The

Himalayan Face-Off
Chinese Assertion and the Indian Riposte

Shishir Gupta
 PRAISE FOR
The Himalayan Face-Off

‘“When two elephants fight or make love, it is the grass that suffers”, goes the saying. The rise of China and
the aspirations of India will have a profound impact on the world. The 21-day stand-off between the two
countries in April 2013 was the trigger for this book. The enormous research that has gone into writing this
book is truly impressive. The author’s capacity to correlate historical events and contemporary
developments is a measure of that research. A must-read for those who follow India–China relations and are
worried about the future.’

– P. Chidambaram ‘The emergence of China as an important economic player has brought about a paradigm
shift in the region. Its assertiveness is visible and at times, provocative. It has been going slow in resolving
the boundary issues with India. Its attitude on Arunachal Pradesh is indicative of its expansionist designs.
Its statements on Arunachal Pradesh, stapled visas [and] frequent incursions are a grim reminder that India
cannot lower its guard. India wants cordiality with its neighbours that can only be on basis of reciprocity.
Shishir Gupta’s book, The Himalayan Face-Off: Chinese Assertion and the Indian Riposte is based on
exhaustive research on the history of Indo–China relationship in the past 50 years. He has captured and
recollected in great detail the past history and highlighted the current challenges. The book reflects a deep
insight of a troubled relationship.’

– Arun Jaitley
 First published in 2014 by Hachette India
(Registered name: Hachette Book Publishing India Pvt. Ltd)
An Hachette UK company
www.hachetteindia.com

This ebook published in 2014

1
Copyright © 2014 Shishir Gupta

Shishir Gupta asserts the moral right to be identified as

the author of this work
Map on page 3 courtesy Shishir Gupta
Maps on pages 65, 94, 125 & 139 illustrated by KBK Infographics

All rights reserved. No part of the publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system (including but not limited to computers,
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versions) without the prior written permission of the publisher, nor be otherwise circulated in any form of binding or cover other than
that in which it is published and without a similar condition being imposed on the subsequent purchaser.

The views and opinions expressed in this book are the author’s and the facts are as reported by him. The publishers are not in any way
liable for the same.
Print edition ISBN 978-93-5009-579-9
Ebook edition ISBN 978-93-5009-606-2

Author photo by Tashi Tobgyal

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Hachette Book Publishing India Pvt. Ltd

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Typeset in Sabon Roman 10.5/13
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To Shailja Vaidya, Aditya Vikram,
Anukriti Gaura & Pug Kiki
 CONTENTS

Preface

Introduction: A Flawed Friendship

1. India and China: Adversaries Forever?

2. 1962 War and Trust Deficit

3. Chinese Military Capability and Threat to India

4. Convergence and Containment

5. Triggers on the Himalayan Belt

6. The Dalai Lama and the Tibet Question

7. India Takes up the Challenge

8. An Uncertain Future

Annexure
Bibliography
Notes
Index
 PREFACE

The face-off between troops of the Indian Army and the intruding Chinese
People’s Liberation Army (PLA), at a rivulet called Raki on the high mountain
plateau of Depsang in eastern Ladakh, on 17 April 2013 may be a minor speck
on the humungous canvas of 10,000 years of combined existence of the two
states, but contemporary history will record the 21-day stand-off as a watershed
in bilateral relations between New Delhi and Beijing. The Chinese have called
the stand-off a ‘non-event’, as the PLA was well within China’s territorial limits.
PLA troops withdrew from the stand-off on 5 May 2013, but only after
underlining the fact that the 3,488 km Line of Actual Control (LAC) between the
two neighbours would remain a source of military flashpoint.
Change was more evident on the Indian side, as for the first time since the
1962 war between the two countries, India took up the Chinese gauntlet and
openly asked Beijing to vacate the Depsang plains. While the incident revived
memories of the humiliating war among the Indian public, Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh’s government realized deception and realpolitik were
legitimate diplomatic tools while engaging with the Middle Kingdom. One gets a
glimpse of these tools in the Chinese diplomatic armoury in the correspondence
between Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and his Chinese counterpart
Zhou Enlai on the boundary dispute in the run-up to the 1962 war. A democrat
and rather woolly idealist, Nehru in a letter told Premier Zhou that China could
not walk out of historic boundary accords between Tibet and British India just
because Beijing was weak. In his 26 September 1959 letter to Zhou, Nehru
wrote: ‘All Chinese governments have respected the Indian border. The fact that
previous Chinese governments were weak is no answer.’1
This book explores the friction between a near-superpower and an aspiring
one, as the growing influence of an assertive communist China in today’s world
intersects with the interests of a democratic India. With the 1962 war as an
important context, the book uncovers the growing uneasiness in India about
Chinese moves to confine India within South Asia and push it to a lower
equilibrium by keeping it engaged with its neighbours, who are being supported
by copious aid and military hardware periodically by Beijing. Although India’s
dismissal of the Depsang incursion as ‘acne in need of ointment’2 by its young
and energetic External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid is purely optical, New
Delhi, particularly Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Defence Minister A.K.
Antony, are seriously concerned about Beijing’s moves on the global scale and
its impact on India’s national security. Far from sounding jingoistic or
advocating military steps against China, the book records the steps that India has
taken post the unveiling of the ‘Look East’ policy in 1995 by then Prime
Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao to safeguard India’s territorial limits and its
national interests.
The saving grace is that India’s China policy has gathered political consensus
across party lines, and was pursued with equal vigour by the BJP-led National
Democratic Alliance (NDA) government headed by Prime Minister Atal Behari
Vajpayee between 1999 and 2004. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s
understanding of an assertive China and its ramifications on the Asian security
calculus and the world at large are mentioned at length. It is quite evident that
while China gets insecure about unrest in Tibet and Xinjiang, its assertiveness in
East Asia and South Asia will lead to serious consequences by rearming Japan
and increasing the US’s focus on the Asia-Pacific region, while bolstering the
confidences of Vietnam and Philippines.
The book also records Chinese infrastructure development and military
capacity building in Tibet and Xinjiang, with serious strategic consequences to
India, as well as the steps New Delhi has taken since the turn of the twenty-first
century to safeguard its national security. A subtle message from Delhi post the
Depsang intrusion has been that peace on the border is central, or what Antony
called an ‘important guarantor’3, for growth in bilateral ties including trade, and
that any PLA assertiveness on the border would be equally matched by the
Indian Army. This book exposes the gross asymmetry between the huge Chinese
deployment, infrastructure development and military capabilities on the Sino–
Indian border, while also discussing lagging Indian capacities and the efforts
New Delhi is making to catch up to its neighbour. It also explores the steps
China has taken to expand its influence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean in
order to win the confidence of India’s neighbours in the Himalayan belt as well
as on the latter’s eastern, western and southern peripheries.
Viewed from the Indian perspective, the book conveys the perception of the
Indian government and the public which is yet to get over the 1962 war and
notes the continued hurdles from Beijing towards Indian aspirations – whether in
the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)’s waiver for the Indo–US nuclear deal or the
expansion of the United Nations (UN) Security Council. While taking a hard
look at the doctrines, hardware and capabilities of China’s armed forces – the
PLA, PLA Navy and PLA Air Force – the book tries to compare the two
countries’ respective forces and their future impact on national security. Keeping
the big strategic picture in mind, the book carefully builds a case for India to not
get enticed by words and public posturing of the Chinese leadership but to be
prepared for the uncompromising message sent out by the PLA on boundary
dispute resolution and Pakistan.
At the outset, I must admit that I have neither had the opportunity to visit
China nor interact with its leaders; however, this book is not about China, but its
policies and mindset towards India as perceived by the top Indian leadership,
political parties and the public. This book has all intentions of promoting Indo–
China bilateral terms on equal terms. It is based on newspaper articles,
reportage, historical interpretations, policy papers and the views of experts on
Indo–China relations.
Since the arrest of five nondescript Chinese spies in McLeodganj, near
Dharamsala in Himachal Pradesh, in 1995, I have closely observed the
fourteenth Dalai Lama Tenzin Gyatso and the Tibetan government-in-exile. I
have been fortunate to personally interact with the Dalai Lama and discuss the
Sino–Tibet relationship with him on more than two occasions. This book delves
into how the Dalai Lama and his followers could be used as a point of
confrontation by China, and how a leaderless Tibetan radical movement post the
current Dalai Lama could be a bigger headache for not only Beijing but also
New Delhi. While it examines the Tibetan struggle post the fourteenth Dalai
Lama and the various options created by Beijing for his successor, it argues that
the Tibetan independence movement will not die out. Instead, the movement will
get more inflamed and radicalized. For China, dialogue and not belittling the
Dalai Lama is the only option out, as the Tibetan movement has caught the eye
of global powers.
Perhaps for the first time ever, the book records in great detail Indian
infrastructure development, including border road development as well as
accretion of Indian military capabilities vis-à-vis Chinese forces. In order to have
a first-hand experience of the Indian response and its gaps, I travelled to Ladakh,
Sikkim, Arunachal Pradesh and to the Arabian Sea in the past decade to assess
military and naval capabilities. While India’s border infrastructure development
does not have any territorial designs nor is it built with the intention of seizing
disputed territory by force, the political leadership at the same time has no
intention of sweeping incidents under the carpet as in the run-up to the 1962 war,
as Nehru admits in his letters. In fact, the current Indian leadership is in no mood
to back down on any diplomatic or military misdemeanours by the Chinese. In
this context, the book argues that the time is ripe for both sides to resolve the
boundary dispute, as any accidental flare-ups could have serious consequences
for both nations and the world at large.
Given that both countries have existed for thousands of years, this book has
been a tedious exercise to say the least. However, I was helped by top political,
military, diplomatic and bureaucratic leaders, whom I cannot name for obvious
reasons, to understand the vexed relations between the two countries and its
historic past and future ahead. These experts not only showed me the context in
which Indo–China bilateral ties had proceeded in the past five decades but also
the way forward. They shared their perceptions and analyses about past and
current events, knowing that the organization they were heading could also come
under criticism.
I would like to thank Amish Raj Mulmi of Hachette India, who repeatedly
asked me questions to make the book more lucid, and gave me suggestions to
focus on the big picture. My discussions with Editorial Director Nandita
Aggarwal were invaluable as she gave her insight and comments to make the
book concise and reader-friendly. The support of my newspaper Hindustan
Times has been invaluable to say the least.
Lastly, I would like to thank my father J.P. Gupta and dearest late mother
Mridula Gupta, without whom none of this would have been possible. All faults
and mistakes in this book are mine alone.

Shishir Gupta
31 December 2013
 INTRODUCTION
A Flawed Friendship

On 15 April 2013, Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO), a remote Indian Army outpost
named after a sixteenth century Yarkhandi trader who lost his life in a blizzard
while negotiating the treacherous South Silk Route from Leh, Ladakh, to
Kashgar and Yarkhand in Xinjiang, entered the lexicon of the average Indian
and revived the spectre of the never-forgotten 1962 India–China border conflict.1
Around 11.30 a.m. that day, Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) troopers
manning the 5,050 metre high Burtse post, south of the mountain plains of
Depsang and DBO, sighted an advance patrol of the PLA at a distance of merely
600 metres. Despite the disputed border status between India and Tibet
Autonomous Region (TAR) of China, and the LAC serving as the de-facto
boundary as differently perceived by both Indian and Chinese armies after the
1962 ceasefire, the PLA patrol was 19 km within Indian territory. The distance
of 19 km was perhaps calculated from a defined line called the Limits of
Patrolling (LOP), which is 10–20 km before the Indian perception of the LAC
and hundreds of kilometres from the Chinese border, if we take Occupied Aksai
Chin into account.
After alerting ITBP headquarters and Indian Army counterparts about the
intrusion, Indian para-military troopers started following the PLA personnel and
chased them throughout the day. An aerial reconnaissance by Cheetah
helicopters mounted on 16 April discovered that the intruding patrol had come
from a new Chinese tented position near the Raki Nullah, a rivulet in the
Depsang plains. Undetected, the PLA had set up six tents inside the Indian side
of the LAC, with 19 troopers, including five Chinese officers, manning the new
patrol base at a significant distance from their original base site opposite the
Indian post called JAK II, named after the Jammu and Kashmir Light Infantry.
The PLA had set up tents on an old patrol base of the Indian Army, as a result of
which a new fortification close to Raki Nullah was hurriedly put up by Indian
troopers to tackle the PLA incursion.
Following the laid-down protocol of military engagement that has been in
place since 2005, both sides entered into a face-off at a distance of 300 metres
across Raki Nullah on 17 April. Thus began a waiting game that lasted almost
three weeks, five high-decibel border flag meetings and muscle diplomacy in
both Delhi and Beijing. The Indian leadership was at first flummoxed at the
timing of the intrusion, since it came on the eve of the new Chinese Premier Li
Keqiang’s first official visit to India on 20 May, with other high profile
exchanges to follow.
In response to the incursion, a meeting of the high-profile China Study Group
(CSG) was called at the Defence Ministry on 17 April to synergize New Delhi’s
response.2 Set up in 1976 as a crisis management group on China, the CSG
comprises of the Home, Defence and Foreign secretaries respectively, the
director of the Intelligence Bureau, the secretary of Research and Analysis Wing
(R&AW), the Vice Chief of Army Staff and the Director-General of Military
Operations (DGMO). The diplomatic side of the crisis was handled by National
Security Advisor (NSA) Shivshankar Menon and Foreign Secretary Ranjan
Mathai in New Delhi and Indian Ambassador to China Subrahmanyam
Jaishankar in Beijing.
The CSG meeting was an angry affair, with the high-powered group
recommending that India call off the proposed Indian Army delegation-level
visit to Chengdu on 27 April 2013 to discuss military exercises with the PLA as
a signal to Beijing. However, the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) vetoed the
move, as Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was of the belief that Depsang was a
localized problem and would be sorted out diplomatically. The third hand-in-
hand counter-terrorism exercise finally took place between 4–14 November
2013 in Chengdu. Given the political sensitivity of the issue on both sides, a
border patrol meeting was called at Spanggur Gap, near Pangong Tso, on 18
April to defuse the crisis. While the Indian Army asked the PLA to withdraw to
its original positions as per the 1976 border patrolling agreement, the PLA
produced a map, which was part of the annexure to a letter written by Zhou to
Nehru and the Conference of African-Asian leaders in November 1959, to
buttress its case that the new position was well within the Chinese side of the
LAC.3 The November 1959 map (reproduced on the facing page), which defines
the LAC running parallel to Raki Nullah and widely diverges from the Indian
LAC, was an indicator that the PLA had come prepared and the incursion was
planned much in advance; according to this map, the strategic Depsang Bulge,
which gave India an option of countering any PLA attack towards DBO,
belonged to China.

Zhou Enlai’s 15 November 1962 letter to heads of state of Afro-Asian Nations defined the Indo–China
border according to Chinese perceptions. As seen in the image above, the Western Sector corresponds to
Chinese claim line except for Demchok; the Middle Sector corresponds to Indian boundary depictions less
Barahoti and two other pockets; in Sikkim, the line corresponds to Indian boundary lines less tri-junction;
and in the Eastern Sector, the LAC corresponds to the ‘illegal’ McMahon Line less Khinzemane.

A subsequent stand-off in the border patrol meeting set alarm bells ringing at
Raisina Hill. Foreign Secretary Mathai summoned the Chinese Ambassador to
India Wei Wei and expressed serious concerns over the PLA move.4
Ambassador Jaishankar registered India’s protest to Director-General (Boundary
Affairs) Deng Zheng Hua at the Chinese Foreign Ministry5 and conveyed that
the incursion should be rolled back with status quo ante as it existed on 15 April
restored. A third, and significant, step was taken by the Indian Army under the
guidance of Northern Army Commander K.T. Parnaik, which New Delhi quietly
claimed to be a game-changer. Some 500 km from the 17,000 feet high plains of
Depsang, the Indian Army constructed a tin shed to cover a point known as ‘30
R’ in Chumar, eastern Ladakh.6 The ‘30 R’ point was within the LOP authorized
by the CSG and the Cabinet Committee on Security in 1976, but it was also an
area under dispute which virtually sat on the LAC unlike in Depsang, where the
LOP was more than 10 km short of the perceived LAC. The CSG has defined the
limits to which Indian troops could patrol within its perceived LAC; these limits
are known as LOP and run from 2 to 20 km within the Indian side of the LAC.
 The ‘30 R’ point was the farthest point to be patrolled by the Army/ ITBP in
the Chumar sector and was actually a spot where troopers would rest before
returning to their bases. The PLA detected the tin shed due to its reflection
through surveillance and on 21 April, two Chinese helicopters entered Chumar
to survey the shed. Simultaneously, surveillance mounted in the Depsang area
picked up the two huts put up by the Indian Army for logistical support of the
troops involved in the face-off at Raki Nullah.
Director-General Deng raised the issue of the Chumar construction with
Jaishankar the next day, while reiterating that the Chinese tents in Depsang
plains were within its own territory. Coordinating closely with NSA Menon,
Jaishankar told Deng he had no mandate to discuss Chumar, but the presence of
40 troops, six tents, four dogs and four SUVs were a change of ground positions
in Depsang. He said the issue here was a unilateral change in ground position by
China and not whether the PLA were on their side of the LAC or not. He
reminded Deng that time for the preparations for Premier Li’s visit was running
out if the face-off was not amicably resolved.
While External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid characterized the face-off
as ‘acne in need of ointment’,7 the PM, Defence Minister Antony, NSA Menon
and Jaishankar were all aware of the political ramifications if the issue was not
resolved amicably. Trying to play the good diplomat, a vocal Khurshid tried to
assuage the Chinese by indicating that Premier Li’s visit was on schedule and so
was his own preparatory visit to Beijing on 9 May. Behind the scenes, New
Delhi through Menon and Jaishankar let it be known to Beijing that the onus for
resolving the crisis was on the Chinese government or it would seriously impact
the high-level exchanges and bilateral relations at large. A product of Jawaharlal
Nehru University, Jaishankar signalled a ‘chukka jam’ on visit preparation at the
Indian Embassy in Beijing until the Chinese withdrew from Depsang.
At the border meeting on 23 April, the PLA tried to strike a deal with the
Indian Army by linking their withdrawal from Depsang plains to New Delhi
ceasing military activity in DBO sector, stopping the construction of military
bunkers at Fukche near Chushul and removing the tin shed in Chumar. This
proposal was rejected by the Indian side as the reasons for the incursion became
more transparent. The incursion was viewed as a measure to force New Delhi to
come to the table on the border issue as India, by undertaking rapid border
infrastructure development in response to China’s own development in the past
decade, was turning the LAC into a de-facto border – something Beijing did not
want given its maximalist position on the boundary resolution with India.8 The
Depsang incursion came after China submitted a new Border Defence
Cooperation Agreement (BDCA) to India on 4 March 2013.9 which prima facie
was aimed at maintaining the present status quo, and to which India responded to
by deleting any references to freezing of positions on 10 May.10 The BDCA was
signed between the two countries on 23 October 2013, even as trans-LAC
transgressions continued unabated in Ladakh sector.
The revival and activation of Indian advance landing grounds at DBO and
Nyoma, in the hinterland of Chushul and Fukche, had added to India’s
deployment capabilities in the Western Sector. Besides, with two roads now
reaching DBO, India was in a position to threaten the Karakoram Pass, the
traditional gateway to the restive Xinjiang province, which is at a striking
distance from the battalion headquarters at this remote outpost. Tactically,
control over the Depsang bulge also gave the Indian side an advantage to cut-off
any PLA manoeuvres towards the DBO battalion headquarters in the event of
hostilities.
Another reasoning for the incursion was that the new regime under Xi Jinping
and Premier Li Keqiang wanted to test the Manmohan Singh government on
how serious New Delhi was about the resolution of the boundary dispute, and
whether it was flexible enough to cartographic changes in the future. The
Depsang incursion was also viewed by some as a show of one-upmanship
between the PLA and PLA Navy, and the existing rivalry between generals. The
incursion was the Army’s answer to the Navy’s belligerence in South and East
China Sea against Japan and Philippines.
In the initial days of the incursion, a view on Raisina Hill existed that this
move could have been a solo operation by the PLA without sanction from the
Communist Party leadership, with an aim to rupture the growing bonhomie
between New Delhi and the new regime in Beijing. This reasoning was given a
short shrift by Menon, who made it amply clear that the sanction for the
incursion had indeed come from the top Chinese leadership as far as Delhi was
concerned, and no time was to be wasted in splitting hairs or attributing motives
to the act. With the military theatre transparent to all satellites orbiting over the
area, major world powers like the US were watching the Indian response to this
new Chinese challenge to determine the future of power play between the two
Asian giants.
Determined that the incursion should be kept localized in spatial terms to only
the Depsang plains, the Indian Army refused to give any commitments on either
freezing activity in DBO sector or dismantling bunkers in either Fukche or
Chumar. Indian reasons were quite evident as the PLA was constantly upgrading
its infrastructure across eastern Ladakh with roads coming close to the notional
LAC and a huge military observation post coming up at Demchok, north of
Chumar. At the CSG meeting called to discuss the 23 April border patrol
meeting, one of the intelligence chiefs pointed out that the PLA had taken three
weeks to withdraw from a face-off at Barahoti plains in the Middle Sector, or
Uttarakhand, in August 2002. It was then decided that while New Delhi will
pursue diplomacy to defuse the crisis, the military under Lt. General Parnaik was
to be given a free hand to deal with the unfolding situation without opening any
new theatres. Rather than be cowed down by the Chinese, Parnaik asked his XIV
Corps Commander to strengthen the III Trishul Division, whose troops were
deployed on the LAC, to ensure that any military flare-up from the other side
was contained. With Parnaik ready to hang his boots in August, the diminutive
commander prepared his troops for the worst-case scenario. He wrote to the
DGMO recommending a series of military steps, including retaliating in kind to
the incursion, that the Army needed to take to get the Chinese to vacate.
Parnaik’s recommendations were greeted with reserve at Army Headquarters
with instructions from the highest levels to not discuss the Chumar constructions
with the Chinese and no action was to be taken to spread the tension horizontally
in eastern Ladakh. Another border patrol meeting on 30 April was tenser, with
the Chinese accusing India of pushing into Chumar and the Indian side paying
no heed to the accusation. It was at this time that New Delhi took a stern position
with strong diplomatic signals to China. External Affairs Minister Salman
Khurshid was sent on a mission to Iran to announce a $100 million assistance to
develop the Chahbahar port on the mouth of the Strait of Hormuz, 75 km
upstream of the Chinese project at Gwadar in Pakistan. To drive home the
message that New Delhi was determined and had no intentions of blinking,
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Japan in late May was extended by a
day. The net effect was that the Chinese called for an unscheduled border
meeting on 4 May and for the first time were willing to discuss simultaneous
disengagement from the face-off site without any Indian commitments on either
Fukche or Chumar. At 7.30 p.m. on 5 May, both sides disengaged from Depsang
plains and the Indian troops returned to their old position in Chumar after
dismantling the ‘30 R’ tin shed.
There is a slightly unsavoury version of this story that does not paint the
Indian Army and its leadership in shining light and perhaps justifies the Chinese
incursion in Depsang on paper. It is quite evident now that the Indian Army was
sending patrols to the LAC in Chumar with ‘30 R’ being one of the rest-stops for
the patrol. The ‘30 R’ point was well-hidden from Chinese observation till such
time that an enterprising commander put a tin shed over the point and converted
it into an observation post in May 2012. In June 2012, the PLA sent two officials
on yaks across the LAC to observe Indian activities, but they were detected and
detained by the Indians. On being questioned, the two men claimed they were
local revenue officials out to collect tax from the villagers. The detained men,
obviously PLA spies, were let go after being kept for six hours. China officially
protested to New Delhi for detaining their revenue officials and for increasing
Indian activity in Chumar as no new structures could be built near the LAC. It is
another matter that the PLA protest every Indian move on the LAC.
In the meantime, the ‘30 R’ point, which is hidden in a bowl behind a hilltop,
gave the Indian Army a dominant position of the LAC along Chumar and deep
observational capability into the flatlands ahead with installed CCTV cameras.
Here again, the Indian Army was trying to secure the LAC without any territorial
ambitions and in light of Chinese staking claim to some 85 sq. km of Indian
territory in Chumar. The tin shed was detected by PLA helicopters in 2012 itself
and the 2013 Depsang incursion was a quid pro quo. However, the PLA did not
stop even after the tin-shed was dismantled. Due to laxity on part of Indian
troops, they took away the CCTV camera in June 2013 and even the cable and
telecommunication wires the next month. Chinese actions made it amply evident
that the PLA was prepared to play hardball and would not compromise even an
inch on the LAC while beefing up its own capabilities.
Post the 5 May withdrawal, Defence Minister Antony went on record11 to say
India would continue upgrading its infrastructure along the LAC just as the
Chinese had done on their side. Khurshid went to Beijing on 9 May in a sombre
mood after his own party raised a hue-and-cry about the Chinese incursion. The
BJP, led by Gujarat Chief Minister and prime ministerial candidate Narendra
Modi, took pot shots at the UPA for allowing the Chinese to enter Indian
territory and castigated Khurshid for his desires to settle down in Beijing. The
political temperature generated on account of the incursion in the Indian media
forced the UPA government’s hand during Premier Li’s three-day visit to India,
with PM Singh making it clear that peace and tranquillity on the border could
not be compromised under any circumstances. The Indian PM basically
indicated that peace on the border was the bedrock of bilateral relations between
India and China and any move to destabilize it would mean unravelling
projected close ties.
 Although Depsang was a test of nerves for India, the face-off also changed
the mindset of those at Raisina Hill. After the new Xi Jinping regime took over
in Beijing, India was genuinely trying to reach out to China after its leadership
reciprocated on speedy boundary settlement. Backed with the desire to forge
long-standing ties with China and a mutually acceptable boundary settlement,
India in early 2013 toyed with the idea to keep itself equidistant from the US and
Japan to signal to Beijing that New Delhi was not part of the anti-China club.
This was quite evident from the fact that India refused to be part of any naval
multilateral exercises involving the US and Japan in the Arabian Sea or off the
coast of Guam. At the heart of this new move was the understanding that as
China was a rising power, India needed to deal with it independently rather than
seek help from the US, which many at Raisina Hill, barring Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh, thought was a declining power. Stung by Chinese moves at
Depsang, PM Singh said that Japan was close to his heart since 1971 during his
visit in May and wanted to take the Indo–Japanese bilateral relationship to a new
height. He talked about joint military exercises with Japan, perhaps mindful that
rearming Tokyo would become a reality due to Chinese aggressive moves in
East China Sea.
Instead, the Chinese incursion bared the real intentions of the Xi Jinping
regime and forced New Delhi to recalibrate its tune for the future. In many ways,
the course correction tested by Indian diplomacy post the Xi Jinping regime was
again reset towards reviving ties with the US as it was evident that there was a
huge trust deficit between the two sides with the PLA not willing to give an inch
of its notional territory. That the Depsang face-off had brought no change in
Chinese thinking was evident, as two days before Premier Li was to land in
Delhi, a PLA contingent blocked a Indian platoon from patrolling the Sri Jap
area north of Pangong Tso on 17 May.12 The Finger VIII area in Sri Jap sector is
where Major Dhan Singh Thapa of 8 Gorkha Battalion got his Param Vir Chakra
for taking on the PLA in the 1962 war.13
These incidents are an ominous sign for the future, as India will have to be
ever vigilant to the Chinese threat across the LAC, with the PLA determined to
dominate the LAC. With India upgrading its observation and patrol capability
near the LAC, Chinese activities are more transparent now. The introduction of
17 high-speed US-built interceptor boats in Pangong Tso by the Indian Army has
ensured that the PLA does not have a free run of the lake, which sits on the
LAC. The continuous friction on the LAC is also a diplomatic challenge, as
Beijing continues to be aggressive and wants to dominate Asian geopolitics. This
was glaringly evident during Manmohan Singh’s Japan visit as the state-run
People’s Daily called Japan a ‘petty burglar’ trying to entice India against
Beijing. In a thinly veiled threat, the Chinese paper said India was engaging
Japan at its own risk.14 While a section of Indian intelligentsia believes that
India unnecessarily played up the Depsang incursion, the face-off was in fact an
eye-opener for the Indian security establishment as they realized the fragility of
peace on the border, notwithstanding Beijing’s ostensible desire for peace and
tranquil borders with India.

PAST HISTORY
Although this book has no intention of recalling the combined histories of both
India and China, it would be sufficient to say that there has been little interaction
between the Han-dominated Chinese mainland and India due to the 2,400 km
long and sometimes 400 km wide Himalayan wall separating the two
civilizations, except for visits by celebrated Chinese travellers such as Faxian
(also spelt as Fa-Hsien) and Huanzang (Hsuan Tsang) in the fifth and seventh
centuries CE. The western anchor of the Himalayas is held by the 8,126 metre tall
Nanga Parbat in Gilgit–Baltistan region and the eastern anchor by the 7,782
metre tall Namcha Barwa, just west of the great bend of the Brahmaputra.
India and Tibet, on the other hand, have had continuous links with each other
since the birth of Buddha. Tibet was clearly the buffer between Chinese and
Indian kingdoms in the past with the two inward-looking civilizations hardly
interested in each other in either strategic or social spheres. While India was
ruled by foreign conquerors for the past 1,000 years, China underwent
subjugation in the nineteenth century. On the eve of the twentieth century, both
countries were trying to overthrow the humiliating shackles of British imperial
domination, with fire-brand nationalism on the rise on both sides of the
Himalayas. Matters got further complicated with the fall of the Manchu kingdom
in 1911, with Tibet becoming virtually independent till a victorious and
ambitious Communist China invaded it in 1950. The pitch got queered between
the newly established Republic of China under Kuomintang’s Sun Yat Sen and
British India when a conference of Tibetan, Chinese and British plenipotentiaries
met in Simla in 1913 to bring about a settlement in regards to the matters on the
Sino–Tibetan frontier. A tripartite convention was drawn up in 1914 and
initialled by Tibetan and British India representatives but the Chinese
government refused to permit their plenipotentiary to put his full signature.15
According to Karunakar Gupta’s Sino–Indian Relations 1948–52: Role of
K.M. Panikkar, the perfidious British replaced the correct narrative about the
Simla convention printed in the Aitchison’s Treaties Volume XIV (1929)16 in a
spurious edition printed in 1938 with an imprint of 1929. The new version,
according to Gupta, stated:
‘The Simla Conference convened in 1913 was to negotiate an agreement as to the international
status of Tibet, with particular regard to the relations of Britain, China and Tibet, and to the frontiers
of Tibet both with China and India. After prolonged negotiations, the conference under the
presidency of Sir Henry McMahon drew up a tripartite convention between Great Britain, China and
Tibet, which was initialled in Simla in 1914 by representatives of the three parties. The Chinese
government, however, refused to ratify the agreement, by their refusal, depriving themselves of the
benefits which they were to obtain there under, among which were a definite recognition that Tibet
was under Chinese suzerainty, and an agreement to permit a Chinese official with a suitable escort
of not exceeding 300 men to be maintained in Lhasa. The convention was, however, ratified by
Great Britain and Tibet by means of a declaration accepting its terms as binding between
themselves.’

Gupta argued that independent India’s first foreign secretary, Sir G.S. Bajpai,
had the wrong impression that the 1914 Simla Convention resulted in a legally
valid border agreement along the crest of Himalayas (the McMahon Line) by an
Anglo–Tibetan declaration due to the concocted volume of Aitchison’s Treaties
and China was deprived of her suzerainty over Tibet because of her refusal to
sign the agreement. The Nationalist Government of China under Chiang Kai-
shek also challenged the Simla Convention in context of the Indo–Tibetan
frontier as well as Anglo–Tibetan trade regulations. Gupta argues that critics of
Nehru and his China advisor and Ambassador in Beijing Panikkar were wrong in
asserting that India’s claim to the McMahon Line and extraterritorial rights
enjoyed by India in Tibet were based on several treaties and conventions
culminating in the Simla Convention. Instead, he says:
‘Senior members of the Indian Cabinet did not know the simple fact that the Indo–Tibetan frontier
(the Mcmahon Line) was not a part of the functions of the Simla Convention.’

Gupta goes on to add that as Panikkar knew the lack of treaty basis about the
McMahon Line, he wanted ‘the area between the foothills of the Assam
Himalayas and the Himalayan crest line, which was mostly tribal territory owing
allegiance neither to India or China (Tibet), should be rapidly brought under the
effective jurisdiction of India before opening of border negotiations.’ The book
provides justification to Panikkar’s actions on the border with Tibet and also
defends the change of word ‘suzerainty’ to ‘sovereignty’ to depict China’s
relations with Tibet in an Indian diplomatic communication to China on 31
October 1950. Even though the mistake, which Nehru found was in semantics,
was traced to the Cipher Bureau of the Ministry of External Affairs in New
Delhi, the correction was never communicated to the Chinese. Despite the
MEA’s request, the matter was not taken up as Chinese armies were on their
way to invade Tibet and the change of words would have led to tensions between
New Delhi and Peking (Beijing).
The fact is that India only recognized nominal ‘suzerainty’, not ‘sovereignty’,
of China over Tibet and that too on the condition that China would recognize
Tibet as an autonomous state. By invading Tibet, China had not only reneged on
its past assurances but had changed the facts on the ground. Nehru’s speech in
the Lok Sabha on 30 March 1959 is very illuminating in this context, as it is very
high on moral fibre but low on strategic content. He distanced himself from
imperial British India, which had sent an expedition under Colonel
Younghusband to Lhasa in 1904 and imposed extraterritorial rights on Tibet.
Loftily, Nehru wanted no part of those privileges as independent India was
totally different from its imperial predecessors who had also humiliated the
Chinese in the past decades. What is critical in the speech was the word play
between suzerainty, sovereignty and autonomy in the context of India, China and
Tibet relations. Nehru said:
‘When the Prime Minister of the Chinese Government came here, two or three years ago, he
discussed the situation in Tibet with me… He told me that Tibet had always been, according to him
and according to the Chinese position, a part of the Chinese state, although Tibet was not China in
the sense of being a province of China. Tibet was an autonomous region which had been a part of
Chinese state… He said they wanted to treat Tibet as an autonomous region and give it full
autonomy… All I can say is that we had to recognize Chinese sovereignty over Tibet.’17

Nehru stuck to his part of the commitment while Beijing ran over Tibet
without leaving behind a single shred of autonomy. It would not be unfair to say
that India under Nehru and his advisors committed a series of blunders or
deliberate mistakes in the context of Tibet as Communist China was a far
superior military power than India. Nehru’s failure to read that a communist
China under Mao Zedong was fundamentally different than a democratic India,
and that the two could never be in the same boat with the former still coveting
territories like Nepal, Bhutan and Arunachal Pradesh, proved costly for New
Delhi.
Also, it is quite evident from official records18 that Nehru, with the help of his
key advisor Panikkar, paid little heed to the advice of others on China, including
his Deputy Prime Minister Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel. Written a month before he
died, Sardar Patel’s prescient letter dated 7 November 1950 to Nehru shows the
difference in approach between the two on China in the context of Tibet.19 The
letter was written after China had responded to Indian written concerns over the
military occupation of Tibet on 21 and 26 October 1950.20
The Chinese reply, which came on 30 October with two more exchanges to
follow, said, ‘Tibet is an integral part of Chinese territory and the problem of
Tibet is entirely a domestic problem of China.’ Clearly indicating that India was
‘affected’ by foreign influences hostile to China, the communication basically
asked India to lay off Tibet and to not confuse Chinese actions in Tibet to its
membership of the UN. Patel found the Chinese reply an act of ‘gross
discourtesy’ and said, ‘It looks as though it is not a friend speaking in that
language but a potential enemy.’ Expanding on the strategic implications of
Tibet’s occupation on bordering Indian states, he asked Nehru to ensure Indian
defence preparedness on two fronts – Pakistan and China – as Beijing had
ambitions that were not well disposed towards New Delhi. ‘Chinese irredentism
and communist imperialism are different from the expansionism or imperialism
of the Western powers. The former has a cloak of ideology which makes it ten
times more dangerous. In the guise of ideological expansion lie concealed racial,
national or historical claims. The danger from north and north-east, therefore,
becomes both communist and imperialist.’
However, Nehru adopted a different strategy. Believing that the two
countries, who had recently thrown off the imperial yoke, could join hands to
tackle Western imperialist powers, Nehru played the global statesman and
helped China with speedy recognition and entry into the UN and during the
Korean crisis. All this was done perhaps in the hope that the Chinese would
respond in kind and not invade Tibet. India even signed the Panchsheel
Agreement in April 195421 without any counter-commitment from China
towards honouring the McMahon Line or any other deal. Further, Nehru did not
support raising the Tibet issue in the UN and agreed with Panikkar in opposing
political asylum to the fourteenth Dalai Lama after Chamdo had fallen to
communist forces in November 1950. Replying in the Rajya Sabha to a question
raised by Dr H. Kunzuru on why the question of the McMahon Line was not
raised before signing the Panchsheel Agreement, Nehru on 9 December 195922
loftily indicated that there was no need of inviting a debate on the McMahon
Line as the Indian frontier was ‘clear in our maps’ – precisely what he had been
advised by Panikkar.
By that time, China had changed the ground situation with Tibet under its
thumb and the Aksai Chin highway completed by 1957. While Nehru played the
democrat statesman trying to forge a common front with China against the
imperial West, Beijing changed the rules of the game through its use of military
power in Tibet. To add to Indian misery, Nehru was later unfairly accused by
China of being a running dog of imperialists.23 While we will discuss the 1962
war in a later chapter, the big picture up to the conflict was that Nehru’s pacifist
approach could have been based on the realization that Communist China was
way ahead of India in military terms even then. The utter failure of India to read
into the developing situation in Tibet and its serious ramifications on India saw
Nehru becoming a mute spectator to the fall of Lhasa.
However, Chinese claims on the Wu Je or Barahoti plains in Uttarakhand in
1956 and the Aksai Chin highway forced Nehru’s hands as he pushed Indian
forces to control as much area as possible in Ladakh and NEFA to prevent any
further Chinese intrusions into areas vaguely defined as Indian territory. The
final act that led to the 1962 war was India granting asylum to the Dalai Lama in
1959, and the subsequent rebellion against the Chinese occupation in Tibet.24
Despite official talks being held in 1960 to exchange coordinates of the
perceived boundary lines on both sides, as far as Mao was concerned, he wanted
to teach India a lesson for meddling in Tibetan affairs.
To put it simply, Nehru and his Defence Minister V.K. Krishna Menon – who
lost his job after the first offensive in NEFA in October 1962 – never thought
that China would attack India. The war and its aftermath have been discussed in
detail later in the book, but the Indian defeat added to the invincibility of the
PLA, which had already shown the US Army its place in the Korean War. The
communist victory also left deep psychological scars on the Indian political
mindset and the Indian Army, which was let down by poor leadership on both
political and military fronts. For the next four decades, India held on to the status
quo on the border and did not even think about beefing up its defences lest it
annoy the Chinese.
Post-1962, India started focusing on Pakistan, which was then supported by
the US, and went on to fight two wars with its western neighbour in 1965 and
1971. After India conducted its first nuclear test in 1974, China helped Pakistan
in the latter’s nuclear enrichment programmes and ensured that Islamabad
became a nuclear power with long-range delivery platforms in the 1990s – as
always, Pakistan has been boxed in a category much above its weight in the
global arena due to the support extended to it by China and the US.
India on the other hand sang the song of non-alignment till the time
communist USSR collapsed in 1989 and the situation in Kashmir erupted at
around the same time. It was Indira Gandhi who in 1966 said that India was
ready to improve relations with China and ‘conduct meaningful talks’ so as to
seek a settlement of the boundary dispute. Four years later, on 1 May 1970,
Chairman Mao, meeting foreign envoys at the Tiananmen Rostrum, said to the
Indian chargé d’affaires Brajesh Mishra that ‘India is a great country, and your
people are great people. We should be friendly in spite of everything, and should
not go quarrelling as we do now.’25 Mao asked Mishra, who was NSA to
Vajpayee in 1999–2004, to convey his best regards to the Indian President and
prime minister.
Mishra reported back to the Chinese government on 11 June 1971 that India
was ready to start a dialogue to discuss steps for normalization of relations. The
process was suspended due to the 1971 conflict with Pakistan and with India
signing a peace and friendship treaty with the erstwhile Soviet Union. Indira
Gandhi restored ambassadorial relations with China in August 1977 with the
appointment of K.R. Narayanan as ambassador to Beijing, while Chen Zhaoyuan
was sent as envoy to India. Bilateral trade resumed two years later under the
Morarji Desai regime after the visit of then Foreign Minister Vajpayee to Beijing
in February 1979. Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua put forth a three point
proposal to promote the process of settling the boundary dispute through
negotiations:

1. Both sides maintain the status quo in the border regions pending the
settlement of the boundary question and keep peace along the border, and if
any problem occurs on the border, it should be settled through friendly
consultations on both sides.
2. The boundary question should not be an obstacle to the development of
relations between two countries, and both sides should develop relations in
various fields to promote mutual understanding and friendly cooperation, so
as to create a favourable atmosphere for settling the boundary question for
the future.
3. Both sides should continue to exchange view on the boundary question
through appropriate channels with contacts maintained between the Indian
Ambassador to China and the Chinese Foreign Ministry or between the
Chinese Ambassador to India and the Indian Foreign Ministry.
 These baby steps to restore bilateral relations were taken as Beijing convinced
India that diplomatic ties between the two could not be held hostage to the
boundary dispute and the two could be handled on a parallel track.26 New Delhi
on its part also wanted to normalize ties with China as it could ill-afford to have
two hostile neighbours in the west and in the north. But there was a sting in the
tail during Vajpayee’s visit as Beijing sent out a loud and clear message that it
would brook no interference in its strategic ambitions when it invaded Vietnam,
a friend of India, in 1979, while Vajpayee was still in Beijing. The consequent
rise of China as an economic power, its expanding close relations with Pakistan
and the virtual defeat of USSR, then an Indian ally, in Afghanistan ensured that
Nehru’s grandson Rajiv Gandhi visited Beijing in 1988 to meet the Chinese
leadership under Deng Xiaoping. A joint working group was then set up to
discuss the border issue; between 1989 to 2002, fourteen rounds of inconclusive
talks took place with each side sticking to its positions.27
It was Prime Minister Narasimha Rao, an astute ruler, who signed the path-
breaking ‘Peace and Tranquillity Agreement’ in September 199328 with the
Jiang Zemin regime even as he unveiled the ‘Look East’ policy for
simultaneously engaging South East Asia and Japan in 1995. Bilateral
confidence-building measures between India and China followed a year later.
The 1998 nuclear tests under the Vajpayee government brought the Indian focus
back on Beijing as the then PM named China and the nuclear proliferation in
South Asia as the main reason for New Delhi to go nuclear.29
As China did by announcing the Tibet–Xinjiang highway via Aksai Chin in
1957, India changed the ground position in 1998 as the security paradigm of the
region changed forever, as Pakistan with Beijing’s support also went nuclear in a
matter of days. Although a major part of the Vajpayee government’s diplomacy
was directed at fighting nuclear sanctions and engaging the US on cross-border
terrorism and the Kashmir issue, India and China managed to exchange border
maps of the 545 km long Middle Sector in November 2000 as a result of the
1994-constituted expert group on boundary issues. The exchange of maps was
part of the confidence-building process to make the other side understand the
perceived boundary by the adversary.
However, the exchange of contentious Western Sector maps did not take
place as scheduled in June 2002 as Chinese experts objected to the Indian
alignment of the LAC. While both sides saw each other’s Western Sector maps,
the Indian map did not include Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and the 5,180 km of
Shaksgam Valley, near Karakoram Pass, which was illegally ceded by Islamabad
to Beijing in 1963.30 Eastern Sector maps have neither been shown nor
exchanged to date as the expert group was stalled in 2002 after fourteen rounds
of talks.
In June 2003, Vajpayee visited Beijing and discussed the resolution of the
boundary dispute with China. It was decided that the dispute could be best
resolved not inch-by-inch but with a larger political understanding of the issue.
Both sides thus set up a special representative dialogue for a political resolution
of the issue, with Vajpayee’s trusted NSA and Principal Secretary Brajesh
Mishra heading the Indian side, while Dai Bingguo, who demitted office as a
powerful state councillor in December 2012, represented the Chinese side.31
With India able to harmonize its nuclear differences with the US after a series
of high-level dialogues and the path-breaking visit of US President Bill Clinton
in March 2000, the two countries moved towards a civil nuclear agreement in
July 2005 and a new chapter in Indo–US strategic relations dawned. But before
India and the US penned the 18 July 2005 agreement, Beijing – mindful of
Washington’s interest in New Delhi – sent Prime Minister Wen Jiabao on a three
day trip to India in April 2005. During Wen’s visit, agreements on political
parameters and guiding principles for settling the boundary issue, protocols on
implementation of confidence-building measures in military fields and opening
up of air links between the two countries were signed.32 In 2012, India and
China signed an agreement on the working mechanism for consultation and
coordination on the boundary issue to ensure no untoward accident takes place
on the LAC.
The thaw in Indo–China relations was partly due to galloping trade ties
between the two, with Indian companies scouring the neighbouring country for
products, particularly in power and telecom sectors. Although heavily skewed in
favour of China, bilateral trade, which stood at $2.92 billion in 2000, touched
$51.8 billion in 2009. China is now India’s largest trade partner,33 replacing the
US. In 2010 and 2011, figures touched $61.7 billion and $73.90 billion
respectively, making India the seventh-largest export destination for China.34
Trade fell in 2012 to $66 billion due to a sluggish global economy, but is
expected to touch $100 billion before 2015.35
But burgeoning trade figures tell only half the story, as there has been no let
up in Chinese strategic moves to undermine India when it comes to entry into the
NSG and the expanded UN Security Council. Beijing continues to be very thick
with Pakistan and has made deep inroads into Nepal, Myanmar, Bangladesh and
Sri Lanka, undermining traditional Indian interests in these countries. Maldives
and Bhutan appear to be the next steps as Beijing leverages into South Asia,
thereby constricting Indian ground for manoeuvring in its own backyard. Indian
moves to explore offshore oil in South China Sea with the help of Vietnam has
been resisted by China as it has developed a nuclear submarine base in Hainan
Island near the disputed Paracel Islands.36
It is not that the UPA government under Manmohan Singh has not made any
moves to counter the Chinese spread. During Prime Minister Wen’s visit to India
in December 2010, New Delhi for the first time did not refer to ‘One China’ or
to the Tibetan Autonomous Region, a standard practice in the past.37 The clear
message that India sent was that it would only talk of ‘One China’ if Beijing
talks of ‘One India’ in the context of Jammu and Kashmir. Indian opposition
leaders like Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra Modi have also made it clear that
China could not expect to improve relationships with India if it continues to prop
up Pakistan. During his visit to China in November 2011, Modi did some hard
talk with Chinese leadership,38 to the extent that he told them Beijing was seen
to be supporting terrorism against India by siding with Pakistan. Manmohan
Singh in his quiet way also told Xi Jinping at the BRICS summit in Durban in
March 2013 that China’s ties with other countries should not be an impediment
to advancing bilateral ties, in the context of Beijing supplying nuclear reactors
for the Pakistani reactor Chashma III.39 That India and China continue to talk
past each other was also evident during the bilateral counter-terrorism dialogue
on 10-12 April 2013, where New Delhi spoke about jihadist terror from Pakistan
and Beijing talked about the ‘terror’ threat from the fourteenth Dalai Lama and
his followers in Tibet.

THE ROAD AHEAD

At the BRICS summit in Durban on 27 March 2013, Prime Minister Manmohan
Singh was only physically present, as his mind was focused elsewhere: his first
meeting with newly appointed Chinese President Xi Jinping was to be later that
evening at a Zimbali resort, some 40 km outside the South African city. Thus
Singh could not even squeeze time to meet the South African President Jacob
Zuma. Since Xi had taken over as general secretary of the Chinese Communist
Party and the chairman of the all-powerful Central Military Commission (CMC)
on 15 November 2012, Singh and members of the apex Indian Cabinet
Committee on Security (CCS) were preparing to meet the regime change in
Beijing. With India registering a below 5 per cent GDP growth in the last quarter
of 2012, Singh had all the reasons to be worried in the face of a rising China.
The unfolding security scenario in Asia was foreboding, with China flexing its
military muscles from the Sea of Japan to the South China Sea, while US-led
coalition forces were pulling out of restive Afghanistan.
The pressing question on the minds of Indian security experts was: how to
deal with China? Should there be a change in New Delhi’s focus if the US was a
declining economic power? Should Beijing’s bilateral moves during the 2012
regime change be taken at face value? Will the US deliver on its promised Asian
pivot or on its attempts to rebalance power in Asia to tackle China?
These were questions to which not only Singh but his other Cabinet
colleagues, particularly Finance Minister P. Chidambaram and Defence Minister
A.K. Antony, were also looking for answers. Even Singh’s normally astute
China-expert, NSA Menon, had given up on firm predictions for the time being
as he preferred to watch the dynamic situation unfold.
The first meeting between the two leaders was courteous and cordial, with the
Indian PM politely pointing out that China’s ties in South Asia should not be
detrimental to the bilateral relationship. While Singh did not name Pakistan in
particular, he was clearly hinting at the agreement between Beijing and
Islamabad40 to build a third nuclear reactor at Chashma in February 2013 despite
serious objections from the NSG. Even Chinese forays into Nepal, Bangladesh,
Sri Lanka and Maldives were areas of Indian concern as these countries had
perfected the art of playing one giant against the other for ulterior motives.
On its part, the Chinese leadership during the 2012 power transition and
elections to the twelfth National People’s Congress had made all the right noises
to India. Visiting India on the eve of the convening of the People’s Congress,
then Defence Minister Liang Guanglie was all polite and conciliatory towards
India and did not deliver a single jarring note in his meeting with Antony.41
Without a word either about Chinese concerns over India’s so-called political
support to Tibetan independence movement or about proposed Indian oil
exploration activities in South China Sea, Liang spoke only of peace and
tranquillity on the disputed 3,488 km long LAC. Seeking closer military-to-
military ties, Liang invited Antony to China to personally assess Beijing’s
intentions towards New Delhi after the regime change.
Deputy Chief of PLA General Staff Lt. Gen. Qi Jianguo’s visit to India three
days before Xi’s meeting with Singh was no different, with the former overtly
promoting bilateral bonhomie with Antony.42 However, the last meeting
between the designated special representatives, Dai Bingguo and Menon, for the
fifteenth round of boundary dialogue in Beijing on 3–4 December 2012 before
Dai demitted office, was particularly significant. At the time of the meeting, the
all-important Politburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party
had just been constituted at the eighteenth National Congress, with Xi replacing
Hu Jintao as the general secretary. The significant aspect of the new Standing
Committee was that the number of members had been restricted from nine to
seven, with five of the these members known to be aligned to former president
Jiang Zemin’s conservative Shanghai faction apart from Xi and then Li Keqiang
– Jiang’s reported low opinion of the Indian leadership and its capabilities had
been quite evident in interlocution with the US and Russian leadership.43
While bidding adieu to Dai Bingguo and understanding the importance of the
written word in Chinese diplomacy, Menon and his counterpart recorded
eighteen points of bilateral agreement on the vexed border issue to ensure future
continuity.44 Dai on his part conveyed Beijing’s readiness to move forward in
settling the boundary dispute while comprehensively engaging New Delhi on all
outstanding issues. Even as both special representatives recorded the boundary
talks since 2003 in document form, Dai conveyed that China’s new leadership
wanted to engage India as an autonomous stable power in the world with no less
than five out of seven members of the apex standing committee having visited
India.45
Rather than believe Dai Bingguo’s overtures on face value, Menon, pragmatic
as ever, waited for the new Chinese leadership to expand its vision on its
relationship with India. A week after taking over as President, Xi on 20 March
outlined a five point plan to better ties with India without any movement on
addressing the border dispute. Replying to submitted questions from
newspersons of BRICS countries before he left for Durban, Xi said, ‘The border
question is a complex issue left from history and solving the issue won’t be easy.
However, as long as we keep friendly consultations, we can eventually arrive at
a fairly reasonable and mutually acceptable settlement. Pending the final
settlement of the boundary question, the two sides should work together and
maintain peace and tranquillity in the border areas and prevent the border
question from affecting the overall development of bilateral relations.’46
Taking a step forward from the 1954 Panchsheel principles, Xi proposed a
new bilateral Panchsheel based on the following guidelines:

• We should maintain strategic communication and keep bilateral relations on

the right track.
• We should harness each other’s comparative strength and expand win-win
cooperation in infrastructure, mutual investment and other areas.
• We should strengthen cultural ties and constantly increase mutual
understanding and friendship between our peoples.
• We should expand coordination and collaboration in multilateral affairs to
jointly safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of developing countries
and tackle global challenges.
• We should accommodate each other’s core interests and properly handle
problems and differences existing between two countries.47

Xi’s statement on the border issue confirmed to the Indian leadership that
China was in no hurry to sort it out even though he verbally conveyed to Singh
at Durban that both sides should accelerate the boundary resolution. It was in
consonance with former Prime Minister Wen Jiabao telling the UPA government
in 201048 that it would take a very long time to settle the boundary issue. While
Xi did not bring up the topic of core interests with Singh at Durban, Beijing was
essentially indicating that India should not dabble in Tibet, Taiwan, the Korean
peninsula, East and most importantly South China Sea. The other important
point raised by Xi was that both India and China should collaborate together in
multilateral forums on specific issues to promote the interests of the developing
world. This related to synergizing in global climate change and trade
negotiations.
While Xi did talk of strategic communications, he did not clarify whether this
meant the leadership of both countries would discuss an issue of mutual concern
before implementing it or advocating for maintaining high-level contacts
between the political leadership of the two countries. The other points raised by
Xi were seen as rather mundane by India, as China was seen actively blocking
New Delhi’s entry into the expanded UN Security Council and had tried its best
through proxies like Pakistan to scuttle the 2005 Indo–US civilian nuclear deal
in the NSG. Xi’s new formulation, in real terms, meant that China wanted India
to concentrate on increasing bilateral trade – already skewed in Beijing’s favour
– and addressing its core interests in Tibet without paying any heed to a forward
movement in resolving the boundary dispute.
 With India neither having the will nor the current capacity to change the
situation on the ground, Xi’s proposals were in fact a diktat from an aspiring
superpower to a regional power that the latter should not be seen as an
impediment to Beijing’s global rise. In many ways, it was also a reflection of a
majority mindset in India that it could in no way match China in economic or
military terms and thus was buying time till it had built up sufficient capacities
to militarily deter Beijing and the PLA.
Before Singh’s Durban meeting with Xi, the Indian assessment of the new
Chinese President was ominous as he was not just wearing three hats – general
secretary of Communist Party, chairman of the CMC and President – but was
also in charge of the fearsome Chinese internal security apparatus. To put in
perspective, the current internal security budget of China is $110 billion as
compared to its defence budget of $106 billion.49 While Xi’s predecessors –
particularly Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin – could not consolidate power in office,
the new President was seen by New Delhi to be more powerful than Deng
Xiaoping and in the league of founding father Mao Zedong, with the entire
coercive power of the state behind him. In fact, one Indian minister, who is part
of the apex CCS, felt that Hu Jintao had been a failure as he had not succeeded
in reviving the Chinese economy.
To understand Xi, one must examine a series of steps taken by China in the
context of India since the time he became general secretary. The first step that
marked the arrival of Xi was the stamping of visas with a watermark that showed
maximum territorial limits of China,50 with Aksai Chin, Arunachal Pradesh or
so-called southern Tibet, Taiwan and South China Sea within its territory. The
quiet yet firm response from New Delhi was stamping Indian visas on Chinese
passports with a watermark showing the maximum territorial limits of the
republic. The second was Beijing’s green signal51 to build three more run-of-
theriver dams on the middle reaches of the Brahmaputra or the Yarlung Tsangpo
without any consultation with lower riparian states – India and Bangladesh. The
three dams were approved by the Chinese state council or the Cabinet under the
new energy development plan for 2015, which was released on 23 January 2013,
and ended a two-year halt imposed by the Hu Jintao regime in approving new
projects on the river due to opposition from Tibetan environmental groups and
India. China had already paid scant regard to Indian concerns by starting the
construction of a 510 MW project at Zangmu in Tibet in 2010. These four dams
are all on the great bend of the Brahmaputra’s main stream before it enters
Arunachal Pradesh; they will have a direct impact on the water flow of lower
riparian states, particularly if China revives its plan to divert Yarlung Tsangpo’s
waters to its arid northern regions and a possible link-up with the Yangtze river.
According to the approved plan, a 640 MW dam will be built at Dagu, 18 km
upstream of Zangmu. Another 320 MW dam will be built at Jiacha in the middle
reaches of Brahmaputra’s main stream and a third dam of unconfirmed capacity
will be built 11 km upstream of Zangmu at Jiexu. The Chinese plan says the
government ‘will push forward vigorously the hydropower base construction’52
on the middle reaches of the Yarlung Tsangpo, while during the twelfth five year
plan (2011–15), Beijing will construct 120 million kilowatt of conventional
hydropower with majority of projects expected to be based in Tibet.53
According to a feasibility study conducted by Huadong Engineering
Corporation, the catchment area at the Dagu dam site could be 157,400 sq. km,
while the average annual discharge would be 1,010 cubic metres per second
(cumec). With a height of 124 metres, the dam – despite Chinese reassurances
that no water will be diverted – will have an impact on downstream flow due to
‘spread pondage area’, or the dam reservoir, with daily active capacity of 86
million cubic metres needed for generating power. Beijing has also built at least
six smaller hydropower projects on the Brahmaputra’s tributaries, which it
insists has no impact on downstream flows. A day after the decision to build
three more dams was reported in the Indian media, the Chinese government
issued a statement54 saying that Beijing would take into consideration the
interests of lower riparian states as it goes ahead with the construction.
Finally, while Xi Jinping was inspecting PLA bases in Guangdong province
and PLA Air Force bases in Gobi desert in December 2012–January 2013, China
moved towards acquiring the Gwadar deep-sea port in restive Baluchistan in
Pakistan. The port, 533 km from Karachi and 120 km from the Iranian border,
sits on the mouth of the Persian Gulf just outside the Strait of Hormuz. The port
not only provides strategic reach to Pakistan and China to monitor more than
half of world’s hydrocarbon trade from the Gulf but also provides huge military
leverage to Beijing in adverse circumstances, with more than 70 per cent of
Indian oil supplies coming from the area. It also provides a crucial alternative
route for China to get its oil supplies from the Gulf and Middle East via the
Gwadar–Islamabad–Xinjiang route through the Karakoram Highway and
reduces Indian leverage over shipping lanes of communication (SLOCs) to Strait
of Malacca.
On 30 January 2013, the Pakistani Cabinet chaired by Prime Minister Raja
Pervez Ashraf gave its permission for transferring the concession agreement for
Gwadar from the Port of Singapore Authority to China Overseas Port Holding
Limited. As the Singapore-based company could not develop the port as desired
according to Pakistan, it was handed over to Beijing which had invested $248
million in the first phase of the project. In 2011, then Pakistan Defence Minister
Chaudhry Ahmad Mukhtar had gone on record stating that Islamabad would be
‘grateful’ to the Chinese government55 if the naval base was built at Gwadar.
China, on its part, had said that it would construct another twenty berths for
ships at Gwadar if given rights to operate the port. On 18 February 2013,
Pakistan formally awarded the contract to the Chinese company at a glittering
ceremony attended by President Asif Ali Zardari, Chinese Ambassador to
Pakistan Liu Juan, Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar and other top officials.
In his speech, Zardari said the Chinese provinces of Xinjiang and Tibet were
closer to Pakistani ports as compared to ports in China and talked about
developing a new trade corridor linking the Middle East to China via Gwadar.
What started as a fish harbour project by former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto
on 14 December 1989 had now become a Chinese port in the Indian Ocean.
The Indian reaction to the handover was very interesting. Two days after the
Pakistan Cabinet cleared the handover, Foreign Minister Salman Khurshid,
perhaps without understanding the strategic import of the move, said that Indians
should not overreact.56 A former spokesman for the Congress, Khurshid said,
‘There are some things which have pure, simple and commercial dimensions and
some things which have strategic dimensions. But these are things which one
should consider in the normal course when we know exactly what we are dealing
with.’ India’s longest-serving Defence Minister Antony had a totally different
take; on 6 February, he said, ‘The Chinese are now constructing that [Gwadar]
port on Pakistan’s request. In one sentence, I can say that it’s a matter of concern
to us.’57 Antony deliberately underplayed his comment as matters were far more
complicated than they appeared to be and were directly related to another port
mere 72 km west of Gwadar.
Adjoining the hot desert of Baluchistan and very close to the Pakistan– Iran
border lies the Chah Bahar port on the Makran coast of Sistan and Baluchestan
province of Iran. The Chah Bahar port with four jetties was being developed by
India to trade with Central Asia and to assist in the economic and infrastructure
development in Afghanistan in the absence of any land corridor due to a
recalcitrant Pakistan. Fearing a loss of strategic depth in Afghanistan, Pakistan
despite pressures from the US and other Western powers has refused India
access to Kabul via the Attari–Khyber pass route even for humanitarian
assistance.58 During the Taliban regime in the 1990s, India with the help of
Russia and Iran reached out to Kabul via Tajikistan with Farakhor, just across
the Amu Darya, as its base for humanitarian activities. At the same time, it
started looking at Chah Bahar and Bandar Abbas ports in Iran for trade with
Central Asian republics, particularly with hydrocarbonrich Kazakhstan. Despite
Pakistan’s overt and covert efforts to block Indian aid to Afghanistan, New
Delhi with support from US-led coalition forces reached out to Kabul by
assisting it in infrastructure projects. One of the key road projects supported by
India was the 218 km road connecting Delaram in Farah province to Zaranj in
Nimruz near the Iranian border. The road essentially connects the Afghan–
Iranian border with Kandahar–Herat highway. From Zaranj, a road access to Iran
via Zabol is connected with the Chah Bahar port.
India is also planning to build a 900 km railway line to transport iron ore from
Haji Gak mine in Zabul, southern Afghanistan, via the Chah Bahar port. In 2012,
India supplied one lakh tonnes of wheat to Afghanistan through the Iranian port.
With Iran facing sanctions from the UN, the US and other Western powers for
allegedly trying to build a nuclear arsenal since 2007, New Delhi has kept its
trade open with Tehran as nearly 12 per cent of its oil supplies come from the
country. While the US has time and again mounted pressure on India to join the
embargo on Iran, New Delhi has made its position clear to Washington on two
vital counts. Firstly, India has gone public that it is opposed to Tehran building a
nuclear arsenal and jeopardizing the security of the entire Middle East given its
attitude towards Israel.59 Secondly, India has made it known that it cannot
source all its oil supplies for obvious reasons from Saudi Arabia and needs
alternative sources even though it is trying its best to cut down on supplies from
Tehran.60 Besides, Indian interlocutors have made it known to their American
counterparts that Washington, with its track record, could once again join hands
with Tehran, which would leave New Delhi high and dry.
It is not that Delhi is too happy with the Iranian attitude, particularly in the
light of its highly secretive force Al Quds’ operatives targeting an Israeli
diplomat with a bomb in the heart of the capital on 13 February 2012, with near
simultaneous similar attacks in Bangkok in Thailand and Tbilisi in Georgia.61
However, it needs cooperation from Tehran for its oil supplies and its
relationship with Afghanistan.
Indian hackles were up when Pakistan gave the Gwadar port development
project to the Singapore Port Trust for a 40-year operating lease in 2007, while
China showed a keen interest in the port at the same time. The main reason for
India putting the Chah Bahar port on a back burner was a third-party assurance
to the highest levels of the UPA government that China would keep off Gwadar
if New Delhi backed out of Chah Bahar. Indian interlocutors were told that
China would move into Gwadar the moment New Delhi acts on Chah Bahar.
Now, with China under Xi formally taking over development of Gwadar, New
Delhi will have little option but to develop Chah Bahar as the Pakistani port will
provide long legs to the Chinese Navy in terms of refuelling, dry docking and
logistics.
Matters did not stop at Gwadar. Paying no heed to either Indian or
international concerns, China took step four when Beijing and Islamabad signed
a secret agreement for a 340 MW pressurized water nuclear reactor for phase III
of the 1,000 MW power plant at Chashma in Punjab. The deal with China
National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) was signed in Beijing during a visit by a
delegation from the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission from 15 to 18
February 2013. CNNC is China’s main nuclear weapons producer and has been
linked in the past to Pakistan’s nuclear programme by US and other Western
intelligence agencies. CNNC sold thousands of ring magnets to Pakistan during
the 1990s to be used as centrifuges to produce highly enriched uranium for
nuclear weapons. New Delhi is clear that it is only due to Chinese support that
Pakistan today has perhaps a larger nuclear arsenal of some 110 warheads, as
compared to the Indian arsenal which supposedly hovers around 80.
When China had joined the NSG in 2004, it had agreed to not sell additional
reactors beyond the two 300 MW reactors for Chashma I and Chashma II.62
Besides, China is not permitted under NSG guidelines to sell nuclear goods to
any country that is not part of the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA).63 While Chashma I and II have already been commissioned, Chashma
III and IV, of 340 MW each, are expected to be commissioned by 2016.
While both countries have been silent over the deal, a Beijing spokesman
replied to the allegation that the deal violated NSG provisions by saying, ‘I want
to point out that relevant cooperation between China and Pakistan does not
violate the relevant norms of the NSG.’64 The Chinese argument is that the 1
GW reactor is ‘grandfathered’65 by an agreement before Beijing joined the NSG.
Despite Islamabad having the worst track record of nuclear proliferation in the
past decade – when its chief nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan supplied weapons
technology to Libya, Iran and North Korea – Beijing went ahead and signed the
Chashma III deal even though there are tangible threats of diversion and theft of
fissile material.
 New Delhi should not be under any illusions about the Xi Jinping regime. It is
quite evident that China will continue to use Pakistan and vice-versa to needle
India and block its global ambitions. First propped by the US and now by China,
Pakistan continues to be categorized in a higher category in global affairs by
reaping advantage of its in-house pan-Islamic jihadist forces and trumped-up
fears about India trying to split the country.
Xi Jinping has also indicated that he will pursue a more assertive foreign
policy during his decade in power. In his first speech as head of state, Xi said
that he will fight for ‘the great renaissance of the Chinese nation’ and urged
greater national unity. Rather than only urging the PLA to protect the nation, Xi
warned the Chinese military to improve its ability to ‘win battles’ and urged the
nation to achieve what he called ‘China’s dream’. It was quite evident from Xi’s
‘China-first’ speech and strategic steps in the interregnum that Beijing was
focused on becoming a superpower rivalling the US and was willing to play
aggressive to achieve that goal. Xi’s speech was in line with Chinese
aggressiveness in the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute with Japan, Scarborough
shoal stand-off with Philippines, and Paracel and Spratly islands dispute with
Vietnam due to Chinese claims on the entire South China Sea.
Apart from Chinese stand-offs in East and South China Sea, Beijing was
stressed by its long-time ally North Korea issuing bellicose nuclear threats to the
US and South Korea and creating instability in the Korean peninsula. While Xi
went on record saying that ‘no one should be allowed to throw a region and even
the world into chaos for selfish gains’,66 Beijing was getting increasingly
frustrated with North Korea as an armed conflict in the Korean peninsula had the
potential to destabilize the entire region and beyond. Clearly pre-occupied with
diplomatic and military developments in the east, China was predictably being
verbally considerate to India since the regime change in Beijing. With no
intentions of opening another front in the south, India–China bilateral meetings
in 2012–13 went off smoothly even though Beijing delivered nothing except
words of mutual cooperation and continued to pursue it strategic interests in the
region.
Faced with an extremely focused adversary, the Indian strategy has been to
try and avoid confrontation or to buy time till it is militarily and diplomatically
prepared to tackle Beijing. Given the obvious military asymmetry and the ever-
widening economic gap between the two powers, India chooses to follow an
independent diplomatic path with China in the hope that Beijing will recognize
that New Delhi was not a lackey of the US or any other power and thereafter
deliver on its core bilateral concerns. While Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
has been very clear that China will be more aggressive in the days to come, he
has articulated a non-confrontationist win-win approach with Beijing, which
allows both countries to pursue their respective economic agendas rather than
stare at each other across the border. On resolution of the border dispute, Singh
has stuck to the line that India was willing to show accommodation on the border
issue but this accommodation should take into account ground realities or be
addressed through the April 2005 bilaterally approved political parameters and
guiding principles. The parameters were signed after Singh offered the above
solution to Wen Jiabao in Vientiane in November 2004.67
Since the UPA government took over in 2004, New Delhi has made it amply
clear that India and China are not necessarily heading towards a confrontation as
there was enough space in the world to handle the growth ambitions of the two
countries. Delivering the K. Subrahmanyam Memorial Lecture on 6 February
2013 on ‘India’s National Security – Challenges and Priorities’, Finance
Minister P. Chidambaram said, ‘A war with China was, and remains,
unthinkable and therefore that threat was fitted into another compartment
reserved to dealt with through a mixture of engagement, diplomacy, trade, and
positioning adequate forces along the borders.’68 Placing priority on economic
growth over national security, Chidambaram outlined the huge steps that China
had undertaken through a sustained 9 per cent growth in sharp contrast to the
low Indian figures to virtually suggest that Beijing was a different cup of tea. As
cabinet ministers in India normally reflect the views of the chairs they occupy,
Chidambaram’s statement was in sync with his position as finance minister. As
home minister after the 26/11 attacks, Chidambaram had given national security
top priority.
Prime Minister Singh on his part felt that bilateral relations between the two
countries could be characterized by cooperation and competition at the same
time, but on the whole to be for the larger public good. However, Singh
tempered his cooperation-and-competition theory with cold fact that one
country’s policy towards the other was defined not just by intentions but by
capabilities. In this context, Chinese capabilities across the borders have been
rising by the day despite its good intentions towards India.
On the eve of Xi Jinping taking over, there was a debate among top Indian
policymakers within the UPA government on how to engage the new Chinese
leadership. The PMO in March 2013 was juggling with at least two major
models on engagement with China with the revival of the US economy playing a
major factor in their thinking. A section of the PMO felt that India needed to
engage China as it was a rising power in comparison to dwindling American
economic power. This section felt that US interests in South Asia and Middle
East was on the decline and Washington would start looking inwards after
withdrawing from Afghanistan in 2014 and after its oil imports from the Middle
East came to a naught in 2016. As the US began focusing towards reviving its
own economy, its idea of a strong Asian pivot would get diluted, and therefore,
it was best that New Delhi dealt with a rising China on its own. Indian fears
about a diluted Asian pivot were heightened when Chuck Hagel was appointed
Secretary of Defence in the second Barack Obama regime. Hagel in his 2008
book America: Our Next Chapter69 was more concerned about trade with China
rather than as a competitor in security issues. To add to Indian discomfort, US
Secretary of State John Kerry was not President Obama’s first choice.
Dovetailed into this Indian thought process was the conclusion that as the US
begins revamping its infrastructure, it would generate both resources and
employment internally and thus boost its economy. This would force China to
look at Delhi as an alternative for its excessive capacities in the infrastructural
sector. This analysis came out to be partly true when Xi Jinping offered
infrastructure support, particularly towards upgrading Indian Railways, to Singh
at the 2013 BRICS meeting.70
Another section in the PMO also advocated for engagement with China but
differed on the projected decline of US economic might. This group believed
that with large-scale discoveries of shale gas on the US mainland, Washington
was on its way towards an economic revival and could be a key partner in
tackling the rise of China. However, both groups were clear that China would
consistently grow at above 8 per cent in the coming years and Beijing would be
a superpower for all practical purposes in the next decade. The fundamental
question in both the theories was whether India should align with the US and the
latter’s partners in the Asia-Pacific while engaging with China, or whether to
respond positively to Beijing’s verbal assurances and forge an independent path
with Xi Jinping.
While Prime Minister Manmohan Singh did not reveal his mind to his foreign
policy advisors, he was apparently clear that the US would continue to remain a
pre-eminent power for at least the next two decades, given its technological
innovation and military capabilities. This made a lot of sense given that the US
Navy currently operates 10 aircraft carriers and nearly 283 ships while China is
still taking baby steps in naval aviation and expeditionary forces through a
refurbished platform called Liaoning. The Indian Navy is better qualified to
handle aircraft carriers as it has a proven record of naval aviation since INS
Vikrant was acquired from the UK in 1957.
The premise that China would accommodate Indian concerns if New Delhi
were to open its infrastructure market to Beijing is fraught with dangers. If past
bilateral history is any indicator, China never does what it says and never says
what it does. Yet, there is a distinct feeling that India does not realize the full
economic potential of its relationship71 with China’s highly industrialized
neighbours – South Korea and Japan or even Vietnam – as it does not want to
feed into Beijing’s fears of encirclement.72 The Chinese insecurity over Indian
relations with countries like Japan, South Korea and Vietnam was evident with
the state-run People’s Daily virtually threatening New Delhi saying that it should
engage Japan at its own risk. A new flash point emerged on 23 November 2013,
when China declared an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the
contested Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, as part of Beijing’s effort to emphasize
sovereignty rights over the islands. Japan has declared a similar ADIZ over the
same islands in 1967.
Yet, China does not reciprocate its own sentiments and has made huge
inroads into India’s neighbourhood, while Pakistan functions as a virtual proxy
of Beijing and the powerful PLA. The basic priority of the Indian government
has been to keep the disputed border peaceful and incident-free while watching
China move into the Indian Ocean up to the Horn of Africa. To add to this, India
time and again plays music to the ears of Chinese leaders by reiterating that
Tibet is a part of China and that New Delhi is opposed to all political activity by
exiled Tibetans.
This leads us to a much larger question of whether India has already lowered
its global ambitions and has made its peace with the fact that China is a superior
power both in terms of its economy and military. While Beijing may try and read
negative meanings into Indian actions, New Delhi’s mindset is largely pacifist
towards China and perhaps bordering on fear of the stronger neighbour. Try and
question members of the CCS on its China policy and the answers are in
counter-questions. A senior member of the UPA government with his office on
Raisina Hill told me that New Delhi had a plan prepared in consultation with the
CSG to meet the challenge from Beijing. The counter-question, though, from the
CCS member was whether it was in Indian interests to open a front against
Beijing when the latter was already facing problems in South and East China Sea
and its long-time ally North Korea was daring the US to military action in the
Korean Peninsula. The minister told me that while China was engaged on its
eastern front, India was adding to its military capabilities and border
infrastructure to deter any action from Beijing in future.
The absence of any pro-active strategy from India to counter China is also
recognition of the fact that the Middle Kingdom is a superior military power and
Indian armed forces still need time to bridge the gap. But the military gap is fast
turning into a chasm as China is full steam ahead both in economic growth and
military modernization in comparison to India, where military acquisition has
been marred by corruption scandals with even armed forces officials making hay
while the sun shines. The involvement of Air Chief Marshal S.P.S. Tyagi in the
12 VVIP helicopter acquisitions from AgustaWestland in 2010,73 where a Italian
court found that the former air chief had been allegedly bribed to swing the
contract in favour of the Rome-based Finnmeccanica’s subsidiary, clearly shows
the extent to which corruption had seeped into the Indian system.
If military acquisition is stuck because of defence middlemen, the progress on
border infrastructure upgradation is also much behind schedule due to
bureaucratic delays and not just because of treacherous mountainous terrain. A
classic example of delay in Indian military acquisition is the purchase of former
Russian helicopter carrier Admiral Gorshkov. The terms of the deal, signed by
Atal Behari Vajpayee on 20 January 2004,74 were that the ship would be gifted
free to India with $800 million for refit and another $1 billion for MiG-29K
aircraft and other weapon systems. The overhauled and upgraded ship was to be
delivered in 2008. Five years down the line, the ship – now renamed as INS
Vikramaditya – was finally commissioned by Antony at Sevnash in Severodinsk,
Russia, on 16 November 2013, despite the minister not fully recovered from a
surgery earlier that month. The air defence ship arrived at the Indian port of
Karwar in January 2014.75
The morass goes much deeper. India has not been able to acquire a field gun
since the 155 mm Bofors gun was last acquired in 1991 amidst allegations of
kickbacks being paid by the Swedish manufacturer to the highest in the land.
China on the other hand purchased a aircraft carrier shell named Varyag from
Ukraine in 1998, towed it to Dalian shipyard in its north-eastern region, rebuilt it
and commissioned its first aircraft platform on 25 September 2012, now
rechristened Liaoning.76 While India has just 200 out of the originally acquired
410 towed guns left, China has 240 units of PLZ-05 self-propelled indigenously
manufactured 155 mm howitzers and another 150 type 88 WAC 21 towed
howitzers.
 The situation has become more worrisome as India has become the largest
importer of arms77 followed by China, but the latter has also displaced United
Kingdom as the fifth-largest exporter of arms in the world,78 with India nowhere
on the export radar. The crux of the problem is that while Beijing has been able
to push its indigenous military capabilities at the risk of being accused of
copying Russian and American designs, India’s military industry remains
underdeveloped with the in-house Defence Research and Development
Organisation (DRDO) not living up to its promise and the UPA government still
wary of opening the defence manufacturing sector to private entrepreneurs.
The other strategic catch is that China’s military exports are largely to Indian
neighbours. According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
(SIPRI), Pakistan accounted for 55 per cent of Chinese arms exports between
2008–2012, followed by Myanmar (8 per cent) and Bangladesh (7 per cent).79
While India may buy all the weapons in the world to deter Chinese moves across
the disputed land borders and high seas, there is a singular lack of strategic
vision when it comes to dealing with a focused Beijing. And this is confined not
only to the Indian political leadership but to the military top brass and diplomats
at large too, who still suffer from the mental trauma of the 1962 defeat.
The Economist magazine80 blamed Indian lackadaisical approach on a lack of
strategic culture and New Delhi’s largely pacifist approach. Even though CCS
members of Manmohan Singh’s cabinet would have us believe that there is a
method to Indian madness and a long term plan, this is not evident on the
ground, where its fence-sitting diplomacy is largely reactionary and inherently
status-quoist. There is no denying that India needs a huge economic and
technological boost to gain a legitimate seat at the global high table, but it is this
non-alignment mindset that has to change on Raisina Hill. Instead of adjusting to
a rapidly changing global scenario, senior UPA ministers are still fighting the
Cold War and hold a grudge against the US for sending the Seventh Fleet to Bay
of Bengal in the 1971 war. There are other junior ambitious ministers in the
same government who swear by anything that is American. Then there are the
right-of-centre leaders within the Congress party who believe that China is not as
bad as compared to global capitalists incorporated led by the US. Similarly, there
is a pro-US lobby, a pro-Russia lobby, and a rapidly growing pro-China lobby in
the power corridors of New Delhi, but no pro-India lobbyist exists to push its
agenda in the world.
A section of the Indian internal security establishment is quite vocal in its
views that while New Delhi sees a conspiracy in every Pakistani move, it is
rather benign towards China’s increasingly intrusive probes into South Asia and
is willing to happily trade to the tune of $100 billion with Beijing without any
trade-offs in turn. Based on the illogical belief that communist and authoritarian
China and democratic India have much in common, the attitude towards Beijing
has remained the same since Independence. It was this woolly headed ‘Hindi-
Chini Bhai-Bhai’ approach in the 1950s that led to the decimation of the Indian
Army in the winter of 1962.
 one

INDIA AND CHINA

Adversaries Forever?

On 9 August 2013, a grim looking Shyam Saran, chairman of the National

Security Advisory Board (NSAB), met Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to
discuss infrastructure upgrading and developments on both the LAC and the
Line of Control (LOC) with Pakistan in Ladakh sector.1 For the past week, Saran
had extensively travelled in the mountains up north at the directions of the PM
along with former Northern Army Commander and fellow NSAB member Lt.
Gen. (retd) P.C. Bharadwaj.2 This was not the first time that Saran was travelling
in this terrain as the PM had sent him on a similar mission in May 2007 as his
special envoy. At the time, Saran had recommended steps to upgrade Indian
military capacities through infrastructure development in Siachen sector with
Pakistan and the LAC. He had conducted a similar exercise in the Northeast after
taking over as foreign secretary in 2004 and had revisited LAC developments
along the Eastern Sector in 2013 at the directions of the PM.
The August 2013 mission was to review on-going infrastructure development
on the basis of measures taken by the UPA government after Saran’s first set of
recommendations, as well as to report on border developments.3 While Saran
had good news about the LOC, apart from cross-border firing in the Jammu
sector, his main focus was on the LAC and developments post the April 2013
Depsang intrusion. Saran told the PM that there was vast asymmetry between
Chinese and Indian military capabilities and that the PLA were nibbling away
territory on the LAC through better access, communication and military
dominance. According to him, India was worse off in the Western Sector as
compared to the Eastern Sector as the PLA’s focus appeared to be on the LAC in
eastern Ladakh. He found that the road to DBO had still not been completed as it
was being held up due to a vigilance inquiry, as a result of which the
northernmost posts were being supplied through helicopters and efforts were on
to land a newly acquired fixed wing C-130J Hercules fixed-wing aircraft at DBO
with radar equipment and supplies. The C-130J landed at DBO airstrip on 20
August 2013 with 20 tonnes of equipment, the first fixed-wing flight that had
landed on DBO after an Indian Air Force (IAF) AN-32 transport aircraft landed
in 2008.4 But the landing of aircraft was the least of India’s problems; Saran
reported that the situation was quite bad in Depsang and Pangong Tso areas,
with the domineering PLA pushing the Indian Army inwards.
The Depsang bulge falls south of DBO and just north of Burtse, where PLA
troops were first sighted before the 2013 face-off at Raki Nullah. While the
Chinese claim the entire bulge area as per Zhou Enlai’s 1959 map (refer to map
on page 3), the Indian perception of the LAC runs ahead of the bulge. Matters in
this area get more complicated as between Indian and Chinese lines runs a dotted
line, the Limits of Patrolling, as ratified by the CCS, for Indian patrols. The LOP
does not cover the full bulge but bisects it with points identified as 10, 11, 11A
and 13 to be covered by Indian Army patrols, as point 12 falls outside the dotted
line. However, to approach these points, Indian Army patrols have to go through
the gorge formed by Raki Nullah. The PLA incursion in April 2013 was
designed to ensure India could not patrol these points and in effect straighten out
the bulge.
Saran reported to the PM that the Depsang bulge was virtually under Chinese
control and even the points defined under the LOP would be lost if effective
deterrent patrolling was not carried out. The last Army patrol touching these
critical points was carried out on 17 July 2013. Although the Chinese have
accused India of violating the 2005 border agreement by constructing new
structures near the LAC, Saran found that the PLA had been doing the same near
Srijap sector in Pangong Tso. It was thanks to the 17 American high-powered
interceptor boats, introduced in the lake in 2011, that India for the first time had
been able to patrol its territory. While Singh asked Saran to submit his report the
next day, Saran said the morale of Indian troops was high after the introduction
of modular posts with centralized heating and high-quality winter equipment for
the troopers.
There was more good news on the national security front in the context of
China on the day Saran submitted his report, as the nuclear reactor of India’s
first indigenously built nuclear submarine INS Arihant went critical on 10
August5 and the first indigenous aircraft carrier INS Vikrant was launched two
days later.6 Fully understanding the security and political ramification of China
nibbling away on Indian territory, the PM sent Saran’s report to Defence
Minister Antony and NSA Shivshankar Menon apart from setting up a official
committee to implement all the recommendations suggested by the former
envoy.
Saran’s report confirmed that China was pursuing twin-track diplomacy with
India when it came to border and bilateral relations at large. Following the
footsteps of President Xi and Prime Minister Li Keqiang, Chinese Special
Representative Jiang Jiechi suggested to NSA Menon during his June 2013
Beijing visit that India should accelerate the border resolution. This suggestion
was in line with Xi’s proposal to the PM on 27 March 2013 at Durban and
Premier Li’s conversations with Singh during his visit to Delhi in May 2013. For
the first time, the Chinese had neither made any demands on large chunks of
land in the Eastern Sector nor had they indicated that India would have to yield
territory for a fair boundary resolution. But no commitment was made on the
ground or on paper, with India only dependent on China’s words. With both
Menon and Antony, who travelled to Beijing in July 2013, Chinese leaders were
willing to listen to the Indian point of view and wanted closer bilateral ties, at
least on the face of it. As part of the Border Defence Cooperation Agreement,
both sides agreed to add Kibuthu in the Eastern Sector as another point to hold
border personnel meetings to defuse any tensions on the LAC as well as open
hotlines between the Indian Army and the PLA in Beijing.7 Worried about the
rise of Japan and unrest in the Middle East, Chinese leaders wanted closer
cooperation with India in the region and beyond.8
Yet, despite these overtures, Chinese helicopters once again conducted a
reconnaissance of the LAC in the Chumar sector on 11 July 2013.9 A Chinese
spokesman defended the 17 June and 11 July acts by saying the PLA had not
crossed the LAC. These unsettling tactics on part of the PLA continued, with a
group of visiting Indian journalists on 15 July told by Major General Chen Zhou
of the Academy of Military Sciences that the Depsang incursion was accidental
and not deliberate.10 Briefing the media persons, he said Chinese military
strategy was defensive in nature. New Delhi, on its part, was cautious and did
not want to over-interpret Chinese gestures as this had led to disappointment in
the past. During Antony’s July visit, India made it amply clear it will not back
down from any Depsang-like situation in the future and that peace and
tranquillity on border was an important guarantor of growth in bilateral relations.
Taken aback by the phenomenal Chinese road infrastructure in Beijing and in its
outskirts, Antony’s commitment to improve India’s border infrastructure
doubled in belief. He signalled to his Chinese counterpart General Chang
Wanquan that just like China, India also had the right to build infrastructure and
strengthen troop defences on its side of the LAC for its national security. While
the UPA leadership heard what Antony privately called ‘pleasant faces’ of the
Chinese leadership’s opinion, they were unsure about the motives and ambitions
of the Chinese military leadership, which continues to adopt a hard line posture
with India. India therefore decided to make all efforts towards peace and
tranquillity on the border, but at the same time build up on its conventional
deterrence to thwart any sudden or accidental flare-ups.
Ties between India and China are not just about trust between the two nations
but also national interest and power projections. The two countries have co-
existed for the past 5,000 years, with their civilizations developing on a virtually
parallel track thanks to the Himalayas separating India and Tibet. These two
nations, representing one-third of humanity, have also been victims of conquests
and colonial occupation and share a common distrust towards outsiders. The two
countries have been insular societies, contained and content among themselves.
Yet, despite these similarities, there are multiple differences between these two
behemoths.
Despite both carrying colonial baggage from the past century, India and
China have evolved into fundamentally different nation-states, with the latter a
single-party monolithic communist state, while the former a raucous multi-party
democracy. While the rise of China in the past three decades is a result of
focused long-term vision of its leaders like Deng Xiaoping, India owes its
meandering rise to economic liberalization and definitive diplomatic steps in the
1990s by the P.V. Narasimha Rao government and the rise of its huge middle
class. The Chinese people, comprising 90 per cent ethnic Han and the rest
underdeveloped minorities like Tibetan Buddhists and Muslim Uighurs, tend to
speak in one voice and in one language. India, on the other hand, is a multi-
lingual, multi-ethnic state, with a rather chaotic decision-making approach based
on a long drawn-out consensus among multiple political parties, some of which
represent particular castes or regions. Just as the many voices vented through a
vibrant Indian media tend to confuse the Chinese, Beijing’s singular approach is
disconcerting to New Delhi and stokes the fear of deception among its decision-
makers.
Matters are further complicated by the rise of nationalistic feelings in both
countries, whose growth paths and interests have intersected globally, naturally
resulting in a rivalry that spans continents. Even though the leadership of the two
countries has tended to dispel the notion of rivalry, the undercurrent is that of
mutual suspicion and distrust.
In India, this feeling has been largely fuelled by an unfinished border dispute
agenda that has continued since the 1962 war, and by China’s increasing
assertiveness in South Asia. While China believes that its rise to global
superpower status in this century will be harmonious and peaceful, its
neighbours – from Japan to India – heavily discount this statement, as they can
virtually feel the heat from an imposing Beijing leadership. On the eve of the
eighteenth National Party Congress in November 2012 and ahead of the once-a-
decade leadership change, Professor Wang Jisi – regarded as a top foreign policy
expert by the Communist party leadership – said that Beijing was reworking its
plans to give its ties with India a primacy, while rebalancing Beijing’s decades-
old pro-Pakistan tilt, to counter American influence on India. New Delhi,
though, is not convinced, and its perspective towards China found voice in West
Bengal Governor and former NSA M.K. Narayanan’s statement in Melbourne on
1 November 2012, that both countries were ‘destined by geography to be rivals’.
Addressing the annual Australia–India conference, he regarded China’s
increasing assertiveness while dealing with disputes – whether on land or sea –
as ‘most disconcerting’. Narayanan specifically pointed out a few areas of
concern: ‘China’s activities in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir are very troubling for
India. Its not-so-subtle wooing of some of India’s neighbours to India’s
detriment is a cause of concern. [The] potential for a conflict also exists as
competition between India and China for new energy sources intensifies, with
China moving aggressively into West Asia and elsewhere.’11
Although what Narayanan echoed is now common knowledge among the
Indian strategic community, the India–China relationship is certainly not a lose-
lose game, as both sides use each other to emphasize their global roles and act as
force-multipliers on key global issues like climate change, UN reform and WTO
negotiations. Panchsheel – the five principles of peaceful co-existence and non-
interference as exhorted by Nehru – is still the bedrock of relations between the
two countries and is not targeted at any third country. The two countries believe
and practise non-interference, are opposed to the use of force for changing
inimical regimes like Libya post-2011 Arab Spring, and want political transition
in other states to come from within. Both countries support reform in the UN,
including giving more representation to developing countries on the Security
Council. But the critical difference in the positions of the two countries on UN
reform is that while India aspires to be a member of the UNSC, China only
‘understands and supports’ Indian aspiration to ‘play a greater role’ in the United
Nations, including in the Security Council.12 The fact is that Beijing is still to
come out in the open and support India’s candidature for an expanded UNSC,
despite Nehru actively canvassing for China to be included in the UNSC in the
1950s.
The two countries also have similar positions on WTO and climate change,
and are opposed to weaponization of outer space. While working towards a
regional trade agreement between the two countries, the bilateral trade between
them is slated to touch $100 billion in 2015–2016,13 with Indian private
companies – particularly those dealing in telecommunication equipment and
power transmission – preferring Beijing as a source for imports. Both countries
are equally opposed to terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, and are
partners in strengthening the global framework against terrorism. This
commitment to stamp out terrorism is due to the fact that both nations are
victims of trans-national terror emanating from the Pakistan– Afghanistan arc –
though Beijing has hardly suffered as compared with India due to its umbilical
ties with Pakistan, a recognized source for pan-Islamic terrorism.
After India and China became strategic partners in 2005,14 the two countries
started building defence ties through an established line of dialogue, with an idea
of understanding each other’s military doctrines to maintain peace along the
3,488 km-long LAC. In this context, Indian Army and PLA personnel deployed
along the LAC promote exchanges with both parties getting involved in cultural
and sports exchanges. Although India stands by established UN laws of the seas
for passage in international waters, both countries are opposed to third-party
intervention on high seas and believe in an international force under the UN to
target pirates, gun runners and drug traffickers.
However, the key issue between the two countries remains the border
settlement issue, still a work in progress and a hanging fire for the last fifty
years. Although there are confidence-building agreements and protocols since
the 1993 Peace and Tranquillity Agreement in place to keep the LAC quiet, the
issue remains an open wound and is prone to flare-ups from time to time. After
both countries fought each other in 1962, it was under Prime Minister Rajiv
Gandhi that fruitful steps were taken to normalize ties between the two countries
in 1988. Then, in 1995, Prime Minister Rao pushed the peace envelope with
China and at the same time unveiled the Look East policy, under which India for
the first time in its modern diplomatic history started looking towards South East
Asia and gave up its colonial hangover with Western powers. After the 1993
Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity Agreement and the 1996 Agreement on
Confidence-Building Measures in Military Field along the LAC, the single
biggest achievement on the boundary dispute has been the Agreement on
Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for Settlement of the India–China
Boundary Question, signed on 11 April 2005 – both the 2011 joint secretary
level-border mechanisms and the 2013 BDCA are progenies of this agreement.
It is instructive to note the timing of the 2005 agreement, as Beijing
recognized the convergence between India and the US with the signing of the
civilian nuclear agreement between the two countries and the de facto
recognition of New Delhi as a nuclear weapons state on 18 July 2005. The
immediate trigger for Beijing’s rapprochement was the initiative of the Indian
leadership in leading the relief effort, in the wake of the disastrous 26 December
2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, which engulfed parts of 11 Asian countries and left
nearly 255,000 people dead. New Delhi moved its Western Navy with relief as
soon as then Sri Lankan Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike and then
Maldives President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom requested Manmohan Singh for
help, much before the Americans woke up to one of the biggest disasters in
history.
Two days after Indian ships landed in Sri Lanka and Maldives, the US,
Australia and Japan joined hands with India in relief efforts. Caught unawares,
the Chinese wanted to pitch in but its overtures did not find currency with Uncle
Sam. It was only after Beijing read the Indian tsunami initiative and capability in
the global context that it decided to move ahead on the boundary issue.
However, with Manmohan Singh’s government subsequently running into
difficulties with Left coalition allies over the Indo–US nuclear deal and UPA-I
heading for a political showdown in 2007– 2008, the Chinese once again
changed tack. This was evident during a bilateral meeting between Indian and
Chinese premiers on the sidelines of the East Asia Summit in Singapore on 21
November 2007. It was at this meeting that Wen Jiabao, the Chinese premier,
harped that India should be prepared to give substantial concessions on the
Eastern and Western sectors to resolve the border issue. Even though Manmohan
Singh had made it clear that he had across-the-board political backing to sort out
the boundary issue, Wen indicated that Beijing wanted to move away from the
mutually agreed political parameters signed in April 2005. He instead sought a
regional trade agreement with India as well as market economy status for China.
With China showing little seriousness about addressing long-standing
bilateral issues, Manmohan Singh quietly deferred the joint task force on Indo–
China regional trade agreement to then Commerce Minister Kamal Nath for
further negotiations with his Chinese counterpart. At the high-level trade and
economic relations committee meeting, Singh also concurred with views of the
then External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee, Finance Minister P.
Chidambaram and Kamal Nath that China could not be given market economy
status till 2016 under WTO provisions. While India revised the bilateral trade
targets to $60 billion, the Indian PM sent a tough message on the eve of his visit
to Beijing, between 13 and 17 January 2008, that India was in no hurry to allow
Beijing to its markets if China was not forthcoming on sorting out outstanding
bilateral issues.
The shifting positions in Beijing’s attitude towards the boundary dispute are a
good barometer of India’s standing in the world and the forward movement in
bilateral ties. While New Delhi thinks its aspiration for the global high table is
legitimate, the Chinese leadership and even its junior diplomats have a
condescending view towards India, and do not have any qualms in shifting the
strategic goal posts to suit its strategic convenience. This patronizing attitude is
evident from two events in 2005–2006.
On 4 September 2005, then Defence Minister and now Indian President
Pranab Mukherjee was addressing a seminar on the role of private sector in
defence preparedness, organized by the Indian Merchants Chamber of
Commerce in Mumbai. In his speech, Mukherjee, one of the senior-most
Congress politicians, called on medium and small enterprises to actively
participate in the manufacturing and purchase in the field of national defence. He
explained why India needs to actively prepare for war by raising the example
that China ‘invaded’ India in 1962, before moving onto the India–US defence
agreement signed during his June 2005 US visit. When Mukherjee was ready to
answer questions, Chinese Consul-General in Mumbai Song Deheng tersely
pointed out, ‘China never invaded India! As defence minister, Mr Mukherjee
should be better informed than other people concerning the background and
situation at that time. It is untrue and irresponsible to say that China invaded
India. Particularly, over forty years later, today, when China and India enjoy
much improved relations, it is even outdated to say that China “invaded” India,
therefore, minister, please do not use the word “invade”.’ 15
A diplomat at the level of a deputy secretary publicly challenging the defence
minister of India on the sensitive 1962 war was noted by New Delhi, even as
Mukherjee chose not to join issues with the junior envoy. What was more galling
was that Song chose to settle the scores on the spot rather than raise the issue
through proper diplomatic channels. But this was not all.
On the eve of the Chinese President Hu Jintao’s state visit to India between
20 and 23 November 2012, the then Chinese Ambassador to India Sun Yuxi in
an interview to CNN-IBN claimed that Arunachal Pradesh is part of Chinese
territory, and the sensitive hotspot of Tawang is ‘only one of the places in it’.16
Sun reiterated his position and also hinted loudly that China did not consider
India as part of the nuclear weapons states’ club and avoided a question on
Beijing wanting India to give up nuclear weapons. ‘Unfortunately, we have five
nuclear weapons powers in the world. That number should be reduced. We will
be very happy if we can give up our nuclear weapons and are working on an
international agreement on elimination of nuclear weapons,’ he said. While a US
telegram exposed by WikiLeaks stated that the Chinese conveyed that Sun’s
remarks were unauthorized and out of step with the prevailing bilateral
sentiment, Deheng and Sun’s remarks reveal the dominant Beijing mindset
towards India.17
It is in this context that one of India’s most eminent China experts and NSAB
chairman Shyam Saran’s 29 August 2012 speech must be read. Saran, delivering
the second annual K. Subramanyam Lecture, said that most Chinese portrayals
of India and Indian leaders in conversations with other world leaders and in
articles by some scholars and commentators have been ‘starkly negative’.18 ‘An
Indian would find it quite infuriating to read some of the exchanges on India and
its leaders in the Henry Kissinger transcripts on the eve of the 1971 India–
Pakistan war.’ Saran noted that Chinese commentators took China’s elevated
status in Asia and the world as given, but dismissed Indian aspirations as a
‘dream’, noting the repeated references to the big gap between the national
powers of the respective countries. ‘India’s indigenous capabilities are usually
dismissed as having been borrowed from abroad,’ he said, referring to a research
paper entitled Chinese Responses to India’s Military Modernization by Lora
Salmaan of Carnegie Endowment,19 in which the author had pointed out the
frequent dismissal by Chinese analysts of Indian claims of domestic production
and innovation by adding the phrase ‘so-called’ or putting ‘indigenous’ or
‘domestic’ in question. Saran noted the usual Chinese refrain that India is
chaotic and undisciplined and does not have what it takes to be a great power
like China. He also quoted another article by commentator Peter Lee, recalling
an anecdote from a Washington Security Conference when a Chinese delegate
caused an awkward silence among the congenial group at a post-event drinks
session by stating that India was an ‘undisciplined country where plague and
leprosy still existed’. The Chinese delegate admitted Beijing was amazed at the
quick rise of a ‘big dirty country’ like India.20
Speaking on ‘China in the twenty-first century: What India needs to know
about China’s world view’, Saran noted that deception and shifting stances was a
legitimate diplomatic tool in the Chinese armoury, with the stress on the written
word emphasized repeatedly rather than the spoken. ‘In Chinese diplomatic
behaviour, this cultural particularity poses unusual challenges to any interlocutor
or negotiator. The Chinese will insistently demand and sometimes obtain explicit
formulations from friend and adversary alike on issues of importance to their
interests, but rarely concede clarity or finality in formulations reflecting the other
side’s interests. Thus, there is recurring demand that India reaffirm, time and
again, its recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet.’ Saran provided an
example by referring to the 2003 China visit by Prime Minister Vajpayee, when
China conceded Sikkim as a part of India but did not explicitly record this in
written formulation. In 2005, during Wen Jiabao’s visit to India, China went a
step further and handed over maps that showed Sikkim as part of India. But the
absence of an official statement recognizing Indian sovereignty over Sikkim
leaves the door open to subsequent shifts if necessary. Saran said, ‘I recall seeing
the record of a conversation between Indian diplomat Ratan Kumar Nehru, a
relative of Jawaharlal Nehru, and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai in 1962, some
months before the border war erupted… R.K. Nehru drew attention to reports
that China was leaning towards the Pakistani position that Jammu and Kashmir
was disputed territory.’ According to Saran, Nehru reminded Zhou of an earlier
conversation, when China had been asked if it accepted Indian sovereignty over
Jammu and Kashmir and Zhou had rhetorically asked, ‘Has China ever said that
it does not accept Indian sovereignty over Jammu and Kashmir?’ In the latest
encounter between the two, Saran noted, ‘Zhou turned the same formulation on
its head to ask, “Has China ever said that India has sovereignty over Jammu and
Kashmir?”’
Saran concluded the lecture by arguing that India and China ‘harbour
essentially adversarial perceptions of one another’. Since China is the one power
‘which impinges most directly on India’s geopolitical space’, the two countries
will ‘inevitably intrude into each other’s zones of interest’, or ‘overlapping
peripheries’. ‘It is not necessary that this adversarial relationship will inevitably
generate tensions or, worse, another military conflict, but in order to avoid that,
India needs to fashion a strategy which is based on constant familiarity with
Chinese strategic calculus,’ Saran noted, advocating the need for Indian
diplomacy to be nimble-footed while dealing with China and to be prepared for
sudden changes in context and positions from the Chinese leadership. To handle
China, Saran recommended, India will have to keep the global context and state
of play in mind as Beijing prepares itself carefully before each action and does
nothing on impulse. He suggested that India should only believe in the written
word from China and should be prepared to question or challenge any move that
impinged on Indian sovereignty as Beijing understands both the language of
power and deception.
While New Delhi may believe that Beijing will mellow down on its territorial
claims in the coming years, China loses no opportunity to emphasize its so-
called suzerainty over Arunachal Pradesh, or South Tibet as they call it, as
amplified by then Chinese envoy to India Sun Yuxi in 2006.21 A 2010 paper,
authored by the Institute of Defence and Strategic Analyses (IDSA) research
fellow Namrata Goswami, records that in May 2007, China denied a visa to
Ganesh Koyu, an Indian Administrative Service officer from Arunachal Pradesh,
who was to be part of a 107-member IAS study team to Beijing and Shanghai.22
Beijing’s pretext of denying him a visa was to point out to India that Ganesh is a
Chinese citizen since he belonged to Arunachal Pradesh, and could therefore
visit the two cities without a visa. Another deliberate act of Chinese provocation
was in June 2009, when China tried to block India’s request for a $2.9 billion
loan from Asian Development Bank, as the request included $60 million for a
flood management, water supply and sanitation project in Arunachal Pradesh.
According to the author, the Chinese move to block the ADB loan was the first
time that Beijing sought to broadcast its claim on Arunachal Pradesh in a
multilateral forum. Subsequently, in October 2009, China expressed deep
dissatisfaction when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited Arunachal
Pradesh during the campaign for the state assembly elections. The Chinese
Foreign Ministry spokesperson Ma Zhaoxu asserted that such visits trigger
disturbances in the disputed region. In November 2009, China openly protested
the Dalai Lama’s visit to Arunachal Pradesh when Jiang Yu, a Foreign Ministry
spokesperson, asserted that China’s stance on the so-called Arunachal Pradesh
was consistent. ‘We firmly oppose Dalai visiting the so-called “Arunachal
Pradesh,” the author quoted the spokesperson.23
Similarly, A.K. Antony, a demure, quiet and reticent defence minister, has
been at the receiving end of the Chinese on each of his visits to Arunachal
Pradesh. Beijing objected to his visit to Tawang on 6 April 2008, and more
recently, to his 25 February 2012 visit to state capital Itanagar to participate in
the twenty-fifth statehood celebrations, with Chinese Foreign Ministry
spokesperson Hong Lei saying that India should refrain from taking any action
that could complicate the border issue.24 However, the usually polite defence
minister refused to take things lying down this time and called Beijing’s
comments ‘most unfortunate’ and ‘really objectionable’.25 Antony emphasized
that Arunachal is as integral a part of India as Jammu and Kashmir, and as
defence minister it was his right and duty to visit the state.
Although New Delhi time and again in the past has tried to paper over
strategic difficulties posed by Beijing, the Chinese leadership loses no
opportunity to drive the nail with brazen behaviour of a superior power.

‘MADE IN TIBET’ FLOODS

At 1.30 a.m. on 1 August 2000, a 50-foot high wall of water from the Sutlej river
tore into the mountain gorges of Kinnaur, Shimla and Mandi districts in
Himachal Pradesh, washing away everything that came in its path. More than
100 people lost their lives, while 120 km of the strategic Old Hindustan–Tibet
highway was washed away and 98 bridges of various sizes and shapes were
completely destroyed. The official estimate of the loss was T 200 crore.
This flash flood was a replay of the flash floods in Arunachal Pradesh about
two months earlier, on 11 June. Only this time, the river that ravaged the Indian
countryside was the Siang, known as the Tsangpo in China and the Brahmaputra
in India. That day, the Siang rose by an unprecedented 100 to 120 feet and
devastated four districts of the state. At least 26 people lost their lives while
three strategic bridges were swept away by the raging waters, with the official
estimate of the loss being T 139.50 crore.
The two flash floods were initially dismissed by the then NDA government as
freak natural phenomena caused by cloudbursts. In fact, they would have
remained nondescript files in the National Disaster Management Cell of the
Ministry of Agriculture but for Indian Space Research Organisation’s (ISRO)
stunning revelation that the floods had been caused by the premeditated release
of excess water that had collected in water bodies in the Sutlej and the Siang
river basins in Tibet. The Sutlej is part of the Indus river system and enters India
from Tibet through Kinnaur district in Himachal Pradesh, while the Siang is part
of the mighty Brahmaputra system and enters India in the Upper Siang district of
Arunachal Pradesh.26
 China has denied these allegations and maintains that there were no floods or
incessant rain in Tibet at the time of the two flash floods. The Chinese have
attributed the floods to ‘natural’ causes on the Indian side. But when the two
disasters struck, it was not raining in either Himachal Pradesh or Arunachal
Pradesh. This is precisely why there were no flood warnings issued by the two
state governments at the time.
ISRO’s charges are based on a careful examination of satellite images of river
basins in Tibet. ISRO scientists pored over multi-date satellite data to investigate
the causes of the flash floods, analysing around 30 satellite pictures of the Siang
river basin in eastern Tibet region and 25 images of western Tibet. These
findings were submitted to the Ministry of External Affairs. Also, during a
review of the flood forecasting projects under the Jai Vigyan National Mission in
March 2001, an ISRO representative apprised the then Union Science and
Technology Minister Murli Manohar Joshi of these findings. While the satellite
images remain classified, officials from the Ministry of Water Resources
indicate that these pictures clearly show the presence of huge water bodies
upstream in Sutlej and Siang river basins before the flash floods. However, these
lakes disappeared soon after the disaster struck, a clear indication that the
Chinese had breached these water bodies, as a result of which lakhs of cusecs of
water were released into the two rivers. According to Water Resources Ministry
officials, the floods in Arunachal had occurred due to a breach of a lake on the
Tsangpo, with ISRO pointing out this lake’s location at latitude 30.15 degrees
north and longitude 94.50 degrees east in Tibet. Then Chief Minister Gegong
Apang went on record saying a lake was formed after the Yigoing, a tributary of
the Tsangpo, was blocked by massive landslides in Tibet’s Bomi region in April
2000. He alleged that the Chinese authorities took the help of the army to breach
the artificial lake, which resulted in floods downstream that cut off the Upper
Siang district from the rest of India and completely washed away the Kargo and
Nubo bridges, two of the biggest steel bridges in the state.27
Similarly, in Himachal Pradesh, 14 major strategic bridges were swept away
and Air Force helicopters had to be deployed for rescue and relief work.
Kinnaur, famous for its apples and alpine landscape, remained cut off from the
rest of the country for several weeks. The worst hit was the Nathpa-Jhakri
hydroelectric project which was coming up on the Sutlej in Rampur district.
Floodwaters entered the turbine section of the multi-crore 1,500 MW project,
setting it back by almost three years.
Armed with ISRO’s evidence of downstream damage and irrefutable satellite
imagery, India took up the need for river data sharing for both Brahmaputra and
Sutlej with China in 2001 – while both countries shared data on the Brahmaputra
in the 1950s, the 1962 war put a stop to all bilateral cooperation. Nonetheless, it
took China another three years before an agreement to bi-annually share real-
time flood data of the Brahmaputra was signed in 2004, and on the Sutlej during
Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to India in December 2010.
But the optimistic prospects of joint river management between the two
countries were stymied in April 2010, when Chinese Foreign Minister Yang
Jiechi confirmed to New Delhi that a run-of-the-river dam was being constructed
at Zangmu in Gyaca county, Shannan Prefecture, Tibet, on the Tsangpo.28
Gyaca, or Drumpa, lies on the Great Bend of the Tsangpo – called Shuomatan
Point, where the river does a U-turn and starts flowing towards Arunachal
Pradesh in India – and the dam project is expected to generate 510 MW of
electricity by 2015. Despite the $1.2 billion dam contract being awarded to
Gezhouba Group in April 2009, Beijing had consistently denied reports in the
Indian media about it trying to rein in the Brahmaputra by building a dam
upstream.29 Although China has now told India that it is neither diverting the
river nor creating a storage capacity dam, it must be remembered that Beijing
only confirmed the Zangmu dam after being presented with satellite imagery of
construction at the site. According to Chinese reports, nearly 114,000 MW of
hydroelectricity could be generated from the Tsangpo basin alone and nearly 28
hydroelectric projects are already on the drawing board. If China decides to
divert the river or store its waters, the project will directly impact the areas
downstream, with India also looking to generate more than 80,000 MW of
hydroelectric power from the Brahmaputra.
In response to the Chinese dam, Manmohan Singh allayed fears by stating in
Parliament on 4 August 2011 that the flow of the river would not be affected by
the dam built by China. ‘What has been alleged is that it is only a run-of-the-
river dam,’ he told the Rajya Sabha as he intervened on behalf of then External
Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna. Replying to the question on impact of Zangmu
dam on Brahmaputra flow, Krishna said that India had been assured by Wen
Jiabao during his December 2010 visit that the dam will have no ill effects on
the downstream area of the Brahmaputra. Krishna may be right, but there are
credible reports about Chinese plans to divert the Tsangpo at the Great Bend to
the dried-up Yellow River basin up north.30 With China expected to face 25 per
cent water shortfall by 2030,31 it is only a matter of time before Beijing decides
to pump water through underground channels to the Yellow River Basin, which
is already 30 per cent dead and heading towards desertification.32
The idea of a south-north water diversion was introduced in China by Mao
Zedong in 1952 and is now estimated to be completed by 2050.33 This project
entails the transfer of 44.8 million cubic metres of southern waters to Beijing and
Tianjin up north. Professor Brahma Chellaney of the think-tank Centre for
Policy Research has described China as a ‘hydro-hegemon’,34 as the country is
the largest source of trans-boundary rivers with as many as 10 rivers flowing out
of the Tibetan plateau to 11 countries in South and East Asia. According to him,
no country in history has built more dams than China, which has built more
dams than the rest of the world put together, with poorer environmental
practices. The water crisis situation could go out of hand, he argues, as China
continues to adopt a unilateralist approach to its use of rivers and dam
construction. While almost all of China’s neighbours have water agreements
among themselves, not one has an agreement with Beijing – this includes
friendly nations like North Korea and Pakistan. While India is apprehensive and
has raised the issue of diverting the Brahmaputra with Beijing, China has for the
moment ruled out any such move citing ‘possible impact on state-tostate
relations’.35 Jiao Yong, vice-minister for water resources, said on 14 October
2011, ‘The Yarlung Tsangpo river flows across China’s Qinghai Tibet Plateau.
Many Chinese citizens have been calling for greater usage of this river.
However, considering the technical difficulties, the actual need of diversion and
the possible impact on the environment and state-to-state relations, the Chinese
Government has no plans to conduct any diversification project on this river.’36
On the sidelines of the 2013 BRICS summit, Prime Minister Manmohan
Singh proposed a joint river management mechanism to Chinese President Xi
Jinping so that new projects on trans-border rivers could at least be discussed in
the interests of lower riparian states like India and Bangladesh. Although China
is still far away from initiating joint river management with India, the prospects
of possible frictions arising over sharing of river water are very high in the future
between the two most populated countries.37 For example, on 26 June 2005, a
landslide dam drained on the Pareechu Lake in Tibet resulted in floods on the
downstream Sutlej in Himachal Pradesh.38 Though it was confirmed by satellite
imagery that the dam had formed more than a year ago, Beijing gave little
inkling of the danger to come. India can ill-afford to have its infrastructure
destroyed and downstream run-ofthe-river dams shut down or threatened every
time a landslide dam is drained on the Tibetan plateau.
 The only way out is for the two countries to work on a river water sharing
treaty. The impending water crisis in India could trigger a confrontation with
other states too, due to severe environmental impact from flooding on lower
riparian states like Bangladesh and Pakistan.39 India on its part stands steadfast
on the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty with Pakistan despite the two states going to
war three times post-agreement. Broadly, the treaty grants exclusive rights of
Ravi, Beas and Sutlej to India and Indus, Chenab and Jhelum to Pakistan. In
December 1996, India signed a Ganges water treaty with Bangladesh granting
dedicated flows to Dhaka at Farakka Barrage. India also has a robust river
mechanism with Nepal with both countries discussing various hydroelectric
projects on trans-border rivers and its impact downstream.
In contrast, China does not have any treaty on trans-border Tibetan rivers due
to its insecurities over Tibet and is loath to discuss any hydroprojects on these
rivers. While Beijing shares basic river data with India on the Brahmaputra, the
impact of dams on the mighty river may trigger off a political reaction in India
forcing the government of the day to strongly react to China. With Indian
political parties, particularly the BJP, already targeting the UPA government for
its weak policy towards China, matters could get far worse if water flows in
India’s Northeast states are impacted by the Great Bend dams. The clamour
against China on Brahmaputra dams has already started building up, with
Arunachal Pradesh state government complaining about the drying up of the
river. Besides the trans-border ramifications, there is concern over the ecological
impact of these mega hydroprojects in Tibet.
The massive commercial exploitation of the fragile Tibetan plateau ecosystem
by the Han Chinese is a matter of serious concern to India, and the world at
large. The Tibetan plateau is the largest repository of ice on the planet outside
the two poles with nearly 40,000 glaciers feeding the 10 trans-border rivers
emanating from the region. The relocation of millions and the subsequent trans-
location of Han Chinese into the heart of Tibet for purposes of security,
deforestation, unbridled mining of natural resources and rapid industrialization
have already wreaked havoc on the environment. According to a China Daily
June 2011 report,40 the Chinese state council has prepared a comprehensive plan
to protect the environment and ecology of the Qinghai–Tibet plateau over the
next two decades. The plan covers the Tibetan Autonomous Region, Qinghai
province, as well as parts of the Xinjiang Uighur autonomous region and
Sichuan, Yunnan and Gansu provinces. The three step roadmap states:
ecological degradation and pollution should be effectively controlled before
2015; the region should fully embrace a balanced development model that
focuses on both economic growth and ecological protection; and an overall
improvement in environment quality and healthy ecosystems should be restored
by 2030. The report states that the once-pristine Tibetan plateau is already
suffering from desertification due to intensive human activities such as mining
and overgrazing, further worsened by global warming. It quotes a ranger at
Qomolangma National Natural Reserve in Tibet as saying that pristine forests in
the area had been destroyed by local people for housing and that sandstorms
were frequent in his hometown Dingri during winter months.
Although the Himalayas stand between India and Tibet, there appears to be a
correlation between weather patterns on the plateau and monsoons in the
subcontinent. There is serious concern in Indian officialdom over the ecological
impact of rapid industrialization of Tibet on trans-border rivers and the
monsoon, as this could lead to a crisis of global proportions. There is a need for
the world to use economic and diplomatic leverage to impress on Beijing to stop
further degradation of the ecosystem and make it the engine to sustain double
digit economic growth for China.
While India and China have collaborated on climate change issues at
multilateral forums, the two countries have moved very slowly bilaterally on
sharing environment and river basin data due to Beijing’s sensitivity towards
Tibet. At this juncture, it is pertinent to note that the only subject recording a
rapid forward movement in bilateral ties is trade, currently pegged at some $74
billion and increasingly skewed towards the Chinese side.41 India is looking to
further this trade, as highlighted by PM Manmohan Singh at the Earth Rio+20
Summit in 2012, when he announced that the two countries had decided to
increase mutual trade to $100 billion by 2015, with Beijing allowing the long-
pending demand of exporting Indian rice to China. However, a closer look at the
bilateral trade reveals that India suffers a $40 billion deficit in its trade with
China, a fifth of its total trade deficit, in 2011.

SKEWED TRADE
Bilateral trade between India and China stood at $75.4 billion in 2011–12
against $59 billion in 2010–11. India exported goods worth $17.9 billion to
China in 2011–12, while importing goods worth $57.5 billion, resulting in a
trade deficit of $39.5 billion. Apart from these glaring figures of a widening
trade deficit, the nature of Indian exports to China came to the notice of the
Indian National Security Council Secretariat much earlier though, through the
illegal mining scandal in Karnataka.
Before the Chinese economy slowed down post the 2008–2009 global crisis,
it was Indian iron ore or what is called iron fines that fuelled China’s growth
engine. With global iron ore prices on a high during the period, Karnataka
mining barons made a killing by exporting iron ore to China from the state. A lot
of these exports were a result of illegal mining at Sanduru hills in Bellary, a city
on the Karnataka–Andhra Pradesh border. According to official figures from the
MEA, the trade imbalance for India grew from 12.84 per cent (January–October
2009) to 15.90 per cent for the same period in 2010 and 22.79 per cent in 2011.
The trade deficit stood at $27 billion in 2011 and expanded to $29 billion in
2012.42
But a more serious issue is the fact that India mostly exports raw materials to
China, while the latter sells capital goods and finished products in the Indian
market. This is no different from the imperial legacy when the British grew
opium in India for export to China at the turn of the last century. In simple terms,
India does not manufacture enough finished products that the Chinese want to
buy, but Chinese finished goods have dominated Indian markets. In fact, India
had to impose a duty of 20 per cent on telecommunication and power equipment
imports as all private manufacturers were outsourcing the manufacturing of
critical equipment to China, throwing security concerns and standardization
processes out of the window. Indian concerns over Chinese telecommunication
imports have mounted since 2010, as giants like Huawei and ZTE Corporation
are suspected to have PLA links.43 While ZTE Corporation was founded in 1985
by state-owned enterprises associated with the Chinese Ministry of Aerospace,
Huawei’s founder Ren Zhengfei retired as a major from the PLA in 1982. Ren
also joined the Communist Party of China in 1978 and as a representative of
private entrepreneurs was elected member of the twelfth National Congress.
Ren’s ties with the Party and the PLA were cited as security concerns in not
allowing Huawei imports to expand in India. The Indian Home Ministry,
particularly the internal security establishment, was equally shocked to find that
Indian private power companies had virtually outsourced all their equipment
manufacturing to China without understanding the long-term security
implications of the move.44
Just as the US did not allow Huawei to pick up a 17.4 per cent stake in
American internet router and network equipment manufacturer 3Com on
grounds of national security in 2008,45 New Delhi had legitimate concerns over
lack of standardization of equipment used in the critical infrastructure sector.
Given the links of the two companies with the Chinese government, Indian
intelligence could not rule out the use of previously embedded malware in the
equipment to pass out data or trigger a system collapse in times of hostilities.
The Home Ministry also raised the red flag after it came to its notice that
Chinese companies were desperate to bag infrastructure projects, particularly
power projects, in the northern states of Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab, Himachal
Pradesh, Uttarakhand and Haryana. According to officials, it was found that
Chinese companies were actually bidding at 10– 20 per cent of the base bid price
for projects in the northern states, while the bids were around plus to minus 10
per cent of the lowest bidders in projects down south. Even the National Security
Council Secretariat (NSCS) pointed out the discrepancies between Chinese bids
for projects in the north and south of India, giving rise to fears that the bids were
subsidized by the state or could be used to trigger a power outage or a grid
collapse in times of crisis. It was then that the ministry prepared guidelines for
all imported systems to be test-checked by a third party for malware and need for
intense scrutiny of the equipment. The Department of Telecommunications
(DoT) was told that Indian nationals should mandatorily be made part of the
group hired for third party checks so that indigenous test capabilities could be
built up. Much to its chagrin, MHA officials found that DoT had only one piece
of equipment to check malware in equipment installed by private companies and
that too was outdated. To be fair, the Indian security establishment was not only
worried about China but also the US and other Western countries. Indian fears
came true after a third country tipped off Indian intelligence about possibility of
malware in American hardware equipment installed at a nuclear power plant in
South India.
Test checks were conducted and the malware was located, but rather than
remove the malware, the Indian nuclear establishment replaced all the 190
computers in the plant.
It was after such security breaches that the government proposed to impose
20 per cent tariff on the import of electrical equipment. It wanted equipment for
key infrastructural projects like the T 20,000 crore laying of optical fibre to link
country-wide panchayats, the T 15,000 crore alternative communication network
for armed forces, and the T 600 crore secure system for handling government
data and files to be sourced domestically. The sub-text in these proposed policies
is that India wants companies like Huawei and ZTE to set up shop in the country
rather than merely export equipment. This was emphasized to the companies
further: After S. Jaishankar took over as Indian ambassador in July 2009, he was
invited to the plush Shenzhen residence of Ren Zhengfei. Ren took pains over a
meal to convince Jaishankar that Huawei had nothing to do with the Chinese
government just as he had nothing to do with the PLA or Chinese intelligence.
He explained his past association with the PLA and the Communist Party only to
emphasize that he had no support from the Chinese state and that Huawei was a
private entity. While the envoy dutifully conveyed this meeting to his superiors
in New Delhi, he also made it clear to Ren that the only way to allay the Indian
establishment’s security fears was to set up Huawei manufacturing facilities in
India.
Such is the concern over Chinese companies that the DoT on 16 August 2012
recommended to Telecommunications Minister Kapil Sibal that New Delhi
should restrict Beijing’s presence only to telecom manufacturing while keeping
strategic areas such as infrastructure and broadband networks for relatively
friendlier countries like the US, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Sweden and
Finland.46 According to the 15-country international cooperation strategy
prepared by the department, China – the largest exporter of telecom goods to
India – was pushed to the lowest spot on a weighted assessment based on trade
and strategic parameters, with the department recommending that future
cooperation be limited to telecom manufacturing only. Clearly revealing the trust
deficit between the two countries, the report went on to say that equipment for
key businesses such as infrastructure, broadband penetration, managing
urbanization and resilient networks be procured from the US, Japan, South
Korea, Australia, Sweden and Finland, while satellite imagery and emergency
communications be explored from friendly countries like the US, Russia, Japan
and France.
The department’s view on China will clearly impact the sale of third
generation Chinese wireless broadband networks while continuing to allow
imports of cell phones, computer hardware like notebooks and computer
accessories like USBs and Bluetooth devices from the country. Going further,
the report earmarked the US, Israel, Finland, Canada and Japan for sensitive
purchases of security, encryption and surveillance technologies due to strategic
reasons. Mobile applications purchases were preferred from US, Japan, South
Korea and Israel while cooperation in cloud computing was only recommended
for purchases from the US and Japan. The report suggests joint working groups
to be set up with the identified countries and relevant organizations in the future.
With India becoming cyber security conscious in the past decade, the DoT
has been closely screening the imports of network equipment, particularly from
China, with vendors required to make their software code and facilities available
for inspection or face stiff penalties. The fear of cyber intrusions and attacks and
controls by China, the US and other Western countries also prompted an inter-
ministerial panel in July 201247 to recommend a complete ban on sourcing
telecom equipment for all critical networks from overseas, while coming out in
favour of a 100 per cent domestic sourcing of such projects. ‘India’s territorial
boundaries are adjacent to unfriendly neighbours. If any critical network is built
using equipment from hostile countries and the same is shut down for a small
period, the country’s security would be compromised,’ said the report on
‘Preference to Domestically Manufactured Electronic and Telecom Goods in
Procurement, due to Security Considerations, and in Government Procurement.’
The report stated that Japan, Taiwan and South Korea, who are also in close
geographical proximity to hostile countries, do not allow any critical network to
be built using equipment from such countries.
Among the projects identified for complete domestic sourcing were national
optic fibre networks, networks for spectrum and other defence communications,
national knowledge networks and all communication projects for utility
companies such as Indian Railways, oil, gas and power entities. ‘Since most of
the products are already available in the country or can be developed in required
timelines, it must be ensured that 100 per cent requirement of critical equipment
for such projects should be domestically manufactured at the earliest,’ the report
said. In fact, to ensure that preferential access to domestic firms does not violate
WTO provisions, the Telecom Ministry is all set to specify that such treatment
would only be given to projects that have ‘security implications for the country’
and in government purchases for ‘own use and not for commercial sale or with a
view to use in the production of commercial goods for resale.’48
The lingering Indian suspicion of Huawei and ZTE is quite evident from the
report. Indian intelligence and law enforcement agencies have issued a warning
on the use of sophisticated Chinese equipment that could compromise the
country’s security, as Chinese firms are extremely reluctant to share technical
information and system keys of their products with Indian counterparts. In wake
of this concern, the committee suggested that the source code and intellectual
property rights of all products should be indigenous and be available to any
government agency at any time. The panel’s concerns are based on the growing
requirement of fully secure backbone networks for critical projects as the ability
of the adversary to use these devices and applications to disrupt normal human
life and threaten life and property was growing by the day. Although the existing
preferential market access policy requires that both state-and private-owned
mobile and landline networks buy up to 30 per cent of the network from within
India,49 given the penetration of Chinese companies in Indian telecom
infrastructure, the proposed new policy – whose implementation was put on hold
and further review by the PM in July 2013 – wants domestic sourcing to rise to a
minimum of 80 per cent by 2020.50 However, till that time – given the scale,
volumes, quality and cost of products manufactured by Chinese companies – it
would be very difficult for Indian companies to compete with them in terms of
technology and pricing.
Despite New Delhi seriously worried about the security ramifications of high
technology imports from China, particularly in power and telecommunication
sectors, the fact is that Indian entrepreneurs are making a bee-line to Beijing to
purchase basic equipment like power bus relays and data storage equipment. On
12 July, 2012, India’s top institutions like the PMO, the Ministry of External
Affairs, DRDO and ITBP, which patrols the LAC, were targeted by Chinese
hackers. While India security agencies are strengthening the firewalls through
cyber discipline and counter-strategies, they also understand that capital goods
imports from China will rise in the future due to competitive pricing and excess
capacities. In this context, New Delhi has adopted a two-pronged strategy:
firstly, encourage Chinese manufacturers to set up shop in India and secondly,
use the same lever to extract security compliance.
The over-dependence of Indian companies on China cuts both ways
politically as well.51 It not only gives Beijing the handle to further explore the
Indian market, but also gives New Delhi the political leverage and space for
bilateral manoeuvres. With the global economic slowdown hitting India and
finally manifesting in weaker growth rates in China, the former remains the
biggest market for Beijing’s excess capacities that have been lying idle due to
shrinking contracts from the West and the volatile Middle East. China has been
in a single-minded pursuit of exploiting South Asian markets to sustain its
economic growth, and this is an opportunity for India to sort out long-standing
prickly issues like the need for joint management of trans-border rivers, pending
exchange of maps in the Western and Eastern sectors, addressing the growing
evidence of Chinese indirect support to Indian rebels in the Northeast and
solving the boundary dispute.
 India needs to learn to leverage trade, particularly market access, with China
and other powerful countries as well or else Beijing would continue to dismiss
New Delhi as a regional power incapable of delivering on an international stage.
Saran believes one of the key factors that will mould Chinese perceptions about
India will be the latter’s relationships with other major powers, particularly the
US. ‘My own experience has been that the closer India–US relations are seen to
be, the more amenable China has proved to be. I do not accept the argument that
a close Indo–US relationship leads China to adopt a more negative and
aggressive posture towards India. The same is true of India’s relations with
countries like Japan, Indonesia and Australia, who have convergent concerns
about Chinese dominance of the East theatre. I also believe that it is a question
of time before similar concerns surface in Russia as well. India should be
mindful of this while maintaining and consolidating its already friendly, but
sometimes sketchy relations with Russia. The stronger India’s links are with
these major powers, the more room India would have in its relations with
China.’52
The other issue, Saran pointed out, which could change China’s outlook
towards India was the shrinking global economy, with Beijing integrally linked
to the global economy and the presence of other major powers in the Asian
theatre. ‘A reassertion of Chinese dominance, or an assumption, that being at the
top of the pile in Asia is part of some natural order, is likely to bump against
painful ground reality, as it has since 2009, opening the door to the US
rebalancing. The recent reports of slowing down of Chinese economic growth
should be sobering,’ Saran noted.

COURSE CORRECTION
Saran is not the only one who has picked up on the sobering mood of the
Chinese political leadership post the 2009 economic slowdown. While the
slowdown has brought a reality check to the Chinese political thinking, the US
pivot in the Pacific and the countering of Beijing’s aggressiveness in South
China Sea by other East Asian powers have also contributed to this
readjustment. The changing strategic calculus in Asia, with New Delhi prepared
to meet China only on equal terms in the twenty-first century, has also led to a
course correction by Beijing. The threat of pan-Islamist terrorism through the
Wakhan corridor due to instability in Pakistan–Afghanistan, the rise of militancy
in Xinjiang and the turmoil in Tibet have ensured that China maintains near-
normalcy in its relationship with India, or at least publicly demonstrates it. In the
run-up to the twelfth National People’s Congress and the subsequent national
leadership change in March 2013, China had been predictably accommodating
towards India as it wanted no disturbance during the power shuffle. This near-
normal attitude towards India is also due to China’s open friction with other East
Asian nations, such as with the Philippines over Scarborough Shoals in South
China Sea, with Japan over the disputed Diaoyu islands in East China Sea and
with South Korea over Beijing’s inability to control a belligerently nuclear North
Korea. As Saran has noted, there are no morals attached to the legitimate
Chinese game of diplomatic deception.53
This cooling down towards India was evident during Defence Minister
General Liang Guanglie’s visit to India in September 2012, after a long-standing
invitation. This was the first visit by a Chinese defence minister in eight years;
General Cao Guangchan, also vice-chairman, Central Military Commission, paid
a visit in March 2004. From the Indian side, George Fernandes and Pranab
Mukherjee both visited China as defence ministers in 2003 and 2006
respectively.
During Liang’s visit, the Manmohan Singh government and Antony in
particular were surprised by the bonhomie shown by the Chinese delegation as
nothing incongruent was raised during bilateral meetings with the PM, Antony
and NSA Menon. Normally, any Chinese bilateral engagement would be
prefaced by Beijing’s concern over so-called political activities of the Dalai
Lama and Tibetan Youth Congress activists, but Liang presented a different face
even before he took off from Beijing. Antony, during Liang’s visit, told the
Parliament in a written reply that India had asked China to stop expanding its
footprint in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK).54 ‘The government is aware of
the infrastructure development by China at the border and their [Chinese]
undertaking infrastructure projects in PoK. The government has conveyed its
concerns to the Chinese about the activities in PoK and asked them to cease such
activities.’
Liang on his part gave an interview to The Hindu, in which he stated that ‘the
PLA has never deployed a single soldier in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir,’ calling
all such reports and allegations ‘totally groundless’.55 ‘It needs to be stressed
that China always holds an explicit attitude towards developing the strategic and
cooperative partnership between [India and China]. It is regrettable that some
media in India occasionally make some groundless comments when reporting
about China–India relations,’ Liang said. While Liang blamed the media for
fuelling the distrust between India and China, he went a step further by replying
to a question on Beijing’s future plans to establish military bases in the Indian
Ocean Region (IOR). He told The Hindu: ‘PLA Navy ships, while conducting
long-distance voyages, often went close to ports of littoral countries for logistic
supply. This is a common practice of world navies. Since the beginning of their
escort mission in the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia at the end of
2008, the PLA Navy ships have conducted logistic supply from the ports of
Djibouti, Oman, Yemen, etc. According to the need of escort missions and other
long-distance voyages, we would also consider having logistic supply or short
rest at appropriate ports of other countries. Such logistic supply activities do not
have any connection with establishing military bases overseas.’
On the long standing boundary dispute and border management, Liang
adopted a pragmatic moderate line when he said, ‘Before the final settlement of
the boundary issue, the Chinese side is willing to work together with the Indian
side to jointly maintain peace and tranquillity in the China–India border areas
(sic). The exchange and cooperation between the border troops of China and
India is an important basis for maintaining stability in the border areas.’ He
insisted that both sides needed to strictly abide by the relevant agreements,
restrict their own border troop personnel and not unilaterally expand activities
and military deployment along the LAC to jointly maintain a stable situation in
the border areas.
Liang’s public negation of PLA soldiers in PoK and Beijing’s interest in
military bases in the IOR was greeted with scepticism by the Indian
establishment. While Antony was happy to note the reasonable line from Liang,
he knew that a new Chinese defence minister would take over by March 2013.
Even though the two decided to increase the frequency of ministerial visits,
Antony was rather convinced that the new leadership under Xi would be more
nationalistic and therefore more assertive. Instead of being taken in by Liang’s
interview, Antony was clear that India needed to keep the LAC tranquil and
continue building up capacities and infrastructure along the disputed boundary.
The Indian assessment before Liang’s visit was that Beijing did not want any
disturbances on the LAC during the power transition and leadership change in
China. The first indication came from none other than President Hu Jintao
himself, when he spoke about peace on the border and closer economic
cooperation during his interaction with Manmohan Singh on his visit to New
Delhi on 28–29 March 2012 for the fourth BRICS summit.
 Liang also discussed the new joint secretary-level mechanism for border
management without any message on sorting out the boundary issue with
Antony, conveying the Chinese desire to hold more bilateral exercises with
Indian forces, delegation level visits and exchanges down to the level of junior
officers. He also stated the official Chinese position on South China Sea citing
historic claims, where there wasn’t any space for third party intervention as
China needed to sort out the disputes bilaterally.
The official Indian position on South China Sea remains an opposition to
outside intervention (read the US), passage for ships according to international
laws on sea and resolving the dispute bilaterally but in context of the laws on
sea. It is interesting to note that both China and India are opposed to outside
intervention in South China Sea as New Delhi fears that the same rule could be
applied to the IOR, where it doesn’t want the US to be an active third player.
While both sides did not raise the issue of PLA or Chinese presence in PoK,
Antony obliquely mentioned Pakistan without naming it by saying that ‘no
country should export terror’.56 China itself has now felt the effects of Islamists
in Xinjiang with East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) cadres being trained
in Af–Pak. As terrorism continues to radiate from the region, both defence
ministers expressed support for peace and stability in Afghanistan; China has
started to feel the heat through the Wakhan corridor and its long borders with
central Asian republics.
Antony’s wariness about Chinese military moves turned out to be true when
PLA troops intruded across the LAC in April 2013. The Indian Defence
Minister, who was prepared to visit China in May 2013, had to postpone his trip
as New Delhi conveyed it was opposed to any high-level exchanges till the time
the PLA returned to its original positions or restored the status quo on the LAC.
After the Depsang face-off was resolved, Antony finally visited China on 3 July
2013 to meet his Chinese counterpart General Chang Wanquan. Cutting through
the chaff, he made it politely clear that India will stand up to any PLA moves on
the LAC. To drive the message home, on 16 July 2013, the Indian Cabinet
Committee on Security cleared a T 81,000 crore proposal to set up the Army’s
first mountain strike corps to plug the gaps on the LAC.
It is not that New Delhi does not see through China’s newfound
accommodation in bilateral ties; instead, it understands the need to buy time and
consolidate its military capacities. India is not convinced about Chinese denials
over the presence of military or para-military personnel in mufti in PoK. In fact,
after the contentious border dispute, the Chinese all-weather relationship with
Pakistan continues to heighten the existing trust deficit between New Delhi and
Beijing, with the two adversaries sharing the ambition to pin New Delhi down to
South Asia.
The close bilateral ties between Pakistan and China are evident from the fact
that former Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari visited China nine times during
his tenure. In 2012, Zardari, former PM Raza Pervez Ashraf and all three
services chiefs visited China with Beijing offering support to Islamabad to tide
over its balance of payment crisis and promoting bilateral cooperation in
banking and trade facilitation. Although China makes relevant noises for
expansion of the UNSC and will not stand in the way of India’s entry to the high
table,57 New Delhi knows that Beijing and Islamabad are coordinating in their
efforts to scuttle India’s bid for a permanent seat. Apart from bilateral
cooperation in defence technologies, infrastructure, mining, nuclear and energy
sectors, China launched the Pakistani satellite PAKSAT-1R in 2011, besides
signing a 10 year agreement on space cooperation.
China looks set to play a larger role in Kabul as well. During the first China–
Afghanistan–Pakistan trilateral dialogue, held in Beijing in February 2012, it
was evident that Beijing was seriously concerned about the post-2014 situation
in Afghanistan, when US forces pull out. While the US for the past two decades
has been footing the bill for stabilizing Afghanistan and Pakistan to a large
extent, the post-2014 scenario will force Beijing to loosen its purse strings to
handle the militant threat to Xinjiang from radicals based in the two Islamic
nations. Recognizing the threat that Beijing faces from Islamists, a joint
declaration establishing strategic and cooperative partnership was signed during
Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s visit to China between 5–8 June 2012. Beijing
has also announced a $23.8 million grant to Afghanistan for reconstruction
efforts. Kabul was also granted an observer status in the China-led Shanghai
Cooperation Organisation (SCO), with former president Hu Jintao telling his
Afghan counterpart that the multilateral organization wanted to play a bigger
role in Kabul.
While China’s security engagement with Afghanistan is limited to providing
troop training and overall capacity building at present, its main interests lie in
economic reconstruction and the vast untapped mineral and hydrocarbon
resources in the country. China’s biggest investment in Afghanistan is in the
Ayunak copper mine project, while work on oilfield drilling in Amu Darya has
begun.58
Another source of concern for New Delhi has been the newfound affection
between Thimphu and Beijing. New Delhi was surprised by the meeting between
Wen Jiabao and former Bhutan Prime Minister Jigmi Y. Thinley on the side
lines of the 2012 UN Rio +20 summit, where it was revealed that Beijing wanted
establishment of diplomatic ties with Thimphu in return for support on a non-
permanent seat in the UNSC for the next two years. The two PMs decided to
move ahead on settling the boundary dispute and subsequently in the twentieth
round of official level talks, both sides agreed to conduct a joint technical survey
of the disputed areas.59 While Wen has gone on record to say that the Indo–
China boundary dispute would take a long time to resolve, he wanted a time-
frame to be set for a final settlement on the boundary from Thinley, clearly
indicating Beijing’s priorities in the region.60 By 2011, Beijing had become the
third largest trading partner of Bhutan,61 cultivating the elite and the
parliamentarians through development of Buddhist projects in the erstwhile
Himalayan kingdom. Much to the chagrin of New Delhi, people-to-people
contacts have also increased between the two countries, with Chinese tourist
arrivals recording a high of 2,895 tourists in 2011 as compared to none in
2006.62
Similarly, Chinese penetration in other neighbouring nations such as Sri
Lanka, Nepal and Myanmar is equally worrying for New Delhi, which has
desperately tried to counter such moves. In Sri Lanka, an exponential rise in
China’s involvement coincides with President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s rise to
power in 2005. The real impetus came after China’s support in defeating the
ethnic Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) rebels in 2009. China has
become a major trade and investment partner of Sri Lanka with Chinese funding
climbing to $3.6 billion in 2011, predominantly in infrastructure projects such as
roads and bridges, power and energy, ports and shipping and aviation. Chinese
assistance towards developing Hambantota port will give the PLA Navy long
legs as the port will be used for refuelling Chinese ships criss-crossing the Indian
Ocean. Apart from traditional areas of cooperation like defence and
reconstruction, China and Sri Lanka have joined hands in launching of satellites.
Beijing has also offered a $600 million loan for upgrading the education system
in the islandnation.63
Similarly, Chinese engagement in Nepal has coincided with the rise of the
Maoists in 2008 and already there are indications that Beijing has started to
influence political developments, advising local political parties against
ethnicity-based federalism in the new constitution.64 While China’s main
concern in Nepal is to prevent pro-Tibet activities emanating from Kathmandu, it
has pushed hard on the economic front and is giving serious competition to
Indian companies in infrastructure development projects. While we will discuss
the bilateral cooperation in detail, a number of cultural institutions meant for
spreading Chinese language and portraying China in a positive light have been
set up in the country, with Nepal–China Study Centres being prominent among
them. Nearly 17 such centres are in the Terai region bordering India, exposing
the latter to unbridled Chinese espionage.65
Finally, Beijing’s relations with Myanmar continue to be very strong, though
the recent opening-up of erstwhile Burma has caused concern in China. It has
invested in multiple infrastructure projects in Myanmar, including in an oil and
gas pipeline linking Myanmar to Yunan as well as a railway project connecting
Yunan to the port of Kyaukpyu on the Bay of Bengal.66 This strategic project is
aimed at creating alternative outlets to the Indian Ocean, which would obviate
the need for Chinese imports, including oil from the Gulf, from passing through
the narrow Malacca Straits. China continues to have a robust defence
relationship with Myanmar and there are reports of Chinese weapons making
their way to Indian insurgent groups in the Northeast through the Myanmar–
Bangladesh route. China is trying to extend the Yunan–Kyaukpyu transport
corridor to Bangladesh via the Chittagong axis even as Beijing firms up its
relationship with yet another Indian neighbour.67 The latest in Beijing–Dhaka
relationship is the Chinese offer of assistance to the Rooppur Nuclear Power
Plant Project and the offer to launch Bangladesh’s first satellite.68
However, Chinese interest in small island nation of Maldives takes the cake
as far as Indian security interests are concerned. While Chinese tourist arrivals in
Maldives have shot up since its embassy was inaugurated in 2011, Indian
military intelligence has picked up Beijing’s involvement in political protests
that led to the removal of President Mohammed Nasheed on 7 February 2012 at
the behest of former dictator Gayoom. When the Indian Army was alerted in
January 2012 about a possible military coup at the behest of Chinese operatives,
rapid deployment formations were prepared for possible military preemption in
Male. The ultimate irony was that a liberal Nasheed had to resign and the Indian
army movements were misconstrued as then Army chief V.K. Singh’s attempt to
orchestrate a military coup against the Manmohan Singh government, which was
opposed to give him an extension of another year over the much-publicized age
dispute.
 two

1962 WAR AND TRUST DEFICIT

At 6 a.m. on 3 November 2011, an Indian Army’s advanced light helicopter

(ALH) took off from the Kushok Bakula Rimpochhe Airport at Leh. The
temperature outside was four degrees Celsius below zero. Inside the helicopter
were the then Chief of Indian Army Staff General Vijay Kumar Singh, Northern
Army Commander K.T. Parnaik and XIV Corps Commander Ravi Dastane, who
carried detailed area troop deployment maps with them. The chopper crossed the
17,852 feet high Khardung La and entered the Nubra valley, their flight path set
towards the Siachen glacier.
Some 40 km short of the Indian Army’s base camp near the snout of the 70
km long glacier, the ALH dipped towards the Nubra river and landed on a
makeshift helipad on its banks at Sasoma. Waiting for the army brass were three
Aerospatiale Alouette II or Cheetah helicopters, with two pilots each from the
famed Army Aviation Corps standing in attention in the sub-zero temperature.
The three Cheetahs took off, turned away from the Siachen glacier and headed
towards the glaciated 17,753 feet high Saser La. Flying at an altitude of nearly
20,000 feet, much above the usual flight ceiling for Cheetah helicopters, with
copilots clearing the glass cockpit of ice, the three helicopters crossed the
perfectly conical 25,171 feet high Saser Kangri peak to their right. To their left
were the Siachen and Rimu group of glaciers, with the 28,251 feet high K2
massif looming over the horizon. The flight over Saser La appeared to be never-
ending, the mountain ranges seemingly ready to chew the three helicopters that
had the audacity to enter the Great Karakoram range. Many a men and mule had
lost their lives trying to cross the permafrost at Saser La in summers while
following the old Silk Route to Yarkand.
Yet, that day, the commanders were not on a tour of the mountain ranges.
With the PLA building up its military capabilities across the LAC, and with the
construction of the Qinghai–Tibet Railway (QTR) over permafrost in the high
Tibetan plateau, the Indian Army and Defence Ministry had ordered a study on
whether it was possible to tunnel the permafrost at Saser La to have an
alternative route to forward positions on the border. The Indian defence
establishment had been examining the possibility of a more-than-10-km-long all-
weather tunnel under the glaciated Saser La, which connects Sasoma with
Murgo on the banks of Shyok river. Another reason in support of this tunnel was
the fact that the majority of Indian military positions and advance landing
grounds near the LAC are under observation and within firing range of the PLA
artillery, and hence could not be utilized in case of hostilities breaking out
between the two countries.
From their iced-up Cheetahs, the Army commanders looked down towards
the treacherous Saser La. Building a tunnel here would be fraught with
environmental consequences and daunting, if not impossible. The cold desert of
Gapshan, with its undulating plains devoid of even a single blade of grass,
appeared below them once they crossed the pass and flew towards the 18,176
feet high Karakoram Pass on the Indo–China border. The commanders had now
entered the theatre of the 1962 war, where the PLA had overrun Indian positions
and forced Indian soldiers to retreat to the Ladakh ranges.
Turning back from the desolate Karakoram pass due to high-velocity winds,
the three choppers landed at India’s northernmost military base, Daulat Beg
Oldi. Eight kilometres from the China border and nine kilometres from the LAC,
with temperatures touching less than 10 below zero and freezing winds, the
DBO advance landing ground at 16,880 feet appeared to be the remotest place
on earth. Although the Air Force had landed an Antonov-32 medium-lift plane at
the base on 31 May 2008 for the first time since 1962, the three helicopter pilots
refused to take a chance and kept their engines running due to the intense cold
and rarefied air while the VVIPs did a security review of the Chinese threat in
the area. Fifty years ago, PLA troopers had fired LMG rounds on an Indian AN-
12 cargo plane piloted by Squadron Leader Chandan Singh as he attempted to
land at this very strip. The incident took place on 20 October 1962, as the PLA
overran the Chip-Chap river area that night and threatened to encircle the DBO
base by the afternoon. Indian troops were pulled back to what is now Thoise
military airfield, 160 km north of Leh in Shyok valley.
While the DBO airstrip is still under PLA observation from Trig Heights –
three prominent hills on the LAC – the ground situation has altered since then
and the 1962 exercise cannot be repeated by the PLA anymore. DBO has today
been beefed up with 130 mm long range artillery guns, which were lifted by
helicopters and assembled at these heights, and is now serviced by the powerful
US-built C-130J Hercules transport aircraft, with the first one landing on 20
August 2013. The maintenance of artillery weapons at these heights is an
onerous task, with barrels freezing and requiring replacements on case to case
basis. Even though Indian decision-making process is slow and long-term
strategic policy limited to a few officials on Raisina Hill, DBO is no longer the
1962 vintage base it once was.

Map of eastern Ladakh

Former Indian Army Chief of Staff General V.K. Singh (extreme-left) with senior military commanders at
the Daulat Beg Oldi post near Karakoram Highway in November 2011 (Photo courtesy Indian Army)

In a makeshift operations room at the base, the Army brass was briefed about
PLA activity across the LAC while they saw real-time images of Karakoram
pass through cameras installed near the pass. There is hardly any traffic on the
pass, which lies to the east of Shaksgam valley, which was ceded by Pakistan to
its all-weather friend China in 1963. The PLA also has the Karakoram pass
under observation through cameras and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and
both sides have even installed dummy cameras and radars to keep the other side
off balance and on their toes. The confidence-building measures post the 1962
war, particularly the 1993 and the 1996 agreements, have ensured both sides
don’t commit themselves to aggressive patrolling up to the perceived LAC, or
turn their backs at each other in case their respective patrols inadvertently land
up at the same spot.
As the primary focus of this book will be the chain of events in the past two
decades, with the 1962 conflict as a principal reference point, we will briefly
discuss the disputed areas on the border, and subsequent agreements and
measures post-1962 later in the chapter.

PANGONG TSO AND CHUSUL

The three Cheetahs took-off from DBO towards the Depsang plains and bulge,
which had seen a reduction in LAC transgressions by the Chinese between
2008–2012. This changed for the worse in April 2013. Flying over the Shyok
river, which flows south of Daulat Beg via Gapshan and Murgo, the helicopters
headed for the saltwater lake Pangong Tso after refuelling at a military base
around Yargulak. At a height of 13,970 feet, Pangong Tso is a fascinating sight
with emerald-blue freezing water but without any flora and fauna. Both sides
patrol the lake with high-speed interceptor boats, as the LAC passes through it
with 60 per cent of the saline water body in Tibet and held by China.
It was quite evident to the commanders that India was seriously lagging in
road infrastructure along the LAC. Not so long ago, till the 1990s, troops were
fed by mule trains which took nearly 16 days to reach Murgo from Leh, or had
their supplies air-dropped. Even now, the generals noticed, only a dirt track ran
parallel to the LAC in Ladakh – the track could just support 2.5 tonne trucks
north of Pangong Tso and 3.5 tonne trucks to its south, towards Demchok.
Except for allowing tourists from Leh to visit Pangong Tso with special inner-
line permits, these areas have been out of bounds for visitors for the past 50
years. There were hardly any roads or supporting infrastructure in the area. In
sharp contrast, the Chinese had built highway no. 219, connecting Lazi and
Xinjiang regions in the 1950s, and in the 1990s tarred roads to the LAC. Chinese
capability in the area is far superior, with established communication lines and
tremendous logistical capacity to sustain military operations for significantly
longer periods.
The helicopters continued to fly towards the eastern portion of the 700 sq. km
Pangong Tso, landing at Chushul at a height of 14,304 feet. The generals were
taken to a vantage point for a 360-degree view of an area that saw serious
military action in 1962. While the battalion commander of the Army Chief’s
own Rajput Regiment explained the threat perception in the area, it was quite
evident why Chushul was critical to Indian defences. Bereft of any natural
barriers, a threat to Chushul would directly pressure the capital of Ladakh, Leh,
through the Indus valley via the Kiari–Karu axis. This was where 114 valiant
soldiers of Charlie Company of 13 Kumaon, led by Param Vir Chakra winner
Major Shaitan Singh, made their last stand at Rezang La, a 16,000 feet high pass
on the south-eastern approach to the Chushul valley. The company, comprising
of Ahir soldiers from Haryana, fought the PLA without any artillery or air
support to the very bitter end, writing a glorious chapter on sacrifice in the
annals of Indian Army.
Changing helicopters now, the generals flew over the Chushul airstrip –
which is not used as it is vulnerable to Chinese artillery fire – and Spanggur gap,
where flag meetings between India and China border commanders take place to
resolve any crisis. The Cheetahs then tipped down towards the silent yet resolute
Rezang La memorial in the valley. Their next stop was Demchok, on the banks
of the mighty Indus. Even though the commanders had flown nearly 500 km that
day, it was only at Demchok that the threat from Chinese military capacities
could be seen from the naked eye.
Demchok village is split by the LAC, with a huge PLA observation tower
across and fresh permanent settlements coming up since the 2008 Lhasa
uprising. With the Indus defining the LAC between Demchok and Fukche,
Indian and Chinese border patrols often come face-toface here. Both sides have
cameras and radars mounted along the LAC, with the Chinese focusing more on
internal security along with concerns over Indian presence in the area. Demchok
villagers affirm that had it not been for the India–China stand-off over the
border, the Kailash–Mansarover pilgrimage could easily be conducted from their
village, with the mountain nearer and much more easily accessible as compared
to the Dharchula trek from Uttarakhand.
After detailed briefings from Indian troops patrolling the LAC, it was quite
evident that PLA capacities had grown multi-fold since the 1962 war, with all-
weather black top roads linking forward posts now. It was also understood that
the Indian response to the Chinese buildup had been leaden footed and seriously
wanting, especially in road infrastructure development. With winds building up
post-noon, the Cheetahs escorted the generals to Fukche, base for a Sikh
Regiment battalion. Proud of their war traditions, the Sikh regiment had a gold
Buddha on display in the trophy room, which had been picked up from Peking
during the Boxer Rebellion. Just like the Chushul airstrip, the Fukche advance
landing ground was lying in disuse as it was said to be under direct observation
of the PLA guns. To counter this, the Indian Air Force (IAF) had built an air
strip at Nyoma, some 110 km from Fukche, for LAC logistics and supplies. This
new strip was inaugurated on 18 September 2009 with the landing of an AN-32
cargo aircraft. On 4 October 2013, then Air Chief N.A.K. Brown announced that
Nyoma would be turned into a full-fledged operational base, with fighter and
transport planes, to provide logistics to troops, with the base operational by
2016–17.
It was clear from the comprehensive aerial survey that Indian military
capacities were seriously lagging behind. There was a virtual status quo from the
1962 war as far as border infrastructure on the Indian side was concerned. The
Indian government, particularly the Army, appeared shy of building roads in
border areas with China till such time a conscious decision was taken during the
NDA regime in 2004, built on new confidence post the 1998 nuclear tests.
While we will discuss reasons for delayed Indian border road development in
greater detail later, it would suffice to say that the humiliation of 1962 had
deeply dented the morale of Indian forces and to date serving army commanders
carry that load.
But the 1962 war was not the first time Indian and Chinese troops fought each
other; at the dawn of the twentieth century, Indian soldiers under British rule had
been part of the eight-nation mission to neutralize the Boxer Rebellion. It is
important to delve into Indian participation in the Boxer Rebellion, as the
humiliation meted out to Chinese peasants by the troops of eight nations,
including the US, Russia, France and Britain, was one of the reasons behind the
1962 war lesson Beijing gave to New Delhi.1 The Chinese believed that Indian
troops had been involved in looting and torture of peasants as much as other
troops. The gold Buddha at the Fukche Sikh battalion mess was part of the
Boxer Rebellion booty and evidence that native soldiers were not behind their
imperial masters in the loot of China.

BOXER REBELLION
The Boxer Rebellion (1899–1901) was a violent, anti-foreign and anti-Christian
movement by a secret society founded in Shandong in China’s northern
province. Westerners called these athletic well-trained young men ‘Boxers’. The
Empress Dowager Cixi of the Qing Dynasty used Boxers to expel Western
influence from China under the slogan ‘Revive the Qing Dynasty, destroy the
foreigners’. Boxers across north China attacked Christian missions as they
believed that missionaries were destroying their religion through large-scale
conversion and coercion. Many missionaries and Chinese Christians were killed
in this retaliation.
In June 1900, Boxer fighters, lightly armed or unarmed but believing in their
supernatural powers, gathered in Beijing to besiege foreign embassies.
Diplomats, foreign civilians, soldiers and some Chinese Christians retreated to
the legation quarter east of Tiananmen Square, where they held out for 55 days
until the eight-nation alliance brought 20,000 troops to their rescue. According
to Indian military officials, the siege was lifted by the Indian relief force which
numbered around 8,000 soldiers. The Indian contingent largely comprised Sikh
and Punjab regiments. Some of the units which were decorated during the 13-
month lifting of siege were the 91 Punjab Regiment, 24 Punjab Regiment, 20
Brownlow’s Punjabis, 51 Sikh Regiment, 14 Sikh Regiment, 7 Rajput Regiment,
122 Rajputana Infantry Regiment, 4 Gorkha Regiment, 88 Carnatic Infantry
Regiment, 6 Jat Light Infantry Regiment, 15 Cavalry Regiment, 2 Lancers, 130
Baluch Regiment and 126 Baluch Regiment.
In his essay entitled ‘(A) Subaltern(’s) Boxers: An Indian Soldier’s Account
of China and the World 1900–1901’,2 Professsor Anand Yang uses the account
of a 7 Rajput Regiment sepoy Gadadhar Singh to throw light on Indian
involvement in the rebellion. Gadadhar’s account makes it quite evident that
Indian as well as British troops were involved in the loot of Beijing after the
siege was lifted, though the Indian sepoy blames Russian and French troops for
rape, arson and plunder. Yang, quoting Gadadhar Singh, wrote:
At times, he only identifies the perpetrators as ‘foreign’ troops. But, always, he documents acts of
atrocities with great compassion and humanity. Innocent villagers – men, women, and children – he
observes, were often hunted down as ‘shikar’, as game. Some women, he writes, committed suicide
rather than be captured by foreign troops. While his ‘foreign comrades’ invariably blamed the
Boxers for such deaths, he hewed a different line on the matter because he had personally witnessed
a woman attempting to drown herself rather than fall into the hands of approaching international
troops. The worst offenders, in Singh’s experience, were Russian and French troops. Their modus
operandi was to converge on a few houses in a village, kill a handful of its inhabitants, strip the
houses of all their valuables, bayonet the crying children, and then rape and kill the women; or, as
Singh put it euphemistically, they ‘destroy the religion of their victims before taking their lives’. The
troops would then emerge from the houses and set fire to them. Nor were the hands of his fellow
countrymen any cleaner: Hindustani sepoys, too, were involved in the burning of villages.3

While Gadadhar Singh blames the Japanese too, he underplays British and
Indian involvement in the sacking of Beijing. He is quoted by Yang as saying
that British troops only looted, but the Chinese leadership after the revolution
used this humiliation to build a movement to restore China. It was this mindset
that made Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai militarily respond to Indian adventures
on the border in 1962.4

WAR
Much has been written about border skirmishes prior to the war between the
Indian Army and the PLA in Aksai Chin in the Western Sector and then North-
East Frontier Agency (NEFA) in the Eastern Sector. The skirmishes began on 20
October 1962 and ended with the declaration of a unilateral ceasefire from the
Chinese side on 21 November 1962. The PLA scored a comprehensive military
victory during this period as Indian defences in both sectors were overrun, with
Mao’s troops kilometres away from Leh and Tezpur, Assam. After drubbing the
nose of Nehru, the weak Indian Army Chief General P.N. Thapar and the
political favourite IV Corps Commander Lt. General Brij Mohan Kaul – who ran
the disastrous campaign in the Eastern Sector – the PLA withdrew 20 km from
the McMahon Line and the LAC, the latter cartographically defined by Chinese
Premier Zhou Enlai in his letter to Nehru on 7 November 1959 [see map on page
3].
Named after Sir Henry McMahon, the McMahon Line demarcates the Eastern
Sector on the basis of the 1914 Simla Accord. The Western Sector was loosely
defined by the Johnson Line, named after Survey of India civil servant W.H.
Johnson, who included Aksai Chin in Kashmir in the 1865 maps given to the
erstwhile Maharaja of Kashmir. After the 1962 border skirmishes, the axis along
which both the armies held positions on ground in the Ladakh sector was called
the ‘Line of Actual Control’, though it has not been delineated on the ground to
date with both sides differing in their perceptions and territorial claims. In the
1950s, both these sectors were largely unmanned and loosely held by the Indian
Army, with Nehru still grappling with the post-Partition trauma to contain the
Kashmir issue and integrate the Indian Union.
While Chinese victory was comprehensive, the seeds of the 1962 war lay in
the annexation of Tibet by the PLA in October 1950, the 10 March 1959
rebellion in Lhasa, the granting of asylum by India to the fourteenth Dalai Lama,
and finally, the Great Chinese Famine of 1958–61.5 Much blame has been
heaped on Nehru’s Forward Policy of establishing outposts on the India–China
border to defend its perceived territorial limits for triggering the war, but the
reasons were far more complex. As much as Beijing may justify the military
action in 1962, the fact is that India was punished for granting asylum to the
Dalai Lama, and to divert the Chinese people’s attention from the famine that
had snuffed out 15 million lives. The failure of Mao’s internal policies and the
rebellion in Tibet was papered over by the great victory against India.
In his monograph titled China’s Decision for War with India in 1962,6 China
expert John W. Garver brings out the state of politics in both countries at the
time. All seemed to be fine when India signed the Panchsheel Treaty in 1954
after recognizing Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, Mao and Premier Zhou Enlai
tactically keeping mum over the recognition of the border on the basis of
McMahon Line. When Nehru pointed out the territorial discrepancies in Chinese
maps about the Sino–India border, Zhou told him as late as 1957 that these were
old maps as the Chinese leadership was involved in more pressing affairs of the
new republic. It is evident from the letters exchanged between Nehru and Zhou
that the former was given to understand that the discrepancies in the maps would
be corrected by Beijing.7 The biggest intelligence blunder on the Indian side was
its ignorance that the PLA had already moved into the disputed area of Aksai
Chin and was building an alternative highway to Xinjiang in order to secure
Tibet.
It becomes clear from Garver’s monograph that Mao succeeded in convincing
his key aides and generals that Nehru was eyeing Tibet as the inheritor of British
imperial legacy, which had humiliated Chinese people in the past century. He
labelled Nehru as the instigator in Tibet who wanted to restore the region’s pre-
1949 independence. While Nehru’s Forward Policy has been blamed as a trigger
for the 1962 conflict, the Indian PM had no option as the PLA started securing
its borders with India to insulate Tibet from so-called armed subversives from
across the border. Failed by his intelligence and taken completely unawares by
the Chinese announcement of the Xinjiang–Tibet highway across Aksai Chin in
1957, Nehru was on a politically weak wicket, with the Opposition at home
attacking him for letting the PLA gobble up Indian territory. Garver says that
Nehru and his Foreign Minister V. Krishna Menon pushed the envelope in the
context of Forward Policy in their flawed assessment that the Chinese would
never attack India. While Nehru was perhaps looking to retain Tibet as a historic
buffer between India and the Middle Kingdom, there is nothing on record to
suggest that he actually wanted to capture the Tibetan plateau. The whole idea of
the 1954 treaty was to assuage Chinese apprehensions and to ensure that the
PLA does not come face-to-face with the Indian Army. Nehru’s recognition of
the Chinese annexation of Tibet was to convince Mao of Indian bona fides and
to ensure that there was no PLA buildup across Indian borders.
However, Mao’s intentions were different. In 1956, Beijing laid claim to the
Barahoti plains, or what Zhou called Wu Je, in the Middle Sector. Mao built up
xenophobia against Indians after the events in 1959, with the Dalai Lama being
granted asylum and with the Indian Army being handed over the defence of
NEFA.8 After changing the ground situation with a highway in Aksai Chin, he
proposed a mutual withdrawal of armed forces by 20 km from the LAC on 7
November 1959. This followed the first incident of bloodshed on the border,
which occurred at Longju on the Lokku–NEFA frontier on 25 August 1959. On
that day, a 200–300 strong PLA detachment crossed the frontier in Subansiri
Frontier Division and fired at the picket of a dozen Assam Rifles men. One
person was killed, another seriously injured and the other troopers arrested.9
This aggression was later called unauthorized by the Chinese leadership.
Badgered by his opposition, Nehru had no option but to continue demanding that
the Chinese withdraw from Aksai Chin and any future border agreement be
based on this conditionality. While the Chinese attempted to decrease border
tensions by including a ban on patrolling in the forward zone in January 1960,
the Indian political leadership faced a serious trust deficit after the Chinese
perfidy in Aksai Chin.
In 1960, official talks were held between India and China and coordinates of
the boundary exchanged, with Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai offering ‘as-it-is-
where-it-is’ border settlement.10 The offer was that China would drop its claim
on the ‘illegal’ McMahon Line if India recognized its ground position in Aksai
Chin. John Garver writes:
Hostilities began to spiral again in November 1960 when India started implementing its Forward
Policy. According to official Indian history, a wide corridor of empty area separated Chinese
forward outposts from Indian outposts before 1961. But Chinese forces were steadily pushing
forward their posts, occupying more and more of empty areas. In an effort to prevent further
Chinese advances by demonstrating that the remaining area was not empty, Indian forces were
ordered to push forward. When Indian forces initially began implementing the Forward Policy,
Chinese forces withdrew… This encouraged the Indian side and led to further acceleration of the
Forward Policy.11

Shortly after Indian forces started implementing the Forward Policy, Mao
convened a meeting of the Central Military Commission (CMC), the apex
military decision-making body, in Beijing and compared India’s policy as a
strategic advance in a game of chess in which one side pushes its pawns across
the board. ‘Their (India’s) continually pushing forward is like crossing the Chu
Han (ancient Chinese states) boundary. What should we do? We can also set out
a few pawns, on our side of the river. If they don’t cross over, that’s great. If
they do we will eat them up. Of course, we cannot blindly eat them. Lack of
forbearance in small matters upsets great plans. We must pay attention to the
situation,’ Mao was quoted as saying by Garver.12 Taking cue from these
comments, the PLA resumed patrolling within 20 km of the McMahon Line and
accelerated the construction of roads. Garver writes:
 As the crisis built up, Mao Zedong took personal charge of the struggle with India. Mao stressed to
PLA Chief of Staff Lou Ruiquing that the firing of the Chinese first shot must be personally
approved by him. On 26 February 1962, Beijing delivered a lengthy and conciliatory sounding note
to India. The note called for negotiations to reach a peaceful settlement of the boundary problem.
India’s reply came on 13 March, and it reiterated India’s standard position that Chinese withdrawal
from Aksai Chin was an essential precondition for negotiations.

Nehru had little option but to reply so. His policy towards China was the
object of severe criticism in India throughout the 1950s, particularly from the
Socialist Party with their anti-Beijing stance and the right-wing Jana Sangh and
Swatantra parties. On 21 August 1959, a young Jana Sangh leader called Atal
Behari Vajpayee had moved a resolution in the Lok Sabha to refer the Tibetan
issue to United Nations.13 Even Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, who was Nehru’s
home minister until his death in 1950, eyed Chinese moves with suspicion and
criticized Nehru over China’s invasion of Tibet. J.B. Kripalani’s critique of
Nehru’s foreign policy with regard to China became a handle to attack the entire
Congress government, including for its sympathies to the Left and championing
the cause of Non-Aligned Movement. Even if Nehru wanted to accept the
Chinese proposal of India dropping its claim to Aksai Chin, he could not do so,
due to the fierce opposition within his own government and from opposition
parties.
However, there was a serious political and military miscalculation of the
extent to which the Chinese could be pushed on the border while implementing
the Forward Policy. Despite strong Chinese protests on 5 and 19 May 1962 after
alleged Indian intrusions in Longju region of NEFA and the exchange of gunfire,
India reported that more than 2,000 sq. miles of Chinese territory had been
brought under Indian control since the beginning of the Forward Policy. To
make matters worse, the Indian Army headquarters allowed all post commanders
to fire on the Chinese if Indian posts were threatened. Garver writes:
Egregious Indian miscalculation regarding China’s willingness to resort to military force underlay
the increasingly assertive Indian policies that unfolded between November 1961 and October 1962.
There was virtual consensus among the Indian leaders that China would not respond with military
force to Indian advances, or if it did, any military response would be extremely limited. A Chinese
resort to large scale military force was deemed impossible. This conclusion was established by
Nehru and Defence Minister Krishna Menon and became unchallengeable political unorthodoxy. In
the words of the Indian Chief of General Staff regarding the final order to Indian forces in
September 1962 to drive Chinese forces from atop Thag La ridge in NEFA, the Ladakh experience
had shown that a few rounds fired at the Chinese would cause them to run away.14

The political misjudgement of the Indian leadership was compounded by the

ineptness of its military commanders. With 65 per cent of India under 35 years
of age today, memories of the bloody skirmishes fifty years ago have almost
faded for the average Indian. For even the middle-aged Indian, the war, which
left more than 1,382 Indian soldiers dead,15 thousands more wounded, missing
or captured by PLA and led to a comprehensive humiliating defeat in November
1962, is perhaps better understood through late director Chetan Anand’s 1964
war epic Haqeeqat (‘Truth’). Replete with mellifluous songs, the movie filmed
in Ladakh with the support of the Indian Defence Ministry is full of patriotic
ethos and the ‘do or die’ valour of Indian troops against the deceitful marauding
Chinese who abuse the ‘Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai’ slogan of the early Nehruvian
days.
The brutal truth, however, is hidden far away from the eyes of an average
Indian. In the innards of the Indian defence establishment in South Block lie two
top-secret copies of the Lieutenant-General Henderson Brooks and Brigadier (Lt.
General) P.S. Bhagat’s operational review of the 1962 debacle. Kept away inside
a series of lockers in the Director General of Military Operations’ office and in a
vault in the Defence Secretary’s office, the report, typed in foolscap paper, is the
shame of the Indian Army and therefore never to be revealed. The yellowing
three volumes of the Henderson Brooks–Bhagat report – with the review in one
volume and maps and annexure in the other two – can now only be accessed
through a series of approvals from the Defence Ministry. Even the Defence
Minister has to seek permission to read the report, as former Defence Minister
George Fernandes learnt to his detriment.16
The Brooks–Bhagat report tears into the Indian Army leadership, singling out
Tezpur-based IV Corps Commander Brij Mohan Kaul – a Menon favourite –
who virtually ran the war from his sick-bed from what is now 5, Motilal Nehru
Marg, and Major-General A.S Pathania, commander of the much decorated
Fourth Infantry Division, who ordered the troop withdrawal from NEFA out of
fear of the invading PLA particularly. Laced with quotes from victorious
generals from the West and leading war strategists of the past, the Brooks–
Bhagat report castigates the Indian Army brass for total failure of command and
control, with a sick Kaul being replaced by Lt. General Harbaksh Singh and then
staging a comeback in the midst of the month-long war to reclaim the position,
and then Intelligence Bureau Chief B.N. Mullick for failure to read enemy
moves. While the Army brass has told the ministry it does not want its
humiliation to be made public, the political leadership has not been spared in a
separate forty-page top-secret note written on the Brooks–Bhagat report by then
Army Chief J.N. Chaudhuri, who replaced a largely ineffective General P.N.
Thapar a day after China offered a humiliating ceasefire to Indian charge
d’affaires P.K. Bannerjee in Beijing on 19 November 1962.
Gifted with good writing skills, General Chaudhuri goes for the jugulars of
Krishna Menon for interfering in the Army’s operational affairs during the war
and of Nehru for a poorly strategized Forward Policy towards Tibet. The report
and this appended note make it evident that the 1962 debacle was due to political
leaders playing Napoleon and generals their self-serving sidekicks. Menon was
fired on 1 November, while Thapar and Kaul were fired on 21 November 1962
after the Chinese withdrawal and ceasefire. This was after the PLA had occupied
Tawang on 23 October 1962 after launching its attacks four days earlier at Bum
La and Thag La in Arunachal Pradesh, threatening to take over Tezpur in then
NEFA.
The situation in the Ladakh sector was a trifle better, with then-Western
Army Commander Lt. General Daulat Singh quietly lifting three additional
battalions from the Pakistan borders and deploying them in defence of Chushul.
The battle of Rezang La near Chushul on 18 November 1962 and the valiant
sacrifice of Major Shaitan Singh and his 109 men ensured that the PLA could
not threaten Leh.
The Brooks–Bhagat report does not blame the defeat on lack of winter
clothing, logistics or ammunition as the Army would have the public believe.
Instead, it puts the blame squarely on poor leadership and cowardice to an
extent. The fact is that India had sent its most-decorated and battle-hardy Fourth
Infantry Division or the Red Eagle division, which had World War II campaigns
in North Africa and Italy under its belt, to fight the PLA in Kameng sector of
NEFA, but the formation just folded up against the enemy in Tawang. The Army
gave a much better performance in the Battle of Walong in the Eastern Sector,
with the Sixth Kumaon Battalion coming out in brave colours in comparison to
the Tawang disaster. The Army has not forgotten the role played by the Fourth
Division in 1962; today, the once-famed division is reduced to a training
formation in Allahabad under the Central Army Command.
The 1962 humiliation is best exemplified by the now-declassified 19
November 1962 letter from Nehru to US President John F. Kennedy,17 asking
for American air support as the Chinese were threatening to take over entire
eastern India and overrun Leh. US help came, not in the form of fighters to take
on the Chinese Air Force but in the form of transport aircraft to stock Indian
formations. It is a matter of record that the Americans based a squadron of C-
130 Hercules in Palam under Brigadier-General Paul W. Tibbets, who had flown
the Enola Gay to drop the Hiroshima atomic bomb, to help Indian war
replenishment efforts from December 1962 onwards. However, the damage to
the Indian ego and prestige had been done by then, and China had arrived on the
world stage, thanks to Nehru’s inability to read Beijing’s moves.
The basic Indian assumption that the PLA would give up on its border claims
was essentially flawed; Mao had stood up to even the US in Korea. Garver
argues that India underestimated the ‘new’ China, which wanted to wipe away
the past century of humiliation at the hands of imperialist powers like Britain
and Japan.18 The sense of humiliation and guilt was so strong in ‘new’ China
that it was not prepared to suffer at the hands of imperialists any longer,
whatever the cost. The ex-Chinese foreign minister Huang Hua in his memoir
recalls that Nehru and his daughter Indira Gandhi visited China between 19–30
October 1954 and met Chairman Mao no less than four times.19 Chairman Mao,
Huang wrote, told Nehru, ‘China was bullied by Western imperialist countries
for more than 100 years. And your country [was] bullied for even longer, for
more than 300 years. Therefore, we Orientals have a desire for unity and for
defending ourselves. Despite the differences in our ideologies and our social
systems we have a major common point…we have both had to cope with
imperialists.’
Nehru on his part did not focus on the bilateral relationship but instead took it
to a global level, in line with his statesman-like thinking and ideology. Nehru,
Huang wrote, told Mao, ‘Both China and India are large countries facing similar
problems, and have resolutely embarked on the road to progress. The deeper the
understanding between our two countries becomes, the better will be the
guarantee not only for the welfare of Asia, but also for the welfare of entire
world. The tense situation in the world today requires our joint efforts for
peace.’20 It was Nehru who pushed for an invitation to China to the first Asian-
African Conference in Bandung in 1955 and, according to Huang, introduced
Premier Zhou Enlai to all the participating leaders. The Nehru–Zhou bonhomie
continued when the Chinese Premier paid his second visit to India in 1956, with
hearty cheers of ‘Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai’ greeting the visiting delegation. Huang
wrote, ‘It was regrettable that there was tension between China and India after
the rebellion in Tibet in 1959 and the differences between the two countries over
the Sino–Indian boundary question also came to the surface. Zhou Enlai visited
New Delhi in April 1960 to hold talks with Nehru. He said the Himalayas should
be the peak of eternal friendship between the two great nations of China and
India. Since such are the sentiments about the Himalayas, the Chinese people’s
sentiments towards the Karakorum are the same.’21
Military tensions between the two nations escalated after Nehru’s rejection of
Zhou’s ‘as-it-is-where-it-is’ proposal and his implementation of the Forward
Policy. Just as India failed to read the resolve of ‘New’ China, its military
commanders failed in assessing the superiority of PLA forces. Not only did the
PLA deploy crack troops from Xinjiang and Lanzhou military regions, troops
which had participated in quelling the Tibet rebellion and were acclimatized to
the rarefied atmosphere of the high Himalayan region, but its army commanders
were also battle-hardened strategists of the Long March. India also failed on the
diplomatic front despite the stature of Nehru as a global statesman and leader of
the NAM. In the chapter ‘China’s Decision for War with India in 1962’, Garver
makes it amply clear that Mao had alerted both US and Russia on the decision to
go to war and had explicit approval of non-intervention from them before he
gave the green signal to attack. The timing of attack on India coincided with the
onset of Bay of Pigs crisis in Cuba and the beginning of the Cold War.
In retrospect, all this could have been resolved through dialogue, except that
Mao wanted to teach India and Nehru a lesson for ‘meddling’ in Tibet. The
granting of asylum to the Dalai Lama was perhaps the last straw for Mao, and
the rest was but justification for the war. It is quite evident from Garver’s book
that India did not realize the sensitivity of the situation while China planned each
move like a game of chess. A classic example of the attitudes of both sides is the
meeting between former war veteran General Chen Yi and Indian representative
Krishna Menon on the sidelines of the July 1962 conference on the International
Agreement on the Neutrality of Laos in Geneva. Garver wrote:
On 23 July, the two men met. Chen asked Menon what ideas the honourable Indian government had
about solving the Sino–Indian border problem? Menon replied that in India’s view there was no
border problem between China and India. The location of the boundary was very clearly displayed
on Indian maps. Implicit in this was the notion that the way to a solution lay in Chinese withdrawal
from all territory claimed by India. Moreover, the message was conveyed in an arrogant tone of
voice.22

After Chen communicated the message to Beijing, Mao issued a ‘twenty

character directive’ in response to India’s Forward Policy. The directive made it
clear that the PLA was not to yield any ground to Indian troops and to be
prepared to undertake a long period of armed co-existence. There were articles
in the Chinese Communist Party’s mouthpiece, the Remmin Ribao Observer,
which hinted at the possibility of the PLA advancing south of the McMahon
Line and even eviction of Indian forces from NEFA. The doors to all further
negotiations were shut by Nehru in his speech to the Lok Sabha on 13 August
1962, in which he reiterated that the precondition for negotiations was a
complete Chinese withdrawal from all Indian territory it had unilaterally
occupied – essentially, Aksai Chin.23 This was presented to Beijing in the form
of a note on 22 August 1962.
The stage was set for war. Garver wrote:
Chinese leaders spent considerable time in mid-1962 analyzing Nehru’s objectives in attacking
China. Three main reasons were identified. First, Nehru wished to direct outward internal
contradictions in India. Second, he hoped to win international, and especially US, support. Third, he
hoped to attack China’s prestige in the Third World. Pursuit of these objectives by attacking China
was based on the belief, Mao concluded, that China would not hit back. Notably absent from this
Chinese understanding of Nehru’s motives was the proposition that Nehru believed through Forward
Policy, India was recovering legitimately Indian territory arbitrarily and illegally occupied by China
during the 1950s. Again Chinese leaders simply failed to understand Nehru’s motives, and attributed
to him far-fetched motives deriving from his evil class nature.24

If Mao and Zhou did not understand the true motive behind Nehru’s Forward
Policy, the Indian leadership also failed to realize the seriousness of the Chinese
military threat. Like their political masters, Indian military commanders also
believed, unfortunately, that the Chinese would give up land without a fight.
This was a serious error of judgement; the Dalai Lama’s flight to India had made
the Chinese leadership appear vulnerable in the restive Tibet plateau. The Indian
underestimation of the adversary and the seriousness of the situation are quite
evident as Nehru travelled to Ceylon for a bilateral visit on the eve of the
conflict in October, despite Indian and PLA troops locked in an eyeball-to-
eyeball confrontation at Thag La ridge in NEFA since September.25
Situated east of the Tibet–Bhutan–NEFA tri-junction, the Thag La ridge is a
dominant feature on the LAC, with Indian troopers establishing a post at Dhola
on the southern base of the ridge as part of the Forward Policy in June 1962.
Official Indian war records show that the Chinese crossed the LAC in August
that year and entrenched themselves at the ridge-top. Eight hundred Chinese
troopers descended from the ridge and encircled the Dhola post on 8 September.
Faced with strong public clamour to evict the PLA from Thag La, a meeting was
held between Menon and General Thapar and other military commanders to
review the 8 September stand-off. It was decided in the 9 September meeting
that the Chinese be evicted from the ridge and instructions to the same were
passed on to the Eastern Army commander. On 18 September 1962, an Indian
government spokesman made the decision to evict the PLA from Dhola public.
Firing began on 20 September between the two sides and exchanges continued
till 29 September. Official Indian history records that General Thapar asked the
government to reconsider its decision to evict the PLA from Thag La on 22
September as he felt that the Chinese would open other fronts in Ladakh. Thapar
went unheard; the then Indian Foreign Secretary M.J. Desai conveyed Nehru’s
decision to the Indian Army that intrusions in NEFA were unacceptable.26
There were also differences between the Eastern Army Commander Lt.
General L.P. Sen and 33 Corps Commander Lt. General Umrao Singh over the
military buildup needed to evict the PLA, with the latter asking till 5 October for
time to build up the requisite forces. General Umrao Singh was divested of
NEFA charge for this, and on 3 October 1962, India’s fate was sealed when Lt.
General B.M. Kaul, then Chief of General Staff, was given charge of evicting
the PLA under the newly raised IV Corps.
Indian official history makes it amply clear that Kaul’s moves to establish a
post at Yumtso La, west of Thag La ridge, and in the Namkha Chu area were the
triggers for the border skirmish. Namkha Chu is a river flowing at the base of
Thag La. This led to the first major clash on 10 October 1962 in the Namkha
Chu area with a battalion strength of PLA troopers attacking a probing patrol of
the Indian Army. Between 10–22 October, the D-Day, Indian history explicitly
records the disagreements within the top echelons of the Army, with the Eastern
Army commander and local commanders wanting to withdraw from the Namkha
Chu area but the government refusing to recognize facts on the ground. It is
evident from these records that the Army brass knew that the dice was loaded
against them, but the political leadership was oblivious of the facts.27
After the 10 October clashes, General Kaul wanted directions from the
government on whether to continue eviction of PLA from Thag La or to
withdraw from the area. Overtly, Nehru and Menon left this decision to the local
commanders, but it was covertly made clear that Indian forces should not vacate
the area, even though the eviction plan had already been more or less abandoned.
Nehru, while leaving for Colombo on 12 October, told the Indian media that his
instructions were to free the country but the date and timing had been left to the
Indian Army.28 On 17 October, Thapar and Kaul gave instructions to hold
positions in the Namkha Chu area after a high-level meeting at the Defence
Ministry. The next day, Kaul fell ill and was subsequently allowed to run the war
effort from Delhi. The die had been cast.
On the Chinese side, Garver says the decision to punish a hegemonic India
was taken by Mao and the CMC on 3 October, but the official directive was
issued on 6 October with the main assault in the Eastern Sector while
coordinating in the west:
On 8 October, the CMC ordered several additional divisions in the Chengdu and Lanzhou military
regions to prepare to move into Tibet. All these forces were veteran, high-quality units. Most had
previously participated in anti-rebel operations in Tibet and were therefore acclimatized to combat
operations in high altitudes. The PLA judged Indian forces inferior to the Chinese in combat and
war fighting capabilities.29

In a 16 October report to Zhou Enlai, Chinese commanders listed out five

reasons for India’s new offensive posture. According to Garver, the first was a
desire to turn Tibet into a colony or protectorate of India. The other reasons
were: a desire to gain increased US and Soviet military assistance by becoming a
part of their anti-China campaign; a desire to achieve hegemony in Asia by using
anti-China activities to increase India’s status with poor and small countries of
the Third World; a desire to divert class and national contradictions within India;
and lastly, that India believed China was actually bluffing. The CMC then
formally decided to ‘annihilate’ Indian forces who were painted as aggressors in
the eastern theatre that same day, once the report was submitted to Mao.30
While Indian war records show that its troops did not have winter clothing
even when they were directed to occupy a peak west of Thag La, the Chinese
leadership had planned every move in advance as they were looking for a
comprehensive victory. ‘On 14 October, Chinese Ambassador in Moscow Liu
Shao had secured from Russian leader Nikita Khrushchev guarantees that if
there was a Sino–Indian war, the USSR would stand together with China.’31
Mao’s timing was quite superb:
Chinese leaders attributed this Soviet support and the stark reversal of earlier Soviet policy of
neutrality in the Sino–Indian dispute to the Soviet desire for Chinese support in the event of war
with United States over Cuba. The Cuban missile crisis would not erupt until 22 October, when
President John F. Kennedy would announce the US discovery of Soviet missiles in Cuba along with
the US decision for a naval quarantine. It seems, however, that Moscow had earlier given Beijing
some glimpse of the plan to deploy missiles in Cuba.32

So while the world was focused on the Cuban missile crisis, the PLA was
raiding NEFA after skirmishes began on the dawn of 20 October 1962. The PLA
launched an offensive on the Indian Army, whose commanders were deeply
divided and were forced to follow political directives, in the Tawang region for
four continuous days. The strategically located Tawang fell to the PLA on 23
October, with the offensive in the Western Sector continuing till 27 October. The
offensive was then halted for three weeks to show the reasonability of the
Chinese leadership towards India and to send a signal to Nehru to abandon his
faulty strategy.
However, Nehru’s intentions are quite clear from his 22 October address to
the nation:
Perhaps there are not many instances where one country, that is India, had gone out of the way to be
friendly and cooperative with the Chinese government and people, and to plead their cause in the
councils of the world, and then for the Chinese government to return evil for good and even go to
the extent of committing aggression and invade our sacred land. No self-respecting country and
certainly not India, with her love for freedom, can submit to this, whatever the consequences may
be.33

Indian offensive operations to oust Chinese positions both in Tawang and

Walong areas of NEFA resumed on 14 November. Chinese forces responded by
launching a massive pre-planned offensive on 18 November, and Indian
defences in the east rapidly crumbled, with the PLA already looking at the
Brahmaputra plains. The seriousness of the situation is aptly summed up by the
two recently declassified letters, written within a span of few hours, by Nehru to
Kennedy.34 These letters betray a sense of urgency and helplessness, as
Bomdila, headquarters of NEFA, fell to the PLA during the time the two letters
were spaced. While asking for 12 squadrons of air fighters and radar support
from the Americans, Nehru informs Kennedy that the entire Northeast would fall
to the Chinese as the PLA was poised for an attack through the Chumbi valley to
cut off the Siliguri corridor. The pathetic state of affairs is evident; Nehru writes
that Chushul in the Western Sector had been overrun and the PLA was now
staring at Leh.
As India stared down the barrel of a humiliating defeat, the Chinese declared
a unilateral ceasefire on 21 November and went back behind the McMahon Line
in NEFA and redefined the LAC in the Western Sector.35 While the common
perception among the Indian people today is that China withdrew after teaching
India a lesson by handing over a comprehensive military defeat, particularly in
the Eastern Sector, the withdrawal was carefully planned by Beijing and
coincided with the lifting of the US naval blockade of Cuba on 20 November
1962.
With the world’s focus on Cuba and with the threat of a global nuclear war
looming, the PLA engaged India without any fear of third party intervention.
The Chinese withdrawal came within hours of the missile crisis being defused. It
is obvious that the China’s withdrawal or restoring the 1959 status quo was a
signal to the world that it did not believe in territorial conquests like imperial
powers of the past and also ensured that neither the US nor the Soviet Union
intervened on behalf of India.
That US intervention was on the cards has been revealed from declassified
recordings of the White House after July 1962. According to the book which
contains the recordings,36 Kennedy had planned to use nuclear weapons if China
attacked India again after the 1962 skirmish. It is quite obvious that the Chinese
had calibrated the war effort at the peak of the Cuban missile crisis in such a way
that the US could not intervene, and Chinese forces later programmed their
withdrawal to ensure any direct clash with the US Air Force did not occur.
The 1962 debacle had significant political and military fallouts in India.
Intelligence failures in detecting the building of the Aksai Chin highway and
then the gross military miscalculation that the Forward Policy would at best
result in minor border skirmishes was the bane of Indian leadership. The
comprehensive PLA victory also ensured the primacy of Mao, whose standing
had been under threat after the failure of the Great Leap Forward in which
millions died due to starvation. The 1962 war stamped the arrival of a ‘New
China’ on the world scene, and a consequent cutting down of political stature of
Nehru in the Third World.
For India, the debacle signalled the end of Nehru era as the Opposition held
him singularly responsible for the disaster. Nehru’s favourite Defence Minister
Menon was booted out after the first phase of war with the prime minister
handling the portfolio himself from 1 November to 21 November 1962, and then
handing it over to Y.B. Chavan. Army Chief General P.N. Thapar was also
kicked out and sent to Afghanistan as ambassador once the war ended, while
General J.N. Chaudhuri took over. A decision to set up an external intelligence
agency, later called the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW), was taken, rather
than rely solely on the Intelligence Bureau, which had bungled in detecting the
Tibet–Xinjiang highway through Aksai Chin. Comprehensive upgrading of
Indian armed forces with new military hardware and equipment was ordered,
with the defence budget increasing by nearly 1 per cent of the then GDP.
The defeat left a deep impression on the psyche of the Indian Army, which
had failed miserably in the Eastern Sector. New Delhi did not dare look towards
the sector for the next 25 years, only to accidentally stare at China in the
Somdorong Chu valley stand-off in 1986–1987, described in detail later in this
chapter. Between the two dates, there was a day-long border clash at Nathu La in
then-Indian protectorate of Sikkim on 1 October 1967, due to difference in
territorial claims by both sides and aggressive behaviour of the local Chinese
PLA commander.37
 Fifty years after the war, the Brooks–Bhagat report is going to pieces in the
South Block locker, with no government since then having the gumption to
overrule the first prime minister of India and declassify the report. It appears to
be a concerted effort to brush the 1962 humiliation under the carpet, with even
the 1999–2004 NDA government led by Vajpayee not interested in opening the
can of worms. Apart from a total breakdown of command-and-control and a
confused political leadership, the one question that remains unanswered is why
Nehru did not use the IAF despite the PLA launching a full-scale offensive in the
Western and Eastern sectors.
That Nehru did not have much faith in IAF’s capabilities and capacities is
quite evident from his two letters to Kennedy. But the PLA Air Force was
equally bad, if not worse.38 One explanation is that Nehru did not want to
escalate the conflict further after the November offensive; worse, he choked on
the decision after the hammering from PLA in the Eastern Sector. The two
letters to Kennedy are actually SOS calls from a cornered politician, who was
militarily outwitted by a stronger and more-prepared opponent. Although post-
1962 IAF chiefs and commanders insist that the outcome of war would have
been different had Nehru given a green signal to bomb the war theatre in Ladakh
and NEFA, the fact is that India had hardly any radar capability to detect PLA
aircraft or anti-aircraft missile equipment to handle any Chinese retaliation. The
other reason why Nehru refrained from giving the IAF a go ahead was that it
would have vertically escalated the conflict into the Indian hinterland and that
the IAF could have ended up doing collateral damage in Tibet as there was no
way that Han China could be targeted given the Indian capabilities at that time.
However, it would be wrong to conclude that India has forgotten the 1962 war; it
certainly rankles the rank and file of the Indian Army as they faced the brunt of
the PLA thrust. The Indian people have also not forgotten the war, which is why
it will be very difficult for the Indian political leadership to sell any deal that
even smells of a compromise with the Chinese without adverse reactions from
the public. If it is a very hard political bargain for India to settle the boundary
issue, Beijing is equally in no hurry to negotiate, as it feels that New Delhi is
keeping the pro-independence Tibetan movement alive with the Dalai Lama and
three other top-ranking Buddhist lamas or high priests still living in India. Till
the time the Tibet issue is not sorted out – there are not many takers for its
resolution given the spate of self-immolations in the high plateau since 2010 –
China eyes each Indian move with suspicion. As the deterioration of the India–
China relationship began after the Lhasa rebellion on 10 March 1959, it would
be reasonable to assume that Beijing will always eye India through the Tibet
prism. As discussed in subsequent chapters, China invoked the Pakistan card to
engage India in a low-cost, high-yield strategy, and at the same time made
moves to contain Indian rise globally while talking peace and tranquillity. The
nuclearization and arming of Pakistan through weapon platforms and delivery
systems by China have ensured that Islamabad has fought three wars with India
since 1962 and has unleashed terrorism first in Jammu and Kashmir and then to
the Indian hinterland.39 Today, India– China trade has swelled to $63 billion and
is heading towards the $100 billion mark, but both sides continue to watch each
other moves very carefully as New Delhi manoeuvres towards the high global
table with a $2 trillion economy, a skilled work force and the fourth largest
military in the world with state-of-the-art weaponry.

TRUST DEFICIT
After humiliating India in the border war and establishing his preeminence in the
Party hierarchy, Chairman Mao made his first diplomatic overture towards India
while meeting foreign envoys at the Tiananmen rostrum on 1 May 1970. Huang
Hua wrote:
Mao told Indian charge d’affaires Brajesh Mishra that India was a great country and your people are
great people. We should be friendly in spite of everything and should not go quarrelling as we do
now.40

According to Huang, Mao also asked Mishra to convey his best regards to the
Indian President and prime minister. Mishra reverted to the Chinese leadership
on 11 June, saying that India was ready to start a dialogue with China to discuss
steps of normalization between the two countries. However, diplomatic parleys
were put on hold as India went into a conflict with Pakistan in December 1971
after signing a peace and friendship treaty with the erstwhile Soviet Union in
August 1971. It was only in 1976 that India, under Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi, decided to exchange ambassadors with China. The resolution of the
boundary dispute figured during Foreign Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee’s visit
to China in February 1979 during the Janata Party regime under Prime Minister
Morarji Desai. Huang wrote:
On 14 February, Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping met Vajpayee and put forward a proposal for a
package deal on the boundary question, i.e. the Chinese side would make concessions in the Eastern
Sector while the Indian side would make concessions in the Western Sector. Deng told Vajpayee
 that if our generation cannot reach an agreement then we should leave the problem for the next
generation to solve. As long as both sides maintain a stable situation, it doesn’t matter if this matter
is shelved for a while. Such questions will not affect India’s security or India’s economic
construction, nor will it affect China’s security or construction.41

During the official talks, Huang put forward a three-point proposal to

promote the process of settling the border question through negotiations. The
three points were:

• Both sides should maintain the status quo in the border regions, pending the
settlement of the boundary question, and keep the peace along the border,
and if any problem occurs on the border, it should be settled through
friendly consultations between the two sides.
• The boundary question should not be an obstacle to the development of
friendly relations between the two countries, and both sides should develop
relations in various fields to promote mutual understanding and
cooperation so as to create a favourable atmosphere for settling the
boundary question in the future.
• Both sides should continue to exchange views on the boundary question
through appropriate channels with contacts maintained between the Indian
ambassador to China and Chinese Foreign Ministry or between the Chinese
ambassador to India and the Indian Foreign Ministry.42

While Huang says that the package deal could not be realized due to Indian
insistence on concessions in the Western Sector, Vajpayee also got a taste of
Chinese power as Beijing invaded India’s close friend Vietnam during his visit.
The next important step in restoring bilateral ties was taken during Huang Hua’s
visit to India in June 1981 after back-channel diplomacy with Prime Minister
Indira Gandhi on the sidelines of Zimbabwe’s independence celebrations and at
the funeral of Yugoslavia dictator Marshal Tito. Huang met Gandhi on 29 June
to discuss the boundary question; for the first time, India came out with a
parallel policy formulation to deal with China. Huang wrote:
Indira Gandhi said this is an important question, and also a question most difficult to solve. It
involves principles, and national interests and sentiments. If we can find the first step to creating a
good atmosphere, it will be conducive to the settlement of the question… We have adopted a
parallel policy. Unless steps are taken to develop friendship and goodwill, it will not be possible to
settle the boundary question. However, from the long-term point of view, unless the boundary
question is settled, it will be difficult to maintain friendship and goodwill.43
 For all the diplomatic parleys between the countries, it took a military
decision in 1986 from an intrepid army chief General K. Sundarji to remind the
Chinese that the disputed border was an ever-ready trigger for conflict. Called
the 1987 Somdorong Chu valley incident, this episode is an important milestone
in the context of Indo– Chinese border disputes as it led to the signing of the
1993 Peace and Tranquillity Agreement. The stand-off is instructive to
understand the state of play between the two countries and how a decisive
military commander could surprise the PLA.

SOMDORONG CHU VALLEY STAND-OFF AND

AFTERMATH
After Indira Gandhi took over the reins of India once again in 1980, she ordered
a review of Indian border defences in consultation with Army Chief K.V.
Krishna Rao. It was decided that if the strategic Tawang region was to be
defended, then India needed to have troops on the Hathung La ridge line, parallel
to Thag La ridge, the highest watershed in the area. In pursuance of this
decision, an IB team established a post in Somdorong Chu pastures in 1983 to
observe the Chinese atop Thag La. The post was occupied in summers and
vacated during the icy winters. This exercise was undertaken for the next two
years, but when the IB team returned to Somdorong Chu in 1986, it found that
the PLA had established semi-permanent structures in Somdorong Chu valley,
which were being serviced through air support. An alarmed India lodged a
diplomatic protest in Beijing over the PLA intrusion, only to be told that the area
was north of the McMahon Line and in Chinese territory.
Senior Indian diplomats recall that a meeting was held in the Cabinet
Secretariat in New Delhi to decide on the Indian response. Chaired by Cabinet
Secretary B.G. Deshmukh, the meeting was attended by representatives of
Ministry of External Affairs, Indian Army, IB, R&AW and the ITBP. As
Arunachal Pradesh had been granted statehood in February 1987, the newly
appointed Chief Minister Gegong Apang was also present. At the meeting, Army
representatives made it clear it was difficult to dislodge the Chinese as there
were no roads to the valley and enforcement could only be provided through
helicopters. Apang surprised everyone by saying that he could build a road in
three months if Centre gave him the money. The psychological impact of the
1962 war on the Army was still evident at the meeting, as the Army
representative ruled against the road as it could also allow the Chinese to come
into India. The Army representative digressed from the core issue and said the
only solution was that the ITBP should be placed under the Army in the area, to
which the ITBP representative objected. The meeting was inconclusive, and
Deshmukh was bewildered at the Army representative’s behaviour.
While the Indian political leadership mulled over what to do, General
Sundarji on his own initiative as part of Operation Falcon deployed troops along
the parallel Hathung La ridge and strengthened defences in Sikkim and Ladakh
sector by inducting tanks. The spectre of 1962 raised itself once again as the
Chinese were surprised by the Indian manoeuvre, which allowed the Indian
military to base itself across the PLA at Namkha Chu. Indian diplomats posted in
Beijing at the time recall that the Indian political leadership was petrified of the
PLA response, but the Chinese were equally confused at the Indian response. In
May 1987, it was External Affairs Minister Narayan Dutt Tewari’s task to
explain the Indian response to the Chinese leadership after landing in Beijing
post the NAM conference in Pyongyang.
The meeting began at the ceremonial lounge in Beijing airport, with Tewari
advocating and parroting the peace-and-restraint line, and the Chinese Vice
Foreign Minister Liu Shuqing complaining about Indian military moves in
Somdorong Chu. It was perhaps for the first time that the Chinese leadership got
paid back in the same coin by the Indian military with deception and double-
speak used effectively as tools. The Indian political leadership, like the Chinese
had in 1962, talked peace but its army was behaving otherwise. Indian diplomats
believe that the Somdorong Chu incident showed the Indian resolve over
defending Arunachal Pradesh. The Chinese realized that New Delhi could play
pragmatic diplomacy while changing the situation on ground. While John Garver
says that the Chinese had secured guarantees from Bangladesh not to allow
Indian transit in case they attacked the Siliguri corridor, the piece of land that
joins the Northeast with the Indian hinterland in West Bengal, as a counter to
Somdorong Chu, it appears that the Indians were equally prepared as tanks had
been airlifted to Sikkim and Ladakh sector. This new respect for Indian military
moves in the Eastern Sector resulted in Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s historical
visit to China in December 1988.
However, the downside of the Somdorong incident was that the Chinese
position on the border dispute radically changed, 27 years after Premier Zhou
Enlai offered the ‘as-it-is-where-it-is’ principle. The Chinese had then said they
were willing to reciprocate in the Eastern Sector in return for Indian concessions
in the Western Sector; this offer was put forth by Deng Xiaoping to Vajpayee in
1979 and was reiterated in 1985 by the Chinese supremo once again. But in
1987, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Liu Shuqing leading a delegation to India
told A.P. Venkateswaran, then Secretary (East), Ministry of External Affairs and
in-charge of China, that Beijing was looking for concessions both in the Western
and Eastern sectors as the disputed territory was significant for the so-called
southern Tibet area, making boundary resolution more intractable and politically
an impossible solution.44
Post Liu’s statement, Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to Beijing in December 1988 paved
the way for a joint working group to settle the boundary dispute amicably.
Headed by officials of vice-minister rank, the first meeting took place in 1989.
After Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination by LTTE terrorists in 1991, then Prime
Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao concluded the Agreement on the Maintenance of
Peace and Tranquillity along the LAC during his visit to China in September
1993.
The very next year, boundary talks at the expert group level were mooted
with the idea of exchanging border maps to prevent any misunderstanding by
patrolling troops. Fourteen rounds of talks have happened so far, but it was only
in 2001 that the maps of the Middle Sector, which is also the least contentious,
were exchanged. In 2002, Western Sector maps were shown to both sides, but
they could not be exchanged due to Chinese objections over the alignment of the
LAC according to Indian maps.45 In the interim, an agreement on confidence
building measures along the LAC was signed during Chinese President Jiang
Zemin’s visit to India in November 1996.
In 1998, however, Indo–Chinese relationships took a dive under the BJP-led
government, especially as it chose to exercise the nuclear test option. Vajpayee
singled out China and its close relationship with Pakistan as one of the reasons
for the Shakti series of nuclear tests in his letter to US President Bill Clinton. But
there soon was a reversal to normalization, after Vajpayee visited China in June
2003 post Clinton’s visit in March 2000.
During Vajpayee’s visit, both sides decided they will appoint special
representatives to explore the political perspective of the overall bilateral
relationship within the framework of the boundary settlement, meaning that the
boundary resolution would not be handled through the perspective of officials on
both sides but at a political level, keeping the bigger picture of the bilateral
relationship in mind. Given the political context to the boundary settlement, the
Indian NSA and Principal Secretary to Prime Minister Brajesh Mishra was
designated as the special representative, while seasoned diplomat and state
councillor Dai Bingguo, who outranked the Chinese foreign minister,
represented the Chinese side.
In May 2004, the UPA-I government took over and worked towards closer
diplomatic ties with the US under President George W. Bush. Manmohan Singh
and Bush worked towards an Indo–US civilian nuclear cooperation agreement
that ended India’s isolation post the 1998 tests. Realizing that close convergence
between India and the US was not in its best interests, Beijing recalibrated its
diplomatic strategy towards India.46 In April 2005, Premier Wen Jiabao signed
the Agreement on Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for Settlement of
India– China Boundary Issues and the Protocol on Implementation of CBMS in
military field during his visit to New Delhi. Moving further, in January 2012,
both sides signed an Agreement on Establishment of a Working Mechanism for
Consultation and Coordination on India– China Boundary Affairs.47
While there has been peace on the LAC since the 1993 agreement, the PLA
did put pressure on the Western Sector during the 1999 Kargil war and has been
intruding into Indian territory on grounds of difference of territorial perceptions
on the LAC for the past decade.48

BOUNDARY QUESTION TODAY

India’s border with China, which is nearly 3,488 km long, has largely remained
un-demarcated. The border follows the geographical principle of watershed,
which in most places is the crest of the highest mountain range. The concept of a
‘line of actual control’ was first referred to by the Chinese in 1959.49 This was
revealed in three letters that Zhou Enlai had written to Nehru. In his 7 November
1959 letter, he referred to the ‘line up to which each side exercises actual control
in the west as well as the so-called McMahon Line in the east’ and proposed that
the armed forces of China and India should each withdraw 20 km from those
lines.

Western Sector

The LAC in eastern Ladakh generally corresponds to the position reached as a

result of the 1962 conflict. The precise LAC observed by India in the Western
Sector was marked on large topographic sheets by the China Study Group,
headed by the cabinet secretary, in 1976. The Chinese perception of the LAC
was first known through Zhou Enlai’s letter to Nehru on 7 November 1959,
which stated that the LAC in the Western Sector coincided with the traditional
customary line. A copy of the map depicting the 7 November 1959 line was
annexed to Zhou’s letters addressed to the heads of Afro-Asian countries on 15
November 1962. The Chinese perception of the LAC in the Western Sector
corresponds to their boundary claims except in the Demchok area (500 sq. km),
which they claim to be in adverse possession of India. The LAC clarification and
confirmation had commenced in June 2002 after maps of the Middle Sector had
been exchanged. During the twelfth meeting of the expert group, held on 17 June
2002, Western Sector maps depicting each country’s LAC perceptions were
shown to each other. However, the maps were not exchanged due to Chinese
objections. Comparison of the two maps indicated 12 areas of differences in
LAC perception and the area involved:

• Samar Lungpa 176 sq. km

• Trig Heights and Depsang bulge 972 sq. km
• Kong Ka La (three pockets) 56 sq. km
• Pangong Tso (both banks) 83 sq. km
• Spanggur Gap 24 sq. km
• Mount Sajum 129 sq. km
• Dumchele 40 sq. km
• Demchok 150 sq. km
• Chumar 80 sq. km

Indian military records indicate that China is in adverse possession of 33,000

sq. km here, though public information is around 38,000 sq. km of land. Apart
from this, Pakistan has illegally ceded 5,180 sq. km of the Shaksgam Valley to
China in 1963.

Middle Sector

The exchange of maps of this sector was completed in March 2002. Four areas
of difference in this sector emerged:

• Kaurik 250 sq. km

• Shipki La 64 sq. km
• Pulam Sumda 1,336 sq. km
• Barahoti Plains 750 sq. km
Eastern Sector

China claims approximately 70,000–90,000 sq. km as per public information in

the Eastern Sector. China is in adverse possession of 94 sq. km in three pockets:

Namkha Chu 23 sq. km

Somdorong Chu 15 sq. km
Longju 56 sq. km

Maps of this sector have never been exchanged. During the eighth meeting of
the joint working group in July 1995, both sides agreed to eight mutually agreed
disputed areas: Trig Heights and Demchok in eastern Ladakh, Barahoti in
Middle Sector, and Namkha Chu, Somdorong Chu, Yangtse, Asaphi La and
Longju in the Eastern Sector.

PATTERNS OF TRANSGRESSION
Since the 1962 conflict, the Indian Army and the ITBP have been patrolling the
3,488 km long LAC and trying to match their PLA counterparts, notwithstanding
the disadvantages in critical infrastructure and logistical support systems. The
Indian CCS had endorsed the CSG which in 1976 defined the LOP for the Indian
Army all along the LAC, from eastern Ladakh to Arunachal Pradesh. After the
1993 Agreement and other CBMs, troop patrols from both sides have avoided
eye-to-eye contact with each other but play the game to the hilt through banner
drills and by leaving tell-tale signs emphasizing their respective territorial
claims. In the event of commanders’ individual egos leading to a face-off, a
border patrol meeting or a red flag meeting is summoned to pacify tempers on
both sides.
Due to the sensitive nature of the dispute, transgressions across the LAC on
both sides are shrouded in secrecy, with each side playing down the military
significance of the event. The Indian government plays down the issue by saying
transgressions took place due to ‘differing perceptions’ about where the LAC
actually is. Defence Minister Antony went on record in Parliament in May 2012
saying that ‘our security forces also continue to patrol all areas that fall within
the Indian perception of the LAC.’
As for the numbers, Minister of State for Home Affairs Mullappally
Ramachandran admitted before Parliament that the number of transgressions on
the LAC by PLA troops stood at 228 in 2010, 213 in 2011 and 64 till April 2012.
On the basis of data collected over the past four years (2008–2011), it is quite
evident that both sides are busy patrolling their ‘perceptions of the LAC’. The
data reveals that Chinese transgressions in the Eastern Sector have gone up as
compared to the Western Sector, with UAVs being deployed by both sides to
monitor incursions. While there have been no intrusions by the PLA in the
Sikkim sector since 2008, there has been an increase in PLA activity in the
Dichu area of Arunachal Pradesh with aggressive patrolling observed in Yangste
area in India’s far-east. The Army has noticed UAV activity in Kameng area of
Arunachal Pradesh over the past four years with Beijing focused on making out
its case for concessions in so-called ‘southern Tibet’.

Disputed and sensitive positions along the LAC

In the Western Sector, a reduction in PLA activities in Trig Heights and

Depsang Bulge area in eastern Ladakh had been reported till 2011, but the
Depsang incursion in April–May 2013 aggravated the boundary dispute. This
could be due to the fact that Indian patrols do not go up to the LAC on advice of
the CSG in these areas. The number of transgressions in Demchok has also
reduced, despite the PLA building up infrastructure and observation towers on
their side. The Pangong Tso area has witnessed intense patrolling from both
sides using boats. An increase in transgressions in the Dumchele area has been
noticed, with Chumar witnessing helicopter surveillance in 2007 and 2009.
However, PLA incursions and aggressive patrolling was quite evident in 2013.
More than 150 transgressions were recorded in the Western Sector alone till
August 2013, with the PLA focused on freezing Indian activities in Chumar area
by virtually bullying New Delhi to refrain from even monitoring the border with
CCTV cameras.
In the Middle Sector, Chinese surveillance by helicopters was noticed in
August 2011 and in 2012 in the Kaurik Pass area, according to the Himachal
Pradesh Government. The PLA has been aggressively patrolling the Barahoti
plains as compared to the Indian side, which possibly is related to comparative
troop strength in the area. In 2013, the PLA continued to dominate the area with
incursions reported in July.50

TRANSGRESSIONS ALONG THE LAC

2008 2009 2010 2011

LAC
Number of Transgressions

WESTERN SECTOR

Trig Heights 69 75 34 2

Depsang 3 5 6 -

Pangong Tso (*by boat) 89 (*32) 100 (*32) 104 (*29) 95 (*29)

Area Bush 52 42 40 37

Dumchele (# by PLA patrols) 2 8 16 12 (# 11)

Demchok (# by civilians) - 4 13 (# 6) 05 (# 1)

Chumar - 2 2 1

MIDDLE SECTOR

Barahoti (# by civilians) 17 (# 15) 14 (# 11) 9 (# 7) 8 (# 3)

EASTERN SECTOR

Sikkim 78 - - -

Yangtse - - 1 2

Asaphila 4 4 4 4

Dichu (# by PLA patrols) 27 123 (# 6) 88 (# 12) 90 (# 13)

Transgressions along the LAC by China from 2008 to 2011

 While the Indian side has been matching the PLA in patrolling the LAC, the
March 2008 Tibet uprising and subsequent self-immolations have made Beijing
very jittery, with sections within the PLA pinning the blame on India for inciting
the protests. Even though Indian watchers of Chinese activities in Tibet feel that
Beijing is building infrastructure for its internal security purposes, the PLA
buildup in Tibet and Xinjiang provides it with the capacity to deliver a military
punch to India if the latter tries to act aggressively.
While PLA transgressions dipped till 2012, there was a sudden spurt in 2013,
with the onset of the Xi regime. Apart from the Depsang face-off, the total
number of transgressions increased, particularly in eastern Ladakh, with PLA
transgressions noticed even in winter months with temperatures reading 20
below zero, as Chinese soldiers crossed the LAC in Depsang and Chumar as late
as 19–20 December.
With the Indian side now working overtime to improve infrastructure all
along the LAC, there are chances that its moves could be misinterpreted by
Beijing for ulterior purposes, and therein lie the danger of another border
skirmish, along the lines of the 1962 war. This was proved true during the 2013
face-off, when the PLA tried to pressurize India to freeze border infrastructure
upgrading along the LAC in eastern Ladakh. The Depsang incursion was
planned in a way to push India to accept the Chinese draft of the proposed
border defence agreement in March 2013 that was aimed at stopping India from
upgrading its roads and communication networks along the LAC. The face-off
also indicated the fragility of peace on the Indo– China border, forcing New
Delhi to be prepared for all eventualities and keeping its powder dry.51
 three

CHINESE MILITARY CAPABILITY AND

THREAT TO INDIA

The sixtieth anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China on 1

October 2009 was a sobering day for the world, as then President Hu Jintao
displayed the PLA military might to the world in a parade on Tiananmen Square
for the first time ever. After successfully hosting the Olympics in August 2008,
the military parade involving nearly 10,000 troops and high-technology weapons
was an eye-opener to the world, and particularly for India. The showcase was
ample evidence that behind the economic might of the dragon, China had
sufficient firepower to take on any country.
For Beijing’s southern neighbour, the display looked ominous. It confirmed
the fear that the PLA was miles ahead of Delhi in military might, and that it was
high time Indian policymakers took notice of this.
After the 1962 war, the Indian political and military leadership did not
seriously consider itself a rival to China; the defeat exposed the capability gap
between the two armies in terms of men and material, apart from being tied
down in full scale wars in 1965 and 1971 and limited conflict in Kargil in 1999
with Beijing’s proxy Pakistan. The comprehensive 1962 defeat meant that the
Indian military objective now became to hold the LAC rather than to leverage
the boundary dispute to New Delhi’s advantage. A weak Indian economy
between 1960 and 1990 based on the socialist model left the Indian leadership
looking inwards and dabbling in international diplomacy only on the non-
alignment platform. While China under the guidance of Deng Xiaoping moved
away from a centrally planned economy to a market economy in 1978, it was the
1991 balance of payment crisis that woke the Indian leadership out of its
slumber. World Bank figures reveal that Indian and Chinese economies were
comparable in 1980, with both countries registering GDP figures of around $180
billion.1 But thanks to market reforms, China’s GDP grew to become nearly
twice that of the Indian GDP in 1992 with double digit growth. Only in 1991 did
India, under the leadership of P.V. Narasimha Rao and Finance Minister
Manmohan Singh, dismantle the licence raj and initiate liberalization due to the
hue and cry over India pledging 67 tonnes of gold reserve as collateral for a $2.2
billion loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
The rise of China, with its double digit growth in the 1990s, made the Indian
political leadership wake up to the new disparity, as Beijing was now reaching
out to other South East Asian economies. This resulted in Prime Minister Rao
launching the ‘Look East Policy’ in 1995 to boost bilateral trade and economic
cooperation with South East Asian economies, along with a long-term vision of
countering the growing Chinese footprint in East and North Asia. Rao not only
faced an economic crisis but also a deteriorating security situation within and
outside the country. While he had to face the rise of Hindu nationalism in the
form of Babri Masjid–Ram Janmabhoomi agitation and a full-blown Pakistan-
aided insurgency in Kashmir, there was evidence that China had helped Pakistan
conduct its first nuclear test in 1990. Matters came to head when Pakistan Prime
Minister Benazir Bhutto sent her Foreign Minister Lt. Gen Sahabzada Yaqub
Khan to threaten India with nuclear blackmail on 21 January 1990. With the
Kashmiri separatist movement at its peak, General Khan told his Indian
counterpart I.K. Gujral that ‘war clouds would hover over the subcontinent if
timely action was not taken.’2 The growing nuclear weapon and missile nexus
between Pakistan, China and North Korea and Pakistan’s direct involvement in
Kashmir pushed Narasimha Rao to invoke the nuclear deterrent message. He
planned a nuclear test in Pokhran on 16 December 1995, but the test had to be
aborted as US satellites had picked up the Indian plans. It was left to the NDA
government under Vajpayee to complete the unfinished task, in May 1998, when
it detonated six thermonuclear and sub-kiloton devices in Pokhran. In a
subsequent letter to US President Bill Clinton, Vajpayee gave the rationale for
the tests:
I have been deeply concerned at the deteriorating security environment, specially the nuclear
environment, faced by India for some years past. We have an overt nuclear weapon state on our
borders, a state which committed armed aggression against India in 1962. Although our relations
with that country have improved in the last decade or so, an atmosphere of distrust, persists mainly
due to the unresolved border problem. To add to the distrust, that country has materially helped
another neighbour of ours to become a covert nuclear weapons state. At the hands of this bitter
neighbour we have suffered three aggressions in the last 50 years. And for the last ten years we have
been the victim of unremitting terrorism and militancy sponsored by it in several parts of our
country, especially in Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir. Fortunately, the faith of the people in our
democratic system as also their patriotism has enabled India to counter the activities of the terrorists
 and militants aided and abetted from abroad.3

This letter marked the first time that the Indian political leadership had
publicly blamed China for deterioration in the security environment of South
Asia, while justifying the tests as a nuclear deterrent to stave off the dragon and
its proxy state. The tests were preceded by Vajpayee’s defence minister and
veteran socialist leader George Fernandes going on record declaring that China
was ‘India’s potential threat no. 1’4 and called for India to awaken to the fact
that Beijing was forging military alliances with Myanmar and Pakistan to
encircle India.
Despite China taking umbrage to Fernandes’ statement, the NDA government
did not issue any clarifications. Many scholars attributed the outburst to
Fernandes’ personal association with pro-independence Tibetan activists and
anti-junta activists in Myanmar, but the NDA government quietly moved to
forge an alliance with the US after Clinton’s successful visit in March 2003 as
part of a larger countervailing strategy. The Indo–US engagement picked up
during the presidency of George W. Bush, particularly after the signing of the
Indo–US nuclear agreement on 18 July 2005.
While India was politically trying to circumvent the Chinese encirclement
game in South Asia by forging ties with Beijing’s neighbours like Vietnam,
Laos, Cambodia, South Korea and Japan, the Indian Army still had to come to
terms with the 1962 debacle psychologically. This weakness was illustrated in a
meeting of the CSG in 2004, which was summoned to discuss Chinese road and
infrastructure build up across the LAC.
Attended by the Union home secretary, defence secretary, foreign secretary,
R&AW secretary, the IB director and the vice-chief of Army staff, the meeting
was held in the DGMO in South Block. The home secretary argued that India
should build road infrastructure on its side of the LAC for better logistics and
troop deployment in the border areas, and pushed for strategic roads up to the
LAC to be built by the Border Roads Organization (BRO) in Eastern, Western
and Middle sectors. However, the then vice-chief of the Indian Army surprised
the others by opposing this suggestion. His justification for the opposition
betrays the extent to which the Army still suffers from the 1962 hangover; he
said that the PLA could use the very same roads to invade India. The home
secretary immediately shot back at the general, saying that India should then
stop building all roads and fortify themselves in New Delhi or else the PLA
would overrun the country.
 The idea that India must shore up its road infrastructure along the LAC found
resonance in the Ministry of External Affairs after veteran bureaucrat and old
China-hand Shyam Saran took over as foreign secretary in mid-2004 with the
UPA government under Manmohan Singh assuming power in May 2004. With
personal knowledge of Indian border infrastructure as ambassador to Myanmar
and Nepal, Saran pushed the newly formed government to pay attention to
border infrastructure development.
In 2004, Saran with the help of the Defence Ministry wrote a proposal to the
CCS for two inter-basin roads and seven north-south alignment roads in
Arunachal Pradesh.5 This proposal was given a go-ahead by the UPA-I
government in 2005, with the BRO working on one road in the Western Sector
to link DBO with Demchok on a parallel alignment to the LAC. Another road
was envisaged in the Barahoti plains area to beef up ITBP posts in the Middle
Sector.
Being a raucous democracy with federal polity, the roads along the LAC are
still a work-in-progress, even though the BRO is dedicated to its task. Nowhere
along the LAC is the contrast between border roads in India and China starker
than at the 14,140 feet high Nathu La in Sikkim. Closed during the 1962 war and
scene of the bloody border skirmish in 1967, Nathu La was opened for nominal
border trade after the India–China agreement on 23 June 2003.6 Operationalized
on 6 July 2006, the agreement allowed residents living on both sides of the
border to trade in 26 listed items with Changgu designated as a market in Sikkim
and Renqinggang in Tibetan Autonomous Region. Just 54 km from Gangtok and
430 km from Lhasa, Nathu La overlooks the sensitive Chumbi valley in Tibet
which juts into the strategic Siliguri corridor.
Given its sensitivity, this area has the largest concentration of army
formations on both sides of the border, with virtually three Indian Army
divisions facing an equivalent number of PLA troops. On ground zero at Nathu
La, a metal-top two-lane highway begins on the Tibet side, which connects to
Yadong in Chumbi valley and from there on to Shigatse and Lhasa. On the
Indian side, however, is a rocky dirt track beginning from the pass to the nearby
Sherthang Mart, built for bilateral border trade, near Tsongmo Lake. The road up
to Gangtok, called Jawaharlal Nehru Marg, is in a similar condition, with
landslides wiping off sections every monsoon. The highway 31 Alpha, which
connects Gangtok to Sevoke near Siliguri, is a two-lane road, but with works
perpetually in progress. This is the only road link between West Bengal and
Sikkim, with an alternative road plan stuck in land acquisition issues and
political rivalries. The 31 A highway to Gangtok is perpetually jammed and it
takes no less than four hours to travel a distance of 92 km from Sevoke to
Gangtok – just two hours less than required to reach Lhasa from Nathu La, a
distance of 434 km, on an expressway which allows speed up to 160 kmph. It is
quite evident from the road to Nathu La that the border infrastructure gap has
widened in comparison to China and work on war footing is required, for roads
are force multipliers when it comes to military capability and troop deployment.
This ever-widening gap is not limited to border area development but is also
evident in the rapid growth of the indigenous Chinese defence industry as
compared to India. China has overtaken India in the industry, where it is largely
in the hands of bleeding public sector units or minuscule yet ravenous private
sector units, both in terms of innovation as well as reverse engineering.

THE INDIGENOUS FACTOR

The sixtieth anniversary of the PRC and the subsequent military parade,
involving nearly 10,000 troops and a display of high-technology weapons, was
meant to shock and awe its adversaries. At Indian Army Headquarters in South
Block, officials sat up and took notice of this display of indigenous weapons and
were shocked to see the results of an in-house exercise conducted to compare the
weapons systems.
It was found that in the small arms category, the Indian Army had no answer
to the Chinese QBZ Type-95 assault rifle and Type-95B carbine. The Indian
sub-machine gun was inferior as compared to its Chinese Type-5 counterpart,
which was based on top-of-the-line Heckler and Koch MP-5. However, the
situation was different in the armour section, with New Delhi assessing that it
had an edge in tanks. According to the report, the 2001 vintage Chinese third
generation ZTZ99G (125 mm guns, 54 tonnes weight) Main Battle Tank (MBT)
was a copy of the Russian T-72 tank and perhaps inferior to the Indian MBT
Arjun (120 mm, 60 tonnes). The Chinese second generation ZTZ 96A MBT (125
mm, 42.5 tonnes) was a copy of the Russian T-80, which matched the Indian T-
72 (125 mm, 40 tonnes), but was inferior to the Russian-built Indian tank T-90
(125 mm, 46.5 tonnes).
However, the PLA artillery on display at the parade posed a lot of questions
for Indian planners, as its army did not have any answers to the self-propelled
and tracked howitzers. Chinese artillery was based on Russian designs, with both
India and China using the same Russian version of the 300 mm long-range
multiple-launch rocket systems (MRLS). But the anti-tank missiles and
antiaircraft guns on display made Indian analysts happy, as the Indian Army’s
third generation Nag ‘fire-and-forget’ missile was quite superior to the Chinese
AFT-9/HU-9 Red Arrow anti-tank missile with a range of 4 km.
The PLA had also displayed 12 categories of indigenous missiles and missile
systems, which were superior to the Indian arsenal – the latter limited in range
due to the missile technology control regime (MTCR) stipulations in cruise
missiles. In the cruise missile category, the Indian BrahMos was considered
superior to the YJ-83 anti-ship cruise missile, but the former was limited by
range to 290 km, while the latter could hit a target 500 km away with an active
homing warhead. But the BrahMos was no match to the DH-10 land attack
cruise missile with a range of 1,500 km. However, the DRDO-developed short-
range ballistic missile Agni-I with a range of 700–800 km was considered a
match in comparison to PLA’s Dong Feng (literally, ‘East Wind’)-11A (range
300 km) and DF-15A (range 500 km) short-range ballistic missiles. Indian
analysts also rated the 2,500 km range Agni-II and the 3,500 km range Agni-III
intermediate-range ballistic missile to be superior to the Chinese DF-21C
medium-range ballistic missile with a range of 1,700 km. However, the PLA’s
12,500 km range three-stage intercontinental ballistic missile DF-31 A has no
answer in the Indian strategic missile arsenal to date, even though India has test
fired a three-stage Agni-V with a range of 5,000 km on 19 April 2012. On 26
February 2008, India test-fired the 600–700 km range Sagarika submarine-
launched ballistic missile, which will give teeth to its indigenously built nuclear
submarine INS Arihant.
Also on display at the October parade were a number of indigenously built
Chinese fighter jets and helicopters, which are equally matched by the IAF’s
arsenal. Chinese aerial platforms were either a straight copy or similar to
Russian, French and Israeli designed and manufactured fighters and helicopters.
For instance, the Chinese J-7 indigenous single-engine fighter is a copy of the
erstwhile Soviet Union-designed and manufactured MiG-21 fighter. The J-8
twin-engine fighter is based on a 1965 design of a twin-engine MiG-21 with Su-
15 nose cone. This PLA Air Force aircraft is being phased out by the single-
engine J-10 fighter but the IAF’s MiG-27 aircraft is superior. The Chinese J-19
fighter is a copy of the 1998 Israeli Lavi, which is comparable to the IAF’s
Mirage-2000, even though the Indian assessment was that the former is yet to
prove itself in war or on the field. The PLAAF J-11B fighter is based on the
design of the 1998 Su-27, which is equally matched by the Indian Su-30K air-
defence fighter. The 1988 vintage JH-7A ‘Flying Leopard’ fighter bomber
somewhat resembles the French ‘Super Entendard’, which is inferior in terms of
capability to IAF’s Jaguar deep-penetration strike bomber. According to Indian
experts, two fatal crashes of the JH-7A in 2009 had raised doubts about its
reliability. The ‘Flying Leopard’ is actually nicknamed the ‘Fat Leopard’ due to
its large unwieldy frame.
While the Indian military took solace in the fact that they were not outclassed
by Chinese hardware on display, there was a degree of concern about how the
PLA had been more successful in indigenization of weapons technology as
compared to DRDO. Formed in 1958, DRDO has a network of 52 laboratories
engaged in developing defence technologies, particularly long-range delivery
platforms, with the defence industry being a virtually no-go area for the private
sector till the end of twentieth century. While China has been able to push its
indigenous defence industry, DRDO’s success rate is far less than desired. In
March 2013, Antony informed the Parliament that all major DRDO projects
were running behind schedule by a minimum of four years. The ‘four years
delay’ was an exercise in semantics and fudging, as old projects have been
renamed to show progress – a hall mark of India’s affair with the erstwhile
Soviet Union. For instance, the indigenous Light Combat Aircraft (LCA)
project, which began in 1984, has bled the Indian exchequer without any
tangible results. Phase II of the LCA, which was to be completed by 2008, was
first extended to December 2012 and has now been extended to March 2015.
Behind the opacity of the DRDO, it is a well-known fact that India is tying up
with Sweden for transfer of technology for the Grippen next-generation fighter
so that it can be re-labelled as the LCA-Mark II. The indigenous fighter jet
engine Kaveri, which was supposed to become functional by December 1996,
was given an extension till December 2009. The development of an airborne
early warning and control system (AWACS) for the IAF, for which the DRDO
was collaborating with Brazil, has been postponed to March 2014 after the first
deadline was missed in October 2011. The list of delayed projects or
unsatisfactory products from the DRDO stable goes on and on.
On the other side, the Chinese military hardware combined with their huge
defence budget of $106 billion and developing infrastructure are all adding to the
pressure on Indian borders. Further, Russian defence contractors are supplying
the same technology and aircraft engines to China as to India – a source of
discomfort to Indian military mandarins. A classic example is the RD-93 aircraft
engine, which is at the heart of IAF’s MiG-29 air-defence fighter; the same
engine is used to power the Chinese JF-17 fighter, which was jointly developed
with Pakistan. Much to the chagrin of India, the Chinese diverted 100 RD-93
engines to Pakistan despite New Delhi conveying its serious concerns to
Moscow at the highest level.7
With the Chinese making it clear that they were prepared for a long haul to
sort out the boundary dispute with India, the PLA’s rapid military infrastructure
development was of serious concern to New Delhi. That the Chinese were in no
hurry to resolve the boundary issue was evident during Wen Jiabao’s December
2010 visit. While boundary talks were elevated to the level of special
representatives in 2003 to resolve the dispute, Wen made it clear that Beijing
was in no hurry and would rather look towards a boost in bilateral trade,8 which
is already tilted in China’s favour. This was a drastic change in position from the
2003 agreement, when it was decided that special representatives close to the top
leadership would resolve the boundary issue on political terms rather than
indulging in an elaborate cartographic exercise.
With the boundary dispute resolution nowhere in sight and the Chinese
building up infrastructure rapidly in Tibet and Xinjiang, New Delhi decided it
would take a closer look at developments across the border and take stock of its
own capacities and capabilities. Before we discuss the Indian response to
Chinese accretion in Tibet, it is important to understand the nature of the build-
up and its military ramifications on the roof of the world.

INFRASTRUCTURE BUILD-UP IN
TIBET
Train links

China has a long history of politically driven construction projects. The 21,196
km long Great Wall, whose construction started in the seventh century BCE, was
one; the tradition continues to this day. The Three Gorges dam project on the
mighty Yangtze and the western express highway linking its restive regions of
Xinjiang with Tibet via the disputed Aksai Chin region are glorious examples
from the past century. The 1,118 km Golmud–Lhasa railway link, also known as
the Qinghai–Tibet Railway (QTR), is the latest and perhaps the costliest project
to join this growing list of building wonders. These capital-intensive projects
have served Beijing’s larger interests of internal consolidation, apart from
economic development of the regions concerned.
While the railway link is part of China’s blueprint to control and integrate the
restive Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR), the scheme has fired the
imagination of Indian security planners given its strategic and economic
ramifications. Completed on 1 July 2006, the single-track metre-gauge railway
link stretches from Golmud city in Qinghai province to Lhasa by breaching the
mighty Kunlun Shan ranges at the roof of the world.9 With a plan outlay of
$2.34 billion, the railway line passes through 30 tunnels and bridges, which
alone covers a distance of 37.5 km. It is the world’s steepest and highest railway
line with more than 960 km of the track laid at altitudes over 1,300 ft and nearly
560 km over permafrost.
The Indian government, however, doesn’t feel very strongly about these
records. Instead, its perceptions about the rail link were bared in a report soon
after the project was launched. The first in a series of reports, circulated at the
highest levels in the Vajpayee government, stated that the railroad connection
would significantly improve China’s military transport capability in Tibet
besides linking Lhasa to Beijing and Shanghai by railroad. It has drastically
reduced the travel time from Golmud to the Tibetan capital from 72 hours to 16
hours and provided China an opportunity to transport five million tonnes of
cargo annually from mainland China to Tibet and 2.8 million tonnes of mineral
resources in the reverse direction. In military terms, the report stated, the rail link
gave China the capability to mobilize up to 12 divisions (12,000 men make a
division) a month. In contrast, Indian deployment capabilities on its borders with
China through a rail road are non-existent. There is no rail track in Ladakh; it
culminates at Kathgodam in the Uttarakhand plains, and at Tinsukia in Assam,
far away from the LAC in Arunachal Pradesh.
Apart from the military implications, the QTR project was designed to
reinforce Beijing’s writ on the restive TAR, possibly through a change in the
demographic character of the region with the influx of Han workers in the
sparsely populated Tibetan plateau. As the future of Tibet is central to India’s
long-term security, the Tibetan government-in-exile in 2001 predicted that the
project would escalate the military build-up on the plateau.10
But the QTR isn’t the only project worth noting. Beijing is now constructing
three more railway lines to Lhasa in a bid to tighten its grip on the region and
improve its logistics capability. These rail links, which will become operational
by 2038, are the Lanzhou–Nagchu– Lhasa, Chengdu–Nagchu–Lhasa and Dali–
Nyingtri–Lhasa routes. Parallel to the Golmud–Lhasa highway and an oil
pipeline, the QTR fulfils the Chinese objective of utilizing the virgin natural
resources of Tibet. Powered by heavy-duty General Electric locomotives and
pressurized cabins, the train runs at 140 kmph through plain country and 90
kmph in mountainous terrain. The planned line capacity is of eight pairs of
passenger trains and one way flow of five million tonnes of goods per year.
The QTR’s high load capacity and all-weather capability also eases the
delivery of heavy armaments like howitzers, tanks and missiles and heavy
machinery for construction to this mountainous region. Work has already begun
on the branch railway line between Lhasa and Shigatse with plans to extend the
same line to Yadong in Chumbi Valley and as far as Kathmandu in Nepal and
Linzhi in south-eastern Tibet,11 part of Nyingchi prefecture. This prefecture
borders Arunachal Pradesh – which the Chinese claim as its own as southern
Tibet. There are also plans to extend the rail line to Pakistan via Khunjerab Pass
and link it to Gwadar port.12 Beijing also maintains a nuclear arsenal of an
estimated 129 to 169 land-based missiles along the QTR.13 There are credible
reports that missile-launch brigades on the eastern section of the rail corridor
have been established and could be relocated to central Tibet due to the railroad
network.
Among the many military implications of the QTR, some stand out as
particularly worrying for India. The QTR will considerably reduce the induction
time for military formations from mainland China to forward areas, and the
gradual transport of troops into the high-altitude plateau means that
acclimatization to some extent would be taken care of during the period of
transit. The period and process of acclimatization would commence as soon as
the formations enter Tibet. The QTR also makes possible the movement of
troops from Kunming and other eastern Chinese provinces much faster, as the
inadequacies of the eastern highway can now be offset by the railroad. With the
dependence on roads and bridges reduced, the number of bottlenecks in troop
deployment also gets proportionally reduced. Finally, the induction of strategic
missiles along the QTR is now possible and they could also be hidden in the
numerous tunnels en route. Some 30 km of the QTR is covered through tunnels
with the Yangbajain tunnel being the longest at 3.35 km and Feng Zuo Shan
tunnel being the highest at 4,905 m on the QTR route.
Road development

China in the past decade has extensively transformed the infrastructure profile of
Tibet and Xinjiang. Most modern facilities are now available in cities and towns
of the regions, making it possible for the country’s rapid economic growth to be
shared with the local population in a bid to assimilate them into the dominant
ethnic Han demography. Modern communication systems have been established
in the region and power connectivity with other parts of the country through
electricity grids has been successfully achieved. The most important ingredients
in this massive infrastructure progress reflect in the development of railroads,
highways, communication networks, airfields and logistics bases.
In 2003, China initiated a major highway renovation project, which led to an
upgrading of 51,000 km of roads in Tibet by the Beijing Olympics in 2008.14
During this period, national highways, provincial highways and country roads
were developed with an ambitious plan to connect all villages by metalled road.
By 2008, all major highways in the region were two-way black-top roads, with
the road from Lhasa to Yadong ready by end-2008. With the central Tibet
highway already four-lane, all highways are now upgraded to all-weather routes
designed to remain open to traffic throughout the year.
During this period, lateral roads were also upgraded with an additional 3,600
km of roads constructed by 2007 to link 90 per cent of counties in Tibet, and the
remaining counties were linked in the next year15 – the latest reports indicate
that all counties have been linked with black-top metalled roads. China has also
focused on border roads with access to high passes for logistics and rapid
deployment of troops. In the disputed Eastern Sector, the road extends not only
close to the LAC but in some areas like Namkha Chu, Somdorong Chu, Longju
and Fish Tail-II, across it. In fact, all the passes and posts along the India–Tibet
border are either connected or in the process of being connected to bigger
arterial roads and from there on to the major axis.
According high priority to road upgrading, 7,000 km of highways and roads
were further upgraded by 2010.16 The current target is to increase the existing
network of highways from 58,000 km to 70,000 km by 2015. According to
official Indian estimates, the road development undertaken by Beijing has given
it the capability to move 11,500 tonnes per day whereas only 200 tonnes per day
are required to sustain major military operations for sustained periods.17

Airfields and Advance Landing Grounds

There are currently eight airfields in Tibet, of which five are in operational
condition, two are under construction and one is in a state of disuse.18 In
addition to this, there are airfields at Hotan, Kashgar, Korla, Urumqi and
Yarkand in Xinjiang – leading to a total of nearly 18 airbases in Tibet and
Xinjiang within the range of Su-27 aircraft, and an additional 22 airfields are to
be constructed by 2020.19 Although these airfields are currently used for civil
aviation purposes, they could play a major role in case of hostilities. However,
these bases are not presently equipped with blast pens – used for parking fighter
planes – and have limited apron facilities, maintenance hangers, and ammunition
and fuel-oil-lubricant storage areas. While the capabilities of logistics bases at
Hotan and Kashgar are not exactly known, the other bases are capable of
handling the following:

• Shiquanhe 50,000 tonnes

• Shigatse 40,000 tonnes
• Tsethang 100,000 tonnes
• Nyingchi 85,000 tonnes
• Naqu 1.2 million tonnes

This means that the PLA has an assessed daily tonnage capacity of 31,880
tonnes per day in Tibet, apart from the air bridge that could be set up in case of
any pressure on the LAC or a future rebellion in Tibet. This includes:

• Trains: 9,380 tonnes per day (6 lines × 3,230 tonnes)

• Roads: 11,500 tonnes per day
• Air: 1,000 tonnes per day

In military terms, this means that the PLA could put pressure on the LAC at
an extremely short notice, with the capacity to deploy five times its present troop
strength on the Indo–China border within a month.
The story on this side of the border is far worse, though. Indian infrastructure
is far inferior to Tibet, with no railroads in Ladakh, Barahoti and Arunachal
Pradesh. The nearest railhead to Ladakh is Jammu–Udhampur, headquarters of
Northern Army Command, with the Qazigund–Srinagar–Baramulla line in the
Kashmir valley expected to be linked by 2017 through the Banihal Tunnel. The
nearest railhead in Himachal Pradesh is Shimla and that too on a small gauge
track. In Uttarakhand, the nearest railhead is Kathgodam and Dehradun, and in
West Bengal it is Jalpaiguri with no linkages to Gangtok. The situation in
Arunachal Pradesh is far worse, with the nearest railhead being North
Lakhimpur in Assam, around 60 km away from the state capital Itanagar. The
North Frontier Railway plans to open a line that connects Rangia–Rangpara–
North Lakhimpur–Murkongselek, a village 42 km from Passighat in Arunachal,
by 2014.20
Time and again, state chief ministers like then Himachal Pradesh Chief
Minister Prem Kumar Dhumal have raised the Chinese threat with the Indian
Prime Minister to build a railroad to Leh and upgrade the Manali–Leh highway
to an all-weather road by building tunnels under major Himalayan passes.21
However, the nature of the Indian democratic beast is such that only a survey of
Bhanupali – a town in Ropar, Punjab – to Bilaspur in Himachal Pradesh has
been carried out by the railway authorities to date. The Manali–Leh highway is
being upgraded with a 9 km long tunnel under the 13,051 feet high Rohtang La
being constructed with the help of BRO.22 Part of the road parallel to the LAC in
Ladakh linking DBO to Demchok is still a work-inprogress, with army posts
currently served by either mule trains or air drops.
While the Indian state has woken up to Chinese capabilities in Tibet,
infrastructure development has moved at a much slower pace due to issues in
land acquisition and environmental issues in West Bengal, Sikkim and
Arunachal Pradesh. A classic example is that the BRO does not have helicopters
to transport heavy excavators and road-construction machinery in Arunachal
Pradesh as all Pavan Hans helicopters were grounded after state Chief Minister
Khandu Dorjee died in a crash at Se la on 30 April 2011. The fact is, with IAF
and the Army having its own priorities, there aren’t enough helicopters for BRO;
India is on the verge of a major helicopter acquisition to supplement the existing
strength.
The proposed two inter-basin roads and seven north-south alignments are
stuck in environmental issues, as their development would involve clearing
forest areas in sensitive border-states. The status and condition of advance
landing grounds along the LAC leaves much to be desired on the Indian side,
despite the Chinese building helipads right next to the border.23 In the Western
Sector, helipads have been built all along the DBO–Chushul–Demchok
alignment, but the air strips at Chushul and Fukche are operational only on
paper, as the Indian Army knows they are under surveillance from the other side
and in range of PLA artillery.
It is only after the 1999 Kargil war that the Leh airport was upgraded to an
airbase with fighter pens. While Thoise functions as a logistics base for both
Siachen and Western Sector, the Nyoma landing ground is operational but with
limited usage. Advance landing grounds have come up in Arunachal Pradesh
including at Tawang and Passighat but the air cover in the state is mainly
serviced by the Tezpur airbase in Assam – a base of World War II vintage which
housed Soviet-era MiG-21 air-defence fighters till as late as 2009.24 In June
2009, India decided to move the Russian multi-role and nuclear-capable Su-30
MKI fighter to Tezpur. This move was part of the Indian signal to its northern
neighbour that it would be prepared to use the air force in case of any adventure
on the disputed Eastern Sector, unlike in 1962.
While India has quietly tried to improve its infrastructure along the border
with an eye on China as well as to protect the integrity of the nation, it has far to
go before it can match Beijing’s efforts and long-term vision. The PLA’s
numerical strength in Tibet has actually thinned down as compared to the past
due to increased troop mobility and deployment capabilities.25 The 2013 military
face-off at Depsang plains does not augur well for the future. A post-event
analysis reveals that the PLA may have intruded 19 km into Indian territory to
maintain its intra-service superiority with the PLA Navy, which has been
aggressive in South China Sea while facing off with neighbours like Japan and
Philippines. The Depsang incursion was not ordered by a local hothead
commander; the PLA Headquarters in Beijing were involved in the planning of
the incident with an aim to bring India on the table to resolve the border issue on
the former’s terms. Although Beijing had told India through diplomatic channels
that the issue would be resolved within a week, it took the Xi Jinping
government two more weeks to force the PLA to withdraw – a clear indication
of the PLA’s clout in China.
India has no option but to continue upgrading its infrastructure along the
LAC, particularly in its surveillance capabilities, as the Northern Army detected
the PLA incursion perhaps five days late, on 16 April 2013. The way out is to
ensure that the border remains peaceful and tranquil with both armies desisting
from any aggressive manoeuvres. This can only happen if both armies exchange
maps and know the ground positions of the adversary.

PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY

The Chinese constitution, first promulgated in 1954, gives the People’s
Liberation Army a pride of place in the triumvirate comprising the establishment
– the party, the state and the military. In a way, the People’s Republic of China
could be historically described as a state that evolved from the Communist Party
of China, which in turn evolved from the Red Army, the precursor of the current
PLA. As such, the PLA is represented on the Party Committee and at each level
of administration in China – county, prefecture, province and the central
government. The party secretary of each province is listed as the first political
commissar of their respective military command, indicating the degree of
overlapping influences and controls between the state, the party and the army.
The seniority of representatives is dependent on the presence of the PLA and the
People’s Armed Police in these administrative divisions, and appropriate to the
rank or seniority of the respective party secretary.26
By ensuring the local PLA commander has an ex-officio seat on these
decision making bodies, the CPC and the Chinese state accord the PLA access to
and influence over government policy as it is being conceptualized, refined and
implemented. From the point of view of the Party, its hierarchical nature and the
traditional mutually distrustful nature of its cadre combine usefully with this
system of multiple controls. The fact that appropriate PLA representatives are
involved with the party’s decisions all through the process ensures that the PLA
cannot disagree with the party’s line on important issues and makes it easy to
pinpoint responsibilities in case of divergence from the line.
As a unified organization of China’s land, sea and air forces, the PLA is one
of the largest defence forces in the world. It traces its roots to the 1927
Nanchang uprising by the Communists against the Chinese Nationalist Party led
by Chiang Kai-shek. Initially called the Red Army, the PLA grew under Mao
Zedong and Zhu De in number from 5,000 troops in 1929 to 200,000 in 1933.27
Only a fraction of this poorly armed force survived the 1934 Long March while
retreating from the Nationalists. However, after rebuilding the movement, a
large chunk of the PLA realigned and fought with the Nationalists against the
Japanese in north China. After the Second World War, the Chinese Communist
Party forces renamed the Red Army as PLA and defeated the Nationalists
comprehensively, thus paving the way for the formation of the PRC in 1949.
When the PLA became a National Armed Force in 1949, it was an unwieldy,
five-million-strong, peasant army.
In 1950, the PLA inducted 10,000 troops in the Air Force, formed in 1949,
and 60,000 troops in its Navy, formed in 1950. It was also supported by a 5.5
million strong militia. During the 1950s, the demobilization of troops began,
resulting in a reduction of PLA strength to 2.8 million by 1953.28 In 1982, the
Central Military Commission was created to strengthen civilian control over the
military and in 1985, China reorganized its 11 military regions into seven. The
modernization programme, which included the demobilization of regional
troops, received an impetus in the 1990s and continues to be a key area of focus
even now.
The role of the PLA is to defend Chinese territory, deter attacks from any
nation and if deterrence fails, to wage war and bring it to a conclusion
favourable to China. In addition, the PLA assists in maintaining internal security,
engages in productive and constructive work, and aids in national development
of China and its special foreign policy objectives. Broadly speaking, the PLA
comprises all elements of the armed forces of China and is the world’s largest
military force with a strength of 2.3 million, of which PLA ground forces
comprise 1.54 million, the Navy 260,000 personnel and the Air Force 380,000
personnel.29 The Second Artillery Corps, which is the repository of strategic
missiles, comprises 120,000 personnel. The PLA Navy and PLA Air Force,
though significantly smaller in number than its Army, are the largest in Asia and
the third-largest in the world. The command and control of the PLA is in the
hands of the Central Military Commission, currently headed by President Xi
Jinping. While there is a parallel Ministry of National Defence, it has no
operational control over the PLA. The ministry does not possess authority for
policy formulation or implementation. Its responsibilities include administration
and manpower planning, budget, procurement and foreign liaison, but the
operational control of the armed forces runs directly from the CMC to the PLA’s
four general departments: General Staff Department, General Political
Department, General Logistics Department and General Armaments
Department.
The GSD carries out staff and operational functions of the PLA. It
disseminates policy decisions, translates national security and defence policy
into specific responsibilities and oversees policy implementation while
exercising operational command and control during hostilities. Headed by a
Chief of General Staff, the GSD acts as the headquarters for ground forces and
includes separate directorates for the Air Force, Navy and Second Artillery
Corps. The GPD in turn is responsible for ideological indoctrination, political
loyalty, cultural activities, personnel records and management, morale, discipline
and military justice. The GPD exercises major influence at each echelon of the
PLA through political commissars. Serving as a watchdog, the GPD has direct
access to the CMC on matters of morale and discipline. The GLD is responsible
for production, supplies, transportation, housing of logistics and medical
services, while the GAD procures and provides armaments and equipment for
the PLA including liaising with armament development agencies. Established in
April 1998, the GAD’s task is to enhance the building and management of
PLA’s weaponry and equipment under a centralized and unified control.
The PLA and its precursor Red Army have evolved from route armies to
military regions and now military area commands (MAC) or theatres of war. A
MAC is mainly in charge of formulating programmes and plans for combat
readiness, operation of troops in the theatre, reserve force build-up in the theatre,
organizing and commanding joint theatre operations involving other arms and
providing joint logistical support. China at present is divided into seven MACs,
each led by a general or a lieutenant general. The MACs have the overall
responsibility for defence and security of the assigned zones. These seven MACs
are in Beijing, Chengdu, Guangzhou, Jinan, Lanzhou, Nanjing and Shenyang.
The group armies in Lanzhou (north) and Chengdu (east) MAC are responsible
for military operations against India.

• Beijing MAC 27, 38 and 65 group armies (GA)

• Chengdu MAC 13 and 14 GAs
• Guangzhou MAC 41 and 42 GAs
• Jinan MAC 20, 26 and 54 GAs
• Lanzhou MAC 21 and 47 GAs
• Nanjing MAC 1, 12 and 31 GAs
• Shenyang MAC 16, 39 and 40 GAs

Each MAC controls provincial military commands and prefectural and armed
forces department at the county level. The latter two also play a political role and
serve as party committees for organizing indoctrination and military service
weeks for civilians.
However, the core tactical formations that wage war are the group armies,
which are equivalent to the Indian Army’s corps formations. The 1.54 million-
strong PLA ground force is organized into 18 group armies used for plains (Type
I), mountains and jungles (Type II) and for coastal areas (Type III). The main
force consists of combat units like infantry, armour, mechanized infantry,
mountain infantry and airborne army under the PLA Air Force. Each GA
comprises 30,000 to 65,000 personnel with normally two to three mechanized or
mountain divisions, one armoured division, one artillery division and one
antiaircraft artillery brigade.
 While the PLA is organized into normal combat units and formation and
supported by local forces and militia, we will focus on China’s strategic nuclear
force, also called the Second Artillery Corps, and the Rapid Reaction Force.
Both have a significant bearing on Chinese military posture against India.

Second Artillery Corps

Established in Beijing on 1 July 1966, China’s strategic nuclear force was named
by none other than Premier Zhou Enlai. Although operationally controlled by the
GSD, the Second Artillery Corps is directly controlled by the CMC and has been
an independent arm of the Chinese armed forces since 1974. Headquartered at
Qinghe near Beijing, the Corps has strategic and nuclear missiles in its
inventory, numbering between 90,000 to 120,000 personnel, spread over six
geographically oriented divisions also called as bases.30 A division or base
comprises of brigades which are the basic missile firing units of the Corps.31
The number of missile brigades has grown to 25 over the years with more
brigades raised to control the missiles aimed at Taiwan. These brigades are
divided between nuclear and conventional units. Mobile nuclear brigades include
those equipped with the DF-31 intercontinental ballistic missile with 8,000-plus
km range, and DF-4, DF-21 and the DF-3 intermediate range ballistic missiles
with ranges varying from 2,500 to 7,000 km.32
In the last four decades, China has produced a veritable list of strategic and
tactical missiles. Over the years, the Second Artillery Corps has witnessed a
change from liquid-fuelled, silo-based missiles to solid-propelled and mobile
strategic and tactical weapons. Solid-propelled missiles are easier to store with a
longer shelf life, while mobility enhances the survivability of the weapon during
a second strike. Newer generation Chinese missiles also have multiple
independent targetable re-entry vehicles warheads, which are aimed at outwitting
the antimissile defence theatre and enhancing the second strike capability.33 The
peace-time locations of the two missile bases which are deployed opposite India
along with their subordinate missile brigades are given below, with the 53
missile base in Kunming Province holding 95 nuclear missiles of DF-21 and
DH-10 cruise missiles with 4,000-plus km range, and the 56 missile base located
in Xining, Qinghai Province, has an inventory of 42 missiles of DF-21 and
longer-range DF-31A category.34 Reports have indicated that there are at least
five launch sites close to the India–China border but none of these are located in
Tibet as all the missiles have ranges between 1,700 and 12,000 km, adequate to
target sites in India. The known launch sites are in Xichang in Sichuan province,
Da Qaidam and Delingha in Qinghai, Korla in Xinjiang and in Jiuquan, Gansu
province.35

Brigade Location Missile type

53 Base, Kunming, Yunan province

802 Brigade Jianshui, Yunan DF-21 (1,700–2,600 km)

808 Brigade Chuxiong, Yunan DF-21

821 Brigade Liuzhou, Guangxi DH-10 (1,500–3,000 km)

825 Brigade Qingyuan, Guangdong DF-21

56 Base, Xining, Qinghai province

809 Brigade Datong, Qinghai DF-21

812 Brigade Tianshui, Gansu DF-31A (8,000–12,000 km)

823 Brigade Korla, Xinjiang DF-21

Peace-time locations of the two Chinese missile bases which are deployed opposite India

Rapid Reaction Force

In 1985, the CMC realized that future warfare would not be based on large-scale
wars, as none of the superpowers would be able to achieve overwhelming
military superiority. Working on the presumption that the threat of a large scale
nuclear war in future was rather negligible, the Chinese military prepared itself
for instability due to territorial disputes, ethnic and religious conflicts and arms
proliferation.36 The Rapid Reaction Force was raised to counter threats such as
instability in the Chinese periphery of Xinjiang, Tibet, Taiwan and the South
China Sea.
The basic principle behind the RRF structure was to have a capability of
modern strategic weapons so that it could exert effective deterrence and develop
a highly competitive, high-tech force for small-scale intensive regional combat
operation.37 The RRF concept was then refined and the force reorganized after
the 1991 Gulf War around the following ideas:

• That modern warfare is based on high technology, which can not only fulfil
tactical and combat missions but also strategic objectives.
• That regional wars could serve as a viable means for political resolution and
render large-scale war unnecessary.
 • That the existence of high-tech weapon systems holds out the possibility of a
quick and favourable resolution through long-distance, high-power
precision attacks.
• That high-tech weapons had changed the requirements of force composition
and had resulted in new types of synergized operations.
• That adaptation and responsiveness were two key elements for the
development of RRF.38

Indian military analysts say China brought in the RRF concept to react to
situations that may arise either internally or in its neighbourhood. The idea is to
have one RRF for each military area command. The present assessment is that
China has 12 to 14 RRF divisions, with their mobility set to be upgraded with
Beijing ordering 40 IL-76 heavy-lift aircraft and eight IL-78M mid-air refuelling
aircraft from Russia.39 Each RRF unit is equipped with advance equipment and
weapons systems equivalent to special forces in Western countries. These forces
now have the capability to reach anywhere in China within 24 to 48 hours and
this timing will be further reduced in days to come.
It is important to understand the RRF concept and the military implications
this has for India. The outline of the RRF includes tasks such as surprise attacks
on enemy command-and-control centres, disruption of enemy supply lines,
interdiction and disruption of force assembly areas, armed reconnaissance
behind enemy lines, tactical and operation air assault, infiltration and
destabilization in rear areas, deployment of observation teams to direct long-
range artillery guns and organizing and coordinating guerrilla activities with
local militias.40 The current assessment is that the RRF will become immensely
potent in the years to come, with the force presently at 30 per cent of the PLA’s
overall strength – this equates to a strength of 300,000 to 500,000 troops.41
The capabilities of the RRF were demonstrated in an exercise conducted in
Beijing MAC in 2010, where a mountain infantry brigade conducted a long-
range raid across the Gobi desert, 2,000 km away, in merely ten days.42
All these are signs that China is heading towards a lean, integrated and highly
efficient army. This large-scale mobility and rapid deployment capability poses
serious threat to New Delhi, with analysts believing that the five existing
airfields in Tibet were enough to transport five to six RRF formation forces to
the border within 48–72 hours. Further, Indian counter-capacities are
comparatively limited due to lack of heavy lift aircraft and older military
doctrine revolving around strike forces rather than highly mobile strike groups.43
Just like PLA ground forces, China since the 1990s has been putting great
emphasis on the expansion of its naval arm, the rising star of the triumvirate, and
is working towards acquiring long legs to increase its area of influence to the
Indian Ocean.

PLA NAVY
Commensurate with its rising naval capabilities, the Chinese Navy has been
flexing its muscles in the South and East China seas, much to the chagrin of the
US, the dominant Asia-Pacific naval power, and nations on the periphery of
these seas. Aggressive patrolling and sea-denial tactics, asking countries like
India to stay away from exploring oil and gas off the coast of Vietnam on
grounds of territorial disputes over Paracels and Spratly islands, flexing its
muscles with Japan over Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, pushing Philippines over the
Scarborough Shoal and an uneasy relationship with South Korea have been part
and parcel of PLA Navy play in the past decade.44 Of these, the Senkaku/Diaoyu
islands dispute is the most serious, due to the uneasy historical relationship
between Japan and China over the past century, and has the potential to trigger
arms build-up in Tokyo. A string of three uninhabitable islands spread over 2.7
square miles in East China Sea are at the heart of conflicting claims by Japan,
China and even Taiwan. As these islands are located in waters rich with fish and
potential hydrocarbon resources, China and Japan have been testing each other’s
military resolve in the area by sending warships and surveillance planes. Riding
on a nationalist sentiment, Japan Prime Minister Shinzo Abe suggested a dual
party benefit and ownership but President Xi Jinping is not forthcoming. In
September 2010, China blocked rare earth mineral exports used in hybrid cars,
wind turbine and guided missiles to Japan after the latter detained a Chinese
trawler captain whose vessel had nearly collided with Japanese Coast Guard
vessels in the disputed area.
In his book Trapped Giant: China’s Military Rise,45 Jonathan Holslag, a
research fellow at the Brussels Institute for Contemporary China Studies, says
that China suffers from geopolitical claustrophobia or the fear of hostile powers
controlling neighbouring countries and possibly encircling it. He believes this
was an important motivator for the aggressive posturing which has led Beijing to
complement its territorial borders with strategic frontiers within which it would
commit its military force. He writes:
China perceives its security environment in three layers that can be summarized as the heartland,
frontier land and the belt of uncertainty. The stability and prosperity of the heartland, covering the
first and second tier of coastal provinces, has been the main concern of Chinese leadership since
Mao Zedong. The Chinese heartland is both continental and maritime. The frontier land includes
most of its territory that Beijing actually controls and covets like Taiwan, Arunachal Pradesh, most
of South China Sea, the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea. Beyond the frontier land stretches a
long belt of uncertainty and it includes all the neighbouring countries. It is this claustrophobic
attitude of the Chinese state that increases the trust deficit with neighbouring states like Japan, India,
Vietnam and South Korea.46

A 2008 Japanese Defence White Paper, quoted by Holslag, concentrated on

China’s regional power projection capabilities and emphasized that Beijing had
begun acquiring capabilities for missions other than tackling Taiwan. He writes:
It (the white paper) referred to an incident in October 2008 when four Chinese vessels, including a
Russian made Sovremenny-class destroyer, passed through the Tsugarna Strait to advance to Pacific
Ocean. This was the first identified passage by Chinese surface combatants through the strait to take
a route circling Japan. In November 2008, four naval vessels including a top-of-the-line Luzhou-
class destroyer passed between Okinawa Island and Miyako Island and headed towards Pacific
Ocean. In December 2008, two Chinese maritime surveillance ships conducted navigation
operations not permitted to foreign ships under international law, such as hovering and cruising
within the territorial waters of Japan near the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. In March 2010, a flotilla of
the North Sea fleet sailed through the Miyako Strait on its way to South China Sea. A month later,
Japanese Defence Ministry reported three incidents of PLA Navy helicopters approaching Japanese
destroyers to within 100 metres of Okinawa.47

Apart from Japan, Vietnam and Philippines are equally concerned with the
PLA Navy flexing its muscles in South China Sea. In 2007, a new PLA navy
base opened near Sanya in Hainan. This facility, only 300 km from the disputed
Paracel Islands, has long piers that allow a large fleet of warships to be hosted
and has a new underground base for submarines.48 Further south, China
maintains smaller facilities on Woody Islands, Fiery Cross Reef and Mischief
Reef in the South China Sea.49 On Woody Island, there are reports that the base
comprises seven large radars, a long pier and a runway more than three km long.
A network of maritime hubs, called a ‘string of pearls’, now stretches from the
South China Sea to Hambantota in Sri Lanka, and Gwadar on the Strait of
Hormuz.50 The Gwadar port is of particular concern to India, as the port is now
linked to Beijing through a land route via the Khunjerab Pass on the Karakoram
Highway.
The three fleets of the PLA Navy – the Beihai (North Fleet), the Dunghai
(East Fleet) and the Nanhai (South Fleet) – are currently undergoing upgradation
or ‘force level augmentation’. The PLA Navy has a three-phased modernization
programme which will be completed by 2050. The first phase was completed by
2000, during which the Navy underwent substantial resurgence with an aim to
gain control over Yellow Sea, East China Sea and South China Sea, all located
within the first island chain of the Pacific Ocean. The second phase is to be
completed between 2020–2025, with the Navy acquiring longer legs and
exercising sea control over the second island chain beyond Taiwan into the
Pacific Ocean. This would proceed with the induction of two aircraft carriers
currently being built at Dalian shipyard. Varyag or the renamed Liaoning, a
conventional turbine-powered carrier, was commissioned in 2012, and China
plans to commission a nuclear powered carrier by 2020. The third phase will be
completed by 2050, where the PLA Navy will have a credible presence in the
Pacific and Indian ocean with a ‘blue water capability’, which will allow it to
operate in deep waters across the world and far away from its home base.
China’s superpower aspirations, at least on the seas, have been clear since
December 2008; it has continually deployed forces in the Gulf of Aden since
that date as part of the UN mandated anti-piracy task force. The task force has
considerable firepower under a rear-admiral rank officer with two state-of-the-art
Jiangkai-II guided missile frigates and marine commando units with helicopters
stationed on the tanker Qingdao Hu.
However, the Navy attracted negative publicity due to its non-engagement
with Somali pirates who had hijacked a Chinese merchant vessel, De Xin Hai,
with a cargo of 76,000 tonnes of coal on 19 October 2009 off the east coast of
Somalia. China eventually paid $3.5 million as ransom on 27 December 2009 to
release the ship, which was on similar lines as the $3.4 million paid to release
the ships Dajian and Tianyu in 2008.51 More significantly, the PLA Navy
instead used the incident to its advantage by pressing the case for a naval base in
the Gulf of Aden; Djibouti has been mentioned as a location for a possible
port.52
With New Delhi maintaining that its strategic interests stretched from the
Gulf of Aden to the Strait of Malacca,53 Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean is
bound to concern India, as the PLA Navy is already practising sea denial or has
tried to restrict and block entry of ships into the South China Sea. On 22 July
2011, Indian amphibious assault ship INS Airawat was buzzed by Chinese radio
as it returned from a goodwill visit to Vietnam.54 While the Indian ship took no
cognizance of the radio call, the unidentified caller made it clear that the ship
was entering Chinese territorial waters.
Indian concerns were then voiced by A.K. Antony at the Asia-Pacific
Security Summit or the Shangri La dialogue on 2 June 2012, when he said that
maritime freedom was not the prerogative of a select few and passage at sea
should be preserved to ensure access for all.55 ‘In an era of globalization and
interdependence, the balance between the rights of states and the freedoms of the
larger global community is vital for international trade and global security,’ he
said, referring to Chinese build-up in the region.
Antony particularly pointed out the hike in Chinese defence spending to $106
billion in 2012, an 11.2 per cent jump over the previous year. ‘Even though we
don’t believe in an arms race, since China has increased their military
capabilities and are spending more on defence, in our own way, to protect our
national interest, we are also strengthening our capabilities in our borders.’
Despite the strong words, Antony was quick to point out the growing
cooperation between India and China in anti-piracy and maritime security
measures, and expressed optimism that the cooperation will evolve further in the
coming years. He also urged China and ASEAN member-countries to settle
South China Sea disputes among themselves.
At the same summit, then US Defence Secretary Leon Panetta underlined
American commitment towards the Asia-Pacific region, with 60 per cent of its
powerful navy deployed in the region. While making it clear that the significant
boost in military resources in the region was not aimed at containing China, he
echoed President Barack Obama’s vision of making the region a top priority in
the twenty-first century. Panetta, a former CIA chief, said, ‘I would encourage
you to look at the increasing technological capabilities of our forces as much as
their numbers in judging the full measure of our security presence and our
security commitment. For example, over the next five years we will retire older
ships, but will replace them with more than 40 far more capable and
technologically advanced ships. Over the next few years we will increase the
number and size of our exercises in the Pacific. We will also increase and more
widely distribute our port visits, including in the important Indian Ocean Region.
And by 2020 the Navy will reposture its forces from today’s 50:50 split between
the Pacific and the Atlantic, to about a 60:40 split between those oceans. That
will include six aircraft carriers in this region, a majority of our cruisers,
destroyers, littoral combat ships and submarines.’56
As much as the Chinese are concerned over the US’s presence and dominance
in the Asia-Pacific, this worry is shared by India, as Panetta referred to increased
American salience in the Indian Ocean Region. Antony expressed these concerns
by telling Panetta post the summit that India supports a strong navy-to-navy
relationship with the US but it would not like to be seen as ganging up against
China. He made it clear that just as India wanted access for all in the South
China Sea as per international laws, it did not want the US to act as a top cop in
the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions.
However, Panetta was quite lucid about US defence plans in the region, and
this was affirmed by what he said at the Summit. ‘Our forward deployed forces
are the core of our commitment to this region and we will…sharpen the
technological edge of our forces. These forces are also backed up by our ability
to rapidly project military power if needed to meet our security commitments.
We are investing specifically in those kinds of capabilities – such as an advanced
fifth-generation fighter, an enhanced Virginia class submarine, new electronic
warfare and communications capabilities and improved precision weapons – that
will provide our forces with freedom of manouevre in which our access and
freedom of action is threatened. We recognize the challenges of operating over
the Pacific’s vast distances. That is why we are investing in new aerial refuelling
tankers, a new bomber, and advanced maritime patrol and antisubmarine warfare
aircraft.’57
It is the vast distances of the Pacific that China should be bothered about, just
as India should be concerned about the same in the Indian Ocean. Holslag quotes
George Washington University’s David Shanbaugh, who did a authoritative
study on the PLA, as saying:
What China has purchased, which attracted a lot of media attention, is not very great in numbers and
not even state of the art. The Chinese indigenous defence capability is really very poor, particularly
in aircraft and submarines.58

To counter the humongous US Navy, China is seeking to effectively enhance

strategic depth, change to offensive mode of naval operations and attain power
projection capabilities. As the PLA Navy seeks to push its maritime defence
perimeter further, it requires a carrier task force with aviation, large-and mid-
sized warships, improved C4ISR* and long range specialized vessels.
The PLA Navy’s modernization programme is also on the fast track, with the
unveiling of a new submarine-launched JL-2 ballistic missile with a range
similar to the land-based DF-31 (7,000–12,000 km), the construction of five
nuclear-powered Jin class (Type 94) submarines, two nuclear-powered Shang
class (Type 93) submarines, sky-wave and surface-wave radars for over the
horizon targeting, YJ-83 anti-ship missiles and HQ-16 surface-to-air missile
systems. All these are indicators that the PLA Navy wants to acquire blue water
status and have the military leverage to intervene in any corner of the world.
The maritime security perimeters of Chinese and US naval forces will
intersect over the vast seas of the Asia-Pacific in the years to come, but the PLA
Navy’s current capabilities will restrict it to sea denial practices rather than force
projection in the South and East China seas or in the faraway Indian Ocean
Region. Indian naval analysts feel that the PLA Navy has a long way to go, as it
does not yet have expeditionary force capabilities with no air defence for task
force operations in South or East China seas or beyond. The PLA Navy in the
Asia-Pacific is pitted against the US’s Hawaii-based Pacific Command, which is
forwardly deployed in Yokosuka in Japan, Guam and now in Singapore. Centred
around the latest George Washington aircraft carrier, the Seventh Fleet alone has
no less than 350 top-of-the-line aircraft. India has been operating an aircraft
carrier, the INS Vikrant, since 1961. The Indian Navy’s blue water capacities
have increased manifolds in the past two years, with a number of critical projects
coming to fruition. India inducted the Russian Nepa class nuclear submarine,
rechristened INS Chakra, on 4 April 2012. The indigenous nuclear submarine
Arihant was launched on 25 July 2013, its nuclear plant going critical on 10
August 2013. On 12 August 2013, Antony and his wife Elizabeth launched the
37,500 tonne INS Vikrant, India’s first indigenous carrier, and on 18 November
2013, Antony received the Russian-built INS Vikramaditya carrier from
Sevmash shipyard. Vikramaditya and Chakra will be harboured in Karwar naval
base, protecting India’s western seaboard, while plans are on to house both the
indigenous carrier and submarine in Visakhapatnam, to protect the eastern
seaboard.
In contrast, China’s sole aircraft carrier Liaoning is still undergoing sea trials
after a 2012 commissioning and it will take a couple of years more for the PLA
Navy to operate fighters and bombers from the platform and function as a
carrier-based force. Land-based fighters have a limited air-defence role in terms
of long range for a navy that aspires for blue water status. Indian analysts find
that PLA Navy submarines lack operational ability with the platform having a
large signature due to noise and poor vibration-damping technology. They do
rate the PLA Navy’s capability of tackling surface-to-surface missiles and air-to-
surface missiles as limited and rather poor, just as Chinese antisubmarine
warfare capabilities and its electronic warfare abilities leave much to be desired.
Same goes for ship-based artillery, which lacks range and accuracy according to
Indian military planners.
While the PLA is now acquiring more Sovremenny class destroyers and the
latest Amur class submarines from Russia, the Chinese threat to India at present
comes from ground forces in Tibet and not from the PLA Navy, though its air
force is getting more potent by the day.

PLA AIR FORCE

Formed in 1949, the PLA Air Force is the third largest in the world and probably
the most antiquated and least modernized as compared to that of Western
countries. Although it was formed to protect China’s borders, it has now
embarked on domination of skies well beyond its neighbourhood with the
passage of time. Its objectives are to protect China’s territorial space against any
possible intrusion and conduct operations against Taiwan or any identified
adversary in South China Sea, to halt any hostile air invasion and secure victory
in context of a regional conflict scenario, to conduct air-defence operations, to
provide other forces with necessary support in operations for launching strategic
counter attacks, support the national economic construction effort and maintain
China’s maritime routes.59
Its current strength is around 470,000 personnel with more than 1,500 fighter
aircraft, over 648 transport aircraft and around 547 helicopters. Headquartered in
Beijing, the air force commander functions directly under the chief of general
staff of the GSD. The commander exercises control over air force formations
through the military region air force headquarter or MRAF, controls air-defence
forces as well as 15 airborne corps. The MRAF headquarters is colocated with
the ground force military region headquarters for better coordination.
The air force currently comprises six air corps, each consisting of two or
more air divisions. Each air corps is self-contained administratively and
responsible for directing tactical air operations and coordination of air exercises.
The highest operational or field formation, however, is the air division,
consisting of headquarters and three air regiments. A fighter air division has
around 124 aircraft under it, a bomber air division 93 aircraft and a transport air
division 90 aircraft.
The large economic, industrial and technological base of China ensures that
the PLA Air Force is constantly upgraded and meets the requirements of a
professional force. Its assets are dispersed over a wide area with good heli-borne
capability and a large airborne force. The force is under good radar cover and
long-range surface-to-air missiles.
At present, there are five operational airfields in Tibet, 15 airfields around
Tibet and nine other airfields in mainland China that could be used for military
operations against India.60 In fact, there are 18 airfields in Tibet and Xinjiang
that are within range for Su-27 operations in case of hostilities. Two new air
fields are being constructed at Shiquanhe in western Tibet and Bayi in Nyingchi
prefecture in eastern Tibet, with another three being planned in the next decade.
While the Shiquanhe airfield or Gar-Gunsa airport could be used as a forward
base to launch operations across the LAC in Ladakh and Uttarakhand, the Bayi
airport in Nyingchi prefecture, which China considers Arunachal Pradesh is a
part of, would play a major role in hostilities in the Eastern Sector.
The terrain and technology poses restrictions on fighter operations in Tibet, as
these airfields are above 12,000 feet. As the terrain in Tibet is flat, barren and
devoid of any vegetation, high quality satellite, aircraft and UAV surveillance is
possible. This means that any adversary would be able to identify and acquire
targets easily in favourable weather conditions. Indian military analysts believe
that airfields at an altitude of 10,000–20,000 feet would have to incur severe
load penalties on the aircraft due to lack of oxygen and the already rarefied
atmosphere. This is precisely the reason why the PLA Air Force has deployed
Russian Su-30 MKC, which is the same as Indian Su-30 MKI for all practical
purposes, on its Chengdu and Guangzhou airbases away from the Tibetan
plateau for operations against India.
 Chinese airfields in Tibet

Due to altitude restrictions in Tibet, the PLA Air Force is building airfields
capable of sustaining fighters and large-scale airborne operations for rapid troop
deployment on the high plateau. In addition to this, it is acquiring more air-to-air
refuelling platforms and AWACS to offset any load penalties.61 These would
play an important part in the new warzone concept of limited warfare.
While the PLA Air Force did not participate in the 1962 war with India,
China has now built an intricate and well-developed air-defence network along
the LAC that has the capacity to airlift a division of troops and two battalions at
a time. It has mass-produced the indigenous Y-7 and Y-8 transport aircraft,
copies of the Russian Antonov-24 and Antonov-12 respectively. Similarly, its
indigenous fighter production line is based on Russian or Israeli aircraft, and
faces serious problems with locally manufactured jet engines. In 2009, there
were two JH-7A bomber crashes (19 July 2009 and 4 August 2009), preceded by
a J-10 fighter (which resembles the Israeli Lavi) crash on 24 March 2009. In all
three instances, indigenous engines were being tested in the aircraft. The J-10
fighter uses the same engine (AL-31H) as the Su-27, while the PLA Air Force’s
latest fighter JF-17/FC-1 uses the MiG-29 engines (RD-93) as power plant.62
While the PLA Air Force may outmatch the IAF in numbers, there aren’t
many differences in the technology. Essentially, both countries rely on the
Russian Su-30 as their front-line fighters with different versions of the MiG-21
fighter as back-up. The 26-yearold indigenous Indian programme to develop the
single-engine multi-role fighter Tejas is still to come to fruition and to date its
prototypes are powered by American General Dynamics engine. It is due to this
very delay that DRDO is looking towards Swedish Grippen ‘Next Generation’
aircraft for a possible joint venture and transfer of technology. Plans are afoot to
label this fighter as Tejas-II.
Matters are just slightly better for the PLA Air Force as the Chinese
indigenous defence industry does better than its Indian counterpart in reverse
engineering. Both China and India use the same Russian IL-76 aircraft for heavy
lift and IL-76M for mid-air refuelling. In fact, India is definitely one up on China
when it comes to airborne surveillance and heavy lift capability with the
acquisition of three PHALCON AWACS planes from Israel, and C-17
Globemaster and C-130J Hercules aircraft from the US. The Russian IL-76
aircraft is no match to the Globemaster and the Hercules in high-altitude rarefied
conditions as the IL-76 does not have the engine to lift any significant load. The
Globemaster and the Hercules on the other hand are proven workhorses with
powerful engines that can operate easily in such conditions.
With the Chinese GDP thrice that of India’s, Beijing has more money and
better technology to beef up its military muscle and push its indigenization plan
beyond the critical threshold over the coming years. A glance at the defence
budget of China makes its amply evident that the country is in the superpower
race, with an outlay of $106.4 billion for 2012–13, an increase of 11.2 per cent
over the previous outlay of $91.5 billion.
The Chinese defence budget is the second-highest in the world after the US.
Analysts estimate that by 2015, China will outstrip all 12 of its neighbours in
defence spending, with figures reaching over $200 billion. Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimates that Chinese per capita
defence outlay is $88 as compared to $34 in India and $31 in Pakistan,63 with
the budget recording a double digit growth for the past two decades except for
the year 2003–2004.
China’s declared defence outlay is just half of the story. While budget
reforms have helped lessen the discrepancy between the PLA’s official budget
and its actual revenue, it is common knowledge that the Chinese military
spending is much higher than the official outlay.64 Over the years, steps have
been taken to make the process more transparent. China has banned the military
from taking part in business activities, a practice which had been responsible for
generating significant additional revenue throughout the armed forces. It
introduced new regulations in accounting and auditing procedures in the early
1990s, making it difficult for military units to hide their assets and profits. It also
created a general armament division in 1998 to oversee the introduction of a
market-based procurement bidding system. In 2001, a radical zero-based
budgeting initiative was introduced for several ministries including defence.
Under the new system, all military units were obliged to calculate their
anticipated requirements for the coming year from zero rather than follow the
old procedure of taking the current year budget and simply adding the
percentages.65
Despite these measures, there is still some way to go before full transparency
in Chinese defence spending is implemented. China’s official defence budget
does not include all elements of military spending.66 Most importantly, there is
substantial expenditure on military research and development, although the size
of such spending is very uncertain. In addition, the defence budget does not
include spending on the People’s Armed Police Force (PAPF), which fulfils a
dual internal security and military role, although expenditure figures for the
PAPF are published separately by the government.
SIPRI estimates that Chinese military spending tends to be a little over 50 per
cent higher than the ‘official’ budget, but this comes with a substantial margin of
error.67 Experts, however, are very sceptical of Western estimates that suggest
the ‘true’ level of Chinese military spending is double the official figure or more.
SIPRI’s estimate includes a rather large outlay for research and development.
Apart from the officially declared budget, there is scope for creating and
funnelling unreflected sums towards defence-related expenditures. Extra-
budgetary funds can be created by the state council for overseas weapons
procurement, while direct allocations to defence industries can be made,
including subsidies to loss-making enterprises.
Apart from these two important heads, the Chinese defence budget does not
include profits from defence industry and arms sales, funds for key defence and
military construction projects, retirement benefits to ex-servicemen and disabled,
profits from PLA military enterprises and most importantly, the import of
weapons and equipment.
In comparison, the Indian defence budget for research and development was
$830 million in 2012–2013.68 The retirement benefits to ex-servicemen and
disabled take a significant chunk of the defence budget. India has set aside
$14.21 billion for modernization of all three services, including weapon
purchases and equipment. SIPRI estimates that India is the largest weapons
importer in the world and China comes at number four after being at the top in
2006–2007.
China is spending huge sums of money on its military expansion and its
budget could be nearly four times the Indian defence budget. This should
increase, provided its fantastic economic growth continues in the coming
decades. Behind the cultivated facade of a benign superpower on the rise, the
Chinese military is the dominant force in Asia, but with a propensity to lean on
its neighbours in case of internal crisis as in the past. With China ready to bare
its fangs in South China Sea and in no hurry to solve the border dispute with
India, its growing military backed by its infrastructure cannot be taken lightly by
any nation in the neighbourhood. The threat to India also magnifies after one
takes into account Chinese influence in South Asia. Chinese encirclement of
India with its immediate neighbours threatens to choke New Delhi and confine
its role to being a regional power.
* A military termed defined as ‘command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance
and reconnaisance’.
 four

CONVERGENCE AND CONTAINMENT

Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is never given to hyperbole or emotions

when it comes to matters of the state. His public enunciations on diplomacy or
politics have been quite matter of fact and lacking in any political flair or usual
diplomatic optics. This cultivated facade hides the understanding Singh has of
global affairs, and he is prepared to deal with it keeping India’s larger interest in
mind.
So it was unusual when the normally reticent Singh called a clutch of media
persons to his Race Course Road residence on 6 September 2010 to counter the
allegations that the Congress-led UPA government was not communicating
enough with the people. In the meeting, Singh sounded quite frustrated by the
continued ‘pinpricks’ from Beijing and Islamabad despite his unflagging efforts
to improve relations with India’s neighbours. When asked about China referring
to Jammu and Kashmir as ‘India-controlled Kashmir’, Singh agreed that Beijing
could be tempted to use India’s ‘soft underbelly’ – Kashmir and Pakistan – ‘to
keep India in low-level equilibrium’.1 The statement underscored his repeated
emphasis for India and Pakistan to resolve their differences and reach a good
equation. Not only would continued differences give countries like China the
opportunity to exploit, but also impede progress in South Asia. ‘China would
like to have a foothold in South Asia and we have to reflect on this reality. We
have to be aware of this,’ he said. He, however, also said it was his firm belief
that the world was large enough for India and China to ‘cooperate and compete’
at the same time.
After his meetings with the Chinese leadership, including with then President
Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, in 2010, Singh felt that Beijing
wanted to sort out outstanding issues with India. ‘However, this leadership will
change in two years (2012). There is a new assertiveness among the Chinese. It
is difficult to tell which way it will go. So, it’s important to be prepared.’2
 Singh’s telling comment that China could be tempted to use Pakistan or
Kashmir to keep India in low-level equilibrium was an understatement, given his
demeanour. Ever since Pakistan illegally ceded 5,180 sq. km of Shaksgam
Valley in north Ladakh to China in 1963, Beijing has been using Islamabad to
diplomatically and militarily contain India within the geographical perimeter of
South Asia. From providing Pakistan with nuclear weaponization technology,3
nuclear capable delivery platforms4 and support in international forums, Beijing
has openly admitted to being an ‘all-weather ally’ of Islamabad5 and that their
bilateral relationship was ‘sweeter than honey’.6
While we will discuss the Chinese relationship with Pakistan in detail, it is
quite apparent that Islamabad owes Beijing for allowing it to participate in the
heavyweight category of nations, of which India is a natural member.
When Manmohan Singh said that India would have to prepare for an assertive
China, the immediate trigger was Beijing’s refusal to give a normal visa to then
Indian Northern Army Commander Lt. General B.S. Jaswal, leader of a high-
level military delegation travelling to China in July 2010.7 Jaswal was instead
given a stapled visa on a sheaf of paper on grounds that as northern army
commander he was responsible for the disputed Jammu and Kashmir territory
where Indian forces had allegedly committed human rights violations.
India loudly protested this move, amounting to interference in its internal
affairs. The Chinese move also signalled a change in its policy towards Jammu
and Kashmir, which has been coveted by Pakistan since 1947 and has been the
subject of four wars. Till the stapled visa, the Chinese policy on Kashmir had
advocated both India and Pakistan to mutually sort out the issue across the
table.8 Beijing rejected India’s protests over the visa as it maintained that China
had been stamping normal visas only on those passports which were issued from
Srinagar since 2008. Residents of Arunachal Pradesh were also given either
stapled visas or in some instances no visa, as they were deemed to be Chinese
citizens. The fact is that India kept quiet over stapled visas to Jammu and
Kashmir residents since 2008 and chose to raise the issue in 2010 only after the
Indian Army brass cried foul. As is evident from Nehru’s letters to Zhou Enlai
(see chapter 2), India has a habit of sweeping bilateral pinpricks by China under
the carpet and beyond the public view in hope that the former would see New
Delhi’s point of view.
Why did the Chinese suddenly choose to give stapled visas to Kashmiri
citizens? For a country which was the site of the 1989 Tiananmen Massacre,
why the noises over human rights violations? The answer to these questions lie
in China’s internal political struggles and events in Tibet. Just as Zhou Enlai
offered a border resolution to Nehru in 1959 on an ‘as-it-is-where-it-is’ basis
after the 1959 rebellion in Tibet, Beijing’s decision to prick India was due to
events prior to the 2008 Beijing Olympics.
The 2008 Tibetan unrest that began on the anniversary of the 10 March 1959
uprising saw serious violence against the Han population in Gansu, Qinghai and
Sichuan provinces, with the Chinese Peoples’ Armed Police Force being used to
crush the rebellion.9 The Chinese reaction to these protests was predictable, with
Premier Wen Jiabao blaming supporters of the Dalai Lama.10 ‘There is ample
fact and we also have plenty of evidence proving that this incident was
organized, premeditated, masterminded and incited by the Dalai clique,’ he
said.11
The Chinese establishment ignores the fact that the younger generation of
Tibetans is dissatisfied with the Dalai Lama’s insistence on peaceful protests and
this has led to deep divisions within the community. The Dalai Lama on his part
denied any involvement in the 2008 events. On 31 March 2008, the state-owned
news agency Xinhua published what it claimed to be an account of the process
by which the Dalai Lama allegedly masterminded the riots.12 The story claimed
that five groups associated with the government-in-exile recruited agents for the
‘Tibetan People’s Great Uprising’ in India in February, that 101 agents sent from
Dharamsala were instrumental in organizing the protests and the subsequent
riots, that the government-in-exile directly funded the protests and that the
Tibetan Youth Congress intended to conduct an armed guerrilla campaign in
China. The next day, the Chinese government escalated its accusation against
supporters of the Dalai Lama, accusing them of planning suicide attacks.13 The
prime minister of the Tibetan government-in-exile, Samdhong Rinpoche, denied
these allegations,14 saying that ‘Tibetan exiles are 100 per cent committed to
non-violence. There is no question of suicide attacks.’
By blaming the Dalai Lama and the government-in-exile for the unrest in
Tibet, China was directly accusing India for giving shelter to its opponents and
fomenting the agitation in Tibet. While Beijing offered a so-called compromise
on the border dispute after the 1959 Tibet rebellion and the failure of Mao’s
Great Leap Forward, the reaction in 2008 towards India was to the contrary, and
commensurate to Chinese economic and military power. Beijing chose to send a
message through stapled visas, indicating that it could revise its position on an
issue most sensitive to Indians – Jammu and Kashmir. The collateral beneficiary
of this move was China’s best friend Pakistan.
While India kept the stapled visa issue under wraps during 2008 so that it
could be handled diplomatically, therefore deliberately not escalating the issue
during the Tibetan unrest and the Olympics, Manmohan Singh returned as prime
minister in May 2009; key changes in the foreign policy establishment were
made in subsequent months. China specialist Shivshankar Menon took over as
NSA in January 2010, with Gopal Krishna Pillai taking over as the new Home
Secretary and Subrahmanyam Jaishankar appointed Indian Ambassador to China
six months earlier. General Vijay Kumar Singh, who till March 2010 was
Eastern Army Commander, took over as the Indian Army Chief.
With the PM worried about Chinese assertiveness, the UPA-II government,
formed without the support of Indian communist parties, decided to stand firm
on its ground with China. Back in power with larger numbers of MPs, UPA-II’s
firmness with China was also the result of P. Chidambaram being the home
minister, after taking over on 1 December 2008 post the Mumbai terror attacks,
and die-hard old school Congressman A.K. Antony as defence minister, who
trusts Russia more than China as far as bilateral ties with India are concerned.
The first sign of Indian firmness came after 70 people died in a chimney
collapse at the Bharat Aluminum Company Limited (BALCO) power plant in
Korba, Chhattisgarh, on 23 September 2009, with the plant being designed by
Shandong Electric Power Corporation (SEPCO) of China with more than 89
engineers and workers employed at the site. After the incident, Chinese
personnel fled the site even as the state government ordered a judicial inquiry.
As India issued a ‘lookout’ circular at all the major airports to detain the Chinese
workers, it was found that all the Chinese personnel were on business visas
rather than employment visas. Subsequent checks revealed that the Indian
embassy in Beijing had issued no less than 25,000 business visas to Chinese
citizens including factory workers.
With the approval of the CCS, the Home Ministry under Chidambaram
decided to curtail business visas to around 5,000 a year and insisted that workers
arrive on employment visas or be hired from India by Chinese companies.15
Beijing protested through diplomatic channels but New Delhi was unfazed as the
policy of cutting down on business visas was across the board and for all
countries.
But the Chhattisgarh incident was not the only reason why India decided to
deal upfront with Beijing once UPA-II was sworn into power. Just as New Delhi
was worried about Beijing’s close military ties with Islamabad, its worst fears
came true in 2010 when it found evidence that China was fishing in troubled
waters of the Northeast by supplying small arms and area weapons like AK-47
rifles and mortars to Indian insurgent groups.16 Till then, while the Pakistani
Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) had penetrated Northeast rebel groups through
the Bangladesh route for the past two decades, Chinese aid to Indian rebels could
not be proved. However, there were whispers in the Northeast about old ties
between the Nationalist Social Council of Nagaland (Isaac–Muivah) and
Chinese intelligence since Mao Zedong’s days. The ties, which had taken a
downturn during Deng Xiaoping’s regime, took an upswing when NSCN (I-M)
Chairman Isaac Chishi Swu visited China in 2009.17 Anthony Shimray, NSCN
(I-M) chief weapons procurer and head of the so-called foreign command of the
group, was a routine visitor to China before he was picked up by Indian security
agencies on 2 October 2010 in Patna.18 Shimray, during his interrogation by
National Investigating Agency (NIA) sleuths, apparently said that he had paid an
advance of $800,000 in April 2010 to a Thai national identified as Willy
Naruenartwanicha to source rocket launchers, grenades, assault rifles and
ammunition for the Naga and other insurgent groups in Assam and Manipur
from a weapons supplier in mainland China. Willy Narue was arrested by the
Thai Police on 31 August 2013 on charges of supplying arms from Chinese
weapon manufacturers to Northeast rebels.19 Chinese weapons suppliers
included NORINCO (China North Industries Corporation), a Beijing-based
multinational giant that manufactures weapons systems including small arms,
and China Xinshidai Company. Shimray, 52, told his interrogators that he had to
make a final payment of another $200,000 before the Chinese company would
ship arms from Dalian in north China to the Naga group through either the Cox’s
Bazaar route in Bangladesh or through the land route via north Myanmar. The
arms supplier said the weapons delivery was expected to be made in October–
November 2010 once the advance had been paid to the Chinese company, and
that he had been frequently travelling to Beijing and was in constant touch with
Chinese intelligence agencies.
Such was Shimray’s clout within the insurgent group that his release had been
demanded by Isaac Chishi Swu in a letter to Manmohan Singh in October 2010,
saying that the arms procurer for the group was in India only to help the Naga
leadership in the ongoing dialogue with New Delhi.20 Before Swu’s missive, the
NSCN (I-M)’s so-called commander-in-chief, V.S. Atem, wrote a threatening
letter to the Indian government and accused the R&AW of picking up Shimray
from Tribhuvan International Airport in Kathmandu as he landed from Bangkok.
Shimray’s arrest led to the arrest of several underground Northeast rebel
leaders and the unearthing of illegal terror funds parked in real estate projects in
Gurgaon, Mumbai and Bengaluru by these groups.21 While the official Indian
diplomatic protest with China on the latter dabbling in anti-India activities was
met with flat denial, Indian intelligence agencies claim to have found credible
links between Chinese intelligence agencies and Northeast insurgents,
particularly the NSCN (I-M).
As it is, the decades-old insurgencies in the Northeast have blocked the
development of these states and also tied down security forces in low-intensity
conflict situations. Indian intelligence believes its Chinese counterpart has
encouraged the NSCN (I-M) to continue its insurgency and has even advised it
to spread its influence in neighbouring Arunachal Pradesh, particularly in
bordering Tirap and Changlang districts. The presence of certain key leaders of
Northeast insurgent groups such as the United Liberation Front of Asom
(ULFA)’s so-called commander-in-chief Paresh Barua in Yunan province22 and
other leaders of NSCN (I-M), United National Liberation Front (UNLF),
Revolutionary People’s Front (RPF), People’s Liberation Army (PLA) at Ruili
on the Myanmar–China border is another indicator of the links between anti-
India groups and the Chinese security establishment.
Another classic example of Chinese intelligence links with insurgent groups
was the unauthorized visit of a Ms Qing Wang to meet NSCN (I-M) leaders in
January 2011. While Qing was deported to China, Indian agencies believe that
she was a non-official operative of the People’s Security Bureau, lead
intelligence agency of China. Home Minister Chidambaram had only said Qing
had claimed to be a journalist after her deportation, but photographs retrieved
from her laptop left the government befuddled about her intentions. Qing, a 38-
year-old Chinese national, was passing herself as both a timber sales
representative and a TV journalist from Guangzhou in China. Pictures from her
computer showed her ‘interest’ in insurgent movements in South Asia,
particularly the NSCN (I-M), the Kachin Independence Army in Myanmar and
Maoist rebels in Nepal. On 21 January 2011, Indian immigration authorities sent
Qing back on Chinese Eastern Airlines flight CZ 360, deporting her to
Guangzhou, after she was caught in Dimapur, Nagaland, without the mandatory
restricted area permit required to visit the state.23
While Qing had a tourist visa (AH-228250) on her passport (G45343709) to
visit New Delhi, Jaipur, Mumbai and Bangalore from 17 December 2010 to 25
January 2011, she ‘strayed’ to Nagaland after meeting general secretary NSCN
(I-M) Muivah for four hours in Delhi. Qing was questioned for nearly 36 hours
by security agencies at IGI Airport and was allowed to leave after she ‘evaded’
all questions. She was a resident of F1910-1912, Tower C, Beijing Global Trade
Centre, No. 36, North Third Ring Road, East Dongcheng district, Beijing. Her
visa application said that she worked as manager in the trade department of
Beijing Xuanwei Timber Industry Company in Dongcheng. However, she posed
as a journalist and took the Brahmaputra Mail on 15 January 2011 from the Old
Delhi Railway Station to Dimapur along with other Naga youths.24
A background check on Qing found that she had travelled to India twice
before: from 27 December 2009 to 23 January 2010, and from 11 August 2010
to 23 August 2010. During her last trip, Qing had made her first acquaintance
with Muivah in Delhi and visited the NSCN (I-M) Camp Hebron at
Manglamukh in Dimapur as well as a camp in Kohima.
In 2011, she had a long meeting with Muivah and then went to Camp Hebron
where she was caught by Dimapur police and flown to Delhi. What intrigued
authorities was that Qing had travelled to India in August 2010 on a different
passport (No. G16555721) with similar identity details and landed at Kolkata
from Kunming in Yunnan province. ‘Her keen interest in Naga insurgency and
her extra-cautious measures in movements raised doubts about her stated official
position and indicated that she had links with Chinese intelligence,’ a senior
official said at that time. Shimray also had links in Kunming and had travelled to
China no less than six times since 1994.
Among the pictures recovered from Qing Wang’s laptop was this photo with NSCN (I-M) general secretary
Thuingaleng Muivah (Photo courtesy author)

Qing’s laptop revealed photographs with Muivah in Delhi, with Maoist

supremo Pushpa Kumar Dahal aka Prachanda in a purported PLA camp in Nepal
and another photograph in a Kachin insurgent camp in Myanmar. As Qing was
suspected of being in touch with Northeast insurgents, New Delhi protested to
Beijing. Evidence of Chinese involvement in the Northeast including travel
details of Paresh Barua was given to Special Representative Dai Bingguo during
the fifteenth round of dialogues in January 2012.25 China, however, rejected
these charges and countered by supplying evidence linking Indian intelligence
with pro-Tibetan independence groups.
Although Chinese involvement in the Northeast is covered in layers of
deniability, a major portion of its work is allegedly done by the ISI and
Myanmar-based insurgent groups who supply Chinese arms and provide shelter
to anti-India groups. While Bangladesh under Sheikh Hasina has taken action
against anti-India rebels, there is considerable presence of insurgent camps in
Myanmar, across Moreh on the Manipur border and across the Vijaynagar
salient in Arunachal Pradesh. Satellite pictures of these camps and UAV
photographs have been shared by India with Myanmar President Thein Sein,
when the latter visited in May 2012.
Shimray’s revelations and the Qing Wang incident, coupled with the rise of
PLA transgressions on the LAC after 2008, made New Delhi adopt a tougher
posture towards Beijing. So when Lt. General Jaswal was not given a proper
visa, India promptly suspended high-level defence exchanges with China and
cancelled the military delegation’s visit to the country. What angered New Delhi
further was that Jaswal had earlier been to China in 2008 as an observer of
military exercises on a normal visa.26 It was a year before defence exchanges
resumed, with the stapled visa issue raised by both Manmohan Singh and
External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna in their meetings with the Chinese
leadership.27 The Indian leadership, particularly Krishna, made it clear that
Beijing should understand that Kashmir was an integral part of India and held
the same salience and sensitivity as Tibet did for China. The basic message was
that India could also start giving stapled visas to Chinese nationals who have
settled in Tibet or review its commitment to the ‘One China’ policy.
Tibet again returned to the centre stage of India–China ties when Dai
Bingguo cancelled his trip to New Delhi for boundary talks on 28–29 November
2011 to protest the presence of the Dalai Lama at a Buddhist Conference in
Delhi from 27–30 November 2011, which was said to be inaugurated by then
President Pratibha Patil and funded by the public diplomacy department of the
Ministry of External Affairs. Virtually accusing the Dalai Lama of playing a
political role in India, Dai cancelled his visit despite being told that the Tibetan
religious leader was only speaking at the function on 30 November, after the
Chinese leader had flown back to Beijing. With an India–China defence policy
dialogue scheduled in December 2011, bilateral ties once again came under the
Tibetan cloud.
Interestingly, New Delhi did not back down on the issue except quietly
ensuring that no minister or official was present on the occasion. The postponed
fifteenth round of dialogues between the special representatives finally took
place on 16–17 January 2012, with both sides agreeing to put a border
mechanism in place to avoid the risk of accidents on the LAC. The new border
mechanism, mooted by then Premier Wen Jiabao in 2010, was to be headed by a
joint secretary from the foreign ministries of both countries with an aim to
resolve issues immediately without the risk of conflagration. In March 2012,
during Krishna’s visit to Beijing, it was also decided to institute a maritime
dialogue between the two Asian giants as yet another step towards normalcy.28
Maritime engagement had become a necessity in the backdrop of China
objecting to Indian oil and gas exploration in Block 127 and 128 claimed by
Vietnam in the disputed Paracels and Spratly islands chain, while Beijing was
awarded a 15-year contract to do deep sea exploration in 100 blocks in the south-
west ridge in the Indian Ocean by the International Seabed Authority (ISA) in
November 2011.29
While China raised a red flag over Indian explorations in South China Sea in
September 2011, saying that New Delhi needed Beijing’s permission to carry on
drilling in the two blocks as it was the owner, India’s state-owned ONGC Videsh
Limited (OVL) was awarded 100 per cent participating interest and operatorship
of the two offshore blocks in Phu Khanh basin by the Vietnam government on
24 May 2006.30 Vietnam, on its part, claims that the two blocks lie within its
exclusive economic zone and are within its territorial waters. OVL had bagged
the two blocks after it successfully bid for them among the nine offered for
global competitive bidding in PetroVietnam’s 2004 licensing round.
Block 127 is an offshore deepwater block, located at a depth of more than 400
metres with an area of 9,246 sq. km. After identifying the location, the well was
drilled in July 2009 to a depth of 1,265 m. As there was no hydrocarbon
presence, OVL decided to relinquish the block to PetroVietnam after investing
$68 million. Block 128 is at a depth of more than 400 metres and an area of
7,058 sq km. A drilling rig was deployed on the location in September 2009;
however, the well could not be drilled as the rig had difficulty in anchoring at the
location due to the hard sea bed. Drilling activity was terminated after OVL
invested $46 million.31
Despite India being involved in hydrocarbon exploration and gas extraction in
Vietnam since 1998, the two blocks in an island chain disputed by Vietnam and
China triggered off a fresh round of confrontation. The dispute came to the fore
after China filed a claim on the extended continental shelf on the basis of land
features before the UN Convention on the Laws of Seas in May 2009.32 With
Beijing and other ASEAN countries taking positions of maximum territorial
claims in the South China Sea, the stage was set for a confrontation between
India and China as the latter now staked claim to the two blocks. Matters got
further complicated in 2012 with OVL seriously considering exiting the blocks
on commercial-technical interests after India asked Beijing to back off from its
claims on the basis of international norm on access to natural resources33 as the
blocks were within Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone and continental shelf.34
While Vietnam had asked the Indian company to continue its explorations for
two more years, China suo moto put Block 128 open for bidding for exploration
in June 2012. Simultaneously, China’s powerful CMC approved the
establishment of a military garrison for South China Sea, a move that would
boost tensions in an already fractious region.35 As China already has a
substantial military presence in the sea, the military garrison was a further
assertion of China’s sovereignty claims after it upped the administrative status of
the sea to the level of a city, which it calls Sansha.36 Xinhua reported that the
Sansha garrison would be responsible for national defence mobilization and
carrying out military missions.
Sansha city is based on what is known in English as Woody Island, part of the
Paracel Islands which are also claimed by Vietnam and Taiwan. China took
control of the Paracels in 1974 after a naval showdown with Vietnam. Though
Sansha’s permanent population is no more than a few thousand fishermen, its
administrative responsibility covers China’s vast claims in the South China Sea
and its myriad, mostly uninhabited, atolls and reefs. Despite Vietnam protesting
the establishment of Sansha garrison and China’s invitation to bid for oil blocks,
including Block 128, Beijing has dismissed all claims.

COMRA was awarded a 15-year contract in November 2011 for prospecting and exploring for high value
 COMRA was awarded a 15-year contract in November 2011 for prospecting and exploring for high value
metals in the south-west ridge in the Indian Ocean, around 2,000 km from the southern tip of India

Apart from the tussle in South China Sea, India found a new headache closer
home, in the Indian Ocean. The China Ocean Mineral Resources Research and
Development Association (COMRA) was awarded a 15-year contract in
November 2011 by ISA for prospecting and exploring for polymetallic
sulphides, nodules containing high value metals, in the south-west ridge in the
Indian Ocean.37 The ridge is around 2,000 km from the southern tip of India,
with Madagascar being the nearest landmass. While COMRA’s contract was
largely seen as China’s foray into scarce and much-needed mineral resources,
New Delhi saw this as part of Beijing’s enlarging footprint in the Indian Ocean
after being part of the international anti-piracy force off the Gulf of Aden. With
Delhi declaring that its strategic interests stretched from the Gulf of Aden to the
Strait of Malacca, Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean was a immediate cause
of worry as PLA Navy vessels could use this opportunity to map the ocean bed
and collect electronic intelligence about Indian ships.
As India could not object to Chinese deep sea exploration proposals in
international waters, it decided to go in for polysulphide exploration in the same
area in a bid to catch up with Beijing. It is quite evident from the above that the
two countries were now matching their strategic moves, with New Delhi using
its newly close relationship with the US after the 2005 nuclear agreement as
leverage. While New Delhi made it clear to the US that it was not part of its bloc
like other NATO countries, India’s strategic shift towards Washington also
raised concerns in Beijing. With the relationship between the US’s close ally
Pakistan going sour over terrorism and Afghanistan, New Delhi moved closer to
the US and other powers like Japan, South Korea, Mongolia and Vietnam –
nations also fearful about China’s hegemony. The Indian response was also
triggered by China building economic bridges in South Asia and seeking an
opening into the Indian Ocean through investment and development of Gwadar
port. China’s new focus on infrastructural development in South Asia and its
growing clout with Indian Ocean rim countries is designed to strategically choke
and contain India.

RIVALRY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

China is highly dependent on imported energy to sustain its economy. A net oil
importer, China has been importing 56 per cent of its oil from the Middle East.38
Conservative estimates project that China will import almost two-thirds of its oil
needs by 2015 and three-quarters by 2030.39 As Beijing primarily looks to the
Persian Gulf, Central Asia and Africa to satisfy its growing demands for oil, it is
heavily dependent on sea lines of communication (SLOCs) through the Indian
Ocean to meet its energy requirements. Despite this, China’s geographical
location provides it with no access to the Indian Ocean, nor does it have any
ports along its coastline that provides easy access to the region. Its only access is
through the narrow straits of Malacca, Sunda and Lombok, which link South
China Sea to the Indian Ocean.
In 2010, over 80 per cent of China’s oil imports transited through the Malacca
and the Sunda straits.40 While China has been actively pursuing oil and gas
pipelines to alleviate its dependence on SLOCs, its current and future demands
suggest that its dependence on sea lanes passing through the Indian Ocean will
not reduce. Viewed from the Chinese perspective, a domination of the Indian
Ocean would be most desirable, as this region provides the lifeblood of its
booming economy.
In contrast to China, India is geographically positioned astride the most
important sea lanes in the region with dominance over the Malacca Strait
through its military presence in Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Thus, in China’s
view, India has the potential to disrupt these SLOCs in times of conflict. The
Chinese threat perception went up after the NDA government decided to set up a
tri-service command at Andaman and Nicobar Islands (ANC) in July 2001.41
After the 1857 War of Independence, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands
served as a convict settlement colony for the British. Spread over an area of
8,325 sq. km in the Bay of Bengal, these island territories have been known for
exotic turtles and virgin tropical forests. A tiny and remote speck on the vast
Indian canvas and although initially envisaged as a maritime surveillance
command, the islands’ significance lies in their location. The island territories sit
at the mouth of the Malacca Strait, the second-busiest SLOC in the world. Most
ships approach the strait through the 10 Degree Channel, which bisects the
Andaman Islands and the Great Nicobar Islands. Indira Point, the southernmost
tip of India, is actually separated by the channel from Indonesia’s strifetorn
Banda Aceh territory.
By setting up the ANC, India now has the military capacity to protect and
monitor sea traffic bound for South China Sea. The importance of the Malacca
Strait to India, which is roughly 500 miles long, 72 feet deep and 1.5 miles wide
towards its eastern end, can be gauged from the fact that the cost of India’s iron
ore export to Japan will go up by 4 per cent if this channel is blocked. With at
least one crude oil tanker passing through this strait every 30 minutes, the hike in
freight charges will be enormous in the worst-case scenario.42
With India inducting the C-130J Super Hercules, it has upgraded the naval air
station at Campbell Bay in the southernmost island of Great Nicobar. The new
base was commissioned on 31 July 2012. Aptly named ‘Baaz’ (Falcon) and
located just 190 km from Sumatra, the naval station will dominate the Malacca
Strait and other shipping channels to South East Asia and North Asia with the
5,250 km range, short take-off and rapid-troop deployment C-130J aircraft.43
Chinese policy intellectuals are deeply concerned with the emergence of a
capable Indian Navy. One Chinese defence analyst even worries that the islands
that constitute India’s Andaman and Nicobar archipelago could be used as a
‘metal-chain lockdown’ at the western entrance of the Malacca Strait.44 This
means that India could leverage the geographical location of the archipelago and
its naval capability to blockade the strait in the worst-case scenario and create an
energy crisis in China.
As part of its naval strategy, the PLA Navy has attempted to deny the US
Navy access into the Taiwan Strait, while it is progressing towards its unstated
aim of dominating the Indian Ocean Region. This is being done through a two-
fold strategy. The first is to develop its military capabilities to enable the Navy
to carry out distant sea operations in the Indian Ocean and in the Western
Pacific.45 The second is by increasing its influence in the Indian Ocean and in
India’s periphery through a combination of military and economic aid so as to
develop forward operating bases in both South Asia and Africa. It is these
forward bases which will become future launch pads for PLA Navy operations in
the Indian Ocean. Western strategists term this move as ‘Strings of Pearls’, as
linking up these forward bases forms a line that resembles a necklace.46
As remarked in the earlier chapter, the PLA Navy has embarked on a
modernization programme in the past decade with a goal of being the pre-
eminent regional power in East Asia and progressively a global military power.
The modernization programme has been highlighted by impressive additions to
their surface and sub-surface fleet. Its preparations to carry out distant sea
operations, especially in the Indian Ocean, has been underscored by the fact that
over the past few years it has deployed assets to support non-combatant
evacuation operations in Libya, extended its presence in the Gulf of Aden for its
third year of counter-piracy operations and conducted medical camps and a
service mission to Latin America and the Caribbean using PLA hospital ships.47
An analysis of the modernization programme reveals two trends. Firstly, the
Chinese Navy is concentrating on technologies and hardware which denies its
adversaries access into its zones of influence such the Taiwan Strait and South
China Sea. This is manifesting itself in all military domains, such as in the newer
generation of fighter aircraft for the PLA Air Force, a new class of submarines,
including independent air propulsion conventional-and nuclear-powered, for the
Navy and anti-ship ballistic missiles for the Second Artillery Corps.
Secondly, while area-denial capabilities are primarily aimed at overcoming
the conventional superiority enjoyed by the US, distant sea operations
capabilities are aimed at giving the PLA Navy the same sea legs as the US and
operate for prolonged periods away from its coastline. The modernization effort
has been led by the aircraft carrier Liaoning, which is at present undergoing sea
trials for integration of weapon systems and aerial platforms.48 A new class of
destroyers – type 052C or Luyang II class of anti-air defence destroyers, newer
frigates such as the type 054 A or Jiangkai II class of multi-purpose frigates, the
type 072 amphibious landing platform docks and a new class of tankers for
logistics and fuel supply on high seas are all indicative of the Navy’s growing
ability to operate in distant seas.
Apart from developing military infrastructure, the PLA Navy also needs ports
and forward operating bases in the Indian Ocean to protect SLOCs. To achieve
this, China is taking concrete steps to develop its maritime reach well into the
Indian Ocean and West Africa. The ‘string of pearls’ stretch from the submarine
pens of the Hainan Islands in South China Sea to the port of Gwadar in Pakistan.
Each ‘pearl’ is a nexus of Chinese geopolitical influence or military presence: a
container shipping facility in Chittagong in Bangladesh, a deepwater port in
Kyaukpyu in Myanmar, Gwadar port and the Hambantota port on the
southernmost tip of Sri Lanka.49 A future ‘pearl’ could be the naval base in
Seychelles, built ostensibly to support anti-piracy operations.
While implementing this strategy of ‘pearls’, China has reasoned that in small
countries militaries are powerful, and if they are won over with free and low-
price military equipment supported by economic assistance, winning over the
political dispensation would be easy. The clout of the military brass in countries
like Myanmar, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka is phenomenal; in some
cases like Myanmar, the military junta runs the government. While India, given
its democratic structure and polity, has difficulty in engaging with these
countries, particularly with Myanmar and Pakistan, the Chinese one-party rule
has ensured that it has no qualms in breaking bread with these regimes
howsoever repressive they may be. Apart from the Chinese pincer moves
through Pakistan and Myanmar, both these nations are instrumental in the
destabilization of India’s borders.
The Chinese strategy of using economic and military leverage to get countries
in South Asia under its fold has been successful to an extent and has been able to
provide Beijing a foothold in some Indian Ocean rim countries in a non-
confrontational manner in order to encircle India. The supply of Chinese military
hardware to these countries has also ensured that maintenance facilities for
Chinese equipment are already in place for the PLA Navy in future.

STRING OF PEARLS STRATEGY

‘All-Weather’ Friend Pakistan

The most important ‘pearl’ in the Chinese strategy to bundle up India in the
South Asian box, Beijing sees Pakistan as a low-cost strategic foil against India
and has exploited the hostility between the two countries by providing military
and political support to Islamabad. Given the visceral hatred that the Pakistan
Army has towards its Indian counterpart after four conflicts, the Chinese big
brother strategy suits Islamabad, as with Beijing’s political backing it can punch
far above its weight category in international forums.
A second front with Pakistan fulfils Beijing’s strategy to keep India occupied
on its northern and western borders. Often using terror groups as a strategic arm
of its foreign policy, Pakistan has been successful in engaging India in a low-
level intensity conflict since military-backed raiders tried to take back Kashmir
in 1948. In Chinese strategic calculation, its ability to prevent or win a military
conflict with New Delhi would also depend on a strong Pakistani military
capability on the western borders of India. For instance, the port of Karachi
currently handles 90 per cent of Pakistan’s seaborne trade. However, due to its
proximity to India, it is extremely vulnerable to Indian naval pressures as was
witnessed during the 1971 war, when India affected a blockade of the port using
warships and submarines. A similar move was seen during the 1999 Kargil
conflict. The Pakistan Navy does operate from other ports like Omara, Bin
Qasim, and Pasni on the Makran Coast, but this area in the north Arabian Sea is
prone to violent storms and strong currents. This is where the Chinese-built port
of Gwadar comes into play.
Gwadar, a small fishing village in restive Baluchistan, lies nearly 450 miles
west of Karachi. Pakistan identified Gwadar as a potential port location in 1964
but lacked the means to fully develop its infrastructure. The development of port
facilities at Gwadar was a win-win situation for both Pakistan and China. A
modern port at Gwadar would enhance Pakistan’s strategic depth along its
coastline with respect to India. For China, the strategic value of Gwadar is
immense as it is just 240 miles away from the Strait of Hormuz, and up to 60 per
cent of Beijing’s hydrocarbon supplies come from the Middle East.50
Given Gwadar’s proximity to the Persian Gulf, the port serves as a strategic
transit point for Iranian and African crude oil exports to China. Although the
official intent of China points to using the port as an energy transport hub, the
deep water port will become a major naval base in the future. The dual
functionality enables Gwadar to not only be a port of call or a bunkering station
for Chinese commercial tankers transiting through the area, but also serve as a
base of Chinese naval ships in the north Arabian Sea, thus providing Beijing an
opening in the Indian Ocean through the sea route, while integrating China
through the land route for speedy movement of goods, supplies and logistics.
The latter is achieved through the 1,300 km long Karakoram Highway, built in
1979, that links Xinjiang in China to Gilgit–Balistan in Pakistan over the 15,000
feet high Khunjerab Pass.
Indian security concerns were heightened after its then Northern Army
Commander Lt. General K.T. Parnaik raised the presence of Chinese engineers
and workers in infrastructure development works in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir
(PoK) in April 2011.51 Later in September that year, Defence Minister Antony
went on record stating India had officially red-flagged the issue of China taking
up infrastructural projects in PoK with Beijing.52 Then Indian Army Chief
General V.K. Singh stated, ‘There are certain construction working teams…a
large number is available. Around 3,000 to 4,000 people are present, including
some for security purposes. There are certain engineer troops now (like) our own
engineers are combat engineers. So, in some way they are part of the PLA.’53
While Beijing has dismissed Indian claims, confirmed reports suggest the
presence of Chinese workers in the Neelum–Jhelum Hydroelectric project just
across the Line of Control from Tithwal in Jammu and Kashmir.54 Available
reports indicate presence of 937 Chinese personnel at Chattar Kalas, Thota
Mansi and Nauseri villages and involved in the hydroelectric project work.
Another 100 Chinese engineers and workers are involved in building the
Muzaffarabad–Athmuqam road and are living in six nearby camps.
Chinese workers are also involved in strengthening of the Karakoram
Highway with presence at Deh, near Khunjerab pass, Sust, Sultanabad, Pari and
Alam Bridge. Apart from beefing up the highway for heavier vehicles in PoK
and northern areas, plans are afoot to have a 750 km rail link between Kashgar in
Xinjiang to Havelian in Abbottabad.55 Pakistan has engaged international
consultants since 2007 to prepare a feasibility report on the Kashgar–Havelian
project, with the rail track running parallel to the Karakoram Highway. Pakistan
Railway has already signed an agreement with Dongfang Electric Corporation
for a pre-feasibility study of a China–Pakistan train line.56 The Chinese company
has also signed transfer-of-technology agreements with Pakistan to supply 75
diesel locomotives and 500 freight wagons.57
Although Pakistan is mired in political instability, with jihadists groups
propagating violence and radical Islam, the Khunjerab rail link, when it opens
for traffic, will ensure direct movement of goods from Gwadar to Kashgar and
there on to Beijing. Not only will this rail link boost Pakistan’s economy, it will
integrate Gwadar with China as a permanent port and naval base.
The relationship between the two countries goes deeper than military
assistance. Pakistan views China as its most reliable partner, with its political
leadership consulting Beijing on every major issue. For instance, newly sworn-in
Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s first trip abroad was to China in July
2013, where he described the bilateral relationship as ‘sweeter than honey’. Ex-
President Asif Ali Zardari went to China thrice in 2010, as did his predecessor
military dictator Pervez Musharraf.58 Both countries regularly share intelligence
on New Delhi, as ISI’s coverage of India is quite deep, incisive and penetrative.
Post the July 2009 ethnic riots in Xinjiang, the two countries have also shared
intelligence on jihadists and the radicalization of ethnic Uighurs in northern
areas of Pakistan.
The two countries have long-standing strategic ties with a synergized defence
relationship that is based on near-similar world views when it comes to India.
This partnership serves both Chinese and Pakistani interests by presenting India
with a potential two-front theatre in the event of war with either country, despite
so not happening even after four wars between Islamabad and New Delhi.
Chinese officials also view a certain degree of India–Pakistan tension as
advancing their own strategic interests, with the friction bogging India down in
South Asia and interfering with New Delhi’s ability to assert its global
ambitions.
Unsurprisingly, China is Pakistan’s largest defence supplier. The Chinese JF-
17 Thunder fighter aircraft is currently under production at the Pakistan
Aeronautical Complex,59 and an initial batch of 250 to 300 planes is scheduled
this decade.60 The JF-17 was first inducted in Pakistan’s 26th Spiders Squadron
on 18 February 2010, replacing the Nachang Q-5, a copy of the MiG-19. Despite
Indian protests, Russia allowed China to supply 100 Kilmov RD-93 engines to
Pakistan for the fighter aircraft. China also plans to provide Pakistan with J-10
medium-role combat aircraft, with an initial delivery of 36 planes, powered by
the indigenous ‘Taihang’ WS-10 engine. Other recent sales of conventional
weapons include four F-22P frigates with helicopters, K-8 jet trainers, T-85
tanks and F-7 aircraft. Pakistan Navy was handed over PNS Zulfiqar, the first of
the four F-22P frigates (design type 053H3 Jiangwei II) on 30 July 2009, PNS
Shamsheer on 19 December 2009 and PNS Saif was delivered on 28 May 2010.
It has been assessed that by 2015, the Pakistan Navy would have six to eight
modern frigates, two to three destroyers, several missile boats and corvettes at
friendship rates from Beijing. China also helped Pakistan build its heavy
mechanical and aeronautical complexes, and several defence production units.
The most significant development in the military cooperation between the two
countries occurred in 1992, when China supplied Pakistan with 34 short-range
ballistic M-11 missiles. Beijing also built a turn-key ballistic missile
manufacturing facility near Rawalpindi and helped Pakistan develop the 750-
km-range solid-fuelled Shaheen-1 ballistic missile.61
While the US sanctioned Pakistan in 1990 over its nuclear weapons
programme, China has consistently supported Pakistan’s military
modernization.62 There are signs that Sino–Pak defence cooperation received a
boost following the US’s raid on Osama bin Laden’s hideout in Abbottabad.
Two weeks after the raid, then Pakistani Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani
travelled to Beijing in an attempt to showcase the China–Pakistan relationship as
the pillar of Pakistan’s foreign policy. The US decision to pursue the bin Laden
raid unilaterally without prior notification to Pakistani officials incensed their
military leadership. To demonstrate its displeasure over the operation, Pakistan
kicked out 90 US military trainers from the country and turned its attention to its
‘all-weather’ friend.63
In response to Pakistan’s overtures, China called on the US to respect the
‘independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity’ of Pakistan and announced it
would expedite the delivery of 50 JF-17 aircraft equipped with upgraded
avionics to Pakistan. However, when Pakistan’s defence minister claimed that
Pakistan had invited China to start building a naval base at Gwadar, Chinese
officials publicly dismissed the notion.64 Despite Pakistani assurances that they
did not provide Chinese officials with access to wreckage from the stealth
helicopter that crashed during the bin Laden raid, US intelligence officials
reportedly believe the Pakistanis did allow Chinese engineers to inspect the parts
before they were returned to the US.
It is widely acknowledged that China transferred equipment and technology
and provided scientific expertise to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and ballistic
missile programmes throughout the 1980s and 1990s.65 In a recently released
letter from 2003, Abdul Qadeer Khan, who was instrumental in developing
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme and who confessed in 2004 to running a
nuclear black market,66 suggests that China had supplied Pakistan with
significant quantities of low-enriched uranium in the early 1980s, allowing it to
accelerate the production of weapons-grade uranium. There are also indications
that China provided Pakistan with nuclear warhead designs from China’s 1966
nuclear test. In 1994, information surfaced that China’s Nuclear Energy Industry
Corporation had transferred 5,000 ring magnets to a Pakistani nuclear weapons
lab for use in gas centrifuges to enrich uranium.67 The harsh international
reaction to the transfer prompted China to pledge in 1996 that it would not allow
any further cooperation with unsafe nuclear facilities. China helped Pakistan
build two civilian nuclear reactors at the Chasma site in Punjab province under
agreements made before it joined the NSG in 2004.68 More recently, China has
been planning to build two new nuclear reactors (Chasma III and Chasma IV),
but the US has indicated that Beijing must first seek an exemption from the NSG
for any future nuclear technology transfers. When China joined the NSG, it
subjected itself to rules that forbid the sale and export of nuclear technology to
countries that have not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
Beijing has argued that the new proposed sale should be viewed as part of the
earlier agreement before it joined the NSG and thus be ‘grandfathered’ into
international acceptance.69
Though Pakistan considers China a more reliable defence partner than the
US, Islamabad recognizes that the latter’s support has its limits, especially
during times of conflict between New Delhi and Islamabad. When Pakistan
sought Chinese assistance during the 1965 war, Beijing encouraged Islamabad to
withdraw its forces from Indian territory.70 During the 1999 Kargil war, Beijing
privately supported US calls for Pakistan to withdraw its forces to defuse the
crisis, and apparently communicated this stance to Pakistani leaders. The
Chinese position during the Kargil episode helped spur a thaw in Indo–Chinese
relations even though New Delhi had noted heightened military activity across
the LAC in July 1999 at the peak of hostilities.71 During the 2001– 2002
standoff after Pakistani terrorists attacked the Indian Parliament, China once
again stayed neutral and counselled restraint on both sides, declaring that it was
a ‘neighbour and friend of both countries’.72
Despite the public posturing and tactical diplomatic turns made by Beijing,
India is clear that China believes its long term interests in the region are best
protected by Pakistan. This continues to be the bottom line of the newly
appointed Xi Jingping regime as well, as was evident in the first ever Indo–
China dialogue on Afghanistan on 17–18 April 2013 and the annual bilateral
counterterrorism dialogue a week earlier in Beijing.73 There was Pakistani
intersection in both dialogues, held in the backdrop of withdrawal of US forces
from Kabul in 2014.
It is not that China does not understand the role of Pakistan-based terrorists
groups like the Haqqani Network, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan or Lashkar-e-
Toiba in destabilizing the entire region, including the restive Xinjiang province
across the Wakhan Corridor. Beijing in fact is very concerned about the links
between the Uighur East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) terrorist group
and jihadists from the Pakistan–Afghanistan arc and understands its political
ramifications if the umbilical cord is not cut. Yet, it has the confidence to deal
with Pakistan and pressurize it to turn off the jihadist tap.
China’s main concern is US involvement in Afghanistan post-2014, as the
Pentagon plans to keep behind nearly 20,000 troops in Kabul for special
operations and support to the Afghan government. It was evident during the
dialogue that while both India and China were supportive of the present Hamid
Karzai regime,74 Beijing felt that engaging with Pakistan and reconciling with
the ultra-conservative Taliban was vital for the long-term stability of
Afghanistan. At the dialogue, both India and China talked past each other about
the growing prospects of Pakistani Islamist groups using Afghanistan for
strategic depth after the US pull-out. This was despite the fact that both the US
and India were getting intelligence inputs about the ultra-conservative Ahl-e-
Hadith ideology-based Lashkar-e-Toiba moving into Nuristan and Kunar
province of Afghanistan, just across the Durand Line. Beijing was concerned
about the spread of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and ETIM in Xinjiang
province but was willing to overlook the fact that the separatist movements’
roots were based in the Af–Pak arc. During the meeting, Chinese officials even
surprised their Indian counterparts by raising concerns over the threat from Dalai
Lama supporters to Tibet. For China, its ‘all-weather friend’ can do no wrong.

Bangladesh

Despite India re-energizing its relationship with Dhaka after Sheikh Hasina
swept to power in 2009, China has been miles ahead in its engagement with
Dhaka, with institutionalized defence hardware linkages and political dialogue.
Dhaka remains an important player in Chinese military calculus and provides
Beijing with an added leverage to check Indian forces in the Bay of Bengal. This
is evident from the regular political and military exchanges between the two
nations, apart from the arms that China supplies to all three wings of
Bangladesh’s armed forces – 85 per cent of Bangladesh’s hardware comes from
Beijing.75 For example, the Bangladesh Army’s main battle tanks, the Type 79
and 69, are made by NORINCO, with Dhaka expecting deliveries of the MBT-
2000 from Beijing by 2013.76 The MBT-2000 tank is a joint venture between
China and Pakistan and has been labelled the ‘Al-Khalid’ by Islamabad.
Bangladesh Navy’s top-of-theline guided missile frigates are of Chinese origin
and so are a large number of its patrol boats. Finally, although Bangladesh has
bought Russian MiG-29 fighters, it relies heavily on the Chinese-made F-7 and
Nachang A-5 fighters for guarding its skies.
Apart from defence cooperation, Bangladesh is also the third largest trade
partner of China in South Asia, with bilateral trade notching $8.7 billion, seven
times more than it was in 2002.77 Beijing has offered to construct nuclear plants
in Bangladesh to help meet its growing energy needs while seeking to develop
existing natural gas resources.78 With the promise of developing the latter, China
has added a sweetener by promising investment in Bangladesh’s road
infrastructure.79
Military analysts say that China is willing to underwrite Dhaka’s expenditure
on expansion, upgrading and modernization of the latter’s armed forces. The
emphasis on enhancing cooperation in training, maintenance and some areas of
defence production would normally imply induction of modern Chinese military
hardware, as these activities would not be applicable to vintage military
equipment. While deliberate secrecy and ambiguity has been maintained in the
scope of the 2002 Sino–Bangladesh Defence Agreement,80 it prepares a
springboard for widening strategic cooperation in future.
China is actively involved in major Bangladeshi infrastructure projects,
including the China–Myanmar–Bangladesh trination highway and the Sonadia
deep sea port off the Chittagong coast.81 The proposed highway links Kunming
with Chittagong via Myanmar and provides Beijing access to the Bay of Bengal.
This highway-port linkage will not only boost Chinese trade but also come in
handy in case of a strategic opportunity. Dhaka has already offered China the use
of Chittagong port for refuelling and logistics purposes.
The fact is that New Delhi dilly-dallied in supplying arms, particularly tanks
and armoured personnel carriers, to Dhaka fearing they could be used against
India in case of hostilities. China moved in to take advantage of India’s delay.
The military and economic leverage China currently has on Bangladesh and the
complex legacy of the 1947 Partition that brings in the West Bengal state
government into Indian diplomatic play with Dhaka has raised serious concerns
in New Delhi. After the Sheikh Hasina government took over in January 2009,
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh with an eye towards China made all-out efforts
to resolve the boundary and Teesta water disputes with Bangladesh, in return for
Dhaka looking out for Indian security interests.82 However, the ‘exchange of
enclaves’ agreement and the Teesta water agreement have been stalled, with
West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee still to make up her mind on the
boundary dispute resolution and is totally opposed to the Teesta water sharing
agreement.83 With the Sheikh Hasina government returning to power in
December 2013, India is making all-out efforts to push bilateral trade with
Bangladesh and is now even willing to supply arms to keep Beijing at bay.

Myanmar

China has maintained close relations with Myanmar since the past sixty years
and the latter describes the close bilateral relationship as ‘paukphaw’ (blood
brothers).85 Diplomatic relations between China and Burma were established in
1950; four years later, Zhou Enlai visited Yangon and proposed the five
principles of peace. The two countries share a 2,200 km long boundary, which
was demarcated in 1960 – the first boundary resolution by Beijing after China
became a republic. Since its independence in 1948 to the early 1960s, the
Burmese government was involved in territorial integration of the republic and
battled out with ethnic minorities and the Communist Party of Burma (CPB).
Relations with China soured in the late 1960s after the 1967 anti-Chinese riots,
with Beijing supporting the CPB, which controlled the border area and trade.
This dual diplomacy continued till the late 1970s, until Deng Xiaoping’s 1978
visit, when Beijing withdrew its support to the CPB and began a new chapter in
its relationship with Yangon.
After the military junta took control of Myanmar in 1988, China’s stock with
Yangon rose as the Western world imposed sanctions on the authoritarian
regime. China took full advantage of Myanmar’s ostracism, with the latter
becoming a virtual satellite-state of Beijing. For China, Myanmar is a strategic
asset as it provides access to the Indian Ocean and is economically important for
the development of its south-western states, particularly Yunnan. China’s
interests in Myanmar are energy procurement and security, access to the Indian
Ocean and security of border areas, and bilateral trade. Naypyidaw, the new
capital, is crucial to China for its energy requirements, with both countries
signing an agreement for a dual (gas and crude) pipeline from Kyaukpyu on
Myanmar’s western coast to Kunming on 27 March 2009.86
New Delhi has historically been caught in a dilemma on how to deal with the
military junta-ruled Myanmar and the latter’s opposition to National League for
Democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi, with whom India has close ties. Beijing’s
close ties with the junta stems from its realization that the military has seeped
into Burmese society since General Ne Win’s days. As India dilly-dallied, China
supplied arms to Myanmar despite the country being a global pariah for its
human rights record and military dictatorship.
While Myanmar was being ostracized by the international community and its
junta feared Western or Indian intervention on behalf of incarcerated Burmese
democratic leaders, China helped Naypyidaw expand its armed forces from
185,000 to 350,000 and supplied military hardware. Although its inventory is
mixed, a majority of Myanmar’s equipment comes from China, including tanks,
APCs, howitzers and portable surface-to-air missiles. The Myanmar Air Force
flies Chengdu J-7 fighter interceptors and Xian JH-7 fighter-bomber alongside
Russian MiG-29 fighters. The Myanmar Navy is no different, with China
supplying frigates, submarine chasers and fast attack crafts.87
China’s influence in Myanmar has complicated India’s relationship with
Myanmar in two ways. Firstly, lukewarm ties pre-2000 ensured that the junta
only made verbal noises of not allowing its territory to be used by Indian
insurgents, while China managed to bag numerous infrastructure projects in the
country. The unstated agreement between India and Myanmar was that China
would not be allowed to cross west of the Chindwin river, a tributary of the
mighty Irrawaddy, which was breached when the Yunan Construction
Corporation was given the contract to rebuild the historic Stillwell road from
Tanai, headwaters of Chindwin, to Pangsau Pass on the Arunachal border.88
Named after the American military general Joe Vinegar Stillwell, the Stillwell
road connects Ledo in north Assam to Kunming in China via Myitkyina in
Myanmar.
While Indian military strategists think of Myanmar as a virtual Chinese
satellite, Yangon has lately been uneasy of Beijing’s penetration and may want
to balance its ties with New Delhi and other countries in Asia.89 The first signs
of the strain in the relationship were evident when the Myanmar Army took
action against the Kokang militia in Shan state in August 2009, which led to a
large number of refugees moving to the neighbouring Yunnan province of
China. Beijing objected to the refugee influx and took the matter up with
Myanmar. The balancing act was further demonstrated when Thein Sein took
over as president in 2011. The relationship underwent a change with civilian rule
being established at Naypyidaw after 23 years of military junta regime. On 30
September 2011, Thein Sein suspended work on one of the seven dams built
with Chinese assistance. Work at the Myitsone dam project in Kachin state was
suspended due to stringent opposition on counts of environmental destruction,
relocation of inhabitants and damage to cultural assets owing to its construction.
Built by the Chinese Power Investment Corporation on the Irrawaddy, the
$3.6 billion project was the target of environmental activists and community
groups. The hydroelectric dam was designed to generate 3,600–6,000 MW of
electricity, which will be exported to Yunnan. While Thein Sein had said in
2011 that work on the project would remain suspended during his term, latest
reports indicate that Naypyidaw is under pressure from Beijing to resume work
soon. However, work on six other hydroelectric dams with Chinese help has not
been aborted.90
India is also concerned about Chinese activities in the Coco and Hyangii
islands in the northern Bay of Bengal and near the Strait of Malacca
respectively. Intelligence reports confirm that China has installed a radar facility
on Coco Islands to gather electronic intelligence on movement of Indian Navy
vessels as well as monitor missile launches from the Indian test range at
Chandipur-on-sea in Orissa. There may be more monitoring facilities on other
islands, as Indian analysts have identified Kyaukpyu on Ramree Island, south of
Sittwe river port, Great Coco Island and Zadetkyi Kyun Island off the
Tenasserim Coast in south-east Myanmar as signal intelligence facilities with
radars, or earth satellite stations in the case of Zadetkyi Kyun. The naval base
near Kyaukpyu and the new base near Kawthaung off the Tennasserim coast,
close to the Strait of Malacca, are being touted as Beijing’s new facilities in the
Indian Ocean.91
From the military perspective, the Stillwell road and offering the Irrawaddy
for navigation allows Beijing to move troops in and around Myanmar as and
when required. To add to Indian concern is the fact that thirteen airfields have
been widened and lengthened to accommodate larger aircraft than those
currently employed by the Myanmar Air Force.92 Looking for an Irrawaddy
corridor linking China to the Indian Ocean, China at one point of time in the late
1990s was keen to lease the Yangon port for 30 years. The projected pipeline
between Yangon to Kunming will transport Myanmarese natural gas to China
easily, with no less than five Chinese companies involved in prospecting for gas
in Myanmar’s five offshore and four on-shore blocks respectively. This pipeline
started delivering oil and gas to Yunnan on 28 July 2013.93

Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka was one of the first countries to recognize the People’s Republic of
China in the 1950s, with both sides signing the Rubber– Rice Agreement in 1952
which took care of the island nation’s excess rubber produce in return for cheap
rice and other food crops. The two countries moved a step closer with a bilateral
maritime agreement in 1963 which provided most-favoured treatment for
commercial and passenger vessels. However, China’s engagement with the Pearl
Nation began in earnest during the latter’s three decade-long civil war with the
LTTE. New Delhi’s hands were tied up due to its southern domestic politics
surrounding ethnic Tamil strife in Sri Lanka. The civil war between Tamil
groups and the Sinhala-dominated army had serious resonance in Indian
coalition politics as Tamil political parties virtually exercised a veto on
diplomatic ties with the island nation. After burning its fingers during Operation
Pavan, the military intervention by IPKF in the 1980s, India adopted a totally
hands-off approach after Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated by a LTTE female
suicide bomber in 1991.
With India out of play, China, Pakistan and Israel moved in with much
needed military supplies to give the advantage to the Sri Lankan Army over
LTTE rebels. Beijing’s strategy of close strategic engagement with Colombo
was evident as it actively supported operations against the LTTE, with China
supplying six F-7 aircraft, $37.6 million worth of ammunition and ordnance
items, Type-85 APCs, $1 billion in aid and finally rallying to support Colombo
at the UN Security Council and vetoing the human rights violation resolution in
2009. These visible gestures of support have brought Colombo closer to China.94
Using this opportunity, China moved in to build a container port at
Hambantota on the southern tip of Sri Lanka in September 2012.95 The port is
capable of basing four to six nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines and
could be used to dominate the entire Indian Ocean region. The port could also be
part of a strategy to ensure stability of Chinese SLOCs as submarines in tropical
waters are ideal for blockading a country with large coastlines.
The Indian response to this new ‘strategic cooperation’ has been multi-
faceted.96 While India has cemented ties with Colombo by investing in road,
railway and housing infrastructure projects, it has decided to enhance its military
capabilities in its island territories flanking Sri Lanka as well as in South India.
On 27 May 2013, while Sri Lanka President Mahinda Rajapaksa was talking
strategic partnership with Xi Jinping in Beijing, A.K. Antony inaugurated the
first fighter base in South India at Thanjavur in Tamil Nadu.97 Keeping its
Indian Ocean interests in mind, the Indian Air Force has decided to base its
front-line long-range Su-30 MKI fighters at Thanjavur. India knows China is
more than matching its steps when it comes to Sri Lanka as there is no
infrastructure project in the island nation that Beijing is not invested in, keeping
its maritime interests in mind.98
Colombo is also a confirmed stopover for PLA Navy’s anti-piracy task force
vessels, both pre-and post-deployment. All signs point towards a convergence of
relations between the two countries; Sri Lankan Chief of Naval Staff Admiral
T.S.G. Samarasinghe celebrated the Chinese lunar new year on board the visiting
Jiangkai class Wenzhou missile frigate in Colombo on 21 February 2010.
Colombo was also granted a ‘dialogue partner’ status in the SCO on 18 June
2009, an multilateral development body led by Beijing.

BEYOND THE PEARLS

On his first trip abroad in March 2013 as China’s head of state, President Xi
Jinping visited four countries, of which three were in Africa. Giving out a clear
signal of Chinese diplomatic priorities, Jinping first went to Russia and there on
to Tanzania, South Africa and the Republic of Congo.99 While the focus of
Jinping’s visit was the BRICS summit in Durban, he sent a clear signal that
China and Africa have shared destinies and signed no less than 40
agreements.100 In stark contrast, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh due to
domestic political compulsions could not make it to even Mozambique and
Seychelles en route to Durban despite Maputo eager to sign a bilateral oil and
gas agreement and Victoria prepared to sign a defence cooperation agreement
with India.101
While Jinping’s predecessor Hu Jintao also made it a point to strengthen ties
with African states by paying bilateral visits, Manmohan Singh in his nine years
as prime minister made bilateral visits only to Mauritius (March 2005), South
Africa (September 2006), Nigeria (October 2007) and Ethiopia (May 2011). His
other visits to Africa have been to either IBSA summits in South Africa (18
October 2007 and 17 October 2011) or the CHOGM summit in Uganda (26
November 2007).102 Simply put, China is ahead of India in engaging Africa,
with Africa’s bilateral trade with Beijing touching more than $200 billion in
2012103 as compared to $62 billion trade with New Delhi.104
While India only woke up to its trade potential with Africa after organizing
the first India–Africa Summit in 2008 in New Delhi, Beijing has made serious
inroads with more than 800 companies involved in infrastructure, energy and
banking sectors. Beijing pursues its resources and trade interests in Africa with
an eye on wider strategic interests.105 While China has set up an Africa
development fund with a corpus of $5 billion, India matched it by promising to
extend loans worth $5.4 billion during 2011–2014. The year 2006 was declared
as China’s ‘Year of Africa’, with Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing visiting
seven countries, followed by then President Hu Jintao visiting another three and
then Prime Minister Wen Jiabao another seven countries. In November that year,
China entertained high-level representatives from 49 African states in Beijing at
a summit meeting of the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). The
eight promises made at FOCAC in 2006 included doubling the assistance to
Africa by 2009, providing $3.6 billion in preferential loans, setting up the Africa
development fund and helping the least-developed nations by cancelling debts.
Tanzania has been singled out by China for engagement, with then President Hu
Jintao visiting the country in February 2009 and Xi Jinping signing 16 trade
agreements with his Tanzanian counterpart Jakaya Kikwete within 11 days of
assuming power in 2013.106

Seychelles

The strategic importance of Seychelles dates back to the Napoleonic era, when
the British gained control of this island chain which straddled the sea route to the
East Indies. In the 1960s, an American report had stated that this island chain
could be considered an ‘unsinkable aircraft carrier’ in the Indian Ocean, given its
proximity to international shipping lanes and oil producing nations.107 Although
China–Seychelles diplomatic relations date back to 1976, it was the 2007 visit
by Hu Jintao that triggered off action, with China signing five bilateral
agreements on economic cooperation, education and investment promotion. In
December 2011, then Chinese Defence Minister General Liang Guanglie led a
huge delegation to Seychelles with a view to intensify military cooperation. In
May 2010, China pledged $6 million in investments when Seychelles President
James Michel visited Beijing and held talks with Hu Jintao.
To support its anti-piracy operations, China regularly uses the ports of
Djibouti, Salalaha in Oman and Aden in Yemen for what is known as
operational turn-round (OTR) of warships. Given its strategic location, China
may consider Seychelles as its forward operating base for its ships in the Indian
Ocean, as Beijing imports huge amounts of hydrocarbons from western Africa
and South America.108 These oil imports may have to pass through the
Mozambique Channel instead of the channel between east of Madagascar Island
and the American base of Diego Garcia to their final destination, perhaps even
through Gwadar in the near future.
Since Seychelles dominates the Mozambique Channel and is equidistant from
other international shipping lanes which carry oil and other material from
Persian Gulf and Africa to Chinese ports, a PLA Navy operating from
Seychelles can effectively provide cover to its shipping lanes during times of
crisis and conflict.

Tanzania

Working on the basis of a ‘comprehensive national power’ concept to achieve

superpower status,109 China has consistently projected itself as a soft power, as a
trade-and economy-driven state and by no means a military threat to any nation.
This projection has in many ways consolidated its support from Central Asian,
African and Latin American nations. The same strategy had initially worked
with South East Asian countries but the latter has now seen the iron fist in the
velvet glove.
Beijing has been reaching out to the African continent in the past decade with
an eye towards its immense natural resources and future markets. As of 2012,
China has bilateral trade agreements with 42 out of the 53 African states and 65
per cent of Africa’s mineral exports are destined for Beijing. A significant 32 per
cent of China’s energy requirements are being met by oil-producing African
nations like Sudan and Nigeria.110
Beijing has supplemented its economic cooperation with the export of cheap
military hardware. Spurred by the successful deployment of PLA Navy ships for
anti-piracy operations, Chinese naval strategists are thinking of forward bases in
Africa. Countries currently being focused for this exercise are Tanzania, Kenya,
Sudan and Mozambique.
As the largest recipient of Chinese aid and assistance, Tanzania appears to be
increasingly dependent on Chinese benevolence. China has provided various
kinds of assistance to Tanzania since its leader Julius Nyerere, one of the
founders of the Non-Aligned Movement, visited Beijing and signed the
Friendship Treaty in 1965. Major Chinese projects in Tanzania are the
Tanzania–Zambia Railway, the Friendship Textile Mill which runs on subsidized
preferential credit, the Mubrali Rice Farm, the Kiwira Coal Mine and the
Mahonda Sugarcane Factory. At present, there are eight Sino–Tanzanian joint
ventures and no less than 40 Chinese companies carry out labour contracts and
services in Tanzania. Sino–Tanzanian trade is heavily tilted in Chinese favour as
it exports foodstuffs, vehicles, textiles, light industrial products, chemical
products, mechanical equipment, electrical appliances and steel while importing
dry seafood, raw leather, wooden logs, coarse copper and wooden handicrafts.
With such relations, or more appropriately dependence, it would not be
difficult for China to extract certain concessions from Tanzania, like use of its
military bases to expand its footprint beyond the Indian Ocean.

Kenya

China enjoys a huge trade surplus with Kenya, with its exports to the latter
increasing by over 25 per cent annually from 2004 to 2008.111 Beijing in fact is
exporting more than 30 times its imports. In 2008, China exported $917 million
of goods to Kenya while importing $29 million worth of Kenyan goods. China’s
exports in 2008 grew by 39 percent over 2007, capping the fourth straight year
of at least 25 percent growth in exports. China is now the third-largest exporter
to Kenya after the United Arab Emirates, which principally exports oil, and
India. Rapidly building up its economic leverage with Nairobi, the China
National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) is drilling for oil in the Isiolo region
in eastern Kenya.112 The exploratory well was completed in April 2010 at the
cost of $26 million; however, numerous oil companies have drilled 31
exploratory wells in Kenya over the past fifty years without much success.
However, CNOOC is making a credible effort to find oil in an area geologically
similar to South Sudan.
The two countries are trying to forge deeper defence ties, with China
providing weapons to Kenya and increasing its involvement with the Kenyan
National Security and Intelligence Service (NSIS) by providing
telecommunications and computer equipment.113 While Kenya has sourced
military equipment from China since 2002, it has also shown a willingness to
reciprocate by involving Chinese companies in critical infrastructure projects
like the development of a deep sea port at Lamu. China has already given a $140
million grant to develop the Lamu port and rail-cum-road corridor. Indian
military experts fear the ports of Mombasa and Lamu will give China the
leverage to use them as forward operating bases. Chinese companies are
interested in developing the two ports with an eye towards developing road and
rail infrastructure to South Sudan and Ethiopia, and pipeline infrastructure to the
former and Uganda.114 According to US diplomatic cables exposed by
Wikileaks, China’s interest in the $5 billion Lamu project is linked to the
presence of oil in South Sudan and Uganda, which could be exported via Lamu.
China is also developing a number of infrastructure projects in Kenya, with
Chinese companies working on the Thika road project, a major eight lane
highway from Nairobi to Thika town, with another Chinese firm the prime
contractor for the Mombasa–City Centre– Gigiri road upgrade project. The
second phase of a project to upgrade the Jomo Kenyatta International Airport in
Nairobi is under the China National Aero-Technology International Engineering
Company. Beijing is also developing a 120 MW thermal plant in Longonot and
another 600 MW coal-fired power station in Mombasa. It is also undertaking
projects that involve construction of 132 kV lines and substations in the Rift
Valley, and in the central, western and coast provinces.115
 Most significantly, all these projects are being undertaken at extremely
competitive prices, with Chinese companies outbidding American companies for
the contracts.116 It is quite evident that Beijing is pursuing a long-term strategy
in Africa to support its aspiration of becoming a superpower. Although India is
part of the Chinese calculus, it is focusing more towards competing with the US
as New Delhi is no threat to Beijing and is treated by its leadership as a regional
power which could be choked through leverages when the time comes.

Sudan

On 4 February 1959, Sudan became the fourth African government to establish

official relations with China, but no significant ties between the two emerged
until the mid 90s, when Beijing began its pursuit of external energy resources.
By that time, Beijing had already decided to establish oil bases abroad by
investing and participating in the exploration, development, and construction of
oilfields and pipelines ‘to guarantee (China’s) long term and steady supply of
crude oil import.’117 This policy has already paid dividends in Sudan, based on
oil production sharing agreements and other investments, with trade between the
two countries touching $6.8 billion in 2009.118
China’s dominance in Sudan is mostly related to oil. In 1996, the China
National Petroleum Corporation paid $441 million to acquire a 40 per cent
majority share in the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company.119 The next
year, it won a twenty-year project for the production and transportation of oil in
western Kordofan, covering three blocks in the Mughlad Basin.120
China has also played a major role in the construction of a $1 billion, 1,506
km long export pipeline by providing engineering, equipment and construction
of facilities. The pipeline came into operation on 23 June 1999, and exactly a
week later, a new refinery was inaugurated north of Khartoum. CNPC provided
half of the total investment of $540 million, and presently operates the
refinery.121 On 30 August 1999, Sudan became a net oil exporter for the first
time, exporting 600,000 barrels of oil from Port Bashir from a new two million
tonne oil terminal built by China 25 km south of Port Sudan.
Sudan’s oil reserve estimates of 6.4 billion barrels are considerable, and
China has invested heavily in the country’s oil infrastructure. China has also
invested nearly $2 billion into the country’s 1250 MW Merowe hydropower
dam, which opened in 2009.122 Like Myanmar and Pakistan, Beijing followed a
policy of non-interference in Sudan despite the 22-year-long civil war, gross
human rights violation and famine from 1983 to 2005. Before the UN Security
Council arms embargo in December 2005, which halted Chinese arms sales to
Sudan altogether, China and Russia were significant arms suppliers with smalls
arms supply registering a 600 times growth between 1999 and 2005.123 China
supplied guns, grenade launchers and heavy machine guns between 2003 and
2005, a period which saw the worst of human rights violations.124 It supplied 20
A-5C Fantan fighter aircraft to Sudan in 2003 along with military trucks and A-8
trainer aircraft.
With respect to Sudan, India followed a pragmatic foreign policy and dipped
into its oil reserves by purchasing the stock of Canadian oil major Talisman in
2004, which exited from the wartorn nation on account of human rights
violations. ONGC Videsh Limited not only bought out Talisman, but it also tied
up with CNPC in Sudan for oil exports. However, in 2011, the oil-rich South
Sudan gained independence following the 2005 accord – a significant
development for future foreign policy for both India and China in the region.
Indian analysts feel that China is leveraging towards securing a forward
operating base in Sudan to watch over the Red Sea and Horn of Africa. That may
be the case, but Beijing is equally interested in natural resources from Africa.
Significantly, India and China have turned out to be partners in Sudan instead of
competitors, with oil companies of both countries signing an agreement in 2005
to collaborate in the energy sector and engaging in an energy security dialogue
for the long term.125

Mozambique

Beijing’s relations with Mozambique date from 1963, when five delegations of
the Marxist-Leninist Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO) visited
China. Unlike most countries in Africa, Mozambique has never recognized
Taiwan. Mozambique became independent in 1975 with the FRELIMO party
taking over the reins of power and immediately advocating the One China
policy. China granted an interest-free loan of $56 million the same year and sent
the first in a continuing series of medical teams to Mozambique that has
continued to the present day.126 The Chinese embassy claims that since the first
medical team arrived in 1976, Chinese medical staff have treated 1.3 million
patients and trained more than 2,000 Mozambicans. Mozambique leader Samora
Machel, however, preferred the USSR over China because the former had
provided more military support to FRELIMO during the liberation struggle.
Relations improved briefly in 1978 when Machel visited China and about 100
Chinese military specialists were sent to work in Mozambique.127 China
provided $60 million in credits, making Mozambique one of its largest aid
recipients in Africa.
Despite this, relations between the two deteriorated after Mozambique
criticized China over its border war with Vietnam and took the side of the Soviet
Union during its intervention in Afghanistan. China took advantage of a 1983
famine followed by a flood and offered much-needed assistance with long term
interests in mind.128 Machel returned to Beijing in 1984 and obtained more than
$20 million in economic aid. As a result, Mozambique did not criticize China
during the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown.
In the 1980s, the two countries signed numerous other agreements. In 1988,
FRELIMO and the Communist Party of China signed an agreement to build
Mozambique’s parliament building.129 The bilateral relationship picked up in the
new millennium with Hu Jintao visiting Maputo in 2007 and promising several
new projects, including a $6 million agricultural technology centre that was
inaugurated in 2011 and a national stadium. China also cancelled $52 million of
Mozambique’s debt.130
As with other African countries, the security relationship has consisted
primarily of high-level exchange visits. In 2007, however, China gave the armed
forces $1.5 million in non-military equipment. Two years later, it agreed to
provide the military $3 million for the purchase of logistical equipment and to
continue to train it.
Most of China’s engagement in Mozambique is currently focused on the
economic relationship. A third of all roads in the country are being built by
Chinese companies in addition to Maputo International Airport, the national
football stadium, the national conference centre, telecommunications networks
and water supply projects. A joint Sino–Lusophone initiative known as
Geocapital was created in 2005– 2006 as a private fund with the aim of
channelling Chinese capital to Mozambique. In 2008, China became the second-
largest investor in Mozambique after South Africa.131
As of 2010, China had invested $607million in Mozambique. It has further
pledged to invest $13 billion in industrial, tourism, mining and energy projects
over the next decade. The largest Chinese investment so far is the Wuhan Iron
and Steel Corporation’s $800 million investment to develop coal reserves for
export to China and the purchase of an 8 per cent share of Riversdale, an
Australian company, for $200 million that has coal concessions in Mozambique.
Mozambique’s prime minister A.B. Baptista Ali made two visits to China in
2010 when he received promises from the Export-Import Bank for $165 million
in financing to upgrade Maputo International Airport and build cement and
cotton processing factories.132 In 2011, China funded about one-quarter of the
total cost of the All-Africa Games held in Maputo at a cost of $156 million.133
Beijing’s interest in Mozambique is again driven by natural resources with an
eye towards the Indian Ocean. The involvement of China in Mozambique,
especially in maritime infrastructure development, will definitely give it the
necessary leverage in seeking the country’s port as forward bases or even
logistics support for its deep sea mineral exploration in the nearby south-west
Indian Ocean ridge.
 five

TRIGGERS ON THE HIMALYAN BELT

The days when Jawaharlal Nehru used to walk down the corridors from the
Prime Minister’s Office to the Defence Ministry in South Block or even cross
the road to meet Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel in times of crisis are long gone. Given
the security requirements and the paraphernalia surrounding the prime minister,
it is the defence minister or home minister or any member of the hallowed CCS
who now call upon the PM with a retinue of officials to discuss matters of
national importance.
Which is why the corridors of power went abuzz on 19 April 2011, when
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, accompanied by NSA Shivshankar Menon
and then Principal Secretary to the PM T.K.A Nair walked up to the DGMO in
the Defence Ministry for an urgent presentation. Behind the foreboding black
iron-grill doors of the DGMO, Defence Minister A.K. Antony, then Army Chief
General V.K. Singh, DGMO chief Lt. Gen. A.M. Verma and other senior Army
officials awaited them in the operations room.
The Indian Army’s military operations room is the nerve centre for
conducting war in times of hostilities. It is also where daily situation on the live
borders with Pakistan and China are monitored with first-hand situation reports,
‘sit-reps’ in military parlance, pouring in from the LOC or the LAC.
Inside the operations room that morning, large-scale maps of Xinjiang, Tibet
and the LAC were highlighted. Over the past decade, due to tremendous
infrastructure improvement in Tibet and Xinjiang, increased Chinese military
capabilities have been a serious cause of concern for India. It was not long ago
that the PLA and the Indian Army deployments on the LAC mirrored each other,
with each side holding seven military divisions with over 140,000 men
respectively at the border. At the beginning of the new millennium, the Indian
military assessment was that with improved infrastructure in Tibet, China could
increase its force levels to 21 divisions (over 450,000 troops) within a month of
hostilities breaking out. The situation had dramatically changed further after the
opening of the QTR and new advance landing grounds along the LAC.
On that morning, General Verma informed everyone present that the PLA
now had the capacity to deploy 34 divisions (around 750,000 troops) within 22
days. In contrast, India could only mobilize 17 divisions (around 350,000 men)
in the same period, with five dual task divisions being pulled out of the Indo–
Pak border. The Army argued there was a serious and urgent need for force
accretion with China to even defend India’s borders; this meeting sowed the
seeds for raising India’s first Mountain Strike Corps in the minds of the PM and
Defence Minister. The top military brass argued that the three existing Indian
strike corps – I, II and XXI – were primarily designed to counter a threat from
Pakistan and there was hardly any reserve force for application in a worst-case
scenario with China. After much delay, the armed forces’ proposals for a
mountain strike corps, upgradation of airbases with operational role across the
LAC and purchase of aerial strike platforms were cleared by the CCS in July
2013.
While armed forces across the world are prone to exaggeration when it comes
to threat scenarios, the scenario painted by the Indian Army was a matter of
serious concern. The DGMO opined that given the recent history, the status of
China and India as growing regional powers and the boundary issue had limited
the scope of bilateral friendship and led to an enduring strategic rivalry between
the two countries. According to the Indian Army, theoretically, there could be
many contingencies for localized flare-ups, with major conflict contingencies
due to:

• A perceived Indian involvement in fomenting unrest in Tibet through the

Dalai Lama set-up in Dharamsala.
• An India–Pakistan conflict escalating to a higher threshold with the
possibility of Beijing opening a second front.
• India proactively opposing the assertion of China’s claims on disputed or
sensitive pockets on the LAC.

Although Beijing has been projecting its rise through peace and economic
development, the Indian military establishment believes that in case of any
hostilities with India, China will aim for a political victory rather than territorial
gains. It is in this context that India is examining the PLA’s latest war zone
concept (WZC), which looks at the limited application of military force with
only group armies involved in limited conflicts. According to Indian military
planners, the PLA will limit itself to a WZC in the event of any hostilities with
India, including in a high-threat scenario, due to the following reasons:

• The international community would not stand idle in case of the two Asian
giants clashing across the LAC. The global economic repercussions of a
military conflict between the two would be far too serious and would lead
to intervention from multilateral bodies like the UN and other UNSC
powers.
• The cost of war would be a significant factor as a long or even a limited war
is unlikely to give the PLA any advantage compared to the economic
setback China would face in such a scenario.
• A limited war with India would tie up PLA forces in and around the area of
application for a considerable period and weaken its hands for use
elsewhere.
• Being a superior power, the PLA is expected to embarrass Indian forces if
hostilities break out. However, an unexpected military reversal will have
serious implications for Beijing in its march to become a superpower like
the US.

Taking into account the overall scenario, a section of the Indian military
establishment believes that China may not have a major offensive design across
the LAC and would be happy to confine New Delhi to being a regional player
through a strategy of containment. The assessment is that the PLA will maintain
a status quo on its terms along the LAC without letting off any pressure on the
‘Southern Tibet’ issue.
While China has already conveyed that it is in no hurry to sort out the
boundary dispute, conflict resolution mechanisms such as the 1993 accord and
the 1996 CBMs should prevent an escalation of military tensions. On 17 January
2012, during the fifteenth round of meetings between the special representatives,
the two countries signed a working mechanism on border issues to further cool
down tensions over the LAC.1 Signed by NSA Menon and his Chinese
counterpart Dai Binggou, the mechanism calls for consultation and coordination
on the boundary issue and under this agreement, the working mechanism will
now be headed by a joint secretary-level official from the MEA and a director-
general level official from the Chinese foreign ministry.2 The mechanism would
study ways to conduct and strengthen exchanges and cooperation between
military personnel and establishments of the two sides in border areas. It will
also explore the possibility of cooperation in border areas. In practical terms, this
means that local commanders on the LAC would engage with each other through
sports festivals and help each other during times of natural calamities.3 The
mechanism will undertake other tasks that are mutually agreed upon by the two
sides, but will not discuss the boundary question or the special representative
mechanism. It will hold consultations once or twice every year alternately in
India and China. Emergency consultations, if required, may be convened after
mutual agreement in case there is transgression reported by either side on the
LAC or a localized dispute.4
The new mechanism was strained during the 21 day face-off in 2013, with
New Delhi wondering whether the Chinese Foreign Ministry had the powers to
direct the PLA to back-off in case of a serious transgression. With the two
armies staring at each other across the frigid mountain desert, Indian
Ambassador to China S. Jaishankar met with China’s Director-General of
Boundary Affairs Ouyang Yujing on a daily basis to convince Beijing to back
off. It was quite evident to the Indian side that the PLA did not take orders from
its Foreign Ministry and that the entire face-off was planned not by a local
commander but by Beijing. The Chinese plea that the Depsang incursions were
accidental did not wash with New Delhi as it was clear the PLA leadership
would show no flexibility on the boundary resolution and would keep the LAC
active by emphasizing Chinese claims.
The Chinese infexibility on the LAC was backed by PLA forces, with reports
indicating no less than 42 divisions and another 45 brigades organized under 18
group armies, ready for force application in a worst-case scenario. This was far
removed from the peacetime scenario where only a couple of brigades,
motorized regiments, and rapid reaction force divisions were monitoring the
LAC in Tibet. But what alarmed the Indian leadership was the military brass
assessment that China had the cpacity to deploy 750,000 troops within a week
along the LAC.
While theoretically, the PLA could move a massive force in the worst-case
scenario, there are some critical points to be noted in this projected long-scale
deployment. The Indian military establishment believes that the PLA has limited
capacity in bringing other military region formations to the LAC. According to
intelligence reports, the PLA has not been involved in a large-scale inter-military
region mobilization so far, while a lack of homogeneity existed among troops in
case of inter-military region inductions. This lack of homogeneity could be
crucial as it could affect command and control and cohesion of troops in the
worst-case scenario. Another concern for the PLA was that military tasks in the
restive Tibetan Autonomous Region and Xinjiang were different from other
Han-dominated regions of China. In these regions, the PLA would have to be
extra careful on account of its vulnerability due to highly restive populations and
lack of local support. Both areas have been restive since the 2008 Beijing
Olympics. While the ETIM in Xinjiang is supported by Islamists across the
Wakhan Corridor, the self-immolation movement in Tibet, particularly in the
Sichuan region, has shown no signs of abating. Besides, there are serious
acclimatization issues, as the LAC runs through the most hostile climates in the
world with heights touching 18,000 feet and temperatures reaching minus 30
degrees Celsius.
While the PLA has the capacity to deploy rapid reaction forces from other
regions at critical times or adverse situations, retaining its troops on the
Himalayan belt for a long period could weaken the PLA’s hold in other areas of
China. The PLA would have to balance its troop positions if an adverse situation
develops on the LAC.

CHINESE MILITARY AMBITIONS:

A VIEW FROM SOUTH BLOCK
With China pursuing its ambitions to become a global superpower rivalling the
US, it would not, under normal circumstances, have military ambitions over
India or any of its territory as the adventure could turn costly and digress it from
its world ambitions. This is not to say that China will settle the border question
with India on the latter’s terms or abandon its encirclement policy in South Asia
and beyond. Former Premier Wen Jiabao during his interaction with the Indian
leadership had made it amply clear that China was in no hurry to sort out the
border dispute. China would like to keep India on tenterhooks by also not losing
an opportunity to promote its ‘all-weather friend’ Pakistan’s ambitions. It is in
this context one should examine the likely military aims that PLA has over India.
A frequently discussed topic within the Indian military establishment is the
‘two-front theory’. While the possibility of both China and Pakistan opening
simultaneous war fronts has been factored into India’s war doctrine, there has
been little evidence of it in the past four wars that New Delhi has fought against
Islamabad. Despite this, many within the armed forces believe that China will
open a second front against India during a future conflict over Jammu and
Kashmir or over water rights with Pakistan. Although defending against a two-
front aggression would be a very daunting task for the Indian military, the fact
that all three countries are nuclear powers would act as a serious deterrent for
such a scenario, as this would revive the mutually assured destruction (MAD)
doctrine of the Cold War days. Among other factors that would prevent such a
conflagration is the international community, particularly the US, which in the
past few years has had frequent diplomatic run-ins with Beijing over the latter’s
engagement in Africa or escalation of tensions in the South China Sea. The
friction between the US, and its allies Japan and South Korea, and China has
further increased after Beijing announced the ADIZ over East China Sea on 23
November 2013, asking aircraft entering this zone to obey its rules or face
defensive procedures. Two days after the ADIZ was announced, the US flew two
B-52 strategic bombers through the zone in defiance of the new Chinese air
defence rules, which also apply to the desputed Diaoyu/Senkaku islands. On 28
November, military planes from South Korea and Japan also flew through the
ADIZ without informing the authorities. While the US, Japan and South Korea
criticized the ADIZ, India maintained a studied silence as it did not want to get
involved in the fracas without any locus standi.
Though the international community or the UN has proved to be fickle in
their support for India at times, particularly during the 1948 Kashmir conflict
and the 1962 war with China, the growing Indo–US military relationship post
the 2005 nuclear agreement is likely to deter any adversary from opening a
second front. Significantly, the convergence of India–US ties has been
concurrently marked by a steady deterioration of Washington’s relationship with
Islamabad over harbouring terrorists group like the Haqqani network, Tehreek-e-
Taliban Pakistan and the India-centric Lashkar-e-Toiba. The involvement of
Pakistan-based groups in destabilizing Afghanistan has been seriously noted by
the American administration, which has questioned Islamabad’s commitment to
eradicate terror.
The changing geopolitics of the day should rule out the ‘two-front’ theory; a
most likely possibility in this regard could be a PLA posturing along the Western
Sector to tie Indian troops down in case of a full-scale conflict between India and
Pakistan. Evidence of this was seen during the Kargil conflict, when the PLA
showed an aggressive posturing on the LAC in the sector just before then
Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif flew to meet then US President Bill
Clinton to discuss the withdrawal of Pakistani troops from the Indian side of the
LOC in the Kargil sector.6 New Delhi had in fact lodged a strong protest with
Beijing over PLA personnel crossing the LAC in the Western Sector during the
1999 war.7 According to intelligence reports,8 seven heavy vehicles carrying
four PLA officers and 102 soldiers crossed the LAC in eastern Ladakh in the
first week of July. The soldiers were observed to be ‘working on a road’ with a
bulldozer between 7.30 a.m. and 3.30 p.m. on 1 July 1999. The Srinagar-based
15 Corps of the Indian Army, which was then overlooking both the LAC and the
LOC, was immediately informed of the intrusion.
The PLA incursion was preceded by heightened Chinese activity in the sub-
sector North area in eastern Ladakh, three days after Nawaz Sharif’s
unscheduled visit to Beijing in June 1999. The Indian Army’s assessment at that
time was that Sharif wanted the Chinese to divert Indian attention towards
eastern Ladakh in order to relieve pressure on Pakistani intruders in Kargil.
Taking note of the increased Chinese activity, the commander of 114 Infantry
Brigade had recommended that Ladakh Scout troops be moved from Fukche to
Demchok along the Lukung–Thakung–Chusul alignment to counter the
enhanced threat perception. However, no additional forces were rushed to
eastern Ladakh. After the incursion, the Indian Army requested a flag meeting
with their Chinese counterparts to resolve the issue.
While the Indian Army could possibly have over-interpreted Chinese
movement during the Kargil War, the PLA posturing was perhaps designed to
send a message of reassurance to Islamabad, just as the PLA has been sending a
message to India through its recent military exercises in restive Tibet. India’s
external intelligence wing R&AW in its August 2012 assessment conveyed to
the Manmohan Singh government that ‘there was a possibility of a skirmish or
an incident triggered by China on the LAC…Beijing was contemplating such an
action to divert attention from its own domestic troubles.’9 The domestic
troubles the R&AW assessment referred to were the self-immolations in Tibet,
militancy in Xinjiang province and the political tussle before the change of
leadership in Beijing in October 2012.
According to military analysts, the R&AW assessment was no different from
its 2009 report, which ruled out any major military adventure by China but was
silent on the possibility of a minor or limited conflict. The 2009 assessment had
emphasized that China’s ‘recent incursions into India were part of a well-
designed plan to keep India on tenterhooks’ and force it to divert attention from
its primary development objectives. Notwithstanding R&AW’s generic alerts to
the Indian government, the PLA’s military exercises are also sending a message
to its restive populations in Tibet and Xinjiang. In fact, a section of the Indian
strategic establishment believes that Chinese build-up along the LAC is to secure
control of these areas to avoid future disturbances.10
This latter supposition, however, does not hold if one looks at the nature of
the exercises being conducted. In August 2010, an exercise to transport ‘strategic
logistic equipment’ from the Qinghai plateau to the Tibetan plateau was
conducted.11 The ‘equipment’ apparently meant Air Force and missile units and
was perhaps designed to test whether the equipment could handle the rarefied
atmosphere of Tibet. In October that same year, the PLA conducted a live-fire
joint training drill involving the Air Force, armoured, artillery and electronic
warfare units on the plateau. The drill was to test the endurance of PLA troopers
at 4,700 m in the plateau’s harsh and oxygen-starved climate. In 2011, two joint
exercises in Chengdu and Lanzhou military regions were conducted. Reports
indicate that one was held at an Army group level to practise a division-sized
force in joint and integrated operations involving Special Forces; the other, held
in October 2011, was a live-fire drill comprising Air Force, armoured and
artillery units.12 In March 2012, a massive military exercise was conducted on
the Qinghai–Tibet plateau using multirole J-10 fighters in ground attack mode.
According to reports and photos released by PLA Daily on 21 March 2012, the
ground crew of the J-10 regiment loaded ammunition on the 3,500 m high
plateau at temperatures around 20 degrees below zero.13 Flying round the clock,
the fighters scrambled and attacked targets with conventional and laser-guided
bombs. ‘Operations on the plateau are routine for the Air Force. The main
obstacles for plateau operations are thin air, complicated weather conditions
faced by ground crews and low oxygen density which makes igniting the engines
much harder,’ a military aviation analyst was quoted in the Chinese state-run
Global Times newspaper. While newspaper reports quoted senior PLA officers
as saying that the PLA Air Force had for the first time positioned J-10 fighters at
Lhasa airbase during winter months, a PLAAF engineering unit in May 2012
announced that it had modified the aircraft to make them more suited to the
harsh environment of the Tibetan plateau and that it would improve aircraft
maintenance work.14 New surveillance and tracking radars with better range and
capability had been activated in the Lanzhou military region – responsible for
the LAC in Western and Middle sectors – to monitor Indian activity during the
July 2012 PLA exercise.15 In addition, a military exercise was carried out a
month before with anti-tank units in live-fire practice to ‘test their precision
strike capability’.16
In fact, the year 2012 saw the PLA focusing on India, with high levels of
military training activity carried out by the Chengdu military region and the
various formations under it. Indian military intelligence has reported on a war
game described as ‘command and confrontation’17 organized by the Chengdu
military region in June 2012. Over 100 high-ranking officers from troop units
above regiment levels in Chengdu were said to have attended the exercise and
studied the command-and-control structure under full ‘information-based
conditions’.18 Information-based conditions mean that the battle commander is
directly in touch with command headquarters on a real-time basis and has
information about the total war theatre. This was the highest-level war game that
involved both the 13 and 14 group armies with a representation from the
neighbouring Lanzhou military region.19
These exercises clearly indicate towards the R&AW’s assessment of a limited
war threat to India. For over a decade, the PLA has been working on the war
zone concept under conditions of full information, which means transmission
and reception of data in real time and a transparent war theatre being managed
from a command-and-control centre away from the battlefield.20 Working
towards realizing these objectives, the PLA has improved its C4ISR capabilities
in Tibet. Military analysts say that China has laid out a vast network of
underground fibre optic communication lines which not only secures its
networks but also enhances its information warfare capabilities. Several types of
military satellites in space have enabled the PLA to provide force multiplication
to its ground assets. According to reports, 58 very small aperture terminal
(VSAT) satellite stations are part of the robust command-and-control structure in
Tibet with no comparison to Indian capabilities in this regards.21 While PLA Air
Force units and sub-units have been networked through satellite links, there is
broadband connectivity between successive higher command structures
including Lanzhou and Chengdu military regions to Beijing. Intelligence reports
indicate that the PLA has constructed fifth-generation barracks for troops in high
altitude Lanzhou and Chengdu military regions with hyperbaric chambers to
accelerate the acclimatization of troops being inducted from lower altitudes. All
these steps point to a preparation for rapid deployment and lightening strike
along the LAC.
As threat translates into intention, the PLA’s military ambitions may not
confine it to posturing in case of a full scale Indo–Pak war.
 The PLA’s other military aim, according to Indian Army planners, is to pose
a credible threat to the disputed areas along the LAC and coerce India into
accepting Chinese demands. While a section of Indian intelligence believes that
Chinese posturing in Tibet has more to do with its insecurity on the internal
security front, recent exercises reported from Tibet involve rapid induction of
airborne divisions in the high plateau within 36 to 48 hours from neighbouring
military regions. These reports also indicate that the Su-30 MKK multirole
fighter and the Su-27 UBK fighter have been practising during summer months
in Tibet.
The other area of concern is the increasing missile threat from Tibet. Indian
satellite imagery has picked up missile storage bunkers across two of the most
sensitive areas on the LAC – Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh. Large missile
storage facilities have been sighted at Xiadulla in Xinjiang province and at Bayi
in Nyingchi prefecture, which claims Arunachal Pradesh to be part of its
administration. The PLA is in fact breathing down India’s neck where it is most
vulnerable – part of the ancient silk route that connects the Ladakh region in the
northernmost part of Jammu and Kashmir to the bordering Xinjiang region.
The Indian military establishment recently began countermeasures after
coming across intelligence that China had set up at least two missile storage
facilities just across the Western Sector. The missile site at Xaidulla came as a
big surprise; in July 2011, satellite images showed 13 tunnels had been built at
Xiadulla, an old base of the PLA, just 98 km from the Karakoram mountain pass
between Ladakh and the Xinjiang Uighur autonomous region. Another missile
facility is located at Qizil Jilga, 40 km off the LAC in eastern Ladakh near the
recently repaved Western Tibet highway.
The PLA has also beefed up its overall capability in Aksai Chin, with new
observation towers coming up across Indian positions. Simultaneously, Beijing
is also working on a new road to link Kashgar to the Khunjerab pass in the
Karakoram mountains to connect Gilgit–Baltistan and the Xinjiang region and
bypass the landslide-prone section of the Karakoram highway.
The situation is equally alarming across Arunachal Pradesh, with intelligence
inputs provided by locals indicating that the PLA had developed underground
missile and weapons storage sites where Han Chinese had been deployed to
build underground infrastructure and tunnels. Intelligence reports from across
the LAC indicate large trucks and missile-shaped objects to have entered
underground storage complexes, especially at Bayi. Analysts say that these
missile sites are expected to house the Dong Feng-21 intermediate range
missiles, which have the range to cover the whole of India, and other short-range
missiles with a range of 200–600 km to hit targets in an extended war theatre.
It is evident that the Chinese capability to react and militarily force a decision
on India is very strong and there is no way the Indian Army could push the PLA
to accept New Delhi’s terms on the boundary issue. If China’s global ambitions
were not a priority, the PLA could for all practical purposes cross the LAC in
areas like Depsang bulge in Ladakh and even hold territory for political gains. A
not-so-secret fact is that Indian Army patrols in some places like Depsang plains
and Pangong Tso are demarcated by a 1976 LOP directive from the CSG and fall
much short of the perceived LAC to avoid confrontation with the PLA. So while
the Indian Army makes noises about transgressions and about PLA building
roads in Pangong Tso, their troop patrols do not even cover the area where these
activities are occurring, perhaps with an aim to keep the border quiet.
The point here is that while the Indian military establishment is on the back
foot in an effort to make the LAC tranquil, China loses no opportunity to state
their boundary claims emphatically. This is quite evident in the Western and
Middle sectors where PLA patrols routinely survey the borders up to their
definition of the LAC. In Demchok – where the Indus demarcates the LAC –
Chinese patrols are frequently seen in the area, supported with infrastructure
build-up and indicating a consolidation of positions. Indian long-range patrols
also conduct reconnaissance in the area but the timings of the two patrols are
deliberately different so that they do not lead to an eyeball-to-eyeball
confrontation.
Backed with Beijing’s newly acquired economic and military might and
world-class infrastructure, Chinese patrols are aggressive and make it a point to
leave a stamp on what they perceive is their territory, by either leaving markings
in Mandarin or indulging in construction activity. The fact is, in case the PLA
wants to score a political point through military coercion, the Indian Army will
come under serious pressure. The Indian security establishment’s assessment is
that China may escalate from military coercion to limited force application in
selected disputed or sensitive areas to either bargain from a position of strength
or achieve political gains by embarrassing Indian forces through its limited
mobilization. This likely military aim was a viable prospect, but it would require
a serious political trigger or military flare-up to justify the PLA unilaterally
altering the alignment of the LAC. Instead, the cause for a military flare-up
could go beyond events on the LAC or Indo–China bilateral ties, and in fact may
lie in Beijing’s activities in third countries like Nepal and Bhutan in the
Himalayan belt.
While both these countries act as buffers between the two giants, China has
made serious inroads into Nepal recently and is trying to establish diplomatic
ties with Bhutan, India’s strongest ally, and offering to make sincere efforts to
solve the border dispute between Beijing and Thimphu. These inroads into Nepal
and Bhutan are red flags to New Delhi as both countries have open borders and
historic links with India. Any PLA threat or Chinese coercion through these
countries, particularly Bhutan, could invite an Indian military response as
Bhutan sits on the mouth of the Chumbi valley and next to the chicken neck that
links West Bengal to Assam and the Northeast.

BHUTAN
Spread just over 38,000 sq. km of high mountain land, the kingdom of Bhutan
shares a 470 km long border with Tibet. Unlike Tibet, however, Bhutan has had
no history of being a suzerain of China and has been independent for centuries.
Yet, the mountainous kingdom forms one of the fingers of China’s ‘five finger
policy’, with Tibet the palm and the fingers being Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim,
Bhutan and Arunachal Pradesh. It is considered a part of China’s vision of
greater Tibet. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Bhutan’s ties with Tibet
were strained, as the kingdom sided with the imperial British in the 1903–04
military expedition to Lhasa. After Communist China occupied Tibet in 1950
and pushed the fourteenth Dalai Lama’s representatives to sign the Seventeen
Point Agreement for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet, Bhutan withdrew its
representative from Lhasa. The 1959 Lhasa rebellion, fleeing of the Dalai Lama
to India, Beijing’s consolidation of Tibet and arrival of more than 6,000 refugees
in Bhutan raised alarm bells in Thimphu. Today Bhutan is the only country in
South Asia that does not have direct diplomatic relations with Beijing in the
backdrop of Chinese claims on four pockets of territory along the border with
Thimphu.22 While India overtly has no objections to China establishing ties with
Bhutan, it watched with concern the willingness on part of Chinese and
Bhutanese leaders to establish formal diplomatic ties following the first-ever
meeting between the heads of the two countries on 21 June 2012 in Rio de
Janeiro on the sidelines of the United Nations Rio+20 Conference on Sustainable
Development.23
 It is a matter of record that the Indian Embassy in Thimphu and R&AW had
no clue about the meeting, as no indications had come from Thimphu. In fact, a
day before the meeting, it was none other than Premier Wen who sent a message
through diplomatic channels to the Indian delegation at the Rio summit
informing them that he would be meeting the Bhutan PM. New Delhi held it
against Jigme Thinley for playing the China card against India and mounted
pressure by withholding fuel subsidies to Bhutan on the eve of its general
elections in June 2013. The subsidies were restored in July 2013 after Thinley’s
rival Tshering Tobgay and his People’s Democratic Party (PDP) won the
elections.
After the path-breaking Rio meeting, Wen and Thinley both gave out
statements indicating the two countries were willing to establish diplomatic
relations. Wen said that ‘China is ready to forge formal diplomatic relations with
Bhutan on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’, and that
China was ‘willing to complete border demarcation with Bhutan at an early
date’, indicating that Beijing followed a ‘foreign policy of good
neighbourliness,’ according to Xinhua.24 Responding to this, Thinley said that
Bhutan ‘wishes to forge formal diplomatic ties with China as soon as possible’
as well as settle border issues ‘in a cooperative manner’.
Bhutan, which enjoys close diplomatic, political and military relations with
India, has in recent years begun to widen its diplomatic engagement. It
established relations with Myanmar earlier in 2012. Bhutan also has diplomatic
ties with Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and the Maldives, but does not
have formal relations with either the US or the other four permanent members of
the UN Security Council. It has looked to improve relations with Beijing by
taking forward the border dispute and also voicing its support to China on the
Tibetan issue. Wen said China ‘highly appreciates Bhutan’s staunch support of
China’s position on issues concerning Taiwan and Tibet’.25 Thinley was quoted
by Xinhua as saying his talks with Wen ‘carry great historic significance’. He
assured Bhutan’s support on the Tibetan issue, saying his government ‘firmly
sticks to a One-China policy’.26 Thinley said Bhutan ‘highly appreciate[d]
China’s endeavour to safeguard the common interests of developing countries in
international and regional affairs,’ adding that the country was willing to
enhance bilateral economic and trade cooperation.27
However, border talks between the two countries have made slow progress,
with China offering a package solution including the recognition of Bhutanese
claims over 495 sq. km of disputed land, and the two sides deciding to conduct
joint field surveys.28 China’s territorial claims in Bhutan cover a total of 764 sq.
km, with 269 sq. km in the north-west and 495 sq. km in the central part of
Bhutan.
Even though the Chinese offer came in 2012, India was expecting the two
countries to break ice after Bhutan became a constitutional monarchy in 2008.
Briefing Bhutanese parliamentarians on 4 December 2009, Dasho Pema
Wangchuk, secretary of international boundaries, gave a candid view of the
boundary dispute between Thimphu and Beijing. He said there were four areas
on the western border, which runs alongside the Chumbi valley, that were being
disputed by the Chinese: the Dokhlam, Charithang, Sinchulimpa and Dramana
pasture lands.29 The secretary informed the other parliamentarians that the 495
sq. km of disputed land in Bayul–Pasanglung sector had been conceded to
Bhutan by China in the overall package deal, but the Chinese were willing to
give up its claims on the land only if other aspects of the deal were accepted and
implemented. These included trade and progress in diplomatic relations that
would include establishing a Chinese embassy in Thimphu.30
In April 2010, the Bhutanese foreign minister Ugyen Tshering before the
National Assembly gave out a brief history of the boundary talks between China
and Bhutan with map claims of both sides being exchanged in the sixth round of
dialogues.
The brief gives an important insight into the Chinese approach towards
resolving boundary issues and resemble the parallel approach adopted by Beijing
towards India. For instance, in the seventh round of talks between the two
countries, China made some additional offers on the Luling valley sector which,
if the Bhutanese accepted, would make them forego claims in the Middle
Sector.31 In the twelfth round of talks, China brought in a draft of the proposed
interim agreement on the maintenance of peace and tranquillity along the border,
which was signed by the two foreign ministers after discussions.32 In the next
round of talks in September 1999 in Thimphu, China came up with proposals for
settlement of the boundary dispute, along with establishment of diplomatic
relations and trade.33 China proposed that the two sides might concentrate on
preparations of descriptions and confirmation of border alignment, adding a new
dimension to talks.
In the sixteenth round of talks, maps showing claims of both sides were
exchanged. In April 2004, it was decided to narrow down the differences at the
expert group level.34 In 2005, the maps were examined but could not be
exchanged due to vast differences between the border claim lines of the two
sides. China had differences in areas amounting to 1,300 sq. km of land of which
they were ready to consede 900 sq.km. In the eighteenth round of talks, the
Bhutanese rejected the Chinese package offered in the seventh round as
Pasamlung area, the kingdom claimed, was already under Thimphu. This
indicated that Bhutan was not going to be pressurized by Beijing into granting
any territorial concessions and were prepared for tough negotiations. However,
from the Indian strategic perspective, the crux of the border issue between
Bhutan and China centres around 89 sq. km of the Dokhlam plateau at the tri-
junction between the three countries, 42 sq. km of Sinchulimpa and another 138
sq. km in Gin, Shakhatoe and Dramana pasture lands. The most critical tri-
junction dispute was glossed over by Dasho Wangchuk in his report to the
National Assembly, perhaps deferring the issue for another day in the future.
Simply put, China and Bhutan are converging on resolving the 180 sq. km of
Sinchulimpa and Dramana pasture lands, but Thimphu is not willing to give up
claims on Pasamlung just as China is steadfast on Dokhlam. The reason why
China is not willing to give up on Dokhlam is not difficult to fathom, as a border
resolution in its favour would give the PLA more penetration into India’s hyper-
sensitive chicken neck area separating Bhutan with West Bengal. The Chumbi
valley with headquarters at Yatong in Tibet is shaped like a dagger piercing into
the Indian chicken neck, or the Siliguri corridor bound by Sikkim and Bhutan on
either side. The Siliguri corridor, around 200 km long with width varying from
20 to 60 km, links the seven states of the Northeast to mainland India. Indian
fears are that in case hostilities break out with China, the PLA would cut through
the Siliguri corridor to separate the Northeast and then proceed to occupy
Arunachal Pradesh.
Indian military experts define Dokhlam plateau as a quadrilateral bound by
Batang La, Gyomochen, Torsa river and Amu Chu rivulet, a tributary of
Jaldhaka river. As of now, Bhutan is holding onto the Dokhlam plateau
southwards of Batang La. If Bhutan were to give up its claims on the plateau, the
new border alignment would be from Gyomochen, south of Batang La. This
would give allow the PLA to further its ambitions into Indian territory, with a
positive outcome of Sinchulimpa and Dramana pasture lands giving more width
to China in the Yatong area.
While both sides have publicly claimed for a reasonable solution to the border
issue, Beijing wants to revive trade with Bhutan through the traditional route via
Batang La in the Chumbi valley while border talks continue on a parallel track.
Yet, even if China were to resume trade and diplomatic ties with Thimphu, it
will not concede land on the west as it needs to counter Indian forces sitting on
the ridges of both sides of Chumbi valley in Sikkim as well in Bhutan.
Similarly, just as Beijing will not give up its claims on the Dokhlam plateau
and only allow minor adjustments in the other areas, India is equally sensitive
about the area and any PLA mobilization would be met with a robust pre-
emptive response unlike in 1962.
While India appears to have no intentions of exercising its veto under the
2007 bilateral friendship treaty with Bhutan in opening up diplomatic ties with
China, the move is fraught with complications and has long term implications
given Beijing’s claim on Arunachal Pradesh.35 It is a foregone conclusion that
China will increase its economic ties with Bhutan under the guise of stated
principles of mutual benefit and non-interference,36 and move swiftly towards
mineral imports from Thimphu while offering infrastructural development to the
kingdom. However, besides the increased external threat, India may also have an
internal security headache as many insurgent groups operating in the Northeast
move through Bhutan and till 2003–2004 had training camps across the Assam
border. Nearly thirty camps belonging to groups such as ULFA, National
Democratic Front of Bodoland and Kamtapur Liberation Organization were
uprooted in December 2003 in operations spanning over a year with the
Bhutanese Army striking south of Samdrup Jongkhar area with the help of the
Indian Army. Given the Indian claim that the ULFA chief Paresh Barua is in
Yunan province of China and has been seen in Shanghai, Chinese intelligence
could quietly influence these groups once its relations with Bhutan normalize
and put more pressure north of the Brahmaputra.
India quietly expressed its concerns to Bhutan post the Rio meeting; it said it
had no objections to Bhutan’s ties with China as long as New Delhi’s security
concerns were addressed. Any military pressure on Bhutan by the PLA would
clearly elicit a response from New Delhi as it would be seen as a threat to the
chicken neck area.
If Chinese inroads into Bhutan will be a future cause of concern for India,
Beijing’s rapidly growing relationship with the erstwhile Hindu kingdom of
Nepal is already causing a headache to security planners in Delhi. In fact, with
Pakistan and Myanmar already close to Beijing, Nepal, particularly under the
now popular Maoist political leadership, could rapidly increase Indian security
costs due to additional deployments on the 1,751 km long open border.
Contending with Pakistan and Myanmar was already an onerous task; it is now
far worse with Nepal coming up on the horizon.

NEPAL
Pushpa Kamal Dahal alias Prachanda is the chairman of Unified Communist
Party of Nepal (Maoists), the party which launched an insurgency movement on
13 February 1996 to overthrow the Shah Dynasty in the Himalayan State. After
the death of more than 15,000 civilians in the ensuing civil war, King Gyanendra
Bir Bikram Shah was deposed on 28 May 2008. Gyanendra had taken over as
king after his nephew Prince Dipendra allegedly massacred his entire family
including then ruling King Birendra on 1 June 2001 under mysterious
circumstances.
Following the ideology of Mao Zedong, Prachanda went on to become the
first prime minister of a republic Nepal for a brief period in 2008–2009. Within
six days of becoming PM on 18 August 2008, he left for Beijing, ostensibly to
participate in the closing ceremony of the 2008 Olympics. In a clear signal to
India, the message was that New Delhi may not be the first port of call for the
new Nepalese leadership. Prachanda’s preference for China was evident once
again after he visited Beijing between 12 and 18 October 2009, after he was
sacked for trying to overthrow Nepal Army Chief Rookmangud Katwal. During
his visit as Opposition leader, Prachanda met Wen Jiabao and requested that
Beijing extend the Qinghai–Lhasa railroad to Kathmandu.37 The Lhasa–
Kathmandu bus service was restarted in 2009 through the 800 km Chinese
highway 318 or the so-called Friendship Highway from Lhasa to Zhangmu.38
The Nepalese town of Kodari is linked to Zhangmu through the Sino–Nepal
Friendship Bridge, with Kathmandu just 115 km away. China is now building
six cross-border linkages between Nepal and Tibet and seriously considering
extending the railroad to Kathmandu.39
From the day diplomatic relations were established on 17 June 1947, India
and Nepal share unique ties marked by open borders and centuries-old people-
to-people contacts of kinship and culture. Once the only Hindu kingdom in the
world, Nepal shares an 1,850 km long border with the Indian states of Sikkim,
West Bengal, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand in the south and with TAR
in China in the north. As much as the Nepalese resent it, India considers the
erstwhile Himalayan kingdom as its backyard and is extremely sensitive towards
expanding footprints of China or its key ally Pakistan in the country. The 1950
India–Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship forms the bedrock of bilateral
relations, even though Kathmandu time and again voices criticism and calls for a
level-playing field. While Nepalese political parties target India to gain points
domestically, New Delhi played a crucial role in stabilizing the new republic that
led to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in November 2006 among all the
political stakeholders including the Maoists. The foundation for the
reconciliation process was laid in New Delhi exactly a year earlier with the 12-
point understanding between the seven party alliance and the Maoists. While
many within the Indian polity including right-wing Hindu parties advocated that
the erstwhile Shah Dynasty led by King Gyanendra be supported, New Delhi
was steadfast in holding on to a democratic line and understanding the
sentiments of Nepalese people. It is not for any other reason that Western powers
including the US let India play the lead role in stabilizing Nepal during the
decade of turmoil between 1998 and 2008. While even Chinese diplomats in
Kathmandu grudgingly admit India’s hold on the pulse of Nepalese people, the
Nepalese Maoists still look towards Mao for ideological support. India is
Nepal’s largest trading partner and the only transit-providing country to this
landlocked nation40 but the growing influence of Maoists in the political
structure has pushed Kathmandu towards Beijing.41 While Indian diplomats
believe this to be a ploy to extract more mileage out of Delhi, it was not long ago
that the then King Mahendra withdrew Indian Army check posts from the
Nepal–Tibet border in 1970 and his son King Birendra invited an Indian
economic blockade after Kathmandu decided to import anti-aircraft guns from
China in 1989.42 There are growing voices led by Maoist leaders demanding a
review of the 1950 Treaty on grounds that it is unequal.43
Since 1996, Nepal’s exports to India have grown more than eleven times,
while bilateral trade has grown more than 10 times. Nepalese exports to India,
which stood at 29.8 per cent of its total external trade in 1996, stood at 66.4 per
cent in 2011. The total bilateral trade stood at $4.21 billion in 2010–11 with
Nepal importing $3.62 billion worth goods including petroleum products. Indian
firms are the biggest investors in Nepal accounting for $448 million foreign
direct investment in the strife-torn state.44
As a neighbour with open borders, India runs a robust economic cooperation
programme with Nepal both bilaterally as well as under the multilateral South
Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC). According to the Indian
Embassy in Kathmandu, India had funded a total of 425 projects including 35 in
the large and intermediate category and rest in the small category as on 1
January 2012, with total aid touching nearly T4,000 crore.
Apart from the economic relationship, New Delhi has very close military
cooperation with Kathmandu, with Indian INSAS rifles 5.56 mm, machine guns,
105 mm artillery guns, military trucks, anti-mine vehicles and ammunition
routinely supplied to shore up the government during the civil war. While
Nepalese Army officers and men are being trained in India, there are no less than
45,000 Gurkha soldiers serving in nearly 46 battalions and spread over seven
regiments of the Indian Army.45 Nearly 120,000 Gurkha ex-servicemen also
cement the ties between the two countries. Traditional ties between the two
armies are such that the Indian Army Chief is an honorary general of the Nepal
Army and vice-versa.
However, the past decade of civil war has played havoc with Indo–Nepal ties
as New Delhi has always been a supporter of democracy and opposed to a
Maoist dictatorship or royal authoritarian rule. After Gyanendra seized absolute
power on 1 February 2005, India supported democratic parties and suspended all
weapon supplies to Kathmandu in retaliation. The inherent inability of Nepalese
democratic parties like the Nepali Congress to stand up to the Maoists and the
influence of Prachanda on the polity has ensured that bilateral ties between the
two countries have cooled. New Delhi’s strategic priority in the last decade was
to improve its ties with the US and re-establishing its roots in Afghanistan. We
get an idea of this from the fact that India is currently pouring in T 1,000 crore of
annual aid into Afghanistan’s development, while its annual grant in aid to
Nepal post-2005 has been only T 150 crore.46
Beijing started to cultivate Kathmandu proactively after 2008, perhaps on
account of instability in Tibet during the run-up to the Olympics. Chinese
engagement in Nepal is aimed at cutting India’s influence on the Himalayan
state through competition in infrastructure projects, building its economic
leverage and increasing people-to-people contacts. According to Xinhua,47 the
number of bilateral personnel exchanges between China and Nepal had reached
74,000 in 2010.
The other objective of Beijing is to ensure that Tibetan refugees get no
support to run an anti-Beijing campaign from Kathmandu. Chinese sensitivity
towards Tibet was highlighted by the unilateral last minute cancellation of Wen
Jiabao’s visit to Nepal on 20 December 2011.48 The cancellation of a three-
nation tour that included Nepal and Myanmar was a clear message to both
countries. While Wen’s visit to Nepal was cancelled due to security concerns
arising out of perceived softness of Kathmandu towards Tibetan refugees and
anti-China US human rights groups, Beijing apparently conveyed its
unhappiness to Naypyidaw over the sudden suspension of work on the Myitsone
hydroelectric project. The growing Chinese clout within Nepal became clearer
after Deputy Prime Minister and Home Minister Bijaya Kumar Gachchadhar
was rushed to Beijing to assuage the Chinese leadership and convince them that
Kathmandu would not allow any Tibetan demonstrations during Wen’s visit.
Gachchadhar was in Beijing for five days between 25 and 30 December 2011 to
ensure that Wen quietly visited Kathmandu for exactly four and a half hours on
14 January 2012 while en-route to the Persian Gulf.49 The visit was shrouded in
secrecy with the Chinese Premier expecting large scale demonstrations and
possible self-immolation by Tibetan refugees.50
With Zhu Rongji being the last Chinese Premier to visit Nepal in May 2001,
Wen announced a $120 million grant package for economic and technical
assistance. He also announced a one-time grant of $20 million to be spent on
rehabilitation of former Maoists combatants and increased the annual assistance
to Nepal by 50 million Yuan.51 The key, however, lay in a grant of 10 million
Yuan for strengthening Nepal Police.
In the eight-point bilateral statement released after Wen’s short visit,
Kathmandu expressed its firm support for China on its efforts to uphold state
sovereignty, national unity and territorial integrity, assuring Beijing that it would
not allow ‘any forces to use its territory for any anti-China or separatist
activities.’52 With an eye towards strengthening its own internal security, China
and Nepal agreed to improve the meeting mechanism between law enforcing
authorities of the two countries in order to deepen cooperation on border
management and law enforcement capacity building for upholding peace and
stability of Sino–Nepal border areas.
Although Nepal is a country of peripheral concern to China, it occupies a
special place in its foreign policy due to its geographical location. It is the only
South Asian country that shares the longest land border with China after India.
While China recognizes the social, political, religious and ethnic links between
India and Nepal, its engagement towards Kathmandu is focused on containing
Tibetan refugees south of the Himalayas and putting an end to their perceived
anti-China activities. Its second priority is to neutralize the Indian influence as
much as possible, so that Nepal acts as a buffer and not as a client-state of New
Delhi. In this context, Prachanda’s revival of King Birendra Shah’s proposal that
Nepal should be turned into zone of peace between India and China is fraught
with ramifications.53
Beijing’s third priority in Nepal is to increase its bilateral trade and build an
economic leverage through large-scale infrastructure projects. To neutralize
Indian influence or even negate it, Beijing’s ‘all-weather friend’ Pakistan is
present in full diplomatic strength in Kathmandu and has been quite successful
in penetrating central India through the open borders of UP and Bihar. With
China increasing its diplomatic activity in Nepal, Kathmandu is now a crossroad
for diplomatic forces from India, China, Pakistan, the US and other Western
powers.
A nightmare for the Indian military would be a Maoist Nepal under Chinese
influence, which could bring Beijing’s military footprint closer to Indian borders
in the states of Uttarakhand, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. This would entail a
sizeable Indian military deployment and long-term expenditure. The other aspect
that worries India is Indian Naxalites, present from Bihar to Andhra Pradesh,
joining hands with their Nepalese counterparts. While there is little evidence to
link the two groups, the ISI has apparently tried to fish in troubled waters with
offers of tactical training to Naxalites.
Pakistan, which has one of the largest diplomatic representations in
Kathmandu, has often exploited the open border to destabilize India through
multiple means. The role of Pakistani Embassy officials in the hijacking of
Indian Airlines flight IC-814 in 1999 and the subsequent exchange of three
terrorists including Jaish-e-Mohammed leader Masood Azhar showed the
penetration of Islamabad into Nepal. Time and again, India has submitted proof
to both Nepal and Pakistan54 about large amounts of fake Indian currency being
injected into the country through the porous border.55 Pakistan has also been
accused of orchestrating anti-India violence in Nepal by raising the spectre of
New Delhi’s plans to make Kathmandu join the Indian Union.56 Pakistan-based
terror groups like Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed have used the Nepal
border to infiltrate terrorists for attacks in India, evidence of which has been
presented to Islamabad and Kathmandu repeatedly.57 A strategic tie-up between
Chinese and Pakistani intelligence agencies lately have fuelled the suspicion that
Beijing has outsourced part of its intelligence collection on India to Islamabad.
With Nepal and China getting cosier by the day, the worst-case scenario for
India would be Chinese intelligence agencies using Pakistani channels or Maoist
links to pick up information about Indian deployments on the border.
The other threat is from Chinese goods coming into India through the open
border and skewing the bilateral trade further in favour of Beijing. India is
already concerned about the economic leverage and goodwill China is building
in Nepal by participating in big-ticket infrastructure projects and through grants
and loans. China, which has a long history of politically driven projects and
plans, outflanked India by doling out a $3 billion grant to develop Lumbini,58
birth place of Lord Buddha, on the India–Nepal border as a Buddhist City. It is a
project that could relatively weaken the Dalai Lama’s hold over Tibetan
Buddhists and India’s legitimate claim to the Buddhist heritage. Three of the
four key sites related to the Buddha – Sarnath, Kushinagar and Gaya – are in
India. They form part of India’s Look East policy, initiated by Narasimha Rao in
1995, of engaging predominantly Buddhist countries around China’s periphery
as well as part of the Indian Buddhist history trail. The Indian Ministry of
External Affairs often ferries visiting dignitaries from Vietnam, Myanmar,
Japan, South Korea and Mongolia to Bodh Gaya.
The Asia-Pacific Exchange and Cooperation Foundation (APECF), a Chinese
NGO, announced the Lumbini project in July 2011. The project cost assumes
greater significance if we compare it with Nepal’s GDP of $15 billion.59 APECF
announced the signing of the Lumbini project with the Chinese chapter of United
Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) without even consulting
Nepalese authorities or its leadership,60 despite Lumbini already home to an
eight sq. km Lumbini Development Zone designed by the Japanese architect
Kenzo Tange in 1978 and funded by the Japanese government. The zone is
located around the spot where Queen Mayadevi is believed to have given birth to
Prince Siddhartha in 563 BC. ‘The Greater Lumbini Project will complete
Tange’s master plan and will have six-lane expressways connecting the
birthplaces of Prince Siddhartha’s parents,’ Gopal Kiraty, Nepal’s then culture
minister, was quoted as saying in the Indian media.61 A new Lumbini airport
will fly visitors to the circuit and the entire project will take around three years
to complete.
Indian security agencies feel the project, just seven km from the Uttar Pradesh
border, could become a zone of Chinese influence and power projection.
APECF’s composition hints strongly at links with the Chinese Communist Party
and the PLA, with the foundation’s executive vice-president Xiao Wunan a
senior party leader. Indian concerns over the project were conveyed to
Kathmandu during then Prime Minister Baburam Bhattarai’s October 2011 visit
to New Delhi.62
 Indian authorities want the project to be open to international participation
and competitive bidding but the matter is far more complicated, given the role
played by Nepalese Maoist leaders. Prachanda wanted UN Secretary-General
Ban Ki-Moon to head the Lumbini project, while Kiraty, a Prachanda acolyte,
had invited APECF to register itself in Nepal. While the Lumbini project is
currently on the back burner due to Indian concerns, former Maoist Prime
Minister Baburam Bhattarai had requested Wen Jiabao to extend the railway line
from Lhasa to Kathmandu and there on to Lumbini.63 That China is keen to
develop the project was evident during the visit of Vice Foreign Minister Fu
Ying, who not only visited the site on 12 August 2012 but also offered all
assistance on part to Beijing to develop the spot as a large number of Chinese
visitors flock to the religious site every year. By participating in development of
the birthplace of the Buddha, China is clearly sending a message to Tibetan
Buddhists that it is not against religious worship even though it is an atheist
state.
At the same time, Beijing is projecting itself as a soft power by injecting
massive doses of aid and grants into Nepal. This becomes amply clear from the
road building projects currently being funded by China. These include a 16 km
road between Syaprubesi and Rasuwagadhi that will link the two countries via a
bridge at Rasuwagadhi, a NPR 10 billion Outer Ring Road project in
Kathmandu, a 340 million RMB grant for construction of a 10-lane road from
Kalanki to Koteshwar in Kathmandu and another 3.8 million RMB grant for the
Inner Ring Road.64
China has also agreed to provide an assistance of $3.14 million out of a total
project cost of $3.80 million for the construction of an airport in Pokhara.65 The
two countries have signed an agreement to build a dry port at Larcha in
Tatopani, the main customs point between the two countries. Aiming to increase
bilateral trade by increasing cross-border connectivity, China has given a grant
of $50 million for the construction of buildings, apartments, parking lot for
container trucks and auxiliary facilities – all to be completed within 26 months –
for the dry port.66 The Tatopani dry port plan includes a bridge over the river
Bhotekoshi and nearly 6 km of roads to ensure better connectivity between the
two countries. Other grants from Beijing are for the Birendra Hospital, the B.P.
Koirala Cancer Hospital, Banepa Polytechnic project, for supplying digital radio
trunking service to Nepal police for three districts in Kathmandu Valley and 10
other districts and state of the art security equipment for Nepal police.67
 However, the extent of Chinese involvement in Nepal is evident from its
participation in hydroelectric projects. The Chinese government and its private
sector are involved in no less than 18 such projects in Nepal. Future transmission
of power across the border could help China economically develop the southern
Tibet region as well as help Nepal earn vital revenue. The most important
Chinese-assisted hydroelectric projects in Nepal are the 104 MW Upper Trishuli,
the 126 MW Kulekhani phase I, II and III project, the 102 MW Bhotekoshi
project, the 30 MW Chamelia project at Darchula, the 128 MW Upper Seti at
Tanahun, the 455 MW Upper Tamakoshi project and the 750 MW West Seti
project with 400 KV transmission lines.68
The other area of concern for India is the future gas pipeline linking
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan with Xinjiang. The 1,833 km pipeline
costing $7.3 billion will transport 40 billion cubic metre of gas for China from
Central Asia, linking it to the national east-west pipeline grid. If China decides
to extend this pipeline or the oil and gas pipeline currently running parallel to the
QTR network to Nepal, Kathmandu’s reliance on India for hydrocarbon supplies
would be nominal and further reduce New Delhi’s influence.69
Beijing’s growing interest in Nepalese affairs has been evident since King
Gyanendra affected the coup. With the US and other Western powers increasing
their diplomatic efforts for a political settlement in Nepal in the past decade,
China jumped in and reached out to all political parties. While India was seen to
converge with the Western political initiative to keep the Maoists away from
power, China reached out to Prachanda and other left parties to keep US
influence in Nepal at bay. India, on the other hand, had opened channels with all
parties including the Maoists, yet it promoted other political parties like the
Nepali Congress after inexplicably cutting ties with Prachanda’s men. This was
perhaps due to Indian interests in promoting multi-party democracy and not
spiralling the Himalayan state towards an ultra-left dictatorship – a sentiment
echoed by the Americans and other Western powers opposed to the Maoists.
After the decimation of the Maoists in the December 2013 Constituent Assembly
elections, New Delhi hopes that Kathmandu will balance the tilt towards Beijing,
with Sushil Koirala led-Nepali Congress emerging as the largest party in the
elections. However, this is not to say Kathmandu will stop playing the China
card.
As political parties grapple to find a consensus over a new constitution in
Nepal, China’s stake appears to have yielded dividends. While Beijing has
reached out to all political parties, particularly towards the UCPN (M) and the
Madhesi parties, India is seen to be a backer of the Nepali Congress, whose
leaders have been embroiled in all conspiracies in the past and do not present a
cogent alternative to the people. By promoting a constitution on ethnic lines,
Maoists have also got the Terai people on their side with Beijing doling out
scholarships and visas to rising and erstwhile leaders.70 After New Delhi pitched
for a multi-party democracy in Nepal, it lost touch with Gyanendra. One of the
first steps that Gyanendra did after taking over was to close down the Tibetan
Bureau office in Kathmandu to appease the Chinese as India had pulled its hand
back and banned weapon supplies.71 Beijing then moved in seriously by scaling
up its embassy in Kathmandu and even posting a senior diplomat as ambassador.
Being ardent practitioners of pragmatic diplomacy, Beijing is in touch with not
only the former royal family as well.72 The rising stock of China is evident in
Kathmandu to Indian diplomats with unprecedented negative propaganda against
New Delhi and its big brother attitude towards Nepal.
Although India has more or less reconciled to closer engagement between
China and Nepal in times to come, the military establishment is not prepared for
additional deployment on the Uttar Pradesh and Bihar borders in case Chinese
influence grows uncomfortable in the Terai of Nepal. This is not a far-fetched
possibility as Pakistan has already made inroads through radicalization along the
Indo–Nepal border and would be more than happy to make life difficult for New
Delhi by helping Beijing. Nepal could become a flash point if China either
comes too close to the border or starts approaching Indian Naxalites. The new
game between India and China in the Himalayan belt could lead to aggressive
competition and cause either side to use limited military mobilization to achieve
political objectives.
Chinese inroads into the Himalayan belt have been noticed with concern by
New Delhi and both Nepal and Bhutan are now the focus of Indian diplomacy to
counter Beijing. In fact, in June 2012, a new department called Development
Projects Administration (DPA) was carved out in the Ministry of External
Affairs to handle grants, assistance, loans and credit lines for South Asian
countries and Africa after New Delhi was castigated for poor deliverance on
infrastructure aid projects by neighbours.73 While DPA has been created to
streamline Indian aid to friendly countries, its focus is to match China on
infrastructure and hydroelectric projects in the immediate and extended
neighbourhood in Central Asia.74
Despite the concerns, the Indian military establishment rules out China
instigating an all-out war to secure its politico-military objectives. The reasons
are not quite difficult to fathom. Firstly, India’s nuclear posture is of ‘no first
use’, but it has developed a potent second strike capability with nuclear
submarines and aircraft carriers. Secondly, a war dilutes Chinese aims and
priorities with respect to Taiwan and its disputed island territories for an
unacceptably long period of time. Thirdly, quick major land gains are unlikely
due to mountain terrain, rarefied climate and strong opposition from the 1.1
million strong Indian Army. Fourthly, in case of an all-out conflict, Chinese
SLOCs, through which it imports 80 per cent of hydrocarbons and oil, would be
extremely vulnerable to Indian Navy ships patrolling from the Arabian to the
Andaman Sea.
Besides, such a conflict would not only erode the soft power image of China
but also have adverse economic consequences on the global economy. An all-out
war between two biggest nations in the world would rattle the globe and the
consequential crisis would not be allowed by the international community. China
may be on its way to become a global power, but India has also moved ahead of
1962.
 six

THE DALAI LAMA AND THE TIBET QUESTION

It was a smoggy day in November 2012 when I met the fourteenth Dalai Lama
Tenzin Gyatso, the spiritual leader of Tibet and head of the Yellow Hat Gelug
school of Tibetan Buddhism, in Delhi while on his way to a Buddhist conference
in Tokyo. Alert and fit as always, the 77-year-old leader had not changed his
outlook towards China since the last time I had met him in January 2008. But his
perspective towards India, whom he fondly refers to as his guru given the
Nalanda past of Tibetan Buddhism, had changed for the better and was an
indicator of times to come.
According to him, India was no longer ‘over-cautious’1 in dealing with China
over Tibet, and the Manmohan Singh government was firmer as compared to
past governments in its bilateral engagement with Beijing. ‘Earlier, I used to say
that the Government of India was over-cautious with China over Tibet. But now
I have changed my opinion and I see that India is standing more firm [sic] in
dealing with China. I saw this shift when I was allowed by the Indian
Government to go to Tawang in November 2009 despite reservations from
Beijing. Another example of this was that a day after visiting Chinese Defence
Minister Liang Guanglie claimed in September 2012 that there were no PLA
troopers in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, the Indian Army Chief contradicted the
statement and claimed the presence of 4,000 Chinese personnel in the occupied
area.’
My meeting came a day after Beijing had accused the Dalai Lama2 for
instigating self-immolations in Tibet with more than 100 persons burning
themselves to death since March 2011 and no less than 11 self-immolations
being reported on the eve of the crucial eighteenth National Peoples’ Congress to
elect China’s new leaders in 2012.3 The Dalai Lama countered Beijing’s
accusations by saying it was Chinese repression in Tibet and ethnic
discrimination of Tibetans which was forcing young men and women to end
their lives. ‘The unbearable situation in Tibet is the cause for these unfortunate
events. I am very, very sad about the turn of events. These are symptoms of fear,
hard line suppressive policy practised by China in Tibet [sic]. The time has come
for China to think more realistically,’ he said. The Dalai Lama welcomed the
Chinese government to send any delegation to India to examine his
conversations with visitors in Dharamsala to dispel any notions that he was
instigating the self-immolations. ‘I am a free spokesman for the Tibet issue. I
take orders from my fellow Tibetans and do not direct them to any action,’ the
self-exiled leader said emphatically.
However, he was very guarded about the then ongoing leadership transition in
China and said that he would rather wait than jump to any conclusions on Xi
Jinping’s Tibet policy. ‘It is difficult to say whether China will adopt a moderate
line on Tibet under the leadership of Xi Jinping, as even Hu Jintao, when he took
over from Jiang Zemin a decade ago, talked about a harmonious and stable
China. At that time, I welcomed Hu’s statement but the past 10 years have been
very difficult for Tibet. Let Xi take over China and maybe I can give a call after
watching his policies on Tibet unfold over the coming months,’ the leader said
while acknowledging that he knew Xi’s father, Xi Zhongxun, who was once
vice-premier of China.
Little progress has been made on the frozen dialogue between the Tibetan
government-in-exile and the Chinese despite two attempts – one at the behest of
Deng Xiaoping between1979–1993 and the other during 2002–2010. ‘They call
me a demon and a splittist, actually it is the PLA which acts as a splittist in
Tibet,’ the Dalai Lama said, indicating that the PLA was driving the Chinese
hard line policy in Tibet. When asked whether China was hoping the Tibetan
struggle would fizzle out after his life cycle, the Dalai Lama said that he was not
going to die in the next 15 to 20 years. ‘In Tibet, it is a struggle between [the]
power of [the] gun and [the] power of truth. At the moment, it is the gun which
is ruling but ultimately it is truth which will win.’ The Dalai Lama said that more
and more Han Chinese were being attracted to Tibetan Buddhism as they have
discovered that it does not represent ‘Lamaism’ and had the true lineage of
Nalanda.
While the Dalai Lama was prepared to wait it out for China to turn towards
genuine autonomy in Tibet, he knew that his time was running out fast, with
young Tibetans criticizing his moderate policies and opting for a more radical
sentiment to free Tibet. He was, however, clear that the resolution of the Tibet
issue was directly linked to the India–China boundary settlement and that the
issue was central to bilateral relations between the two countries. According to
him, trust between India and China will only develop once the situation in Tibet
returns to ‘absolutely normal’.4 ‘[The] boundary issue cannot be solved when
there is fear and suspicion between the two countries,’ he said.

The author with His Holiness the Dalai Lama (Photo courtesy author)

Concerns over Indian political support to the Dalai Lama and the 120,000
Tibetan refugees is a standard fare on the Chinese menu in the past fifteen
meetings between Indian and Chinese special representatives. It is customary for
China to red-flag the Dalai Lama’s activities at every bilateral engagement and
sometime with so-called pin-pointed inputs – which often turn out to be awry –
about activities of the radical Tibetan Youth Congress. Chinese interlocutors
even stretch their imaginations by accusing Indians of organizing military
training camps for Tibetans.5 The standard Indian reply is now repetitive. When
Wen Jiabao raised the issue about the Dalai Lama’s political activities with his
Indian counterpart at the 2009 ASEAN summit in Bangkok, Manmohan Singh
went on record saying, ‘I explained to Premier Wen that the Dalai Lama is our
honoured guest. He is a religious leader and we do not allow Tibetan refugees to
indulge in political activities.’6 While there are standard instructions to Union
Cabinet ministers, the last publicly reiterated in November 2007,7 to not attend
any functions of the Dalai Lama and for other politicians to keep away from
such functions, Beijing is least convinced of Indian intentions. One must
remember that the single biggest reason for the 1962 war was the need to punish
India and end perceived Indian efforts to undermine Chinese control of the
Tibetan plateau and to restore the 1949 status quo. After the fall of the Qing
Empire in China in 1911, the thirteenth Dalai Lama claimed independence from
China. This status had continued till 1949.
Chinese angst against India has grown since the Dalai Lama fled the Potala
Palace in March 1959 and given refuge in India by Nehru, whose government
had not criticized the PLA’s brutal repression on the high plateau till then. Fifty-
three years later, the Dalai Lama is continued to be perceived by China to be a
singular thorn in bilateral relations and the symbol of Tibetan struggle for greater
autonomy and perhaps independence. They believe New Delhi is propping up
the Dalai Lama and Tibetan refugees to create instability in Lhasa and that is the
reason why Beijing repeatedly wants India to reiterate its One-China policy.8
However, India has linked the One-China policy with the One-India policy
and has refused to endorse the Chinese mandate since Wen Jiabao’s visit in
December 2010. It stuck to its stand during Li Keqiang’s visit to New Delhi post
the resolution of the Depsang incursion in May 2013. The 2010 rebuff was after
Beijing decided to give stapled visas to Jammu and Kashmir residents. The
Chinese propaganda machine routinely churns out increasingly fancy
descriptions of the Dalai Lama as the relationship between Beijing and the
Tibetan government-in-exile goes from bad to worse. The pacifist Nobel Prize
winner has been called ‘jackal’, a ‘wolf in sheep’s clothing’ and, usually, a
‘splittist’.9 He has also been equated with Hitler’s Nazis and their genocidal war
on European Jews.10 In a commentary carried by Xinhua in March 2012,11 the
Dalai Lama was accused of advocating policies that would result in the
expulsion of ethnic Han Chinese from traditionally Tibetan parts of the country.
‘The remarks of the Dalai Lama remind us of the cruel Nazis during the second
World War,’ it said, adding, ‘How similar it is to the Holocaust committed by
Hitler on Jews!’ He was called a ‘tricky liar skilled in double dealing’.
These vicious statements came at a time when Beijing was battling Tibetan
self-immolations in protest against Beijing’s policies. According to pro-freedom
websites, more than 121 Tibetans including 19 women had died by self-
immolation till July 2013.12 The victims have included 12 monks of Kirti
Monastery in Ngaba, Sichuan province, which has now become a flashpoint for
such painful protests. Five Tibetans in exile have self-immolated since April
1998, with 27-year-old Jamphel Yeshi, a Tibetan Youth Congress activist,
setting himself on fire in the heart of New Delhi hours before Hu Jintao’s one-
day visit to the BRICS summit on 29 March 2012.13
While China blames the Dalai Lama for instigating the self-immolations, he
himself calls this agonizing method of protest ‘a very, very delicate political
issue’. In an interview to an Indian newspaper14 in July 2012, he said: ‘[I]f I say
something positive, then the Chinese immediately blame me… If I say
something negative, then the family members of those people feel very sad.
They sacrificed their lives…best thing is to remain neutral.’ He called on the
Chinese government to ‘carry out thorough research’ and not pretend that
‘nothing is wrong’ with its policies.
China, though, has hardened its stance towards the Dalai Lama and is
prepared to wait out the life of the 78-year-old. In June 2012, the Dalai Lama’s
two special envoys, who were in talks with Beijing since 2002, resigned citing
the ‘deteriorating’ situation in Tibet and frustration over the lack of response
from the Chinese side to the dialogue process.15 The resignations of envoys Lodi
G. Gyari and Kelsang Gyaltsen were accepted after nine rounds of unsuccessful
talks with Beijing, with the dialogue stalled since January 2010. According to
the resignation letter quoted in the media, the envoys said, ‘Given the
deteriorating situation inside Tibet since 2008 leading to the increasing cases of
self-immolations by Tibetans, we are compelled to submit our resignations. One
of the key Chinese interlocutors in the dialogue process even advocated
abrogation of minority status as stipulated in the Chinese Constitution thereby
seeming to remove the basis for autonomy… At this particular time, it is difficult
to have a substantive dialogue.’
The Tibetan government-in-exile, headed by Harvard graduate Lobsang
Sangay, had urged Beijing to accept the Middle-Way Approach, which seeks
genuine autonomy for Tibetans within the People’s Republic of China and
within the framework of the Chinese Constitution.16 The Chinese response has
been hard, with evidence of its intelligence penetrating the Dalai Lama set-up in
Dharmsala and other Tibetan monasteries in the Himalayan belt, from Ladakh to
Dichu in Arunachal Pradesh. Beijing is hoping that with the death of the Dalai
Lama, the political tussle in Tibet would end as by Chinese law high lama
reincarnates have to be ratified by the Communist Government. In the absence
of the next Dalai Lama or coming of age of Tenzin Gyatso’s successor, China
would like to install its own fifteenth Dalai Lama as the spiritual head of
Tibetans with the help of the Beijingappointed eleventh Panchen Lama
Gyaincain Norbu.
 The Dalai Lama had anointed Gedhun Choekyi Nyima as the eleventh
Panchen Lama on 14 May 1995, but he was detained by Chinese authorities
three days later and has never been seen since then.17 Gyaincain Norbu, the son
of two party workers, was anointed the Panchen Lama by drawing of lots from a
golden urn rather than by the traditional method of high lamas naming the
successor. Matters get further complicated as the head of the Kagyu School of
Tibetan Buddhism, the seventeenth Karmapa, is third in line of succession.
Except for the Dalai Lama, there are more than two contenders for both the
Panchen Lama and the Karmapa.
While the focus of this book is not Tibetan Buddhism, it is important to
understand the state of play within the religion as it is integral to bilateral ties
between India and China, for Tibetan Buddhism now dominates the global mind
space due to the Dalai Lama and the monasteries in the Himalayan belt. The four
main sects of Tibetan Buddhism are Nyingma, Kagyu, Gelug and Sakya, with
the fourteenth Dalai Lama being the political and spiritual head until he gave up
the political charge in March 2011.18 Notwithstanding Chinese mistrust and
accusations, New Delhi has never played the Tibet card despite the leaders of all
four schools living in ‘labrangs (mirror)’ monasteries in India after the Dalai
Lama fled his homeland in 1959. While Tenzin Gyatso as the head of the
Gelugpa School is based in Dharamsala, the Nyingma school’s leader Takling
Tsetrul has monasteries in Shimla and Ladakh. The Kagyu school’s primary
monastery, albeit currently out of bounds for the two contending leaders of the
Black Hat school, is in Rumtek outside Gangtok in Sikkim, and the Sakya school
leader Sakya Trinzin is based in a monastery in Raipur near Dehradun.
However, as the global face of the Tibetan struggle is the Dalai Lama, the
Chinese perhaps feel that a restive population in Tibet can be controlled once
Tenzin Gyatso is not there. But there is also a very distinct possibility that in the
absence of a unifying leader after Gyatso, there could be a free for all where
monasteries with restive monks could become hubs of anti-China or even anti-
India activities in the future. Any accident on the LAC, or even a
misinterpretation or misperception – as is clearly evident from the 1962 lesson –
could trigger off a clash or a skirmish between India and China.
Cognizant of these facts and the mayhem that may follow, the Dalai Lama
could even appoint his successor during his own lifetime as there is a precedence
of two simultaneous heads of the Gelugpa school in the past.19 Premature or
delayed reincarnation of the Dalai Lama has a historical precedent and is evident
from the fact that the seventh Dalai Lama was born before the death of the sixth
Dalai Lama.
Apart from the resignation of the two envoys, two significant moves were
made by the Dalai Lama in 2011 to outmanoeuvre Beijing’s attempts to box him
into a corner and maintain the relevance of the Dalai Lama institution. On 19
March, he renunciated all political power and decided that the institution of
Dalai Lama would confine itself only to the spiritual affairs of Tibet and Tibetan
Buddhism in the future. In his speech he compared the stability of Indian
democracy and inherent instability of Chinese authoritarian rule by saying, ‘We
have to follow the trend of the free world which is that of democracy. For
example, in India, [despite] its huge population, diverse language, religions, and
culture…it remains very stable. This is because of democracy, the rule of law,
free expression and media. To the contrary, China under authoritarian rule is
always facing problems. It was mentioned in a recent Chinese document that it
was allocating more budget to maintain internal security stability than national
defence. This shows that they have more enemies inside rather than outside,
which is a matter of shame.’20 The spiritual leader was not far from the truth, as
China’s internal security, headed by none other than President Xi, has an
estimated budget of $110 billion as compared to a defence budget of $106
billion.
The decision to forsake political power allowed the Dalai Lama to place
himself above an authoritarian Beijing by democratizing the Central Tibet
Administration as well as dispelling the notion that the Dalai Lama was the only
spearhead against Chinese repression in Tibet or a demagogue. Prioritizing
elections, he said, ‘If leaders are selected through elections, it would be a matter
of real pride. But to hold power at the barrel of the gun…is immoral and
outdated.’ He justified his requital of political power by delving into the history
of the institution. ‘The [tradition of the] Dalai Lama as the spiritual and the
temporal authority of Tibet did not begin during the period of first four Dalai
Lamas. It started during the time of the fifth Dalai Lama under different
circumstances and the influence of the Mongol warlord Gushri Khan… As I am
the fourteenth in line of that institution, it is most appropriate if I on my own
initiative…end the dual authority of the Dalai Lama.’21
He said the Tibetan people would select a leadership that would take over
political responsibilities based on democratic elections. This wilful handover of
power, in his opinion, would help sustain ‘our exiled administration and make it
more progressive and robust’. The decision would also galvanize the
international community which supported the Tibetan cause, as it would
‘commend the Dalai Lama’s sincerity for complete democratization of the
Tibetan polity’. The decision to revoke political power to a freely elected
government would also ‘expose the falsehood and lies of the Chinese
government that there is no Tibet problem except the issue of the Dalai Lama’s
personal rights.’
The carefully worded retirement speech was dismissed as usual by the
Chinese government as a political act. The Chinese Foreign Ministry’s
spokeswoman Jiang Yu said, ‘The Dalai Lama uses religion as a disguise and he
is a political exile who has been carrying out separatist activity for a long time.
For years he has been expressing his intention to retire. We think these are tricks
to deceive the international community.’22
On 27 April 2011, Harvard-educated and Darjeeling-born Lobsang Sangay
took over as Kalon Tripa, or head of the government-in-exile, through an
election in which 49,000 votes were cast.23 The elections sent out a message that
the Dalai Lama did not believe in feudal theocracy as it existed in Tibetan
history but in democracy, freedom of expression and elections. By giving up his
political role, he had removed the barrier for world powers who had been
criticized by China for entertaining a political exile and were often subjected to
pressure from Beijing on count of needling the One-China policy or interfering
in its internal affairs. While his new role also eased the Indian discomfort of
harbouring a political leader and exposing New Delhi to a Chinese political
counter on the delicate Kashmir issue, the main purpose appears to resurrect an
alternative leadership under Lobsang Sangay for the Tibetan struggle in the
future without the feudal trimmings of historical Tibet.
Even before Beijing recovered from the retirement speech, the Dalai Lama
made another astute statement on his reincarnation on 24 September 2011, which
seriously threatened China’s carefully cultivated role since 2007 on the selection
of his successor – the Dalai Lama opened the prospect of his reincarnation being
discovered during his own lifetime. Virtually putting a spanner in Chinese
machinations over selecting the next spiritual head, he made it clear that a
‘tulku’ is a reincarnated lama who can choose his time and place of rebirth and
have many forms. ‘Superior Bodhisattvas, who can manifest themselves in
hundreds or thousands of bodies simultaneously, can manifest an emanation
before death,’24 he said. He quoted the ancient Tibetan sage Jamyang Khyentse
Wangpo: ‘Reincarnation is what happens when someone takes rebirth after the
predecessor’s passing away; emanation is when manifestations take place
without the source’s passing away.’ Using the historical context to reject the
concept of choosing the next Dalai Lama by picking lots in a golden urn, he said,
‘When I was recognized as the fourteenth Dalai Lama in 1939, the priest–patron
relationship (from the Manchu kingdom) between Tibet and China had already
come to an end. Therefore, there was no question of any need to confirm the
reincarnation by employing the golden urn… Today, the authoritarian rulers of
People’s Republic of China, who as communists reject religion but still involve
themselves in religious affairs, have imposed a so-called re-education campaign
and declared the so-called order number five, concerning the control and
recognition of reincarnations, which came into force on 1 September 2007. The
enforcement of various inappropriate methods for recognizing reincarnations to
eradicate our unique Tibetan cultural traditions is doing damage that will be
difficult to repair.’
While making it amply clear that he will consult with all his people including
lamas and practitioners of Tibetan Buddhism at the age of ninety to re-evaluate
the institution, Tenzin Gyatso said, ‘Bear in mind, apart from the reincarnation
recognized through such legitimate methods, no recognition or acceptance
should be given to a candidate chosen for political ends by anyone, including
those in the People’s Republic of China.’ The statement had a clear message that
the fourteenth Dalai Lama had no intentions of letting the Chinese plan succeed
and let the Tibetan struggle fizzle out after him. By saying he was not in favour
of the golden urn method, he also rejected those lamas who had been elected by
the Chinese using the same method.
The Dalai Lama had been mulling over his reincarnation plans for the past
decade as he was convinced that Beijing would play all the cards to keep Tibet
under control. Discussing the issue with me in 2008, he had then said he was
even open to the idea of his successor being a female as the ‘very purpose of the
reincarnation, male or female, is to carry out the unfinished tasks of the previous
life.’25 The unfinished task, as he elaborated, is seeking ‘meaningful autonomy’
from the communist Chinese government for the Tibetan people. Expanding on
the theme of his succession, the Dalai Lama said that even a ‘female Dalai Lama
can be very effective’ in serving Buddhism and there have been instances of
female lamas in the past seven hundred years of Tibetan history. He, however,
made it very clear that his successor, boy or girl, would be chosen from outside
Tibet and appeared amenable to choose his successor ‘before his death’ as per
Tibetan traditions. ‘Way back, on 10 March 1969, I had said that it was time for
the Tibetan people to decide whether to continue with the institution of Dalai
Lama. In 1992, I was willing to hand over legal authority for certain degrees of
freedom in Tibet. Since 2001, I am in semi-retirement position with all political
authority now vested in the government-in-exile. I am now looking forward to
complete retirement,’ the Dalai Lama said during an interview for the Indian
Express.26
In his strategic perception, Tibetans were the ‘first line of defence’ for Indians
all along the LAC but the situation could completely change with the large-scale
influx of Han Chinese into Tibet, which would alter its demography. He urged
New Delhi to take up the case of meaningful autonomy with Beijing as ‘it is
ultimately a matter of safety of the 3,488 km long border from Arunachal
Pradesh to Ladakh.’
He said it was for the Tibetan people to decide on the method of his
succession; whether the successor should be elected like the Pope who is
appointed by cardinals of the Roman Catholic Church on principles of seniority,
or whether a reincarnation is recognized before his death, or in the traditional
manner. But given the previous controversy over succession of the Panchen
Lama and the 2007 Beijing diktat that makes it mandatory for all reincarnate
lamas to be officially recognized by the Chinese government, the Dalai Lama
feared complications from Beijing over his succession. ‘Just like the Panchen
Lama succession, the Chinese will also choose an official Dalai Lama. So there
will be two Dalai Lamas, one chosen and other official… But the real Dalai
Lama will have a Tibetan heart and my people will not accept the official Dalai
Lama,’ he said. Replying to the question that Beijing has always believed Tibet
was part of China, the Dalai Lama said that legal experts and historians needed
to study the relationship between the Chinese emperor and the Tibetan religious
leadership in the past before coming to such a conclusion. His response was that
Beijing had first claimed Tibet was a part of China since the Yuan dynasty
(thirteenth century CE), yet later, it said Tibet had been a part of China since the
Tang dynasty (seventh century CE). ‘The Chinese first called the cultural
revolution a great achievement…then said there was some achievement and
some destruction and now finally admit that there was total destruction during
that period… You cannot change history on the basis of political necessity,’ the
Dalai Lama said.
He also revealed the details of his government’s dialogue with the Chinese
government. Beijing’s position had hardened in the sixth round of talks, in which
they made it clear that there was ‘no Tibet issue’ and the ‘only issue was Dalai
Lama’. According to him, except for a brief period of hope in the late 1970s,
when Hua Guofeng was at the helm of affairs in Beijing, the Chinese position
over Tibetan autonomy had toughened during the six rounds of dialogue. ‘In the
third meeting, the Chinese gave some 30 points against us, which we responded
to in the next round… In the fifth round (February 2006), they accused the Dalai
Lama of seeking independence for Tibet…this was followed by my intensive
criticism and suppression in Tibet…and in the last round, nothing was
discussed,’ the Dalai Lama said. While he maintained that the Tibetan spirit for
freedom will remain indomitable, he fears that the time for a just resolution of
the Tibetan issue was running out, due to the huge influx of Han Chinese into the
Tibetan plateau with official support and growing communication infrastructure.
According to him, there are 200,000 Han Chinese out of a total population of
300,000 in Lhasa already and these figures are constantly increasing.27 ‘If Tibet
becomes a land of Han Chinese, then even autonomy will be meaningless,’ he
said. Beijing on its part refuses to give the Han migrant population numbers.
Even though China has launched vitriolic attacks against the Dalai Lama for
trying to split the nation, only a leader like him has been able to moderate the
pro-autonomy or the pro-independence movement. The argument that Tibetans
by nature and religion are pacifist is not true and its thousands of years of
history, more often than not violent, stands witness to the fact. Notwithstanding
Chinese propaganda against Tibetans, Buddhist Tibet was a powerful warrior
kingdom in the latter part of the first millennium. During the thirteenth century,
Tibet fell under Mongol control. With a tradition of forceful resistance to
tyranny, the Tibetans overthrew the Mongols and regained independence in late
fourteenth century. In 1647 CE, the fifth Dalai Lama demanded that the Ming
Emperor in Peking recognize Tibet’s sovereignty and independence, which was
agreed to. Subsequently, China and Tibet engaged in wars for the control of
eastern Tibet, or what the British called inner Tibet. The Chinese managed to
conquer much of the provinces of Kham and Amdo and merge them into the
empire. The Buddhist Khampa tribes of inner Tibet, who won complete
independence from the Chinese and the Tibetan government in Lhasa in the
middle of the nineteenth century, were described by Chinese observers in 1666
CE as people who ‘delight in wars and not hesitant to die.’28 In outer Tibet,
which was also claimed by China, Peking’s influence was minimal as three large
monasteries, with some 2,000 ‘dobdobs’ or fighting monks, held power until the
Communist takeover in 1951.29
The salient point is that peace would be at a premium in the absence of the
Dalai Lama, as radical activists of Tibetan Youth Congress do not yet ascribe to
the middle path of meaningful autonomy and passive resistance. India should
also be thankful to the Dalai Lama as the government-in-exile gives some hope
to the refugees of returning to the high plateau or else the inherent frustrations
could lead to violence. Bejing’s foisted man will never be recognized by the
Tibetans in exile as well as the increasingly aware international community. The
absence of a leader or installing a puppet Dalai Lama may bring more radical
Tibetan nationalism into play and lead to direct confrontations akin to March
2008.
There is a strong need for a Tibetan leader to be in place during the current
Dalai Lama’s lifetime with the credibility and political weight to lead Tibetan
politics. There are various models and options available for the anointment of a
successor, but it is quite evident that the pro-Tibetan movement will not die with
the passing away of the fourteenth Dalai Lama, much as communist China may
try. There is a possibility of the current Dalai Lama appointing his successor
soon, so that he could be tutored by him personally and build a working
relationship with Karmapa Ogyen Trinley Dorje if the anointed Panchen Lama
remains missing or is given up for dead. If the succession is not overseen by
him, infighting among the various monasteries would create an internal security
situation for India, Nepal and Bhutan, even if infighting among the various
religious orders is not that big a headache for China or even India as compared
to the Tibetan Youth Congress taking up arms and launching a guerrilla struggle.
Any such incident could lead to a serious deterioration of ties between India and
China as the latter will accuse New Delhi of harbouring terrorists – a charge that
India has been levelling against Pakistan for the past two decades.
Naturally, it is in the interests of New Delhi that Tibetan refugees in India
conduct a peaceful political struggle as any radicalization or its subversion
would have an irreversible impact on bilateral ties. On the other hand, Tibetans-
in-exile may go down into political oblivion with the passing away of their most
visible and recognized face and run into friction with the locals of Himachal
Pradesh, Uttarakhand and other refugee settlements. Just as India will never
recognize the Tibetan government-in-exile as it will be a huge red flag to China,
the prospects of a Dalai Lama propped up by Beijing and supported by pro-
China Tibetans getting wider credibility is equally remote. In the absence of a
widely acceptable Dalai Lama, the pro-freedom struggle, which is already
showing signs of frustration with its acts of self-immolation, could degenerate
into a proper guerrilla struggle with sporadic acts of terrorism on the plateau.
The new Chinese leadership perhaps realizes that the institution of Dalai Lama is
central to stability in Tibet and no political objective could be achieved by not
talking to the government-in-exile. Just as New Delhi felt that Tibet could go
into a free fall after the demise of the fourteenth Dalai Lama, the Xi Jinping
regime made preliminary overtures to Dharamsala in July 2013 in recognition of
this concern. But for the public record, there is no place for a ‘splittist’ Dalai
Lama in Beijing’s scheme of things. And India, as usual, has been kept out of
these discreet overtures from Beijing.
The Indian problem in the post-Dalai Lama scenario would be that the
movement assumes radical proportions within the refugees, not so much as it
peters out into oblivion as New Delhi has always considered Tibet a recessed
card. Latest reports also indicate that the high lama off late has not been keeping
well, which has led to a lot of worry within the Indian establishment. While there
is no way that India could support the Tibetan struggle until and unless China
forces it by dabbling into Jammu and Kashmir or Arunachal Pradesh, New Delhi
knows that Beijing is going to try all tricks in the trade to exploit the fault lines
within the Tibetan community. A PRC-anointed Dalai Lama will clash with the
Gelugpa sect head appointed outside of Tibet and sow the seeds of confusion
into the Tibetan struggle. Already there is uncertainty as there are two Panchen
Lamas and as many as three Karmapa reincarnates, with Chinese intelligence
seriously complicating the issue by interfering in Tibetan Buddhism.
Besides, China will definitely put pressure on supporters of the current Dalai
Lama in Tibet and harden its attitude towards the refugees in India. Taking into
account the Chinese order of September 2007 on the ‘Reincarnation of the
Tibetan Living Buddha’ which stipulates mandatory sanction from Beijing, and
the confusion over the Karmapa incarnates, there is a strong possibility that the
next Dalai Lama would be of Gelugpa royal lineage but already into his or her
teens. He or she would be tutored and mentored by the current Dalai Lama so
that the credibility of the institution does not suffer. The current Dalai Lama has
also tried to sort out the confusion over the seventeenth Karmapa, head of the
influential and financially strong Kagyu school, by recognizing Ogyen Trinley
Dorje as the Karmapa over the other prominent claimant Trinley Thaye Dorje,
currently residing in a monastery in Kalimpong, West Bengal. The Dalai Lama’s
support for Ogyen Dorje is despite the fact that Thaye Dorje is supported by a
powerful section within the Indian intelligence establishment which continues to
be suspicious of the former’s links with Chinese intelligence given the
mysterious circumstances over his arrival in India.

KARMAPA CONTROVERSY
KARMAPA CONTROVERSY
In 1992, a group led by Tai Situ Rinpoche recognized Ogyen Trinley Dorje as
the reincarnation of the sixteenth Karmapa. After seeking the Dalai Lama’s
approval, Ogyen Trinley was enthroned at Tsurphu monastery in Tibet at the age
of seven – the traditional seat of Karmapas along with Labrang in Rumtek –
where he studied under the guidance of Buddhist masters, apart from mastering
Mandarin Chinese. Ogyen, alias Apo Gaga, then 14 years old, caught the
attention of the world media when he dramatically escaped from the high-
security Tsurphu monastery in Kham and surfaced in Dharamsala on 5 January
2000.30
The boy’s great escape from the monastery on 28 December 1999 to Mustang
on the Nepal–Tibet border, his airlift to Kathmandu in the presence of a
representative of the Dalai Lama, his subsequent entry into India through the
Raxaul border and finally his surfacing at Dharamsala still remains shrouded in
mystery and intrigue. Since then, he has been living in the Gyuto Tantric
Monastery in Dharamsala under the watchful eyes of Indian intelligence and
Chinese spies. The monk was rarely allowed to move and it was finally in 2008
that Ogyen visited Woodstock in the US, where the influential and rich Dharma
centre was set up by the sixteenth Karmapa, Rangjung Rigpe Dorje.31
Ogyen’s enthronement may have been subject to controversy but those
associated with him revere him as the reborn Karmapa. Right from his
anointment to his escape, controversies have followed Ogyen like a shadow. He
drew criticism from Buddhist devotees when he entered the sacred Mahabodhi
temple in Gaya wearing his shoes, to which he later expressed his regret.32 But
in 2011 he was in the news for all the wrong reasons.
On 26 January 2011, the Una district police in Himachal Pradesh recovered T
1 crore in cash from a vehicle based on a tip-off from Indian security agencies.33
The two occupants of the vehicle told the police that the money was part of a
land deal struck with the Ogyen Trinley-headed Karmae Garchen Trust. The
police raided the monastery in Gyuto, where they recovered currency
denominations from 25 countries including China, Taiwan, the UK, the US,
Vietnam, Thailand and Germany. The police also found 6 lakh Chinese Yuan at
the office of the Karmae Garchen trust. Ogyen was named in the charge sheet
filed by the police even as his supporters and the Tibetan government-in-exile
lobbied extensively to remove his name. While nine others including Ogyen’s
aide Shakti Lama were arrested and later released on bail, the Himachal Pradesh
government sought opinion from the law department to remove Ogyen’s name in
public interest and the case was dropped.
On 24 April 2012, the Himachal Pradesh police quietly dropped all criminal
charges against Ogyen. This was the culmination of a complex, nuanced and
multi-layered game played between Indian intelligence agencies and rival high
lamas of Tibetan Buddhism and watched by the Chinese rulers of Tibet. The
biggest winner in the cash seizure controversy was Ogyen’s arch-rival Trinley,
the second claimant to the Karmapa title. Said to be propped up by a section of
Indian internal security establishment, Trinley and his mentor Shamar Rinpoche
are based in a Kalimpong monastery. The criminal case against Ogyen Dorje
sparked off a war of words between R&AW and the Intelligence Bureau, with
the former accusing the latter of trying to put Ogyen Dorje and his chief backer
the Dalai Lama in place.34 A section of the Indian intelligence is still not
convinced about Ogyen Dorje’s credentials and strongly believes that he is a
Chinese Security Bureau plant in the Dalai Lama set-up. This section believes
that even the Dalai Lama is increasingly getting uncomfortable over his protégé
Ogyen Dorje’s links with Beijing, but there is no proof to nail the nexus.
Given the implications of the seventeenth Karmapa and the Tibet issue and
the strong difference of opinion between Indian agencies, NSA Menon stepped
in as soon as the details of the Una police raid were made known to Delhi. Much
to his credit, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh saw through the complex high-
voltage game after a top-level Buddhist delegation met him on 29 January 2011
in support of Ogyen. After discussing the issue with his principal advisors, the
PM made it clear that the Karmapa or his supporters could only buy land in India
through benami transactions which normally have a cash component. It was also
brought to the notice of the Una police that as the Karmapa’s supporters were
Tibetans, Europeans and Americans, the cash offerings had to be in Chinese
Yuan, Euros or US dollars.
Despite the public and media slamming Ogyen for being a Chinese agent and
Beijing cleverly issuing an official statement denying it,35 a message was sent to
then Himachal Pradesh Chief Secretary Rajwant Sandhu on the sidelines of the
annual chief secretaries conference on 4 February 2011 to not escalate the issue
and stop the media trial of Ogyen Trinley, and to let the police quietly
investigate the high-profile case due to rival claimants and powerful lobbies at
work.
The rival Karmapa, Trinley Thaye Dorje, was also born in Tibet but was
anointed as the seventeenth Karmapa by Shamar Rinpoche at the Karmapa
Buddhist Institute in Qutab Institutional Area in south Delhi in 1994 in a typical
cloak-and-dagger operation. On the day of his anointment in the presence of a
large number of foreigners, supporters of Taisitu Rinpoche, one of the principal
backers of Ogyen Trinley, tried to storm the regal ceremony. There was massive
stone pelting by rival monks who fought with sticks and sharp weapons outside
the institute to prevent the anointment of Thaye Dorje as the Karmapa.
In the backdrop of Beijing’s desperation over the 35 self-immolations in
Kham–Sichuan region, the role of the Karmapa assumes critical importance as
he is the second-most powerful lama outside China. The Karmapa’s word counts
in eastern Tibet and could play a soothing influence in settling down the restive
Sichuan region. The other factor weighing on the mind of New Delhi was that in
case something were to happen to the current Dalai Lama, Ogyen Dorje would
be an important player in forming the search party to seek out the next Dalai
Lama. Beijing would do everything to nix the move.
The quest for wearing the Black Hat, the rightful heir to the gold-and-
diamond fortune at the Rumtek Monastery, a labrang of Tsurphu, and the
influence of the seventeenth Karmapa in the sensitive Sikkim–Bhutan region are
all important factors in the political calculus of India and China. All these factors
were put on the table before NSA Menon on 21 February 2012 by top
government officials and intelligence chiefs. It was pointed out in this meeting
that Ogyen Dorje had quit the Karmae Garchen Trust six months prior to the
cash seizure and hence had nothing to do with the benami land deal. After
ensuring that all principals were on board, the meeting chaired by Menon
decided the following:

• India will not get involved in the internal politics of the Karma Kagyu school
and will give equal status to Ogyen and Trinley but will not allow either of
them to take seat at Rumtek Monastery till the Karmapa reincarnation issue
is resolved. Both will be allowed to travel abroad on refugee certificates
but will also be asked to maintain proper accounts.
• While no one from Indian agencies could vouch that Ogyen Trinley has
nothing to do with Beijing, the chances of his being a Chinese agent are
extremely remote as he came to India when he was 14. By calling him a
Chinese agent, India was not only antagonizing his supporters and Tibetans
at large but also potentially delivering him into Beijing’s lap. Hence, the
decision to engage Ogyen was taken and his future statements on China
 would be watched.
• Unreasonable action against Ogyen would annoy the Dalai Lama, whose set-
up would be under greater threat if the seventeenth Karmapa claimant
actually had linkages with the Chinese establishment. As long as Ogyen is
not a security threat, New Delhi would not be worried about his religious
role.

Significantly, Ogyen was allowed to travel to the US twice and his critical
statement on Chinese repression and regret over rising self-immolations in
Sichuan was also noted with quiet satisfaction.36 While India officially
recognizes Chinese claims over Tibet, Beijing is increasingly worried over
protests and self-immolations as its internal repressive force is not working
against restive monks. The self-immolations are a matter of serious concern to
India too, as it is not in New Delhi’s interest that the largely peaceful movement
in Dharamsala and Tibet goes out of control and further poisons its relationship
with China.
So when External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna went to meet his Chinese
counterpart Yang Jiechi in February 2012, he offered Indian help for settling
strife in Tibet but added that he was confident that such a situation would not
arise.37 Later, even Chinese officials started murmuring the need to engage India
over Tibet. An interview published in The Hindu on 25 February 2012 quoted a
Chinese government adviser stating that ‘good communication’ between China
and India would be ‘helpful’ in addressing the ongoing unrest in Tibetan areas.38
Zhao Qizheng, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Chinese
People’s Political Consultative Conference, a top political advisory body, said
that China would ‘welcome’ communicating with India over the role of overseas
groups, which he blamed for orchestrating recent incidents. However, to date,
the Chinese government has neither offered nor has the Indian government given
any unsolicited advice on tackling the self-immolations, given the sensitivities
attached to Tibet.
While the Chinese Communist Party may try its rough tactics to decimate the
pro-freedom movement in Tibet, the key to peace in the land of snow lies in
India. Chinese repression of Tibetan culture and religion since Mao Zedong’s
failed Cultural Revolution has globalized the struggle, with Tibetan Buddhism
now recognized and studied all over the world. The heads of all four schools are
based in India and command a massive following across the world. Even though
the current Dalai Lama is treated as a precious commodity by the Chinese and
world alike, the pro-freedom movement outside and inside Tibet will not die out
with the passing away of Tenzin Gyatso, but may even take a different, perhaps
violent, route.
Even though China is spending more on internal security than on its defence
after the March 2008 riots, Beijing would be ill-advised if it tinkered with the
Dalai Lama succession plan as there could be a violent flare-up both in Tibet as
well as India. The Indian assessment is that the new Chinese leadership appears
to be more nationalist and would try to consolidate both Tibet and Xinjiang in
the coming decade through demographic changes and harsh methods. New Delhi
is clear that Beijing will prop up its own Dalai Lama and then put pressure on
India to close down the Tibetan government-in-exile. The Chinese prop-up may
not only rally round the pro-PRC Tibetans, but he could also berate the refugees
in India as ‘splittists’ and recognize Beijing’s claims over Arunachal Pradesh.
According to a well-researched study by the Indian Institute for Defence
Studies and Strategic Analyses (IDSA), there are 208 monasteries in India with
over 27,451 monks and 17 nunneries with over 1,696 nuns established as
labrangs of the original monasteries in the Tibetan plateau.39 These monasteries
are well-endowed with funds unlike their Indian counterparts and have support
all over the Himalayan belt including in Nepal and Bhutan. Whatever school of
Buddhism the herd may follow, the Dalai Lama is a magnet to all followers of
Tibetan Buddhism as was evident when he visited Tawang in November 2009 –
50 years after his escape to this border town. Even though the Dalai Lama had
previously visited Tawang in 1983, 1997 and 2003 (twice), the Chinese raised
serious objections with India for allowing the religious leader to travel to a
disputed territory. According to media reports, the Dalai Lama not only
questioned Chinese intent by criticizing his visit to Tawang, he also rejected
Beijing’s claims over the town.40 Recalling the 1962 war, the Dalai Lama told
reporters that the PLA had occupied Tawang and Bomdila that year. ‘But the
then Chinese government declared a unilateral ceasefire and withdrew (its
forces). Now the Chinese have got different views. This is something which I
really don’t know. I am little bit surprised,’ he was quoted in the media in an
apparent reference to Chinese claims over Tawang.
It is no secret that China covets the so-called south Tibet region and Tawang
town in particular and is rather unhappy with the bilateral agreement to sort out
the boundary issue as there is a clear reference of not disturbing settled
populations. The Chinese partly substantiate their claims over Tawang as the
sixth Dalai Lama hailed from Monyul in Arunachal Pradesh. Beijing believes
that Monyul, Loyul and Lower Tsayul of Arunachal Pradesh were under Tibetan
administrative and jurisdictional control. However, the Indian counter is that by
the same sixth Dalai Lama’s place-of-birth yardstick, China might as well stake
claim over the whole of Mongolia as the fourth Dalai Lama was born there.
While the Chinese leadership under Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao had been
dismissive about the current Dalai Lama, the Tibetan leader and the government-
in-exile are hoping against hope that the new leaders would have a more
conciliatory approach towards the issue.
However, if Xi’s speech at the sixtieth anniversary of Tibet’s ‘peaceful
liberation’ at Lhasa on 19 July 2011 is any indication, then not much change in
the official Tibet policy is to be expected. Making the address in front of the
Potala Palace, the traditional seat of Dalai Lama, Xi had said, ‘People of all
ethnic groups in Tibet have stood firm in fight against separatism. They have
forestalled separatist and sabotage activities staged by the Dalai group and
foreign hostile forces… We should adhere to the Party’s basic religion-related
policies, administrate religious affairs in accordance with law, and uphold
normal order of Tibetan Buddhism. We should fight against separatist activities
of the Dalai group, rely on cadre and people of all ethnic groups, seek long-term
policies and take measures that address the root cause, and completely destroy
any attempt to undermine stability in Tibet and national unity of motherland.’41
While all evidence indicates that Xi will continue to maintain a hard line on
Tibet, his father Xi Zhongxun, described as a liberal-minded former vice
premier, shared a special relationship with the current Dalai Lama. According to
an interview by Reuters on 1 September 2012, senior Xi had a close bond with
the spiritual leader, who once gave Xi Zhongxun an expensive watch in the
1950s, a gift that the senior party official still wore decades later.42 The article
quoted the Dalai Lama recalling elder Xi as ‘very friendly, comparatively more
open-minded, very nice’ and gave the watch to him during his extended visit to
Beijing in 1954. Xi Zhongxun was purged from the post of vice premier in 1962
prior to the Cultural Revolution and was eventually imprisoned. His son was
then sent to work in the countryside like most ‘intellectual youth’ of the time.43
Xi Jinping joined the party in 1974 with stints at Hebei, Fujian and Zhenjiang
before being named party chief of Shanghai in 2007. Little is known of the 59-
year-old ‘princeling’ Xi’s political leanings but he is known to push the idea of a
harmonious society depending on the sharing of wealth between the country’s
industrial powerhouses on the east coast and its rural areas in the west.
A month after the Dalai Lama’s statement on Xi’s father, the influential
International Tibet Network, a conglomerate of NGOs working for the Tibetan
cause, published a booklet called Xi Jinping’s Tibet Challenge, highlighting
repression on the plateau and making recommendations for the new leader. The
radical booklet is indicative of the growing resistance within Tibet despite a
massive crackdown by the People’s Armed Police and the PLA. The booklet
notes that ‘in the last five years, there has been a surge of resistance by Tibetans
in Tibet; notably the uprisings in 2008, which were of a scale previously not
witnessed since 1959, but increasing again in recent months. Since January 2012
more than 20 mass protests have taken place with demonstrations calling for
freedom in Tibet and return of Dalai Lama.’44
The booklet calls for cessation of ‘harsh and systematic repression of
religious and cultural life in Tibet, and [suspension] with immediate effect [of]
the Chinese government’s patriotic education programme.’ Activists belonging
to the network have called for an end to and reversal of the ‘coercive’ policy of
resettlement of nomads by allowing them to return to their lands and lives.
Besides asking for a halt on all repression against the Tibetan people and calling
for the release of political prisoners, the activists have interestingly asked Xi to
‘stop environmentally destructive mining and damming projects, and engage
with downstream nations to implement bottom up participatory management of
Tibet’s water resources.’
If there is any change in the party’s vision of Tibet, or if Xi will come out
with a new Tibet initiative, this will only become clear once the new leader is
firmly in the saddle. But Indian diplomatic circles know that Xi will not take
chances with Tibet and will stick to the party’s traditional hard line. This is
perhaps one of the reasons why Xi did not visit India before the crucial
November 2012 national party conclave even though he had visited other nations
before his appointment. Unconfirmed diplomatic channels suggest Xi wanted to
visit India in 2012 but could not afford to take chances with the possibility of
Tibetan protests, immolations or a misconstrued statement on the sensitive issue
or on the Dalai Lama just before his takeover. It was evident to Indian diplomats
that any accident on the Tibetan issue would have been a death knell to Xi’s
political plans. This is because the PLA is opposed to any reconciliation on the
issue and wants the prevailing hard line to continue in order to consolidate the
land of snow, as any weakness on its part will open up another front with the
restive Muslim population of Xinjiang.
Beijing is concerned over the convergence of interests between Tibetan
Buddhists and supporters of ETIM in Xinjiang as the latter has proven links with
pan-Islamic radicals.45 While the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government-in-
exile have no common platform with Xinjiang separatists, the spiritual leader
raised the hackles of Beijing when he urged Chinese restraint after the 5 July
2009 Xinjiang riots that left more than 197 dead and another 1,721 injured.46
The rioting began in Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang Uighur autonomous region,
over the killing of two Uighurs during clashes between migrant Uighur and Han
workers in a toy factory in Shaoguan, Guangdong, in eastern China on 25 June
2009.47 The Urumqi riots began after Uighur protestors were met by the Chinese
police, as a result of which the region witnessed large-scale destruction of
vehicle and property over the next two days. The PRC government, however,
alleged that the riots were planned outside China by the World Uighur Congress
and its leader Rebiya Kadeer.48 It took China more than six months of harsh
action including a total clampdown on communications and internet to contain
the communal conflagration that followed with some 400 Uighurs facing
criminal action including death sentences for rioting. On 10 July 2009, the Dalai
Lama issued a statement saying, ‘I am deeply saddened and concerned with the
worsening situation in East Turkestan (Xinjiang) especially with the tragic loss
of lives. I earnestly urge the Chinese authorities to exercise restraint and far-
sightedness. I offer my prayers to those who lost their lives, their families and
others affected by this sad turn of events.’49
While the statement was quite innocuous, China was infuriated by the
reference to ‘East Turkestan’, a name given to Xinjiang region by Uighur
separatists. Not one to back down, the Dalai Lama referred to East Turkestan
again in his speech on the fifty-first anniversary of the Tibetan National Uprising
Day on 10 March 2010, when he said: ‘Let us also remember the people of East
Turkestan who have experienced great difficulties and increased oppression and
the Chinese intellectuals campaigning for greater freedom who had received
severe sentences.’50 The latter speech got the Chinese goat with Xinhua calling it
‘resentful, yet unsurprising’ and ‘full of angry rhetoric.’51
The restive Xinjiang region is turning out to be a major headache for Beijing,
as Urumqi and Kashgar periodically erupt in flames, despite massive repression
from Chinese security forces. This problem could multiply in the near-future,
once US forces pulls out of Afghanistan this year, with the Af–Pak region again
turning into a breeding ground of terror. Given that jihadist forces are at work in
this region, there is a distinct possibility that ETIM and similar movements will
be supported by jihadi groups from across the Wakhan corridor. While China
refuses to discuss Pakistan’s role in abetting terror with India, it is evident that
Beijing is worried on account of Xinjiang and has told Islamabad to ensure there
is no cross-border movement of jihadis.
Although Beijing would like to sweep the Uighur–Han trouble under the
carpet, the problem is far more serious. More than 35 Uighurs were killed in
communal violence near Urumqi in June 2013. The Xinjiang communal violence
has a parallel with sectarian clashes between Rakhine Buddhists and Rohingya
Muslims in the Arakan state of Myanmar in June 2012. Just as pan-Islamic
jihadist groups like Lashkar-e-Toiba are fishing in troubled waters by training
Rohingya radicals near the Bangladesh–Myanmar border, there is a strong
possibility that radical Uighurs could be pushed into religious fundamentalism
and revenge against the Han population in Xinjiang by the same groups with
funds pouring in from Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf. This could have a
domino effect in Tibet too, with India ill-prepared to handle such a contingency.
Chinese intransigence in dealing with the Tibet issue and the Dalai Lama has
posed a serious challenge to India as Beijing continues to adopt a maximalist
position on Tibet and does not want to yield. However, it wants India to reiterate
time and again in writing that Tibet is a part of China and wants New Delhi to
throw out the Dalai Lama and the Tibetans in exile without any quid pro quo.
For Beijing, it is a one-way street when it comes to India despite Nehru
recognizing Tibet as a part of China way back in 1954 and virtually pushing the
middle kingdom into the UN Security Council without anything in return.

THE INDIAN DILEMMA

Since the time the Dalai Lama crossed over to Tawang in 1959, India has been
almost apologetic about the spiritual leader and his herd. A close watch has been
kept by Indian intelligence on his activities as well as on the government-in-exile
for the past 54 years to ensure that neither indulges in any political activity. Yet
Beijing has always accused India of harbouring anti-China sentiments and the
Dalai Lama has been a political pariah for both nations despite his non-violent
approach. As the resolution of Tibet is directly linked with the resolution of the
boundary dispute, Beijing is in no hurry, hoping that the issue would be resolved
after the current Dalai Lama passes away and that India would yield on the
boundary issue with concessions both on the Eastern and Western sectors once
China becomes a superpower bypassing the US in the coming decades.
Except in the past decade, India has been almost ambivalent towards the
Dalai Lama and was virtually afraid of annoying the Chinese on the issue in the
hope that the latter would settle the boundary issue and normalize the
relationship. What is particularly significant is that India has neither supported
any militancy in Tibet nor has made claims on any Chinese territory despite
Beijing losing no opportunity to humiliate New Delhi through stapled visas to
Jammu and Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh residents. When Wen Jiabao
indicated in 2010 that Beijing was in no hurry to solve the boundary issue, it
appeared to be coming from a mindset that was almost dismissive about New
Delhi’s newly found global clout.
The Indian diplomatic response was quite timorous to Wen’s riposte, as it was
more than happy to broaden the special representative dialogue to the overall
bilateral relationship instead of focusing only on the political resolution of the
boundary dispute as was envisaged in June 2003. In a nutshell, China has India
on the back foot on the Dalai Lama issue and at the same time it allows Pakistan
to achieve a strategic parity with New Delhi, the expanding yet skewed trade
relationship with Beijing being the icing on the cake. Even if India–China
bilateral trade goes beyond $100 billion in the coming years, China’s posture
towards India is adversarial and perhaps will remain so in the future, with
Beijing viewing New Delhi through the prism of Dalai Lama and the Tibetan
government-in-exile. While Mao used the ruse of Nehru’s non-existent designs
on Tibet to wage a war on India in 1962, New Delhi has never coveted the land
of snow nor has any designs to recover the disputed territory by force. Neither
has it planned to destabilize Tibet through military or political means.
The dialogue between China and the Dalai Lama has failed not due to Indian
interference or advice but due to Chinese rigidity towards negotiations or a
possible compromise. It is quite evident that the Chinese handle dissent through
brutal repression, whether it be the 1989 Tiananmen Square agitation by Han
Chinese or pro-autonomy movements in Tibet and Xinjiang by minority
communities. The Chinese claim that the Dalai Lama’s existence in India is
provocative does not stand much ground either, as India has been rather cautious
and even timid towards the Dalai Lama and the Tibet issue since 1959,
recognizing the high plateau as an integral part of PRC in 1954 itself.
Even though China wants to project itself as a benign superpower, its
leadership loses no opportunity to bare its teeth on sovereignty issues. The
closed mindset of its political leadership appears incapable of sharing power or
empowering minorities for a more harmonious relationship. Perhaps this is to do
with the single-party authoritarian government in Beijing which clamps down on
all dissidence or even signs of it with a heavy hand and excessive force. Unlike
how a democratic India handles dissent or outright separatism in the Northeast,
particularly in Nagaland and Manipur, China has done nothing towards allowing
the Dalai Lama to return home except wait for him to die. In May 2012, the
Dalai Lama told a British newspaper that he feared China had trained bogus
female devotees to kill him while seeking his blessings.52 He was quoted in the
Sunday Telegraph as saying: ‘We have received information from Tibet. Some
Chinese agents are training some Tibetans, especially women, you see, using
poison – the hair poisoned, and the scarf poisoned – they were supposed to seek
blessings from me, and my hand touch [sic].’53 He also said Chinese interference
in the search for his reincarnation meant that he could be the last Dalai Lama as
well. In that event, a number of young Buddhist monks, including the Karmapa,
could emerge as the spiritual leader of Tibetan Buddhism, he told the newspaper.
While China hotly denied the allegations, Indian intelligence knows that the
leader is under serious threat, which is why round-the-clock protection is
provided to him with each visitor screened for explosives and chemicals. He has
the highest level of Indian security with a multi-tier security cordon in
Dharamsala, where the antecedents of each visitor are properly verified before
meeting him. Despite the Dalai Lama expressing his desire to return to Tibet
with his people time and again, there has been no signal from China. Unlike the
Xinjiang movement, which has support from jihadist groups like ETIM, the
Tibetan struggle has no armed support from either India or any other country and
is led by a man who professes non-violence.
Yet, China has used the Dalai Lama argument to boost its military capabilities
in Tibet even though it has enough para-military forces to quell any large-scale
armed rebellion. India has diplomatically boxed itself into a corner as it cannot
protest the Chinese occupation of Tibet to reject territorial claims made in the
name of Tibet in Ladakh, Barahoti plains and Arunachal Pradesh. To add to
Indian discomfiture, China has been largely successful in telling the world that it
is no threat to India and is even a strategic partner of New Delhi like the US,
Russia and the UK.
That Beijing has always been suspicious of India over Tibet and the Dalai
Lama is evident from a news report based on declassified Chinese documents
leading to the 1962 war. The report quotes an internal diplomatic note dated 24
November 1950 which reports on talks between India and China over
continuation of Indian privileges in Tibet as the successor government of
imperial Britain.54 The note said that India had interfered in China’s internal
affairs and had hindered China from ‘liberating’ Tibet. The note goes on to say
that India pretended not to have any ambitions on Tibetan politics or land but
desired to maintain the privileges that were written in the treaties signed in 1906.
The Chinese began objecting to Indian activities as it strengthened its grip over
Tibet in 1950 and suspected New Delhi of destabilizing Tibet despite Nehru
supporting Mao in the UN over the issue. Another internal note dated 28 July
1952 from the Communist Party’s Central Committee instructed authorities in
Tibet to crack down on Indian business delegations and accused India of
spreading ‘reactionary publications’ in Tibetan language.55 According to a report
in The Hindu,56 on 6 September 1953, the Chinese Foreign Ministry let its
displeasure be known to then Indian representative in Beijing R.K. Nehru,
saying that the Indian government was holding an irresponsible position on
Tibet.
The naiveté on part of Nehru and the Indian diplomatic establishment
continued as India itself decided not to link the two issues of India recognizing
Tibet as part of PRC and yet China not reciprocating by recognizing Indian maps
that delineated its frontiers as a quid pro quo. In 1956, armed revolts broke out
inside Tibet against the occupation by Chinese forces and the same year the
Dalai Lama travelled to India to attend a Buddhist conference, while also
exploring the possibility of seeking asylum with the Nehru Government. Even
though the Dalai Lama was persuaded by Nehru to return to Tibet, New Delhi
arranged two meetings between the spiritual leader and Zhou Enlai, who
happened to visit India during the same time. According to media reports,57 the
Dalai Lama told Zhou in the first meeting on 1 November 1956 that there was no
democracy in the way the Standing Committee on Tibetan Autonomous Region
was operating. Ahead of the second meeting on 30 December, Zhou hit out at
Tibetan separatists said to be active across the border in Kalimpong and warned
the Dalai Lama that the PLA would suppress any dissident activity. On 8
October 1962, a report said that Zhou recalled his 1956 talks with the Dalai
Lama with the Soviet Ambassador in Beijing and said that India had exposed its
desire to collude with the Dalai Lama and attempt to maintain Tibetan
serfdom.58
It is clearly evident that Nehru was accused of being an imperialist and India
a hegemon with designs on Tibet by the Chinese leadership to justify its war.
The 1962 war was used to cut the historical cord between Tibet and India to
ensure that Lhasa would be dealt only through the Han rulers of Beijing and not
through the Dalai Lama. The media report citing unclassified documents quoted
Zhou telling the Soviet Ambassador:‘At that time, I found Nehru [had] inherited
British imperialist thoughts and deeds on the border issue and the Tibet issue.
However, considering the friendship of China and India, we took a tolerant
attitude and did not convey this to Nehru. In 1958, serfs in Tibet, Xikang
(Sichuan) and Qinghai rebelled. Nehru could not wait and took advantage of the
border issue to interfere with China’s internal affairs. The Dalai Lama rebelled in
1959 and fled to India, and this was caused by Nehru’s inducement.’59
The Chinese leadership used the Dalai Lama stick to beat India, take control
over Tibet and eliminate any historical territorial claims it might have. Without
anyone questioning Mao over his reading on so-called Indian interference in
Tibet, Beijing safely concluded that Nehru wanted to practice the imperial
legacy of the British and thus had designs on Lhasa, when all Nehru wanted was
for Tibet to be a moderate buffer between communist China and democratic
India.
In fact, barring the past decade, India has been almost apologetic over giving
asylum to the Dalai Lama and Tibetan refugees. The Ministry of External
Affairs had posted a section officer or an under-secretary to act as liaison with
the Dalai Lama and also to keep a close watch on his visitors – this was to
ensure that no political activities against China were undertaken. While the
Chinese leadership may believe that the MEA liaison is a link to hatch
conspiracies and armed rebellions in Tibet, inside the ministry the posting is
considered a punishment with no one interested in taking the job.
Till the turn of the century, the Dalai Lama had been relegated to the
backburner of Indian foreign policy even after he was awarded the Nobel Peace
Prize in 1989. However, all this took a turn with the announcement of the US
Tibet Policy Act 2002, leading to the appointment of a Special Coordinator on
Tibet Issues by the George W. Bush administration to push for a dialogue
between the Dalai Lama and Beijing for a negotiated agreement on Tibet.60
Albeit supporting the economic development of Tibet, the US policy was for
projects that take into account the cultural and environmental impact in the
autonomous region. It talked about the release of political prisoners and setting
up an office in Lhasa to monitor Tibet as well as work against religious
persecution prevailing in the region.
While Beijing took serious umbrage at the announcement of the policy, the
2002 Act instructed the US Ambassador to China to ‘meet the 11th Panchen
Lama, who was taken from his home on 17 May 1995, and otherwise ascertain
information concerning his whereabouts and well-being.’61 The policy also
asked the US Ambassador to request PRC to ‘release the 11th Panchen Lama
and allow him to pursue his religious activities without interference and
according to tradition.’ New Delhi started paying attention to the Dalai Lama
once its ties with Washington improved post 9/11, with the two democracies
now moving towards an agreement to end India’s nuclear isolation.
Although neither the NDA nor the UPA government changed its One-China-
policy, it was during Manmohan Singh’s first few months as prime minister that
Indian engagement with the Dalai Lama took a new turn. One of the first steps
taken by Shyam Saran after taking over as foreign secretary in 2004 was to
upgrade the level of engagement with him. He instructed that a director-level
officer be appointed as liaison officer henceforth to give feedback on the then
ongoing dialogue between the Dalai Lama and Beijing. The officer’s real role
was to keep the Dalai Lama in loop over India’s engagement with China and
vice-versa as well as to keep an eye on Western dignitaries meeting the leader in
Dharamsala.
The other decision taken by the UPA government in 2004 was to
institutionalize an annual dialogue between the Indian foreign secretary and the
Dalai Lama to exchange notes on China and the way ahead for the exiles to
return to their homeland. Since 2004, Shyam Saran and his successors –
Shivshankar Menon, Nirupama Rao and Ranjan Mathai – have met the Dalai
Lama in a bid to revive the frozen dialogue with China as well as to moderate
the pro-autonomy movement in Tibet. Interestingly, upgrading the rank of the
liaison officer to director-level continued during the tenures of Saran, Menon
and Rao, but was downgraded to a deputy liaison officer with a section officer
from the MEA now handling the job, apparently due to shortage of officers or
reluctance on part of the younger officers to cool their heels in Dharamsala
instead of cooler climes of Europe and the US.
The reluctance on part of Indian Foreign Service officers to gain experience
in Dharamsala is perhaps due to the fact that most of India believes Tibet to be a
lost cause and even a large section within the MEA hopes that the movement
will fizzle out with the death of the current Dalai Lama. However, a very
influential section of political leadership cutting across party lines and also
within the Indian bureaucracy believes that the time has come for New Delhi to
play the Tibet card for a peaceful settlement of the restive issue through
dialogue. Even though China would loath bringing India on board the Tibet
dialogue, the fact is that India does not support any armed movement in the high
plateau nor is it promoting insurgency in the restive region.
While China continues to clamp down on the pro-autonomy movement
through repression in Tibet and pressure on Nepal, Bhutan and Myanmar, the
game is not at all cost effective for India without any diplomatic returns. The
IDSA study showed that Indian strains of Buddhism have taken a back seat to
Tibetan Buddhism in the monasteries of the sensitive Himalayan belt. Today, the
visible face of Buddhism across the world is the Dalai Lama, with richly
endowed monasteries and influential followers all over the world. If the Tibetan
movement goes radical or militant, it would obviously bring in new
ramifications for India’s internal security. New Delhi knows that all China
requires is a single incident in Tibet that is linked to the Dalai Lama set-up for it
to say that India had been forewarned.
The time has come for New Delhi to take up the Dalai Lama issue with
Beijing so that the spiritual leader can return home with minimum power and
maximum dignity. The return of the Dalai Lama and his followers will push the
Chinese to settle the boundary issue with India and put an end to Beijing’s
aggressive moves in the region. Otherwise, the only other option for India is to
review its Tibet Policy in the context of ‘One China’.
 seven

INDIA TAKES UP THE CHALLENGE

Just before the last round of polls in the 2009 General Elections, a day before the
critical states of Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand, West Bengal and Punjab went to
vote on 13 May, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had an unusual visitor. Given
that political temperatures were running high and the PM was involved in hectic
campaigning, the visitor really had no business to come to 7 Race Course Road.
The UPA’s Left allies had walked out of the alliance on the Indo–US nuclear
agreement, leading to a confidence vote in 2008 where the main Opposition
party, the BJP, had accused the Congress of buying votes from members of Lok
Sabha for money. The political atmosphere was thus quite uncertain, with many
not expecting Manmohan Singh to be prime minister once again. Perhaps the
visitor also thought the same, and that could be why he came to see him just
before the final round of voting.
The then Chief of Army Staff General Deepak Kapoor sought a one-on-one
meeting with the prime minister as the government had been sitting on the
Defence Ministry’s proposal for raising two more infantry divisions for
Arunachal Pradesh, a brigade for Ladakh and a battalion for Sikkim for more
than a year. Once Vijay Singh took over as the new defence secretary on 31 July
2007, Army Headquarters was abuzz about the manifold increase in Chinese
military capabilities in Tibet after the introduction of the QTR in July 2006.
Chinese incursions across the LAC had increased, with PLA patrols being more
assertive about reiterating their territorial claims along the disputed border.
General Kapoor had approached the new defence secretary for increasing the
number of troops on the ground in Arunachal Pradesh and Ladakh to counter the
increased Chinese threat and capability in Tibet. The Army, which had not added
even a single soldier to its total strength since 1985, now wanted to raise two
more divisions for Arunachal Pradesh and send another 4,000 troops to Ladakh
and Sikkim. The two tasked then Major-General A.K. Singh, additional director
general of perspective planning, to prepare a note for the CCS. Once General
Singh took over as Southern Army Commander in 2011, the original note which
had been drafted by him was rectified by Vijay Singh himself and the proposal
was moved to the CCS after then Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon also
pushed for force accretion. However, the proposal hit a hurdle with then NSA
M.K. Narayanan not in favour of raising two divisions as he felt that the Chinese
would object to this and could even derail the special representative dialogue
over the issue. Narayanan, now West Bengal Governor, was India’s special
representative at the time, with State Councillor Dai Bingguo representing the
PRC.
Given the proximity of Narayanan with the Nehru–Gandhi family since the
days he was director of Intelligence Bureau and part of Rajiv Gandhi’s inner
circle, the CCS virtually buried the proposal, and sat on it through 2008 with
Kapoor asking Vijay Singh for help towards the end of the year after all efforts
including approaching Shyam Saran, the Prime Minister’s special envoy, failed.
Vijay Singh finally approached Defence Minister Antony, who was very much
in favour of raising the two divisions but was never the sort to assert himself in
the CCS. A flustered defence secretary apparently told his minister that he
should not be remembered as the second defence minister from Kerala who let
the country down against China. Antony did not reply to this taunt but he
obviously did not like the comparisons with V.K. Krishna Menon, the disgraced
defence minister at the time of the 1962 war. It was under these circumstances
that General Kapoor met Manmohan Singh.
The Army Chief apparently told the PM that he did not know what the
outcome of the 2009 elections would be but the nation and the Army would not
like to remember him as the man who could not take on China by not taking a
decision on the proposal. Moved by the request, the prime minister called for a
CCS meeting two days before the votes were to be counted on 16 May 2009.
The proposal was reworked and put up before the quietly convened CCS, with
Vijay Singh insisting that Foreign Secretary Menon, whose last posting was as
ambassador to China, was present to counter any last-minute hitches from
Narayanan. Only this time, the proposal sailed through without any objections
from Narayanan, perhaps as none of the CCS members thought they were
coming back to power.
The fact is that the humiliation of the 1962 war and its impact on the psyche
of the Indian political and military leadership ensured that China was discussed
in hush-hush tones in both circles till 2004. Any proposal or initiative before the
CSG or the apex CCS was discussed taking into account the sensitivity of
India’s northern neighbour and its military ramifications. Despite the PLA
intruding across the LAC many a times in the past, and more recently at
Depsang, to reinforce its territorial claims, New Delhi latched on to the 1993
Peace and Tranquillity Agreement and tried to sweep all border disagreements
under the carpet and beyond the public realm. Blatant incursions by PLA across
the LAC were reported by the media, only to be met with stout denials. Lately,
Beijing’s grouse has been against a raucous Indian media rather than official
New Delhi, which is more than accommodating when dealing with China. With
the Indian public engrossed in the diplomatic cross-fire with Pakistan since
Kashmir erupted in 1990, China was a no-go area and confined to a select few in
the government.
Till 2004, the Indian Army was opposed to improving all border
infrastructure, including roads, along the LAC in the fear that this would
facilitate the PLA to walk into India. While Prime Minister Vajpayee blamed
China and its nuclear relationship with Pakistan as the main reason of India
declaring itself a nuclear weapons state in 1998 in a letter to US President Bill
Clinton,1 a section of the Indian media was shocked at the veteran BJP leader
naming Beijing as if he had committed a sacrilege. After the Shakti series of
nuclear tests were conducted on 11 and 13 May, the then Chinese Foreign
Minister Tang Jiaxuan and then US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright took
the lead in drafting the UN Security Council Resolution No. 1172, aimed at
emasculating New Delhi’s nuclear capabilities. To make sure the message got
through, the resolution added the Kashmir issue.2
With India’s GDP registering tremendous growth in the first decade of the
twenty-first century and its ties with Washington vastly improving after
Clinton’s visit in March 2000, New Delhi started to look at the strategic
environment in Asia beyond Pakistan. While the Vajpayee government towards
its end began exploring the idea of improving border infrastructure along the
LAC, the credit for standing up to China largely goes to Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh and a few other dedicated bureaucrats and generals. Foreign
secretaries Shyam Saran and Shivshankar Menon, both seasoned China experts,
have brought to light the security implications of Han Chinese penetration into
Tibet. Both have been at the receiving end during their postings in Beijing and
know the utter contempt the Chinese leadership had for India and its leaders.
They knew that China’s attitude towards India was a good indicator of New
Delhi’s global strategic clout.
 Beijing’s contempt for India was visible while the latter was preparing for a
‘peaceful nuclear explosion’ in Pokhran in 1973. The two bureaucrats and the
political leadership were aware of the declassified letter written by Henry
Kissinger on 2 March 1973 to Richard Nixon that showcases the utter contempt
Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai had for the Indian leadership. Kissinger says, inter
alia, ‘In South Asia, the Chinese believe India remains Moscow’s principal
agent; their distrust of New Delhi remains as potent as ever… Chou [Zhou]
displayed a particular contempt for the Indians and a personal dislike of Indian
leaders. He related several cynical and disdainful anecdotes about Prime
Minister [Jawaharlal] Nehru and [Indira] Gandhi… In response, I said that we
would go slow in any improvement of relations with New Delhi and would keep
the PRC informed.’3
Rather than be locked into dealing with Pakistan, China’s proxy in South
Asia, Saran and Menon, close friends otherwise too, devised a strategy to deal
with Beijing on equal terms with the help of the political leadership, particularly
PM Singh and Antony. Not to be outplayed and outwitted by Chinese moves to
engage India’s neighbours, the Manmohan Singh government decided to build
up capacities along the LAC and offered close economic cooperation to South
Asian countries. Although Singh’s political mentor Narasimha Rao had
envisioned the ‘Look East’ policy to counter Chinese influence in South East
Asia in 1995, the mantra had largely remained on the drawing board with few
initiatives in the interregnum.4 Other diplomatic initiatives like the Ganga–
Mekong Cooperation, launched in November 2000 to integrate tourism, culture,
education and most importantly transportation linkages between India and
countries like Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam in order to
stimulate mutual trade and economic trade, had hardly taken off.5 It is another
matter that when the Ganga–Mekong Cooperation project was launched with
then External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh in the lead, the new initiative was
touted to be an answer to China’s 1999 Kunming initiative to integrate South
Asian economies with Beijing.6
The 9/11 attacks and the subsequent launch of the war against Al Qaeda and
Taliban in Afghanistan on 7 October 2001 triggered off close contacts between
Vajpayee and US President George W. Bush, with both sides committing to a
strategic partnership in November.7 Visiting New Delhi in November 2001, then
US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld told his Indian counterpart George
Fernandes that Washington wanted a long term relationship with India, but it
was only looking at a tactical relationship with Pakistan, its supposed ally in the
‘war on terror’.8 A month later, Fernandes, known China baiter and supporter of
the Tibet cause, was surprisingly invited by the Chinese envoy for a trip to
Beijing. Beijing had taken note of the growing relationship between the two
countries.
Indo–US diplomatic ties were further cemented after Jaish-e-Mohammed
terrorists attacked the Parliament on 13 December 2001. With its zero tolerance
approach towards terrorism, the US reached out to pacify India, which had
mobilized its armed forces towards Pakistan in an operation codenamed
Parakram, while also ensuring that Islamabad stopped exporting terror to its
eastern neighbour. Even while Indian troops were amassed on the Pakistan
border, Prime Minister Vajpayee’s principal secretary Brajesh Mishra offered to
put some of India’s existing nuclear reactors and all future reactors under
international safeguards in a bid to end New Delhi’s nuclear isolation. The offer
was made to visiting US Secretary of State Colin Powell on 28 July 2002 in a
meeting at the PMO.9
The increased diplomatic engagement with the US ensured that China moved
on the issue of resolving the boundary dispute by agreeing to appoint a special
representative to explore the settlement from a political perspective during
Vajpayee’s June 2003 visit.10 In January 2004, US President George W. Bush
announced the ‘Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP)’ agreement and
expanded cooperation in civilian nuclear activities, civilian space activities and
high technology trade.11 Not surprisingly, China agreed to sign the political
parameters on boundary settlement and acknowledge India’s aspiration for a UN
Security Council seat after then US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
announced the completion of NSSP in March 2005, setting the stage for the
nuclear agreement that was unveiled in July that year.12 Beijing realized that the
‘presumption of denial’ had now become the ‘presumption of approval’13 as far
as Washington’s assessment of New Delhi was concerned, as the global calculus
had dramatically reversed with Washington viewing New Delhi as a
countervailing force to Beijing and discouraging any weapons supplies to China,
including blocking top-of-the-line Israeli PHALCON AWACS.14 Russia, after
the collapse of the Soviet Union, remained the principal hardware supplier to
India but continued to supply the same equipment to China, such as the Su-30
MK multi-role fighters and Kilo-class submarines. Despite serious concerns
from India, it supplied RD-93 engines for the JF-17 fighter to Pakistan in 2008
as well as Mi-17 medium lift helicopters.15
The past decade had shown that China was willing to accommodate India
after assessing the latter’s relations with Washington. There was no such thing as
a verbal agreement when it came to Beijing and everything had to be in black-
and-white for it to have any meaning. India learnt the hard way about Chinese
insistence on the written word.
In June 2003, the Chinese promised visiting Indian PM Vajpayee that it
would amend its maps to bring them in line with the rest of world’s recognition
of Sikkim as part of India.16 In 2005, Wen Jiabao did show a map to Indian
officials that showed Sikkim as part of India. The Chinese assurance did not
come for free as Vajpayee had to commit in writing about India recognizing
Tibet as part of China and not allowing Tibetans in India to engage in anti-China
activities.
However, as the Left allies of the UPA-I posed serious hurdles in the
implementation of the Indo–US nuclear accord, the Chinese line changed. With
the Opposition NDA already opposing the nuclear agreement, the political
situation in 2007–2008 was quite fluid with Left allies threatening to force a
mid-term election on the UPA government. Seeing that the agreement was on
the doldrums, China stumped India within days of Prime Minister Manmohan
Singh’s three-day trip to Beijing in January 2008 by lodging a diplomatic protest
over Indian military activity in Sikkim and claimed that Indian troops were
active on the Chinese side of the LAC.17
The reopening of claims on Sikkim accompanied with hectic PLA activity
along the LAC rattled the Indian establishment, which was already concerned
about the tremendous upgradation of infrastructure following the launch of the
QTR in July 2006. The reversal of its position on Sikkim, demographic changes
and massive infrastructural capacity building in Tibet – the QTR multiplied the
military threat by thrice its previous position – and continued close military ties
with Pakistan shook India out of its 1962 stupor. The Indian response to Chinese
build-up in Tibet became more cohesive both in military and diplomatic terms,
with the focus now on improving border infrastructure, notwithstanding the
apprehensions within a section of the military and intelligence establishments
respectively.

THE INDIAN ARMY’S RESPONSE

One of the most significant triggers for a response by the Indian military was
when the PLA destroyed three Indian Army bunkers in Doka La on the sensitive
Sikkim–Bhutan–Tibet tri-junction on 8 November 2007, claiming that the
bunkers were on their side of the LAC.18 According to reports, the disputed
bunkers near Torsa Nala had been set up by Indian troops belonging to the
Siliguri-based 33 Corps in 2005 under Lt. General Deepak Kapoor. While China
objected to these bunkers for the first time in July 2007, top Indian Army
generals were shocked that the PLA knew the exact distance of the bunkers from
the LAC. Although Army Headquarters could not confirm it, senior Indian
commanders still suspect the PLA knew the location of the bunkers by hacking
into the computers of 33 Corps or by planting a malware. The exact grid
references and assessments used in a 33 Corps report were thrown back at the
Indian Army by PLA commanders.
The way the PLA was allowed to demolish the bunkers without the matter
being taken up at the highest levels did not go down well with the Eastern Army
Command as they felt that China should have raised objections when the
bunkers were being constructed. Local army commanders were also unhappy at
their own bosses who chose not to make a stand and gave into the Chinese
without any fuss.
Unknown to these local commanders, the national security establishment was
actually very worried about Chinese movements across Sikkim, particularly in
an area known as the ‘finger’, north of Gyangyong. No less than NSA
Narayanan, Foreign Secretary Menon and Defence Secretary Vijay Singh had
secretly travelled to the Sikkim border in early 2008 in separate Army Aviation’s
Cheetah helicopters to survey the area and take steps to ward off the Chinese
threat after being convinced that the latter had no claim to the territory. The three
officials were hosted by a battalion of the newly moved 27 Mountain Division
which was deployed at over 17,000 feet in the Eastern Sector. It was decided that
the Army should thwart any assertiveness by the Chinese over control of the
‘finger’ by strengthening its defences and converting its positions into a
permanent post to keep watch over PLA troop movements. This was done after
General Deepak Kapoor ordered a survey of the strategic area to counter any
Chinese territorial claims.
While the northernmost tip of Sikkim, which is just over a kilometre in
length, has always been part of Indian territory, the Army earlier sent in only
regular patrols and had a few traditional defensive positions in the area. A
permanent position was set up after unusually high number of intrusions in the
area and a discovery in November 2007 that a new east-west road being built by
China would pass through the ‘finger’. Things heated up after China ‘informed’
India that it would need to blast some stone formations along the border to make
way for the road.19
The ‘finger’ overlooks a valley known as the Sora Funnel and is considered a
strong defensive position to ward off any move by China to enter the Sikkim
plateau. Reports indicate that the Indian Army always had a permanent presence
in the area and had bunkers and temporary posts here since 1962.20
While construction of the road was halted after a diplomatic complaint was
lodged by New Delhi, the Indian Army, which currently holds the area,
strengthened its bunkers, built new vehicle tracks, repaired old roads and set up
defensive positions to counter any possible threat. The stone cairns, which China
had threatened to destroy, were also modified as defensive positions by the
Kalimpong-based 27 Mountain Division. While the Indian ‘build-up’ in the area
had prompted a diplomatic protest by Beijing, the Army stuck to its stance that it
had troops in the area prior to the movement of 27 Mountain Division to North
Sikkim.
Despite it being common knowledge now that General Kapoor and his
successor General V.K. Singh had differences of opinion on many issues related
to the Army, they were both on the same page when it came to countering China.
The appointment of V.K. Singh as Eastern Army Commander in March 2008
triggered off a series of steps that beefed up India’s military capacities against
China till he demitted office as Army Chief on 31 May 2012. Soon after, his
successor General Bikram Singh went public in September saying that the Army
would not allow a repeat of 1962.
The Indian Army’s focus on PLA upgradation began with Sanjeev Chachra,
who was then commanding the Gangtok-based 17 Mountain Division,
conducting transformation studies in the Eastern Army Command under General
V. K. Singh in 2009 to make the Indian military response more cohesive and
rapid in times of crisis. Lt. General Chachra now heads the Northern Command
based in Udhampur and is responsible for both the LAC and the LOC’s
defences. As early as October 2004, the CSG was made aware by the Indian
Army that the PLA had developed a capacity to deploy 21 divisions in 30 days
with the advent of the QTR and oil and gas pipelines in Tibet. Till that time,
India and China had mirror deployments along the LAC. The October 2004
meeting at the DGMO is extremely significant, as for the first time a decision
was taken to recommend force accretion and build infrastructure along the LAC
to the CCS. As recalled earlier, when a top Army commander objected to the
building of roads as it would allow access to the Chinese, the then home
secretary curtly told the then Vice Chief of Army Staff that in that case Indian
forces should be holed up in New Delhi in fear that China could use Indian road
networks to take over India.
It was with Deepak Kapoor as the Army Chief and V.K. Singh as the Eastern
Army Commander that the CCS took the decision of allowing the Army to raise
two mountain divisions in May 2009, with 1,260 officers and 35,011 troops. The
56 and 71 infantry divisions were headquartered in Zakhama in Nagaland under
the Dimapur-based III Corps and at Missamari in Assam under the operational
command of the Tezpur-based VI Corps respectively.21 The operational tasks of
both divisions were in Arunachal Pradesh with a plan to beef up defences in case
the PLA launched a limited attack. The Army divides the border state into two
areas, with Kameng which includes Tawang area and the other called Rest of
Arunachal Pradesh.
A decision was also taken to raise Arunachal and Sikkim scout battalions
aimed at using local environment-adapted human resources to counter the
adversary. With Ladakh Scouts coming out in flying colours in the 1999 Kargil
War, the first battalion of Arunachal Scouts was raised in May 2011. In the run-
up to the Beijing Olympics, China had begun a massive internal security
exercise in Tibet and Xinjiang fearing there would be a rebellion from within
and possible posturing from the Indian side. The Doka La incident was part of
the Chinese exercise to revisit its claims on the LAC and send a message to the
Indian Army to not fish in troubled waters.
After the March 2008 riots in Lhasa, the PLA began to aggressively patrol the
LAC with increased transgressions at Trig Heights, Depsang, Pangong Tso,
Dumchele and Demchok in Ladakh, Barahoti in Middle Sector, and Sikkim,
Tangtse, Asaphila and Dichu in the Eastern Sector.22 PLA helicopters and UAVs
were also noticed in Chumar in Ladakh, Kaurik Pass in Himachal Pradesh and
Kameng area in Arunachal Pradesh. There has been no let up in PLA patrolling
on the LAC since 2008, only that now the Indian Army tries to match them
largely through numbers and technical means.
Army transformation studies under General Chachra acquired a renewed
impetus after the PLA demonstrated a capability to mobilize and deploy
formations at a short notice to contain the Lhasa rebellion and the Xinjiang flare-
up in 2008. Much to Indian concerns, the PLA was able to mobilize the 149
Special Mechanized Mountain Division, a rapid reaction force, within 48 hours
of the Lhasa riots. It became quite evident that the Chinese had now acquired the
capability to launch an offensive almost without warning, with improvement in
its capabilities and induction using improved infrastructure.
To add to Indian woes, the newly developed Chinese war zone concept gave a
new meaning to limited war with real-time relay of the war theatre to Beijing for
better decision making. Designed to deal with an adversary not matched in
military strength, the WZC addresses limited attack using only one of the seven
military regions with the overall aim of political and not territorial gains. The
basic idea in the Indian context is to embarrass India and not capture any
territory. While the shoring up of defences in Arunachal Pradesh was to repel
any surprise offensive from China, the Army felt that there should be enough
reserve forces for rapid deployment to counter or deter any such moves by the
adversary.
A study of the PLA’s offensive capabilities showed the vulnerability of
Indian forces, particularly in the Middle Sector, which paved the way to the
heart of the country. Although Indian defences are considered strong in the
Eastern Sector from Sikkim to Arunachal Pradesh, the Kibithu–Walong axis
along the Lohit valley was identified as an area where the PLA could use force.
The other area of concern, perhaps perennial, was the Ladakh sector, where a
PLA offensive through the Chushul–Fukche front could threaten Leh through the
Indus valley. However, the Army’s worst scenario was the lightly held Middle
Sector, with only one independent infantry brigade under the Central Army
Command holding the vast territory from Himachal Pradesh to Uttarakhand
against the PLA.
With an aim to not allow the Chinese such easy access while at the same time
aiming to launch a counter-offensive, a new plan was developed by General V.
K. Singh on the basis of the study conducted by General Chachra when he took
over as the twenty-sixth Chief of Army Staff. Within a year, General Singh
presented the new force accretion plan to Defence Minister Antony, who asked
the plan to be converted into a note for the CCS after the 2011 DGMO
presentation. During his tenure as Eastern Army Commander, General Singh
identified a sleepy town called Pannagarh in Bardhaman district of West Bengal
as an ideal place to locate headquarters of a new reserve force to deter China.
Located in the hinterland, Pannagarh also has an airstrip that had served for
maintenance of the B-24 Liberator heavy bombers of the US Air Force during
1942–45 in the Second World War.
Before preparing the new plan, the Eastern Command studied the 28-day war
between China and Vietnam in February–March 1979. The war was a bloody
slugfest which ended in a stalemate with both sides declaring victory. The fact
that puny Vietnam not only stood up to the more powerful Chinese offensive but
also forced the PLA to withdraw from occupation of its border cities was not lost
on Indian commanders. The key to Vietnamese victory was to move its reserve
army formations based in neighbouring Cambodia behind PLA forces fighting
on the Vietnam border. Caught unawares in the pincer move, the Chinese
hurriedly declared a victory and withdrew.
It was the placement and movement of the reserve force that interested the
Indian Army, as for the first time the military and the political leadership were
thinking of a counter-offensive strategy and not just a defensive one. The new
plan was geared towards building capacity to capture enemy territory so that the
Indian hand was not weak whenever it would come to the negotiations stage.
The Special Frontier Force (SFF) or Establishment 22 under the Cabinet
Secretariat was also given a new purpose, with Tibet battalions told to brush up
plans. Raised after the 1962 war, the SFF is currently a division of troops drawn
from Tibetan refugees, hill people from Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh and
those on deputation from the Indian Army proficient in Tibetan or Mandarin
language. As the SFF last saw action in Chittagong Hill Tracts in the 1971 war,
the force was found to be low on morale without any future prospects. After
Menon took over as NSA in January 2010, with General Singh following him in
March, the SFF was reactivated as the security establishment found that
naturally acclimatized men from the Uttarakhand hills were leaving for the
plains for employment purposes. Menon found that even the specially trained
ITBP paramilitary force was being used by the Home Ministry to be deployed
for internal security duties in Naxalite-infested areas of Andhra Pradesh,
Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Orissa. With P. Chidambaram at the helm of affairs
in the Home Ministry at the time, a decision was taken to make the ITBP stick to
its original charter of manning the Indo–Tibet borders. General Singh then
became the first Army chief to visit SFF headquarters in Chakrata near
Dehradun in 2011 to boost the morale of the troops and their commanders and
plan joint exercises with the Army.
The counter-China plan was not made because Menon, Shyam Saran or
General Singh were warmongers or wanted to take on the PLA. It was made in
the context of increased Chinese military capabilities in Tibet and PLA’s
assertion on the LAC. With India aspiring to be on the global high table,
Manmohan Singh and his team knew that the country could ill-afford another
setback or humiliation of the PLA occupying its territory. The clear message was
that India would build its capacities without instigating the Chinese or launching
any military adventure on the LAC. ‘Hold the line and quietly build capabilities’
was the message Antony had given to the chiefs of the three armed services.
With the Pannagarh airbase central to ‘joint-manship’23 with the Indian Air
Force responsible for firepower and logistical purposes, General Singh proposed
to raise a mountain strike corps in an earmarked area of 6,000 acres comprising
the Ranchi-based 23 Division and a newly raised division to counter the Chinese
WZC. As the Ranchi force, part of the Mathura-based I Strike Corps, was
initially aimed for application in the Western Sector, another division was to be
raised under the Western Army Command to compensate for the loss of this
division.
The plan further proposed raising an armoured brigade of Russian T-90
missile-firing tanks with a mechanized infantry facing the Chushul–Fukche front
in the Ladakh sector and another armoured brigade of Russian T-72 tanks in the
Sikkim sector to push an offensive through the mountain passes. One must
remember that six US-made AMX-13 light tanks had to be airlifted by the Indian
Army in the 1962 war to defend Chushul after the PLA threatened Leh. Moving
swiftly, General Singh pushed a regiment of T-72 tanks with 58 tanks per
regiment and a mechanized infantry battalion with BMP-II infantry combat
vehicles into Sikkim sector in 2011. The tanks were to be replaced with T-90s
after more of the latest Russian tanks were acquired from Moscow.
The third element of this accretion plan was to raise an independent infantry
brigade for Barahoti plains to supplement the existing nine infantry formations
to ward off any offensive from the Kaurik Pass and the Middle Sector. The new
infantry brigade would also allow the Bareilly-based 6 Division to perform its
operational role as reserve for the Northern Command and not get tied up in the
Middle Sector in case of hostilities.
The total cost of the Pannagarh Strike Corps plan was worked out to be
around T 60,000 crore. While Prime Minister Manmohan Singh approved the
mountain strike corps plan in principal after the 18 April 2011 DGMO meeting
itself, the accretion effort received a setback due to a slowdown in the economy
and lack of funds. The plan also got mired due to the age controversy
surrounding General Singh, who moved the Supreme Court against the
government to get his date of birth rectified from 10 May 1950, as recorded in
his NDA papers, to the actual 10 May 1951.24
General Singh met Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee thrice before his
retirement to get the force accretion plan through to the CCS, but the UPA
government did not oblige him as a section of the bureaucracy felt that the Army
chief had unilaterally moved the proposal without discussing with the other
armed services. In the meantime, Lt. General (Retd) Prakash Menon, military
advisor to NSA Menon, objected to the China plan as being only Army-centric
while all-round hardware upgrading was required in the Air Force and Navy too.
The view of the National Security Council Secretariat was that the huge amount
of T 60,000 crore should be distributed among the three services rather than only
be concentrated on the Indian Army. The Army was at odds with the NSCS as
the former felt that a future war with China would only be fought on land with
hardly any engagement on high seas due to the vast distances separating them.
Although the Army still nurtured the 1962 grouse of bearing the brunt without
the Air Force and Navy even taking a scratch, the NSCS believed that the Air
Force and Navy would play an equal and as important a part in any future
conflict with the PLA. The Army’s view did not find convergence with the
national security establishment as China experts felt that the Air Force and the
Navy would make all the difference in a future conflict with the PLA as the
mountain terrain along the LAC would not allow much manoeuvrability.
When General Singh moved the Supreme Court over the age controversy, the
UPA-II government began viewing him with a degree of suspicion and decided
to hold back the strike corps proposal, with the Finance Ministry marking the
plan back to the Defence Ministry for further consultations. In July 2012, after
Singh demitted office, Defence Minister Antony sent the proposal to the Chiefs
of Staff Committee (COSC) to bring the Navy and Air Force on board and
broad-base military capabilities against China. It was left to the three service
chiefs to deliberate on the plan, hardware requirements, and efforts to synergize
future operations. Antony wanted the strike corps plan to be cleared by the CCS
within the 2012–2013 fiscal year after the three chiefs decided on their specific
requirements to strengthen the northern borders and deployment in the Indian
Ocean. The three forces had to send their proposals to the COSC before the final
view was taken on new air and naval assets, including helicopters for advance
landing grounds and warships for longer reach into the Indian Ocean. Given the
speed at which China is building its military capacities and the turf battles within
the three armed services of India, Antony had set a 2012 deadline for the COSC
to prepare a revised proposal. With Antony pushing hard, the CCS quietly
approved the new strike corps on 17 July 2013 at the cost of T 62,000 crore and
a plan of adding another 45,000 troops.25 The mountain strike corps is expected
to be operational within the twelfth five-year plan.
Besides beefing up conventional capabilities of the Army, the UPA-II
government also simultaneously focused on missile deterrents to improve the
military’s reach into Tibet, Lanzhou and Chengdu military regions. As a first
step in this direction, the government cleared the first regiment of around 300
missiles of the 290 km range BrahMos supersonic missiles for Arunachal
Pradesh in October 2011.26 Deployed despite Beijing’s objections, the missile
sends a clear message to China with its capability to target key cities in Nyingchi
as well as Yadong in Shigatse prefecture. With more than three BrahMos
regiments already deployed in the Western and Northern sectors, the areas across
the border in Ladakh are already covered by the precision-guided tactical
weapon.27
However, India took the next big strategic step to build its nuclear deterrent
by test-firing the 5,000 km range Agni-V ICBM on 19 April 2012.28 Beijing’s
concern over the missile was evident when Chinese official media accused
DRDO of downplaying the range of the 50 tonne three-stage, solid-fuel
weapon.29 While DRDO chief V.K. Saraswat described the Agni-V’s range as
between 5,500–5,800 km, China believes that the weapon has a range of over
8,000 km and qualifies for ICBM status.
Designed to be transported by road through canister-based technology, Agni-
V will carry multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV) payloads
and has the range to cover the whole of Asia and Europe. While Agni-I, Agni-II
and Agni-III missiles with maximum ranges of 1,200 km, 2,500 km and 3,700
km respectively have been made operational, India needed a delivery system that
could deliver a payload as far as north China and cover the Han heartland with
required accuracy. Placed under the Strategic Forces Command, the successful
test-firing of Agni-V off Wheeler Island in the Bay of Bengal was greeted with
lot of satisfaction by the Indian military establishment.
The missile also caters to the worst case of high-threat scenario from the
PLA, including a collusive threat from China’s ‘all-weather friend’ Pakistan.
According to an Indian Army assessment, China is expected to adopt political
neutrality till 2020 and will not open a front with India if Islamabad starts sabre-
rattling on the western or northern borders. However, New Delhi expects that in
case of a conflict between India and China, Pakistan is likely to use this
opportunity to launch either a sub-conventional or a conventional operation
against India.
An all-out war against China would probably involve the PLA deploying 34
divisions along the LAC, aiming to threaten the Siliguri corridor to cut off the
Northeast from the rest of India. The PLA would also attempt to capture Tawang
and parts of Arunachal Pradesh. In the Middle Sector, it would threaten
Joshimath and other areas, while in the Western Sector, the PLA would attempt
to capture areas in Ladakh, Demchok, Fukche and Tangste.
With PLA now developing a capacity to mobilize forces in Chengdu and
Lanzhou military regions within 21 days, Beijing has the capability to cause a
severe political and military embarrassment to India. The Agni-V and the under-
development Agni-VI with a range of nearly 10,000 km are designed to cater to
this worst-case scenario. The Agni-V is expected to be made operational in
2014–15 while work on the truly inter-continental Agni-VI is already in
progress. However, given the international climate against full-blown wars of the
previous century, the economic cost of hostilities on a country’s development
and most importantly the nuclear environment, a large scale conflict on land, air
and sea is not likely between India and China.
In this regard, the Indian Army is perhaps right in its assessment that any
stand-off with China would be over land with the main objective of only
embarrassing the adversary or show the other power down through surprise. The
Indian military knows that China had become capable of sustaining large forces
for longer durations in Tibet in 2010, and thus it is imperative on India’s part to
push infrastructure development in the border areas to neutralize the surprise
element from either China or Pakistan.

INFRASTRUCTURE
UPGRADATION
On 31 July 2004, Shyam Saran took over as foreign secretary superseding nearly
ten other IFS officers senior to him. To Saran’s credit, there was bipartisan
consensus over his appointment, with then NSA Brajesh Mishra making his
preference for the then ambassador to Nepal as the new foreign secretary if the
NDA returned back to power. NDA did not return to power, but Mishra’s
recommendation was seen through – Saran was the new PM’s choice of foreign
secretary as well.
Before coming to South Block, Saran had served as ambassador to Myanmar
and Nepal and was absolutely clear about the dismal state of affairs when it
came to Indian border infrastructure. He was instrumental in operationalizing the
160 km Moreh–Tamu–Kalemyo road during his posting to Yangon at the turn of
the century. As ambassador to Nepal, Saran personally visited the Terai region
bordering India to witness the chaos prevailing on the open border.
The first step that Saran took as foreign secretary was to travel to the
Northeast to assess the infrastructure from the Indian side. Saran travelled to
Arunachal Pradesh in November 2004 with then Chief Minister Gegong Apang
and did a spot study of the LAC. With the Indian Army not at all keen on
connecting the LAC with roads as part of the regressive tactical strategy to
contain future PLA intrusions, Saran found the border infrastructure in utter
disarray. Conscious of the Chinese leadership’s contempt towards India during
the years he had served in Beijing, Saran studied the situation on ground and
decided to change it. As a fluent Mandarin speaker, he understood the nuances
of diplomacy with the Chinese and knew that China only understood the
language of power and would not come to the negotiating table unless India
changed the facts on the ground.
Upon Saran’s return, he submitted a report to the PM recommending two
inter-basin strategic roads in Arunachal Pradesh and seven north–south road
alignments linking those spots where Chinese incursions had occurred in 1962 to
these strategic roads. Saran also recommended the revival of advance landing
grounds in Arunachal Pradesh that had been lying defunct since the fall of
Tawang in 1962, such as Passighat, and upgrading airbases like Tezpur in
Assam. As the report concerned India’s internal situation, he also presented a
copy to then Special Advisor to PM M.K. Narayanan and was actually berated
by then NSA J.N. Dixit for not giving him a copy of the report despite the issue
pertaining to China. Manmohan Singh marked a copy to the newly appointed
A.K. Antony for implementation of the recommendations by the BRO.
With Saran getting involved in hectic diplomacy with the US over the nuclear
deal and sealing the political parameters for the resolution of the boundary
dispute with China, his focus changed for the next three years. The same was the
case for the PM, with the Indo–US nuclear deal a priority, as he had to weather
serious threats to his government over the agreement. Antony on his part
directed the Army and the BRO to start the process of identifying strategic roads
that needed to be built in Arunachal Pradesh.
Winds of change started sweeping in Army Headquarters in July 2006, when
Lt. General Mohan Pande took over as director-general of military operations,
who was succeeded by Amarjeet Singh Sekhon the next year. Indian military
commanders began to see the merit in upgrading border infrastructure for the
first time. Saran became the special envoy of the PM on the nuclear deal after he
demitted office on 1 September 2006, while his close friend Shivshankar Menon
took over as foreign secretary after superseding no less than 16 officers. While
for the record Saran was the PM’s envoy, his other important job was to improve
border infrastructure. In the summer of 2007, Saran flew with Defence Minister
Antony to the Western Sector to study road and border infrastructure in Ladakh.
Antony and Saran flew right from Daulat Beg Oldi to Chumar with stops at
Chushul and Demchok. Much to his disappointment, Saran found the advanced
landing grounds in a state of disrepair with huge cracks in the runways at DBO,
Chushul and Fukche as they were said to be under observation of Chinese
artillery. Saran found that there was no standardization at Army outposts when it
came to clothing, shoes, shelter, food or even communication facilities.
Standardization of equipment and facilities was a priority as the troopers did not
have adequate winter clothing or shoes despite patrolling at the roof of the world
in arctic temperatures.
Back in Delhi, Saran filed a report on the state of affairs in the Ladakh sector
to the PM, who asked him to discuss the matter in detail with Antony. Pointing
to the pathetic state of road infrastructure along the LAC and the fact that mule
trains were still used to cart supplies to army posts in DBO and Depsang, Saran
recommended that the advanced landing grounds must be revived in DBO,
Chushul, Fukche and Demchok and defined the standard when it came to
clothing, food and communications. Upon discovering that troopers never
discussed the state of affairs in the presence of their superiors, Saran picked up
strands of information by interacting with them. For instance, there was no
yardstick in allowing jawans to use satellite phones to talk to their families. In
some places, Thuraya satellite phones were free while in others phones were
either not available or the jawans were charged for their calls. Saran
recommended standardized clothing, shelter and food rations for posts according
to the altitudes and mandated one satellite phone with free usage for troopers at
these heights.
While he was told that the DRDO was developing pre-fabricated huts or posts
for the Army, Saran said that there was no use in reinventing the wheel and
recommended that equipment be purchased from countries making specialized
winter clothing and equipment. The PM’s envoy also made an aerial trip to all
the key passes on the Manali–Upshi–Leh route like Rohtang La, Baralacha La
and Tanglang La to study how to make this strategic highway accessible
throughout the year and ensure round-the-year supplies to troops deployed in
Ladakh. As the Manali–Leh route was the only alternative to the Delhi–
Srinagar–Zozi La–Drass–Kargil–Leh route, Saran recommended changes in road
alignments and tunnelling of Baralacha La and Tanglang La for a snow-free road
around the year, apart from suggesting work to be expedited on the nine km long
tunnel under Rohtang La.
Given that Ladakh is a cold desert with sunshine available for over 300 days
in a year, Saran proposed solar power be harnessed through captive farms for
Army and civilian establishments in Leh and neighbouring areas. That the
Ladakh sector and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands – both on the frontline of
China’s military and naval capabilities – are surviving on diesel-generated power
is a sobering thought by itself. The PM’s envoy also studied border
infrastructure along the LOC with Pakistan and Siachen with recommendations
on upgrading the roads in the Kargil sector.
Saran’s report was taken seriously by both the PM and Antony and within
weeks a Defence Ministry delegation left for Austria and Switzerland to
purchase heavy winter clothing and pre-fabricated huts with built-in toilets. With
Menon and Vijay Singh at the helm of affairs in South Block by July 2007 as
foreign and defence secretaries respectively, Saran’s report was made actionable
with the Air Force reviving the DBO, Chushul, Fukche, Demchok and Nyoma
landing grounds. Work on a road parallel to the LAC in Ladakh sector was
expedited even though the road is still a dusty track with a capacity to handle
three tonne trucks from Demchok to Lukung beyond Pangong Tso and one tonne
ATVs up to DBO. With the government putting pressure on the armed forces,
the DBO advanced landing ground was repaired with cracks on the tarmac,
which had been hidden by metal sheets, removed through soil stabilization. The
airstrip used during the 1962 war and serviced by American Fairchild Packets up
to 1966 was opened after 42 years when an IAF AN-32 aircraft finally landed at
DBO on 31 May 2008 within months of Saran’s report.
The Fukche advanced landing ground, which is 2.5 km from the LAC and
under Chinese observation, was reactivated on 4 November 2008 with another
AN-32 landing on the airstrip. The Nyoma airstrip was reactivated when an AN-
32 landed at the 13,300 feet high runway in the early hours of 18 September
2009. Just 23 km from the LAC, Nyoma is located in the shadow of twin
mountain peaks on the axis to Leh. Despite Saran’s recommendations, the Air
Force has decided not to activate the Chushul landing ground due to its close
proximity to the LAC and as it was under direct observation of the PLA post
across the disputed territory.30
Situated near the famous Rezang La battle memorial, the Chushul airstrip,
however, is in working condition and could be used during emergencies or in
case of hostilities. The Demchok landing ground is currently used for logistics,
supply and deployment.
Further to Saran’s recommendations, Antony asked Defence Secretary Vijay
Singh to ensure that all airstrips in Arunachal Pradesh were reactivated as well.
Singh tasked Eastern Air Commander P.K. Barbora for identifying the advanced
landing grounds and reactivating them. After discussions between the state
government and the IAF, the Defence Ministry proposed to then Chief Minister
Dorjee Khandu that if the airstrips were handed over to the Centre, the latter
would not only reactivate them but also allow them for civilian use.31 Despite
this proposal being agreed to by Khandu, the handover was mired in red tape
between the state government, the Centre and the IAF.
With Vijay Singh due to retire on 31 July 2009, Antony asked him at the
beginning of the year to ensure that the landing grounds in Arunachal were taken
over by the Centre for reconstruction before he demitted office. On 9 June that
year, Singh and Arunachal Pradesh Chief Secretary Tabom Bam signed a
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to allow the Defence Ministry to
develop advanced landing grounds at Aalo, Walong, Ziro, Mechuka, Tuting,
Passighat, Vijaynagar, Tezu, Daporijo and Tawang.32
While the Ministry of Civil Aviation in conjunction with the Ministry of
Development of North Eastern Region have floated tenders for civil construction
of these advanced landing grounds, the basic idea is to improve force mobility
and ensure rapid deployment of troops and equipment in Arunachal Pradesh. On
19 November 2011, Arunachal Pradesh Governor General J.J. Singh
accompanied by Eastern Air Commander S. Varthaman inaugurated the
rejuvenated landing ground at Vijaynagar by landing an AN-32 aircraft at the
base, which is strategically located at the tri-junction of India, Myanmar and
China.33 Flights were suspended from the base in 2009 when pierced metal
sheets fixed with wooden pegs that the airstrip was made of came undone as
aircraft took off from the ground.
It is at Vijaynagar that one understands the 1962 mindset of the Indian Army,
as even after 65 years of independence, there are no roads to this 6,000 strong
settlement without any electricity, with anti-India insurgent groups like ULFA,
NSCN (I-M) and NSCN-K training across the border in Myanmar with Chinese
weapons. The only alternative to air transport from Vijaynagar is a six-day trek
through a 157 km stretch of thick jungles through Namdapha to reach Miao, the
nearest town.
As road infrastructure was a matter of serious concern for Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh and a topic of intense debate in the CSG, Cabinet Secretary
B.K. Chaturvedi pushed for a proposal for 12 strategic roads – one each in
Western and Middle sectors and the other 10 in the Eastern sector. In May 2006,
44 years after the 1962 war, the Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs
(CCEA) cleared T 900 crore for construction of the 12 roads.34 The PMO
pushed the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways, the Ministry of
Development of North Eastern Region and the Defence Ministry to improve
road infrastructure in border areas with China. Apart from the 12 roads, the
following initiatives were taken:

• Seven border roads and two inter-basin roads in Arunachal Pradesh were to
be taken up under a specially accelerated road development programme for
the Northeast.
• Twenty-seven roads were identified by the Ministry of Home Affairs to link
the border outposts.
• Thirty-six general staff roads were identified by the DGMO.
• The BRO would implement a comprehensive and consolidated plan for road
connectivity up to key passes and main defences.
Replying to a question on all-weather roads in border areas in the Lok Sabha
on 8 March 2010, Defence Minister Antony said that a total of 72 roads were in
the process of being upgraded and developed along the border areas in the north
and the Northeast.35 Eighteen thousand km of roads was expected to be
completed by 2022. The key step to link border towns of Arunachal Pradesh
with highways in the hinterland was pushed by none other than Manmohan
Singh during his two-day visit to the state in January 2008. Addressing the
people of the border state, Singh said, ‘I am happy to announce that a two lane
trans-Arunachal Pradesh highway, from Tawang to Mahadevpur (Assam),
covering 1,840 km and passing through Bomdila, Nechipu, Sippa, Sagalee, Ziro,
Daparizo, Along, Passighat, Roing, Tezu, Mahadevpur, Namchik, Changlang,
Khonsa and Kanubari will be constructed.’36 On 16 May 2008, the trans-
Arunachal highway was notified as a national highway, 52B, with the total cost
of the project touching around T 10,000 crore.37
However, despite the government taking keen interest in the highway, work
in at least 10 stretches was still to be finalized as on 27 April 2012 due to typical
bureaucratic red tape. For example, after four years of construction, only 64 km
of the sanctioned 162 km between Tawang and Nechipu had been completed and
a detailed project report was awaited for the remaining 68 km.
The process of improvement of border infrastructure has not been without
hurdles, despite key people putting in tremendous effort to ensure India does not
draw up a zero. One of the key decisions taken by the Defence Ministry that
helped road infrastructure was in 2008 when Antony in consultation with
Defence Secretary Singh insisted that the BRO focus only on strategic roads and
pull out of developing roads in the hinterland. Directing the BRO to take up
border roads as top priority, the Defence Ministry pulled out the agency from
building the NH-16 project linking Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra and
Chhattisgarh.38
The next hurdle was the clearance from the Ministry of Environment and
Forests on deforestation in the virgin landscape of Arunachal Pradesh, with
environmental activists raising a hue and cry over the projects. It goes to the
credit of the PM and Antony for taking the initiative and bureaucrats like Saran,
Vijay Singh, G.K. Pillai and Shivshankar Menon that they went out of their way
to sensitize the judiciary and P.V. Jayakrishnan, chairman of the Supreme Court-
appointed Central Empowerment Committee, on the strategic requirement for
border roads and the need to improve connectivity in the Northeast, particularly
in Arunachal Pradesh.
The Defence Ministry is also spending serious money on upgrading and
improving Army and Air Force infrastructure in the Western and Eastern sectors.
Replying to a question on major projects of Military Engineer Services in the
Lok Sabha, Antony pegged the planned development of army infrastructure and
improvement of IAF infrastructure in the Northeast at T 7,374 crore and T 1,753
crore respectively.39 Similarly, capacity building along the northern borders was
estimated to cost T 24,312 crore, while upgrading ammunition storage facilities
would cost another T 18,450 crore. The improvement in infrastructure on border
areas has been carried out in conjunction with the acquisition of hardware for the
Army and the Air Force, the latter of which still harbours the grouse that had its
fighters been used in the 1962 war, the outcome could have been different.

INDIAN AIR FORCE

On the eve of IAF’s eightieth anniversary in 2012, former Air Chief N.A.K.
Browne made no bones about the fallacy of Nehru not using the offensive
capability of the Air Force in the 1962 war. Fifty years after the border war,
Browne said, ‘India had learnt an open and glaring lesson by not using offensive
air power in the 1962 war and its outcome would have been totally different if
the role of air force had been expanded beyond providing logistics support.’40
It is, however, quite evident from the letter Nehru wrote to Kennedy that the
IAF could not be deployed during the war as India had no radar and air defence
equipment against any retaliatory action by the Chinese. Former Air Chief
Shashindra Pal Tyagi contests this truth. ‘There is unanimity among air warriors
that use of combat air power in 1962 would have had a decisive impact on the
battle,’ he told me in an interview.41 According to him, the Air Force was not
deployed because the political leadership was worried that the use of air power
would escalate the war and Indian cities like Kolkata would be bombed as India
did not have any air defence systems to negate Chinese firepower. Tyagi also
said the war was mismanaged, with the defence minister virtually running a
‘private war’, with IV Corps Commander Lt. General B.M. Kaul reporting to
him directly without keeping the Army chief in the picture. ‘Since Kaul did not
ask for air power, none was provided. It is highly unlikely that the IAF
leadership was seriously consulted. It is also true that the IAF leadership did not
play an active role by suo moto advising the government. But then these were
strange times and few knew who was in charge,’ he said, emphasizing that ‘the
only war India has lost after Independence is the one in which combat air power
was not used.’
With the PLA amassed across the Chumbi valley corridor in 1962 and
threatening to severe the Northeast from India towards the end of the war, the
ground situation perhaps deterred Nehru from bringing in air power as it would
have led to a vertical escalation of the conflict. Nonetheless, this brutal lesson
from 1962 was factored into the Defence Ministry’s response to the Chinese
build-up in Tibet in the past decade, with IAF now acquiring long-range delivery
systems, top-of the line surveillance and heavy lift capabilities, air defence
radars and ‘beyond visual range’ missiles.42 The induction of six IL-78M mid-
air refuelling tankers from Uzbekistan and the first batch of 140 Russian Su-30
MKI multi-role fighters at the turn of the twenty-first century have provided
long-range capability to the Air Force with all targets in Tibet within reach. As
fighters burn nearly 40 per cent of their fuel during take-off and climb with
payload, the IL-78M extend the range of the aircraft.
 While the Su-30 MKI lived up to its reputation, the IAF was facing serious
problems with cargo aircraft, as the IL-76 medium lift aircraft was facing serious
problems in take-off with payload from Leh airport during hot summer days. As
the IL-76 was found to be underpowered and required long runways in a rarefied
atmosphere, the Defence Ministry acquired six C-130J Super Hercules aircraft
from the US in 2008. The Defence Ministry had happy memories of the C-130
as the US had stationed one squadron of these versatile aircraft at Palam to
replenish Indian posts a year after December 1962.
The history of the C-130 aircraft in India was recalled by the Indian team,
headed by Antony and Vijay Singh, to the Americans at the Berlin Air Show in
2008 after the deal to purchase the six C-130s for more than a billion US dollars.
After US pilots demonstrated the prowess of C-17 Globemaster III strategic
lifter aircraft on the sidelines of the show, on 15 June 2009, the IAF announced
it would purchase 10 C-17 Globemaster aircraft at a cost of $4.1 billion with the
option of purchasing another six after the first batch was delivered in 2013–
2015.43 The first heavy lift C-17 Globemaster landed at Hindon airbase near
New Delhi on 18 June 2013 with two more following in the next two months.44
After the first C-130J was inducted into the IAF in February 2011, India will
now purchase a total of 18 C-130J after the CCS approved the purchase of
another six aircraft on 18 November 2013, despite both countries being involved
in a diplomatic row over the treatment accorded to Indian Deputy Consul-
General Devyani Khobragade.
The first of the C-130J aircraft was put to use in relief operations after a
massive earthquake hit Sikkim. India purchased the C-130J and the C-17
keeping in mind the versatility of the two aircraft and the ability to land and
take-off from short runways, just like those that existed on the Himalayan belt.
While the first batch of these two aircraft will be based in Hindon airbase near
Ghaziabad, the IAF has already announced that the second batch of C-130J will
be based at Pannagarh in West Bengal in support of the new mountain strike
corps and will supply logistics in the Eastern Sector.
While the replenishment of army posts along the LAC is part of the job for
these two strategic transport aircraft, their main purpose is the rapid deployment
or insertion of special forces behind enemy lines. In the context of the PLA
raising airborne troop divisions, the two aircraft will give a tremendous boost to
Indian lift capability and rapid deployment of special forces para-commandos
based at Kheria in Agra.
The purchase of the airlifters were concurrent to the upgradation of IAF’s key
bases – Tezpur, Chabua, Hashimara, Bagdogra and Kalaikunda – in the Eastern
Sector in terms of infrastructure, early warning radars and air defences. One of
the key steps taken by the IAF with an overt signal of minimal deterrence to
Beijing was the phasing out of ageing MiG-21 fighters from the Tezpur frontline
base. On 15 June 2009, much to the concern of the Chinese, the IAF inducted
Su-30 MKI fighters at the refurbished Tezpur station with another six mid-air
refuellers to be based in Pannagarh for extended air operations when required.
On 1 March 2011, Chabua in upper Assam received its first batch of Su-30 MKI
fighters, with one plane overshooting the base and runway at supersonic speed.
Constructed during the Second World War in 1939, the Chabua base is the
easternmost station of the IAF and India’s first line of defence in the east.45
With India in the process of phasing out the MiG-series of aircraft, it is only a
matter of time when all major bases will be using the 272 Su-30 MKI fighters in
the Air Force’s present inventory before 126 medium-range multi-role combat
aircraft (MMRCA) are inducted into operations this decade. While the French
Rafale fighter has been shortlisted for the MMRCA contract, DRDO is also
looking for a tie-up with Swedish maker SAAB for transfer of technology of
Grippen NG (next generation) fighters. The latest in the series of acquisitions is
the purchase of 22 Apache long-range attack helicopters from the US for the
IAF.46
However, when it comes to China, India’s defensive capabilities will have to
match the PLAAF’s offensive air power, as the latter is well equipped to take the
battle into the Indian heartland. In this context, the IAF has been upgrading its
radars and counter-capability in the past decade, albeit at a slow pace. To
counter multiple level of threats from the air – including ballistic missiles, cruise
missiles, fighter aircraft and bombers – the IAF after a delay of nearly 27 years
signed a contract to procure 37 low-level light-weight radars for detecting
incoming aircraft in July 2009 with Thales of France and Bharat Electronic
Limited.47 The radars are being deployed in the mountains with the Su-30 MKIs
doing practice runs of taking out targets like bridges and culverts in the
Himalayan ranges.
Indian radar detection capabilities have improved vastly in the past decade
with the induction of three top-of-the-line PHALCON AWACS from Israel
during 2009–2011 and two Green Pine radar systems, which is at the heart of the
latest Israeli Arrow 2 anti-missile system.48 While India has asked for two more
PHALCON AWACS from Israel at the cost of $800 million in 2011, the aircraft
has tremendous reach with airborne command and control capability of a battle
theatre. The Israeli airborne warning platform is a huge force multiplier with the
capability of detecting aerial threat some 500 km away beyond the horizon. The
air defences at IAF bases have also been upgraded with India purchasing Barak-
8 mobile defence systems in April 2009 along with the SPYDER short-range
anti-aircraft missile systems.49 The emerging picture from New Delhi is that IAF
is being sufficiently upgraded not only to defend Indian territory but also to take
the war to the enemy.

INDIAN NAVY
On 25 September 2012, then Chinese President Hu Jintao and then Prime
Minister Wen Jiabao commissioned Liaoning, a 55,000 tonne Kuznetsov-class
aircraft carrier, at the height of the tussle with Japan over conflicting territorial
claims on the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands.50 Launched on 4 December 1988, the
carrier, named Varyag, was transferred to Ukraine after dissolution of the Soviet
Union and purchased as scrap by China in 1998. It was refitted by the PLA Navy
as an aircraft carrier purportedly for ‘scientific research, experiment and
training’.51
With the Liaoning, the PLA Navy has now acquired a different set of
capability and is slowly but surely becoming a blue water navy with existing
nuclear submarine capability. The launch of Liaoning is akin to the construction
of the Tibet–Xinjiang highway in 1956, as it changes what is diplomatically
called ‘facts on ground’. Even though naval aviation is trickiest of the lot with
humungous experience required in launch and recovery of aircraft, Liaoning
gives the PLA Navy the capability to launch expeditionary forces in the future
and gives Beijing the option to exercise coercive diplomacy against a regional
adversary.
With China engaging in defence diplomacy with Indian Ocean states, the
launch of Liaoning is a matter of concern to India as well as other powers in
Asia-Pacific. It was the purchase of Varyag in 1998 that signalled Beijing’s shift
from a land-based doctrine to a sea-based one with force projection capability.52
However, unlike the Aksai Chin highway, India was not taken by surprise with
the launch of Liaoning and had already factored the need for completing its own
nuclear triad by acquiring a Russian Charlie-II class nuclear submarine INS
Chakra on lease between 1988 and 1991.53 On 4 April 2012, Defence Minister
Antony launched the Nerpa class nuclear attack submarine – renamed after its
predecessor Chakra – on a 10-year lease from Russia.54
The acquisition of Chakra completes the Indian nuclear triad as New Delhi
now has the second strike capability in consonance with its ‘no first use’ nuclear
policy. In fact, after the 1974 tests, Indian strategic thinkers were keen to acquire
a nuclear submarine to deter any superpower or aspiring superpower. In 1976,
the Navy had proposed to then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi that they should
take the Russian offer of a nuclear submarine.55 Interestingly, the Russian offer
was made by Fleet Admiral S.G. Gorshkov, whose name was used to christen
the 45,000 tonne Kiev class helicopter carrier which after an overhaul will now
be known as INS Vikramaditya.
The Indian Navy is on the verge of acquiring quite a bit of strategic muscle
with the capability of reaching anywhere on the planet. On 26 July 2009, Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh and his wife Gursharan Kaur symbolically launched
India’s first nuclear submarine INS Arihant at Visakhapatnam naval base,56 and
its nuclear reactor went critical on 10 August 2013.57 This 6,000 tonne
submarine, based on the original Charlie-II class design, has the capability to
launch ballistic missiles and will strengthen India’s nuclear deterrent capability.
INS Arihant is currently on a sea trial and is expected to be inducted in the Navy
by 2013–2014. The Indian Navy is also constructing two indigenous aircraft
carriers – INS Vikrant and INS Vishal – based on the design of India’s first
aircraft carrier Vikrant with the first air-defence ship expected to be
commissioned only in 2017 and the second five years later.58 Vikrant was
launched by Elizabeth Antony, wife of the defence minister, at Kochi shipyard
on 12 August 2013.59 But two days later, the Indian Navy suffered its worst
mishap when a Kilo-class submarine INS Sindhurakshak, which had been
refurbished in 2013, caught fire at Mumbai naval dockyard and went down with
18 hands. While the sabotage angle is not being ruled out, the Navy claims that
the accident was due to an explosion during the loading of armaments.60
Although the Navy lost a critical combatant in the Sindhurakshak accident, its
modernization plan is based on its concept of three carrier-based forces with
complement of nuclear submarines, destroyers and frigates. INS Vikramaditya
will be based in Karwar in Karnataka to handle the western seaboard, while INS
Vikrant will be based in Visakhapatnam on the eastern seaboard along with two
nuclear submarines based at the nearby Gangavaram port in Andhra Pradesh.61
As things stand now, the Navy has plans to be a pre-eminent modern naval force
with a combatant level of 150 warships and 500 aircraft. It is expected to induct
49 new ships and submarines including Scorpene class submarines, Kolkata
class destroyers, P-28 anti-submarine warfare corvettes, Shivalik class frigates
and remainder three Talwar class frigates from Russia along with off-shore
patrol vessels, landing platform dock and a number of interceptor aircraft within
this decade. In addition, the naval air force will get a huge boost with induction
of eight American P8I anti-submarine, anti-surface reconnaissance and
surveillance aircraft and a multi-role helicopter.62
However, the Indian Navy is currently facing delays in warship production
due to slow work at Indian shipyards and perpetual cost overruns from Russian
shipyards. While the Defence Ministry has now allowed the private sector to get
into warship building, the Manmohan Singh government knows that slackness in
defence production needs to be drastically cut down for India to counter China in
the Indian Ocean.63 With New Delhi projecting its area of influence from the
Gulf of Aden to the Strait of Malacca, the Indian Navy has been engaged in
maritime exercises with countries like the US, Brazil, South Africa, France,
Indonesia, Thailand, Russia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Oman and the UK.64 To
counter growing Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean, the Navy has transferred
off-shore patrol boats, fast-attack craft, surveillance aircraft and patrol boats to
the navies of Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Maldives, Seychelles and Mauritius to
strengthen their capabilities to fight piracy and maritime terrorism. The Navy
also, on request of respective governments, undertakes patrols in the exclusive
economic zones of friendly countries like Seychelles, Maldives, Madagascar and
Mauritius to counter piracy.65 Just as Chinese warships are operating in western
Indian Ocean, Indian Navy warships are increasingly making forays into South
China Sea and up to Japan.66 Indian cooperation with South and East China Sea
littorals like Vietnam, Philippines, Indonesia, South Korea and Japan is on the
rise as well, hedging against the Chinese at the eastern crossroad of Indian
Ocean, with convergence of interests on energy security issues.
Given the PLA Navy’s moves to engage African countries, Indian Navy has
moved ahead to provide military cooperation, particularly training, to almost a
third of the 54 African nations.67 As many as 12 east African navies are part of
the new Indian Ocean Naval Symposium initiative which is a step towards
constructive engagement between navies of the Indian Ocean littorals. The
Navy’s assessment is that Chinese demand for energy motivates both its foreign
policy and its national security policy but its attempts to import oil via pipelines
would not reduce its dependence on the sea lanes of communication in the
Indian Ocean.
As the PLA Navy approaches the Indian Ocean as a land-locked power
seeking port access with littoral countries like Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka
and Myanmar, all of which fall within the ambit of Indian influence, there is a
possibility of conflict between the two Asian giants. Keeping the context of
competition between two growing powers for energy and natural resources and
the need to keep sea lanes free from pirates and terrorists, India has taken
multiple steps to counter them in the Indian Ocean.
With an increased force level of combatants and force multipliers available at
its disposal, India has taken key steps in this decade to enlarge its footprint over
the Indian Ocean right till the Cape of Good Hope and Horn of Africa. However,
more significant steps have been taken closer to Indian shores with the aim of
enforcing international laws of seas within and outside its jurisdiction and
exclusive economic zones.
The islands of Lakshadweep lie on the nine degree channel, a 200 km wide,
2,397 m deep water lane, which separates the union territory from the Indian
mainland. The channel handles a lot of hydrocarbon and merchandise traffic
from the Gulf to north and east Asia via the turbulent high-seas off the Makran
coast. On 1 May 2012, the Navy commissioned a full scale naval base – INS
Dweeprakshak – at Kavaratti, the administrative headquarters of Lakshadweep.
Media reports quoted Navy officials as saying that the station on the western
maritime frontier of the country was a milestone indicative of the force’s
commitment to maintain effective coastal surveillance and defence
capabilities.68 Officials said that the Navy had put in place radar stations and
other surveillance measures across the island chain to monitor shipping traffic
and gather operational intelligence.
The Navy has been operating a detachment at Kavaratti since the 1980s. With
the commissioning of INS Dweeprakshak, the island territories will witness
calibrated strengthening of assets in tandem with their growing relevance to the
security calculus of the nation. ‘A firmer footing on the islands, which are spread
out astride some of the busiest shipping lanes of the world, would provide the
necessary wherewithal to the Navy to discharge its responsibilities suitably.
Indian warships on patrol would now extend their reach farther with base
support from INS Dweeprakshak,’ senior Indian Navy officials said.69
Four months later, India announced setting up of six radar stations in
Lakshadweep, to be established as part of the static sensors project of the
Defence Ministry.70 The project aims at preventing undetected intrusion of
vessels along the coastal line with radar stations at Kiltan, Androth, Agatti,
Kalpeni, Minicoy and Suhielipar by 2013. ‘The movement of vessels can be
tracked, however small it may be. A vessel can be identified. The control room
can also speak to the ship. The data collected will be shared with other maritime
agencies and networks to generate a comprehensive maritime domain
awareness,’ senior Coast Guard officials were quoted as saying in the
newspapers.71 The project envisages the fitting of high-end surveillance gadgets
like frequency diversity radars, electro-optic sensors (CCD cameras, LLTV and
thermal imagers), VHF sets and MET equipment on lighthouses and masts
erected at 36 locations on the mainland in addition to the six locations on
Lakshadweep and four in Andaman and Nicobar Islands. A total of 46 remote
radar stations are envisaged in the first phase at a cost of T 601.75 crore with an
aim of covering shipping movement in the Nine Degree Channel or
Lakshadweep Sea and the Arabian Sea.
The strategic importance of Lakshadweep is evident from a cursory look at
the major shipping lanes map of the world, with traffic from the Strait of
Malacca bound for Suez Canal and Gulf of Hormuz being bisected by the Indian
island-chain. Realizing the strategic leverage that Lakshadweep and Andaman
and Nicobar island chains provide, a tri-service command was set up at Port
Blair in 2001 to prevent smuggling, gun-running, piracy, drug trafficking,
poaching and illegal human trafficking in the region.72
Situated merely 90 km from the restive Banda Aceh region in Indonesia and
around 193 km from Myanmar territory, the Andaman island chains are a
strategically located hub in the Indian Ocean, particularly in the Bay of Bengal.
It is not without reason that the US looked towards India to patrol sea lanes in
the Indian Ocean after the launch of ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ in
Afghanistan after 9/11.
The 150 km wide Ten Degree Channel bisects the Andaman Islands from the
Nicobar group, which is used as a major shipping route. The Six Degree Channel
between 7º (Great Nicobar) and 5º (Banda Aceh) is the main route to Malacca
Strait with traffic from the Gulf countries, the Suez Canal and the Cape of Good
Hope converging in the area for entry into south, east and north Asia.
Realizing the importance of this major shipping route, on 31 July 2012, India
opened the INS Baaz naval base at Campbell Bay, just 51 km from India’s
southernmost tip Indira Point.73 While Beijing noticed the launch of Baaz with a
degree of concern with its official media highlighting its location, the new
station is 300 nautical miles from Port Blair and sits on the mouth of the Strait of
Malacca.74 Baaz is envisaged as a launch pad for Navy operations in the area
with an upgraded airbase ready to cater to long-range fighters and rapid
deployment transport aircraft like the C-17 and the C-130J for special
operations. Baaz is part of the on-going effort to fortify naval infrastructure in
the island chain with forward operating bases at Kamorta in Nicobar and
Diglipur in Andaman. Only Port Blair airport, which has been upgraded in the
past decade, is cleared for civilian use and has flights to New Delhi, Chennai and
Kolkata.
The build-up of Indian capability in Andaman and Nicobar Islands is key to
deter any adventure from any major power in the region, including China. With
a rapid deployment army brigade based on the island along with a complement
of landing ships, combat infantry vehicles and surveillance aircraft, the
Andaman and Nicobar command has the capacity to deter any adversary. While
it has come to the notice of Indian observers that some Chinese ships have
started taking the route back home through Sunda and Lombard straits further
down south, the increase in transportation costs are significant as it costs one
dollar more to cart one litre of oil through Sunda and two dollars per litre
through the Lombard route.75
An on-going tussle continues between environmentalists and strategists over
the deployment of long-range radars in the virgin forests of these island-chains,
but the security imperatives are likely to prevail in the context of a rising China.
 eight

AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE

Fifty years to the day Tawang fell to invading troops of the PLA on 24 October
1962, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei asserted that India was
its partner instead of a rival and wanted to deepen strategic cooperation with
New Delhi.1 Hong’s comment was the first official statement from China on the
war’s fiftieth anniversary, with the state-run media conspicuous by its silence on
the conflict. While the Second World War and Japan’s occupation of China is a
common topic for the Chinese media in light of tensions over disputed East
China Sea islands, Beijing’s controlled media hardly comments on either the
1962 war or its 1979 war with Vietnam, both conflicts in which Beijing was the
aggressor. In contrast to the silent Chinese media, Indian media ran series of
articles and documentaries to commemorate the war.
Hong in his statement had said, ‘The current world has undergone deep and
profound changes. As the two most-populous developing countries and emerging
economies, both China and India face important opportunities of development.
The two countries are cooperating partners, instead of rivals. Their common
ground far outweighs [the] disputes, and common interests outnumber [the]
conflicts.’ Writing on the fiftieth anniversary of the war in the Tribune, former
Chinese Ambassador to India Cheng Ruisheng counted the positives of India–
China relationship since the signing of Five Principles of Co-Existence in 1954.
Stressing that harmony was precious between the two countries, Cheng said
bilateral ties between the two countries have gradually improved since 1976 with
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to Beijing in 1988 a major turning point in
the relations. Apart from what he called a ‘short setback’ in 1998 after India’s
nuclear tests, Cheng said the rapid development of Indo–China relations led to a
strategic and cooperative partnership in 2005. Another positive listed by him was
of China adopting a neutral stand on the Kashmir question and maintaining
friendly relations with both India and Pakistan. Stating that there was
deterioration of relations and confrontation between the two between 1959 and
1976, Cheng wrote: ‘Relations between China and Pakistan rapidly strengthened
[during the time], with the result that India had to face a two-front unfavourable
strategic environment. And due to continued improvement of relations between
India and the Soviet Union and the formation of an alliance between them,
China, whose relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated at that time, also had
to face a two-front disadvantageous strategic environment. After US President
Nixon’s visit to China in 1972, there emerged in South Asia a confrontation
between China, Pakistan and the United States on one side and India and the
Soviet Union on the other side, giving rise to a serious threat to peace in Asia
and the world.’2
Cheng’s article is singularly instructive as it presents Beijing’s view on Indo–
China relations and the state of play in South Asia. According to him, China has
tried hard to persuade relevant parties to reconcile when ‘conflicts occur
between India and Pakistan or between India and other South Asian countries’.
The former Chinese Ambassador to India and Myanmar denied that Beijing’s
relations with Pakistan and other South Asian countries intended to encircle or
contain India. ‘China has developed friendly relations with both India and
Pakistan in a separate way, while trilateral relations between China, India and
the United States have maintained a general balance… In recent years, India’s
diplomatic strategy has shown a certain degree of inclination towards the United
States but has still adhered to policy of friendship with China,’ Cheng wrote.
The diplomat singles out three major factors for the rise of the ‘China Threat’
theory in India, namely, that no major breakthrough in the boundary dispute has
occurred and the continued impact of the 1962 war on the psyche of the
respective nations, that a widening economic gap between India and China has
led to insecurity in New Delhi, and that India is concerned over China’s growing
relations with its neighbours, while Beijing is concerned about New Delhi’s
military cooperation with the US and Japan. ‘The situation in recent years has
indicated that both sides have taken a number of steps in promoting mutual trust.
The main steps taken by the Indian side in support of China are: recognizing
Tibet as part of China’s territory [and] taking resolute measures so that the
Olympic torch passed through Delhi successfully in April 2008. The main steps
taken by the Chinese side in support of India are: recognizing Sikkim as part of
India’s territory; making positive remarks on India’s desire to become a
permanent member of the UNSC [and] taking a flexible attitude so that the
resolution to lift nuclear embargo against India could be passed by Nuclear
Suppliers Group,’ Cheng concluded.
The former diplomat’s claim that China was neutral about the Kashmir
question stands under scrutiny, as on the eve of Wen Jiabao’s 2010 visit to India,
a Xinhua report described the Sino–Indian border as nearly 2,000 km long –
knocking off nearly 1,500 km of border shared by Jammu and Kashmir with
China.3 According to Indian Army boundary records, the total length of the
Indo–China border is 3,488 km, from the tri-junction of India–China–
Afghanistan to the tri-junction of India–China–Myanmar in the east. Nehru in
his letters to Zhou in the 1950s records the border being as long as 3,520 km.
The Xinhua article clearly indicated that China no longer treats the 1,488 km
line separating Jammu and Kashmir on one hand and Xinjiang and Tibet on the
other as a border with India. The Chinese recasting of the border and the
entailing Kashmir question in the past decade appears to be part of a larger
strategy of Beijing. Issuing stapled visas to Indian Kashmiri residents with
passports processed in Srinagar, raising human rights issues to stymie Lt.
General B.S. Jaswal’s visit in 2010, expanding its footprint in POK and seeking
to link Xinjiang with Gwadar are all pieces of this strategy.
A day before Wen arrived in India, the Global Times – an English newspaper
published by the People’s Daily, the official organ of the Chinese Communist
Party – contradicted the Indian figure of the length of the border.4 In an
interview to the Global Times, Indian Ambassador S. Jaishankar had referred to
a common border of 3,488 km in reply to a question on LAC tensions.
Publishing the article the next day, the newspaper added a small note to
Jaishankar’s observation, saying that ‘There is no settled length on the common
border. The Chinese government often refers to the border length as being about
2,000 km.’ Also, briefing the Chinese media on the eve of Wen’s visit, Hu
Zhengyue, then Chinese Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs, also referred to
the length of the border as 2,000 km.5
All these statements mean that China, which claims to be neutral on Jammu
and Kashmir, is yet to recognize the state as part of India. Beijing currently
occupies 38,000 sq. km of Indian territory in Aksai Chin, while Pakistan ceded
another 5,180 sq. km of Shaksgam valley to China in 1963. It is quite evident
from the various statements and the facts that China treats Jammu and Kashmir
as a separate or disputed entity, and if India is to reclaim the Shaksgam valley, it
would have to deal with both Pakistan and China separately or even together.
The spectre of a two-front conflict was raised once again by Shyam Saran in his
9 August 2013 on-the-spot report to the prime minister as the west end of the
Rimu group of glaciers is juxtaposed to Siachen and the eastern end to the
Karakoram Pass–Daulat Beg Oldi. Recommending beefing up deterrent security
measures in the DBO sector, which is a cul-de-sac with China on two sides and
Pakistan on one side, Saran said the continued nibbling at the border by the PLA
could be part of a military plan to cut off this area in order to have a new snow-
free alignment for the Karakoram highway.
This 2,000 km border message drove hard into the Indian establishment and
for the first time, India made no reference to New Delhi’s recognition of Tibet as
part of China in the joint statement released on 16 December 2010.6 No
reference to One-China policy was made during Singh’s meeting with President
Xi Jinping at Durban in March and with Prime Minister Li Keqiang in May 2013
either. Post Wen’s 2010 visit, the ambiguous Chinese strategy over Jammu and
Kashmir was pointed out by S.M. Krishna, who communicated in no uncertain
terms that Kashmir was as much an integral part of India as Tibet was of China.7
An influential section within the Indian diplomatic establishment actually
advocated that India should start issuing stapled visas to residents of Outer Tibet
as a message to Beijing. While the establishment resisted this hard move, the
Manmohan Singh government was quite unhappy about the new characterization
of the LAC and the status of Jammu and Kashmir. However, to drive the point
home, India for the first time raised a flag about the presence of PLA troops in
POK, particularly in the involvement of Chinese troops in the disputed Neelum
hydroelectric project, which faces the sensitive Gurez sector across the LOC. A
retired Indian foreign secretary bluntly told his Chinese interlocutor during a
2012 visit to Beijing that given the LOC is susceptible to accidental artillery
firing from both sides, PLA workers involved in the Athmuqam–Muzaffarabad
road project and the Neelum project run the risk of getting caught in the
crossfire.
The Gurez–Neelum valley sector is an area that still witnesses infiltration of
jihadist groups into Indian territory with support fire from Pakistani troops. The
other issue that disappointed the Indian side during Wen’s visit was his remark
that the Indo–China border issue would take a long time to resolve and thus the
focus should be on bilateral economic ties.8 The broad-basing of the special
representative dialogue from a focused border resolution to the totality of
bilateral relations towards the end of Narayanan’s tenure also acted as a
dampener. Thus, there was no Indian reiteration of the One-China Policy in the
joint communiqué issued at the beginning of Wen’s visit for the first time. While
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has met Chinese leaders on the sidelines of
multilateral forums, he has not visited China since the BRICS summit at Sanya
in April 2011. Even though many believe that the PM did want to go to China on
the eve of the eighteenth National Party Congress in 2012, Manmohan Singh
concurred with the suggestions of his top diplomatic advisors that India should
maintain parity with Beijing and not be seen as bending over backwards to
accommodate them.
In the meantime, India has concentrated on cementing ties with Nepal and
Bhutan through increased economic participation and reviving its close
relationships with Bangladesh and Myanmar. Rather than being confined to
diplomatic engagements, India now seeks to engage these countries across
sections of societies so that there are multiple levers involved in cushioning any
downturn in ties. It has increased bilateral aid to Nepal from a measly T 150
crore per annum in 2011 with focus on infrastructure projects and linking cross-
border roads and railway projects worth T 4,000 crore.9 According to a report
prepared on border infrastructure by Saran, then foreign secretary, there was
extremely poor and inadequate border infrastructure on the Indian side of the
Nepal border with no man’s land virtually obliterated through encroachments.
The report said that 80 per cent of bilateral and transit trade went through four
check points: Jogbani–Biratnagar, Raxaul–Birgunj, Sunauli–Bhairahawa, and
Nepalganj Road–Nepalgunj. A total of 22 border checkpoints existed, of which
15 were also available for transit trade.
The Saran report also found that the state of roads and border infrastructure is
much better on the Nepalese side with no facility to monitor human traffic across
the border. Indian roads were in very poor state and badly maintained, leading to
bottlenecks, slow movement and frequent accidents and were marked by general
lawlessness. The photographs appended to the Saran report told the whole story
and projected an alarmingly poor image of India at the entry points with only
one single broad-gauge link from India to Nepal connecting Raxaul to Birgunj
and a narrow-gauge line between Jaynagar–Janakpur and Katihar to Jogbani.
The Saran report led to the Manmohan Singh government strengthening border
management and security with the CCS clearing the development of four
integrated check posts at the above mentioned border crossings.10 The CCS was
also informed about the need to build backward road linkages to allow cross-
border movement and easy access. The CCS note recommended the following
roads be constructed: Jogbani–Forbesganj (11 km); Raxaul–Motihari–
Piparakothji (66 km), Sunauli–Gorakhpur (92 km) and Nepalgunj Road–
Bahraich–Barabanki (157 km). The Home Ministry was tasked to develop a
‘garland road’ along the border for better patrolling, surveillance and border
management.11
The UPA government also took up feasibility studies on the basis of the Saran
report to link the following cities through broad-gauge link: Katihar–Jogbani–
Biratnagar; Gonda–Nepalgunj; Nautanwa–Bhairahawa; New Jalpaiguri–
Panitanki–Kakarbhitta and Jaynagar–Bijapura–Baribas. With Manmohan Singh
understanding the importance of not letting Nepal slipping into the Chinese zone
of influence, the UPA-II government is developing link roads from India to the
East–West highway in the Terai region of Nepal. The Saran report also
recommended setting up an oil pipeline between Indian Oil Corporation and
Nepal Oil Company between Raxaul and Amlekhgunj via the Birganj–Simra
axis.12
The Saran report found the situation vis-à-vis Bhutan no different, with poor
cross-border infrastructure in particular at Jaigaon, the border town. Once again,
infrastructure was relatively more developed on the Bhutan side. For instance,
the Bhutanese border town of Phuentsholing had better facilities than Jaigaon.
The report found that despite India investing heavily in developing road
infrastructure inside Bhutan, New Delhi had neglected parallel development on
its side of the border. The customs and immigration office in Jaigaon were
dilapidated as compared to the imposing building in Phuentsholing. While
calling for an upgraded integrated check post at Jaigaon, the Saran report
recommended a better network of roads on the Indian side as critical to
preventing misuse of the border by Northeast insurgent groups. Saran also
recommended an expeditious upgrading of the following approach roads from
Assam to Bhutan: Rangia–Tamalpur–Samdrup–Jhonkar (60 km); Pathsala–
Nangalam (39 km); Santabari–Gelephu (40 km) and Baribesa–Kalikhola (30
km).
While suggesting that India push the economic development of border areas
in Assam by establishing small and medium enterprises to utilize Bhutan’s
power generation potential, the Saran report wanted to link the Himalayan
neighbour with the Indian railway network. It suggested that rail links between
border towns of India and Bhutan be set up between Hasimara–Phuentsholing
(18 km), Darranga–Samdrup–Jhonkar (60 km), Kokrajhar–Gelephu (70 km),
Banarhat–Samte (16 km) and Pathsala–Nangalam (40 km). The draft feasibility
of these linkages was submitted to the government in July 2007.
The Saran report also suggested developing an integrated check post at
Jaigaon and a dry port at Phuentsholing to expand mutual economic cooperation.
With India already assisting in some 69 projects in Bhutan, the Saran report
recommended additional economic linkages with more joint ventures in the
fledgling democracy. On the Indian side, the report suggested upgrading nearly
300 km of roads from Chaudharyghat to Sikaridanga, parallel to the India–
Bhutan border in Assam, to allow the Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB) to effectively
patrol and stop radical elements of southern Bhutan refugees transiting through
India.
The other roads recommended by Saran to the PMO along the India–Bhutan
border are in Tawang and West Kameng districts in Arunachal Pradesh. These
include roads between Lumla–Bleeting (40 km), Jang–Nantsering (60 km) and
Shergaon–Bhairavkund via Tenzing Gaon, Kalathang, Angjaling and Balemu
(88 km). It was largely due to Saran’s recommendations and the UPA
government’s efforts that a planned development of Jaigaon was included in the
2021 perspective plan of West Bengal, while the Ministry of Home Affairs
started pursuing the parallel road projects.
With New Delhi infusing nearly T 10,000 crore into Bhutan’s tenth five year
plan for infrastructure and economic development, India is watching Bhutan
closely, particularly after Thimphu and Beijing made overtures to each other
after resuming full-fledged diplomatic ties in 2012.13 Under the terms of the
Indo–Bhutan Treaty, India respected Bhutan’s will to be a closed door society,
giving gauged advice to Thimphu on defence and foreign relations. With Bhutan
now a democracy, India knows that Thimphu will forge diplomatic and trade ties
with Beijing as well as try to be a player on the international stage. But it got a
sobering message from the international community as it got only 20 votes to
push its case to become a non-permanent member of the UNSC in 2012 without
China’s promised support.
On the eve of Bhutan’s second general elections, India withdrew fuel and
kerosene subsidies to the fledgling democracy as the government under Prime
Minister Jigme Thinley was inexplicably slow in discussing the eleventh five
year plan with New Delhi and the subsidy component of the previous plan had
been exhausted.14 Thinley was perceived to be doing a balancing act between
India and China, so much so that it was Prime Minister Wen Jiabao who
informed India through diplomatic channels about his scheduled meeting with
the Bhutanese PM in June 2012.15 While New Delhi castigated its ambassador
and R&AW sleuths for drawing a blank on the crucial meeting, the Indian
security establishment noted the Thinley move with concern. There was relief
for New Delhi after Thinley’s Druk Phuensum Tshogpa party lost to Tshering
Tobgay’s People’s Democratic Party in the general elections by a large margin.
The new prime minister went public on how his government wanted to cement
ties with India even before his swearing-in.16
While the message to Nepal was that it should not play the China card too
often, Bhutan, which is looking for a newfound engagement with Beijing, was
told that it should calibrate its transition from monarchy to democracy carefully
lest it goes the Kathmandu way. Although India had maintained close bilateral
ties with Myanmar’s ruling military junta till the turn of the century, the
relationship took a back seat in the past decade due to concerns from the
international community over human and political rights. There was an
unwritten understanding between India and Myanmar that China would not be
allowed to extend its footprint west of the Chindwin, the largest tributary of the
Irrawaddy. However, taking advantage of Myanmar’s political isolation, Chinese
companies were able to breach this unwritten convention and are now even
building the historic Stillwell Road from Myitkyina to Pangsau Pass near the
Arunachal border. With Myanmar’s new government showing signs of lifting
political restrictions and releasing National League for Democracy chairperson
and perhaps the most famous political prisoner in the world Aung San Suu Kyi
on 10 November 2010, New Delhi revived its engagement with Myanmar in the
earnest. This was accompanied by the Thein Sein government trying to distance
itself from the Chinese by suspending the $3.6 billion Myitsone project due to
environmental concerns and large-scale relocation of human settlements.
India’s renewed engagement with Myanmar post 2010 was not only to limit
expanding Chinese footprints but also to secure its own territory from anti-India
insurgent groups with bases right across the border and as far as Yunan in China.
Although the India–Myanmar border is virtually porous with Naga, Mizo and
Kuki ethnic groups straddling both sides of the 1,400 km long border, there are
only two functional entry-exit points – Moreh–Tamu and Champai in Mizoram
and Rhi in Myanmar. As of now there is only a single all-weather road linking
Moreh in Manipur and Kalay in Myanmar but there is a huge movement of
Chinese contraband through pliant border agencies and ethnic community
groups. Poor roads on both sides of the border hamper trade as well as
monitoring of cross-border traffic, particularly of anti-India insurgent groups
armed with Chinese weapons.
The Saran report had recommended setting up a proper integrated check post
at Moreh–Tamu instead of the currently existing tinshed. It suggested an
additional trading post at Pangsau pass, expanding tradable goods beyond the
current 22 items and regulating the free movement regime by reducing the limit
to 16 km in India and making it available only to the tribal population in order to
cut down on smuggling and movement of insurgent groups. The report also
suggested that India talk to Myanmar to complete the demarcation of the border
so that the limits are properly defined.
While the CCS cleared the integrated check post at Moreh, India started
refocusing on Myanmar only after the Thein Sein government showed its intent
on political reforms and maintaining a balance with the Chinese.17 The Saran
report recommended that India should continue constructive engagement and
enmesh Myanmar in a network of linkages, not just aimed at stymieing Chinese
advances towards the Indian border but also at mutual development of India’s
backward Northeast states. Saran recommended upgrading the Tamu–Kalewa–
Kalemyo road, built by the BRO in 2000, and the Rhi–Tiddim and Rhi–Falam
roads. With the larger objective of using Myanmar as a gateway to South East
Asia, Saran suggested expediting the construction of the Jiribam–Imphal rail link
and extending it to Myanmar’s historic city of Mandalay as part of the ambitious
Delhi–Hanoi rail link. Besides upgrading the Jitribam–Imphal–Moreh road and
integrating it with the proposed trans-Asian highway network, the Saran report
had pushed for implementation of the Kaladan multi-modal transport project to
link Mizoram with Myanmar. He suggested that India and Myanmar should
jointly develop the Tamanthi hydel project on the Chindwin, which could
generate as much as 1,200 MW of power. Of this, some 800 MW could be
exported to India to cater to India’s energy-deficient Northeast.
Saran made similar suggestions to the PMO on revitalizing the Indo–
Bangladesh relationship through more road linkages and proper border
monitoring in order to promote trade, keep a watch on changing demography in
border areas and to mount surveillance on anti-India insurgent groups. The big
picture of Saran’s report, which is in the process of implementation by his
successors, was to integrate India with its neighbours to ward off external
influences.
But even the best of plans go awry if a single-minded focus is missing, and so
it has from the Indian leadership – which is why most of India’s neighbours dub
their diplomatic engagement with New Delhi ‘all talk and no action.’ In sharp
contrast, Chinese engagement with South Asia is focused, mutually productive
and across the political spectrum. A rising China with strong tentacles across
South Asian markets could encroach on the Indian space and lead to a potential
crisis in the coming decade. According to a document titled ‘Non-Alignment
2.0: A Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in the Twenty-First Century’, Asia
is likely to remain a theatre of power competition in the coming years, with the
US looking towards retaining its significant role in the continent.18 While the
document advocates the need to watch the Sino–US contest in Asia closely, it
finds that India still has to live up to expectations and opportunities provided in
Asia. Calling China a ‘significant foreign policy and security challenge’, it
recommends a strategy of ‘holding the line’ in the north on Indo–China land
frontier, i.e. the LAC, but to ‘maintain and, if possible, enlarge India’s current
edge in the maritime south.’ As it expects the border issue to not be resolved in
the near future, the policy document recommends that New Delhi put in place
‘operational concepts and capabilities in place’ to deter any ‘significant
incursions’ from the Chinese side. With China getting locked up in acquiring
dominance in the Yellow Sea, the Taiwan Strait, the East China Sea and the
South China Sea, the document suggests that India use this opportunity to build
its own naval capabilities in the Indian Ocean and foster closer maritime ties
with key littoral states like Indonesia, Australia and Vietnam.
Under the head ‘Hard Power’, the document talks about the possibility of a
future Indo–China border conflict and says that the nuclear factor ‘can be
expected to limit the scale of conflict and impact the scope of feasible political
objectives’. It says that even though the border has been stable, Beijing could
assert its territorial claims in Arunachal Pradesh or Ladakh by use of force.
While the document does not believe that raising a mountain strike corps was a
solution to Indian problems, it says, ‘[A] better way of responding to limited
land grabs by China is for us [India] to undertake similar actions across the
LAC: a strategy of quid pro quo. There are several areas where the local tactical
and operational advantage rests with us. These areas should be identified and
earmarked for limited offensive operations on our part… Such a strategy will not
only wrest the initiative from the Chinese, but also be useful for our diplomatic
efforts to restore status quo ante.’
Finally, the paper advocates, ‘In the event of a major offensive by China, we
cannot resort to a strategy of proportionate response. Rather, we should look to
leverage our asymmetric capabilities to convince the Chinese to back down.
Three broad capabilities will be required to do so. First, we must be able to
trigger an effective insurgency in areas occupied by Chinese forces. We need to
induct locals into paramilitary forces and police units and train them to switch
into guerrilla mode when required… We must develop capabilities to interdict
China’s logistics and operational infrastructure in Tibet. The fork in the road we
need to choose is a politico-military strategy of quid pro quo and asymmetry as a
means to defend our borders with China.’
The paper calls for reassessing India’s Tibet policy as it recommends that
New Delhi’s political engagement with China should be ‘carefully nuanced and
constantly calibrated’ to changing global and regional developments. Clubbing
the Tibet issue with the local dimension, the document says, ‘Persuading China
to seek reconciliation with the Dalai Lama and the exiled Tibetan community
may contribute to easing Indo–China relations. The initial soundings must be
discreet and exploratory. And we must be mindful of the risk of hostile reaction,
particularly from conservative sections of the PLA. The situation vis-à-vis Tibet
has been complicated by the transition to a democratically elected Tibetan
government-in-exile. The Chinese had, in part, expected that the Tibetan
community would continue with its traditional method of selecting the Dalai
Lama – a method amenable to manipulation by China. The Dalai Lama’s
popular legitimacy among his own people is a fact that the Chinese government
must acknowledge.’
On the global front, the policy document acknowledges that the challenge to
Indian diplomacy was to operate within a bandwidth where New Delhi’s
diversified relations with major powers should ensure that Beijing exercises
restraint but these ties should not go beyond the threshold where China sees
India as a threat or a negative power to its rise. ‘If China perceives India as
irrevocably committed to an anti-China containment ring, it may end up
adopting overtly hostile and negative policies towards India, rather than making
an effort to keep India on a more independent path.’
The paper is an important piece of work as it is reflective of the defensive or
extra-cautious mindset of the Indian establishment while dealing with China.
The Indian strategy acknowledges that it is no match in comparison to China in
terms of military and economic power and its policies are designed to not rouse
the giant yet somehow make it cognizant of New Delhi’s clout.
Indian diplomacy has a complex or perhaps confused mindset where it sees
itself as a world power in this century and refuses to calibrate its pole position
according to its economic and military power capability. Yet, with China, it
seems to be sitting on the fence diplomatically despite the fact that Beijing has
done little to make bilateral relations less adversarial. In the current context,
New Delhi is more than satisfied that the Chinese did not make any triumphant
statements on the fiftieth anniversary of the war. Even though China has been
acting as a bully in Asia for the past decade to force the world to recognize
Beijing’s arrival on the global stage, New Delhi’s stance is of a weak power
which wants to play in the premier league but is afraid of it. Rather than
realizing that the Chinese leadership outwitted their naïve Indian counterparts on
political, diplomatic, military or perhaps all fronts in the 1962 war, Indian
policymakers and think-tanks have created a myth of a frightening power sitting
across the border using often repeated quotes from Chinese strategist Sun Tzu
for exaggeration.
New Delhi fails to recognize that China was better prepared 50 years ago.
China has a strategy that indicates suffering Indian antics and then striking at an
opportune moment. Rather than India’s political and military establishment
believing that it was an overwhelming force that attacked the Northeast 50 years
ago, New Delhi should not cover the cowardice of its top military and the
political leadership. The question is, if Indian strategic ambitions are global, then
how does the future look like with China on the rise and its all-weather ally
Pakistan in a black hole emitting terror and negative vibes?
The easier way out is for India to recalibrate its ambitions and confine itself
to being a regional power, as there is no point of setting up an oil rig in the South
China Sea or patrolling the Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam like the US Navy if the
vision is not big enough. In fact, China will be more than happy to accommodate
India as a regional power but not as the global giant as it aspires to be. To be fair
to New Delhi, it is a newcomer to global politics, as even its top strategy
executors quietly admit that at the turn of the last century India was an
economically weak third world country trying to do a diplomatic balancing act in
saving its interests and sovereignty. Its diplomacy and military efforts were
fixated on traditional rivals Pakistan and virtually all its external energies were
used to defend its own territory – Jammu and Kashmir – from outside
interference and intruding jihadists.
It was the demise of the Soviet Union on 26 December 1991 and its empty
coffers that forced India to change its diplomatic orientation and open itself to
global markets. Yet, throughout the 1990s, New Delhi was in a state of
diplomatic confusion and political turmoil with communal tension on the rise
after the demolition of the Babri Masjid complex and the Congress party with
Narasimha Rao voted out of power in 1996. It was the Shakti series of nuclear
tests at Pokhran in May 1998 that dramatically reversed the global calculus and
changed ‘facts on the ground’. Signalling a big bang argument against joining
multilateral non-proliferation regimes, Pokhran II resulted in strategic gains for
India and led to the Indo–US nuclear deal, which offered a de-facto nuclear
weapons status to New Delhi.
The diplomatic realignment is quite evident today as Washington views New
Delhi as a countervailing force to China and discourages any weapons supply to
Beijing. Russia, albeit remaining a principal hardware supplier to India, is losing
ground and also supplies the same weapons to China and perhaps to Pakistan in
the future. India actually entered the premier league only towards the end of last
decade, with a $2 trillion economy and one of the biggest markets in the world
and armed with minimal nuclear deterrent to restrain any adventure from its
globally ambitious neighbour. The past decade also saw a reduction in the
salience of Pakistan in India’s diplomacy as New Delhi now focuses on joining
the UNSC in the expanded global body.
The change in the Indian mindset has also reflected in its self-confident
attitude towards China and other powers at large. There is divergence of views
within the Indian strategic establishment on its relationship with China and the
path ahead. One definitive view within the government is that Beijing has a one-
way relationship with New Delhi with a focus on the Indian market for its own
economic growth and sustenance with minimum quid pro quo. This section
believes that the boundary dispute resolution is a work-in-progress,
transgressions across the LAC have not ceased, Chinese military hardware
supplies to Pakistan are on the rise and the development of military capabilities
in Tibet poses a direct threat to India. Beijing does not lose a single opportunity
to reiterate its claims over Arunachal Pradesh and covertly tries to undermine
Indian diplomatic reach in multilateral institutions like the NSG and the UN, like
it did when President Mukherjee visited the state in November 2013. The
President called the state an integral and important part of India and a core
stakeholder in India’s Look East Policy. A Chinese spokesperson once again
responded by reiterating its so-called historical claims over Arunachal and the
illegality of the McMahon Line, and said that India should refrain from any
action that complicates the boundary question.
Following on such signals, this section of the Indian establishment believes
that the present Chinese move to accommodate India is part of a deception to lull
the Indian military, perhaps due to Beijing’s current priorities in East China and
South China seas. In fact, by taking on Japan, the US’s closest ally and part of its
nuclear umbrella, over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, which Tokyo purchased and
nationalized on 11 September 2012, Beijing is sending an assertive message to
all US allies in East and South Asia. By continuously sending surveillance and
warship to the disputed islands, China wants to tell the world, particularly
Philippines, Vietnam and India, that it has both the audacity and capacity to take
on Japan and its closest ally, the US. This influential section of Indian strategists
believes that while India is buying peace with China on the latter’s terms,
Beijing is keeping all its options open against India, including the possibility of a
limited skirmish on the land border to embarrass New Delhi’s ambitions.

GENUINE DÉTENTE OR ELABORATE DECEPTION

But the view that the Chinese talk of peace and tranquillity is all part of a plan is
not shared by strategic managers of the Manmohan Singh government in South
Block. An Indian top strategist with the UPA government, on the condition of
anonymity, told me that there have been three definite gains from China in the
past decade. The first was Chinese recognition of Sikkim as part of Indian
territory in 2003 after it showed the Indian government changed maps
recognizing New Delhi suzerainty over the hill state. Despite what Chinese
think-tanks say, the process is as irreversible as Indian recognition of Tibet as
part of China. The second gain is that there have been lesser numbers of PLA
transgressions on the LAC as compared to the 1980–90s and the border has been
largely tranquil for the past decade. On this issue, there is a difference of views
between the diplomats and the military over the drop in transgressions,
particularly with the spike noticed in 2013 due to better monitoring of the border
by India. The third has been the opportunity for both countries to play-off
against each other to achieve their respective political and diplomatic objectives.
India gets traction from the US over China, just as Beijing gets support and
space from India’s neighbours by projecting New Delhi’s assertiveness in South
Asia.
According to this senior official with miles of experience on China, there are
no constants in this bilateral relationship as the situation is dynamic and
changing by the minute. He said just like China will be subject to global mirth if
it reopens the Sikkim chapter again, New Delhi cannot revisit its Tibet policy
either. The Indian assessment in 2012–2013 was that China had undergone a lot
of internal turmoil during the leadership transition phase post the eighteenth
National Party Congress, with ‘princelings’ threatening to upset the apple cart of
the then leadership of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao. The role of ‘princelings’ in the
present Xi Jinping regime cannot be under-emphasized as the President himself
is part of the elite club and in-charge of the PLA as chairman of the Central
Military Commission and internal security.
 ‘Princelings’ are descendants of eight elderly members of the Chinese
Communist Party led by Deng Xiaoping, who had tremendous clout in the 1980–
90s. While the entrenched establishment booted out former Central Politburo
member and Secretary of CCP’s Chongqing branch Bo Xilai, a ‘princeling’
himself, on 28 October 2012, there was evidence of the ‘princelings’ striking
back at associates of former President Jiang Zemin in Shanghai and Premier
Wen Jiabao through leaks about their alleged corruption in the Western media.
Bo Xilai was sentenced to life imprisonment on 22 September 2013 after being
found guilty of corruption. The Indian establishment believes that the attacks on
Jiang and Wen were designed to send a message to Hu Jintao that he would be
open to criticism if he continued to take on the ‘princelings’.
The internal political turmoil, according to this senior official, would
dominate Chinese leadership thinking till the end of 2013 at least and give them
little time to focus on exploring options with India. The official pointed out to
the relatively benign Chinese statement on the fiftieth anniversary of the 1962
war to say that when it comes to military options, Beijing are at a much higher
bar than India as demonstrated in the border war. According to him, China has
much more to lose than India in terms of its advanced military infrastructure
near the border. Further, India at least has the military capability to stand up to
China in a limited war for the next five years and perhaps may even score points
in a boxing contest. The senior official said that it was difficult to pre-judge a
military contest between the two powers after five years as it depended on the
state of their respective economies and the dominance of China on the global
stage. According to him, it will be difficult for China to exercise the military
option with India as it requires at least three years of political preparation to start
a military adventure on the scale of 1962. Besides, the present international
climate with the US standing just 12 nautical miles off the China border in South
China Sea and its Special Forces ready to act as a pivot is not conducive to
Beijing launching a military adventure against India.
From the Chinese perspective, the official said, there were clear signs of
international powers ganging up in the East and South China seas with the
backing of the mighty US Navy. He said that rather than going for a spat on the
LAC with India, China is expected to strengthen its roots in Nepal with the help
of Maoist leaders and push for establishment of full-fledged relations with
Bhutan.
However, the assessment of a peaceful LAC in the near future is not shared
by the military establishment given that the PLA is now constantly exercising in
Tibet and the response time for even preparing political grounds for a skirmish
has been cut down drastically since the 1962 war in the era of instant
communications. The April 2013 incursions and constant friction in Chumar
where China now claims 85 sq. km of territory despite the area being a defined
international border is a grim reminder that jostling between the two sides will
become more frequent, with India taking steps to closely monitor the LAC.
Indian TV news channels in August 2013 beamed footage from the Tawang
sector where armed Indian Army troops were physically wrestling with intruding
armed PLA troopers to send them back. A single incident of accidental or angry
firing could change temperatures on the border.
While the Indian Army agrees that China will not launch a land campaign
against India across the LAC, it fears a timely embarrassment from the PLA in a
pre-designated sector on the disputed border that will be designed to show India
its place in the global hierarchy. From the Indian military perspective, the 200
km long strip with a width varying from 20 to 60 km identified as the Siliguri
Corridor, which links the mainland to the Northeast, is the most vulnerable area.
The Chumbi valley with Yatong as headquarters is a dagger poised between
Sikkim and Bhutan and gives the adversary an option to use long-range artillery
and special forces to disrupt Indian movements in the least and sever the
Northeast from the mainland in times of hostility. In case this were to happen,
whether India would revise its nuclear ‘no first use’ policy and go for a strike in
the Han hinterland to save its territory or continue fighting the Chinese
conventionally by opening other fronts in vulnerable areas of Tibet is a million
dollar question.
Although the Siliguri corridor, where the PLA had started amassing troops in
1962, presents a juicy option to Chinese military planners, the Indian side also
has an answer to this move. If the PLA has an option of severing India’s
Northeast, the Indian army has an option of launching attacks from north and
east Sikkim through Nathu La and Jelep La to cut off material support and
supplies from Yadong for any PLA offensive. With the Indian Army saturated in
the Siliguri corridor and soon expected to be backed by the newly inducted
mountain strike corps, the move could also result in an embarrassment for the
PLA even if Bhutan remains neutral in the dispute. The new Indo–Bhutan
Friendship Treaty signed in 2007 clarifies Thimphu’s status as an independent
sovereign nation with India having no locus standi in its internal or external
affairs.
Till the turn of the century, the Siliguri corridor was the biggest fear of the
Indian military but in the past decade it has shrug off its defensiveness and is
prepared for a counter to deal with a PLA thrust through the Chumbi valley, with
the road linking Yadong to Shigatse a prime target for interdiction. The
introduction of T-72S tanks into Sikkim is aimed at countering PLA moves
through the valley, with the intention of exploiting the hinterland and blocking
supplies to any offensive force.
Although India and China have exchanged maps of the Middle Sector and
know the exact locations of each other’s positions and LAC perceptions in
Uttarakhand, the Indian Army started focusing on the area as it could possibly be
another location for a PLA offensive. The Indian military has legitimate fears
that the PLA could go in for a ‘bite’ operation in this sector and occupy Indian
territory to send a political signal. It is quite evident from the Indian Army’s
2011 force accretion proposal that the area is weakly held by the Indian central
command with only an independent brigade of around 3,000 men patrolling the
area with ITBP jawans.
The 2011 force accretion proposal entailed raising another independent
brigade for the area and reactivating the SFF for special operations in case of
hostilities. Much to the chagrin of the Indian security establishment, it found
during its review of the area post-2008 that men from the state were leaving for
the plains in search of employment.19 It was also found that the ITBP was
deployed for counter-Maoist operations as far as Andhra Pradesh.20 It was quite
clear to policymakers that there was hardly anyone to defend Indian territory in
case the PLA decided to sneak in through the Middle Sector.
Taking stock of the situation, the UPA government then decided not to use
ITBP for plugging security gaps in the hinterland but for the purpose that the
paramilitary force was raised for.21 While there is substantial deployment of
ITBP now along the Kailash–Dharchula–Pithoragarh route, the Mana pass route
via Joshimath, the Uttarkashi–Gangotri axis, the area between Chitkul in the
Baspa–Sangla valley of Himachal Pradesh west of Gangotri, and the Barahoti
plains across the Nanda Devi biosphere are vulnerable to PLA action. Given
India’s ‘no first use’ nuclear policy, this sector presents the most serious threat
given its proximity to India’s political heart.
It is perhaps because of this very reason that the Indian Army has now
considered reorganizing the Central Army Command, which to date only has a
training division in Allahabad and a brigade under its command. An infantry
division based in Bareilly near Uttarakhand has its operational role on the
western and northern front and is part of the Mathura-based strike corps.
Incidentally, the training division of the Central Command is the once-celebrated
Fourth Infantry Division, which got decimated in the 1962 battle at Namka Chu
in NEFA. Prior to the 1962 battle, the Fourth Division was perhaps the most
heavily decorated Indian fighting formation with glorious campaigns in the
Second World War.
Although Indian military planners have tended to gloss over the Uttarakhand
threat, this area is most vulnerable in case the PLA is tasked to crush Indian
might. However, the ground situation indicates that there have been far less PLA
transgressions in the Middle Sector as compared to the other two sectors, but this
could also be due to poor observation on account of thin Indian troop
deployment and lesser sightings during the bi-annual long range patrols in the
area. The area is so remote that India shot down a proposal for a border
personnel meeting site with China at the 17,500 feet high Lipu Lekh pass as it
involved a three-day trek to reach the venue.
However, from the Chinese political perspective, the best place to justify a
skirmish and teach India a lesson would be in Arunachal Pradesh, where Beijing
has showed no signs of giving up claims on what it calls ‘South Tibet’. But
anything less than a 1962 victory, or worse, a stalemate, would be seen as a
reverse by the international community, unacceptable to China at a time when it
is the second-largest economy in the world and rushing towards superpower
status.
As the 1987 Somdorong Chu stand-off shows, Arunachal Pradesh is very
sensitive for the Indian Army as the military assessment is that the PLA could
test New Delhi in this border state if India is found to be directly interfering in
Tibet or joins hands overtly with Beijing’s adversaries to box it into a diplomatic
corner. With no less than two Army Corps and six divisions deployed in the
state, Arunachal, particularly the Kameng frontier, would not be a cake walk for
the PLA as the area is militarily ready to tackle any move from an adversary.
The Indian Army’s assessment is that the PLA could push India through what it
calls ‘rest of Arunachal Pradesh’, particularly the Lohit river valley, via the
Kibuthoo–Walong axis on the border. While advanced landing grounds have
been activated at Kibuthoo, the area is thinly populated and it would be an
embarrassment if the PLA was found to be holding Indian territory here.
Even though the area is under constant surveillance from satellites, UAVs and
combat air patrols, it is the Walong sector, which saw a battle in 1962, which is
most vulnerable from the Indian point of view. The armed forces have in fact
beefed up defences here by deploying the BrahMos cruise missiles and the area
across the LAC is under strategic missile coverage to ensure that India never
abandons Arunachal like Nehru did in 1962. Unlike in the past, India has enough
military capacity today to counter-attack PLA-held territory in Nyingchi
prefecture and target logistical lines in the region by air or by missiles. From a
military perspective, a repeat of the 1962 war is not possible for the PLA today,
but there are very strong chances that Beijing itself might be surprised in this
sector.
The Western Sector in Ladakh is being looked after by the XIV Corps, and
the LAC from Karakoram Pass to Chumar is packed with troops matching and
standing up to PLA patrols in the area. Even though the road infrastructure on
the Indian side is a work-in-progress and the patrolling falls short of the LAC in
Depsang plains to avoid unnecessary confrontation, Indian territory is well-
defended in the area with the Chinese side equally vulnerable in the Demchok–
Chumar sector.
The Indian nightmare in Ladakh, though, is if Pakistan were to
simultaneously open a second front against India along with the PLA, with a
larger design of cutting off Indian hold on the Siachen Glacier and redrawing the
1949 Ceasefire Line to the Karakoram Pass. As of now, Indian forces are
wedged between the Pakistani Army and the PLA in the Daulat Beg Oldi sector,
but the area is hostile to any conventional military campaign as it is surrounded
by some of the highest mountain peaks in the world, the biggest glaciers outside
the Arctic and permanently glaciated passes. Any military adventures in this
hostile area stand the risk of encountering a disaster, with temperatures
plummeting to 50 degrees Celsius below zero.
Indian armed forces have factored in the two-front possibility in their war
games with specific focus on holding on to Siachen and blocking the Chushul–
Leh axis through a deployment of armoured regiments of T-90 tanks. With the
IAF having a permanent airbase in Leh and two forward airstrips capable of
handling fighters at Thoise and Nyoma, land forces have adequate support for
sustained operations in the limited theatre if it were ever put to test. Unlike the
1962 battle, where Nehru chose to keep the IAF’s offensive capabilities out of
the war theatre, air power will have a definitive role to play in any future
military engagement with China. The ‘Non-Alignment 2.0’ paper discusses the
use of air power and its limitations if India engages an adversary beyond its land
borders:
Beyond local border skirmishes, armed conflicts will necessarily involve air power. Air power
application in any war will seek to neutralise air assets of the adversary. It is aimed to achieve as
 much freedom for one’s own aircraft to operate without interference, also to minimize the
adversary’s ability to apply air power against one’s own assets. This process cannot be confined to a
limited geographical area and could encompass airfields, aircraft and air defence systems, among
other targets. The geographical spread of the conflict is therefore difficult to contain. Escalation can
also be inadvertent due to political signals and military actions being misinterpreted in the fog of
war. Dual use assets complicate the danger of escalation as it is not possible to distinguish a
conventional armed aircraft or missile from a nuclear one. Consequently, nuclear weapons constrict
the traditional utility of military force and call for a redefinition of our notion of victory. The
challenge for the military establishment is to shape our hard power capabilities in tandem with
India’s political objectives, while remaining within the ambit of the political and strategic logic
imposed by nuclear weapons.22

With both India and China professing to the ‘no first use’ clause and the two
countries now possessing limited yet potent second-strike capabilities, the
nuclear option is ruled out as the possibility of a full-fledged war between the
two Asian giants appears quite impossible. Indian advances in satellite imagery
and technology coupled with its deep-penetration radars have made its
adversaries transparent to the extent that Indian armed forces can now pick up
incoming aircraft or missiles as soon as they are launched. The problem facing
both India and China is that both are still in the process of developing basic
antimissile shields, which cannot be effective against an incoming supersonic
missile.
India and China’s limited naval capabilities also rules out a war option
between the two countries, at least for the coming decade. Both countries have
an expeditionary force only on paper, with India possessing a 59-year old small
aircraft carrier INS Viraat and the recently commissioned INS Vikramaditya and
China just launching its refurbished aircraft carrier Liaoning.
Even though Indian naval aviation is developed enough to optimize the role
of an aircraft carrier during a conflict, it will take the PLA Navy at least 10 more
years before it acquires the expertise to launch and recover aircraft at sea. Both
countries have nuclear attack submarines but without the fleet complement and
logistics, it will be impossible for the PLA Navy to operate in the Indian Ocean,
while the same holds true for Indian submarines in the South China or the East
China seas. Thus, the naval option is also more-or-less ruled out unless New
Delhi is prepared to invite PLA wrath across the LAC by blocking oil tankers
bound for China in the Indian Ocean in a hostile scenario.
It is quite evident from the available force profiles and capabilities that if an
India–China confrontation were to take place in this decade, it would be over the
land border with limited application of air and naval power. The scenario is
expected to change dramatically in favour of China if Beijing maintains its
economic growth and Indian growth continues to slow down below 5 per cent.
Under these circumstances, where both countries – particularly China – stand to
lose a lot by engaging militarily, the war option appears to be not very realistic
unless Beijing faces a serious internal security threat in Tibet with perceived
instigation from India. This leads us to two final questions: Is China a credible
threat to India, or is the perceived threat because of Indian insecurity over the
disputed border? And, if Beijing really is a credible threat, how should India deal
with China?

THREAT FROM CHINA AND THE INDIAN

RESPONSE
From 25 June to 5 July 2012, the Chinese government allowed Indian
Ambassador S. Jaishankar a rare visit to Lhasa, Shigatse, Kailash–Mansarover
and Shiquanhe in Tibet with stops at the Potala Palace, Jhokhang Temple and
Sera Monastery.23 The last time the Chinese government gave an Indian envoy
permission to travel to Tibet was in 2002 to then Ambassador Shivshankar
Menon. For the record, it was P.N. Menon, Shivshankar’s father, who served as
India’s consul-general in Lhasa in 1959, and who received the current Dalai
Lama in Tawang after he fled Tibet the same year.
One of India’s most competent and perceptive diplomats, Jaishankar found
that China had created a marvel of road and rail infrastructure in Tibet where it
was possible to maintain speeds over 160 kmph on the highways. Travelling
from Shigatse, facing Sikkim, to Shiquanhe, just across eastern Ladakh, in a
Toyota Land Cruiser, Jaishankar realized that the quality of roads was top class,
with few bridges or flyovers. The QTR, however, travelled on rail bridges and
on heightened platforms to cater to permafrost conditions in the land of snow.
The perspective one learns from Indian diplomats posted in Beijing and other
consulates is that China is concentrating on consolidating Tibet from an internal
security point of view; also, it has too much to lose if it was thinking in terms of
a skirmish across the land border. According to Indian diplomats and
intelligence agencies, China’s current strategic priorities are in the east – over
East China Sea, Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula and South China Sea – and it has
no interest in raising stakes with India either on the land border or in the Indian
Ocean region.
For Jaishankar, infrastructure facilities in Tibet were an eye-opener; Chinese
infrastructure in Tibet was far superior to what India has on its borders, and the
former has much more to lose in case of hostilities, with QTR bridges and
highways becoming legitimate targets for the IAF as part of logistics and
supplies interdiction. In sharp contrast, roads on the Indian side of the LAC are a
work in progress.
Tibet-watchers in India believe that even though China will continue to drag
its feet on the boundary issue, it is not looking for a fight with India as that
would be detrimental to its perceived peaceful rise as a global power. While
Indian intelligence agencies time and again raise an alarm over PLA exercises in
Tibet, their assessment is that China will tighten its grip over Tibet by
continuously upgrading its military capability, thus presenting a very daunting
option to its adversaries. Even though the Indo–China border has been largely
peaceful since the 1967 border firing at Nathu La, Tibet could be a trigger to an
accident in the future as Beijing wants New Delhi and Western powers to keep
away from the region as much as possible. Chinese anxiety over Tibet was
highlighted in August 2012 when Beijing refused India permission to reopen its
consulate in Lhasa after it was shut down in 1959.24 While India has three
consulates in Guangzhou, Shanghai and Hong Kong, it was to reopen the
consulate as a reciprocal to the Chinese demand to open a consulate in Chennai
after Mumbai and Kolkata. The Indian request was made in May 2012.25 Much
to the chagrin of Beijing, India allowed Taiwan to open a consulate in Chennai.
Rejecting the proposal for a consulate in Lhasa, the Chinese government
offered the option of Chengdu in Sichuan province to India stating that it was a
key economic centre of western China and a consulate here would help
expanding trade ties between the two countries.26 It was quite evident that China
did not want any consulate in Lhasa, with Nepal the only country being
represented in the capital of Tibet. Zhao Gancheng, Director of South Asia
Studies at the Shanghai Institute of International Studies, was quoted in the state-
owned Global Times as saying that India was motivated more by politics than
economic interests on reopening the Lhasa consulate. ‘The Indian Government
hopes to closely watch, observe and infiltrate the Tibetan area after opening the
Lhasa consulate. The issue regarding Tibet is an internal affair and we won’t
tolerate any external forces imposing a negative impact on the situation in
Tibet,’ the scholar was quoted as saying.
It is amply clear from Zhao’s statement that Tibet is still an open wound for
China despite the fact that India has no designs on Tibet and has reiterated that
time and again. From the Indian point of view, a consulate in Lhasa would be a
huge confidence-building measure as it would allay any Indian fears about a
PLA offensive through the land frontier as well as allow the resumption of
historical cultural exchanges between the two countries on the Buddhist pilgrim
circuit. The mission in Lhasa would not only facilitate logistics for Indian
pilgrims to Kailash–Mansarover but will also send a signal that China has
nothing to hide in Tibet and will help in restoring normalcy to the restive region.
The Chinese inability to come to terms with India over Tibet, refusing to
initiate a dialogue with the Dalai Lama and to come to the table to settle the
LAC are permanent red flags to India. As long as normalcy is not restored in
Tibet, the land of snow could well be the trigger to a future Indo–China
skirmish. Beijing refuses to recognize that India did not respond to Chinese
provocations over providing stapled visas to Jammu and Kashmir and Arunachal
residents by doing the same to Chinese residents of Tibet. Despite a section of
Indian security and diplomatic establishments urging the UPA-II government to
conduct ‘tit for tat’ diplomacy, New Delhi resisted the urge and signalled its
disapproval by suspending bilateral defence ties and drastically reducing the
delegation size of a military visit after a IAF group captain was given a stapled
visa.
While India and China have established a hot line to avoid chances of any
accidents on the LAC, an institutionalized mechanism between the three wings
of the armed forces needs to be set up so that an IAF or PLA fighter aircraft
unintentionally straying across the LAC does not lead to action-stations in Delhi
or Beijing. The same also applies to an Indian warship in the South China Sea or
a Chinese destroyer in the Bay of Bengal, as long as the purpose of the mission
is not military. But military-to-military ties between any two countries are built
on trust and confidence and not when two of the largest armies in the world are
staring at each other across the LAC. Like the PLA which holds India
responsible for its internal problems in Tibet, an increasingly confident Indian
Army is still nursing the 1962 wound and is presently building capability to
avoid a repeat of what happened 50 years ago.
However, despite the joint exercises, there cannot be any trust between the
Indian Army and the PLA till the time Beijing continues to provide military
hardware and international political support to Pakistan. Chinese involvement in
Pakistan’s nuclear programme, weaponization and delivery platforms as well as
continuing conventional weapons supplies to its army raises the two-front
spectre for the Indian Army. Even though China did not come to Pakistan’s aid
during the 1971 war, Islamabad may not be able to resist a call from Beijing in
case a land front opens up with the PLA in Ladakh. The two-front theory is one
of the reasons why the Indian Army is totally opposed to withdrawal from the
Siachen Glacier as technically it is feasible to disrupt logistical movement on the
Karakoram Highway, particularly on the Khunjerab Pass–Gilgit axis. Post the
1999 Kargil War, the Indian Army has made fundamental changes to its war-
making concepts which have been further refined this decade to cater to the
PLA’s war zone concept. The ‘cold start doctrine’ of the Indian Army was
originally aimed at Pakistan where the basic idea was to reduce the response
time in the event of any hostilities. By restructuring the three Indian strike corps
into pre-designated eight battle groups, the basic plan was to drastically cut
down the mobilization period and be on the offensive from the word go and not
lose the initiative, as happened post the 13 December 2001 attack on the Indian
Parliament. Despite the Vajpayee government giving a green signal on 17
December 2001, it took the Indian military more than 19 days to mobilize its
forces and by that time the window for retribution had been closed due to
international pressure on Pakistan.
Fundamental changes have been made to India’s war doctrine after the
military restructured its fighting capacities with the aim of waging all future
battles in enemy territories. The new concept was discussed in the tri-services
commanders’ conference in October 2011 and was war-gamed in the military
exercises in south Pokhran that winter with both China and Pakistan in mind.27
Learning the brutal lesson from the Kargil war of not fighting within Indian
territory, the new doctrine is actually a step ahead of the ‘cold start’ concept with
scope only for aggression and not passive resistance. During the conference, top
Army commanders discussed the ‘restructuring of pivot and strike corps’ and
theatre-based ‘combat support and combat service support’. In common
parlance, this means that the Indian Army has done away with the concept of
holding (defensive) and strike (offensive) corps-level formations. Under the new
scheme of things to come, holding corps have been re-designated as pivot corps
with the task to secure objectives in enemy territory and lay the foundation for
launching strike formations. For example, the Bathinda-based X Corps will no
longer hold the intruding enemy but launch across to build a platform for strike
by the designated II Corps in Ambala. The same concept would apply to the
LAC, with the Ladakh-based XIV Corps, Siliguri-based XXXIII Corps and
Tezpur-based IV Corps playing the role of the pivot and the newly proposed
Mountain Strike Corps and additional formations in Ladakh and Sikkim building
on the offensive across the LAC to grab territory. Each formation would have
pre-designated support structures including air support so that battle groups will
function with synergy rather than as last-minute creations.
This new concept was first war-gamed in the ‘Vijayee Bhava’ exercise in
May 2011 with the Army and the Air Force enacting the land-air battle plans.28
It was tested once again in ‘Sudarshan Shakti’, another war exercise 75 miles off
the Indo–Pakistan border in Rajasthan in the winter of 2011.29 Apart from
tackling an aggressive PLA along the LAC, the new concept has also been
developed to counter the ‘early war offensive’ of the Pakistan Army, which is
also based on a rapid response concept and allows 25 per cent of Pakistan army
reserves to be deployed on its eastern border at the first sign of war.
Till such time that the Indo–Pakistan border and the Indo–China border
questions are settled, the Indian Army is working on the premise that the two
theatres are linked and the response has to be calibrated in such fashion. The
presence of PLA and PLA Armed Police personnel in POK has ensured that
India and China essentially harbour adversarial perceptions of each other with
New Delhi more than convinced that Beijing is pushing Islamabad to box itself
much above its weight category. Delivering the second K. Subrahmanyam
lecture, Saran had said that adversarial perceptions are determined by geography
as well as by growth trajectories of India and China.30 ‘As the two countries
expand their respective economic and military capabilities and their powers
radiate outwards from their frontiers, they will invariably intrude into each
other’s zone of interests, which are called overlapping peripheries. It is not
necessary that this adversarial relationship will inevitably generate tensions or
worse, another military conflict, but in order to avoid that India needs to fashion
a strategy which is based on consistent familiarity with Chinese strategic
calculus. One must always be mindful of the prism through which China
interprets the world around it and India’s place in that world. It is only through
such a complex and continuing exercise that China’s India challenge can be dealt
with.’
Saran’s understanding essentially requires that India increase its coverage of
China with better political and military intelligence to understand Beijing’s
pressure points and the current state of play between the PLA and the
Communist Party. One must remember that it was the Intelligence Bureau’s
failure to detect the highway across Aksai Chin that was largely responsible for
the 1962 conflict. While China’s Ministry of State Security has managed to
penetrate the Indian establishment and free media, there is mounting evidence
that Beijing gets vital intelligence on India through Pakistani channels as the
latter has far better penetration and human sources in the subcontinent.
According to intelligence inputs, an institutionalized tie-up between the MSS
and the ISI occurred in January 2012 and some five structured meetings at high-
official levels have taken place in the past two years with India figuring in the
dialogue. This information was shared with top officials in the UPA government
and noted with concern by the Indian Army. The UPA government was told that
the ISI was also sharing its intelligence with its Chinese counterparts about the
restive regions of India including the Northeast states. Beijing’s key interest was
in the Dalai Lama set-up and it was keenly watching Indian involvement in the
Lobsang Sangay government-in-exile in Dharamsala. With Bangladesh now not
allowing Northeast insurgent groups to target India from its territory and
Myanmar making similar noises, Indian Military Intelligence sources found that
insurgents were now getting monetary and logistical support from Yunan
province in southern China.
However, it is the flip side of the tie-up which is seriously worrying the
Indian intelligence establishment. Military Intelligence now believes that the ISI
could exacerbate tensions with China by exaggerating New Delhi’s role in the
Tibetan movement. Even though India has little to do with the Sangay set-up, the
perception is that it is the ISI which has made the MSS suspicious of Indian
moves in Dharamsala. Beijing is hyper-sensitive to Tibetan activity in the
subcontinent and there would be increasing pressure on India to dismantle the
Dalai Lama set-up after his death. As it is, Wen Jiabao during his visit to
Kathmandu in January 2012 extracted a commitment from the Baburam
Bhattarai government to not allow any anti-China activities in the erstwhile
kingdom.
While Chinese coverage of India is all encompassing thanks to Pakistan, New
Delhi fears penetrating into Tibet and mainland China as it does not want to raise
the temperature. To make matter worse, R&AW’s Beijing station chief Amreet
Ahluwalia was dismissed from service in August 2012 on grounds of operational
impropriety.31 Ahluwalia had serious operational differences with his
headquarters on dealing with China with the former threatening to expose
operational details through letters to the UPA government and opposition
parties. It was only after this episode that the UPA government decided in
principle to create a post for a senior IB operative in Beijing despite unwelcome
noises from the R&AW.
Although the Chinese may believe that India would be getting premium
intelligence on Tibet and Xinjiang through the Dalai Lama setup, it took the
Indian Army nearly six months to get R&AW to confirm two new missile
storage facilities – at Ziadullah or Xiadulla and Qazil Jilga – across the LAC in
Ladakh after satellite images showed missile tunnels in August 2011. Despite
India’s need to be more pro-active in China, Indian intelligence agencies rely
largely on electronic and spatial tools to cover China as it does not want to
aggravate tensions with Beijing. But given the increasing assertion of China in
Tibet, South and East China seas and the Indian Ocean, India will have to shed it
timorous attitude if it does not want to get surprised once again by Beijing and
be presented with another fait accompli on the land or sea frontiers.
New Delhi also needs to dispel the notion that it would take China at least
three years to prepare politically for a border skirmish as it did 50 years ago, and
that India’s close ties with other world powers, particularly the US, would deter
Beijing from precipitating a crisis. The answer to the first question is a flat no,
while the jury is still out on the second one. It took China three years to prepare
the ground before the 1962 conflict so that both the erstwhile Soviet Union and
the US would not intervene in the crisis was because that was an era of
turboprop planes, ships, message runners and cranked-up black phones. Today,
what Beijing’s leadership achieved in three years could be done in three months
even through snail mail, with force mobilization in a limited offensive reduced
to a matter of couple of days. This is clearly evident from the Indian Army
estimate that the PLA could deploy 34 divisions in a month along the LAC, with
Beijing running the battle from projected LED screens at its headquarters.
The first signs of a skirmish between India and China will not be
conventional troop movements, but could well be a cyber-attack on the Indian
Army’s computers at the headquarters or at the corps level to dismantle
communication systems or at least disable them by jamming the hardware and
tripping the northern electricity grid to cripple the systems. While India’s
institutional capability to ward off cyber-attacks is at a very nascent stage
currently and the system has not primed itself to the highest levels of security
breaches, China has made significant advances in cyber-security, with New
Delhi’s Computer Emergency Response Teams and Intelligence Bureau
detecting malwares in the PMO, and in the External Affairs, Finance and the
Home ministries in the past two years, with stolen files being diverted to proxy
servers and then lifted by the end-user, i.e. China.32
According to Indian cyber-security experts, the war between India, Pakistan,
China and other global powers is already on in cyberspace, with intelligence
agencies trying to hack key e-mail accounts to get information or spread
economic, diplomatic or military disinformation. One must remember that the
Dhoka post incident in November 2007 in Sikkim was result of the Chinese
getting access to the XXXIII Corps’ computers and finding out the location of
the post in context of LAC perceptions of both sides.33
The very thought that India will be able to pick up any warning signs during a
Chinese build-up should be discarded, as there has been a sea change in the
global situation since 1962 – when Beijing was a third-world power with the
‘potential’ to make it to the first world. Today, Russia has been reduced to an
oligarchy with nuclear weapons and Japan is no longer the economic power that
it was in the 1990s; China has the capacity and the capability to take a harsh
decision with only the US to contend with on the global stage. It is only India’s
engagement with the US which can buy it space against a military move from
Beijing as the US will remain the pre-eminent superpower for at least another 20
years.
While New Delhi could expect Washington to help its military bridge the
strategic capability gap through infusion of high-end technology and by
mounting international pressure, it would be naïve to expect the US to intervene
in a conflict with China. Even though the Indo–US relationship has redefined
itself in the past decade, many of the Congress old-guard ministers in the
Manmohan Singh cabinet have not moved away from the Cold War mindset.
This left-of-centre clique within the Congress party is wary of the Americans
and remembers the deployment of the Seventh Fleet in the Bay of Bengal during
the 1971 war, but conveniently forgets its support in the 1962 war and thereafter.
This ginger group fears retaliation from China if India were seen to be too close
to US and its allies like Japan and South Korea despite the changing strategic
calculus in Asia with Vietnam opening Cam Ranh Bay to its once-enemy. Still
trapped in the non-alignment box of the Cold War, this influential group with
projected socialistic bearings wants the best of military technology from the US
but without any ideological baggage or global commitments.
The so-called independent strategic path could have been possible if the
DRDO, established in 1958, or private Indian defence contractors had delivered
the latest military technology to Indian forces. Apart from the Agni series of
missiles, DRDO projects like the light-combat aircraft Tejas and main battle tank
Arjun have been works in progress despite technological help from Russia and
later from the US. The first squadron of Tejas is still to be raised, despite the
project being started in 1983. DRDO has not been able to produce a workable
anti-tank missile, despite its tall claims of building an indigenous antimissile
shield for India. The same goes for the Indian private industry, which prefers
importing equipment in semi-knocked down condition rather than spend large
sums of money on military research. With the Chinese miles ahead of India, at
least in indigenous military equipment manufacturing, New Delhi has no option
but to look towards the US and Israel as Russian military contractors have awry
timelines, costly spare parts and under-par workmanship. To add to Indian woes,
Russia is supplying the same hardware, technology and engines to China, which
it is buying in large numbers. It is therefore natural to India to engage the US
closely as the procurement procedures are largely transparent unlike opaque
Russian deals of the past and with Washington ready to part with the best of
military technology. New Delhi also needs US support to make an entry into the
NSG as well as to become a permanent member of the UNSC. One must
remember that it was a call from none other than then George W. Bush to his
Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao that pushed the NSG to clear the Indo-US nuclear
agreement.34
India will need US support all the more after the Americans walk out of
Afghanistan in 2014, dramatically escalating the price of peace not only for New
Delhi but also for Beijing as the Taliban on both sides of the Durand Line
presents a clear threat to the region. Even though its friendship with Pakistan has
allowed China to divert the jihadist traffic from Xinjiang, Beijing like India will
have to pay a price for peace as the American dollar pipeline used to stabilize
Afghanistan will soon dry up after the ISAF pull-out. As the looming spectre of
a destabilized Afghanistan looms over the horizon, with visions of unbridled
Taliban forces on the rampage and the return of Al Qaeda and the return of
Lashkar-e-Toiba in Kunar and Nuristan provinces, China like India will have to
prepare for rising radicalization in Xinjiang with a weak Pakistan either not
interested or not capable of containing the menace.
While top Indian policymakers are convinced that New Delhi will have to
chart its own course in the global play and will not want to be seen as part of the
anti-China clique, the establishment itself is very concerned about the mixed
messages coming from Beijing. When NSA Menon went to Beijing for the
sixteenth round of special representatives’ talks on 28–29 June 2013, his
counterpart Jiang Jiechi and Prime Minister Li Keqiang were more than
accommodative to Indian concerns. For the first time, China did not raise the
demand of large chunks of land in the Eastern Sector to settle the boundary
dispute. They were concerned about the situation in the Middle East and the rise
of Japan, and wanted to have a global partnership with India. The same message
was repeated by Prime Minister Li and his Chinese Defence Minister General
Chang Wanquan to A.K. Antony when he visited Beijing on 4 July 2013.35
With the 2014 Lok Sabha general elections just months away, Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh paid a three day visit to Beijing in October 2013. Even though
he signed the Border Defence Cooperation Agreement on 23 October and a MoU
on Strengthening Cooperation on Trans Border Rivers,36 there was no let up in
transgressions across the LAC.37 The visit was more of a last official trip to
China by Manmohan Singh, with the Congress party pitching the Nehru–Gandhi
family scion Rahul Gandhi as prime ministerial candidate for the 2014 elections.
While Manmohan Singh reiterated that India–China ties were rooted in tranquil
borders, there were hardly any concessions offered by Beijing that recognized
India’s right to built border infrastructure along the LAC. The MoU on trans-
border rivers was also a bit of a letdown, as China only offered to share
hydrological data on the Brahmaputra for an additional 15 days, i.e. from 15
May, instead of 1 June, to 15 October each year. This is despite the fact that the
Indian Ministry of Water Resources wanted historical hydrological data on the
Brahmaputra, a standardization of measures on both sides and adding the river
Sutlej to the list of rivers on which hydrological data could be shared.
The much touted BDCA is just one more on the list of agreements that flows
out of the mother 1993–96 Peace and Tranquillity agreements. The new
agreement is still a work in progress as India and China still have to work out the
arrangements on the hot line between the Indian Army and the PLA’s
Directorate General of Military Operations. The new border personnel meeting
point proposed at Kibuthu in Arunachal Pradesh is mired in logistical issues
from the Chinese side, while LAC transgressions recorded a rise in 2013 as
compared to previous years despite the onset of early winter in eastern Ladakh.
India also watched tensions in East China Sea on the rise, with China unilaterally
announcing the ADIZ over the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku islands and the East
China Sea. The possibility of China announcing a similar ADIZ over other
disputed land territories cannot be ruled out. The other matter of serious concern
during the winter of 2013 at Raisina Hill was the rise in coverage of India by
Chinese intelligence agencies and their cyber capacities. In April–May 2013, the
NSCS noticed with alarm the denial and disruption of internet traffic by Chinese
routers. Till 31 December 2013, the NSCS was still trying to find out details
from public sector telecom companies about the nature of disruption and the
emanating threat from China’s cyber capacities.
Despite this bonhomie between the two sides, the PLA tested its Indian
counterpart on the LAC in eastern Ladakh, Sikkim and in Arunachal Pradesh.
This gave rise to suspicions that the Chinese leadership was a playing multi-
track game, with the PLA indulging in hard tactics on the border. Defence
Minister Antony let his worst fears be known as he felt that Prime Minister Li
and Special Representative Jiang Jiechi were the pleasant faces of the Chinese
Communist Party, while the real face of Beijing was the PLA. Between April–
July 2013, there were multiple face-offs between the Indian Army and the PLA
on the LAC with Chumar in eastern Ladakh being the focus. Although New
Delhi would like to believe the statements of President Xi, Prime Minister Li and
Special Representative Jiang that Beijing wants to accelerate the boundary
resolution, the facts on the ground are different and indicate that the PLA is on a
different track with India. PLA actions on the LAC after President Xi took over
reveal that the Chinese will not concede an inch of territory to solve the dispute
and the actual resolution is a long way off.
While the Chinese leadership has now settled down, with out of favour senior
party leader Bo Xilai sentenced to life imprisonment38 and President Xi
Jinping39 confident enough to make comments on Mao on the occasion of his
120th anniversary, India prepares to go to polls with perhaps a change of mind,
keeping in mind the rise of BJP’s prime ministerial candidate Narendra Modi.
The electoral drubbing of the Congress in the 2013 assembly elections in the
states of Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Chhattisgarh and Delhi shows that Modi
and the BJP stand a good chance of coming to power at the Centre. Given
Modi’s record on governance in Gujarat, where he has been chief minister for
four terms, border infrastructure will be a priority along the LAC if he were to
come to power. Unless the 2014 election throws up a mixed mandate with a
weak regime, it is quite safe to assume that the BJP will take more steps to
emphasize India’s sovereignty with China.
India on its part is in no hurry, but it has communicated that any PLA
aggression on the border will be countered, even though New Delhi is
committed to a peaceful border. As part of the newly negotiated BDCA, which
sums up the confidence building steps since the 1993 Peace and Tranquillity
Agreement, both sides have agreed to more locations on the LAC for border
personnel meetings to immediately resolve issues as well as have a hotline
between the divisional commanders and heads of military operations directorate
on both sides for smoother conflict resolutions. Citing the Depsang incursion in
April 2013, a top Indian official said that it takes more than four tents and a dog
to rattle India, in the context of Chinese troops setting up tents at Raki Nullah
during the 21-day face-off.40 Yet, Defence Minister Antony and the Indian Army
are not laughing at the joke and believe anything can happen with China on the
LAC. For that, both sides are keeping their powder dry.
 Annexure

Major Chinese-assisted projects in South

Asia and Indian Ocean Region as of 2010–11
1. BANGLADESH

S.
Project Details
No.
1. Dredging project in Gorai river Funded by China Harbour Engineering Company
The 1,320 MW power plant at Anwara is being built by China Hudian
2. 1,320 MW power plant at Anwara, Chittagong
Hong Kong Company.
China is contributing two-thirds of the $659 million construction cost
3. Shahjalal fertilizer plant
of the fertilizer factory in Sylhet.
At the under-construction Savar Leather Industrial Park in Savar,
4. Centralized effluent treatment plant
north-west of Dhaka
Three bridges on the Madaripur–Shariatpur– Chandpur road in Being constructed by China’s Anhui Construction Engineering Group
5.
Bangladesh. Overseas Development Company
China’s Shanghai Electric Group for installation of a 100–150 MW
6. Gas-fired plant in Sylhet
plant
China Chengda Engineering Company for installation of a 150 MW
7. Cycle power plant at Chandpur
plant
Sino-Hydro Corporation Ltd is the turnkey contractor of Shikalbaha
8. Picking power plant at Chittagong
150 MW plant.
Harbin Power Engineering Corporation is the turnkey contractor of the
9. Cycle power plant at Fenchuganj, Sylhet
90 MW plant.

2. MALDIVES
S.
Project Detail
No.
In 1972, the China provided an interest free loan of £13.5 million for
10 years with 25 years of grace period for the development of the
1. Development/upgradation of airport airport. In February 2009, an amount of $260 million was provided by
China for upgradation of the airport and the development of a new
passenger terminal.

3. MYANMAR

A) HYDROPOWER

Chin State
• Laiva (0.96/0.6 MW) (Falam township) Kachin State
 • Chibwe (Chibwi) (2,000 MW), N’Mai Hka (Chibwe township) • Chibwe Nge (Chibwi Nge) (99 MW),
Chibwe Creek (Chibwe township) • Ching Hkran (Chying Hkran) (2.52 MW) (Ching Hkran village,
Myitkyina township) • Hopin (1.26 MW), (Monyin township) • Khaunglanphu (1,700 MW), N’Mai
Hka (Khaunglanphu township) • Laiza (1,560 MW), N’Mai Hka (Sumprabum township) • Lakin
(1,400 MW), N’Mai Hka (Chibwe township) • Myitsone (3,600 MW), Irrawaddy confluence • Nam
Hkam Hka (5 MW), (Potao township) • Pashe (1,600 MW), N’Mai Hka (Chibwe township) • Phizaw
(1,500 MW), N’Mai Hka (Khaunglanphu township) • Tarpein I (240 MW), Tarpein river
(Dawphoneyan township) • Tarpein II (168 MW), Tarpein river (Dawphoneyan township) Karen State

• Hat Gyi(1,200 MW), Salween river • Thaukyegat I (150 MW), Thaukyayka (Day Loh) river, (Tantabin
township, Pegu division) • Thaukyegat II (120 MW), Thaukyayka (Day Loh) river Magway Division

• Buywa (60 MW), Mone creek (Bu village, Sidoktaya township) • Kyeeon Kyeewa (75 MW), Mone
creek (Pwintbyu township) • Mone Creek (75 MW), (Sidoktaya township) Mandalay Division •
Dattawgyaing (Kyauksei township) • Nancho (40 MW), Nancho creek (Pyinmanah township) •
Paunglaung (280 MW) (Pyinmana township) • Upper Paunglaung (140 MW)
• Watwon (0.5 MW) (Pyin Oo Lwin township) • Yeywa (790 MW), Myitnge river (Kyauksei township)
Pegu Division

• Kapaung (30 MW) (Taungoo township) • Kun (Kunchaung) (60 MW), Sittaung river (Phyu township) •
Kyauk Naga (75 MW), Shwegyin river (Shwegyin township) • Phyu (20 MW), Phyu river (Phyu
township) • Thaukyegat (150 MW), Thaukyayka (Day Loh) river • Yenwe (25 MW), Yenwe creek
(Kyaukdagah township) • Zaungtu (20 MW), Upper Bago river (Taikkyi village, Bago township)
Sagaing Division

• Thapanseik (30 MW), Mu river (Thapanseik village, Kyunhla township) • Zichaung (1.26 MW)

Shan State
• Chinshwehaw (0.2 MW)
• Kengtawng (54 MW), Namtein creek (Mone township) • Kunhein (Kunheng) (0.15 MW) • Kunlon (0.5
MW)
• Kyaing Ton (Kengtung) (0.32/0.48 MW) • Kyaukme (4 MW)
• Mepan (Meipan) (1.26 MW) (Mong Hsat township) • Nam Myaw (4 MW)
• Nam Wop (3 MW) (Kyaing Ton township) • Shweli I (600 MW), Shweli river (Man Tat village,
Namhkam township) • Shweli II (460 MW), Shweli river • Shweli III (360 MW), Shweli river •
Tasang (7100 MW), Salween river • Upper Thanlwin (2400 MW), Salween river • Zawgyi I (18 MW),
Zawgyi creek (Yaksawk township) • Zawgyi II (12 MW), Zawgyi creek B) SUBSTATIONS &
TRANSMISSION LINES

• Belin–Meikhtila–Taungtwingyi–Monywa • Belin substation (Kyaukse township, Mandalay division) •

Kengtawng transmission line (Shan state) • Mongsan substation (Shan state) • Myaungdagar–
Hlaingthagar–Yekyi • Rangoon Dagon substation (Rangoon division) • Rangoon–Yegyi (Rangoon
division) • Shweli I substation and transmission lines (Shan state) • Shwesaryan substation (Kyauksei
township, Mandalay division) • Yeywa substation (Mandalay division) C) OIL & NATURAL GAS

Arakan State
• A-1 Block (offshore)
• A-4 Block (offshore)
• AD-1 Block (offshore, shallow water, apprx. 200 m deep) • AD-6 Block (offshore, deep water apprx.
2,000 m deep) • AD-8 Block (offshore, deep water apprx. 2,000 m deep) • L Block (onshore)
 • M Block (onshore, Kyaunkpyu region) Mandalay Division

• Bagan Project (onshore)

• IOR-3 Block (onshore, Tetma) • RSF-2 Block (onshore, Tuyintaung) • RSF-3 Block (onshore,
Gwegyo–Ngashandaung) Moattama Coast

• M-2 Block (offshore)

• M-3 Block (offshore)
• M-4 Block (offshore)
• M-10 Block (offshore)

Pegu Division
• Pyay oilfield
• IOR-4 Block (onshore)

Sagaing Division
• C-1 Block (onshore, Indaw–Yenan) • C-2 Block (onshore, Shwebo–Monywa) • D Block (onshore,
Sagaing and Magwe divisions) D) OIL & GAS PIPELINE

• Shwe gas pipeline (Shwe to Yunnan province) • Crude oil pipeline (Kyaukpyu to Ruili in Yunnan
province) E) MINING

Chin State
• Mwetaung nickel deposit

Sagaing Division
• Letpadaung copper deposit (Monywa) Shan State • Tigyit coal-fired power plants and mines (120 MW)
(Tigyit, Pin Laung township) • Namtu–Bawtwin mineral deposit Mandalay Division

• Tagaung Taung nickel deposit (Thabeikkyin township) • Mount Popa pozzolan mine and factory 4.
NEPAL

HYDRO POWER PROJECTS

S. Installed Capacity and Source of Finance/Year of
Project/ Location Remarks/Update
No. Estimated Cost Commissioning/ Company
Upper Trishuli 3B/ Rasuwa
1 44 MW Government project/ Planned and proposed
and Nuwakot
Government project/ MOE/Negotiation stage
Upper Trishuli 3A/ Rasuwa 60 MW; Exim Loan of $120
2 2011/PRC for $200 million/Run of the river
and Nuwakot million
project/Planned and proposed
Government project/Run of the river project/
Operational and major hydro project/Indian
3 Devighat 15 MW 1983 assistance/Commissioned first in 1934 by an
Indian grant of NPR 150 billion and soft loan
of NPR 150 billion
Government project/ Storage reservoir/
4 Kulekhani-I 80 MW 1982
Operational and major hydro project
Storage type/Operational and major hydro
5 Kulekhani-II 32 MW 1986
 Storage type/Operational and major hydro
5 Kulekhani-II 32 MW 1986
project
Sinohydro Corpn. Ltd/ It is a tailrace scheme of Kulekhani-II/ Rapti
Financed by Nepal river/Private/ Under construction;
6 Kulekhani-III 14 MW; NPR 2,216 million
Government and Nepal construction work started in 2008 and 40 per
Electricity Authority cent of work has been completed
Private project/Run of the river project/Final
phase of construction started by Chilime
7 Bhotekoshi 102 MW; NPR 14 billion 2002 Hydropower Company in 2012/ China Power
Investment Corporation has been invited to
participate in prequalification tender
Government project/ Run of the river project/
8 Sunkoshi 10 MW 1972
Operational and major hydro project
Operational/Run of the river
9 Tinau (Butwal) 1,024 KW 1971
project/Gridconnected project
Madi Hydropower
Private project with PPA concluded/Under
10 Development Pvt. Ltd, 0.01 MW Ting Da Eden Holiday Villa
construction
Kaski
11 Getec Nepal Pvt. Ltd, Kaski 0.014 MW China Guanxi Corp. Private project
Asia Pacific Power Tech
12 Luo Gao Rang Private project
Co., Kathmandu
Malungkhola Hydropower
13 0.005 MW Luo Baorong Private project
Co., Lundi, Rasuwa
Private and run of the river
project/Construction work started in
China Gejua Water and 2007/Still under construction; In January
Chamelia Hydel Project, Power Group Co. Ltd/Likely 2011 the project was protested by the workers
14 30 MW
Darchula to be completed in August at the project/ The initial estimated cost of the
2013 project was NPR 7.5 billion and increased by
NPR 2 billion/Supply material for the project
increased in October 2011
Private project/Storage type/NEA has
completed the upgrading feasibility study of
the project under technical assistance from
128 MW/ $328 million by JICA; the project will be commissioned by
15 Upper Seti, Damauli ADB and Japan Invest. 2015 FY 2014–15. The project will comprise of a
Comp. 140 m high concrete dam, 195 m long
penstock, underground powerhouse and
ancillary structures; planned and proposed;
expected to be completed by 2017
Run of the river project/ NEA has given high
Upper Tamakoshi, priority to start the construction by end of
16 456 MW; $340 million 2013
Lamabagar 2008 so as to complete by 2012–13; under
construction
Private and reservoir project by Ministry of
Energy/Power Trading Corporation, India,
Snowy Mountain Eng. Corp.
has signed an agreement for purchase of
Australia and China
West Seti Hydropower power from this project; reservoir type, highly
750 MW; Chinese Exim National Machinery and
17 (including 400 KV recommended by Energy Secretary. Under
loan of $1.6 billion Equipment Import and
transmission line) observation of Ministry of Energy. A MoU
Export, China; started in
has been signed on 29 February 2012 between
2005
NEA and UTGL, China, for construction of
the project
Nepal government has provided the project
for 30 years on the basis of build, own,
By Indian company GMR in
18 Upper Karnali 900 MW operate and transfer (BOOT)/12 per cent of
joint venture with NBA
electricity generated will be provided to
Nepal

Road Projects

S.
Details of the project Project type (loan/ grant) Approx amount Remarks
No.
Syaprubeshi-Rasuwagadhi road (including
1. Grant NPR 1.6 billion
border bridge at Rasuwagadhi)
 Syaprubeshi-Rasuwagadhi road (including
1. Grant NPR 1.6 billion
border bridge at Rasuwagadhi)
2. Ring road (agreement signed)
Construction of north– south link road (Hilsa–
Simikot stretch, Rio– Kimathanka stretch, and
3.
Barela–Chingre stretch and Jomsom–Korala
stretch
Inner Chakrapath Road (from Kalanki to
Grant RMB 340 million 9 km road including 3
Koteshwor, 10 lanes), Phase I: Kalanki–
bridges/Detailed design
4. Koteshwor
completed; to be worked out
Grant RMB 3.8 million after Phase I
Phase II: remaining section
5. Maintenance of VICC Grant NPR 180 million
Chinese technical team
arrived in 2007 and carried
6. Construction of Outer Ring Road Grant NPR 10 billion out survey and design; a
preliminary report has been
received

Other Projects

S. Project type
Details of the project Approx amount Remarks
No. (loan/grant)
Of total estimated cost of $3.80 million,
1. Pokhara airport construction Loan $3.80 million China has agreed to provide assistance to the
tune of $3.14 million
Frontier building, apartment, parking lot and
auxiliary facilities/ Draft exchange notes
2. Tatopani dry port Grant $50 million
received/Amount to cover from 2002 and
2007 agreement
For improvement of Lumbini as pilgrim
3. Lumbini as Buddhist city Grant $3 billion
centre
Medical equipment and supporting assistance
4. RMB 100 million
for Birendra Hospital, Chhauni, Kathmandu
5. Civil Service Hospital Grant $52 million Operational
6. B.P. Koirala Cancer Hospital Grant $1.6 billion Operational
7. Banepa polytechnic extension of project Grant $10 billion Construction completed
Supply of digital radio trunking service to
8. Nepal Police, for three districts of Kathmandu RMB 26 million
valley and other 10 districts
220 KV transmission line and 132 KV bay Loan assistance
9. RMB 154 million
extension/Works for Upper Trishuli 3A HP from EXIM Bank
10. Security equipment to Nepal Police Grant RMB 10 million
11. Security equipment donation Grant RMB 6 million
RMB 21 lakh and For the upgradation of two schools at
Grant
RMB 7 lakh Kapilvastu and Rupandehi
For computers and accessories to Pathak
Grant RMB 10 lakh
Higher School, Pokhara
12. Aids for school
For computers and accessories to Chorepatan
Grant RMB 20 Lakh
Higher Secondary School of Kaski district
To schools which have introduced Chinese
Grant RMB 6 Lakh
language and scholarships to students

5. PAKISTAN

S.
Project Details
No.
1. Neelam Jhelum Hydropower Project EXIM Bank of China will provide a loan of $448 million for the project
 1. Neelam Jhelum Hydropower Project EXIM Bank of China will provide a loan of $448 million for the project
The project is a joint venture between Sindh provincial government and Engro
2. Sindh–Engro Coal Mining and Power Project Powergen Pvt. Ltd, a subsidiary of Engro Corporation with 40 per cent and 60 per cent
stake respectively
3. Diamer–Bhasha Hydropower Project On the Indus in Gilgit–Baltistan
The project is located in Muzaffarabad district. The dam site is proposed just upstream
4. Kohala Hydropower Project of Domel on Jhelum river, near Siran village, 174 km from Islamabad, and the
powerhouse is located at Barsala, 7 km upstream from Kohala bridge
5. Bunji Hydropower Project The project is located on the Indus near Gilgit
6. AES Imported Coal Project Project located in Gadani, Balochistan
A 500 KV power transmission line project valued at $55 million was signed on 20
7. Transmission line projects
December 2001 with China Cable as the main contractor
8. Kotli Hydropower Project Mira Pakistan Ltd on Poonch river in Kotli, PoK
9. Madian Hydropower Project Cherat Cement, on Swat river
China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation involved in Chashma nuclear projects in
10. Chashma Nuclear Power Project
Pakistan/ Chashma I and II already completed
Harbin Electric International involved in setting up this power plant in Kashmore
11. Guddu Power Plant
district, Sindh
China Three Gorges Corporation has begun construction at the cost of work $130
12. 49.5 MW wind farm at Jhimpir
million
Being constructed by China’s Gejuwa Water and Power Group/Almost 90 per cent of
13. Chameliya Hydropower Project the work of the 131 km of 132 KV transmission line has been completed/A sum of
$11.5 million has been spent
Beixin Road and Bridge Construction is carrying out work on the project at a cost of
14. Benazir Bhutto International Airport
$23.8 million
Due to a massive landslide at Attabad on 4 January 2010, the Hunza river was blocked
and about 3 km of the highway was buried. The strategy proposed by China and agreed
Restoration of Karakoram highway at Attabad
15. by Pakistan for restoration of the highway at Attabad barrier lake was to lower the
lake
lake’s level by 30 m and then reroute the highway by construction of tunnels, high-level
bridges and roads/Work currently going on
16. Karachi port deep water bridge project Cost $450 million
China is giving aid worth $188 million for repairing roads which suffered damages in
17. Pakistan’s reconstruction project after flood
2010
Karachi–Hyderabad (M-9) Express Highway
18.
Project
19. Dry port in Sust This port is being run by a joint venture company named Pak–China Sust Port Company
20. Jinnah Hydropower Project Awarded to Dongfang Electric Company of China at a cost of $128 million

6. Sri Lanka

S.
Project Details
No.
China has already completed Phase I of the project for which it has provided $400
1. Hambantota Port Development
million/Work on Phase II yet to start
2. Hambantota International Airport China has lent $190 million for second international airport at Hambantota
Sri Lanka has signed a $ 500 million deal with China Merchants Holdings, local
conglomerate Aitken Spence and Sri Lanka Ports to boost Colombo port’s cargo-
3 Colombo port expansion
handling capacity/Letter of intent for the project was signed in September 2010 and the
project is scheduled for completion by early 2013
China has invested around $760 million for road construction across the country,
4. Road development
including $302 million for projects in the north
1. China’s Exim Bank has committed $102.5 million for Sri Lanka to buy new diesel
engines
2. Earlier, 15 power sets (S10 category) were supplied by China at a cost of $2.46
5. Railway
million each
3. China has reportedly proposed to construct a new railway line in the north from
Omanthai to Trincomalee and further down to Batticaloa
China is developing 900 MW of coal power in three phases, of which Phase I is already
 China is developing 900 MW of coal power in three phases, of which Phase I is already
6. Norochcholoi Coal Power Project
on stream/ Cost of project is over $1.5 billion
1. China CAMC Engineering Co. Ltd has bagged a project to implement Yan Oya
Reservoir Project at a cost of $176 million to be financed by Industrial and Commercial
7. Irrigation projects Bank of China
2. Chinese are also lobbying to gain $530 million Uma Oya multipurpose project to
generate 120 MW power and irrigation in Uva and Hambantota district
A $600 million project being conceived by the Education Ministry to develop 1,000
8. Proposed school and education projects secondary school and additional primary schools as feeder units to upgrade the quality
of schools
Chinese wind power companies such as Goldwind, Dongfang Electric and Sinovel are
9. Proposed wind energy projects making aggressive attempts to bag the engineering procurement and construction
contracts in proposed projects in Mannar, Jafana and Puttalam
Sapugaskanda Refinery expansion and China has shown interest to invest about $2 billion to upgrade its existing capacity from
10.
modernization project 50,000 to 100,000 barrels per day
China Zhonghang International Technical and Economic Co. Ltd has offered to do
various upgradation works related to Sri Lanka Railways signaling system. The project
Propsed upgradation of railway signaling
11. is to overhaul the old CTC system, docking, IP subsystem, networking subsystem, PBX
system
voice subsystem and rail side machinery/Railway officials predict a rough estimate of
$400 million
China is aggressively lobbying for the proposed Colombo–Kandy expressway, called
North–East Expressway, which is estimated to cost $1.3 billion/ Proposed expressway is
12. Proposed Colombo–Kandy expressway divided into two phases viz., Phase I, from Kadawatha to Ambepussa (48.20 km), and
Phase II, from Ambepussa to Katugastota (50.7 Km)/Initially, Phase I of the project will
be on offer and is estimated to cost $700 million
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Introduction
1. Letters dated 14 December 1958 from Jawaharlal Nehru to Zhou Enlai, 23 January 1959 from Zhou
to Nehru and 22 March 1959 from Nehru to Zhou are from ‘Notes, Memoranda and Letters
Exchanged and Agreements Signed between The Governments Of India and China, 1954– 1959,
White Paper No. I’, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India
2. Letters dated 8 September 1959 from Zhou to Nehru and 26 September 1959 from Nehru to Zhou are
from ‘Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged between The Governments Of India and China,
September– November 1959, White Paper No. II’, MEA, Government of India
3. Letters dated 7 November 1959 and 17 December 1959 from Zhou to Nehru and 16 November 1959
and 21 December 1959 from Nehru to Zhou are from ‘Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged
between The Governments Of India and China, November 1959–March 1960, White Paper No.III’,
MEA, Government of India
4. A.G. Noorani, India–China Boundary Problem 1846–1947: History and Diplomacy, Oxford
University Press, 2011
5. Alastair Lamb, Tibet, China and India: 1914–1950 – A History of Imperial Diplomacy, Roxford
Books, 1989
6. Harrison E. Salisbury, The New Emperors: Mao and Deng – A Dual Biography, Indus, 1992
7. Karunkar Gupta, Sino–Indian Relations – 1948–52: Role of K.M. Pannikar, Minerva Publications,
1987
8. Huang Hua, Memoirs: Contemporary History and Diplomacy of China, Foreign Languages Press,
2008
9. Chuck Hagel and Peter Kaminsky, America: Our Next Chapter – Tough Questions, Straight
Answers, HarperLuxe, 2008
10. ‘Can India become a Great Power?’ The Economist magazine, 30 March–5 April 2013

Chapter 1
1. Shyam Saran, ‘China in the Twenty First Century: What India Needs to Know About China’s World
View’, Second Annual K. Subrahmanyam Memorial Lecture, India International Centre, 29 August
2012
2. Namrata Goswami, China’s Territorial Claim on Arunachal Pradesh: Crafting an Indian Response,
IDSA, 25 October 2010
3. Hari Bansh Jha, Diversion of the Brahmputra: Myth or Reality?, IDSA, 9 August 2011
4. Jesper Svensson, Managing the Rise of a Hydro-Hegemon in Asia: China’s Strategic Interests in the
Yarlung Tsangpo River, IDSA Ocassional Paper No. 23, April 2012.
5. Dr Sanjaya Baru, China and India – Bilateral Trade and the Global Economy, September 2013
6. Martin Jazques, When China Rules the World: The Rise of the Middle Kingdom and the End of
 Western World, Allen Lane, 2009
7. ‘The Next Leap Forward: Special Report on China’, Time magazine, 8 June 2012
8. ‘Rising Power, Anxious State’, The Economist magazine, 25 June–1 July 2011
9. ‘India vs. China’, Time magazine, 21 November 2011
10. ‘How Strong is China’s Economy?’ The Economist magazine, 26 May–1 June 2012

Chapter 2
1. Anand Yang, (A) Subaltern(’s) Boxers: An Indian Soldier’s Account of China and the World –
1900–1901, University of Washington
2. Ed. Robert A. Bickers & Gary Tiedemann, The Boxers: China and the World, Riwman and
Littlefield, 2007
3. ‘History of the Conflict with China, 1962,’ History Division, Ministry of Defence, Government of
India, 1992
4. Neville Maxwell, India’s China War, Jaico Publishing House, 1970
5. Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, 1945–50, Volume I and II, Navajivan Press, 1974
6. J.P. Dalvi, Himalayan Blunders, Thacker & Co Ltd, 1969
7. John W. Garver, China’s Decision for War with India in 1962, Stanford
8. John W. Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino–Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century, University of
Washington Press, 2000
9. Ed. Rakesh Batabyal, The Penguin Book of Modern Indian Speeches: 1977 to Present, Penguin, 2007
10. B.G. Varghese, Fifty Years after 1962, Subbu Forum Round Table, September 2012
11. Inder Malhotra, ‘J.N. to JFK, “Eyes Only”’, Indian Express, 15 November 2010

Chapter 3
1. IISS, The Military Balance 2011: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and
Defense Economics, Routledge, 2011
2. IISS, Strategic Survey 2011: The Annual Review of World Affairs, Routledge, 2011
3. M. Taylor Fravel, Regime Insecurity and International Cooperation: Explaining China’s
Compromises in Territorial Disputes, 2005
4. Chinese Strategic Posture in Tibet Autonomous Region and India’s Response, National Security
Alert, Vivekananda International Foundation, 2012
5. Jonathan Holslag, Trapped Giant: China’s Military Rise, IISS, 2010
6. Christian Le Miere, The Return of Gunboat Diplomacy: Survival, Global Politics and Strategy, IISS,
2011
7. Mandip Singh, China’s Defence Budget 2013–2014, IDSA, 18 March 2013
8. Mandip Singh, PLA’s Top Ten Exercises in 2012: An Analysis, IDSA, 21 March 2013
9. Benjamin Lai, The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Since 1949: Ground Forces, Osprey
Publishing, 2012
10. Larry M. Wortzel, The Dragon Extends its Reach: Chinese Military Power Goes Global, Potomac
Books, 2013
 Chapter 4
1. ‘China’s Place in the World’, The Economist magazine, 3–9 October 2009
2. ‘How India’s growth will outpace China’s’, The Economist magazine, 2–8 October 2010
3. Ajit Doval, Chinese Intelligence: From a Party Outfit to Cyber Warriors, Vivekananda International
Foundation, 2013
4. Harsh V. Pant, South China Sea: New Arena of Sino–Indian Rivalry, YaleGlobal, August 2012
5. C. Raja Mohan, Samudra Manthan: Sino–Indian Rivalry in the Indo– Pacific, Oxford University
Press
6. Sarah Raine, China’s African Challenges, IISS, 2009
7. Mandip Singh, China consolidates claim in South China Sea, IDSA, 17 April 2013
8. Brahma Chellaney, ‘Countering China’s “String of Pearls”’, Washington Times
9. Christophe Jaffrelot, A Tale of Two Ports: Gwadar and Chahbahar display Chinese–Indian Rivalry in
the Arabian Sea, YaleGlobal, 2011
10. Christopher J. Pehrson, String of Pearls: Meeting the Challenge of China’s Rising Power Across the
Asian Littoral, Strategic Studies Institute, US

Chapter 5
1. Brahma Chellaney, ‘India’s Mountain Strike Farce’, Wall Street Journal, 30 July 2013
2. Brig. (retd) Gurmeet Kanwal, Strike Corps for the Mountains: Upgrading India’s Military Strategy
from Dissuasion to Deterrence, VIF, September 2013
3. Sujit Datta, China’s High Risk Gamble, IDSA, 3 September 2010
4. Lt. General (retd) Gautam Bannerjee, India’s Military Strategy vis-à-vis China, VIF
5. Gurmeet Kanwal, Military Threat from China, CLAWS, 5 August 2012
6. Monika Chansoria, Chinese PLA’s Integrated Military Exercises in Tibet, CLAWS, Spring 2012
7. Medha Bisht, Bhutan 2010: Foreign Policy Developments, IDSA, 30 December 2010
8. Rumel Dahiya & Ashok K. Behuria, India’s Neighbourhood: Challenges in the Next Two Decades,
Pentagon Security International, 2012
9. Satish Kumar, China’s Expanding Footprint in Nepal: Threats to India, IDSA, April 2011

Chapter 6
1. Tibet and India’s Security: Himalayan Region, Refugees and Sino–Indian Relations, IDSA Task
Force Report, May 2012
2. ‘The Next Emperor: Will Xi Jinping change China?’ The Economist Magazine, 23–28 October 2010
3. Ananth Krishnan, ‘Behind the War, a Genesis in Tibet’, The Hindu, 20 October 2012
4. Mandip Singh, Critical assessment of China’s Vulnerabilities in Tibet, IDSA, 2013
5. Jeffrey Bartholet, Aflame : A Wave of Self-Immolation Sweeps Tibet, New Yorker, 8 July 2013
6. Robert D. Sloane, Tibetan Diaspora in the Shadow of the Self-Immolation Crisis: Consequences of
Colonialism, Boston University, September 2013
7. ‘The Karmapa’s comeuppance?’, The Economist, 31 January 2011
8. P. Stobdan, Tibet and the Institution of Dalai Lama, IDSA
 9. Humphrey Hawksley, Dragon Fire, Pan Macmillan, 2000
10. The Dalai Lama, Reincarnation, 24 September 2011

Chapter 7
1. Claude Arpi, ‘The Tibetans Who Fought the 1971 War’, Rediff, 10 January 2012
2. Heather Timmons & Jim Yardley, ‘Signs of an Asian Arms Build-up in India’s Missile Test’, New
York Times, 19 April 2012
3. Frank O’ Donnel, Managing India’s Missile Aspirations, IDSA, 10 February 2013
4. Shyam Saran, Is India’s Nuclear Deterrent Credible?, Subbu Forum Society for Policy Studies, India
Habitat Centre, 24 April 2013
5. Shivshankar Menon, India and the Global Scene, Prem Bhatia Memorial Lecture, August 2011
6. Shivshankar Menon, The Role of Militaries in International Relations, Cariappa Memorial Lecture,
10 October 2011
7. Shivshankar Menon, India’s External and Internal Security, Eighth Raja Ramanna Memorial Lecture,
21 January 2013
8. P. Chidambaram, India’s National Security – Challenges and Priorities, K. Subrahmanyam Memorial
Lecture, 26 February 2013
9. Brig. (retd) Gurmeet Kanwal, China’s Cyberwar Doctrine: Implications for India, Vivekananda
International Foundation, http://www.vifindia.org/article/2012/july/02/china-s-cyberwar-doctrine-
implications-forindia
10. Brig. (retd) Vinod Anand, Defending China: PRC’s Defence White Paper 2010 and Military
Transparency, Vivekananda International Foundation,
http://www.vifindia.org/article/2011/april/11/Defending-China-PRCs-Defence-White-Paper-2010-
and-Military-Transparency

Chapter 8
1. Nonalignment 2.0: A Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in the Twenty-First Century, Centre for
Policy Research, 2012
2. Christopher W. Hughes, Japan’s Remilitarisation, IISS, 2009
3. Namrata Goswami, China’s Response to India’s Military Upgrade in Arunachal Pradesh: A Classic
Case of Security Dilemma, IDSA, 16 November 2011
4. Lalit Kumar, Counters of a Possible Indian Response to Chinese Aggressiveness, IDSA Policy Brief,
17 January 2011
5. Namrata Goswami, Chinese Territorial Claim on Arunachal Pradesh: Crafting an Indian Response,
IDSA, 25 October 2010
6. Edward N. Lutwak, The Rise of China vs. the Logic of Strategy, Harvard University Press, 2012
 NOTES

Preface
1 ‘Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged between the Governments Of India And China’, September-
November 1959, White Paper No. II issued by Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India
2 http://www.indianexpress.com/news/incursion-acne-can-be-cured-with-ointment-says-khurshid/1107855/
3 http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/india-china-agree-to-rebuild-fragile-defence-
ties/article4887844.ece

Introduction
1 http://factgrabber.com/index.php?
q=Daulat_Beg_Oldi_Advanced_Landing_Ground&lcid=ZpFmwSeZJ5mGGUaJZKFkweapRolkiWa5BoGmkSeB5hkG
2 http://www.hindustantimes.com/Indianews/NewDelhi/Chinese-armycrossed-LAC-on-April-10/Article1-
1059229.aspx
3 http://www.hindustantimes.com/Indianews/NewDelhi/Strain-on-Indo-Sino-ties-as-troops-face-
off/Article1-1049389.aspx
4 http://www.indianexpress.com/news/border-tension-escalates-foreign-secretary-summons-chinese-envoy-
to-lodge-protest/1106401/
5 Author’s interview (AI)
6 http://www.hindustantimes.com/Indianews/NewDelhi/India-s-tin-shed-at-Chumar-made-PLA-troops-
back-off/Article1-1057741.aspx; http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/amid-ladakh-tensions-india-
china-discussjoint-militaryexercises/article4658593.ece;
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2013-08-23/india/41439754_1_pla-troops-largest-
andsecond-largest-armies-daulat-beg-oldi; http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/pm-terms-ladakh-
incident-a-localised-problem/article4660344.ece
7 http://www.indianexpress.com/news/incursion-acne-can-be-cured-withointment-says-khurshid/1107855/
8 AI
9 http://mea.gov.in/media-briefings.htm?dtl/21724/Transcript+of+Media+B
riefing+by+Official+Spokesperson+and+Indian+Ambassador+to+China+on+Chinese+Premiers+ongoing+visit+to+Indi
10 http://www.hindustantimes.com/Indianews/NewDelhi/Engaging-thedragon/Article1-1062347.aspx
11 http://www.hindustantimes.com/Indianews/Goa/Infra-build-up-along-China-border-to-go-on/Article1-
1058663.aspx; http://www.hindustantimes.com/Indianews/NewDelhi/Chinese-army-crossed-LAC-on-
April-10/ Article1-1059229.aspx; http://www.hindustantimes.com/Indianews/NewDelhi/Chinese-
incursions-border-situation-grim-in-Chumar/Article11098453.aspx
12 http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2013-05-26/india/39537838_1_ pla-troops-daulat-beg-oldi-
dbo;
13 http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/HEROISM/Thapa.html; http://pmindia.nic.in/speech-details.php?
nodeid=1319; http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-10-02/india/34216995_1_high-speed-
 interceptorboats-chinese-boats-pangong-tso
14 http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-05-28/news/39580230_1_sino-indian-ties-east-china-
sea-china-and-india
15
Noorani, A.G., India–China Boundary Problem 1846–1947: History and Diplomacy, Oxford University
Press, New Delhi, 2011
16 Gupta, Karunakar, Sino–Indian Relations 1948–52: Role of K.M. Panikkar, Minerva, Calcutta, 1987
17 ibid.
18 http://www.tribuneindia.com/2012/20121016/edit.htm#7
19 http://www.tribuneindia.com/2012/20121016/edit.htm#6
20
ibid.
21
http://ignca.nic.in/ks_41062.htm, http://meahindi.nic.in/hindixpsite/celdemo/panchsheel.pdf
22 Gupta, K., Sino–Indian Relations
23 http://theindianeconomist.com/indias-grand-strategy-part-4/
24 Garver, John, ‘The Unresolved Sino–Indian Border Dispute: An Interpretation’, China Report, Sage
Journals, May 2011
25 Huang, Hua, Memoirs: Contemporary History and Diplomacy of China, Foreign Languages Press, 2008
26 ibid.
27 http://www.hindustantimes.com/Indianews/NewDelhi/A-mix-ofcompetition-amp-
engagementahead/Article1-940936.aspx
28 http://www.stimson.org/research-pages/agreement-on-the-maintenance-of-peace-along-the-line-of-
actual-control-in-the-india-china-border/
29 http://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/13/world/nuclear-anxiety-indian-s-letterto-clinton-on-the-nuclear-
testing.html
30 http://www.tpprc.org/documents/agreements/1963-A.pdf
31 http://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/7679/Declaration+on+Princ
iples+for+Relations+and+Comprehensive+Cooperation+Between+the+Re
public+of+India+and+the+Peoples+Republic+of+China
32 http://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/6563/Synopses+of+Agreem
entsMOUsMemoranda++Visit+of+Chinese++Wen+Jiabao+to+India+Apri l+912+2005
33 http://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/China-January-2012.pdf
34 ibid.
35 http://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/india-china-bilateral-trade-projected-at-100-
bn-by-2015-113041500358_1.html
36 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/1917167/Chinese-nuclear-submarine-base.html
37 http://www.hindustantimes.com/Indianews/NewDelhi/Engaging-thedragon/Article1-1062347.aspx
38 AI
39 http://www.indianexpress.com/news/chinas-ties-with-others-must-not-hurtindia-pm-tells-xi-
jinping/1095146/
40 http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/mar/21/china-pakistan-reachsecret-reactor-deal-pakistan/?
page=all
41 AI
42 AI
43 http://edition.cnn.com/2012/11/15/world/asia/china-leadership-reaction-cheng-li
44 http://www.hindustantimes.com/Indianews/Mumbai/China-ready-to-settle-border-issues/Article1-
970460.aspx
45 http://www.hindustantimes.com/Indianews/Mumbai/China-ready-to-settleborder-issues/Article1-
970460.aspx
46 http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-03/20/c_132249063.htm
47 http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/news/international/china-unveils-5point-formula-to-improve-ties-
with-india/article4524944.ece
48 AI
49 AI
50 http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asia-pacific/india/121124/india-china-new-passport-
visa-map-borders
51
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/china/China-to-construct-threemore-dams-on-Brahmaputra-
river/articleshow/18257155.cms
52 http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/china-gives-goahead-forthree-new-brahmaputra-
dams/article4358195.ece
53 http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/china-gives-goahead-forthree-new-brahmaputra-
dams/article4358195.ece
54 http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2013-02-05/china/36764226_1_ zangmu-yarlung-zangbo-
brahmaputra
55
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3914bd36-8467-11e0-afcb-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2VD2E9BB3
56
http://zeenews.india.com/news/nation/no-need-to-overreact-on-pakistans-gwadar-port-
khurshid_826431.html
57 http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/chinese-presence-at-gwadar-portis-a-matter-of-concern-
antony/article4386103.ece
58 AI
59 http://www.hindu.com/2008/09/30/stories/2008093060691200.htm;
60 http://www.indianexpress.com/news/cant-halt-the-import-of-iran-oil-indiato-tell-us/1090655/
61 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-15/thai-police-say-israeli-diplomats-in-bangkok-targeted-by-
iranian-bombers.html
62 http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/mar/21/china-pakistan-reachsecret-reactor-deal-pakistan/?
page=all
63 ibid.
64
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-03-25/news/38010065_1_china-national-nuclear-
corporation-chashma-china-andpakistan
65 ibid.
66 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-07/china-s-xi-says-region-cant-enter-chaos-as-korea-tensions-
rise.html
67 http://www.indianexpress.com/news/five-thoughts-on-china/1092790/
68 http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=92059
69 Hagel, Chuck & Kaminsky, Peter, America: Our Next Chapter – Tough Questions, Straight Answers.
HarperLuxe, 2008
70 http://www.indianexpress.com/news/chinas-ties-with-others-must-not-hurtindia-pm-tells-xi-
jinping/1095146/
71 http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2013-05-28/china/39578745_1_ sino-indian-ties-east-china-
sea-china-and-india
72 http://www.indianexpress.com/news/india-warned-by-chinas-communistparty-daily-over-japan-ties-as-
manmohan-singh-returns/1123214/
73 http://www.indianexpress.com/news/vvip-chopper-deal-cbi-files-fir-againstexiaf-chief-s-p-tyagi-
 others/1087381/
74 http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2010-03-13/india/28115998_1_ gorshkov-ins-vikramaditya-
huge-cost-escalation
75
http://zeenews.india.com/news/nation/gorshkov-delayed-project-cost-toremain-2-3-bn-
antony_812961.html
76 http://www.ukrainebusiness.com.ua/news/7852.html
77 http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/ awx_03_18_2013_p0-560119.xml;
78 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/9937327/Chinaovertakes-UK-to-become-worlds-
fifth-largest-arms-exporter.html
79
http://apdforum.com/en_GB/article/rmiap/articles/online/ features/2013/04/29/india-china-weapons;
http://www.thedailystar.net/beta2/news/china-among-top-5-arms-exporters/
80 http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21574511-indias-lack-strategicculture-hobbles-its-ambition-be-
force-world-can-india

Chapter 1
1 http://www.hindustantimes.com/Indianews/NewDelhi/PLA-restricting-Indian-patrol-area-Report/Article1-
1116538.aspx
2 http://www.indianexpress.com/news/45-yrs-after-china-conflict-delhi-tobuild-roads-linking—ladakh-
outposts/31463/
3 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/indiahome/indianews/article-2386427/Shyam-Saran-heads-Ladakh-review-
border-security.html; AI
4 http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2013-08-20/india/41428460_1_dbo-c-130j-super-super-
hercules
5 http://www.thehindu.com/sci-tech/science/giant-stride-for-country-sayspm-on-nuclear-reactor-ins-
arihant/article5009098.ece
6 http://indiannavy.nic.in/press-release/vikrant-navys-first-indigenousaircraft-carrier-launched
7 http://www.hindustantimes.com/Indianews/NewDelhi/India-wants-to-add-post-to-China-border-
meetings/Article1-1092141.aspx
8 AI
9 http://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ians/chinese-choppersviolate-indian-airspace-
113071400655_1.html
10 http://www.indianexpress.com/news/top-china-army-body-says-ladakhintrusion-was-
accidental/1142292/
11 http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/beijings-assertiveness-in-dealingwith-disputes-disconcerting-
narayanan/article4055563.ece
12 http://in.chineseembassy.org/eng/ssygd/zygx/t191495.htm
13 http://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/india-chinabilateral-trade-projected-at-100-
bn-by-2015-113041500358_1.html
14 http://www.china.org.cn/english/2005/Apr/125627.htm
15 http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200509/07/eng20050907_207149.html;
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2005-09-04/india/27863586_1_border-dispute-chinese-
invasion-arunachalpradesh
16 http://www.rediff.com/news/2006/nov/14china.htm
17 http://www.ndtv.com/article/wikileaks-revelations/wikileaks-chinese-envoy-exceeded-arunachal-brief-
 108843;
18
http://ris.org.in/images/RIS_images/pdf/Second%20Annual_K%20Subrahmanyam%20Memorial%20Lecture.pdf
19
http://carnegieendowment.org/experts/?fa=491
20 http://www.japanfocus.org/-Peter-Lee
21 http://www.rediff.com/news/2006/nov/14china.htm
22 http://www.idsa.in/system/files/IB_Chinasterrorialclaim.pdf;
http://idsa.in/system/files/OP_ChinaTerritorialClaim_O.pdf
23
http://www.hindustantimes.com/News-Feed/India/China-opposes-DalaiLama-s-visit-to-
Arunachal/Article1-452854.aspx
24 http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/refrain-from-taking-actionthat-could-complicate-border-
dispute-china/article2932357.ece
25 http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-02-28/india/31107078_1_ arunachalpradesh-antony-
border-issue
26 http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/floods-ravage-himachal-and-arunachalpradesh-satellite-pictures-
suggest-china-hand/1/232112.html
27 ibid.
28 http://www.ipcs.org/article/china/damming-the-brahmaputra-setback-tosouth-asian-stability-3211.html;
http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/one-river-two-countries-too-many-dams/article4570590.ece
29 http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2010-04-22/india/28126091_1_ zangmu-brahmaputra-india-
and-china
30 http://www.indianexpress.com/news/as-the-brahmaputra-bends/1104650/;
http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/no-threat-from-china-dam-onbrahmaputra-manmohan-
singh/1/148576.html
31 http://www.idsa.in/event/ExaminingChinasHydrobehaviour
32 http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/DiversionofYarlungTsangpo_MBisht_111109
33 http://www.indianexpress.com/news/as-the-brahmaputra-bends/ 1104650/
34 http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/08/opinion/global/chinas-hydrohegemony.html; China as
HydroHegemon: The Onset of Water Wars, http://www.vifindia.org/article/2011/july/06/Chinaas-
HydroHegemon-The-Onset-of-Water-Wars
35 http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2013-02-01/india/36683325_1_zangmu-yarlung-tsangpo-
china-s-qinghai-tibet
36 ibid.
37 http://www.indianexpress.com/news/china-spikes-indias-proposal-for-jointmechanism-
onbrahmaputra/1103909/
38 http://blogs.agu.org/landslideblog/2009/05/26/the-pareechu-landslide-andflood-2005/;
http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/sutlej-river-in-himachalpradesh-swelled-up-after-pareechu-lake-
burst-in-tibet/1/193302.html
39 http://wrmin.nic.in/index3.asp?sslid=443&subsublinkid=287&langid=1;
https://www.indianembassy.org/policy/Foreign_Policy/ganga.htm; http://wrmin.nic.in/index3.asp?
subsublinkid=288&langid=1&sslid=369
40 http://www.china.org.cn/environment/2011-06/17/content_22806358.htm
41 http://www.hindustantimes.com/worldnews/China/China-asserts-upperhand-in-trade-with-India/Article1-
1091417.aspx
42 http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/nic/0041/report.pdf; http://mea.gov.in/
Portal/ForeignRelation/China_Brief.pdf; http://www.indianembassy.org.cn/DynamicContent.aspx?
MenuId=3&SubMenuId=0
43 AI; http://intelligence.house.gov/sites/intelligence.house.gov/files/Huawei-
ZTE%20Investigative%20Report%20(FINAL).pdf
44 AI
45 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-17/huawei-technologies-setback-shows-u-s-is-refusing-
investments-china-says.html
46 http://www.indianexpress.com/news/restrict-chinese-presence-only-to-telecom-manufacturing-
dot/994103/
47 http://www.indianexpress.com/news/foreign-telecom-equipment-forcritical-networks-to-be-
banned/982162/
48 Department of Telecom, Government of India, ‘Preference to Domestically Manufactured Electronic and
Telecom Goods in Procurement, due to Security Considerations, and in Government Procurement, July
2012.
49 The Union Cabinet on February 2, 2012, approved a PMA policy calling for using indigenously
manufactured products to mitigate the threat of cyber espionage in segments that can have security
implications.
50
http://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/policy-for-indiamade-telecom-equipment-on-
hold-113070500854_1.html
51 http://www.thehindu.com/sci-tech/technology/internet/india-primetarget-of-chinese-cyberespionage-
kaspersky/article4784805.ece; http:// businesstoday.intoday.in/story/india-cyber-security-at-
risk/1/191786.html
52
http://ris.org.in/images/RIS_images/pdf/Second%20Annual_K%20Subrahmanyam%20Memorial%20Lecture.pdf
53 ibid.
54 http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-09-04/india/33581059_1_ actual-control-beijing-
islamabad-chinese-defence-minister
55
http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/china-has-never-deployed-asingle-soldier-in-pok-
liang/article3855456.ece
56 AI
57 AI
58 http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2013/04/02/qa-aynak-miningafghanistan
59 AI
60 http://www.indianexpress.com/news/boundary-issue-a-historical-legacywill-take-long-time-to-resolve-
wen/725959/
61 http://english.sina.com/china/2012/0816/497328.html
62 AI
63 http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/chinasri-lanka-space-cooperation-worries-
india/article4530698.ece
64 AI
65 AI
66 http://www.asiasentinel.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2910&Itemid=168
67 http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2013-04-08/india/38372753_1_ ulfa-cadres-kachin-weapons;
http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/chineseagents-smuggle-arms-to-spread-militancy-in-north-
east/1/139538.html
68 http://world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-A-F/Bangladesh/#. UedQYY03BiI

Chapter 2
 Chapter 2
1
AI
2
Robert A. Bickers & Gary Tiedemann (ed.), The Boxers, China and the World, Rowman and Littlefield,
2007
3 ibid.
4 AI
5
John W. Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino–Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century, University of
Washington Press, 2001.
6 John W. Garver, ‘China’s Decision for War With India in 1962’, New Directions in the Study of Chinese
Foreign Policy (ed. Robert S. Ross and Alastair Iain Johnston), Stanford University Press, 2006.
7 Letters dated 14 December 1958 from Nehru to Zhou Enlai, 23 Jan 1959 from Zhou to Nehru and 22
March 1959 from Nehru to Zhou are from ‘Notes, Memoranda And Letters Exchanged and
Agreements Signed Between The Governments Of India And China, 1954–1959, White Paper No.I’
issued by MEA, Government of India; Letters dated 8 September 1959 from Zhou to Nehru and 26
September 1959 from Nehru to Zhou are from ‘Notes, Memoranda And Letters Exchanged Between
The Governments Of India And China, September–November 1959, White Paper No. II’ issued by
MEA, Government of India; Letters dated 7 November 1959 and 17 December 1959 from Zhou to
Nehru and 16 November 1959 and 21 December 1959 from Nehru to Zhou are from ‘Notes,
Memoranda And Letters Exchanged Between The Governments Of India And China, November
1959–March 1960, White Paper No.III’ issued by MEA, Government of India.
8 ibid.
9 Ministry of Defence, Government of India. Official 1962 War History, History Division;
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Army/History/1962War/PDF/
10
Garver, ‘China’s Decision for War with India in 1962’, Stanford
11 ibid.
12 ibid.
13 Rakesh Batabyal (ed.), The Penguin Book of Modern India Speeches, 1877 to Present, Penguin Books,
2007.
14 Garver, ‘China’s Decision for War with India in 1962’, Stanford
15 http://www.indianexpress.com/news/truth-of—62-is-locked-away/240755/
16 ibid.
17 http://www.indianexpress.com/news/j.n.-to-jfk—eyes-only-/711276/
18 Garver, ‘China’s Decision for War with India in 1962’, Stanford
19 Huang Hua, Memoirs: Contemporary History and Diplomacy in China, Foreign Language Press
20 ibid.
21 ibid.
22 Garver, ‘China’s Decision for War with India in 1962’, Stanford
23 ibid.
24 ibid.
25 Ministry of Defence, Government of India. Official 1962 War History, History Division;
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Army/History/1962War/PDF/
26 ibid.
27 ibid.
28 ibid.
29 Garver, ‘China’s Decision for War with India in 1962’, Stanford
30 ibid.
31 ibid.
32 ibid.
33 Ministry of Defence, Government of India. Official 1962 War History, History Division;
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Army/History/1962War/PDF/
34 http://www.frontline.in/navigation/?
type=static&page=flonnet&rdurl=fl2725/stories/20101217272510000.htm;
http://claudearpi.blogspot.in/2011/01/congress-forgets-1962-war.html;
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/j.n.-to-jfk—eyes-only-/711276/
35 http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/days/; http://www.hindustantimes.com/Indianews/NewDelhi/A-mix-
ofcompetition-amp-engagementahead/Article1-940936.aspx; http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/Indias
DefenceBudget_balachandran_040313
36 http://www.indianexpress.com/news/when-john-f-kennedy-almost-nukedchina-over-india/1049574/0;
37 http://www.claws.in/index.php?action=details&m_id=856&u_id=26
38 http://www.indianexpress.com/news/j.n.-to-jfk—eyes-only-/711276/
39 http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/paper296
40 Huang Hua, Memoirs, Foreign Language Press
41 ibid.
42
ibid.
43
ibid.
44
ibid.
45 AI
46 AI
47 www.mea.gov.in
48 http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/no-threat-from-china-manmohan/article2714065.ece
49 AI
50 http://www.hindustantimes.com/Indianews/NewDelhi/Chinese-do-it-againthis-time-in-
Uttarakhand/Article1-1097868.aspx
51 http://www.hindustantimes.com/Indianews/NewDelhi/Engaging-thedragon/Article1-1062347.aspx

Chapter 3
1 www.tradingeconomics.com/india/gdp; www.tradingeconomics.com/china/gdp
2 http://www.hindustantimes.com/Indianews/NewDelhi/India-faced-Nblackmail-from-Paksitan-
twice/Article1-917921.aspx
3 http://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/13/world/nuclear-anxiety-indian-s-letterto-clinton-on-the-nuclear-
testing.html
4 http://expressindia.indianexpress.com/news/ie/daily/19980504/12450024.html
5 AI
6 http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?
dtl/7692/Documents+signed+between+India+and+China+during+Prime+Minister+Vajpayees+visit+to+China
7 http://www.indianexpress.com/news/-no-aircraft-engines-to-pak-please/19275/
8 http://newshopper.sulekha.com/boundary-resolution-requires-patiencesays-wen-
 jiabao_news_1243626.htm
9 http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/gormu-lhasa-railway-line-to-improvechinas-military-logistics-capability-
exert-strategic-pressure-onindia/1/231190.html
10
http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/gormu-lhasa-railway-line-to-improvechinas-military-logistics-
capability-exert-strategic-pressure-onindia/1/231190.html
11 AI
12 AI
13 AI
14 AI
15
AI
16
AI
17 AI
18 http://blogs.hindustantimes.com/inside-story/2011/10/19/india-must-wakeup-to-chinese-threat/
19 ibid.; AI
20
http://indianrailways.gov.in/railwayboard/uploads/directorate/stat_econ/Annualreport10-
11/North_eastern_region.pdf
21 http://www.indianexpress.com/news/manalileh-rail-project-gatherssteam/380577/;
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/dhumal-offers-toacquire-land-for-leh-rail-project/348115/
22 http://www.indianexpress.com/news/sonia-invokes-rajiv-s-dream-asrohtang-tunnel-work-
begins/639777/; http://m.indianexpress.com/news/tunnelling-away-under-rohtang-pass-with-
challenges-to-meet-and-milesto-go/1127946/
23 AI
24 http://news.rediff.com/report/2009/jun/15/four-sukhoi-fighters-inductedat-tezpur.htm;
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2009-05-26/guwahati/28150851_1_tezpur-airbase-su-
30mki-india-and-china
25
http://www.hindustantimes.com/Indianews/NewDelhi/Engaging-thedragon/Article1-1062347.aspx
26 AI; http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/agency/pla-intro.htm;
https://www.fas.org/irp/world/china/pla/index.html; http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/070523-china-
military-power-final.pdf
27 AI
28 AI
29 AI; http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/agency/pla-orbat.htm
30 AI
31 http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/facility/missile.htm
32 http://blogs.fas.org/security/2010/09/df21c/
33 Brig. (retd) Vinod Anand, China Strengthens its Missile Defence Capabilities: Implications for India,
Vivekananda Intenational Foundation. http://www.vifindia.org/article/2013/february/22/china-
strengthens-itsmissile-defence-capabilities-implications-forindia
34 http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/facility/missile.htm
35 ibid.; AI
36 AI; http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF145/CF145.chap4.pdf;
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/2037370/posts
37 http://ibnlive.in.com/blogs/sauravjha/2976/64503/chinas-likely-escalationoption-against-india-rapid-
reaction-forces.html
38 AI
39 http://bbs.chinadaily.com.cn/thread-758279-1-1.html; AI
40 AI; http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub995.pdf
41 http://www.fas.org/irp/dia/product/970409-prc.htm
42 http://intellibriefs.blogspot.in/2011/01/chinese-military-exercises-during-2010.html;
http://www.idsa.in/jds/2_2_2008_TheTraintoLhasa_SArya; AI;
43 http://intellibriefs.blogspot.in/2011/01/chinese-military-exercises-during-2010.html; Gupta, Shishir, ‘No
eyeball to eyeball any more in new war doctrine’, Indian Express, 6 March 2004.
44 http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/expeditions/2013/06/07/thesenkakudiaoyu-island-dispute-in-the-east-
china-sea/; http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/23/business/global/23rare.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
45
Holslag, Jonathan. Trapped Giant: China’s Military Rise, Routledge, 2011
46
ibid.
47 ibid.
48 http://www.afcea.org/content/?q=node/1968; http://blogs.fas.org/security/2008/04/new-chinese-ssbn-
deploys-to-hainan-island-naval-base/
49 Holslag, Trapped Giant, 2011
50 ibid.
51 AI
52 http://www.chinaafricaproject.com/djibouti-welcomes-china-to-build-a-military-base-translation/
53 AI
54 http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-09-02/india/30105514_1_south-china-sea-spratly-ins-
airavat
55
http://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri%20la%20dialogue/archive/sld12-43d9/second-plenary-session-
25b4/a-k-antony-a296
56 http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1681
57 ibid.
58 Holslag, Trapped Giant, 2011
59 A military terminology defined as: command, control, communications, computers, intelligence
surveillance and reconnaissance.
60 AI
61 AI; http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-03-08/india/28668105_1_airbases-sukhoi-
squadrons-tar
62 AI
63 AI; http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/iaf-gets-its-first-c-17-globemaster-iii-military-transport-
aircraft/1/284068.html;
64 http://www.indepthnews.info/index.php/global-issues/830-quietly-chinaincreases-defence-spending
65 AI
66 ibid.
67 ibid.
68 http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/ChinasDefenceBudget2013-14_msingh_180313
69 http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/ChinasDefenceBudget2013-14_msingh_180313

Chapter 4
1 http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2010-09-07/india/28215059_1_india-and-pakistan-bilateral-
ties-outstanding-issues
2 ibid.
3 http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2010-06-21/india/28309082_1_nsg-exemption-china-pak-
nuclear-reactors
4 http://cns.miis.edu/archive/country_india/china/mpakpos.htm
5 http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/01/the-limits-ofthe-pakistan-china-alliance;
http://idsa.in/idsacomments/ChinaPakistanNuclearCooperation_gbalachandran_180413
6
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/10161516/ChinaPakistan-friendship-sweeter-
than-honey-says-Nawaz-Sharif.html
7 http://www.indianexpress.com/news/india-summons-chinese-envoy-overvisa-row/673321/
8 http://www.indianexpress.com/news/india-sees-shift-in-chinas-policy-onkashmir/697187/
9 http://www.savetibet.org/index.php?q=gallery&g2_itemId=358
10 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7302021.stm
11 http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2008-03-18/india/27760187_1_dalai-lama-dalai-clique-
chinese-envoy
12 http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-04/02/content_7901044.htm
13 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/apr/02/china.tibet
14 http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,344208,00.html
15 http://www.indianexpress.com/news/govt-to-tighten-norms-for-businessvisas/522669/
16
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/indiahome/indianews/article-2115584/Pakistan-ISI-admits-supporting-
insurgency-Indias-Northeast.html
17 AI
18 http://northeastnewsportal.blogspot.in/2013/01/nia-report-reveals-nscnim-china-link.html
19 http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324886704579048323896830230.html?
mod=fox_australian; http://www.indianexpress.com/news/key-arrest-in-thailand-may-prove-china-
link-to-ne-arms/1163329/
20 http://www.indianexpress.com/news/sourced-arms-from-china-says-arrested-naga-militant/701612/
21 http://www.indianexpress.com/news/sourced-arms-from-china-says-arrested-naga-militant/701612/; AI
22 http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/ulfa-chief-paresh-barua-in-china/1/160288.html
23 http://www.indianexpress.com/news/the-mysterious-case-and-photos-ofqing-wang/743703/
24 ibid.
25 AI.
26 http://www.dnaindia.com/india/1429786/report-lt-gen-bs-jaswal-hadvisited-chinain-2008
27 http://www.indianexpress.com/news/india-and-china-agree-to-resume-defence-exchanges/775955/
28 http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/wen-backs-greater-internationalrole-forindia/article956565.ece;
http://www.livemint.com/Politics/xVlJM0Vc1GKt7WxdBCv2RK/IndiaChina-to-hold-maritime-
dialogue.html
29 http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?
q=cache:oHxwor5J3msJ:www.ongcvidesh.com/Assets.aspx+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=in;
http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/south-china-sea-new-arena-sino-indianrivalry
30 http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?
q=cache:oHxwor5J3msJ:www.ongcvidesh.com/Assets.aspx+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=in
31 ibid.
32 http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/south-china-sea-commons-china-only.
33 http://www.voanews.com/content/india-vows-to-protect-south-china-sea-interests/1558070.html
34 http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?lng=en&id=143966;
https://media.law.wisc.edu/m/hzgq2/20060629095101779.pdf
35 http://www.indianexpress.com/news/china-puts-indian-oil-block-up-forauction/975480/
36 http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_ESCA_bulletin5.pdf;
http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2012/07/23/more-prc-forcesinto-south-china-sea/
37 http://post.jagran.com/Exploration-of-polymetallic-sulphides-inIndian-Ocean-brings-IndiaChina-at-
loggerheads-1323314896; http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/china-signs-contract-for-indian-
ocean-miningrights/article2640040.
38 http://www.rfa.org/english/commentaries/energy_watch/oil-02042013105305.html
39 http://www.defence.gov.au/adc/docs/Publications2012/01_India%20-%20China%20NA%20-
%20Full%20Paper%20v16%20-%2015%20Dec%2011%20-%20final.pdf
40 http://www.e-ir.info/2012/09/07/the-importance-of-the-straits-of-malacca/;
http://www.andrewerickson.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/ChinaPipeline-Sealane_NWCR_2010-
Spring.pdf
41 Gupta, Shishir, ‘Isles of Influence’, India Today, 13 August 2001.
42 http://indiannavy.nic.in/press-release/new-naval-airstation-ins-baazcommissioned-cns-0;
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/naval-air station-opened-in-campbell-bay/article3707955.ece
43 http://maritimesecurity.asia/free-2/strait-of-malacca-free-2/india-opens-hawks-eye-over-strait-of-
malacca/
44 http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/chinas-string-ofpearls-vsindias-iron-curtain/
45 AI
46 http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub721.pdf; http://
blogs.reuters.com/india/2009/07/28/india-encircled-by-chinas-string-ofpearls/;
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/may/6/counteringchinas-string-ofpearls/
47 AI
48 http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-09/25/c_131871538.htm
49 AI
50 http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-21063-Operation-of-Gwadar-Port-formally-handed-over-
to-China
51
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-04-05/india/29383864_1_gilgit-baltistan-chinese-
presence-pok
52 http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-09-06/india/30118628_1_strategic-roads-india-china-
border-zakama; http://www.indianexpress.com/news/india-asks-china-to-cease-activities-in-pakistan-
occupiedkashmir/997108/
53 http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-10-06/news/30250574_1_chinese-presence-chinese-
troops-pok
54 AI
55 ibid.; Analysis: Chinese Military ‘Buildup’ in Gilgit,
http://www.vifindia.org/article/2010/september/08/Analysis-Chinese-Military-Buildup-in-Gilgit
56 http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KL22Df02.html;
http://www.dongfang.com.cn/index.php/business/detail/?cid=36
57 http://www.dongfang.com.cn/index.php/business/detail/?cid=36
58 http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?266067
59 http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/politics/08-Mar-2009/JF17-
aircraft-production-deal-signed
60 http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-08-09/pakistan/29868121_1_jf-17s-paf-pakistan-air-
force
61 http://cns.miis.edu/archive/country_india/china/mpakchr.htm
62 http://www.fas.org/man/crs/IB94041.pdf
63 http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011%5C06%5C09%5Cstory_9-6-2011_pg1_1
64 http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/01/the-limits-of-the-pakistan-china-alliance
65 ibid.
66 http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/21/international/asia/21nukes.html?pa
gewanted=print&position=&_r=0
67 http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/nuke/
68
http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/nsg-stamp-for-sino-pak-pact-a-blow-to-india/1/144445.html;
http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/chinese-premier-to-meet-nawaz-sharif-next-
week/article4721262.ece
69 http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/ChinanurturesitsnuclearnexuswithPakistan_rnayan_050413
70 http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/01/the-limits-of-the-pakistan-china-alliance
71 ibid.
72 http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2012/01/china_-_pakistan_alliance_less.php
73 http://www.hindustantimes.com/Indianews/NewDelhi/India-and-Chinaagree-on-Karzai-but-differ-on-
Pak/Article1-1048279.aspx
74 http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2013-04-17/india/38615480_1_first-ever-dialogue-close-ally-
pakistan-xinjiang
75 AI
76 http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2011/06/30/bangladesh-eyeschina-arms/
77 http://bd.china-embassy.org/eng/sghd/t1045297.htm
78 http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-AF/Bangladesh/#.Ubvwnfk3BiI
79 http://www.strategicforesight.com/bangladesh_china.htm
80 http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/China-Bangladesh-signlandmark-defence-
pact/articleshow/32366373.cms
81 http://colouredjournal.blogspot.in/2010/09/bangladesh-riding-dragon.html;
http://www.burmanet.org/news/2010/09/15/thedaily-star-bangladesh-yangon-agrees-on-tri-nation-
highway/
82 http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/manmohan-says-mamataassented-to-teesta-
deal/article2433343.ece;
83 http://www.indianexpress.com/news/no-teesta-deal-with-bangladeshwithout-mamata-govt/841921/;
84 http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-07-12/kolkata/32647968_1_bangladesh-enclaves-
enclave-exchange-diptimansengupta; http://www.hindustantimes.com/Indianews/NewDelhi/Indiamay-
start-army-supplies-to-Bangladesh/Article1-742111.aspx
85 http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Research/Region/Asia/201209_kudo.html; AI
86 http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KD03Df03.html; http://www2.irrawaddy.org/article.php?
art_id=15383
87 http://www.altsean.org/Research/SPDC%20Whos%20Who/Armssuppliers.htm
88 http://www.indianexpress.com/news/china-beats-indiato-stilwell-roadcontract-in-myanmar/733995/
89 AI; http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/11/world/asia/long-reliant-on-chinamyanmar-now-turns-to-japan-
for-help.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
90 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/01/world/asia/myanmar-suspendsconstruction-of-controversial-
 dam.html; http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Research/Region/Asia/201209_kudo.html
91 AI
92 AI
93 http://www.elevenmyanmar.com/business/2493-myanmar-chinapipeline-to-begin-operations-next-
month; http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/12/myanmar-china-energy-
idUSL3N0EO0M120130612
94 AI
95
http://www.priu.gov.lk/news_update/Current_Affairs/ca201209/20120917sl_china_sign_agreements_enhance_bilateral_
96 http://www.mea.gov.lk/index.php/en/media/media-releases/4233-sri-lankachina-relations-elevated-to-
astrategic-cooperation-partnership
97 http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/news/states/antony-inauguratessukhoi-airbase-in-
thanjavur/article4756089.ece
98 http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/ChinasForayintoSriLankaandIndias Response_rndas_050810
99 http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-03/31/c_132274000.htm
100 http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/special/xjp20130322/
101 http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-will-continue-to-work-forpeace-stability-in-africa-says-
pm/article4555279.ece
102 http://pmindia.nic.in/visit-all.php?show=INT
103 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-21923775
104 http://www.livemint.com/Politics/wXZo3tcbX0SblgBDSpucnI/India-Africaopen-second-trade-
summit.html
105 AI
106 Raina, Sarah, China’s African Challenges, Routledge
107
http://www.idsa.in/node/8156/3306
108
AI; http://www.idsa.in/node/8156/3306
109 http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/pills2/part08.htm
110 AI
111 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/249097
112 ibid.
113 ibid.
114 ibid.
115 ibid.
116 ibid.
117 http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-12-24/world/35417909_1_southsudan-stephen-dhieu-dau-cnpc
118 http://www.focac.org/eng/zxxx/t832788.htm
119 http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/khartoums-partners-in-beijing/
120 ibid.
121
http://www.cnpc.com.cn/resource/english/images1/pdf/CNPC%20in%20Sudan%202009%20Report/CNPC%20in%20Su
COLLCC=4036006645&
122 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-09-09/africa-s-new-friend-china-finances-9-3-billion-of-
hydropower.html
123 http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/080311-cah-investing-in-tragedy-report.pdf
124 ibid.
125
http://www.bmradvisors.com/upload/news/news_document/Quote_OVL,%20CNPC%20join_Gokul%20Chaudhri_Mint
Jun1340096582.pdf
126 AI
127 http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2012/08/02/chinas-involvementin-mozambique/
128 ibid.
129 ibid.
130 ibid.; AI
131
http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2012/08/02/chinas-involvementin-mozambique/
132
http://www.globaltimes.cn/china/diplomacy/2010-06/542499.html
133
http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2012/08/02/chinas-involvementin-mozambique/

Chapter 5
1 http://www.indianembassy.org.cn/NewsDetails.aspx?NewsId=318&NAID=1
2 http://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?
dtl/17963/IndiaChina+Agreement+on+the+Establishment+of+a+Working+Mechanism+for+Consultation+and+Coordin
3 ibid.
4 ibid.
5 AI
6 http://wws.princeton.edu/research/cases/Bisaria2-09.pdf
7
AI
8
AI; http://www.assamtribune.com/scripts/detailsnew.asp?id=jun0313/at09
9 Brig. (retd) Gurmeet Kanwal, Military Threat from China: R&AW Report sets Alarm Bells Ringing,
Vivekananda International Foundation (VIF), http://www.vifindia.org/article/2012/july/18/military-
threat-from-china-rand-aw-report-sets-alarm-bells-ringing
10 Brig. (retd) Vinod Anand, The Evolving Threat from PLA along Indo-Tibetan Border: Implications, VIF,
http://www.vifindia.org/article/2012/july/26/the-evolving-threat-from-pla-along-indo-tibetanborder-
implications
11 http://ramanstrategicanalysis.blogspot.in/2011/01/chinese-military-exercises-during-2010.html
12 http://www.indianexpress.com/news/chinese-army-conducts-live-militaryexercises-in-tibet/703424/
13 http://www.claws.in/SW/SW%20J.52-56.pdf
14 http://www.globaltimes.cn/NEWS/tabid/99/ID/701550/Jets-training-over-Tibet.aspx
15 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/indiahome/indianews/article-2171061/Combative-China-rings-alarm-
bells.html
16 http://www.china-defense-mashup.com/china-holds-live-fire-drill-in-tibet.html
17 The Chinese concept of ‘command and confrontation’ applies to the PLA’s advanced operational
concepts in recent years, including target-centric warfare, precision and rapid warfare, vertical
lightning warfare and the likes, which has made the setting of training contents more reasonable, the
design of training situations more real, the innovative characteristics of fighting methods more
distinctive, the actual troop orientation more highlighted and combat command more accurate and
efficient.
18 http://www.voanews.com/content/chinas-peoples-liberation-army-pla-prepare-for-war/1585348.html.
19 Brig. (retd) Vinod Anand, PLA Sharpening its Claws in Tibet, VIF, http://
 www.vifindia.org/article/2012/july/06/pla-sharpening-its-claws-in-tibet
20 Brig. (retd) Gurmeet Kanwal, China’s Emerging War Concepts, VIF, http://
www.vifindia.org/article/2012/august/21/china-s-emerging-war-concepts
21
AI
22 http://www.ipcs.org/article/china/sino-bhutan-relations-implications-forindian-security-3692.html
23 http://www.cabinet.gov.bt/?p=952
24 http://english.gov.cn/2012-06/22/content_2167545.htm
25 ibid.
26 ibid.
27 ibid.
28
http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/Sino-BhutanBoundaryNegotiations_mbisht_190110
29
http://www.c3sindia.org/bhutan/1149
30 ibid.
31 ibid.
32 ibid.
33 ibid.
34
ibid.
35
http://www.mea.gov.in/Images/pdf/india-bhutan-treaty-07.pdf
36 http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200210/15/eng20021015_105075.shtml;
http://www.bhutanstudies.org.bt/pubFiles/19-Spdr&Pglt.pdf
37 http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/southasia/prachandaconcludes-third-china-visit-with-focus-
on-economy/article4637442.ece
38 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/apr/23/nepal-china-tibet-india-araniko-highway
39 AI
40 http://www.mofa.gov.np/en/nepal-india-relations-100.html
41 http://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Nepal-February-2012.pdf
42 http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2008/Oct/13/in-yesteryears-nepalese-too-faced-economic-
blockade-58.asp
43 http://ipsnews2.wpengine.com/1999/01/nepal-new-treaty-helps-dispelsuspicions-about-india/
44 http://www.indianembassy.org.np/index1.php?option=information&id=65
45 AI
46 AI
47 http://english.gov.cn/2012-01/14/content_2044455.htm
48 http://www.indianexpress.com/news/chinese-pm-wen-s-nepal-visitcancelled/887534/
49 http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/wen-jiabao-makes-briefnepal-visit-offers-
aid/article2801043.ece; http://www.indianexpress.com/news/wen-loosens-purse-strings-on-nepal-
visit/899752/
50 http://www.indianexpress.com/news/wen-jiabao-refuses-to-meet-nepal-pmin-rio/967231/
51 http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/3755/3756/3770/3772/t19281.htm
52 http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-01/14/c_131360593.htm
53 http://www.telegraphnepal.com/national/2011-07-27/nepal:-kingbirendras-zone-of-peace-discussed
54 http://142.4.27.83/English/news.php?id=10501
55 http://www.hindustantimes.com/worldnews/Nepal/Dawood-s-rolesuspected-in-fake-currency-
racket/Article1-1057773.aspx; http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2010-11-
 16/news/27628545_1_fake-indian-currency-currency-notes-counterfeit-notes
56 http://www.rediff.com/news/2001/jan/16nepal.htm
57 AI; http://cnponline.org/ht/d/ViewBloggerThread/i/37292/pid/35636
58 http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/chinese-foundation-plans-3-billion-project-in-
nepal/article2233492.ece
59 ibid.
60 AI
61 http://education.intoday.in/story/interview-with-nepal-culture-minister-gopal-kiraty/1/161417.html
62 http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/china-india-battle-for-control-over-nepalgolmud-lhasa-railroad-
lumbini/1/161581.html
63
ibid.; AI
64 http://www.telegraphnepal.com/national/2012-12-30/nepal:-chinesesupport-in-road-construction-and-
investment
65
http://www.ekantipur.com/the-kathmandu-post/2011/02/28/money/sinoaid-presence-growing-in-
nepal/218958.html
66 AI
67 AI
68 AI
69 AI
70 AI
71 http://www.hindustantimes.com/Indianews/NewDelhi/Delhi-to-resumeweapon-supply-to-
Kathmandu/Article1-799606.aspx
72 AI
73 http://www.mea.gov.in/development-partnership-administration.htm
74 http://www.hindustantimes.com/Indianews/NewDelhi/Indiato-send-1-5lakh-tonnes-wheat-to-Kabul-via-
Pak/Article1-903898.aspx;

Chapter 6
1 http://www.hindustantimes.com/Indianews/NewDelhi/India-now-firmerwith-China-on-Tibet-issue-Dalai-
Lama/Article1-954105.aspx
2 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-20293887
3 http://www.freetibet.org/news-media/na/full-list-selfimmolations-tibet
4 The Dalai Lama has been demanding high-level autonomy as a first step towards reconciliation with
China; http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/nov/11/dalailama-china-tibet-miliband
5 AI; http://paktribune.com/articles/India-behind-Tibetan-Insurgency-242855.html
6 http://www.dnaindia.com/india/1303024/report-dalai-lama-an-honouredguest-singh-tells-wen
7 http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2007-11-03/india/27983405_1_dalai-lama-prime-minister-
function
8 http://www.hindustantimes.com/News-Feed/liinindia/Li-s-visit-India-wont-affirm-One-China-in-joint-
statement/Article1-1062570.aspx
9 http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/25/world/asia/china-attacks-dalai-lamain-online-burst.html?_r=0
10 http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2012/03/30/2003529036
11 http://www.economist.com/blogs/analects/2012/03/hitler-and-dalailama;
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/mar/25/china-accuses-dalailama-nazi
12 http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/23/world/asia/in-self-immolations-signsof-new-turmoil-in-tibet.html?
pagewanted=all; http://www.savetibet.org/resource-center/maps-data-fact-sheets/selfimmolation-fact-
sheet
13 http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/29/world/asia/tibetan-exiles-rallyaround-delhi-self-immolator.html
14 http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/dalailama-speaks-of-dilemmaon-spreading-
selfimmolations/article3617428.ece
15
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2012/0607/DalaiLama-s-envoys-to-China-resign-
in-frustration
16 http://www.savetibet.org/media-center/ict-press-releases/tibetan-leader-calls-china-respond-middle-way-
policy-tibet
17 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4551425.stm
18 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/11/world/asia/11tibet.html
19 IDSA Task Report, Tibet and India’s Security: Himalayan Region, May 2012
20 http://dalailama.com/biography/retirement1/retirement-remarks1
21 ibid.
22 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/10/dalailama-retirement-trick-china
23
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/lobsang-sangay-to-be-new-tibetankalon-tripa/778400/
24
http://dalailama.com/biography/reincarnation
25
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/we-are-india-s-first-line-of-defencebut-han-influx-a-grave-threat-
dalai-lama/264148/
26 ibid.
27 http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/world/asia/25tibet.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
28 http://www.liberty.edu/media/1190/lawreview/V2N1-Kopel%20-%20Article.pdf
29 IDSA, Tibet and India’s Security, May 2012
30 http://kagyuoffice.org/inindia/the-karmapas-great-escape-december-28-1999-january-5-2000/
31 http://www.kagyu.org/ktd/
32 http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-01-30/patna/28363457_1_17th-karmapa-monasteries-
buddhist-devotees
33 http://www.indianexpress.com/news/rs-3.5-cr-seized-in-raid-on-karmapamonastery/742907/
34 AI
35 http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-01-31/china/28369784_1_17th-karmapa-karmapasect-
united-front-workdepartment
36 http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-01-31/china/28369784_1_17th-karmapa-karmapasect-
united-front-workdepartment
37 http://www.hindustantimes.com/Indianews/HimachalPradesh/Politics-ofthe-black-hat/Article1-
851375.aspx
38 http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-international/communicationwith-india-can-be-helpful-on-
tibetan-unrest-says-china/article2930375.ece
39 http://www.idsa.in/system/files/book_Tibet-India.pdf
40 http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-10/23/content_12304152_1.htm;
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2009-11-09/news/27664712_1_tawang-monastery-
dalailama-uprising-against-chineserule
41 http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-07/19/c_13995316.htm
42 http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:VYBisSbtZcUJ:in.
reuters.com/article/2012/09/01/china-tibet-xijinping-idINDEE88002I201
20901+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=in
43
http://chinese-leaders.org/xi-zhongxun/
44 http://issuu.com/internationaltibetnetwork/docs/xijinping-tibetchallenge
45 http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=4347
46 http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-07/06/content_11661325.htm;
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/07/06/us-china-xinjiang-idUSTRE5650SW20090706;
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jul/05/xianjiang-riots-security-uighur-han
47 http://www.farwestchina.com/2010/06/one-year-ago-the-shaoguanincident.html
48 http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1909109,00.html
49 http://www.fijitimes.com/story.aspx?id=125178
50 http://www.dalailama.com/news/post/506-statement-of-his-holiness-the- dalailama-on-the-51st-
anniversary-of-the-tibetan-national-uprising-day
51 http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010/03/11/story_11-3-2010_pg20_8
52 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/tibet/9261729/DalaiLama-reveals-warning-of-Chinese-
plot-to-kill-him.html
53 ibid.
54
http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/behind-the-war-a-genesis-in-tibet/article4013766.ece
55
ibid.
56
ibid.
57 ibid.
58 ibid.
59 ibid.
60 http://usforeignpolicy.about.com/gi/o.htm?
zi=1/XJ&zTi=1&sdn=usforeignpolicy&cdn=newsissues&tm=30&f=00&su=p284.13.342.ip_&tt=2&bt=8&bts=8&zu=h
center/tibetan-policy-act
61 ibid.

Chapter 7
1 http://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/13/world/nuclear-anxiety-indian-s-letterto-clinton-on-the-nuclear-
testing.html
2 AI; http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/naruhodo/data/pdf/data6-1.pdf
3 http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v18/d18
4 http://www.mea.gov.in/lok-sabha.htm?dtl/21423/Q3688+LOOK+EAST+POLICY;
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-11-26/world/35282800_1_south-china-sea-indian-fears-
indian-media
5 http://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Brief_on_MGC_for_MEA_website-Final.pdf
6 http://blogs.hindustantimes.com/inside-story/2011/12/07/seize-themoment-in-burma/;
http://www.ipcs.org/article/india-the-world/mekongganga-cooperation-initiative-indias-underused-
soft-power-tool-2440.html
7 http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2004-book1/html/PPP-2004-book1-doc-pg52.htm
8 http://www.hindu.com/2001/11/02/stories/02020009.htm
9 http://www.indianexpress.com/oldStory/87437/
10 http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/2649/t22852.htm
11 http://www.bis.doc.gov/news/2005/04annualrept/appb.htm
12 AI
13
Beijing had earlier presumed that the US would deny India access to dual-use technology.
14
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/27/AR2005062700351.html
15 http://www.indianexpress.com/news/-no-aircraft-engines-to-pak-please-/19275/
16 http://www.rediff.com/news/2003/jun/18china1.htm; http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2008-06-
22/india/27773782_1_chinese-envoy-sikkim-and-tibet-sino-indian-border
17 http://www.indianexpress.com/news/after-pm-visit-china-protests-troopmovement-in-sikkim/265866/
18 http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2007-12-01/india/27964872_1_bunkers-chinese-troops-
sumdorong-chu-valley; http://indiannationalism. org/kolkataseminar/articles/PStobdan/Sino-
India_relations.pdf
19 http://www.indianexpress.com/news/india-pins-hope-on-tactics-thathelped-end-past-chinese-
incursions/1111675/0
20 http://www.indianexpress.com/news/india-sets-up-permanent-post-infinger-area/311810/
21 AI
22 AI
23 A military term that denotes operational synergy between different forces of the Indian Union.
24 http://www.hindustantimes.com/Indianews/NewDelhi/Delhi-ready-tocounter-Beijing-sborder-
might/Article1-735945.aspx; AI
25
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/cabinet-nod-for-mountain-strikecorps-along-china-
border/article4925112.ece; http://www.hindustantimes.com/Indianews/NewDelhi/New-mountain-
corps-to-man-China-bordersoon/Article1-1077052.aspx
26 http://www.indianexpress.com/news/china-flexing-muscles-govt-clearsbrahmos-for-arunachal/860799/
27 AI
28 http://www.indianexpress.com/news/india-successfully-test-fires-agnivjoins-top-missile-club/938769/;
http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/04/19/india-missile-agni-idINDEE83I01M20120419
29 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/indiahome/indianews/article-2132861/Chinaaccuses-India-undermining-
Agni-V-missile-capabilities.html
30 http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2008-05-31/news/28492468_1_airstrip-dbo-lands;
http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/IAF+plane+lands+at+Ladakh’s+Nyoma+airfield/1/62421.html
31 AI
32 http://www.hindustantimes.com/Indianews/ArunachalPradesh/Defenceministry-takes-over-operational-
control-of-8-ALGs/Article1-419899.aspx
33 http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=77314
34 AI
35 http://164.100.47.132/LssNew/psearch/QResult15.aspx?qref=82639
36 http://pmindia.nic.in/speech-details.php?nodeid=625
37 http://www.indianexpress.com/news/transarunachal-highway-upgradedis-now-nh52b/312719/
38 http://www.telegraphindia.com/1080418/jsp/nation/story_9153442.jsp
39 http://164.100.47.132/LssNew/psearch/QResult15.aspx?qref=114478
40 http://www.indianexpress.com/news/iaf-would-have-changed-the-courseof—62-war-air-chief/1012584/
41 http://www.hindustantimes.com/Indianews/NewDelhi/A-mix-ofcompetition-amp-
engagementahead/Article1-940936.aspx
42 A military term for missiles that target beyond the horizon and line of sight.
43 http://www.indiastrategic.in/topstories331.htm
44 http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/industry-and-economy/logistics/iaf-gets-first-fleet-of-boeing-c17-
globemaster-iii/article4829790.ece; http:// defencesecurityindia.com/boeing-delivers-indian-air-forces-
3rd-c-17-globemaster-iii/
45 http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/iaf-inducts-the-c130j-aircraft-intoits-fleet/article1159199.ece
46 http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2013-04-02/india/38217610_1_22-heavy-duty-apache-
helicopters-22-apache-helicoptersattack-helicopters
47
http://forceindia.net/NovArticle3.aspx; http://news.in.msn.com/national/article.aspx?cp-
documentid=5424089
48 http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/Phalcon+inducted+’quietly’+in+IAF/1/25156.html
49 http://www.defence.pk/forums/indiandefence/224062-israeli-indian-firmssign-barak-8-missile-pact.html
50 http://eng.mod.gov.cn/SpecialReports/2012-09/26/content_4402429.htm;
http://english.sina.com/china/2012/0925/510072.html
51 http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/varyag-aircraft-carrier-china/
52 Sea Dragon or Manatee — Red China Aircraft Carrier,
http://www.vifindia.org/article/2012/march/31/sea-dragon-or-manatee-red-china-aircraft-carrier
53 http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/ins-chakra-inducted-into-navy/article3280078.ece
54
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-01-24/india/30658507_1_nuclear-submarine-extensive-
sea-trials-ins-chakra
55 http://www.hindustantimes.com/Indianews/NewDelhi/A-mix-ofcompetition-amp-
engagementahead/Article1-940936.aspx
56 http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2009-07-26/hyderabad/28203306_1_nuclear-powered-
submarine-ins-arihant-sea-trials
57 http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2013-08-10/india/41266000_1_ins-arihant-nuclear-triad-
submarine
58 http://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/navy-eyes-hightech-options-for-future-aircraft-
carriers-113052900923_1.html
59 http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2013-08-12/india/41331820_1_aircraft-carrier-warship-
defence-minister-ak-antony
60
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2013-08-14/india/41408691_1_mumbai-fire-brigade-
submarine-naval-dockyard
61 AI
62 http://www.hindustantimes.com/News-Feed/India/IndianNavy-s-P-81-aircraft-to-be-armed-with-new-
US-radars/Article1-574614.aspx; http:// indiannavy.nic.in/press-release/first-boeing-p-8i-aircraft-joins-
indiannavy
63 http://www.indiastrategic.in/topstories1385_Warship_building_in_India.htm
64 http://indiannavy.nic.in/operations/exercise-foreign-navies
65 http://indiannavy.nic.in/operations/anti-piracy-operations
66 http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-09-02/india/30105514_1_south-china-sea-spratly-ins-
airavat; http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/12/03/us-china-sea-india-idUSBRE8B20KY20121203;
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/1282
67 AI
68 http://www.defencenow.com/news/656/india-sets-up-new-navy-base-inlakshadweep.html
69 http://indiannavy.nic.in/press-release/new-naval-unit-ins-dweeprakshak-established-kavaratti-
lakshadweep-islands
70 http://newindianexpress.com/states/kerala/article787443.ece
71 ibid.
72 http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/india-sets-up-major-command-inandaman-and-nicobar-islands-to-
protect-its-waters/1/230928.html
73 http://indiannavy.nic.in/press-release/new-naval-airstation-ins-baazcommissioned-cns-0
74 http://indiannavy.nic.in/node/1432
75 AI

Chapter 8
1 http://www.livemint.com/Politics/llsdNrZFbWAkIngaETTOFN/Indiapartner-not-rival-50-years-after-
SinoIndia-war-Chi.html?facet=print
2 http://www.tribuneindia.com/2012/20121024/edit.htm#6
3 http://expressindia.indianexpress.com/latest-news/The-mystery-of-missing-thousand-miles-in-
JampK/726600/
4 http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2010-12-19/india/28235024_1_china-india-border-global-
times-km-ofindian-territory; http://www.outlookindia.com/printarticle.aspx?269742
5 http://www.forceindia.net/The%20Great%20Game/Special%20Report%20Wen%20Jiabao%20Visit.pdf
6 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/india/8209461/China-India-row-over-Kashmir-
escalates-raising-fears-of-military-tensions.html
7
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-tells-china-kashmir-is-to-uswhat-tibet-taiwan-are-to-
you/article886483.ece
8 http://www.indianexpress.com/news/boundary-issue-a-historical-legacywill-take-long-time-to-resolve-
wen/725959/
9 http://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Nepal_Brief.pdf
10 Ambassador Shyam Saran’s report to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
11 ibid.
12 ibid.
13 http://www.indianembassythimphu.bt/relationpages.php?rid=8
14 http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2013-07-14/india/40569291_1_druk-phuensum-tshogpa-
thimpu-jigme-thinley;
15 AI
16 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-23302048; http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2013-07-
11/india/40513398_1_thimphu-jigme-thinley-bhutanese;
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/wjbcxlhgkcxfzdhbfwbxwlgzlagt/t945186.shtml
17 http://mha.nic.in/pdfs/BM_IntCheck(E).pdf
18 http://www.cprindia.org/sites/default/files/NonAlignment%202.0_1.pdf
19 AI
20 ibid.
21 ibid.
22 http://www.cprindia.org/sites/default/files/NonAlignment%202.0_1.pdf
23 http://www.indianembassy.org.cn/PhotoGalleryList.aspx?PhotoCatId=243
24 http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/china-rejects-indias-request-for-consulate-in-tibet/1/199643.html
25 http://www.hindustantimes.com/Indianews/NewDelhi/India-wants-toreopen-Lhasa-consulate-China-not-
game/Article1-862295.aspx
26 http://www.hindustantimes.com/Indianews/NewDelhi/China-says-no-to-Indian-consulate-in-Tibetan-
capital/Article1-907267.aspx
27 AI
28 http://www.jagranjosh.com/current-affairs/sixday-joint-exercise-of-theindian-army-the-air-force-vijayee-
bhava-began-1304939412-1
29 http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/sudarshan-shakti-aims-totransform-armed-
forces/article2692709.ece
30
http://ris.org.in/images/RIS_images/pdf/Second%20Annual_K%20Subrahmanyam%20Memorial%20Lecture.pdf
31 http://m.indianexpress.com/news/raw-beijing-chief-dismissed-forimpropriety/984360/
32 AI
33 AI
34 AI
35 http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-06/28/c_132496108.htm;
36 http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?
dtl/22366/Agreement+between+the+Government+of+the+Republic+of+India+and+the+Government+of+the+Peoples+R
37
http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?
dtl/22368/Memorandum+of+Understanding+between+the+Ministry+of+Water+Resources+the+Republic+of+India+and
Transborder+Rivers
38 http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/25/us-china-politics-bo-idUSBRE99O02R20131025
39 http://www.hindustantimes.com/worldnews/mao-zedong-made-mistakes-chinese-president/article1-
1166626.aspx
40 AI
 INDEX

1914 Simla Convention 11

1960 Indus Waters Treaty 48
1989 Tiananmen Square agitation 211
2002 Sino–Bangladesh Defence Agreement 150

Abdul Qadeer Khan 26, 147

Admiral Gorshkov 31
Agni-V 102, 230, 231, 319
Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures in Military Field along the LAC 39
Agreement on Establishment of a Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India–China
Boundary Affairs 91
Agreement on Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for Settlement of India–China Boundary Issues
90
Agreement on Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for Settlement of the India–China Boundary
Question 39
Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the LAC 16, 38, 39, 87, 90, 219, 278
Agusta Westland 31
Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) 30, 168, 277, 323
A.K. Antony x, 19, 44, 120, 132, 155, 163, 232, 276
Aksai Chin 1, 13, 14, 16, 22, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 79, 83, 84, 105, 172, 241, 249, 272
Amreet Ahluwalia 273
Anthony Shimray 133
Arunachal Pradesh i, xi, 12, 22, 41, 43, 44, 45, 46, 48, 76, 88, 89, 93, 105, 106, 108, 109, 110, 118, 125,
130, 134, 136, 172, 174, 177, 178, 193, 198, 201, 206, 207, 211, 212, 217, 225, 226, 230, 231, 232,
235, 236, 237, 253, 256, 259, 264, 277, 293, 296
Asia-Pacific Exchange and Cooperation Foundation (APECF) 184
Asia-Pacific Security Summit 120
Asif Ali Zardari 23, 59, 146
Atal Behari Vajpayee x, 31, 74, 86
Aung San Suu Kyi 152, 254

Bandar Abbas 24
Bangladesh 17, 19, 22, 32, 47, 48, 61, 89, 133, 136, 143, 149, 150, 151, 175, 210, 244, 251, 255, 272, 279,
303, 311
Ban Ki-Moon 184
Barack Obama 29, 121
Barahoti 3, 6, 14, 72, 92, 94, 95, 100, 108, 212, 225, 228, 263
Beihai (North Fleet) 119
Benazir Bhutto 24, 98, 289
Bhutan 12, 17, 60, 80, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 187, 200, 204, 206, 216, 222, 251, 252, 253, 254, 262, 295
Bill Clinton 17, 90, 98, 168, 219
B.N. Mullick 75
Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (BDCA) 5, 35, 276, 278
Boxer Rebellion 68, 69
Bo Xilai 261, 277
Brahmaputra 10, 22, 23, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 82, 135, 178, 276, 293, 299
BrahMos 102, 230, 265
Brajesh Mishra 14, 16, 86, 90, 221, 231
Brij Mohan Kaul 70, 75
Brooks–Bhagat report 75, 76, 84, 325

Cao Guangchan 56
Central Military Commission (CMC) 18, 73
Chahbahar 7, 294
Chang Wanquan 36, 59, 276
Chashma 18, 19, 26, 289
Chiang Kai-shek 11, 111
China Overseas Port Holding Limited 23
Chuck Hagel 28, 292
Condoleezza Rice 221

Dai Bingguo 16, 19, 20, 90, 136, 137, 218

Dalai Lama vii, xi, 13, 14, 18, 43, 56, 71, 72, 78, 79, 85, 131, 137, 149, 164, 174, 184, 189, 190, 191, 192,
193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212,
213, 214, 215, 216, 257, 267, 269, 272, 273, 295, 316, 324
Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) 1, 2, 5, 6, 33, 34, 64, 66, 100, 109, 233, 234, 250, 324
Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) 31, 54, 102, 103, 104, 126, 230, 233, 240, 275,
324
Deng Xiaoping 16, 22, 36, 86, 89, 97, 133, 151, 190, 261
Depsang ix, x, 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 33, 34, 35, 58, 66, 92, 94, 95, 96, 110, 166, 173, 192, 219, 225, 233, 265,
278
De Xin Hai 120
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands 56, 117, 119, 260
Director-General of Military Operations (DGMO) 2, 6, 75, 99, 163, 164, 224, 226, 228, 236, 324
Donald Rumsfeld 220
Dunghai (East Fleet) 119
Durand Line 149, 275

East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) 58, 149, 167, 209, 210, 212, 324

Five Finger policy 174

Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) 156
Forward Policy 71, 72, 73, 74, 76, 78, 79, 80, 83

Ganga–Mekong Cooperation 220

Gegong Apang 45, 88, 232
General Deepak Kapoor 217, 223
General J.N. Chaudhuri 84
General K. Sundarji 87
General P.N. Thapar 70, 76, 84
George Fernandes 56, 75, 99, 220
George W. Bush 90, 99, 214, 220, 221, 275
Gopal Krishna Pillai 132
Great Leap Forward 84, 131
Gwadar 7, 23, 24, 25, 106, 119, 140, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 157, 249, 294, 310
Gyaincain Norbu 194
Hamid Karzai 59, 149
Henderson Brooks 75
Henry Kissinger 41, 220
Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai 32, 75, 77
Huang Hua 15, 77, 86, 87, 292, 304, 305
Huawei 50, 51, 52, 54, 302
Hu Jintao 19, 21, 22, 41, 58, 60, 97, 129, 155, 156, 161, 190, 193, 207, 241, 261, 275

IC-814 183
I.K. Gujral 98
Indian Army ix, x, 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 14, 32, 34, 35, 38, 62, 63, 65, 67, 70, 71, 72, 74, 75, 80, 81, 82, 84, 85,
88, 93, 99, 100, 101, 102, 110, 113, 130, 132, 145, 163, 164, 169, 171, 173, 178, 180, 181, 188, 189,
219, 222, 223, 224, 225, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 235, 249, 262, 263, 264, 270, 271, 272, 273,
276, 277, 278
Indian Institute for Defence Studies and Strategic Analyses (IDSA) 206
Indian Ocean Naval Symposium 243
Indian Ocean Region 57, 121, 123, 142, 279
Indian Space Research Organisation 44
Indira Gandhi 14, 15, 77, 86, 87, 88, 242
Indo–US nuclear deal xi, 39, 232
INS Arihant 34, 102, 242
INS Dweeprakshak 244
INS Vikramaditya 31, 123, 242, 266
INS Vikrant 29, 34, 123, 242
Intelligence Bureau 2, 75, 84, 203, 218, 272, 274
Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) 133
Isaac Chishi Swu 133

Japan x, 6, 7, 8, 9, 16, 18, 27, 29, 30, 35, 37, 39, 52, 53, 55, 56, 77, 99, 110, 117, 118, 119, 123, 140, 141,
168, 184, 241, 243, 247, 248, 260, 274, 276, 285, 296
Jawaharlal Nehru ix, 5, 42, 101, 163, 292
Jiang Jiechi 35, 276, 277
Jiang Zemin 16, 19, 22, 90, 190, 261
Jigmi Y. Thinley 60
J.N. Chaudhuri 76, 84
J.N. Dixit 232
John F. Kennedy 76, 82
Johnson Line 71
John W. Garver 71, 293, 303
Julius Nyerere 157

Kamal Nath 40
Karakoram Highway 23, 65, 119, 145, 270
Karmae Garchen Trust 202, 204
Karmapa 194, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 212, 295
Khardung La 63
K.T. Parnaik 4, 63, 145
Kunming initiative 220
K.V. Krishna Rao 88

Leon Panetta 121

Liang Guanglie 19, 56, 156, 189
Liaoning 29, 31, 119, 123, 143, 241, 266
Light Combat Aircraft 103
Li Keqiang 2, 5, 19, 35, 192, 250, 276
Liu Shuqing 89
Lobsang Sangay 193, 196, 272
Long March 78, 111
‘Look East’ policy x, 16, 220
Lou Ruiquing 73
L.P. Sen 80
Lt. General Brij Mohan Kaul 70
Lt. General B.S. Jaswal 130, 249
Lt. General Daulat Singh 76
Lt. General Harbaksh Singh 75
Lt. Gen Sahabzada Yaqub Khan 98
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 60, 90, 154

Madeleine Albright 219

Mahinda Rajapaksa 60, 155
Major-General A.S Pathania 75
Maldives 17, 19, 39, 61, 175, 243
Manmohan Singh ix, x, 2, 5, 7, 8, 9, 17, 18, 27, 29, 32, 33, 39, 40, 43, 46, 47, 49, 56, 58, 62, 90, 98, 100,
129, 130, 132, 133, 136, 151, 155, 163, 169, 189, 191, 203, 215, 217, 218, 219, 220, 222, 227, 228,
232, 236, 242, 243, 250, 251, 252, 260, 274, 276, 321
Mao Zedong 12, 22, 47, 70, 73, 111, 118, 133, 179, 205, 220
Maumoon Abdul Gayoom 39
McMahon Line 3, 11, 13, 71, 73, 79, 83, 88, 91, 259
M.J. Desai 80
M.K. Narayanan 37, 218, 232
Morarji Desai 15, 86
Mountain Strike Corps 164, 230, 239, 271
Mozambique 155, 157, 161, 162
Myanmar 17, 32, 60, 61, 99, 100, 133, 134, 136, 143, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 160, 175, 178, 181, 184,
210, 216, 220, 231, 235, 243, 244, 245, 248, 249, 251, 254, 255, 272, 280
Myitsone dam project 153

N.A.K. Browne 237

Nanhai (South Fleet) 119
Nationalist Social Council of Nagaland (Isaac–Muivah) 133, 134, 135, 235
Nawaz Sharif 146, 168, 169
Neelum–Jhelum Hydroelectric project 145
Nepal 12, 17, 19, 48, 60, 61, 100, 106, 134, 136, 174, 175, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186,
187, 200, 202, 206, 216, 231, 251, 252, 254, 262, 268, 283, 284, 286, 288, 295, 314, 315, 321
Ne Win 152
Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) 221
Nikita Khrushchev 82
North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA) 70
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) xi, 17, 19, 21, 26, 148, 259, 275, 327

Ogyen Trinley Dorje 200, 201, 202

ONGC Videsh Limited (OVL) 137
Operation Pavan 154
Osama bin Laden 147
Ouyang Yujing 166
Pakistan xi, 7, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 30, 32, 33, 37, 38, 41, 47, 48, 56, 57, 58, 59, 66,
76, 85, 86, 90, 92, 97, 98, 99, 104, 106, 127, 129, 130, 131, 140, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149,
150, 154, 160, 163, 164, 167, 168, 175, 178, 179, 183, 187, 189, 200, 210, 211, 219, 220, 221, 222,
230, 231, 234, 244, 248, 249, 250, 258, 259, 265, 270, 271, 272, 274, 275, 276, 289, 290, 308
Panchen Lama 194, 198, 200, 215
Panchsheel Agreement 13, 20, 37, 71, 327
Pangong Tso 2, 9, 34, 66, 67, 92, 94, 95, 173, 225, 234
Paul W. Tibbets 77
P. Chidambaram i, 18, 28, 40, 132, 227, 296
People’s Armed Police Force (PAPF) 127
People’s Daily 9, 30, 249
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) ix, xi, 6, 57, 60, 110, 112, 117, 119, 120, 122, 123, 124, 140, 142, 143,
155, 157, 241, 243, 244, 266, 267
People’s Security Bureau 134
Pervez Musharraf 146
P.K. Bannerjee 76
PLA Navy xi, 6, 57, 60, 110, 112, 117, 119, 120, 122, 123, 124, 140, 142, 143, 155, 157, 241, 243, 244,
266, 267
P.N. Thapar 70, 76, 84
Port of Singapore Authority 23
Pranab Mukherjee 40, 56, 228
Protocol on Implementation of CBMS 90
P.S. Bhagat 75
Pushpa Kamal Dahal alias Prachanda 136, 179
P.V. Narasimha Rao x, 36, 90, 98

Qi Jianguo 19
Qing Dynasty 69
Qinghai–Tibet Railway (QTR) 63, 105, 106, 107, 164, 186, 217, 222, 224, 267, 268, 327
Qing Wang 134, 135, 136

Raja Pervez Ashraf 23

Rajiv Gandhi 15, 38, 89, 90, 154, 218, 247
Rangjung Rigpe Dorje 202
Ranjan Mathai 2, 215
Ravi Dastane 63
Remmin Ribao Observer 79
Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) 2, 84, 88, 99, 133, 169, 171, 174, 203, 253, 273, 313, 327
Richard Nixon 220

Salman Khurshid x, 4, 7, 24
Samdhong Rinpoche 131
Sansha garrison 138, 139
Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel 12, 74, 163
Scarborough Shoals 56
Second Artillery Corps 112, 114, 142
Seventeen Point Agreement for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet 174
S.G. Gorshkov 242
Shaheen-1 147
Shaitan Singh 67, 76
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 60
Sheikh Hasina 136, 149, 151
Shinzo Abe 118
Shivshankar Menon 2, 35, 132, 163, 215, 218, 219, 233, 237, 267, 296
Shyam Saran 33, 41, 100, 215, 218, 219, 227, 231, 250, 293, 296, 321
Siachen 33, 63, 110, 234, 250, 265, 270
Simla Convention 11
Sir Henry McMahon 10, 71
Sirimavo Bandaranaike 39
Socialist Party 74
Somdorong Chu valley 84, 87, 88
Song Deheng 40
Special Frontier Force (SFF) 227, 263, 328
S.P.S. Tyagi 31
Sri Lanka 17, 19, 39, 60, 61, 119, 143, 154, 155, 175, 243, 244, 290, 291
Stillwell road 152, 153
Subrahmanyam Jaishankar 2, 52, 132, 166, 249, 267
Sun Yat Sen 10
Sun Yuxi 41, 43

Tang Jiaxuan 219

Tawang 41, 44, 76, 82, 88, 110, 189, 206, 210, 225, 231, 232, 235, 236, 237, 247, 253, 262, 267
The 1950 India–Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship 179
Thein Sein 136, 153, 254, 255
Three Gorges 104, 289
Tibetan government-in-exile xi, 105, 131, 190, 192, 193, 200, 202, 206, 209, 211, 257
Trinley Thaye Dorje 201, 204
T.S.G. Samarasinghe 155
Tshering Tobgay 175, 254

Umrao Singh 80
Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists) 179
United Nations (UN) Security Council xi

Varyag 31, 119, 241

Vijay Kumar Singh 63, 132
Vijay Singh 217, 218, 223, 234, 235, 237, 239
V.K. Krishna Menon 14, 218
V. Krishna Menon 72
V.K. Singh 62, 65, 145, 163, 224, 225

Wang Jisi 37
war zone concept (WZC) 164
Wen Jiabao 17, 21, 27, 39, 42, 46, 47, 60, 90, 104, 129, 131, 137, 156, 167, 179, 181, 185, 191, 192, 207,
211, 222, 241, 249, 253, 261, 272
W.H. Johnson 71
Willy Naruenartwanicha 133

Xi Jinping 5, 8, 9, 18, 23, 26, 28, 29, 47, 110, 112, 118, 155, 156, 190, 201, 207, 208, 250, 261, 295
Xi Zhongxun 190, 207

Y.B. Chavan 84

Zhou Enlai ix, 2, 34, 42, 70, 71, 73, 77, 78, 81, 89, 91, 114, 130, 131, 151, 213, 220, 249, 292, 303
ZTE Corporation 50
Author of the best-selling Indian Mujahideen: The Enemy Within
(Hachette India, 2011), Shishir Gupta is currently Deputy Executive
Editor at Hindustan Times. As a journalist covering geopolitics and
strategic affairs, he has reported widely on wars, insurgencies, terrorism,
intelligence, defence and diplomacy over the last two decades. Gupta was
conferred the Ben Gurion Award for Journalism in 2011. He has also
worked with the Indian Express and India Today.
 The Himalyan Face-Off

‘Even if bilateral trade between India and China goes beyond $100 billion in
the coming years, China’s posture towards India is adversarial and will
perhaps remain so in the future, with Beijing viewing New Delhi through
the prism of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government-in-exile… A
rising China, inflexible on boundary dispute resolution and with strong
tentacles across South Asia and beyond, could encroach on India’s strategic
space and lead to a potential crisis this decade.’

In April 2013, Indian troops sighted an advance patrol of the Chinese

People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 19 km deep within Indian territory, a
considerable distance from the Line of Actual Control, the de facto border claim
line that was drawn up after the 1962 war between the two countries – a war that
still traumatizes the mind of India’s political and military establishment.
Protracted negotiations led to the withdrawal of Chinese troops, but the
incursion laid bare the intent of the world’s largest standing army. Despite recent
advances in the bilateral relationship, highlighted by the nearly $70 billion trade
between the two countries, China continues to regard Indian interests as
secondary, and India as a regional adversary.
In this breakthrough work, seasoned journalist and author of the bestselling
Indian Mujahideen Shishir Gupta details the various advances made by Beijing,
particularly the PLA, in encircling India and stifling the latter’s bid to break out
as an aspiring superpower. Gupta discusses Indian political, diplomatic and
military responses to China’s assertion in the subcontinent and beyond, and the
various course corrections India must undergo in its foreign and defence policies
to counter China’s might and influence on matters of India’s national security.
In describing how India must realize and counter China’s clout over its
friends and enemies if it is to achieve superpower status, Gupta sheds new light
on Indo-China relations. The Himalayan Face-Off: Chinese Assertion and the
Indian Riposte is an important reminder of the realigned geopolitics of the
modern world, where the two most populous nations on the planet are essentially
battling each other over their share of the global pie – sometimes on the world’s
highest battlegrounds.
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