Appendix 1: Technical Notes On Set Theory: Cohen's Technique of Forcing

Appendix 1: Technical Notes on Set Theory
Cohen’s Technique of Forcing

Cohen’s technique of forcing involves constructing an outer model L[G]
of L. The aim of this technique is to extend L by adding a new set G
which is forced to have certain desired properties not possessed by the
sets in L (e.g. the property of violating the continuum hypothesis). This
is done in such a way that L[G] (i.e. the result of adjoining to L the set G
and everything constructible from G together with the elements of L) is
consistent with the axioms of ZFC.
Using the work of Gödel, Cohen (1963: 1143) assumed the existence
of a model M which satisfies the axioms of ZF + V = L (i.e. ZF with
the Axiom of Constructability). He took M to be a countable standard
transitive1 model. Countability is convenient and it follows from the
Lowenheim–Skolem theorem that if a first-order set theory has a model
at all, then it has a countable model. Cohen’s focus on M being standard
1
A set X is countable if its elements can be put in a one-to-one relation with the elements of ω.
A set X is transitive if every element of X is a subset of X.
A model M of a set theory is standard if the elements of M are well-founded sets ordered with the
set membership relation.
© The Author(s) 2017 331

J. McDonnell, The Pythagorean World,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-40976-4
332 Appendix 1: Technical Notes on Set Theory
and transitive also made his proof easier, but these are not essential crite-
ria for the technique of forcing in general.
For every object X which can be proved to exist in ZF + V = L, M
contains an analogue object Y, which is often equal to X (Chow 2008:
6). For example, M contains all the ordinals and ℵ0. However, the ana-
logue Y is not always equal to X. For example, since M is countable,
the set y which is the analogue of the power set of ℵ0 in M will also be
countable, so it cannot be the same as the power set of ℵ0 in ZF + V = L
(which Cantor showed to be uncountable). Many subsets are missing
from y. We say that y is ‘uncountable in M’ even though it is countable
in ZF + V = L. The notions of ‘countability’ and ‘powerset’ are relative to
the model. Notions, such as ‘the empty set’, which do not depend on the
model, are said to be absolute.
Cohen’s aim (1963: 1144) was to extend M by adjoining a subset U
of ℵ0 that is missing from M and that violates the continuum hypothesis
(e.g. contains ℵ2 or more reals). The resulting model M[U] would be a
model for ZF and the Axiom of Choice and the negation of the con-
tinuum hypothesis. He was concerned that, if U were chosen indiscrimi-
nately, then the set that plays the role of a particular cardinal number in
M might not play the same role in M[U]. For example, the set ℵ2 in M
might become countable in M[U].2 However he argued that, if U were
chosen in a generic manner from M,3 then no new information would be
extracted from it in M[U] which was not already contained in M, so sets
such as the cardinals would be preserved. Cohen wrote:
we do not wish U to contain “special” information about M, which can

only be seen from the outside… The U which we construct will be referred
to as a “generic” set relative to M. The idea is that all the properties of U
must be “forced” to hold merely on the basis that U behaves like a “generic”
set in M. This concept of deciding when a statement about U is “forced” to
hold is the key point of the construction. (Cohen 1966: 111)
Cohen formalised the notion of a set U being M-generic and of the forc-
ing relation, through which satisfaction for the extension of M could be
2
This behaviour is called cardinal collapse.
3
For example, to be generic, U should contain infinitely many primes.
Appendix 1: Technical Notes on Set Theory 333
approached from inside M. He showed how to build the new set U one
step at a time, tracking what new properties of M[U] would be “forced”
to hold at each step (Chow 2008: 8). The result was a model which,
together with Gödel’s earlier work on L, proved the independence of the
continuum hypothesis in ZFC.
Generating Large Cardinal Axioms Using

Elementary Embeddings
The most general method for generating large cardinal axioms uses ele-
mentary embeddings (Woodin 2011b: 97–99). An elementary embedding
j of V into a transitive class M is a mapping j: V → M which preserves
all relations definable in the language of set theory (i.e. if arbitrary a0,…
,an in V satisfy an arbitrary first-order formula Ф in the language of set
theory, then their mappings j(a0),…,j(an) satisfy Ф in M, and conversely).
A basic template for large cardinal axioms asserts that there exists such an
embedding j which is not the identity. If j is not the identity then there
will be a least ordinal which is not mapped to itself (i.e. such that j(α) ≠
α) and this is called the critical point of j. Then the critical point of j is a
measurable cardinal and the existence of the transitive class M and the
elementary embedding j are witnesses for this.
By placing restrictions on M, by requiring it to be closer and closer
to V (in a manner analogous to width reflection for inner models, but
precisely defined in terms of the closure properties of M (Koellner 2011a:
10–12), we can generate stronger and stronger large cardinal axioms. By
continuing this process to its natural limit; that is, by taking M = V, the
axiom generated asserts the existence of a Reinhardt cardinal which is the
critical point of a non-trivial elementary embedding j: V → V. However,
this axiom has been shown to be inconsistent with ZFC by a theorem of
Kunen (Kanamori 1994: 319). The strongest large cardinal axiom which
evades Kunen’s proof, and so is not known to be inconsistent with ZFC,
is one asserting the existence of an ω-huge cardinal:
A cardinal κ is an ω-huge cardinal if there exists λ > κ and an elementary

embedding j: Vλ+1 → Vλ+1 such that κ is the critical point of j. (Woodin
2011c: 456)
The outlined procedure for generating large cardinal axioms does not
show us how to build up to the large cardinal from below and so it is
not intrinsic. Also, to be very clear, it does not guarantee the existence of
the large cardinal or the relative consistency of the associated axiom with
ZFC. It simply provides us with a means of pushing the level of cardinals
as high as it can go, right up to the point where we bump into Kunen’s
theorem. A further sobering fact is that even the largest of large cardinal
axioms is not enough to determine the continuum hypothesis. Levy and
Solovay (1967) showed that all such large cardinal assumptions are rela-
tively consistent with both the continuum hypothesis and its negation.
Large Cardinal Axioms and Deﬁnable

Determinacy
In the early development of set theory, there was a focus on studying
the properties of the hierarchy of definable sets of real numbers L(R)4—
what is now called descriptive set theory (Koellner 2011b: 16–24). Many
important results were proved. Bendixson (1883) and Cantor (1884)
showed that all closed sets of reals have the perfect set property5 and so
satisfy the continuum hypothesis. This result was later extended to
the first-order in a hierarchy of certain definable open sets. Another
property of interest is Lesbesgue measurability. It was known that there
are sets of reals which are not Lesbesgue measurable (giving rise to the
Banach–Tarski paradox discussed in Sect. 4.2.3) but it was not known
whether or not any definable sets of reals lacked this property. Again,
proofs of Lesbesgue measurability were limited to the first-order in a
hierarchy of certain definable open sets. The story was much the same
4
See the discussion of Gödel’s constructible universe L in Sect. 4.2.4 for a definition of definable
sets. By starting with the real numbers R and iterating the definable power set operation along the
ordinals, we get the hierarchy L(R) of definable sets of reals.
5
See Koellner (2011b: 17–18) for a definition of the hierarchy of definable open and closed sets of
reals. A set of reals is perfect if it is non-empty, closed and contains no isolated points. A set of reals
has the perfect set property if it is either countable or contains a perfect subset. If a set of reals con-
tains a perfect subset, it must have the same size as the continuum. Therefore, if a set of reals has
the perfect set property, it must satisfy the continuum hypothesis (Koellner 2011b: 20).
for other regularity and structural properties of interest.6 Beyond this,

independence results developed in the 1960s (following the work of
Gödel and Cohen) showed that many questions about the properties of
definable sets of reals are not decidable in ZFC.
The situation was greatly clarified in the 1970s and 1980s with the
development of new axioms for ZFC (Koellner 2011b: 24–30). One
strand of research studied the implications of large cardinal axioms. The
other strand, to do with axioms of determinacy, had its origins in a quite
different area of mathematics—game theory. The Axiom of Determinacy,
AD, is an assertion about a two-person infinite game. It says that for
every set of reals A, there is a winning strategy for one of the players in the
game associated with A.7 AD is known to be inconsistent with the Axiom
of Choice so, in the search for new axioms for ZFC, it is usual to consider
restrictions of AD to certain definable sets of reals, giving rise to axioms
of definable determinacy which are consistent with Choice. For example,
by restricting AD to the hierarchy of definable sets of real numbers L(R),
one gets the new axiom candidate ADL(R).
The underlying connection between determinacy and the regularity
properties of sets of reals is not immediately obvious to outsiders, but to
some set theorists “determinacy lies at the heart of the regularity prop-
erties and may be considered their true source” (Koellner 2011b: 26).
What is obviously remarkable is the intricate web of results interweaving
large cardinals, determinacy and regularity properties; as outlined by the
examples below:
Theorem A.1.3.1 Assume ZFC + ADL(R). Then all the sets of reals in
L(R) have the perfect set property, are Lesbesgue measurable and have
the property of Baire.
Theorem A.1.3.2. (Woodin) Assume ZFC + “there exist ω-many Woodin

cardinals with a measurable cardinal above them all”. Then ADL(R).
6
Note that there are many such properties other than the ones mentioned in the text; for example,
the property of Baire and the uniformisation property (Koellner 2011b).
7
See Woodin (2010a: 4) for details.
Theorem A.1.3.3. (Woodin) Assume ADL(R). Then there is an inner

model N of the theory ZFC + “there are ω-many Woodin cardinals”.
Theorem A.1.3.4. (Woodin) Assume ZFC + “there is a proper class of

Woodin cardinals”. Then the independence of statements in L(R) cannot
be established by forcing.8
Many more such linked theorems are discussed by Koellner (2011b:

26–35). These theorems bring the two strands of research on new axioms
together in an unexpected way. They show that definable determinacy is
necessary and sufficient to prove the regularity properties of certain defin-
able sets of reals; and that large cardinals are necessary and sufficient to
prove definable determinacy.
Koellner (2011b: 30–38) has used these results to support the case for
definable determinacy and, hence, for large cardinal axioms. Some of his
main points are:
1. The regularity properties of structure theory are desirable properties

for definable sets of reals (e.g. they circumvent the Banach–Tarski
paradox).
2. ADL(R) lifts the regularity properties of structure theory to the level of
L(R). Conversely, all theories which have this desirable consequence
imply ADL(R).
3. For sufficiently strong large cardinal axioms, which themselves imply
ADL(R), the results regarding regularity properties cannot be undone
by forcing from L(R).
4. ADL(R) is implied by many theories which have proved useful in
strengthening ZFC and “there is reason to believe that ADL(R) lies in
the overlapping consensus of all sufficiently strong, natural theories”
(Koellner 2011b: 36).
5. There is promising research to indicate that the case can be strength-
ened beyond L(R).
8
This is a very loose statement of an important theorem by Woodin. For a precise statement, see
Theorem 12 of Koellner (2006).
6. Definable determinacy and large cardinal axioms are at root equivalent:

“We have here a case where intrinsically plausible principles from com-
pletely different domains reinforce each other” (Koellner 2009b: 111).
Although the results are remarkable, not all set theorists find the case
for definable determinacy compelling. They argue that descriptive set
theory is only one area and focusing on another area might produce com-
peting, incompatible axioms. Part of Koellner’s argument is the claim
that this is unlikely but, of course, it depends on what areas one finds
interesting and what weight one gives to intrinsically plausible results
from different areas. For example, Shelah (2003: 211–213) thinks that
Gödel’s Axiom of Constructibility V = L is an interesting axiom with
some appealing consequences, and it is known to be incompatible with
one of the axioms of definable determinacy.
Deﬁning Effective Completeness

Theorem A.1.3.4 from the previous section offers the hope of overcoming
forcing. It says that, assuming sufficiently strong large cardinal assump-
tions, the truth value of statements in L(R) cannot be changed by forcing.
As stated in Koellner and Woodin (2009: 1158): “Woodin cardinals ‘seal’
or ‘freeze’ the theory of L(R)”. Furthermore, the results of descriptive set
theory show that the same large cardinal assumptions effectively resolve
all of the open problems relating to the regularity and structural proper-
ties of definable sets of reals. So, in this sense, we can achieve effective
completeness at the level of L(R). Recall that L(R) is the same as L(Vω+1).
This means that we can achieve effective completeness at a level beyond,
and inclusive of, the level of second-order arithmetic, Vω+1, but below the
level of third-order arithmetic, Vω+2. It would be desirable to extend this
result to Vω+2 and higher levels. However, the continuum hypothesis is a
statement in Vω+2 and we know that it cannot be resolved by any standard
large cardinal axioms, so something more will be needed. To define effec-
tive completeness at higher levels of the set hierarchy, it is necessary to
introduce some technical notions.
Firstly, there is the notion of the Levy hierarchy of formulas. A formula

in a language that contains the language of set theory is of type Σ0 (or,
equivalently, Π0) if it is built from atomic formulas through the use of
logical connectives and bounded quantifiers ∀x ∈ y and ∃x ∈ y. A formula
is of type Σ1 if it is of the form ∃x φ where x is a list of variables and φ
is of type Π0. A formula is of type Π1 if it is of the form ∀x φ where φ is
of type Σ0. In general, a formula is of type Σn, n>1, if it is of the form
∃x φ where φ is of type Πn-1. And a formula is of type Πn, n>1, if it is of
the form ∀x φ where φ is of type Σn-1. In set theory, an assertion is called
Π2 if it is of the form: “For every infinite ordinal α, Vα ╞ φ ”, for some
Σ1-sentence φ, where ╞ is the symbol for consequence in the language.
Similarly, an assertion is called Σ2 if it is of the form: “There exists an infi-
nite ordinal α such that Vα ╞ φ ”, for some Π1-sentence φ. A Σ2-sentence
is expressible as the negation of a Π2-sentence.
Secondly, there is the notion of a Σ2n sentence. A Σ2n sentence is one of
the form “Vω+2╞ φ”, where φ is a formula which is Σn in the Levy hier-
archy. The continuum hypothesis is equivalent to a Σ21 sentence. Hence,
it is a sentence at the level of third-order arithmetic, Vω+2 and at the first
level of the Levy hierarchy.
Thirdly, there is the notion of stratifying the universe of sets in terms
of the cardinal partition, H(κ), rather than the familiar ordinal partition,
Vα. Here, κ is an infinite cardinal and H(κ) is the set of all sets whose
transitive closure has cardinality less than κ (i.e. the set of all sets which
have cardinality less than κ, whose members have cardinality less than
κ, whose members’ members have cardinality less than κ, etc.) (Koellner
2011c: 13). For example, H(ω) = Vω and the theories of the structures
H(ω1) and Vω+1 are mutually interpretable. If the continuum hypothesis
is true, then H(ω2) and Vω+2 are mutually interpretable, otherwise H(ω2)
is less rich than Vω+2. So, in investigating the continuum hypothesis, it
makes sense to consider H(ω2) first.
Fourthly, and lastly, there is the notion of Ω-completeness. This will take
a bit more explanation. We know that in order to resolve the continuum
hypothesis, a new notion is needed. Part of the answer might be to intro-
duce a logic which is stronger than first-order logic and is well behaved in
the sense that its consequences cannot be altered by forcing in the pres-
ence of large cardinal axioms (Koellner 2011c: 15–17). Ω-logic is such a
logic.9 It has a notion of consequence, denoted ╞Ω, which is robust to

forcing under the assumption of a proper class of Woodin cardinals. It
also has a quasi-syntactic proof relation, denoted ├Ω, defined in terms
of universally Baire sets of reals which act as witnesses for the “proofs” in
the logic (Woodin 2001b: 684). Ω-logic is known to be sound. Hence,
if a sentence φ is Ω-provable in a set theory T, then it is necessarily an
Ω-consequence of T. However, it is not known whether Ω-logic is com-
plete; that is, whether every sentence φ which is an Ω-consequence of a
set theory T is necessarily Ω-provable in T. The conjecture that Ω-logic is
both sound and complete is called the Ω conjecture. This is so important
that I will highlight it:
The Ω conjecture says that Ω-logic is both sound and complete.
A theory T is said to be Ω-complete for a collection of sentences Γ if for

each φ Є Γ, either T ╞Ω φ or T ╞Ω ~φ (Koellner 2011c: 17). Hence, the
Ω-completeness of a theory for some collection of sentences means that
those sentences are decidable in Ω-logic.
Exploring the Effective Completability of Set

Theory
Using the notions introduced in Sect. A.1.4, Theorem A.1.3.4 asserting
the invariance of the theory of L(R) under set forcing can be rephrased as:
Theorem A.1.5.1. (Woodin) Assume ZFC and that there is a proper

class of Woodin cardinals. Then ZFC is Ω-complete for the collection of
sentences of the form “L(R) ╞ φ”. (Koellner 2011c: 17)
Because of the nature of the continuum hypothesis, we know that

there is no standard large cardinal axiom LCA such that ZFC + LCA
is Ω-complete for Σ21 sentences. However, there is the possibility that
a supplementary axiom could achieve this outcome and, surprisingly, it
9
For more information on Ω-logic and its relation to full first- and second-order logic, see Koellner
(2010).
turns out that simply assuming the continuum hypothesis as an addi-

tional axiom does achieve it. Thus:

class of measurable Woodin cardinals. Then ZFC + CH is Ω-complete
for Σ21. (Koellner 2011c: 29)
Moreover, up to Ω-equivalence, CH is the unique Σ21-statement that

is Ω-complete for Σ21 (Koellner and Woodin 2009: 1161).
Of course, assuming the continuum hypothesis as an axiom doesn’t
count as resolving it. On the contrary, for many years, Woodin promoted
a parallel case in which the continuum hypothesis is negated (Woodin
2001b). Thus, assuming that there is a proper class of Woodin cardinals
and that the Strong Ω Conjecture10 holds, Woodin (1999) proved that
there is an axiom A such that ZFC + A is Ω-complete for the struc-
ture H(ω2) and that any such axiom has the feature that the continuum
hypothesis is false in the associated theory. The axiom A is not unique,
there are many such Ω-complete theories (Koellner and Woodin 2009).
However, Woodin found a particular axiom, called Axiom (*), which
gives a “maximal” theory in the sense that it satisfies all Π2-sentences
that can possibly hold (Koellner 2011c: 14). Assuming Axiom (*), the
continuum hypothesis is false and 2^ ℵ0 = ℵ2. Woodin (2001b: 687)
saw Axiom (*) as being a candidate for the generalisation of ADL(R) to the
structure H(ω2); that is, settling in Ω-logic the full theory of H(ω2) just
as ADL(R) had settled the open problems of descriptive set theory in L(R).
So now, we have two cases for extending our Ω-complete theories:
Case 1, in which the continuum hypothesis is assumed as an axiom and
Case 2, which assumes Axiom (*) and has the consequence that the con-
tinuum hypothesis is false. Case 1 is only Ω-complete for Σ21 sentences,
whereas Case 2 is Ω-complete for the whole of the structure H(ω2). Case
2 uses the additional assumption that the Strong Ω Conjecture holds.
Does this mean that there is a bifurcation of the universe of sets
at the level of the continuum hypothesis? This question can’t really
be answered at the local level since there is always the possibility that
10
The Strong Ω Conjecture is the Ω Conjecture plus a conjecture about an extended form of the
AD. See Koellner (2011c: 16–17).
further extensions of the theory will favour one path over the other. It
is known that if the Strong Ω Conjecture holds, then one cannot have
an Ω-complete theory of the whole of the structure Vω+2:

class of Woodin cardinals. Assume the Strong Ω Conjecture. Then there
is no recursively enumerable theory A such that ZFC + A is Ω-complete
for Σ23. (Koellner and Woodin 2009: 1162)
So this path is effectively closed off at the Σ23 level. On the other hand,
the following theorem shows that the continuum hypothesis is not suf-
ficient to provide an Ω-complete theory at the Σ22 level:
Theorem A.1.5.4. (Jensen, Shelah) ZFC + CH is not Ω-complete for

Σ22. (Koellner and Woodin 2009: 1162)
So this path is also closed.

One can consider further local scenarios at the Σ22 level.11 I take it that
the upshot of these is that, if the Strong Ω Conjecture holds, then it is
likely that there is a “best” theory in which the continuum hypothesis has
a definite answer, even though there is not yet a compelling case to tell
us which way that answer will fall (Koellner 2011c: 33). My impression
is that the local approach is nearing the end of its usefulness. There were
remarkable successes at the level of Vω+1 which were extended with great
effort to fragments of Vω+2 but without any clear result for the contin-
uum hypothesis. Cases multiply and it becomes hard to keep track of the
arguments. The justification for the “best” cases becomes less compelling.
Perhaps this situation will improve with further research but, regardless,
the local approach has inherent limitations.
If the Strong Ω Conjecture does not hold, then there is the possibility
that we could have an Ω-complete theory for Vω+2. In fact, it might be
possible to achieve an Ω-complete theory for any specified level Vα and to
piece these together into a coherent theory of the entire universe of sets. If
this were achieved, then the theory would be a candidate for the effective
11
See, for example, Koellner (2011c: 27–33).
completion of set theory along the lines envisaged by Gödel (1946: 151)
(see Sect. 4.5.1). However, Koellner and Woodin (2009) have shown that
such a theory could not be unique. If there is an Ω-complete theory of
Vα for α ≥ (ω+2), then there is another, equally good but incompatible
Ω-complete theory which differs on the truth value of the continuum
hypothesis.12 This seriously raises the spectre of pluralism. The existence
of two, or more, coherent but incompatible Ω-complete theories of V
would undermine the universalist’s concept of truth. It would not be
possible to combine such theories in the manner suggested by Martin
(2001). Such a scenario is considered by Steel (2004) and discussed at
length by Maddy (2005: 369–373). The theories would all be univer-
sal and equivalent in terms of the mathematics that would result (i.e.
choosing one theory over another would not result in any behavioural or
methodological differences). In choosing one theory, the others would be
accessible as generic extensions. The continuum hypothesis (and other
undecidable statements) would be meaningless in an absolute sense, but
acquire a relative value as a matter of convention.
This scenario is highly speculative but does serve to crystallise a plau-
sible pluralist case. Note that a multiverse of this kind does not conform
to the radical pluralist view of what a multiverse might consist of (i.e. all
consistent theories). It locks in a universalist view at least to the level of
ZFC + “there is a proper class of measurable Woodin cardinals” which is
essential for the application of the notion of Ω-completeness. In this way,
it avoids the problems which plague the radical pluralist view.
Woodin (2011d) has used a global perspective to define and investi-
gate a multiverse of a related kind, which he calls the generic multiverse.
Ultimately, he sets up the generic multiverse position as a strawman, only
to show that it is untenable under fundamental principles of set theory,
provided that the Ω Conjecture is true. Here, once again, we see the impor-
tance of the Ω Conjecture.
Woodin’s generic multiverse is generated from V by closing under
generic extensions (forcing) and under generic refinements (inner mod-
els of a universe which the given universe is a generic extension of ). The
associated generic multiverse view of truth is that a sentence is true if
12
Note that the continuum hypothesis is just a particular case; there are other suitable sentences
which could be forced to differ between Ω-complete theories of Vα.
and only if it holds in each universe of the generic multiverse. Letting

the background theory be ZFC + “there is a proper class of measurable
Woodin cardinals”, this view entails that the continuum hypothesis is
indeterminate whilst ADL(R) is true (and, hence, all the results of descrip-
tive set theory, described previously, are locked in).
Woodin (2011d: 19–21) proves that for each Π2-sentence φ, the fol-
lowing are equivalent:
1. φ holds across the generic multiverse;

2. “φ is true in Ω-logic” holds across the generic multiverse;
3. “φ is true in Ω-logic” holds in at least one universe of the generic
multiverse.
This means that if φ is Ω-valid in one universe, then it holds in all the
universes of the generic multiverse. Notably, a sentence asserting the exis-
tence of a proper class of Woodin cardinals (and its consequences) and a
sentence asserting the truth of the Ω conjecture would be invariant across
the generic multiverse. Woodin says: “the notion of truth is the same as
defined relative to each universe of the multiverse, so from the perspec-
tive of evaluating truth all the universes of the multiverse are equivalent”
(Woodin 2011d: 15). He sees this as an important point in favour of the
generic multiverse view. For one thing, it implies that a statement (such
as a consistency statement) can’t be indeterminate in one universe and
determinate in another, as might happen under the radical pluralist view.
Thus, truth is not so sensitive to the meta-universe in which the generic
multiverse is being defined and the pluralist isn’t forced to retreat to an
infinite regression of meta-universes in order to define his position.
Next, Woodin (2011d: 17–18) formulates two related multiverse laws:
1. The set of Π2-multiverse truths cannot be recursive in the set of mul-

tiverse truths of Vα for any specifiable α; and
2. The set of Π2-multiverse truths is not definable in Vα across the mul-
tiverse for any specifiable α.
These laws capture the idea that any reasonable concept of multiverse
truth cannot be reduced to, or defined in, an initial fragment Vα of the
universe V. That would lead to “a brand of formalism that denies the
transfinite by reducing truth about the universe of sets to truth about a

simple fragment” (Woodin 2011d: 17). Woodin’s multiverse laws are in
the spirit of the reflection principles of set theory.
Woodin (2011d: 23–25) goes on to show that, assuming both the
Ω Conjecture and the existence of a proper class of Woodin cardinals,
both multiverse laws are violated by the generic multiverse position.
Specifically, he proves that both laws are violated at the level of Vδ0+1
where δ0 is the least Woodin cardinal. This result can be sharpened to
Vω+2 for the first multiverse law, but the import is the same in any case:
the generic multiverse position is untenable because the set of all its truths
is reducible to the set of truths of some initial fragment of V.
The pluralists’ best response, short of placing restrictions on the
generic multiverse, is to deny the truth of the Ω Conjecture. Woodin
([2011d: 28] and [2011b: 111–112]) argues that there is evidence for
the Ω Conjecture, albeit nothing conclusive. Firstly, the Ω Conjecture
can be shown to be consistent with the theory ZFC + “There is a proper
class of Woodin cardinals”. Secondly, the assertion of its Ω-satisfiability
is a Σ2-assertion which is invariant across the generic multiverse and
there are no known examples of Σ2-statements that are provably abso-
lute and not settled by large cardinal axioms. Thirdly, “recent results
indicate that if [the Inner Model] program can succeed at the level
of supercompact cardinals then no large cardinal hypothesis whatso-
ever can refute the Ω Conjecture” [Woodin 2011d: 28]. These are the
results from the theory of Ultimate L (as discussed in Sect. 4.5.3 in the
main text).
Fending Off a Potential Threat

to the Universalist View
In “The Realm of the Infinite” (2011b), Woodin begins by arguing that
we implicitly accept the meaningfulness of the large finite and that there is
nothing to prevent us from accepting the meaningfulness of the universe
of sets (as discussed in Sect. 4.6 in the main text). In the next part of his
paper, he gives further arguments for accepting the truth of set theory,
this time in opposition to a hypothetical Sceptic who denies any genuine
meaning to a conception of uncountable sets (i.e. he accepts the meaning-

fulness of the large finite and the completed infinity of the natural num-
bers, but not of uncountable sets, and certainly not of large cardinals).
Woodin lays out the evidence for large cardinals and makes his predic-
tion that the theory ZFC + “there exist infinitely many Woodin cardi-
nals” will never be shown to be inconsistent (even though, analogously
to the large finite case, an inconsistency could conceivably be found in
the physical realm). The Sceptic accepts the evidence for the consistency
of the theory, and agrees with the prediction, but doesn’t accept that it is
the result of the truth of the axioms (or, equivalently, the existence of the
large cardinals). He suggests that the infinite realm is so inclusive that any
reasonably defined large cardinal axiom would turn out to be consistent,
provided that there isn’t a simple proof of its inconsistency. In particular,
he points to the Reinhardt cardinal axiom, which is the strongest possible
large cardinal axiom generated by the elementary embedding template (as
discussed in Sect. A.1.2). Kunen produced a simple proof of its inconsis-
tency with ZFC, but that proof depended on using the Axiom of Choice,
and it is still possible that it is consistent with ZF. Furthermore, if the the-
ory ZF + “there is a weak Reinhardt cardinal” is consistent, then it implies
the consistency of ZFC + “there is a proper class of ω-huge cardinals” and
thereby accounts for all the consistency predictions of Woodin’s accepted
large cardinal hierarchy. So this one claim—the formal consistency of the
Reinhardt axiom with ZF—would account for all the claims of set theory.
The Skeptic’s claim creates a serious problem for Woodin. The con-
sistency of the Reinhardt cardinal axiom could not be grounded in the
existence of a Reinhardt cardinal because then we would have an imme-
diate bifurcation of set theory into a universe in which the Axiom of
Choice holds and one in which it does not hold. Anyway, there is no fine
structure theory for a Reinhardt cardinal, so no witnesses to its existence.
Rather, the set theorist might try to account for its formal consistency
by showing that the theory ZF + “there is a weak Reinhardt cardinal”
is equiconsistent with a theory of the form ZFC + LCA, for some large
cardinal axiom LCA; in the same way that ZF + AD can be shown to be
equiconsistent with ZFC + “there exist infinitely many Woodin cardi-
nals”, even though AD itself is incompatible with the Axiom of Choice
(Woodin 2011b: 100–101). However, this approach will not be possible
because the Reinhardt cardinal axiom is stronger than any large cardi-
nal axiom not known to refute the Axiom of Choice and, so, will not
be equiconsistent with any such theory. Next, Woodin explores the idea
that the generic multiverse view of truth might be able to account for the
prediction that weak Reinhardt cardinals are consistent with ZF (Woodin
2011b: 107–108). Again, this approach will not be possible because, as we
saw previously, the generic multiverse view of truth is untenable under the
assumption of the Ω Conjecture because it violates the multiverse laws.
Next, Woodin plays his trump card—Ultimate L. If a solution
to Ultimate L could be found, then one corollary would be that the
Reinhardt cardinal axiom is inconsistent with ZF (Woodin 2011b:
115–116). So, rather than contorting ZFC to account for the consis-
tency of weak Reinhardt cardinals with ZF, it could be proved that they
are, in fact, inconsistent. This would comprehensively refute the Skeptic’s
claim. More than that, it would provide “for the first time an example
of a natural large cardinal axiom proved to be inconsistent as a result
of a deep structural analysis” (Woodin 2011b: 116). Such an inconsis-
tency result could never be achieved by Inner Model Theory because of
its incremental nature. But Ultimate L would provide us with the means
to explore the boundary between possible and impossible large cardinal
axioms, strengthening its claim to being the ultimate arbiter of math-
ematical truth and existence. Woodin’s hunch is that it would enable us
to eliminate essentially all the large cardinal axioms known to contradict
the Axiom of Choice, tantamount to a proof of the Axiom of Choice
(Woodin 2011c: 470). Then, according to Woodin’s view, any suggested
set theory would need to be justified by first establishing its equiconsis-
tency with a specific level of Ultimate L. Ulimate L, in its turn, would be
justified by our understanding of the hierarchy of large cardinal axioms as
“true axioms about the universe of sets” (Woodin 2011b: 96).
Woodin thinks that one of the main pieces of evidence supporting the
truth of large cardinal axioms is our ability to construct their fine structure
theory. Using Inner Model Theory, evidence for each large cardinal axiom is
built up from below. Starting from Gödel’s L, minimal extenders are added
at each stage to witness the existence of the next large cardinal in the hier-
archy. However, we know that this process cannot be extended beyond the
level of an inner model with one supercompact cardinal. The reason is that
Woodin’s investigation of this case has shown that such a model would
automatically inherit all stronger large cardinals. Then these stronger large
cardinal axioms would require some further extrinsic justification. Woodin
suggests that the answer to this dilemma is to use the structural analogy of
the theory of L(R) under ADL(R) to the theory of L(Vλ+1) under the assump-
tion of an ω-huge cardinal to reveal the structure theory of ω-huge cardinals
without constructing a full inner model theory (Woodin 2011c: 469–470).
References
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de Points. Acta Mathematica 2: 415–429.
Cantor, G. 1884. De la Puissance des Ensembles Parfaits de Points.
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Cohen, P. 1963. The Independence of the Continuum Hypothesis.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of
America 50(6): 1143–1148.
———. 1966. Set Theory and the Continuum Hypothesis. Menlo Park,
CA: Addison-Wesley.
Chow, T. 2008. A Beginner’s Guide to Forcing, pp. 1–16, downloaded
from http://arxiv.org/abs/0712.1320
Gödel, K. 1946. Remarks Before the Princeton Bicentennial
Conference on Problems in Mathematics. In K. Gödel Collected Works,
Vol. II, edited by S. Feferman et al., 150–153. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1990.
Kanamori, A. 1994. The Higher Infinite: Perspectives in Mathematical
Logic. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
Koellner, P. 2006. On the Question of Absolute Undecidability.
Philosophia Mathematica 14(2): 153–188.
———. 2009b. Truth in Mathematics: The Question of Pluralism.
In New Waves in Philosophy of Mathematics, edited by O. Bueno and Ø.
Linnebo, 80–116. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
———. 2011a. Independence and Large Cardinals. In The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer ed.). Edited by E. N. Zalta, down-
loaded from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/

independence-large-cardinals/
———. 2011b. Large Cardinals and Determinacy, downloaded from
http://logic.harvard.edu/EFI_LCD.pdf, pp. 1–44.
———. 2011c. The Continuum Hypothesis, downloaded from
http://logic.harvard.edu/EFI_CH.pdf, pp. 1–38.
Koellner, P., and W. Woodin. 2009. Incompatible Ω-Complete
Theories. Journal of Symbolic Logic 74: 1155–1170.
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Continuum Hypothesis. Israel Journal of Mathematics 5: 234–248.
Maddy, P. 2005. Mathematical Existence. The Bulletin of Symbolic
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Steel, J. 2004. Generic Absoluteness and the Continuum Problem,
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Woodin, W.H. 1999. The Axiom of Determinacy, Forcing Axioms, and
the Nonstationary Ideal, volume 1 of de Gruyter Series in Logic and its
Applications. Berlin: de Gruyter.
———. 2001b. The Continuum Hypothesis, Part II. Notices of the
American Mathematical Society 48: 681–690.
———. 2011b. The Realm of the Infinite. In Infinity: New Research
Frontiers, edited by M. Heller and W. H. Woodin, 89–118. New York:
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———. 2011c. The Transfinite Universe. In Kurt Gödel and the
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———. 2011d. The Continuum Hypothesis, the Generic Multiverse
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Appendix 2: Problems with Plenitude
Overview
This appendix considers the problems that arise if too much plenitude is
postulated. It refers to David Lewis’ On the Plurality of Worlds (1986) for
a fair statement of the problems and a defence of plenitude. Lewis’ main
reason for embracing plenitude is that it allows a great benefit in terms of
unity and economy of theory. He thinks that logical space for philosophers
can be developed in an analogous way to set theory for mathematicians,
thus enabling philosophers to use a vast realm of possibilia to reduce the
required number of primitives and premises (1986: 4). To pave the way,
he has shown in Parts of Classes (1991) how the constructions of set theory
can be reproduced in mereology (i.e. the study of parts and wholes).
How Much Plenitude?

Lewis defends the thesis of modal realism which he states as:
the thesis that the world we are part of is but one of a plurality of worlds,
and that we who inhabit this world are only a few out of all the inhabitants
of all the worlds. (1986: vii)

DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-40976-4
350 Appendix 2: Problems with Plenitude
According to this thesis, there are many possible worlds, some just like
ours and some completely alien to our understanding. A possible world
has parts which are possible individuals. A world is the mereological sum
of all the possible individuals that are its parts.13 Spatiotemporal relations
make individuals cohere in a world.
Lewis advocates a principle of recombination. Parts of any world can
be duplicated, multiplied, and combined into a new world. There is just
one proviso:
The only limit on the extent to which a world can be filled with duplicates
of possible individuals is that the parts of a world must be able to fit
together with some possible size and shape of spacetime. Apart from that,
anything can coexist with anything, and anything can fail to coexist with
anything. (Lewis 1986: 89–90)
The proviso limits the ways in which space-time may be occupied (cf.
set theory, in which there is no limit to the ways in which sets can be
construed and the result is Cantor’s hierarchy of infinities). If space-time
is a continuum, then it cannot accommodate more individuals than the
cardinality of the real numbers. Lewis is prepared to contemplate differ-
ent possible space-times but he is not prepared to let the cardinality of
possible individuals yield consequences about the possible size of space-
time. Therefore, the cardinality of possible individuals is limited.
Forrest and Armstrong (1984) show that, without the proviso, the
principle of recombination leads to paradoxes for Lewis’ possible worlds
analogous to the paradoxes of set theory. For example, consider the world
which contains all the possible worlds as parts. This “biggest world” exists
according to Lewis’ mereology of possible worlds. Suppose that it has car-
dinality K. Forrest and Armstrong show how to construct a world with
cardinality greater than K by extracting parts of the biggest world, dupli-
cating and recombining them. However, by hypothesis, no world can have
cardinality greater than K. Fortunately, the proviso prevents this argument
from going through: the “bigger than biggest” world is too big to fit into
the biggest world and, so, too big to fit into any possible space-time.
13
The mereological sum of several things is the least inclusive thing that includes all of them as
parts.
Appendix 2: Problems with Plenitude 351
Lewis relies on the proviso to prevent the construction of “bigger than

biggest” worlds. This forces him to contemplate a cleavage between the
structure of mathematics and the structure of possible worlds. There will
be some set-theoretical objects that are bigger than any possible world.
Nevertheless (at some cost in terms of unity and economy of theory),
Lewis sticks to the principle of plenitude in listing his conception of what
there is altogether: “the possible worlds, the possible individuals that are
their parts, and the mathematical objects, even if those should turn out to
be pure sets not made out of the parts of the worlds” (1986: 111). Lewis
thinks that we should accept mathematics and he rejects the suggestion
that any mathematical objects could be fictional. He is less concerned by
Benacerraf ’s dilemma than some:
If we are prepared to expand our existential beliefs for the sake of theoreti-
cal unity, and if thereby we come to believe the truth, then we attain
knowledge. We can know that there exist countless objects causally isolated
from us and unavailable to our inspection. (1986: 109)
According to Lewis, mathematics and possible worlds give us knowledge

beyond the reach of our causal acquaintance. We arrive at this knowledge
by reasoning from general principles (such as recombination). Indeed,
the same principles are involved in constructing sets and possible worlds;
it’s just that possible worlds have an additional constraint.
The constraint on possible worlds derives from the intuition that they
are just like our world in many relevant ways. They can be described
as “concrete”, just like our world and so can be distinguished from the
“abstract” world of mathematics, even though Lewis cannot find a prin-
cipled distinction between concrete and abstract (1986: 81–86). The
question arises as to where to draw the line. Do concrete individuals
have to fit into finite-dimensional space-times? Lewis thinks that that is
too restrictive and he hopes that there is a natural break higher up: “high
enough to make room for all the possibilities we really need to believe
in” (1986: 103). The break must be natural because, if it were arbitrary,
then we could always imagine a possible world in which the boundary
is moved. It is hard to see how this natural break would be defined and
Lewis does not offer an answer. The constraint on possible worlds leads
to an inevitable clash of intuitions.
The Convergence of Physical

and Mathematical Objects
I think that Lewis’ goals of unity and simplicity would be much better
served if he abandoned the concrete/abstract distinction altogether or, at
least, removed the structural distinction between concrete and abstract
possibilia (in other words, if he allowed the structure of all possible
worlds to be isomorphic to some mathematical structure and vice versa).
Of course, this is a difficult option for those who see possible worlds
as a combination of concrete parts because it means either abandoning
the higher reaches of set theory (which Lewis will not do) or finding
some physical interpretation for mathematical objects like large cardinals
(impossible for Lewis).
A similar dilemma is faced by philosophers of mathematics who favour
Aristotelian realism (see e.g. [Franklin 2014]). Aristotelian realists take
the view that the world consists of particulars and universals and that
mathematical objects are universals which are in re (i.e. in the things
themselves). In their view, mathematics studies structures which are
instantiated in real objects such as bathroom tiles (groups) and coastlines
(fractals). This leaves them with the problem of what to say about unin-
stantiated mathematical objects. In the modal version of Aristotelian real-
ism, the response is that some mathematical objects can be constructed
combinatorially from concepts sourced in the real world—they are pos-
sibilia similar to Lewis’ possible worlds. Still, the assumption is that they
could be instantiated in concrete things and this puts a constraint on what
mathematical objects are supported by this view.
Some mathematical objects don’t seem to have relevance to the physi-
cal world at all. For example, it is hard to envisage any role for the inac-
cessible numbers of set theory in any physical process. We would not
reach that sort of cardinality even in a multiverse even if an infinite num-
ber of universes had been continually generating baby universes since
past infinity. An inaccessible number is just that: it cannot be reached by
the iteration of constructive processes such as taking unions of collections
of smaller sets, or taking power sets, or taking any combination of opera-
tions available in set theory. If one imagines translating all mathematical
objects into the background language of set theory, then the subset which
is relevant to known physical processes is tiny. Feferman (2006b: 446)
has suggested that it can be described by the predicative part.14
One option is to restrict mathematics to the point where it can be
physicalised in some sense, by claiming that some part of it is inconsistent
or fictional. For example, one might hold (with Nelson [2011]) that only
the finite part of mathematics is consistent. This could be combined with
a view of the universe as a digital computer operating on a discrete system
of binary information (as held by Fredkin [1992] and Wolfram [2002]).
In this view, there would be a core part of mathematics—the finite part—
which is consistent, firmly grounded in physical intuition and real, and
physics would only be concerned with that part. Physics and mathemat-
ics would both be translatable into a language of finite information pro-
cessing. Presumably, Aristotelian realists could adopt this ultrafinitist
position and, indeed, Franklin (2014: 133) questions whether infinities
are really needed in applied mathematics. However, he seems to prefer to
adopt a version of modal realism in which some of the truths of math-
ematics refer to actual physical instantiations whilst others refer to pos-
sible instantiations, and the possible instantiations can be infinite. This
reinstates the problem of where to draw the line. Beyond the finite, there
is no principled place to draw the line between physics and mathematics.
Aristotelian realism supports an epistemology in which our knowledge of
mathematical objects is explained in terms of our knowledge of everyday
objects but it does not account for our knowledge of infinity.
Hartry Field is a philosopher who abolishes the distinction between
concrete and abstract objects by denying the existence of abstract enti-
ties. He champions the view that mathematics is fictional and of only
instrumental use in physical theories. As a test case, Field (1980) tries
to identify the ‘physical’ part of Newtonian gravitational theory (i.e. the
part which has empirical support and/or corresponds to physical struc-
ture) and separate it from the ‘surplus’ part (i.e. the part which provides
logical and instrumental support). He develops a nominalised version
of the theory which refers only to space-time points and regions, not to
14
According to predicativists, the natural numbers form a definite totality but the collection of all
sets of natural numbers (i.e. the power set) does not.
abstract mathematical objects. He defines bridge laws which map state-

ments from the nominalised theory to its mathematical counterpart (and
vice versa). According to Field, the advantage of using the mathematical
theory is that it allows us to use all the deductive power of mathematics
to demonstrate consequences which might have been obscure or difficult
to prove in the nominalised theory. The mathematics doesn’t lead to any
new assertions about the physical world—all the physical consequences
of the theory can be derived from the underlying nominalised theory.
However, in order for the nominalised theory to retain the full power
of the mathematical theory, Field is forced to build almost all the struc-
ture and complexity of the real number system into space-time itself.
Effectively, he adds pseudo-mathematical structure to the nominalised
theory until it converges towards the structure of the mathematical
theory. Thus, his attempt to nominalise Newtonian gravitational theory
leads to a counter-productive blurring of the concrete/abstract boundary.
I argue that the concrete/abstract boundary should be abolished by
embracing all objects as abstract objects. What exists are minds (abstract
individuals) and thoughts (abstract classes15). In this view, physical objects
are a subset of mathematical objects but are not essentially different. Both
physical and mathematical objects are the objects of intention of some
mind (i.e. they are thoughts). The structure of the world instantiates all
of mathematics, all possible forms, and physical reality condenses out
by a process of self-actualisation in thought. I assume that the world is
fully rational and that there are minds which are able to understand, test
and validate their theories about its structure at all levels. Thus, any set is
oversee-able by some mind. Gödel’s incompleteness theorems show that
every level of the set-theoretical hierarchy contains true statements which
can only be proved using the resources of higher levels. The hierarchy
of effective field theories in physics is similarly incomplete. A coherent
and fully rational theory of physics and mathematics together requires a
mind which embraces all of mathematics but transcends it. That Mind is
the encompassing mind which is the mereological sum of all individual
minds and their thoughts. It is a proper class.
15
Not all classes are objects, some are proper classes.
Comments on Lewis’ Parts of Classes

In Lewis’ metaphysical framework, reality divides exhaustively into indi-
viduals and classes (1991: 7). An individual is anything that has no mem-
bers but is a member of some class. A class is either a set or a proper class.
A singleton is a class that has no parts except itself—it is a mereological
atom. Every individual has a singleton and so does every set. The only
things that lack singletons are the proper classes. A class is any mereologi-
cal sum of singletons. A proper class does not have a singleton but it is the
mereological sum of singletons.
The notion of a singleton is a primitive. Lewis finds it mysterious
(1991: 29–35). Singletons have only a single member so they do not
fall under the usual description of a set as being a collection of many
into one. He says: “Our utter ignorance about the nature of the single-
tons amounts to utter ignorance about the nature of classes generally”
(1991: 31). I say that a singleton is a thought: it is the result of a mind
taking some individual as an object of intention. Classes are not in space-
time and they are not located where their members are, but they are not
nowhere, rather, they are associated with minds.
According to Lewis, any class includes the null set, but the null set is
not a subclass or a part (1991: 10–11). Classes do not have the null set as
part because the null set is not a class, it is an individual. Any individual
will do for the null set. Lewis redefines the null set as the mereological
sum of all individuals (1991: 14). It is everywhere rather than nowhere.
This fits well with my framework. The null set is the mereological sum
of all monads and so is the encompassing mind bare of its thoughts. It is
the One which is transcendentally present in all beings and is their source
(Sect. 5.4: 159).
Paradoxes of Plenitude
What about Forrest and Armstrong’s paradox which arises when we allow
unrestricted plenitude for possible worlds? Their argument does not get
off the ground in my framework because it assumes that there is a big
world which contains all the possible worlds as parts. In my framework,
there is no world of all worlds, just as there is no set of all sets, because
each individual monad is a possible world and the class of monads is a
proper class.
Lewis (1986: 104–108) considers a second paradox of plenitude con-
cerning the set of worlds that characterises the content of somebody’s
thought.16 There is no natural bound on the cardinality of the set of
somebody’s thoughts and the argument uses this fact to construct a pos-
sible world whose cardinality exceeds the cardinality of the set of all pos-
sible worlds. As before, this argument fails in my framework because
there is no set of all possible worlds. However, some interesting points
arise in Lewis’ discussion. For example, Lewis claims that:
Not just any set of worlds is a set that might possibly give the content of
someone’s thought. Most sets of world, in fact all but an infinitesimal
minority of them, are not eligible contents of thought. (1986: 105)
I do not agree with this. Any set defines a possible thought although not
all possible thoughts define a set. Lewis is committed to the view that
there are unthinkable contents. I hold that all content is thinkable by
some mind. Lewis’ discussion of unthinkable content seems only to show
that there is content which it is perverse for a mind to think about its
world, given its beliefs and desires. He does not show that such content
is unthinkable. I can think “I want a saucer of mud” even if I cannot
put myself into a state in which I would want to turn that thought into
action. Another mind in another possible world might actually want a
saucer of mud!
Actuality
Lewis’ indexical analysis of actuality enables him to dodge some potential
problems of plenitude, including ethical problems. According to Lewis:
16
Here, “somebody” is not considered to have human limitations (e.g. it might refer to a god) and
so it should be read as “some mind”, maybe an infinite mind.
every world is actual at itself, and thereby all worlds are on a par. This is not
to say that all worlds are actual—there’s no world at which that is true.
(1986: 93)
For us, our world is actual and other possible worlds are not actual.
Therefore, we should concern ourselves with evils in this world, even
if there would be the same sum total of good and evil throughout the
worlds no matter what we do in this one (1986: 123–128). Reasonably,
it is the good and evil in our actual world which we care about. My
framework also denies that other worlds are actual, so I can refer to Lewis’
arguments in defence of these problems.
However, my analysis of actuality differs significantly from Lewis’. In
quantum monadology, the actual world is the one and only, necessary, best
possible world. In Lewis’ modal realism, actuality is a contingent matter—
it is not the case that one world alone is absolutely actual. First, Lewis asks
how we would know that we are absolutely actual. Then, he writes:
And yet we do know for certain that the world we are part of is the actual
world—just as certainly as we know that the world we are part of is the very
world we are part of. (1986: 93)
I take this knowledge that each of us has—of our own existence and
actuality—as the most certain knowledge which we can have. It poses
a problem for monadology in that it is not clear how an actual monad
can know that it is actual rather than merely possible. One response is to
say that it is a special property which actual monads have—to be imme-
diately acquainted with their own actuality—but this is not satisfactory
as an explanation. Another response is to invoke the concrete/abstract
divide—the actual world is concrete and possible worlds are abstract—
but this distinction is not available in the idealistic interpretation of mon-
adology which I have adopted.
I propose to make a distinction between actual and possible monads in
terms of consciousness—actual monads are conscious whereas potential
monads are like philosophical zombies. Consciousness is a property of
actual monads because they follow the critical path from beginning to
end and complete the neural circuit in which meaning is communicated
to each individual mind by the encompassing mind.
The Construction of Possible Worlds

Lewis’ view of the construction of possible worlds is a static, mereologi-
cal view involving the combination of parts into wholes. I don’t find this
way of constructing possible worlds satisfactory. It misses the dynamic,
process component of the construction of possible worlds which imposes
a hierarchy of priority on thoughts; the ordinal hierarchy as opposed to
the cardinal hierarchy which Lewis draws from in his imaginative experi-
ments. Spatiotemporal relations are not what makes a possible world
cohere. It is the laws which enable monads to have harmonious relations.
Possible worlds have to be built up coherently according to local laws.
Lewis seems to think that possible worlds help us to say what it means
for a false theory of nature to be close to the truth: “A theory is close to
the truth to the extent that our world resembles some world where that
theory is exactly true” (1986: 24). This doesn’t seem right. Our world
obeys a hierarchy of laws at different scales which result in harmony. A
world in which, for example, Newton’s laws were exactly true would not
be like our world at all. For one thing, quantum mechanics is responsible
for the stability of fundamental matter in our world. Lewis’ worlds seem
to be more like the dreams (imaginings) of monads at a particular scale,
more wish than possible fact, not taking total harmony into account. As
he says:
imaginability is a poor criteria of possibility. We can imagine the impossi-

ble, provided we do not imagine it in perfect detail and all at once. We
cannot imagine the possible in perfect detail and all at once, not if it is at
all complicated. (1986: 90)
I can imagine a hundred-foot elephant walking around the earth but I

know that it is not possible according to our physical laws and I doubt
whether it is possible at all. It is not enough for possible worlds to be
imaginable, they have to be actualisable.
I think that to properly define the construction of possible worlds,
it will be necessary to go beyond the mereological approach of Parts of
Classes to embed mathematics as a bare structure in a bigger theory of
concepts which has static (cardinal, to do with size) and dynamic (ordi-
nal, to do with priority) components.
References
Feferman, S. 2006b. The Impact of the Incompleteness Theorems on
Mathematics. Notices American Mathematical Society 53: 434–449.
Field, H. 1980. Science without Numbers: A Defense of Nominalism.
Oxford: Blackwell.
Franklin, J. 2014. An Aristotelian Realist Philosophy of Mathematics.
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Fredkin, E. 1992. Finite Nature. Proceedings of the XXVIIth Rencontre
de Moriond, Les Arcs, Savoie, France, March 22–28.
Forrest, P., and D. Armstrong. 1984. An Argument against David
Lewis’ Theory of Possible Worlds. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62:
164–168.
Lewis, D. 1986. On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
———. 1991. Parts of Classes. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Nelson, E. 2011. Warning Signs of a Possible Collapse of Contemporary
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Index1
A a priori, 12, 49, 72, 79, 80, 80n4,

abstract objects, 39, 300, 353, 354 109, 111, 112, 142, 207,
action, 74, 150, 228, 237, 239, 262, 209, 210, 216, 235,
325, 356 310, 324
actualisation, 41, 57, 196, 270 Aristotelian realism, 352, 353
actuality, 2, 183, 220, 223–96, 305, asymptotic freedom, 19, 86, 95–7,
306, 310, 313, 325, 356–7 116. See also quantum
aesthetics. See beauty chromodynamics
analogy axioms. See also set theory; large
formal, 56, 104 cardinals
mathematical, 11, 31, 52, 54, 56, Axiom of Choice, 133, 135–8,
60, 93, 104, 114, 116, 117, 152, 158, 168, 216, 296,
120, 130 332, 335, 345, 346
physical, 92, 286n17 Axiom of Constructibility (V=L),
Pythagorean, 92, 104 138, 157, 159, 218, 337
apperception, 240 Axiom of Determinacy, 158,
applicability of mathematics, 3–63 163n28, 335
Note: Page number followed by ‘n’ refers to notes

1

DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-40976-4
384 Index
axioms. See also set theory; large cardinal number, 113, 132, 133,
cardinals (cont.) 135, 218, 315, 315n1,
Axiom of Infinity, 134, 134n4, 317, 332
152, 154, 156, 157 Carnap, Rudolf, 9, 273
Axiom of Replacement, 152, 154 causality, 239, 255, 269
desirable characteristics, 127, 153 cellular automata, 35–7, 57. See also
Empty Set Axiom, 151, 152 Wolfram, Stephen
extrinsic vs. intrinsic, 127, 169 chance, 26, 33, 100, 277, 310, 323
large cardinal axioms, 127, CHQT. See consistent histories
151n15, 153–62, 164–72, quantum mechanics
333–9, 344–7 (CHQT)
power set axiom, 152, 210 coarse-graining, 41, 179, 246,
set theoretical, 46, 126, 128, 247n8, 255–8, 269, 272,
131–3, 161, 251 287
Azzouni, Jody, 13, 31n4, 52 Cohen, Paul, 139, 140, 158, 193,
331–3, 335. See also forcing,
technique of
B coherence, 180, 227, 238, 239, 285
Balaguer, Mark, 10n2, 146–9 collapse of wave function, 197, 201,
Bangu, Sorin, 16, 18, 22–6, 29, 39, 257, 259, 283
42, 48 common sense, 234, 235, 248,
Barrow, John, 34, 35, 36n7, 50, 54, 293, 308
59n13, 101 complementarity, 251, 252, 258
beauty, 7, 16–23, 29, 38, 39, 42, 48, completeness, 136, 137n8, 162, 164,
54, 60, 99, 105, 115, 129, 337–9, 342
301, 308, 329 complexity, 31, 35–6, 39, 50, 58,
being, 193. See also Heraclitus; 73, 120, 197, 199, 210,
Parmenides; Plato; Hegel 288, 292, 302, 312, 354
absolute structure of, 193 compossibility, 231, 290
Benioff, Paul, 292, 293 concept
Berkeley, George, 184, 192, 192n4 abstract, 324
biology, 17, 36, 50, 102, 119, complete, 232
264–6, 274 concrete/abstract boundary, 354
broken symmetry, 103 conditional probability, 251, 254,
256, 267, 276
consciousness, 184, 188, 198,
C 228, 240, 242, 247,
Cantor, Georg, 30, 128, 131–5, 135n5, 256, 278, 280, 281,
137, 142, 168, 203, 204, 264, 287, 291, 294, 309,
308, 309, 332, 334, 350 328, 357
Index
385
consistency differentiation, 197, 263, 289–91, 294

in mathematics, 120, 146–8, Dirac, Paul, 16–18, 20–3, 31, 33,
147n13 42, 48, 55, 71, 113
in physics, 88 discovery, 15, 19, 41, 50, 54, 55, 61,
in quantum mechanics, 241, 242 70, 71, 81, 88, 94, 117,
consistent histories quantum 142, 166, 225, 235, 312
mechanics (CHQT), dualism, 184, 192, 310
223–5, 243–4, 246–61, Dyson, Freeman, 22, 24, 33
266–73, 275–8, 281–4,
288, 295, 305
constructivism, 317 E
contingent, 12, 33, 38, 72, 73, 101, Eddington, Arthur, 25, 80n4, 80,
120, 147, 232, 255, 268, 82, 84
278, 357 effective completeness, 162, 337–9
continuum hypothesis, the, 128, effective field theory, 25, 73, 112–14,
132, 134, 137, 139, 141, 268, 302
144, 153–6, 155n20, 158, eigenstate, 241
159, 162, 163, 163n28, Einstein, Albert, 16, 17, 19, 24, 25,
164, 165, 171, 174, 179, 31, 33, 40, 57, 78–82,
303, 331–5, 337–43 107n15, 115
correlation, 186, 197, 199, 239, 244, electrodynamics, 11, 76
245, 255, 266, 277, 279, 285 electromagnetism, 28, 53, 75, 76,
cosmology, 73, 101s, 119s, 181, 197, 79, 81, 85, 116, 196
201, 224, 242, 246, 257, 302 electroweak theory
development, 23
SU(2), 116
D elementary embeddings, 157, 333–4,
decoherence, 239, 244, 248, 249, 345
255, 257, 259, 269, 271, elementary particles
277, 278, 285, 288, 289 bosons, 18, 80n5, 85, 86, 100
decoherent histories, 244–6, 278. See fermions, 100, 186
also consistent histories gluons, 19, 24, 56, 69, 77, 86,
quantum mechanics 92, 96, 97, 103, 113,
(CHQT) 117, 188
degree of reality, 232, 268 Higgs boson, 86
Descartes, René, 184, 192 omega minus, 56, 117, 264
determinacy, 158, 159, 183, 220, quarks, 19, 24, 55, 56, 63, 69, 82,
334–7 86, 91–7, 103, 113, 117,
projective, 154 118, 186, 187
determinism, 224, 242, 245, 255, 257 W and Z bosons, 18, 80n5, 86
386 Index
emergence, 40, 41, 200, 244–7, 253, formalism, 1, 8, 22, 23, 53, 115,
255, 257, 284 174, 225, 260, 278,
classical from quantum, 116, 220, 281n16, 282, 305, 316, 343
223, 305 framework
empty set, the, 130, 132, 134, 138, coarse-grained, 40, 246, 247,
151, 152, 182, 191, 195, 254, 274
203–6, 313, 332 conceptual, 271–4, 282, 287,
epistemology, 182, 202–3, 233, 353 288, 294, 319
essence, 42, 59, 63, 111, 290, 328 fine-grained, 256
existence, 2, 6, 9, 16, 19, 22, 34, 37, incompatible, 251, 256–8,
44, 45, 50, 58–60, 63, 74, 258n13, 270, 273, 276, 285
77, 78, 92, 96n11, 117, linguistic, 274
125, 127, 129, 133, 137, metaphysical, 2, 63, 129, 183,
140, 142, 148, 149, 151, 184, 195–203, 219, 225,
155–7, 163–74, 179, 182, 284, 291, 300, 303, 354
184, 186–97, 204, 205, narrative, 272, 277
211, 216, 226, 227, 230–2, quantum, 273
245, 258, 264–6, 270, freedom, 19, 49, 86, 91, 95–7, 116,
287–290, 292, 299, 301, 260, 287n18, 318, 325
303, 317, 322, 324, 325, Frege, Gottlob, 8, 43–46, 61,
329, 331, 333, 341–347 118n21, 132, 143, 315
expression, 195, 201, 226–9, 235, French, Steven, 88, 88n8, 92–3, 105,
238, 238n2, 273, 311, 318, 115, 189
324, 328 Friedman, Harvey, 130n1, 137,
137n7, 150, 168, 170
F
Feferman, Solomon, 150, 167, 170, G
170n30, 171, 353 gauge theories, 57, 59n13, 70, 76,
Feynman, Richard, 23, 243, 271 80, 84, 87, 96, 116, 117.
fibre bundles, 81, 99 See also group theory
fictionalism, 1, 9, 127, 149 Yang–Mills, 18, 19, 80n5, 81, 85,
Field, Hartry, 237. See also fictionalism 86, 94
fine structure methods, 160, 161, Gell-Mann, Murray, 16, 89–95, 105,
164, 167, 345, 346. See also 117, 220, 243, 243n5,
set theory 244–8, 253–7, 259, 264,
finitism, 152, 152n16, 309, 310 269, 272–3, 305. See also
first philosophy, 180, 307 consistent histories quantum
forcing, the technique of, 138, 139, mechanics (CHQT)
160, 162, 331–2 generic extension, 162, 163, 342
Index
387
generic multiverse, 164, 342–6 Hartle, James, 32, 220, 223, 243n5,
geometrisation of physics, 82, 112 244–7, 248–54, 255, 269,
God 271–80, 305. See also
act of creation, 230, 231 consistent histories
charateristics of, 74, 184, 203–4, quantum mechanics
229–33, 262, 264–71, (CHQT)
324–6, 328 Hegel, Georg, 183, 194, 208, 328
source of truth, 233, 265 Heisenberg, Werner, 16, 56, 90, 99,
Gödel, Kurt 104n14, 105
Axiom of Constructibility (V=L), Heraclitus, 193–4
138, 157, 159, 218, 337 Higgs mechanism, 19, 86, 90, 102,
extrinsic vs. intrinsic axioms, 127, 103, 116
141, 169 Hilbert space, 10, 12, 241, 246–51,
incompleteness theorems, 2, 160, 253, 256, 259, 267, 271–3,
166, 251, 292, 354 278, 284
maximise principle, 154
Grattan-Guinness, Ivor, 13, 31n4,
50, 52 I
Griffiths, Robert, 220, 223, 243, idealisation, 21, 37, 51, 61, 89, 93,
244, 247, 249, 252, 255, 104, 107, 120, 232, 236
257–9, 269, 273. See also idealism, 184, 227, 265, 300, 307–9,
consistent histories 328. See also Berkeley
quantum mechanics mathematical, 307–9
(CHQT) imagination, 22, 51, 233, 234, 237
Gross, David, 3, 16, 57, 77, 323 implicational opacity, 13, 52
group theory. See also symmetry incompleteness theorems. See set
SU(2), 27, 90–4, 104, 105, 196 theory
SU(3), 19, 27, 69, 71, 81, 86–94, independence results. See Cohen;
104, 105, 196, 264 Gödel
U(1), 27, 76, 81, 89, 90, 196 individual, 4, 17, 26, 29, 30, 79, 90,
93, 94, 96, 102, 104, 152,
153, 155, 191, 204, 214,
H 220, 226, 227, 232, 233,
Hamkins, Joel, 140–45, 149, 162, 237, 238, 244, 261, 264,
173 268, 270, 276, 278, 281,
harmony, 37, 42, 47, 79, 119, 185, 282, 293, 294, 304, 307,
227, 229, 231, 237, 239, 309, 311, 314, 316–20,
268, 284, 290, 307, 321, 326, 328, 350, 351,
317–20, 358 354–7
388 Index
infinity inaccessible cardinal, 154, 156, 170

absolute, 203, 264, 282, 293 Mahlo cardinal, 154, 155n18, 156
actual, 236, 264 measurable cardinal, 157, 160,
potential, 87, 121, 152, 154, 293 164, 218, 220, 333
information gathering and utilising supercompact cardinal, 160n26,
systems (IGUS), 245, 254, 164, 165, 344, 346
256, 269, 276–81, 250 Woodin cardinal, 160–4, 166,
innate, 73, 110, 111, 113, 236, 302 213, 335–45
inner model, 138, 144, 157, 159, 160, laws of nature, 6, 10, 11, 15, 33–5,
164–8, 333, 336, 342, 346 37, 39, 54, 58–60, 63, 112,
interpretability, 166 114, 118, 170, 197, 232,
interpretant, 316, 325, 326 239, 262, 268, 285, 301,
isospin, 56, 90, 91, 93, 103, 105 319, 322
Leibniz, Gottfried. See monadology
metaphysics, 238n2
J two kingdoms, 281, 305
Jensen, Ronald, 159, 341. See also universal language, 264
fine structure methods Lewis, David, 309, 349–52,
Johnston, Mark, 327 355–8
local vs. global view, 284–5
logic. See logicism; omega logic
K first-order, 137n8, 140, 143, 162,
Kaluza-Klein theory. See unified field 172, 174, 213, 338
theory in quantum mechanics, 225
Kanamori, Akihiro, 139, 155n18, second-order, 45, 143, 162n27,
160n26, 205, 333 172, 212, 339n9
Kant, Immanuel, 49, 50, 142, 180, strength, 212
183, 184, 207, 317 logicism, 1, 45, 316
Koellner, Peter, 134, 145, 147, 151, Longo, Giuseppe, 49
153–163, 212, 218, 333,
335, 334n5, 336–42
M
Maddy, Penelope, 135, 136, 141,
L 142, 149, 151, 152, 154,
language of thought, the, 60, 264, 157, 163
275, 310 Magidor, Menachem, 143, 149n14,
large cardinals. See axioms 153, 154, 157
axioms, 127, 151, 153–162, Martin, Donald, 143, 144, 159, 163,
164–172, 333–7, 339, 344–7 167, 342
Index
389
mathematical intuition, 5, 16, 24, monadology

29–33, 168, 169, 208 Leibnizian, 2, 287, 324
mathematical universe hypothesis, quantum, 2, 225, 282–96
59, 187 monads. See monadology
matter, 2, 15, 29, 38, 45, 52, 57, aggregations, 236
59n13, 61, 77, 80, 96, 98, complete individual concept
99, 102, 103, 114, 119, (CIC), 226, 314
139, 142, 148–50, 162, dominant, 265, 290
163, 184–6, 188, 192, 200, entelechies, 185
203, 227, 263, 279, 293, properties, 229, 266
307–10, 318, 319, 324, monist, 184
325, 329, 342, 357 multiverse
Maxwell, James Clerk, 28, 53, mathematical, 2, 71, 140–51, 182
75, 214 physical, 2, 73
McAllister, James, 24, 38
meaning, 9, 60, 104, 135, 182–4,
187, 193, 198–200, 208, N
212, 214, 215, 220, 228, naturalism, 180, 211
234, 254, 271, 275, 277, necessary, 17, 38, 40, 73, 84, 93, 95,
283–7, 292, 294, 295, 300, 101, 120, 126, 139n10, 142,
306, 309, 314, 316–9, 320, 147, 159, 181, 182, 192,
324–6, 329, 357 194, 206, 233, 242, 253,
measurement, 80n4, 186, 241, 248, 257, 278, 293, 304, 306,
252, 256–8, 277 319, 336, 337, 357, 358
mereology, 349, 350 Newtonian dynamics, 243, 245
metaphysical framework, 2, 63, 128, Newton, Isaac, 11, 24, 25, 28, 57,
182, 184, 195–203, 219, 71, 82, 101, 108, 112, 215,
225, 284, 291, 300, 304, 224, 243, 245, 263, 269,
355 274, 292, 353, 358
metaphysics
principles, 23, 72, 110–19, 180,
182, 192, 237 O
Pythagorean, 2, 6, 15, 22, 25, 28, objectivity, 78, 171, 321
38–43, 56, 59, 115, 301 observable, 97, 98, 105, 241–3
mind, 1–2, 16, 47, 73, 118, 171, observer, 74, 186, 196, 240, 242, 243,
182, 223, 354 260, 277, 278, 280, 285
model theory, 160, 166, 190, 211, omega conjecture, 162, 163n28,
215, 217, 346 164, 165, 198n5, 339, 340,
modes of presentation, 312, 316, 327 340n10, 340–4, 346
390 Index
omega logic, 162, 162n27, 172, 173, phenomena, 3, 20, 21, 26, 33, 36,
213, 217, 338, 339n9, 339, 37, 49, 53, 54, 58, 59, 62,
340, 343 81, 98, 101, 108, 113,
Omnès, Roland, 220, 239, 243, 117n20, 136–40, 203, 224,
243n5, 246, 249, 256n12, 227, 231, 232, 236–40,
259, 293, 296, 305. See also 242, 259–61, 264, 270,
consistent histories quantum 281, 287–9, 293
mechanics (CHQT) phenomenology, 8, 72, 78, 102, 115,
One and the Many, the, 72, 109, 194, 202, 203, 208, 225,
110, 182, 193, 195, 201, 282, 288, 314, 321
223, 226, 238n2, 286, 302 Planck, Max, 14, 40, 53n13, 82, 98,
One, the, 286, 289, 302, 316, 320, 108, 113, 120, 187, 215,
328, 355, 357 247, 260, 271
ontological relativity, 127 Plato, 25, 183, 193, 219.
ontology, 139, 173, 182, 187, 189, See also Platonism
208, 211, 214, 249, 257, Timaeus, 73, 118, 219, 285, 302
260, 274 platonic divide, 300, 308
optimisation, 197, 198n5, 262, 290–5 Platonism, 1, 8, 146, 211, 316
ordinal number, 131, 133, 138 full-blooded (FBP), 146
outer model, 138, 331 plenitude
principle of, 264, 350
problems with, 349–58
P Plotinus, 205
paradoxes, 121, 126. See also set pluralism, 8, 126, 140–9, 163.
theory See also set theory
set theoretical, 131–3 radical, 145–9
Parmenides, 110, 193, 194, 302 point of view, 70, 78, 190, 195, 229,
parts and wholes, 349 267, 268, 270, 273, 282,
Peano arithmetic, 45 306, 317
Peirce, Charles, 318, 322, 325, 326 possibility, 80n4, 117, 127, 128,
perception 130, 137, 140, 146, 156,
clear and distinct, 233, 319 163, 166, 169, 201, 225,
confused, 228, 235 228, 236, 269–70, 278,
perfection 281, 284, 290, 292, 300,
maximisation, 287 304, 305, 316, 317, 321,
principle of, 231, 232, 239, 261, 325, 339–41, 358
264 possible actual, 225, 270–4, 277,
phaneron, 325, 327 282–7, 295, 305
Index
391
possible worlds Q
best possible world, 231, 268, 284, QCD. See quantum
291, 294, 306, 320, 357 chromodynamics (QCD)
Leibnizian, 2, 220, 223, 225, 260, quantum chromodynamics (QCD),
287, 305, 324 25, 69–71, 86–88, 91,
Lewisian, 350 95–8, 107, 112, 116
potentiality, 2, 183, 220, 223–296 asymptotic freedom, 19, 86,
power set, 132–35, 138, 152, 154–8, 95–7, 116
158n23, 170n31, 171, 210, development of, 301
300, 332, 334n4, 352, QCD Lite, 96–8, 107
353n14 SU(3), 19, 27, 69, 88–91
prediction, 3, 6, 11, 19, 26, 27, quantum field theory, 12, 20, 25,
34–6, 47, 48, 50, 55, 56, 53, 54, 58n12, 59n13,
61, 104, 105, 107, 108, 86, 87, 95, 186, 263.
166–7, 209, 244, 254, 274, See also quantum
291, 293, 311, 319, 345 chromodynamics;
Principle of Sufficient Reason, 74 electroweak theory
problem of evil, the, 198n5 relativistic, 86, 87
projection, 71, 267, 282, 286, 289, quantum mechanics. See also
314, 318, 319, 321 consistent histories
properties quantum mechanics
compossible, 231, 269, (CHQT)
287, 290 Copenhagen interpretation,
incompatible, 231, 270, 241, 242
273, 285 quantum/classical divide,
Putnam, Hilary, 213–16, 276 241, 242
Pythagoras, 129 standard interpretation, 110, 130,
Pythagorean 146, 217, 240–3
analogy, 92 quasiclassical
heuristic, 16, 21–3, 28, 41, 53, framework, 247, 272, 275, 278,
56, 115 280, 285
metaphysics, 2, 6, 16, 23, 26, 28, realm, 245, 246, 253, 257, 274,
38–42, 56, 59, 115, 301 277, 279, 281
theory, 39, 70, 72, 94, 106–13 variable, 245, 246, 254, 255, 257,
Pythagoreanism 259, 278
Ancient, 72 Quine, Van, 32, 111n17, 127, 172,
in mathematics, 2 180, 214, 215, 317
in physics, 306 Naturalism, 180, 211
392 Index
R Schwartz, Jack, 3, 29, 30

randomness, 242, 295 set theory. See also determinacy;
stochastic process, 241, 251, 270, fine-structure methods;
284, 319 forcing, technique of
rationalism, 16, 106, 111, 170, 173, independence results; inner
183, 193, 195, 196, 202, 216 model; large cardinals;
realism reflection principles; ZFC
mathematical, 169, 173, 211, 281 descriptive, 158, 159, 334, 337,
robust, 143 340, 343
structural, 72, 83–4, 107, 188 development of, 126, 129–40
thin, 146, 149 foundational role, 149–51
record, 22, 100, 242, 256, 275, 276, interpretability, 166
279, 282–6, 288, 306, 314, maximise principle, 155
321, 323 modern, 111, 133–6
reductionism, 5, 24, 284 paradoxes, 131–3
reflection principles, 156–8, 182, pluralist, 126–8, 139, 144, 145,
200–2, 344 151, 162–4, 173, 179, 219,
relational strategy, the, 70, 80–3, 111 303, 342–4
relativity universalist, 126–128, 139, 140,
general theory of relativity, 70, 76 151, 163, 173–4, 179, 219,
special theory of relativity, 75 303, 342, 344–7
renormalisation, 17, 25, 27, 32, Shapiro, Stewart, 8, 43n8, 45, 181,
58n12, 87, 98 189–91, 210, 212n8
representation, 14, 25, 27, 55, 57, Shelah, Saharon, 159, 166, 337, 341
62, 63, 77, 79, 89, 91, 99, signs, 12, 24, 38, 60–1, 179, 229,
111, 191, 224, 229, 263, 264, 300, 316, 325, 326
284, 310, 311, 313, 327 simplicity, 6, 16, 17, 29, 33–8, 42,
Resnik, Michael, 62n15, 188, 102, 116, 205, 231, 232,
191, 208 262, 283, 301, 306, 352
Russell, Bertrand, 45, 73, 110, single framework rule, the, 252–3,
133–4, 205, 292, 302 258
Ryckman, Thomas, 57, 77–80, 84, singularity, 119, 121, 197
107n16 Smolin, Lee, 74, 78, 82, 83, 102, 113
solipsism, 228, 279, 280
spacetime, 82, 271, 309, 350
S spontaneous symmetry breaking,
scaling, 40, 95, 96, 189, 302 27, 39, 71, 80n5, 102,
Schrödinger’s equation, 241, 269 196, 268
Index
393
standard model, the symmetry. See also group theory

cosmology, 73, 101, 181, 197, 201 dynamic, 186, 195–8, 311
particle physics, 14, 18, 27, 29, geometrical, 75, 93
32, 54, 57, 59n13, 76, 80, global, 70, 73–77, 103, 116
104, 107, 196 Leibniz’s use of, 264, 269
state Local, 57, 59, 70, 73–77, 81, 288
monadic, 296 Lorentz, 70, 75, 76, 87
physical, 241, 277, 278, 309 Poincaré, 79, 103, 283
quantum, 89, 93, 186, 242, 244, principles, 26, 38, 40, 69–71,
253, 285 75–7, 79, 84, 88, 98–106,
static vs. dynamic view, 194, 311, 311
314
Steel, John, 151, 160, 161, 172
Steiner, Mark, 4, 43, 46, 47, 50, 56, T
60, 72, 88, 92, 94, Tarski, Alfred. See mathematical
104–106, 115 universe hypothesis
stochastic process, 241, 251, 270, Tegmark, Mark, 2, 59, 101, 187,
284 188, 194, 291, 304, 306
string theory. See also Theory of Theory of Everything, 5, 114, 268,
Everything 292, 301
problems, 14, 18, 27, 29, 71, 77 truth
unified field theory, 77, 79, 81 dynamic, 322
structuralism in a framework, 322
ante rem, 189 of set theory, 127, 166–8, 344
conceptual, 171 ultimate, 20, 41, 322
in mathematics, 189–91
ontic, 72, 83, 84, 107, 187–9, 192
in physics, 185–9 U
subjective, 10, 16, 26, 147, 184, Ultimate L, the theory of, 164–6
188, 197, 209, 210, 272, ultimate reality, 118, 224, 257,
278, 280–2, 286, 288, 291, 274, 300
294, 310, 313 unification, 19, 100, 102, 284
substance, 13, 184, 185, 185n1, unified field theory, 77, 79, 81
192–5, 226, 227, 237, Kaluza-Klein, 81, 85
261, 265, 290, 310 uniqueness
superposition, 241–4, 247n8, in mathematics, 200, 219, 292
248, 260, 270, 283, in physics, 6, 209
285, 296, 306 unicity, 258
394 Index
unity, 112, 185, 197, 198, 204, 206, Weyl, Hermann. See also gauge
209, 238, 239, 256, 265, theory
266, 281, 286, 295, 349–51 world geometry, 77–80
universalism, 140–1. See also set Wheeler, John, 268, 309, 311
theory Wigner, Eugene
universal science, 230, 230n1 contributions to quantum
universe of sets, the, 127, 134, 138, mechanics, 113
144, 154, 156, 163, 166, philosophy of mathematics,
168, 169, 195, 200–2, 2, 4, 7–10, 48
203–6, 210, 211n7, 213, unreasonable effectiveness
214, 219, 220, 240, 293, of mathematics, 1–4, 7–16
313, 315, 338, 341, 344 Wilczek, Frank, 16, 19, 31n4, 40,
unreasonable effectiveness of 41, 50, 54, 69, 86, 95,
mathematics, 1–5, 7–16. 97n12, 108, 109, 263,
See also Wigner 306, 323
Wilson, Mark, 32, 107
Witten, Edward, 14, 15, 30, 99
V Wolfram, Stephen, 35, 36, 353
V. See universe of sets, the Woodin, Hugh. See omega logic;
Von Neumann, John, 12–14, 195, Ultimate L; Woodin
214, 241, 242 cardinal
W Y
wave function, 32, 76, 197, 200, Yang-Mills theory. See gauge theory
241, 248, 257, 259, 283,
284
Weinberg, Steven, 16, 20, 22, 25, Z
32, 36, 37, 77, 86 Zermelo-Fraenkel (ZFC), 133–40,
well-founded 150–61, 163–6, 170, 180,
phenomena, 231, 232, 244 213, 218, 331, 333–6,
sets, 135n6 339–46

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© The Author(s) 2017 331

we do not wish U to contain “special” information about M, which can

Generating Large Cardinal Axioms Using

A cardinal κ is an ω-huge cardinal if there exists λ > κ and an elementary

Large Cardinal Axioms and Deﬁnable

for other regularity and structural properties of interest.6 Beyond this,

Theorem A.1.3.2. (Woodin) Assume ZFC + “there exist ω-many Woodin

Theorem A.1.3.3. (Woodin) Assume ADL(R). Then there is an inner

Theorem A.1.3.4. (Woodin) Assume ZFC + “there is a proper class of

Many more such linked theorems are discussed by Koellner (2011b:

1. The regularity properties of structure theory are desirable properties

6. Definable determinacy and large cardinal axioms are at root equivalent:

Deﬁning Effective Completeness

Firstly, there is the notion of the Levy hierarchy of formulas. A formula

logic.9 It has a notion of consequence, denoted ╞Ω, which is robust to

The Ω conjecture says that Ω-logic is both sound and complete.

A theory T is said to be Ω-complete for a collection of sentences Γ if for

Exploring the Effective Completability of Set

Theorem A.1.5.1. (Woodin) Assume ZFC and that there is a proper

Because of the nature of the continuum hypothesis, we know that

turns out that simply assuming the continuum hypothesis as an addi-

Theorem A.1.5.2. (Woodin) Assume ZFC and that there is a proper

Moreover, up to Ω-equivalence, CH is the unique Σ21-statement that

Theorem A.1.5.3. (Woodin) Assume ZFC and that there is a proper

Theorem A.1.5.4. (Jensen, Shelah) ZFC + CH is not Ω-complete for

So this path is also closed.

and only if it holds in each universe of the generic multiverse. Letting

1. φ holds across the generic multiverse;

1. The set of Π2-multiverse truths cannot be recursive in the set of mul-

transfinite by reducing truth about the universe of sets to truth about a

Fending Off a Potential Threat

meaning to a conception of uncountable sets (i.e. he accepts the meaning-

loaded from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/

How Much Plenitude?

© The Author(s) 2017 349

Lewis relies on the proviso to prevent the construction of “bigger than

According to Lewis, mathematics and possible worlds give us knowledge

The Convergence of Physical

abstract mathematical objects. He defines bridge laws which map state-

Comments on Lewis’ Parts of Classes

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