PURITA MIRANDA VESTIL and AGUSTIN VESTIL, petitioners, 
vs. The Vestils are liable for damages for Theness’ death as
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, DAVID UY and TERESITA
UY, respondents.
G.R. No. 74431 November 6, 1989
FACTS:
On July 29, 1915, Theness was bitten by a dog while she was
playing with a child of the petitioners in the house of the late
Vicente Miranda, the father of Purita Vestil, at F. Ramos Street
in Cebu City. She was rushed to the Cebu General Hospital,
where she was treated for "multiple lacerated wounds on the
forehead" 1 and administered an anti-rabies vaccine by Dr.
Antonio Tautjo. She was discharged after nine days but was
readmitted one week later due to "vomiting of saliva." 2 The
following day, on August 15, 1975, the child died. The cause of
death was certified as broncho-pneumonia. 3
Trial Court: Dismissed the complaint.
Court of Appeal: Theness had died due to the dog bites. Under
Article 2183 of the Civil Code., the Vestils are liable for damages
as possessor of the property and the dog.
Defense: The dog was tame and had merely been provoked,
although no one had seen it bite Theness. Additionally, she had
died of broncho-pneumonia, which had no correlation to dog
bites.
Anyway, she (Purita) could not be held liable because the dog
does not belong to her but to Vicente Miranda, her father. She
is not the sole owner of the unpartitioned property, there are
other heirs. There are also other occupants of the house that
maintain themselves out of a common fund, they do not pay
rent because of their relation to her father but do occupy the
property.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Vestils liable for damages. Yes.
HELD:
The cause of Theness’ death was the dog bites. She developed
hydrophobia, a symptom of rabies, and had died due to
broncho-pneumonia, a complication of rabies.
Liability is due to the possession of the dog, regardless of the
ownership of the dog or property. Under Article 2183,
regardless if the animal was tame or vicious or if it had been
lost and removed from the control of the Vestils, liability still
attach because one who possesses an animal for utility,
pleasure or service must answer for the damage which the
animal may had caused.
Article 2183: The possessor of an animal or whoever may make
use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may
cause, although it may escape or be lost. 'This responsibility
shall cease only in case the damages should come from force
majeure from the fault of the person who has suffered damage.
possessor of Andoy, the dog. Theness is just 3 years old and
could not be faulted for any of actions of alleged provocations.
Notably, the Vestils had offered to assist in the hospitalization
expense, even if they declared the Uys to merely be their casual
acquaintances only.
While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house,
which was still part of Vicente Miranda's estate, there is no
doubt that she and her husband were its possessors at the time
of the incident in question. She was the only heir residing in
Cebu City and the most logical person to take care of the
property, which was only six kilometers from her own
house. 13 Moreover, there is evidence showing that she and her
family regularly went to the house, once or twice weekly,
according to at least one witness, 14 and used it virtually as a
second house. Interestingly, her own daughter was playing in
the house with Theness when the little girl was bitten by the
dog. 15 The dog itself remained in the house even after the
death of Vicente Miranda in 1973 and until 1975, when the
incident in question occurred. It is also noteworthy that the
petitioners offered to assist the Uys with their hospitalization
expenses although Purita said she knew them only casually. 
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. CA
G.R. No. 110295 October 18, 1993
FACTS:
Private Respondent Lydia Geronimo was the proprietress of
Kindergarten Wonderland Canteen in Dagupan City, an
enterprise engaged in the sale of soft drinks and other goods to
the students of Kindergarten Wonderland.
On or about August 12, 1989, some parents of the students
complained of the presence of some fiber-like substance in the
Coke and Sprite soft drinks. The same were also discovered in
her stocked soft drinks. She brought the said substances to the
Department of Health at San Fernando, La Union for testing and
the results showed that the same were “adulterated”. She then
filed a complaint against petitioner.
On the other hand, petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint
on the ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies, as
well as prescription because the complaint is allegedly for
breach of warranty under Article 1561 of the Civil Code.
The RTC granted petitioner’s motion to dismiss. Subsequently,
the CA annulled the lower court’s orders on the ground that the
complaint was one for quasi-delict, and not for breach of
warranty, which prescribes in four years.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA committed a reversible error in ruling
that Article 2176 is applicable despite the fact of the existence
of contractual relations between the parties.
RULING:
NO. The public respondent's conclusion that the cause of action
in Civil Case No. D-9629 is found on quasi-delict and that,
therefore, pursuant to Article 1146 of the Civil Code, it
prescribes in four (4) years is supported by the allegations in the
complaint, more particularly paragraph 12 thereof, which
makes reference to the reckless and negligent manufacture of
"adulterated food items intended to be sold for public
consumption."
The vendee's remedies against a vendor with respect to the
warranties against hidden defects of or encumbrances upon the
thing sold are not limited to those prescribed in Article 1567 of
the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 1567. In the case of Articles 1561, 1562, 1564, 1565 and
1566, the vendee may elect between withdrawing from the
contract and demanding a proportionate reduction of the price,
with damages either case.
The vendee may also ask for the annulment of the contract
upon proof of error or fraud, in which case the ordinary rule on
obligations shall be applicable. Under the law on obligations,
responsibility arising from fraud is demandable in all obligations
and any waiver of an action for future fraud is void.
Responsibility arising from negligence is also demandable in any
obligation, but such liability may be regulated by the courts,
according to the circumstances. Those guilty of fraud,
negligence, or delay in the performance of their obligations and
those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof are
liable for damages.
The vendor could likewise be liable for quasi-delict under Article
2176 of the Civil Code, and an action based thereon may be
brought by the vendee. While it may be true that the pre-
existing contract between the parties may, as a general rule, bar
the applicability of the law on quasi-delict, the liability may
itself be deemed to arise from quasi-delict, i.e., the acts which
breaks the contract may also be a quasi-delict. Thus, in Singson
vs. Bank of the Philippine Islands, this Court stated:
We have repeatedly held, however, that the existence of a
contract between the parties does not bar the commission of a
tort by the one against the other and the consequent recovery
of damages therefor. Indeed, this view has been, in effect,
reiterated in a comparatively recent case. Thus, in Air France vs.
Carrascoso, involving an airplane passenger who, despite hi
first-class ticket, had been illegally ousted from his first-class
accommodation and compelled to take a seat in the tourist
compartment, was held entitled to recover damages from the
air-carrier, upon the ground of tort on the latter's part, for,
although the relation between the passenger and a carrier is
"contractual both in origin and nature . . . the act that breaks
the contract may also be a tort.
Otherwise put, liability for quasi-delict may still exist despite the
presence of contractual relations.
Under American law, the liabilities of a manufacturer or seller
of injury-causing products may be based on negligence, breach
of warranty, tort, or other grounds such as fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation. Quasi-delict, as defined in Article 2176 of
the Civil Code, (which is known in Spanish legal treaties as culpa
aquiliana, culpa extra-contractual or cuasi-delitos) is
homologous but not identical to tort under the common law,
which includes not only negligence, but also intentional criminal
acts, such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and
deceit.
It must be made clear that our affirmance of the decision of the
public respondent should by no means be understood as
suggesting that the private respondent's claims for moral
damages have sufficient factual and legal basis.
CITY OF MANILA V. TEOTICO
G.R. NO. L-23052, JANUARY 29, 1968
FACTS:
On the evening of January 27, 1958, Teotico at Old Luneta
around P. Burgos Avenue, Manila while waiting for a jeepney.
When a jeepney arrived, he was walking towards it and fell into
a manhole which broke his eyeglasses and pieced his eyelids. He
was brought to a nearby hospital wherein they found out
several injuries he sustained.
Teotico sued City of Manila and its officers for damages for its
failure to cover the manhole which caused his injuries. On its
defense, City of Manila alleged that the iron that was covering
the manhole was stolen and that was not the first time it was
stolen. Also, they alleged that they were not liable because
under R.A. 409, Sec.4, “The city shall not be liable or held for
damages or injuries to persons or property arising from the
failure of the Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any other city
officer, to enforce the provisions of this chapter, or any other
law or ordinance, or from negligence of said Mayor, Municipal
Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to
enforce said provisions.”
The RTC ruled in favor of Teotico and the CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
Should Sec.4, R.A. 409 applicable considering it is a special law
to cover City of Manila’s negligence?
HELD:
1. NO. It is true that, insofar as its territorial application is
concerned, Republic Act No. 409 is a special law and the Civil
Code a general legislation; but, as regards the subject-matter of
the provisions above quoted, Section 4 of Republic Act 409
establishes a general rule regulating the liability of the City of
Manila for: "damages or injury to persons or property arising
from the failure of" city officers "to enforce the provisions of"
said Act "or any other law or ordinance, or from negligence" of
the city "Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while
enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions." Upon the
other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code constitutes a
particular prescription making "provinces, cities and
municipalities . . . liable for damages for the death of, or injury
suffered by any person by reason" — specifically — "of
the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public
buildings, and other-public works under their control or
supervision." In other words, said section 4 refers to liability
arising from negligence, in general, regardless of the object
thereof, whereas Article 2189 governs liability due to "defective
streets," in particular. Since the present action is based upon
the alleged defective condition of a road, said Article 2189 is
decisive thereon.
At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not
necessary for the liability therein established to attach that the
defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or
municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said
article requires is that the province, city or municipality have
either "control or supervision" over said street or road.
BERNARDINO JIMENEZ v. CITY OF MANILA
G.R. No. 71049 May 29, 1987
FACTS:
In the morning of August 15, 1974 Jimenez, together with his
neighbors, went to Sta. Ana public market to buy "bagoong" at
the time when the public market was flooded with ankle deep
rainwater.
After purchasing the "bagoong" he turned around to return
home but he stepped on an uncovered opening which could not
be seen because of the dirty rainwater, causing a dirty and rusty
four-inch nail, stuck inside the uncovered opening, to pierce the
left leg of plaintiff-petitioner penetrating toa depth of about
one and a half inches.
Respondent City of Manila maintains that it cannot be held
liable for the injuries sustained by the petitioner because under
the Management and Operating Contract, Asiatic Integrated
Corporation assumed all responsibility for damages which may
be suffered by third persons for any cause attributable to it. It
has also been argued that the City of Manila cannot be held
liable under Article 1, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 409 as
amended (Revised Charter of Manila) which provides:
The City shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to
persons or property arising from the failure of the Mayor, the
Municipal Board, or any other City Officer, to enforce the
provisions of this chapter, or any other law or ordinance, or
from negligence of said Mayor, Municipal Board, or any other
officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions.
Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines which provides that:
Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages
for the death of, or injuries suffered by any person by reason of
defective conditions of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings
and other public works under their control or... supervision."
In other words, Art. 1, sec. 4, R.A. No. 409 refers to liability
arising from negligence, in general, regardless of the object,
thereof, while Article 2189 of the Civil Code governs liability due
to "defective streets,public buildings and other public works" in
particular and is therefore decisive on this specific case. What
said article requires is that the province, city or municipality has
either "control or supervision" over the public building in
question.
ISSUES:
Is the City of Manila should be jointly and severally liable with
Asiatic Integrated Corporation for the injuries Jimenez suffered?
RULING:
YES. In the case at bar, there is no question that the Sta. Ana
Public Market, despite the Management and Operating
Contract between respondent City and Asiatic Integrated
Corporation remained under the control of the former. As
exhibited by the facts that contract is explicit in this regard that
control remained with the City; that the fact of supervision and
control of the City over subject public market was admitted by
Mayor Ramon Bagatsing in his letter to Secretary of Finance
Cesar Virata; the City of Manila employed a market master for
the Sta. Ana Public Market whose primary duty is to take direct
supervision and control of that particular market, more
specifically, to check the safety of the place for the public; and
Finally, Section 30 (g) of the Local Tax Code as amended,
provides:
The treasurer shall exercise direct and immediate supervision
administration and control over public markets and the
personnel thereof, including those whose duties concern the
maintenance and upkeep of the market and ordinances and
other pertinent rules and regulations.
As a defense against liability on the basis of a quasi-delict, one
must have exercised the diligence of a good father of a family.
(Art. 1173 of the Civil Code).
There is no argument that it is the duty of the City of Manila to
exercise reasonable care to keep the public market reasonably
safe for people frequenting the place for their marketing needs.
While it may be conceded that the fulfillment of such duties is
extremely difficult during storms and floods, it must however,
be admitted that ordinary precautions could have been taken
during good weather to minimize the dangers to life and limb
under those difficult circumstances. For instance, the drainage
hole could have been placed under the stalls instead of on the
passage ways. Even more important is the fact, that the City
should have seen to it that the openings were covered. Sadly,
the evidence indicates that long before petitioner fell into the
opening, it was already uncovered, and five (5) months after the
incident happened, the opening was still uncovered. (Rollo, pp.
57; 59). Moreover, while there are findings that during floods
the vendors remove the iron grills to hasten the flow of water
(Decision, AC-G.R. CV No. 0 1387; Rollo, p. 17), there is no
showing that such practice has ever been prohibited, much less
penalized by the City of Manila. Neither was it shown that any
sign had been placed thereabouts to warn passersby of the
impending danger.
In sum, it is evident that the City of Manila is liable for damages
under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, respondent City having
retained control and supervision over the Sta. Ana Public
Market and as tort-feasor under Article 2176 of the Civil Code
on quasi-delicts.
Jimenez had the right to assume that there were no openings in
the middle of the passageways and if any, that they were
adequately covered. Had the opening been covered, petitioner
could not have fallen into it. Thus the negligence of the City of
Manila is the proximate cause of the injury suffered, the City is
therefore liable for the injury suffered by the petitioner.
Respondent City of Manila and Asiatic Integrated Corporation
being joint tort-feasors are solidarily liable under Article 2194 of
the Civil Code.
FLORENTINA A. GUILATCO vs. CITY OF DAGUPAN, and the
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 61516 March 21, 1989
FACTS:
While Florentina Guilatco was about to board a motorized
tricycle at a sidewalk located at Perez Blvd. (a National Road,
under the control and supervision of the City of Dagupan), she
accidentally fell into a manhole located on said sidewalk,
thereby causing her right leg to be fractured. As a result
thereof, she had to be hospitalized, operated on, and confined
at a Hospital.
The Trial Court ordered the City of Dagupan to pay Florentina
Guilatco for the damages she incurred. On appeal by the City of
Dagupan, the appellate court reversed the order of the lower
court.
The city contends that Perez Boulevard, where the fatal
drainage hole is located, is a national road that is not under the
control or supervision of the City of Dagupan. Hence, no liability
should attach to the city. It submits that it is actually the
Ministry of Public Highways that has control or supervision
through the Highway Engineer, which, by mere coincidence, is
held concurrently by the same person, Alfredo Tangco, who is
also the City Engineer of Dagupan.
ISSUE:
Whether or not control or supervision over a national road by
the City of Dagupan exists, in effect binding the city to answer
for damages in accordance with article 2189 of the Civil Code.
HELD:
Yes.
The liability of public corporations for damages arising from
injuries suffered by pedestrians from the defective condition of
roads is expressed in the Civil Code as follows:
Article 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable
for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person
by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges,
public buildings, and other public works under their control or
supervision.
It is not even necessary for the defective road or street to
belong to the province, city or municipality for liability to attach.
The article only requires that either control or supervision is
exercised over the defective road or street. 
In the case at bar, this control or supervision is provided for in
the charter of Dagupan and is exercised through the City
Engineer who has the following duties:
Sec. 22. The City Engineer--His powers, duties and
compensation-There shall be a city engineer, who shall be in
charge of the department of Engineering and Public Works. He
shall receive a salary of not exceeding three thousand pesos per
annum. He shall have the following duties:
xxx
(j) He shall have the care and custody of the public system of
waterworks and sewers, and all sources of water supply, and
shall control, maintain and regulate the use of the same, in
accordance with the ordinance relating thereto; shall inspect
and regulate the use of all private systems for supplying water
to the city and its inhabitants, and all private sewers, and their
connection with the public sewer system.
xxx
The same charter of Dagupan also provides that the laying out,
construction and improvement of streets, avenues and alleys
and sidewalks, and regulation of the use thereof, may be
legislated by the Municipal Board. Thus the charter clearly
indicates that the city indeed has supervision and control over
the sidewalk where the open drainage hole is located.
The express provision in the charter holding the city not liable
for damages or injuries sustained by persons or property due to
the failure of any city officer to enforce the provisions of the
charter, cannot be used to exempt the city, as in the case at
bar.

The charter only lays down general rules regulating the liability
of the city. On the other hand article 2189 applies in
particular to the liability arising from "defective streets, public
buildings and other public works."  The Commissioner found that there were deviations in the
FELIZA P. DE ROY vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 80718 January 29, 1988
Facts:
The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioner,
Felisa Perdosa De Roy, collapsed and destroyed the tailoring
shop of private respondents, Luis Bernal, Sr., et al., resulting in
injuries to their family and death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter.
Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate
their shop but the former failed to do so.
Given the facts, the First Judicial Region rendered judgment
finding petitioners guilty of gross negligence and awarding
damages to private respondents. This decision was affirmed in
toto by the Court of Appeals.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner is liable
Ruling:
Yes. Article 2190 of the Civil Code provides that the proprietor
of a building or structure is responsible for the damage resulting
from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of
necessary repairs.
Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument that
private respondents had the "last clear chance" to avoid the
accident if only they heeded the. warning to vacate the tailoring
shop and , therefore, petitioners prior negligence should be
disregarded, since the doctrine of "last clear chance," which has
been applied to vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this case.
JUAN F. NAKPIL & SONS, and JUAN F. NAKPIL vs. THE COURT
OF APPEALS, UNITED CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., JUAN J.
CARLOS, and the PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION
G.R. No. L-47851, October 3, 1986
FACTS:
Philippine Bar Association (PBA) is a non-profit organization
formed under the corporation law decided to put up a building
in Intramuros, Manila. Hired to plan the specifications of the
building were Juan Nakpil & Sons, while United Construction
was hired to construct it. The proposal was approved by the
Board of Directors and signed by the President, Ramon Ozaeta.
The building was completed in 1966. In 1968, there was an
unusually strong earthquake which caused the building heavy
damage, which led the building to tilt forward, leading the
tenants to vacate the premises.
On November 29, 1968, PBA commenced this action for
recovery of damages against UCCI and its President and General
Manager Juan J. Carlos, claiming that the collapse of the
building was caused by defects in the construction. UNITED, in
turn, filed a third-party complaint against the NAKPILS, alleging
in essence that the collapse of the building was due to the
defects in the architects" plans, specifications and design.
specifications and plans, as well as defects in the construction
of the building failure of PBA to exercise the requisite degree of
supervision in the construction of the building.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an act of God (fortuitous event) exempts from
liability parties who would otherwise be due to negligence?
(NO)
HELD:
There should be no question that the NAKPILS and UNITED are
liable for the damage resulting from the partial and eventual
collapse of the PBA building as a result of the earthquakes.
Art. 1174 of the NCC, states that no person shall be responsible
for events, which could not be foreseen. But to be exempt from
liability due to an act of God, the following must occur:
1) cause of breach must be independent of the will of the
debtor
2) event must be unforeseeable or unavoidable
3) event must be such that it would render it impossible
for the debtor to fulfill the obligation
4) debtor must be free from any participation or
aggravation of the industry to the creditor.
Although the general rule for fortuitous events stated in Article
1174 of the Civil Code exempts liability when there is an Act of
God, thus if in the concurrence of such event there be fraud,
negligence, delay in the performance of the obligation, the
obligor cannot escape liability therefore there can be an action
for recovery of damages.
The negligence of the defendant was shown when and proved
that there was an alteration of the plans and specification that
had been so stipulated among them. Therefore, there should be
no question that NAKPIL and UNITED are liable for damages
because of the collapse of the building.
One who negligently creates a dangerous condition cannot
escape liability for the natural and probable consequences
thereof, although the act of a third person, or an act of God for
which he is not responsible, intervenes to precipitate the loss.
The bone of contention is therefore, not on the fact of collapse
but on who should shoulder the damages resulting from the
partial and eventual collapse. As ruled by this Court in said
decision, there should be no question that the NAKPILS and
UNITED are liable for the damage.