MOTION TO QUASH

(Rule 117, Rules of Court)

The motion to quash may be made at any time before the accused enters his plea (Sec. 1, Rule 117 of the
Rules of Court). However, under Sec. 9, Rule 117, which adopts the omnibus motion rule, a Motion to
Quash may still be filed after arraignment on the ground that the facts alleged in the information charge
no offense, that the court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged, that the offense or penalty has
prescribed, or that the doctrine of double jeopardy precludes the filing of the information.

Only the accused has the right to file Motion to Quash. There is nothing in the rules which authorizes the
court or judge to motu propio initiate a Motion to Quash by issuing an order requiring why the
information may not be quashed on the ground stated in said order.

Under the Rules of court, the motion shall be in writing. It does not permit an oral motion to quash. The
motion must comply with the following requisites:

(a) The motion shall be in writing;

(b) The motion shall be signed by the accused or his counsel;
(c) The motion shall distinctly specify the factual and legal grounds of the motion.

In resolving the motion to quash filed by the accused, the court shall consider no grounds other than those
stated in the motion. The only ground which the court may consider even if not stated in the motion to
quash is lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged (Sec. 2, Rule 117, Rules of Court).

A complaint or information may be subject to a motion to quash on any of the following grounds:

(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused;
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses is
prescribed by law;
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against
him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.

Failure to assert any ground of a motion to quash before a plea to the complaint or information shall be
deemed a waiver of any objections. The failure to assert a ground may either be because:

(a) The accused did not file a motion to quash; or

(b) The accused filed a motion to quash but failed to allege the ground in said motion (Sec. 9, Rule
117, Rules of Court).
Although the rule is that those grounds not asserted in the motion to quash are waived, the following
objections are not waived:

(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
(c) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished; and
(d) Double jeopardy.

When a motion to quash in a criminal case is denied, the remedy is not a petition for certiorari, but the
petitioners to go to trial, without prejudice to reiterating the special defenses invoked in their motion to
quash (Serana v. Sandiganbayan, 542 SCRA 225, 23 January 2008). This remedy however, is subject to
exceptions. If the court, in denying the motion acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave

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abuse of discretion, then certiorari or prohibition lies (Lazarte v. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 180122, 13
March 2009).

The existence of a valid ground for sustaining a motion to quash will not necessarily result in the
dismissal of the information or complaint. If the motion to quash is based on the alleged defect of the
complaint or information, and the defect can be cured, the court shall order that an amendment be made
(Sec. 4, Rule 117, Rules of Court).

When a motion to quash is sustained, the court may order that another complaint or information be filed
unless the ground relied upon is either (a) extinction of the criminal liability, or (b) on the ground of
double jeopardy as provided in Sec. 6, Rule 117 (Sec. 5, Rule 117, Rules of Court). An order sustaining a
motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense unless based on the ground that
the criminal action or liability has been extinguished or there is double jeopardy (Sec. 6, Rule 117, Rules
of Court).

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
AQUILINO ANDRADE, ROMAN LACAP, YONG FUNG YUEN, RICKY YU, VICENTE SY,
ALVIN SO, ROMUALDO MIRANDA, SINDAO MELIBAS, SATURNINO LIWANAG,
ROBERTO MEDINA and RAMON NAVARRO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 187000
November 24, 2014

FACTS:

A random drug test was conducted in the National Bilibid Prison (NBP) wherein the urine samples of
thirty-eight (38) inmates were collected and subjected to drug testing by the Chief Medical Technologist
and Assistant Medical Technologist of the Alpha Polytechnic Laboratory in Quezon City, and out of that
number, twenty-one (21) urine samples tested positive. Those twenty-one (21) urine samples, which
included that of herein respondents, yielded positive results confirming the result of the initial screen test.
Necessarily, the twenty-one (21) inmates were charged with violation of Section 15, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165 (RA 9165) under identical Informations.

All respondents pleaded "Not Guilty" to the crime charged during their arraignment on June 29, 2006. On
August 29, 2006, respondents filed a Consolidated Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the facts alleged
in the Information do not constitute a violation of Section 15, RA 9165. Tha RTC dismissed the
complaint on the ground that no probable cause for the offense charged in the Information.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the petitioners may not already avail the remedy provided under Rule 117 of the
Rules of Court?
2. Whether or not the RTC erred in dismiising the case based on lack of probable cause?

HELD:

1. The petitioners are still entitled to avail the remedy.

The ground relied upon by respondents in their "Motion to Dismiss," which is, that the facts alleged in the
Information do not constitute an offense, is actually one of the grounds provided under a Motion to Quash
in Section 3 (a), Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

It must be emphasized that respondents herein filed their Motion after they have been arraigned. Under
ordinary circumstances, such motion may no longer be allowed after arraignment because their failure to
raise any ground of a motion to quash before they plead is deemed a waiver of any of their objections.
Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides:

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Sec. 9. Failure to Move to Quash or to Allege Any Ground Therefor. - The failure of the accused to assert
any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did
not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any
objections except those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a),(b), (g), and (i) of Section 3
of this Rule.

2. Yes, the RTC judge went beyond her authority when she dismissed the cases based on lack of probable
cause and not on the ground raised by respondents.

Under Section 2, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure plainly states that in a motion to
quash, the court shall not consider any ground other than those stated in the motion, except lack of
jurisdiction over the offense charged. In the present case, what the respondents claim in their motion to
quash is that the facts alleged in the Informations do not constitute an offense and not lack of probable
cause as ruled by the RTC judge.

The RTC judge's determination of probable cause should have been only limited prior to the issuance of a
warrant of arrest and not after the arraignment. Once the information has been filed, the judge shall then
"personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence" to determine whether
there is probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest. At this stage, a judicial determination of probable
cause exists.
Considering that the RTC has already found probable cause, it should have denied the motion to quash
and allowed the prosecution to present its evidence and wait for a demurrer to evidence to be filed by
respondents, if they opt to, or allowed the prosecution to amend the Information and in the meantime
suspend the proceedings until the amendment of the Information without dismissing the case.

If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution shall be
given by the court an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment. The motion shall be granted if the
prosecution fails to make the amendment, or the complaint or information still suffers from the same
defect despite the amendment.

MOTION TO DISMISS
(Rule 16, Rules of Court)

A motion to dismiss is not a pleading. It is merely a motion. Under the Rules, a motion is an
application for relief other than by a pleading (Sec. 1, rule 15, Rules of Court).

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When a motion to dismiss if filed, all grounds for objection available at the time the motion is filed
must be invoked in the motion. This is required under the “Omnibus Motion Rule.” The objections
which are not invoked are deemed waived.

The motion to dismiss, like any other motion, shall state the relief sought and the grounds upon
which it is based and, if required by the Rules or necessary to prove the facts alleged therein, it
shall be accompanied by supporting affidavits and papers. (Sec. 3, Rule 15, Rules of Court)

The motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant (Sec. 4, Rule 15, Rules of Court) and shall
contain a notice of hearing addressed to all parties concerned. Such notice shall specify the time and
date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion (Sec. 5,
Rule 15, Rules of Court).

The notice requirement in a motion is mandatory and its absence renders the motion defective. As a
rule, a motion without a notice of hearing is considered pro forma and does not affect the
reglementary period for the filing of the requisite pleading (Jehan Shipping corporation v. National
Food Authority, 477 SCRA 781, 788).

The motion to dismiss must be filed within the time for filing the answer but before filing said
answer, a motion to dismiss may be filed on any of the grounds mentioned in Rule 16.

A motion that is filed after the answer has been filed, is considered filed out of time and the
defending party is estopped from filing the motion to dismiss (Philville v. Javier, 477 SCRA 533,
537).

When a motion to dismiss may be filed even after the answer has been served and filed:

(a) Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter;

(b) There is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause;
(c) That the action is barred by a prior judgment; or
(d) That the action is barred by the statute of limitations.

If the motion to dismiss is denied, the movant shall file his answer within the balance of the period
prescribed by Rule 11 to which he was entitled at the time of serving his motion, but not less than
five (5) days in any event. This period shall be computed from the receipt of the notice of denial.
(Sec. 4, Rule 16, Rules of Court). The order of denial, being interlocutory, is not appealable by
express provision of Sec. 1(b), Rule 41.

CALIFORNIA AND HAWAIIAN SUGAR COMPANY; PACIFIC GULF MARINE, INC.; and
C.F. SHARP & COMPANY, petitioners,
vs.
PIONEER INSURANCE AND SURETY CORPORATION, respondent.
G.R. No. 139273
November 28, 2000

FACTS:

On November 27, 1990, the vessel MV SUGAR ISLANDER arrived at the port of Manila carrying a
cargo of soybean meal in bulk consigned to several consignees, one of which was the Metro Manila Feed

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Millers Association. When the cargo [was] weighed on a licensed truck scale a shortage of 255.051
metric tons valued at P1,621,171.16 was discovered. The respondent, as insurer, paid the consignee Metro
Manila Feed Millers Association. private respondent filed a complaint for damages against herein
petitioners. Within the reglementary period to file an Answer, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the
complaint on the ground that respondents claim is premature, the same being arbitrable.

On November 11, 1992, [the RTC] issued an Order deferring the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss until
the trial and directing petitioners to file their Answer. Petitioners then moved to reconsider said Order
which was, however, denied by [the RTC] on the ground that the reason relied upon by herein petitioners
in its Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Reconsideration [was] a matter of defense which they must prove
with their evidence.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court erred when it deferred the resolution?

HELD:

Section 6, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules, specifically provides that a preliminary hearing on the affirmative
defenses may be allowed only when no motion to dismiss has been filed. Section 6, however, must be
viewed in the light of Section 3 of the same Rule, which requires courts to resolve a motion to dismiss
and prohibits them from deferring its resolution on the ground of indubitability. Clearly then, Section 6
disallows a preliminary hearing of affirmative defenses once a motion to dismiss has been filed because
such defense should have already been resolved. In the present case, however, the trial court did not
categorically resolve petitioners Motion to Dismiss, but merely deferred resolution thereof.

Indeed, the present Rules are consistent with Section 5, Rule 16 of the pre-1997 Rules of Court, because
both presuppose that no motion to dismiss had been filed; or in the case of the pre-1997 Rules, if one has
been filed, it has not been unconditionally denied. Hence, the ground invoked may still be pleaded as an
affirmative defense even if the defendants Motion to Dismiss has been filed but not definitely resolved, or
if it has been deferred as it could be under the pre-1997 Rules.

Undeniably, a preliminary hearing is not mandatory, but subject to the discretion of the trial court. In the
light of the circumstances in this case, though, we find that the lower court committed grave abuse of
discretion in refusing to grant the Motion.

We note that the trial court deferred the resolution of petitioners Motion to Dismiss because of a single
issue. It was apparently unsure whether the charter party that the bill of lading referred to was indeed the
Baltimore Berth Grain Charter Party submitted by petitioners.

Considering that there was only one question, which may even be deemed to be the very touchstone of the
whole case, the trial court had no cogent reason to deny the Motion for Preliminary Hearing. Indeed, it
committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied a preliminary hearing on a simple issue of fact that
could have possibly settled the entire case. Verily, where a preliminary hearing appears to suffice, there is
no reason to go on to trial. One reason why dockets of trial courts are clogged is the unreasonable refusal
to use a process or procedure, like a motion to dismiss, which is designed to abbreviate the resolution of a
case.

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