta de los frutos que percibio durante dicho periodo de tiempo. Durante el
tiempo en que continuo administrando los inmuebles hasta que los entrego
al nuevo administrador, la apelante continuo siendo administradora de facto
y estaba sjueta a las ordenes directas del Juzgado de conformidad con el
articulo 677 del Codigo de Procedimiento Civil que requiere que el
administrador rinda cuenta de todos los productos de los inmuebles que
hubiese administrado.
Page 23 of 40
No siendo meritorias las pretensiones de la apelante y hallandose conforme
a derecho el auto apelado, lo confirmamos, con las costas a la apelante. Asi
se ordena.
[9] G.R. No. L-23419 June 27, 1975
INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED GELACIO SEBIAL.
BENJAMINA SEBIAL, petitioner-appellee, vs. ROBERTA SEBIAL,
JULIANO SEBIAL and HEIRS OF BALBINA SEBIAL, oppositors-
appellants.
Special proceedings; Intestate succession; Probate court retains jurisdiction to
approve inventory of assets of decedent even if presented after 3-month period
prescribed in Section 1, Rule 83 of the Rules of Court.—The three-month period
prescribed in section 1, Rule 83 (formerly Rule 84) of the Rules of Court is not
mandatory. After the filing of a petition for the issuance of letters of administration
and the publication of the notice of hearing, the proper Court of First Instance
acquires jurisdiction over a decedent’s estate and retains that jurisdiction until the
proceeding is closed. The fact that an inventory was filed after the three-month
period would not deprive the probate court of jurisdiction to approve it. However, an
administrator’s unexplained delay in filing the inventory may be a ground for his
removal (Sec. 2. Rule 82, Rules of Court).
Same; To determine if summary settlement is called for, probate court should
ascertain value of estate left by deceased by preponderance of evidence.—While the
verified petition for the issuance of letters of administration, it was alleged that the
gross value of the decedent’s estate was “not more than five thousand pesos”, in the
amended inventory the valuation was P17,000. Indeed, one of the lower court’s
omissions was its failure to ascertain by preponderance of evidence the actual value
of the estate, if there was still an estate to be administered. The approval of the
amended inventory was not such a determination. Anyway, in the present posture of
the proceeding, no useful purpose would be served by dismissing the petition herein
and ordering that a new petition for summary settlement be filed.
Same; Same; Intestate court’s approval of inventory of assets of deceased is
not conclusive of what assets really belonged to the estate and is without prejudice
to a judgment in an action on the title thereto.—The lower court’s order approving
the amended inventory is not a conclusive determination of what assets constitutes
the decedent’s estate and of the valuations thereof. Such a determination is only
provisional in character and is without prejudice to a judgment in a separate action
on the issue of title or ownership.
Same; Same; Probate court cannot pass upon question of title to property
except where the parties are all heirs arid submit such question before the probate
court.—The general rule is that questions of title to property cannot be passed upon
in a testate or intestate proceeding. However, when the parties are all heirs of the
decedent, it is optional upon them to submit to the probate court the question of title
to property and, when so submitted, the probate court may definitely pass judgment
thereon. (The lower court was held to have erred in ordering delivery to
₯Special Proceedings (Rule 82- Rule 83)
administratrix of certain properties claimed by oppositors as their own and properties
already sold to third persons.)
Same; Same; Probate court may take cognizance of properties under
administration provided interest of third persons who may be cited to appear in
court are not prejudiced.—Lorenzo Rematado and Lazaro Recuelo are not heirs of
the decedent. They are third persons. The rule is that matters affecting property under
administration may be taken cognizance of by the probate court in the course of the
intestate proceedings provided that the interests of third persons are not prejudiced.
However, third persons to whom the decedent’s assets had been fraudulently
conveyed may be cited to appear in court and be examined under oath as to how they
came into the possession of the decedent’s assets, but a separate action would be
necessary to recover the said assets.
Same; Prescription among co-heirs; Generally, prescription does not run
among co-heirs.—Generally prescription does not run in favor of a coheir as long as
he expressly or implied recognizes the coownership (Art. 494, Civil Code). But from
the moment that a coheir claims absolute and exclusive ownership of the hereditary
properties
and denies the others any share thereto, the question involved is no longer one of
partition but that of ownership.
AQUINO, J.:
Gelacio Sebial died intestate in 1943 in Pinamungajan Cebu. According to
the appellants, Gelacio Sebial, by his first wife Leoncia Manikis, who
allegedly died in 1919, begot three children named Roberta, Balbina and
Juliano. By his second wife, Dolores Enad, whom he allegedly married in
1927, he supposedly begot six children named Benjamina, Valentina,
Ciriaco, Gregoria, Esperanza and Luciano.
On June 17, 1960 Benjamina Sebial filed in the Court of First Instance of
Cebu a verified petition for the settlement of Gelacio Sebial's estate. She
prayed that she be appointed administratrix thereof (Spec. Proc. No. 2049-
R). Roberta Sebial opposed the petition on the ground that the estate of
Gelacio Sebial had already been partitioned among his children and that, if
an administration proceeding was necessary, she, Roberta Sebial, a resident
of Guimbawian, a remote mountain barrio of Pinamungajan, where the
decedent's estate was supposedly located, should be the one appointed
administratrix and not Benjamina Sebial, a housemaid working at Talisay,
Cebu which is about seventy kilometers away from Pinamungajan. In a
supplemental opposition the children of the first marriage contended that the
remedy of Benjamina Sebial was an action to rescind the partition.
After hearing, the lower court in its order of January 16, 1961 appointed
Benjamina Sebial as administratrix. It found that the decedent left an estate
consisting of lands with an area of twenty-one hectares, valued at more than
Page 24 of 40
six thousand pesos, and that the alleged partition of the decedent's estate
was invalid and ineffective.
Letters of administration were issued to Benjamina Sebial on January 19,
1961. On the same date, a notice to creditors was issued. The oppositors
moved for the reconsideration of the order appointing Benjamina Sebial as
administratrix. They insisted that the decedent's estate had been partitioned
on August 29, 1945, as shown in Exhibits 5, 6, 7 and I, and that the action to
rescind the partition had already prescribed. The lower court denied the
motion in its order of February 11, 1961.
The oppositors filed on March 16, 1961 a motion to terminate the
administration proceeding on the grounds that the decedent's estate was
valued at less than six thousand pesos and that it had already been
partitioned and, therefore, there was no necessity for the administration
proceeding.
On April 27, 1961 Benjamina Sebial filed an inventory and appraisal of the
decedent's estate allegedly consisting of seven unregistered parcels of land,
covered by Tax Declarations Nos. 04477, 04478, 04490, 04491, 04492,
04493 and 04500, with a total value of nine thousand pesos, all located at
Barrio Guimbawian, Pinamungajan. The oppositors registered their
opposition to the inventory on the ground that the seven parcels of land
enumerated in the inventory no longer formed part of the decedent's estate.
On May 6, 1961, the administratrix filed a motion to require Lorenzo
Rematado, Demetrio Camillo and the spouses Roberta Sebial and Lazaro
Recuelo to deliver to her the parcels of land covered by Tax Declarations
Nos. 04478, 04490,04491 and 04493.
On June 24, 1961 the probate court issued an order suspending action on
the pending incidents in view of the possibility of an amicable settlement. It
ordered the parties to prepare a complete list of the properties belonging to
the decedent, with a segregation of the properties belonging to each
marriage. Orders of the same tenor were issued by the lower court on July 8
and October 28, 1961.
On November 11, 1961 the oppositors, Roberta Sebial, Juliano Sebial and
the heirs of Balbina Sebial, submitted their own inventory of the conjugal
assets of Gelacio Sebial and Leoncia Manikis, consisting of two parcels of
land acquired in 1912 and 1915. They alleged that the conjugal estate of
Gelacio Sebial and Dolores Enad consisted of only one parcel of land,
containing an area of seven hectares, allegedly purchased with money
coming from the conjugal assets of Gelacio Sebial and Leoncia Manikis.
They further alleged that the said seven- hectare land was sold by the
₯Special Proceedings (Rule 82- Rule 83)
children of the second marriage to Eduardo Cortado (Tax Declaration No.
2591).1äwphï1.ñët
The oppositors claimed that the aforementioned two parcels of land acquired
during the first marriage were partitioned in 1945 among (1) Roberta Sebial,
(2) Juliano Sebial, (3) Francisco Sebial as the representative of the estate of
Balbina Sebial and (4) Valentina Sebial as the representative of the six
children of the second marriage, some of whom were minors. They clarified
that under that partition the three children of the first marriage received a
three-fourths share while the six children of second marriage received a one-
fourth share (Tax Declaration No. 06500). They also alleged that Eduardo
Cortado, Emilio Sialongo, Lorenzo Rematado and Lazaro Recuelo were the
third persons involved in the transfer of the lands pertaining to the estate of
Gelacio Sebial (Tax Declarations Nos. 04493, 06571 and 04471). To the
inventory submitted by the oppositors, the administratrix filed an opposition
dated November 18, 1961.
In an order dated November 11, 1961 the lower court inexplicably required
the administratrix to submit another inventory. In compliance with that order
she submitted an inventory dated November 17, 1961, wherein she
reproduced her inventory dated April 17, 1961 and added two other items,
namely, two houses allegedly valued at P8,000 and the fruits of the
properties amounting to P5,000 allegedly received by the children of the first
marriage. The oppositor interposed an opposition to the said inventory.
On November 24, 1961 the oppositors filed a "motion for revision of partition"
which was based on their own inventory dated November 7, 1961.
The lower court in its order of December 11, 1961 approved the second
inventory dated November, 7, 1961 because there was allegedly a "prima
facie evidence to show that" the seven parcels of land and two houses listed
therein belonged to the decedent's estate. In another order also dated
December 11, 1961 the lower court granted the motion of the administratrix
dated May 4, 1961 for the delivery to her of certain parcels of land and it
directed that the heirs of Gelacio Sebial, who are in possession of the parcels
of land covered by Tax Declarations Nos. 04493, 04491, 04490 and 04478,
should deliver those properties to the administratrix and should not disturb
her in her possession and administration of the same. The lower court denied
the oppositors' motion dated November 20, 1961 for "revision of partition".
On December 29, 1961 Roberta Sebial moved for the reconsideration of the
two orders on the grounds (1) that the court had no jurisdiction to approve an
inventory filed beyond the three-month period fixed in section 1, Rule 84 of
the Rules of Court; (2) that the said inventory is not supported by any
documentary evidence because there is no tax declaration at all in Gelacio
Page 25 of 40
Sebial's name; (3) that the two houses mentioned in the inventory were
nonexistent because they were demolished by the Japanese soldiers in 1943
and the materials thereof were appropriated by the administratrix and her
brothers and sisters; (4) that the valuation of P17,000 indicated in the
inventory was fake, fictitious and fantastic since the total value of the seven
parcels of land amounted only to P3,080; (5) that Gelacio Sebial's estate
should be settled summarily because of its small value as provided in section
2, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court and (6) that an ordinary action is necessary
to recover the lands in the possession of third persons.
The oppositors without awaiting the resolution of their motion for
reconsideration filed a notice of appeal from the two orders both dated
December 11, 1961. The notice of appeal was filed "without prejudice to the
motion for reconsideration". Benjamina Sebial opposed the motion for
reconsideration. The lower court in its order of January 18, 1962 denied
oppositors' motion for reconsideration. It approved Roberta Sebial's amended
record on appeal. The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals in its resolution of July 31, 1964 in CA-G.R. No.
31978.-R certified the case to this Court because in its opinion the appeal
involves only the legal issues of (1) the construction to be given to section 2,
Rule 74 and section 1, Rule 84 (now Rule 83) of the Rules of Court and (2)
whether an ordinary civil action for recovery of property and not an
administration proceeding is the proper remedy, considering oppositors'
allegation that the estate of Gelacio Sebial was partitioned in 1945 and that
some of his heirs had already sold their respective shares (Per Angeles,
Gatmaitan and Concepcion Jr., JJ.)
The Clerk of Court of the lower court in his letter of January 15, 1963,
transmitting the amended record on appeal, said "there was no presentation
of evidence by either parties concerning the two orders appealed from".
This case involves the conflicting claims of some humble folks from a remote
rural area in Cebu regarding some unregistered farm lands. Because of her
poverty Roberta Sebial wanted to appeal in forma pauperis. Her husband
Lazaro Recuelo and her nephew, Candelario Carrillo, in order to justify the
filing of a mimeographed brief, swore that their families subsisted on root
crops because they could not afford to buy corn grit or rice.
Oppositors' contention in their motion for reconsideration (not in their brief)
that the probate court had no jurisdiction to approve the inventory dated
November 17, 1961 because the administratrix filed it after three months
from the date of her appointment is not well-taken. The three-month period
prescribed in section 1, Rule 83 (formerly Rule 84) of the Rules of Court is
not mandatory. After the filing of a petition for the issuance of letters of
₯Special Proceedings (Rule 82- Rule 83)
administration and the publication of the notice of hearing, the proper Court
of First Instance acquires jurisdiction over a decedent's estate and retains
that jurisdiction until the proceeding is closed. The fact that an inventory was
filed after the three-month period would not deprive the probate court of
jurisdiction to approve it. However, an administrator's unexplained delay in
filing the inventory may be a ground for his removal (Sec. 2, Rule 82, Rules
of Court).
The other contention of the oppositors that inasmuch as the value of the
decedent's estate is less than five thousand pesos and he had no debts, the
estate could be settled summarily under section 2, Rule 74 of the Rules of
Court or that an administration proceeding was not necessary (the limit of six
thousand pesos was increased to ten thousand pesos in section 2, Rule 74
effective on January 1, 1964) rests on a controversial basis. While in the
verified petition for the issuance of letters of administration, it was alleged
that the gross value of the decedent's estate was "not more than five
thousand pesos", in the amended inventory the valuation was P17,000.
Indeed, one of the lower court's omissions was its failure to ascertain by
preponderance of evidence the actual value of the estate, if there was still an
estate to be administered. The approval of the amended inventory was not
such a determination.
Anyway, in the present posture of the proceeding, no useful purpose would
be served by dismissing the petition herein and ordering that a new petition
for summary settlement be filed. Inasmuch as a regular administrator had
been appointed and a notice to creditors had been issued and no claims
were filed, the probate court could still proceed summarily and expeditiously
to terminate the proceeding. With the cooperation of the lawyers of the
parties, it should strive to effect an amicable settlement of the case (See arts.
222 and 2029, Civil Code).
If the efforts to arrive at an amicable settlement prove fruitless, then the
probate court should ascertain what assets constituted the estate of Gelacio
Sebial, what happened to those assets and whether the children of the
second marriage (the petitioner was a child of the second marriage and the
principal oppositor was a child of first marriage) could still have a share,
howsoever small, in the decedent's estate.
The lower court's order of December 11, 1961, approving the amended
inventory of November 11, 1961, is not a conclusive determination of what
assets constituted the decedent's estate and of the valuations thereof. Such
a determination is only provisional in character and is without prejudice to a
judgment in a separate action on the issue of title or ownership (3 Moran's
Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., 448-449).1äwphï1.ñët
Page 26 of 40
The other order dated December 11, 1961 requires the delivery to the
administratrix of (1) two parcels of land covered by Tax Declarations Nos.
04491 and 04493 in the possession of the spouses Lazaro Recuelo and
Roberta Sebial, an oppositor-appellant; (2) the parcel of land covered by Tax
Declaration No. 04490 in the possession of Lorenzo Rematado and (3) the
parcel of land described under Tax Declaration No. 04478 in the possession
of Demetrio Camillo (Canillo), a child of the deceased Balbina Sebial, one of
the three children of the first marriage.
The petitioner testified and presented Exhibits A to J and X to Y-3. The
oppositor also testified and presented Exhibits 2 to 10-A. The stenographic
notes for the said hearing should be transcribed. In addition to that evidence.
The probate court should require the parties to present further proofs on the
ownership of the seven parcels of land and the materials of the two houses
enumerated in the amended inventory of November 17, 1961, on the alleged
partition effected in 1945 and on the allegations in oppositors' inventory
dated November 7, 1961.

We hold that the said order is erroneous and should be set aside because
the probate court failed to receive evidence as to the ownership of the said
parcels of land. The general rule is that questions of title to property cannot
be passed upon in a testate or intestate proceeding. However, when the
parties are all heirs of the decedent, it is optional upon them to submit to the
probate court the question of title to property and, when so submitted, the
probate court may definitely pass judgment thereon (3 Moran's Comment's
on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., pp. 448, 473; Alvarez vs. Espiritu, L-18833,
August 14, 1965, 14 SCRA 892).
Lorenzo Rematado and Lazaro Recuelo are not heirs of the decedent. They
are third persons. The rule is that matters affecting property under
administration may be taken cognizance of by the probate court in the course
of the intestate proceedings provided that the interests of third persons are
not prejudiced (Cunanan vs. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227; Ibid, 3 Moran 473).
However, third persons to whom the decedent's assets had been fraudulently
conveyed may be cited to appear in court and be examined under oath as to
how they came into the possession of the decedent's assets (Sec. 6, Rule
87, Rules of Court) but a separate action would be necessary to recover the
said assets (Chanco vs. Madrilejos, 12 Phil. 543; Guanco vs. Philippine
National Bank, 54 Phil. 244).
After receiving evidence, the probate court should decide once and for all
whether there are still any assets of the estate that can be partitioned and, if
so, to effect the requisite partition and distribution. If the estate has no more
assets and if a partition had really been made or the action to recover the
lands transferred to third person had prescribed, it should dismiss the
intestate proceeding.
WHEREFORE, (a) the probate court's order of December 11, 1961, granting
the administratrix's motion of May 4, 1961 for the delivery to her of certain
properties is set aside; (b) its other order of December 11, 1961 approving
the amended inventory should not be considered as a final adjudication on
the ownership of the properties listed in the inventory and (c) this case is
remanded to the lower court for further proceedings in accordance with the
guidelines laid down in this decision. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

The probate court should receive evidence on the discordant contentions of

the parties as to the assets of decedent's estate, the valuations thereof and
the rights of the transferees of some of the assets. The issue of prescription
should also be considered (see p. 84, Record on Appeal). Generally
prescription does not run in favor of a coheir as long as he expressly or
impliedly recognizes the coownership (Art. 494, Civil Code).1äwphï1.ñët But
from the moment that a coheir claims absolute and exclusive ownership of
the hereditary properties and denies the others any share therein, the
question involved is no longer one of partition but that of ownership (Bargayo
vs. Camumot, 40 Phil. 857).

At the hearing of the petition for letters of administration some evidence was
already introduced on the assets constituting the estate of Gelacio Sebial.

₯Special Proceedings (Rule 82- Rule 83) Page 27 of 40

[10] G.R. No. 114217               October 13, 2009
HEIRS OF JOSE SY BANG, HEIRS OF JULIAN SY and OSCAR SY, 1
Petitioners, vs. ROLANDO SY, ROSALINO SY, LUCIO SY, ENRIQUE SY,
ROSAURO SY, BARTOLOME SY, FLORECITA SY, LOURDES SY,
JULIETA SY, and ROSITA FERRERA-SY, Respondents.
Actions; Judgments; A several judgment is proper when the liability of each
party is clearly separable and distinct from that of his co-parties, such that the
claims against each of them could have been the subject of separate suits, and
judgment for or against one of them will not necessarily affect the other.—Section 4,
Rule 36 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure states: SEC. 4. Several judgments.
—In an action against several defendants, the court may, when a several judgment is
proper, render judgment against one or more of them, leaving the action to proceed
against the others. The trial court’s Third Partial Decision is in the nature of a several
judgment as contemplated by the rule quoted above. The trial court ruled on the
status of the properties in the names of petitioners (defendants below) while
deferring the ruling on the properties in the names of respondents pending the
presentation of evidence. A several judgment is proper when the liability of each
party is clearly separable and distinct from that of his co-parties, such that the claims
against each of them could have been the subject of separate suits, and judgment for
or against one of them will not necessarily affect the other.
Same; Civil Law; Partition; The issue of ownership or co-ownership, to be
more precise, must first be resolved in order to effect a partition of properties.—In
the settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties can only
be made: (1) after all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration,
allowance to the widow, and estate tax have been paid; or (2) before payment of said
obligations only if the distributees or any of them gives a bond in a sum fixed by the
court conditioned upon the payment of said obligations within such time as the court
directs, or when provision is made to meet those obligations. Settling the issue of
ownership is the first stage in an action for partition. As this Court has ruled: The
issue of ownership or co-ownership, to be more precise, must first be resolved in
order to effect a partition of properties. This should be done in the action for partition
itself. As held in the case of Catapusan v. Court of Appeals, 435 SCRA 232, 239: “In
actions for partition, the court cannot properly issue an order to divide the property,
unless it first makes a determination as to the existence of co-ownership. The court
must initially settle the issue of ownership, the first stage in an action for partition.
Needless to state, an action for partition will not lie if the claimant has no rightful
interest over the subject property. In fact, Section 1 of Rule 69 requires the party
filing the action to state in his complaint the “nature and extent of his title” to the real
estate. Until and unless the issue of ownership is definitely resolved, it would be
premature to effect a partition of the properties x x x.”
Lis Pendens; While the trial court has an inherent power to cancel a notice of
lis pendens, such power is to be exercised within the express confines of the law.—
While the trial court has an inherent power to cancel a notice of lis pendens, such
₯Special Proceedings (Rule 82- Rule 83)
power is to be exercised within the express confines of the law. As provided in
Section 14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a notice of lis pendens
may be cancelled on two grounds: (1) when the annotation was for the purpose of
molesting the title of the adverse party, or (2) when the annotation is not necessary to
protect the title of the party who caused it to be recorded. This Court has interpreted
the notice as: The notice is but an incident in an action, an extrajudicial one, to be
sure. It does not affect the merits thereof. It is intended merely to constructively
advise, or warn, all people who deal with the property that they so deal with it at
their own risk, and whatever rights they may acquire in the property in any voluntary
transaction are subject to the results of the action, and may well be inferior and
subordinate to those which may be finally determined and laid down therein. The
cancellation of such a precautionary notice is therefore also a mere incident in the
action, and may be ordered by the Court having jurisdiction of it at any given time.
And its continuance or removal—like the continuance or removal of a preliminary
attachment of injunction—is not contingent on the existence of a final judgment in
the action, and ordinarily has no effect on the merits thereof.
Settlement of Estates; Partition; It is the court hearing the settlement of the
estate that should effect the payment of widow’s allowance considering that the
properties of the estate are within its jurisdiction, to the exclusion of all other courts.
—The court hearing the petition for guardianship had limited jurisdiction. It had no
jurisdiction to enforce payment of the widow’s allowance ordered by this Court.
Reviewing the antecedents, we note that the claim for widow’s allowance was made
before the Supreme Court in a case that did not arise from the guardianship
proceedings. The case subject of the Supreme Court petition (Civil Case No. 8578) is
still pending before the RTC of Lucena City. Rule 83, Sec. 3, of the Rules of Court
states: SEC. 3. Allowance to widow and family.—The widow and minor or
incapacitated children of a deceased person, during the settlement of the estate, shall
receive therefrom, under the direction of the court, such allowance as are provided
by law. Correlatively, Article 188 of the Civil Code states: Art. 188. From the
common mass of property support shall be given to the surviving spouse and to the
children during the liquidation of the inventoried property and until what belongs to
them is delivered; but from this shall be deducted that amount received for support
which exceeds the fruits or rents pertaining to them. Obviously, “the court” referred
to in Rule 83, Sec. 3, of the Rules of Court is the court hearing the settlement of the
estate. Also crystal clear is the provision of the law that the widow’s allowance is to
be taken from the common mass of property forming part of the estate of the
decedent. Thus, as evident from the foregoing provisions, it is the court hearing the
settlement of the estate that should effect the payment of widow’s allowance
considering that the properties of the estate are within its jurisdiction, to the
exclusion of all other courts.
Same; Same; Guardianship; Jurisdiction; Generally, the guardianship court
exercising special and limited jurisdiction cannot actually order the delivery of the
property of the ward found to be embezzled, concealed, or conveyed—only in
extreme cases, where property clearly belongs to the ward or where his title thereto
has been already judicially decided, may the court direct its delivery to the
Page 28 of 40
guardian; The distribution of the residue of the estate of the deceased incompetent is
a function pertaining properly, not to the guardianship proceedings, but to another
proceeding in which the heirs are at liberty to initiate.—In emphasizing the limited
jurisdiction of the guardianship court, this Court has pronounced that: Generally, the
guardianship court exercising special and limited jurisdiction cannot actually order
the delivery of the property of the ward found to be embezzled, concealed, or
conveyed. In a categorical language of this Court, only in extreme cases, where
property clearly belongs to the ward or where his title thereto has been already
judicially decided, may the court direct its delivery to the guardian. In effect, there
can only be delivery or return of the embezzled, concealed or conveyed property of
the ward, where the right or title of said ward is clear and undisputable. However,
where title to any property said to be embezzled, concealed or conveyed is in dispute,
x x x the determination of said title or right whether in favor of the persons said to
have embezzled, concealed or conveyed the property must be determined in a
separate ordinary action and not in a guardianship proceedings. Further, this Court
has held that the distribution of the residue of the estate of the deceased incompetent
is a function pertaining properly, not to the guardianship proceedings, but to another
proceeding in which the heirs are at liberty to initiate.
Criminal Procedure; Probable Cause; Words and Phrases; Probable cause
need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence
establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence
establishing absolute certainty of guilt.—A finding of probable cause does not
conclusively prove the charge of falsification against respondents. In a preliminary
investigation, probable cause has been defined as “the existence of such facts and
circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts
within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the
crime for which he was prosecuted.” It is well-settled that a finding of probable
cause needs to rest only on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has
been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be
based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing
guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute
certainty of guilt.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court are two Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. The first Petition, G.R. No. 114217, assails the Decision 2
dated May 6, 1993 and the Resolution 3 dated February 28, 1994 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 17686. On the other hand, the second
Petition, G.R. No. 150797, questions the Decision dated February 28, 2001
and the Resolution dated November 5, 2001 of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No.
46244.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
₯Special Proceedings (Rule 82- Rule 83)
G.R. No. 114217
On May 28, 1980, respondent Rolando Sy filed a Complaint for Partition
against spouses Jose Sy Bang and Iluminada Tan, spouses Julian Sy and
Rosa Tan, Zenaida Sy, Ma. Emma Sy, Oscar Sy, Rosalino Sy, Lucio Sy,
Enrique Sy, Rosauro Sy, Bartolome Sy, Florecita Sy, Lourdes Sy, Julieta Sy,
Rosita Ferrera-Sy, and Renato Sy before the then Court of First Instance of
Quezon, Branch 2, docketed as Civil Case No. 8578. 4
Respondents Rolando Sy, Rosalino Sy, Lucio Sy, Enrique Sy, Rosauro Sy,
Bartolome Sy, Julieta Sy, Lourdes Sy, and Florecita Sy are the children of Sy
Bang by his second marriage to respondent Rosita Ferrera-Sy, while
petitioners Jose Sy Bang, Julian Sy and Oscar Sy are the children of Sy
Bang from his first marriage to Ba Nga, and petitioners Zenaida Tan and Ma.
Emma Sy are the children of petitioner spouses Jose Sy Bang and Iluminada
Tan.5
Sy Bang died intestate in 1971, leaving behind real and personal properties,
including several businesses.6
During an out-of-court conference between petitioners and respondents, it
was agreed that the management, supervision or administration of the
common properties and/or the entire estate of the deceased Sy Bang shall
be placed temporarily in the hands of petitioner Jose Sy Bang, as trustee,
with authority to delegate some of his functions to any of petitioners or private
respondents. Thus, the function or duty of bookkeeper was delegated by
Jose Sy Bang to his co-petitioner Julian Sy, and the duty or function of
management and operation of the business of cinema of the common
ownership was delegated by petitioner Jose Sy Bang to respondent Rosauro
Sy.7
Herein petitioners and respondents also agreed that the income of the three
cinema houses, namely, Long Life, SBS and Sy-Co Theaters, shall
exclusively pertain to respondents for their support and sustenance, pending
the termination of Civil Case No. 8578, for Judicial Partition, and the income
from the vast parts of the entire estate and other businesses of their common
father, to pertain exclusively to petitioners. Hence, since the year 1980,
private respondents, through respondent Rosauro Sy, had taken charge of
the operation and management of the three cinema houses, with the income
derived therefrom evenly divided among themselves for their support and
maintenance.8
On March 30, 1981, the Judge rendered a First Partial Decision based on the
Compromise Agreement dated November 10, 1980, submitted in Civil Case
No. 8578 by plaintiff Rolando Sy and defendants Jose Sy Bang and Julian
Page 29 of 40
Sy. On April 2, 1981, the Judge rendered a Second Partial Decision based
on the pretrial order of the court, dated March 25, 1981, entered into by and
between respondent Renato Sy and petitioner spouses. Said First Partial
Decision and Second Partial Decision had long become final, without an
appeal having been interposed by any of the parties. 9
On June 8, 1982, the Judge rendered a Third Partial Decision, 10 the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders this Third Partial Decision:
(a) Declaring that all the properties, businesses or assets, their income,
produce and improvements, as well as all the rights, interests or
participations (sic) in the names of defendants Jose Sy Bang and his wife
Iluminada Tan and their children, defendants Zenaida and Ma. Emma;
both surnamed Sy, and defendants Julian Sy and his wife Rosa Tan, as
belonging to the estate of Sy Bang, including the properties in the names
of said defendants which are enumerated in the Complaints in this case
and all those properties, rights and interests which said defendants may
have concealed or fraudulently transferred in the names of other persons,
their agents or representatives;
(b) Declaring the following as the heirs of Sy Bang, namely: his surviving
widow, Maria Rosita Ferrera-Sy and her children, Enrique, Bartolome,
Rosalino, Rolando, Rosauro, Maria Lourdes, Florecita and Julieta, all
surnamed Sy, and his children by his first wife, namely: Jose Sy Bang,
Julian Sy, Lucio Sy, Oscar Sy and Renato Sy;
(c) Ordering the partition of the Estate of Sy Bang among his heirs entitled
thereto after the extent thereof shall have been determined at the
conclusion of the proper accounting which the parties in this case, their
agents and representatives, shall render and after segregating and
delivering to Maria Rosita Ferrera-Sy her one-half (1/2) share in the
conjugal partnership between her and her deceased husband Sy Bang;
(d) Deferring resolution on the question concerning the inclusion for
partition of properties in the names of Rosalino, Bartolome, Rolando and
Enrique, all surnamed Sy. SO ORDERED.
On June 16, 1982, petitioners filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings and for
Inhibition, alleging, among others, that the Judge had patently shown
partiality in favor of their co-defendants in the case. This motion was denied
on August 16, 1982.11
₯Special Proceedings (Rule 82- Rule 83)
On July 4, 1982, petitioners filed a Petition for Prohibition and for Inhibition
(Disqualification) and Mandamus with Restraining Order with the Supreme
Court docketed as G.R. No. 60957. The Petition for Prohibition and for
Inhibition was denied, and the Petition for Mandamus with Restraining Order
was Noted.12
On August 17, 1982, the Judge issued two Orders: (1) in the first Order, 13
Mrs. Lucita L. Sarmiento was appointed as Receiver, and petitioners’ Motion
for New Trial and/or Reconsideration, dated July 9, 1982 and their
Supplemental Motion, dated July 12, 1982, were denied for lack of merit; and
(2) in the second Order,14 the Judge ordered the immediate cancellation of
the lis pendens annotated at the back of the certificates of title in the names
of Bartolome Sy, Rosalino Sy and Rolando Sy.
On August 18, 1982, the trial court approved the bond posted by the receiver,
Mrs. Lucita L. Sarmiento, Bartolome Sy, Rolando Sy and Rosalino Sy. 15
While the Petition for Mandamus with Restraining Order was pending before
the First Division of the Supreme Court, petitioners filed a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition before the Supreme Court, docketed as G.R. No.
61519. A Temporary Restraining Order was issued on August 31, 1982, to
enjoin the Judge from taking any action in Civil Case No. 8578 and, likewise,
restraining the effectivity of and compliance with the Resolution dated August
16, 1982, the two Orders dated August 17, 1982, and the Order dated August
18, 1982.
On September 2, 1982, petitioners withdrew their Petition for Mandamus with
Restraining Order, docketed as G.R. No. 60957.
On September 11, 1982, an Urgent Manifestation and Motion was filed by
Mrs. Lucita L. Sarmiento, the appointed receiver, which was opposed by
petitioners on September 24, 1982. 16
After several incidents in the case, the Court, on May 8, 1989, referred the
petition to the CA for proper determination and disposition.
The CA rendered the assailed Decision17 on May 6, 1993, denying due
course to and dismissing the petition for lack of merit. It held that Judge Puno
acted correctly in issuing the assailed Third Partial Decision. The CA said
that the act of Judge Puno in rendering a partial decision was in accord with
then Rule 36, Section 4, of the Rules of Court, which stated that in an action
against several defendants, the court may, when a judgment is proper,
render judgment against one or more of them, leaving the action to proceed
against the others. It found that the judge’s decision to defer resolution on the
properties in the name of Rosalino, Bartolome, Rolando, and Enrique would
Page 30 of 40
not affect the resolution on the properties in the names of Jose Sy Bang,
Iluminada, Julian, Rosa, Zenaida, and Ma. Emma, since the properties were
separable and distinct from one another such that the claim that the same
formed part of the Sy Bang estate could be the subject of separate suits.
The CA also upheld the judge’s appointment of a receiver, saying that the
judge did so after both parties had presented their evidence and upon
verified petition filed by respondents, and in order to preserve the properties
under litigation. Further, the CA found proper the order to cancel the notice of
lis pendens annotated in the certificates of title in the names of Rosalino,
Rolando and Bartolome.
The Motion for Reconsideration was denied on February 28, 1994. 18
On April 22, 1994, petitioners filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
The Court denied the Petition for non-compliance with Circulars 1-88 and 19-
91 for failure of petitioners to attach the registry receipt. Petitioners moved for
reconsideration, and the Petition was reinstated on July 13, 1994.
In this Petition for Review, petitioners seek the reversal of the CA Decision
and Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 17686 and, consequently, the nullification
of the Third Partial Decision and orders of the trial court in Civil Case No.
8578. They also pray for the Court to direct the trial court to proceed with the
reception of further evidence in Civil Case No. 8578. 19 In particular,
petitioners allege that the CA decided questions of substance not in accord
with law when it upheld the trial court’s Third Partial Decision which, they
alleged, was rendered in violation of their rights to due process.
Petitioners narrate that the trial court initially gave them two trial days – May
26 and 27, 1982 – to present their evidence. However, at the hearing on May
26, the judge forced them to terminate the presentation of their evidence. On
June 2, 1982, following petitioners’ submission of additional documentary
evidence, the trial court scheduled the case for hearing on June 8 and 9,
1982, at 2 o’clock in the afternoon "in view of the importance of the issue
concerning whether all the properties in the names of Enrique Sy, Bartolome
Sy, Rosalino Sy, and Rolando Sy and/or their respective wives (as well as
those in the names of other party-litigants in this case) shall be declared or
included as part of the Estate of Sy Bang, and in view of the numerous
documentary evidences (sic) presented by Attys. Raya and Camaligan." At
the June 8 hearing, petitioners presented additional evidence. Unknown to
them, however, the trial court had already rendered its Third Partial Decision
at 11 o’clock that morning. Thus, petitioners argue that said Third Partial
Decision is void.20
₯Special Proceedings (Rule 82- Rule 83)
They also question the trial court’s First Order dated August 17, 1982 and
Order dated August 18, 1982 granting the prayer for receivership and
appointing a receiver, respectively, both allegedly issued without a hearing
and without showing the necessity to appoint a receiver. Lastly, they question
the Second Order dated August 17, 1982 canceling the notice of lis pendens
ex parte and without any showing that the notice was for the purpose of
molesting the adverse parties, or that it was not necessary to protect the
rights of the party who caused it to be recorded. 21
On May 9, 1996, Rosita Ferrera-Sy filed a Motion for Payment of Widow’s
Allowance. She alleged that her deceased husband, Sy Bang, left an
extensive estate. The properties of the estate were found by the trial court to
be their conjugal properties. From the time of Sy Bang’s death in 1971 until
the filing of the motion, Rosita was not given any widow’s allowance as
provided in Section 3, Rule 83 of the Rules of Court by the parties in
possession and control of her husband’s estate, or her share in the conjugal
partnership.22
In their Comment on the Motion for Payment of Widow’s Allowance,
petitioners argued that Section 3, Rule 83 of the Rules of Court specifically
provides that the same is granted only "during the settlement of the estate" of
the decedent, and this allowance, under Article 188 of the Civil Code (now
Article 133 of the Family Code), shall be taken from the "common mass of
property" during the liquidation of the inventoried properties. 23 Considering
that the case before the trial court is a special civil action for partition under
Rule 69 of the Rules of Court, Rosita is not entitled to widow’s allowance.
On September 23, 1996, the Court granted the Motion for Payment of
Widow’s Allowance and ordered petitioners jointly and severally to pay
Rosita ₱25,000.00 as the widow’s allowance to be taken from the estate of
Sy Bang, effective September 1, 1996 and every month thereafter until the
estate is finally settled or until further orders from the Court. 24
In a Manifestation dated October 1, 1996, petitioners informed the Court that
Rosita and co-petitioner Enrique Sy had executed a waiver of past, present
and future claims against petitioners and, thus, should be dropped as parties
to the case.25 Attached thereto was a Sinumpaang Salaysay wherein Rosita
and Enrique stated that they were given ₱1 million and a 229-square meter
parcel of land, for which reason they were withdrawing as plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 8578.26
Respondents, except Enrique Sy, filed a Counter-Manifestation and
Opposition to Drop Rosita Sy as a Party.27 They said that it would be
ridiculous for Rosita to give up her share in Sy Bang’s estate, amounting to
hundreds of millions of pesos, which had already been ordered partitioned by
Page 31 of 40
the trial court, to the prejudice of her seven full-blooded children. They
alleged that Rosita was not in possession of her full faculties when she
affixed her thumbmark on the Sinumpaang Salaysay considering her age,
her frequent illness, and her lack of ability to read or write. Hence, they filed a
petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lucena City for
guardianship over her person and properties. They also alleged that Enrique
and some of Jose Sy Bang’s children would stealthily visit Rosita in
Rosauro’s house while the latter was away. On one of those occasions, she
was asked to affix her thumbmark on some documents she could not read
and knew nothing about. They claim that Rosita has never received a single
centavo of the ₱1 million allegedly given her.
In their Reply to Counter-Manifestation, 28 petitioners countered that
respondents failed to present any concrete evidence to challenge the
Sinumpaang Salaysay. Since the same was duly notarized, it was a public
document and presumed valid. They, likewise, alleged that the Counter-
Manifestation was filed without Rosita’s authorization as, in fact, she had
written her counsel with instructions to withdraw said pleading. 29 Further, they
averred that Rosita executed the Sinumpaang Salaysay while in full
possession of her faculties. They alleged that Rosita intended to oppose the
petition for guardianship and they presented a copy of a sworn certification
from Rosita’s physician that "she (Rosita) is physically fit and mentally
competent to attend to her personal or business transactions."30
On the other hand, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Court’s September 23, 1996 Resolution. It alleged that Rosita and Enrique
executed their Sinumpaang Salaysay on August 29, 1996. However, this
development was made known to the Court only on October 1, 1996; hence,
the Court was not aware of this when it issued its Resolution. Petitioners
prayed for the reconsideration of the September 23, 1996 Resolution and
dropping Rosita and Enrique as parties to the case.31
In their Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration, respondents
maintained that the Court should not consider the Motion for
Reconsideration. Respondents alleged that Rosita thumbmarked the
Sinumpaang Salaysay without understanding the contents of the document
or the implications of her acts. Respondents also tried to demonstrate that
their mother would thumbmark any document that their children asked her to
by exhibiting four documents each denominated as Sinumpaang Salaysay
and thumbmarked by Rosita. One purported to disown the earlier
Sinumpaang Salaysay. The second was a reproduction of the earlier
Sinumpaang Salaysay with the amount changed to ₱100.00, the Transfer
Certificate of Title number changed to 12343567, and the size of the property
to "as big as the entire Lucena City." The third purported to bequeath her
shares in the conjugal partnership of gains to Rosauro, Bartolome, Rolando,
and Rosalino, while refusing to give any inheritance to Florecita, Lourdes,
₯Special Proceedings (Rule 82- Rule 83)
Julieta, and Enrique. Lastly, the fourth contradicted the third in that it was in
favor of Florecita, Lourdes, Julieta, and Enrique, while disinheriting Rosauro,
Bartolome, Rolando, and Rosalino. These, respondents assert, clearly show
that their mother would sign any document, no matter the contents, upon the
request of any of her children.32
The Court denied the Motion for Reconsideration on November 18, 1996. 33
Petitioners filed a Supplement to their Memorandum, additionally arguing that
the Third Partial Decision did not only unduly bind the properties without due
process, but also ignored the fundamental rule on the indefeasibility of
Torrens titles.34
G.R. No. 150797
Meanwhile, on September 30, 1996, respondents filed a Joint Petition for the
Guardianship of the Incompetent Rosita Ferrera-Sy before the RTC of
Lucena City, Branch 58 (Guardianship court), docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 96-34. On May 19, 1997, Rosauro Sy, who sought to be
named as the special guardian, filed before the Guardianship court a Motion
to Order Court Deposit of Widow’s Allowance Ordered by the Supreme
Court.35 Then, he filed a Motion before this Court seeking an Order for
petitioners to pay Rosita ₱2,150,000.00 in widow’s allowance and
₱25,000.00 every month thereafter, as ordered by this Court in its September
23, 1996 Resolution. He also prayed for petitioners’ imprisonment should
they fail to comply therewith.36
On July 8, 1997, the Guardianship court issued an Order, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, Mr. Jose Sy Bang and his wife Iluminada Tan; and their
children, Zenaida Sy and Ma. Emma Sy; and Julian Sy and his wife Rosa
Tan, are hereby ordered to deposit to this Court, jointly and severally, the
amount of ₱250,000.00 representing the widow’s allowance of the
incompetent Rosita Ferrera Sy corresponding the (sic) periods from
September 1, 1996 to June 30, 1997, and additional amount of ₱25,000.00
per month and every month thereafter, within the first ten (10) days of each
month.37
Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was denied. Rosauro, the appointed
guardian, then asked the Guardianship court to issue a writ of execution.
Meanwhile, on December 10, 1997, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari
with the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 46244 to annul the July 8, 1997
Order and October 9, 1997 Resolution of the Guardianship court. 38
Page 32 of 40
In a Decision39 dated February 28, 2001, the CA ruled in respondents’ favor,
finding "nothing legally objectionable in private respondent Rosauro Sy’s
filing of the motion to order the deposit of the widow’s allowance ordered by
the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 114217 or, for that matter, in the public
respondent’s grant thereof in the order herein assailed. More so, when the
public respondent’s actions are viewed in the light of the Supreme Court’s
denial of petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of its resolution dated
September 23, 1996."40 Thus it held:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the assailed
resolution dated September 23, 1996 (sic) is AFFIRMED in toto. No
pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
Their Motion for Reconsideration having been denied on November 5,
2001,41 petitioners filed this Petition for Review 42 under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court praying for this Court to reverse the CA’s February 28, 2001
Decision and its Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration, and to
declare the Guardianship court to have exceeded its jurisdiction in directing
the deposit of the widow’s allowance in Special Proceedings No. 96-34. 43
They argued that the Guardianship court’s jurisdiction is limited to
determining whether Rosita was incompetent and, upon finding in the
affirmative, appointing a guardian. Moreover, under Rule 83, Section 3, of the
Rules of Court, a widow’s allowance can only be paid in an estate
proceeding. Even if the complaint for partition were to be considered as
estate proceedings, only the trial court hearing the partition case had the
exclusive jurisdiction to execute the payment of the widow’s allowance. 44
They raised the following issues:
The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Guardianship Court’s Order dated
8 July 1997, and Resolution dated 9 October 1997, in that:
I.The trial court, acting as a Guardianship Court, and limited jurisdiction, had
no authority to enforce payment of widow’s allowance.
II.The payment of widow’s allowance cannot be implemented at [the] present
because the estate of Sy Bang – the source from which payment is to be
taken – has not been determined with finality.
III.The Order of the trial court purporting to enforce payment of widow’s
allowance unduly modified the express terms of this Honorable Court’s
Resolution granting it.45
Petitioners, likewise, question the Guardianship court’s omission of the
phrase "to be taken from the estate of Sy Bang" from the July 8, 1997 Order.
₯Special Proceedings (Rule 82- Rule 83)
They interpreted this to mean that the Guardianship court was ordering that
the widow’s allowance be taken from their own properties and not from the
estate of Sy Bang – an "undue modification" of this Court’s September 23,
1996 Resolution.46
On January 21, 2002, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. No. 114217 and
G.R. No. 150797. The parties submitted their respective Memoranda on May
21, 2003 and June 19, 2003, both of which were noted by this Court in its
August 11, 2003 Resolution.
Pending the issuance of this Court’s Decision in the two cases, respondent
Rosauro Sy filed, on November 11, 2003, a Motion to Order Deposit in Court
of Supreme Court’s Ordered Widow’s Allowance Effective September 23,
1996 and Upon Failure of Petitioners Julian Sy, et al. to Comply Therewith to
Order Their Imprisonment Until Compliance. He alleged that his mother had
been ill and had no means to support herself except through his financial
assistance, and that respondents had not complied with this Court’s
September 23, 1996 Resolution, promulgated seven years earlier. 47 He
argued that respondents’ defiance constituted indirect contempt of court.
That the Guardianship court had found them guilty of indirect contempt did
not help his mother because she was still unable to collect her widow’s
allowance.48
Petitioners opposed said Motion arguing that the estate from which the
widow’s allowance is to be taken has not been settled. They also reiterated
that Rosita, together with son Enrique, had executed a Sinumpaang
Salaysay waiving all claims against petitioners. Hence, there was no legal
ground to cite them in contempt.49
On April 4, 2005, this Court granted Rosauro’s Motion, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds and so holds petitioner Iluminada Tan (widow
of deceased petitioner Jose Sy Bang), their children and co-petitioners
Zenaida Sy, Ma. Emma Sy, Julian Sy and the latter’s wife Rosa Tan, GUILTY
of contempt of this Court and are collectively sentenced to pay a FINE
equivalent to ten (10%) percent of the total amount due and unpaid to Rosita
Ferrera-Sy by way of a widow’s allowance pursuant to this Court’s Resolution
of September 13, 1996, and accordingly ORDERS their immediate
imprisonment until they shall have complied with said Resolution by paying
Rosita Ferrera-Sy the amount of TWO MILLION SIX HUNDRED THOUSAND
ONE HUNDRED PESOS (₱2,600,100.00), representing her total
accumulated unpaid widow’s allowance from September, 1996 to April, 2005
at the rate of TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (₱25,000.00) a month,
plus six (6%) percent interest thereon. The Court further DIRECTS
Page 33 of 40
petitioners to faithfully pay Rosita Ferrera-Sy her monthly widow’s allowance
for the succeeding months as they fall due, under pain of imprisonment.
This Resolution is immediately EXECUTORY. SO ORDERED.50
Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma paid the court fine of ₱260,010.00 on
April 5, 2005.51
Respondents, except Rosauro Sy (who had died), filed a Motion for
Execution52 before this Court on April 25, 2005. On the other hand, petitioner
Rosa Tan filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer for Clarification. 53
She alleged that, in accordance with Chinese culture, she had no
participation in the management of the family business or Sy Bang’s estate.
After her husband’s death, she allegedly inherited nothing but debts and
liabilities, and, having no income of her own, was now in a quandary on how
these can be paid. She asked the Court to consider that she had not
disobeyed its Resolution and to consider her motion.
Other petitioners, Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma, also filed a Motion for
Reconsideration with Prayer for Clarification. 54 They stressed that the ₱1
million and the piece of land Rosita had already received from Jose Sy Bang
in 1996 should form part of the widow’s allowance. They also argued that
whatever allowance Rosita may be entitled to should come from the estate of
Sy Bang. They further argued the unfairness of being made to pay the
allowance when none of them participated in the management of Sy Bang’s
estate; Zenaida and Ma. Emma being minors at the time of his death, while
Iluminada and Rosa had no significant role in the family business.
Respondents then filed a Motion for Issuance of Order Requiring
Respondents to Deposit with the Supreme Court’s Cashier its Ordered
Widow’s Allowance55 and a Motion for Execution of Resolution dated April 4,
2005.56 Petitioners opposed the same.57
On July 25, 2005, the Court issued a Resolution granting both of
respondents’ motions and denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. 58
Petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma filed, on August 15, 2005, a
Manifestation of Compliance and Motion for Clarification. 59 They maintained
that the issues they had raised in the motion for reconsideration had not been
duly resolved. They argued that when this Court issued its September 23,
1996 Resolution, it was not yet aware that Rosita had executed a
Sinumpaang Salaysay, wherein she waived her claims and causes of action
against petitioners. They also informed this Court that, on April 17, 1998, the
Guardianship court had issued an Order which recognized a "temporary
agreement" based on the voluntary offer of Jose Sy Bang of a financial
₯Special Proceedings (Rule 82- Rule 83)
assistance of ₱5,000.00 per month to Rosita while the case was pending.
Moreover, as a manifestation of good faith, petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida
and Ma. Emma paid the ₱430,000.00 out of their own funds in partial
compliance with the Court’s Resolution. However, the same did not in any
way constitute a waiver of their rights or defenses in the present case. They
underscored the fact that the allowance must come from the estate of Sy
Bang, and not from Jose Sy Bang or any of the latter’s heirs, the extent of
which remained undetermined. They further asked the Court to adjudicate
the liability for the widow’s allowance to be equally divided between them and
the other set of petitioners, the heirs of Julian Sy.
On August 30, 2005, respondents filed a motion asking this Court to issue an
Order for the immediate incarceration of petitioners for refusing to comply
with the Court’s resolution.60 They aver that the period within which
petitioners were to comply with the Court’s Resolution had now lapsed, and
thus, petitioners must now be incarcerated for failure to abide by said
Resolution. They likewise asked the Court to refer petitioners’ counsel, Atty.
Vicente M. Joyas, to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for violations
of the Canons of Professional Responsibility or to declare him in contempt of
court. They alleged that despite the finality of the Court’s denial of petitioners’
motion for reconsideration, Atty. Joyas still filed a Manifestation with
compliance arguing the same points. Further, Atty. Joyas is not petitioners’
counsel of record in this case since he never formally entered his
appearance before the Court.61
In a Resolution dated September 14, 2005, the Court denied the motion to
refer Atty. Joyas to the IBP for being a wrong remedy. 62
Petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma then filed an Omnibus
Motion,63 seeking an extension of time to comply with the Court’s Resolution
and Motion to delete the penalty of "fine" as a consequence of voluntary
compliance. They insist that their compliance with the order to pay the
widow’s allowance should "obliterate, expunge, and blot out" the penalty of
fine and imprisonment. They alleged that for their failure to comply with this
Court’s Resolution, the RTC, Lucena City, found them guilty of indirect
contempt and imposed on them a fine of ₱30,000.00. They had appealed
said order to the CA.
They also tried to make a case out of the use of the terms "joint and several"
in the September 23 Resolution, and "collectively" in the April 5, 2005
Resolution. They argued that "joint and several" creates individual liability for
each of the parties for the full amount of the obligation, while "collectively"
means that all members of the group are responsible together for the action
of the group. Hence, "collectively" would mean that the liability belongs
equally to the two groups of petitioners. They requested for an additional 60
days to raise the necessary amount. They also asked the Court to hold their
Page 34 of 40
imprisonment in abeyance until their "just and reasonable compliance" with
the Court’s orders.
Barely a month later, petitioners, through their new counsel, filed another
Manifestation stressing that Sy Bang’s marriage to Rosita Ferrera is void.
They claimed that respondents have falsified documents to lead the courts
into believing that Rosita’s marriage to Sy Bang is valid.
The Omnibus Motion was denied in a Resolution dated October 17, 2005.
Thereafter, respondents filed a Motion to Immediately Order Incarceration of
Petitioners,64 which petitioners opposed.65
66
In a Resolution dated December 12, 2005, the Court issued a Warrant of
Arrest67 against petitioners and directed the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) to detain them until they complied with this Court’s April 4, 2005 and
July 25, 2005 Resolutions.
Petitioner Rosa Tan filed a Manifestation with Motion. 68 She informed the
Court that, to show that she was not obstinate and contumacious of the Court
and its orders, she had begged and pleaded with her relatives to raise money
to comply, but concedes that she was only able to raise a minimal amount
since she has no source of income herself and needs financial support to buy
her food and medicines. She obtained her brother’s help and the latter issued
six checks in the total amount of ₱650,000.00. She also alleged that she was
not informed by her husband’s counsel of the developments in the case, and
remained unconsulted on any of the matters or incidents of the case. She
reiterated that she had no participation in the management of the Sy Bang
estate and received nothing of value upon her husband’s death. She prayed
that the Court would not consider her failure to raise any further amount as
contempt or defiance of it’s orders.
The motion was denied in a Resolution dated January 16, 2006.
In an Urgent Manifestation of Compliance with the Contempt Resolutions
with Payment of Widow’s Allowance with Prayer Reiterating the Lifting of
Warrant of Arrest on Humanitarian Grounds, 69 petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida
and Ma. Emma asked the Court to delete the penalty of indefinite
imprisonment considering their partial compliance and the partial compliance
of Rosa Tan. They expressed willingness to deposit the widow’s allowance
with the Supreme Court’s Cashier pending the determination of Sy Bang’s
estate. They reasoned that the money to be deposited is their own and does
not belong to Sy Bang’s estate. The deposit is made for the sole purpose of
deleting the penalty of indefinite imprisonment. They claim that they are not
willfully disobeying the Court’s order but are merely hesitating to comply
because of pending incidents such as the falsification charges against
₯Special Proceedings (Rule 82- Rule 83)
Rosita, the resolution of the partition case, the Sinumpaang Salaysay
executed by Rosita, and the pendency of Rosita’s guardianship proceedings,
as well as humanitarian considerations. Thus, they prayed for the Court to
reconsider the order of contempt and to recall the warrant of arrest.
On February 15, 2006, this Court issued a Resolution 70 lifting the warrant of
arrest on petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida, Ma. Emma, and Rosa Tan on the
condition that they issue the corresponding checks to settle the accrued
widow’s allowance of Rosita Ferrera-Sy. They were also directed to submit
proof of their compliance to the Court within ten (10) days from notice.
In a Manifestation71 dated February 28, 2006, petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida
and Ma. Emma informed the Court that they had deposited the checks in
favor of Rosita with the RTC, Lucena City, Branch 58, during the proceedings
on February 28, 2006.72
Respondents filed a Comment to the Manifestation arguing that the deposit
of said checks, amounting to ₱1,073,053.00, does not amount to full
compliance with the Court’s order considering that the accrued widow’s
allowance now amounted to ₱4,528,125.00.1avvph!1
Then, petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma filed a Motion to include
Rosalino Sy, Bartolome Sy, Rolando Sy, and Heirs of Enrique Sy as Likewise
Liable for the Payment of Widow’s Allowance as Heirs of Sy Bang as they
may also hold Assets-Properties of the Estate of Sy Bang. 73 They argued that
it is denial of the equal protection clause for the Court to single out only the
two children of the first marriage – Jose Sy Bang and Julian Sy – and their
heirs, as the ones responsible for the widow’s allowance. This ruling, they
aver, does not take into consideration the numerous and valuable properties
from the estate of Sy Bang being held in the names of Rosalino, Bartolome,
Rolando, and Enrique. They alleged that two compromise agreements, both
approved by the trial court, transferred properties to Rolando and Renato.
They further alleged that respondents Rolando, Maria Lourdes, Florecita,
Rosalino, Enrique, and Rosita Ferrera-Sy have executed separate waivers
and quitclaims over their shares in the estate of Sy Bang for certain
considerations. However, out of respect for the Court and their fear of
incarceration, they complied with the Court’s orders using their personal
funds which they claim is unfair because they have never participated in the
management of the properties of Sy Bang. They prayed that the Court
pronounce that the liability for the widow’s allowance be divided
proportionately among the following groups: Iluminada, Zenaida, and Ma.
Emma; Rosa Tan; Rosalino Sy and wife Helen Loo; Bartolome Sy and wife
Virginia Lim; Rolando Sy and wife Anacorita Rioflorido; and the heirs of
Enrique Sy, namely, Elaine Destura and Edwin Maceda.
Page 35 of 40
On March 23, 2006, petitioners filed an Urgent Reply to respondents’
Comment on the manifestation of compliance with Opposition 74 to the motion
filed by respondents for the Court to reiterate its order for the NBI to arrest
petitioners for failure to comply with the February 15, 2006 Resolution. They
argued that they had fully complied with the Court’s orders. They alleged that
on three occasions within the period, they had tried to submit 12 postdated
checks to the Court’s cashiers, but the same were refused due to the policy
of the Court not to issue receipts on postdated checks. They then filed a
motion before the RTC of Lucena City praying for authority to deposit the
checks with the trial court. The motion was denied but, on reconsideration,
was later granted. The checks are now in the custody of the RTC. The only
issue respondents raise, they claim, is the amount of the checks. Hence,
there is no basis for the Court to direct the NBI to effect their arrest.
The Court, in a Resolution dated March 29, 2006, required respondents to
comment on the motion to include some of them in the payment of widow’s
allowance. Petitioners, on the other hand, were required to comment on a
motion filed by respondents for the Court to reiterate its order to the NBI to
arrest petitioners for failure to comply with the February 15, 2006
Resolution.75
Petitioners filed their Comment with Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the
March 29, 2006 Resolution.76 They reiterated their arguments in their Urgent
Reply to respondents’ Comment on the manifestation of compliance with
Opposition. They further alleged that there is now a Resolution by the
Regional State Prosecutor, Region IV, San Pablo City, finding probable
cause to charge respondents with falsification of three marriage contracts
between Sy Bang and Rosita Ferrera. According to them, this development
now constitutes a "highly prejudicial question" on whether they should comply
with the order to pay widow’s allowance. They claim that, while the filing of
the information is merely the first step in the criminal prosecution of
respondents, it already casts doubt on whether Rosita is legally entitled to the
widow’s allowance. They now seek partial reconsideration of the Resolution
inasmuch as it requires them to deposit with the Clerk of Court, RTC of
Lucena City, Branch 58, new checks payable to Rosita Ferrera.
Respondents, on the other hand, filed a Comment and Manifestation 77 on
why they should not be made to pay the widow’s allowance. They argued
that the RTC had already decided that the estate of Sy Bang was comprised
of properties in the names of Jose Sy Bang, Iluminada Tan, Zenaida, Ma.
Emma, Julian Sy, and Rosa Tan, and the same was affirmed by the CA.
Pending the resolution of the appeal before this Court, this Decision stands.
Thus, petitioners’ claim that the estate of Sy Bang is yet undetermined is
false. They also claim that, contrary to petitioners’ claims of being poor, they
still hold enormous properties of the Sy Bang estate, which had been
transferred in their names through falsification of public documents, now
₯Special Proceedings (Rule 82- Rule 83)
subject of several cases which respondents filed against them before the
Department of Justice (DOJ). Respondents further claim that the validity of
their mother’s marriage to Sy Bang has been recognized by the courts in
several cases where the issue had been raised, including the case for
recognition of Rosita’s Filipino citizenship, the guardianship proceedings, and
the partition proceedings.
On June 23, 2006, respondents filed a Motion for Substitution of Parties. 78
They averred that Jose Sy Bang died on September 11, 2001, leaving behind
his widow Iluminada and 14 children, while Julian Sy died on August 28,
2004, leaving behind his widow Rosa and eight children. The claims against
Jose and Julian were not extinguished by their deaths. It was the duty of
petitioners’ counsel, under Rule 3, Section 16 of the Rules of Court, to inform
the Court of these deaths within 30 days thereof. Petitioners’ counsel failed to
so inform this Court, which should be a ground for disciplinary action. Hence,
respondents prayed that the Court order the heirs of the two deceased to
appear and be substituted in these cases within 30 days from notice.
In a Resolution79 dated July 5, 2006, the Court granted the motion for
substitution and noted the Comment and Manifestation on the Motion to
include Rosalino Sy, Bartolome Sy, Rolando Sy, and Heirs of Enrique Sy as
Likewise Liable for the Payment of Widow’s Allowance as Heirs of Sy Bang.
Respondents then filed a Manifestation and Motion to Implement the
Supreme Court’s Resolutions of September 23, 1996, April 4, 2005, July 25,
2005, December 12, 2005, and February 15, 2006. 80 They prayed that
petitioners be given a last period of five days within which to deposit with the
Supreme Court Cashier all the accrued widow’s allowances as of June 2006.
Petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma opposed respondents’
manifestation and motion.81 They argued that the resolutions sought to be
implemented were all issued prior to the DOJ Resolution finding probable
cause to file the falsification charges against respondents. They contended
that the criminal cases for falsification expose Rosita as a mere common-law
wife and not a "widow"; hence, there is no legal justification to give her the
widow’s allowance. They also reiterated their earlier arguments against the
grant of widow’s allowance.
Meanwhile, Rosa Tan filed a Comment on the Substitution of Parties with
Motion for Reconsideration.82 She argued that since the trial court had
already appointed a judicial administrator for the estate of Sy Bang, which
includes Julian Sy’s estate, the proper party to be substituted should be the
administrator and not Julian’s heirs who never exercised ownership rights
over the properties thereof.
Page 36 of 40
The Court denied the motion for reconsideration to the Resolution granting
substitution of parties for lack of merit on November 20, 2006.
The Court’s Ruling
G.R. No. 114217 Finding no reversible error therein, we affirm the CA
Decision.
The Third Partial Decision of the RTC To review, the CA held, to wit:
The respondent Judge acted correctly inasmuch as his decision to defer the
resolution on the question concerning the properties in the name of Rosalino,
Bartolome, Rolando and Enrique, all surnamed Sy, will not necessarily affect
the decision he rendered concerning the properties in the names of Jose Sy
Bang and wife, Julian Sy and wife, Zenaida Sy and Maria Sy, considering
that the properties mentioned were separable and distinct from each other,
such that the claim that said properties were not their own, but properties of
the late Sy Bang, could have been the subject of separate suits. 83
We agree with the CA.
Section 4, Rule 36 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure states: SEC. 4.
Several judgments. – In an action against several defendants, the court may,
when a several judgment is proper, render judgment against one or more of
them, leaving the action to proceed against the others.
The trial court’s Third Partial Decision is in the nature of a several judgment
as contemplated by the rule quoted above. The trial court ruled on the status
of the properties in the names of petitioners (defendants below) while
deferring the ruling on the properties in the names of respondents pending
the presentation of evidence.
A several judgment is proper when the liability of each party is clearly
separable and distinct from that of his co-parties, such that the claims against
each of them could have been the subject of separate suits, and judgment for
or against one of them will not necessarily affect the other. 84
Petitioners, although sued collectively, each held a separate and separable
interest in the properties of the Sy Bang estate.
The pronouncement as to the obligation of one or some petitioners did not
affect the determination of the obligations of the others. That the properties in
the names of petitioners were found to be part of the Sy Bang estate did not
₯Special Proceedings (Rule 82- Rule 83)
preclude any further findings or judgment on the status or nature of the
properties in the names of the other heirs.
The trial court’s June 2, 1982 Order reads:
IN view of the importance of the issue concerning whether all the properties
in the name (sic) of Enrique Sy, Bartolome Sy, Rosalino Sy and Rolando Sy
and/or their respective wives (as well as those in the names of the other
parties litigants in this case), (sic) shall be declared or included as part of the
Estate of Sy Bang, and in view of the numerous documentary evidences (sic)
presented by Attys. Raya and Camaligan after the said question was agreed
to be submitted for resolution on May 26, 1982, the Court hereby sets for the
reception or for the resolution of said issue in this case on June 8 and 9,
1982, both at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon; notify all parties litigants in this
case of these settings.85
It is obvious from the trial court’s order86 that the June 8, 1982 hearing is for
the purpose of determining whether properties in the names of Enrique Sy,
Bartolome Sy, Rosalino Sy, and Rolando Sy and/or their respective wives are
also part of the Sy Bang estate.
Hence, in the assailed Decision, the trial court said:
[I]n fact, the Court will require further evidence for or against any of the
parties in this case in the matter of whatever sums of money, property or
asset belonging to the estate of Sy Bang that came into their possession in
order that the Court may be properly guided in the partition and adjudication
of the rightful share and interest of the heirs of Sy Bang over the latter’s
estate; this becomes imperative in view of new matters shown in the
Submission and Formal Offer of Reserve Exhibits and the Offer of Additional
Documentary Evidence filed respectively by Oscar Sy and Jose Sy Bang, et
al., thru their respective counsels after the question of whether or not the
properties in the names of Enrique, Bartolome, Rosalino, and Rolando, all
surnamed Sy, should form part or be included as part of the estate of Sy
Bang, had been submitted for resolution as of May 26, 1982; the Court
deems it proper to receive additional evidence on the part of any of the
parties litigants in this case if only to determine the true extent of the estate
belonging to Sy Bang.87
The trial court painstakingly examined the evidence on record and narrated
the details, then carefully laid out the particulars in the assailed Decision. The
evidence that formed the basis for the trial court’s conclusion is embodied in
the Decision itself – evidence presented by the parties themselves, including
petitioners.
Page 37 of 40
However, notwithstanding the trial court’s pronouncement, the Sy Bang
estate cannot be partitioned or distributed until the final determination of the
extent of the estate and only until it is shown that the obligations under Rule
90, Section 1,88 have been settled.89
In the settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate
properties can only be made: (1) after all the debts, funeral charges,
expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and estate tax have
been paid; or (2) before payment of said obligations only if the distributees or
any of them gives a bond in a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the
payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs, or when
provision is made to meet those obligations.90
Settling the issue of ownership is the first stage in an action for partition. 91 As
this Court has ruled:
The issue of ownership or co-ownership, to be more precise, must first be
resolved in order to effect a partition of properties. This should be done in the
action for partition itself. As held in the case of Catapusan v. Court of
Appeals:
"In actions for partition, the court cannot properly issue an order to divide the
property, unless it first makes a determination as to the existence of co-
ownership. The court must initially settle the issue of ownership, the first
stage in an action for partition. Needless to state, an action for partition will
not lie if the claimant has no rightful interest over the subject property. In fact,
Section 1 of Rule 69 requires the party filing the action to state in his
complaint the "nature and extent of his title" to the real estate. Until and
unless the issue of ownership is definitely resolved, it would be premature to
effect a partition of the properties x x x."92
Moreover, the Third Partial Decision does not have the effect of terminating
the proceedings for partition. By its very nature, the Third Partial Decision is
but a determination based on the evidence presented thus far. There
remained issues to be resolved by the court. There would be no final
determination of the extent of the Sy Bang estate until the court’s
examination of the properties in the names of Rosalino, Bartolome, Rolando,
and Enrique. Based on the evidence presented, the trial court will have to
make a pronouncement whether the properties in the names of Rosalino,
Bartolome, Rolando, and Enrique indeed belong to the Sy Bang estate. Only
after the full extent of the Sy Bang estate has been determined can the trial
court finally order the partition of each of the heirs’ share.
Appointment of Receiver As to the issue of the judge’s appointment of a
receiver, suffice it to say that the CA conclusively found thus:
₯Special Proceedings (Rule 82- Rule 83)
The records show that the petitioners were never deprived of their day in
court. Upon Order of the respondent Judge, counsel for the petitioners
submitted their opposition to the petition for appointment of a receiver filed by
private respondents.
Moreover, evidence on record shows that respondent Judge appointed the
receiver after both parties have presented their evidence and after the Third
Partial Decision has been promulgated. Such appointment was made upon
verified petition of herein private respondents, alleging that petitioners are
mismanaging the properties in litigation by either mortgaging or disposing the
same, hence, the said properties are in danger of being lost, wasted,
dissipated, misused, or disposed of. The respondent Judge acted correctly in
granting the appointment of a receiver in Civil Case No. 8578, in order to
preserve the properties in litis pendentia and neither did he abuse his
discretion nor acted arbitrarily in doing s. On the contrary, We find that it was
the petitioners who violated the status quo sought to be maintained by the
Supreme Court, in G.R. No. 61519, by their intrusion and unwarranted
seizures of the 3 theaters, subject matter of the litigation, and which are
admittedly under the exclusive management and operation of private
respondent, Rosauro Sy.93
Cancellation of Notice of Lis Pendens Next, petitioners question the trial
court’s Order canceling the notice of lis pendens. 94
Section 77 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, or the Property Registration
Decree, provides: SEC. 77. Cancellation of lis pendens. Before final
judgment, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled upon order of the court,
after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the
adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who
caused it to be registered. It may also be cancelled by the Register of Deeds
upon verified petition of the party who caused the registration thereof.
At any time after final judgment in favor of the defendant, or other disposition
of the action such as to terminate finally all rights of the plaintiff in and to the
land and/or buildings involved, in any case in which a memorandum or notice
of lis pendens has been registered as provided in the preceding section, the
notice of lis pendens shall be deemed cancelled upon the registration of
certificate of the clerk of court in which the action or proceeding was pending
stating the manner of disposal thereof.
The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a two-fold effect: (1) to keep the
subject matter of the litigation within the power of the court until the entry of
the final judgment in order to prevent the final judgment from being defeated
by successive alienations; and (2) to bind a purchaser, bona fide or not, of
Page 38 of 40
the land subject of the litigation to the judgment or decree that the court will
promulgate subsequently.95
While the trial court has an inherent power to cancel a notice of lis pendens,
such power is to be exercised within the express confines of the law. As
provided in Section 14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a notice
of lis pendens may be cancelled on two grounds: (1) when the annotation
was for the purpose of molesting the title of the adverse party, or (2) when
the annotation is not necessary to protect the title of the party who caused it
to be recorded.96
This Court has interpreted the notice as:
The notice is but an incident in an action, an extrajudicial one, to be sure. It
does not affect the merits thereof. It is intended merely to constructively
advise, or warn, all people who deal with the property that they so deal with it
at their own risk, and whatever rights they may acquire in the property in any
voluntary transaction are subject to the results of the action, and may well be
inferior and subordinate to those which may be finally determined and laid
down therein. The cancellation of such a precautionary notice is therefore
also a mere incident in the action, and may be ordered by the Court having
jurisdiction of it at any given time. And its continuance or removal-like the
continuance or removal of a preliminary attachment of injunction-is not
contingent on the existence of a final judgment in the action, and ordinarily
has no effect on the merits thereof.97
The CA found, and we affirm, that Rosalino, Bartolome and Rolando were
able to prove that the notice was intended merely to molest and harass the
owners of the property, some of whom were not parties to the case. It was
also proven that the interest of Oscar Sy, who caused the notice to be
annotated, was only 1/14 of the assessed value of the property. Moreover,
Rosalino, Bartolome and Rolando were ordered to post a ₱50,000.00 bond to
protect whatever rights or interest Oscar Sy may have in the properties under
litis pendentia.98
G.R. No. 150797
In G.R. No. 150797, petitioners are asking this Court to reverse the CA’s
February 28, 2001 Decision and its Resolution denying the Motion for
Reconsideration, and to declare the Guardianship court to have exceeded its
jurisdiction in directing the deposit of the widow’s allowance in Special
Proceedings No. 96-34.
We find merit in petitioners’ contention.
₯Special Proceedings (Rule 82- Rule 83)
The court hearing the petition for guardianship had limited jurisdiction. It had
no jurisdiction to enforce payment of the widow’s allowance ordered by this
Court.
Reviewing the antecedents, we note that the claim for widow’s allowance
was made before the Supreme Court in a case that did not arise from the
guardianship proceedings. The case subject of the Supreme Court petition
(Civil Case No. 8578) is still pending before the RTC of Lucena City.
Rule 83, Sec. 3, of the Rules of Court states: SEC. 3. Allowance to widow
and family. – The widow and minor or incapacitated children of a deceased
person, during the settlement of the estate, shall receive therefrom, under the
direction of the court, such allowance as are provided by law.
Correlatively, Article 188 of the Civil Code states: Art. 188. From the common
mass of property support shall be given to the surviving spouse and to the
children during the liquidation of the inventoried property and until what
belongs to them is delivered; but from this shall be deducted that amount
received for support which exceeds the fruits or rents pertaining to them.
Obviously, "the court" referred to in Rule 83, Sec. 3, of the Rules of Court is
the court hearing the settlement of the estate. Also crystal clear is the
provision of the law that the widow’s allowance is to be taken from the
common mass of property forming part of the estate of the decedent.
Thus, as evident from the foregoing provisions, it is the court hearing the
settlement of the estate that should effect the payment of widow’s allowance
considering that the properties of the estate are within its jurisdiction, to the
exclusion of all other courts.99
In emphasizing the limited jurisdiction of the guardianship court, this Court
has pronounced that:
Generally, the guardianship court exercising special and limited jurisdiction
cannot actually order the delivery of the property of the ward found to be
embezzled, concealed, or conveyed. In a categorical language of this Court,
only in extreme cases, where property clearly belongs to the ward or where
his title thereto has been already judicially decided, may the court direct its
delivery to the guardian. In effect, there can only be delivery or return of the
embezzled, concealed or conveyed property of the ward, where the right or
title of said ward is clear and undisputable. However, where title to any
property said to be embezzled, concealed or conveyed is in dispute, x x x the
determination of said title or right whether in favor of the persons said to have
embezzled, concealed or conveyed the property must be determined in a
separate ordinary action and not in a guardianship proceedings. 100
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Further, this Court has held that the distribution of the residue of the estate of
the deceased incompetent is a function pertaining properly, not to the
guardianship proceedings, but to another proceeding in which the heirs are
at liberty to initiate.101
Other Unresolved Incidents Payment of Widow’s Allowance
It has been 13 years since this Court ordered petitioners to pay Rosita
Ferrera-Sy her monthly widow’s allowance. Petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida
and Ma. Emma have since fought tooth and nail against paying the said
allowance, grudgingly complying only upon threat of incarceration. Then, they
again argued against the grant of widow’s allowance after the DOJ issued its
Resolution finding probable cause in the falsification charges against
respondents. They contended that the criminal cases for falsification proved
that Rosita is a mere common-law wife and not a "widow" and, therefore, not
entitled to widow’s allowance.
This argument deserves scant consideration.
A finding of probable cause does not conclusively prove the charge of
falsification against respondents.
In a preliminary investigation, probable cause has been defined as "the
existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a
reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor,
that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was
prosecuted." It is well-settled that a finding of probable cause needs to rest
only on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been
committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be
based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence
establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence
establishing absolute certainty of guilt.102
Hence, until the marriage is finally declared void by the court, the same is
presumed valid and Rosita is entitled to receive her widow’s allowance to be
taken from the estate of Sy Bang.
We remind petitioners again that they are duty-bound to comply with
whatever the courts, in relation to the properties under litigation, may order.
Motion to Include Rosalino Sy, Bartolome Sy, Rolando Sy, and Heirs of
Enrique Sy as Likewise Liable for the Payment of Widow’s Allowance as
Heirs of Sy Bang
₯Special Proceedings (Rule 82- Rule 83)
On March 14, 2006, petitioners filed a Motion to include Rosalino Sy,
Bartolome Sy, Rolando Sy, and Heirs of Enrique Sy as Likewise Liable for
the Payment of Widow’s Allowance as Heirs of Sy Bang.
The Motion is denied.
The widow’s allowance, as discussed above, is chargeable to Sy Bang’s
estate. It must be stressed that the issue of whether the properties in the
names of Rosalino, Bartolome, Rolando, and Enrique Sy form part of Sy
Bang’s estate remains unsettled since this Petition questioning the trial
court’s Third Partial Decision has been pending. On the other hand, there
has been a categorical pronouncement that petitioners are holding properties
belonging to Sy Bang’s estate.
That the full extent of Sy Bang’s estate has not yet been determined is no
excuse from complying with this Court’s order. Properties of the estate have
been identified – i.e., those in the names of petitioners – thus, these
properties should be made to answer for the widow’s allowance of Rosita. In
any case, the amount Rosita receives for support, which exceeds the fruits or
rents pertaining to her, will be deducted from her share of the estate. 103
A Final Note
We are appalled by the delay in the disposition of this case brought about by
petitioners’ propensity to challenge the Court’s every directive. That the
petitioners would go to extreme lengths to evade complying with their duties
under the law and the orders of this Court is truly deplorable. Not even a
citation for contempt and the threat of imprisonment seemed to deter them.
Their contumacious attitude and actions have dragged this case for far too
long with practically no end in sight. Their abuse of legal and court processes
is shameful, and they must not be allowed to continue with their atrocious
behavior. Petitioners deserve to be sanctioned, and ordered to pay the Court
treble costs.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition in G.R. No.
150797 is GRANTED, while the Petition in G.R. No. 114217 is DENIED. The
Regional Trial Court of Lucena City is directed to hear and decide Civil Case
No. 8578 with dispatch. The Motion to include Rosalino Sy, Bartolome Sy,
Rolando Sy, and Heirs of Enrique Sy as Likewise Liable for the Payment of
Widow’s Allowance as Heirs of Sy Bang is DENIED. Treble costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
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