1 - (Edited Based On 2016 4 Year Review Class)

ELECTION LAW PRE-BAR REVIEW
Atty. Jocelyn Arro-Valencia
2014 BAR Examination Coverage for Election Laws
A. Suffrage
B. Qualification and disqualification of voters
C. Registration of Voters
D. Inclusion and Exclusion Proceedings
E. Political Parties
a. Jurisdiction of the COMELEC over political parties
b. Registration
F. Candidacy
a. Qualification of candidates
b. Filing of certificates of candidacy
i. Effect of filing
ii. Substitution of candidates
iii. Ministerial duty of COMELEC to receive certificate
iv. Nuisance candidates
v. Petition to deny due course to or cancel certificates of candidacy
vi. Effect of disqualification
vii. Withdrawal of candidates
G. Campaign
a. Premature campaigning
b. Prohibited contributions
c. Lawful and prohibited election propaganda
d. Limitations on expenses
e. Statement of contributions and expenses
H. Board of Election Inspectors and Board of Canvassers
a. Composition
b. Powers
I. Remedies and jurisdiction in election law
a. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy
b. Petition for disqualification
c. Petition to declare failure of elections
d. Pre-proclamation controversy
e. Election Protest
f. Quo Warranto
J. Prosecution of election offenses
A. SUFFRAGE
THEORY OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY - Section 1, Article 11 of the Constitution: “The Philippines is a democratic and republican
state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.” A democratic and republic government
derives all its powers, directly or indirectly, from the people – who represents the sovereign power of the state.
In the case of Naval v COMELEC& Remulla (July 08, 2014), then associate justice Puno explained the character of a Republican
State and the public office.
“ The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from
them. A republic is a representative government, a government run by and for the people. It is not a pure democracy where the people
govern themselves directly. The essence of republicanism is representation and renovation, the selection by the citizenry of a
corps of public functionaries who derive their mandate from the people and act on their behalf, serving for a limited
period only, after which they are replaced or retained, at the option of their principal (sovereign/people). Obviously, a republican
government is a responsible government whose officials hold and discharge their position as a public trust and shall, according to the
Constitution, ‘at all times be accountable to the people’ they are sworn to serve. The purpose of a republican government it is almost
needless to state, is the promotion of the common welfare according to the will of the people themselves.”
In a democratic process, suffrage is very important. So what is suffrage?
SUFFRAGE
Is the right to vote in the election of officers chosen by the people and in the determination of questions submitted to the
people. (Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political Law 2009 edition)
Suffrage applies not only to elections, but may also extend to initiatives, referenda, plebiscite and recall.
Means by which people express their sovereign judgment. (Nolasco v. Comelec 275 SCRA 763).
It is not a natural right but merely a privilege. it is because it is withheld to those who do not possess the qualification such
as citizenship and age, and fulfillment of the procedural requirements. Even if you have the qualification but you do not go
1| (edited based on 2016 4th year review class)

through the process (ie: registration) you still cannot vote or you go through the process but is disqualified, still you cannot
vote. It is not absolute but subject to valid substantive and procedural rules.
Although it is a political right and obligation of qualified citizens to vote in the election of certain national and local officers
of the government and in the decision of public questions submitted to the people.
It is both a right and a privilege. Right being the expression of the sovereign will of the people. Privilege because its
exercise is conferred only to such persons or class of persons as are most likely to exercise it for the purpose of the public
good.
Suffrage as a duty is in the nature of a public trust and constitutes a voter a representative of the whole people. This
duty requires that the privileged bestowed should be exercised not exclusively for the benefit of the citizen or citizens
proferring it but in good faith and with intelligent zeal for the general benefit and welfare of the State. (Cipriano Abanil v.
Justice of the Peace Court of Bacolod, Negros Occidental et. al. 70 Phil. 28 (1940)).
Basis of suffrage: Sec. 1, Art. V of 1987 the Constitution provides, “Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines,
not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least 18 years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year
and in the place wherein they propose to vote, for at least 6 months immediately preceding the election. No literacy, property, or
other substantive requirements shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.
Suffrage may also be exercised by qualified Filipinos abroad. Article V, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution further provides that,
“The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by
qualified Filipinos abroad.” Congress enacted R.A. 9189 “Overseas Absenting Voting Act of 2003” now amended by the Overseas
Absenting Voting Act of 2013.
SCOPE OF SUFFRAGE: FORMS OF POPULAR INTERVENTION
Sec. 2 (1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution, the Comelec is vested with the power to “enforce and administer all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall”.
Main Sources of Election laws:

1. Philippine Constitution
2. Omnibus Election Code BP 81- it is the basic source governing the elections although it has gone through several amendments
to improve under the 1987 Philippine Consitution and other several re-enacments. It is still a good law since its first re-
enactment by the Election Reforms Law of 1987 to achieve and enhance the objective for Honest, Orderly, Peaceful, Free and
Credible Election (HOPE- FRECRE)
3. Local Government Code
1) Election – is the means by which the people choose, through the use of the ballot, their officials for definite and fixed
periods and to whom they entrust, for the time being as their representatives, the exercise of powers of government
(Garchitorena v. Crsecini 39 Phil. 258 (1918)). In ordinary dialect or understanding, the Court in Carlos v.
Angeles, 346 SCRA 571 (2000) held that elections refers to the conduct of the poles – listing of votes, holding of
electoral campaign, act of casting and receiving the ballots from the voters, counting them, and making the election
returns and proclaiming the candidates. It refers to the entire and complete electoral exercise from the (3 stages of
election) pre- election, election and post election.
- so when you say elections, it constitutes the entire electoral process from pre- election until post election.
- The essence of election is PLURALITY OF VOTES. It is counted by the number of voters who actually voted, not the
number of registered voters (Sunga v COMELEC, Bungad v COMELEC and Penera v COMELEC) that the public office
is filled up by those who garnered the most number of votes. That is why in disqualification cases if the mayor is
disqualified it is the vice mayor by operation of law who takes place and not the mayoral candidate who garnered the
second highest vote since it implies that the people repudiated him.
a. Kinds of Election
1 Regular election – refers to an election participated in by those who possess the right of suffrage and not disqualified by
law and who are registered voters.
2. Special elections – election not regularly held but which is conducted

to supply a vacancy in a particular office before the expiration of the full term for which the incumbent was elected.
Sec. 4 of RA 7166 provides that, “in case a permanent vacancy shall occur in the Senate or House of
Representative at least one (1) year before the expiration of the term, the Comelec shall call and hold a
special elections to fill the vacancy not earlier than 60 days nor longer than 90 days after the occurrence of
the vacancy.
Article VI, Section 9, Constitution provides that case such vacancy in the Senate, the special elections shall be
held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular elections.
Article VII, Sec. 10 of the Constitution, in case a vacancy occurs in the offices of the President and Vice-
President, a special election cannot be called if the vacancy occurs within 18 months before the date of the
next presidential elections.

In cases were a postponement and failure of elections are declared by the Comelec in accordance with Sections
5,6,7 of BP 881). Lucero v. Comelec 234 SCRA 280 (1994); Borja v. Comelec 260 SCRA 604 (1996).
In fixing the date for special elections the Comelec should to see to it that:
1) it should not be later than thirty (30) days after the cessation of the cause of the postponement or suspension of the
election or the failure to elect;
2) it should be reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in the failure to elect.
(Lucero v. Comelec 234 SCRA 280).
3. Manual Elections – Manual/mechanical casting/voting, counting, and canvassing stages, which involves the following –
a. Use of paper “write-in” ballots during the casting stage;
b. The “direct reading and manual tallying of votes” in multiple copies of election returns (ER); and
c. The manual addition of results in Statement of Votes (SOVs) and the Certificates of Canvass (COCCs)
4. Automated Election System (AES) – a system using appropriate technology which has been demonstrated in the voting,
counting, consolidating, canvassing, and transmission of election result, and other electoral process. (Sec. 2, RA 9369, The
Automated Election System Law, As Amended)
2) Plebiscite – an electoral process by which an initiative on the Constitution is approved or rejected by the people
(Sec. 3 R.A. 6735 “The Initiative and Referendum Act). Generally associated with the ratification process.
Plebiscite is required –
a. Section 4, Article XVII of the Constitution, with reference to the voting to determine whether the voters in the
country are in favor of or against the ratification of the Constitution or an amendment thereto and
b. Sec. 10, Art. X, in connection with the voting to determine whether the voters in the political units affected agree to
a proposed creation, division, merger, abolition or boundary change of a political unit.
Padilla Jr. v. Comelec 214 SCRA 735, the Comelec resolved to approve the conduct of the plebiscite in the area or units affected
for the proposed Municipality of Tulay-na-Lupa and the remaining areas of the mother Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte. Majority
of the electorates in the units affected rejected the creation of Tulay-na-Lupa.
Petitioner Gov. of Camarines Norte in a Special Civil Action for Certiorari, seek to set aside the Plebiscite asserting that it was a
complete failure and that the results obtained were invalid and illegal because the Plebiscite as mandated by Comelec Res. No. 2312
should have been conducted only in the political unit or units affected (which is the 12 barangays and should not have included the
mother unit of the Municipality of Labo.)
HELD: With the approval and ratification of the 1987 Constitution, more specifically, Art. X, Section 10, the creation, division, merger,
abolition or alteration of the boundaries of any political unit shall be subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
Plebiscite in the ‘POLITICAL UNITS AFFECTED” was held to mean that residents of the political entity who would be economically
dislocated by the separation of a portion thereof have a right to vote in the said Plebiscite or the plurality of political units which
would participate in the Plebiscite. The Court reiterated its ruling in Tan v. Comelec 142 SCRA 727 (1986), that “in the conduct
of a Plebiscite, it is imperative that all the constituents of the mother and daughter units affected shall be included.
Sanidad v. Comelec 181 SCRA 529, the Supreme Court declared as unconstitutional the restriction imposed by Comelec on media
relative to discussing on air and print the features of the plebiscite issues in the creation of the autonomous region for the Cordilleras
and held that plebiscite are matters of public concern and importance and the peoples’ right to be informed and to be able to freely
and intelligently make a decision would be best served by access to an unabridged discussion of the issues.
City of Pasig v. Comelec/Municipality of Cainta Province of Rizal, Sept. 10, 1999, the issue raised was the propriety of the
suspension of the plebiscite proceedings pending the decision of the boundary dispute between the Municipality of Cainta and the
City of Pasig. The City of Pasig passed an Ordinance creating barangays Karangalan and Napico. The Municipality of Cainta moved to
suspend or cancel the respective plebiscite due to the pending case before the RTC of Antipolo for the settlement of the boundary
dispute and that the said activities await the decision of the RTC on the matter.
That Comelec suspended the holding of the plebiscite for the creation of Brgy. Karangalan but rendered the creation of Napico
as moot as the same has already been ratified in the plebiscite held for the purpose. The SC held that the creation of Napico cannot be
considered as moot and it is most proper that the plebiscite be declared null and void in view of the pending boundary dispute between
Pasig and Cainta which presents a prejudicial question and must be decided first before the plebiscite for the proposed barangays be
conducted.
***(Boundary dispute is a prejudicial question that needs to be determined before the plebiscite can be conducted.)
Jurisdiction over controversies involving Plebiscite Issues - Ma. Salvacion Buac/Antonio Bautista v. Comelec/Alan
Peter Cayetano and some Intervenors, G.R. No. 155855, January 26, 2004, a petition for certiorari and mandamus was filed
by petitioners Buac and Bautista assailing the October 28, 2002 en banc resolution of the Comelec which held that it has no jurisdiction
over controversies involving the conduct of plebiscite and the annulment of its results.

The facts show that in April 1988, a plebiscite was held in Taguig for the ratification of the Taguig Cityhood Law (RA No.
8487) proposing the conversion of Taguig from a municipality into a city. Without completing the canvass of 64 other election returns,
the Plebiscite Board of Canvassers (PBOC) declared that the “NO” votes won and that the people rejected the conversion of Taguig to a
city. The PBOC was however ordered by the Comelec en banc to reconvene and complete the canvass which the board did and in due
time issued an Order proclaiming that the negative votes prevailed.
Petitioners filed with the Comelec a petition to annul the results of the plebiscite with a prayer for revision and recount of the ballots.
Cayetano intervened and moved to dismiss the petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Comelec. He claimed that a
plebiscite cannot be the subject of an election protest and that the jurisdiction to hear a complaint involving the conduct of a plebiscite
is lodged with the RTC.
Comelec 2nd division initially gave due course to the petition ruling that it has jurisdiction over the case. It treated the petition as akin
to an election protest considering that the same allegations of fraud and irregularities in the casting and counting of ballots and
preparation of returns are the same grounds for assailing the results of an election. It then ordered the Taguig ballot boxes to be
brought to its Manila Office and created revision committees to revise and recount the plebiscite ballots.
Intervenor Cayetano, in an unverified motion, moved for reconsideration of the Comelec Order insisting that it has no jurisdiction to
hear and decide a petition contesting the results of a plebiscite.
In a complete turnaround, the Comelec 2nd division issued an Order granting the Motion for Reconsideration. It dismissed the petition
to annul the results of the plebiscite and ruled that Comelec has no jurisdiction over said case as it involves an exercise of QJ powers
not contemplated under Section 2(2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.
On appeal, the Comelec en banc affirmed the ruling of its 2nd division. It held that the Comelec cannot use its power to enforce and
administer all laws relative to plebiscites as this power is purely administrative or executive and not QJ in nature. It concluded that the
jurisdiction over the petition to annul the Taguig plebiscite results is lodged with the RTC under Section 19(6) of BP 129 which provides
that the RTC shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court or body exercising
judicial or QJ functions. Hence, the petition before the SC.
The SC held that the key to the case is its nature, which involves the determination of whether the electorate of Taguig
voted in favor of or against the conversion of the municipality of Taguig. The invocation of judicial power to settle disputes
involving the conduct of a plebiscite is misplaced. Judicial power as defined under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution as the duty
of the court of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine
whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government.
This case assailing the regularity of the conduct of the Taguig plebiscite does not fit the kind of a case calling for the exercise of judicial
power. There is no plaintiff or defendant in the case for it merely involves the ascertainment of the vote of the electorate on whether
they approve or disapprove the conversion of their municipality into a highly urbanized city.
In referring to Article IX-C, Section 2(1), the SC said that the said provision is explicit that Comelec has power to “enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall. To enforce
means to cause to take effect or to cause the performance of such act or acts necessary to bring into actual effect or operation, a plan
or measure which entails all the necessary and incidental power for it to achieve the holding of honest, orderly, peaceful, free and
credible elections (HOPE FRECRE). The SC was surprised that for the first time, Comelec yielded its historic jurisdiction over a motion
for reconsideration which was even filed out of time, thus rendering it without jurisdiction to entertain the same.
***(COMELEC has jurisdiction over the plebiscite because only to determine which votes, in favor or against, won. It is
in the exercise of the administrative and executive powers of the COMELEC)
INITIATIVE – are lawmaking powers that belong to the people and have been described as the “people power” features of our
Constitution (Asked in the 2000 BAR). Initiative under RA 6735 is defined as the power of the people to propose amendments to the
Constitution or to propose and enact legislation through an election called for the purpose.
REFERENDUM – power of the electorate to approve or reject a piece of legislation through an election called for the purpose. (Sec. 2,
R.A. 6735). It is merely a YES or NO
Subic Bay and Metropolitan Authority v. COMELEC- wherein the SC made a statutory demarcation between initiative and referendum
and in so far as the power vested to COMELEC to guide the people in the conduct of plebiscite, initiative and referendum. The conduct
of plebiscite and initiative is more complicated than a referendum since it is merely saying “yes or no” on a propose measure which was
submitted by the legislator, whereas in plebiscite or initiative it is the people themselves crafting the law. So COMELEC needs to be
directly involved taking into consideration the constitutionality and making sure that the law is understandable and has complied with
the requirements as a law.
POLITICAL LAW; ELECTIONS; INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM; MAY BE EXERCISED BY THE PEOPLE TO PROPOSE AND
ENACT LAWS OR APPROVE OR REJECT ANY ACT OR LAW OR ANY PART THEREOF PASSED BY THE CONGRESS OR

LOCAL LEGISLATIVE BODY.- The Constitution clearly includes not only ordinances but resolution as appropriate subjects
of a local initiative. Section 32 of Article VI provides in luminous language: 'The Congress shall, as early as possible,
provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly
propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress, or local legislative
body x x x.' An act includes a resolution. Black defines an act as 'an expression of will or purpose x x x it may denote
something done x x x as a legislature, including not merely physical acts, but also decrees, edits, laws, judgments,
resolves, awards, and determinations xxx.' It is basic that a law should be construed in harmony with and not in violation
of the Constitution. In line with this postulate, we held in In Re Guarina that 'if there is doubt or uncertainty as to the
meaning of the legislative, if the words or provisions are obscure, or if the enactment is fairly susceptible of two or more
constructions, that interpretation will be adopted which will avoid the effect of unconstitutionality, even though it may be
necessary, for this purpose, to disregard the more usual or apparent import of the language used."'
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; DIFFERENTIATED.- There are statutory and conceptual demarcations between a referendum and an
initiative. In enacting the "Initiative and Referendum Act, Congress differentiated one term from the other. Along these
statutory definitions, Justice Isagani A. Cruz defines initiative as the "power of the people to propose bills and laws, and
to enact or reject them at the polls independent of the legislative assembly." On the other hand, he explains that
referendum "is the right reserved to the people to adopt or reject any act or measure which has been passed by a
legislative body and which in most cases would without action on the part of electors become a law." The foregoing
definitions, which are based on Black's and other leading American authorities, are echoed in the Local Government
Code (R.A. 7160). Prescinding from these definitions, we gather that initiative is resorted to (or initiated) by the people
directly either because the law-making body fails or refuses to enact the law, ordinance, resolution or act that they
desire or because they want to amend or modify one already existing. Under Sec. 13 of R.A. 6735, the local legislative
body is given the opportunity to enact the proposal. If it refuses/neglects to do so within thirty (30) days from its
presentation, the proponents through their duly-authorized and registered representatives may invoke their power of
initiative, giving notice thereof to the local legislative body concerned. Should the proponents be able to collect the
number of signed conformities within the period granted by said statute, the Commission on Elections "shall then set a
date for the initiative (not referendum) at which the proposition shall be submitted to the registered voters in the local
government unit concerned x x x." On the other hand, in a local referendum, the law-making body submits to the
registered voters of its territorial jurisdiction, for approval or rejection, any ordinance or resolution which is duly enacted
or approved by such law-making authority. Said referendum shall be conducted also under the control and direction of
the Commission on Elections. In other words, while initiative is entirely the work of the electorate, referendum is begun
and consented to by the law-making by the people themselves without process of law wishes of their elected
representatives, while referendum consists merely of the electorate approving or rejecting what has been drawn up or
enacted by a legislative body. Hence, the process and the voting in an initiative are understandably more complex than
in a referendum where expectedly the voters will simply write either "Yes" or "No" in the ballot.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; COMELEC EXERCISES ADMINISTRATION AND SUPERVISION CONDUCT THEREOF.- From the above
differentiation, it follows that there is need for the Comelec to supervise an initiative more closely, its authority thereon
extending not only to the counting and canvassing of votes but also to seeing to it that the matter or act submitted to
the people is in the proper form and language so it may be easily understood and voted upon by the electorate. This is
especially true were the proposed legislation is lengthy and complicated, and should thus be broken down into several
autonomous parts, each such part to be voted upon separately. Care must also be exercised that "(n)o petition
embracing more than one subject shall be submitted to the electorate," although "two or more propositions may be
submitted in an initiative." It should be noted that under Sec. 13 (c) of R.A. 6735, the "Secretary of Local Government or
his designated representative extend assistance in the formulation of the proposition." In initiative and referendum,
the Comelec exercises administration and supervision of the process itself, akin to its powers over the
conduct of elections. This law-making powers belong to the people, hence the respondent Commission cannot control
or change the substance or the content of legislation. In the exercise of its authority, it may (in fact it should have done
so already) issue relevant and adequate guidelines and rules for the orderly exercise of these "people-power" features of
our Constitution.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE COURT CANNOT PASS UPON A PROPOSED INITIATIVE UNTIL THE PEOPLE HAVE VOTED FOR IT AND IT
HAS BECOME AN APPROVED ORDINANCE OR RESOLUTION. Deliberating on this issue, the Court agrees with private
respondent Garcia that indeed, the municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage. It is not yet an approved
law. Should the people reject it, then there would be nothing to contest and to adjudicate. It is only when the people
have voted for it and it has become an approved ordinance or resolution that rights and obligations can be enforced or
implemented thereunder. At this point, it is merely a proposal and the writ of prohibition cannot issue upon a mere
conjecture or possibility. Constitutionally speaking, courts may decide only actual controversies, not hypothetical
questions or cases. We also note that the Initiative and Referendum Act itself provides that "(n)othing in this Act shall
prevent or preclude the proper courts from declaring null and void any proposition approved pursuant to this Act xxx."
So too, the Supreme Court is basically a review court. It passes upon errors of law (and sometimes of fact, as in the case
of mandatory appeals of capital offenses) of lower courts as well as determines whether there had been grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any "branch or instrumentality" of government. In
the present case, it is quite clear that the Court has authority to review Comelec Resolution No. 2848 to determine the
commission of grave abuse of discretion. However, it does not have the same authority in regard to the proposed
initiative since it has not been promulgated or approved, or passed upon by any "branch or instrumentality" or lower
court, for that matter. The Commission on Elections itself has made no reviewable pronouncement about the issues

brought by the pleadings. The Comelec simply included verbatim the proposal in its questioned Resolution No.
2848. Hence, there is really no decision or action made by a branch, instrumentality or court which this Court could take
cognizance of and acquire jurisdiction over, in the exercise of its review powers.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE COMELEC MY PASS UPON SUCH PROPOSAL INSOFAR AS TO ITS FORM AND LANGUAGE ARE
CONCERNED AND WHETHER THE SAME IS PATENTLY AND CLEARLY OUTSIDE THE CAPACITY OF THE LOCAL
LEGISLATIVE BODY TO ENACT.- Having said that, we are in no wise suggesting that the Comelec itself has no power to
pass upon proposed resolutions in an initiative. Quite the contrary, we are ruling that these matters are in fact within the
initiatory jurisdiction of the Commission - to which then the herein basic questions ought to have been addressed, and
by which the same should have been decided in the first instance. In other words, while regular courts may take
jurisdiction over "approved" propositions" per said Sec. 18 of R.A. 6735, the Comelec in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
and administrative powers may adjudicate and pass upon such proposals insofar as their form and language are
concerned, as discussed earlier; and it may be added, even as to content, where the proposals or parts thereof are
patently and clearly outside the "capacity of the local legislative body to enact." Accordingly, the question of whether the
subject of this initiative is within the capacity of the Municipal Council of Morong to enact may be ruled upon by the
Comelec upon remand and after hearing the parties thereon.
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution provides that “Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least 12% of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein”.
Section 32, Article VI of the Constitution provides that “Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and
referendum and the exceptions therefrom, where the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or
part thereof passed by Congress or local legislative body after the registration of a petition thereof signed by at least 10% of the total
number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least 3% of the registered voters thereof.”
***( this 10% applies to statutes or local or national laws)
RA 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 also provides for a “local initiative” defined as the “legal process whereby the
registered voters of a local government unit may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance. Sec. 126 thereof
provides for a “local referendum” defined as the “legal process whereby the RV of the local government units may approve, amend or
reject any ordinance enacted by the sanggunian.”
Classes of Initiative – 1) On the Constitution; 2) On Statutes; 3) On Local Legislation. Indirect Initiative is exercised by the people
through a proposition sent to Congress or the local legislative body for action.
Classes of Referendum – 1) On Statutes; 2) On Local Laws.
Santiago, et. al. v. Comelec, et. al., 270 SCRA 106 (336 SCRA 843), the controversy brought to the Supreme Court by way of a
petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is “the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through the system of Initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution”.
Atty. Jesus Delfin filed a petition with the Comelec to amend the constitution, specifically to lift the term limits of elective officials, by
people’s initiative. Atty. Delfin asked the Comelec for an order: (1) to fix the time and dates for signature gathering all over the
country (2) to cause the necessary publications of said Order and the said petition in newspapers of general and local circulation and
(3) instruct the municipal election registrars in all regions in the Philippines to assist petitioners and volunteers in establishing signing
station at the time and on the dates designated for the purpose.
The Comelec issued an Order granting the petition. Santiago filed this special civil action for prohibition raising among other grounds
that RA 6735 does not provide for people’s initiative to amend the constitution considering that the same is still pending with the
Senate of which she is the author. The petition of Atty. Delfin was not validly initiated as it failed to comply with the signature
requirement for initiating an initiative. The Comelec never acquired jurisdiction over the petition as jurisdiction is acquired
only after its filing – the petition being the initiatory pleading.
The SC gave due course to the Petition on the legal premise that the Constitution recognizes only two (2) methods of
proposing amendments to the Constitution, viz (1) by Congress upon a vote of ¾ of all its members and (2) by constitutional
convention.
The SC interpreted Sec. 2 of RA 6735 which provides that “ the power of the people under a system of initiative and
referendum to directly propose, enact, approved or reject, in whole or in part the Constitution, laws, ordinance or resolutions passed by
any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act, is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed.” It held that
the inclusion of the word “constitution” here is neither germane nor relevant to said action which exclusively relates to initiative and
referendum on national and local laws, ordinances and resolution. Therefore, the people are not accorded the power to “directly
propose, enact, approved or reject, in whole or in part the Constitution, through the system of initiative.

The SC further declared that Comelec cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right
of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative. The power of Comelec to issue rules
and regulations (QJ power) is limited only to what is provided under –
(a) Section 2 of Article IX-C of the Constitution and

(b) by a law where subordinate legislation is authorized and which satisfied the “completeness” and the “sufficient standard”
tests.
*** therefore, initiatory pleading palanag, there must be 12%- 3% requirement na
xxxUnder Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution and Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 6735, a petition for initiative on the
Constitution must be signed by at least 12% of the total number of registered voters of which every legislative district is
represented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein. The Delfin Petition does not contain signatures of the required
number of voters. Delfin himself admits that he has not yet gathered signatures and that the purpose of his petition is
primarily to obtain assistance in his drive to gather signatures. Without the required signatures, the petition cannot be
deemed validly initiated.
The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The petition then is the initiatory
pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc. The only participation of the COMELEC or its
personnel before the filing of such petition are (1) to prescribe the form of the petition; [63] (2) to issue through its Election
Records and Statistics Office a certificate on the total number of registered voters in each legislative district; [64] (3) to assist,
through its election registrars, in the establishment of signature stations; [65] and (4) to verify, through its election registrars,
the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters affidavits, and voters identification cards used in the
immediately preceding election.[66]
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot
be entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The latter knew that the petition does not fall under any of the
actions or proceedings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under Resolution No. 2300, for which reason it did not
assign to the petition a docket number. Hence, the said petition was merely entered as UND, meaning, undocketed. That
petition was nothing more than a mere scrap of paper, which should not have been dignified by the Order of 6 December
1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996, and the order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their memoranda or
oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and merely wasted
its time, energy, and resources.
Raul Lambino, et. al. vs. Comelec G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006 the issue on initiative to propose amendments to the
1987 Constitution was again at issue. FACTS: Raul Lambino of Sigaw ng Bayan and Erico Aumentado of the Union of Local Authorities
of the Philippines (ULAP) filed a petition for people’s initiative before the Commission on Elections on August 26, 2006, after months of
gathering signatures all over the country. Lambino claimed that the petition is backed by 6.3M registered voters.constituting at least
12% of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least 3% of the registered voters. They further claimed
that the provincial and city Comelec officials had already verified the 6.3M signatures
The Comelec denied the petition, reasoning that a lack of enabling law keeps them from entertaining such petitions. It invoked the
1997 Supreme Court ruling in Santiago vs. Comelec (336 SCRA 843), where it declared RA 6735 inadequate to implement the initiative
clause on proposals to amend the Constitution. The Comelec ruling prompted Lambino and Aumentado to bring their case before the
Supreme Court on the following issues -
(1) Whether the initiative petition of the Lambino group complied with the provisions of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
(2)Whether the Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago vs. Comelec declaring RA 6735 “incomplete and inadequate or wanting in
essential terms and conditions” to implement the initiative clause to amend the Constitution.
The Supreme Court upheld the Comelec’s ruling on the petition for people’s initiative on October 25, 2006 with a close 8-7 vote. As
ruled:
The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the basic requirement of the Constitution for the conductof people’s
initiative. The Constitution require that the amendment must be “directly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition.”
Lambino’s group failed to include the full text of the proposed changes in the signature sheets –a fatal omission,
according to the Supreme Court ruling, because it means a majority of the 6.3M people who signed the signature sheets could
not have known the nature and effect of the proposed changes. For the petition to be valid, two essential requisites must be
complied with, namely: (a) the people must author, and thus sign, the entire proposal; no agent or representative
can sign on their behalf; and (b) as an initiative upon a petition, the proposed amendments must be embodied
in the petition itself.
A people’s initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the Constitution and not to its revision. Only
Congress or a constitutional convention may propose revisions to the Constitution. A people’s initiative may propose only
amendments to the Constitution.
INITIATIVE – Amend lang the Constitution; Pag revision—dapat Constitutional Convention or Congress

The SC declared that “A popular clamor, even one backed by 6.3M signatures, cannot justify a deviation from the specific
modes prescribed in the Constitution itself.”
The rationale for the second requisite is that the signature requirement would be rendered meaningless if the person affixing his
signature has not first seen and understood what it is that he is signing. Further, and more importantly, loose interpretation of the
subscription requirement can pose a significant potential for fraud. On-compliance with the above mentioned requirement is fatal to
the initiative petition. For sure, the great majority of the 6.3M people who signed the signature sheets did not see the full text of the
proposed changes before signing, as the proposed amendments were not stated in the signature sheets. (The purpose of the full
text requirement is to provide sufficient information so that registered voters can intelligently evaluate whether to
sign the initiative petition.) They were not apprised of the nature and effect of the proposed amendments, among which are
substantial changes as follows:
1) the term limits on members of the legislature will be lifted and thus member of the Parliament may be re-elected
indefinitely;
2) The Interim Parliament whose membership comprised of present members of Congress can decide when to call the
parliamentary elections. Thus, leaving them the absolute discretion to determine their term limits.
3) That within 45 days from the ratification of proposed changes, the interim Parliament may further propose revision or
amendments to the Constitution.
Furthermore, a people’s initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment to the Constitution and not
revision. Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of proposing amendments to the Constitution: a) by direct
congressional action (3/4 votes of all its members), b) through a constitutional convention, and c) through a people’s
initiative.
The first and second modes, as provided in Section 1 of Article XVII, apply to both amendment and revision, but the 3 rd mode applies
only to amendments. The distinction between the first two modes and the third was intentional as shown by the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission.
There can be no dispute that a people’s initiative can only propose amendments to the Constitution since the Constitution itself limits
initiatives to amendments. There can be no deviation from the constitutionally prescribed modes of revising the Constitution. A
popular clamor, even one backed by 6.3M signatures, cannot justify a deviation from the specific modes prescribed in the Constitution
itself. The Lambino’s group proposed changes constituted not just an amendment but a revision, because of the change in the form of
government from Presidential to Parliamentary, and the shift from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN REVISION AND AMENDMENT. Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the
constitution, like altering the principle of separation of power or the system of checks and balances. There is also revision if the
change alters the substantial entirety of the Constitution. On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds,
reduces, deletes, without altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally affects several provisions of the constitution, while
amendment generally affects only the specific provision being amended.
Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces,
principle in the constitution, like altering the principle of deletes, without altering the basic principle involved.
separation of power or the system of checks and balances.
alters the substantial entirety of the Constitution
Revision generally affects several provisions of the while amendment generally affects only the specific provision
constitution, being amended.
The framers of the Constitution intended, and wrote, a clear distinction between “amendment” and “revision” of the
Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that only Congress or a constitutional convention may propose revisions to
the Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that a people’s initiative may propose only amendments to the
Constitution. Where the intent and language of the Constitution clearly withhold from the people the power to propose
revisions to the Constitution, the people cannot propose revisions even as they are empowered to propose amendments.
On the second pivotal issue of revisiting the ruling of the Court in Santiago vs. Comelec, the Court held that an affirmation or reversal
of the same will not change the outcome of the case. The Court must avoid revisiting a ruling involving the constitutionality of a
statute if the case before the Court can be resolved on some grounds.
In the resolution on the motion for reconsideration, the Court maintaining its 8-7 vote, denied with finality the motions for
reconsideration of its October 25, 2006 decision dismissing the said petition to amend the 1987 Constitution through a people’s
initiative. Ten justices however reiterated their earlier opinions that RA 6735 is sufficient and adequate as an enabling law to amend
the Constitution through a people’s initiative, effectively abandoning Santiago v. Comelec.
(LIMITED ONLY TO REVISION PA RIN, not amendment. Si lambino group amendment ilang gusto. Term limit. Member of parliament
re-elected indefinitely. When to call elections. Interim parliament mag propose na amendment or revision sa Constitution.)

Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority v. Comelec 252 SCRA 492 (1996), an action for certiorari and prohibition was brought to the
SC seeking to nullify the ruling of the Comelec and Resolution No. 2848 denying petitioner’s plea to stop the holding of a local initiative
and referendum on the proposition to recall Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 of the SB of Morong Bataan.
In this case, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan on April 1993, passed Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993,
expressing therein its absolute concurrence to join the Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) as required by Sec. 12 of RA 7227 (Bases
Conversion and Development Act of 1992). On September 5, 1993, the SB submitted the Kapasyahan to the Office of the President.
On May 24, 1993, respondent Garcia, et. al. filed a petition with the SB of Morong to annul PK Blg. 10, Serye 1993 and therein
proposed for amendments to the said law. The SB acted upon the petition and promulgated PK Blg. 18, requesting Congress to amend
certain provisions of RA 7227 and informed respondents that the other matters in the proposed amendments were already submitted
to the Office of the President.
Not satisfied and within 30 days from submission of their petition, respondent resorted to their power of initiative under the LGC of
1991. On June 18, 1996 Comelec issued Resolution No. 2845 adopting a calendar of activities for local referendum to annul or repeal
Kapasyahan Bldg. 10.
Petitioner SBMA seeks to nullify the Order of Comelec denying petitioner’s plea to stop the holding of a local initiative and referendum
on the proposition to recall the Kapasyahan as it was proceeding with a local initiative that proposes an amendment of a national law.
ISSUE:
whether Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating and implementing its Res. No. 2842 which
govern the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or repeal PK Blg. 10 and
whether the questioned local initiative covers a subject within the powers of the people of Morong to enact
(whether such initiative seeks the amendment of a national law.
In this case, the SC was compelled to distinguish Initiative from Referendum. To begin with, the process started by Garcia et. al., was
an Initiative but respondent Comelec made preparations for a referendum. In the body of the Comelec Resolution No. 2842, the
word“referendum” is repeated at least 27 times, but initiative is not mentioned at all. The Comelec labeled the exercise as a
referendum, the counting of votes was entrusted to a referendum committee, the documents were called referendum returns and so
forth. As distinguished, initiative is a process of law making by the people themselves without the participation and against the wishes
of their elected representatives while referendum consists merely with the electorate approving or rejecting what has been drawn up or
enacted by the legislative body by simply indicating yes or no in the ballot.
In initiative, there is a need for the Comelec to supervise the process closely, it’s authority therein extending not only
to the counting and canvassing of votes but also to seeing to it that the matter or act submitted to the people is in the
proper form and language so it may be easily understood and voted upon by the electorate. Care in this activity must
be exercise that “no petition embracing more than one subject shall be submitted to the electorate, although two or
more propositions may be submitted in an initiative. “
As to the second issue, SBMA insists that the creation of the SSEZ is now a fait accompli for the benefit of the entire nation and Morong
cannot unilaterally withdraw its concurrence or impose new conditions for such concurrence as this would effectively render nugatory
the creation of the SSEZ. The SC agreed with the contention of Garcia that the position of SBMA is premature and conjectural because
at this point the resolution is just a proposal. If the people should reject it during the referendum, then there is nothing to declare as
illegal. A writ of prohibition cannot issue upon a mere conjecture or possibility as courts may decide only actual controversies and not
hypothetical questions or cases.
3) RECALL – is the termination of official relationship of a local elective public official for loss of confidence by the people
prior to the end of his term of office (Sec. 69, R.A. 7160 LGC). In Angobung v. Comelec 269 SCRA 246 (1997), the Supreme
Court ruled that recall is the mode of removal of a public officer by the people before the end of his term of office which shall be
exercised by the registered voters of a local government unit to which the local elective official subject of such recall belongs.
The mode of initiating recall against a public elective official is now limited to a petition commenced only by the registered voters in the
local unit concerned. Section 70 and 71 of RA 7160 is now amended by RA 9244, otherwise known as An Act Eliminating
the Preparatory Recall Assembly as a Mode of Instituting Recall of Elective Local Government Officials.
Section 70 of RA 7160 now reads as follows: “The recall of any elective provincial, city, municipal or barangay official shall be
commenced by a petition of a registered voter in the LGU concerned and supported by the registered voters in the LGU
concerned during the election in which the local official sought to be recalled was elected subject to the following
percentage requirements:
At least 25% in the case of an LGU with a voting population of not more than 20,000
At least 20% in the case of LGUs with a voting population of at least 20,000 but not more than 75,000: Provided, that in no
case shall the required petitioners be less than 5,000.
At least 15% in the case of local government units with a voting population of at least 75,000 but not more than 300,000:
Provided however, that in no case shall the required number of petitioners be less than 15,000; and
At least 10% in the case of local government units with a voting population of over 300,000 thousand: Provided however, that
in no case shall the required petitioners be less than 45,000.

At least 25% 20,000 below
At least 20% 20,000-75,000 at least 5,000
At least 15% 75,000-300,000 at least
15,000
At least 10% Over 300,000 at least
45,000
DATE OF RECALL – Upon the filing of a valid petition for recall with the appropriate local office of the Comelec, the Comelec or its
duly authorized representative shall set the date of the election or recall, which shall not be later than 30 days upon the completion of
the procedure outlined in the preceding article, in the case of the barangay, city or municipal officials, and 45 days in the case of
provincial officials.
The official sought to be recalled shall automatically be considered as duly registered candidate or candidates to the
pertinent positions and like other candidates, shall be entitled to be voted upon.” (Sec. 71)
EFFECTIVITY OF RECALL – recall shall become effective only upon the election and proclamation of a successor in the person
of the candidate who received the highest number of votes cast during the election in recall. Should the official sought to be recalled
receive the highest number of votes, confidence in him is thereby affirmed and he shall continue in office. (Sec. 72).
LIMITATIONS ON RECALL – an elective official may be subject of recall elections only ONCE during his term of office exclusively on
the ground of LACK OF CONFIDENCE. The recall cannot be undertaken within one (1) year from the date of the official’s
assumption of office or within one (1) immediately preceding a regular election. (Sec. 74)
In Paras v. Comelec 264 SCRA 49, Paras, incumbent punong brgy sought to bar the recall proceedings against him citing Sec. 74
(B) of RA 7160 that it was barred by the scheduled SK elections. The SC settled the issue and held that the SK elections is not
considered a “regular local elections” for purposes of recall under Sec. 74. The term regular local elections is construed as one
referring to an election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and be
filled up by the electorate. It is confined to the regular elections of elective national and local officials.
REGISTRATION OF VOTERS
Article V Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines NOT otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least 18
years of age who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one (1) year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at
least six (6) months in the immediately preceding the elections. No literacy, property or other substantive requirements shall be
imposed on the exercise of suffrage.
Section 2. The Congress shall provide for a system of securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system of absentee
voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.
The Congress shall also design a procedure for the disabled and illiterates to vote without the assistance of other persons.
Until then, they shall be allowed to vote under existing laws and such rules as the Commission on Elections may promulgate to protect
the secrecy of the ballot.
WHO MAY REGISTER (RA 8189, (An Act Providing for the General Registration of Voters providing for a System of
Continuing Registration which took effect on June 11, 1996)
Registration of voters is a means of determining who possess the qualifications as a voter and regulating the exercise of the right of
suffrage.
Registration does not confer the right to vote; it is but a condition precedent to the exercise of the right.
How is Registration done – Registration refers to the ACT of accomplishing and filing of a sworn application for
registration (Voters Registration Record VRR) by a qualified voter before the election officer of the city or municipality wherein
he resides and including the VRR in the book of RV upon approval by the Election Registration Board (Sec. 3(a)).
REGISTRATION IS EXTENDED TO: DOMESTIC AND OVERSEAS VOTERS
FOR DOMESTIC VOTERS – GOVERNED BY RA 8189 The Voters Registration Act
(Sec. 9 (repealed Sections 116 and 117 of the OEC). Sec. 9 clarified when the residency and age requirements should be attained) –
Salient amendments:
(first salient feature) Section 9 – Who may Register – All citizens of the Philippines NOT otherwise disqualified by law who
are at least 18 years of age, who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one (1) year, and in the place wherein
they propose to vote, for at least six (6) months immediately preceding the elections.

Any person who temporarily resides in another city, municipality or country solely by reason of his occupation, profession,
employment in private or public service, educational activities, work in the military or naval reservations, within the Philippines, service
in the AFP, or confinement or detention in government institution in accordance with law, shall NOT be deemed to have lost his
original residence.
Any person who, on the day of registration may not have reached the required age or period of residence but, who on
the day of election shall possess such qualifications, may register as a voter.”
Meynard Sabili v. Comelec/Florencio Librea 670 SCRA 670 (2012) – The Court have held that “absence from residence to
pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than the place where one is elected, does not constitute loss of
residence”. Section 117 of the OEC provides that “transfer of residence to any other place by reason of one’s occupation, profession
employment in private and public service, educational activities work force, the constabulary or national police force, or confinement or
detention in government institutions in accordance with law” is not deemed as loss of residence.
The Court ruled that there is nothing wrong in an individual changing residences so he could run for an elective post, for as long as he
is able to prove with reasonable certainty that he has effected a change of residence for election law purposes for the period required
by law.
(second salient feature) ILLITERATE AND DISABLED VOTERS – Illiterates or disabled are referred to as a persons who cannot
by themselves prepare an application for registration because of their physical disability and/or inability to read and write. (Section 3
(e))
Section 14.Procedure for illiterate applicants (those who cannot read and write) – assisted by the election officer or any
member of an accredited citizens arm. (way apil relatives dire!) The election officer shall place such illiterate person under oath,
ask him the questions and record the answers given in order to accomplish the application form in the presence of the majority of the
members of the Board. The accomplished form shall be subscribed by the applicant in the presence of the Board by means of
thumbmark or some other customary mark and it shall be subscribed and attested by the majority of the members of the Board.
Procedure for disabled voters – the application for registration of a physically disabled person (ex. blind, no hands,
senior citizen, mute) may be prepared by any relative within the 4 th civil degree of consanguinity or affinity or by the
election officer or any member of an accredited citizen’s arm using the data supplied by the applicant.
NOTE: Common to both procedures, the fact of illiteracy and disability shall be so indicated in the application.
RA 10366 now provides accessible Polling Places for Persons with Disabilities (PWDS and Senior Citizens and also provides for, among
others, assistance in the accomplishment of registration forms. The law was in line with the objective of Sec. 29 of the “Magna Carta
for Persons with Disability” (RA No. 7277) which provides that “polling places should be made accessible to disabled persons during
national and local elections.”
The Comelec shall likewise keep an updated record of PWDs and SC registered voters, indicating the types of disability and
the assistance they need. (Sec. 6, RA 10366). In designing the ballot, Comelec shall ensure reasonable accommodation to PWDs and
SC to enable them to accomplish the ballots by themselves (Sec. 10)
Comelec, in coordination with the National Council on Disability Affairs (NCDA), the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), and
PWD and Senior Citizens organization shall organize, design, and implement sensitivity training programs for person performing
electoral duties to familiarize them of the needs of the PWDs and SC. (Sec. 12)
Sec. 11 – Disqualifications: (Section 11 of R.A. 8189 repealed Sec. 118 of the OEC)
Any person who has been sentenced by final judgment to suffer imprisonment for not less than one (1) year.
Any person who has been adjudged by final judgment by competent court or tribunal of having committed any crime
involving disloyalty to the duly constituted government such as rebellion, sedition, violation of the anti-subversion and
firearms law, or any crime against national security in accordance with law.
Insane or incompetent as declared by a competent authority.
WHEN DISABILITY REMOVED –
Plenary pardon or amnesty – those sentenced by final judgment. Article IX-C, Section 5 provides that the President
cannot, without the favorable recommendation of the Comelec grant pardon, amnesty, parole or suspension of
sentence in cases involving violation of election laws and violation of election rules and regulations.
Expiration of five (5) years after service of sentence
Official declaration by the proper authority that the insanity or incompetency no longer exist.
Double Registrants – In all cases where registrants are found to be registered in two (2) or more
districts/cities/municipalities, the latest registration shall prevail which is deemed to be more in consonance with the intent
of the concerned registered votes. Accordingly, they shall be allowed to vote only in the district/city/municipality of their latest
registration.

This is distinguished from the policy on double/multiple registrants found within the same district/city/municipality where
original registration shall prevail over subsequent registrations. (Comelec Res. 7893, 07 May 2007. See also Sec. 261 (y(5)) of the
OEC (Prohibited Acts) which provides “Any person who, being a registered voter, registers anew without filing an application for
cancellation of his previous registration” shall be guilty of an election offense).
-registered ka kaduha within the same district ex. District 1 registered ka sa Matina ug Sa Maa
RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT:
Romeo A. Jalosjos v. Comelec Dan Erasmo, Sr. 670 SCRA 572 (2012)
Residence – The Local Government Code requires a candidate seeking the position of provincial governor to be a resident of the
province for at least (1) year before the election. For purposes of the election laws, the requirement of residence is
synonymous with domicile, meaning that a person must not only intend to reside in a particular place but must also
have personal presence in such place coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. There is no hard and fast rule to determine
a candidate’s compliance with residency requirement since the question of residence is a question of intention. Still, jurisprudence had
laid down the following guidelines:
(a) every person has a domicile or residence somewhere;
(b) where once established, that domicile remains until he acquires a new one; and
(c) a person can have but one domicile at a time.
The Comelec concluded that Jalosjos has not come to settle his domicile in Ipil since he has merely been staying at his brother’s house.
But this circumstance alone cannot support such conclusion. Indeed, the Court has repeatedly held that a candidate is not required
to have a house in a community to establish his residence or domicile in a particular place. It is sufficient that he should
live there even if it be in a rented house or in the house of a friend or relative. To insist that the candidate own the house where he
lives would make property a qualification for public office. What matters is that Jalosjos has proved two things: actual physical
presence in Ipil and an intention of making it his domicile.
Mitra vs. Commission on Elections, Antonio Gonzales and Orlando Balbon, Jr. 622 SCRA 744 (July 2010). In this case,
following the conversion of Puerto Princesa (Mitra’s domicile of origin) from a component city to a highly urbanized city whose residents
can no longer vote for provincial officials, Mitra abandoned his domicile in Puerto Princesa and acquired a new one in Aborlan which is
within the LGU where he intended to run. Mitra bought the old Maligaya Feedmill and used the second floor as his residence.
In considering the residency issue, the dwelling where a person permanently intends to return to and to remain – his or her
capacity or inclination to decorate the place, or the lack of it, IS IMMATERIAL. Comelec gravely abused its discretion when it
determined the fitness of a dwellingas a person’s residence based solely on very personal and subjective assessment
standards when the law is replete with standards that can be used. Comelec used wrong considerations in arriving at the
conclusion that Mitra’s residence is not the residence contemplated by law.
Assitio vs. Aguirre 619 SCRA 518 –Residence as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, is
DOCTRINALLY SETTLED to mean ‘domicile”, importing not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that
place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention inferable from a person’s acts, utterances and activities. Domicile is not easily
lost. To successfully effect a transfer, one must demonstrate: (1) an actual removal or change of domicile; (2) bonafide
intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and (3) acts which correspond to
said purpose. Same ruling in earlier case of Romualdez-Marcos v. Comelec, 248 SCRA 300.Requisites when new domicile is acquired
by choice.
HOW TO REGISTER
(third salient feature) Section 8 – System of Continuing Registration of Voters/Creation of Election Registration Boards
A qualified voter personally files an application for registration DAILY with the office of the election officer during regular office
hours. The ERB are authorized to act on all applications for registration .
LIMITATION: No registration shall be conducted during the period starting 120 days before a regular elections and 90 days before a
special elections.
(4th salient feature) Sec. 15 – Election Registration Board – There shall be in each city and municipality as many as ERB’s as
there are election officers therein.
Composition – Election Officer (EO) as chairman and as members, the public school official most senior in rank and the local civil
registrar (LCR), or in his absence, the city or municipal treasurer (MT).
In case of disqualification of the EO, the Commission shall designate as acting EO who shall serve as chairman of the ERB. In
cases of the non-availability of the LCR or the MT, Comelec shall designate any other appointive civil service official from the same
locality as substitute.
Restrictions to appointment – No member of the board shall be related to each other or to any incumbent city or municipal elective
official within the 4th civil degree of consanguinity or affinity. If in succeeding elections, any of the newly elected city or municipal

officials is related to a member of the board within the same degree, such member is automatically disqualified to preserve the
integrity of the ERB.
Every registered party and such organizations as may be authorized by the Comelec shall be entitled to a watcher in every
registration board.
Sec. 17 – Procedure for hearing of applications.

Date of hearing posted in the city or municipal bulletin board and EO office at least 1 week before date of hearing
If objected to, EO shall receive evidence. Physical presence of applicant in this case is mandatory to rebut
evidence presented in opposition thereto
If no objection to application, physical appearance not required and will be duly informed in writing
Applications for registration shall be heard and processed on a quarterly basis. Board shall convene on the 3rd day of Monday
of April, July, October and January of every calendar year except in an election year to conform with the 120 days prohibitive
period before election day.
Section. 21 – Publication of Action on Application for Registration

(5th salient feature) SECTION 12.Change of Residence to another City or Municipality – Any registered voter who has
transferred residence to another city or municipality may apply with the EO of his new residence for the transfer of his registration
records. The application for transfer of registration shall be subject to the requirements of notice and hearing and the approval of the
ERB in accordance with this Act. Upon approval of the application for transfer, and after notice of such approval to the EO of the
former residence of the voter, said EO shall transmit by registered mail the voter’s registration record to the EO of the voter’s new
residence.
Section 13.Change of Address in the Same City or Municipality –Any voter who has changed his address in the same city or
municipality shall immediately notify the EO in writing. If the change of address involves a change in precinct, the Board shall transfer
his registration record to the precinct book of voters of his new precinct and notify the voter of his new precinct. All changes of
address shall be reported to the office of the provincial election supervisor and the Commission in Manila.
Sec. 27 – DEACTIVATION – is a process wherein the registration record of a voter is removed by the ERB from the
corresponding precinct book of voters and places the same in an inactive file properly marked and dated in indelible ink and
after entering the cause for deactivation which are as follows:
Those who are disqualified by virtue of a final judgment, insane and incompetent persons as officially declared.
Any person who failed to vote in the two (2) successive preceding regular elections as shown by his voting records.
Any person whose registration has been ordered excluded by the court.
Any person who has lost his Filipino citizenship.
For purposes of the above – the Clerks of Court of the MTC, MTCC, RTC and SB shall furnish the EO of the city or municipality
concerned at the end of each month a certified list of persons who are disqualified by virtue of a final judgment, with their addresses.
For those who lost their citizenship, insanity and incompetency, the Comelec may request a certified list of such persons from the
government agencies concerned.
(another salient feature)Sec. 28 – REACTIVATION – is a process whereby a voter whose registration records has been
deactivated files with the election officer a sworn application for reactivation of his registration in the form of an affidavit by
stating therein that the grounds for the deactivation no longer exist.
PERIOD TO FILE – Any time but not later than 120 days before a regular election and 90 days before a special election. Upon
approval, the Board, shall retrieve the registration records from the inactive file and include the same in the corresponding precinct
book of voters.
REQUIREMENT: Local heads or representatives of political parties shall be properly notified of the approved applications.
Sec.29 – CANCELLATION – is a process wherein the Board cancels the registration records of those who have died as certified by
the local civil registrar who shall submit each month a certified list of persons who died during the previous month to the election
officer of the place where the deceased is registered.
PETITION FOR INCLUSION OR EXCLUSION. Remedies of persons whose application for reactivation, inclusion or correction has
been disapproved or those who intend to exclude a voter from the list of voters.
Panlaqui v. Comelec 613 SCRA 573 –Voters’ inclusion/exclusion proceedings essentially involve the issue of whether a voter shall
be included in or excluded from the list of voters based on the qualifications required by law and the facts presented to show
possession of these qualifications. As distinguished from the procedure in certificate of candidacies (petition to deny due course or
cancel a certificate of candidacy) on the other hand, the denial/cancellation proceedings involve the issue of whether there is a false
representation of a material fact (Sec. 78).
Sec. 33 JURISDICTION – The Municipal and Metropolitan Trial Courts shall have original jurisdiction over all cases of inclusion and
exclusion of voters in their respective cities or municipalities.(By express provision of Article IX-C, Section 2 (3) of the
Constitution, the Comelec shall decide all questions affecting elections, except the right to vote. This question is a justiciable issue
which finds redress in the judiciary.(Pungutan v. Comelec 43 SCRA 1 (1972).

Again – in Panlaqui vs. Comelec 613 SCRA 573 - It is not within the province of the RTC in a voter’s inclusion/exclusion
proceedings to take cognizance of and determine the presence of a false representation of a material fact. It has no
jurisdiction to try the issues of whether the misrepresentation relates to material fact and whether there was an intension to deceive
the electorate in terms of one’s qualifications for public office. The finding that Velasco was not qualified to vote due to lack of
residency requirement does not translate into a finding of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform or hide a fact
which would otherwise render him ineligible.
Canicosa v. Comelec 282 SCRA 512 (1997). The question of inclusion or exclusion from the list of voters involves the right to vote
which is not within the power and authority of the Comelec to rule upon. The determination of whether one has the right to vote is a
justiciable issue properly cognizable by our regular courts.
WHERE TO APPEAL – Decisions of the Municipal or Metropolitan Trial Courts may be appealed by the aggrieved party to the Regional
Trial Court within five (5) from receipt of notice thereof. Otherwise, said decision shall become final and executory. Regional Trial
Court shall decide the appeal within ten (10) days from the time it is received and the Regional Trial Court decision shall immediately
become final and executory. No motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.
Domino v. Comelec 310 546 (1999). Except for the right to remain in the list of voters or for being excluded thereform for the
particular election in relation to which the proceedings had been held, a decision in an exclusion proceeding, even if final and
unappealable does not acquire the nature of res judicata. Thus, a decision in an exclusion proceeding would neither be
conclusive on the voter’s political status, nor bar subsequent proceedings on his right to be registered as a voter in any
other election.
Sec. 34 – Petition for Inclusion of Voters in the list – WHO MAY FILE: any person whose application for registration –
Has been disapproved by the Board; or

Whose name has been stricken out from the list;
Whose name was not included in the precinct list of voters
Who has been included therein with a wrong or misspelled name (after the Board disapproves its application for reinstatement
or correction of name) may file with the court.
PERIOD TO FILE: Any time except 105 days prior to a regular election or 75 days prior to a special election. The petition should be
supported by a certificate of disapproval of his application and proof of service of notice upon the Board. MTC shall decide
within fifteen (15) days after its filing.
If the decision is for the inclusion of voters in the permanent list of voters, the Board shall place the application for registration
previously disapproved in the corresponding BV and indicate in the application for registration the date of the order of inclusion and the
court which issued the same.
Section 35 – Petition for Exclusion of Voters from the list – WHO MAY FILE: any registered voter, representative of a political
party or the Election Officer.
PERIOD TO FILE: Any time except 100 days prior to a regular election or 65 days prior to a special election. Supporting
documents shall be proof of notice to the Board and to the challenged voter. MTC shall decide within ten (10) days.
If the decision is for exclusion, the Board, shall remove the voters registration record from the corresponding BV, enter the
order of exclusion therein.
Akbayan v. Comelec March 26, 2001 – The petition for exclusion is a necessary component to registration since it is a safety
mechanism that gives a measure of protection against flying voters, non-qualified registrants, and the like. The prohibitive period, on
the other hand, serves as the purpose of securing the voters substantive right to be included in the list of voters.
The bone of contention of petitioners in this case in praying for a 2-day special registration of new voters for the May 14, 2001
elections which was denied by the Comelec on account of operational impossibility, undermined their constitutional right to vote and
caused the disenfranchisement of around 4M Filipinos of voting age who failed to register before the registration deadline set by the
Comelec.
As ruled, the right of suffrage is not absolute, as in the enjoyment of all other rights, it is subject to existing substantive and
procedural requirements embodied in our Constitution, statute and other repositories of law.
Procedural limitation – must undergo the process of registration, in addition to the maximum requirements set by the Constitution
under Section 1, Article V, the act of registration being an indispensable precondition and essential to the right of suffrage and election
process. Referring to Section 8 of RA 8189, the law is explicit that “no registration shall however be conducted during
the period starting 120 days before a regular election and 90 days before a special election.”

Sec. 35 of RA 8189 on the hand speaks of the prohibitive period within which to file a sworn petition for the exclusion of voters from
the permanent list of voters. Thus if the special registration of voters will be conducted, then the prohibitive period for filing petitions
for exclusion must likewise be adjusted to a later date, if not, then no one can challenge the voters list which is violative of the
principles of due process and would open the registration process to abuse and seriously compromise the integrity of the voter’s list
and that of the entire election.
ABSENTEE VOTING
Local Absentee Voting – In local absentee voting, public officials and employees, in the performance of their election duties,
stationed in places other than the place where they are registered voters of (e.g. members of the PNP, AFP, offices of the Comelec,
school teachers, among others) are allowed to vote in their respective place of work (Sec. 12, RA 7166).
RA No.10380, otherwise known as the “Local Absentee Voting for Media Act”, now allow media practitioners to vote on specified
days earlier than Election Day so that that even if on Election Day, they are assigned to cover election events away from their place of
registration as voters, they would nonetheless have the opportunity to cast their votes.
Limitation: Those entitled to avail of local absentee voting shall only be allowed to vote for President, VP, Senators, and Party-List
Representative
Grounds for disapproval of the Application for Local Absentee Voting

1) The applicant is not a RV or his registration records have been deactivated.
2) It was filed out of time;
3) It was not sworn to or otherwise not under oath by any person authorized to administer oath;
4) It was only photocopied/faxed;
5) The Certification portion of the application form is not duly accomplished.
OVERSEAS ABSENTEE VOTING (OAV) – RA 9189 Absentee Voters Act of 2003
Under RA 9189, Filipino citizens who are overseas workers, immigrants or permanent residents in other countries may vote in Philippine
national elections when they are away from the country on the day of the elections; Provided, That in the case of immigrants or
permanent residents, they file a sworn statement that they will resume actual physical permanent residence within three (3)
years from approval of their registration. (Sec. 5(d))
A. Scope of OAV – Definition: Absentee voting refers to the process by which qualified citizens of the Philippines abroad
exercise their right to vote. (Sec. 3(a))
B. Coverage – All citizens of the Philippines abroad who are not disqualified by law, at least 18 years of age on election day,
may vote for President, VP, Senators and Party List Representatives (Sec. 4)
Section 5 – Disqualification:
(a) Those who have lost their Filipino citizenship in accordance with Philippine laws;
(b) Those who have expressly renounced their Philippine citizenship and who have pledged allegiance to a foreign
country;
(c) Those who have committed and are convicted by a final judgment by a court or tribunal of an offense punishable by
imprisonment of not less than one (1) year, including those who have committed and been found guilty of
Disloyalty as defined under Article 137 of the Revised Penal Code, such as disability not having removed by
plenary pardon or amnesty; Provided, however, That any person disqualified to vote upon the expiration of five (5)
years after service of sentence; Provided further, That the Commission may take cognizance of final judgments issued
by foreign courts or tribunals only on the basis of reciprocity and subject to the formalities and processes prescribed by
the Rules of Court on execution of judgments;
(d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country, unless he/she executes, upon
registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical
permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three (3) years from approval of his/her registration under this Act.
a. Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country.
b. Failure to return shall be cause for the removal of the name of the immigrant or permanent resident from the
National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia;
(e) Any citizen of the Philippines abroad previously declared insane or incompetent by competent authority in the
Philippines or abroad, as verified by the Philippine embassies, consulates or foreign service establishments concerned,
unless such competent authority subsequently certifies that such person is no longer insane or incompetent.
Macalintal v. Comelec 405 SCRA 614 (2003) – The execution of the affidavit itself is not the enabling or enfranchising act. The
affidavit required in Section 5(d) is not only proof of the intention of the immigrant or permanent resident to go back and resume
residency in the Philippines, but more significantly, it serves as an explicit expression that he had not in fact abandoned his domicile of
origin. The affidavit is required of immigrants and permanent residents abroad because by their status in the host
countries, they are presumed to have relinquished their intent to return to this country; thus, without the affidavit, the
presumption of abandonment of Philippine domicile shall remain.

3. Casting of Ballots in OAV – The overseas voter shall cast his ballot within 30 days before election day or 60 days before
election day in the case of seafarers. (Sec. 16.3)
4. Counting of Ballots of OAV – a) Only ballots cast and mailed ballots received by embassies, consulates and other
foreign establishments before the closing of voting on election day shall be counted (Sec. 16.7 and Sec. 18.3).
b) The counting shall be conducted on site and shall be synchronized with the start of counting in the Philippines (Sec. 18.1).
c. The Special Board of Election Inspectors (SBEI) shall composed of a chairman and two (2) members
The ambassador, consul general or career public officer designated by the Comelec shall be the chairman.
In the absence of government officers, two Filipino citizens qualified to vote under this Act shall be
deputized as members (Sec. 18.3)
Immediately after the counting, the SBEI shall transmit by facsimile or electronic mail the result to the
Comelec and the accredited major political parties.
5. Canvassing of OAV – A Special Board of Canvassers (SBOC) composed of a lawyer preferably of the Comelec as
chairman, a senior career officers from any government agency maintaining a post abroad and, in the absence of another
government officer, a citizen of the Philippines qualified to vote under this Act, shall be constituted to canvass the election
returns.
The SBOC shall transmit by facsimile, electronic mail or any other safe and reliable means of transmission, the
certificate of canvass and the statements of votes to the Comelec and the major accredited parties.
The certificates of canvass and the statements of votes shall be the primary basis for the national canvass. (Sec.
18.4)
Overseas Voting Act of 2013– The President on May 27, 2013 signed into law RA 10590, OAV 2013, amending the Overseas
Voting Act of 2003. With the passage of the law, Filipino immigrants abroad will no longer need to execute an affidavit
stating that they will return to the Philippines within 3 years before they are allowed in absentia.
In the landmark case of Nicolas-Lewis vs. Comelec, dual citizens were refused by Comelec to register and vote in the 2004
Philippine elections, the Supreme Court ruled in 2006 that “there is no provision in the dual citizenship law, RA 9225
(Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003 – requiring duals to actually establish residence and physically stay in
the Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote.”
The ruling established a precedent that dual citizens can register and vote without establishing residence in the
Philippines. A provision in the amended law is inserted to emphasize that dual citizens who reacquired or retained their Philippine
citizenship under RA 9225 can exercise their right of suffrage.
The amended law also mandates the creation of the Resident Election Registration Boards (RERB). The specific provision is a new
insertion institutionalizing the overseas voting system by creating an office within the Comelec exclusively for overseas voting.
The amendments also empowers the Comelec to attain the most effective and innovative way of using advance technology in
enfranchising Filipinos overseas without compromising the secrecy and sanctity of the electoral process.
Loida Nicolas-Lewis, et. al. vs. Comelec G.R. No. 162759, August 6, 2006. - Petitioners are dual citizens having retained or
reacquired Philippine Citizenship under RA 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003. As such, they
sought registration and certification as overseas absentee voters under RA 9189 or the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003,
in order to vote in the May 2004 elections. However, the Philippine embassy in the US advised them that per Comelec letter dated
September 23, 2003, they have yet no residence requirement as prescribed by the Constitution. Petitioners sought a clarification from
the Comelec which thereafter, expressed the opinion that dual citizens under RA 9225 cannot exercise the right of
suffrage under the Overseas Absentee Voting Law because said law was not enacted for them, hence, they are
considered regular voters who have to meet requirements of residency, among others.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners and others who might have meanwhile retained and/or reacquired Philippine citizenship pursuant to
RA 9225 may vote as absentee voter under RA 9189.
HELD: Section 1 of Article V of the Philippine Constitution prescribed residency requirement as a general eligibility factor for
the right to vote. On the other hand, Section 2 thereof, authorizes congress to devise a system wherein an absentee may vote,
implying that a non-resident may, as an exception to the residency prescription in the preceding section, be allowed to vote.
There is no provision in the dual citizenship law (RA 9225), requiring “duals” to actually establish residence and physically stay in the
Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote. On the contrary, RA 9225, in implicit acknowledgement that “duals” are
most likely non-residents, grants under Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as granted to an absentee voter under RA 9189
which aims to enfranchise as much as possible all overseas Filipinos, who, save for the residency requirement exacted of an ordinary
conditions, are qualified to vote as ruled in Makalintal vs. Comelec 405 SCRA 614.

POLITICAL PARTIES, PARTY LIST AND CITIZENS ARM
Article IX-C, Sec. 1 (5), authorizes the Comelec under the Constitution to “Register, after sufficient publication,
political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must present their platform or
program of government; and accredit citizens’ arms of the Commission on Elections.
Section 60 of the OEC/Section 1, Rule 32 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure provides that any group pursuing the same
political ideals may register with the Comelec. HOW? by filing a verified petition with its Law Department duly verified by its President
and Secretary-General, or any official duly authorized to do so under its Constitutions and by-laws.
Before Comelec takes action, the Comelec shall first verify, through its field offices, the status and capacity of the petitioner and
the veracity of the allegations in the petition. (Sec. 4, Rule 32). After the verification process, the Petition will be published with the
Notice of Hearing.
Once registered the political party is issued a Certificate of Registration (Sec. 7) (1) acquires juridical personality (2) public is informed
of the party’s existence and ideals (3) it identifies the party and its officers for purposes of regulation by the Comelec. For purposes of
the electoral process that an organization need not be a political party.
Limitations on Registration –
It is a religious sect or denomination or association, organized for religious purposes. Registration of religious
sects are prohibited for the purpose of the electoral process which is made in the spirit of separation of church and state
and intended to prevent churches from wielding political power. Does not extend to organizations with religious affiliations
or to political parties which derive their principles from religious beliefs.
Those who seek to achieve their goals through unlawful means
Those which refuse to adhere to the Constitution
Those which are supported by any foreign government (Sec. 2(5) Article IX-C)
Cancellation of Registration (Sec. 8) – Upon verified complaint of any interested party, or motu propio by the
Commission, the registration of any political party, coalition of political parties or organizations under the party-list system may be
cancelled after due notice and hearing on the following grounds:
(a) Acceptance by the political party, coalition of political parties, or organizations or any of its candidates, of financial
contributions from foreign governments and/or their agencies for activities related to elections.
(b) Violation of laws, rules or regulations relating to elections, plebiscites, referenda or initiative.
(c) Untruthful statements in its petition for registration
(d) The said political party, coalition of political parties or organization has become a religious sect or denomination, is
pursuing its goals thru violence or other unlawful means, is refusing to adhere to or uphold the Constitution of the Philippines,
or is receiving support from any foreign government;
(e) Failure to comply with applicable laws, rules or regulations of the Commission
(f) Failure to field official candidates in the last two preceding elections or failure of their candidates to obtain
at least five (5) per centum of the votes cast in the last two preceding elections.
Jurisdiction of Comelec over Inter-Party Disputes/Power to Register Political Parties

Samson Alcantara, et. al. vs. Comelec 696 SCRA 547 (2013) – Under the Constitution, the Comelec is empowered to register
political parties. In the exercise of its power to register political parties, the Comelec necessarily possesses the power to pass upon the
question of who, among the legitimate officers of the part-list group, are entitled to exercise the right and privileges granted to a party-
list group under the law. The Comelec’s jurisdiction on this point is well-settled and is not here disputed.
Luis LokinJr./Teresita Planas v. Comelec/CIBAC 674 SCRA 538 (2012)

In Atienza v. Comelec (612 SCRA 961 (2010), it was expressly settled that the Comelec possessed the authority to resolve intra-
party disputes as a necessary tributary of its constitutionally mandated power to enforce election laws and register political parties.
The Court, therein cited Kalaw v. Comelec and Palmares v. Comelec which uniformly upheld the Comelec’s jurisdiction over intra-party
disputes: As ruled in Kalaw v. Comelec, the Comelec’s powers and functions under Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, “include
the ascertainment of the identity of the political party and its legitimate officers responsible for the acts.” The Court also declared in
another case that the Comelec’s power to register political parties necessarily involved the determination of the persons who must act
on its behalf. Thus, the Comelec may resolve an intra-party leadership dispute, in a proper case brought before it, as an
incident of its power to register political parties.
Liberal Party vs. Commission on Elections 620 SCRA 393 (May 6, 2010), the SC distinguished REGISTRATION and
ACCREDITATION of a political party. The root of this petition before the SC is the Nationalista Party-Nationalista Party Coalition (NP-
NPC) petition before the COMELEC for registration as a coalition and accreditation as the dominant minority party. While the
Comelec En Banc claimed jurisdiction over the registration of coalitions and has in fact decreed NP-NPC’s registration, the Comelec
however did NOT rule on the accreditation aspect. The registration of a coalition and the accreditation of a dominant
minority party are two separate matters that are substantively distinct from each other.
Section 2(5), Article IX-C and Rule 32 of the CRPregulate the registration of political parties, organizations or
coalition of political parties. Accreditation as a dominant party is governed by Comelec Resolution No. 8752, Section 1 of

which states that the petition for accreditation shall be filed with the Clerk of the Commission who shall docket it as an SPP
(means Special Proceedings (DM) case. This was the manner the NP-NPC was docketed.
Registration of political parties is a special proceeding assigned to a Division for handling under the CRP. No
similar clear cut rule is available to a petition for accreditation as a dominant party.
Registration must first take place before a request for accreditation can be made. Accreditation is the next
natural step to follow after registration.
When the Comelec En Banc, resolved the registration of the NP- NPC the case is terminated and ripe for review by the SC via a Petition
for Certiorari. The issue with respect to accreditation is a separate issue which is treated in a separate proceedings. As ruled, a Motion
for Reconsideration of a Resolution of the Comelec En Banc is a prohibited pleading (Sec. 1(d) Rule 13). The remedy available to a
party is a petition for certiorari with the SC pursuant to Article IX-A, Sec. 7 and Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino, represented by its Chairman Edgardo J. Angara v. Comelec, et. al. 423 SCRA 665, (the
Comelec misapplied equity in this case). LDP informed the Comelec by way of Manifestation that only the Party Chairman or his
authorized representative may endorse the COC of the party’s official candidates; that Rep. Butch Aquino was on “indefinite force
leave” and in the meantime Ambassador Enrique Zaldivar was designated Acting Secretary General.
Aquino in a comment alleged that the Party Chairman does not have the authority to impose disciplinary sanctions on the
Secretary General and that the Manifestation filed has no basis praying that Comelec disregards the same. Comelec issued an order
requiring the parties to file verified petition. Pending resolution, a Certificate of Nomination of Sen. Panfilo Lacson as LDP candidate for
President was filed with the Comelec which was signed by Rep. Aquino as LDP Secretary General
Comelec issued a Resolution granting the petition with LEGAL EQUITY for both Petitioner and Oppositor (Angara Wind and
Aquino Wing).
ISSUE: Whether or not Comelec gravely abused its discretion in issuing the subject Resolution.
RULING – the only issue is simply “Who as between the Party Chairman and the Secretary General has the
authority to sign certificates of candidacy of the official candidates of the party. Yes Comelec acted with grave abuse of
discretion. While it has jurisdiction to rule upon questions of party identity and leadership as an incident to its enforcement powers. It
IS well within its competence to inquire into which party officer has authority to sign and endorse certificate of
candidacy of party’s nominees. And to resolve the issue raised, the Comelec need only to turn to the Party Constitution
and election laws. The Comelec Resolution is INDECISION in the guise of equity. It chose not to because of its irrational fear of
treading, as Aquino contends, on “unchartered” territories but which have long been chartered by jurisprudence.
Comelec divided the LDP into wings both having authority to nominate candidates for every elective position. Consequently,
Comelec planted seeds of confusion among the electorate who are apt to be confounded by two candidates from a single political
party. This was not only a disservice to the opposition but to the voting public as well as its Resolution facilitated, rather than
forestalled, the division of the minority party.
Agapay ng Indigenous Peoples Rights Alliance (A-IPRA) v. Comelec 696 SCRA 563 – the Supreme Court reiterated its ruling
in Laban that “the ascertainment of the identity of a political party and its legitimate officers is a matter that is well
within its authority. The source of this authority is not other than the fundamental law itself, which vests upon the Comelec the
power and function to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of election.”
Damasen vs. Tumamao 613 SCRA 49 (2010) – the discretion of accepting members to a political party is a right and a privilege, a
purely internal matter, which the Court cannot meddle in. The reason behind the right given to a political party to nominate a
replacement where a permanent vacancy occurs in the Sanggunian is to maintain the party representation as willed by the people in
the election (Sec. 45 (b) of RA 7160 Rule on Succession and as held in Navarro v. CA 672 SCRA 355 (2010). Damasen was not a
bonafide member. Tumamao was husband of the VM who died).
PARTY LIST
R.A. 7941, otherwise known as An Act Providing for the Election of Party-List Representatives through the Part-List System. The party-
list system is a mechanism of the proportional representation in the election of representatives to the HR from national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, registered with the Comelec, to enable Filipinos belonging to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that would benefit them. (Sec. 2)
Party-list representation shall constitute 20% of the total number of representatives by selection or election from the labor,
peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural minorities, women, youth and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the
religious sector (Sec. 11 and Art. V, Sec. 5(2) 1987 Constitution)
NOTE: The party-list system is composed of three (3) different groups: (1) national parties or organizations; (2) regional parties or
organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or organization. National and regional parties or organization are different from sectoral parties
or organizations. The former need not be organized along sectoral lines and not represent any particular sectoral nor should they be
marginalized and underrepresented.
Atong Paglaum, Inc. vs. Comelec 02 April 2013, the Supreme Court ruled – “Sec. 5(1), Art. VI of the Constitution is crystal clear
that there shall be “a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organization. “The commas after the
words national, and regional, separate national and regional parties from sectoral parties. Had the framers of the 1987 Constitution
intended national and regional parties to be at the same time sectoral, they would have stated “national and regional sectoral parties.”
They did not, precisely because it was never their intention to make the party-list system exclusively sectoral.

What the framers intended, and what they expressly wrote in Section 5(1), could not be any clearer: the party-list system is
composed of 3-different groups, and the sectoral parties belong to only one of the 3 groups.”
COCOFED v. Commission on Elections 703 SCRA 165 – Section 4 and 5 of RA 7941 distinguished. Section 4 of RA 7941, a
party-list group already registered “need not register anew” for purposes of every subsequent election, but only needs to file a
manifestation of intent to participate with the Comelec. Section 5 on the other hand provides, that an applicant for registration has
to file with the Comelec, not later than 90 days before the election, a verified petition stating its desire to participate in the party-list
system as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or organization. The applicant is required
to submit its constitution, by-laws, platform of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the
Comelec may required. Aside from these, the law requires the publication of the applicant’s petition in at least 2 national newspapers
of general circulation. The Comelec then resolves the petition, determining whether the applicant has complied with all the necessary
requirements.
Lokin, Jr. vs. Commission on elections 621 SCRA 385 (June 22, 2010), the SC ruled that Comelec cannot issue rules and
regulations that provide a ground for the substitution of a party-list nominee NOT written in R.A.7941.
Sec. 8 provides – “Nomination of Party-List Representatives. Each registered party, organization or coalition shall
submit to the Comelec not later than 45 days before the election a list of names, not less than five (5), from which
party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the required number of votes.
A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their consent in writing may be named
in the list. The list shall not include any candidate for any elective office or a person who has lost his bid for an elective office in the
immediately preceding election. NO change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the
same shall have been submitted to the Comelec except in cases (1) where the nominee dies, or (2) withdraws in
writing his nomination, (3) becomes incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed
last in the list. Incumbent sectoral representatives in the HR who are nominated in the party-list system shall not be
considered resigned.”
CIBAC (Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption) thru its President Emmanuel Villanueva manifested their intent to participate in the
May 14, 2007 synchronized national and local elections and submitted their list of 5 nominees (Villanueva, Lokin (herein petitioner),
Cruz-Gonzales, Tugna and Galang). The list was later published in the newspapers of general circulation. Before the elections,
Villanueva filed a certificate of nomination, substitution and amendment of the list of nominees whereby it withdrew the nominations of
Lokin, Tugna and Galang and substituted Borje. The amended list included Villanueva, Cruz-Gonzales and Borje. Subsequently,
Villanueva transmitted to Comelec the signed petitions of more than 81% if the CIBAC members in order to confirm the withdrawal of
the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang.
Based on the Party-List Canvas Report, it showed that CIBAC was entitled to a second seat, hence, the counsel of CIBAC filed
with the Comelec sitting as National Board of Canvassers, a request to proclaim Lokin as the 2nd nominee which was opposed by
Villanueva and Cruz-Gonzales. Since Comelec failed to act on the filing of the certificate of nomination, substitution and amendment of
the list of nominees and the petitions of the more than 81% of CIBAC members, Villanueva filed a petition to confirm the said
certificate with the Comelec which was docketed as E.M. No. 07-054. In the meantime, Comelec as NBC partially proclaimed several
party lists as having won which included Cibac.
The Secretary General of CIBAC informed the Secretary General of the HR to formally swear Lokin into office but which was
denied in view of the pendency of E.M. No. 07-054 which approved the withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin et. al. and the
substitution of Borje. Cruz-Gonzales was proclaimed as the official second nominee.
Lokin brought before the SC via Mandamus to compel respondent Comelec to proclaim him as the official second nominee of
CIBAC. Also, in another petition, Lokin assailed Sec. 13 of Resolution No. 7804 (Rules and Regulations Governing the filing of
Manifestation of Intent to Participate and submission of Names of Nominees under the Party-List) and its resolution in E.M. No. 07-054.
The Comelec asserts that a petition for certiorari is an inappropriate recourse in law due to the proclamation of Cruz-Gonzales
as representative and her assumption of that office; that Lokin’s proper recourse was an electoral protest filed in the HRET, therefore,
the Court has no jurisdiction over the matter being raised by Lokin. CIBAC posits that Lokin is guilty of forum shopping for filing a
petition for mandamus and a petition for certiorari, considering that both petitions ultimately seek to have him proclaimed as the
second nominee of CIBAC.
ISSUES: a) Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the controversy. The Court has jurisdiction. The controversy
involving Lokin is neither an EP nor an action for QW, for it concerns a very peculiar situation in which Lokin is seeking to be seated
as second nominee of CIBAC. Although an EP may properly be available to one part-list organization seeking to unseat another
party-list organization to determine which between the defeated and the winning party-list organizations actually obtained the majority
of the legal votes, Lokin’s case is not one in which a nominee of a particular party-list organization thereby wants to unseat another
nominee of the same party list. Neither does an action for QW lie, considering that the case does not involve the ineligibility and
disloyalty of Cruz-Gonzales to the RP, or some other case of disqualification.
Lokin has correctly brought this special civil action for certiorari against the Comelec to seek the review of its resolution in
accordance with Section 7 of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution, notwithstanding the oath and assumption of office by Cruz-

Gonzales. The constitutional mandate is now implemented by Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure, which provides for the review of
the judgments, final orders or resolution of the Comelec and the Commission on Audit. As Rule 64 states, the mode of review is by a
petition for certiorari in accordance with Rule 65 to be filed in the SC within the limited period of 30 days. The Court has original and
exclusive jurisdiction over Lokin’s certiorari and for mandamus.
(b) Both actions, certiorari and mandamus did not violate the rule against forum shopping even if the actions involved the
same parties, because they were based on different causes of action and the reliefs they sought were different.
(c) Comelec gravely abused its discretion in promulgating Section 13 of Res. No. 7804 as it expanded the exceptions
under Sec. 8 of RA 7941 Section 8 enumerates only 3 instances in which the party-list organization can substitute
another person in place of the nominee. The enumeration is exclusive.
Cocofed Case – As early as February 8, 2012, Comelec had informed, through its Resolution No. 9359, all registered parties who
wished to participate in the May 2013 party-list elections that they shall file with the Comelec a Manifestation of Intent to Participate in
the party list election together with its list of at least 5 nominees, no later than May 31, 2012. Under Sec. 6(5) of RA 7941, violation of
or failure to comply with laws, rules and regulations relating to elections is a ground for the cancellation of registration. Cocofed failed
to submit a list of 5 nominees (submitted only 2 nominees) despite ample opportunity to do so before the elections, which is a violation
imputable to the party under said provision.
Pursuant to Section 8 of RA 7941, the Court cannot leave to the party the discretion to determine the number of nominees it
would submit. The submission of the list is a statutory requirement for the registration of party-list groups and the submission of this
list is part of a registered party’s continuing compliance with the law to maintain its registration.
A party-list group’s previous registration with the Comelec confers no vested right to the maintenance of its registration. In
order to maintain a party in a continuing compliance status, the party must prove not only its continued possession of the requisite
qualifications but, equally, must show its compliance with the basic requirements of the law.
Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy (ANAD) v. Comelec 705 SCRA 340 (2013) – the Supreme Court reiterated.
Compliance with Section 8 of RA 7941 is essential as the said provision is a safeguard against arbitrariness. Section 8 rids a party-list
organization of the prerogative to substitute and replace its nominees, or even to switch the order of the nominees, after submission of
the list to Comelec.
Abayhon vs. HRET et. al 612 SCRA 375/Palparan Jr. vs. HRET et. al.
Who are the members of the House of Representatives
– These two cases were consolidated and jointly resolved as it both concerns the authority of the HRET to pass upon the eligibilities of
the nominees of the party-list groups that won seats in the lower house of Congress.
Abayhon is the 1st nominee of the Aangat Tayo party-list that won a seat in the HR during the 2007 elections. Palparan on the
other hand was the 1st nominee of Bantay party-list. A petition for QW was filed with HRET against the party-list groups and its
nominee claiming that it was not eligible for a party-list since it did not represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors.
Abayhon is the spouse of an incumbent congressional district representative and likewise does not belong to the UR and marginalized.
Petitioners also claim that Abayhon lost her bid as party-list rep called An Waray in the immediately preceding elections of May 10,
2004. Palparan also was alleged to have committed various human rights violations against the marginalized sectors (Bantay
represents the victims of communist rebels, CAFGU, security guards and former rebels.)
Abayhon and Palparan postures that the Comelec already confirmed the status of the party list as a national multi-sectoral
party-list organization, that HRET had no jurisdiction over the petitioner for QW since the petitioners collaterally attacked the
registration of the party-list organization, a matter that fell within the jurisdiction of the Comelec. That it was the party-list that was
taking a seat in the HR and not them, being only its nominees. All questions involving their eligibility as nominee, were internal
concerns of the organization. The HRET dismissed the petition against party-list but upheld its jurisdiction over nominees who both
filed an MR which was denied. Hence, this special civil action for certiorari alleging that the HRET gravely abused its discretion.
The Court made reference to Sec. 5(1) of Article VI (which identifies who the “members” of that House are. The
HR shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative
districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ration, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through
a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.
Clearly the “members” of the HR are two kinds. . .1)those who shall be elected from legislative districts and 2) “those
who shall be elected through a party-list system”. From the point of view of the Constitution, it is the party-list rep who are
“elected” into office, NOT their parties or organizations. These representatives are elected, however, through that peculiar
party-list system that the Constitution authorized and that Congress by law established where the voters cast their votes for the
organizations or parties to which such party-list reps belong.
Once elected, both the district reps and the party-list reps are treated in like manners. They have the same deliberative
rights, salaries, and emoluments. They can participate in the making of laws that will directly benefit their legislative districts or
sectors. They are also subject to the same term limitations of 3 years for a max of 3 consecutive terms. The party list system
act itself recognizes party list nominees as members of the HR (Sec. 2, RA 7941 Declaration of Policy – The State shall promote
proportional representation in the election of reps in the HR through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral

parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to the marginalized and UR sectors x
x x x to become members of the HR “.
The Court held that initially, the authority to determine the qualifications of a party-list nominee belongs to the organization
and to choose five from among the aspiring nominees to comply with the law. But where an allegation is made that the party or
organization had chosen and allowed a disqualified nominee to become its party-list rep in the lower house and enjoy the secured
tenure that goes with the position, the resolution of the dispute is taken out of its hand. Hence, pursuant to Section 17 of Article VI,
the HRET being the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the
HR, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. The HRET was correct in dismissing the QW and
retaining authority to rule on the qualifications.
Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) v. Comelec 619 SCRA 585 (DELISTING)– The Comelec may motu propio OR
upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove, or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national,
regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition IF It: (a) fails to participate in the last 2 preceding elections; OR (b) fails
to obtain at least 2% of the votes casts under the party-list system in the 2 preceding elections for the constituency in
which it was registered (Section 6 RA 7941). The word “OR” is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of
one thing from the other things enumerated. A party list group or organization that failed to garner 2% in a prior election and
immediately thereafter did not participate in the preceding election – is something that is not covered by Section 6(8) of RA 7941.
From this perspective, it may be an unintended gap in the law and as such is a matter for Congress to address. This case abandoned
the Minero vs. Comelec G.R. No. 177548 May 10, 2007.
Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. v. Comelec 646 SCRA 63 (2011)
Comelec removed PGBT in the list of qualified parties vying for a seat under the party-list system of representation in
violation of the status quo order of the Supreme Court (which was not participation in the preceding election). An
equally important aspect of a democratic electoral exercise is the right of free choice of the electorates on who shall govern them – the
party-list system affords them this choice, as it gives the marginalized and underrepresented sectors the opportunity to participate in
governance. Comelec was cited for contempt by the Court.
Effect of removal by Comelec of PGBI in the list: As it was the Comelec itself which prevented PGBI from participating in the 10
May 2010 party-list elections when it deleted PGBI, with grave abuse of discretion, from the list of accredited party-list groups or
organizations and, thereafter, refused to return it to the list despite the Court’s directive, PGBI should, at the very least, be
deemed to have participated in the 10 May 2010
Amores vs. HRET et. al 622 SCRA 593 (2010) – Amores via a petition for QW with the HRET questioned the legality of the
assumption of office of Emmanuel Joel Villanueva as rep of CIBAC. It was alleged among other things, that Villanueva assumed office
without a formal proclamation by the Comelec, disqualified to be a nominee of the youth sector of CIBAC since at the time of the filing
of his certificates of nomination and acceptance, he was already 31 years old or beyond the age limit of 30 pursuant to Section 9 of RA
7941 and that his change of affiliation from CIBAC’s youth sector to its overseas Filipino workers and their families sector was not
effected at least 6 months prior to the May 14, 2007 elections so as to be qualified to represent the new sector under Section 15 of RA
7941.
The HRET dismissed the petition as it found the petition to be filed beyond the 10 days reglementary period, that the age
qualification for youth sectoral nominees under Section 9 of RA 7941 applied only to those nominated as such during the first 3
congressional terms after the ratification of the Constitution or until 1998, unless a sectoral party is thereafter registered exclusively as
representing the youth sector, which CIBAC, a multi sectoral organization, is not. As regards the shift of affiliation, it was held that
Section 15 did not apply as there was no resultant change in party list affiliation.
ISSUES: (1) whether the petition for QW was dismissible for having been filed unseasonably; and (2) whether Section 9 and 15 of RA
7941 apply to Villanueva. As to the first issue, the SC found grave abuse of discretion on the part of HRET. The Court overlooked the
technicality of timeliness and rules on the merits since the challenge goes into Villanueva’s qualifications, it may be filed at anytime
during his term. Also date of proclamation was not clear. As to the second and more substantial issue, the Court made reference to
Section 9 of RA 7941 which provides that in case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be 25 but not more
than 30 years of age on the day of the election. The youth sectoral rep who attains the age of 30 during his term shall
be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term.
The Court did not find any textual support on the interpretation of HRET that Section 9 applied only to those nominated
during the first 3 congressional terms after the ratification of the Constitution or until 1998. A cardinal rule in statutory construction is
that when the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. Only room for
application. The distinction is nowhere found in the law. When the law does not distinguish, we must not distinguish.
Respecting Section 15 of RA 7941, the Court likewise found no textual support for HRET’s ratiocination that the provision
did not apply to Villanueva’s shift of affiliation from CIBAC’s youth sector to its overseas Filipino workers and their families sector as
there was no resultant change in party list affiliation. Section 15 reads “ Change of Affiliation: Effect – Any elected party list
rep who changes his political party or sectoral affiliation during his term of office shall forfeit his seat; Provided, That if
he changes his political party or sectoral affiliation within 6 months before an election, he shall not be eligible for
nomination as party-list rep under his new party or organization.
The wordings of Section 15 is clear as it covers changes in both political party and sectoral affiliation and which may occur
within the same party since multi-sectoral party-list org are qualified to participate in the Philippine party-list system. A nominee who

changes his sectoral affiliation within the same party will only be eligible for nomination under the new sectoral affiliation if the change
has been effected at least 6 months before the elections. Sec. 9 and 15 apply to Villanueva.
As regards the contention that Villanueva is the 1st nominee of CIBAC, whose victory was later upheld, is NO moment. A
party-list org’s ranking of its nominees is a mere indication of preference , their qualifications according to law are a different matter.
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. Comelec 618 SCRA 32 – Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify
themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals or transgendered individuals. They applied for registration with Comelec in 2006 and its
accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization had no substantial membership. Ladlad in 2009 again filed a
petition for registration which was dismissed by Comelec on moral grounds (Bible and Koran).
The SC ruled that moral disapproval is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from
participation to the party list system. The Constitution provides in Sec. 5, Art. III that “No law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is
“government neutrality in religious matters.” Clearly, “governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of
neutrality.” Hence, the Court finds that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the Comelec to utilize the Bible and
the Koran to justify the exclusion of ang Ladlad.
In sum, the crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies
with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941. The SC found that Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with
the legal requirements for accreditation.
Veterans Federation Party v. Comelec 342 SCRA 244, the SC provided for the four unique parameters of the Filipino Party-list
System which are as follows –
The 20% allocation – the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed 20% of the total membership of the
HR, including those under the party-list;
The 2% threshold – only those parties garnering a minimum of 2% of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are
“qualified” to have a seat in the HR;
The 3-seat limit – each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum three
seats, that is, one qualifying and two additional seats;
The proportional representation – the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed “in proportion to
their total number of votes..
In this case, following the May11, 1998 national elections which is the first election for party-list representation, the Comelec en
banc proclaimed 14 parties and organizations which had obtained at least 2% of the total number of votes cast for the party-list
system which constitute a total of 25 nominees short of the 52 party-list representatives who should actually sit in the house. The
PAG-ASA files with the Comelec a Petition to proclaim the full number of party-list representative provided by the Constitution. They
alleged that the filling up of the 20% membership of party list representative in the House, as provided under the Constitution, was
mandatory. Nine other party list organizations filed their respective motions to intervene seeking the same relief as that sought by
PAG-ASA on substantially the same grounds.
The Comelec, contrary to its rules and regulations governing the said elections, instead proclaimed the other 38 party-list
organization notwithstanding its not having garnered the required 2% votes. RULING: Sec. 5(2) of Article VI which states that the
sectoral representation shall constitute the 20% is not “mandatory” as it merely provides a ceiling for party-list in congress. And,
obtaining absolute proportional representation is restricted by the 3-seat per party limit to a maximum of two additional slots. Comelec
was held to have abused its discretion in disregarding an act of Congress.
Changed by Banat Case
The 8-point guidelines for screening party-list participants
In Bagong Bayani Labor Party v. Comelec 359 SCRA 698 (2001) (also reiterated the ruling in Veterans), at issue
is the Omnibus Resolution of the Comelec which approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties and which the SC
remanded to the Comelec for the latter to determine evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations allowed to
participate in the party-list elections complied with the requirements of the law. The SC ruled that the party-list organizations or
parties must factually and truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented constituencies mentioned in Section 5 of RA 7941
and the persons nominated by the party-list candidate-organization must be “Filipino citizens belonging to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties.”
In remanding the case to Comelec the SC laid down the following guidelines –
First, the PP, sector or organization must represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in
Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must show – through the Constitution, articles of incorporation, by-laws, history,
platform of government and track record – that it represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and underrepresented sectors.
Second, while major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate, they must
comply with the declared statutory policy enabling Filipino citizens belonging to the M and U to be elected to
the HR.
Third, religious sector may not be represented in the party-list system. In view of the objections directed against the
registration of Ang Buhay Hayaang Humabong, which is allegedly a religious group, the Court notes the express
constitutional provision that the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list system. Furthermore, the
Constitution provides that “religious denominations and sects shall not be registered.” The prohibition was explained by a

member of the Constitutional Commission in this wise “The prohibition is on any religious organization registering as a
political party. I do not see any prohibition here against a priest running as a candidate. This is not prohibited here; it is the
registration of a religious sect as a political party.”
Fourth, it must not be disqualified under the ground enumerated under Section 6 of RA 7941 (not a religious
sect or denomination or association organized for religious purposes, advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
a foreign party or organization; receives support from any foreign government, fails to comply with laws rules or regulations
relating to elections, declared untruthful statement in its petition, it has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year, it
fails to participate in the last 2 preceding elections OR failed to obtain at least 2% of the votes cast under the
party list system in the 2 preceding elections for the constituency in which it was registered)
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity funded or assisted
by the government (referring to MAD of Richard Gomez). It must be independent of the government. The participants of
the government or it officials in the affairs of a party-list candidate is not only illegal and unfair to other parties, but also
deleterious to the objective of the law; to enable citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors and
organizations to be elected to the House of Representatives.
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law, its nominees must likewise do
so.Section 9 of RA 7941 reads – “qualifications of Party-List Nominees – No person shall be nominated as party-list
representative unless he is a natural born citizen of the Philippines, a RV, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not
less than 1 year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona-fide member of the party or
organization which he seeks to represent for at least 90 days preceding the day of the elections and is at least 25 years of
age on the day of the election.
Seventh and Eight not only the candidate party must represent the M and U sectors, so also must its nominees.
It must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation
as a whole.
AKLAT (Assosasyon Para sa Kaunlaran Ng Lipunan at Adhikain Para sa Tao, Inc.) vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 162203, 14
April 2004, came up with a ruling on the “Window-Dressing” of party-list participant. In this case, Comelec found that
significantly, Aklat and A.K.L.A.T. have substantially the same incorporators. In fact 4 of Aklat’s 6 incorporators are also incorporators
of A.K.L.A.T.. This substantial similarity is hard to ignore and bolsters the conclusion that the supposed re-organization
undertaken by Aklat is plain window-dressing as it has not really changed its character as a business interest of
persons in the book publishing industry.
The Court observed that Aklat’s articles of incorporation and document entitled The Facts About Aklat which were attached to
its petition for re-qualification contain general averments that it supposedly represents marginalized groups such as the youth,
indigenous communities, urban poor and farmers/fisherfolks. These general statements do not measure up to the first guideline set by
the Bagon Bayani case for screening party-list participants. Sec. 5 of RA 7941 provides that “it must show – through its constitution,
articles of incorporation, bylaws, history, platform of government and track record – that it represents and seeks to uplift marginalized
and underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its membership should belong to the marginalized and underrepresented.
Bantay Republic Act or BA-RA 7941 vs. G.R. No. 177271, May 4, 2007, 523 SCRA 1 - Petitioners reacting on an emerging
public perception that the individuals behind the party-list groups do not, as they should, actually represent the poor and marginalized
sectors. Petitioners, wrote a letter to the Comelec requesting that the complete list of the nominees of all parties who have been
accredited pursuant to Comelec Resolution No. 7804 prescribing rules and regulations to govern the filing of manifestation of intent to
participate and submission of names of nominees under the party-list system of representation in connection with the May 14, 2007
elections be published. The Comelec vehemently did not accede to the request of the petitioners, it based its refusal to disclose the
names of the nominees of subject party-list groups on Section 7 of RA 7941 (more specifically the last sentence which states:
“the names of the party-list nominees shall not be shown on the certified list.”.
The Comelec believe that the party list elections must not be personality oriented. Abalos said under RA 7941, the people are to vote
for sectoral parties, organizations, or coalitions not for their nominees.
ISSUE: whether or not the disclosure of the names of the nominees are covered by the Right of Public to information.
HELD: The Comelec has a constitutional duty to disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party list groups. No national
security or like concerns is involved in the disclosure of the names of the nominees of the party-list groups in question. The last
sentence of Section 7 is limited in scope and duration, meaning, that it extends only to the certified list which the same
provision requires to be posted in the polling places on election day. To stretch the coverage of the prohibition to the
absolute nothing in RA 7941 that prohibits the Comelec from disclosing or even publishing through mediums other than the “Certified
list” the names of the party-list nominees. The Comelec obviously misread the limited non-disclosure aspect of the provision as an
absolute bar to public disclosure before the May 2007 elections. The need for voters to be informed about matters that have a bearing
on their choice. The ideal cannot be achieved in a system of blind voting, as veritably advocated in the assailed resolution of the
Comelec.
New Formula in the Allocation of Seats for Party-List Representatives

Banat et. al. vs. Comelec G.R. 178271/12972 21 April 2009 – After the VFP v. Comelec, G.R. No. 136781, 136786 and 136795,
06 October 2000, ruling of the Supreme Court and the controversial application of the “Panganiban Formula” by the Abalos
Commission, Party-list participants in Banat et al., filed separate complaints against the Comelec on the proper allocation of seats in the
party-list system. On 23 April 2009, the Supreme Court declared the 2% threshold clause in relation to the distribution of the
additional seats of RA 7941 unconstitutional.
Following Section 5, Article VI, par. 2 of the 1987 Constitution, 20% of all seats in the HR is reserved for sectoral
representatives elected in the party list system. This formula is now called the “Carpio formula.”
Under the Banat and Bayan Muna cases (G.R. No. 179271 and G.R. No. 179295, 21 April 2009), the SC laid down the latest
formula in the allocation of seats for party-list participants:
1) The parties, organizations and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they
garnered during the elections.
2) The parties, organizations and coalitions receiving at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be
entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3) Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking above-mentioned in paragraph no. 1 hereof, shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
4) Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than 3 seats.
Banat abandoned the matter of computation held in the Veterans Party case considering that the intention was to fill the 20% seats in
the HR.
2% = 1 guaranteed seat
** In the determination of seats, wala na yung 2% threshold. So kahit 1.8% lang, pwede na rin to fill in the 20% seats.
ELIGIBILITY OF CANDIDATES
Candidate defined: The term “candidate” refers to any person aspiring or seeking an elective public office, who has filed a
certificate of candidacy by himself or through an accredited political party, aggroupment, or coalition of parties. (Sec. 79, OEC)
The terms “candidate” under the Automated Election System (AES) in 2010, refers to “any person aspiring for or seeking an elective
public office who has filed his COC and who has not dies or withdrawn or otherwise disqualified before the start of the
campaign period for which he filed his COC. Provided, that, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall
take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period.” (Comelec Reso. No. 8678). Premature campaign
As regards a Party-List system, a “candidate” also refers to “any registered national, regional, or sectoral party, organization or coalition
thereof that has filed a manifestation to participate under the part-list system which has not withdrawn or which has not be disqualified
before the start of the campaign period.” (RA 7941).
Comelec Reso. No. 9615 adopted a broader definition of the term “candidate” for the 13 May 2013 Elections to include party-list in
include all the above-definitions.
Qualifications
For President and Vice-President – No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, able to read and write, at least 40 years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for
at least 10 years immediately preceding such election.
There shall be a Vice-President who shall have the same qualifications and term of office and be elected with, and in the same
manner, as the President. He may be removed from office in the same manner as the President (Article VII, Section 2 and 3,
Constitution)
For Senator – No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of election, is at least
35 years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less than 2 years immediately
preceding the elections. (Article VI, Section 3, Constitution)
For Members of the House of Representatives – No person shall be a Member of the HR unless he is natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, and, on the day of election, is at least 25 years of age, able to read and write, and except the party list representatives, a
registered voter in the district in which he shall elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than on year immediately
preceding the election. (Article VI, Section 6, Constitution)
For Party-List Nominees – No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural born-citizen of the
Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of
the election, able to read to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least
90 days preceding the day of the election and is at least 25 years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be 25 but not more than 30 years of age on the day of the
election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of 30 during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the
expiration of his term. (RA 7941).
Bengzon III v. HRET 357 SCRA 545 (2001) – Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen.. On the other hand, if he

was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born
Filipino.
Local Government Officials – An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay,
municipality, city or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang
bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election; able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
Common to All Offices - Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of the service for the full term for which they were elected.
RA No. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) Section 36(g) provides that “all candidates for public office
whether appointed or elected both in the national and local government shall undergo mandatory drug tests. Comelec
issued Resolution No. 6486 on 23 December 2003 implementing 9165. Publication of the results will be published. But the resolution
does not indicate whether or not candidates who test positive for drugs will be allowed to assume office if they win.)
Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board, G.R. No. 157870, 03 November 2008 – Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and
Comelec Resolution No. 6486 was challenged as the same illegally impose an additional qualification on candidates for senator.
Senator Pimentel point out that, subject to the provision on nuisance candidates, a candidate for senator needs only to meet the
qualification laid down in Section 3, Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship; (2) voter registration; (3) literacy; (4) age and
(5) residency. Beyond these stated qualification requirements, candidates for senator need not possess any other qualification to run
for senator and be voted upon and elected as member of the Senate.
As ruled, Sec. 36(h) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by Comelec assailed Resolution, effectively enlarges the
qualification requirements enumerated in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. As couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires a
candidate for senator to be certified illegal drug-clean, obviously a pre-condition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for
senator or, with like effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as senator-elect. Viewed in its
proper context, the implementing Comelec Resolution add another qualification layer to what the 1987 Constitution, as the minimum,
required for membership in the Senate. Sec. 36(h) infringed the constitutional provision defining the qualification or eligibility
requirements for one aspiring to run for and serve as senator. Getting elected would be of little value if one cannot assume office for
non-compliance with the drug-testing requirement.
CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY
1. Under the Manual Elections – The COC of candidacy shall be filed on any day from the commencement of the election period
but not later than the day before the beginning of the campaign period; Provided, that in cases of postponement or failure of election
under Section 5 and 6 of the OEC, no additional COC shall be accepted except in cases of substitution of candidates as provided un
Section 77. (Section 75, OEC)
COC must be filed not later than the day before the date for the beginning of the campaign period. (Sec. 7, RA 7166)
2. Under the AES – Section 11 of RA 8436 provides “for this purpose, the deadline for filing of COC/petition for
registration/manifestation to participate in the election shall not be later than 120 days before the elections.
The period has already been amended by RA 9369 which now reads – “For this purpose, the Commission shall set the
deadline for the filing of COC/petition of registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any person who files his
COC within this period shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his COC; Provided
that, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period. Xxxx “.
Section 73, BP 881/Omnibus Elections Code (OEC) , par. (1) – Certificate of Candidacy – No person shall be eligible for any
elective office unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed therein. Sinaca v. Mula 315 SCRA 266, it is the
nature of a formal manifestation to the whole world of the candidate’s political creed or lack of political creed.
Coquilla v. Comelec G.R. No. 139801, 31 May 2000 – A certificate which did not indicate the position for which the candidate is
running may be corrected. The SC ruling on the effectiveness of the amended COC filed to correct the defect declared that the filing of
an amended COC even after the deadline but before the election was substantial compliance with the law which cured the defect.
Section 73 (3) BP 881 (Effect of filing multiple certificates of candidacy)–No person shall be eligible for more than one office
to be filed in the same election(requirement to run for elective office), and if he files his certificate of candidacy for more than
one office, he shall not be eligible for any of them.
Remedy:
Withdrawal of Certificate of Candidacy - However, before the expiration of the period for the filing of the certificates of candidacy,
the person who has filed more than one certificate of candidacy may submit a written declaration under oath the office for which he
desires to be eligible and cancel the certificate of candidacy for the other office or offices.
Pilar v. Comelec 245 SCRA 759 (1995) – The withdrawal of a certificate of candidacy does not extinguish one’s liability for the
administrative fine imposed by Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166, which requires every candidate to file a true statement of all
contributions and expenditures in connection with the elections.

Villanueva v. Comelec 122 SCRA 636 (1983) – the withdrawal of a certificate of candidacy not made under oath produces no
legal effect; for all intents and purposes, the withdrawing candidate remains a candidate.
Go v. Comelec 357 SCRA 739 (2001) – Where affidavit of withdrawal filed. There is nothing that mandates that the affidavit
of withdrawal must be filed with the same office where the certificate of candidacy to be withdrawn was filed. Thus, it can be filed
directly with the main office of the Comelec, the office of the regional election supervisor concerned, the office of the provincial election
supervisor of the province to which the municipality involved belongs, or the office of the municipal election officer of the said
municipality.
EFFECTS: FILING OF CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY
In Talaga v. Comelec/Alcala 683 SCRA 197 (2012) The High Court provided for the rationale for the filing of CoC within a
prescribed period – The evident purposes of the requirement for the filing of CoCs and in fixing the time limit for filing them are,
namely; (a) to enable the voters to know, at least 60 days prior to the regular election, the candidates from among whom they are
to make the choice; and (b) to avoid confusion and inconvenience in the tabulation of the votes cast. If the law does not confine
to the duly-registered candidates the choice of the voters, there may be as many persons voted for as there are voters, and votes may
be cast even for unknown or factitious persons as a mark to identify the votes in favor of a candidate for another office in the same
election.
Sec. 66 BP 881/OEC.An appointive official is considered resigned upon the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy. The forfeiture
is automatic and the operative act is the moment of filing which shall render the appointive official resigned (Nicolasora v. CSC 1990
case and PNOC v. NLRC, May 31, 1993), where the provision of Sec. 66 is applicable also to GOCC and can constitute as a just
cause for termination of employment in addition to those set forth in the Labor Code.
Section 66 has already been repealed by RA 9369 to wit – “Section 13. Section 11 of RA 8436 is hereby amended to read as
follows: “Any person holding a public office or position, including active members of the AFP, and officers and employees in GOCC,
shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same at the start of the day of the
filing of his/her certificate of candidacy.
Sec. 67 OEC – An elective official running for a position other than the one he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for
President and Vice-President, is deemed resigned upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. Section 67 has been repealed by
Section 14 of RA 9006 (The Fair Elections Law), a candidate holding an elective position whether national or local running for
office other than the one he is holding in a permanent capacity is considered resigned only upon the expiration of his term.
Sinaca v. Mula 315 SCRA 266 (1999) – The provision of the election law regarding certificates of candidacy, such as signing and
swearing on the same, as well as the information required to be stated therein, are considered mandatory prior to the elections.
Thereafter, they are regarded as merely directory.
Quinto v. Comelec G.R. No. 189698, 22 February 2010 –the Court ruled that substantial distinctions exists between elective
official and appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office
for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their
office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their tenure while other serve at
the pleasure of the appointing authority.
SUBSTITUTION OF CANDIDACY
Section 77 BP 881. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another. After the last day for the filing of
certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any
cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace
the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by the political party concerned
may file his certificate of candidacy for the office affected in accordance with the preceding sections not later than mid-day of
the date of the election. If the death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day before the election and mid-day
of election day, said certificate may be filed with the board of election inspectors in the political subdivisions where he is a candidate
or, in the case of candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate of the country, with the Commission.
A valid certificate of candidacy is an indispensable requisite in case of substitution of a disqualified candidate under
Sec. 77. Under said provision, the candidate who dies, withdraws or is disqualified must be an official candidate of a registered or
accredited political party and the substitute candidate must be of the same political party as the original candidate and must be duly
nominated as such by the political party.
Rulloda vs. Comelec G.R. No. 154198 January 20, 2003 – The absence of a specific provision governing substitution of
candidates in barangay elections cannot be inferred as a prohibition against said substitution. Such a restrictive construction cannot be
read into the law where the same is not written. Indeed, there is more reason to allow substitution of candidates where no political
parties are involved than when political considerations or party affiliations reign, a fact that must have been subsumed by law.
Miranda v. Abaya, G.R. No. 136351 July 28, 1999 – Substitution is not allowed if certificate of the candidate to be substituted
was cancelled, because he was running for the 4th consecutive term. A person without a valid COC cannot be considered a candidate
in much the same way as any person who has not filed any COC at all cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be a candidate at all.

(Son Miranda substituted Father Miranda who subsequently DQ. COC of father declared invalid. So son Miranda has no basis for the
substitution because invalid ang coc of his father.) So Navarro, as a matter of recall, became mayor. May recall pending as vice mayor.
Talaga v. Comelec & Castillo and Castillo v. Comelec & Talaga, 683 SCRA 197 (2012)–In this case, Ramon was disqualified
having been found to be ineligible for the position of Mayor of Lucena City which disqualification became final prior to the May 10, 2010
elections. Barbara Ruby filed her CoC in substitution of Ramon. Castillo was the opponent who filed a disqualification case against
Barbara Ruby on the ground that the substitution was not valid in view of the ineligibility of Ramon, Ramon did not voluntarily
withdraw his CoC before the elections in accordance with Section 73 and that she was not an additional candidate for the position of
Mayor because her filing of her CoC was beyond the period fixed by law. Comelec declared the substitution of Barbara Ruby as invalid
on May 20, 2011
Barbary Ruby garnered the highest number of votes while Castillo garnered second. Castillo contends that since the
disqualification of Ramon was final prior to the election he should be declared winner. Castillo made reference to case of Cayat. In
this case, Rev. Fr. Nardo B. Cayat, the petitioner in Cayat, was disqualified and his disqualification became final before the May 10,
20014 elections. Considering that no substitution of Cayat was made, Thomas R. Pelileng, Sr. his rival remained the only candidate for
the mayoralty post in Buguias, Benguet.(Cayat v. Comelec 522 SCRA 23 (2007)).
In contrast, after Barbara Ruby substituted Ramon, the May 10, 2010 elections proceeded with her being regarded by the
electorate of Lucena City as a bona fide candidate. To the electorate, she became a contender for the same position vied for by
Castillo, such that she stood on the same footing as Castillo. Such standing as a candidate negated Castillo’s claim of being the
candidate who obtained the highest number of votes, and being consequently entitled to assume the office of Mayor. The Court
stressed that the existence of a valid CoC is a condition sine qua non for a valid substitution.
Pending the final determination, both of them were in equal footing. Castillo was rejected by the people. If ma disqualify man
si Barbara, succession by operation of law will apply. Republican government – positions shall only be filled by the candidates who
garnered the highest number of votes.
Effect of Substitution of Candidates after Official Ballots Have Been Printed in AES - In case of valid substitution after the
official ballots have been printed, the votes cast for the substituted candidates shall be considered votes for the substitutes.” (Sec. 12
RA 8436, 22 December 1997)
Under Section 12 of RA 9006, 12 February 2001 it provides – in case of valid substitutions after the official ballot have been
printed, the votes cast for the substituted candidates shall be considered as stray votes but shall not invalidate the whole ballot. For
this purpose, the official ballot shall provide spaces where the voters may write the name of the substitute candidates if they are voting
for the latter; Provided, however, that if the substitute candidate has the same family name, this provision shall not apply.
Since Section 12 of RA 8436 has not been amended nor repealed by RA 9369, it can be assumed that the votes
cast for the substituted candidates shall be considered votes for the substitutes in an AES for the reason that the
counting machine will not read any unwarranted marks on the official ballot such as writing the name of the substitute
candidate.
AES May 2012 Comelec Res 8678 Substitution sec 13.

SEC. 13. Substitution of Candidates, in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another. - If after the last day for the filing of
certificate of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, he may be
substituted by a candidate belonging to, and nominated by, the same political party. No substitute shall be allowed for any independent
candidate.
The substitute for a candidate who withdrew may file his certificate of candidacy as herein provided for the office affected not later
than December 14, 2009.
The substitute for a candidate who died or suffered permanent incapacity or disqualified by final judgment, may file his certificate of
candidacy up to mid-day of election day. If the death or permanent disability should occur between the day before the election and
mid-day of election day, the substitute candidate may file the certificate with any board of election inspectors in the political subdivision
where he is a candidate, or in the case of a candidate for President, Vice-President or Senator, with the Law Department of the
Commission on Elections in Manila.
No person who has withdrawn his candidacy for a position shall be eligible as substitute candidate for any other position after the
deadline for filing of certificates of candidacy.
Federico v COMELEC 689 SCRA 135

Gubernatorial candidate for Batangas died on April 27, 2010. His wife Edna, who was a candidate for mayor, substituted her late
husband. SO the party actually had the option to substiteu another candidate for governor aside from Edna. By .. Edna as substitute
candidate for governor, the party new that she had to withdraw her candidacy for mayor. Considering that the deadline for substitution
in case of withdrawal had already lapsed, no person can substitute her as mayoralty candidate. The sudden death of then-governor her
husband and the substitution by his widow could not justify a belated substitution in the mayoralty race. The party, however,
substituted Federico for Edna for mayor. He was nominated by the party. Maligaya, the opponent, sought to disqualify him. SO
maligaya should be proclaimed as winner. SC: As correctly pointed out by the OSG, it is clear from the foregoing that different
deadlines were set to govern the specific circumstances that would necessitate the substitution of a candidate due to death,
disqualification or withdrawal. In case of death or disqualification, the substitute had until midday of the election day to file the COC. In

case of withdrawal, which is the situation at bench, the substitute should have filed a COC by December 14, 2009. Substitution of
Federico is invalid. Itong kay Edna kasi involves death or DQ—voluntary. Edna should have withdrawn earlier eh di pa naman namatay
yung asawa niya.
What is the indispensable requisite in substation?

1. filing of valid certificate of candidacy of the substituted candidate
2. the substituted candidate must be an official candidate
3. he must be nominated by his political party
RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT 6 months
Svetlana P. Jalosjos vs. Comelec/Tupag/Estrellada 699 SCRA 507 (2013)– The SC stressed that to be an actual and physical
resident of a locality, one must have a dwelling place where one resides no matter how modest and regardless of
ownership. The fact that the residential structure where petitioner intends to reside was still under construction on the lot she
purchased means that she has not yet established actual and physical residence in the barangay, contrary to the declaration of her
witnesses that she has been an actual and physical resident of Brgy. Tugas since 2008.
Meynard Sabili v. Comelec/Florencio Librea 670 SCRA 664 (2012). It is not required that a candidate should have his
own house in order to establish his residence or domicile in a place. It is enough that he should live in the locality even in a
rented house or that of a friend or relative. What is of central concern then is that the person identified and established a place in
the said City where he intended to live in and return to for an indefinite period of time.
Jalosjos v. Comelec 683 SCRA 1 24 April 2012 – Jalosjos came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother in
Zamboanga Sibugay. It is evident that Jalosjos did so with intent to change his domicile for good. He left Australia, gave up his
Australian citizenship, and renounced his allegiance to that country. In addition, he reacquired his old citizenship by taking an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in his being issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the
BID. By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to live in Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his domicile there. And he has
since lived nowhere else except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
Mitra vs. Commission on Elections, Antonio Gonzales and Orlando Balbon, Jr. 622 SCRA 744 (July 2010). In considering
the residency issue, the dwelling where a person permanently intends to return to and to remain – his or her capacity or inclination to
decorate the place, or the lack of it, IS IMMATERIAL. Comelec gravely abused its discretion when it determined the fitness of a
dwelling as a person’s residence based solely on very personal and subjective assessment standards when the law is
replete with standards that canbe used. Comelec used wrong considerations in arriving at the conclusion that Mitra’s residence is
not the residence contemplated by law.
Asistio v. Trindad Pe-Aguirre, G.R. No. 191124, 27 April 2010–the High Court said – “Domicile is not easily lost. To successfully
effect a transfer thereof, one must demonstrate: (1) an actual removal or change of domicile; (2) a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and (3) acts which corresponding with that purpose. There
must be animus manendi coupled with animus non revetendi. This purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must for
for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile
must be actual.
Limbona v. Comelec, G.r. No. 181970, June 25, 2008– There is no hard and fast rule to determine a candidate’s compliance
with residency requirement since the question of residence is a question of intention.
Coquilla vs. Comelec 385 SCRA 607 – A former Filipino citizen cannot be considered a resident of the Philippines and in the
locality he intends to be elected prior to his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
The “term residence” is to be understood NOT in its common acceptation as referring to “dwelling” or “habitation”, but rather
to “domicile” or legal residence, that is, “the place where the party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no
matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi)”. A domicile of origin is
acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the child’s parents reside and continues until the same is abandoned by
acquisition of a new domicile (by choice.)
Romualdez-Marcos v. Comelec 248 SCRA 30 (1995). “it is the fact of residence, not a statement in the certificate of candidacy
which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitutions residency qualification
requirement. The said statement becomes material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform or
hide a fact which would otherwise render the candidate ineligible.
Perez v. Comelec 317 SCRA 640, the qualifications of Rodolfo Aguinaldo former governor of Cagayan was at issue when he filed
his certificate of candidacy as member of the HR for the 3 rd district of Cagayan in the 11 May 1998 elections. The Court reiterated the
meaning of residence as “the place where the party actually or constructively has his permanent home” where he, no matter where he
may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, while domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when
it speaks of residence for the purpose of election law. And, the fact that a person is a RV in one district is not proof that he is not
domiciled in another district.

Toryano Sr., vs. Comelec 337 SCRA 574, the issue in this case is the residence qualification of Vicente Emano who filed his
certificate of candidacy for Mayor of Cagayan de Oro. Court explained that the purpose of the residence as required by
Constitution and the law as a qualification for seeking and holding public office, is to give candidates the opportunity to be
familiar with the needs, difficulties and aspiration, potentials for growth and all matters vital to the welfare of their constituencies.
On the part of the electorate, to evaluate the candidate’s qualifications and fitness for the job they aspire for. In this case Emano,
cannot be deemed to be a stranger or newcomer when he ran for and was overwhelmingly voted as city mayor having garnered a
margin of 30K votes.
Papandayan, Jr. vs. Comelec 381 SCRA 133. Domicile connotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business
or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. The requirements in order to acquire a new domicile by choice are: (a) an
intention to remain there; (b) residence or bodily presence in the new locality; and (c) an intention to abandon the old domicile.
ACTIONS TO CHALLENGE CANDIDACY OF A CANDIDATE OR DISQUALIFY CANDIDATE
1) Sec. 12 of the 0EC –

any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent (when we say incompetence, the
same may refer not only to mental illness, disease or physical disability but also to other causes which may include
minority or lack of residence requirement)
any person who has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion
for any offense for which carries a penalty of more than 18 months imprisonment
for a crime involving moral turpitude
The disqualification is removed by

plenary pardon or granted amnesty
upon declaration by a competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed
expiration of a period of 5 years from his service of sentence unless of course within the same period he
again becomes disqualified.
2) Sec. 68 of the OEC

those guilty of giving money or material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt voters or public official performing
electoral functions;
those who have committed terrorism to enhance his candidacy
those who have spent in the election campaign more than that required by law (Php10/RV/Php5.00) national-local
NOTE: Section 68 deals with a petition to disqualify a candidate for other violations of the election code as specified in said section,
and against a candidate who is a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country. That section does not specify a period within
which to file the petition.
In Codilla vs. De Venecia 393 SCRA 634, it was held that the power of Comelec to disqualify candidates is limited to the
enumerations mentioned in Section 68 of the OEC. Elements to be proved are as follows:
the candidate, personally or through his instructions, must have given money or other material consideration and
the act of giving material consideration or money should be for the purpose of influencing, inducing or corrupting the voters or
public officials performing electoral functions.
3) Sec. 69 – Petition to Abate a Nuisance Candidate – the Comelec, may motu propio or upon verified petition of an
interested party, refuse to give due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy if it is shown that it is filed in contemplation of a
nuisance candidate or cancel the same if already filed. This is an exception to the ministerial duty of the Comelec and its
officers to receive a certificate of candidacy under Section 76 of the OEC.
Even if ministerial duty, comelec can motu proprio but refuse to give due course. BUT, party must be given opportunity to be heard.
WHO IS A NUISANCE CANDIDATE
one who files his certificate to put the election process in mockery or disrepute
contemplates the likelihood of confusion which the similarity of surnames of two (2) candidates may generate. (in the
appreciation of ballots, when two candidates with the same name or surname and only the name or surname is written, will
be considered stray vote and will not be counted for either of the candidate unless one of the candidate with the same name
or surname is an incumbent – equity of the incumbent rule)
by other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bonafide intention to run for office, thus
would prevent the faithful determination of the true will of the people.
(Bautista vs. Comelec 298 SCRA 480)
Who can file – a petition to declare a candidate a nuisance candidate shall be filed by any registered candidate for the same
office within 5 days from the last day of the filing of the certificate of candidacy. (As amended by Section 5 of RA 6646

Rev. Elly Chavez Pumatong v. Comelec, G.R. No. 161872 13 April 2004 – The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance
candidates and the disqualification of candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The
State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational;, objective and orderly. Towards this end, the State
takes into account the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater
the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election.
These practical difficulties should, of course, never attempt the State from the conduct of a mandated electoral exercise. At the same
time, remedial actions should be available to alleviate these logistical hardships, whenever necessary and proper. Ultimately, a
disorderly election is not merely a textbook example of inefficiency, but a rot that erodes faith in our democratic institutions.
Martinez III vs. HRET 610 SCRA 53 (January 2010) – Proceedings in cases of nuisance candidates require prompt disposition.
The declaration of a duly registered candidate as nuisance candidate results in the cancellation of his COC.
Dela Cruz v. Comelec G.R. No. 192221, 13 November 2012 - (Should the votes cast for such nuisance candidate be
considered stray or counted in favor of the bona fide candidate?) – In an automated election, the Supreme Court, likewise
ruled not to consider the votes cast for a nuisance candidate as stray but to count them in favor of the bona fide candidate.
“As far as Comelec is concerned, the confusion caused by similarity of surnames of candidates for the same position and
putting the electoral process in mockery or disrepute, had already been rectified by the new voting system where the voter simply
shades the oval corresponding to the name of their chosen candidate. However, as shown in this case, Comelec issued Resolution No.
8844 on May 1, 2010, 9 days before the elections, with sufficient time to delete the names of disqualified candidates not just from the
Certified List of Candidates, but also from the Official Ballot. Indeed, what use will it serve if Comelec orders the names of disqualified
candidates to be deleted from list of official candidates if the official ballots still carry their name?
The Court holds that the rule in Resolution No. 4116 considering the votes cast for a nuisance candidate declared as such in a
final judgment, particularly where such nuisance candidate has the same surname as that of the legitimate candidate, not stray but
counted in favor of the latter, remains a good law. As earlier discussed, a petition to cancel or deny a CoC under Section 69 of the OEC
should be distinguished from a petition to disqualify under Section 68. Hence, the legal effect of such cancellation of a CoC of a
nuisance candidate cannot be equated with a candidate disqualified on grounds provided in the OEC and the Local Government Code.
The possibility of confusion in names of candidates if the names of nuisance candidates remained in the ballot on election day,
cannot be discounted or eliminated, even under the automated voting system especially considering that voters who mistakenly shaded
the oval beside the name of the nuisance candidate instead of the bonafide candidate they intended to vote for could no longer ask for
replacement ballots to correct the same.
4) Sec. 78 OEC – Petition to Deny due Course or to Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. “A verified petition seeking to deny
due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 (contents of the COC) of the OEC is false. The petition
may be filed at any time not later than 25 days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due
notice and hearing, not later than 15 days before election.”
Who may file – by any person through a verified petition
On What Grounds – the candidate made material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy. Section 78 deals “exclusively”
with a petition to deny due course to a COC on the ground that a material representation in the contents of the certificate under Sec.
74, is false. (pertains to a candidate’s eligibility or qualification such as citizenship, residence or status as a registered voter Maruhom
vs. Comelec 594 SCRA 108)
Period to File – Within 25 days from the last day for the filing of the certificate of candidacy.
Jurisdiction – Comelec sitting in a division.
Sergio G. Amora, Jr. vs. Comelec and Arnielo S. Olandria 640 SCRA 473 (2011) - To emphasize, a petition for
disqualification on the one hand, can be premised on Section 12 and 68 of the OEC, or Section 40 of the LGC. On the
other hand, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC can only be grounded on a statement of a material
representation in the said certificate that is false.
The petitions also have different effects. While a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to
continue as a candidate, the person whose certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a
candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC. Thus in Miranda v. Abaya, this Court made the distinction that a candidate who is
disqualified under Section 68 can validly be substituted under Section 77, but a person whose CoC has been denied due
course or cancelled under Section 78 cannot be substituted because he/she is never considered a candidate.” (also ruled in
Fermin v. Comelec 574 SCRA 782)
Mayor Barbara Ruby Talaga vs. Comele/Alcala 683 SCRA 197 (2012) – The High Court reiterated, that a Section 78 petition
should not be interchanged or confused with a Section 68 petition. The remedies under the two sections are different eventualities. A
person who is disqualified under Sectin 68 is prohibited to continue as a candidate, but a person whose CoC is cancelled or denied due
course under Section 78 is not considered as a candidate at all because his status is that of a person who has not filed a CoC. Miranda
v. Abaya 311 SCRA 617 (1999), has clarified that candidate who is disqualified under Section 68 can be validly substituted pursuant to
Section 77 because he remains a candidate until disqualified; but a person whose CoC has been denied due course or cancelled under
Section 78cannot be substituted because he is not considered a candidate.

Munder vs. Comelec 659 SCRA 254 (2011) - “Jurisprudence has clearly established the doctrine that a petition for disqualification
and a petition to deny due course to or to cancel a certificate of candidacy, are two distinct remedies to prevent a candidate from
entering an electoral race. Both remedies prescribe distinct period to file the corresponding petition, on which the jurisdiction of the
Commission on Elections over the case is dependent.”
Fernando V. Gonzalez vs. Comelec, et. al. 644 SCRA 761 (2011) - “In order to justify the cancellation of CoC, it is essential that
the false representation mentioned therein pertain to a material matter for the sanction imposed by Section 78 would affect
the substantive rights of the candidate – the right to run for the elective post for which he filed the CoC. Material
representation refers to qualifications for elective office (interpreted to refer to statements regarding age, residence and citizenship or
non-possession of natural-born Filipino status); Aside from the requirement of materiality, the false representation must consist of a
deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible; it must be made with the
intention to deceive the electorate as to one’s qualification for public office.” (also ruled in Salcedo II v. Comelec 312 SCRA 447 (1999))
Two remedies available for questioning the qualifications of the candidate: Distinction between the two
proceedings under Section 78 and Section 253 under B.P. 881, thereof (1) Before elections under Section 78 and (2) After
elections under Section 253. The only difference between the two proceedings is that, under Section 78, the qualifications for
elective office are misrepresented in the certificate of candidacy and the proceedings must be initiated before the
elections, whereas a petition for QW under Section 253 may be brought on the basis of two grounds – (1) ineligibility or
(2) disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines, and must be initiated within 10 days after proclamation of the election
results. Under Section 253, a candidate is ineligible if he is disqualified to be elected to office, and he is disqualified if he lacks any of
the qualification for election office.
Clearly, the ONLY INSTANCE where a petition questioning the qualifications of a candidate for elective office can be filed
before election is when the petition is filed under Section 78 of the OEC.
Period for filing a petition under Section 78 – In Loong v. Comelec 216 SCRA 760 (1992), the Court categorically declared that
the period for filing a petition for cancellation of candidacy based on false representation is covered by Rule 23 and NOT Rule 25
allowing the filing of a petition at any time after the last day for filing of CoC’s but not later than the date of proclamation, is merely a
procedural rule that cannot supercede Section 78 of the OEC.
A petition filed under Section 78 must not be interchanged or confused with one filed under Section 68 – In Fermin v.
Comelec 574 SCRA 782 (2008), the Court stressed that a petition which is properly a “Section 78 petition” must therefore be filed
within the period prescribed therein, and a procedural rules subsequently issue by Comelec cannot supplant this statutory period under
Section 78.
Jurisdiction – Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath and assumed office as a member of the House of
Representatives, the jurisdiction of the Comelec over election contests relating to his election, returns and qualifications ENDS and the
HRET own jurisdiction BEGINS.
In Perez v. Comelec 317 SCRA 641 (1999) the Court does not have jurisdiction to pass upon the eligibility of the private
respondent who was already a Member of the HR at the time of the filing of the petition for certiorari – considering that by statutory
provision (Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution, the HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the HR.
Procedure in filing Motion to Suspend Proclamation: The suspension of proclamation of a winning candidate is not a matter
which theComelec Second Division can dispose of motu propio. Section 6 of RA No. 6646 requires that the suspension must
be upon motion by the complainant or any intervenor.
Second Placer Rule- It is well-settled that the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible
candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected.
Exceptions to the Second Placer Rule – The exception to the second placer rule is predicated on the concurrence of the following
(1) the one who obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified; and (2) the electorate is FULLY AWARE in fact and in law of a
candidate’s disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety but would nonetheless case their votes in favor
of the ineligible candidate. These facts warranting the exception to the rules are not present in the case at bar.
Ashary M. Alauya (Clerk of Court, Shari’a District Court, Marawi City vs. Judge Casan Ali L. Limbona 646 SCRA 1 (2011)
- Partisan political activity – The filing of a certificate of candidacy is a partisan political activity as the candidate thereby offers
himself to the electorate for an elective post. “No officer or employee in the civil service shall engage directly or indirectly, in any
electioneering or partisan political campaign.” The act of the Judge in filing a certificate of candidacy as a party-list representative in
the May 1998 elections without giving up his judicial post violated not only the law, but also the constitutional mandate.
Teodora Sobejana-Condon v. Comelec/Luis Bautista/Robelito Picar/Wilma Pagaduan 678 SCRA 267 (2012) - Remedy of
a person who fails to file the petition to disqualify a certain candidate within the twenty-five (25)-day period prescribed by Section 78
of the OEC is to file a petition for QW within 10 days from proclamation of the results of the election as provided under Section 253 of
the OEC.

Renunciation of foreign citizenship to be valid under Section 5(2) of RA 9225 – The language of Section 5(2) of RA 9225 is free from
any ambiguity. In Lopez v. Comelec 559 SCRA 696 (2008), the Court declared it ‘s categorical and single meaning: a Filipino
American or any dual citizen cannot run fo any elective public position in the Philippines unless he or she personally swears to a
renunciation of all foreign citizenship at the time of filing the CoC. The Court also expounded on the form of the renunciation and held
that to be valid, the renunciation must be contained in an affidavit duly executed before an officer of the law who is authorized to
administer an oath stating in clear and unequivocal terms that affiant is renouncing foreign citizenship.
Casan Macode Maquiling v. Comelec et. al. 700 SCRA 367 (2013) –the declared policy of RA 9225 is that “all Philippine citizens
who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act”.
This policy pertains to the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. Section 5(2) requires those who have re-acquired Philippine
citizenship and who seek elective public office, to renounce any and all foreign citizenship. This requirement of renunciation of
any and all foreign citizenship, when read together with Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code which disqualifies those
with dual citizenship from running for any elective local position, indicates a policy that anyone who seeks to run for public
office must be solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen. To allow a former Filipino who reacquires Philippine citizenship to
continue using a foreign passport – which indicates the recognition of a foreign state of the individual as its national – even after the
Filipino has renounced his foreign citizenship, is to allow a complete disregard of this policy.
Panlaqui v. Comelec 613 SCRA 573 – Voters’ inclusion/exclusion proceedings essentially involve the issue of whether a petition
shall be included in or excluded from the list of voters based on the qualifications required by law and the facts presented to show
possession of these qualifications. On the other hand, the COC denial/cancellation proceedings involve the issue of whether there is a
false representation of a material fact. The false representation must necessarily pertain not to a mere innocuous mistake but to a
material fact or those that refer to a candidate’s qualification for elective office.
NOTE: In Fermin v. Comelec G.R. No. 179695 and G.R. No. 182369, December 18, 2008, the SC clarified that Section 5
(Procedure in cases of Nuisance candidates) and Section 7 (Petition to Deny Due Course To or Cancel a Certificate of
Candidacy under RA 6646, did not in any way amend the period for filing “Section 78” petitions.
While Section 7 of the said law makes reference to Section 5 on the procedure in the conduct of cases for the denial of due course
to the COC’s of nuisance candidates (then chief Justice Davide in his dissenting opinion in Aquino v. Comelec, G.R. No. 120265,
September 18, 1995 248 SCRA 400, explains that “the procedure hereinabove provided mentioned in Section 7 cannot be
construed to refer to Section 6 which does not provide for a procedure but to the effects of disqualification cases, (but) can only refer
to the procedure provided in Section 5 of the said Act on nuisance candidates, “ the same cannot be taken to mean that
the25-day period for filing Section 78 petitions is changed to 5 days counted from the last day for the filing of COC’s.
The clear language of Section 78 cannot be amended or modified b y a mere reference in a subsequent statute to the use of
a procedure specifically intended for another type of action. Cardinal is the rule in statutory construction that repeals by implication are
disfavored and will not be so declared by the Court unless the intent of the legislators is manifest. Noteworthy in Loong v. Comelec
216 SCRA 760 (1992),which upheld the 25-day period for filing Section 78 petitions, was decided long after the enactment
of RA 6646. Hence, Section 23, Section 2 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure is contrary to the unequivocal mandate of the law.
Following the ruling in Fermin, the Court declared that “as the law stands, the petition to deny due course to or cancel a COC
may be filed at anytime not later than 25-days from the time of the filing of the COC.
In Justimbaste v. Comelec 572 SCRA 736 (2008) – Material misrepresentation as a ground to deny due course or cancel a
certificate of candidacy refers to the falsity of a statement required to be entered therein as enumerated in Section 74 of the OEC.
Concurrent with materiality is a deliberate intention to deceive the electorate as to one qualification making reference to Salcedo II that
in order to justify the cancellation of the COC under Section 78, it is essential that the false representation mentioned therein pertained
to a material matter for the sanction imposed by this provision would affect the substantive rights of a candidate – the right to run for
the elective post for which he filed the COC. There is also no showing that there was an intent to deceive the electorate as to the
identity of the private respondent, nor that by using his Filipino name the voting public was thereby deceived.
DISQUALIFICATION UNDER THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE R.A. 7160

A candidate for an elective office may likewise be disqualified on the following grounds –
those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one
(1) year or more imprisonment, within 2 years after serving sentence. (Sec. 40) (Qualifications of local elective
candidates under the LGC was asked in the 1999 Bar)
NOTE:The 1st ground for disqualification consists of two (2) parts, namely: (1) those sentenced by final judgment for an offense
involving moral turpitude, regardless of the period of imprisonment; and (2) those sentenced by final judgment for an offense, OTHER
THAN one involving moral turpitude, punishable by one (1) year or more imprisonment, within 2 years after serving sentence.
Sec. 40 of RA 7160 limits the disqualification to two (2) years after service of sentence. This should now be read in relation to Sec. 11
of RA 8189 which enumerates those who are disqualified to register as a voter. The 2 year disqualification period under Sec. 40 is now
deemed amended to last 5 years from service of sentence after which period the voter will be eligible to register as a voter and to run
for an elective public office.
Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic

Fugitives from justice in criminal and non-political cases.
In Marquez, jr. vs. Comelec and Rodriguez 259 SCRA, it was held that fugitives from justice refer to a person who has
been convicted by final judgment. The SC ruled that when a person leaves the territory of a state not his own, homeward bound
and subsequently learns of the charges filed against him while he is in his own country, does not outrightly qualify him as a fugitive
from justice if he does not subject himself to the jurisdiction of the former state. When Rodriguez left the US, there was yet no
complaint filed and warrant of arrest, hence there is no basis in saying that he is running away from any prosecution or
punishment.
Those removed from office as a result of an administrative charge
In Rodolfo Aguinaldo vs. Comelec, it was held that a public elective official cannot be removed for administrative conduct
committed during a prior term as his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officers previous misconduct to
the extent of cutting of the right to remove him therefore. (distinguish from Reyes case)
(Admin charge was still pending in appeal)
Grego v. Comelec 274 SCRA 481, the Court ruled that Sec. 40 of RA 7160 does not have any retroactive effect. In this case a
Deputy Sheriff was removed for serious misconduct in 1981 prior to the effectivity of the Local Government Code. He run in 1992 &
1995. His removal in 1981 cannot serve as basis for his disqualification. Laws have prospective effect.
Those with dual citizenship. The relevant cases under this provision are the cases of –
Mercado v. Manzano & Comelec G.R. No. 135083 May 25, 1999
Aznar v. Comelec 185 SCRA 703
Cirilo Valles v. Comelec & Lopez G.R. #138000 August 9, 2000
In Aznar, it was ruled that the mere fact that respondent Osmeña was holder of a certificate stating that he is an American citizen did
not mean that he is no longer a Filipino & that an application for an ACR was not tantamount to renunciation of his Philippine
Citizenship.
Mercado v. Manzano & Comelec, it was held that the fact that respondent Manzano was registered as an American citizen in the
BID & was holding an American passport on April 22, 1997, only a year before he filed a certificate of candidacy for Vice-Mayor of
Makati, were just assertions of his nationality before the termination of his American citizenship.
Filing = renounce. Whatever status he had prior that were mere assertions of his citizenship.
Valles v COMELEC & Lopez (SUPERSEDED BY RA 9225), the Court held that the mere fact that Lopez was a holder of an Australian
passport and had an ACR are not act constituting an effective renunciation of citizenship and do not militate against her claim of
Filipino citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the lost of citizenship, the same must be express (Com. Act 63, Sec. 1).
Referring to the case of Aznar, an ACR does not amount to an express renunciation or repudiation of one’s citizenship. Similarly, her
holding of an Australian passport as in the Manzano case, were likewise mere acts of assertions before she effectively renounced the
same. Thus, at the most, Lopez had dual citizenship – she was an Australian and a Filipino, as well. (Dual does not automatically mean
DQ) (SUPERSEDED BY RA 9225)
In reconciling the disqualification under Sec. 40 of RA 7160. The Court clarified and as ruled in the Manzano case “dual citizenship” as
used in the LGC and reconciled with Article IV Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution on dual allegiance (Dual allegiance of citizens
is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.”) In recognizing situation in which a Filipino citizen may,
without performing any act, as an involuntary consequence of the conflicting laws of different countries, be also a citizen of another
state (jus sanguinis for the Philippines where the child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of his/her place of
birth as opposed to jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth), the Court explained that dual
citizenship as a disqualification must refer to citizens with dual allegiance.
The fact that Lopez had dual citizenship did not automatically disqualify her from running for public office. For candidates with dual
citizenship, it is enough that they elect Phil. Citizenship upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy, to terminate their status as
persons with dual citizenship. The filing of the certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce foreign citizenship effectively removing any
disqualification as a dual citizen.
In the Certificate of Candidacy, one declare that he/she is a Filipino citizen and that he/she will support and defend the Constitution of
the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto. Such declaration, which is under oath, operates as an effective
renunciation of foreign citizenship.
Lopez v. Comelec 559 SCRA 696 (2008)–The ruling in Valles in 2000 has been superseded by the enactment of RA 9225
in 2003. RA 9225 expressly provides for the condition before those who re-acquired Filipino citizenship may run for a public office in
the Philippines. Section 5 of the said law states: “Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. – Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine
Citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under
existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions xxx (2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the

certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath.
(Valles – act of filing = renounce na. But 9225 required file personally SWORN STATEMENT)
AASJS Member-hector G. Calilung vs. Secretary of Justice G.R. No. 160869, may 11, 2007, the SC took the opportunity to
set parameters of what constitutes dual allegiance considering that it only made a distinction between dual allegiance and dual
citizenship in Mercado vs. Manzano.
FACTS: Following the implementation of RA 9225 “An Act Making the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who Acquire foreign Citizenship
Permanent, amending for the purpose CA 63, as amended, petitioner filed a petition against respondent DOJ Secretary Simeon
Datumanong who was tasked to implement laws governing citizenship. He prayed for a writ of prohibition to stop respondent from
implementing RA 9225. he avers that RA 9225 is unconstitutional as it violates Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution
that states “ Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law”. He contends
that the Act cheapens the Philippine citizenship since the Act allows all Filipinos, either natural-born or naturalized, who become foreign
citizens, to retain their Philippine citizenship without losing their foreign citizenship. Section 3 permits dual allegiance because said law
allows natural-born citizens to regain their Philippine by simply taking an oath of allegiance without forfeiting their foreign allegiance.
The Constitution however, is categorical that dual allegiance is inimical to the national interest.
HELD: The intent of the legislature in drafting RA 9225 is to do away with the provision in CA 63, which takes away Philippine
citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries. RA 9225 allows dual citizenship to natural-
born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it
does not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign
citizenship. Plainly,Section 3, RA 9225 stayed clear out of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the
issue of whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What happens to the other citizenship was not made
a concern of RA 9225. (Note: Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a self-
executing provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance.)
In De Guzman v. Comelec, G.R. No. 180048 June 19, 2009, it was held that “where the Oath of allegiance and certificate of
candidacy did not comply with Section 5(2) of RA 9225 which further requires those seeking elective public office in the Philippines
to make a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship as where the candidate for VM of Guimba, Nueva Ecija failed to
renounce his American citizenship, it was held that he was disqualified from running for VM in the May 14, 2007 elections.
Teodora Sobejana-Condon v. Comelec/Luis Bautista et. al. 678 SCRA 267 (2012) - Renunciation of foreign citizenship to be
valid under Section 5(2) of RA 9225 – The language of Section 5(2) of RA 9225 is free from any ambiguity. In Lopez v.
Comelec 559 SCRA 696 (2008), the Court declared it ‘s categorical and single meaning: a Filipino American or any dual citizen
cannot run for any elective public position in the Philippines unless he or she personally swears to a renunciation of all foreign
citizenship at the time of filing the CoC. The Court also expounded on the form of the renunciation and held that to be valid, the
renunciation must be contained in an affidavit duly executed before an officer of the law who is authorized to administer an oath
stating in clear and unequivocal terms that affiant is renouncing foreign citizenship.
Maquiling vs. Comelec 700 SCRA 367 (2013) – If we allow dual citizens who wish to run for public office to renounce their foreign
citizenship and afterwards continue using their foreign passports, we are creating a special privilege for these dual citizens, thereby
effectively junking the prohibition in Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code. It must be stressed that what is at stake here is the
principle that only those who are exclusively Filipinos are qualified to run for public office.
Frivaldo v. Comelec 174 SCRA 245 (1989). Frivaldo was proclaimed governor elect of the Province of Sorsogon and subsequently
assumed office. A disqualification was filed against him by the League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter on the ground that he was
not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the US in 1983, which he admitted but which he undertook only to protect himself
against then President Marcos. The SC found Frivaldo disqualified for not having possessed the requirement of citizenship which
cannot be cured by the electorate, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified.
Republic v. dela Rosa 232 SCRA 785. The disqualification of Frivaldo was again at issue. Frivaldo opted to reacquire his Philippine
citizenship thru naturalization but however failed to comply with the jurisdictional requirement of publication, thus, the Court never
acquired jurisdiction to hear the naturalization of Frivaldo. He was again disqualified.
In Frivaldo v. Comelec 257 SCRA 72 (1996), Frivaldo later reacquired Philippines citizenship and obtained the highest number of
votes in 3 consecutive elections but was twice declared by the SC to be unqualified to hold office due to his lack of citizenship
requirement. He claimed to have re-acquired his Filipino citizenship thru repatriation. It was established that he took his oath of
allegiance under the provision of PD 725 at 2pm on 30 June 1995, much later than the time he filed his certificate of candidacy.
The Court held that the “the law does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship unlike that
of residence and age, as Sec. 39 of RA 7160 specifically speaks of “qualification of elective officials, not candidates” thus, the
citizenship requirement in the local government code to be possessed by an elective official at the latest as of the time he is proclaimed
and at the start of the term of office to which he has been elected. But to remove all doubts on this important issue, the Court
held that the repatriation of Frivaldo retroacted to the date of the filing of his application on 17 August 1994 and being

a former Filipino who has served the people repeatedly and at the age of 81, Frivaldo deserves liberal interpretation of
the Philippine laws and whatever defects there were in his nationality should now be deemed mooted by his
repatriation.
3 term limit or having served 3 consecutive terms.
Article X, Section 8, 1987 Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA 7160 provides “No local elective official shall serve for more
than 3 consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.
Abundo v COMELEC – Rationale of the 3-term limit rule. Abrogate monopolization of power and prevent politicians from breeding
proprietary interest but to enhance the people’s freedom of choice.
In Laceda Sr., vs. Limena & Comelec 571 SCRA 603 – the Court held that the rationale behind Section 2 of RA 9164, like Section
43 of RA 7190 (Local Government Code) from which the 3-term rule was taken, is primarily intended to broaden the choices of the
electorate of the candidates who will run for office, and to infuse new blood in the political arena by disqualifying officials from running
for the same office after a term of 9 years.
The case of Laceda Sr. involved a similar question in Latasa vs. Comelec 417 SCRA 601 where the Court held that where a person
has been elected for 3 consecutive terms as municipal mayor and prior to the end or termination of such 3-year term the municipality
has been converted by law into a city, without the city charter interrupting his term until the end of the 3-year term, the
prohibition applied to prevent him from running for the 4th time as city mayor thereof, there being no break in the continuity of the
terms. Comelec did not err nor commit any abuse of discretion when it declared Laceda disqualified and cancelled his COC.
Adormeo v. Comelec & Talaga, Jr. G.R. No. 147927 04 February 2002 and citing Borja v. Comelec 295 SCRA 157 and
Lonzanida v. Comelec 311 SCRA 602, it was ruled that the term limit for elective local officals must be taken to refer to the “right
to be elected” as well as the “right to serve in the same elective position.” Thus, two (2) conditions for the application of the
disqualification must concur:
that the official concerned has been elected for three (3) consecutive terms in the same local government post; and
that the has fully served the three (3) consecutive terms.
In this case, respondent Talaga, Jr., was elected mayor of Lucena City in May 1992. He served the full term, was re-elected in
1995-98 but lost in the 1998 election to Tagarao. In the recall elections of May 2000, Talaga, Jr. won and served the unexpired term
of Tagarao until 30 June 2001. Talaga Jr. filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position in the 2001 elections which candidacy
was challenged by petition Adormeo on the ground that Talaga, Jr. is already barred by the 3-term limit rule.
Adormeo contends that Talaga’s candidacy violated Section 8, Article X of the Constitution which states that the term of office of local
elective officials shall be three (3) years and no such official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms citing the case of
Lonzanida v. Comelec To further support his case, he adverts to the comment of Fr. Joaquin Bernas who stated that in interpreting said
provision that “if one is elected representative to serve the unexpired term of another, that unexpired term, no matter how short, will
be considered one term for the purpose of computing the number of successive terms allowed.”
The Comelec en banc ruled in favor of Talaga which reversed the ruling of the 1 st division and held that – 1) Talaga was not elected for
3 consecutive terms because he did not win the 11 May 1998 elections; 2) that he was installed only as mayor by reason of his victory
in the recall elections; 3) that his victory in the recall elections was not considered a term of office and is not included in the 3-term
disqualification rule and finally 4) that he did not fully serve the 3 consecutive term. His loss in the 11 May 1998 elections is considered
an interruption in the continuity of his service as Mayor of Lucena City. ISSUE: Was Talaga disqualified to run for Mayor of Lucena
City in the 14 May 2001 elections?
In holding the qualifications of Talaga, the Court reiterated its ruling in Borja that the term limit for elective local officials must be taken
to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position considering that the continuity of his
mayorship was disrupted by the defeat in the 1998 elections which is considered as an interruption in the continuity of service. The
Court further held that the comment of Fr. Bernas is pertinent only to member of the HR there being no recall elections
provided for members of Congress.
In Lonzanida v. Comelec and Lu 28 311 SCRA 602 (July 1998), Lonzanida was elected and served 2 consecutive terms as
municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales, prior to the 08 May 1995 elections. In the May 1995 elections, Lonzanida ran for the same
elective post and was again proclaimed winner. He assumed office and discharged the duties thereof. His proclamation in 1995 was
contested by his then opponent Juan Alvez who filed an election protest before the RTC of Zambales which rendered a decision
declaring a failure of elections rendering the result for the office as null and void. The office of the mayor was then declared vacant.
Both parties appealed to the Comelec and on 13 Nov. 1997, it resolved the election protest filed by Alvez in his favor after determining
that Alvez garnered the plurality of votes. The Comelec issued a writ of execution ordering Lonzanida to vacate the post to which he
obeyed and Alvez assumed for the remainder of the term.

Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy for Mayor in the 11 May 1998 and his opponent timely filed a petition to disqualify him
for the same post. ISSUE: Whether Lonzanida’s assumption of office from May 1995 to March 1998 may be considered as service of
one full term for the purpose of applying the 3-term limit for elective local government officials. It was held that Lonzanida is still
qualified to run for mayor and held that the 2-rquisites for the application of the 3-term limit is wanting. First, petitioner cannot be
considered as having been elected to the post in the May 1995 elections, and second, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998
mayoralty term by reason of involuntary relinquishment of office. An interruption for any length of time, if due to an
involuntary cause is enough to break the elected officials’ continuity of service.
As repeatedly ruled by the SC, a “proclamation subsequently declared void is no proclamation at all and while a proclaimed
candidate may assume office on the strength of the proclamation of the BOC, he is only a presumptive winner who
assumes the office subject of the final outcome of the election protest.”
Another issue raised in Lonzanida is that the Comelec already lost jurisdiction over the disqualification case when he
was proclaimed as winner and that jurisdiction is already with the RTC for QW. The SC reiterated its ruling in Trinidad v.
Comelec 288 SCRA 76 (1998) that pursuant to Sec. 6 of RA 6646, the proclamation nor assumption of office of a candidate against
whom a petition for disqualification is pending before the Comelec does not divest the Comelec of jurisdiction to continue hearing the
case and resolve it on the merits.(Also ruling in Dizon v. Comelec 577 SCRA 589).
Borja v. Comelec 295 SCRA 157 (1998), the SC ruled on the issue on whether a VM who succeeds to the office of mayor by
operation of law and serves the remainder of the term is considered to have served a term in that office for the purpose of the 3-term
limit. The SC upheld the decision of the Comelec that succession for the expired term is not the service contemplated as would
disqualify the elective official from running for the same elective post. The purpose of this provision is to prevent a circumvention of
the limitation on the number of terms an elective local official may serve. Conversely, if he is not serving a term for which he was
elected as he was simply continuing the service of the official he succeeds, such official cannot be considered to have fully served the
term notwithstanding his voluntary renunciation of office prior to his expiration. (Asked in the 2001 BAR)
- when he assumed the position of mayor by virtue of succession, his service should not be treated as 1 full term. For disqualification to
apply, the candidate should have been thrice elected and have served the same post consecutively.
In applying said policy, the following situations (tenures in office) are NOT considered service of term for purpose of applying the 3-
term limit –
officer fills up a higher office by succession/operation of law

officer is suspended from office (failed to serve full term/involuntary)
officer unseated, ordered to vacate by reason of an election protest case
officer serving unexpired term after winning in the recall elections;
In Ong vs. Alegre 479 SCRA 473 – A petition for disqualification was filed against Francis Ong for having violated the 3-term limit
rule for having served as mayor of San Vicente Camarines Norte in the May 1995, 1998 & 2001 elections. The controversy revolves
around the 1998-2001 mayoral term wherein the election protest filed by Alegre was promulgated after the term of the contested
office has expired.
The question for consideration is whether or not the assumption of Francis Ong as Mayor from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001, may be
considered as one full term service in the context of the consecutive term limit rule. The Court declared that such assumption of office
constitutes, for Francis, “service for the full term” and should be counted as a full term served in contemplation of the 3-term limit
prescribed by the constitutional and statutory provisions, barring elective officials from being elected and serving for more than 3-
consecutive terms.
The Court debunked the claim of Francis Ong that he was only a presumptive winner in view of the ruling of the RTC that Alegre was
the real winning candidate in the light of his being proclaimed by the MBOC coupled by his assumption of office and his continuous
exercise of the functions thereof from start to finish of the term, should legally be taken as service for a full term in contemplation of
the 3-term rule. Lonzanida from which Ong sought refuge is not applicable in view of the involuntary relinquishment of office before
the expiration of his term. (Same ruling in Rivera III vs. Comelec 523 SCRA)
Aldovino Jr., vs. Comelec 609 SCRA 234 (2009) – Article X, Section 8 – both by structure and substance – fixes an elective
official’s term of office and limits his stay in office to 3 consecutive terms as an inflexible rule that is stressed, no less, by citing
voluntary renunciation as an example of a circumvention. The provision should be read in the context of interruption of term, NOT
in the context of interrupting the full continuity of the exercise of the power of the elective position. The “voluntary
renunciation” it speaks of refers only to the elective official’s involuntary relinquishment of office and loss of title to this office. It does
not speak of the temporary “cessation of the exercise of power or authority” that may occur for various reasons, with
preventive suspension being only one of them. Quoting Latasa – the law contemplates a rest period during which the
local elective official steps down from office and ceases to exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of the
territorial jurisdiction of a particular government unit.” Preventive suspension did not interrupt the elective official’s
term.
SUMMARY consecutive terms and involuntary interruption:

1. Borja Jr Case and Abundo v COMELEC– when a permanent vacancy occurs in an elective position and the
official merely assumes the position pursuant to the rules of succession under the Local Government Code, this
service for the unexpired portion of the replaced official, it cannot be treated as one full term as contemplated
under the Constitutional prohibition. So it cannot be counted.
2. Socrates Case- an elective official who has served for 3 consec terms and who did not seek the elective
position had an interruption in the continuity of the service for he had become in the interim from the third
term up to the end of the recall election a private citizen. So Recall election
3. Elective local office due to the conversion of a municipality to a city does not by itself interrupt the incumbent
officials continuity of service (Latasa Case)
4. Preventive suspension is not a term interruptive event as the officer’s continued stay and entitlement to the
office remain during the period of suspension although he is barred from exercising the function of his office.
(Aldovino case)
5. When a candidate is proclaimed as winner for an elective position and assumes office, his term is interrupted
then he loses in an election protest and he is ousted from office. Thus disenabling him from serving what
would otherwise be the unexpired portion of his office had the case been dismissed. Interruption = for any
length of time provided the cause is INVOLUNTARY. Sec 8 Art 10 voluntary.
6. Ong and Rivera when an official is defeated in an election protest and such decision becomes final after the
official has served the full term, then his loss in the election protest does not constitute as an interruption
because he has served his term from the start to the finish. So counted in the computation of the term limit
because the nullification came after the expiration of his term.
DISQUALIFICATION CASES (EFFECTS)
If declared DQ by FJ before an election, name is considered stray.

But if not resolved prior to election and he won, candidate can be proclaimed.
Sec. 72 of the OEC and Section 6 of 6646 states: “any candidate who been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall
not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment
before an election to be disqualified and is voted for and received the winning number of votes in such election, the Comelec shall
continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is
strong.”
Arateo v COMELEC Oct 9 2012 The COC was cancelled because he was ineligible or not qualified to run for mayor.
Whehter COC was cancelled before or after the election is immaterial because cancellation means he was never
candidate from the beginning because coc void ab initio. So only one qualified candidate in that election. Anitpolo
therefore received the highest number of votes.
CAMPAIGN AND ELECTION PROPAGANDA
Election period is 120 days - 90 days before the date of the election and 30 days thereafter. Campaign period for Pres., VP and
Senators starts 90 days before the date of the election, 45 days for members of the HR and local candidate and 15 days for barangay
official, which excludes the day before and the day of the elections.
Prohibited Activities – Section 80 BP881 – Election campaign or partisan political activity outside campaign period. It shall be
unlawful for any person whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any party or association of persons, to engage in an election
campaign or partisan political activity except during the campaign period: Provided, That political parties may hold political convention
or meetings to nominate their official candidates within 30 days before the commencement of the campaign period and 45 days for
President and Vice-President.
RA 9006 (Fair Election Law),

Lifted the political ad ban. Can buy from media subject to limitations and conditions. Truth in advertising. With
supervision of the COMELEC.
SWS v COMELEC – RA 9006 was adopted guaranteeing or ensuring equal opportunity for public service. Stipulates
regulation of the enjoyment of all permits in the operation of media.
Section 3.Election propaganda whether on television, cable television, radio, newspapers or any other medium is hereby allowed for
all registered political parties, national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations participating under the party-list elections and for all
bona fide candidates seeking national and local positions subject to the limitation on authorized expenses of candidates and political
parties, observance of truth in advertising and to the supervision and regulation by the Comelec.
Requirements for Published or Printed Broadcast Election Propaganda. RA 9006 now allows paid political advertisements for
print and broadcast media provided the said advertisement shall bear and be identified by reasonably legible or audible words “
Political advertisement paid for” followed by the true and correct name and address of the candidate or party for
whose benefit the election propaganda was printed or aired.

Free of charge – if broadcast is given free of charge the radio and television station, it shall be identified by the words “airtime for
this broadcast was provided free of charge by” followed by the true and correct name and address of the broadcast entity. Provided
that said print, broadcast donated shall not be published or printed without the written acceptance of the candidate or political party
which acceptance shall be attached to the advertising contract and submitted to the Comelec.
Guidelines whether by purchase or donation – Print advertisements shall not exceed ¼ page in broadsheet and ½ page in
tabloids 3 x a week per newspaper, magazine or other publications during the campaign period. (Section 6, RA 9006).
Television/Radio Advertisements – nation candidates/registered political party shall be entitled to not more than 120 minutes of
TV advertisement and 180 minutes of radio. Local candidates not more than 60 minutes of TV advertisement and 90 minutes of radio.
Comelec Time and space – print space, Comelec shall pay just compensation (PPI ruling) in at least 3 newspapers of general
circulation which Comelec shall allocate free of charge to the national candidates. Broadcast network (radio and TV) free of charge to
Comelec.(Section 8, RA 9006)
Limitations In Broadcasting of Election Accounts – Comelec shall ensure that radio and television or cable television
broadcasting entities shall not allow the scheduling of any program or permit any sponsor to manifestly favor or oppose any candidate
or political party or unduly or repeatedly referring to or including said candidate and/or political party in such program respecting,
however, in all instances the right of said broadcast entities to air accounts of significant news or news worthy events and views on
matter of public interest.
Restrictions on Media Practitioners – any mass media columnist, commentator, reporter or non-air correspondent or personality
who is a candidate for any elective office or is a campaign volunteer for or employed or retained in any capacity by any candidate or
political party shall be deemed resigned, if so required by their employer, or shall take a leave of absence from his/her work as such
during the campaign period. Any media practitioner who is an official of a political party or member of the campaign staff of a
candidate or political party shall not use his/her time or space to favor any candidate or political party
No movie, cinematography or documentary portraying the life or biography of a candidate shall be publicly exhibited in a
theater, television stations or any public forum during the campaign period or those portrayed by an actor or media personality who is
himself a candidate.
Posting of Campaign Materials – political parties and party-list groups may be authorized by the Comelec common poster areas for
their candidates in not more than 10 public places such as plazas, markets, barangay centers and the like, wherein, candidates can
post, display or exhibit election propaganda. The size of the poster areas shall not exceed 12 x 16 feet or it equivalent. With respect
to independent candidates, may likewise avail of this but the difference is merely on the size which shall not exceed 4 x 6 feet or its
equivalent. (Section 9, RA 9006)
RA 9189, Section 15 – Regulation of Campaign Abroad – The use of campaign materials, as well as the limits on campaign spending
shall be governed b the laws and regulations applicable to the Philippines.
BP 881, Section 95 – Prohibited Contributions. No contribution for purposes of partisan political activity shall be made directly or
indirectly by any of the following:
(a) Public or private financial institutions: Provided, however, That nothing herein shall prevent the making of any loan to a
candidate or political party by any such public or private financial institutions legally in the business of lending money,
and that the loan is made in accordance with laws and regulations and in the ordinary course of the business;
(b) Natural and juridical persons operating a public utility or in possession of or exploiting any natural resources of the
nation;
(c) Natural and juridical persons who hold contract or sub-contract to supply the government or any of its divisions,
subdivisions or instrumentalities, with goods or services or to perform construction or other works;
(d) Natural and juridical persons who have been granted franchises, incentives, exemptions, allocations or similar privileges
or concessions by the government or any of its divisions, subdivisions or instrumentalities, including government-owned
or controlled corporations.
(e) Natural and juridical persons who, within the one year prior to the date of the election, have been granted loans or other
accommodations in excess of 100K by the government or any of its divisions, subdivisions or instrumentalities including
government owned or controlled corporations.
(f) Educational institutions which have received grants of public funds to no less than 100K;
(g) Officials or employees in the Civil Service, or members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines;
(h) Foreigners and foreign corporations.
It shall be unlawful for any person to solicit or receive any contribution from any of the persons or entities enumerated herein.
ABS-CBN 323 SCRA 811, the SC defined exit polls as a specie of electoral survey conducted by qualified individuals or groups of
individuals for the purpose of determining the probable result of an election by confidentially asking randomly selected voters whom
they have voted for, immediately after they have officially cast their ballots. An absolute prohibition is unreasonably restrictive because
it effectively prevents the use of exit poll data not only for election days of the elections, but also for long term research. The concern

of Comelec of a non-communicative effect of the exit polls which is disorder and confusion in the voting centers does not justify a total
ban of the exist polls. Comelec should instead set safeguards in place for those who intends to conduct exit polls.
COMELEC cannot prohibit ABS to use exit poll. Unreasonably restrictive. Can be used not just for election days but also for research.
Section 5.5 of RA 9006 (Fair Elections Law) provides for the requirements for the taking of an exit polls:
pollsters shall not conduct their survey within 50 meters from the polling place whether said survey is taken in a home,
dwelling place and other places;
pollsters shall wear distinctive clothing;
pollsters shall inform the voters that they may refuse to answer; and
the result of the exit polls may be announced after the closing of the polls on election day, and must clearly identify the total
number of respondents, and the places where they were taken.. Said announcement shall state that the same is unofficial and
does not represent a trend.
SOCIAL WEATHER STATION vs. COMELEC 357 SCRA 496 – This case involved the issue on election surveys. SWS is a private
non-stock, non-profit social research institution conducting surveys in various fields, including economics, politics, demography and
social development, and thereafter, processing, analyzing and publicly reporting the results thereof. On the other hand, Kamahalan
Publishing Corporation publishes the Manila Standard, a newspaper of general circulation, which features newsworthy items of
information including election surveys.
Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin the Comelec from enforcing par. 5.4 of RA 9006 which provides,
“Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates
shall not be published seven (7) days before an election”.
The term “election surveys” is defined in par. 5.1 of the law as follows ”Election surveys refer to the measurement of opinions
and perception of the voters as regards a candidate’s popularity, qualification, platforms or a matter of public discussion in relation to
the election, including voters’ preference for candidates or publicly discussed issues during the campaign period”.
Petitioner SWS states that it wishes to conduct an election survey throughout the period of the elections both at the national
and local levels and release to the media the results of such survey as well as publish them directly. Kamahalan also states that it
intends to publish election survey results up to the last day of the elections on May 14, 2001. SWS v. Kamahalan Publishing HELD:
Par. 5.4 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgement of freedom of speech, expression and the press. It is invalid
because it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression and it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression
even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by
means other than the suppression of freedom of expression.
RA 9006, Section 5 Election surveys – refers to the measurements of opinions and perceptions of the voters as regards a
candidate’s popularity, qualifications, platforms or matter of public discussion in relation the election, including voters’ preference or
candidates or publicly discussed issues during the campaign period. The person or entity who publishes a survey is required to include
the following information: (as discussed in the 2015 SWS case)
Name of the person, candidate, party or organization who commissioned or paid the survey;
Name and address of the person or polling firm from who conducted the survey
Period during which the survey was conducted, methodology used, including the number or individual respondents and the
areas from which they were selected and the specific questions asked
Margin of error of the survey.
The survey together with the raw data gathered to support the conclusions shall be available for inspection, copying and
verification by the Comelec, or by the registered political party or any Comelec accredited citizen arm.
(Secc.5 para. 4 is no longer applicable. It was declared unconstitutional Sec 5 para 2 and 3 provide for regulation of the conduct of
election of survey)
Election surveys means to shape the prefence of voters. Strategy of campaign machineries affect outcome of elections. Similar nature
to election paraphernalia. Extensive, normally paid for by those interested in the outcome of the elections, and have tremendous
consequences on election results.
SWS v COMELEC (2015) Case – Mr Tiangco compelled SWS and Pulse Asia to comply with the COMELEC requirement by giving the
names and the identities of the subscriber who paid for the pre election survey in 2013. Otherwise, be held liable. SC: Election survey
is akin to an election propaganda subject to the regulation of the COMELEC. Effect of election surveys: Likens election to a horse race
denominated by the number rather than focusing on the issues and principles programs and platforms.
First, there is the bandwagon effect where "electors rally to support the candidate leading in the polls." This "assumes that
knowledge of a popular ‘tide’ will likely change voting intentions in [favor] of the frontrunner, that many electors feel more comfortable

supporting a popular choice or that people accept the perceived collective wisdom of others as being enough reason for supporting a
candidate."
Second, there is the underdog effect where "electors rally to support the candidate trailing in the polls." This shift can be motivated
by sympathy for the perceived underdog.
Third, there is the motivating effect where "individuals who had not intended to vote are persuaded to do so,"having been alerted of
the fact of an election’s imminence.
Fourth, there is also the demotivating effect where "voters abstain from voting out of certainty that their candidate or party will
win[.]"
Fifth, there are reports of a behavior known as strategic voting where "voting is influenced by the chances of winning[.]"
Lastly, there is also the theory of a free-will effect where "voters cast their ballots to prove the polls wrong[.]"
Election surveys published during election periods create the "politics of expectations." Voters act in accordance with what is perceived
to be an existing or emerging state of affairs with respect to how candidates are faring.
Now an election of propaganda subject to the regulation of the COMELEC.
PREMATURE CAMPAIGNING
In Francisco Chavez v. Comelec et. al. G.R. No. 162777 31 August 2004, Chavez brought before the SC a Petition for
Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction as taxpayer and citizen asking the Court to enjoin the
Comelec from enforcing Section 21 of its Resolution No. 6520 dated 06 January 2004. (Sec. 32 provides: All propaganda materials
such as posters, streamers, stickers or paintings on walls and other materials showing the picture or name of a person and all
advertisements on print, in radio or on television showing the image or mentioning the name of a person, who subsequent to the
placement or display thereof becomes a candidate for public office shall be immediately removed by said candidate and radio station,
print media or television station within 3 days after the effectivity of these implementing rules; otherwise, he and the said radio station,
print media or television station shall be presumed to have conducted premature campaigning in violation of Sec. 80 of the OEC)
Chavez on various dates entered in formal agreement with certain establishment to endorse their products and pursuant
thereto, 3 bill boards were set up on some strategic areas in Metro Manila. Subsequently on 30 December 2003, Chavez filed his
certificate of candidacy for the position of Senator. On 06 January 2004, Comelec issued Resolution No. 6520 which contained Section
32. Comelec directed Chavez to comply with the said provision and replied how he may have violated the assailed provision. Another
letter was sent seeking exemption from the application of Section 32, considering that the billboard adverted to are mere product
endorsements and cannot be construed as paraphernalia for premature campaigning under the rules.
Comelec replied by informing him to remove or cover the said billboards pending the resolution of the Comelec on his request
for exemption. Aggrieved, Chavez sent to the SC via a petition for prohibition seeking the said provision as unconstitutional based on
the following grounds –
It was a gross violation of the non-impairment clause
An invalid exercise of police power
In the nature of an ex post facto law
Contrary to the Fair Elections Act
Invalid due to overbreadth
As to the 1st issue – is Section 32 of Comelec Resolution No. 6520 an invalid exercise of police power? Petitioner argues: the billboards
(even if it bears his name) do not at all announce his candidacy for any public office nor solicit for such candidacy from the electorate;
they are mere product endorsements and not election propaganda. Prohibition is not within the scope of power of the Comelec.
RULING – police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty, is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morale,
peace, education, good order or safety of the general welfare of the people. The primary objective of the provision is to prohibit
premature campaigning and to level the playing field for candidates of public office, to equalize the situation between
popular or rich candidates, on one hand and lesser-known or poorer candidates, on the other, by preventing the former
from enjoying undue advantage in exposure and publicity on account of their resources and popularity. This is a valid
reason for the exercise of police power as held in the Philippines Press Institute v. Comelec case.
It is true that when petitioner entered into the contract or agreements to endorse certain products, he acted as a private individual and
had all the right to lend his name and image to these products. However, when he filed his COC for senator, the billboards featuring
his name and image assumed partisan political character because the same directly promoted his candidacy. If subject billboards were
to be allowed, candidates for public office whose name and image are used to advertise commercial products would have more
opportunity to make themselves known to the electorate, to the disadvantage of other candidates who do not have the same chance of
lending their faces and names to endorse popular commercial products as image models. Similarly, an individual intending to run for
public office within the next few months, could pay private corporations to use him as their image model with the intention of

familiarizing the public with his name and image even before the start of the campaign period. This, without doubt, would be a
circumvention of the rule against premature campaigning..
Section 32 neither violated the non-impairment clause as this must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the Government. Equal
opportunity to proffer oneself for public office, without regard to the level of financial resources one may have at his disposal, is a vital
interest to the public. The SC has stressed that contracts affecting public interest contain an implied reservation of the police power as
a postulate of the existing legal order. This power can be activated at anytime to change the provisions of the contract, or even
abrogate it entirely, for the promotion or protection of the genera; welfare. Such an act will not militate against the impairment clause.
Which is subject to and limited by the paramount police power.
On the issue that Sec. 32 of the Comelec Resolution is in the nature of an ex post facto law. Not ex post facto – the offense as
expressly prescribed in Section 32, is the non-removal of the described propaganda materials three (3) days after the effectivity of the
said Resolution. If the candidate for public office fails to remove such propaganda materials after the given period, he shall be liable
under Section 80 of the OEC for premature campaigning. Nowhere is it indicated in the said provision that it shall operate
retroactively.
On the issue that the provision was a violation of the Fair Elections Act as billboards are already permitted as lawful election
propaganda. It was ruled that the provision does not prohibit billboards as lawful election propaganda. It only regulates their use to
prevent premature campaigning and to equalize, as much as practicable, the situation of all candidates by preventing popular and rich
candidates from gaining undue advantage in exposure and publicity on account of their resources and popularity. Comelec was only
doing its duty under the law (Sec. 3 and 13 of the Fair Elections Act on lawful propaganda)
Section 80 of the OEC provides “it shall be unlawful for any person, whether or not a voter or candidate or for any party,
or association of persons, to engage in an election campaign or partisan political activity, except during the campaign
period.”
Penera v. Comelec 599 SCRA 609.The issue on premature campaigning was raised. Facts show that Penera and Andanar were
mayoralty candidates in Sta. Monica in the last May 14, 2007 elections. Andanar filed before the Office of the Regional Election
Director, Caraga Region, Region XIII, a petition for disqualification against Penera for unlawfully engaging in election campaigning and
partisan political activity prior to the commencement of the campaign period.
The Petition alleged that on 29 March 2007, a day before the start of the authorized campaign period on 30 March 2007, Penera and
her partymates went around the different barangays in Sta. Monica, announcing their candidacies and requesting the people to vote for
them on the day of the elections. Penera alleged that the charge was not true although having admitted that a motorcade did take
place which was simply in accordance with the usual practice in nearby cities and provinces, where the filing of COC was preceded by a
motorcade, which dispersed soon after the completion of such filing. Penera in her defense cited Barroso v. Ampig (385 Phil 2237; 328
SCRA 530) wherein the Court ruled that a motorcade held by candidates during the filing of their COC’s was not a form of political
campaigning. Pending the disqualification case, Penera was proclaimed as winner and assumed office.
Comelec ruled that Penera engaged in premature campaigning in violation of Section 80 and disqualified Penera from continuing as a
mayoralty candidate. The SC ruled no abuse of discretion on the part of the Comelec and held that the conduct of a
motorcade is a form of election campaign or partisan political activity which fall squarely under of Section 79 of the
OEC.
Penera moved for reconsideration arguing that she was not yet a candidate at the time of the supposed premature campaigning,
since under Section 15 of RA 8436 (the law authorizing the Comelec to use an automated election system for the process of voting,
counting of votes, and canvasing/consolidating the results of the national and local elections), as amended by RA 9369, is not officially
a candidate until the start of the campaign period.
In granting Penera’s MR, the SC En Banc held that Penera did not engage in premature campaigning and should thus,
not be disqualified as a mayoralty candidate. The Court said-
(a) The Court’s 11 September 2009 Decision (or the assailed Decision) considered a person who files a certificate of
candidacy already a “candidate” even before the start of the campaign period. This is contrary to the clear intent and letter of Section
15 of RA 8436, as amended, which stated that a person who files his certificate of candidacy will only be considered a
candidate at the start of the campaign period, and unlawful acts or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect
only upon the start of such campaign period. In applying the said law –
(1) The effective date when partisan political acts become unlawful as to a candidate is when the campaign
period starts. Before the start of the campaign period, the same partisan political acts are
lawful.
(2) Accordingly, a candidate is liable for an election offense only for acts done during the campaign
period, not before. In other words, election offenses can be committed by a candidate only upon
the start of the campaign period. Before the start of the campaign period, such election
offenses cannot be committed. Since Penera can only be considered as a candidate at the start of the
campaign period, she cannot be held liable for the said premature campaigning. The filing of the COC

earlier is for the purpose of being including her name in the printing of ballots (since
automated na).
Since the law is clear, the Court has no recourse but to apply it. The forum for examining the wisdom of the law, and
enacting remedial measures, is not the Court but the Legislature.
(b) Contrary to the assailed Decision, Section 15, of RA 8436, as amended, does not provide that partisan political acts
done by a candidate before the campaign period are unlawful, but may be prosecuted only upon the start of the campaign period.
Neither does the law state that partisan political acts done by a candidate before the campaign period are temporarily lawful, but
becomes unlawful upon the start of the campaign period. Besides, such a law as envisioned in the Decision, which defines a criminal
act and curtails freedom of expression and speech, would be void for vagueness.
(c) That Section 15 of RA 8436 does not expressly state that campaigning before the start of the campaign period is
lawful, as the assailed decision asserted, is no moment. It is a basic principle of law that any act is lawful unless expressly declared
unlawful by law. The mere fact that the law does not declare an act unlawful ipso facto means that the act is lawful. Thus, there is no
need for Congress to declare in Section 15 of RA 8436 that partisan political activities before the start of the campaign period is lawful.
It is sufficient for Congress to state that “any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of
the campaign period.” The only inescapable and logical result is that the same acts, if done before the start of the campaign period,
are lawful.
(d) The Court’s 11 September 2009 Decision also reversed Lanot v. Comelec (G.R. No. 164858, 16 November 2006).
Lanot was decided on the ground that one who files a certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign period.
This ground was based on the deliberations of the legislators who explained that the early deadline for filing COC under RA 8436 was
set only to afford time to prepare the machine readable ballots, and they intended to preserve the existing election period, such that
one who files his COC to meet the early deadline will still not be considered as a candidate.
When Congress amended RA 8436, Congress decided to expressly incorporate the Lanot doctrine into law, thus, the provision in
Section 15, of RA 8436 that a person who files his certificate of candidacy shall be considered a candidate only at the start of the
campaign period. Congress wanted to insure that no person filing a certificate of candidacy under the early deadline required by
the automated election system would be disqualified or penalized for any partisan political act done before the start of the campaign
period. This provision cannot be annulled by the Court except on the sole ground of its unconstitutionality. The assailed Decision,
however, did not claim that this provision is unconstitutional. In fact, the assailed Decision considered the entire Section 15 good law.
Thus, the Decision was self-contradictory – reversing Lanot but maintaining the constitutionality of the said provision.
In Lanot vs. Comelec 507 SCRA 114, the Court ruled that there are two aspects of a disqualification case:
1) Electoral aspect determines whether the offender should be disqualified from being a candidate or from holding office.
Proceedings are summary in character and require only clear preponderance of evidence. An erring candidate may be
disqualified even without prior determination of probable cause in a PI. The electoral aspect may proceed independently of
the criminal aspect and vice-versa.
2) Criminal aspect determines whether there is probable cause to charge a candidate for an election offense. If there is
probable cause, the Comelec through its Law Department, files the criminal information before the proper court. Proceedings
before the proper court demand a full-blown hearing and require proof beyond reasonable doubt to convict. A criminal
conviction shall result in the disqualification of the offender, which may even include disqualification from holding a future
public office.
CANVASSING BODIES
*** distinction manual and automated election!
Section 221, BP 881/RA 6646, Section 20 - Boards of Canvassers (Local Boards). There shall be a board of canvassers for each
province, city and municipality as follows:
(a) Provincial Board of Canvassers – The provincial board of canvassers shall be composed of the provincial election
supervisor or a lawyer in the regional office of the Commission, as chairman, the provincial fiscal, as vice-chairman, and
the provincial superintendent of schools as member.
(b) City Board of Canvassers – The city board of canvassers shall be composed of the city election registrar or a lawyer of the
Commission, as chairman, the city fiscal, as vice-chairman, and the city superintendent of schools, as member. In cities
with more than one election registrar, the Commission shall designate the election registrar as chairman.
(c) Municipal Board of Canvassers. – The municipal board of canvassers shall be composed of the election registrar or a
representative of the Commission, as chairman, the municipal treasurer, as vice-chairman and the most senior district
school supervisor or in his absence a principal of the school district or the elementary school, as member.
The proceedings of the board of canvassers shall be open and public.

BP881, Section 222. Relationship with Candidates and other members of the Board.The chairman and the members of the
boards of canvassers shall not be related within the 4 th civil degree of consanguinity or affinity to any of the candidates whose votes
will be canvassed by the said board, or to any member of the same board.
BP881, Section 224. Feigned Illness. Any member of the board of canvassers feigning illness in order to be substituted on election
day until the proclamation of the winning candidates shall be guilty of an election offense.
RA 8436, Section 23 – National Board of Canvassers for Senators – The chairman and members of the Commission on Elections
sitting en banc, shall compose the national board of canvassers for senators. It shall canvass the results for senators by consolidating
the results contained in the data storage devices submitted by the district, provincial and city boards of canvassers, of those cities
which comprise one or more legislative districts. Thereafter, the national board shall proclaim the winning candidates.
Section 30, RA 7166 – Congress as the National Board of Canvassers for the election of President and Vice-President: Determination
of Authenticity and Due Execution of Certificates of Canvass. –
1) Congress for Pres. & VP (Sec. 4, Article VII)

2) Comelec – Senators and Regional Officials –
3) PBC – Members of the HR and provincial officials (composed of the PES, Provincial Prosecutor and provincial official of the
DepEd
4) District BOC in each legislative district in MM – members of the HR and municipal officials
5) City and MBOC – member of the HR, city and municipal officials composed of the city or municipal EO, City Prosecutor and
DepEd Superintendent
RA 9189, Section 18(4) – A Special Board of Canvassers composed of a lawyer preferably of the Commission as chairman, a senior
career office from any of the government agencies maintaining a post abroad and, in the absence of another government officer, a
citizen of the Philippines qualified to vote under this Act deputized by the Commission, as vice-chairman and member secretary,
respectively, shall be constituted to canvass election returns submitted to it by the Special Boards of Elections Inspectors. Xxx xxx “The
Certificates of Canvass and the accompanying Statements of Votes as transmitted via facsimile, electronic mail and any other means of
transmission equally safe, secure and reliable shall be the primary basis for the national canvass.
CERTIFICATE OF VOTES, STATEMENT OF VOTES, ELECTION RETURNS AND DISTRIBUTION

MEMORIZE DIFFERENCES
Certificate of Votes – is an election document issued by the BEI’s after the counting and announcement of the results and before
leaving the polling place upon request of the accredited watcher. It shall contain the number of votes obtain by each candidate
written in words and figures, precinct #, name of the city or municipality signed and thumb marked by each member of the board.
Typoco vs. Comelec 614 SCRA 391 – In Garay v. Comelec 261 SCRA 222 (1996) the Court held that “(a) certificate of votes does
not constitute sufficient evidence of the true and genuine results of the election; only election returns are, pursuant to Sections 231,
233-236 and 238 of BP881.” Again in De Guzman v. Comelec 426 SCRA 698 (2004) the Court stated that, in an election contest where
the correctness of the number of votes is involved, the best and most conclusive evidence are the ballots themselves; where the ballots
can nor be produced or are not available, the election returns would be the best evidence.”
Doromal vs. Biron/Comelec 613 SCRA 160 (2010) – the certificate of votes, which contains the number of votes obtained by
each candidate, is issued by the BEI upon the request of the duly accredited watcher pursuant to Section 16 of RA 6646. Relative to its
evidentiary value, Section 17 of RA 6646 provides that Sections 235 and 236 of BP 881 notwithstanding, the Certificate of Votes shall
be admissible in evidence to prove tampering, alteration, falsification or any anomaly committed in the preparation of the election
returns concerned, when duly authenticated by at least two members of the BEI who issued the certificate. Failure to present the CV
shall however not bar the presentation of other evidence to impugn the authenticity of the ER. It cannot be a valid basis of canvass.
Purpose of requiring authentication of at least 2 members of the BOC – to safeguard the integrity of the certificate from the time it is
issued by the BEI to the watcher after the counting of votes at the precinct level up to the time that it is presented to the board of
canvassers to proved tampering.
FUNCTIONS OF THE CERTIFICATE OF VOTES
Prevent or deter the members of the BEI or other official from altering the statement because they know of the existence of
such certificate
To advise the candidate definitely of the number of his votes so that in case the election statement submitted to the BOC does
not tally with the certificate in his hands, he may ask that the other authentic copies of the same be used for the canvass
To serve as evidence of fraud in election protest cases and in subsequent prosecution of the election offenses against those
liable therefore.
Statement of Votes – is a tabulation per precinct of the votes obtained by the candidates or reflected in the ER.
Certificate of Canvass – is based on the SV and which serves as basis for proclamation.

DISPOSITION OF ELECTION RETURNS
Election Returns and Distribution – RA 8173 amending Section 27 of RA 7166, provides that in the election for Pres., VP, Senators and
members of the HR, the ER shall be distributed as follows -
1st CBO or MBOC
2nd congress, directed to the Pres. of the Senate
3rd Comelec
4th Dominant majority party as may be determined by the Comelec in accordance with law
5th Dominant minority party as may be determined by Comelec in accordance with law
6th Citizens Arms authorized by the Comelec to conduct an unofficial count to be deposited inside the ballot box.
For Local officials – (1) CBOB or MBOC (2) Comelec (3) PBOC (4) DMP (5) DMP (6) Citizen’s Arms for unofficial count (7) inside ballot
box.
Petition to Declare a postponement, failure or annulment of elections and call for a special elections in accordance with
Sections 5,6, & 7 of the OEC as amended by Sec. 4 of RA 7166.
Sec. 5 of the OEC provides for the grounds for declaring a postponement of elections that is when for -
any serious cause such as violence,
terrorism,
loss or destruction of election paraphernalia or records,
FM and other analoguous circumstances of such a nature that the holding of a HOPE-FRECRE should become impossible in
any political subdivision.
Jurisdiction - the Commission en banc may “motu propio” or upon a verified petition by any interested party, and after due notice
and hearing, whereby all interested parties are afforded equal opportunity to be heard, shall postpone the election to a date which is
reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted to a failure to elect but not later than 30 days
after the cessation of the cause for such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.
Sec. 6 on the other hand, prescribes the conditions for the exercise of the power to declare a Failure of Elections. As
reiterated in Dibaratun vs. Comelec 611 SCRA 367, citing Banaga Jr. v. Comelec 336 SCRA 701 (2000) also in Canicosa v.
Comelec 282 SCRA 517- to declare a failure of elections, either of these three (3) instances should be present
conformably with Section 6 of the OEC –
1. the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or
other analogous causes;
2. the election in any polling place has been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of voting on account of FM,
terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes
3. after the voting and counting, and during the preparation and transmission of the ER or in the custody of canvass thereof,
such election results in a failure to elect on the same grounds.
Based on the foregoing provisions, two (2) conditions must concur to declare a failure of elections –
no voting has taken place in the precincts concerned on the date fixed by law or, even if there was voting the
election nevertheless resulted in a failure to elect and
the votes not cast would affect the results of the elections (Carlos. V. Angeles)
In the same case of Coquilla v. Comelec, the SC stressed that “what is common in these three instances is the resulting failure to
elect. In the first instance, no election was held, while in the second, the election is suspended. In the third instance, circumstances
attending the preparation, transmission, custody or canvas of the election returns cause a failure to elect. And, the term failure to
elect means nobody emerged as a winner.”
Procedural Rules - On the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, the Comelec may call
for the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to
the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than 30 days after the cessation of the
cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.
Sec. 4 of RA 7166 (An Act Providing for the Synchronized National and Local Elections) provides that any declaration of
postponement, failure of election and calling for a special elections as provided in Section 5,6, & 7 shall be decided by the Commission
sitting en banc by a majority vote of its members. This power is exclusively vested in the Comelec as ruled in the case of Sanchez v.
Comelec 193 SCRA 849.
Loong v. Comelec 257 SCRA 1, a petition to declare failure of elections/annulment of elections on the ground of massive fraud in
some municipalities was filed before proclamation.. Comelec dismissed the petition for having been filed out of time since it was filed
only after petitioners realized that the annulment of election will wipe out their lead. HELD: It was ruled that the Comelec Resolution

dismissing the petition was arbitrary as no law provided for a reglementary period within which to file a petition for annulment of
elections if there is no proclamation yet.
Canicosa v. Comelec 282 SCRA 512, Canicosa filed with the Comelec a Petition to declare failure of elections and to declare null
and void the canvass and proclamation based on the following grounds (names of the RV did not appear on the list, padlocks were not
self locking among other) which was dismissed by the Comelec en banc on the ground that the allegations therein did not justify the
declaration of failure of elections.
Canicosa insists that its was error on the part of Comelec sitting en banc to rule on his petition as it should have first been
heard by a division. The SC held that the matter relating to the declaration of failure of elections or the allegations raised by Canicosa
did not involve an exercise of QJ or adjudicatory functions. It involves an administrative function which pertains to the enforcement
and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections. Grounds are exclusive under Section 6.
Pasandalan vs. Comelec, et. al., G.R. No. 150312 July 18, 2002, the SC held that a petition for declaration of failure of
elections is an “extraordinary remedy” and therefore the petition must specifically allege the essential grounds that
would justify the same. Otherwise, the Comelec can dismiss the petition outright for lack of merit and no grave abuse
of discretion can be attributed to it. The Comelec is mandated to exercise this power with utmost circumspect to prevent
disenfranchising voters and frustrating the electorate’s well.”
In this case, Pasandalan filed a petition for declaration of failure of election on the ground that while voting was going on
Cafgu’s indiscriminately fired their firearms causing the voters to panic and leave the polling places without casting their votes and
taking advantage of the situation, the supporters of his opponent took the official ballots and filled them up with his name, the BEI’s
failed to affix their initials at the back of several official ballots. Pasandalan , on the basis of the affidavits of his own poll
watchers, insists that a technical examination of the official ballots in the contested precincts be made which would
show that only a few persons wrote the entries, citing the case of Typoco v. Comelec 319 SCRA 498 and Basher v.
Comelec 330 SCRA 736.
The SC held that the Comelec is not mandated to conduct a technical examination before it dismisses a petition for nullification of
election when the petition is, on its face, without merit. In the case of Typoco, petitioner buttressed his petition with independent
evidence that compelled the Comelec to conduct a technical examination of the questioned returns. Typoco filed a Motion to Admit
Evidence to prove that a substantial number of election returns were manufactured and claimed that the returns were prepared by only
one person based on the report of a licensed examiner of questioned documents who examined copies of the election returns.
Pasandalan failed to attach independent and objective evidence other than the self-serving affidavits of his own poll watchers.
(Affidavits of his own watchers! Unlike kay Typoco na may expert’s affidavit to prove na may mga ER na manufactured.)
In Basher, the fact that an election is actually held prevents as a rule, a declaration of failure of elections, the Court,
however, can annul an election if it finds that the election is attended with patent and massive irregularities and
illegalities.In this case, after a series of failed elections in Brgy. Maidan, Municipality of Tugaya, Lanao del Sur during the 1997 Brgy.
Elections, the election was reset to 30 August 1997. Due to the prevailing tension in the locality, the voting started only at around 9
p.m. and lasted until the early morning of the following day. Basher filed a petition for the nullification of the election which was
dismissed by the Comelec on the ground that actual voting had taken place. The SC overturned the Comelec ruling because the
election was unauthorized and invalid. The electorate was not given sufficient notice that the election would push
through after 9pm of the same day. Moreover, the voting did not comply with the procedure laid down by the Comelec in its
Resolution.
Banaga Jr. vs. Comelec 336 SCRA 701, the fact that a verified petition has been filed does not mean that a hearing on the case
should first be held before Comelec can act on it. The petition must show on its face that the conditions necessary to declare a failure
of elections are present.
Ampatuan et. al. v. Comelec/Candao, et. al., G.R. No. 149803, January 31, 2002, private respondents filed a petition for
declaration of failure of elections in several municipalities in Maguindanao. During the pendency of the hearing of said petition, the
Comelec proclaimed petitioners as winners for the position of governor, vice-governor and board members.
Thereafter, the Comelec issued an order directing the continuation of the hearing on the failure of elections and issued an
order outlining the procedure to be followed in the technical examination. Petitioners, relying on the case of Typoco, Jr. v. Comelec,
contended that by virtue of their proclamation, the only remedy left for private respondents is to file an election protest, in which case,
original jurisdiction lies with the regular courts and that Comelec no longer has jurisdiction to conduct a technical examination as it
would defeat the summary nature of a petition for declaration of failure of elections citing several rulings that an election protest is the
proper remedy for a losing candidate after the proclamation of the winning candidates.
ISSUE: whether the Comelec was divested of its jurisdiction to hear and decide a petition for declaration of failure of
elections after the winners have already been proclaimed. HELD: It was ruled that the fact that the a candidate proclaimed
has assumed office does not deprive the Comelec of its authority to annul any canvass and illegal proclamation. In this case, it cannot
be assumed that the proclamation of petitioners was legal precisely because the conduct by which the elections were held was put in
issue by respondents in their petition for annulment of election results and/or declaration of failure of elections. The cases relied

upon by petitioners that an election protest is the proper remedy for a losing candidate after proclamation of the
winning candidate involved pre-proclamation controversies.
The SC made reference to its ruling in Loong v. Comelec that “ a pre-proclamation controversy is not the same as an action
for annulment of election results, or failure of elections”. In pre-proclamation cases, the Comelec is restricted to an
examination of the election returns on their face and is without jurisdiction to go beyond or behind them and investigate election
irregularities. The Comelec is duty-bound to investigate allegations of fraud, terrorism, violence and other analogous causes in actions
for annulment of election results or for declaration of failure of elections conformably with the OEC. Accordingly, the Comelec, in the
case of actions for annulment of election results or declaration of failure of elections, may conduct technical examination of election
documents and compare and analyze voters’ signatures and thumbprints in order to determine whether or not the elections had indeed
been free, honest and clean.
Borja, Jr. v. Comelec 260 SCRA 604, a petition for declaration of failure of elections and to nullify the canvass and proclamation
was filed by Borja wherein he alleged that there was lack of notice of the date and time of canvass, there was fraud in the conduct of
the elections as several voters were disenfranchised, presence of flying voters and unqualified members of the BEI. The Comelec
dismissed the petition ruling that the grounds relied upon by Borja were ground proper only in an election contest. SC upheld the
decision of the Comelec.
PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSY
BP 881, Section 242 – The Commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all pre=proclamation controversies. It may motu propio and
after due notice and hearing, order the partial or total suspension of the proclamation of any candidate-elect or annual partially or
totally any proclamation, if one has been made, as the evidence shall warrant in accordance with the succeeding sections.
Lucero Case – 30 days following the cause
Matalam v. Comelec 271 SCRA 733/BP 881 – a pre-proclamation controversy is defined, as a general rule, any question
pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the BOC which may be raised by any candidate or any registered political party or
coalition of political before the board or directly with the Comelec, on any matter raised under Sections 233 (when ER are delayed,
lost or destroyed), 234 (material defects in the ER), 235 (when ER appear to be tampered with or falsified) and 236
(discrepancies in the ER) of the OEC in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of
the ER and Certificate of Canvass.
Section 17, RA 6646, questions affecting the composition or proceedings of the BOC may be initiated with the board or directly with
the Comelec. However, matters raised under Sec. 233 to 236 shall be brought in the first instance before the BOC only.
EXCEPTIONS: Section 15 of RA 7166 provides that for purposes of the elections for Pres. and VP, Senators and members of the HR,
no Preproc cases shall be allowed on matters relating the P,T,R,C, and A of the ER or the certificate of canvass, as the case may be.
HOWEVER, this does not preclude the authority of the appropriate canvassing body motu proprio or upon written complaint of an
interested person to correct manifest error in the certificate of canvass or ER before it.
MANIFEST ERROR – obvious to the naked eye, manifest
PIMENTEL v. COMELEC – 3 recognized exceptions to such prohibition with respect to no pre proclamation controversy
1. the board is authorized with respect to the correction of manifest errors
2. questions affecting the validity of the composition and proceedings of the BOC
3. determination of the authenticity and due execution of the cert of canvass
Section 27
How is the correction of the manifest errors done by the BOC – motu proprio or verified petition on the following grounds: COMELEC
Rules of Procedure Section 5
(1) a copy of the election returns or certificate of canvass was tabulated more than once,
(2) two or more copies of the election returns of one precinct, or two or more copies of certificate of canvass were tabulated
separately,
(3) there has been a mistake in the copying of the figures into the statement of votes or into the certificate of canvass, or
(4) so-called returns from non-existent precincts were included in the canvass
COMELEC Resolution 8804
PART II
PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSIES
Rule 3
Coverage of Pre-Proclamation Controversies

Section 1. Pre-Proclamation Controversy. A pre-proclamation controversy refers to the proceedings of the board of canvassers
which may be raised by any candidate or by any registered political party or coalition of political parties, or by any accredited and
participating party list group, before the board or directly with the Commission. It covers only two issues:
a. Illegal composition of the Board of Canvassers (BOC);
b. Illegal proceedings of the BOC.
The basis of the canvass shall be electronically transmitted results.
Section 2. Jurisdiction of the Commission in Pre-Proclamation Controversies. - COMELEC has exclusive jurisdiction in pre-
proclamation controversies arising from national, regional or local elections.
A pre-proclamation controversy may be raised by any candidate or by any registered political party, organization, or coalition of political
parties before the BOC, or directly with the Commission.
Issues affecting the composition or proceedings of the Boards may be initiated by filing a verified petition before the Board or directly
with the Commission.
If the petition is filed directly with the Board, its decision may be appealed to the Commission within three (3) days from issuance
thereof. However, if commenced directly with the Commission, the verified petition shall be filed immediately when the board begins to
act illegally, or at the time of the appointment of the member of the board whose capacity to sit as such is objected to.
Section. 3. Rights of Political Parties and Candidates Before the Board of Canvassers in Pre-Proclamation Cases. -
a) All registered political parties, organizations, or coalitions of political parties, and accredited citizens' arms, and candidates, have the
right to be present and to be represented by counsel during the canvass of election returns, or certificates of canvass.
b) Only one counsel may argue for each registered political party, organization, or coalition of political parties, accredited citizens' arm
or candidate.
c) No dilatory action shall be allowed by the BOC. It may impose time limits for oral arguments.
d) All registered political parties, organizations, or coalitions of political parties, and candidates, are entitled to obtain a copy of the
Statement of Votes per precinct and a copy of the certificate of canvass duly authenticated by the BOC.
Rule 4
Illegal Composition or Proceedings of the Board of Canvassers
Section 1. Illegal Composition of the Board of Canvassers. - There is illegal composition of the BOC when, among other similar
circumstances, any of the members do not possess legal qualifications and appointments. The information technology capable person
required to assist the BOC by Republic Act No. 9369 shall be included as among those whose lack of qualifications may be questioned.

Section 2 - Illegal Proceedings of the Board of Canvassers. - There is illegal proceedings of the BOC when the canvassing is a
sham or mere ceremony, the results of which are pre-determined and manipulated as when any of the following circumstances are
present:
a) precipitate canvassing;
b) terrorism;
c) lack of sufficient notice to the members of the BOC's;
d) Improper venue
Section 3. Where and flow Commenced. - Questions affecting the composition or proceedings of the BOC may be initiated in the
BOC or directly with the Commission, with a verified petition, clearly stating the specific ground/s for the illegality of the composition
and/or proceedings of the board.
Section 4. When to File Petition. - The petition questioning the illegality, or the composition and/or proceedings of the BOC shall be
filed immediately when the BOC begins to act as such, or at the time of the appointment of the member whose capacity to sit as such
is objected to, if it comes after the canvassing of the Board, or immediately when the proceedings become illegal.
Section 5. Procedures for Petition on the Ground of Illegal Composition and Proceedings of the Board of Canvassers.
a) In case the petition is filed before the BOC:
a.1) Upon receipt of the verified petition, the BOC shall immediately announce the fact of the filing of said petition and the ground/s
raised therein.
a.2) The BOC shall immediately deliberate on the petition, and within a period of twenty-four (24) hours, make a prompt resolution
thereon, which resolution shall be reduced into writing.
a.3) Should the BOC decide in favor of the petition, it shall immediately inform the Commission of its resolution. Thereafter, the
Commission shall make the appropriate action thereon.
a.4) In no case shall the receipt by the BOC of the electronically transmitted precinct, municipal, city, or provincial results, be
suspended by the filing of said petition.
a.5) The petitioner may appeal an adverse resolution by the BOC to the COMELEC, by notifying the BOC of his or her intent to appeal,
through a verbal, and a written and verified Notice of Appeal. The notice on the BOC shall not suspend the formal proclamation of the
official results of the election, until the final resolution of the appeal.
a.6) Within forty-eight (48) hours from such notice to the BOC, the petitioner shall submit before the Board a Memorandum on Appeal
stating the reasons why the resolution being questioned is erroneous and should be reversed.

a.7) Upon receipt by the BOC of the petitioner's memorandum on appeal, the Board shall forward the entire records of the petition at
the expense of the petitioner.
a.8) Upon receipt of the records herein referred to, the petition shall be docketed by the Clerk of Commission and submitted to the
COMELEC en banc for consideration and decision.
a.9) Within five (5) days therefrom the COMELEC en banc shall render its decision on the appeal.
b) If filed directly with the Commission, the petition shall be heard by the COMELEC en banc under the following procedures. Upon
receipt of the petition by the COMELEC, the Clerk of the Commission shall docket the same and forthwith send summons to the BOC
concerned with an order directing it to submit, through the fastest verifiable means available, its answer within forty-eight (48) hours.
The COMELEC en banc shall resolve the petition within fire (5) days from the filing of the answer, or upon the expiration of the period
to file the same.
What is the effect if the illegality of the composition of the BOC is discovered after the proclamation?
Section 6. Illegal Proceedings Discovered after Proclamation. - If the illegality of the proceedings of the BOC is discovered
after the official proclamation of the supposed results, a verified petition to annul the proclamation may be (where) filed before the
COMELEC (when) within ten (10) days after the day of proclamation. Upon receipt of the verified petition, the Clerk of the Commission
shall have the same docketed and forthwith issue summons to the parties to be affected by the petition, with a directive for the latter
to file their answer within five (5) days from receipt. Thereafter the case shall be deemed submitted for resolution, which shall not be
later than seven (7) days from receipt of the answer.
Sano Jr. vs. Comelec 611 SCRA 475 – It is settled that a pre-proclamation controversy is summary in nature, administrative in
character; indeed, it is a policy of the law that pre-proclamation be promptly decided, so as not to delay canvass and proclamation.
The board of canvassers will not look into allegations of irregularity that are not apparent on the face of ER’s that appear otherwise
authentic and duly accomplished.
Authority of the Comelec in PPC – the Commission exercises authority to decide PPC in two instances –
in appeals from the ruling of the BOC which is generally of two types first type are n questions contesting its composition or
proceedings and appeal therefrom must be taken by the contestant adversely affected within 3 days from such ruling .and the
second type refers to ruling on questions contesting ER. The party adversely affected must immediately inform the board that
he intends to appeal from the ruling and the board shall enter said information in the minutes of the canvass and within 48
hours from the ruling, the adverse party must file with the board a written and verified notice of appeal, and within an
unextendible period of 5 days thereafter, he has to take the appeal to the Comelec
in petitions directly filed with it.
Macabago v. Comelec 392 SCRA 178 – it was held that issues in a PPC is properly limited to challenges aimed against the BOC and
proceedings before said board relative to particular ER to which respondent should have made particular verbal objections
subsequently reduced in writing.
BP 881 Section 243.Comelec Rules of Procedure Rule 27 (4) - SCOPE/ISSUES that may be raised in a PRE-
PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSY
Illegal composition or proceedings of the BOC

The canvassed ER are incomplete, contain material defects, appear to be tampered with, or falsified or contain discrepancies
in the same returns or in other authentic copies as mentioned in Sec. 233-236
The ER were prepared under duress, threats, coercion or intimidation or they are obviously manufactures or not authentic – in
Ocampo v. Comelec 235 SCRA 436, it was held that this fact must be evident from the face of the said document. In the
absence of a strong evidence establishing spuriousness of the returns, the basic rule is that the ER shall be accorded prima

facie status as bona fide reports of the results of the count of the votes which shall prevail for purposes of canvassing and
proclamation.
When substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places are canvassed, the result of which materially affect the
standing of the aggrieved candidate. (Sec. 243)
PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS IN A PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSY
Sec. 20 of RA 7166 (repealing Sec. 245 OEC) provides for the mandatory two-step rule or requirement of verbal
objection to the inclusion of the ER and to be formalized in writing within 24 hours. Failure to observe such rule is fatal to a
candidate’s cause, leaving him with no other remedy except an EP. This cannot be cured by instituting a petition directly filed with the
Comelec under Sec. 241
Sandoval v. Comelec 323 SCRA 407, it was stressed that Comelec exercises exclusive jurisdiction and may motu propio or upon
verified petition, and after due notice and hearing, order the partial or total suspension of the proclamation of the candidate elect or
annul partially or totally any proclamation, if one has been made, as the evidence shall warrant in accordance with Sec. 242 of the
OEC.
Velayo v. Comelec 327 SCRA 713 – a PPC is summary in nature, administrative in character and which is filed before the BOC. It
was ruled that while it is true that RA 7166 provides for summary proceedings in PP cases and does not require a trial type hearing,
nevertheless, summary proceedings cannot be stretched as to mean ex-parte proceedings.
In Velayo case, respondent objected to the inclusion of two (2)ER’s which did not contain a vote for respondent being statistically
improbable which was overruled by the BOC. It was ruled that it is possible for a candidate to get zero votes in one or few precincts.
The bare fact that a candidate receive zero votes in 1 or 2 precincts can not support a finding that the ER are statistically improbable.
(Exception to the Lagumbay Doctrine)
Lagumbay v. Comelec 16 SCRA 175 (1966) - The Lagumbay doctrine isthe prevailing case on statistical improbability which
states that where there exists uniformity of tallies in favor of candidates belonging to one party and the systematic blanking out of the
opposing candidates as when all the candidates of one party received all the votes, each of whom exactly the same number, and the
opposing candidates got zero votes, the election returns are obviously manufactures, contrary to al statistical improbabilities and utterly
improbable and clearly incredible.
In Ocampo v. Comelec 325 SCRA 636, it was reiterated that if only one candidate obtained all the votes in some precincts, this is
not sufficient to make the election returns statistically improbable.
Imelda Dimaporo vs. Comelec/Vicente Belmonte 544 SCRA 381- (Sec. 15 of RA 7166)provides that for the purpose of the
elections for president, VP, senator & member of the HR, no pre-proclamation cases shall be allowed on matters relating to the
preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of ER or the certificate of canvass, as the case may be, except as provided
for in Sec. 30 hereof. However, this does not preclude the authority of the appropriate canvassing body motu propio or upon written
complaint of an interested person to correct manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or ER before it).
Rommel Munoz vs. Comelec, Carlos Balido Jr. 495 SCRA 407 - “Results of the Elections” Defined – the phrase “results of the
election” is not statutorily defined. However, as explained in Lucero v. Comelec it means “ the net result of the election the rest of the
precincts in a given constituency, such that if the margin of a leading candidate over that of his closest rival in the latter precincts is
less than the total number of votes in the precinct where there was failure of election, than such failure would certainly affect “the
results of the elections.”
EFFECT OF ASSUMPTION OF OFFICE OF CANDIDATE ELECT/WHEN PPC IS DEEMED TERMINATED – A pre-proclamation

controversy is no longer viable after the proclamation of the winning candidates as the issues raised therein may be more closely
examined and better resolved in an EP.(RA 7166, Section 16 (2)).
However, this is only true where the proclamation is based on a complete canvass and on the assumption that the proclamation is
valid. Where a proclamation is null and void, the proclamation is no proclamation at all and the proclaimed candidate’s assumption of
office cannot deprive the Comelec of the power to declare such nullity and annul the proclamation.
Section 16 of RA 7166 provides that all-pre-proclamation cases pending before the Commission shall be deemed
terminated at the beginning of the term of office involved and the rulings of the boards of canvassers concerned shall be deemed
affirmed, without prejudice to the filing of a regular election protest by the aggrieved party. HOWEVER, proceedings may continue
when on the basis of the evidence thus far presented, the Commission determines that the petition appears meritorious and
accordingly issued an order for the proceedings to continue or when appropriate order has been issued by the SC in a petition for
certiorari
ELECTION PROTEST

An EP is a special statutory proceedings designed to contest the right of a person, declared elected to enter upon and hold
office. It is strictly a contest between the defeated and winning candidates as to who actually obtained the majority of the legal votes
and therefore, is entitled to hold office.
NATURE OF PROCEEDING - It is a formal judicial proceedings that goes into the correctness of the counting and appreciation of
ballots at the precinct level were the parties are allowed to present and examine evidence in detail.
WHO CAN FILE – can only be filed by a candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for.
PERIOD TO FILE – within 10 days from proclamation
GROUNDS – fraud, vote-buying, terrorism, presence of flying voters, misreading and misappreciation of the ballots,
disenfranchisement of voters, other election irregularities.
Lucy Marie Torres-Gomez v. Eufrocino C. Codilla/ 668 SCRA 600 (2012)
Verification – (Defective verification) The verification of a pleading is only a formal, not jurisdictional requirement. The purpose of
requiring the verification is to secure an assurance that the allegations in the petition are true and correct, not merely speculative. This
requirements is simply a condition affecting the form of pleadings, and non compliance therewith does not necessarily render the
pleading fatally defective.
Nature of Election controversy – An election controversy, by its nature, touches upon the ascertainment of the people’s choice as
gleaned from the medium of the ballot. For this reason, an election protest should jibe resolved with utmost dispatch, precedence and
regard of due process. Obstacles and technicalities that fetter the people’s will should not stand in the way of a prompt determination
of election contests. Thus, rules on the verification of protests should be liberally construed.
Court upheld the jurisdiction of HRET as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the member
of the HRET.
Salvador D. Viologo, Sr., v. Comelec 658 SCRA 516 (2011)
Facts: Motion for reconsideration was denied by Comelec en banc for lack of verification as required by Section 3, Rule 20 of the
Comelec Rules of Procedure on Disputes in an Automated Election System and Section 3, Rule 19 of CRP.
Comelec Rules of Procedure are subject liberal construction. In Quintos v. Comelec (440 Phil. 1045; 392 SCRA 489 (2002)),
this Court held that “the lack of verification of private respondent’s Manifestation and Motion for Partial Reconsideration is merely a
technicality that should not defeat the will of the electorate. The Comelec may liberally construe or even suspend its rules of procedure
in the interest of justice, including obtaining a speedy disposition of all matter pending before the Comelec.”
Elections construction of rules and regulations classified into three:

1. those RR which the election officials should comply with. It should be liberally construed but it can be called if there is
negligence on the part of the BOI or election deputies then they can be held liable for election offense or administrative or
criminal charge but it cannot invalidate the ballot.
2. Those RR which the public officials shall comply with requirements such as age, residency, citizenship that must be accorded
strict construction;
3. With respect to election disputes/ protest which are liberally construed.
Purpose why COMELEC Rules of Procedure is liberally construed: To determine the true will of the people.
Nature of Election Protest: In Pacanan v. Comelec 597 SCRA 189 (2009), the Court, in clarifying the mandated liberal
construction of election laws held: An election contest, unlike an ordinary civil action, is clothed with a public interest. The purpose of
an election protest is to ascertain that the candidate proclaimed by the board of canvassers is the lawful choice of the people. What is
sought is the correction of the canvass of votes, which was the basis of proclamation of the winning candidate. An election contest
therefore involves not only the adjudication of private and pecuniary interests of rival candidates but paramount to their claims is the
deep public concern involved and the need of dispelling the uncertainty over the real choice of the electorate. And the court has the
corresponding duty to ascertain, by all means within its command, who is the real candidate elected by the people.
Moreover, the CRP are subject to a liberal construction. This liberality is for the purpose of promoting the effective and efficient
implementation of the objectives of ensuring the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections and for achieving just,
expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the Comelec.
This principle was reiterated in the more recent consolidated cases of Tolentino v. Comelec 617 SCRA 575 (2010) and De Castro vs.
Comelec 617 SCRA 575, where the Court held that in exercising its powers and jurisdiction, as defined by its mandate to ptoetect the
integrity of elections, the Comelec “must not be straijackedted by procedural rules in resolving election disputes.”

Douglas R. Cagas v. Comelec/Bautista 663 SCRA 644 (2012) - The Court has no power to review on certiorari an
interlocutory order or even a final resolution issued by a Division of the Comelec. The governing provision is Section 7,
Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, which provides: Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any
case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed
submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission
or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari (rule 65) by the aggrieved party within 30 days from receipt of a copy
thereof. This provision, although it confers on the Court the power to review any decision, order or ruling of the Comelec, limits such
power to a final decision or resolution of the Comelec en banc and does not extend to an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the
Comelec. Otherwise stated, the Court has no power to review on certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final resolution issued by a
Division of the Comelec.
Maria Laarni L. Cayetano v. Comelec/Dante Tinga 648 SCRA 561 (2011) – The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to
review an order, whether final or interlocutory even a final resolution of a division of the Comelec – the Court can only
review via certiorari a decision, order, or ruling of the Comelec en banc in accordance with Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution, a
rule which admits of exceptions as when the issuance of the assailed interlocutory order is a patent nullity because of the absence of
jurisdiction to issue the same. (Court made reference to the case of Repol v. Comelec 428 SCRA 321 (2004) which was affirmed in
Soriano Jr. v. Comelec 520 SCRA 88 (2007) and Blanco v. Comelec 554 SCRA 755. Ruling in Soriano. . .“In the 2004 case
of Repol v. Comelec, the Court cited Ambil and held that this Court has no power to review via certiorari an interlocutory order or even
a final resolution of a division of the Comelec. However, the Court held that an exception to this rule applies where the commission of
grave abuse of discretion is apparent on its face. In Repol, what was assailed was a status quo ante Order without any time limit, and
more than 20 days had lapsed since its issuance without the Comelec First Division issuing a writ of preliminary injunction. The Court
held that the status quo ante Order of the Comelec First Division was actually a temporary restraining order because it ordered Repol
to cease and desist from assuming the position of municipal mayor of Pagsanghan, Samar and directed Ceracas to assume the post in
the meantime. Since the status quo ante Order, which was qualified by the phrase “until further orders from this Commission.” Had a
lifespan of more than 20 days, this Order clearly violates the rule that a temporary restraining Order has an effective period of only 20
days and automatically expires upon the Comelec’s denial of preliminary injunction.”
Ceriaco Bulilis v. Victorino Nuez, Presiding Judge of MCTC, Ubay Bohol, Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 52, Talibon,
Bohol 655 SCRA 241 (2011) -Facts: Bulilis was proclaimed winner for the elections for punong barangay. Opponent Victorino
Nuez filed an EP (for judicial recount and annulment of proclamation) with MCTC. The counsel of Bulilis filed his brief at 1:45pm on the
date of preliminary conference and when the case was heard at 2pm, Nuez moved in open court to be allowed to present evidence ex
parte since Bulilis only filed his brief on the date of the preliminary conference which is contrary to Section 4, Rule 9 of A.M. No. 08-4-
15-SC which provides that the brief should be filed at least one (1) day before the date of the preliminary conference. Judge Garces
granted the motion.
Bulilis filed MR which was denied by MCTC. Bulilis filed certiorari with RTC which was dismissed on the ground that it is Comelec that
has exclusive jurisdiction in election cases involving municipal and barangay officials. Hence, the petition for certiorari with the SC.
(Rule 28, Sections 1 and 2 of CRP/Section 12 Amendments to Rules 41, 45, 58 and 65 of the Rules of Court/Section 8, Rule 14 of
Comelec CRP ). Based on these rules, the Court recognizes the Comelec’s appellate jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari against all
acts or omissions of courts in election cases. Indeed, in the recent case of Galang, Jr. v. Geronimo 643 SCRA 631 (2011), the
Court had the opportunity to rule that a petition for certiorari questioning an interlocutory order of a trial court in an electoral protest
was within the appellate jurisdiction of the Comelec.
Since it is the Comelec which has jurisdiction to take cognizance of an appeal from the decision of the RTC in election contests
involving elective municipal officials (Sec. 8 Rule 14 CRP), then it is also the Comelec which has jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari
in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
Although Galang involved a petition for certiorari of an interlocutory order of the RTC in a municipal election contest, the rationale for
the above ruling applied to an interlocutory order issued by a municipal trial court in a barangay election case. Under Rule 14, Section
8 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC, decisions of municipal trial courts in election contests involving barangay officials are appealed to the
Comelec. Following the Galang doctrine, it is the Comelec which has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari involving
acts of the municipal trial courts in such election contests.
ROMEO M. JALOSJOS, JR v. COMELEC AND DAN ERASMO, SR. 674 SCRA 530 (2012)
Demarcation line between the jurisdiction of the Comelec and the House of Representatives:Facts: In May 2007 Jalosjos
ran for Mayor of Tampilisan, Zamboanga del Norte and won. While serving as Tampilisan Mayor, he bought a residential house and lot
in Barangay Veterans Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay and occupied it in September 2008. Eight months after, he applied with the
ERB of Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay for the transfer of his voters registration record which application was opposed by Erasmo in a petition
for exclusion before the MCTC of Ipil-Tungawan. RTC ruled to exclude Jalosjos on the ground that Jalosjos did not abandon his
domicile im Tampilisan since he continue even then to serve as its Mayor. Jalosjos appealed his case to the RTC of Pagadian City
which affirmed the MCTC decision on September 11, 2009. Jalosjos elevated the matter to the CA through a petition for certiorari with
an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction which was granted and enjoined the courts below from enforcing their
decisions, with the result that his name was reinstated in the Barangay Veterans Village’s list pending the resolution of the petition.

On November 28, 2009, Jalosjos filed his CoC for the position of representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay for the
May 10, 2010 elections. Erasmo filed a Petition to deny due course to or cancel his CoC before the Comelec, claiming that Jalosjos
made material misrepresentations in his CoC when he indicated in it that he resided in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. The Second Division
of the Comelec issued a joint reso dismissing the petition of Erasmo for insufficiency in form and substance. While Erasmo’s MR was
pending before the Comelec En Banc, the May 10, 2010 elections took place resulting in Jalosjos winning the elections and was
proclaimed on May 13, 2010.
In June 2, 2010, the CA rendered judgment in the voter’s exclusion case before it holding that the lower courts erred in excluding
Jalosjos since he was qualified under the Constitution and RA 8189. Erasmo filed a petition for review of the CA decision before the
SC. On the other hand, Comelec en banc granted the MR of Erasmo and declared Jalosjos ineligible as he did not satisfy the residency
requirement since, by continuing to hold the position of Mayor in Tampilisan, he should be deemed not to have transferred his
residence form that place to Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
While the Constitution vests in the Comelec the power to decide all questions affecting elections, such power is not without limitation.
It does not extend to contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the HR and the Senate. The
Constitution vests the resolution of these contests solely upon the appropriate Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the HR.
The Court has already settled the question of when the jurisdiction of the Comelec ends and when that of the HRET begins. The
proclamation of a congressional candidates following the election divests Comelec of jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the proclaimed Representative in favor of HRET.
QUO WARRANTO
A petition for Quo Warranto refers to questions of disloyalty or ineligibility of the winning candidate. It has the effect of disqualifying a
candidate to hold office towhich he is elected. Its primordial objective is to prevent an elective official from assuming office grounded
on ineligibility. (Sec. 253 OEC)
NATURE OF PROCEEDING – it is a proceeding to unseat the ineligible person from office, but not to install the protestant in his
place.
WHO CAN FILE – any voter.
PERIOD TO FILE- within 10 days from proclamation
Republic v. dela Rosa 232 SCRA 785, a QW assailing the public official’s title and seeking to prevent him from holding office for
alienage is not covered by the 10-days period for appeal prescribed in Section 253 of the OEC.
The distinction been an EP and QW as a remedy is not the label given to it but the allegations therein stated. If a petition
alleges fraud and irregularity which vitiated the conduct of the election, although entitled QW, is an EP and vice versa. In view of
these fundamental differences, an EP and QW cannot be availed of jointly in the same proceeding. They may be filed separately with
the second and later case suspended until the earlier is resolved. An action for QW cannot be converted into an EP.
Penera vs. Comelec 599 SCRA 609, is the well-established principle that the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes
does not entitle the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. In this case, the rules on succession
under Section 44 of the Local Government Code shall apply which states that” if a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the Mayor,
the Vice-Mayor concerned shall become the mayor. A permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a higher vacant
office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify or is removed from office, voluntarily resigned, or is otherwise permanently
incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office.”
(Virgnio Villamor vs. Comelec & Amytis de Dios-Batao 496 SCRA 334) As a general rule, the proper remedy after the
proclamation of the winning candidate for the position contested would be to file a regular election protest or a petition for QW. The
filing of an EP or a petition for QW precludes the subsequent filing of a pre-proclamation controversy or amounts to the abandonment
of one earlier filed, thus, depriving the Comelec of the authority to inquire into and pass upon the title of the protestee or the validity of
his proclamation. The reason is that once the competent tribunal has acquired jurisdiction of an EP or a petition for QW, all questions
relative thereto will have to be decided in the case itself and not in another proceedings. This procedure is to prevent confusion and
conflict of authority.
Basarte vs. Comelec 523 SCRA 76 – The prevailing rule that as long as the returns appear to be authentic and duly accomplished
on their face, the BOC cannot look beyond or behind them to verify allegations of irregularities in the casting or the counting of the
votes as it presupposes that the returns “appear to be authentic and duly accomplished on their face”. This principle does not apply in
cases like the one at bar where there is a prima facie showing that the return is not genuine, several entries having been omitted in the
assailed return.
JURSIDCITON OVER ELECTION PROTESTS AND QUO WARRANTO

1) SUPREME COURT – sitting en banc as Presidential Electoral Tribunal as sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualification of Pres. and VP. Protest to be filed 30 days from proclamation. Not subject to judicial review (1987 Constitution).
Joke on Supreme Court body.
2) SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL – for members of senate as sole judge over all contest relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of its own members. Filed within 15 days from date of proclamation. Not subject to judicial review except on grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (1987 Constitution)
3) HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL – for members of HR to be filed within 10 days from proclamation.
Composition - Each electoral tribunal shall be composed of nine members, three of whom shall be justices of the SC to be designated
by the CJ and the remaining 6 members of the senate or HR, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of their
proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party list system,. Senior
justice shall be chairman (Art. VI, Sec. 17, 1987 Constitution) .
4) COMELEC – for regional, provincial and city officials filed in 10 days. Subject to judicial review within 30 days from date of receipt
of decision by aggrieved party.
Article IX-C, Section 2(2) 1987 Constitution, Comelec shall “Exercise exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the
elections, returns and qualifications of all elective, regional, provincial and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests
involving municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by courts of
limited jurisdictions. Decisions, final order, or rulings of the Commission, on election contests involving elective municipal and barangay
offices shall be final, executory and not appealable.”
Mendoza v. Comelec 616 SCRA 443 – There is a difference in the result of the exercise of jurisdiction by the Comelec over election
contests. The difference adheres in the kind of jurisdiction invoked, which in turn, is determined by the case brought before the
Comelec. When a decision of a trial court is brought before the Comelec for it to exercise appellate jurisdiction, the division decides the
appeal but, if there is a motion for reconsideration, the appeal proceeds to the banc where the majority is needed for a decision. If the
process ends without the required majority at the banc, the appealed decision stands affirmed.
Upon the other hand, and this is what happened in the instant case, if what is brought before the Comelec is an original protest
involving the original jurisdiction of the Commission, the protest, as one whole process, is first decided by the division, which process is
continued in the banc if there is a motion for reconsideration of the division ruling. If no majority decision is reach in the banc, the
protest, which is an original, shall be dismissed. There is no first instance decision that can be deemed affirmed.
Hence, if no decision is reached after the case is reheard, there are two different remedies available to the Comelec, to wit (1) dismiss
the action or proceeding, if the case was originally commenced in the Comelec; or (2) consider as affirmed the judgment or order
appealed from, in appealed cases. This rule adheres to the constitutional provision that the Comelec must decide by a majority of all
its members.
Relampagos v. Cumba 243 SCRA 690 (1995) and in Carlos v. Angeles 346 SCRA 571 (2000), Comelec is vested with the
power to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction consistent with Section 50 of
BP 881 and Article 2(1) of the Constitution. These ruling abandoned the earlier ruling in Garcia vs. de Jesus 206 SCRA 779. It was
also declared that both the SC and Comelec has concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus over
decision of trial courts of general jurisdiction (RTC) in election cases involving elective municipal officials. The Court that takes
jurisdiction first shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the case. (Art. VIII 5(1) 1987 Constitution, Rule 65, Sec. 1)
Section 7, Article IX-A and Rule 3 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure.The Comelec in the exercise of its QJ functions to
transact business “may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate rules and procedures” in order to expedite the
disposition of elections cases, including pre-proclamation controversies and summon parties to a controversy pending before it.”
The authority to hear and decide election cases, including pre-proclamations controversies is vested with a division and the Comelec
sitting en banc does not have the authority over it in the first instance. The Comelec en banc can exercise jurisdiction only on
Motions for Reconsideration of the resolution or decision of the Comelec in division as a requirement for the filing of a
petition for certiorari by the aggrieved party with the SC within 30 days from receipt of a copy thereof (Sec. 3 Art. IX-
C).
Sec. 2 Rule 19 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure a motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division shall
be filed within five (5) days from the promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not pro-forma, suspends the execution for
implementation of the decision, resolution, order or ruling and would in effect, suspend the running of the period to elevate the matter
to the SC (Sec.4).
5) REGIONAL TRIAL COURT – exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, qualifications and returns for municipal
officials. Protest to be filed 10 days from date of proclamation. Subject to appeal with Comelec within five (5) days from receipt of

decision. Decisions of the Comeledc en banc on contest on appeal involving municipal and barangay officials are final and executory
except on grounds of grave abuse of discretion within 30 days.
6) MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT – exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications for
barangay officials. Protest to be filed within 10 days from proclamation. Appeal to the Comelec within 5 days from receipt of the
decision.
Calo v. Comelec 610 SCRA 342/Pecson v. Comelec 575 SCRA 634 – decisions of the courts in election protest cases, resulting
as they do from a judicial evaluation of the ballots and afull blown adversarial proceedings. Should at least be given similar worth and
recognition as decisions of the board of canvassers. This is especially true when attended by other equally weighty circumstances of
the case, such as the shortness of the term of the contested elective office, of the case.
Mananzala vs. Comelec and Julie Monton 523 SCRA 31. - Decisions, final orders or rulings of the Commission on Election
contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory and not appealable; All such election cases shall be
heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.
A decision of the RTC was raised on appeal which was heard by the 2nd division which reversed the decision of the RTC. In his MR
petitioner argues that the MR filed with the former 2nd division “has thrown the whole case wide open for review as in a trial de
novo in a criminal case” yet Comelec en banc failed to conduct a thorough review of the contested ballots. Election cases cannot be
treated in a similar manner as criminal cases where, upon appeal from a conviction by the trial court, the whole case is thrown open for
review and the appellate court can resolve issues which are not even set forth in the pleadings.
Coquilla vs. Comelec, et. al. G.R. No. 151914, July 31, 2002, the SC resolved the issue on whether the 30-day period for
appealing the resolution of the Comelec was suspended by the filing of a motion for reconsideration by petitioner. Private respondent
in this case contends that the petition should be dismissed because it was filed late considering that the Comelec en banc denied
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration for being pro-forma and conformably with Sec. 4 of Rule 19 of the CRP, the said motion did
not suspend the running of the 30-day period for the filing of the petition for certiorari under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A of the Constitution.
The Comelec en banc ruled that the motion for reconsideration was pro-forma on the ground that the motion was a mere rehash of
petitioners averments contained in his Verified Answer and Memorandum, neither were new matters raised that would sufficiently
warrant a reversal of the assailed resolution of the Second Division.
The SC ruled however that the mere reiteration in a motion for reconsideration of the issues raised by the parties and passed upon by
the court does not make a motion pro-forma; otherwise, the movant’s remedy would not be a reconsideration of the
decision but a new trial or some other remedy.
In explaining the purpose/objective of a motion for reconsideration, the SC referred to its decision in Guerra Enterprises
Company Inc., v. CFI of Lanao del Sur 32 SCRA 314 (1970), where it held that the ends sought to be achieved in the filing of a motion
for reconsideration is “precisely to convince the court that its ruling is erroneous and improper, contrary to the law or the evidence, and
in doing so, the movant has to dwell of necessity upon the issues passed upon by the court. If a motion for reconsideration may not
discuss these issues, the consequence would be that after a decision is rendered, the losing party would be confined to filing only
motions for reopening and new trial.
The SC further enumerated cases where a motion for reconsideration was held to be pro forma: (Filipinas Eng’r Case)
it was a second motion for reconsideration;

it did not comply with the rule that the motion must specify the findings and conclusions alleged to be contrary to law or not
supported by the evidence;
it failed to substantiate the alleged errors;
it merely alleged that the decision in question was contrary to law
or the adverse party was not given due notice thereof.
Under Rule 13, (1) of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, a Motion for Reconsideration of an En Banc Resolution is
a prohibited pleading, except in election offense cases (Sec. 261 of the OEC).
Angelia v. Comelec 332 SCRA 757, the SC addressed the issue on whether a party can go to the SC via a Petition on Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court during the pendency of the MR filed with the Comelec en banc. Angelia filed before the SC a
Petition for Certiorari to set aside the resolution of the Comelec en banc annulling his proclamation alleging that he was not given due
notice and hearing. Without waiting for the resolution on his motion, Angelia filed the instant petition on the sole assignment of
error that Comelec violated his constitutional right to due process. Comelec raised that the petition should be dismissed for being
premature considering that the MR of petitioner was still pending with the Comelec en banc and that he should have first withdrawn
the MR before raising the said resolution with the SC.
SC held that petitioner acted correctly in filing the petition because the resolution of the Comelec en banc is not subject to
reconsideration, and therefore, any party who disagrees with it had only one recourse, that was to file a petition for certiorari under

Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The filing of the petition would in effect constitute as an abandonment of his MR with the
Comelec.
What is contemplated by the term “final orders, rulings and decisions of the Comelec that may be reviewable by the SC
on Certiorari? The SC in Garces v. Court of Appeals 259 SCRA 99 (1996) and Filipinas Engineering & Machine Shop v. Ferrer 135
SCRA 25 (1985), the interpreted the term ”final orders, rulings and decisions of the Comelec reviewable by the SC on certiorari as
provided by law are those rendered in actions or proceedings before the Comelec and taken cognizance of by the said body in the
exercise of its quasi-judicial powers.
PRINCIPLES COMMON TO ALL ELECTION CONTESTS
1) WHO MAY FILE – a candidate who has duly filed a COC and has been voted for.
2) Jurisdiction Allegations – (1) protestant was a candidate who had duly filed a COC and had been voted for the same office
(2) that the protestee has been proclaimed (3) that the petition was filed within 10 days after proclamation (4) that fraud and
election irregularities vitiated the conduct of the elections and affected the legality thereof.
Miguel v. Comelec 335 SCRA 172, the SC ruled that it is the ministerial duty of the trial court to order the opening of the ballot
boxes, examination and counting of ballots deposited thereunder whenever there is averment in an election protest that requires the
examination, scrutiny or counting of ballots as evidence. The purpose of opening the BB is to determine, with the minimum amount of
protracted delay, the truthfulness of the allegations of fraud and anomalies in the conduct of electoral exercise.
CERTIFICATE OF FORUM SHOPPING
The SC in Loyola v. CA 245 SCRA 477 (1995) and Lomarong v. Dubguban 269 SCRA 624 (1997), it was ruled that the SC
Circular requiring that any complaint, petition or other initiatory pleading must contain a non-forum certification applies to election
cases. The requirement is mandatory, not jurisdictional, non-compliance therewith may warrant the dismissal of the election case.
MAKE UP CLASS ( JULY 4, 2016)
POWERS OF COMELEC
Section 7 of Art. IX- A and Rule _ of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the COMELEC in the exercise of its quasi- judicial function, may
sit En Banc of in division and shall promulgate rules and procedures to expedite the disposition of election cases including pre –
proclamation controversies and summon parties before it. To stress, the authority to hear and decide pre- proclamation controversies is
vested in a division and the en banc does not have authority over it in first instance. The COMELEC En Banc can only exercise
jurisdiction on motions for reconsideration of the resolution or decision of COMELEC in division and the parties may file to the SC a
petition for certiorari within 30 days from the receipt of the copy thereof under Sec. 3, Art. IX- C.
Rule 20, Section 2. Period for Filing Motions for Reconsideration. - A motion to reconsider a decision shall be filed within five
(5) days from the promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not pro forma, suspends the execution or implementation, of the decision,
resolution, order or ruling.
- Thus, it suspends the running of the period for the parties to elevate it to SC.
Under Rule 13, section 1 of the CRP, (old rules) motion for reconsideration of an en banc ruling, resolution, order or decision except in
election offense cases under Sec. 161 of BP 88. Remember the case of Angelia v COMELEC 332 SCRA 757. The SC addressed the issue
whether a party can go to the SC by filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 during the pendency of a motion for reconsideration
before the COMELEC en banc. Is that allowed? In this case, Angelia filed a petition for certiorari before the SC to set aside the
COMELEC Resolution regarding his proclamation alleging that he was not given due notice and hearing. Without waiting for the
resolution of his MR, he filed a petition for certiorari in SC on the sole assignment of error that the COMELEC violated his constitutional
right of due process. The COMELEC contend that the instant petition should be dismissed for being premature, because petitioner has a
pending motion for reconsideration of the resolution, dated August 18, 1998, of the COMELEC.
We hold that petitioner acted correctly in filing the present petition because the resolution of the COMELEC in question is not subject to
reconsideration and, therefore, any party who disagreed with it had only one recourse, and that was to file a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
As the case before the COMELEC did not involve an election offense, reconsideration of the COMELEC resolution was not possible and
petitioner had no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. For him to wait until the COMELEC
denied his motion would be to allow the reglementary period for filing a petition for certiorari with this Court to run and expire. The
effect of the filing of the certiorari constitute as an abandonment of his MR before the COMELEC.
In the case of Filipinas Engineering v Ferrer, contemplated here what is final order, decisions or rulings of the COMELEC that maybe
reviewable by the SC by certiorari. What is contemplated by the term "final orders, rulings and decisions" of the COMELEC reviewable

by certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law are those rendered in actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and taken
cognizance of by the said body in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.
In the case of Miguel v COMELEC, SC ruled that when there is an allegation in an election protest that would require the perusal,
examination or counting of ballots as evidence, it is the ministerial duty of the trial court to order the opening of the ballot boxes and
the examination and counting of ballots deposited therein. Xxx the serious allegations embodied in the election protest mandates and
necessitates the opening of the subject ballot boxes to the end of resolving the issue of fraud and irregularities in the election.
Precisely, the purpose of ordering the opening of the ballot boxes is to ascertain, with the least amount of protracted delay, the
veracity of the allegations of fraud and anomalies in the conduct of the electoral exercise.
PAYMENT OF APPEAL/FILING FEES
Pacanan, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, 597 SCRA 189

Aguilar v. Comelec 591 SCRA 491 - Petitioner Pacanan, Jr. and private respondent Langi Sr., were candidates for mayor in the
municipality of Motiong, Samar during the May 14, 2007 elections. Petitioner was proclaimed having garnered a total of 3,069 votes
against private respondent’s 3,066 votes.
On May 25, 2007, private respondent filed an election protest with the RTC which rendered a Decision on January 7, 2008
RTC declaring private respondent as winner with a plurality of 6 votes. 3 days after or on January 10, 2008 petitioner filed a notice of
appeal and paid 3K appeal fee before the RTC and also appealed the RTC decision to the Comelec. Out of the 3K appeal fee required
under Sec. 3, Rule 40 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, petitioner only paid 1K plus 200 to cover the legal research/bailiff fees.
On March 17, 2008 Comelec 1st division issued on Order dismissing the appeal on the ground that petitioner failed to pay the correct
appeal fee within the 5-days reglementary period which is a ground for the dismissal of the appeal under Section 9(a), Rule 22 of
the CRP. On March 28, 2008 petitioner filed a MR with the Comelec En Banc which denied the resolution declaring that the appeal
was not perfected on time for non-payment of the complete amount of appeal and for late payment as well, hence, did not acquire
jurisdiction over the appeal.
Before the SC is a petition for Certiorari raising that 1) Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in holding that the correct appeal fee was not paid on time; 2) In failing to consider, that assuming that the
correct appeal fee was not paid on time, the alleged non-payment is not in anyway attributable to petitioner; 3) that assuming the
correct appeal fee was not paid on time, there are highly justifiable and compelling reasons to resolve the subject case on the merit in
the interest of justice and public interest.
The SC noted that two (2) different tribunals earlier require the payment of two different appeal fees for the perfection of
the appeals of election cases.
Sec. 3, Rule 22 of the CRP (Appeals form decisions of Courts in election Protest Cases), mandates that the notice
of appeal must be filed with 5-days after the promulgation of the decision. On the other hand, Section 3 & 4 Rule 40 of the CRP
amended the amount of the appeal fees to 3.2K which should be paid with the cash division of the Comelec.
On the other hand, Section 8 & 9, Rule 14 of A.M. No. 07-4-15 SC (Rules of procedure in Election Contests before
the Court Involving Elective Municipal and Barangay Officials effective May 15, 2007) also provide the procedure of
instituting an appeal and the required appeal fees to be paid for the appeal to be given due course.
This requirement in the payment of appeal fees had caused much confusion, which the Comelec addressed through the
issuance of Comelec Res. No. 8486 on July 15, 2008. The salient feature of the said resolution provide that “the appeal to
the Comelec of the trial court’s decision in election contests involving municipal and barangay officials is perfected
upon the filing of the notice of appeal and payment of the 1K appeal fee to the court that rendered the decision within
the 5-day reglementary period. The non-payment or the insufficient payment of the addition appeal fee of 3.2K to the Comelec
Cash Division in accordance with Rule 40, Section 3 of the CRP, as amended, does not affect the perfection of the appeal
and does not result in outright or ipso facto dismissal of the appeal.
Comelec 1st division gravely abused its discretion in issuing the order dismissing the appeal taking notice that the notice of
appeal and the 1K appeal fee were, respectively filed and paid with the MTC on April 21, 2008 which date the appeal was perfected.
Comelec Res. 8486 clarifying the rule on the payment of appeal fees was issued only on July 15, 2008, or almost 3-months after the
appeal was perfected. Yet on July 31, 2008 or barely two weeks after the issuance of Comelec Res. 8486, the Comelec 1 st division
dismissed the appeal for non-payment of the 3.2K appeal fee.
Considering that petitioner filed his appeal months before the clarificatory resolution on appeal fees, the
appeal should not be unjustly prejudiced by Comelec Res. No. 8486. Fairness and prudence dictate the 1st division should
have first directed petitioner to pay the additional appeal fee in accordance with the clarificatory resolution. Instead it hastily dismissed
the appeal on the strength of the clarificatory resolution which had taken effect only a few days earlier. (This unseemly haste is an
invitation to outrage.) Court further stressed the liberal construction policy.

Villagracia v. Comelec 513 SCRA 655 (2007), while it is true that a court acquires jurisdiction over a case upon complete payment
of the prescribed filing fee, the rule admits of exceptions, as when a party never raised the issue of jurisdiction in the trial court.
Gomez-Castillo v. Comelec 621 SCRA 499 – The period of appeal and the perfection of appeal are not mere technicalities to be so
lightly regarded, for they are essential to the finality of judgments, a notion underlying the stability of our judicial system. The short
period of 5-days as the period to appeal recognizes the essentiality of time in election protests, in order that the will of the electorate is
ascertained as soon as possible so that the winning candidate is not deprived of the right to assume office, and so that any doubt that
can cloud the incumbent of the truly deserving winning candidate is quickly removed.
- If you recall in election contests as to determine the real winner it is liberally construed. If it is accepted, the court
shall apply liberally construction. But the liberal construction policy is not absolute because it is subject to jurisdiction.
In the second classification with respect to reglementary period, it is strictly construed. Period of appeal are not
mere technicalities.
Zanoras v. Comelec G.R. No. 158610 November 12, 2004, the mere filing of the notice of appeal was not enough. It should be
accompanied by the payment of the correct amount of appeal fee. The payment of the full amount of the docket fee is an
indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal. (Rulloda v. Comelec 245 SCRA 702)
Loyola v. Comelec 337 SCRA 134 (1997), the Court stressed that there is no longer any excuse for shortcoming in the payment of
filing fees. The Court held that in the case at bar “any claim of good faith, excusable negligence or mistake in any failure to pay the
full amount of filing fees in election cases which may be filed after the promulgation of this decision is no longer acceptable (March 25,
1977). The Loyola doctrine was reiterated in the subsequent cases of Miranda v. Castillo 274 SCRA 503, Soller v. Comelec 339 SCRA
684 hold that a court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees and errors in the
payment of the filing fee is no longer allowed.
EXECUTIONS PENDING APPEAL
TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON V. COMELEC/LUIS BAUTISTA/ROBELITO V. PICAR/WILMA P. PAGADUAN 678 SCRA

267 (2012)
Executions Pending Appeal - There is no reason to dispute the Comelec’s authority to order discretionary execution of judgment in
view of the fact that the suppletory application of the Rules of Court is expressly sanctioned by Section 1, Rule 41 of the Comelec Rules
of Procedure. Under Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, execution pending appeal may be issued by an appellate court after the
trial court has lost jurisdiction. In Batul v. Bayron 424 SCRA 26 (2004), the Court stressed the import of the provision vis-à-vis election
cases when we held that judgments in election cases which may be executed pending appeal includes those decided by trial courts and
those rendered by the Comelec whether in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction.
Saludaga vs. Comelec 617 SCRA 601 – The discretion to allow execution pending reconsideration belongs to the division that
rendered the assailed decision, order or resolution, or the Comelec en banc, as the case may be – not to the presiding Commissioner. A
writ of execution pending resolution of the MR of a decision of the division is not granted as a matter of right such that its issuance
becomes a ministerial duty that may be dispensed even just by the Presiding Commission.
Calo v. Comelec 610 SCRA 342 – The relevant rule provides that a motion for execution pending appeal filed by the prevailing party
shall contain a 3-day notice to the adverse party and execution pending appeal shall not issue without prior notice and hearing. The
purpose of these requirements is to avoid surprises that may sprung upon the adverse party who must be given time to study and
meet the arguments in the motion before a resolution by the court. Where a party had the opportunity to be heard, then the purpose
has been served and the requirement substantially complied with. In this case, even the Comelec admitted that respondent was heard
and afforded his day in court; hence, it should not have annulled the RTC special order on said ground.
San Miguel vs. Comelec 609 SCRA 424 – The law provides that the court “may” issue execution pending appeal. Evident from the
usage of the word “may”, the language of the subject provision denotes that it is merely directory, not mandatory, for the trial court to
issue the special order before the expiration of the period to appeal. The trial court may still thereafter resolve a motion for execution
pending appeal, provided: (i) the motion is filed within the 5-day reglementary period; and (ii) the special order is issued prior to the
transmittal of the records of the Comelec.
Malaluan v. Comelec 254 SCRA 397, this was the first case where a judge, acting without a precedent, granted the motion for
execution of its decision in an election protest case, pending appeal. It was ruled that Sec. 2 Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which
allowed the RTC to order execution pending appeal upon good reasons stated in a special order, may be made to apply by analogy or
suppletorily to election contest decided by it. The posting of the supersedeas bond was considered good reasons by the judge.
Camlian v. Comelec 271 SCRA, executions pending appeal must be strictly construed against the movant as it is an exception to the
general rule on execution of judgments.
Ramas v. Comelec 286 SCRA 189, what may constitute “good reasons’ for execution pending appeal
The public interest involved or the will of the electorate
The shortness of the remaining period of the term of the contested office
The length of time that the election contest has been pending.

The filing of a bond alone does not constitute good reasons. Nevertheless, the trial court may require the filing of a bond as
condition for the issuance of the corresponding writ of execution to answer for the payment of damages which the aggrieved party may
suffer by reason of the execution pending appeal.
Fernando U. Batul v. Lucilo Bayron, et. al. 424 SCRA 26, execution pending appeal in the discretion of the courts applies
suppletorily in election cases including those involving city and provincial officials to obviate a hollow victory for the duly elected
candidate as determined either by the Court or by Comelec. The Comelec resolution granting execution pending appeal (by virtue of
its original exclusive jurisdiction over all contest relating to the E, R and Q of provincial and city officials) was raised before the SC
arguing that Sec. 2 Rule 39 cannot be applied and the only ground that will validly sustain execution of a decision by a Comelec
division pending reconsideration is when the MR is not pro forma.
Case of Ramas did not declare that such remedy is exclusive only to election contests involving elective municipal and barangay
officials. Sec. 1 of Rule 41of the Comelec Rules of Procedure expressly provides that pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court
shall be applicable by analogy or in a suppletory character.
Navarosa v. Comelec 411 SCRA, the RTC in an election protest case granted execution pending appeal by Esto after finding that
Esto won in the said election. In the same order the judge allowed protestee Navaroza to stay the execution of the decision pending
appeal by filing a supersedeas bond in double the amount posted by the protestant.. A Petition for Ceriorari was filed by Esto with the
Comelec where the Comelec 2nd division affirmed the trial court’s order granting execution pending appeal and nullified the stay of the
execution. The Comelec did not gravely abuse its discretion as it is for Comelec in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction to issue the
extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition mandamus and injunction over all contest involving elective municipal officials decided by
the trial court of general jurisdiction elevate on appeal, and NOT the trial court, that may order the stay or restrain the immediate
execution of the decision pending appeal granted by the trail court of general jurisdiction in an election contest.
Except when the trial court reversed itself in a MR of its order granting immediate execution, it cannot later on stay or restrain
the execution thereof in the guise of allowing the losing party to file a supersedeas bond. The issue before the trial court where a
motion for execution pending appeal is filed is to determine whether or not there are “good reasons” to justify the immediate execution
pending appeal. The issue is not whether there are good reasons to stay the immediate execution of the decision pending appeal.
LIM VS.COMELEC ET.AL. G.R. NO. 171952 March 08, 2007; Torres vs. Abundo, Sr. 512 SCRA 556; - Before granting a
motion for execution pending appeal in election cases, the SC laid down the following requisites –
(1) there must be motion by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party
(2) there must be good reasons for the execution pending appeal
(3) the order granting execution pending appeal must state the good reasons.
Good reasons (Fermo v. Comelec)
1) public interest involved or will of the electorate
2) shortness of the remaining term of the contested office
3) length of time that the election contest has been pending
Istarul vs. Comelec 491 SCRA 300 (2006) – the length of time that the election protest has been pending, thus, leaving petitioner
only 21 months as the remaining portion of the term to serve as mayor, does not constitute “good reasons” to justify execution
pending appeal. Referring to Fermo, the SC held that “shortness of term”: alone and by itself cannot justify premature execution. It
must be manifest in the decision sought to be executed that the defeat of the protestee and the victory of the protestant has been
clearly established.”
Trillanes IV. Vs. Pimentel, Sr. 556 SCRA 471 (relate to Rodolfo Aguinaldo on the condonation issue) – The case against Trillanes
is not administrative in nature. And there is no “prior term’ to speak of. In a plethora of cases, the Court categorically held that the
doctrine of condonation does not apply to criminal cases. Election, or more precisely, election to office, does not obliterate a criminal
charge. Petitioners electoral victory only signifies pertinently that when the voters elected him to the Senate, “they did so with full
awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action and with the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which
he could accomplish within the confines of prison.
CAN DAMAGES BE AWARDED IN ELECTION PROTEST CASES?
Malaluan vs. Comelec, the Court ruled that damages cannot be granted in an election protest case ratiocinating that the provision
of law allowing damages under specific circumstances, more particularly compensatory and actual damages is provided under Article
2176 of the Civil Code which is appropriate only in breaches of obligations in contracts and QC and on the occasion of crimes and QD
where the defendant may be held liable for damages the proximate cause of which is the act or omission complained of.
Therefore, the monetary claim of a party in an election case must necessarily be anchored in contract, QC, or a tortiuos act or omission
of a crime in order to effectively recover actual or compensatory damages. In the absence of any or all of these, the claimant must be
able to point out a specific provision of law authorizing a money claim for election protest expenses against the losing party.
The bonds or cash deposits required by the Comelec Rules of Procedure are in the nature of filing fees not damages

SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES IN AN ELECTION PROTESTCASE
Fernando Poe v. Arroyo March 29, 2005, the Court resolved the issue on whether the widow may substitute/intervene for the
protestant who die during the pendency of the latter’s protest case.
The fundamental rule applicable in a presidential election protest is Rule 14 of the PET Rules which provides “only the
registered candidate for Pres. or VP of the Philippines who received the 2 nd and 3rd highest number of votes may contest the election of
the P and VP, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the PET within 30 days after the proclamation of the
winner.
The Court made reference in its ruling in Vda de Mesa v. Mencias where it rejected substitution by the widow or the heirs in
election contest where the protestant dies during the pendency of the protest on the grounds that the heirs are not real parties in
interest and that a public office is personal to the public officer and not a property transmissible to the heirs upon death. The Court
pursuant to Rule 3, Section 15 of the rules of Court, however, allowed substitution and intervention upon the death of the protestee
but by a real party in interest, one who would be benefited or injured by the judgment and entitled to avail of the suit. In the Mencias
and Lumogdnag v. Javier cases, the Court permitted substitution by the VM since the VM is the real party in interest considering that if
the protest succeeds and the protestee is unseated, the VM succeeds to the office of the mayor that becomes vacant if the one duly
elected cannot assume office.
The Court further held, that nobility of intentions is not the point in reference in determining whether a person may intervene in an
election protest case.
PROSECUTION OF ELECTION CASES
Article IX-C Section 2(6) of the Constitution vests in the Comelec the power and function to investigate and where appropriate,
prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses and malpractices. This
prosecutorial power of the Comelec is reflected in Section 265 of BP 881. It is well settled that the finding of probable cause in the
prosecution of election offenses rests in the Comelec’s sound discretion. (Garcia v. Comelec 611 SCRA 55 Jan. 2010)
Arroyo v DOJ: w/n the COMELEC has the exclusive jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute election law violation. The grant to the
Comelec of the power to investigate and prosecute election offenses as an adjunct to the enforcement and administration of all election
laws is intended to enable the Comelec to effectively insure to the people the free, orderly, and honest conduct of elections. The failure
of the Comelec to exercise this power could result in the frustration of the true will of the people and make a mere idle ceremony of
the sacred right and duty of every qualified citizen to vote.63 The constitutional grant of prosecutorial power in the Comelec was
reflected in Section 265 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, to wit:
Section 265. Prosecution. The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have the exclusive power to conduct
preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the same. The Commission may avail of
the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government: Provided, however, That in the event that the Commission fails to act on
any complaint within four months from his filing, the complainant may file the complaint with the office of the fiscal [public prosecutor],
or with the Ministry [Department] of Justice for proper investigation and prosecution, if warranted.
Under the above provision of law, the power to conduct preliminary investigation is vested exclusively with the Comelec. The latter,
however, was given by the same provision of law the authority to avail itself of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the
government.64 Thus, under Section 265 Rule 34 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, provincial and city prosecutors and their assistants
are given continuing authority as deputies to conduct preliminary investigation of complaints involving election offenses under election
laws and to prosecute the same. The complaints may be filed directly with them or may be indorsed to them by the petitioner or its
duly authorized representatives.66 Thus, under the Omnibus Election Code, while the exclusive jurisdiction to conduct preliminary
investigation had been lodged with the Comelec, the prosecutors had been conducting preliminary investigations pursuant to the
continuing delegated authority given by the Comelec.
Banat Partylist Case: the constitutionality of Sec. 43 of RA 9369 or the Automated Systems Law had been raised by the petitioners
and addressed by the court. While recognizing the exclusive powers of the COMELEC in the prosecution and investigation of election
offense under BP 881, the framers of the 1987 Constitution did not have such limitation. The exclusivity is just a legislative enactment
that can be well amended by Sec. 43 of the RA 9369.
SEC. 43. Section 265 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 is hereby amended to read as follow:
"SEC. 265. Prosecution. - The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have the power, concurrent with
the other prosecuting arms of the government, to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under
this Code, and prosecute the same"
As clearly set forth above, instead of a mere delegated authority, the other prosecuting arms of the government, such as the DOJ, now
exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the Comelec to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses and to prosecute the
same.

Notwithstanding, the grant of concurrent jurisdiction the COMELEC and DOJ, nonetheless the order of the joint task force, whereby the
resolutions finding probable cause for election offenses will still be approved by the COMELEC in accordance with the COMELEC rules of
procedure with more reason therefore we cannot consider the creation of the joint committee as an abdication of the COMELEC’s
independence as enshrined in the Constitution.
The procedure in conducting preliminary investigation is governed by Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and Rule 34 of 1993
Comelec Rules of Procedure.
Under both rules, the respondent shall submit his counter- affidavit that of his witnesses and other supporting documents relied upon
his defense, within 10 days from the receipt of the subpoena, with the complaint and the supporting affidavits and documents.
Respondent is limited only to the documents or evidence which may not have been furnished maybe copied by them at his expense.
Comelec v. Noynay, July 9, 1998, the Comelec resolved to file an Information for violation of Section 261(i) of the OEC against
certain public school officials for having engaged in partisan political activities which was filed by its Regional Director with Branch 23 of
RTC of Allen Northern Samar presided by Judge Tomas B. Noynay. The judge ordered the records of the cases to be withdrawn and
directed the Comelec to file the cases with the MTC on the ground that pursuant to Section 32 of BP 129 as amended by RA 7691, the
RTC has no jurisdiction over the cases since the maximum imposable penalty in each of the cases does not exceed 6 years
imprisonment. The SC ruled that RA 7691 did not divest the RTC of jurisdiction over election offenses which are punishable with
imprisonment of not exceeding 6 years. The opening sentence of Section 32, provides that the exclusive original jurisdiction of
Metropolitan Trial Courts, MTC and MCTC does not cover those criminal cases which by specific provisions of law fall within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC and of the SB, regardless of the penalty prescribed therefore.
Comelec vs. Espanol 417 SCRA 554, it was ruled that the Comelec, thru its duly authorized legal officers, under Section 265 of the
OEC, has the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under the OEC and to prosecute
the same. The acts of these deputies within the lawful scope of their delegated authority are the acts of the Comelec.
Garcia v. Commission on Elections 611 SCRA 55 – Generally, the Court will not interfere with the finding of probable cause by the
Comelec absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion.
Pp. v. Inting July 25, 1990, Comelec is given exclusive authority to investigate and conduct preliminary investigations relative to
commission of election offenses and prosecute the same. A preliminary investigation conducted by the Provincial Election Supervisor
involving an election offense does not have to be coursed through the Provincial Prosecutor before the RTC may take cognizance of the
investigation and determine whether or not probable cause exist to issue a warrant of arrest. If the Provincial Prosecutor performs any
role at all as regards the prosecution of an election case, it is by delegation or that he was deputized by the Comelec.
Faelnar v. People 331 SCRA 429, (a) where the State Prosecutor, or Provincial or City Prosecutor exercises the power to conduct
preliminary investigation of election offense cases and after the investigation submits its recommendation to the Comelec, the issue of
probable cause is already resolved. The proper remedy to question the said resolution is to file an appeal with the
COMELEC and the ruling of the Comelec on the appeal would be immediately final and executory.
(b) If the preliminary investigation of the complaint for an election offence is conducted by the Comelec, the investigation officer
prepares its recommendation to the Law Department which department in turn makes its recommendation to the Comelec en banc on
whether there is probable cause to prosecute. It is the Comelec en banc which determines the existence of probable cause.
The proper remedy of the aggrieved party is to file a Motion for Reconsideration of such resolution. This effectively allows for a review
of the original resolution, in the same manner that the Comelec on appeal, or motu propio, may review the resolution of the State
prosecutor, or Provincial or city fiscal. (Take note that since this is an election offense a Motion for Reconsideration of an En Banc
resolution is allowed.)
Herman Tiu Laurel vs. RTC Judge of Manila Br. 10 and Comelec, the SC upheld the power of Comelec to prosecute cases of
violations of election laws and further explained that there are two (2) ways through which a complaint for election offenses
may be initiated.
(1) it may be filed by the Comelec motu propio or

(2) it may be filed via written complaint by any citizen of the Philippines, candidate, registered political party, coalition of
political parties or organizations under the party-list system or any accredited citizen arms of the commission.
Motu propio complaints may be signed by the Chairman of the Comelec and need not be verified. But those complaints filed
by parties other than the Comelec must be verified and supported by affidavits and other evidence.
The complaint shall be filed with the Comelec Law Department or with the offices of the EO, PES or RED, or the State
Prosecutors, provincial or city prosecutors. Whether initiated motu propio or filed with the Comelec by any party, the complaint shall
be referred to the Comelec Law Department for investigation. Upon the direction of the Chairman, the PI may be delegated to any
lawyer of the Department, any RED or PES, or any Comelec lawyer.

Comelec v. Silva Feb. 10, 1998, the SC settled the issue as to whether the Chief State Prosecutor, who was designated by the
Comelec to prosecute election cases, has the authority to decide whether or not to appeal from the orders of dismissal of the RTC. It
was held that the authority belongs to the Comelec and not the prosecutor as the latter derive its authority from the Comelec and not
from their offices. Propriety dictates, that if the prosecutor believes, after the conduct of the PI, that no probable cause warrants the
prosecution of the accused who have allegedly violated Sec. 27 of RA 6646 (tampering of certificate of canvass), the matter would
have been discussed with the Comelec and if the latter disagrees, seek permission to withdraw from the case.
Dino vs. Olivares 607 SCRA 251 (2009). The SC held that being mere deputies or agents of the Comelec (with continuing
authority), provincial or city prosecutors deputized by it are expected to act in accord with and NOT contrary to or in derogation of its
resolutions, directives or orders in relation to election cases that such prosecutors are deputized to investigate and prosecute. They
must proceed within the lawful scope of their delegated authority.
Such authority may be revoked or withdrawn anytime by the Comelec, either expressly or impliedly, when in its judgment such
revocation or withdrawal is necessary to protect the integrity of the process to promote the common good, or where it believes that
successful prosecution of the case can be done by the Comelec.
When the Comelec en banc directed the City Prosecutor of Paranaque to transmit the entire records of the election offense case, it had
the effect of SUSPENDING THE AUTHORITY of the City Prosecutor. Hence, the filing of the amended information and the amended
information themselves, is declared void and of no effect.
Kilosbayan vs. Comelec 280 SCRA 892, Kilosbayan filed a letter-complaint with the Comelec against incumbent officials running for
public elective office for violation of Sec. 261 of the OEC alleging illegal disbursement of public funds and submitting as evidence to
support the complaint, published writings in newspapers without any additional evidence to support the newspaper articles on the
argument that it was the Comelec’s constitutional duty to prosecute election offenses upon any information of alleged commission of
election offenses. The Comelec dismissed the complaint there being on probable cause found. The SC rued that it is not the duty of
the Comelec to search for evidence to prove an election complaint filed before it. The task of Comelec as investigator
and prosecutor is not the physical searching and gathering of proof in support of the alleged commission of an election
offense. The complainant still has the burden to prove his complaint.

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ELECTION LAW PRE-BAR REVIEW

Atty. Jocelyn Arro-Valencia

2014 BAR Examination Coverage for Election Laws

In a democratic process, suffrage is very important. So what is suffrage?

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SCOPE OF SUFFRAGE: FORMS OF POPULAR INTERVENTION

Main Sources of Election laws:

2. Special elections – election not regularly held but which is conducted

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Classes of Referendum – 1) On Statutes; 2) On Local Laws.

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(a) Section 2 of Article IX-C of the Constitution and

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REGISTRATION IS EXTENDED TO: DOMESTIC AND OVERSEAS VOTERS

FOR DOMESTIC VOTERS – GOVERNED BY RA 8189 The Voters Registration Act

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WHEN DISABILITY REMOVED –

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Sec. 17 – Procedure for hearing of applications.

Section. 21 – Publication of Action on Application for Registration

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Has been disapproved by the Board; or

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Grounds for disapproval of the Application for Local Absentee Voting

OVERSEAS ABSENTEE VOTING (OAV) – RA 9189 Absentee Voters Act of 2003

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Jurisdiction of Comelec over Inter-Party Disputes/Power to Register Political Parties

Luis LokinJr./Teresita Planas v. Comelec/CIBAC 674 SCRA 538 (2012)

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Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. v. Comelec 646 SCRA 63 (2011)

21| (edited based on 2016 4th year review class)

The 8-point guidelines for screening party-list participants

22| (edited based on 2016 4th year review class)

New Formula in the Allocation of Seats for Party-List Representatives

23| (edited based on 2016 4th year review class)

24| (edited based on 2016 4th year review class)

25| (edited based on 2016 4th year review class)

EFFECTS: FILING OF CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY

26| (edited based on 2016 4th year review class)

AES May 2012 Comelec Res 8678 Substitution sec 13.

Federico v COMELEC 689 SCRA 135

27| (edited based on 2016 4th year review class)

What is the indispensable requisite in substation?

RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT 6 months

28| (edited based on 2016 4th year review class)

ACTIONS TO CHALLENGE CANDIDACY OF A CANDIDATE OR DISQUALIFY CANDIDATE

1) Sec. 12 of the 0EC –

The disqualification is removed by

2) Sec. 68 of the OEC

WHO IS A NUISANCE CANDIDATE

29| (edited based on 2016 4th year review class)

Who may file – by any person through a verified petition

Jurisdiction – Comelec sitting in a division.