S. R. Bommai v.

Union of India

S. R. Bommai v. Union of India ([1994] 2

SCR 644 : AIR 1994 SC 1918 : (1994)3
SCC1) was a landmark judgment of the
Supreme Court of India, where the Court
discussed at length provisions of Article
356 of the Constitution of India and
related issues. This case had huge impact
on Centre-State Relations. The judgement
attempted to curb blatant misuse of
Article 356 of the Constitution of India,
which allowed President's rule to be
imposed over state governments.[2]
 S. R. Bommai v. Union of India

Court Supreme Court

Decided 11 March 1994[1]

Citation(s) 1994 AIR 1918, 1994

SCC (3), 1, JT 1994
(2)215, 1994
SCALE(2)37
Court membership

Judges sitting Kuldip Singh

P. B. Sawant
Katikithala Ramaswamy

S C Agarwal
 S. C. Agarwal
Yogeshwar Dayal
B. P. Jeevan Reddy
S. R. Pandian
A. M. Ahmadi
J. S. Verma[1]
Keywords

Constitution of India, Article 356

Background
Article 356 deals with imposition of
President's Rule over a State of India.
When a state is under President's Rule, the
elected state government (led by the Chief
Minister and the Council of Ministers) is
dismissed and Council of ministers is
suspended at legislature, and
administration is conducted directly by the
Governor of the state. The Governor is an
appointee of the President and thus,
effectively, a functionary of the Union
Government (the central or federal
government). Thus imposition of
President's Rule negates the federal
character of the Indian political system,
where administration usually is shared
between the Union and State
governments. It also militates against the
democratic doctrine of popular
sovereignty, since an elected government
is suspended. These reasons have made
use of Article 356 controversial.
Nevertheless, it was used repeatedly by
central governments to suspend state
governments (of opposite political parties)
based on genuine reasons or trumped-up
excuses.[3]

Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar, chairman of the

Drafting Committee of the Constitution of
India, referred to Article 356 as a dead
letter of the Constitution. In the
constituent assembly debate it was
suggested that Article 356 is liable to be
abused for political gains. Dr. Ambedkar
replied, "I share the sentiments that such
articles will never be called into operation
and they would remain a dead letter. If at
all they are brought into operation, I hope
the President, who is endowed with these
powers, will take proper precautions
before actually suspending the
administration of the provinces. I hope the
first thing he will do would be to issue a
mere warning to a province that has erred,
that things were not happening in the way
in which they were intended to happen in
the Constitution. If that warning fails, the
second thing for him to do will be to order
an election allowing the people of the
province to settle matters by themselves.
It is only when these two remedies fail that
he would resort to this article."[4]
But this was never the case and before the
judgement in Bommai case, Article 356
has been repeatedly abused to dismiss the
State Governments controlled by a
political party opposed to ruling party at
centre. Provision for suspension of elected
governments has been used on more than
90 occasions and in most of the cases, it
appeared to be of doubtful constitutional
validity, as mentioned by B. P. Jeevan
Reddy during one of his interviews in
1998.[2]

The Facts
S.R. Bommai v. Union of India came before
the bench of 9 judges (consisting of Kuldip
Singh, P. B. Sawant, Katikithala
Ramaswamy, S. C. Agarwal, Yogeshwar
Dayal, B. P. Jeevan Reddy, S. R. Pandian, A.
M. Ahmadi, J. S. Verma) under the
following circumstances:

Karnataka

The Janata Party being the majority party

in the Karnataka State Legislature had
formed Government under the leadership
of S.R. Bommai. In September 1988, the
Janata Party and Lok Dal merged into a
new party called Janata Dal. The Ministry
was expanded with addition of 13
members. Within two days thereafter, K.R.
Molakery, a legislator of Janata Dal
defected from the party. He presented a
letter to the Governor along with 19 letters,
allegedly signed by legislators supporting
the Ministry, withdrawing their support. As
a result, on 19 April, the Governor sent a
report to the President stating therein
there were dissensions and defections in
the ruling party. He further stated that in
view of the withdrawal of the support by
the said legislators, the chief Minister,
Bommai did not command a majority in
the Assembly and, hence, it was
inappropriate under the Constitution, to
have the State administered by an
Executive consisting of Council of
Ministers which did not command the
majority in the state assembly. He,
therefore, recommended to the President
that he should exercise power under
Article 356(1). However, on the next day
seven out of the nineteen legislators who
had allegedly written the said letters to the
Governor sent letters to him complaining
that their signatures were obtained on the
earlier letters by misrepresentation and
affirmed their support to the Ministry. The
Chief Minister and his Law Minister met
the Governor the same day and informed
him about the decision to summon the
Assembly, even by bringing forward the
scheduled session, to prove the
confidence of assembly in his Ministry. To
the same effect, he sent a telex message
to the President. The Governor however
sent yet another report to the President on
the same day i.e., 20-4-1989, and stated
that the Chief Minister had lost the
confidence of the majority in the House
and repeated his earlier request for action
under Article 356(1). On that very day, the
President issued the Proclamation in
question with the recitals already referred
to above. The Proclamation was,
thereafter approved by the Parliament as
required by Article 356(3).
A writ petition was filed on 26 April 1989
challenging the validity of the
proclamation. A special bench of 3 judges
of Karnataka High Court dismissed the
writ petition.

Meghalaya

On 11 October 1991 the president issued a

proclamation under Article 356(1)
dismissing the government of Meghalaya
and dissolving the legislative assembly.
The Proclamation stated that the
President was satisfied on the basis of the
report from the Governor and other
information received by him that the
situation had arisen in which the
Government of the State could not be
carried on in accordance with the
provisions of the Constitution. The
Government was dismissed and the
Assembly was dissolved accordingly.

Nagaland

On 7 August 1988, the president issued

the proclamation on the basis of Governor
Report and dismissed the Government of
Nagaland thus dissolving the Legislative
assembly. Vamuzo, leader of opposition
party, challenged the validity of
Proclamation in Gauhati High Court. A
Division Bench comprising the Chief
Justice and Hansaria, J. heard the petition.
The Bench differed on the effect and
operation of Article 74 (Constitution of
India)(2) and hence the matter was
referred to the third Judge. But before the
third learned judge could hear the matter,
the Union of India moved this Court for
grant of special leave which was granted
and the proceedings in the High Court
were stayed.

Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Himachal

Pradesh
On account of the Babri Masjid demolition,
communal riots spread out in the entire
country. The Central Government banned
RSS, VHP and Bajrang Dal. The Central
Government dismissed the BJP
Governments of Madhya Pradesh,
Rajasthan and Himachal Pradesh. As a
result, on 15 December 1992, the president
issued the proclamation under Article 356
dismissing the State Governments and
dissolving the Legislative Assemblies
Madhya Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh and
Rajasthan. The validity of these
proclamations was challenged by the
Writs in the appropriate High Courts. The
Madhya Pradesh High Court allowed the
petition, but writ petition relating to
Rajasthan and Himachal Pradesh were
withdrawn to Supreme Court.

All the above said petition contained

similar question of law and therefore they
were heard conjointly by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court. The arguments in the S.R.
Bommai’s case commenced in the first
week of October 1993 and were concluded
in the last week of December 1993.

The Contentions
S. R. Bommai v. Union of India raised
serious question of law relating to
Proclamation of President's Rule and
dissolution of Legislative assemblies
according to Article 356 of the
Constitution of India.

The first and most important question

which the Supreme Court had to determine
was whether the Presidential Proclamation
under Article 356 was justiciable and if so
to what extent.

The second contention was whether the

President has unfettered powers to issue
Proclamation under Article 356(1) of the
Constitution.

It was contended that since the

Proclamation under Article 356[1] would
be issued by the President on the advice of
the Council of Ministers given under
Article 74(1) of the Constitution and since
Clause [2] of the said Article bars inquiry
into the question whether any, and if so,
what advice was tendered by Ministers to
the President, judicial review of the
reasons which led to the issuance of the
Proclamation also stands barred. Whether
the Legislature dissolved by the Presidents
proclamation can be revived if the
president proclamation is set aside.
Whether the validity of the Proclamation
issued under Article 356(1) can be
challenged even after it has been approved
by both Houses of Parliament under
Article 356(3).

It was also contended that whether any

relief’s can be granted when the validity of
proclamation is challenged and whether
the court can grant an interim stay against
holding the fresh election.

Whether a president can dissolve the

legislature without having obtained the
approval of both the Houses of the
Legislature. It was contended that
Secularism being a basic feature of the
Constitution, a State government can be
dismissed if it is guilty of nonsecular acts.
The Principles laid down by
Supreme Court
The SC laid down certain guidelines so as
to prevent the misuse of A356 of the
constitution.

1. The majority enjoyed by the Council of

Ministers shall be tested on the floor of
the House.
2. Centre should give a warning to the
state and a time period of one week to
reply.
3. The court cannot question the advice
tendered by the CoMs to the President but
it can question the material behind the
satisfaction of the President. Hence,
Judicial Review will involve three
questions only:
a. Is there any material behind the
proclamation
b. Is the material relevant.
c. Was there any mala fide use of power.
4. If there is improper use of A356 then the
court will provide remedy.
5. Under Article 356(3) it is the limitation
on the powers of the President. Hence, the
president shall not take any irreversible
action until the proclamation is approved
by the Parliament i.e. he shall not dissolve
the assembly.
6. Article 356 is justified only when there is
a breakdown of constitutional machinery
and not administrative machinery

Article 356 shall be used sparingly by the

center, otherwise it is likely to destroy the
constitutional structure between the
center and the states. Even Dr. Ambedkar
envisaged it to remain a 'dead letter' in the
constitution.

Based on the report of the Sarkaria

Commission on Centre–state
Relations(1988), the Supreme Court in
Bommai case (1994) enlisted the
situations where the exercise of power
under Article 356 could be proper or
improper.

Imposition of President’s Rule in a state

would be proper in the following
situations:

Where after general elections to the

assembly, no party secures a majority,
that is, Hung Assembly.
Where the party having a majority in the
assembly declines to form a ministry
and the governor cannot find a coalition
ministry commanding a majority in the
assembly.
Where a ministry resigns after its defeat
in the assembly and no other party is
willing or able to form a ministry
commanding a majority in the assembly.
Where a constitutional direction of the
Central government is disregarded by
the state government.
Internal subversion where, for example,
a government is deliberately acting
against the Constitution and the law or
is fomenting a violent revolt.
Physical breakdown where the
government willfully refuses to
discharge its constitutional obligations
endangering the security of the state.
The imposition of President’s Rule in a
state would be improper under the
following situations:

Where a ministry resigns or is dismissed

on losing majority support in the
assembly and the governor
recommends imposition of President’s
Rule without probing the possibility of
forming an alternative ministry.
Where the governor makes his own
assessment of the support of a ministry
in the assembly and recommends
imposition of President’s Rule without
allowing the ministry to prove its
majority on the floor of the Assembly.
Where the ruling party enjoying majority
support in the assembly has suffered a
massive defeat in the general elections
to the Lok Sabha such as in 1977 and
1980.
Internal disturbances not amounting to
internal subversion or physical
breakdown.
Maladministration in the state or
allegations of corruption against the
ministry or stringent financial exigencies
of the state.
Where the state government is not given
prior warning to rectify itself except in
 case of extreme urgency leading to
disastrous consequences.
Where the power is used to sort out
intra-party problems of the ruling party,
or for a purpose extraneous or irrelevant
to the one for which it has been
conferred by the Constitution.

Malafide exercise of Article

356
While dealing with the question as to
whether the Presidential Proclamation
under Article 356 was justiciable all the
judges were unanimous in holding that the
presidential proclamation was justiciable.
The Supreme Court held that the
proclamation under Article 356(1) is not
immune from judicial review. The validity
of the Proclamation issued by the
President under Article 356(1) is judicially
reviewable to the extent of examining
whether it was issued on the basis of any
material at all or whether the material was
relevant or whether the Proclamation was
issued in the malafide exercise of the
power. The Supreme Court or the High
court can strike down the proclamation if
it is found to be malafide or based on
wholly irrelevant or extraneous grounds.
The deletion of Clause (5) by the 44th
Amendment Act, removes the cloud on the
reviewability of the action. When a prima
facie case is made out in the challenge to
the Proclamation, the Union of India has to
produce the material on the basis of which
action was taken. It cannot refuse to do
so, if it seeks to defend the action. The
court will not go into the correctness of
the material or its adequacy. Its inquiry is
limited to whether the material was
relevant to the action. Even if part of the
material is irrelevant, the court cannot
interfere so long as there is some material
which is relevant to the action taken. It is
submitted that the validity of the
Presidents proclamation under Article 356
is justiciable.
Powers of President under
Article 356

The second question which was taken into

consideration by the court was that
whether the President has unfettered
powers to issue Proclamation under
Article 356(1) of the Constitution of India.
It was contended that The Supreme Court
in this regard held that the power
conferred by Article 356 upon the
President is a conditioned power. It is not
an absolute power. This satisfaction may
be formed on the basis of the report of the
Governor or on the basis of other
information received by him or both. The
existence of relevant material is a pre-
condition to the formation of satisfaction.
The satisfaction must be formed on
relevant material. The dissolution of the
Legislative Assembly should be resorted
to only when it is necessary for achieving
the purposes of the proclamation. The
exercise of the power is made subject to
approval of the both Houses of
Parliament.

Article 74 and Justiciability of

advice of Council of Ministers
to President
In regard to the contention, that Article
74(2) bars the inquiry into advice was
tendered by Council of Ministers to the
President, the Supreme Court at length
considered the scope and effect of Article
74(2). Here it would be appropriate to
mention that article 74(2) of the
constitution provides that the court cannot
inquire as to any, and if so what, advice
was tendered by Council of Ministers to
the President. In this regard Supreme
Court held that although Article 74(2) bars
judicial review so far as the advice given
by the Ministers is concerned, it does not
bar scrutiny of the material on the basis of
which the advice is given. The material on
the basis of which advice was tendered
does not become part of the advice. The
Courts are justified in probing as to
whether there was any material on the
basis of which the advice was given, and
whether it was relevant for such advice
and the President could have acted on it.
Hence when the Courts undertake an
inquiry into the existence of such material,
the prohibition contained in Article 74(2)
does not negate their right to know about
the factual existence of any such material.
This is not to say that the Union
Government cannot raise the plea of
privilege under Section 123 of the
Evidence Act. As and when such privilege
against disclosure is claimed, the Courts
will examine such claim within the
parameters of the said section on its
merits. But Article 74(2) as such is no bar
to the power of judicial review regarding
the material on the basis of which the
proclamation is issued.

Invalidation of Proclamation

The Supreme Court also held that the

power of the court to restore the
government to office in case it finds the
proclamation to be unconstitutional, it is,
in Courts opinion, beyond question. Even
in case the proclamation is approved by
the Parliament it would be open to the
court to restore the State government to
its office in case it strikes down the
proclamation as unconstitutional. If this
power were not conceded to the court, the
very power of judicial review would be
rendered nugatory and the entire exercise
meaningless. If the court cannot grant the
relief flowing from the invalidation of the
proclamation, it may as well decline to
entertain the challenge to the
proclamation altogether. For, there is no
point in the court entertaining the
challenge, examining it, calling upon the
Union Government to produce the material
on the basis of which the requisite
satisfaction was formed and yet not give
the relief.

Powers of Parliament

Moreover, the Supreme Court firmly held

that there was no reason to make a
distinction between the Proclamation so
approved and legislation enacted by the
Parliament. If the Proclamation is invalid, it
does not stand validated merely because it
is approved of by the Parliament. The
grounds for challenging the validity of the
Proclamation may be different from those
challenging the validity of legislation.
However, that does not make any
difference to the vulnerability of the
Proclamation on the limited grounds
available. And therefore the validity of the
Proclamation issued under Article 356(1)
can be challenged even after it has been
approved by both Houses of Parliament
under Article 356(3).

Elections to Legislature
pending final Disposal of case

Another issue taken into consideration by

the Supreme Court was whether any relief
can be granted when the validity of
proclamation is challenged and whether
the court can grant an interim stay against
holding the fresh election. In this regard
the Court held that the Court will have
power by an interim injunction, to restrain
the holding of fresh elections to the
Legislative Assembly pending the final
disposal of the challenge to the validity of
the proclamation to avoid the fait
accompli and the remedy of judicial review
being rendered fruitless.

Secularism

Supreme Court while adjudicating that a

State Government cannot follow particular
religion discussed at length the concept of
Secularism. The Court held that
Secularism is one of the basic features of
the Constitution. Secularism is a positive
concept of equal treatment of all religions.
This attitude is described by some as one
of neutrality towards religion or as one of
benevolent neutrality. While freedom of
religion is guaranteed to all persons in
India, from the point of view of the State,
the religion, faith or belief of a person is
immaterial. To the state, all are equal and
are entitled to be treated equally. In
matters of State, religion has no place.
And if the Constitution requires the State
to be secular in thought and action, the
same requirement attaches to political
parties as well. The Constitution does not
recognize, it does not permit, mixing
religion and State power. Both must be
kept apart. That is the constitutional
injunction. None can say otherwise so long
as this Constitution governs this country.
Politics and religion cannot be mixed. Any
State government which pursues
nonsecular policies or nonsecular course
of action acts contrary to the
constitutional mandate and renders itself
amenable to action under Article 356.
Given the above position, it is clear that if
any party or organization seeks to fight the
elections on the basis of a plank which
has the proximate effect of eroding the
secular philosophy of the Constitution
would certainly be guilty of following an
unconstitutional course of action.

Implications and Criticism

This case in the history of the Indian
Constitution has great implications on
Centre-State Relations. It is in this case
that the Supreme Court boldly marked out
the paradigm and limitations within which
Article 356 has to function. The Supreme
Court said that Article 356 is an extreme
power and is to be used as a last resort in
cases where it is manifest that there is an
impasse and the constitutional machinery
in a State has collapsed. The views
expressed by the court in this case are
similar to the concern showed by the
Sarkaria Commission.

The principles laid down in this case put a

bar on the dismissal of the state
government by the centre for political
gains.

It was in this case that the court firmly laid

down certain provision relating to
Presidential proclamation issued Under
Article 356. The Court held that
Presidential proclamation under Article
356 is not absolute and the power
conferred by Article 356 on president is
conditioned power. The Supreme Court
held that presidential proclamation is not
immune from judicial review. Moreover, if
the presidential proclamation is held
unconstitutional, the legislature dissolved
by the presidential proclamation can be
revived. It was also contended that the
Articles 74(2) bars the court from inquiring
about the material on the basis of which
the proclamation is issued, but the court
rejected this contention.

In spite of such bold and illustrious

judgement delivered by the Supreme
Court, people criticized that the Court took
such a long time to deliver the verdict and
allowed, in the cases of Karnataka and
Meghalaya, the illegality to be perpetuated
and ultimately deprive the citizens of those
states to be governed by their chosen
representative. Secondly, it was also
criticized that the concept of secularism
had been misinterpreted only regard to
Hindu fundamentalism.

Still, the judgement delivered by the

Supreme Court put a check on arbitrary
dismissal of state governments in future
and strengthen the federal structure of
Indian polity which had hitherto been
damaged on several occasions particularly
when different political parties were in
power at the Centre and the State.

See also
Supreme Court of India
Article 356
Sarkaria Commission
Judicial Review
Article 74

Notes
1. "S. R. Bommai v. Union of India" .
2. Prasad, R. J. Rajendra (July 1998).
"Bommai verdict has checked misuse of
Article 356" . Cover Story: Who's afraid of
Article 356. Chennai, India: Frontline.
Retrieved 30 December 2011.
3. Arora, Shubhash (1990). President's rule
in Indian states (A study of Punjab) . India:
Mittal Publications. ISBN 81-7099-234-6.
4. "STATUTORY RESOLUTIONS RE.
APPROVAL OF PROCLAMATIONS IN
RELATION TO THE STATES OF UTTAR
PRADESH, MADHYA PRADESH, HIMACHAL
PRADESH AND RAJASTHAN" . India:
Parliament of India. 22 December 1992.
Retrieved 30 December 2011.

External links
Case details as available on Indian
Supreme Court website
 Case details as available on Legal
Service India
Executive discretion and Article 356 of
the constitution of India: By K.
Jayasudha Reddy and Joy V. Joseph
Case details at indiankanoon.org
Soli J. Sorabjee, Decision of the
Supreme Court in S.R. Bommai v. Union
Of India: A Critique [1]

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