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All pretrial motions in this case have been referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 636(b) for disposition or report and recommendation regarding disposition by the District
Court as may be appropriate. This case came before the Court on January 4, 2011, for a scheduled
pretrial conference and motion hearing on the United States’ Motion to Revoke Defendant’s Bond
or Modify Defendant’s Conditions of Pretrial Release [Doc. 63].1 Assistant United States Attorneys
Jeff Theodore and A. William Mackie appeared on behalf of the Government. Attorneys Paula R.
At the outset of the hearing, the Court noted the impending January 10, 2011 trial
date. Attorney Moffatt moved the Court to continue the trial, arguing that additional time was
needed for the Defendant to receive rulings on outstanding pretrial motions. The Defendant has filed
one motion to suppress evidence [Doc. 22], six motions [Docs. 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, and 34] to dismiss
the Superseding Indictment, and two motions requesting a bill of particulars [Docs. 23 and 35]. The
1
The Court’s denial of this motion is set out in a separate order.
supplemental briefing on the suppression motion. To date, the undersigned has entered Reports and
Recommendations [Docs. 62, 64, and 68] on three of the dispositive motions, and the Defendant has
filed two sets of Objections [Docs. 65 and 67]. At the hearing, Attorney Moffatt stated that the
defense anticipated the possible need for time to file objections to the remaining reports once they
were entered and time to receive the District Court’s ultimate ruling on the issues raised. The
Government believed the oral motion to continue the trial was well-taken and did not object to a
continuance.
The Court raised the issue of declaring the case complex for speedy trial purposes,
due to the number of novel legal issues that the Defendant has raised in his pretrial motions. Both
parties agreed that the case was complex. They parties also agreed to a new trial date of April 12,
2011.
The Court finds the Defendant’s oral motion to continue the January 10, 2011trial
date to be well-taken and that the ends of justice served by granting a continuance outweigh the
interest of the Defendant and the public in a speedy trial. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). As noted
above, the Defendant awaits rulings on seven pretrial motions in this case. 18 U.S.C. §
3161(h)(1)(D). Several of these motions contain novel questions of law, such as challenges to the
constitutionality of the statutes and whether the statute charged in Count One can be considered a
crime of violence. The Court finds that these motions are of such a nature that the time required to
determine the issues raised therein creates excludable time. See United States v. Tinklenberg, 579
2
At the beginning of this motion hearing, the Court directed the parties to specific
motions on which it sought clarification, permitting the parties to present argument on the
remaining motions at the end of the hearing, if they desired to do so.
expectation of a delay, of trial in order to create excludable time”), rehg and rehg en banc denied
(Jan. 12, 2010). Moreover, the Court finds that due to the number and novel character of the legal
issues raised, “it is unreasonable to expect adequate preparation for pretrial proceedings or for the
trial itself within the time limits established by” the Speedy Trial Act. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(ii).
The Court finds that this case should be designated as “complex” for speedy trial purposes and that
Finally, the Court observes that once the Defendant receives rulings on his motions,
the parties will need time to prepare for trial in light of those rulings. The Court finds that all of this
could not take place before the January 10, 2011 trial date or in less than three months. Thus, the
Court finds that the failure to grant a continuance would deprive the parties of time to prepare for
The Defendant’s oral motion to continue the January 10, 2011 trial is GRANTED,
and the trial of this matter is reset to April 12, 2011. The Court also finds that all the time between
the January 4, 2011 hearing and the new trial date of April 12, 2011, is fully excludable time under
the Speedy Trial Act for the reasons set forth herein. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D) & -(7)(A)-(B).
With regard to other scheduling in this case, the parties are to appear for a final pretrial conference
on April 1, 2011, at 11:00 a.m. This date will also be the new deadline for completing plea
negotiations. The Court instructs the parties that all motions in limine must be filed no later than
March 28, 2011. Special requests for jury instructions shall be submitted to the District Court no
later than April 1, 2011, and shall be supported by citations to authority pursuant to Local Rule 7.4.
(1) The Defendant’s oral motion to continue the January 10, 2011
trial is GRANTED;
(2) The trial of this matter is reset to commence on April 12, 2011,
at 9:00 a.m., before the Honorable Thomas A. Varlan, United States
District Judge;
(3) All time between the January 4, 2011 hearing, and the new trial
date of April 12, 2011, is fully excludable time under the Speedy
Trial Act for the reasons set forth herein;
(4) A final pretrial conference before the undersigned is set for April
1, 2011, at 11:00 a.m. This date shall also be the plea negotiation
cut-off deadline in this case;
(5) Motions in limine must be filed no later than March 28, 2011;
and
(7) Special requests for jury instructions with the appropriate citation
to authority shall be submitted to the District Court no later than
April 1, 2011.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
ENTER:
s/ H. Bruce Guyton
United States Magistrate Judge