LEGAL/JUDICIAL ETHICS CASES

Floran, et. al., v. Ediza, A.C. No. 5325 October 19, 2011

FACTS: Spouses Floran owns an unregistered 3.5525-hectare parcel of land. Spouses Floran
sought the assistance of Atty. Ediza in the foreclosure proceedings involving their land. When the
spouses sold their land to Phividec Industrial Authority (Phividec), they again sought the help of Atty.
Ediza for the preparation and notarization of the waiver required by Phividec. Atty. Ediza informed the
Spouses Floran to have the original owner of the land, Epal, sign a Deed of Absolute Sale in their favor.
Atty. Ediza gave the Spouses Floran several documents for Epal to sign. Caridad visited Epal in Bunawan,
Agusan del Sur and acquired her approval and expressed assent to the conveyance, as evidenced by a
Deed of Absolute Sale made by Epal in favor of Nemesio for P2,000. On 11 June 1998, Nemesio and
Phividec executed the Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land. Out of the total amount of P272,750,
which Phividec paid and released to the Spouses Floran, Atty. Ediza received the amount of P125,463.38
for the titling of the remaining portion of the land, other expenses and attorney’s fees. Spouses Floran
went back to Atty. Ediza several times to follow-up on the title. However, Atty. Ediza failed to fulfill his
promises. After the lapse of two years, with the land still unregistered, the Spouses Floran asked Atty.
Ediza for the return of their money. Atty. Ediza refused. Thus, Spouses Floran presented their complaint
before the chapter president of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Misamis Oriental.

In the Complaint/Affidavit dated 8 September 2000, Caridad alleged that Atty. Ediza gave them
certain documents, including a Deed of Absolute Sale, for Epal to sign in order to transfer the land in
their name. However, the Spouses Floran later discovered that one of the documents given by Atty.
Ediza is a deed of sale for a one-hectare land in the same property executed by Epal in favor of Atty.
Ediza for a consideration of P2,000. When the Spouses Floran confronted Atty. Ediza, he initially denied
the documents but then later promised to tear and destroy it.

HELD: Atty. Ediza is administratively liable. The practice of law is a privilege bestowed by the
state on those who show that they possess the legal qualifications for it. Lawyers are expected to
maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency and morality, including honesty, integrity and
fair dealing. They must perform their fourfold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their
clients, in accordance with the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility. In the present case, the Spouses Floran asserts that they had no knowledge
that they signed a deed of sale to transfer a portion of their land in favor of Atty. Ediza. They also insist
that Atty. Ediza failed to comply with his promise to register their property despite receiving the amount
of P125,463.38. On the other hand, Atty. Ediza maintains that he acquired the land from the Spouses
Floran because of their “deep gratitude” to him in the dismissal of the civil case for foreclosure of
mortgage. Atty. Ediza further claims that the amount of P125,463.38 which he received was his rightful
share from the sale of the land.

It is clear from the records that Atty. Ediza deceived the Spouses Floran when he asked them to
unknowingly sign a deed of sale transferring a portion of their land to Atty. Ediza. Atty. Ediza also did the
same to Epal when he gave Caridad several documents for Epal to sign. Atty. Ediza made it appear that
Epal conveyed her rights to the land to him and not to the Spouses Floran. Moreover, when the sale of
the Spouses Floran’s land pushed through, Atty. Ediza received half of the amount from the proceeds
given by the buyer and falsely misled the Spouses Floran into thinking that he will register the remaining
portion of the land. Lamentably, Atty. Ediza played on the naivete of the Spouses Floran to deprive them
of their valued property. This is an unsavory behavior from a member of the legal profession. Aside from
giving adequate attention, care and time to his client’s case, a lawyer is also expected to be truthful, fair
and honest in protecting his client’s rights. Once a lawyer fails in this duty, he is not true to his oath as a
lawyer.

Freeman v. Reyes, A.C. No. 6246 (Formerly CBD No. 00-730], November 15, 2011

FACTS: An administrative complaint was filed by complainant Marites E. Freeman, seeking the
disbarment of respondent Atty. Zenaida P. Reyes, for gross dishonesty in obtaining money from her,
without rendering proper legal services, and appropriating the proceeds of the insurance policies of her
deceased husband. Complainant alleged that her husband, a British national, died in London on October
18, 1998. She and her son applied for visas, to enable them to attend the wake and funeral, but their
visa applications were denied. Complainant engaged the services of respondent who, in turn, assured
her that she would help her secure the visas and obtain the death benefits and other insurance claims
due her.
Respondent told complainant that she (respondent)had to personally go to London to facilitate
the processing of the claims, and demanded that the latter bear all expenses for the trip. Complainant
gave the respondent money to cover the supposed expenses, but complainant was not able to obtain
the visas for complainant and her son. Respondent also offered to help and assured her that
representations with the insurance companies had earlier been made, so that the latter would be
receiving the insurance proceeds soon. According to the complainant, respondent required her to affix
her signature in a Special Power of Attorney (first SPA), which would authorize the respondent to follow-
up the insurance claims. However, she found out that the first SPA she signed was not notarized, but
another SPA (second SPA) was notarized and that her signature therein was forged. Later, she came
across a similar copy of a third SPA, but this time, additionally bearing the signatures of two witnesses.
She said that without her knowledge and consent, respondent used the third SPA, notarized on April 30,
1999, in her correspondence with the insurance companies in London. As such, respondent was able to
collect the insurance proceeds. Remittance was made her personal bank account.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent is guilty of gross dishonesty and should be disbarred.

HELD: Complainant had sufficiently substantiated the charge of gross dishonesty against
respondent, for having appropriated the insurance proceeds of the complainant’s deceased husband,
and the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors that respondent should be disbarred. The
object of a disbarment proceeding is not so much to punish the individual attorney himself, as to
safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the court and the public from the misconduct of
officers of the court, and to remove from the profession of law persons whose disregard for their oath of
office have proved them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the bar.
A disciplinary proceeding against a lawyer is sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, it does
not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one
of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is no sense a criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu
proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not
the attorney is still fit to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, is the exercise of its disciplinary
powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of
the Court, with the end in the view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and
honest administration of justice, by purging the profession of members who, by their misconduct, have
proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to
the office of an attorney.

Being a sue generis proceeding, the main disposition of this Court is the determination of the
respondent’s administrative liability. This does not include the grant of affirmative reliefs, such as moral
and exemplary damages as prayed for by the complainant, which may very well be the subject of a
separate civil suit for damages arising from the respondent’s wrongful acts, to be filed in the regular
courts. Even assuming that respondents acted within the scope of her authority to represent the
complainant in pursuing the insurance claims, she should never deviate from the benchmarks set by
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates that a lawyer shall hold in trust all
moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession. Specifically, Rule 16.01 states
that a lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client, and
Rule 16.03 thereof requires that a lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of a client when due or
upon demand. When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is
bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for a particular purpose.
And if he does not use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the
money to his client.

Espinosa, at al., v. Omaña, A.C. No. 9081, October 12, 2011

FACTS: Complainants Espinosa and Glindo charged Omaña with violation of her oath as a lawyer,
malpractice, and gross misconduct in office. Complainants alleged that on 17 November 1997, Espinosa
and his wife Elena Marantal (Marantal) sought Omaña legal advice on whether they could legally live
separately and dissolve their marriage solemnized on 23 July 1983. Omaña then prepared a document
entitled “Kasunduan ng Paghihiwalay.” Complainants alleged that Marantal and Espinosa, fully
convinced of the validity of the contract dissolving their marriage, started implementing its terms and
conditions. However, Marantal eventually took custody of all their children and took possession of most
of the property they acquired during their union. Espinosa sought the advice of his fellow employee,
complainant Glindo, a law graduate, who informed him that the contract executed by Omaña was not
valid. Espinosa and Glindo then hired the services of a lawyer to file a complaint against Omaña before
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD).
 HELD: Omaña violated the Canon of Professional Responsibility in the notarization of Marantal
and Espinosa’s “Kasunduan ng Paghihiwalay”. This case is not novel. This Court has ruled that the
extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial approval is void. The Court has also
ruled that a notary public should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family by
encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudicial dissolving the conjugal partnership, which is
exactly what Omaña did in this case.

In Selanova v. Judge Mendoza (A.M. No. 804-CJ, 159-A Phil. 360 (1975)) the Court cited a
number of cases where the lawyer was sanctioned for notarizing similar documents as the contract in
this case, such as: notarizing a document between the spouses which permitted the husband to take a
concubine and allowed the wife to live with another man, without opposition from each other; ratifying
a document entitled “Legal Separation” where the couple agreed to be separated from each other
mutually and voluntary, renouncing their rights and obligations, authorizing each other to remarry, and
renouncing any action that they might have against each other; preparing a document authorizing a
married couple who had been separated for nine years to marry again, renouncing the right of action
which each may have against the other; and preparing a document declaring the conjugal partnership
dissolved. In preparing and notarizing a void document, Omaña violated Rule 1.01 Canon 1 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility which provides that “[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.” Omaña knew that the “Kasunduan ng Paghihiwalay” has no legal effect
and is against public policy. Therefore, Omaña may be suspended from office as an attorney for breach
of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Linco v. Lacebal, A.C. No. 7241 [Formerly CBD Case No. 05-1506], October 17, 2011

FACTS: Complainant claimed that she is the widow of the late Atty. Alberto Linco (Atty. Linco),
the registered owner of a parcel of land with improvements, consisting of 126 square meters located in
Rizal and covered by a TCT. Complainant alleged that Atty. Jimmy D. Lacebal (respondent), a notary
public for Mandaluyong City, notarized a deed of donation allegedly executed by her husband in favor of
Alexander David T. Linco, a minor. The notarial acknowledgement thereof also stated that Atty. Linco
and Lina P. Toledo (Toledo), a mother of the done, allegedly personally appeared before respondent on
July 30, 2003, despite the fact that complainant’s husband died on July 29, 2003. Consequently, by
virtue of the purported deed of donation, the Register of Deeds of Antipolo City cancelled TCT No.
259001 on March 28, 2005 and issued a new TCT No. 29251 in the name of Alexander David T. Linco.
Aggrieved, complainant filed the instant complaint. She claimed that respondent’s reprehensible act in
connivance with Toledo was not only violate of her and her children’s rights but also in violation of the
law. Respondent’s lack of honesty and candor is unbecoming of a member of the Philippine Bar.

HELD: The findings and recommendations of the IBP were adopted by the Court.

“There is no question as to respondent’s guilt. The records sufficiently

established that Atty. Linco was already dead when respondent notarized the deed of
donation on July 30, 2003. Respondent likewise admitted that he knew that Atty. Linco
died a day before he notarized the deed of donation. We take note that respondent
notarized the document after the lapse of more than 20 days from July 8, 2003, when he
was allegedly asked to notarize the deed of donation. The sufficient lapse of time from
the time he last saw Atty. Linco should have put him on guard and deterred him from
proceeding with the notarization of the deed of donation. “XXX Clearly, respondent
made a false statement and violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and his oath as a lawyer. “We will reiterate that faithful observance and
utmost respect of the legal solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgement or jurat is
sacrosanct. Respondent should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed
the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him
to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein.

“Time and time again, we have repeatedly reminded notaries public of the
importance attached to the act of notarization. Notarization is not an empty,
meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such
that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public.
Notarization converts a public document into a public document; thus, making
that document admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A
notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts,
administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the
acknowledgement executed by a notary public and appended to a private
instrument.”
Gemina v. Madamba, A.C. No. 6689, August 24, 2011

FACTS: The complainant alleged that she is an heir of the registered owner of several parcels of
land located in Laoag City. These parcels of land were unlawfully sold by Francisco Eugenio in
connivance with Atty. Isidro S. Madamba (respondent). The documents pertaining to the transactions
over these lands were notarized by the respondent either without the presence of the affiants or with
their forged signatures. The complainant charged respondent with deceit, malpractice and gross
negligence, and prayed for his suspension/disbarment. Respondent does not deny having affixed his
signature in the subject documents but he was never a participant in the alleged unlawful sale. His
participation is limited to the affixing (of) his signature in the subject documents. The alleged
manipulation was committed by his clerk-secretary who enjoyed his trust and confidence having been in
said position for almost two decades. Said clerk-secretary is responsible for the preparation and entry of
the documents in the Notarial Book. As such, he has all the chance to do the things he wanted to do,
which of course respondent has no least suspicion to suspect him to do illegal and unlawful acts to his
Notarial Register.

Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala submitted to the IBP Board of Governors her Report
and Recommendation, recommending the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit, finding that:

“In her Complaint, complainant alleged that she is an heir of a registered owner
of some parcels of land in Laoag City. However, no documentary evidence was
presented to support the same. She insisted that respondent notarized documents
without the appearance before him of the persons who executed the same, but no clear
and sufficient evidence was also presented. Rule 130, Section 14 of the Rules of Court
provides that Entries in official records made in the performance in his duty by a public
officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined
by law, are prime facie evidence of the facts therein stated.’ In the herein case, although
complainant made it appear that she has evidence to prove that there was anomaly in
the notarization of the subject documents, she failed to present the same.”

HELD: The Court disagrees with the findings of Commissioner Maala for the following reasons:

The IBP cannot inquire into whether the complainant is an heir of the registered owner of the
land. It is not within its authority to determine whether the complainant has a legal right to the
properties involved in the transactions and to require her to submit proof to that effect. Its function is
limited to disciplining lawyers, and it cannot determine issues of law and facts regarding the parties’
legal rights to a dispute. Second, from the respondent’s own admissions, it cannot be doubted that he is
guilty of the charges against him. His admissions show that he had notarized documents without reading
them and without ascertaining what the documents purported to be. He had completely entrusted to
his secretary the keeping and the maintenance of his Notarial Register. This eventually resulted in
inaccuracies in the entry of the notarial acts in his Notarial Register. The IBP resolution, based wholly on
Commissioner Maala’s Report and Recommendation, totally missed and disregarded the submitted
evidence and the respondent’s testimony during the hearing of the complaint. The IBP apparently had
treated the respondent with exceptional leniency. The respondent’s age and sickness cannot be cited as
reasons to disregard the serious lapses he committed in the performance of his duties as a lawyer as a
notary public. The inaccuracies in his Notarial Register entries and his failure to enter the documents
that he admittedly notarized constitute dereliction of duty as a notary public. He cannot escape liability
by putting the blame on his secretary. The lawyer himself, not merely his secretary, should be held
accountable for these misdeeds.

A notary public is empowered to perform a variety of notarial acts, most common of which are
the acknowledgement and affirmation of documents or instruments. In the performance of these
notarial acts, the notary public must be mindful of the significance of the notarial seal affixed on
documents. The notarial seal converts a documents from a private to a public instrument, after which it
may be presented as evidence without need for proof of its genuineness and due execution. Thus,
notarization should not be treated as an empty, meaningless or routinary act. A notary public exercises
duties calling for carefulness and faithfulness. Notaries must inform themselves of the facts they certify
to; most importantly, they should not take part or allow themselves to be part of illegal transactions.
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional responsibility requires very lawyer to uphold the Constitution, obey
the laws of the land, and promote respect for the law and legal processes. The Notarial Law and the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, moreover, require a duly commissioned notary public to make the
proper entries in his Notarial Register and to refrain from committing and dereliction or any act which
may serve as cause for the revocation of his commission or the imposition of administrative sanctions.
Under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, the respondent’s failure to make the proper entry or entries
in his Notarial Register of his notarial acts, his failure to require the presence of a principal at the time of
the notarial acts, and his failure to identify a principal on the basis of personal knowledge by competent
evidence are grounds for the revocation of a lawyer’s commission as a notary public.

Tan, Jr. v. Gumba, A.C. No. 9000, October 5, 2011

FACTS: Toman P. Tan, Jr. (complainant) narrated that Atty. Haide V. Gumba (respondent) asked
to be lent P350,000.00. Respondent assured him that she would pay the principal plus 12% interest per
annum after one year. She likewise offered by way of security a 105-square-meter parcel of land located
in Naga City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 2055 and registered in her father’s name.
Respondent showed complainant a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed by respondent’s parents,
and verbally assured complainant that she was authorized to sell or encumber the entire property.
Complainant consulted one Atty. Raquel Payte and was assured that the documents provided by
respondent were valid. Thus, complainant agreed to lend money to respondent. With the help of Atty.
Payte, respondent executed in complainant’s favor an “open” Deed of Absolute Sale over the said parcel
of land, attaching thereto the SPA. Complainant was made to believe that if respondent fails to pay the
full amount of the loan with interest in due date, the deed of sale may be registered. Accordingly, he
gave the amount of P350,000.00 to respondent.

Respondent, however, defaulted on her obligation and failed to pay the same despite
complainant’s repeated demands. Left with no recourse, complainant went to the Register of Deeds to
register the sale, only to find out the respondent deceived him since the SPA did not give respondent
the power to sell the property but only empowered responded to mortgage the property solely to
banks. Complainant manifested that he had lent money before to other people albeit for insignificant
amounts, but this was the first time that he extended a loan to a lawyer and it bore disastrous results.
He submitted that respondent committed fraud and deceit or conduct unbecoming of a lawyer. The IBP
Board of Governors found respondents guilty of violating of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and ordered her suspension for one (1) year.

HELD: The court agrees with the findings and conclusion of the IBP, but find that a reduction of
the recommended penalty is called for, pursuant to the principle that the appropriate penalty for an
errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts. Well
entrenched in this jurisdiction is the rule that a lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed
either in his professional or private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in
moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to continue
as an officer of the court. Verily, Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibilities mandates all
lawyer to uphold at all times the dignity and integrity of the legal profession. Lawyers are similarly
required, under the Role 1.01, Canon 1 of the same Code, not to engage in any unlawful, dishonest and
immoral or deceitful conduct.

Here, respondent’s actions clearly show that she deceived complainant into lending money to
her through the use of documents and false representations and taking advantage of her education and
complainant’s ignorance in legal matters. As manifested by complainant, he would have never granted
the loan to respondent were it not for respondent’s misrepresentation that she was authorized to sell
the property and if respondent had not lend him to believe that he could register the “open” deed of
sale if she fails to pay the loan. By her misdeed, respondent has eroded not only complainant’s
perception of the legal profession but the public’s perception as well. Her actions constitute gross
misconduct for which she may be disciplined. Complainant is asking that the respondent be disbarred.
The Court finds, however, that suspension from the practice of law is sufficient to discipline respondent.
It is worth stressing that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution. Disbarment will be
imposed as a penalty only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and the
character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar. Where any lesser penalty can
accomplish the end desired, disbarment should not be decreed. In this case, the Court find the penalty
of suspension more appropriate but finds the recommended penalty of suspension for one year too
severe. Considering the circumstances of this case, the Court believes that a suspension of six months is
sufficient. After all, suspension is not primarily intended as a punishment, but as a means to protect the
public and the legal profession.

Gone v. Ga, A.C. No. 7771, April 6, 2011

FACTS: Patricio Gone (complainant) sought the help of Atty. Macario Ga (respondent) in a labor
case. Complainant reported that Atty. Ga is his counsel in NLRC Case No. RB-IV-2Q281-78 entitled
“Patricio Gone v. Solid Mills, Inc.” the case was dismissed by the Labor Arbiter and was elevated to the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The present administrative complaint was due to Atty.
Ga’s failure to reconstitute or turn over the records of the case in his possession. Complainant alleged
that on 13 December 1983, the NLRC building in Intramuros, Manila was burned and among the records
destroyed was his appealed case. He further reported that as early as 8 March 1984, Atty. Ga had
obtained a certification from the NLRC that the records of NLRC Case No. RB-IV-2Q281-78 were burned.
Despite knowledge of the destruction of the records, Atty. Ga allegedly did not do anything to
reconstitute the records of the appealed case. On 9 September 1989, complainant allegedly sent a
letter to Atty. Ga requesting him to return the records of the case in his possession. As of date of
complaint, Atty. Ga has yet to turn over the records. Complainant submits that his counsel’s continued
refusal has caused great injustice to him and his family. Atty. Ga averred that had it not been for the
instant complaint, he would not have, as he never, heard from complainant Gone since 1984. What he
was aware of was the latter’s abandonment of his family way back in 1978. Complainant’s wife is the
relative of Atty. Ga, being the daughter of his first cousin.

HELD: The Code of Professional Responsibility mandated lawyers to serve their clients with
competence and diligence. Rule 18.03 and Rule 18.04 state:
Rule 18.03. A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04. A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and
shall respond within a reasonable time to the client’s request for information.

Respondent Atty. Ga breached these duties when he failed to reconstitute or turn over the
records of the case to his client, herein complainant Gone. His negligence manifest lack of competence
and diligence required of every lawyer. His failure to comply with the request of his client was a gross
betrayal of his fiduciary duty and a breach of the trust reposed upon him by his client. In the case of
Navarro v. Meneses (CBD, A.C. No. 313, 285 SCRA 586) the Court held: “It is settled that a lawyer is not
obliged to act as counsel for every person who may wish to become his client.”

A.M. No. 09-6-1-SC, January 21, 2015

Section 11, rule III of the 2004 Rules on notarial Practice provides that: Jurisdiction and term – a person
commissioned as notary public may perform notarial acts in any place within the territorial jurisdiction
of the commissioning court for a period of two (2) years commencing the first day of January of the year
in which the commissioning is made, unless earlier revoked or the notary public has resigned under
these Rules and the rules of Court. Under said rule, only persons commissioned as notary public may
perform notarial acts within the territorial jurisdiction of the court which granted the commission.
Notarization as stressed by the Court is not an empty, meaningless and routine act. It is vested with
substantive public interest that only those qualified and authorized may act as notaries public.
Notarization converts a private document into a public document making it admissible in evidence
without further proof of authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon
its face and for this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of their duties. Respondent performed notarial acts without the necessary commission in
violation of the rule. Hence, he was barred permanently from being commissioned as notary public and
suspended from the practice of law for 2 years.

A.M. No. CA‐15‐53‐J [Formerly OCA I.P.I No. 15‐230‐CA‐J], July 14, 2015

Facts: An Information for Estafa was filed against complainant, Caterayna Tespene before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 52 of Davao City. After trial court, Tespene was found guilty of the crime charged.
Complainant failed to attend the promulgation. Thereafter, she appealed the case which was
subsequently dismissed for having filed a wrong mode of appeal. Aggrieved, accused/complainant filed a
complaint against respondent CA Justice Bituin Ariama for allegedly rendering false decision and judicial
fraud, in relation to the Estafa case. She alleged that her conviction was fraudulent. Complainant
pointed out that the opening statement of the judgment in the Estafa case stated that she pleaded
“guilty” when in fact she pleaded “not guilty.” Complainant claimed that respondent CA justice
purportedly made a detailed narration of the case to sustain the alleged plea of guilt. Respondent CA
justice denied the allegations against her and explained that the reference that she pleaded “guilty” was
caused by mere inadvertence because the records would show that complainant’s plea during
arraignment was in fact “not guilty.” Respondent insists that there was no fraudulent intent to such slip
up because the case was decided on the merits and not on the basis that accused-complainant
purportedly entered a plea of guilty. Respondent maintained that the erroneous reference of the actual
plea of complainant was not deliberate or malicious and it could not have affected the evidence
presented to prove her guilt. Respondent surmised that the instant complaint against her was instituted
as a substitute for a lost appeal which was entirely due to complainant's fault.

Ruling: Rendering false decision and judicial fraud. It should be emphasized that as a matter of policy, in
the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject
to disciplinary action even though such acts are erroneous. He cannot be subjected to liability  civil,
criminal or administrative  for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in
good faith. In such a case, the remedy of the aggrieved party is not to file an administrative complaint
against the judge but to elevate the error to the higher court for review and correction. The Court has to
be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter
can be branded with the stigma of being biased and partial. Thus, not every error or mistake that a judge
commits in the performance of his duties renders him liable, unless he is shown to have acted in bad
faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations are sufficient defenses in which
a judge charged with ignorance of the law can find refuge. In this case, other than the complainant’s
bare allegation of fraud, there was no showing that respondent was motivated by bad faith or ill motives
in the alleged erroneous judgment. Case against respondent was dismissed for failure of complainant to
substantiate the charges.

A.M. No. RTJ‐12‐2325 [Formerly A.M. No. 12‐7‐132‐RTC], April 14, 2015

In petitions for declaration of nullity of void marriages, the applicable rule is Section 4 of A.M. No. 02‐11‐
10‐SC, as amended, which provides that “the petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or
city where the petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of
the filing.” The OCA Report is replete with findings showing that respondent deliberately disregarded
the said rule. He continued to try and resolve cases despite glaring circumstances, which should have
created doubt as to the veracity of the residential addresses declared in the petitions. Competence and
diligence are prerequisite to the due performance of judicial office and every judge is required to
observe the law. There is gross ignorance of the law when an error committed by the judge was gross or
patent, deliberate or malicious, or when a judge ignores, contradicts or fails to apply settled law and
jurisprudence because of bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption.   For gross ignorance of the law,
respondent was dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits except accrued
leave credits, and with prejudice to re‐employment in the government service including GOCCs.

A.M. No. RTJ‐15‐2426 [Formerly A.M. No. 05‐03‐83‐MTC], June 16, 2015

Judges must adhere to the highest tenets of judicial conduct. Because of the sensitivity of his position, a
judge is required to exhibit, at all times, the highest degree of honesty and integrity and to observe
exacting standards of morality, decency and competence. He should adhere to the highest standards of
public accountability lest his action erode the public faith in the Judiciary. Respondent fell short of this
standard for borrowing money from the collections of the court. He knowingly and deliberately made
the clerks of court violate the circulars on the proper administration of court funds. He miserably failed
to become a role model of his staff and other court personnel in the observance of the standards of
morality and decency, both in his official and personal. The act of misappropriating court funds
constitutes dishonesty and grave misconduct, punishable by dismissal from the service even on the first
offense. For gross misconduct, respondent was dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all
retirement benefits except accrued leaves, and with prejudice to re‐employment in the government
service, including GOCCs.

A.C. No. 5914, March 11, 2015 Lawyers: The legal profession and responsibilities of its members.

Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions.  It is bestowed upon individuals who are
not only learned in law, but also known to possess good moral character. Lawyers should act and
comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, in order to promote the
public’s faith in the legal profession. The Code of Professional Responsibility was promulgated to guide
the members of the bar by informing them of the deportment expected of them in leading both their
professional and private lives. Primarily, it aims to protect the integrity and nobility of the legal
profession, to breed honest and principled lawyers and prune the association of the unworthy. It is for
the foregoing reason that the Court did not yield to complainants’ change of heart by refuting their own
statements against the respondents and praying that the complaint for disbarment they filed be
dismissed. It bears emphasizing that any misconduct on the part of the lawyer not only hurts the client’s
cause but is even more disparaging on the integrity of the legal profession itself. Thus, for tarnishing the
reputation of the profession, respondents may still be disciplined notwithstanding the complainant’s
pardon or withdrawal from the case for as long as there is evidence to support any finding of
culpability.  A case for suspension or disbarment may proceed “regardless of interest or lack of interest
of the complainants, if the facts proven so warrant.”  The withdrawal of the complainant from the case,
or even the filing of an affidavit of desistance, does not conclude the administrative case against
respondents. This is so because the misconduct of a lawyer is deemed a violation of his oath to keep
sacred the integrity of the profession for which he must be disciplined. “The power to discipline lawyers
who are officers of the court may not be cut short by compromise and withdrawal of the charges. This is
as it should be, especially when we consider that the law profession and its exercise is one impressed
with public interest. Proceedings to discipline erring members of the bar are not instituted to protect
and promote the public good only but also to maintain the dignity of the profession by the weeding out
of those who have proven themselves unworthy thereof.” The Court did not set aside the finding of
culpability against the respondents merely because the complainants have decided to forgive them or
settle matters amicably after the case was completely evaluated and reviewed by the IBP. The
complainants’ forgiveness or even withdrawal from the case does not ipso facto obliterate the
misconduct committed by respondents. It is already too late in the day for the complainants to withdraw
the disbarment case considering that they had already presented and supported their claims with
convincing and credible evidence, and the IBP has promulgated a resolution on the basis thereof. For
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, one of the respondents was suspended from the
practice of law for three (3) months and sternly warned and the other was exonerated for lack of
evidence.

A.M. No. P‐10‐2872 [Formerly A.M. No. 10‐10‐118‐MTC], February 24, 2015

Administrative Circular No. 35‐2004, as amended, dated August 20, 2004 requires the daily remittance
of JDF and SAJF collections. Also, Section 4, of OCA Circular No. 50‐95 provides that all collections from
bailbonds, rental deposits and other Fiduciary collections shall be deposited by the Clerk of court
concerned within twenty‐four (24) hours upon receipt thereof with the Landbank of the Philippines.
Respondent clerk of court did not follow the procedural guidelines. Worse, she incurred deficits in her
collections which she failed to settle despite the ample time allowed her to do so. For dishonesty, gross
neglect of duty, and grave misconduct, respondent was dismissed from the service immediately and all
benefits due her were ordered forfeited, with prejudice to             re‐employment in the government
service including GOCCs.

A.M. No. RTJ‐13‐2366, February 4, 2015

In Lorenzana v. Judge Austria, A.M. No. RTJ‐09‐2200, April 2, 2014, the Court emphasized that: A judge
should always conduct himself in a manner that would preserve the dignity, independence and respect
for himself, the Court and the Judiciary as a whole. He must exhibit the hallmark judicial temperament
of utmost sobriety and self‐restraint.  He should choose his words and exercise more caution and
control in expressing himself. In other words, a judge should possess the virtue of gravitas. Furthermore,
a magistrate should not descend to the level of a sharp‐tongued, ill‐mannered petty tyrant by uttering
harsh words, snide remarks and sarcastic comments. He is required to always be temperate, patient and
courteous, both in conduct and in language. The investigating Justice found respondent judge guilty of
conduct unbecoming of a judge when he used intemperate language that projected complainant as a
corrupt and ignorant judge in his class discussions. For conduct unbecoming of a judge, respondent was
admonished.

A.M. No. RTC-14-2399, November 19, 2014

Section 1 (a) of Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Court provides, to wit: Section 1. Arraignment and plea,
how made. – (a) The accused must be arraigned before the court where the complaint or information
was filed or assigned for trial. The arraignment shall be made in open court by the judge or clerk by
furnishing the accused with a copy of the complaint or information, reading the same in the language or
dialect known to him, and asking him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty. The prosecution may call at
the trial witnesses other than those named in the complaint or information. Respondent judge arraigned
an accused inside his chamber, not in open court as required by the Rules. The Supreme Court in a long
line of cases impressed upon judges that they owe it to the public and the legal profession to know the
very law that they are supposed to apply in a given controversy. They are called upon to exhibit more
than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules; to be conversant with the basic law;
and to maintain the desired professional competence, when a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity
with the rules, he erodes the confidence of the public in the courts. For gross ignorance of the law,
respondent judge was fined p40,000.00 and sternly warned.

A.M. No. SCC‐11‐17 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 10‐ 34‐SCC), February 21, 2017
Despite his protestations, the charge that respondent judge made a drawing of a vagina and a penis, and
thereafter showed it to A, a utility clerk, was corroborated by the clerk B, a disinterested witness, who
categorically declared that it was respondent judge who made the drawing, and affirmed that it was he
(B) who crumpled it. The act was enough to create an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for
A such that all subsequent interaction with respondent judge became unwelcome on her part. In fact,
the substantial evidence on record showed that A became afraid of respondent judge and started to
avoid him. The distasteful act by respondent judge of making a drawing of a vagina and a penis, and
thereafter showing it to an employee of the court of which he is an officer constitutes sexual
harassment. It is an act that constitutes a physical behavior of a sexual nature; a gesture with lewd
insinuation. To the Court’s mind, respondent judge deliberately utilized this form of expression, i.e.,
drawing, to maliciously convey to A his sexual desires over her; hence, his conduct cannot be classified
as a mere display of sexually offensive pictures, materials or graffiti under Section 53(C)(4), Rule X of CSC
Resolution No. 01‐0940, such as one who is caught watching or reading pornographic materials. Rather,
respondent judge’s behavior should be classified as an analogous case (Section 53[B][5]) of verbal abuse
with sexual overtones under Section 53(B)(4) of the same issuance, which, thus, qualifies the same as a
less grave offense.      x x x Having been found guilty of sexual harassment, respondent judge was
ordered suspended for six months without pay, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or any
similar act will be dealt with more severely.

A.M. No. RTJ-14-2385 [Formerly A.M. No. 14- 4-115-RTC], April 20, 2016

Records disclose the undisputed delay in the disposition of numerous cases assigned to Branches 13 and
64 which was then presided by respondent judge, despite the OCA's directives for the immediate
resolution of such cases. Despite the grant of his request for a two-month extension to comply with the
directives, he still failed to resolve the pending cases subject of the memoranda dated August 28 and 30,
2012. In fact, as of December 2013, the List of Cases pending before Branch 13 indicates that 20 civil
cases, 17 special proceedings, and 17 criminal cases are already deemed submitted for decision but have
yet to be decided despite the lapse of the 90-day reglementary period. With respect to Branch 64, the
monthly report of September 2013 states that 4 civil cases, 5 special proceedings, and a criminal case
are already deemed submitted for decision but are still undecided despite the lapse of the reglementary
period. No sufficient justification or valid reason is offered by respondent judge for his failure to decide
the said cases within the reglementary period. Hence, he should be held administratively liable for such
gross inefficiency. x x x x Meanwhile, the OCA duly noted that respondent judge’s failure to comply with
the directives in its memoranda dated August 28 and 30, 2012 also constitutes insubordination and
disrespect for the Court's lawful orders and directives.

It bears emphasis that judges should treat directives from the OCA as if issued directly by the Court and
comply promptly and conscientiously with them since it is through the OCA that the Court exercises its
constitutionally-mandated administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.
Unjustified failure to comply with such directives constitutes misconduct and exacerbates administrative
liability. For his undue delay in rendering decision or order and for his violation of Supreme Court rules
and directives, under Sections 9 and 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, respondent judge was fined in
the amount equivalent to three months' salary at the time of his retirement, to be deducted from his
retirement/gratuity benefits.

A.M. No. RTJ-16-2455 [Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 10-3443-RTJ], April 11, 2016

Manifest bias and partiality; Voluntary inhibition. There is no basis for taking any administrative action
against respondent judge for his denial of complainant's Motion to Inhibit. Section 1, Rule 137 of the
Revised Rules of Court provides for when a judge is mandatorily disqualified and when a judge may
voluntarily inhibit from a case. Said rule is reproduced in full below: SECTION 1. Disqualification of
judges. – No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily
interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth
degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the
rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in
which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without
the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record. A judge may,
in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons
other than those mentioned above. None of the circumstances for the mandatory disqualification of a
judge from a case applies to respondent judge. x x x x There is an absolute dearth herein of any evidence
of respondent judge’s bias or partiality, which would have required him to inhibit from Civil Case No.
XXX. Respondent judge's series of orders adverse to complainant and favorable to spouses AAA, by
itself, does not constitute sufficient proof, even if characterized by palpable error/s. Complainant did not
allege, much less prove, any ill motive, corrupt purpose, or malicious intention behind respondent
judge's orders. Unjustified assumptions and mere misgivings that the judge acted with prejudice,
passion, pride, and pettiness in the performance of his functions cannot overcome the presumption that
a judge shall decide on the merits of a case with an unclouded vision of its facts. The Court highlights
that mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for inhibition, there must be extrinsic
evidence of malice or bad faith on the judge's part. Moreover, the evidence must be clear and
convincing to overcome the presumption that a judge will undertake his noble role to dispense justice
according to law and evidence without fear or favor. In the absence of clear and convincing evidence to
prove the charge of bias and prejudice, a judge's ruling not to inhibit oneself should be allowed to stand.
Because voluntary inhibition is discretionary, respondent judge was in the best position to determine
whether or not there was a need to inhibit from the case, and his decision to continue to hear the case,
in the higher interest of justice, equity, and public interest, should be respected. Just as important is the
fact that respondent judge issued the orders in the exercise of his judicial functions. The filing by
complainant of an administrative case against respondent judge—to compel him to inhibit from Civil
Case No. XXX—is not the proper remedy. The Court found no basis for taking any administrative action
against respondent judge for his denial of complainant's Motion to Inhibit.

A.M. No. SCC‐16‐23‐J, February 22, 2017  

The evidence on record shows that respondent judge employed procedural shortcuts and disregarded
relevant rules of procedure in granting the Petition for Divorce. These, in turn, resulted in the grant of a
fraudulent Petition for Divorce. First. There was no service of summons and presentation of evidence ex
parte as required under the Special Rules. To achieve an expedited and inexpensive determination of
cases under the Muslim Code, the Court promulgated the Ijra‐At Al Mahakim Al Shari’a or Special Rules
of Procedure in Shari’a Courts. Section 3 of the Special Rules requires the service of summons with the
copy of the complaint upon the defendant. The defendant shall thereafter file an answer within 10 days
from receipt of summons. Should the defendant fail to answer the complaint within 10 days Issue 17‐3 |
March 2017    Page 2 of 5 from service, the court shall proceed to receive the evidence ex parte upon
which the judgment shall be rendered. Apart from respondent judge’s bare claim, there is nothing on
record to show that summons was served on defendant A. Thus, and as can be expected, no answer was
forthcoming since the defendant did not even know of the existence of the Petition for Divorce. Even
assuming that summons was served, defendant’s failure to file an answer did not justify the outright
grant of the petition. Section 5 of the Special Rules requires the reception of evidence ex parte upon
which the judgment shall be rendered. Here, no such presentation of evidence appears to have been
conducted. The order granting the petition was therefore issued without basis in fact and in law.
Second. Respondent judge failed to apply the Judicial Affidavit Rule which was well in effect at the time
the petition was allegedly filed on September 13, 2013. By its explicit provision, the Judicial Affidavit
Rule applies to all lower courts, including the Shari’a Circuit Courts. x x x x x x x In this case, respondent
judge should have required complainant to file her judicial affidavit in lieu of direct examination during
the presentation of evidence ex parte. This, in turn, could have been the basis of his clarificatory
questions, if any, to determine the veracity of petitioner’s claim. Indeed, as the investigating judge
contends, the erroneous grant of the fraudulent divorce petition could have been averted had
respondent judge complied with the Special Rules  and the Judicial Affidavit Rule.   Finding respondent
guilty of gross ignorance of the law, the Court ordered him suspended from office for six months
without salary and benefits with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be
dealt with more severely.

A.M. No. RTJ‐19‐2567 (Formerly A.M. No. 01‐12‐641‐RTC), August 14, 2019

Compliance with the directives issued by the Court is one of the foremost duties that a judge accepts
upon assumption to office as laid out in Canon 1 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct: SEC. 7. Judges
shall encourage and uphold safeguards for the discharge of judicial duties in order to maintain and
enhance the institutional and operational independence of the judiciary. SEC. 8. Judges shall exhibit and
promote high standards of judicial conduct in order to reinforce public confidence in the judiciary, which
is fundamental to the maintenance of judicial independence.   In this case, the Court cannot
countenance the unjustified refusal of respondent judge to comply with the Court’s twin resolutions
dated January 28, 2002 and August 19, 2002, as well as the directive from OCA. The Court thus agrees
with the findings of the OCA that respondent judge is guilty of gross misconduct for his deliberate and
repeated failure to comply with the Court’s lawful orders and directives. He owes candor to the Court
when rendering an explanation, in the same way that he expected it from lawyers who appeared before
his court. It is even hardly necessary to remind respondent judge that judges should respect the orders
and decisions of higher tribunals, much more the Highest Tribunal of the land from which all other
courts should take their bearings. Ultimately, a resolution of the Supreme Court should not be construed
as a mere request and should be complied with promptly and completely. The Court is equally not
convinced that respondent judge was unaware of the pendency of the Court’s directives against him. It
is highly incredulous that he could feign ignorance of the Court orders and, at the same time, admit that
he was aware of OCA’s directive that the pending cases left behind by retired Judge A be raffled among
Judge B, Judge C and himself. It is also dubious that he conveniently omitted to specify the number of
cases raffled to him and the docket number of the sole case which he claimed to have already decided
on the merits. These circumstances taken as a whole would lead to no other conclusion than that of the
contumacious conduct of respondent judge manifested by his blatant disregard and refusal to respect
the Court’s directive to decide or otherwise dispose of the 13 cases which were raffled to him by reason
of Judge A’s retirement. Concomitant therewith, all directives coming from the Court Administrator and
his deputies are issued in the exercise of this Court’s administrative supervision of trial courts and their
personnel, hence, should be respected. Similarly, these directives are not mere requests, but should be
complied with promptly and completely. Assuming arguendo that the twin resolutions were not served
upon respondent judge, his unexplained disregard of the directive of the OCA for him to decide or
otherwise dispose of the cases raffled to him shows his disrespect for and contempt, not just for the
OCA, but more importantly for the Court, which exercises direct administrative supervision over trial
court officers and employees through the OCA. His indifference to and disregard of the directives issued
to him clearly constituted insubordination which this Court will not tolerate. Thus, the Court finds
reason to wield disciplinary sanction upon respondent judge for his gross misconduct of, even outright
disrespect for the Court, for his indifference to the directive of the OCA and the Court. x x x x x x x To
reiterate, the Court cannot tolerate the conduct exhibited by respondent judge which constitutes no less
than clear acts of defiance against the Court’s authority. It is not enough that no parties were prejudiced
or that the cases were deemed abandoned because of their inaction. What is more important is whether
in the course of the judicial process, judicial norms have been maintained with the end in view that a
judge must discharge his functions with diligence and efficiency as mandated by Canon 3, Rule 3.08, of
the Code of Judicial Conduct which provides that “a judge should diligently discharge administrative
responsibilities, maintain professional competence in court management and facilitate the performance
of the administrative functions of other judges and court personnel.” x x x x The Court found respondent
judge guilty of gross misconduct and was fined a penalty equivalent to six months of his salary, which
shall be deducted from his retirement gratuity.

A.M. No. RTJ‐11‐2281 (Formerly OCA IPI‐10‐3372‐RTJ), September 16, 2019

The Constitution “fixes a reglementary period of 90 days within which judges must resolve motions or
incidents pending before them.” Consonantly, “Rules 1.02 of Canon 1 and 3.05 of Canon 3 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct direct judges to administer justice impartially and without delay and to dispose of the
court’s business promptly and decide cases within the required periods.”

In line therewith, Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 1‐88 provides:

6.1 All Presiding Judges must endeavor to act promptly on all motions and
interlocutory matters pending before their courts.
In this case, respondent judge admitted to have incurred delay in resolving the Motion
to Serve Summons by Publication filed by plaintiff on June 10, 2009 in the earlier mentioned
civil case.

Per Atty. A’s affidavit, which the Investigating Justice quoted in her report, the motion was resolved only
on April 16, 2010. We note that while there was an exchange of papers between the parties in the civil
case subsequent to the filing of the subject motion, plaintiff finally filed on October 26, 2009 a Motion to
Resolve Immediately the Motion to Serve Summons by Publication. By way of an excuse, respondent
judge attributes the delay to complainant, whom he alleged to have been negotiating for the settlement
of the case with Atty. B, and to his Branch Clerk, Atty. A, whom he claimed to have kept the records of
the case and failed to forward them to him.

Respondent judge’s proferred excuse is not persuasive. Judges cannot be allowed to use their staff as
shields to evade responsibility for mistakes or mismanagement committed in the course of the
performance of their duties. Court management is ultimately the judges’ responsibility. Moreover, as
held by the Investigating Justice, respondent judge could have, at least, issued an order deferring the
resolution of plaintiff’s motion on the basis of complainant’s request to defer it. This way, he could have
avoided being accused of delaying the resolution thereof. Even if it were true that the records of the
case were not forwarded to him by his Branch Clerk, to our mind, however, this only shows that there
was something irregular about the way respondent judge managed his court. This is bolstered by his
own admission that during the inventory of cases before his court to check the statuses thereof, among
others, he would sign the records, but scan them only “sometimes.”
xxxx
The following pronouncements in the case entitled “Re: Compliance of Judge Maxwell S. Rosete”, thus
find relevance: Truly, judges play an active role in ensuring that cases are resolved with speed and
dispatch so as not to defeat the cause of the litigants. A judge should administer justice impartially and
without delay. They must always be in control of proceedings to ensure that the mandatory periods
provided in the Rules of Court and several other rules promulgated by the Court are faithfully complied
with. A judge shall dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the required
periods. It is in this connection that we reiterate the oft‐repeated maxim that justice delayed is often
justice denied. Thus, any delay in the administration of justice may result in depriving the litigant of his
right to a speedy disposition of his case and will ultimately affect the image of the Judiciary. A delay in
the disposition of cases amounts to a denial of justice, brings the court into disrepute, and ultimately
erodes public faith and confidence in the Judiciary. Inability to decide a case within the required period
or unreasonable delay of a judge in resolving a pending incident constitutes gross inefficiency and
subjects the judge to administrative sanctions. It is true that the public’s faith and confidence in the
judicial system largely depend on the judicious and prompt disposition of cases and other matters
pending before the courts. The judges’ “failure to decide a case or resolve a motion within [the]
reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative
sanctions against the erring magistrate.”
xxxx
The Court found respondent judge liable for undue delay in rendering decisions and orders and was
imposed a fine of P11,000 to be deducted from his retirement benefits.

A.M. No. RTJ‐19‐2562 (Formerly A.M. No. 18‐10‐234‐RTC), July 2, 2019

In an effort to streamline the processing of applications for optional retirement filed by officials and
employees of the Judiciary, the Court issued Administrative Circular No. 43‐2004, pertinent portions of
which read: WHEREFORE, the following new guidelines in the filing of applications for OPTIONAL
retirement are hereby adopted for strict compliance by all concerned:   1. All applications for optional
retirement shall specify the date of effectivity thereof and should not make it effective “upon approval
by the Court.” x x x x 3. The application should be filed at least SIX MONTHS prior to the effectivity date
of the retirement indicated in the application. x x x x 5. If on the date specified in the application as the
date of the effectivity of the retirement, the applicant has not yet received any notice of approval or
denial of his application, he shall cease working and discharging his functions unless directed
otherwise.   x x x x In this case, the Court notes that while respondent judge complied with the first
guideline by indicating the effectivity date of his optional retirement on January 31, 2018, he violated:
(a) the third guideline as he filed his application for optional retirement only on January 22, 2018, or a
mere nine days—not six months as required—prior to the effectivity date of his optional retirement; and
(b) the fifth guideline as he specified, in his application, January 31, 2018 as the effectivity date of his
optional retirement and yet, still continued to discharge his functions as presiding judge and acting
presiding judge of the RTC‐XXX and the RTC‐YYY, respectively, even after the said date. This constitutes
the less serious charge of Violation of Supreme Court Rules, Directives, and Circulars under Section 9(4),
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, by presiding over cases and even issuing orders and
resolutions even after his optional retirement on January 31, 2018, the Court finds that respondent
judge committed multiple counts of gross ignorance of the law, which is a serious charge under Section
8(9), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. x x x   x x x x Issue 19‐8|August 2019    Page 2 of 7 It is an
elementary rule that a judge has no authority to act on a case once he has retired from office.
Undoubtedly, retirement is one of the recognized modes of severing one’s public employment.

Retirement has been defined as a withdrawal from office, public station, business, occupation, or public
duty. In this regard, jurisprudence states that when a judge retires, all his authority to decide any case,
i.e., to write, sign and promulgate the decision thereon, also ‘retires’ with him. In other words, he had
lost entirely his power and authority to act on all cases assigned to him prior to his retirement. However,
despite his optional retirement on January 31, 2018, respondent judge continued to discharge his
previous functions as presiding judge and acting presiding judge of the RTC‐XXX and the RTC‐YYY,
respectively. Clearly, such actions exhibited his utter lack of conversance about a basic tenet of law and
procedure. As such, he should be held administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law, which
infraction he is considered to have committed for every case he had presided over/decided beyond the
effective date of his retirement. x x x x The Court found respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance of
the law. In lieu of the penalty of dismissal from service which may no longer be imposed due to
respondent judge's retirement, the Court forfeits all his retirement benefits, except accrued leave
credits. He is further disqualified from any reemployment or appointment in any branch or
instrumentality of the government, including government‐owned and controlled corporations and
financial institutions.

A.M. No. RTJ‐17‐2486 (Formerly A.M. No. 17‐02‐45‐RTC), September 3, 2019

The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of every whiff of
impropriety not only in regard to his discharge of judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his
office and even as a private individual. Indeed, judges should be extra prudent in associating with
litigants and counsel who have matters pending before them in order to avoid even the mere perception
of possible bias or partiality. They should be scrupulously careful with respect to pending or prospective
litigations before them to avoid anything that may tend to awaken the suspicion that their personal,
social or sundry relations could influence their objectivity, for not only must they possess proficiency in
law but they must also act and behave in such manner that would assure litigants and their counsel,
with great comfort, of the judges’ competence, integrity and independence. In view of this, whether or
not respondent judge really demanded money in exchange for either the liberty of CCC and DDD or the
dismissal of the criminal case filed against them even became immaterial herein. By simply meeting and
talking with them as the accused whose cases were then pending in his sala, respondent judge already
transgressed ethical norms and compromised his integrity and impartiality as the trial judge. x x x x x x x

Plainly enough, respondent judge’s actuations and behavior constituted grave misconduct. It is settled
that grave misconduct exists where the requisites of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or
flagrant disregard of established rule are present. As an element of grave misconduct, corruption
consists in the act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or
character to procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of
others. Respondent judge’s death intervened in the meantime. Nonetheless, and as recommended by
the OCA, his death should not result in the dismissal of the administrative complaint. In Gonzales v.
Escalona, we held that the Court is not ousted of its jurisdiction by the mere fact that the respondent
public official had meanwhile ceased to hold office. Verily, jurisdiction over the case or subject matter,
once acquired, continues until final resolution.

With more reason is this true herein because respondent judge was fully afforded due process during
the investigation. Worth noting is that the Court already sternly warned respondent judge in A.M. No.
RTJ‐ 06‐1996 “to be more circumspect in issuing orders which must truly reflect the actual facts they
represent to obviate engendering views of partiality among others.” The warning evidently fell on deaf
ears in view of the clear showing that respondent judge still committed another serious offense. x x x x
The Court found the late respondent judge guilty of gross misconduct. All his benefits were forfeited,
including retirement gratuity, exclusive of his accrued leaves, which shall be released to his legal heirs.

A.M. No. RTJ‐18‐2537 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 13‐4027‐RTJ), August 14, 2019

True, a judge’s failure to interpret the law or to properly appreciate the evidence presented does not
necessarily render him administratively liable. Only judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross
ignorance, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice will be administratively sanctioned. However,
it is also settled that when a law or rule is basic, judges owe it to their office to simply apply the law.
Anything less is ignorance of the law, warranting administrative sanction. x x x

In this case, as found by the CA and the OCA, respondent judge’s actions are more than mere errors of
judgment that can be excused and left to the judicial remedy of review by the appellate court for
correction. Respondent judge patently erred in recognizing EEE as the legitimate Barangay Chairman
merely by virtue of the mayor’s appointment. As held by the CA, basic is the rule under existing and
established laws that permanent vacancies in elective positions are filled through automatic succession,
not by appointment.

Respondent judge also patently erred in issuing a TRO and WPI without requiring the applicant to post a
bond. Section 4, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court clearly states:
SEC. 4. Verified application and bond for preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order. – A preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order may be
granted only when:
(a) The application in the action or proceeding is verified, and shows facts entitling the
applicant to the relief demanded; and
(b) Unless exempted by the court, the applicant files with the court where the action
or proceeding is pending, a bond executed to the party or person enjoined, in an
amount to be fixed by the court, to the effect that the applicant will pay to such
 party or person all damages which he may sustain by reason of the injunction or
temporary restraining order if the court should finally decide that the applicant
was not entitled thereto. Upon approval of the requisite bond, a writ of
preliminary injunction shall be issued. x x x x

Clearly, exemption from the posting of the bond is merely an exception. Hence, the reason for such
exemption must be stated in the order. In Universal Motors Corporation v. Judge Rojas, we elucidated
that while Section 4(b), Rule 58 of the Rules of Court gives the presiding judge the discretion to require a
bond before granting a temporary restraining order, the Rules did not intend to give the judge the
license to exercise such discretion arbitrarily to favor one party and prejudice the other. The importance
of the bond is clearly expressed in the above‐cited provision, i.e., it shall answer to the damages which
the enjoined party may sustain by reason of the injunction or TRO. Thus, unless it is shown that the
enjoined party will not suffer any damage, the presiding judge must require the applicant to post a
bond, otherwise the courts could become instruments of oppression and harassment. In this case,
respondent judge’s order contained no explanation or, at least, any mention with regard to the posting
of the bond when the injunctive reliefs were issued.

Lastly, respondent judge also gravely erred when he granted EEE’s motion for execution pending appeal
when there was no evidence presented to justify the same. Execution pending appeal, also called
discretionary execution under Section 2(a), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, is allowed upon good reasons
to be stated in a special order after due hearing. Here, as found by the CA, aside from EEE’s bare
allegations, there was no evidence presented to support the claim that execution pending appeal was
necessary and justified. Worse, respondent judge granted the motion merely on the ground that he
“believes that the appeal seemed dilatory” and “the lapse of time would make the ultimate judgment
ineffective.” Again, basic is the rule that the authority to determine whether an appeal is dilatory or not
lies with the appellate court. The trial court’s assumption prematurely judged the merits of the main
case on appeal. “Except in cases where the appeal is patently or unquestionably intended to delay, it
must not be made the basis of execution pending appeal if only to protect and preserve a duly exercised
right to appeal.” Respondent judge’s patent disregard of basic and established rules and jurisprudence
undoubtedly amounts to gross ignorance of the law and inexcusable abuse of authority. x x x x
The Court found respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law. In lieu of dismissal from service
which may no longer be imposed due to his retirement, all his benefits, except accrued leave credits,
were forfeited. He was further disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government‐owned and controlled corporations.

A.M. No. RTJ‐19‐ 2559 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 11‐3810‐RTJ) and A.M. No. RTJ‐19‐2561 (Formerly A.M. No.
15‐02‐ 49‐RTC), August 14, 2019

Shirkingfromjudicialduty



As may be observed,

the 14 requests that
were eventually re‐raffled
to other judges were
scheduled for
solemnization before
respondent judge on
nine separate days from
June to
October2011.

Respondent judge claims
that all his absences
resulting in his failure
to solemnize  the
marriagesraffledtohimw
ere
duetohisailmentsand
thathefiled
thenecessaryapplications
forleaveforsaidabsences
withattachedmedicalcert
ificates.

However,itappearsthatre
spondentjudgehasnotbee
nforthrightwiththeCourt.
The
OCAreportedthatoutof
theninedaysrespondentj
udgewasabsent,hewas
onsick
leavefor
onlyfourdays:
August10,2011;Septem
ber8and22,2011;and
October20,2011andwas
on
forfeitable leave for
three days: June 15,
16, and 21, 2011. For
his absences on July
20, 2011
andAugust20,2011,resp
ondentjudgedidnotfile
applicationsforleave.

Asaresultofhisunexcus
edabsences,threerequests
forsolemnizationofmarri
agehad
tobere‐raffled
tootherjudges:
twomarriageson
July20,2011,and one
marriageon August
20,2011.

TheCourtisclearinits
directivethat“[u]nlessfor
validreasons,therefusalo
fa
judgeto
participateintheraffleof
requestforsolemnization
ofmarriageshallbeconstr
uedasshirking
from
judicialduty.”Considering
that his
absencesonJuly20,
2011 and August 20,
2011 were
not
coveredbyanyapplications
 for leave,thereis no
valid reasonforhis
failure to solemnize
the three marriages
raffled to him on the
said dates. His failure
to solemnize the three
marriagesfornovalidreas
onistantamounttoarefu
saltoparticipateinthera
ffle.Respondent
judgeshirkedfromhisjudi
cialdutyofparticipatingin
theraffleforrequestsof
solemnizationof
marriage.Indoing
so,heviolatedSupremeC
ourtrules,directives,andc
irculars.

Respondentjudge
wasfinedP12,000forhis
act  ofshirking
fromjudicial
dutybyfailing
tosolemnizemarriagesraffl
edtohimonaccountof
hisunexcusedabsences.[A.
M.No.RTJ‐19‐
2559(FormerlyOCAIPI
No.11‐3810‐
RTJ)andA.M.No.RTJ‐
19‐
2561(FormerlyA.M.No.
15‐02‐
49‐RTC),August14,2019]
As may be observed, the 14 requests that were eventually re‐raffled to other judges were scheduled for
solemnization before respondent judge on nine separate days from June to October 2011. Respondent
judge claims that all his absences resulting in his failure to solemnize the marriages raffled to him were
due to his ailments and that he filed the necessary applications for leave for said absences with attached
medical certificates. However, it appears that respondent judge has not been forthright with the Court.
The OCA reported that out of the nine days respondent judge was absent, he was on sick leave for only
four days: August 10, 2011; September 8 and 22, 2011; and October 20, 2011 and was on forfeitable
leave for three days: June 15, 16, and 21, 2011. For his absences on July 20, 2011 and August 20, 2011,
respondent judge did not file applications for leave.   As a result of his unexcused absences, three
requests for solemnization of marriage had to be re‐raffled to other judges: two marriages on July 20,
2011, and one marriage on August 20, 2011.   The Court is clear in its directive that “[u]nless for valid
reasons, the refusal of a judge to participate in the raffle of request for solemnization of marriage shall
be construed as shirking from judicial duty.” Considering that his absences on July 20, 2011 and August
20, 2011 were not covered by any applications for leave, there is no valid reason for his failure to
solemnize the three marriages raffled to him on the said dates. His failure to solemnize the three
marriages for no valid reason is tantamount to a refusal to participate in the raffle. Respondent judge
shirked from his judicial duty of participating in the raffle for requests of solemnization of marriage. In
doing so, he violated Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars. Respondent judge was fined P12,000
for his act of shirking from judicial duty by failing to solemnize marriages raffled to him on account of his
unexcused absences.