Constitutional Law II
Bernas Supplementary
Part 2
Section 10
[Leca Realty Corp. v. Manuela Corp.] The amount of rental
is an essential condition of any lease contract. Needless to
state, the change of its rate in the Rehabilitation Plan is not
justified as it impairs the stipulation between the parties. Court
rules that the Rehabilitation Plan is void insofar as it amends
the rental rates agreed upon by the parties.
[BPI v. SEC] The non-impairment of contract clause is a limit
only against legislative power, not judicial power. The SEC,
through the hearing panel that heard the petition for approval
of the Rehabilitation Plan, was acting as a quasi-judicial body
and thus, its order approving the plan cannot constitute an
impairment of the right and the freedom to contract.
[Universal Robina Sugar v. Caballeda] RA 7641 is
undoubtedly a social legislation. The law has been enacted as a
labor protection measure and as a curative statute that—absent
a retirement plan devised by, an agreement with, or a voluntary
grant from, an employer—can respond, in part at least, to the
financial well-being of workers during their twilight years soon
following their life of labor.
Art. 287 of the Labor Code provides for two types of retirement:
(a) compulsory and (b) optional. The first takes place at age 65,
while the second is primarily determined by the collective
bargaining agreement or other employment contract or
employer’s retirement plan. In the absence of any provision on
optional retirement in a collective bargaining agreement, other
employment contract, or employer’s retirement plan, an
employee may optionally retire upon reaching the age of 60
years or more, but not beyond 65 years, provided he has served
at least five years in the establishment concerned. That
prerogative is exclusively lodged in the employee.
[PNB v. CA] On this issue, Court adopts the ruling of the First
Division in Metropolitan Bank, to wit: By Section 6[c] of PD No.
902-A, it is clear that the approval of the Rehabilitation Plan and
the appointment of a rehabilitation receiver merely suspend the
actions for claims against respondent corporations. Petitioner
bank’s preferred status over the unsecured creditors relative to
the mortgage liens is retained, but the enforcement of such
For REVIEW purposes only. ***Karell Marie G. Lascano – Ateneo Law Batch 2013***
Fr.
preference is suspended. The loan agreements between the
parties have not been set aside and petitioner bank may still
enforce its preference when the assets of ASB Group of
Companies will be liquidated. Considering that the provisions of
the loan agreements are merely suspended, there is no
impairment of contracts, specifically its lien in the mortgaged
properties.
[Kuwait Airways v. Phil. Airlines] There is no doubt that
Philippine Airlines forebears under several regulatory
perspectives. First, its authority to operate air services in the
Philippines derives from its legislative franchise and is
accordingly bound by whatever limitations that are presently in
place or may be subsequently incorporated in its franchise.
Second, Philippine Airlines is subject to the other laws of the
Philippines, including RA 776, which grants regulatory power to
the CAB over the economic aspect of air transportation. Third,
there is a very significant public interest in state regulation of
air travel in view of considerations of public safety, domestic
and international commerce, as well as the fact that air travel
necessitates steady transversal of international boundaries, the
amity between nations.
Considering that it is the Philippine government that has the
sole authority to charter air policy and negotiate with foreign
governments with respect to air traffic rights, the government
through the CAB has the indispensable authority to compel local
air carriers to comply with government determined policies,
even at the expense of economic rights. The airline industry is a
sector where government abjuration is least desired.
[Republic v. Pagadian City Timber] License agreements are
not contracts within the purview of the due process and the
non-impairment of contracts clauses enshrined in the
Constitution.
A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due
process clause—it is only a license or a privilege, which can be
validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public
welfare.
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Constitutional Law II
Part 2
Section 12
[People v. Concepcion] The arresting officers’ alleged failure to
inform the accused of their Miranda rights or the nature of their
arrest should be raised before arraignment, otherwise it would
be too late in the day for them to raise these alleged illegalities
after a valid information has been filed, the accused arraigned,
trial commenced and completed, and a judgment of conviction
rendered.
[People v. Rapeza] A confession is admissible in evidence if it
satisfactorily shown to have been obtained within the limits
imposed by the 1987 Constitution.
Requisites of Extrajudicial Confession:
(1) The confession must be voluntary
(2) The confession must be made with the assistance of a
competent and independent counsel, preferably of the
confessant’s choice
(3) The confession must be express
(4) The confession must be in writing
In order to comply with the constitutional mandates, there
should likewise be meaningful communication to and
understanding of his rights by the appellant, as opposed to a
routine, peremptory and meaningless recital thereof. Since
comprehension is the objective, the degree of explanation
required will necessarily depend on the education, intelligence,
and other relevant personal circumstances of the person
undergoing investigation.
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Fr. Bernas Supplementary
A policeman’s testimony as regards the contests of a suspect’s
confession is hearsay where the suspect’s confession was made
through an interpreter and not directly to the officer—the
interpreter must be presented to testify instead.
The moment a police officer tries to elicit admissions or
confessions or even plain information from a suspect, the latter
should, at that juncture, be assisted by counsel, unless he
waives this right in writing and in the presence of counsel.
Where the participation of a lawyer in the proceedings was
confined to the notarization of the suspect’s confession, the
same is not considered, in legal contemplation, the kind of legal
assistance that should be accorded to the suspect.
The suspect must also be advised that he has the option to
reject the counsel provided him by the police authorities, which
fact must similarly appear in the extrajudicial confession.
The purpose of providing a counsel to a person under custodial
investigation is to curb the police-state practice of extracting a
confession that leads suspects to make self-incriminating
statements.
Confessions made in a language or dialect not known to the
confessant must also be corroborated by independent evidence
—a multiple process of reading and translating the questions
and translating and typing the answers and reading and
translating again the said answers is naturally pregnant with
possibilities of human, if unintentional, inadequacies and
incompleteness which render the said confession unsafe as
basis of conviction for a capital offense, unless sufficiently
corroborated.
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Constitutional Law II
Part 2
Section 13
[Santos v. How] Jurisprudence is replete with decisions on the
right of petitioner in bail proceedings to introduce his own
evidence in rebuttal.
[People v. Fitzgerald] The right to bail emanates from the
right to be presumed innocent. It is accorded to a person in the
custody of the law who may, by reason of the presumption of
innocence he enjoys, be allowed provisional liberty upon filing
of a security to guarantee his appearance before any court, as
required under specified conditions.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment
exceeding six (6) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his
bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with
notice to the accused, of the following or other similar
circumstances:
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Fr. Bernas Supplementary
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual
delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by
the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement,
evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail
without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation,
parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the
probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another
crime during the pendency of the appeal.
Bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or prisoner
needing medical care outside the prison facility. A mere claim of
illness is not a ground for bail.
General rule: Prior to conviction by the RTC of a criminal
offense, an accused is entitled to be released on bail as a
matter of right.
Exception: Instances where the accused is charged with a
capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment and the evidence of guilt is strong.
[Rodriguez v. Judge] The policy is that a prospective
extraditee is arrested and detained to avoid his flight from
justice. On the extraditee lies the burden of showing that he will
not flee once bail is granted. The grant of the bail, presupposes
that the co-petitioner has already presented evidence to prove
her right to be on bail, that she is no flight risk, and the trial
court had already exercised its sound discretion and had
already determined that under the Constitution and laws in
force, co-petitioner is entitled to provisional release.
Bail may be granted to a possible extraditee only upon a clear
and convincing showing (1) that he will not be a flight risk or a
danger to the community, AND (2) that there exist special,
humanitarian and compelling circumstances.
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Constitutional Law II
Part 2
The cancellation of petitioner’s bail, without prior notice and
hearing, could be considered a violation of co-petitioner’s right
to due process tantamount to grave abuse of discretion.
The grounds used by the highest court in the requesting state
for the grant of bail may be considered, under the principle of
reciprocity.
[Gov’t of Hong Kong v. Olalia] The modern trend in public
international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the
individual person and the sanctity of human rights.
The Court, in granting bail to a prospective deportee, held that
under the Constitution, the principles set forth in that
Declaration are part of the law of the land.
While this Court in Gov’t of USA v. Purganan (2002) limited the
exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceeding, in light of
the various international treaties giving recognition and
protection to human rights, particularly the right to life and
liberty, a reexamination of this Court’s ruling in Purganan is in
order. The Philippine authorities are under obligation to make
available to every person under detention such remedies which
safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies
include the right to be admitted to bail.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, the Court sees no
justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition
cases—clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for
bail must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations
of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and
protection of human rights. Both are administrative proceedings
where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in
issue. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of
human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the
right to liberty of every individual is not impaired.
Extradition – the removal of an accused from the Philippines
with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign
authorities to enable the requesting state or government to
hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed
against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under
the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government;
not a criminal proceeding; (sui generis) tracing its existence
For REVIEW purposes only. ***Karell Marie G. Lascano – Ateneo Law Batch 2013***
Fr. Bernas Supplementary
wholly to treaty obligations between different nations; merely
administrative in character; its object is to prevent the escape
of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his
return to the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or
punishment.
Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly
administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal process.
While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail
to an extraditee, there is no provision prohibiting him or her
from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the
Constitution.
Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the
premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the
“temporary detention” is the possibility of flight of the potential
extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such
extraditee is a fugitive from justice. Given the foregoing, the
prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing
that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail.
An extraditee should not be deprived of his right to apply for
bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is
satisfactorily met.
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of
proof required in granting or denying bail can neither be the
proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the
standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases—
the potential extraditee must prove by “clear and convincing
proof” that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the
orders and processes of the extradition court. According to CJ
Puno, this standard should be lower than proof beyond
reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence.
Section 14
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Constitutional Law II
Part 2
[People v. Ching] An information is an accusation in writing
charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the prosecutor
and filed with the court. The purpose of the requirement for the
information’s validity and sufficiency is to enable the accused to
suitably prepare for his defense since he is presumed to have
no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the
offense.
With respect to the date of the commission of the offense,
Section 11, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
specifically provides that it is not necessary to state in the
information the precise date the offense was committed except
when it is a material ingredient of the offense, and that the
offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as
near as possible to the actual date of its commission. In rape
cases, failure to specify the exact dates or times when the rape
cases occurred does not ipso facto make the information
defective on its face—the date or time of the commission of
rape is not a material ingredient of the said crime because the
gravamen of rape is carnal knowledge of a woman through
force and intimidation.
[People v. Cachapero] The time of occurrence is not an
essential element of rape—its precise date and hour need not
be alleged in the complaint.
Objections as to the form of the complaint or information
cannot be made for the first time on appeal.
[People v. Galvez] The Court recognizes that there may be
instances when an offer of compromise will not amount to an
admission of guilt. It has long been held that in such cases the
accused is permitted to show that the offer was not made under
a consciousness of guilt, but merely to avoid the inconvenience
of imprisonment or for some other reason which would justify a
claim by the accused that the offer to compromise was not in
truth an admission of guilt or an attempt to avoid the legal
consequences which would ordinarily ensue therefrom.
Every circumstance favoring an accused’s innocence must be
duly taken into account, the proof against him must survive the
test of reason, and the strongest suspicion must not be
permitted to sway judgment.
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Fr. Bernas Supplementary
An accused has the right to remain silent and his silence should
not be construed as an admission of guilt.
Time and again, the Court has pronounced that the great goal
of our criminal law and procedure is not to send people to jail
but to render justice. Under our criminal justice system, the
overriding consideration is not whether the court doubts the
innocence of the accused, but whether it entertains reasonable
doubt as to his guilt.
[Valera v. Ombudsman] In an administrative proceeding, the
quantum of proof required for a finding of guilt is only
substantial evidence, that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion.
The jurisdiction that was vested at the time of the filing of the
administrative complaint is not lost by the mere fact that the
respondent public official had ceased to be in office during the
pendency of his case. The Court retains its jurisdiction either to
pronounce the respondent official innocent of the charges or
declare him guilty thereof.
[Mupas v. People] Reasonable doubt is that doubt
engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an
inability after such investigation to let the mind rest each upon
the certainty of guilt—absolute certainty of guilt is not
demanded by the law to convict a criminal charge, but moral
certainty is required as to every proposition of proof requisite to
constitute the offense.
Even if the information charged the accused with frustrated
homicide, a finding of guilt for the lesser offense of less serious
physical injuries may be made considering that the latter
offense is necessarily included in the former, and since the
essential ingredients of physical injuries constitute and form
part of those constituting the offense of homicide.
[Re: Judge Angeles] A judge’s conviction by the RTC does not
necessarily warrant her suspension while her appeal from such
conviction is pending—until the judgment has attained finality,
she still enjoys the constitutional presumption of innocence.
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Constitutional Law II
Part 2
The unpardonable assault on a child is tragic and the trial court
may be swayed by the tide of human indignation, but the Court
must uphold the primacy of the presumption of innocence in
favor of the accused when the evidence at hand falls short of
the quantum required to support conviction.
The constitutional presumption of innocence requires courts to
take “a more than casual consideration” of every circumstance
or doubt proving the innocence of the accused.
[Malana v. People] The age-old rule is that the task of
assigning values to the testimonies of witnesses in the stand
and weighing their credibility is best left to the trial court which
forms its first-hand impressions as a witness testifies before it.
It is also axiomatic that positive testimony prevails over
negative testimony.
The equipoise rule provides that where the evidence of the
parties in a criminal case is evenly balanced, the constitutional
presumption of innocence should tilt the scales in favor of the
accused—it is not applicable where the evidence presented is
not equally weighty, such as where the evidence of the
prosecution is overwhelming.
No equipoise if the evidence is not evenly balanced.
[Romualdez v. COMELEC] (Dissenting Opinion—Tinga) Void
for vagueness rule does not apply to penal laws—is of dubious
origin. From whatever perspective, the void for vagueness
challenge should apply to penal cases as much as it does to
free speech cases.
The due process clause was precisely to protect the people
from being punished by vague laws with indeterminate
standards. If arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be
prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who
apply them.
Note: The overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines have
special application only to free-speech cases.
[People v. Mingming] Prosecution must adduce evidence of
sexual intercourse in each of the rapes charged.
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Fr. Bernas Supplementary
When the law or rules specify certain circumstances that can
aggravate an offense, or circumstances that would attach to the
offense a greater penalty than that ordinarily prescribed, such
circumstances must be both alleged and proved to justify the
imposition of the increased penalty.
Section 19
[People v. Flores] Except in criminal cases where the penalty
imposed is reclusion perpetua or death, all appeals to the Court
are not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion.
Conversely, appeal in criminal cases where the penalty of
reclusion perpetua or death is imposed, is a matter of right. This
is specially true in death penalty cases where a review of the
trial court’s judgment of conviction is automatic and does not
depend on the whims of the death convict. It is mandatory and
leaves the reviewing court without any option.
Rationale for SC’s automatic review of death penalty cases:
Having received the highest penalty which the law imposes,
accused is protected and entitled under that law to have the
sentence and all the facts and circumstances upon which it is
founded placed before the highest tribunal of the land to the
end that its justice and legality may be clearly and conclusively
determined. Such procedure is merciful. It gives a second
chance for life. Neither the courts nor the accused can waive it.
It is a positive provision of the law that brooks no interference
and tolerates no evasions.
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Constitutional Law II Fr. Bernas Supplementary
Part 2
Review by the Court of Appeals of the trial court’s judgment
imposing the death penalty is now automatic and mandatory.

The power to automatically review a decision imposing the

death penalty cannot be waived either by accused or by the
courts.

The judicial conscience cannot accept as valid plea of guilty to a

charge with a mandatory death penalty when entered by an
accused with a befuddled state of mind at an arraignment with
reversible lapses in law.

The severity of the death penalty, especially its irreversible and

final nature once carried out, makes the decision-making
process in capital offenses aptly subject to nothing less than the
most exacting rules of procedure and evidence.

[People v. Bon] Section 1 of RA 9346 specifically repeals all

laws, executive orders and decrees insofar as they impose the
death penalty, and not merely such enactments which are
inconsistent with RA 9346.

The amendatory effects of RA 9346 extend only to the

application of the death penalty but not to the definition or
classification of crimes—RA 9346 does not serve as basis for the
reduction of civil indemnity and other damages that adhere to
heinous crimes.

The new ruling, favorable as it is to persons previously

convicted of crimes which, if consummated or participated in as
principal, would have warranted the solitary penalty of death, is Section 22
given retroactive effect.
[Salvador v. Mapa, Jr.] Ex Post Facto Laws – defined as
follows:

(a) Which makes an action done before the passing of the

law and which was innocent when done criminal, and
punishes such action; or

(b) Which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it

was when committed; or

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Constitutional Law II
Part 2
(c) Which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater
punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it
was committed; or
(d) Which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less
or different testimony than the law required at the time
of the commission of the offense in order to convict the
defendant; or
Fr. Bernas Supplementary
have known of the violations at the time the questioned
transactions were made, thus the counting of the prescriptive
period commenced from the date of discovery of the offense in
1992, after an exhaustive investigation by the Presidential Ad
Hoc Committee on Behest Loans.

(e) That which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies

only but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a
right which when done was lawful; or

(f) That which deprives a person accused of a crime of

some lawful protection to which he has become entitled,
such as the protection of a former conviction or
acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.

The constitutional doctrine that outlaws an ex post facto law

generally prohibits the retrospectivity of penal laws. Penal laws
are those acts of the legislature which prohibit certain acts and
establish penalties for their violations; or those that define
crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment.
The subject administrative and memorandum orders clearly do
not come within the shadow of this definition. Administrative
Order No. 13 creates the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans, and provides for its composition
and functions. It does not mete out penalty for the act of
granting behest loans.

[Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding v. Desierto] The

constitutional proscription of ex post facto laws is aimed against
the retrospectivity of penal laws. Penal laws are acts of the
legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties
for their violations, or those that define crimes, treat of their
nature, and provide for their punishment.

Not being penal laws, Administrative Order No. 13 and

Memorandum Order No. 61 cannot be characterized as ex post
facto laws.

In cases involving violations of RA 3019 committed prior to the

February 1986 Edsa Revolution that ousted President Ferdinand
E. Marcos, the government as the aggrieved party could not

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Constitutional Law II
Part 2
ARTICLE XIII
[GSIS v. Kapisanan] Employees in the public service may not
engage in strikes or in concerted and unauthorized stoppage of
work; that the right of government employees to organize is
limited to the formation of unions or associations, without
including the right to strike.
The right of government employees to organize is limited to the
formation of unions or associations only, without including the
right to strike, adding that public employees going on disruptive
unauthorized absences to join concerted mass actions may be
held liable for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service.
Prohibited Concerted Activity – any collective activity
undertaken by government employees, by themselves or
through their employees’ organization, with the intent of
effecting work stoppage or service disruption in order to realize
their demands or force concessions, economic or otherwise; it
includes mass leaves, walkouts, pickets and acts of similar
nature.
[Jaculbe v. Siliman University] Retirement is the result of a
bilateral act of the parties, a voluntary agreement between the
employer and the employee whereby the latter, after reaching a
certain age agrees to sever his or her employment with the
former.
An employer is free to impose a retirement age less than 65 for
as long as it has the employees’ consent.
Retirement results from a voluntary agreement between the
employer and the employee where the latter after reaching a
certain age, agrees to sever his employment with the former. If
the intent to retire is not clearly established or if the retirement
is involuntary, it is to be treated as a discharge.
[Roman Catholic Archbishop v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform] The laws simply speak of the “landowner” without
qualification as to under what title the land is held or what
rights to the land the landowner may exercise—there is no
distinction made whether the landowner holds “naked title”
only or can exercise all the rights of ownership.
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Fr. Bernas Supplementary
There can be no claim of more than one right of retention per
landowner.
A person’s claim that he is merely an administrator of the
donated properties will not serve to remove these lands from
the coverage of agrarian reform.
The implementation of the CARL is an exercise of the State’s
police power and the power of eminent domain—to the extent
that the CARL prescribes retention limits to the landowners,
there is an exercise of police power for the regulation of private
property, but where, to carry out such regulation, the owners
are deprived of lands they own in excess of the maximum area
allowed, there is also a taking under the power of eminent
domain.
[Magkalas v. NHA] The National Housing Authority, by force
of law, has the authority to order the relocation of petitioner,
and the demolition of her structure in case of her refusal as this
is the only way through which the NHA can effectively carry out
the implementation of PD 1315.
Social justice, as the term suggests, should be used only to
correct an injustice.
It should be stressed that Section 28 of RA 7279 does not totally
and absolutely prohibit eviction and demolition without a
judicial order as in fact it provides for exceptions.
Exceptions:
(1) When the property involved is an expropriated property
in Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City pursuant to Section 1 of
PD 1315
(2) When there are squatters on government resettlement
projects and illegal occupants in any homelot, apartment
or dwelling unit owned or administered by the NHA
pursuant to Section 2 of PD 1472
(3) When persons or entities occupy danger areas such as
esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks,
shotrelines, waterways and other public places such as
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Constitutional Law II Fr. Bernas Supplementary
Part 2
sidewalks, roads, parks and playgrounds, pursuant to
Section 28(a) of RA 7279

(4) When government infrastructure projects with available

funding are about to be implemented pursuant to
Section 28(b) of RA 7279

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