REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW

DIGESTS
ATTY. TRANQUIL SALVADOR III
MIDTERMS
COVERAGE:
Filing Fees

Jurisdiction

Rules 1 - 56
 emedial Law Review
Digests
RUBY SHELTER BUILDERS REALTY DEV’T
CORPORATION V. FORMARAN
FACTS:
- Ruby Shelter obtained a loan from Tan and
Obiedo secured by a REM consisting of 5
parcels of land in the name of the former.
- Despite an extension granted by Tan and
Obiedo and several negotiations, Ruby was not
able to pay.
- Hence, Tan and Obiedo, by virtue of a MOA,
executed Deeds of Absolute sale in their favor
covering the 5 parcels of land. The MOA
provided that if Ruby fails to pay the loan, 5
deeds of absolute sale would be executed in
favor of Tan and Obiedo.
- So Ruby Shelter filed complaint for declaration
of nullity of the deeds. Believing that their
action was one which was incapable of
pecuniary estimation, they paid docket fees
amounting to about 13K. It said that it only
wanted to annul the deeds so no issue of title
or recovery of possession is present to classify
it as a real action.
- Tan and Obiedo moved to dismiss the
complaint and ask for damages (also pursuant
to the MOA – there was a provision that if
Ruby Shelter brought suit against them, it
would be liable for P 10M) contending that the
RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case
because the case involved recovery of real
property making it a real action which requires
payment of docket fees equivalent to a
percentage of the fair market value of the land
(P 700K).
- RTC and CA ruled in favor of Tan and Obiedo
ordering Ruby Shelter to pay additional docket
fees. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N Ruby Shelter should pay additional docket
fees.
HELD/RATIO: YES. For the court to acquire jurisdiction,
docket fees must be paid first. Payment is mandatory
and jurisdictional.
To determine whether an action is real, it must affect
title to or recovery of possession of real property. In
this case, Ruby Shelter did not disclose certain facts
which would classify the complaint it filed as a real
action (like the execution of deeds of sale pursuant to
a MOA). The action was really one for recovery of
possession of the parcels of land. Hence, it is a real
action.
The docket fees for cases involving real property
depend on the fair market value (or the stated value)
of the same: the higher the value, the higher the fees
due. For those incapable of pecuniary estimation, a
fixed or flat rate is imposed.
Filing Fees
MONTANER V. SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT
Facts: Petitioner Luisa Montaner (Luisa), a Roman
Catholic, was married to deceased Alejandro Montaner
(Alejandro) at a Catholic Church . Private respondents
Liling Disangcopan (Disangcopan) and her daughter
Almahleen, both Muslims, filed a complaint for judicial
partition of properties before the Shari’a District Court,
alleging (among others) that deceased Alejandro is a
Muslim and that they are his first family. Luisa filed an
Answer with a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds: 1.
Shari’a has no jurisdiction because Alejandro is a
Roman Catholic; 2. Disangcopan failed to pay the
correct amount of docket fees; and 3. Complaint is
barred by prescription.
Shari’a Court dismissed Luisa’s motion to dismiss. MR
denied.
Issue: W/N Disangcopan’s complaint for judicial
partition of properties should be dismissed by the
Shari’a Court for failure to file the correct amount of
(insufficient) docket fees?
Held and Ratio: SC upheld Shari’a Court’s dismissal.
Allegation of insufficient payment of docket fees
involved two aspects: 1.Whether the Clerk of Court
correctly assessed the docket fees; and 2. Whether
Disangcopan paid the correct assessment of the docket
fees. Filing of the appropriate initiatory pleading and
the payment of the prescribed docket fees vest a trial
court with jurisdiction over the subject matter. If the
party filing the case paid less than the correct amount
for the docket fees because that was the amount
assessed by the Clerk of Court, the responsibility of
making a deficiency assessment lies with the same
Clerk of Court. In such a case, the lower court
concerned will not automatically lose jurisdiction
because the party filing the case cannot be penalized
with the Clerk of Court’s insufficient assessment.
However, the party concerned will be required to pay
the deficiency. In this case, Luisa did not present the
Clerk of Court’s assessment of the docket fees nor did
the records include this assessment, accordingly, there
could be no determination whether Disangcopan
correctly paid the docket fees without the Clerk of
Court’s assessment.
PHILIPPINE FIRST INSURANCE VS. FIRST
LOGISTICS
FACTS: Pyramid Logistics and Trucking Corporation
(Pyramid) alleged in its complaint that its delivery van,
which was loaded with goods belonging to California
Manufacturing Corporation (CMC) valued at
907,149.07, left the CMC Bicutan Warehouse.
However, the van, together with the goods, failed to
reach its destination and its driver and helper were
nowhere to be found, to its damage and prejudice.
4
 emedial Law Review
Digests
It filed a criminal complaint against the driver
and helper for qualified theft, and a claim with
Philippine First Insurance Co., Inc., and Paramount
Insurance General Corporation as co-insurers for the
lost goods. However, the insurance companies refused
to compensate for the loss in violation of their
undertaking under the insurance policies. For this
reason, Pyramid suffered damages and was
constrained to engage the services of counsel to
enforce and protect its right to recover compensation
under the insurance policies, and for which services, it
obligated itself to pay the sum equivalent to 25% of
any recovery in the instant action, as and for
attorney’s fees and legal expenses. It prayed that
judgment be rendered ordering the insurance
companies to comply with their obligation under their
respective insurance policies to pay to it jointly and
severally the sum of 50,000 plus 1,500 for each court
session attended by counsel until the case is
terminated as attorney’s fees, and the costs of suit.
Pyramid was assessed a docket fee of 610 on the basis
of the amount of 50,000.
Pyramid later filed an amended complaint
containing minor changes in the body but bearing the
same prayer. Branch 148 of the Makati RTC, to which
the complaint was raffled, admitted the amended
complaint.
The insurance companies filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, Pyramid
not having paid the docket fees in full. It argued that
in the body of its amended complaint, Pyramid alleged
that it suffered damages, but in the prayer, it
deliberately omitted to specify what these damages
are. This deliberate omission by Pyramid was intended
to evade the payment of the correct filing fee. The
insurance companies invoked the doctrine in
Manchester Development Corporation vs. CA that a
pleading which does not specify in the prayer the
amount sought shall not be admitted or shall otherwise
be expunged, and that the court acquires jurisdiction
only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee.
Pyramid, on the other hand, insists the application of
Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. vs. Asuncion and
subsequent rulings relaxing the Manchester ruling by
allowing payment of the docket fee within a reasonable
time, in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period, where the filing of the initiatory
pleading is not accompanied by the payment of the
prescribed docket fee.
The CA applied the liberal rule in Sun Insurance.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in applying the liberal rule
in Sun Insurance???
RULING: YES, the CA erred. The Manchester rule
applies.
In the case of Tacay vs. Regional Trial Court of Tagum,
Davao del Norte, the SC clarified the effect of the Sun
Insurance ruling on the Manchester ruling as follows:
The requirement in Circular No. 7 that
complaints, petitions, answers, and similar
Filing Fees
pleadings should specify the amount of damages
being prayed for not only in the body of the
pleading but also in the prayer, has not been
altered. What has been revised is the rule that
subsequent amendment of the complaint or similar
pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court,
much less the payment of the docket fee based on the
amount sought in the amended pleading, the trial
court now being authorized to allow payment of the
fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond
the applicable prescriptive period or reglementary
period. Moreover, a new rule has been added,
governing the awards of claims not specified in the
pleading – i.e., damages arising after the filing of the
complaint or similar pleading – as to which the
additional filing fee therefore shall constitute a lien on
the judgment.
In the case at bar, Pyramid failed to specify in
its prayer the amount of claims/damages it was
seeking both in the original and amended complaint. It
reasoned out that it was not aware of the extent of the
liability of the insurance companies under their
respective policies. It left the matter of liability to the
trial court’s determination.
Even assuming that the amounts are yet to be
determined, the rule in Manchester, as modified by
Sun Insurance, still applies. In the case of Ayala
Corporation vs. Madayag, the SC pronounced the
following: While it is true that the determination of
certain damages x x x is left to the sound discretion of
the court, it is the duty of the parties claiming such
damages to specify the amount sought on the basis
of which the court may make a proper determination,
and for the proper assessment of the appropriate
docket fees. The exception contemplated as to
claims not specified or to claims although specified are
left for determination of the court is limited only to any
damages that may arise after the filing of the
complaint or similar pleading for then it will not be
possible for the claimant to specify nor speculate as to
the amount thereof.
BAUTISTA VS. UNANGST
Facts. On November 15, 1996, Hamilton Salak rented
a car from GAB Rent-A-Car, a car rental shop owned
by Benjamin Bautista. The lease was for 3 consecutive
days, P1,000.00 per day. However, Salak failed to
return the car after three (3) days prompting petitioner
to file a complaint against him for estafa, violation of
BP 22 and carnapping.
On February 2, 1997, Salak and his common-
law wife, respondent Shirley Unangst, were arrested
while riding the rented car along QC. The next day,
Bautista demanded from Salak the sum of
P232,372.00 as payment for car rental fees, fees
incurred in locating the car, attorney's fees, capital
gains tax, transfer tax, and other incidental expenses.
Salak and Unangst expressed willingness to
pay but since they were then short on cash, Salak
5
 emedial Law Review
Digests
proposed to sell to Bautista a house and lot. Bautista
welcomed the proposal after consulting his wife,
Cynthia. Cynthia, on the other hand, further agreed to
pay the mortgage loan of Unangst over the subject
property to a certain Jojo Lee in the amount of
P295,000.00. Unangst and Bautista also executed a
separate deed of sale with right to repurchase.
Unangst failed to repurchase the property. As a
result, Bautista filed, on June 5, 1998, a complaint for
specific performance or recovery of possession, for
sum of money, for consolidation of ownership and
damages against Unangst and other unnamed persons
before the RTC of Olongapo. On the other hand,
respondents controverted the allegations in the
complaint.
RTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner.
Respondents failed to interpose a timely appeal.
However, on September 10, 2004, Unangst filed a
petition for relief pursuant to Section 38 of the 1997
Rules on Civil Procedure. She argued that she learned
of the decision of the RTC only on September 6, 2004
when she received a copy of the motion for execution
filed by petitioner. Unangst initially paid P200.00 as
docket fees as this was the amount assessed by the
Clerk of Court of the RTC. Said amount was insufficient
as the proper filing fees amount to P1,715.00.
Nevertheless, the correct amount was subsequently
paid by said respondent on February 22, 2005, a little
less than 2 months after the period for filing the
petition lapsed. Petition was granted.
Bautista contends that respondents' "Petition
for Relief to Be Able to Appeal Judgment," which paved
the way for the allowance of respondents' appeal of
the RTC decision, was filed within the prescriptive
period but the proper docket fees for it were belatedly
paid. He thus posits that the RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over said petition. Having no jurisdiction,
the RTC could not have allowed respondents to appeal
Issue. Whether the CA committed grave error in
finding that the respondent perfected an appeal via
Petition for Relief To Be Able To Appeal Judgment even
when the proper docket fees were paid beyond the
period prescribed. – NO.
Held. Failure to pay the correct amount of docket fees
was due to a justifiable reason.
Indeed, the right to appeal is a purely
statutory right. Not being a natural right or a part of
due process, the right to appeal may be exercised only
in the manner and in accordance with the rules
provided therefor. For this reason, payment of the full
amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful
fees within the reglementary period is mandatory and
jurisdictional. Nevertheless, as this Court ruled
in Aranas v. Endona, the strict application of the
jurisdictional nature of the above rule on payment of
appellate docket fees may be mitigated under
exceptional circumstances to better serve the interest
of justice. It is always within the power of this Court to
suspend its own rules, or to except a particular case
Filing Fees
from their operation, whenever the purposes of justice
require it.
In not a few instances, the Court relaxed the
rigid application of the rules of procedure to afford the
parties the opportunity to fully ventilate their cases on
the merits. This is in line with the time-honored
principle that cases should be decided only after giving
all parties the chance to argue their causes and
defenses. As early as 1946, in Segovia v. Barrios, the
Court ruled that where an appellant in good faith paid
less than the correct amount for the docket fee
because that was the amount he was required to pay
by the clerk of court, and he promptly paid the
balance, it is error to dismiss his appeal because
"(e)very citizen has the right to assume and trust that
a public officer charged by law with certain duties
knows his duties and performs them in accordance
with law. To penalize such citizen for relying upon said
officer in all good faith is repugnant to justice."
Technicality and procedural imperfections
should thus not serve as bases of decisions. In that
way, the ends of justice would be better served.
As regards the substantive issue, Unangst was
correct in alleging that the deed of sale with right to
repurchase qualifies as an equitable mortgage under
Article 1602. She merely secured the payment of the
unpaid car rentals and the amount advanced by
petitioner to Jojo Lee.
PROTON PILIPINAS V. BANQUE NACIONAL DE
PARIS
Facts:
Proton Pilipinas availed of credit facilities of
Banque Nacional de Paris (BNP).
Proton’s resulting debt of $2M was guaranteed
by Automotive Corporation Philippines, Asea
One Corp., and Autocorp Group.
BNP and Proton subsequently executed trust
receipt agreements, where Proton would
receive passenger motor vehicles in trust for
BNP, with the option to sell them, subject to
the condition that Proton would deliver the
proceeds of the sale to BNP, to be applied to
the former’s debt. Vehicles remaining unsold
would be returned to BNP. Proton allegedly
failed to deliver.
BNP demanded from Proton’s corporate
guarantors $1.5M, the total outstanding
obligation. The guarantors refused. BNP filed a
complaint with the Makati RTC praying for
$1.5M plus accrued interest and other related
charges.
Respondent Proton filed a motion to dismiss,
contending that 1) BNP failed to pay the
correct docket fees which is supposed to
include interest, based on Admin Circ. No. 11-
94, and therefore the court could not have
acquired jurisdiction over the case, 2) the clerk
of court failed to apply the correct exchange
6
 emedial Law Review
Digests
rate, and that 3) since no demand letter was
given, the complaint was premature.
The court denied the petition, stating that the
petitioner properly paid the docket fees. It
stated that Section 7(a) of Rule 141 of the
Rules of Court excludes interest accruing from
the principal amount being claimed in the
pleading in the computation of the prescribed
filing fees. It court further added that
assuming the correct filing fees were not paid,
the rule is that the court may allow a
reasonable time for the payment of the
prescribed fees, or the balance thereof, and
upon such payment, the defect is cured and
the court may properly take cognizance of the
action, unless in the meantime prescription has
set in and consequently barred the right of
action.
Regarding the correct dollar-peso rate of
exchange, the Office of the Clerk of Court of
the RTC of Makati pegged it at P 43.00 to
US$1. Absent any office guide of the rate of
exchange which said court functionary was
duty bound to follow, the rate he applied is
presumptively correct.
With regard to the demand letter, the court
said that the failure to make a formal demand
is not among the legal grounds for the
dismissal of the case.
Issues:
1) Whether BNP failed to pay the correct docket
fees
2) Whether the Clerk of court applied the wrong
exchange rate
3) Whether the amount of interest was not
specified in the prayer, rendering the
complaint void.
Held:
1) Petitioner relied on a case decided in 1989 where
Rule 141 was applied, the interest and costs
having been excluded in the computation of the
aggregate amount. However, the present case was
filed in 1998, when such rule had already been
amended by Administrative Circular No. 11-94.
The amended rule includes the interest, damages
of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation
expenses, and other costs in the computation of
the aggregate amount. In the complaint,
respondent prayed for “accrued interest…
subsequent to August 15, 1998 until fully paid.”
The complaint having been filed on September 7,
1998, respondent’s claim includes the interest from
August 16, 1998 until such date of filing.
Respondent not having paid the fees for such,
cannot claim the interest within such duration,
unless respondent is allowed by motion to amend
its complaint within a reasonable time and specify
the precise amount of interest petitioners owe
Filing Fees
within the period and pay the corresponding
docket fee.
With respect to the interest accruing after the filing
of the complaint, the same can only be determined
after a final judgment has been handed down.
Respondent cannot thus be made to pay the
corresponding docket fee. Pursuant, however, to
Section 2, Rule 141, as amended by Administrative
Circular No. 11-94, respondent should be made to
pay additional fees which shall constitute a lien in
the event the trial court adjudges that it is entitled
to interest accruing after the filing of the
complaint.
2) In the Clerk of Court’s application of exchange
rate, the presumption of regularity is disputable,
not conclusive. Petitioners have presented
rebutting evidence that the exchange rate when
the case was filed was P43.21 to US$1, not
P43.00. Thus, the docket fees were insufficient.
However, the trial court did acquire
jurisdiction. Respondent merely relied on the
assessment made by the Clerk of court. In such a
case, where there exists no effort in defrauding the
government, respondent even demonstrating his
willingness to abide by the rules by paying the
additional docket fees as required, the court
acquires jurisdiction.
3) Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a
claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and
payment of the prescribed filing fee but,
subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not
specified in the pleading, or if specified, has been
left for determination by the court, the additional
filing fee shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It
shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or
his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and
assess and collect the additional fee. The amount
of any claim for damages, therefore, arising on or
before the filing of the complaint or any pleading
should be specified. While the determination of
certain damages is left to the discretion of the
court, it is the duty of the parties claiming such
damages to specify the amount sought on the
basis of which the court may make a proper
determination, and for the proper assessment of
the appropriate docket fees. The exception to the
rule is limited only to any damages that may arise
after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading
for then it will not be possible for the claimant to
specify nor speculate as to the amount thereof.
Petition is partially granted. The Clerk of Court
is ordered to reassess and determine the docket
fees that should be paid by respondent within
fifteen (15) days, provided the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period has not yet
expired.
7
 emedial Law Review
Digests
A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC
RE: REQUEST OF NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON
LEGAL AID TO EXEMPT LEGAL AID CLIENTS FROM
PAYING FILING, DOCKET AND OTHER FEES.
On September 23, 2008 the Misamis Oriental Chapter
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
promulgated Resolution No. 24. The resolution
requested the IBP’s National Committee on Legal Aid
(NCLA) to ask for the exemption from the payment of
filing, docket and other fees of clients of the legal aid
offices in the various IBP chapters like the exemption
granted to PAO clients under RA 9406. The Court
lauded the Misamis Oriental Chapter of the IBP for its
effort to help improve the administration of justice,
particularly, the access to justice by the poor. In
promulgating Resolution No. 24, the Misamis Oriental
Chapter of the IBP has effectively performed its duty to
"participate in the development of the legal system by
initiating or supporting efforts in law reform and in the
administration of justice."
In approving the Rule, the Court stressed that
“the Constitution guarantees the rights of the poor to
free access to the courts and to adequate legal
assistance.” It found “the legal aid service rendered by
the NCLA and legal aid offices of IBP chapters
nationwide addresses the right to adequate legal
assistance and that the recipients of the service of the
NCLA and legal aid offices of IBP Chapters may enjoy
free access to courts by exempting them from the
payment of fees assessed in connection with the filing
of a complaint or action in court.” The Court held that
“with these twin initiatives, the guarantee of Section
11, Article III of the Constitution is advanced and
access to justice is increased by bridging a significant
gap and removing a major roadblock.”
The Court concluded with a declaration that
access to justice “is essential in a democracy and in
the rule of law.” Recognizing the “right of access to
justice as the most important pillar of legal
empowerment of the marginalized sectors of our
society,” it has “exercised its power to promulgate
rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights to open the doors of justice to the
underprivileged and to allow them to step inside the
court to be heard of their plaints.”
A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC (IRR): Re: Rule on the
Exemption From the Payment of Legal Fees of
the Clients of the National Committee on Legal
Aid and of the Legal Aid Offices in the Local
Chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Rule on the Exemption From the Payment of
Legal Fees of the Clients of the National
Committee on Legal Aid (NCLA) and of the Legal
Aid Offices in the Local Chapters of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
ARTICLE I
Purpose
Filing Fees
Section 1. Purpose. – This Rule is issued for the
purpose of enforcing the right of free access to courts
by the poor guaranteed under Section 11, Article III of
the Constitution. It is intended to increase the access
to justice by the poor by exempting from the payment
of legal fees incidental to instituting an action in court,
as an original proceeding or on appeal, qualified
indigent clients of the NCLA and of the legal aid offices
in local IBP chapters nationwide.
ARTICLE II
Definition of Terms
Section 1. Definition of important terms. – For
purposes of this Rule and as used herein, the following
terms shall be understood to be how they are defined
under this Section:
(a) "Developmental legal aid" means the rendition of
legal services in public interest causes involving
overseas workers, fisherfolk, farmers, laborers,
indigenous cultural communities, women, children and
other disadvantaged groups and marginalized sectors;
(b) "Disinterested person" refers to the punong
barangay having jurisdiction over the place where an
applicant for legal aid or client of the NCLA or chapter
legal aid office resides;
(c) "Falsity" refers to any material misrepresentation of
fact or any fraudulent, deceitful, false, wrong or
misleading statement in the application or affidavits
submitted to support it or the affidavit of a
disinterested person required to be submitted annually
under this Rule which may substantially affect the
determination of the qualifications of the applicant or
the client under the means and merit tests;
(d) "Legal fees" refers to the legal fees imposed under
Rule 141 of the Rules of Court as a necessary incident
of instituting an action in court either as an original
proceeding or on appeal. In particular, it includes filing
or docket fees, appeal fees, fees for issuance of
provisional remedies, mediation fees, sheriff’s fees,
stenographer’s fees (that is fees for transcript of
stenographic notes) and commissioner’s fees;
(e) "Means test" refers to the set of criteria used to
determine whether the applicant is one who has no
money or property sufficient and available for food,
shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family;
(f) "Merit test" refers to the ascertainment of whether
the applicant’s cause of action or his defense is valid
and whether the chances of establishing the same
appear reasonable and
(g) "Representative" refers to the person authorized to
file an application for legal aid in behalf of the
applicant when the said applicant is prevented by a
compelling reason from personally filing his
application. As a rule, it refers to the immediate family
members of the applicant. However, it may include any
of the applicant’s relatives or any person or concerned
citizen of sufficient discretion who has first-hand
knowledge of the personal circumstances of the
applicant as well as of the facts of the applicant’s case.
8
 emedial Law Review
Digests
ARTICLE III
Coverage
Section 1. Persons qualified for exemption from
payment of legal fees. – Persons who shall enjoy the
benefit of exemption from the payment of legal fees
incidental to instituting an action in court, as an
original proceeding or on appeal, granted under this
Rule shall be limited only to clients of the NCLA and
the chapter legal aid offices.
The said clients shall refer to those indigents qualified
to receive free legal aid service from the NCLA and the
chapter legal aid offices. Their qualifications shall be
determined based on the tests provided in this Rule.
Section 2. Persons not covered by the Rule. – The
following shall be disqualified from the coverage of this
Rule. Nor may they be accepted as clients by the NCLA
and the chapter legal aid offices.
(a) Juridical persons; except in cases covered by
developmental legal aid or public interest causes
involving juridical entities which are non-stock, non-
profit organizations, non-governmental organizations
and people’s organizations whose individual members
will pass the means test provided in this Rule;
(b) Persons who do not pass the means and merit
tests;
(c) Parties already represented by a counsel de parte;
(d) Owners or lessors of residential lands or buildings
with respect to the filing of collection or unlawful
detainer suits against their tenants and
(e) Persons who have been clients of the NCLA or
chapter legal aid office previously in a case where the
NCLA or chapter legal aid office withdrew its
representation because of a falsity in the application or
in any of the affidavits supporting the said application.
Section 3. Cases not covered by the Rule. – The NCLA
and the chapter legal aid offices shall not handle the
following:
(a) Cases where conflicting interests will be
represented by the NCLA and the chapter legal aid
offices and
(b) Prosecution of criminal cases in court.
ARTICLE IV
Tests of Indigency
Section 1. Tests for determining who may be clients of
the NCLA and the legal aid offices in local IBP chapters.
– The NCLA or the chapter legal aid committee, as the
case may be, shall pass upon requests for legal aid by
the combined application of the means and merit tests
and the consideration of other relevant factors
provided for in the following sections.
Section 2. Means test; exception. – (a) This test shall
be based on the following criteria: (i) the applicant and
that of his immediate family must have a gross
monthly income that does not exceed an amount
Filing Fees
double the monthly minimum wage of an employee in
the place where the applicant resides and (ii) he does
not own real property with a fair market value as
stated in the current tax declaration of more than
Three Hundred Thousand (P300,000.00) Pesos.
In this connection, the applicant shall execute
an affidavit of indigency (printed at the back of the
application form) stating that he and his immediate
family do not earn a gross income abovementioned,
nor own any real property with the fair value
aforementioned, supported by an affidavit of a
disinterested person attesting to the truth of the
applicant’s affidavit. The latest income tax return
and/or current tax declaration, if any, shall be attached
to the applicant’s affidavit.
(b) The means test shall not be applicable to applicants
who fall under the developmental legal aid program
such as overseas workers, fisherfolk, farmers,
laborers, indigenous cultural communities, women,
children and other disadvantaged groups.
Section 3. Merit test. – A case shall be considered
meritorious if an assessment of the law and evidence
at hand discloses that the legal service will be in aid of
justice or in the furtherance thereof, taking into
consideration the interests of the party and those of
society. A case fails this test if, after consideration of
the law and evidence presented by the applicant, it
appears that it is intended merely to harass or injure
the opposite party or to work oppression or wrong.
Section 4. Other relevant factors that may be
considered. – The effect of legal aid or of the failure to
render the same upon the rule of law, the proper
administration of justice, the public interest involved in
a given case and the practice of law in the locality shall
likewise be considered.
ARTICLE V
Acceptance and Handling of Cases
Section 1. Procedure in accepting cases. – The
following procedure shall be observed in the
acceptance of cases for purposes of this Rule:
(a) Filing of application – An application shall be made
personally by the applicant, unless there is a
compelling reason which prevents him from doing so,
in which case his representative may apply for him. It
shall adhere substantially to the form made for that
purpose. It shall be prepared and signed by the
applicant or, in proper cases, his duly authorized
representative in at least three copies.
Applications for legal aid shall be filed with the NCLA or
with the chapter legal aid committee.
The NCLA shall, as much as possible, concentrate on
cases of paramount importance or national impact.
Requests received by the IBP National Office shall be
referred by the NCLA to the proper chapter legal aid
committee of the locality where the cases have to be
filed or are pending. The chapter president and the
9
 emedial Law Review
Digests
chairman of the chapter’s legal aid committee shall be
advised of such referral.
(b) Interview – The applicant shall be interviewed by a
member of the chapter legal aid committee or any
chapter member authorized by the chapter legal aid
committee to determine the applicant’s qualifications
based on the means and merit tests and other relevant
factors. He shall also be required to submit copies of
his latest income tax returns and/or current tax
declaration, if available, and execute an affidavit of
indigency printed at the back of the application form
with the supporting affidavit of a disinterested person
attesting to the truth of the applicant’s affidavit.lawph!l
After the interview, the applicant shall be informed
that he can follow up the action on his application after
five (5) working days.
(c) Action on the application – The chapter legal aid
committee shall pass upon every request for legal aid
and submit its recommendation to the chapter board of
officers within three (3) working days after the
interview of the applicant. The basis of the
recommendation shall be stated.
The chapter board of officers shall review and act on
the recommendation of the chapter legal aid
committee within two (2) working days from receipt
thereof; Provided, however, that in urgent matters
requiring prompt or immediate action, the chapter’s
executive director of legal aid or whoever performs his
functions may provisionally act on the application,
subject to review by the chapter legal aid committee
and, thereafter, by the chapter board of officers.
The action of the chapter board of officers on the
application shall be final.
(d) Cases which may be provisionally accepted. – In
the following cases, the NCLA or the chapter legal aid
office, through the chapter’s executive director of legal
aid or whoever performs his functions may accept
cases provisionally pending verification of the
applicant’s indigency and an evaluation of the merit of
his case.
(i) Where a warrant for the arrest of the applicant has
been issued;
(ii) Where a pleading has to be filed immediately to
avoid adverse effects to the applicant;
(iii) Where an appeal has to be urgently perfected or a
petition for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus filed
has to be filed immediately; and
(iv) Other similar urgent cases.
(e) Assignment of control number – Upon approval of
the chapter board of officers of a person’s application
and the applicant is found to be qualified for legal
assistance, the case shall be assigned a control
number. The numbering shall be consecutive starting
from January to December of every year. The control
number shall also indicate the region and the chapter
handling the case.
(f) Issuance of a certification – After an application is
approved and a control number duly assigned, the
chapter board of officers shall issue a certification that
the person (that is, the successful applicant) is a client
of the NCLA or of the chapter legal aid office. The
Filing Fees
certification shall bear the control number of the case
and shall state the name of the client and the nature of
the judicial action subject of the legal aid of the NCLA
or the legal aid office of a local IBP chapter.
The certification shall be issued to the successful
applicant free of charge.
Section 2. Assignment of cases. – After a case is given
a control number, the chapter board of officers shall
refer it back to the chapter legal aid committee. The
chapter legal aid committee shall assign the case to
any chapter member who is willing to handle the case.
handle the case voluntarily, the chapter legal
aid committee shall refer the matter to the chapter
board of officers together with the names of at least
three members who, in the chapter legal aid
committee’s discretion, may competently render legal
aid on the matter. The chapter board of officers shall
appoint one chapter member from among the list of
names submitted by the chapter legal aid committee.
The chapter member chosen may not refuse the
appointment except on the ground of conflict of
interest or other equally compelling grounds as
provided in the Code of Professional Responsibility,19
in which case the chapter board of officers shall
appoint his replacement from among the remaining
names in the list previously submitted by the chapter
legal aid committee.
The chapter legal aid committee and the
chapter board of officers shall take the necessary
measures to ensure that cases are well-distributed to
chapter members.
Section 3. Policies and guidelines in the acceptance
and handling of cases. – The following policies and
guidelines shall be observed in the acceptance and
handling of cases:
(a) First come, first served – Where both the
complainant/plaintiff/petitioner and defendant/
respondent apply for legal aid and both are qualified,
the first to seek assistance shall be given preference.
(b) Avoidance of conflict of interest – Where
acceptance of a case will give rise to a conflict of
interest on the part of the chapter legal aid office, the
applicant shall be duly informed and advised to seek
the services of a private counsel or another legal aid
organization.
Where handling of the case will give rise to a conflict of
interest on the part of the chapter member assigned to
the case, the client shall be duly informed and advised
about it. The handling lawyer shall also inform the
chapter legal aid committee so that another chapter
member may be assigned to handle the case. For
purposes of choosing the substitute handling lawyer,
the rule in the immediately preceding section shall be
observed.
(c) Legal aid is purely gratuitous and honorary – No
member of the chapter or member of the staff of the
NCLA or chapter legal aid office shall directly or
indirectly demand or request from an applicant or
10
 emedial Law Review
Digests
client any compensation, gift or present for legal aid
services being applied for or rendered.
(d) Same standard of conduct and equal treatment – A
chapter member who is tasked to handle a case
accepted by the NCLA or by the chapter legal aid office
shall observe the same standard of conduct governing
his relations with paying clients. He shall treat the
client of the NCLA or of the chapter legal aid office and
the said client’s case in a manner that is equal and
similar to his treatment of a paying client and his case.
(e) Falsity in the application or in the affidavits – Any
falsity in the application or in the affidavit of indigency
or in the affidavit of a disinterested person shall be
sufficient cause for the NCLA or chapter legal aid office
to withdraw or terminate the legal aid. For this
purpose, the chapter board of officers shall authorize
the handling lawyer to file the proper manifestation of
withdrawal of appearance of the chapter legal aid office
in the case with a motion for the dismissal of the
complaint or action of the erring client. The court, after
hearing, shall approve the withdrawal of appearance
and grant the motion, without prejudice to whatever
criminal liability may have been incurred.
Violation of this policy shall disqualify the erring client
from availing of the benefits of this Rule in the future.
(f) Statement in the initiatory pleading – To avail of
the benefits of the Rule, the initiatory pleading shall
state as an essential preliminary allegation that (i) the
party initiating the action is a client of the NCLA or of
the chapter legal aid office and therefore entitled to
exemption from the payment of legal fees under this
Rule and (ii) a certified true copy of the certification
issued pursuant to Section 1(e), of this Article is
attached or annexed to the pleading.
Failure to make the statement shall be a ground for
the dismissal of the action without prejudice to its
refiling.
The same rule shall apply in case the client, through
the NCLA or chapter legal aid office, files an appeal.
(g) Attachment of certification in initiatory pleading – A
certified true copy of the certification issued pursuant
to Section 1(e), of this Article shall be attached as an
annex to the initiatory pleading.
Failure to attach a certified true copy of the said
certification shall be a ground for the dismissal of the
action without prejudice to its refiling.
The same rule shall apply in case the client, through
the NCLA or chapter legal aid office, files an appeal.
(h) Signing of pleadings – All complaints, petitions,
answers, replies, memoranda and other important
pleadings or motions to be filed in courts shall be
signed by the handling lawyer and co-signed by the
chairperson or a member of the chapter legal aid
committee, or in urgent cases, by the executive
director of legal aid or whoever performs his functions.
Ordinary motions such as motions for extension of
time to file a pleading or for postponement of hearing
and manifestations may be signed by the handling
lawyer alone.
(i) Motions for extension of time or for postponement –
The filing of motions for extension of time to file a
Filing Fees
pleading or for postponement of hearing shall be
avoided as much as possible as they cause delay to the
case and prolong the proceedings.
(j) Transfer of cases – Transfer of cases from one
handling lawyer to another shall be affected only upon
approval of the chapter legal aid committee.
Section 4. Decision to appeal. – (a) All appeals must
be made on the request of the client himself. For this
purpose, the client shall be made to fill up a request to
appeal.
(b) Only meritorious cases shall be appealed. If the
handling lawyer, in consultation with the chapter legal
aid committee, finds that there is no merit to the
appeal, the client should be immediately informed
thereof in writing and the record of the case turned
over to him, under proper receipt. If the client insists
on appealing the case, the lawyer handling the case
should perfect the appeal before turning over the
records of the case to him.
Section 5. Protection of private practice. – Utmost care
shall be taken to ensure that legal aid is neither
availed of to the detriment of the private practice of
law nor taken advantage of by anyone for purely
personal ends.
ARTICLE VI
Withdrawal of Legal Aid and Termination of
Exemption
Section 1. Withdrawal of legal aid. – The NCLA or the
chapter legal aid committee may, in justifiable
instances as provided in the next Section, direct the
handling lawyer to withdraw representation of a
client’s cause upon approval of the IBP Board of
Governors (in the case of the NCLA) or of the chapter
board of officers (in the case of the chapter legal aid
committee) and through a proper motion filed in Court.
Section 2. Grounds for withdrawal of legal aid. –
Withdrawal may be warranted in the following
situations:
(a) In a case that has been provisionally accepted,
where it is subsequently ascertained that the client is
not qualified for legal aid;
(b) Where the client’s income or resources improve
and he no longer qualifies for continued assistance
based on the means test. For this purpose, on or
before January 15 every year, the client shall submit
an affidavit of a disinterested person stating that the
client and his immediate family do not earn a gross
income mentioned in Section 2, Article V, nor own any
real property with the fair market value mentioned in
the same Section;
(c) When it is shown or found that the client
committed a falsity in the application or in the
affidavits submitted to support the application;
(d) When the client subsequently engages a de parte
counsel or is provided with a de oficio counsel;
11
 emedial Law Review
Digests
(e) When, despite proper advice from the handling
lawyer, the client cannot be refrained from doing
things which the lawyer himself ought not do under the
ethics of the legal profession, particularly with
reference to their conduct towards courts, judicial
officers, witnesses and litigants, or the client insists on
having control of the trial, theory of the case, or
strategy in procedure which would tend to result in
incalculable harm to the interests of the client;
(f) When, despite notice from the handling lawyer, the
client does not cooperate or coordinate with the
handling lawyer to the prejudice of the proper and
effective rendition of legal aid such as when the client
fails to provide documents necessary to support his
case or unreasonably fails to attend hearings when his
presence thereat is required; and
(g) When it becomes apparent that the representation
of the client’s cause will result in a representation of
conflicting interests, as where the adverse party had
previously engaged the services of the NCLA or of the
chapter legal aid office and the subject matter of the
litigation is directly related to the services previously
rendered to the adverse party.
Section 3. Effect of withdrawal. – The court, after
hearing, shall allow the NCLA or the chapter legal aid
office to withdraw if it is satisfied that the ground for
such withdrawal exists.
Except when the withdrawal is based on
paragraphs (b), (d) and (g) of the immediately
preceding Section, the court shall also order the
dismissal of the case. Such dismissal is without
prejudice to whatever criminal liability may have been
incurred if the withdrawal is based on paragraph (c) of
the immediately preceding Section.
ARTICLE VII
Miscellaneous Provisions
Section 1. Lien on favorable judgment. – The amount
of the docket and other lawful fees which the client
was exempted from paying shall be a lien on any
judgment rendered in the case favorable to the
indigent, unless the court otherwise provides.
In case, attorney’s fees have been awarded to
the client, the same shall belong to the NCLA or to the
chapter legal aid office that rendered the legal aid, as
the case may be. It shall form part of a special fund
which shall be exclusively used to support the legal aid
program of the NCLA or the chapter legal aid office. In
this connection, the chapter board of officers shall
report the receipt of attorney’s fees pursuant to this
Section to the NCLA within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof. The NCLA shall, in turn, include the data on
attorney’s fees received by IBP chapters pursuant to
this Section in its liquidation report for the annual
subsidy for legal aid.
Section 2. Duty of NCLA to prepare forms. – The NCLA
shall prepare the standard forms to be used in
connection with this Rule. In particular, the NCLA shall
Filing Fees
prepare the following standard forms: the application
form, the affidavit of indigency, the supporting
affidavit of a disinterested person, the affidavit of a
disinterested person required to be submitted annually
under Section 2(b), Article VI, the certification issued
by the NCLA or the chapter board of officers under
Section 1(f), Article V and the request to appeal.
The said forms, except the certification, shall be in
Filipino. Within sixty (60) days from receipt of the
forms from the NCLA, the chapter legal aid offices shall
make translations of the said forms in the dominant
dialect used in their respective localities.
Section 3. Effect of Rule on right to bring suits in forma
pauperis. – Nothing in this Rule shall be considered to
preclude those persons not covered either by this Rule
or by the exemption from the payment of legal fees
granted to clients of the Public Attorney’s Office under
Section 16-D of RA 9406 to litigate in forma pauperis
under Section 21, Rule 3 and Section 19 Rule 141 of
the Rules of Court.
Section 4. Compliance with Rule on Mandatory Legal
Aid Service. – Legal aid service rendered by a lawyer
under this Rule either as a handling lawyer or as an
interviewer of applicants under Section 1(b), Article IV
hereof shall be credited for purposes of compliance
with the Rule on Mandatory Legal Aid Service.
The chairperson of the chapter legal aid office shall
issue the certificate similar to that issued by the Clerk
of Court in Section 5(b) of the Rule on Mandatory
Legal Aid Service.
ARTICLE VIII
Effectivity
Section 1. Effectivity. – This Rule shall become
effective after fifteen days following its publication in a
newspaper of general circulation.
The above rule, in conjunction with Section 21, Rule 3
and Section 19, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, the
Rule on Mandatory Legal Aid Service and the Rule of
Procedure for Small Claims Cases, shall form a solid
base of rules upon which the right of access to courts
by the poor shall be implemented. With these rules, we
equip the poor with the tools to effectively, efficiently
and easily enforce their rights in the judicial system.
Re: Query of Mr. Roger Prioreschi (exemption
from legal and filing fees of the Good Shepherd
Foundation)
Facts: Roger was the administrator of the Good
Shepherd Foundation. As such administrator, he wrote
a letter to the Chief Justice (this was 2009 so Puno). In
essence, the letter stated the ff:
1) They were thanking the court for their 1st
indorsement that the foundation pays the nominal fee
of P5000 and balance upon collection action of P10M.
2) Court Administrator Jose Perez pointed out
the need to comply with OCA Circular No.42-2005 and
12
 emedial Law Review Filing Fees
Digests
Rule141 that reserves this “privilege” --- exemption
from filing fees --- to indigent persons. However, the
law mainly deals with an individual indigent and does
not include foundations or associations that work with
and for indigent persons.
3) It was noted that the Good Shepherd
Foundation reach out to the poorest of the poor, newly
born and abandoned babies, children who never saw a
smile of their mother, old people who cannot afford to
pay for common prescriptions, broken families...etc.
4) They were asking the courts to grant to the
foundation the same option to be exempted from filing
fees as given to indigent people (2 executive judges
they previously approached disapproved this
interpretation).

Issue: Whether the special privilege (referring to the

exemption from filing fees) granted under Rule141 and
OCA Circular is applicable to foundations/associations?

Held: NO!
The basis for the exemption from legal and
filing fees is the free access clause under Sec11, Art3
of the Consti. “Free access to the courts and quasi
judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not
be denied to any person by reason of poverty.” This
provision is very important. In fact, a move that it be
removed because it was already covered by the equal
protection clause was defeated.
To implement the free access clause, SC
promulgated Sec21, Rul3 and Sec19, Rule141 of the
Rules of Court. (very long provisions so I won’t put it
here but you have to read it) The clear intent and
precise language of the provisions indicate that only a
natural party litigant may be regarded as an indigent
litigant.
Good Shepherd Foundation is a corporation
with a separate and distinct juridical personality and as
such cannot be exempted from legal and filing fees.
This is the ruling even if the foundation is working for
indigent and underprivileged people. The Consti
premised the free access clause on a person’s poverty
which only a natural person can suffer.
Another reason why the exemption cannot be granted
to juridical persons even if they work for indigent and
underprivileged people is because it may be prone to
abuse. Also, the scrutiny of compliance with the
documentation requirements may prove too time
consuming and wasteful for the courts.

13
 emedial Law Review
Digests
THORNTON VS. THORNTON
FACTS: American husband and Filipina wife got
married here and had a daughter. Three years into
the marriage, wife became bored as a housewife and
wanted to go back to her life as a GRO. Because of
this, their relationship turned sour and one day, the
wife left the family home with her daughter without
notifying her husband.
Husband filed a petition for habeas corpus
before the Family Court of Makati. Dismissed since the
child daw was in Basilan and hence it did not have
jurisdiction. Husband went to Basilan but could not
find his wife and child there. He had a lead that his
wife and child may be somewhere in Cavite, Nueva
Ecija, or Manila.
Therefore, he filed a petition for habeas corpus
before the CA (para enforceable within the country)
but CA denied the petition, claiming that it does not
have jurisdiction because the Family Courts Act (which
gave the FC jurisdiction regarding petition for habeas
corpus in cases involving custody of minors) impliedly
repealed BP129 (which gave CA jurisdiction over
habeas corpus cases)
CA: Family Courts Act (RA 8369) uses the
word “exclusive” in granting the FC jurisdiction over
habeas corpus cases.
Issue: Does CA have jurisdiction over habeas corpus
cases involving custody of minors? – YES.
SC: The CA should take cognizance of the case since
there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction
to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of
minors.
CA’s reasoning will result in an iniquitous
situation, leaving individuals like petitioner without
legal recourse in obtaining custody of their children.
Individuals who do not know the whereabouts of
minors they are looking for would be helpless since
they cannot seek redress from family courts whose
writs are enforceable only in their respective territorial
jurisdictions. Thus, if a minor is being transferred from
one place to another, which seems to be the case
here, the petitioner in a habeas corpus case will be left
without legal remedy.
The primordial consideration is the welfare and
best interests of the child. In the case at bar, a literal
interpretation of the word “exclusive” will result in
grave injustice and negate the policy “to protect the
rights and promote the welfare of children” under the
Constitution and the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child. This mandate must prevail over
legal technicalities and serve as the guiding principle in
construing the provisions of RA 8369.
The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest
intent to revoke the jurisdiction of the CA and SC to
issue writs of habeas corpus relating to the custody of
minors. Further, it cannot be said that the
provisions of RA 8369 and BP 129 are absolutely
incompatible since RA 8369 does not prohibit the CA
Jurisdiction
and the SC from issuing writs of habeas corpus in
cases involving the custody of minors.
In any case, whatever uncertainty there was
has been settled with the adoption of A.M. No. 03-03-
04-SC Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of
Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of
Minors(SEC20: The petition may likewise be filed with
the SC, CA, or with any of its members and, if so
granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the
Philippines.
FAR EAST BANK VS. SHEMBERG | SANDOVAL-
GUTIERREZ
FACTS
Respondents are the registered owners of a parcel
of several realties located in Mandaue City. Prior to
1998, respondents entered into several credit
transactions with petitioner secured by several real
estate mortgage. Respondents failed to pay the
loans thus the petitioner sought to foreclose the
mortgage.
On February 28, respondents filed with the RTC a
Complaint for Declaratory Relief, Injunction,
Damages, Annulment of Promissory Notes,
Documents, and Contracts against petitioner. They
allege that prior to 1998, respondents obtained
credit accommodations from petitioner. The latter
required the respondents’ representatives to sign
“standard pre-printed bank forms in fine print.”
Respondents complied since they trusted
petitioner. However, it turned out that petitioner’s
employees filled the blanks with “false and
inaccurate entries.”Respondents deny and dispute
the genuineness and due execution of the
documents and pray for the following relief: ex-
parte TRO and thereafter upon summary hearing
TRO for 20 days, preliminary injunction issued
upon posting of bond enjoining defendant, etc.
On March 9, the trial court issued an order
granting respondents’ order for the issuance of a
TRO. Petitioner filed its Answer with Affirmative
Defenses, Counterclaim, Vigorous Opposition to
the Order directing the issuance of a TRO and/or
preliminary mandatory injunction. Likewise,
petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss Based on
Affirmative Defense alleging that 1.) the venue is
improperly laid; 2.) the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case for non-payment of
docket fees; 3.) there is non-joinder of
indispensable parties; and 4.) the trial court has no
jurisdiction to enjoin the foreclosure proceedings.
On March 27, the trial court issued an order
denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss. Venue has
been properly laid. Records show, as well as
defendant’s annexes to its answer admits, that the
plaintiffs’ business address and principal place of
business are at Mandaue City. Likewise, similarly
situated are the properties sought to be foreclosed.
15
 emedial Law Review
Digests
It is to be noted that the question of jurisdiction
has not been raised by defendant except with the
cause of action regarding annulment of mortgages
on defendant’s insistence that the tax declaration
attached is not the latest. Considering however
that annulment of mortgage is incapable of
pecuniary estimation the court feels that
jurisdiction is proper since, according to
jurisprudence, what determines the nature of an
action and the court which has jurisdiction over it
are the allegations made by the plaintiff. Evidence
has not been introduced, to the satisfaction of the
court that indeed Far East Bank and Trust
Company no longer exists and BPI has taken over
its assets and liabilities. Besides, the commercial
linkage was between FEBTX and Shemberg as
records show. It is an inherent power of the court
concomitant to its very existence to issue
provisional remedies to protect the rights and
interest of parties pending litigation.
The motion for reconsideration was denied thus the
petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
contending that the trial court acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. The CA dismissed the petition for
certiorari as well as the motion for reconsideration.
Thus this petition.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
W/N the trial court has jurisdiction
o Petitioner: In real actions, the
assessed value of the property or if
there is none, the estimated value
thereof, must be alleged in the
complaint and shall serve as the basis
for computing the fees
o Respondents: Since the suit primarily
involves cancellation of mortgages, an
action incapable of pecuniary
estimation, there is no deficiency in
the payment of docket fees
W/N petitioner bank is entitled to writs of
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
YES. UNDER SCTION 19 (1) OF BP 180 AS
AMENDED BY RA 7691
The RTC have sole, exclusive, original jurisdiction
to hear, try and decide “all civil actions in which
the subject of litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation. In Singsong v. Isabela Sawmill, this
Court laid the test for determining whether the
subject matter of an action is incapable of
pecuniary estimation:
1. Ascertain the nature of the principal action
or remedy sought
2. If the action is primarily for recovery of a
sum of money, the claim is considered
capable of pecuniary estimation. Whether
Jurisdiction
the trial court has jurisdiction would
depend upon the amount of the claim
3. However, there the basic issue is
something other than the right to recover a
sum of money, where the money claim is
only incidental or a consequence of the
principal relief sought, the action is
incapable of pecuniary estimation
Here, the primary reliefs prayed for is the
cancellation of the mortgages for want of
consideration. Jurisprudence provides that where
the issue involves the validity of the mortgage, the
action is one incapable of pecuniary estimation.
NO.
There is grave abuse of discretion where the acts
complained of amount to an evasion of positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined
by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reasons of passion personal
hostility. It is such whimsical and capricious
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.
ARRIOLA V. ARRIOLA
FACTS: John Arriola (respondent) filed a case with the
RTC for judicial partition of the properties of decedent
Fidel Arriola against herein petitioners Vilma and
Ronald Arriola. John is a son of the decedent with the
1st wife; Vilma is the 2nd wife, Ronald her kid with the
deceased.
The RTC rendered a decision ordering partition
of the subject lot into 1/3 share to each party. This
decision became final in March 4, 2004. However,
since the parties failed to agree on how to partition the
lot, John sought its sale through public auction, which
the court ordered. After the date for the public auction
had been scheduled, it had to be reset because the
petitioners Vilma and Roland refused to include in the
auction sale the house standing on the land. Thus,
John filed with the RTC an Urgent Manifestation and
Motion for Contempt of Court praying that petitioners
be held in contempt.
RTC denied the motion, ruling that the non-
inclusion of the house was justified since the decision
of the court earlier shows that nothing was mentioned
about the house. Even John’s initiatory complaint
never mentioned the house. The court said it could not
grant a relief not alleged and prayed for in the
complaint. MR with the RTC also denied.
In a petition for certiorari with CA, the court
granted the petition, reversing and setting aside the
RTC ruling. It ordered the sale of the lot, including the
house standing thereon. Petitioners filed MR with CA,
but it was denied, hence the present case.
16
 emedial Law Review
Digests
Issue: Did the lower court err in taking jurisdiction
over the contempt proceeding? – Yes, it was wrong for
it to do so for failure to comply with req’ts
Ruling: The contempt proceeding initiated by the John
Arriola is one for indirect contempt. Under Rule 71, it is
to be initiated by the court motu propio or by a
verified petition, with supporting particulars and
certified true copies of docs/papers involved and with
full compliance with the req’ts for filing initiatory
pleadings for civil actions. The law is clear. The filing of
a verified petition that has complied with the req’ts for
the filing of initiatory pleading is mandatory and for
failure to do so, the court should dismiss it outright.
Here, John Arriola merely filed an Urgent
Manifestation and Motion for Contempt. It was not
verified, and it failed to conform with the req’ts for
initiatory pleadings such as submission of certification
against non-forum shopping and payment of docket
fees. The RTC clearly erred in taking jurisdiction over
the contempt proceeding. Even if the contempt
proceedings stemmed from the main case over which
the court already acquired jurisdiction, the rules direct
that the petition for contempt be treated independently
of the principal action. Consequently, the necessary
prerequisites for the filing of initiatory pleadings, such
as the filing of a verified petition, attachment of a
certification on non-forum shopping, and the payment
of the necessary docket fees, must still be faithfully
observed. (Before, it was actually allowed that
contempt proceedings be initiated by mere motion and
without compliance with the reqt’s for initiatory
pleadings, but since the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure, such practice was no longer countenanced).
[Substantive part: even if the motion complied with
the req’ts of the Rules of Court, it should still fail on
substantive grounds since it turned out that the house
is a family home and despite the death of one or both
spouses, it shall continue for a period of 10y or for as
long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs
cannot partition it unless there is a compelling reason.
No such reason here.]
CA ruling is modified. The house is declared
part of the lot, but it is exempted from partition by
public auction until the period provided for in the law.
SPOUSES VILLACASTIN V. PELAEZ
Facts: Respondent Paul Pelaez and his wife mortgaged
their agricultural lands in Cebu to DBP. The spouses
failed to pay their mortgage obligation, so their
properties were foreclosed and subsequently sold at
public auction.
Said property had tenants who filed an action
to annul the mortgage, foreclosure and sale of
properties, claiming they were the owners. Said case
was filed before the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator.
Petitioners Sps. Villacastin filed a complaint for
forcible entry with the MCTC against respondent Pelaez
Jurisdiction
and a certain Elesio Monteseven. It alleged that they
were the owners of the property, and that respondent
Pelaez entered the property thru stealth and strategy
and unlawfully deprived the spouses of possession
thereof. MCTC ruled in favour of the spouses. RTC
affirmed.
Meanwhile, the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator in Cebu rendered a decision in favor of the
tenants.
The Court of Appeals, however, ruled that
regular courts should respect the primary jurisdiction
vested upon the DARAB in cases involving agricultural
lands such as the property subject of this case.
Accordingly, it set aside the decision rendered by the
RTC and the MCTC, and dismissed the complaint for
forcible entry filed by petitioners in this case.
Petitioner spouses contend that the case did
not involve any agrarian matter and thus, the MCTC
correctly exercised jurisdiction over the case.
Issue: Which court has jurisdiction over the case?
MCTC/REGULAR COURTS HAS JURISDICTION.
Held: Jurisdiction over the subject matter is
determined by the allegations of the complaint. In
ascertaining, for instance, whether an action is one for
forcible entry falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the inferior courts, the averments of the complaint and
the character of the relief sought are to be examined.
A review of the complaint reveals that the
pertinent allegations thereof sufficiently vest
jurisdiction over the action on the MCTC.1
No landowner-tenant vinculum juris or juridical
tie was alleged between petitioners and respondent, let
alone that which would characterize the relationship as
an agrarian dispute.
Petitioners' action is clearly for the recovery of
physical or material possession of the subject property
only, a question which both the MCTC and the RTC
ruled petitioners are entitled to. It does not involve the
adjudication of an agrarian reform matter, nor an
agrarian dispute falling within the jurisdiction of the
DARAB.
Courts have jurisdiction over possessory
actions involving public or private agricultural lands to
determine the issue of physical possession as this
issue is independent of the question of disposition and
alienation of such lands which should be threshed out
1
The allegations were:
That the plaintiffs are the owners and legal as well as actual
possessors of a parcel of agricultural land more particularly
described as follows; That the defendant, sometime in the
second week of March 1988, by strategy and through stealth
entered the above-described land of the plaintiffs and took
possession thereof; thus, depriving said plaintiffs of the
possession thereof; That several demands were made the
plaintiffs upon the defendants to restore to them the
possession of the above-described parcel of land; but,
defendants refused and still refuse to restore possession of
said property to the plaintiffs.
17
 emedial Law Review
Digests
in the DAR. Thus, jurisdiction was rightfully exercised
by the MCTC and the RTC.
VARGAS V. CAMINAS
Facts: Jesus Garcia, as a developer of Trans-American
Sales and Exposition, sold a townhouse to the Caminas
spouses. However, Garcia also sold the same
townhouse to the Vargas spouses as payment for
various construction materials. Furthermore, Garcia
also mortgaged the same townhouse in favour of the
De Guzman spouses as security for a loan.
The Caminas spouses filed a complaint for the
declaration of nullity of the mortgage (to the De
Guzmans) and deed of sale (to the Vargases). Vargas
also filed a complaint for specific performance.
The Vargas spouses raised the lack of
jurisdiction of the trial court on the ground that the
subject matter falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the HLURB. The De Guzmans argue that the HLURB
has no jurisdiction over cases involving the declaration
of nullity of a mortgage contract filed against the
mortgagee. The Caminas argue that the Vargas
spouses are estopped from raising the issue of
jurisdiction of the trial court.
The RTC and CA decided in favour of the
Caminas spouses.
The case obviously falls under the
jurisdiction of the HLURB based on PD 957.
Issue: The case obviously falls under the jurisdiction
of the HLURB based on PD 957, but… are the Vargas
spouses estopped from raising the defense of lack of
jurisdiction of the RTC? – NO.
Ruling: The rule is that jurisdiction of a court may be
questioned at any stage of the proceedings. In this
case, Vargas raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction
during the Rejoinder. The trial court failed to address
the issue of jurisdiction in its decision. Clearly, the trial
court erred in not dismissing the case before it. Under
the Rules of Court, it is the duty of the court to dismiss
an action whenever it appears that the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter.
The equitable defense of estoppel requires
knowledge or consciousness of the facts upon which it
is based. The same thing is true with estoppel by
conduct which may be asserted only when it is shown,
among others, that the representation must have been
made with knowledge of the facts and that the party to
whom it was made is ignorant of the truth of the
matter.
Lozon v. NLRC came up with a clear rule on
whether jurisdiction by estoppel applies or does not. It
stated that: The operation of the principle of estoppel
on the question of jurisdiction seemingly depends upon
whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or
not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and
decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction, the
parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing such
Jurisdiction
jurisdiction, for the same `must exist as a matter of
law, and may not be conferred by consent of the
parties or by estoppel'.
However, if the lower court had jurisdiction,
and the case was heard and decided upon a given
theory, such, for instance, as that the court had no
jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt such
theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to assume an
inconsistent position that the lower court had
jurisdiction. Here, the principle of estoppel applies. The
rule that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and does not
depend upon the will of the parties, has no bearing
thereon. (In this case, the trial court clearly had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter. Hence, estoppel
does not apply.)
The CA, however, stated that the Vargas
spouses are estopped based on the Tijam doctrine
wherein the lack of jurisdiction was raised for the first
time in a motion to dismiss filed almost fifteen (15)
years after the questioned ruling had been rendered.
THEY ARE MISTAKEN! Tijam is an exception to the
general rule because of the presence of laches. (In this
case, Vargas raised the issue of jurisdiction before the
trial court rendered its decision. They continued to
raise the issue in their appeal before the Court of
Appeals and this Court. Hence, it cannot be said that
laches has set in.)
FIGUEROA VS. PEOPLE
Facts: An information for reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide was filed against Figueroa before
the RTC where he was convicted. He appealed the
conviction raising, among others, the issue of
jurisdiction. He argued for the first time on appeal,
that the RTC had no jurisdiction. The appellate court
denied his appeal ruling that he was already estopped
by laches because he had actively participated in the
trial and because of his belated assertion of the lack of
jurisdiction of the RTC.
Issue: When is a litigant estopped by laches from
assailing the jurisdiction of a court?
Held/Ratio:
Jurisdiction conferred by law in force at time of
institution of action
The rule is that jurisdiction is conferred by law.
And the law that should apply is that in force during
the institution of the action. At the time the
information in this case was filed, BP129 (Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980) had already been
amended by RA7691, which amended BP129 insofar as
it expanded the jurisdiction of the MTCs (RA7691 took
effect on April 15, 1994). Sec. 32 (2) of RA7691
provides that MTCs shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over all offenses punishable by
imprisonment not exceeding 6 years, regardless of the
fine and other accessory penalties.
18
 emedial Law Review
Digests
In this case, the imposable penalty for the
crime charged was PC med and max (specifically 2yrs,
4mos, and 1 day to 6 yrs). So clearly, the MTCs had
jurisdiction. While the SolGen as well as the appellate
court agreed that the MTCs had jurisdiction, they
argued that estoppel by laches still applied. The trial
went on for 4yrs w/o the Figueroa raising the issue of
jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction vis-a-vis estoppels by laches
To resolve the issue, the SC analyzed several
different cases (ang dami so ito lang yung mga sinama
ko).
US v De la Santa – Jurisdiction is subject to
objection at any stage, either in the court
below or on appeal.
Tijam v Sibonghanoy – A party who actively
participated in the trial may be barred by
laches if he belatedly raises the issue of
jurisdiction.
General Rule
Lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage,
even on appeal. (Rationale is because jurisdiction is
conferred by law, and lack of it affects the very
authority of the court to take cognizance of the case)
Exception
Tijam v Sibonghanoy – BUT this is an
exceptional case because here the lack of jurisdiction
was invoked only after 15yrs, and when the case was
already with the CA. Estoppel by laches may be
invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in
cases in which the factual milieu is analogous to that in
Tijam. Laches should be clearly present; that is, lack of
jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to
warrant the presumption that the party entitled to
assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it.
Jurisdiction
peace officers from the land on the pretense that the
property was owned by De Barrera as evidenced by an
OCT. Legaspi filed an action for recovery of possession
with preliminary mandatory injunction and damages
with the RTC.
De Barrera interposed the affirmative defense
of ownership and likewise assailed the jurisdiction of
the court on the ground that the assessed value of the
land was only 11,160 as evidenced by the tax
declaration.
RTC sustained its jurisdiction claiming that
what determines jurisdiction are the allegations in the
complaint and not those in the answer. Since the
complaint alleges that the land was worth 50,000, it is
within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
CA sustained.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction –
NONE
HELD: According to BP 129, accion publiciana and/or
accion reivindicatioria is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the MTC if the assessed value of the land
does not exceed 20,000 outside Metro Manila and
50,000 within Metro Manila. Thus the action is within
the jurisdiction of the MTC it appearing that the
assessed value of the land was only 11,160.
Assessed value is defined as the worth of the
land as determined by the tax authorities against
which the tax rate is applied. It is not similar to fair
market value. Thus, it was an error for the court to
base its jurisdiction to the uncorroborated allegation of
Legaspi that the land was worth 50,000

Some healthy reminders from your friendly SC

Estoppel, being in the nature of a forfeiture, is
not favored by law. It is to be applied rarely—only
from necessity, and only in extraordinary
circumstances. The doctrine must be applied with great
care and the equity must be strong in its favor.
Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter
of an action is conferred by the Constitution and the
law, and not by the consent or waiver of the parties
where the court otherwise would have no jurisdiction
over the nature or subject matter of the action. Nor
can it be acquired through, or waived by, any act or
omission of the parties. Moreover, estoppel does not
apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none
over the cause of action.

DE BARRERA v LEGASPI

FACTS: This is a land dispute between De Barrera and

Legaspi who is the present possessor of a parcel of
land in Misamis Occidental. Legaspi was evicted by

19
 emedial Law Review
Digests
RULE 2: CAUSE OF ACTION
Mindanao Terminal v Phoenix Assurance
Company & McGee
Facts: Del Monte Philippines contracted Mindanao
Terminal, a stevedoring company, to load and stow
bananas and pineapples owned by Del Monte Produce
(note: not by Del Monte Philippines) into the cargo
hold of a vessel. Del Monte Produce insured the
shipment of fruits under an “open cargo policy” with
Phoenix (insurer) and McGee & Co (underwriting
manager/agent of Phoenix).
The cargo was damaged so Del Monte Produce
filed a claim against Phoenix and McGee. Phoenix and
McGee paid del Monte Produce and was issued a
subrogation receipt. So Phoenix and McGee filed an
action for damages against Mindanao Terminal in the
RTC of Davao.
The RTC ruled against Phoenix and McGee
stating, among others, that they did not have a cause
of action against Mindanao because Mindanao was
contracted by Del Monte Philippines, and not with the
insured Del Monte Produce.
On appeal, the CA reversed, stating that there
was a cause of action based on Article 2176 (Quasi-
delict).
Issue: Do Phoenix and McGee have a cause of action
against Mindanao Terminal?
Held: Yes, there was a cause of action.
The present action is based on quasi-delict, arising
from the negligent and careless loading and stowing of
the cargoes belonging to Del Monte Produce. Even
assuming that both Phoenix and McGee have only been
subrogated in the rights of Del Monte Produce, who is
not a party to the contract of service between
Mindanao Terminal and Del Monte, still the insurance
carriers may have a cause of action in light of the
Court’s consistent ruling that the act that breaks the
contract may be also a tort. In fine, a liability for tort
may arise even under a contract, where tort is that
which breaches the contract.
In the present case, Phoenix and McGee are
not suing for damages for injuries arising from the
breach of the contract of service but from the alleged
negligent manner by which Mindanao Terminal handled
the cargoes belonging to Del Monte Produce. Despite
the absence of contractual relationship between Del
Monte Produce and Mindanao Terminal, the allegation
of negligence on the part of the defendant should be
sufficient to establish a cause of action arising from
quasi-delict.
TURNER V LORENZO SHIPPING
Facts: Sps. Philip and Elnora Turner held 1.10 million
shares of stock of Lorenzo Shipping Corporation (LSC),
a domestic corporation engaged in cargo shipping. LSC
CivPro - 1
decided to amend its articles of incorporation to
remove the stockholders' pre-emptive rights to newly
issued shares of stock. As it is prejudicial to their
interest as stockholders, Sps. Turner voted against the
amendment and demanded payment of their shares
(at the rate of P2.3/share based on the book value of
the shares, totaling P2.3M). LSC disagreed on the
amount, but an appraisal committee settled the matter
and set the valuation at P2.5M in total. Sps. Turner
then demanded payment based on this amount, but
LSC still refused to pay. LSC argued that, according to
the Corporation Code, payment can be made only if a
corporation has unrestricted retained earnings
(earnings that can be distributed as dividends) in its
books to cover the value of the shares.1 In January 22,
2001, upon LSC’s refusal to pay, the Turners filed a
complaint for collection and damages. RTC ruled in
their favor and ordered LSC to pay after it was proven
that LSC actually had retained earnings amounting to
P12M in March 21, 2002. CA, however, reversed the
RTC and dismissed the case, stating that the cause of
action had not yet accrued due to the lack of
unrestricted retained earnings in the books of LSC.
Issues: Did RTC Judge Tipon exceed his jurisdiction in
entertaining the complaint and issuing writs of
garnishment against LSC? - Yes. Did the spouses have
a cause of action? – No. When is the proper time to
determine cause of action in this case? – At the time
the demand of payment is made (2001).
Ruling: Subject to certain qualifications, and except as
otherwise provided by law, an action commenced
before the cause of action has accrued is prematurely
brought and should be dismissed. It does not matter if
the cause of action accrues after the action is
commenced and while it is pending. It is settled rule
that to recover at all, there must be some cause of
action at the commencement of the suit.
Before an action can properly be commenced,
all the essential elements of the cause of action must
be in existence, that is, the cause of action must be
complete. All valid conditions precedent to the
institution of the particular action, whether prescribed
by statute, fixed by agreement of the parties or
implied by law must first be performed or complied
with, unless the conduct of the adverse party has been
such as to prevent or waive performance or excuse
non-performance of the condition. In this case, the
condition precedent for a cause of action is the
existence of unrestricted retained earnings in the
books of LSC. Without it, the action is premature.
1
Pursuant to the Corporation Code, the dissenting
stockholders exercising their appraisal rights is subject to the
legal condition that no payment shall be made to any
dissenting stockholder unless the corporation has unrestricted
retained earnings in its books to cover such payment. The
purpose of this is to ensure that the corporate assets cannot
be distributed among the stockholders without first paying the
creditors, based on the trust fund doctrine.
21
 emedial Law Review
Digests
An action prematurely brought is a groundless
suit. Unless the plaintiff has a valid and
subsisting cause of action at the time his action
is commenced, the defect cannot be cured or
remedied by the acquisition or accrual of one
while the action is pending, and a supplemental
complaint or an amendment setting up such after-
accrued cause of action is not permissible.
The evidence here shows that in its quarterly
financial statement submitted to the SEC, LSC indeed
has retained earnings of P12M as of 2002. However,
this fact is neither material nor disputed. The valid
argument against paying is that there must be
unrestricted retained earnings at the time the demand
for payment is made (i.e. filing of the suit in 2001). At
the time of Sps. Turner’s demand, LSC had no retained
earnings yet and in fact even had a deficit of P73M.
This is borne out by LSC’s Financial Statements for
Fiscal Year 1999. Thus, any retained earnings made in
2002—a year after the case was filed—is irrelevant to
the Sps. Turner's right to recover. Well-settled rule is if
no right existed at the time the action was
commenced, the suit cannot be maintained, although
such right of action may have accrued thereafter.
CHUA AND FILDEN CO. VS. METROBANK AND
TRUST CO. AND ATTY. CELESTRA
FACTS: Petitioner Chua, president of Filiden (a
domestic corporation), obtained a loan from Metrobank
which was secured by a REM on parcels of land he
owned. Upon maturity, Metrobank demanded that
Filden and Chua fully pay and settle their accounts, but
the latter failed to do so. Thus, Metrobank extra-
judicially foreclosed the REMs constituted on the
subject properties.
Upon a verified Petition for Foreclosure filed by
Metrobank, Atty. Celestra issued a Notice of Sale. Chua
filed a Complaint for Injunction with Prayer for
Issuance of TRO, Preliminary Injunction and
Damages2 (first case) against Atty. Celestra. After
the expiration of the TRO, Atty. Celestra reset the
schedule of the auction sale on Nov. 8, 2001.
However, on the day of the auction sale (Nov 8), the
RTC issued an Order directing that the said sale be
reset anew AFTER Nov. 8, 2001. Said Order was not
received by Atty. Celestra on time, thus, the auction
sale proceeded on Nov. 8, 2001 and a Certificate of
Sale was issued to Metrobank as the highest bidder.
Petitioners (Chua and Filiden) filed with the
RTC a Motion to Admit Amended Complaint in Civil
Case No. CV-01-0207. The amended complaint
basically questioned the validity of the auction sale.
The RTC ruled in favor of Metrobank, saying that the
auction sale was valid and denied Petitioners’
application for injunction. Upon appeal, the CA
reversed the RTC decision and remanded the case for
further proceedings. Then, petitioners (Chua and
2 3
Civil Case No. CV-01-0207 – First case
CivPro - 1
Filiden) filed a Complaint for Damages3 (second
case) against Metrobank and Atty. Celestra. A Motion
to Consolidate the action for damages and injunction
case was then filed by the Petitioners. Metrobank
opposed the Consolidation on the ground of forum
shopping. The RTC ruled in favor of Metrobank. The CA
affirmed the RTC decision.
ISSUE: W/N the successive filing of the ‘first’
(injunction) and ‘second’ (action for damages)
cases amounted to forum shopping.
HELD/RATIO: YES.
Forum shopping can be committed in three ways: (1)
filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action
and with the same prayer, the previous case not
having been resolved yet (where the ground for
dismissal is litis pendentia); (2) filing multiple cases
based on the same cause of action and the same
prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved
(where the ground for dismissal is res judicata); and
(3) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of
action, but with different prayers (splitting of causes of
action, where the ground for dismissal is also either
litis pendentia or res judicata).
In this case, petitioners committed forum
shopping by filing multiple cases based on the same
cause of action, although with different prayers. Forum
shopping occurs although the actions seem to be
different, when it can be seen that there is a splitting
of a cause of action. A cause of action is understood
to be the delict or wrongful act or omission
committed by the defendant in violation of the
primary rights of the plaintiff. It is true that a
single act or omission can violate various rights at the
same time, as when the act constitutes juridically a
violation of several separate and distinct legal
obligations. However, where there is only one delict or
wrong, there is but a single cause of action regardless
of the number of rights that may have been violated
belonging to one person.
Petitioners would like to make it appear that
the injunction case was solely concerned with the
nullification of the auction sale and certification of sale,
while the action for damages was a totally separate
claim for damages. Yet, a review of the records reveals
that petitioners also included an explicit claim for
damages in their Amended Complaint in the injunction
case. Also, there is no question that the claims of
petitioners for damages in both cases are premised on
the same cause of action, i.e., the alleged wrongful
conduct of respondents in connection with the
foreclosure sale of the properties.
PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS and BUNCAN vs.
STANDARD INSURANCE and GICALE
Civil Case No. CV-05-0402 – Second case
22
 emedial Law Review
Digests
FACTS: The jeepney owned by Gicale was hit by a
Pantranco bus driven by Buncan. It was raining. Both
vehicles were travelling north bound. The hit happened
when, while negotiating a curve along the highway, the
Pantranco bus overtook the jeepney. The bus hit the
left rear side of the jeepney and sped away.
The total cost of the repair wasP21,415.00. Standard
Insurance (insurer of Pantranco) paid only 8K. Gicale
(owner of the jeepney) shouldered the balance
of P13,415.00.
Standard Insurance and Gicale demanded
reimbursement from Pantranco and its driver Buncan,
but they refused. This prompted Standard and Gicale
to file with the RTC a complaint for sum of money.
In their answer, Pantranco and Buncan averred
that it is the MTC, not the RTC, which has jurisdiction.
Gicale’s claim of P13,415.00 and Standard Insurance’s
claim of P8,000.00 individually fell under the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the MTC. They also claimed that
there was a misjoinder of parties because the cause of
action of Standard Insurance and Gicale did not arise
from the same transaction and that there are no
common questions of law and fact common to both
parties.
ISSUE: WON RTC has jurisdiction over the subject of
the action -- YES
RATIO: There is a single transaction common to all--
Pantranco’s bus hitting the rear side of the jeepney.
There is also a common question of fact-- whether
Pantranco and its driver are negligent. There being a
single transaction common to Standard Insurance and
Gicale, consequently, they have the same cause of
action against petitioners.
To determine identity of cause of action, it
must be ascertained whether the same evidence
which is necessary to sustain the second cause of
action would have been sufficient to authorize a
recovery in the first. Here, had Standard Insurance
and Gicale filed separate suits against Pantranco and
its driver Buncan, the same evidence would have been
presented to sustain the same cause of action. Thus,
the filing by both respondents of the complaint with
the court below is in order. Such joinder of parties
avoids multiplicity of suit and ensures the convenient,
speedy and orderly administration of justice.
Section 5(d), Rule 2 provides:
Sec. 5. Joinder of causes of action. – A party may in
one pleading assert, in the alternative or otherwise, as
many causes of action as he may have against an
opposing party, subject to the following conditions:
xxx
(d) Where the claims in all the causes of action are
principally for recovery of money the aggregate
amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction.”
The above provision presupposes that the different
causes of action which are joined accrue in favor of the
same plaintiff/s and against the same defendant/s and
that no misjoinder of parties is involved. The issue of
whether respondents’ claims shall be lumped together
CivPro - 1
is determined by paragraph (d) of the above
provision. This paragraph embodies the “totality rule”
as exemplified by Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129 which
states that “where there are several claims or causes
of action between the same or different parties,
embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the
demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the
causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of
action arose out of the same or different transactions.”
B.P. Blg. 129 provides that the RTC has exclusive
original jurisdiction if the claim, exclusive of interest
and cost, amounts to more than P20,000.00.
SPS. VICTOR & MILAGROS PEREZ and CRISTINA
AGRAVIADOR AVISO v. ANTONIO HERMANO
FACTS: On April 1998, petitioners sps. Perez and
Aviso filed a civil case for Enforcement of Contract and
Damages, with a prayer for issuance of a TRO and/or
Preliminary Injunction against Zescon Land, Inc., its
president Sales-Contreras, a certain Atty. Vitan-Ele
AND respondent in this case, Antonio Hermano. (So
there were supposedly 4 defendants.)
Subsequently, Hermano filed his Answer with
Compulsory Counterclaim. Also, almost 2 years after
he filed his answer, he filed a Motion with Leave to
Dismiss the Complaint or Ordered Severed for
Separate Trial. This latter motion was granted by
RTC QC, in effect dismissing the case with respect to
Hermano. So petitioners Perez and Aviso filed a
petition for certiorari (R65) which was however
dismissed by the CA for having been filed out of time,
as well as the MR.
It all started with petitioners Perez and Aviso
filing a case against Zescon Land, Inc. and its officers
for enforcement of the contract, plus damages, plus
TRO/PI. The petitioners invoke 3 causes of action:
1. Enforcement of the contract to sell entered
between petitioners and Zescon Land, Inc.
2. Annulment or rescission of 2 contracts of
mortgage between petitioners and Hermano
3. Damages against all the defendants.
Petitioners allege that they purchased 5 parcels of
land from Zescon Land, valued at P19.104M. The
petitioners assert that through the tricky machination
and simultaneous execution of the Contract to Sell,
they were also made to sign other documents, such as
2 mortgage deeds in favor of respondent Hermano,
whom they hadn’t even met. Petitioners contend that
they never intended to mortgage their property to
Hermano.
Hermano later on paid filed a case for judicial
foreclosure of the mortgages. The petitioners Perez
and Aviso seek a TRO to prevent Hermano from
foreclosing the properties.
Hermano, on the other hand, contends that
there was a MISJOINDER of parties because
defendants were under different transactions or causes
of action. He already filed a separate action against
petitioners Perez and Aviso for judicial foreclosure of
23
 emedial Law Review
Digests
the parcels of land, in another court while this action is
evidently different from the enforcement of the
contract case. So that was when the trial court allowed
for the dismissal of the case against Hermano.
The petitioners are asserting that RTC acted
with GADLEJ in dismissing the complaint as against
Hermano because Hermano didn’t even file a motion to
dismiss under Rule 16 (bec what he filed was motion
with leave to dismiss or ordered severed for separate
trial). Also, the petitioners say that there was no
misjoinder of causes of action not was there misjoinder
of parties.
ISSUE: W/N the enforcement of contract case
was validly dismissed with respect to Hermano.
HELD/RATIO: NO! There is no misjoinder,
Hermano should be included as defendant in the
case.
The trial court dropped Hermano from the
complaint on ground of misjoinder of causes of action.
The SC however, disagrees. There is no misjoinder of
causes of action, nor of parties.
Joinder of causes of action, is meant the
uniting of two or more demands or rights of action in
one action; the statement of more than one cause of
action in a declaration. It is the union of two or more
civil causes of action, each of which could be made the
basis of a separate suit, in the same complaint,
declaration or petition. A plaintiff may under certain
circumstances join several distinct demands,
controversies or rights of action in one declaration,
complaint or petition.
The joinder of separate causes of action, where
allowable, is permissive and not mandatory in the
absence of a contrary statutory provision, even though
the causes of action arose from the same factual
setting and might under applicable joinder rules be
joined. Modern statutes and rules governing joinders
are intended to avoid a multiplicity of suits and to
promote the efficient administration of justice
wherever this may be done without prejudice to the
rights of the litigants.
While joinder of causes of action is largely left
to the option of a party litigant (petitioner), Section 5,
Rule 2 of our present Rules allows causes of action to
be joined in one complaint conditioned upon the
following requisites: (a) it will not violate the rules on
jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties; and (b) the
causes of action arise out of the same contract,
transaction or relation between the parties, or are for
demands for money or are of the same nature and
character.
There is misjoinder of causes of action when
the conditions for joinder under Section 5, Rule 24 are
not met. Section 5 provides:
4
Sec. 5. Joinder of causes of action. - A party may in one
pleading assert, in the alternative or otherwise, as many
causes of action as he may have against an opposing party,
subject to the following conditions:
CivPro - 1
It is well to remember that the joinder of
causes of action may involve the same parties or
different parties. If the joinder involves different
parties, as in this case, there must be a question
of fact or of law common to both parties joined,
arising out of the same transaction or series of
transaction.
In this case, petitioners have adequately
alleged in their complaint that after they had already
agreed to enter into a contract to sell with Zescon
Land, Inc., through Sales-Contreras, the latter also
gave them other documents to sign, including two
mortgage deeds over the same properties in favor of
respondent Hermano. Petitioners claim that Zescon
Land, Inc. misled them to mortgage their properties
which they had already agreed to sell to the latter.
From the above averments in the complaint, it
becomes reasonably apparent that there are questions
of fact and law common to both Zescon Land, Inc., and
respondent Hermano arising from a series of
transaction over the same properties. There is the
question of fact, for example, of whether or not Zescon
Land, Inc., indeed misled petitioners to sign the
mortgage deeds in favor of respondent Hermano.
There is also the question of which of the four
contracts were validly entered into by the parties.
RULE 3: PARTIES
NAGKAKAISANG LAKAS NG MANGGAGAWA SA
KEIHIN V. KEIHIN PHILIPPINES CORP.
Facts:
Keihin Corp (respondent) is engaged in the
production of intake manifold and throttle body
used in motor vehicles manufactured by
Honda. As part of its standard operating
procedure, Keihin subjects all its employees to
reasonable search before the leave the
company premises.
On Sept. 5, 2003, Helen Valenzuela
(petitioner) was caught with packing tape
inside her bag. Disciplinary action was
instituted against Helen wherein she admitted
the offense and manifested that she would
accept whatever penalty would be imposed
upon her.
Keihin Corp terminated Helen’s services on the
ground that Helen was guilty of serious
(a) The party joining the causes of action shall comply with
the rules on joinder of parties;
(b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions or actions
governed by special rules;
(c) Where the causes of action are between the same parties
but pertain to different venues or jurisdictions, the joinder
may be allowed in the Regional Trial Court provided one of
the causes of action falls within the jurisdiction of said court
and the venue lies therein; and
(d) Where the claims in all the causes of action are principally
for recovery of money, the aggregate amount claimed shall
be the test of jurisdiction.
24
 emedial Law Review
Digests
misconduct because there was a deliberate act
of stalling from the company.
Helen and Petitioner Nagkakaisang Lakas ng
Manggagawa sa Keihin filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal against Keihin Corp alleging
that Helen’s act of taking the packing tape did
not constitute serious misconduct. Thus, even
if Helen admitted to taking the packing tape,
the punishment was disproportionate to her
infraction.
Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint. NLRC
dismissed the appeal.
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for
certiorari filed by Nagkakaisang Lakas ng
Mangagawa sa Keihin for not having been filed
by an indispensable party in interest.
Issue: Whether CA committed error in dismissing the
petition on the ground that it was not filed by an
indispensable party?
Held: No, CA affirmed but SC continued to discuss the
merits of the appeal because dismissal on purely
technical grounds is frowned upon.
It is clear that petitioners failed to include the
name of Helen Valenzuela in the caption of
their petition for certiorari filed with the CA as
well as in the body of the said petition.
Instead, they only indicated the name of the
labor union Nagkakaisang Lakas ng
Manggagawa sa Keihin (NLMK-OLALIA) as the
party acting on behalf of Helen. As a result, the
CA rightly dismissed the petition based on a
formal defect.
Under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court,
"parties in interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action shall be
joined as plaintiffs or defendants."
If there is a failure to implead an indispensable
party, any judgment rendered would have no
effectiveness. It is “precisely ‘when an
indispensable party is not before the court
(that) an action should be dismissed.’ The
absence of an indispensable party renders all
subsequent actions of the court null and void
for want of authority to act, not only as to the
absent parties but even to those present.”
The purpose of the rules on joinder of
indispensable parties is a complete
determination of all issues not only between
the parties themselves, but also as regards
other persons who may be affected by the
judgment. A decision valid on its face cannot
attain real finality where there is want of
indispensable parties.
REPUBLIC v. COALBRINE INTERNATIONAL PHILS,
INC. and SHEILA F. NERI
FACTS:
CivPro - 1
EPZA- Export Processing Zone Authority
(predecessor)
PEZA – Philippine Economic Zone Authority
(successor)
EPZA and Coalbrine entered into a contract in
which Coalbrine would rehabilitate and lease the
Bataan Hilltop Hotel, Gold Course and Clubhouse
(owned by EPZA) for 25 years, renewable for another
25 years at the option of Coalbrine. Respondent NERI
was the Managing Director of the hotel. PEZA Board
later passes a resolution rescinding the contract to
rehabilitate and lease due to Coalbrine’s repeated
violations and non-performance of its obligations as
provided in the contract. PEZA sent Coalbrine a notice
to vacate the premises and to pay its outstanding
obligations to it.
Coalbrine filed with the RTC of Manila a
Complaint for specific performance with prayer for the
issuance of a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction
with damages against PEZA and/or Bataan Economic
Zone wherein respondent Coalbrine sought to declare
that PEZA had no valid cause to rescind the contract to
rehabilitate and lease and to enjoin PEZA from taking
over the hotel and country club and from disconnecting
the water and electric services to the hotel.
Respondents Coalbrine and Neri filed with the RTC of
Balanga, Bataan, a Complaint for damages with prayer
for the issuance of a TRO and/or writ of preliminary
prohibitory/mandatory injunction against Zone
Administrator Quindoza. Respondent alleged that
Quindoza started to harass the hotel's operations by
causing the excavation of the entire width of a cross-
section of the only road leading to the hotel for the
supposed project of putting up a one length steel pipe
and cutting the pipelines that supplied water to the
hotel.
Quindoza, through the SOLGEN, filed a motion
to dismiss on the ground, among others, that the
complaint is fatally defective for being unauthorized
(that Neri had no proof of authority to file the
complaint in the RTC of Balanga, Bataan). RTC denied.
Filed MR but denied. REPUBLIC, represented by
Quindoza in his capacity as Zone Administrator of the
Bataan Economic Zone, filed with the CA a petition for
certiorari under R65 seeking to annul the RTC orders.
CA denied.
Coalbrine and Neri argued that the Republic of
the Philippines was not a party to the civil case subject
of the petition, hence, it has no personality to file the
instant petition for review.
Republic claimed that respondent Neri's
signature in the verification and certification against
non-forum shopping attached to the complaint filed by
respondents in the RTC was defective, since there was
no proof of her authority to institute the complaint on
behalf of the corporation; and that respondent Neri is
not a real party-in-interest.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Neri is a real party-in-
interest – NO
25
 emedial Law Review
Digests
2. Whether or not complaint was fatally defective
for Neri’s lack of proof of authority to file the
complain – YES
3. Whether or not Republic is a real party-in-
interest - YES
HELD: The acts complained of and said to have been
committed by petitioner against respondents have
solely affected the hotel's operations where respondent
Neri was the hotel's Managing Director and whose
interest in the suit was incidental. Thus, the Court
found that respondent Neri has no cause of action
against petitioner. Consequently, the plaintiff in this
case would only be respondent Coalbrine.
A corporation exercises said powers through its
board of directors and/or its duly authorized officers
and agents. Physical acts of the corporation, like the
signing of documents, can be performed only by
natural persons duly authorized for the purpose by
corporate by-laws or by a specific act of the board of
directors. In this case, respondent Coalbrine is a
corporation. However, when respondent Neri filed the
complaint in the RTC, there was no proof that she was
authorized to sign the verification and the certification
of non-forum shopping.
While the requirement regarding verification of
a pleading is merely formal and not jurisdictional, the
lack of certification of non-forum shopping is generally
not curable by mere amendment of the complaint, but
shall be a cause for the dismissal of the case without
prejudice. Failure to provide a certificate of non-forum
shopping is sufficient ground to dismiss the petition.
Likewise, the petition is subject to dismissal if a
certification was submitted unaccompanied by proof of
signatory's authority. The Court found no reason to
relax this rule since no subsequent compliance thereof
was ever made.
Finally, the Court held that Republic was a real
party-in-interest. Notably, Administrator Quindoza was
sued for damages for certain acts that he allegedly
committed while he was the Zone Administrator of the
Bataan Export Processing Zone. Therefore, the
complaint is in the nature of suit against the State, and
the Republic has the personality to file the petition.
REPUBLIC VS. AGUNOY
FACTS: Gregorio Agunoy filed his application for free
patent over Lots 1341 and 1342, an 18-ha. parcel of
land. This application was granted. The free patent led
to the issuance of OCT P-4522. Shortly after, the heirs
of Perez caused an annotation of an adverse claim in
their favor over 15.1 hectares of the land covered by
OCT P-4522. The heirs of Perez later filed a formal
protest. The investigation of the Bureau of Lands show
that the free patent in favor of Agunoy was indeed
fraudulently obtained. Despite the protest, numerous
transactions regarding the land were made on the
Agunoy side (subdivision of the lots, sales, mortgages)
causing the heirs of Perez to file a supplemental
CivPro - 1
protest. On investigation by the Bureau of Lands, it
was found that an OCT for the lot covered by the free
patent already existed at the time of the granting of
the free patent. These facts brought the Republic,
through the OSG, to file a case against several
defendants who are successors-in-interest of Agunoy.
ISSUE: W/N the Republic is a real party-in-interest
HELD: The Republic is not the real party-in-interest. To
qualify a person to be a real party-in-interest in whose
name an action must be prosecuted, he must appear
to be the present real owner of the right sought to be
enforced. A real party in interest is the party who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
And by real interest is meant a present substantial
interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a
future, contingent, subordinate or consequential
interest.
As stated in the facts, the land sought to be
reconveyed in the Republic's suit belongs to a private
party by virtue of the OCT previously issued to such
party and is no longer a disposable public land at the
time of the fraudulent granting of free patent. Case
dismissed ruling against Republic.
RATIO: By the Republic’s admission in its pleadings,
the lands in question were already private property of
Perez/Espiritu, which means that the property in
question was no longer a disposable public land. As the
Bureau of Lands no longer had any jurisdiction and
control, the Republic cannot be considered real-party-
in-interest anymore.
CUA JR. VS TAN
FACTS: PRCI, a corporation5 (for horse racing and
breeding) and a franchise holder6 of opening one
racetrack, amended its Articles of Incorporation to
include a secondary purpose (acquire, develop or sell
real prop). PRCI owned two properties (Makati [Sta.
Ana racetrack] and Cavite) and wanted to convert one
of them (Makati) from a racetrack to urban residential
and commercial use since the property was severely
underutilized. PRCI decided to make a wholly owned
subsidiary instead of giving up the property. But
instead of creating a new corp, they just thought of
just buying another domestic corp (JTH). The purchase
of JTH by acquiring its shares of stock was approved
by the Board and also in a special stockholder’s
meeting. PRCI was able to acquire around 98% of
JTH’s capital stock, and for the remaining capital stock,
PRCI transferred the Makati property to JTH in
exchange for the missing stocks and also serve as
capital for the subsidiary.
5
PRCI is listed in the PSE with authorized capital stock of P1B
divided into 1M shares
6
Via RA 7953
26
 emedial Law Review
Digests
When the transfer of property was presented
at the annual stockholder’s meeting, minority
stockholders (MIGUEL et al) filed derivative suits (with
application for TRO) against the directors of PRCI and
JTH, saying the transfer was fraudulent and prejudicial
to PRCI and that the Board resolutions leading to the
transfer was refused to be given to MIGUEL, violating
the rights of the minority stockholders to information
and to inspect corporate books and records. The TRO
was granted for holding of the annual stockholder’s
meeting.
SANTIAGO (Jr. and Sr.), as directors of PRCI,
filed a petition against the granting of the TRO, but
was dismissed. Subsequently, a permanent injunction
was issued over the same. SANTIAGOs contended that
MIGUEL’s case did not constitute a valid derivative
suit, since the latter failed to allege in their complaint
that they had no appraisal rights7 for the acts they
were complaining of. MIGUEL explained that their
complaint was not merely a derivative suit but was
also an intra-corporate action against the fraudulent
schemes of PRCI directors. They also explained that
the appraisal rights were unavailable to them due to
the mismanagement of the directors.
Subsequently, another set of minority
stockholders (JALANE) filed a derivative suit against
PRCI directors, basically the same as MIGUELs
contentions.
ISSUE: W/N the derivative suits of the minority
stockholders (MIGUEL and JALANE) should prosper. –
NO.
HELD: It is well settled in this jurisdiction that where
corporate directors are guilty of a breach of trust —
not of mere error of judgment or abuse of discretion, a
stockholder may institute a derivative suit for the
benefit of the other stockholders and the corp. A
derivative suit is different from individual (wrong is
done personally) or class suits (wrong done to a
group), because wrong is done to corp itself in cases of
mismanagement by the directors.
The Court held that MIGUEL’s complaint only
amounted to a derivative suit because did not allege
injury either personal or a certain class of stockholders
to which they belong.
However, the derivative suit for the acquisition
of JTH should be dismissed for being moot. The PRCI
Board Resolution for the sale was approved and
ratified by stockholders holding 74% of capital stock
during the special stockholder’s meeting. By
ratification, even an unauthorized act of an agent
becomes the authorized act of the principal. Even if
this suit is not moot, it still dismissible for failure to
implead indispensable parties [Note: for indispensable
parties doctrine, see bold paragraph below], namely,
7
the right of shareholders who object to being acquired to
demand a fair price for their shares, as determined by a
court.
CivPro - 1
the majority of the PRCI stockholders, for they have
approved and ratified the Resolution.
The derivative suit for the property for shares
exchange is also dismissible for lack of cause of action.
A stockholder’s right to institute a derivative suit is not
based on any express provision of the Corporation
Code but is impliedly recognized. The basis of a
stockholder’s suit is always one of equity. However, it
cannot prosper without first complying with the legal
requisites for its institution. One of the requirements is
that appraisal rights are available. MIGUEL’s reasons
for not alleging appraisal rights are invalid.
MIGUEL’s derivative suit bars JALANE’s. The
corporation is the real party in interest in a
derivative suit, and the suing stockholder is only
a nominal party. The corporation should be included
as a party in the suit. Not only is the corporation an
indispensable party, but it is also the present rule that
it must be served with process. With the corporation
as the real party-in-interest and the indispensable
party, any ruling in one of the derivative suits should
already bind the corporation as res judicata in the
other.
Under Rule 3, Section 7 of the Rules of
Court, an indispensable party is a party-in-
interest, without whom no final determination
can be had of an action without that party being
impleaded. Indispensable parties are those with
such an interest in the controversy that a final
decree would necessarily affect their rights, so
that the court cannot proceed without their
presence. “Interest,” within the meaning of this
rule, should be material, directly in issue, and to
be affected by the decree, as distinguished from
a mere incidental interest in the question
involved. On the other hand, a nominal or pro
forma party is one who is joined as a plaintiff or
defendant, not because such party has any real
interest in the subject matter or because any
relief is demanded, but merely because the
technical rules of pleadings require the presence
of such party on the record.[
Allowing two different minority stockholders to
institute separate derivative suits arising from the
same factual background, alleging the same causes of
action, and praying for the same reliefs, is tantamount
to allowing the corporation, the real party-in-interest,
to file the same suit twice, resulting in the violation of
the rules against a multiplicity of suits and even
forum-shopping. It is also in disregard of the
separate-corporate-entity principle, because it is to
look beyond the corporation and to give recognition to
the different identities of the stockholders instituting
the derivative suits.
OTHER NOTES:
Santiago’s petitions were not procedurally
infirm, although a bit defective. They were not
guilty of forum shopping as the identity of
interests was not the same (one was for
27
 emedial Law Review
Digests
individual capacities as PRCI directors and one
collectively as PRCI directors).
A derivative suit, on one hand, and individual
and class suits, on the other, are mutually
exclusive
BANDA v. ERMITA
Facts: Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of EO
378 issued by GMA, characterizing their action as a
class suit filed on their own behalf and on behalf of all
their co-employees at the National Printing Office
(NPO). The assailed EO removed the exclusive
jurisdiction of the NPO over the printing services
requirements of government agencies and
instrumentalities, making it now compete with the
private sector, except in the printing of election
paraphernalia. They perceive this EO to be a threat to
their security of tenure and contend that it is beyond
GMA’s power to amend or repeal the law creating the
NPO, which Aquino issued pursuant to her legislative
power.
Issue: Whether the petition indeed qualifies as a class
suit - NO
Ratio: Courts must exercise utmost caution before
allowing a class suit, which is the exception to the
requirement of joinder of all indispensable parties. For
while no difficulty may arise if the decision is favorable
to the plaintiffs, a quandary would result if the decision
were otherwise as those who are deemed impleaded
by their self-appointed representative would certainly
claim denial of due process.
Sec. 12 of Rule 3 defines a class suit, the
requisites of which are: 1) the subject matter of
controversy is one of common or general interest to
many persons; 2) the parties affected are so numerous
that it is impracticable to bring them all to court; and
3) the parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently
numerous or representative of the class an can fully
protect the interests of all concerned.
An action does not become a class suit merely
because it is designated as such in the pleadings.
Whether the suit is or is not a class suit depends upon
the attending facts, and the complaint or other
pleading initiating the class action should allege the
existence of the necessary facts: 1) the existence of a
subject matter of common interest, and 2) the
existence of a class and the number of persons in the
alleged class, in order that the court might be able to
determine whether the members of the class are so
numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all
before the court, to contrast the number appearing on
the record with the number in the class, and to
determine whether claimants adequately represent the
class and subject matter of general or common
interest.
In this case, the petition failed to state the
number of NPO employees who would be affected by
CivPro - 1
the EO and who were allegedly represented by
petitioners. It was the Sol Gen who pointed out that
there were about 594 employees in the NPO. The 67
petitioners undeniably comprised a small fraction of
the NPO employees, 32 of which subsequently
desisted. Further, only 20 petitioners were mentioned
in the jurat as having duly subscribed the petition
before the notary public.
An element of a class suit is the adequacy of
representation. In determining this, the court must
consider: 1) whether the interest of the party named is
coextensive with the interest of the other members; 2)
the proportion of those made a party to the total
membership of the class; and 3) any other factor
bearing on the ability of the named speak for the rest
of the class. Where the interests of the plaintiffs and
the other members of the class they seek to represent
are diametrically opposed, the class suit will not
prosper.
MIAA v. RIVERA LESSEE HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATIONS
Facts: The Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) was
entrusted with the administration of Manila Int’l Airport
(now MIAA). CAA entered into a 25-year contract of
lease of 4 hectares of land in Rivera Village. On
January 1995, MIAA stopped accepted rental payments
from the lessees. As a result, Rivera Village Lessee
Homeowners Association (homeowners association)
requested MIAA to sell the leased property to its
members. MIAA denied the request because the
property is intended for airport-related activities.
Homeowners association filed a petition for mandamus
and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction. RTC denied the petition. CA
issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining MIAA
from evicting the members of Rivera Village
Association from their lots.
Issue: W/N Rivera Village Lessee Homeowners
Association has personality to sue. – YES.
Held: It is a settled rule that every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-
in-interest. Where the action is allowed to be
prosecuted or defended by a representative acting in a
fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary must be included in
the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real
party-in-interest. The name of such beneficiaries shall,
likewise, be included in the complaint.
In the case at bar, the petition was filed by the
homeowners association through its president. The
president is suing in a representative capacity as
authorized by a Board Resolution to file all the
necessary action in court to have the land titled to the
members of the association. Although the names of
the individual members of the homeowners association
who are the beneficiaries and real parties-in-interest in
the suit were not indicated in the title of the petition,
28
 emedial Law Review
Digests
this defect can be cured by the simple expedient of
requiring the association to disclose the names of the
principals and to amend the title and averments of the
petition accordingly.
The purpose of the rule that actions should be
brought or defended in the name of the real party-in-
interest is to protect against undue and unnecessary
litigation and to ensure that the court will have the
benefit of having before it the real adverse parties in
the consideration of a case. This rule is not to be
narrowly and restrictively construed, and its
application should be neither dogmatic nor rigid at all
times but viewed in consonance with extant realities
and practicalities. The dismissal of this case based on
the lack of personality to sue of petitioner-association
will only result in the filing of multiple suits by the
individual members of the association.
Ratio: Section 3, Rule 3: Where the action is allowed
to be prosecuted or defended by a representative or
someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the
beneficiary shall be included in the title of the
case and shall be deemed to be the real party in
interest. A representative may be a trustee of an
express trust, a guardian, an executor or
administrator, or a party authorized by law or these
Rules. An agent acting in his own name and for the
benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued
without joining the principal except when the contract
involves things belonging to the principal.
NAPERE V. BARBARONA
FACTS:
- Barbarona is the owner of a parcel of land in
Leyte. A lot owned by Anacleto Napere
adjoined the lot of Barbarona on one side.
- When Anacleto Napere died, his son Juan
Napere and his wife (petitioner) planted
coconut trees on some portions.
- Barbarona then filed a complaint against Juan
Napere for encroaching on a portion of his lot
and cultivating the coconut planted on the
former’s lot. Despite demands from Barbarona,
Napere refused to vacate.
- Juan Napere died. His counsel informed the
court about this but no formal substitution of
the heirs were made.
- Eventually, a judgment in favor of Barbarona
was rendered. The heirs of Napere appealed to
the CA that the judgment rendered was void
for lack of jurisdiction because of failure of the
court to formally substitute Napere’s heirs to
the case. CA affirmed the RTC. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE: W/N the judgment is void.
HELD/RATIO: NO. Failure of the court to formally
substitute the heirs of a party in a case which survives
CivPro - 1
his death does not render the judgment void. The
party alleging nullity must instead prove that there
was undeniable violation of due process.
The rule on substitution is not a matter of
jurisdiction but a requirement of due process. Thus, a
proceeding is void and the judgment nullified only if
the party who dies is not represented by any legal
representative or heir.
Formal substitution of heirs is not necessary
when they themselves appear in court, participate in
the case and present evidence in the defense of the
deceased. In this case, the heirs of Juan were present,
participated and testified for the defense of Juan.
Hence, formal substitution was not necessary. They
cannot claim denial of due process when they were
given every opportunity to participate in the trial.
SUMALJAG V. LITERATO
Facts: (1st civil case) Josefa Maglasang (Josefa) filed a
complaint with the RTC for the nullity of a deed of sale
of real property purportedly executed between her as
vendor and the spouses Diosdidit and Menendez
Literato (spouses) as vendees. Josefa was the sister of
Menendez and were 2 of the 6 heirs who inherited
equal parts of a property (Josefa w/ Lot 1220-D and
Menendez w/ Lot 1220-E) passed on to them by their
parents. The spouses responded by filing a
counterclaim denying Josefa’s allegation and
impleaded Josefa as a counterclaim defendant, alleging
that petitioner Judge Antonio Sumaljag (Sumaljag),
occupied both Lots 1220-D and E) at the instance of
Josefa w/out their authority. They claimed that Lot
1220-E is theirs by inheritance and Lot 1220-D by
purchase from Josefa. RTC dismissed the counterclaim.
(2nd civil case) After the RTC dismissed the
counterclaim, Menendez filed a complaint for
declaration of the inexistence of a lease contract,
recovery of possession of land and damages against
Sumaljag & Josefa.
Josefa died during pendency of both cases.
Atty. Puray, Sumaljag and Josefa’s common counsel,
filed a notice of death and substitution of party,
praying that Josefa be substituted by Sumaljag,
alleging that prior to her death, Josefa executed a
Quitclaim Deed over Lot 1220-D in favor
Maglasang(her nephew), who in turn sold the same to
Sumaljag. RTC denied the motion for substitution and
instead ordered Michaeles (Josefa’s sister) to serve as
Josefa’s representative. MR denied. CA upheld the
RTC.
Issue: W/N Sumaljag as a transferee pendete lite,
may substitute Josefa pursuant to Rule 3 of the Rules
of Court?
Held and Ratio: He cannot. The legal representatives
contemplated under Sec. 16, Rule 3 of the Rules refer
to those authorized by law – the administrator,
executor or guardian, who, under the rule on
29
 emedial Law Review
Digests
settlement of estate of deceased persons, is
constituted to take over the estate of the deceased.
*Sec. 16, Rule 3 expressly provides that “the heirs of
the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the
deceased, without requiring the appointment of an
executor or administrator.” Sumaljag is not one of
those mentioned. Instead he is a counterclaim co-
defendant of Josefa whose proffered justification for
substitution is the transfer to him of the interests of
Josefa in the litigation prior to her death.
Moreover, the notice of death and substitution
that Atty. Puray filed reflect a claim against the
interest of the Josefa through the transfer of her
remaining interest in the litigation to another party.
The reason for rule 3, section 16 on substitution is to
protect all concerned who may be affected by the
intervening death, particularly Josefa and her estate.
To suggest then that Sumaljag substitute Josefa would
bring to naught such protection since the transferee
who has his own interest to protect, cannot at the
same time represent and fully protect the interest of
the deceased transferor.
While Atty. Puray has every authority to
manifest to court changes in interest that transpire in
the course of litigation, pursuant to Sec. 19, Rule3,
this can only happen while the client-transferor was
alive and while the manifesting counsel was still the
effective and authorized counsel for the client-
transferor, not after the death of the client when the
lawyer-client relationship was terminated. Thus at
most, Sumaljag can be said to be a transferee pendete
lite whose status is pending with the lower court.
Lastly, the documents attached disclose that the
subject matter of the quitclaim is Lot 1220-E while the
subject matter of the deed of sale executed by
Maglasang in favor of Sumaljag is Lot 1220-D.
*The rule that it is only in case of unreasonable delay
in the appointment of an executor or administrator, or
where the heirs resort to an extrajudicial settlement of
the estate that the court may adopt the alternative of
allowing the heirs of the deceased to be substituted for
the deceased is no longer true.
HERITAGE PARK MANAGEMENT VS. CIAC
FACTS: Public Estates Authority (PEA) was designated
by the Bases Conversion Development Authority to
develop the first class memorial park known as the
Heritage Park, located in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig, Metro
Manila. PEA engaged the services of Elpidio Uy, doing
business under the name and style of EDC, under a
Landscaping and Construction Agreement. In the
agreement, EDC undertook to perform all landscaping
works on the 105 hectare Heritage Park, to be
completed within 450 days. Due to delays, the contract
period was extended to 693 days. Among the causes
of delay was PEA’s inability to deliver to EDC 45
hectares of the property landscaping due to the
existence of squatters and public cemetery.
CivPro - 1
EDC constituted a complaint with the
Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC)
seeking to collect from PEA damages arising from its
delay in the delivery of the entire property for
landscaping. Damages include additional rental costs
for equipment which were kept on standby and labor
costs for idle manpower; added costs for the depletion
of topsoil of the original supplier; additional costs to
mobilize water trucks for the plants and trees which
had already been delivered at the site; and the
necessity to construct a nursery shade to protect and
preserve the young plants and trees prior to actual
transplanting at the landscaped area.
Sometime in March 2000, PEA executed a
Deed of Assignment in favor of Heritage Park
Management Corporation, whereby PEA and Heritage
agreed as follows:
1. That the ASSIGNOR hereby transfers, cedes
and assigns the development contracts
hereinbefore enumerated in favor of the
ASSIGNEE, including all rights, interests,
causes of action, and its corresponding
obligations under said contracts.
2. That the ASSIGNEE hereby accepts the
assignment of all contracts herein before
listed, which were entered into and executed
by ASSIGNOR as Project Manager of the
Heritage Park Project, approved and confirmed
by the HPP Execom, and shall assume
ASSIGNOR’s rights, interests and
responsibilities, obligations, undertakings and
liabilities arising from the said contracts
including judgment awards, costs or expenses
relative to the said contracts, particularly the
terrasoleum 1B & 4 and the Landscaping
contract, which are now subject of litigation
pending before various courts in Parañaque,
and the Construction Industry Arbitration
Commission.
In April 2000, Heritage filed a petition with the
CA for prohibition/injunction with prayer for
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order
against CIAC and EDC. It alleged that CIAC has no
jurisdiction over the Heritage Park Project funds
against which any award against the PEA would be
enforced. Heritage also alleged that it has complete
control, custody, and authority over the funds and has
never submitted itself and the funds to CIAC’s arbitral
jurisdiction.
However, CIAC has already finished hearing
the case and rendered a decision in favor of EDC.
ISSUE#1:
WON the CIAC decision is null and void for having been
conducted and resolved without impleading an
indispensable party???
RULING:
NO. The decision is valid and binding.
When the case was filed by EDC with CIAC on January
2000, PEA had not yet transferred its rights and
30
 emedial Law Review
Digests
obligations over the Project to Heritage. By impleading
PEA as respondent, the CIAC had jurisdiction over the
case at that time. Heritage, however, claims that when
PEA transferred its rights and obligations over the
Project to Heritage, the CIAC lost its jurisdiction. In
other words, Heritage alleges that a court may lose
jurisdiction over a case based on the subsequent
actions of the parties. This is unacceptable.
The settled rule is that jurisdiction once
acquired is not lost upon the instance of the parties but
continues until the case is terminated. Certainly, it
would be the height of injustice to allow parties that
disagree with the decision of a judicial tribunal to annul
the same through the expedient of transferring their
interests or rights involved in the case.
ISSUE#2: (RULE 3)
WON Heritage is an indispensable party???
RULING:
NO. It is a proper but not an indispensable party.
Heritage is mistaken when it claims that it is an
indispensible party to the case and that it was not
included in the case before the CIAC. Being a
transferee of the interests of PEA over the Project
during the pendency of the case before the CIAC, it is
bound by the proceedings in like manner as PEA.
Rule 3 of Section 20 (now Section 19, Rule 3) of the
Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 20. Transfer of Interest. – In case of any transfer
of interest, the action may be continued by or against
the original party unless the court upon motion directs
the person to whom the interest is transferred to be
substituted in the action or joined with the original
party.
This Court has declared in a number of
decisions that a transferee pendente lite stands in
exactly the same position as its predecessor-in-
interest, the original defendant, and is bound by the
proceedings had in the case before the property was
transferred to it. It is a proper but not an
indispensible party as it would in any event be
bound by the judgment against his predecessor.
This would follow even if it is not formally
included as a defendant through an amendment
of the complaint.
Verily, the non-inclusion of Heritage in the
proceedings before the CIAC is of no moment as the
Rules of Court specifically allows the proceedings to
proceed with the original parties while binding the
transferee.
ALGURA VS LGU OF NAGA
Facts. On September 1, 1999, spouses Algura filed a
Verified Complaint for damages against the Naga City
Government and its officers, arising from the alleged
illegal demolition of their residence and boarding house
and for payment of lost income derived from fees paid
by their boarders (7k/month). Simultaneously,
CivPro - 1
petitioners filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Litigate as
Indigent Litigants, to which petitioner Antonio Algura's
Pay Slip was appended, showing a gross monthly
income of P10,474 and a net pay of P3,616.99 for July
1999. Also attached to the motion was a
Certification issued by the Office of the City Assessor,
which stated that the Alguras had no property
declared. Executive Judge Atienza granted petitioners'
plea for exemption from filing fees.
On March 13, 2000, respondents filed a Motion
to Disqualify the Plaintiffs for Non-Payment of Filing
Fees dated March 10, 2000. They asserted that in
addition to the more than PhP 3,000.00 net income of
petitioner Antonio Algura, who is a member of the PNP,
spouse Lorencita Algura also had a mini-store and a
computer shop. Also, respondents claimed that
petitioners' second floor was used as their residence
and as a boarding house, from which they earned
more than PhP 3,000.00 a month. In addition, it was
claimed that petitioners derived additional income from
their computer shop patronized by students and from
several boarders who paid rentals to them. Hence,
respondents concluded that petitioners were not
indigent litigants.
RTC issued an Order disqualifying petitioners
as indigent litigants on the ground that they failed to
substantiate their claim for exemption from payment
of legal fees and to comply with the third paragraph of
Rule 141, Section 18 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The spouses filed a MR. RTC Acting Presiding
Judge denied the petition and ratiocinated that the pay
slip of Antonio F. Algura showed that the GROSS
INCOME or TOTAL EARNINGS of Algura [was]
₧10,474.00 which amount was over and above the
amount mentioned in the first paragraph of Rule
141, Section 18 (P3,000) for pauper litigants residing
outside Metro Manila."
Issue. Whether petitioners should be considered as
indigent litigants who qualify for exemption from
paying filing fees. YES
Held. It is undisputed that the Complaint (Civil Case
No. 99-4403) was filed on September 1, 1999.
However, the Naga City RTC, in its April 14, 2000 and
July 17, 2000 Orders, incorrectly applied Rule 141,
Section 18 on Legal Fees when the applicable rules
at that time were Rule 3, Section 21 on Indigent
Party which took effect on July 1, 1997 and Rule 141,
Section 16 on Pauper Litigants which became
effective on July 19, 1984 up to February 28, 2000.
The old Section 16, Rule 141 requires
applicants to file an ex-parte motion to litigate as a
pauper litigant by submitting an affidavit that they do
not have a gross income of PhP 2,000.00 a month or
PhP 24,000.00 a year for those residing in Metro
Manila and PhP 1,500.00 a month or PhP 18,000.00 a
year for those residing outside Metro Manila or those
who do not own real property with an assessed value
of not more than PhP 24,000.00 or not more than PhP
18,000.00 as the case may be. Thus, there are two
31
 emedial Law Review
Digests
requirements: a) income requirement—the
applicants should not have a gross monthly income of
more than PhP 1,500.00, and b) property
requirement––they should not own property with an
assessed value of not more than PhP 18,000.00.
In the case at bar, petitioners Alguras
submitted the Affidavits of petitioner Lorencita Algura
and neighbor Erlinda Bangate, the pay slip of petitioner
Antonio F. Algura showing a gross monthly income of
PhP 10,474.00, and a Certification of the Naga City
assessor stating that petitioners do not have property
declared in their names for taxation. With respect to
the income requirement, it is clear that the gross
monthly income of PhP 10,474.00 of petitioner Antonio
F. Algura and the PhP 3,000.00 income of Lorencita
Algura when combined, were above the PhP 1,500.00
monthly income threshold prescribed by then Rule
141, Section 16 and therefore, the income requirement
was not satisfied. The trial court was therefore correct
in disqualifying petitioners Alguras as indigent litigants
although the court should have applied Rule 141,
Section 16 which was in effect at the time of the filing
of the application on September 1, 1999. Even if Rule
141, Section 18 (which superseded Rule 141, Section
16 on March 1, 2000) were applied, still the application
could not have been granted as the combined PhP
13,474.00 income of petitioners was beyond the PhP
3,000.00 monthly income threshold.
Petitioners however argue in their MR that the
rules have been relaxed by relying on Rule 3, Section
21 of the 1997 Rules of Civil procedure which
authorizes parties to litigate their action as indigents if
the court is satisfied that the party is "one who has no
money or property sufficient and available for food,
shelter and basic necessities for himself and his
family." The trial court did not give credence to this
view of petitioners and simply applied Rule 141 but
ignored Rule 3, Section 21 on Indigent Party.
The position of petitioners on the need to use
Rule 3, Section 21 on their application to litigate as
indigent litigants brings to the fore the issue on
whether a trial court has to apply both Rule 141,
Section 16 and Rule 3, Section 21 on such applications
or should the court apply only Rule 141, Section 16
and discard Rule 3, Section 21 as having been
superseded by Rule 141, Section 16 on Legal Fees.
The Court rules that Rule 3, Section 21
and Rule 141, Section 16 (later amended as Rule
141, Section 18 on March 1, 2000 and subsequently
amended by Rule 141, Section 19 on August 16, 2003,
which is now the present rule) are still valid and
enforceable rules on indigent litigants.
For one, the history of the two seemingly
conflicting rules readily reveals that it was not the
intent of the Court to consider the old Section 22 of
Rule 3, which took effect on January 1, 1994 to have
been amended and superseded by Rule 141, Section
16, which took effect on July 19, 1984 through A.M.
No. 83-6-389-0. Furthermore, Rule 141 on indigent
litigants was amended twice: first on March 1, 2000
and the second on August 16, 2004; and yet, despite
CivPro - 1
these two amendments, there was no attempt to
delete Section 21 from said Rule 3. This clearly evinces
the desire of the Court to maintain the two (2) rules on
indigent litigants to cover applications to litigate as an
indigent litigant.
Instead of declaring that Rule 3, Section 21
has been superseded and impliedly amended by
Section 18 and later Section 19 of Rule 141, the Court
finds that the two rules can and should be harmonized.
The Court opts to reconcile Rule 3, Section 21 and Rule
141, Section 19 because it is a settled principle
that when conflicts are seen between two provisions,
all efforts must be made to harmonize them. In the
light of the foregoing considerations, therefore, the
two (2) rules can stand together and are compatible
with each other.
When an application to litigate as an indigent litigant is
filed, the court shall scrutinize the affidavits
and supporting documents submitted by the applicant
to determine if the applicant complies with the
income and property standards prescribed in the
present Section 19 of Rule 141. If the trial court finds
that the applicant meets the income and property
requirements, the authority to litigate as indigent
litigant is automatically granted and the grant is a
matter of right.
However, if the trial court finds that one or both
requirements have not been met, then it would
set a hearing to enable the applicant to prove that the
applicant has "no money or property sufficient and
available for food, shelter and basic necessities
for himself and his family." In that hearing, the
adverse party may adduce countervailing evidence to
disprove the evidence presented by the applicant; after
which the trial court will rule on the application
depending on the evidence adduced.
Recapitulating the rules on indigent litigants,
therefore, if the applicant for exemption meets the
salary and property requirements under Section 19 of
Rule 141, then the grant of the application is
mandatory. On the other hand, when the application
does not satisfy one or both requirements, then the
application should not be denied outright; instead, the
court should apply the "indigency test" under Section
21 of Rule 3 and use its sound discretion in
determining the merits of the prayer for exemption.
RULE 5: VENUE
SPS. RENATO & ANGELINA LANTIN vs. HON.
JANE AURORA C. LANTION
Facts: Petitioners Spouses Renato and Angelina Lantin
took several peso and dollar loans from respondent
Planters Development Bank (Planters) and executed
several real estate mortgages and promissory notes to
cover the loans. They defaulted on the payments so
Planters foreclosed the mortgaged lots. The foreclosed
properties were sold at a public auction where Planters
was the winning bidder. Spouses Lantin filed against
Planters and its officers a Complaint for Declaration of
32
 emedial Law Review
Digests
Nullity and/or Annulment of Sale and/or Mortgage,
Reconveyance, Discharge of Mortgage, Accounting,
Permanent Injunction, and Damages with the RTC of
Lipa City, Batangas. Spouses alleged that only their
peso loans were covered by the mortgages and that
these had already been fully paid, hence, the
mortgages should have been discharged. They
challenged the validity of the foreclosure on the
alleged non-payment of their dollar loans as the
mortgages did not cover those loans. Private
respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on the
ground of improper venue since the loan agreements
restricted the venue of any suit in Metro Manila.
Respondent Judge Lantion dismissed the case for
improper venue.
Issue: WON respondent judge committed grave abuse
of discretion when she dismissed the case for improper
venue –NO!
Ratio: According to the spouses, the venue stipulation
in the loan documents is not an exclusive venue
stipulation under Section 4(b) of Rule 4 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.The venue in the loan
agreement was not specified with particularity.
Further, the spouses also contend that since the
complaint involves several causes of action which did
not arise solely from or connected with the loan
documents, the cited venue stipulation should not be
made to apply.
The general rules on venue of actions under
Section 4 (b) of Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure shall not apply where the parties, before the
filing of the action, have validly agreed in writing on an
exclusive venue. The mere stipulation on the venue of
an action, however, is not enough to preclude parties
from bringing a case in other venues. The parties must
be able to show that such stipulation isexclusive. In
the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, the
stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement
on an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the
specified place.
The pertinent provisions of the several real
estate mortgages and promissory notes executed by
the petitioner respectively read as follows: 18. In the
event of suit arising out of or in connection with this
mortgage and/or the promissory note/s secured by this
mortgage, the parties hereto agree to bring their
causes of auction exclusively in the proper court of
Makati, Metro Manila or at such other venue chosen by
the Mortgagee, the Mortgagor waiving for this purpose
any other venue.
Clearly, the words "exclusively" and "waiving
for this purpose any other venue" are restrictive and
used advisedly to meet the requirements.
Further, since the issues of whether the
mortgages should be properly discharged and whether
these also cover the dollar loans, arose out of the said
loan documents, the stipulation on venue is also
applicable thereto.
CivPro - 1
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION VS TROY FRANCIS
MONASTERIO
Facts: San Miguel entered into an Exclusive Warehouse
Agreement (EWA) with SMB Warehousing Service
represented by Monasterio (this was for San Miguel’s
route operations at Sorsogon and Camarines Norte).
In addition, the EWA also contained a
stipulation on venue of actions. It was provided that
“should it be necessary that an action be brought in
court... that the proper court should be in the courts of
Makati or Pasig, Metro Manila, to the exclusion of the
other courts at the option of the company.”
Monasterio, a resident of Naga, filed a
complaint for collection of sum of money against San
Miguel before the RTC of Naga City. He was claiming
P900,600 for unpaid cashiering fees. It was alleged
that aside from rendering services as a
warehouseman, he was given the additional task of
cashiering at San Miguel’s sorsogon and camarines
norte sales offices and was promised a separate fee for
it.
San Miguel filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground of improper venue. San Miguel alleged that
Monasterio’s money claim for unpaid cashiering
services arose from his function as a warehouse
contractor and thus the EWA should be followed. San
Miguel cited Sec4b in relation to Sec2 of Rule4 of the
Rules of Court allowing agreement of parties on
exclusive venue of actions.
Monasterio opposed saying that the cashiering
service was distinct and separate from the services
under the EWA. Thus, EWA being inapplicable he can
file at Naga City.
RTC: denied the motion to dismiss. EWA
limited to warehousing services only. MR was filed.
While MR was pending, Monasterio filed an amended
complaint deleting his claim for unpaid warehousing
and cashiering fees but increasing the demand for
damages.
CA: San Miguel appealed via certiorari. CA held
that cashiering service inseparable from warehousing
service thus, EWA should be followed as to stipulation
of venue. However, since Monasterio filed an amended
complaint, CA dismissed the petition for certiorari
because the case was now moot and academic.
Issue: Whether the EWA should be followed as to
venue?
Held: EWA stipulation on venue is clear so it should
be respected. But the cause of action of Monasterio
was not based on the EWA. In the amended complaint,
Monasterio specifically limited the cause of action to
the collection of the sum owing to him for his
cashiering service. He omitted the warehousing fees
only (this part confuses me because the case said
earlier that the warehousing AND cashiering fees were
deleted).
33
 emedial Law Review
Digests
Allegations in the complaint determines the
nature of the case. Thus, contrary to what the CA
ruled, the case is a collection suit pertaining solely to
the cashiering service.
Exclusive venue stipulation embodied in a
contract restricts or confines parties thereto when the
suit relates to the breach of such contract. But if the
exclusivity clause is not all encompassing, such that
even those not related to the enforcement of the
contract should be subjected to the exclusive venue,
then the stipulation designating exclusive venues
should be strictly confined to the specific agreement.
Besides, restrictive stipulations are in
derogation of the general policy of making it more
convenient for the parties to institute actions arising or
in relation to their agreement. Thus, said restriction
should be strictly construed as relating solely to the
agreement in which the exclusivity clause is embodied.
Lastly, since convenience is the reason behind
the rules on venues, venue stipulations should be
deemed merely permissive. The interpretation to be
adopted should be that which most serves the parties’
convenience. Otherwise, the rules of court will govern.
IRENE MARCOS-ARANETA VS. CA
FACTS: Irene and several co-plaintiffs filed a case
before the RTC of Batac, Ilocos Norte against
Benedicto and his business associates for conveyance
of shares of stocks. Irene alleges that several years
back, Benedicto created 2 companies where 65% of
the shareholdings were being held by Benedicto and
associates in trust for Irene. Benedicto filed a motion
to dismiss on the ground that the venue is improperly
laid. Benedicto was claiming that Irene is not a
resident of Batac but rather, a resident of Makati City.
Irene, on the other hand, claims that her co-plaintiffs
are residing in Batac.
RTC: venue improperly laid since Irene is a
resident of Makati and not Batac.
CA: since co-plaintiffs are residents of Batac,
venue is not improperly laid
Issue: Is the venue improperly laid?
SC: YES. Motion to dismiss granted.
First of all, the action is one in personam. The fact
that the companies’ assets include properties does not
materially change the nature of the action.
Second, there can be no serious dispute that
the real party-in-interest plaintiff is Irene. As self-
styled beneficiary of the disputed trust, she stands to
be benefited or entitled to the avails of the present
suit. It is undisputed too that three other persons, all
from Ilocos Norte, were included as co-plaintiffs in the
complaint as Irene's new designated trustees. As
trustees, they can only serve as mere representatives
of Irene.
Sec. 2 of Rule 4 indicates quite clearly that
when there is more than one plaintiff in a personal
CivPro - 1
action case, the residences of the principal parties
should be the basis for determining proper venue.
According to the late Justice Jose Y. Feria, "the word
`principal' has been added [in the uniform procedure
rule] in order to prevent the plaintiff from choosing the
residence of a minor plaintiff or defendant as the
venue." Eliminate the qualifying term "principal" and
the purpose of the Rule would "be defeated where a
nominal or formal party is impleaded in the action
since the latter would not have the degree of interest
in the subject of the action which would warrant and
entail the desirably active participation expected of
litigants in a case."
SUMMARY PROCEDURE (RULE 5,
1991 Rules on Summary Procedure
as amended)
ESTATE OF MACADANGDANG V. GAVIOLA ET AL.
FACTS: Atty. Macadangdang is the administrator for
the Estate of Felomina Macadangdang. He filed a case
against all the respondents (madami sila, 12, all
unrelated) for Unlawful Detainer. Respondents were
occupying by mere tolerance, 4 parcels of land in the
name of the late Felomina. The MTCC of Davao ruled in
favor of the Estate. Respondents were ordered to
vacate the land, remove their structures, pay
damages.
Respondents appealed to the RTC, which
dismissed the appeal for failure to file an appeal
memorandum. Respondents then filed a Motion for
Reconsideration/ New Trial, which RTC denied, ruling
that it no longer had jurisdiction over the motion after
the dismissal of the appeal. (Meanwhile, the MTCC
ordered the issuance of a writ of execution).
Undaunted, the respondents filed a petition for
review with the CA. It ruled that the order of the RTC
dismissing the appeal for failure of filing an appeal
memorandum should be set aside, since the dismissal
of an appeal on purely technical ground is frowned
upon. (Not so important: It also said that there is a
difference between failure to file a notice of appeal
within the reglementary period and failure to file the
appeal memorandum. The former would result to
failure of the court to obtain jurisdiction, but the latter
would only result to abandonment of appeal, which
could lead to its dismissal upon failure to move for
reconsideration). Thus, it ruled the RTC erred in
denying the MR.
In the present case, Atty. Macadangdang
argues that the CA erred when it allowed the filing of
MR before the RTC. Because this case originated from
an unlawful detainer case where the Rules on
Summary Procedure apply, then the MR is a prohibited
pleading.
Issue: is MR a prohibited pleading in this case? No.
34
 emedial Law Review
Digests
Ruling: Jurisdiction over forcible entry and unlawful
detainer cases fall with the M(etropolitan)TC, MTCC,
M(unicipal)TC, MCTCs. Since the case was one for
unlawful detainer, it was governed by the Rules on
Summary Procedure. The purpose of the Rules is to
prevent undue delays in the disposition of cases and to
achieve this, filing of certain pleadings is not allowed,
including the filing of an MR.
However, the MR in this case was filed before
the RTC acting as an appellate court. Thus, the appeal
before the RTC is no longer covered by the Rules on
Summary Procedure. The Rules only apply before
appeal to the RTC, hence the MR before the RTC is not
a prohibited pleading.
[Minor issues: On the failure to file an appeal
memorandum and negligence of counsel. Rule 40 of
the Rules of Court states that within 15 days from
notice of appeal, it is the duty of the appellant to
submit a memorandum and failure to do so is a ground
for dismissal of appeal. Here, the excuse for failure to
file was the negligence of respondents’ counsel. CA
held that the respondents were not bound by their
lawyer’s gross negligence. SC disagrees. Failure of the
counsel to file the appeal memo is due to heavy
backlog of paperwork – this is not gross negligence.
Moreover, the respondents were not deprived of due
process since appeal is not part thereof. It is merely a
statutory privilege and may be exercised only in
accordance with provisions of the law.]
Petition is granted, the CA decision is set aside
and reversed.
BONGATO V. MALVAR
Facts: Spouses Severo and Trinidad Malvar filed a
complaint for forcible entry against Petitioner Teresita
Bongato, alleging that the latter unlawfully entered a
parcel of land which belonged to the spouses and
erected thereon a house of light materials. Petitioner
Bongato filed an extension of time to file an answer
which the MTCC denied because it said it was
proscribed under the Rule on Summary Procedure and
likewise containing no notice of hearing. Petitioner, on
several occasions, changed counsels, each of which
filed an answer and a motion to dismiss respectively.
Both were denied by the MTCC. The answer was
denied because it was filed beyond the ten-day
reglementary period while the motion to dismiss was
denied as being contrary to the Rule on Summary
Procedure.
MTCC rendered a decision ordering petitioner
Bongato to vacate the land in question, and to pay
rentals, attorney’s fees, and the costs of the suit. RTC
affirmed. Petitioner Bongato filed an MR.
Respondent Judge issued an order granting the
motion for reconsideration ‘only insofar as to
determine the location of the houses involved in this
civil case so that the Court will know whether they are
located on one and the same lot or a lot different from
CivPro - 1
that involved in the criminal case for Anti-Squatting.’
In the same order, respondent Judge disallowed any
extension and warned that if the survey is not made,
the court might consider the same abandoned and the
writ of execution would be issued.
Petitioner still filed a motion for extension of the
deadline for the submission of the relocation survey.
This was obviously denied as respondent Judge noted
that no survey report was submitted and ordered the
record of the case returned to the court of origin for
disposal. CA affirmed the MTCC.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the cause of action for forcible
entry has prescribed? YES, IT HAS
PRESCRIBED.
2. Whether or not a motion to dismiss based on
lack of jurisdiction is a prohibited pleading
under the Rules of Summary Procedure? IT IS
ALLOWED.
Held:
1. It is wise to be reminded that forcible entry is
a quieting process, and that the restrictive
time bar is prescribed to complement the
summary nature of such process. Indeed, the
one-year period within which to bring an action
for forcible entry is generally counted from the
date of actual entry to the land. However,
when entry is made through stealth, then the
one-year period is counted from the time the
plaintiff learned about it. After the lapse of the
one-year period, the party dispossessed of a
parcel of land may file either an accion
publiciana, which is a plenary action to recover
the right of possession; or an accion
reivindicatoria, which is an action to recover
ownership as well as possession.
On the basis of the foregoing facts, it is
clear that the cause of action for forcible entry
filed by respondents had already prescribed
when they filed the Complaint for ejectment.
Hence, even if Severo Malvar may be the
owner of the land, possession thereof cannot
be wrested through a summary action for
ejectment of petitioner, who had been
occupying it for more than one (1) year.
Respondents should have presented their suit
before the RTC in an accion publiciana or an
accion reivindicatoria, not before the MTCC in
summary proceedings for forcible entry. Their
cause of action for forcible entry had
prescribed already, and the MTCC had no more
jurisdiction to hear and decide it.
2. Petitioner further argues that a motion to
dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter is not a prohibited pleading, but
is allowed under Sec. 19(a) of the Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure. We agree.
35
 emedial Law Review
Digests
The Rule on Summary Procedure was
promulgated specifically to achieve “an
expeditious and inexpensive determination of
cases.” The speedy resolution of unlawful
detainer cases is a matter of public policy,
and the Rule should equally apply with full
force to forcible entry cases, in which
possession of the premises is already illegal
from the start. For this reason, the Rule frowns
upon delays and prohibits altogether the filing
of motions for extension of time. Consistently,
Section 6 was added to give the trial court the
power to render judgment, even motu proprio,
upon the failure of a defendant to file an
answer within the reglementary period.
However, as forcible entry and detainer
cases are summary in nature and involve
disturbances of the social order, procedural
technicalities should be carefully avoided and
should not be allowed to override substantial
justice.
Pursuant to Section 36 of BP 129, the
Court on June 16, 1983, promulgated the Rule
on Summary Procedure in Special Cases.
Under this Rule, a motion to dismiss or quash
is a prohibited pleading. Under the 1991
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure,
however, a motion to dismiss on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter is
an exception to the rule on prohibited
pleadings.
Further, a court’s lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter cannot be waived by
the parties or cured by their silence,
acquiescence or even express consent. A party
may assail the jurisdiction of the court over the
action at any stage of the proceedings and
even on appeal. That the MTCC can take
cognizance of a motion to dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction, even if an
answer has been belatedly filed we likewise
held in Bayog v. Natino.
“The Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure, as well as its predecessor,
do not provide that an answer filed
after the reglementary period should
be expunged from the records. As a
matter of fact, there is no provision for
an entry of default if a defendant fails
to answer. It must likewise be pointed
out that MAGDATO’s defense of lack of
jurisdiction may have even been raised
in a motion to dismiss as an exception
to the rule on prohibited pleadings in
the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure. Such a motion is allowed
under paragraph (a) thereof, x x x.”
In the case at bar, the MTCC should
have squarely ruled on the issue of jurisdiction,
instead of erroneously holding that it was a
prohibited pleading under the Rule on
CivPro - 1
Summary Procedure. Because the Complaint
for forcible entry was filed on July 10, 1992,
the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure
was applicable.
BANARES V. BALISING
Facts: Balising filed complaints for estafa against
Banares and other accused. They pleaded not guilty
and filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
filing of the same was premature, in view of the failure
of the parties to undergo conciliation proceedings
before the Lupong Tagapamayapa. Banares
furthermore contended that since they lived in the
same barangay and the amount involved in each of the
cases did not exceed P200.00, the cases were to be
referred to the Lupong Tagapamayapa first before
being filed in court (based on the LGC and Rules on
Summary Procedure).
The MTC ruled in favour of Banares and
dismissed the cases pursuant to the Rules on
Summary Procedure. After 2 months, Balising filed a
motion to revive the criminal cases stating that the
requirement of referral to the Lupon had already been
complied with. This was granted by the MTC.
Banares contends that he Order of the MTC
dismissing the cases had long become final and
executory, thus Balising should have re-filed the cases
instead of filing a motion to revive.
Balising, on the other hand, claimed that the
revival was in accordance with sec. 18 of the Rules on
Summary Procedure. They state that the rule on
finality of judgments do not apply to cases covered by
the Rules on Summary Procedure. They further insist
that cases dismissed without prejudice for non-
compliance with the requirement of conciliation before
the Lupong Tagapamayapa may be revived summarily
by the filing of a motion to revive regardless of the
number of days which has lapsed after the dismissal of
the case.
Issue: Does the rule on finality of judgments apply to
the Rules on Summary Procedure? – YES.
Ruling: First, one must distinguish between a final
order and interlocutory order. A "final order" issued by
a court has been defined as one which disposes of the
subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular
proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done
but to enforce by execution what has been determined
by the court. As distinguished therefrom, an
"interlocutory order" is one which does not dispose of a
case completely, but leaves something more to be
adjudicated upon. Previous jurisprudence state that an
order dismissing a case without prejudice is a final
order if no motion for reconsideration or appeal
therefrom is timely filed. As such, the dismissal of the
criminal cases against Banares is a final order.
The law grants an aggrieved party a period of
15 days from his receipt of the court's decision or
36
 emedial Law Review
Digests
order disposing of the action or proceeding to appeal
or move to reconsider the same. After the lapse of the
fifteen-day period, an order becomes final and
executory and is beyond the power or jurisdiction of
the court which rendered it to further amend or
revoke.
But what about the contention of Balising that
these rules do not apply to the Rules on Summary
Procedure? THIS IS WRONG! First, let us take a look at
Sec. 18 of the Rules on Summary Procedure. It states
that “cases requiring referral to the Lupon for
conciliation under the provisions of Presidential Decree
No. 1508 where there is no showing of compliance with
such requirement, shall be dismissed without
prejudice, and may be revived only after such
requirement shall have been complied with. This
provision shall not apply to criminal cases where the
accused was arrested without a warrant.”
The contention of Balising that the case may
be revived by a motion is wrong because Section 18
merely states that when a case covered by the 1991
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is dismissed
without prejudice for non-referral of the issues to the
Lupon, the same may be revived only after the dispute
subject of the dismissed case is submitted to barangay
conciliation as required under the Local Government
Code. There is no declaration to the effect that said
case may be revived by mere motion even after the
fifteen-day period within which to appeal or to file a
motion for reconsideration has lapsed.
Lastly, Sec. 22 of the Rules on Summary
Procedure state that “the regular procedure prescribed
in the Rules of Court shall apply to the special cases
herein provided for in a suppletory capacity insofar as
they are not inconsistent therewith.”
MADERADA VS. MEDIODEA
Facts: Judge Mediodea was charged with ‘gross
ignorance of the law’ for failing to apply the Revised
Rules on Summary Procedure to an action for forcible
entry with prelim injunction, TRO and damages.
Maderada was the complainant in the forcible
entry case. Mediodea required the defendants to show
cause why the prelim injunction should not be granted.
Hearing was scheduled but, upon the instigation of the
defendants, the hearing was reset by Mediodea. The
hearing was again reset after the defendants
questioned the authority of Maderada to appear as
counsel for her co-plaintiff (may kasama siyang
complainant dun sa forcible entry case). Mediodea then
gave the defendants 10 days more to file the
corresponding motion. Meanwhile, Maderada filed a
total of 3 motions praying for judgment to be
rendered. These were all denied by Mediodea because
of the pending hearing for the issuance of a restraining
order and an injunction. (In short, ang daming motions
during the case).
Mediodea argued that the delay in the
resolution of the case should not be attributed to him
CivPro - 1
because he was duty-bound to resolve all the motions
filed by the parties. The OCA recommended that
Mediodea be fined and given a stern warning because
of the delay. It said that while it is true that the prelim
injunction prayed for should first be resolved before
making a judgment, the same should be done within
30 days from the filing thereof. The OCA took note that
the motion for prelim injunction as well as the case
itself remained unresolved even after 4mos had
already lapsed since the action was filed.
Issue: W/N Mediodea for liable for the delay?
Held/Ratio: Yup!
Forcible entry and unlawful detainer actions are
covered by summary procedure
The ROC clearly provide that actions for
forcible entry and unlawful detainer, regardless of the
amount of damages or unpaid rentals sought to be
recovered, shall be governed by the Rule on Summary
Procedure. These actions are summary in nature,
because they involve the disturbance of the social
order, which should be restored as promptly as
possible. Designed as special civil actions, they are
governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure to
disencumber the courts from the usual formalities of
ordinary actions. Accordingly, technicalities or details
of procedure that may cause unnecessary delays
should be carefully avoided. The actions for forcible
entry and unlawful detainer are designed to provide
expeditious means of protecting actual possession or
the right to possession of the property involved. Both
are "time procedures" designed to bring immediate
relief.
Preliminary injunction
This is a provisional remedy. So it should be
resolved before judgment. Nonetheless, Sec. 15 of
Rule 70 clearly states that this should be resolved
within 30 days from its filing. Mediodea should have
known that since a prayer for preliminary injunction is
merely a provisional remedy in an action for forcible
entry, it should lend itself to the summary nature of
the main case. This is the very reason why the ROC
mandate that a preliminary injunction in a forcible
entry case be decided within 30 days from its filing.
Preliminary injunctions and TROs are extraordinary
remedies provided by law for the speedy adjudication
of an ejectment case in order to save the dispossessed
party from further damage during the pendency of the
original action.
Reminder to judges
Judges are bound to dispose of the court’s
business promptly and to decide cases within the
required period. They are called upon to observe
utmost diligence and dedication in the performance of
their judicial functions and duties.
37
 emedial Law Review
Digests
Note: The digests from this page to the end of
CivPro – 1 are brought to you by the following
4D 2012: Alciso, Antonio, Arriola, Bernardo,
Cajucom, Calalang, Claudio, Dialino, Dizon,
Escueta, Imperial, Martin, Martinez, Mendoza,
Noel, Raso, Rosales, Sia, Siron,Venzuela
PLEADINGS
JOCSON v. CA
FACTS: Petitioner Jocson filed a complaint for
Reconveyance and Damages against Marcelo Steel
Corp & Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corp (MCFC). The trial
Court rendered a decision in favor of Jocson, directing
the execution sale to satisfy the judgment against
respondents. Respondents appealed to the CA. CA
decided in favor of Jocson. Respondents no longer
appealed the CA decision, making such final &
executory. The execution sale pushed through, with
Tiusing winning as the highest bidder.
Marcelo Steel filed a motion to annul said sale,
stating that its obligation was joint, instead of solidary,
and that the total price of the properties sold on
execution was extremely inadequate. Trial court ruled
in favor of Marcelo Steel. Jocson moved for
reconsideration. Tiusing also filed a Motion for
Intervention, as he was the winner of the auction. Trial
court denied both. Jocson filed a Notice of Appeal,
which she later withdrew. In lieu of such, both Jocson
& Tiusing filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA. CA
denied. Both filed a motion for reconsideration, but
was again, denied.
Jocson, in the meantime, filed a Motion for
Motion for Issuance of Alias Writ of Execution to
implement the decision against MCFC.
ISSUE: W/N the withdrawal of the Notice of Appeal
may be done by substituting such with a Petition for
Certiorari? - NO.
RATIO: The petition was only signed by Tiusing’s
counsel, supposedly on behalf of Jocson’s. However,
the rules provide that every pleading must be signed
by all the petitioners or their respective counsels,
otherwise, such pleadings produce no legal effect.
Only Tiusing signed the Verification &
Certification of non-forum shopping. Jocson did not
sign such, despite the rules stating that every petition
for certiorari must be verified. Although Tiusing filed a
“Special Power of Attorney” authorizing him to file,
verify & certify the petition, such was done only 4
months after the petition was filed, with no explanation
as to why it was belatedly filed.
In addition, Jocson already filed a Motion for
Issuance of Alias Writ of Execution to executed the
decision against the other respondent, MCFC. The filing
of this is incompatible with a Petition for Review,
because such means that Jocson already recognizes
that the judgment against Marcelo Steel is still
CivPro - 1
pending, thus only executing the decision against the
other respondent.
AGANA v. LAGMAN
FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for annulment of
title, with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction
against respondent, claiming that she is the sole heir
of Cruz, thus she is the sole owner of the lot, which
was fraudulently sold to Lopez, who subsequently sold
such to respondent.
Respondent filed an Answer with Compulsory
Counterclaim. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss
respondent’s counterclaim for lack of certificate of non-
forum shopping. Trial court denied the motion. Upon
petitioner’s MR, TC reversed itself, dismissing
respondent’s counterclaim. But TC again recalled its
order dismissing the counterclaim.
ISSUE: W/N a compulsory counterclaim requires a
certificate of non-forum shopping? - NO.
RATIO: The SC Administrative Circular, with respect to
the need for a certificate of non-forum shopping for
counterclaims refer only to initiatory pleadings. This
does not include compulsory counterclaims, as these
are merely reactions or responses to the complaint. If
one does not include a compulsory counterclaim in its
answer, then such is deemed waived.
Permissive counterclaims, however, are
considered initiatory pleadings. Thus, non-inclusion of
a certificate of non-forum shopping in permissive
counterclaims is deemed fatal.
Compulsory Counterclaim of respondent: “That
because of the unwarranted, baseless, and unjustified
acts of the plaintiff, herein defendant has suffered and
continue to suffer actual damages in the sum of at
least P400M which the law, equity and justice require
that to be paid by the plaintiff and further to reimburse
the attorney’s fees of P200M.”
IGLESIA NI KRISTO v. PONFERRADA
FACTS: Enrique Santos was the owner of a 936-
square-meter parcel of land located in Tandang Sora,
Quezon City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
issued by the Register of Deeds on July 27, 1961 which
cancelled TCT No. 57193-289.
He had been in possession of the owner’s
duplicate of said title and had been in continuous,
open, adverse and peaceful possession of the property.
He died on February 9, 1970 and was survived by his
wife, Alicia Santos, and other plaintiffs, who were their
children. Thereafter, plaintiffs took peaceful and
adverse possession of the property, and of the owner’s
duplicate of said title. When the Office of the Register
of Deeds of Quezon City was burned on June 11, 1988,
the original copy of said title was burned as well.
38
 emedial Law Review
Digests
The Register of Deeds had the title
reconstituted based on the owner’s duplicate.
Sometime in February 1996, plaintiffs learned that
defendant was claiming ownership over the property
based on TCT No. 321744 issued on September 18,
1984 which, on its face, cancelled TCT No. 320898,
under the name of the Philippine National Bank, which
allegedly cancelled TCT No. 252070 in the names of
the spouses Marcos and Romana dela Cruz.
They insisted that TCT Nos. 321744, 320898 and
252070 were not among the titles issued by the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City and even if the
Register of Deeds issued said titles, it was contrary to
law.
As gleaned from the caption of the complaint,
plaintiffs appear to be the heirs of Enrique Santos,
represented by Enrique G. Santos. The latter signed
the Verification and Certificate of Non-Forum
Shopping.
Defendant asserted that the case involved
more than one plaintiff but the verification and
certification against forum shopping incorporated in
the complaint was signed only by Enrique Santos.
Although the complaint alleges that plaintiffs are
represented by Enrique Santos, there is no showing
that he was, indeed, authorized to so represent the
other plaintiffs to file the complaint and to sign the
verification and certification of non-forum shopping.
Thus, plaintiffs failed to comply with Section 5, Rule 7
of the Rules of Court. Defendant cited the ruling of this
Court in Loquias v. Office of the Ombudsman.
Defendant maintained that the complaint is
defective in that, although there is an allegation that
Enrique Santos represents the other heirs, there is
nothing in the pleading to show the latter’s authority to
that effect; the complaint fails to aver with
particularity the facts showing the capacity of
defendant corporation to sue and be sued; and the
pleading does not state the address of plaintiffs.
Defendant likewise averred that the complaint should
be dismissed on the ground of prescription.
In their comment, on the motion, plaintiffs
averred that the relationship of a co-owner to the
other co-owners is fiduciary in character; thus, anyone
of them could effectively act for another for the benefit
of the property without need for an authorization.
Consequently, Enrique Santos had the authority to
represent the other heirs as plaintiffs and to sign the
verification and certification against forum shopping.
In its reply, defendant averred that absent any
authority from his co-heirs, Enrique Santos must
implead them as plaintiffs as they are indispensable
parties. In response, plaintiffs aver that a co-owner of
a property can execute an action for quieting of title
without impleading the other co-owners.
The trial court issued an order, denying
defendant’s motion to dismiss. It declared that since
Enrique Santos was one of the heirs, his signature in
the verification and certification constitutes substantial
compliance with the Rules. The court cited the ruling of
this Court in Dar v. Alonzo-Legasto.
CivPro - 1
Petitioner averred that, of the plaintiffs below,
only plaintiff Enrique Santos signed the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping. Under Section 5,
Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, all the
plaintiffs must sign, unless one of them is authorized
by a special power of attorney to sign for and in behalf
of the others. Petitioner argues that the bare claim of
Enrique Santos that he signed the verification and
certification in his behalf and of the other plaintiffs who
are his co-heirs/co-owners of the property does not
even constitute substantial compliance of the rule.
Contrary to the ruling of the trial court, the absence or
existence of an authority of Enrique Santos to sign the
verification and certification for and in behalf of his co-
plaintiffs is not a matter of evidence. The defect is fatal
to the complaint of respondents and cannot be cured
by an amendment of the complaint. The trial court
erred in applying the ruling of this Court in Dar v.
Alonzo-Legasto.
On April 7, 2005, the CA rendered the assailed
decision dismissing the petition, holding that the RTC
did not commit grave abuse of its discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying petitioner’s
motion to dismiss. As the Court held in DAR v. Alonzo-
Legasto and in Gudoy v. Guadalquiver,the certification
signed by one with respect to a property over which he
shares a common interest with the rest of the plaintiffs
(respondents herein) substantially complied with the
Rules. As to the issue of prescription, the appellate
court held that the prescriptive period should be
reckoned from 1996, when petitioner claimed
ownership and barred respondents from fencing the
property.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CERTIFICATION OF NON-
FORUM SHOPPING SIGNED BY RESPONDENT ENRIQUE
G. SANTOS ALONE IS A SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE
WITH SECTION 5, RULE 7 OF THE 1997 RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE AND IN APPLYING THE CASE OF
GUDOY V. GUADALQUIVER, 429 SCRA 723, WITHOUT
REGARD TO MORE RECENT JURISPRUDENCE. – NO.
RATIO: The issue in the present case is not the lack of
verification but the sufficiency of one executed by only
one of plaintiffs. This Court held in Ateneo de Naga
University v. Manalo, that the verification requirement
is deemed substantially complied with when, as in the
present case, only one of the heirs-plaintiffs, who has
sufficient knowledge and belief to swear to the truth of
the allegations in the petition (complaint), signed the
verification attached to it. Such verification is deemed
sufficient assurance that the matters alleged in the
petition have been made in good faith or are true and
correct, not merely speculative.
The same liberality should likewise be applied
to the certification against forum shopping. The
general rule is that the certification must be signed by
all plaintiffs in a case and the signature of only one of
them is insufficient. However, the Court has also
stressed in a number of cases that the rules on forum
39
 emedial Law Review
Digests
shopping were designed to promote and facilitate the
orderly administration of justice and thus should not
be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to
subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective. The
rule of substantial compliance may be availed of with
respect to the contents of the certification. This is
because the requirement of strict compliance with the
provisions merely underscores its mandatory nature in
that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed
with or its requirements completely disregarded.
The substantial compliance rule has been
applied by this Court in a number of cases: Cavile v.
Heirs of Cavile, where the Court sustained the validity
of the certification signed by only one of petitioners
because he is a relative of the other petitioners and co-
owner of the properties in dispute; Heirs of Agapito T.
Olarte v. Office of the President of the Philippines,
where the Court allowed a certification signed by only
two petitioners because the case involved a family
home in which all the petitioners shared a common
interest; Gudoy v. Guadalquiver, where the Court
considered as valid the certification signed by only four
of the nine petitioners because all petitioners filed as
co-owners pro indiviso a complaint against
respondents for quieting of title and damages, as such,
they all have joint interest in the undivided whole;
and Dar v. Alonzo-Legasto, where the Court sustained
the certification signed by only one of the spouses as
they were sued jointly involving a property in which
they had a common interest.
It is noteworthy that in all of the above cases,
the Court applied the rule on substantial compliance
because of the commonality of interest of all the
parties with respect to the subject of the controversy.
Applying the doctrines laid down in the above cases,
we find and so hold that the CA did not err in affirming
the application of the rule on substantial compliance.
In the instant case, the property involved is a 936-
square-meter real property. Both parties have their
respective TCTs over the property. Respondents herein
who are plaintiffs in the case below have a common
interest over the property being the heirs of the late
Enrique Santos, the alleged registered owner of the
subject property as shown in one of the TCTs. As such
heirs, they are considered co-owners pro indiviso of
the whole property since no specific portion yet has
been adjudicated to any of the heirs. Consequently, as
one of the heirs and principal party, the lone signature
of Enrique G. Santos in the verification and certification
is sufficient for the RTC to take cognizance of the case.
The commonality of their interest gave Enrique G.
Santos the authority to inform the RTC on behalf of the
other plaintiffs therein that they have not commenced
any action or claim involving the same issues in
another court or tribunal, and that there is no other
pending action or claim in another court or tribunal
involving the same issues. Hence, the RTC correctly
denied the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner.
Considering that at stake in the present case is
the ownership and possession over a prime property in
Quezon City, the apparent merit of the substantive
CivPro - 1
aspects of the case should be deemed as a special
circumstance or compelling reason to allow the
relaxation of the rule.
Time and again, this Court has held that rules
of procedure are established to secure substantial
justice. Being instruments for the speedy and efficient
administration of justice, they may be used to achieve
such end, not to derail it. In particular, when a strict
and literal application of the rules on non-forum
shopping and verification will result in a patent denial
of substantial justice, these may be liberally construed.
The ends of justice are better served when cases are
determined on the merits – after all parties are given
full opportunity to ventilate their causes and defenses
– rather than on technicality or some procedural
imperfections.
REPUBLIC v. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS: On December 17, 1991, petitioner Republic,
through the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG), represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), filed a petition for forfeiture
against Marcos properties before the Sandiganbayan.
In said case, petitioner sought the declaration of the
aggregate amount of US$356 million (now estimated
to be more than US$658 million inclusive of interest)
deposited in escrow in the PNB, as ill-gotten wealth.
The funds were previously held by the following five
account groups, using various foreign foundations in
certain Swiss banks. In addition, the petition sought
the forfeiture of US$25 million and US$5 million in
treasury notes which exceeded the Marcos couple's
salaries, other lawful income as well as income from
legitimately acquired property.
A General Agreement and the Supplemental
Agreements dated December 28, 1993 were executed
by the Marcos children and then PCGG Chairman
Magtanggol Gunigundo for a global settlement of the
assets of the Marcos family. The agreements included
a stipulation that the US$356 million presumed to be
owned by the Marcoses under some conditions.
Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed a manifestation
on May 26, 1998 claiming she was not a party to the
motion for approval of the Compromise Agreement and
that she owned 90% of the funds with the remaining
10% belonging to the Marcos estate.
Republic prayed for a summary judgement
over the controversy which was opposed by
respondent marcos.
Sandiganbayan granted the prayer of
petitioner Republic and rendered a judgment in favour
of the latter, declaring the Swiss deposits which were
transferred to and now deposited in escrow at the
Philippine National Bank in the total aggregate value
equivalent to US$627,608,544.95 as of August 31,
2000 together with the increments thereof forfeited in
favor of the State. However, in 2002 and upon the
motion of Mrs. Araneta who adopted the motion for
reconsideration of the respondent Marcoses, the
40
 emedial Law Review
Digests
Sandiganbayan reversed its 2000 decision stating
there was no basis for the forfeiture because there was
no proof that the Marcoses owned the funds in escrow
from the Swiss Banks.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents raised any
genuine issue of fact which would either justify or
negate summary judgment? - No. The Court held that
respondent Marcoses failed to raise any genuine issue
of fact in their pleadings. Thus, on motion of petitioner
Republic, summary judgment should take place as a
matter of right.
RATIO: In the early case of Auman vs. Estenzo,
summary judgment was described as a judgment
which a court may render before trial but after both
parties have pleaded. It is ordered by the court upon
application by one party, supported by affidavits,
depositions or other documents, with notice upon the
adverse party who may in turn file an opposition
supported also by affidavits, depositions or other
documents. This is after the court summarily hears
both parties with their respective proofs and finds that
there is no genuine issue between them. Summary
judgment is sanctioned in this jurisdiction by Section
1, Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The
theory of summary judgment is that, although an
answer may on its face appear to tender issues
requiring trial, if it is demonstrated by affidavits,
depositions or admissions that those issues are not
genuine but sham or fictitious, the Court is justified in
dispensing with the trial and rendering summary
judgment for petitioner Republic.
The pleadings filed by respondent Marcoses are
replete with indications of a spurious defense:
In their answer, respondents failed to
specifically deny each and every allegation contained
in the petition for forfeiture in the manner required by
the rules. All they gave were stock answers like "they
have no sufficient knowledge" or "they could not recall
because it happened a long time ago," and, as to Mrs.
Marcos, "the funds were lawfully acquired," without
stating the basis of such assertions.
Section 10, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, provides:
A defendant must specify each material
allegation of fact the truth of which he
does not admit and, whenever practicable,
shall set forth the substance of the
matters upon which he relies to support
his denial. Where a defendant desires to
deny only a part of an averment, he shall
specify so much of it as is true and
material and shall deny the remainder.
Where a defendant is without knowledge
or information sufficient to form a belief
as to the truth of a material averment
made in the complaint, he shall so state,
and this shall have the effect of a denial.
The purpose of requiring respondents to make
a specific denial is to make them disclose facts which
CivPro - 1
will disprove the allegations of petitioner at the trial,
together with the matters they rely upon in support of
such denial. Our jurisdiction adheres to this rule to
avoid and prevent unnecessary expenses and waste of
time by compelling both parties to lay their cards on
the table, thus reducing the controversy to its true
terms.
On the part of Mrs. Marcos, she claimed that
the funds were “lawfully acquired”. However, she failed
to particularly state the ultimate facts surrounding the
lawful manner or mode of acquisition of the subject
funds.
Despite the serious and specific allegations
against them, the Marcoses responded by simply
saying that they had no knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of such
allegations. Such a general, self-serving claim of
ignorance of the facts alleged in the petition for
forfeiture was insufficient to raise an issue. Respondent
Marcoses should have positively stated how it was that
they were supposedly ignorant of the facts alleged.
Example of the allegations that were not
specifically denied: The Marcoses used
dummies/nominees, fronts or agents who formed
those foundations or corporate entities, they opened
and maintained numerous bank accounts to amass the
$356M and hide it. The Marcoses just replied that the
said amount was “lawfully acquired” or “they had no
knowledge” of such facts.
Evidently, this particular denial had the
earmark of what is called in the law on pleadings as a
negative pregnant, that is, a denial pregnant with the
admission of the substantial facts in the pleading
responded to which are not squarely denied. It was in
effect an admission of the averments it was directed
at. Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of
negative expression which carries with it an affirmation
or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the
adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an
admission of the substantial facts alleged in the
pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or
modifying language and the words of the allegation as
so qualified or modified are literally denied, has been
held that the qualifying circumstances alone are denied
while the fact itself is admitted.
Respondents' answer was thus a denial
pregnant with admissions of the following substantial
facts: (1) the Swiss bank deposits existed and (2) that
the estimated sum thereof was US$356 million as of
December, 1990.
Therefore, the allegations in the petition for
forfeiture on the existence of the Swiss bank deposits
in the sum of about US$356 million, not having been
specifically denied by respondents in their answer,
were deemed admitted by them pursuant to Section
11, Rule 8 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil
Procedure.
Their claim of “lack of knowledge” of several
matters, transactions and documents was also
disproved (regarding the foundations and the money).
The Marcoses had their signatures on some of the
41
 emedial Law Review
Digests
documents that proved the transactions in issue
proving that they indeed had knowledge thereof.
When matters regarding which respondents
claim to have no knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief are plainly and necessarily within their
knowledge, their alleged ignorance or lack of
information will not be considered a specific denial. An
unexplained denial of information within the control of
the pleader, or is readily accessible to him, is evasive
and is insufficient to constitute an effective denial.
Furthermore, the heirs of FM are bound by the general
denial/admissions made by FM thus the children
cannot claim also claim “lack of knowledge”.
It is settled that judicial admissions may be
made: (a) in the pleadings filed by the parties; (b)
in the course of the trial either by verbal or written
manifestations or stipulations; or (c) in other stages of
judicial proceedings, as in the pre-trial of the case.
Thus, facts pleaded in the petition and answer, as in
the case at bar, are deemed admissions of petitioner
and respondents, respectively, who are not permitted
to contradict them or subsequently take a position
contrary to or inconsistent with such admissions.
Moreover, the opposition filed by Mrs. Marcos
to the motion for summary judgment dated March 21,
2000 of petitioner Republic was merely adopted by the
Marcos children as their own opposition to the said
motion. However, it was again not accompanied by
affidavits, depositions or admissions as required by
Section 3, Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules on Civil
Procedure.
The absence of opposing affidavits, depositions
and admissions to contradict the sworn declarations in
the Republic's motion only demonstrated that the
averments of such opposition were not genuine and
therefore unworthy of belief.
In the Compromise/Supplemental Agreements,
respondent Marcoses sought to implement the agreed
distribution of the Marcos assets, including the Swiss
deposits. This was, to the Court, an unequivocal
admission of ownership by the Marcoses of the said
deposits.
Summary:
Mere denials, if unaccompanied by any fact which will
be admissible in evidence at a hearing, are not
sufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and will not
defeat a motion for summary judgment. A summary
judgment is one granted upon motion of a party for an
expeditious settlement of the case, it appearing from
the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits
that there are no important questions or issues of fact
posed and, therefore, the movant is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. A motion for summary
judgment is premised on the assumption that the
issues presented need not be tried either because
these are patently devoid of substance or that there is
no genuine issue as to any pertinent fact. It is a
method sanctioned by the Rules of Court for the
prompt disposition of a civil action where there exists
no serious controversy. Summary judgment is a
CivPro - 1
procedural device for the prompt disposition of actions
in which the pleadings raise only a legal issue, not a
genuine issue as to any material fact. The theory of
summary judgment is that, although an answer may
on its face appear to tender issues requiring trial, if it
is established by affidavits, depositions or admissions
that those issues are not genuine but fictitious, the
Court is justified in dispensing with the trial and
rendering summary judgment for petitioner.
JUABAN v. ESPINA
FACTS This stemmed from 3 interlinked cases.
Heirs of Bancale sued for the recovery of certain
properties against Eva Paras and others (Case No. 1).
Petitioners Juaban and Zosa were their counsels. The
heirs then entered into an Agreemenet to Sell and to
Buy with respondent Espina, where they agreed to sell
the subject property to respondent or his assignee with
the amount of P2M as advance payment on the
purchase price. Espina duly paid the said amount. He
then designated respondent Cebu Bay Discovery
Properties, Inc. (CDPI) as the vendee. Subsequently,
respondents found out that Juaban and Zosa had filed
a motion to fix their attorneys’ fees which was granted
and fixed by the RTC at P9M. The heirs moved for
reconsideration but were denied. They filed a Notice of
Appeal which was indirectly overruled when the court
granted the motion for execution filed by petitioners. A
writ of execution was then issued followed by the sale
of the subject properties to petitioners for P9M, despite
the express instruction of the writ that the attorneys’
fees were “to be taken from the money due from the
buyer to the sellers under the agreement.”
However, the RTC, under a new presiding
judge, reversed and granted the MR of the heirs.
Meanwhile, petitioners were able to obtain a final deed
of sale from Sheriff Gato on the ground that no
redemption of the subject properties was made (Thus,
an administrative complaint against the sheriff was
filed for allegedly acting with manifest bias and
partiality [Case No. 2]).
Respondents also filed an injunction and
damages case to enjoin the sale in a public auction by
Sheriff Gato, allegedly unaware, at the time of the
filing of said case, that the properties had already been
sold (Case No. 3). The court granted petitioners’
Motion to Dismiss.
On appeal, CA reversed and ordered the writ of
preliminary injunction to be made permanent.
RELEVANT ISSUEs
1. Whether respondent Espina has authority to
file the case. YES
2. Whether the certificate of non-forum shopping
is invalid given that it was only signed by one
of the plaintiffs, i.e. respondent Espina. (Ergo,
whether the complaint should be dismissed
due to non-compliance with the requirements
of the Rules.) NO & NO!
42
 emedial Law Review
Digests
RULING: Petitioners claimed that the complaint should
have been dismissed because Espina no longer had
personal interest in the case as he had assigned his
rights to CDPI and that he was not authorized to file on
behalf of CDPI. However, citing Rule 3 Sec. 2 of the
ROC, SC ruled that Espina is a real party in interest8 in
this case. Thus, respondents’ right to the properties is
based on the Agreement to Sell and to Buy executed
between the heirs and respondent Espina. The said
Agreement is the very source of the right, the violation
of which constituted the cause of action in
respondents’ complaint for injunction before the court
a quo. It was respondent Espina who entered into the
Agreement, and his rights as a party to the said
contract were not extinguished just because he
designated his co-respondent CDPI as vendee of
the subject properties.
Having been established as a real party in
interest, respondent Espina has not only the
personality to file the complaint in the third case,
but also the authority to sign the certification
against forum shopping as a plaintiff therein.
Citing several cases, SC held that the
certification against forum shopping must be signed by
the plaintiff or any of the principal parties and not
by counsel.
The general rule is that the certificate must be
signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case and
the signature of only one of them is insufficient.
Nevertheless, the rules on forum shopping, which were
designed to promote and facilitate the orderly
administration of justice, should not be interpreted
with such absolute literalness as to subvert their own
ultimate and legitimate objective. Strict compliance
with the provisions regarding the certificate of non-
forum shopping merely underscores its mandatory
nature in that the certification cannot be altogether
dispensed with or its requirements completely
disregarded.
Thus, when all the petitioners share a
common interest and invoke a common cause of
action or defense, the signature of only one of
them in the certification against forum shopping
substantially complies with the rules.
Thus, the certificate against forum shopping is
not rendered invalid by the absence of the signature of
an authorized official of respondent CDPI. The
signature of respondent Espina as one of the plaintiffs
therein suffices.
KOREAN TECHNOLOGIES v. ALBERTO LERMA
8
A real party in interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized
by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real
party in interest.
CivPro - 1
FACTS Korea Technologies Co., Ltd. (KOGIES) is a
Korean corporation which is engaged in the supply and
installation of Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) Cylinder
manufacturing plants, while Pacific General Steel
Manufacturing Corp. (PGSMC) is a domestic
corporation.
PGSMC and KOGIES executed a contract in the
Philippines whereby KOGIES would set up an LPG
Cylinder Manufacturing Plant in Carmona, Cavite. In
Korea, the parties executed an Amendment to the
contract regarding the terms of payment.
However, after the installation of the plant, the
initial operation could not be conducted as PGSMC
encountered financial difficulties affecting the supply of
materials, thus forcing the parties to agree that
KOGIES would be deemed to have completely complied
with the terms and conditions of the contract.
For the remaining balance aimed at the
installation and initial operation of the plant, PGSMC
issued two post-dated checks. When KOGIES
deposited the checks, these were dishonoured for the
reason "PAYMENT STOPPED." Thus, KOGIES sent a
demand letter to PGSMC threatening criminal action for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 in case of non-
payment.
PGSMC informed KOGIES that PGSMC was
cancelling their Contract on the ground that KOGIES
had altered the quantity and lowered the quality of the
machineries and equipment it delivered to PGSMC, and
that PGSMC would dismantle and transfer the
machineries, equipment, and facilities installed in the
Carmona plant. Five days later, PGSMC filed before the
Office of the Public Prosecutor an Affidavit-Complaint
for Estafa docketed against the President of KOGIES.
KOGIES filed a Complaint for Specific
Performance, against PGSMC before the Muntinlupa
City Regional Trial Court (RTC). In its complaint,
KOGIES alleged that PGSMC had initially admitted that
the checks that were stopped were not funded but
later on claimed that it stopped payment of the checks
for the reason that "their value was not received" as
the former allegedly breached their contract by
"altering the quantity and lowering the quality of the
machinery and equipment" installed in the plant and
failed to make the plant operational although it earlier
certified to the contrary.
PGSMC filed its Answer with Compulsory
Counterclaim asserting that it had the full right to
dismantle and transfer the machineries and equipment
because it had paid for them in full as stipulated in the
contract, that KOGIES was not entitled to the balance
covered by the checks for failing to completely install
and make the plant operational, and that KOGIES was
liable for damages for altering the quantity and
lowering the quality of the machineries and equipment.
ISSUE Whether the payment of docket fees and
attachment of certificate of non-forum shopping are
not required considering that the Answer with
Counterclaim is a compulsory one and is not an
initiatory pleading?
43
 emedial Law Review
Digests
RULING and RATIO: As aptly ruled by the CA, the
counterclaims of PGSMC were incorporated in its
Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim in accordance
with Section 8 of Rule 11, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure, the rule that was effective at the time the
Answer with Counterclaim was filed.
On July 17, 1998, at the time PGSMC filed its
Answer incorporating its counterclaims against
KOGIES, it was not liable to pay filing fees for said
counterclaims being compulsory in nature. We stress,
however, that effective August 16, 2004 under Sec. 7,
Rule 141, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, docket
fees are now required to be paid in compulsory
counterclaim or cross- claims.
As to the failure to submit a certificate of
forum shopping, PGSMC’s Answer is not an initiatory
pleading which requires a certification against forum
shopping under Sec. 5 of Rule 7, 1997 Revised Rules
of Civil Procedure. It is a responsive pleading, hence,
the courts a quo did not commit reversible error in
denying KOGIES’ motion to dismiss PGSMC’s
compulsory counterclaims.
FILIPINAS TEXTILE v. CA
FACTS: Filipinas Textile Mills, Inc. (Filtex) applied and
was issued letters of credit by State Investment
House, Inc. (SIHI) for the purchase of various textile
materials from its suppliers. The suppliers issued
several sight drafts payable to the order of SIHI, which
were duly accepted by Filtex. The sight drafts were
negotiated to and acquired in due course by SIHI
which paid the value thereof to the suppliers for the
account of Filtex. On behalf of Filtex, Bernardino
Villanueva executed a comprehensive surety
agreement whereby he guaranteed, jointly and
severally with Filtex, the full and punctual payment of
Filtex’s indebtedness. To ensure the payment of the
sight drafts, Filtex issued to SIHI several trust receipts
and replacement trust receipts whereby Filtex agreed
to hold the merchandise in trust for SIHI, with liberty
to sell the same for SIHIs account but without
authority to make any other disposition of the said
goods. Filtex failed to pay. SIHI filed a Complaint for
Collection.
Petitioners argued that the comprehensive
surety agreement and the trust receipts upon which
the Complaint was based was null and void for lack of
consent; that SIHI materially altered the terms and
conditions of the surety agreement; and that the
obligation was fully paid with overpayment. However,
petitioners failed to specifically deny under oath the
genuineness and due execution of said documents in
their respective Answers. On Appeal, petitioners
claimed that the documents were inadmissible in
evidence due to the non-payment of documentary
stamp taxes as required by the NIRC.
SIHI contended that the petitioners expressly
admitted the due execution of the documents in their
CivPro - 1
respective Answers, thus, they could no longer
question their admissibility; that their allegation of
inadmissibility is inconsistent with their defense of full
payment; and that assuming the DST is required, it is
for the sole account of Filtex not only because the
letters of credit were issued at its instance and
application but also because it was the issuer and
acceptor of the trust receipts and sight drafts,
respectively.
The RTC held that Filtex and Villanueva are
jointly and severally liable to SIHI. The CA held that
the petitioners admitted the genuineness and due
execution of said documents because of their failure to
have their answers placed under oath, the complaint
being based on actionable documents in line with
Section 7, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court. MR Denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners admitted the
genuineness and due execution of said documents
because of their failure to specifically deny under oath
the genuineness and due execution of the documents
in their respective Answers? – YES.
RATIO: The Answer with Counterclaim and Answer of
Filtex and Villanueva, respectively, did not contain any
specific denial under oath of the letters of credit, sight
drafts, trust receipts and comprehensive surety
agreement, thus giving rise to the implied admission of
the genuineness and due execution of these
documents. Under Sec. 8, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court,
when an action or defense is founded upon a written
instrument, copied in or attached to the corresponding
pleading as provided in the preceding section, the
genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall
be deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under
oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth what he
claims to be the facts.
The genuineness and due execution of a
document means that the party whose signature it
bears admits that he voluntarily signed the document
or it was signed by another for him and with his
authority; that at the time it was signed it was in
words and figures exactly as set out in the pleading of
the party relying upon it; that the document was
delivered; and that any formalities required by law,
such as a seal, an acknowledgment, or revenue stamp,
which it lacks, are waived by him.
The petitioners are also estopped from
claiming that the documents are inadmissible in
evidence for non-payment of the DST because Filtex
applied for the LOC and it was the issuer and acceptor
of the trust receipts and sight drafts, and Villanueva
signed the comprehensive surety agreement on behalf
of Filtex. Further, they questioned the admissibility of
these documents rather belatedly, at the appeal stage
even. The rule is well-settled that points of law,
theories, issues and arguments not adequately brought
to the attention of the trial court need not, and
ordinarily will not, be considered by a reviewing court
as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal
44
 emedial Law Review
Digests
because this would be offensive to the basic rules of
fair play, justice and due process.
The contention that the petitioners have fully
paid their obligation is purely a factual issue. The
jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought before it
from the Court of Appeals under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court is limited to reviewing or revising errors of
law.
The contention that the comprehensive surety
agreement is null and void for lack of consent of Filtex
and SIHI is specious. The consent of Filtex to the
surety may be assumed from the fact that Villanueva
was the signatory to the sight drafts and trust receipts
on behalf of Filtex. SIHI’s consent to the surety is also
understood from the fact that it demanded payment
from both Filtex and Villanueva.
As regards the purported material alteration of
the terms and conditions of the comprehensive surety
agreement by granting Filtex an extension of the
period for payment thereby releasing Villanueva from
his obligation as surety, we rule that the extension did
not release Villanueva from his liability. The neglect of
the creditor to sue the principal at the time the debt
falls due does not discharge the surety, even if such
delay continues until the principal becomes insolvent.
There is nothing to prevent the creditor from
proceeding against the principal at any time. At any
rate, if the surety is dissatisfied with the degree of
activity displayed by the creditor in the pursuit of his
principal, he may pay the debt himself and become
subrogated to all the rights and remedies of the
creditor.
SY TIONG v. SY CHIM
FACTS: [*this is a consolidated case, the facts in G.R.
No. 179438 is the one relevant to Rem]
FACTS: The corporation Sy Siy Ho & Sons filed a
criminal case for robbery against the Sps. Sy [ Sy
Chim and Felicidad Chan Sy] after failing to respond to
the demand letter for accounting of misappropriated
money. It was alleged and found that they failed to
make cash de deposits to any of the corporation’s
banks hence the total bank remittances for the past
years were less than that reflected in the corporate
financial statements. They have P67, 117, 230.30 as
unaccounted receipts and disbursements. Also, after a
demand letter was sent to them, they stopped
reporting to the company.
Sy Tiong, the Corporate VP called for a special
meeting where he was elected president and his wife
Juanita the new VP. The corporation filed an amended
complaint for accounting and damages against the
Sps. Sy for complete and true accounting of all
amounts misappropriated. The Sps Sy answered that
the meeting was without authority and that they were
the ones authorized by the by-laws to control and
administer the corporation. They also filed their
counter-claim for moral and exemplary damages.
CivPro - 1
They later filed a Motion for Leave to file a
third-party complaint against Sy Tiong and Juanita
alleging that the latter are the ones directly liable for
misappropriation. The RTC granted, the CA however
reversed stating a third-party complaint is not allowed
under the Interim Rules of Procedure governing Intra-
Corporate Controversies as it is not included in the
exclusive enumeration of the allowed pleadings.
ISSUE: W/N a third party complaint is allowed. – YES.
RATIO: The conflict arose because, for while a third-
party complaint is not included in the allowed
pleadings, it is also not among the prohibited
pleadings. This can be resolved by following the well-
entrenched rule in statutory construction that every
part of the statute must be interpreted with reference
to the context, that it be construed in light of the
object to be achieved. Looking at Sec. 3 Rule 1 of the
Interim Rules, the spirit and intent of the law can be
gleamed to be the securing of a just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of an action.
The summary nature of the interim rules and
the allowance of filing of a third-party complaint is
premised on one objective – the expeditious
disposition of cases. A third party complaint is a claim
that a defending party, may, with leave of court, file
against a person to the action called the third –party
defendant, for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or
any other relief. Had it not been for Rule 6, Sec. 11 of
RoC, the third party complaint would have been filed
independently and separately from the original
complaint. Allowing third party complaint avoids
circuitry of actions and unnecessary proliferation of law
suits and results to expeditious disposition in one
litigation all matters arising from one particular set of
facts.
The brining of a third-party complaint is proper
if he would be liable to the plaintiff or the defendant or
both for all part of the plaintiff’s claim against the
original defendant, although the third-party
defendant’s liability arises out of another transaction.
The defendant may implead another as third-party
defendant: (a) on allegation of liability of the latter to
the defendant for contribution, indemnity, subrogation
or any other relief; (b) on ground of direct liability of
the third-party defendant to the plaintiff; or (c) the
liability of the third-party defendant to both plaintiff
and the defendant.
In determining sufficiency of the third party
complaint, the allegations in the original complaint and
the third-party complaint must be examined. The
third-party complaint must allege facts which prima
facie shows that the defendant is entitled to
contribution, indemnity, subrogation or other relief.
In the case at bar, the complaint attributes to
the Sps Sy liability to render full and complete
accounting of amounts misappropriated. The third
party complaint alleges that it is Sy Tiong and Juanita
who should be liable. The allegations in the third-party
complaint impute direct liability to Sy Tiong for the
45
 emedial Law Review
Digests
very same claims the corporation interposed against
Sps Sy. The third party complaint is in respect of the
corporation’s thus should be allowed.
PTA OF ST. MATTHEWS ACADEMY v. METROBANK
FACTS: Spouses Ilagan obtained a loan from
Metrobank in the amount of P4,790,000.00, secured
by a Real Estate Mortgage over parcels of land covered
by various TCTs. Upon default of the spouses,
Metrobank extrajudicially foreclosed the properties, for
which a certificate of sale was issued in its favor as the
highest bidder. During the period of redemption,
Metrobank filed an Ex-Parte Petition for Issuance of a
Writ of Possession docketed as LRC Case No. 6438.
Thereafter, St. Matthew Christian Academy of Tarlac,
Inc. filed a Petition for Injunction with Prayer for
Restraining Order against Metrobank, docketed as
Special Civil Action No. 9793.
The judge issued a joint decision for LRC Case
No. 6438 and Special Civil Action No. 9793, ruling that
Metrobank is entitled to a writ of possession. Pending
resolution of the motion for reconsideration, petitioners
PTA of St. Matthew Academy and other teachers and
students of the said school filed a Motion for Leave to
file Petition in Intervention in Special Civil Action No.
9793, which was granted by the trial court. However, it
reversed its earlier ruling via a subsequent order
stating that petitioners’ intervention would have no
bearing on the issuance and implementation of the writ
of possession. Without filing a motion for
reconsideration, petitioners filed a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition before the CA. The CA
dismissed the same. Hence, this petition, where
among others, petitioners claim that the Metrobank
Branch Head lacked the authority to sign the certificate
of non-forum shopping attached to the Petition for the
Issuance of the Writ of Possession.
ISSUE Whether or not the Metrobank Branch Head’s
lack of authority to sign the certificate of non-forum
shopping was fatal.
RULING and RATIO:
No, lack of authority to sign the certificate of non-
forum shopping was not fatal to Metrobank since such
certificate is only needed when filing an initiatory
pleading. This case does not involve an initiatory
pleading. Although the Petition for the Issuance of a
Writ of Possession was captioned as a “Petition”, the
same is to be considered merely a motion. What
distinguishes a motion from a petition or other
pleading is not its form or the title given by the party
executing it, but its purpose. The purpose of a motion
is not to initiate litigation, but to bring up a matter
arising in the progress of the case where the motion is
filed.
It is not necessary to initiate an original action
in order for the purchaser at an extrajudicial
foreclosure of real property to acquire possession.
CivPro - 1
Hence, it is immaterial that the certification on non-
forum shopping in the MBTC’s petition was signed by
its branch head. Such inconsequential oversight did
not render the said petition defective in form.
PERMANENT SAVINGS BANK v. VELARDE
FACTS: Mariano Velarde obtained a loan amounting to
P1,000,000.00 from Permanent Savings and Loan
Bank (The Bank). The Bank already sent 2 demand
letters to Velarde, however, the latter still failed to
settle his loan obligation. Thus, the Bank filed a
complaint for sum of money for the recovery of the
amount of the loan plus interests and penalties before
the RTC of Manila.
The loan was evidenced by a promissory note,
a loan release sheet and a loan disclosure statement.
In his Answer, Velarde stated that the signature
appearing at the back of the promissory note seems to
be his. However, he denied having received the
proceeds of the loan. He likewise claimed that the
documents relative to the loan do not express the true
intention of the parties.
After the Bank rested its case, Velarde, instead
of presenting evidence, filed a demurrer to evidence
based on the following grounds:
1. Plaintiff failed to prove its case by
preponderance of evidence.
2. The cause of action is barred by prescription.
The Trial Court found merit in Velarde’s
demurer to evidence and dismissed the Bank’s
complaint. It ruled that mere presentation of the
documents evidencing the loan without a testimony of
a competent witness to the transaction and the
documents, coupled with the denial of liability by
Velarde does not suffice to meet the requisite
preponderance of evidence in civil cases. On appeal,
the CA affirmed the dismissal.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a need for the Bank to
present further evidence as to the due execution and
authenticity of the loan documents.
RULING and RATIO:
No, there is no need for the Bank to present further
evidence as to the due execution and authenticity of
the loan documents because Velarde, in his Answer,
did not specifically deny that he signed the promissory
note. What he merely stated in his Answer was that
the signature appearing at the back of the promissory
note seems to be his. Velarde also denied any liability
on the promissory note as he allegedly did not receive
the amount stated therein, and that the loan
documents do not express the true intention of the
parties. These denials, according to the Court, do
not constitute an effective specific denial as
contemplated by law. In fact, respondent’s
allegations amount to an implied admission of
the due execution and genuineness of the
promissory note. The admission of the genuineness
46
 emedial Law Review
Digests
and due execution of a document means that the party
whose signature it bears admits that he voluntarily
signed the document or it was signed by another for
him and with his authority; that at the time it was
signed it was in words and figures exactly as set out in
the pleading of the party relying upon it; that the
document was delivered; and that any formalities
required by law, such as a seal, an acknowledgment,
or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived by
him. Also, it effectively eliminated any defense relating
to the authenticity and due execution of the
document, e.g., that the document was spurious,
counterfeit, or of different import on its face as the one
executed by the parties; or that the signatures
appearing thereon were forgeries; or that the
signatures were unauthorized.
Clearly, both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals erred in concluding that Velarde specifically
denied the Bank’s allegations regarding the loan
documents, as Velarde’s Answer shows that he failed
to specifically deny under oath the genuineness and
due execution of the promissory note and its
concomitant documents. Therefore, he is deemed
to have admitted the loan documents and
acknowledged his obligation with the Bank; and
with his implied admission, it was not necessary
for the Bank to present further evidence to
establish the due execution and authenticity of
the loan documents sued upon.
While Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court requires that private documents be proved of
their due execution and authenticity before they can
be received in evidence, i.e., presentation and
examination of witnesses to testify on this fact; in the
present case, there is no need for proof of execution
and authenticity with respect to the loan documents
because of Velarde’s implied admission thereof.
DEFAULT
ANUNCACION v. BOCANEGRA
FACTS: 9/29/2000 – Anunciacion filed a complaint for
Quieting of Title and Cancellation of Title. The
complaint averred that Bocanegra may be served with
summons and legal processes through Atty. Rogelio G.
Pizarro, Jr. The summons, together with the copies of
the complaint, were then served on Atty. Pizarro. The
record shows that before the filing of the said
complaint, Atty. Pizarro wrote a demand letter on
behalf of respondents and addressed to Anunciacion,
demanding that they vacate the land owned by
Bocanegra.
10/27/2000 - Bocanegra filed a Motion to
Dismiss (MTD) on the ground that the complaint stated
no cause of action. Petitioners filed their Comment on
the MTD.
11/13/2000 – Bocanegra files a Supplemental
Motion to Dismiss and Reply to the Comment on the
MTD, alleging an additional ground that petitioners
failed to pay the required filing fee.
CivPro - 1
11/27/2000 – Anunciacion filed their
Opposition to the Supplemental MTD and Comment to
the Reply to the Comment on the MTD
11/27/2000 – Bocanegra filed a Second
Supplemental MTD and Manifestation citing the
following grounds:
1.) That the court has no jurisdiction over the
person of the defending party.
2.) That the court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the claim.
3.) That the pleading asserting the claim states no
cause of action.
Anunciacion filed their Additional Comment on
the MTD, Supplemental MTD and Comment on the
Second Supplemental MTD
2/19/2001 – RTC dismissed the complaint for
lack of jurisdiction over the persons of respondents as
defendants. MR was denied.
Anunciacion filed before the CA a Petition for
Certiorari, which the CA dismissed upon finding that
there was no waiver of the ground of lack of
jurisdiction on the part of respondents in the form of
voluntary appearance. Applying Section 20, Rule 14,
the CA held that although the grounds alleged in the 2
earlier Motion to Dismiss and Supplemental Motion to
Dismiss were lack of cause of action and failure to pay
the required filing fee, the filing of the said motions did
not constitute a waiver of the ground of lack of
jurisdiction on their persons as defendants. The CA
concluded that there was no voluntary appearance on
the part of respondents/defendants despite the filing of
the aforesaid motions. MR was denied.
Anunciacion filed a Petition for Review on
Certiorari before the Supreme Court
ISSUE AND RULING: W/N the filings of the MTD and
the Supplemental MTD by Bocanegra amounted to
voluntary appearance before the RTC – Yes, case was
reinstated and remanded for further proceedings
(dismissal by the RTC was erroneous)
RATIO: Bocanegra filed a MTD dated 10/25/2000 with
only one ground (that the pleading asserting the claim
"states no cause of action"). Under this ground,
respondents raised the issues that the defendants
anchored their complaint on a WRONG Decree of
Registration; that the Government recognized the
authenticity of the land title; and that the Plaintiffs do
NOT have the legal personality to 'quiet the title' of the
subject property.
Section 20, Rule 14 states that “the
defendant's voluntary appearance in the action shall be
equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a
MTD of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed
a voluntary appearance.
The filing of the 10/25/2000 MTD, without
invoking the lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
respondents, is deemed a voluntary appearance on the
part of the respondents under Sec. 20, Rule 14. The
same conclusion can be drawn from the filing of the
47
 emedial Law Review
Digests
10/13/2000 Supplemental MTD and Reply to the
Comment on the Motion to Dismiss which alleged, as
an additional ground for the dismissal of petitioners'
complaint, the failure of plaintiffs to pay the required
filing fee again but failed to raise the alleged lack of
jurisdiction of the court over the person of the
respondents. It was only in respondents' Second
Supplemental MTD (11/27/2000) that respondents for
the first time raised the court's lack of jurisdiction over
their person as defendants on the ground that
summons were allegedly not properly served upon
them. The Second Supplemental MTD did not divest
the court of its jurisdiction over the person of the
respondents who had earlier voluntarily appeared
before the trial court by filing their MTD and the
supplemental MTD. The dismissal of the complaint on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
respondents after they had voluntarily appeared before
the trial court clearly constitutes grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or in excess
of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC.
Other REM issues:
1. Respondents' Supplemental MTD and Second
Supplemental MTD were in violation of Rule 15, Sec. 8
(Omnibus Motion) in relation to Rule 9, Sec. 1
(Defenses and objections not pleaded are deemed
waived; exceptions lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter, existence of another action pending between
the same parties for the same cause; the action is
barred by prior judgment or by statute of limitations –
court shall dismiss claim). Respondents' failure to raise
the alleged lack of jurisdiction over their persons in
their very first motion to dismiss was fatal to their
cause. They are already deemed to have waived that
particular ground for dismissal of the complaint.
Entertaining supplemental MTD which raise grounds
that are already deemed waived would encourage
lawyers and litigants to file piecemeal objections to a
complaint in order to delay or frustrate the prosecution
of the plaintiff's cause of action.
2. Although the CA correctly observed that Atty.
Pizarro, as the lawyer of the respondents in the
demand letters, does not per se make him their
representative for purposes of the present action, a
scrutiny of the record shows that the address of Atty.
Pizarro and Atty. Norby Caparas, Jr., (the counsel who
eventually entered his appearance for respondents) is
the same. This circumstance leads us to believe that
respondents' belated reliance on the purported
improper service of summons is a mere afterthought, if
not a bad faith ploy to avoid answering the complaint.
In another case, the SC held that a case should not be
dismissed simply because an original summons was
wrongfully served since an alias summons can be
actually served on the defendant. To be sure, a trial
court should be cautious before dismissing complaints
on the sole ground of improper service of summons
considering that it is well within its discretion to order
CivPro - 1
the issuance and service of alias summons on the
correct person in the interest of substantial justice.
MARTINEZ v. REPUBLIC
FACTS: On 24 February 1999 Martinez filed a petition
for the registration in his name of 3 parcels of land
included in the Cortes, Surigao del Sur Cadastre. He
alleged that he had purchased the lots in 1952 from
his uncle, whose predecessors-in-interest were
traceable up to the 1870s. It was claimed that he had
remained in continuous possession of the lots; that the
lots had remained unencumbered; and that they
became private property through prescription pursuant
to Sec. 48(b) of CA 141. He further claimed that he
had been constrained to initiate the proceedings
because the Director of the Land Management Services
had failed to do so despite the completion of the
cadastral survey of Cortes, Surigao del Sur.
The case was docketed and raffled to the RTC of
Surigao del Sur, Br.27. On 30 September 1999, the
OSG, in behalf of the Republic, opposed the petition on
the grounds that appellee's possession was not in
accordance with CA 141; that his muniments of title
were insufficient to prove bona-fide acquisition and
possession of the subject parcels; and that the
properties formed part of the public domain and thus
not susceptible to private appropriation.
Despite the opposition filed by the OSG, the RTC
issued an order of general default, even against the
Republic on 29 March 2000 because during the hearing
on the said date, no party opposed Martinez’s petition.
On 1 August 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision
concluding that Martinez and his predecessors-in-
interest had proved the required possession under CA
141 and thus decreed the registration.
On 10 October 2003, the CA reversed the
decision of the trial court. No MR was filed by Martinez
– instead, it filed the present Petition for Review with
the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether an order of general default issued by
a trial court in a land registration case bars the
Republic, through the OSG, from interposing an appeal
from the trial court’s subsequent decision in favor of
the applicant. – NO.
RATIO: The SC decision is based on the argument of
the OSG that the default order was proper or regular.9
9
Note that under Sec. 26 of PD 1529 (Property Registration
Decree), the order of default may be issued "if no person
appears and answers within the time allowed." The RTC
appears to have issued the order of general default simply on
the premise that no oppositor appeared before it on the
hearing of 29 March 2000. But it cannot be denied that the
OSG had already duly filed its Opposition to Martinez's
petition long before the said hearing. However, despite the
improper default order by the RTC, the OSG did not challenge
its propriety. Thus, the SC refrained from making a
pronouncement on it since it has not been put into issue.
48
 emedial Law Review
Digests
The juridical utility of a declaration of default cannot be
disputed. By foregoing the need for adversarial
proceedings, it affords the opportunity for the speedy
resolution of cases even as it penalizes parties who fail
to give regard or obedience to the judicial processes.
Before the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the rule was
that a defaulted defendant cannot adduce evidence;
nor can he be heard at the final hearing, although he
may appeal the judgment rendered against him on the
merits, even without seeking to set aside the order of
default.10
Under the new Rules, the prior warrant that a
defaulted defendant had the right to appeal was
removed from Sec.2 of Rule 41. On the other hand,
Sec.3 of Rule 9 incorporated the effects of the parties
of an order of default. It cannot be escaped that the
old provision expressly guaranteeing the right of a
defendant declared in default to appeal the adverse
decision was not replicated in the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. Should this be taken as a sign that under
the 1997 Rules a defaulted defendant no longer has
the right to appeal the trial court decision?
If post - 1997 jurisprudence and the published
commentaries to the 1997 Rules were taken as an
indication, the answer should be in the negative. The
right of a defaulted defendant to appeal remains
extant.
By 1997, the doctrinal rule concerning the
remedies of a party declared in default had evolved
into a fairly comprehensive restatement as offered in
Lina v.Court of Appeals:
(a) The defendant in default may, at any time after
discovery thereof and before judgment, file a
motion, under oath, to set aside the order of
default on the ground that his failure to answer
was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
neglect, and that he has meritorious defenses;
(Sec 3, Rule 18)
(b) If the judgment has already been rendered when
the defendant discovered the default, but before
the same has become final and executory, he may
file a motion for new trial under Section 1(a) of
Rule 37;
(c) If the defendant discovered the default after the
judgment has become final and executory, he may
file a petition for relief under Section 2 of Rule 38;
and
(d) He may also appeal from the judgment rendered
against him as contrary to the evidence or to the
law, even if no petition to set aside the order of
default has been presented by him. (Sec. 2, Rule
41)
The fourth remedy, that of appeal, is anchored
on Section 2, Rule 41 of the 1964 Rules. Yet even after
that provision's deletion under the 1997 Rules, the
Court did not hesitate to expressly rely again on the
Lina doctrine, including the pronouncement that a
defaulted defendant may appeal from the judgment
10
Please read the original for the evolution of the rule with
regard to the right to appeal by a defaulted defendant.
CivPro - 1
rendered against him.
In Rural Bank of Sta. Catalina v. Land Bank of
the Philippines, the Court, through Justice Callejo, Sr.,
again provided a comprehensive restatement of the
remedies of the defending party declared in default,
which we adopt for purposes of this decision:
It bears stressing that a defending party
declared in default loses his standing in court
and his right to adduce evidence and to present
his defense. He, however, has the right to
appeal from the judgment by default and assail
said judgment on the ground, inter alia, that the
amount of the judgment is excessive or is
different in kind from that prayed for, or that the
plaintiff failed to prove the material allegations
of his complaint, or that the decision is contrary
to law. Such party declared in default is
proscribed from seeking a modification or
reversal of the assailed decision on the basis of
the evidence submitted by him in the Court of
Appeals, for if it were otherwise, he would
thereby be allowed to regain his right to adduce
evidence, a right which he lost in the trial court
when he was declared in default, and which he
failed to have vacated. In this case, the
petitioner sought the modification of the decision
of the trial court based on the evidence
submitted by it only in the Court of Appeals.
If it cannot be made any clearer, we hold that
a defendant party declared in default retains the right
to appeal from the judgment by default on the ground
that the plaintiff failed to prove the material allegations
of the complaint, or that the decision is contrary to
law, even without need of the prior filing of a motion to
set aside the order of default.
NOTE: Another issue of the case.
After the records had been transmitted to the CA when
OSG appealed, the RTC received a letter dated 21
February 2001 from the Land Registration Authority
(LRA) stating that only Lot Nos. 464-A and 464-B were
referred to in the Notice of Hearing published in the
Official Gazette; and that Lot No. 370, Cad No. 597
had been deliberately omitted due to the lack of an
approved survey plan for that property. Accordingly,
the LRA manifested that this lot should not have been
adjudicated to Martinez for lack of jurisdiction. This
letter was referred by the RTC to the Court of Appeals
for appropriate action.
Since the CA ruled in favor of the government and the
SC affirmed this decision, this issue became moot –
there is no registration to cancel due to non-
publication because all of the lands registered in this
case were cancelled.
SANTOS, JR. v. PNOC EXPLORATION CORP
FACTS: respondent PNOC Exploration Corporation filed
a complaint for a sum of money against petitioner
Pedro T. Santos, Jr. in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
49
 emedial Law Review
Digests
City, Branch 167. The complaint, docketed as Civil
Case No. 69262, sought to collect the amount of
P698,502.10 representing petitioner's unpaid balance
of the car loan advanced to him by respondent when
he was still a member of its board of directors.
Personal service of summons to petitioner failed
because he could not be located in his last known
address despite earnest efforts to do so. Subsequently,
on respondent's motion, the trial court allowed service
of summons by publication.
Respondent caused the publication of the
summons in Remate, a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines. Thereafter, respondent
submitted the affidavit of publication of the advertising
manager of Remate and an affidavit of service of
respondent's employee to the effect that he sent a
copy of the summons by registered mail to petitioner's
last known address.
When petitioner failed to file his answer within
the prescribed period, respondent moved that the case
be set for the reception of its evidence ex parte. The
trial court granted the motion in an order dated
September 11, 2003. The case was deemed submitted
for decision on October 15, 2003.
Petitioner filed an "Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Answer." He
sought reconsideration of the September 11, 2003
order, alleging that the affidavit of service submitted
by respondent failed to comply with Section 19, Rule
14 of the Rules of Court as it was not executed by the
clerk of court. He also claimed that he was denied due
process as he was not notified of the September 11,
2003 order. He prayed that respondent's evidence ex
parte be stricken off the records and that his answer
be admitted.
The trial court denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the September 11, 2003 order. It
held that the rules did not require the affidavit of
complementary service by registered mail to be
executed by the clerk of court. It also ruled that due
process was observed as a copy of the September 11,
2003 order was actually mailed to petitioner at his last
known address. It also denied the motion to admit
petitioner's answer because the same was filed way
beyond the reglementary period.
Aggrieved, petitioner questioned the orders of
the RTC in the CA via petition for certiorari.
During the pendency of the petition in the
Court of Appeals, the trial court rendered its decision
in Civil Case No. 69262. It ordered petitioner to pay
P698,502.10 plus legal interest and costs of suit.
The CA, sustained RTC decision and denied
reconsideration.
ISSUES:
1. W/N RTC lack jurisdiction over his person due to
improper service of summons, failure of the trial court
to furnish him with copies of its orders and processes
including the September 11, 2003 order and
CivPro - 1
preference for technicality rather than justice and
equity.
2. W/N the rule on service by publication under Section
14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court applies only to
actions in rem, not actions in personam like a
complaint for a sum of money.
3. W/N the affidavit of service of a copy of the
summons should have been prepared by the clerk of
court, not respondent's messenger.
RULING and RATIO:
1. NO. The effects of a defendant's failure to file an
answer within the time allowed are governed by
Sections 3 and 4, Rule 9 (on Effect of Failure to Plead)
of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 3. Default; declaration of. - If the
defending party fails to answer within the
time allowed therefor, the court shall,
upon motion of the claiming party with
notice to the defending party, and proof of
such failure, declare the defending party
in default. Thereupon, the court shall proceed
to render judgment granting the claimant such
relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the
court in its discretion requires the claimant to
submit evidence. Such reception of evidence
may be delegated to the clerk of court.
SEC. 4. Effect of order of default. - A party in
default shall be entitled to notice of
subsequent proceedings but not to take part
in the trial. (emphasis supplied)
If the defendant fails to file his answer on time,
he may be declared in default upon motion of the
plaintiff with notice to the said defendant. In case he is
declared in default, the court shall proceed to render
judgment granting the plaintiff such relief as his
pleading may warrant, unless the court in its discretion
requires the plaintiff to submit evidence. The
defaulting defendant may not take part in the trial but
shall be entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings.
In this case, even petitioner himself does not
dispute that he failed to file his answer on time. That
was in fact why he had to file an "Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Answer."
But respondent moved only for the ex
partepresentation of evidence, not for the declaration
of petitioner in default. However, in its In its February
6, 2004 order, the trial did not limit itself to permitting
respondent to present its evidence ex parte but in
effect issued an order of default. But the trial court
could not validly do that as an order of default can be
made only upon motion of the claiming party. Since no
motion to declare petitioner in default was filed, no
default order should have been issued.
However, even if petitioner was not validly
declared in default, he could not reasonably demand
that copies of orders and processes be furnished him.
There is obviously no way notice can be sent to him
and the notice requirement cannot apply to him. The
50
 emedial Law Review
Digests
law does not require that the impossible be
done. Nemo tenetur ad impossibile. The law obliges no
one to perform an impossibility. Laws and rules must
be interpreted in a way that they are in accordance
with logic, common sense, reason and practicality.
Be that as it may, a copy of the September 11, 2003
order was nonetheless still mailed to petitioner at his
last known address but it was unclaimed.
2. NO. Section 14, Rule 14 (on Summons) of the Rules
of Court provides:
SEC. 14. Service upon defendant whose
identity or whereabouts are unknown. - In any
action where the defendant is designated as
an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever
his whereabouts are unknown and cannot
be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service
may, by leave of court, be effected upon
him by publication in a newspaper of
general circulation and in such places and
for such times as the court may order.
(emphasis supplied)
Since petitioner could not be personally served
with summons despite diligent efforts to locate his
whereabouts, respondent sought and was granted
leave of court to effect service of summons upon him
by publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
Thus, petitioner was properly served with summons by
publication.
In substituted service, the in rem/in
personam distinction was significant under the old rule
because it was silent as to the kind of action to which
the rule was applicable. Because of this silence, the
Court limited the application of the old rule to in
remactions only. However, the present rule expressly
states that it applies "[i]n any action where the
defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the
like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and
cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry." Thus, it now
applies to any action, whether in personam, in
rem or quasi in rem.[12]
3. The rules, however, do not require that the affidavit
of complementary service be executed by the clerk of
court. While the trial court ordinarily does the mailing
of copies of its orders and processes, the duty to make
the complementary service by registered mail is
imposed on the party who resorts to service by
publication.
Moreover, even assuming that the service of
summons was defective, the trial court acquired
jurisdiction over the person of petitioner by his
own voluntary appearance in the action against
him. Petitioner voluntarily appeared in the action when
he filed the "Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and
to Admit Attached Answer." See Sec.20, Rule 14.
AQUINO v. AURE (this case has nothing to do with
default)
CivPro - 1
FACTS: Aure filed a complaint for ejectment against
Aquino before the MeTC. Aure and Aure Lending
alleged that they acquired the subject property from
Aquino. Aquino countered that the complain lacks
cause of action.
The MeTC rendered a decision, dismissing the
complaint for ejectment of Aure and Aure Lending for
non-compliance with the barangay conciliation process.
The MeTC observed that Aure and Aquino are residents
of the same barangay but there is no showing that any
attempt has been made to settle the case amicably at
the barangay level. On appeal, the RTC affirmed the
dismissal of the Complaint on the same ground that
the dispute was not brought before the Barangay
Council for conciliation.
Aure appealed with the CA arguing that the
lower court erred in dismissing his complaint for lack of
cause of action. The CA rendered a decision, reversing
the MeTC and RTC decisions. The appellate court
declared that the failure of Aure to subject the matter
to barangay conciliation is not a jurisdictional flaw and
it will not affect the sufficiency of Aure’s Complaint
since Aquino failed to seasonably raise such issue in
her Answer.
ISSUE: Whether or not non-compliance with the
barangay conciliation proceedings is a jurisdictional
defect that warrants the dismissal of the complaint. –
NO.
RATIO: There is no dispute herein that the present
case was never referred to the Barangay Lupon for
conciliation. In fact, no allegation of such barangay
conciliation proceedings was made in Aure and Aure
Lending’s Complaint before the MeTC.
However, as enunciated in the landmark case
of Royales v. Intermediate Appellate Court:
Ordinarily, non-compliance with the condition
precedent prescribed by P.D. 1508 could affect the
sufficiency of the plaintiff's cause of action and make
his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on ground of lack
of cause of action or prematurity; but the same would
not prevent a court of competent jurisdiction from
exercising its power of adjudication over the case
before it, where the defendants, as in this case, failed
to object to such exercise of jurisdiction in their answer
and even during the entire proceedings a quo.
In the case at bar, the Court finds that Aquino
cannot be allowed to attack the jurisdiction of the
MeTC. The Court takes note that the defendant herself
did not raise in defense the aforesaid lack of
conciliation proceedings in her answer, which raises
the exclusive affirmative defense of simulation. By this
acquiescence, defendant is deemed to have waived
such objection. The fact that Aquino raised such
objection during the pre-trial and in her Position Paper
is of no moment, for the issue of non-recourse to
barangay mediation proceedings should be impleaded
in her Answer.
51
 emedial Law Review
Digests
AMENDMENT AND SUPPLEMENT
PAGCOR v. LOPEZ
FACTS: PAGCOR entered into an Agreement with
FILGAME and BELLE Jai-Alai Corporation (BELLE) for
the resumption of the Jai-Alai operations in the
country. FILGAME and BELLE jointly agreed to provide
funds for pre-operating expenses and working capital
while PAGCOR shall manage, operate and control all
aspects of the Jai-Alai operations.
However, the Office of the President of the
Philippines issued a Memorandum directing PAGCOR to
close down all PAGCOR facilities and outlets in Jai-Alai,
on-line bingo and internet casino gaming. The DILG,
through Secretary Alfredo S. Lim, caused the closure
of the Jai-Alai main fronton.
FILGAME and BELLE filed the case for Specific
Performance and Injunction with prayer for Damages
and Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction against PAGCOR, DILG and
Secretary Alfredo Lim. Respondent judge issued a writ
of temporary restraining order.
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court rendered a
decision enjoining PAGCOR, Belle, and Filgame from
managing, maintaining and operating jai-alai games,
and from enforcing the agreement entered into by
them for that purpose.
Consequently, FILGAME and BELLE filed a
Motion to Admit Amended Complaint with the trial
court where the cause of action was changed, i.e.,
from Specific Performance to Recovery of Sum of
Money. FILGAME and BELLE sought to recover their
pre-operating expenses and/or investments including
the goodwill money which they allegedly invested with
PAGCOR. PAGCOR filed an opposition on the ground
that there is a substantial change in the complaint and
cause of action. Respondent judge admitted the
amended complaint.
PAGCOR filed a motion to dismiss the amended
complaint on the ground that the trial court had not
acquired jurisdiction over the case for failure of the
plaintiffs to pay the prescribed docket fees. It claimed
that the amended complaint, which sought recovery of
the pre-operating expenses and investments including
the goodwill money, should have docket fees of
P15,775,903.68. Said Motion to Dismiss was denied by
the respondent judge.
FILGAME and BELLE manifested their intention
to file a Motion for Summary Judgment which they
subsequently filed. PAGCOR filed its opposition thereto.
Respondent judge did not conduct any hearing on the
motion for summary judgment. He thereafter rendered
his decision by way of Summary Judgment in favor of
FILGAME and BELLE.
PAGCOR charges respondent judge for gross
ignorance of the law and procedure and filed the
present administrative case.
ISSUE and RULING: w/n respondent judge erred in:
CivPro - 1
(1) admitting the amended complaint of
FILGAME and BELLE despite the fact that
(a) the amended complaint is a total
change of theory of the case; and
(b) that the required filing fees for the
amended complaint were not paid; and
---NO. (Relevant REM issue [Rule 10])
(2) in rendering summary judgment
(a) despite the fact that respondent
found the existence of 13 factual issues to be
resolved;
(b) without conducting a hearing on
the motion for summary judgment;
(c) based on the alleged implied
admission rather than on the personal
knowledge of witnesses and other affiants; and
---NO.
RATIO:
(1) Respondent judge did not err in admitting the
amended complaint of FILGAME and BELLE.
a. The Court finds no gross ignorance of law
committed by respondent when he
admitted the amended complaint
notwithstanding that such amended
complaint substantially altered the cause
of action of plaintiffs FILGAME and BELLE.
Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court,
provides:
SECTION 3. Amendments by leave of
court. Except as provided in the next
preceding section, substantial
amendments may be made only upon
leave of court. But such leave may be
refused if it appears to the court that
the motion was made with intent to
delay. Orders of the court upon the
matters provided in this section shall
be made upon motion filed in court,
and after notice to the adverse party,
and an opportunity to be heard.
Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure amended the former rule in such manner
that the phrase "or that the cause of action or defense
is substantially altered" was stricken-off and not
retained in the new rules. The clear import of such
amendment in Section 3, Rule 10 is that under
the new rules, "the amendment may (now)
substantially alter the cause of action or
defense." This should only be true, however, when
despite a substantial change or alteration in the cause
of action or defense, the amendments sought to be
made shall serve the higher interests of substantial
justice, and prevent delay and equally promote the
laudable objective of the rules which is to secure a
52
 emedial Law Review
Digests
"just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every
action and proceeding.
The original complaint filed by the plaintiffs
was for specific performance and injunction with
prayer for damages and for TRO and writ of
preliminary injunction against PAGCOR while the
amended complaint was for recovery of sum of money.
Such amendment to the original complaint was
filed by plaintiffs FILGAME and BELLE after the
Supreme Court decision declared that PAGCOR could
not enter into a joint agreement with other
corporations to operate the Jai-Alai, and that the
Agreement is null and void. However, since plaintiffs
had provided funds for PAGCOR’s pre-operating
expenses and working capital, plaintiffs had to file an
amended complaint which seeks the recovery of their
expenses. Although the amended complaint
substantially changed the cause of action of
plaintiffs, the admission thereof by respondent
judge is allowed under Section 3, Rule 10 and
jurisprudence.
b. The Court also finds that respondent was
not guilty of gross ignorance of the law
when he admitted the amended complaint
despite the non-payment by plaintiffs
FILGAME and BELLE of additional docket
fees on the amended complaint.
The court had jurisdiction over the amended
complaint as it had acquired jurisdiction over the case
when the original complaint was filed and the
corresponding docket fee was paid thereon. Plainly,
while the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a
jurisdictional requirement, even its non-payment at
the time of filing does not automatically cause the
dismissal of the case, as long as the fee is paid within
the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
The Supreme Court in the Sun Insurance case had
further declared that “any additional filing (docket) fee
shall constitute a lien on the judgment and that it shall
be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly
authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and
collect the additional fee provided that the cause of
action has not prescribed.” Respondent judge issued
another Order that plaintiffs have still to pay the
amount of P14,717,171.19 based on the claim in the
amended complaint by directing the plaintiffs to pay
within 15 days from receipt. These actuations of
respondent are in accordance with the Sun Insurance
case.
(2) Respondent judge did not err in
rendering summary judgment
(a) despite the fact that
respondent found the existence of 13
factual issues to be resolved;
Based on evidence, PAGCOR was privy to all
the material allegations in the amended complaint
CivPro - 1
relating to the Jai-Alai operations. It would have been
incredulous for PAGCOR to claim ignorance or lack of
knowledge of said material allegations. Respondent
Judge had sufficient basis to render summary
judgment.
(b) without conducting a hearing
on the motion for summary judgment;
That there was no hearing conducted on the
motion for summary judgment, the same was with the
acquiescence of PAGCOR’s counsel. As correctly found
by the CA, based on the evidence, the trial type
hearing on the motion was dispensable in view of the
fact that PAGCOR’s blanket/ineffective denial in its
answer to the amended complaint had the effect of an
admission, thus, did not raise any genuine issues.
Furthermore, a hearing on the motion for summary
judgment was not necessary considering that the
evidence necessary for the resolution of the same was
already part of the records. It is evident from the
records, that PAGCOR was given ample opportunity to
be heard and present its evidence in opposition to the
motion for summary judgment, but PAGCOR chose not
to adduce any such evidence.
(c) based on the alleged implied
admission rather than on the personal
knowledge of witnesses and other
affiants;
It is a recognized rule in summary judgment
that the trial court can determine whether there is
genuine issue on the basis of the pleadings,
admissions, documents, affidavits, and/or counter-
affidavits submitted by the parties. On the basis of
this rule PAGCOR cannot claim that Respondent Judge
was grossly ignorant of the law and procedure when he
rendered summary judgment based on implied
admissions of the material facts in the amended
complaint and not on personal knowledge of witnesses
and other affiants.
ASEAN PACIFIC v. CITY OF URDANETA
FACTS: This case stemmed from a Complaint for
annulment of contracts with prayer for preliminary
prohibitory injunction and temporary restraining order
filed by respondent Capalad. Capalad doing business
under the name JJEFWA Builders, and petitioners
Asean Pacific Planners (APP)
Del Castillo alleged that then Urdaneta City
Mayor Rodolfo E. Parayno entered into five contracts
for the preliminary design, construction and
management of a four-storey twin cinema commercial
center and hotel involving a massive expenditure of
public funds amounting to P250 million, funded by a
loan from the Philippine National Bank (PNB). For
minimal work, the contractor was allegedly paid P95
million. Del Castillo also claimed that all the contracts
53
 emedial Law Review
Digests
are void because the object is outside the commerce of
men. The object is a piece of land belonging to the
public domain and which remains devoted to a public
purpose as a public elementary school. Additionally, he
claimed that the contracts, from the feasibility study to
management and lease of the future building, are also
void because they were all awarded solely to the Goco
family.
In their Answer, APP and APPCDC claimed that
the contracts are valid. Urdaneta City asserted that the
contracts were properly executed by then Mayor
Parayno with prior authority from the Sangguniang
Panlungsod. Mayor Perez also stated that Del Castillo
has no legal capacity to sue and that the complaint
states no cause of action.
After pre-trial, the Lazaro Law Firm entered its
appearance as counsel for Urdaneta City and filed an
Omnibus Motion7 with prayer to (1) withdraw
Urdaneta City's Answer; (2) drop Urdaneta City as
defendant and be joined as plaintiff; (3) admit
Urdaneta City's complaint; and (4) conduct a new pre-
trial. Urdaneta City allegedly wanted to rectify its
position and claimed that inadequate legal
representation caused its inability to file the necessary
pleadings in representation of its interests.
In its Order dated September 11, 2002, the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta City,
Pangasinan, Branch 45, admitted the entry of
appearance of the Lazaro Law Firm and granted the
withdrawal of appearance of the City Prosecutor. It
also granted the prayer to drop the city as defendant
and admitted its complaint for consolidation with Del
Castillo's complaint, and directed the defendants to
answer the city's complaint.
In its February 14, 2003 Order,9 the RTC
denied reconsideration of the September 11, 2002
Order. It also granted Capalad's motion to expunge all
pleadings filed by Atty. Sahagun in his behalf. Capalad
was dropped as defendant, and his complaint filed by
Atty. Jorito C. Peralta was admitted and consolidated
with the complaints of Del Castillo and Urdaneta City.
The RTC also directed APP and APPCDC to answer
Capalad's complaint.
Aggrieved, APP and APPCDC filed a petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals. the Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition.
Hence, this petition, which we treat as one for
review on certiorari under Rule 45, the proper remedy
to assail the resolutions of the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: Did the RTC err and commit grave abuse of
discretion in (a) entertaining the taxpayers' suits; (b)
allowing a private law firm to represent Urdaneta City;
(c) allowing respondents Capalad and Urdaneta City to
switch from being defendants to becoming
complainants; and (d) allowing Capalad's change of
attorneys?
RULING and RATIO:
A. In the case of taxpayers' suits, the party suing as a
taxpayer must prove that he has sufficient interest in
CivPro - 1
preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by
taxation. Thus, taxpayers have been allowed to sue
where there is a claim that public funds are illegally
disbursed or that public money is being deflected to
any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted
through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law.
xxxx
Petitioners' allegations in their Amended
Complaint that the loan contracts entered into by the
Republic and NPC are serviced or paid through a
disbursement of public funds are not disputed by
respondents, hence, they are invested with personality
to institute the same.
Here, the allegation of taxpayers Del Castillo,
Del Prado, Ordono and Maguisa that P95 million of the
P250 million PNB loan had already been paid for
minimal work is sufficient allegation of overpayment,
of illegal disbursement, that invests them with
personality to sue. Petitioners do not dispute the
allegation as they merely insist, albeit erroneously,
that public funds are not involved. Under Article
195325 of the Civil Code, the city acquired ownership
of the money loaned from PNB, making the money
public fund. The city will have to pay the loan by
revenues raised from local taxation or by its internal
revenue allotment.
In addition, APP and APPCDC's lack of
objection in their Answer on the personality to sue of
the four complainants constitutes waiver to raise the
objection under Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.
B. Petitioner contend that only the City Prosecutor can
represent Urdaneta City and that law and
jurisprudence prohibit the appearance of the Lazaro
Law Firm as the city's counsel.
Its appearance as Urdaneta City's counsel is
against the law as it provides expressly who should
represent it. The City Prosecutor should continue to
represent the city.
C. Petitioners claim that Urdaneta City is
estopped to reverse admissions in its Answer
that the contracts are valid and, in its pre-trial
brief, that the execution of the contracts was in
good faith.
We disagree. The court may allow amendment of
pleadings.
Section 5,41 Rule 10 of the Rules of Court
pertinently provides that if evidence is objected
to at the trial on the ground that it is not within
the issues raised by the pleadings, the court may
allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do
so with liberality if the presentation of the merits
of the action and the ends of substantial justice
will be subserved thereby. Objections need not
even arise in this case since the Pre-trial Order
dated April 1, 2002 already defined as an issue
whether the contracts are valid. Thus, what is
needed is presentation of the parties' evidence
on the issue. Any evidence of the city for or
54
 emedial Law Review
Digests
against the validity of the contracts will be
relevant and admissible. Note also that under
Section 5, Rule 10, necessary amendments to
pleadings may be made to cause them to
conform to the evidence.
In addition, despite Urdaneta City's judicial admissions,
the trial court is still given leeway to consider other
evidence to be presented for said admissions may not
necessarily prevail over documentary evidence, e.g.,
the contracts assailed. A party's testimony in open
court may also override admissions in the Answer.
As regards the RTC's order admitting Capalad's
complaint and dropping him as defendant, we find the
same in order. Capalad insists that Atty. Sahagun has
no authority to represent him. Atty. Sahagun claims
otherwise. We note, however, that Atty. Sahagun
represents petitioners who claim that the contracts are
valid. On the other hand, Capalad filed a complaint for
annulment of the contracts. Certainly, Atty. Sahagun
cannot represent totally conflicting interests. Thus, we
should expunge all pleadings filed by Atty. Sahagun in
behalf of Capalad.
D. Relatedly, we affirm the order of the RTC in allowing
Capalad's change of attorneys, if we can properly call it
as such, considering Capalad's claim that Atty.
Sahagun was never his attorney.
WHEREFORE, we (1) GRANT the petition; (2) SET
ASIDE the Resolutions dated April 15, 2003 and
February 4, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 76170; (3) DENY the entry of appearance of the
Lazaro Law Firm in Civil Case No. U-7388 and
EXPUNGE all pleadings it filed as counsel of Urdaneta
City; (4) ORDER the City Prosecutor to represent
Urdaneta City in Civil Case No. U-7388; (5) AFFIRM
the RTC in admitting the complaint of Capalad; and (6)
PROHIBIT Atty. Oscar C. Sahagun from representing
Capalad and EXPUNGE all pleadings that he filed in
behalf of Capalad.
Let the records be remanded to the trial court for
further proceedings.
TIU v. PBCOM
FACTS: Asian Water Resources, Inc. (AWRI),
represented by herein petitioners Henry Tiu,
Christopher Go, and George Co, applied for a real
estate loan with the Philippine Bank of
Communications (PBCOM). The first loan was secured
by a piece of land as collateral. Subsequently, a bigger
loan was applied for by AWRI but without an additional
real estate collateral. Instead, the members of the
Board of Directors of AWRI were required to become
sureties under a Surety Agreement. AWRI defaulted on
its obligation and offered all its properties to be applied
in a dacion en pago arrangement. PBCOM, however,
rejected this offer and sued for collection. In the
Answer of petitioners, they claimed that the Surety
Agreement attached to the complaint were falsified,
considering that when they signed the same, the
CivPro - 1
words "In his personal capacity" did not yet appear in
the document and were merely intercalated thereon
without their knowledge and consent. PBCOM realized
this mistake and explained that the insertion was
ordered by the bank auditor since standard procedures
warranted that the words “in his personal capacity” be
indicated under the name of each surety. It was
alleged to have been made to reflect the parties’ true
intentions. PBCOM then filed a Reply and Answer to
Counterclaim with Motion for Leave of Court to
Substitute Annex "A" of the Complaint,16 wherein it
attached the duplicate original copy retrieved from the
file of the notary public. This version did not anymore
include the alleged intercalated words. PBCOm urged
the trail court to treat its motion as a motion for leave
of court to amend and admit the amended complaint
pursuant to Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioners meanwhile maintain that PBCOM’s cause of
action was solely and principally founded on the
alleged falsified document originally marked as the
Annex. Thus, the withdrawal of the document results in
the automatic withdrawal of the whole complaint on
the ground that there is no more cause of action to be
maintained or enforced by plaintiff against petitioners.
Also, petitioners argue that if the substitution will be
allowed, their defenses that were anchored on the
alleged falsified copy of the Agreement would be
gravely affected.
ISSUE: Does the substitution of the alleged falsified
document qualify as an amendment of the complaint?
Should such amendment be allowed?
RULING and RATIO:
Yes. When a cause of action is anchored on a
document, its substance must be set forth, and the
original or a copy thereof shall be attached to the
pleading as an exhibit and deemed a part thereof. With
respect to PBCOM’s right to amend its complaint,
including the documents annexed thereto, Section 3,
Rule 10 of the Rules of Court specifically allows
amendment with leave of court. Moreover, by virtue of
the amendment of the Rules in 1997, an amendment
may now substantially alter the cause of action or
defense. Second, the granting of leave of court to
amend a pleading is discretionary. And even if the
amendment substantially alters the cause of action or
defense, such amendment could still be allowed when
it is sought to serve the higher interest of substantial
justice. Courts should be liberal in allowing
amendments to pleadings to avoid a multiplicity of
suits and in order that the real controversies between
the parties are presented, their rights determined, and
the case decided on the merits without unnecessary
delay. Furthermore, amendments to pleadings are
generally favored and should be liberally allowed in
furtherance of justice in order that every case, may so
far as possible, be determined on its real facts and in
order to speed up the trial of the case or prevent the
circuity of action and unnecessary expense. In the
present case, there was no fraudulent intent on the
55
 emedial Law Review
Digests
part of PBCOM in submitting the altered surety
agreement. In fact, the bank admitted that it was a
mistake on their part to have submitted it in the first
place instead of the original agreement. The
substitution was also in accordance to the best
evidence rule. Lastly, contrary to petitioners’
contention, they could not be prejudiced by the
substitution since they can still present the substituted
documents as part of the evidence of their affirmative
defenses. Further, the petitioners are not precluded
from filing the appropriate criminal action against
PBCOM for attaching the altered copy of the surety
agreement to the complaint. It cannot thus maintain
that it was prejudiced by the substitution/amendment.
BILL OF PARTICULARS
BARITUA v. MERCADER
FACTS: The original complaint was filed against JB
Lines, Inc. (Petitioner) by heirs of Dominador Mercader
(respondents) arising from the breach of contract of
carriage.
Dominador Mercader boarded petitioner’s bus
bound for Northern Samar as a paying passenger. He
was not able to reach his destination because the said
bus fell into the river resulting in his death.
Petitioner JB Lines, Inc.] filed a motion to
dismiss complaint, to strike out false-impertinent
matters therefrom, and/or for bill of particulars on the
primary grounds that [respondents] failed to implead
Jose Baritua as an indispensable party and that the
cause of action is a suit against a wrong and non-
existent party.
Respondents filed an opposition to the said
motion and an amended complaint. In its answer,
petitioners denied specifically all the material
allegations in the complaint.
The RTC, after due trial, rendered the decision
in favor of the respondents. This was affirmed by the
CA modifying only the amount of lost earnings to be
awarded .
ISSUE: Whether the CA disregarded petitioners'
procedural rights when it ruled on the case without
recognizing their motion for bill of particulars. – NO.
RATIO: Petitioners argue that the CA erred when it
passed sub silencio on the trial court's failure to rule
frontally on their plea for a bill of particulars.
It must be noted that petitioners' counsel
manifested in open court his desire to file a motion for
a bill of particulars. The RTC gave him ten days from
March 12, 1985 within which to do so. He, however,
filed the aforesaid motion only on April 2, 1985 or
eleven days past the deadline set by the trial court.
Moreover, such motion was already moot and
academic because, prior to its filing, petitioners had
already filed their answer and several other pleadings
to the amended Complaint. Section 1, Rule 12 of the
Rules of Court, provides:
CivPro - 1
"Section 1. When applied for; purpose. --
Before responding to a pleading, a party may
move for a more definite statement or for a bill
of particulars of any matter which is not
averred with sufficient definiteness or
particularity to enable him properly to prepare
his responsive pleading. If the pleading is a
reply, the motion must be filed within ten (10)
days from service thereof. Such motion shall
point out the defects complained of, the
paragraphs wherein they are contained, and
the details desired."16 (emphasis supplied)
REYES v. RTC of MAKATI
FACTS: Oscar and Rodrigo Reyes are 2 of the 4
children of Pedro and Anastacia Reyes. These 4 all
owned shares in Zenith Insurance Corporation, a
family corporation. Pedro and Anastacia both died, but
Anastacia’s estate was not settled, including her
shares. By 1990 Oscar owned ~8.7M shares, Rodrigo
owned ~4.2K shares.
In 2000, Rodrigo as shareholder filed a
“derivative suit” against Oscar for 1. Accounting of
assets of Zenith, and 2. Determination of shares and
profits fraudulently appropriated by Oscar and delivery
to his siblings of their rightful portion of shares and
profits. It was filed in the SEC, then transferred to the
present special commercial court in Makati because of
the passage of the Securities Regulation Code which
transferred jurisdiction over certain cases to the RTC.
Oscar filed a motion to declare the suit a
nuisance suit. The RTC dismissed only the second
cause of action on the ground that the same should be
properly done in a settlement of estate proceeding.
Certiorari[65] by Oscar to the CA was denied, thus the
present appeal.
ISSUE: W/N the commercial court of Makati has
jurisdiction over the complaint. – NO.
RATIO: Jurisdiction is conferred by law and
determined by the allegations in the complaint. Section
5, Rule 8 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that in
all averments of fraud or mistake, the
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake must
be stated with particularity. This was not done in
this case. The averments of fraud were all made
generally, e.g. “This is a complaint...to determine the
shares of stock of the deceased spouses Pedro and
Anastacia Reyes that were arbitrarily and fraudulently
appropriated for himself”, “Respondent Oscar C.
Reyes, through other schemes of fraud including
misrepresentation, unilaterally, and for his own
benefit, capriciously transferred and took possession
and control of the management of Zenith.” The
complaint made general averments and conclusions of
law; without statements of the facts to which the
allegations of fraud refer, these do not sufficiently
56
 emedial Law Review
Digests
state an effective cause of action. These also do not
give the opponent a chance to prepare his defense.
Not every allegation of fraud done in a
corporate setting or perpetrated by corporate officers
will bring the case within the special commercial
court's jurisdiction. To fall within this jurisdiction, there
must be sufficient nexus showing that the corporation's
nature, structure, or powers were used to facilitate the
fraudulent device or scheme. This was not so here, for
what was alleged was that Oscar used fraud to
increase his shares, profit and control which enabled
him to become the corporation’s President. This is not
enough.
In ordinary cases, the failure to specifically
allege the fraudulent acts does not constitute a ground
for dismissal since such defect can be cured by a bill of
particulars. In cases governed by the Interim Rules of
Procedure on Intra-Corporate Controversies, however,
a bill of particulars is a prohibited pleading. It is
essential, therefore, for the complaint to show on its
face what are claimed to be the fraudulent corporate
acts if the complainant wishes to invoke the court's
special commercial jurisdiction.
REPUBLIC v. SANDIGANBAYAN (2007)
FACTS: The Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG), through the OSG, filed a
Complaint for reconveyance, reversion, accounting,
restitution and damages alleging that Cruz11 (the
alleged crony in this case), the former President
Marcos, and Mrs. Marcos stole public assets and
invested them in several institutions here and abroad.
The Marcoses failed to file an answer and were
declared in default. Then the former President died and
was substituted by his estate. Mrs. Marcos filed a
Motion to Set Aside Order of Default, which was
granted. The court then directed the former President
Marcos' children to appear before it or it will proceed
with pre-trial and subsequent proceedings. Respondent
Marcos Jr. filed a Motion for Leave to File a Responsive
Pleading as executor of his late father's estate, which
was granted. Respondent asked for three extensions
totaling 35 days to file an answer. But instead of filing
an answer, he filed a Motion for Bill of Particulars
which was again upheld.
Petitioner Republic contended that since the
default order against former President Marcos has not
been lifted by any court order, respondent cannot file a
motion for a bill of particulars. That Respondent was
granted leave to file an answer to the expanded
complaint, not a motion for a bill of particulars; that
the motion is dilatory. That respondent impliedly
11
Roman A. Cruz, Jr. (Cruz), then president and general
manager of GSIS, president of PAL, chairman and president
of the Hotel Enterprises of the Philippines, Inc., owner of
Hyatt Regency Manila, chairman and president of Manila Hotel
Corporation; and chairman of the Commercial Bank of Manila
(CBM).
CivPro - 1
admitted that the complaint sufficiently averred factual
matters because he was able to prepare a draft
answer, as stated in his second and third motions for
extension. That Mrs. Marcos and Cruz had already filed
their respective answers. Petitioner maintained that
the expanded complaint "illustrated the essential acts
pertaining to the conspirational acts" between Cruz
and former President Marcos.
Respondent Marcos Jr. countered that the
allegations consisted of mere conclusions of law and
were too vague and general. That the default order
against his father was effectively lifted; otherwise, he
would not have been called by the court to appear
before it and allowed to file a responsive pleading.
ISSUE: Did the court commit GADALEJ in granting
respondent's motion for a bill of particulars as executor
of former President Marcos' estates considering that
the deceased defendant was then a defaulting
defendant when the motion was filed? – NO.
RULING: Under the Rules of Court, a defending party
may be declared in default, upon motion and notice,
for failure to file an answer within the allowable period.
In this case, former President Marcos died while in
exile in Hawaii while this case was pending. His
representatives failed to file a motion to lift the order
of default. Nevertheless, respondent, as executor of
his father's estate, filed a motion for leave to file a
responsive pleading, three motions for extensions to
file an answer, and a motion for bill of particulars all of
which were granted by the anti-graft court.
The legal effect of the grant of these motions is
that the default order against the former president is
deemed lifted. The act of the court in entertaining such
motions during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings
effectively meant that respondent has acquired a locus
standi in this case. That he filed a motion for a bill of
particulars instead of an answer does not pose an issue
because he, as party defendant representing the
estate, is allowed to do so under the Rules of Court to
be able to file an intelligent answer. It follows that
petitioner's filing of a bill of particulars in this case is
merely a condition precedent to the filing of an
answer.
The allegations against former President
Marcos are obviously couched in general terms. While
the allegations as to the alleged specific acts of Cruz
were clear, they were vague and unclear as to the acts
of the Marcos couple who were allegedly "in unlawful
concert with" the former. There was no factual
allegation in the original and expanded complaints on
the collaboration of or on the kind of support extended
by former President Marcos to Cruz in the commission
of the alleged unlawful acts constituting the alleged
plunder. The alleged acts, conditions and
circumstances that could show the conspiracy among
the defendants were not particularized and sufficiently
set forth by petitioner.
That the late president's co-defendants were
able to file their respective answers to the complaint
57
 emedial Law Review CivPro - 1
Digests
does not necessarily mean that his estate's executor
will be able to file an equally intelligent answer, since
the answering defendants' defense might be personal
to them.
Lastly, the allowance of the motion for a more
definite statement rests with the sound discretion of
the court. As usual in matters of a discretionary
nature, the ruling of the trial court will not be reversed
unless there has been a palpable abuse of discretion or
a clearly erroneous order.

58
 emedial Law Review
Digests
A. Deposition taken in another Proceeding
CARIAGA V. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: Luis Miguel Aboitiz was, at the time of the incident in
question, the Systems Analyst of the Davao Light & Power
Company (DLPC). He received reports that some private
electricians were engaged in the clandestine sale of DLPC
materials and supplies. He initiated a covert operation to
discover the people involved. He sought the assistance of Sgt.
Fermin Villasis of Davao Police and Florencio Siton (a.k.a
Canuto Duran) as undercover agent.
Canuto Duran struck an acquaintance with one
Ricardo Cariaga, a private electrician, at a store. He told
Ricardo that his boss ordered him to buy electrical materials.
Ricardo offered to supply Canuto Duran with electrical
materials, saying that he has a cousin from whom he can
procure the same. Canuto purchased small electrical wires
which, according to Ricardo, came from his cousin, Jonathan
Cariaga. It turned out that Jonathan was the assigned driver of
a DLPC Service Truck. Canuto inquired from Jonathan if he
could supply him with the supplies he needed and when he
said yes, Canuto placed an order. They agreed to meet an a
certain place to facilitate the transaction. Note that several
other transactions between the same parties transpired after
this.
One day, a police team apprehended Canuto and
turned him over to the station. The team was unable to arrest
Ricardo as he had already left when the team arrived at his
house. Canuto Duran confessed in order to persuade Ricardo
and the others who were involved to likewise come out with
the truth. Ricardo came to the police station and confessed to
the crime. He revealed that he acted as a fence for his cousin,
Jonathan Cariaga. He also confessed that the supplies were
DLPC properties.
The prosecution was unable to present Ricardo as its
witness as the subpoena could not be personally served upon
him as according to his wife, Antonieta Cariaga, he was in
Sultan Kudarat and the date of his return to Davao City was
not certain.
The trial court convicted Jonathan Cariaga. CA
affirmed. The Court of Appeals reasoned out that the sworn
statement of Ricardo Cariaga who did not testify in open court
during the criminal proceedings against petitioner is admissible
in evidence and properly considered by the trial court as this
was annexed as part of DLPCs position paper submitted to the
National Labor Relations Commission in a complaint filed by
the accused for illegal dismissal, as an exception to the
hearsay rule under Section 47, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules
of Court.
ISSUE: W/N the sworn statement of Ricardo Cariaga which
was attached to DLPC’s position paper in the labor case filed
by Jonathan Cariaga is admissible? NO, IT IS NOT
ADMISSIBLE.
HELD: Section 47 of Rule 130 reads: SEC. 47. Testimony or
deposition at a former proceeding. The testimony or deposition
of a witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a former
case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the
same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence
Depositions
against the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-
examine him.
More specific however is the rule prescribed in Rule
115, Section 1(f) of the Rules of Court in respect of the
admissibility in evidence in a criminal case of the previous
testimony of unavailable witnesses which reads:
Section 1. Rights of accused at the trial. In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled:
f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses
against him at the trial. Either party may utilize as
part of its evidence the testimony of a witness who is
deceased, out of or can not with due diligence be
found in the Philippines, unavailable or otherwise
unable to testify, given in another case or proceeding,
judicial or administrative, involving the same parties
and subject matter, the adverse party having had the
opportunity to cross-examine him;
The records reveal that witness Ricardo Cariaga was
subpoenaed only once and did not appear to testify in the
criminal case against petitioner. Concededly, this witness was
not deceased or out of the Philippines. In fact, the private
prosecutor informed the court that he is in Sultan Kudarat, and
previously, his wife informed the sheriff that he was in Sultan
Kudarat which is in Cotabato, a mere four hours drive from
Davao City. Against this backdrop, can this witness be
categorized as one that cannot be found despite due diligence,
unavailable or unable to testify. We are inclined to rule in the
negative and reverse the Court of Appeals on this point.
It must be emphasized that this rule is strictly
complied with in criminal cases, hence, mere sending of
subpoena and failure to appear is not sufficient to prove
inability to testify. The Court must exercise its coercive power
to arrest. In the instant case, no efforts were exerted to have
the witness arrested which is a remedy available to a party-
litigant in instances where witnesses who are duly subpoenaed
fail to appear. On this score alone, the sworn statement of
Ricardo Cariaga should not have been admitted as evidence for
the prosecution.
B. Deposition may be taken anytime after
institution of any action; uses of Deposition
JONATHAN LAND OIL V. MANGUDADATU
Facts: Suharto and Miriam Sangki Mangudadatu
(Mangudadatus) filed with the RTC in Tacurong City, Sultan
Kudarat, a complaint for damages against Jonathan Landoil
International Co., Inc. ("JLI"). During the pre-trial, JLI failed to
appear and was thus declared in default. As a result, JLI filed
an Omnibus Motion for New Trial and Change of Venue. This
was eventually denied by the Court and a Writ of Execution
was issued against them.
JLI filed a Motion to Quash/Recall Writ of Execution
since they were not able to receive a copy of an order
resolving their motion for new trial. To make matters worse,
their counsels, Attys. Mario Jr. and Peligro submitted
withdrawals of appearance. They were replaced by new
lawyers and the affidavits of Mario and Peligro attesting that
they had not yet received a copy of the Order resolving the
Motion for New Trial were attached.
60
 emedial Law Review
Digests
JLI then received a notice regarding the public
auction sale of their properties. By reason of the immediate
threat to implement the Writ of Execution, it filed with the CA a
Petition for Prohibition seeking to enjoin the enforcement of
the Writ until the resolution of the Motion to Quash.
The RTC ordered the Mangudadatus to comment on
the motion to quash filed by JLI. In their comment, they
attached two separate Certifications supposedly issued by the
postmaster of Tacurong City, affirming that the Order denying
the Motion for New Trial had been received by Mario and
Peligro. To clear things up, counsel for JLI personally served
counsel for the Mangudadatus a Notice to Take Deposition
upon Oral Examination of Attys. Mario and Peligro. The
Deposition was intended to prove that JLI had not received a
copy of the Order denying the Motion for New Trial. Thus, the
depositions of their former counsels were taken.
The RTC denied JLI’s motion to quash. The CA ruled
that JLI could no longer avail itself of a deposition under Rule
23 of Rules of Court, since trial had already been terminated
(because a decision was rendered after JLI’s default).
Issue: Can JLI avail of the depositions of their former
counsels despite the case being terminated?
Decision: Yes.
A deposition may be taken with leave of court after
jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over
property that is the subject of the action; or, without such
leave, after an answer has been served. Deposition is chiefly a
mode of discovery, the primary function of which is to
supplement the pleadings for the purpose of disclosing the real
points of dispute between the parties and affording an
adequate factual basis during the preparation for trial.
The Rules of Court and jurisprudence, however, do
not restrict a deposition to the sole function of being a mode
of discovery before trial. Under certain conditions and for
certain limited purposes, it may be taken even after trial has
commenced and may be used without the deponent being
actually called to the witness stand. Thus, "[d]epositions may
be taken at any time after the institution of any action,
whenever necessary or convenient. There is no rule that limits
deposition-taking only to the period of pre-trial or before it; no
prohibition against the taking of depositions after pre-trial.”
Depositions are allowed, provided they are taken in
accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court (that is,
with leave of court if the summons have been served, without
leave of court if an answer has been submitted); and provided,
further, that a circumstance for their admissibility exists
(Section 4, Rule 23, Rules of Court).
The Rules of Court vest in the trial court the
discretion to order whether a deposition may be taken or not
under specified circumstances that may even differ from those
the proponents have intended. However, it is well-settled that
this discretion is not unlimited. It must be exercised -- not
arbitrarily, capriciously or oppressively -- but in a reasonable
manner and in consonance with the spirit of the law, to the
end that its purpose may be attained.
Depositions
In this case, the depositions involved a circumstance
that fell under Section 4(c)(2) of Rule 23.1 The witnesses of JLI
in Metro Manila resided beyond 100 kilometers from Sultan
Kudarat, the place of hearing. JLI offered the depositions in
support of its Motion to Quash (the Writ of Execution) and for
the purpose of proving that the trial court’s Decision was not
yet final. As previously explained, despite the fact that trial has
already been terminated, a deposition can still be properly
taken.
C. Deposition not a substitute for actual
testimony
SALES VS. SABINO
Facts: Respondent Sabino filed an action for damages against,
among others, Sales who was the driver of the vehicle involved
in an accident which ultimately caused the death of Sabino’s
son. Before an answer was filed, Sabino notified the defendant
that he will take the deposition of Buaneres Corral. The
deposition was taken before the clerk of court, where the
counsel of Sales participated and cross-examined Corral. The
deposition, together with a certification from the Bureau of
Immigration (BOI), attesting to the departure of Corral for
abroad, was offered in evidence by Sabino. This was opposed
to by Sales on the ground that the jurisdiction requirements for
their admission under Sec. 4, Rule 23 were not complied with.
He argued that the certification by the BOI only showed that
Corral left the country on the date mentioned therein, and that
it does not prove that he has not returned since then and is
unavailable to be present in court to personally testify. TC
admitted the evidence. On certiorari, CA agreed with the TC.
Issue: W/N the TC and CA were correct in admitting the
deposition.
Held/Ratio: SC agreed with CA. It ruled that the situation
falls w/in one of the exceptions in Sec. 4, Rule 23 (specifically,
that the witness is out of the Philippines).
General Rule
Depositions are not meant to substitute for the actual
testimony in open court of a party or witness. It is not to be
used when the deponent is at hand. If it does not fall within
any of the exceptions enumerated in Sec. 4, Rule 23, it may be
opposed to and excluded on the ground of hearsay.
Exceptions
1
The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by
any party for any purpose if the court finds: (1) that the witness is
dead; or (2) that the witness resides at a distance more than one
hundred (100) kilometers from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of
the Philippines, unless it appears that his absence was procured by the
party offering the deposition; or (3) that the witness is unable to
attend or testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment;
or (4) that the party offering the deposition has been unable to
procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena; or (5) upon
application and notice, that such exceptional circumstances exist as to
make it desirable, in the interest of justice and with due regard to the
importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open
court, to allow the deposition to be used;
61
 emedial Law Review
Digests
1. Witness is dead;
2. Witness resides 100kms from the place of trial or
hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it appears
that his absence was procured by the party offering
the deposition;
3. Witness is unable to attend because of age, sickness,
infirmity, or imprisonment;
4. Party offering the deposition has been unable to
procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena;
or
5. Upon application and notice, that such exceptional
circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in the
interest of justice and with due regard to the
importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses
orally in open court, to allow the deposition to be
used.
NB: The party against whom the deposition is sought to be
used should have been present or represented at the taking of
the deposition, or at least had due notice thereof.
SC said here that the certification by the Bureau of
Immigration provided the necessary evidentiary support to
prove that Corral was out of the country when the deposition
was offered.
Also, on waiver…
Sabino argued that there was a waiver of the objection to the
admission of the deposition when Sales’ counsel participated in
the taking of the deposition. SC did not agree holding that,
according to Sec. 29, Rule 3, objections to competency of
witness or competence, relevancy or materiality of testimony
are not waived unless they could have been obviated at the
time the deposition was taken. Remember, in depositions
taking is different from using.
D. Period to apply for Deposition
ROSETE v LIM
FACTS: Spouses Lim sued Rosete, BPI, Register of Deeds,
Espreme Realty and AFP-RSBS for Annulment of Deed of Sale
and Specific Performance. The spouses wanted the Deed of
Sale over a parcel of land executed by AFP-RSBS in favor of
Espreme Realty annulled and consequently, that the titles of
Espreme be cancelled and land be restored to the spouses by
the Register of Deeds.
Several Motions to Dismiss were filed by Rosete et al
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and venue being
improperly laid. These were all dismissed prompting Rosete et
al to file a petition for certiorari.
While the certiorari suit was pending, the spouses
filed a Motion to Serve Supplemental Allegations against BPI
and Rosete. The RTC granted prompting Rosete et al to again
bring the ruling on certiorari.
Meanwhile, Rosete et al filed an Ex Parte Motion to
Admit Answer Ex Abudanti Cautela (meaning “out of abundant
caution”).
On the other hand the spouses filed a Notice to Take
Deposition upon Oral Examination. This was opposed by
Rosete et al saying that leave of court was necessary as there
was no answer filed by them yet and the issues have not yet
been joined because their Answer was filed Ex Abudanti
Depositions
Cautela pending resolution of their certioraris. Also, Rosete et
al contend that since there are pending criminal cases against
them on the same facts, their right to self-incrimination may
be violated the allegations of fact the spouses are seeking are
the same allegations of fact in the criminal action.
Both the RTC and CA ruled in favor of the spouses
ISSUE: Whether or not leave of court is necessary to serve
written depositions and interrogatories – NO
HELD: When to serve written depositions and interrogatories
is spelled clearly in Section 1, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court.
Before an answer has been filed but after the court obtained
jurisdiction over the defendant or property subject of an
action, leave of court is necessary. If an answer has been filed
no leave of court is necessary. In this case, the Answer Ex
Abundati Cautela does not make the answer less of an answer.
It has all the attributes of an answer namely, that it sets out
the litigants’ defenses. There being a complaint and an answer
which completely defines each side’s claims and defenses,
there is no reason to believe why the issues have not yet been
joined as argued by Rosete et al.
E. Non-resident foreign corporation to testify
through deposition
SAN LUIS V JUDGE ROJAS, BERDEX INTERNATIONAL
(sorry if a bit long, daming issues relevant to depositions)
Facts: Berdex, a Californian corporation, filed a complaint for a
sum of money against San Luis. It alleged that it was a non-
resident foreign corporation suing on an isolated transaction.
Berdex claimed that San Luis loaned money from it and that
San Luis refused to sign the contract of loan. San Luis claimed
that there was no loan contract, and whatever money San Luis
initially gave Berdex was not a sign of his liability to Berdex.
(facts really not super important since issue was on the
deposition)
Berdex filed a motion to authorize deposition taking through
written interrogatories, stating that all of its witnesses are
Americans who reside or hold office in the US and that one of
the witnesses was really old and could not travel to the
Philippines, and that there was a perceived danger because of
the 9-11 attacks.
San Luis opposed the deposition, claiming that it
would deprive the court the chance to examine the demeanor
of the witnesses. He also claimed that his right to cross-
examine the witnesses would be impaired.
The lower courts and the CA allowed the depositions
to be taken.
Issue: Whether Section 1, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court
allows a non-resident foreign corporation the privilege
of having all its witnesses, all of whom are foreigners,
to testify through deposition upon written
interrogatories taken outside the Philippines to prove
an oral contract
Held: Yes.
62
 emedial Law Review
Digests
Unequivocally, the rule does not make any distinction or
restriction as to who can avail of deposition. The fact that
private respondent is a non-resident foreign corporation is
immaterial. The rule clearly provides that the testimony of any
person may be taken by deposition upon oral examination or
written interrogatories, at the instance of any party.
Depositions serve as a device for ascertaining the facts relative
to the issues of the case. The evident purpose is to enable the
parties, consistent with recognized privileges, to obtain the
fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before civil
trials and thus prevent the said trials from being carried out in
the dark.
This situation is one of the exceptions for its
admissibility under Section 4(c)(2), Rule 23 of the Rules of
Court, i.e., that the witness resides at a distance of more than
one hundred (100) kilometers from the place of trial or
hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it appears that his
absence was procured by the party offering the deposition.
On the Dasmarinas case
San Luis insists that Dasmariñas does not constitute a
precedent in the instant case as the facts are substantially
different; to wit: (1) in Dasmariñas, plaintiff filed a motion to
take deposition through written interrogatories of two
witnesses abroad after it had already presented its first
witness, while in the present case, private respondent will not
present a single witness to testify in court but only the
witnesses’ depositions; (2) in Dasmariñas, the existence of the
contract involved was not in issue at all, while in the present
case, petitioner denied the existence of the alleged contract of
loan and private respondent has not presented any
documentary evidence to support its claim.
San Luis is wrong. The situation in Dasmariñas is the same
as in the instant case since in both cases, it was already during the
trial stage that the deposition through written interrogatories was
sought to be taken. It does not matter whether one witness for the
plaintiff had already testified since the Dasmariñas ruling did not
make such testimony in court a condition to grant the deposition of
the two other witnesses. Also, in Dasmariñas, the plaintiff sued
defendant to recover a certain sum of money which was the same
as in the instant case as private respondent was suing petitioner for
collection of sum of money.
On claim that the right to take depositions would result in injustice
since oral contracts need a stricter standard of proof
San Luis is wrong. While there are limitations to the rules of
discovery, even when permitted to be undertaken without
leave and without judicial intervention, such limitations
inevitably arise when it can be shown that the examination is
being conducted in bad faith, is irrelevant or merely done to
annoy.
Deposition discovery rules are to be accorded a broad
and liberal treatment and should not be unduly restricted if the
matters inquired into are otherwise relevant and not privileged,
and the inquiry is made in good faith and within the bounds of
law. Otherwise, the advantage of a liberal discovery procedure
in ascertaining the truth and expediting the disposal of
litigation would be defeated. In fact, there is nothing in the
rules on deposition that limits their use in case of oral contract
as alleged by San Luis.
In any event, the admissibility of the deposition does
not preclude the determination of its probative value at the
Depositions
appropriate time.
On claim that deposition will prevent court from observing the
demeanor
San Luis wrong. Depositions are allowed as a departure
from the accepted and usual judicial proceedings of examining
witnesses in open court. It precisely falls within one of the
exceptions where the law permits such a situation, i.e., the use
of a deposition in lieu of the actual appearance and testimony
of the deponent in open court and without being subject to the
prying eyes and probing questions of the Judge. Depositions
are allowed provided the deposition is taken in accordance
with the applicable provisions of the Rules of Court; that is,
with leave of court if the summons have been served, without
leave of court if an answer has been submitted; and provided,
further, that a circumstance for their admissibility exists.
On right to cross-examine
The rules allow San Luis to submit cross-interrogatories upon
private respondent with sufficient fullness and freedom.
On lack of enforcement for perjury
No issue yet so court will not rule on it.
F. Application of Rule 23 in criminal cases
MANGUERRA, ET AL. V. RISOS, ET AL.
Facts: Before the RTC Cebu, Raul Risos, Susan Yongco, Leah
Abarquez and Atty. Gamaliel Bonje (“Risos, et al.”) were
charged with Estafa Through Falsification of Public
Document (i.e. the deed of real eastate mortgage), where they
made it appear that Concepcion Cuenco Vda. de Manguerra
(“Concepcion”), the owner of the mortgaged property (the
Gorordo property), affixed her signature to the document.
Risos, et al. filed a Motion for Suspension of the Proceedings in
the criminal case on the ground of prejudicial question. They
argued that the civil case, which was an action for declaration
of nullity of the mortgage, should first be resolved. The RTC
granted the motion, as well as denied Concepcion’s MR. This
prompted Concepcion’s counsel to seek the nullification of the
RTC orders before the CA.
Earlier last year, Concepcion, who was a resident of
Cebu City, while on vacation in Manila, was unexpectedly
confined at the Makati Medical Center due to upper gastro-
intestinal bleeding; and was advised to stay in Manila for
further treatment. Because of this, Concepcion’s counsel filed a
motion to take her deposition. He explained the need to
perpetuate her testimony due to her weak physical condition
and old age, which limited her freedom of mobility. The RTC
granted the motion and directed that her deposition be taken
before the Clerk of Court of Makati City. The RTC justified that
procedural technicalities should be brushed aside because of
the urgency of the situation. Risos et al. appealed to the CA,
which rendered a Decision favorable to them. The appellate
court set aside the RTC orders and declared void “any
deposition that may have been taken on the authority of such
void orders.”
At the outset, the CA observed that there was a
defect in the criminal case by not impleading the People of the
Philippines, an indispensable party. This notwithstanding, it
63
 emedial Law Review
Digests
resolved the matter on its merit, declaring that the
examination of prosecution witnesses, as in the present case,
is governed by Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure (CrimPro) and not Rule 23 of the Rules of
Court (“CivPro”), which is applicable to civil cases. Pursuant to
the said CrimPro provision, Concepcion’s deposition should
have been taken before the judge or the court where the case
is pending, which is the RTC of Cebu, and not before the Clerk
of Court of Makati City; and thus, in issuing the assailed order,
the RTC clearly committed grave abuse of discretion.
Issues:
1. Does Rule 23 of CivPro apply to the deposition of
Concepcion? (main issue) - No. CrimPro squarely
applies.
2. Does the failure to implead the "People of the
Philippines" in a petition for certiorari arising from a
criminal case a quo constitute a waivable defect in the
same petition? (sub issue) – Yes.
Held: The petition is denied. CA affirmed; RTC committed
grave abuse of discretion.
Ratio:
MAIN ISSUE: Pursuant to the accused’s constitutional right to
confront the witnesses face-to-face, all witnesses shall give
their testimonies during the trial of the case in the presence of
the judge. This is especially true in criminal cases so that the
accused may cross-examine the witnesses. It also gives the
parties and their counsel the chance to propound such
questions as they deem material and necessary to support
their position or to test the credibility of said witnesses. Lastly,
this rule enables the judge to observe the witnesses’
demeanor. As exceptions, however, Rules 23 to 28 of the
Rules of Court (CivPro) provide for the different modes of
discovery that may be resorted to by a party to an action.
These rules are adopted either to perpetuate the testimonies
of witnesses or as modes of discovery. In criminal proceedings,
Sections 12, 13 and 15, Rule 119 (CivPro) allow the conditional
examination of both the defense and prosecution witnesses.
On whether Rule 23 (CivPro) applies to the instant
case, the answer is no. In the case at bench, in issue is the
examination of a prosecution witness, who was too sick to
travel and appear before the trial court. Such a situation,
however, is adequately and squarely covered by a specific
provision of the rules of criminal procedure (i.e. Section 15,
Rule 1192). Thus, Rule 23 could not be applied suppletorily.3
Rule 119 specifically states that a witness may be conditionally
examined: 1) if the witness is too sick or infirm to appear at
the trial; or 2) if the witness has to leave the Philippines with
no definite date of returning. It is required that the conditional
examination be made before the court where the case is
2
See Section 15, Rule 119 on the examination of witness for the
prosecution. Please note that a slightly different rule exists for the
examination of witness for the defense under Section 13 of Rule 119.)
3
While it is true that Section 3, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides
that CivPro rules apply to all actions, civil or criminal and special
proceedings, the suppletory application of the same come into play
only in situations not adequately covered by CrimPro rules on criminal
cases.
Depositions
pending. It is also necessary that the accused be notified, so
that he can attend the examination, subject to his right to
waive the same after reasonable notice. As to the manner of
examination, the Rules mandate that it be conducted in the
same manner as an examination during trial, that is, through
question and answer.
Thus, granting Concepcion’s motion and actually
taking her deposition in Makati City is erroneous and contrary
to the clear mandate of the Rules. There is nothing in the rule
which may be remotely interpreted to mean that such
requirement does not apply when the witness is kilometers
away, as in the present case. The court may not introduce
exceptions or conditions. Neither may it engraft into the law
(or the Rules) qualifications not contemplated. When the
words are clear and categorical, there is no room for
interpretation; there is only room for application. The Court we
cannot disregard rules which are designed mainly to protect
the accused’s constitutional rights. The giving of testimony
during trial is the general rule. The conditional examination of
a witness outside of the trial is only an exception, and as such,
calls for a strict construction of the rules. The Court finds no
necessity to depart from, or to relax, this rule, especially when
the witness’ testimony is crucial to the prosecution’s case.
(Sub Issue: Failure to implead the "People of the Philippines" is
a waivable defect. It is undisputed that in their petition
for certiorari before the CA, the People of the Philippines was
not impleaded as a party thereto. Because of this, the petition
was obviously defective. As provided in Section 5, Rule 110
(CrimPro), all criminal actions are prosecuted under the
direction and control of the public prosecutor. Therefore, Risos
et al. should have impleaded the People of the Philippines as
respondent in the CA case to enable the Solicitor General to
comment on the petition. However, this Court has repeatedly
declared that the failure to implead an indispensable party is
not a ground for the dismissal of an action. The remedy is to
implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties
may be added by order of the court, on motion of the party or
on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such
times as are just. If the petitioner/plaintiff refuses to implead
an indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter
may dismiss the complaint/petition for the
petitioner’s/plaintiff’s failure to comply. In this case, the CA
disregarded the procedural flaw by allowing the petition to
proceed, in the interest of substantial justice. Also noteworthy
is that, notwithstanding the non-joinder of the People of the
Philippines as party-respondent, it managed, through the
Office of the Solicitor General, to file its Comment on the
petition for certiorari. Thus, the People was given the
opportunity to refute the respondents’ arguments.)
G. Purpose of taking Deposition
ISIDRO PAJARILLAGA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
THOMAS KALANGEG
FACTS: Thomas Kalangeg filed with the RTC of Mt. Province a
Complaint for a Sum of Money against Isidro Pajarillaga. They
failed to reach an amicable settlement, thus trial on merits
ensued. It was Kalangeg who first presented his witness.
However, at the next scheduled hearing, neither Pajarillaga nor
64
 emedial Law Review
Digests
his counsel appeared despite notice. Upon Kalangeg’s motion,
the RTC allowed him to present his remaining witnesses
subject to Pajarillaga’s cross-examination on the next hearing.
However, Pajarillaga and his counsel were once again absent
on the next hearing. Upon Kalangeg’s motion, the RTC
declared Pajarillaga to have waived his right of cross-
examination and allowed Kalangeg to make a formal offer of
evidence. In its Order, the RTC admitted all the exhibits
formally offered by Kalangeg and scheduled Pajarillaga’s
presentation of evidence on Oct. 28, 29 and 30, 1997.
Pajarillaga moved to reset the hearing to Dec. 15, 1997 and
the same was granted by the RTC. However, on Dec. 10,
1997, Pajarillaga filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Take
the Deposition of Defendant Upon Written
Interrogatories on the grounds that: (a) Pajarillaga resides
in Manila which is more than 400 kms from Mt. Province; and
(b) Pajarillaga is suffering from an illness which prohibits him
from doing strenuous activities. Kalangeg opposed the motion.
On Dec. 15, 1997, neither Pajarillaga nor his counsel appeared,
but the RTC rescheduled Pajarillaga’s presentation of evidence
to Jan. 12, 1998. An Order was issued by the RTC Judge on
Jan. 29, 1998 denying Pajarillaga’s Motion. He moved for a
MR, but the RTC denied. Pajarillaga elevated the case to the
CA via Rule 65. The CA affirmed the RTC’s orders denying
Pajarillaga’s Motion.
ISSUE: W/N the taking of Pajarillaga’s deposition by
written interrogatories is proper under the
circumstance obtaining in this case.
HELD/RATIO: NO. Pajarillaga’s Petition is Denied for
Lack of Merit.
Deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery, the
primary function of which is to supplement the
pleadings for the purpose of disclosing the real points
of dispute between the parties and affording an
adequate factual basis during the preparation for trial.
It should be allowed absent any showing that taking it would
prejudice any party. It is accorded a broad and liberal
treatment and the liberty of a party to make discovery is well-
nigh unrestricted if the matters inquired into are otherwise
relevant and not privileged, and the inquiry is made in good
faith and within the bounds of law. It is allowed as a departure
from the accepted and usual judicial proceedings of examining
witnesses in open court where their demeanor could be
observed by the trial judge, consistent with the principle of
promoting just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every
action and proceeding; and provided it is taken in accordance
with the provisions of the Rules of Court, i.e., with leave of
court if summons have been served, and without such leave if
an answer has been submitted; and provided further that a
circumstance for its admissibility exists.
There is nothing in the Rules of Court or in
jurisprudence which restricts a deposition to the sole function
of being a mode of discovery before trial. Under certain
conditions and for certain limited purposes, it may be taken
even after trial has commenced and may be used without the
deponent being actually called to the witness stand. There is
no rule that limits deposition-taking only to the period of pre-
trial or before it; no prohibition exists against the taking of
depositions after pre-trial. There can be no valid objection to
Depositions
allowing them during the process of executing final and
executory judgments, when the material issues of fact have
become numerous or complicated. Thus, there is really nothing
objectionable, per se, with petitioner availing of this discovery
measure after private respondent has rested his case and prior
to petitioner’s presentation of evidence. To reiterate,
depositions may be taken at any time after the institution of
any action, whenever necessary or convenient.
But when viewed vis the several postponements
made by Pajarillaga for the initial presentation of his evidence,
we are of the view that his timing is, in fact, suspect. The
records show that Pajarillaga stopped attending the hearings
after Kalangeg presented his first witness. Pajarillaga offered
no excuse for his and his counsel’s absences. Moreover, the
RTC has set four (4) hearing dates for the initial presentation
of his evidence. But he merely moved for its resetting without
invoking the grounds which he now presents before the SC.
Besides, even upon scrutiny of Pajarillaga’s arguments, the SC
thinks that he has not sufficiently shown an “exceptional” or
“unusual” case for the grant of leave and reverse the trial and
appellate courts.
Sec. 4 of Rule 234 of the Rules of Court provide for
instances when depositions may be used for trial or for the
hearing of an interlocutory proceeding. In this case, Pajarillaga
invokes distance and illness to avail of the discovery measure.
The SC agrees with Kalangeg that the matter of distance could
have been settled had Pajarillaga requested for a change of
venue earlier in the proceedings. Pajarillaga has attended the
pre-trial and the hearing where Kalangeg presented his first
witness. He need not await his turn to present evidence before
realizing the great inconvenience caused by the enormous
distance between his place of residence and the place of
hearing. As to Pajarillaga’s assertion of illness, as aptly
observed by the Court of Appeals, the medical certificate
submitted by Pajarillaga merely contained a remark that the
“patient is advised to avoid strenuous activity.” It was not
alleged that the travel from Manila to Mt. Province for the
scheduled hearings was too strenuous to endanger petitioner’s
health.
H. Letters rogatory and commissions
PFEGER, GODOFREDO, ROWENA DULAY, etc v.
RODRIGO DULAY
4
SEC. 4. Use of depositions. – … x x x x
(c) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may
be used by any party for any purpose if the court finds: (1)
that the witness is dead; or (2) that the witness resides at a
distance more than one hundred (100) kilometers from the
place of trial or hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it
appears that his absence was procured by the party offering
the deposition; or (3) that the witness is unable to attend or
testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment;
or (4) that the party offering the deposition has been unable
to procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena; or
(5) upon application and notice, that such exceptional
circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in the interest of
justice and with due regard to the importance of presenting
the testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to allow the
deposition to be used; and x x x x
65
 emedial Law Review
Digests
FACTS: Rodrigo Dulay, a naturalized American citizen, alleged
in his complaint for recovery of bank deposits, that his brother
Godofredo Dulay and nephew Pfeger Dulay immigrated to the
US and stayed with him in his home in Claremont,
Massachusetts. Godofredo returned to the Philippines because
he could not endure the weather. Pfeger stayed behind to
take care of Rodrigo. Having nurtured affection for his
nephew Pfeger, Rodrigo opened a trust account with the Bank
of Boston with a deposit of $230,000.00, with Pfeger as
trustee thereof.
Five months later, Pfeger left Rodrigo’s house
allegedly to join his girlfriend in California. Rodrigo learned
only later that Pfeger actually went back to the Philippines. He
briefly returned to the US but returned again to
the Philippines where he went on a spending binge. Upon
knowing this, Rodrigo verified the status of his account with
the Bank of Boston, and to his shock discovered that Pfeger
had already emptied the account. Rodrigo claimed that Pfeger
used the money to buy several vehicles, loan money to several
people, open bank accounts for his siblings, and buy a house
and lot and jewelry for his wife. Whatever was left of the
account was allegedly transferred to Pfeger’s father,
Godofredo.
Rodrigo filed a petition for the issuance of letters
rogatory to get the depositions of several witnesses residing
abroad. Godofredo and Pfeger moved to be allowed to file
cross-examination questions to respondent’s written
interrogatories, which the trial court granted.
Godofredo and Pfeger filed a Motion to Dismiss the
complaint on the ground of failure to prosecute. This was
denied by the trial court (Pangasinan RTC).
It turned out, however, the depositions could not be
taken before the Clerk of Court of Massachusetts, but were
taken instead before a notary public in New York.
Thereafter, petitioners filed their Motion Reiterating Motion to
Dismiss, which was again denied by the RTC in an order. In
the same Order, trial court directed Rodrigo to have the
written and cross interrogatories taken by the notary public
authenticated by the consulate.
Godofredo and Pfeger filed an Omnibus
Motion, praying that the written interrogatories be declared
inadmissible and reiterating their prayer for the dismissal of
the complaint. RTC denied this, saying that the deposition
taken before the Notary Public from New York, whose
authority was duly certified by the Philippine Consul in New
York, substantially complied with the Rules of Court
In their appeal to the CA, Godofredo and Pfeger, the
major delays in the litigation of the case were caused by
Rodrigo;s failure to send on time the needed documents to the
trial court. CA ruled that Rodrigo could not be faulted for the
incidental delays in the proceedings, which were after all
caused by the refusal of the American tribunal (Clerk of Court
of Massachussets) which brushed aside the letters rogatory
issued by the trial court.
ISSUE: WON CA erred in denying the appeal of Godofredo
and Pfeger to declare inadmissibility of the depositions and
dismiss the case for failure to prosecute—NO
RATIO: While the letters rogatory issued by the trial court
specifically directed the Clerk of Court of Boston to take the
depositions needed in the case, it became impossible to follow
Depositions
the directive since the Clerk of Court of Boston merely brushed
it aside and refused to cooperate. Rodrigo cannot be faulted
for the resultant delay brought about by this circumstance.
Neither can the trial court be faulted for allowing the admission
of the depositions taken not in strict adherence to its original
directive, nor for directing the petitioner to have the
depositions authenticated. Obviously, it was not within the trial
court’s power, much less the respondent’s to force the Clerk of
Court of Boston to have the deposition taken before it.
In our jurisdiction, depositions in foreign countries
may be taken:
(a) on notice before a secretary of embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent of the Republic
of the Philippines;
(b) before such person or officer as may be appointed by
commission or under letters rogatory; or
(c) before any person authorized to administer oaths as
stipulated in writing by the parties.
While letters rogatory are requests to foreign
tribunals, commissions are directives to officials of the issuing
jurisdiction (in this case, the Phils). Generally, a commission is
an instrument issued by a court of justice, or other competent
tribunal, directed to a magistrate by his official designation or
to an individual by name, authorizing him to take the
depositions of the witnesses named therein, while a letter
rogatory is a request to a foreign court to give its aid,
backed by its power, to secure desired information.
Commissions are taken in accordance with the rules laid down
by the court issuing the commission, while in letters rogatory,
the methods of procedure are under the control of the foreign
tribunal.
Leave of court is not required when the deposition is
to be taken before a secretary of embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice-consul or consular agent of the Republic
of the Philippines and the defendant’s answer has already been
served. However, if the deposition is to be taken in a foreign
country where the Philippines has no secretary of embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul or consular agent,
it may be taken only before such person or officer as may be
appointed by commission or under letters rogatory
Here, the authentication made by the consul was a
ratification of the authority of the notary public who took the
questioned depositions. The deposition was, in effect, obtained
through a commission, and no longer through letters rogatory.
It must be noted that this move was even sanctioned by the
trial court by virtue of its Order. With the ratification of the
depositions in issue, there is no more impediment to their
admissibility.
Besides, the allowance of the deposition can not be said to
have caused any prejudice to the adverse party. They were
given the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses through
their cross-interrogatories, which were in turn answered by the
deponents. Save for the complaint of delay in the proceedings,
petitioners were unable to point out any injury they suffered as
a result of the trial court’s action.
I. Failure to answer written interrogatories
FELISA M. JARAVATA vs.
 MA. DIANA KAROLUS and
GRACE V. KUHAIL,
66
 emedial Law Review
Digests
FACTS: Felisa Javarata filed an action for reconveyance and
declaration of nullity of titles and damages before the RTC of
Olongapo City alleging that she is the lawful owner and actual
occupant of a parcel of land situated in Cawag, Subic,
Zambales. The said lot, was consolidated with other parcels of
land and further subdivided into three lots, namely, Lot 1, Lot
2, and Lot 3. Lot 3 was thereafter titled under Felisa's name in
the OCT.
Felisa filed the said complaint claiming that as early
as 1950, she and her predecessors-in-interest have been in
actual, continuous, open, and public possession of Lots 1, 2,
and 3 in the concept of an owner. She alleged that she even
had planted and cultivated the subject parcels of land and had
declared the same for taxation purposes.
The complaint ensued when Felisa discovered that
her relatives, Diana Karolus and Grace Kuhail, fraudulently and
illegally secured titles over Lots 1 and 2. Felisa alleged that the
two, through fraud and misrepresentation, were able to obtain
a Free Patent in their names for which an OCT was issued by
the Register of Deeds. Felisa alleged that Lot 1 overlapped
with the property registered in the name of Karolus while Lot 2
overlapped with the property registered in the name of Kuhail.
Felisa asserted that the free patents issued to
respondents Karolus and Kuhail should be declared null and
void ab initio on the grounds that respondents have never
been in possession of the contested lots and that they were
never qualified to be grantees of free patents, obtained in
1988, on account of their age and citizenship.
Felisa insisted that as early as 1980 she became
owner, ipso facto and by operation of law, of the disputed
parcels of land on account of her open and continuous
possession and cultivation for more than 30 years, her
payment of taxes thereon, and her exercise of all attributes of
ownership over said properties. Hence, she alleged that the
disputed lots ceased to be part of the public domain and
beyond the authority of the Director of Lands and the DENR to
dispose of or award as free patents to third parties.
In their answer, respondents Karolus and Kuhail
claimed, that the issuance of free patents in their names was
made in accordance with law and without any fraud or
misrepresentation; that the areas covered by their OCTs do
not overlap with any area covered by Felisa's property; and
that they had been in possession of the parcels of land until
they were partially disposed by Felisa and her counsel.
Respondents also filed a third-party complaint against
Rudegelio D. Tacorda, Felisa’s counsel.
Felisa then served upon the respondents and their
counsel two separate and different sets of written
interrogatories. Respondents filed their objection to the written
interrogatories but the RTC denied the same. Tacorda likewise
served upon respondents separate and different sets of written
interrogatories.
Thereafter, Felisa and Tacorda filed a joint omnibus
motion primarily to compel the respondents to fully and
completely answer their written interrogatories. Respondents
however, failed to fully answer the written interrogatories both
in the principal action as well as in the third party complaint.
Hence, the RTC declared respondents in default in
accordance with Rule 29, Section 3 (c) of the ROC and
rendered judgment in favor of Felisa. The RTC declared Felisa
as the lawful and true owner of the parcels of land known as
Lot nos. 1 and 2 and declared the OCTs in the name of the
Depositions
respondents, null and void.
Aggrieved, respondents filed a notice of appeal before
the CA. The CA reversed the decision of the RTC and dismissed
the complaint of Felisa. Hence, this petition.
Issues: Whether or not the CA erred in setting aside
the RTC’s default judgment considering that
respondents did not fully answer the written
interrogatories served upon them. – No
Held: The CA was correct in holding that the RTC erred in
rendering a judgment by default against the defendants for
refusal or failure to answer written interrogatories, without first
requiring an application by the proponent to compel an
answer. This is the requisite procedure under Section 1 of Rule
29 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Nevertheless, the CA erred in proceeding to decide
the case on the merits since there was as yet no trial or
presentation of evidence in the court a quo. Petitioner's prayer
to affirm the trial court's default decision does not mean that
there was a trial. The decision of the trial court was based on
constructive admissions by the defendants of the allegations of
the plaintiff due to the court's application of the sanction for
not answering the written interrogatories. In reversing the
application of the sanction, the CA should have given the
parties a chance to substantiate by evidence their respective
claims at the trial court. This is particularly true with respect to
the plaintiff's claim of physical possession for more than 30
years, regarding which the CA said that clear and convincing
evidence was required but wanting. The wrong procedure
followed by the trial court effectively aborted a trial and
presentation of evidence.
The case was therefore ordered remanded to the RTC for
trial and/or further proceedings.
J. Consequences of failure to answer
interrogatories
ZEPEDA v. CHINA BANKING CORP.
FACTS: Spouses Zepeda obtained a loan of P5.8 million from
Chinabank. The loan was secured by a REM over their parcel of
land.
The Zepedas had difficulty paying their loan
obligations so they requested for loan restructuring, which was
allegedly granted by Chinabank. Later on however, they were
surprised when Chinabank extrajudicially foreclosed the
subject property in October 2001. The spouses failed to
redeem the property and ownership wazs consolidated in the
bank’s favor.
So in Feb 2003, the spouses filed a complaint for
nullification of foreclosure proceedings and loan documents
with damages against CHinabank. They aver that the
foreclosure proceedings should be annulled for falure to
comply with the posting and publication requirements. They
also claim that they signed the REM and promissory note in
blank but were not given a copy, and that interest rates were
unilaterally fixed.
Chinabank filed an Answer with affirmative defenses
and counterclaim. It also filed a set of WRITTEN
INTERROGATORIES with 20 questions.
67
 emedial Law Review
Digests
The bank’s affirmative defenses were denied by the
TC and ordered the Clerk of Court to set the pre-trial
conference for marking of parties’ documentary evidence.
Bank filed a petition for certiorari (r65) with CA for
refusal to consider the affirmative defenses AND when
petitioners FAILED TO ANSWER the written interrogatories. CA
granted, ruled in favor of bank and dismissed the complaint.
ISSUE: W/N the complaint should be dismissed for
failure of petitioners spouses Zepeda to answer
Chinabank’s written interrogatories as provided in Sec
3c of Rule 29.
HELD/RATIO: No. CA erred. Complaint should not be
dismissed for failure to answer the written
interrogatories.
It should be noted that respondent bank filed a motion to
expunge the complaint based on Section 3(c) of Rule 29 which
states:
SEC. 3. Other consequences. – If any party or an
officer or managing agent of a party refuses to obey
an order made under section 1 of this Rule requiring
him to answer designated questions, or an order
under Rule 27 to produce any document or other
thing for inspection, copying, or photographing or to
permit it to be done, or to permit entry upon land or
other property, or an order made under Rule 28
requiring him to submit to a physical or mental
examination, the court may make such orders in
regard to the refusal as are just, and among others
the following:
xxxx
(c) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or
staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed,
or dismissing the action or proceeding or any part
thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against
the disobedient party; and
As we have explained in Arellano v. Court of First
Instance of Sorsogon, the consequences enumerated in
Section 3(c) of Rule 29 would only apply where the party upon
whom the written interrogatories is served, refuses to answer
a particular question in the set of written interrogatories and
despite an order compelling him to answer the particular
question, still refuses to obey the order.
In the instant case, petitioners refused to
answer the whole set of written interrogatories, not
just a particular question. Clearly then, respondent
bank should have filed a motion based on Section 5 and
not Section 3(c) of Rule 29. Section 5 of Rule 29 reads:
SEC. 5. Failure of party to attend or serve answers. –
If a party or an officer or managing agent of a party
willfully fails to appear before the officer who is to
take his deposition, after being served with a proper
notice, or fails to serve answers to interrogatories
submitted under Rule 25 after proper service of such
interrogatories, the court on motion and notice, may
strike out all or any part of any pleading of that party,
or dismiss the action or proceeding or any part
thereof, or enter a judgment by default against that
party, and in its discretion, order him to pay
reasonable expenses incurred by the other, including
attorney’s fees.
Due to respondent bank’s filing of an erroneous
motion, the trial court cannot be faulted for ruling that the
Depositions
motion to expunge was premature for lack of a prior
application to compel compliance based on Section 3.
The imposition of sanctions under Section 5 is within
the sound discretion of the trial court. The matter of how, and
when, the above sanctions should be applied is one that
primarily rests on the sound discretion of the court where the
case pending, having always in mind the paramount and
overriding interest of justice. For while the modes of discovery
are intended to attain the resolution of litigations with great
expediency, they are not contemplated, however, to be
ultimate causes of injustice.
K. Request for admission not answered
SIME DARBY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION V. NLRC
Facts:
On Oct 1995, Sime Darby Employees Association
(Union) submitted its proposal to Sime Darby
(Company) for the remaining 2 years of their then
existing CBA. The Company gave its counter-proposal,
but the parties failed to reach a mutual settlement.
The Company declared a deadlock in the negotiations
and subsequently sought the intervention of DOLE by
filing a Notice of CBA Deadlock and Request for
Preventive Mediation. The Union objected to the
deadlock and filed an opposition to the Assumption of
Jurisdiction/Certification to Arbitration.
The Company filed a Notice of Lockout on June 21,
1995 on the ground of the deadlock in the CB
negotiations and sent a Notice of Lock Out Vote to
the NCMB. On the other hand, the Union conducted
its strike vote referendum and filed its Strike Vote
Result to NCMB on July 25, 1991. On Aug 1995, the
Company declared and implemented a lockout against
all the hourly employees of its tire factory on the
ground of sabotage and work slowdown. On Sept.
1995, the Union filed a complaint for illegal lockout
before DOLE.
Meanwhile, on Oct 1995, the stockholders of the
Company approved the sale of its tire manufacturing
assets and business operations. The Company issued
a memorandum dated Oct. 20, 1995 informing all its
employees of the plan to sell the tire manufacturing
assets and operations. On Oct. 27, 1995, the
Company filed w/ DOLE a Closure and Sale of Tire
Manufacturing Operation. On Nov. 15, 1995, the
Company individually served notices of termination to
all its employees, including individual petitioners.
Because of the lockout, the employees were barred
from entering the company premises and were only
allowed to enter to get their personal belongings and
their earned benefits on Nov. 21-22, 1995. The
employees also received their separation pay and
executed individual quitclaims and releases. On Nov.
1995, the Company filed w/ DOLE a Notice of
Termination of Employees covering all its employees
in the tire manufacturing and support operations
effective Dec. 15, 1995.
In Nov. 1995, petitioners filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal before the DOLE while on Jan 1996, they
68
 emedial Law Review
Digests
filed a complaint for ULP. The cases for illegal
dismissal, illegal lockout and unfair labor practice
were then consolidated. Subsequently, the Company
then filed a motion to return separation pay by the
complainants pending resolution of the case. The
Labor Arbiter issued an Order in view of the Motion
requiring both parties to submit their respective
Memoranda. Instead of complying, the petitioners
filed its Memorandum of Appeal w/ an application for
TRO w/ the NLRC.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed the cases for lack of
merit. The LA found the lockout valid and legal,
justified by the incidents of continued work
slowdown, mass absences, and consistent low
production output. They also found that due process
was followed.
The NLRC affirmed en toto the decision of the Labor
Arbiter. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with
the CA which it dismissed.
Petitioners appeal the decision of the CA.
Issue: Whether petitioner’s Request for Admission should have
been granted and the evidence included therein should have
been admitted since respondents’ reply/objection thereto were
not made under oath
Held: No. Petition dismissed.
A request for admission is a remedy provided by Rule
26 of the Rules of Court, which allows a party to file
and serve upon any other party a written request for
the admission of: (i) the genuineness of any material
and relevant document described in and exhibited
with the request; or (ii) the truth of any material and
relevant matter of fact set forth in the request. Said
request must be answered under oath within the
period indicated in the request, otherwise the matters
of which admission were requested should be deemed
admitted. Petitioners claim that respondents, instead
of filing an answer under oath, filed an unsworn
reply/objection thereto. Thus, the admissions should
be deemed admitted in their favor.
Petitioners’ Request for Admission does not fall under
Rule 26 of the Rules of Court. A review of said
Request for Admission shows that it contained
matters which are precisely the issues in the
consolidated cases, and/or irrelevant matters; for
example, the reasons behind the lockout, the
company’s motive in the CBA negotiations, lack of
notice of dismissal, the validity of the release and
quitclaim, etc.
Rule 26 as a mode of discovery contemplates of
interrogatories that would clarify and tend to shed
light on the truth or falsity of the allegations in a
pleading. That is its primary function. It does not
refer to a mere reiteration of what has already been
alleged in the pleadings.
Otherwise stated, petitioner's request constitutes "an
utter redundancy and a useless, pointless process
which the respondent should not be subjected to."
The rule on admission as a mode of discovery is
intended "to expedite trial and to relieve parties of
Depositions
the costs of proving facts which will not be disputed
on trial and the truth of which can be ascertained by
reasonable inquiry." Thus, if the request for admission
only serves to delay the proceedings by abetting
redundancy in the pleadings, the intended purpose
for the rule will certainly be defeated.
More importantly, well-settled is the rule that
hearings and resolutions of labor disputes are not
governed by the strict and technical rules of evidence
and procedure observed in the regular courts of law.
Technical rules of procedure are not applicable in
labor cases, but may apply only by analogy or in a
suppletory character, for instance, when there is a
need to attain substantial justice and an expeditious,
practical and convenient solution to a labor problem.
In view of the nature of the matters requested for
admission by the petitioners, their request for
admission would have only served to delay the
proceedings.
L. Matters covered by a request for admission
DBP v. CA
Petitioner: Development Bank of the Philippines
Respondent: CA and Rosalinda Canadalla-Go, represented by
her Atty-in-fact Benito A. Canadalla
FACTS: Irene Canadalla obtained a loan of P100,000 from
petitioner DBP for purposes of financing her piggery business.
As security, Canadalla executed a Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage over two parcels of land. Canadalla again obtained
another loan of P150,000, which was secured by a mortgage
over the same two parcels of land and a third parcel. Canadalla
failed to comply with her obligations to DBP so DBP
extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgages. The mortgaged
properties were sold at public auction to the DBP, which
emerged as the only bidder.
Canadalla was able to redeem one of the foreclosed
properties but failed to redeem the others since they could not
agree on the redemption price. Irene Canadalla allegedly later
assigned her right to redeem her properties to her daughter,
private respondent Rosalinda Canadalla-Go. When Go failed to
redeem the properties, the DBP consolidated its titles over the
subject properties and new certificates of title were issued in
its name.
Go filed with the RTC of Makati City a Supplemental
Complaint for the "Exercise of Right of Redemption and
Determination of Redemption Price, Nullification of
Consolidation, Annulment of Titles, with Damages, Plus
Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order." After the DBP
filed its Answer but before the parties could proceed to trial,
Go filed a Request for Admission by Adverse Party. Thereafter,
the DBP filed its Comment.
During the hearing, Go objected to the Comment
reasoning that it was not under oath as required by Section 2,
Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, and that it failed to state the
reasons for the admission or denial of matters for which an
admission was requested. For its part, the DBP manifested
that, first, the statements, allegations, and documents
contained in the Request for Admission are substantially the
69
 emedial Law Review
Digests
same as those in the Supplemental Complaint; second, they
had already been either specifically denied or admitted by the
DBP in its Answer; and third, the reasons for the denial or
admission had already been specifically stated therein.
RTC issued an Order granting the motion of Go to
consider as impliedly admitted the matters sought to be
admitted in the Request for Admission and all those denied by
the DBP in its Comment.
DBP filed with the CA a petition forcertiorari
attributing to the court a quo grave abuse of discretion in
granting the Request for Admission despite the fact that (1)
some of the matters assigned in the Request for Admission
had already been specifically denied in its Answer to the
Supplemental Complaint; (2) the sworn statement of Atty.
Caraan (one the legal counsels of DBP) had sufficiently cured
the alleged defect of the Comment; (3) some of the matters in
the Request for Admission involved questions of law,
conclusions of facts, and matters of opinion which are
improper subjects of such a request.
The CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
ISSUE: Whether matters requested to be admitted under Rule
26 of the Rules of Court – which are mere reiterations of the
allegations in the complaint and are specifically denied in the
answer – may be deemed impliedly admitted on the ground
that the response thereto is not under oath – NO!
HELD: The Court finds for DBP.
Indeed, as pointed out by the DBP, the matters
stated in Go’s Request for Admission are the same as those
alleged in her Supplemental Complaint. Besides, they had
already been either specifically denied or admitted in DBP’s
Answer to the Supplemental Complaint. To require the DBP to
admit these matters under Rule 26 of the Rules of Court would
be pointless and superfluous.
The Court held in Po v. CA that "[a] party should not
be compelled to admit matters of fact already admitted by his
pleading and … to make a second denial of those already
denied in his answer to the complaint." It further stated in
Concrete Aggregates Co. v. CA that if the factual allegations in
the complaint are the very same allegations set forth in the
request for admission and have already been specifically
denied or otherwise dealt with in the answer, a response to
the request is no longer required. It becomes unnecessary to
dwell on the issue of the propriety of an unsworn response to
the request for admission. The reason is obvious. A request for
admission that merely reiterates the allegations in an earlier
pleading is inappropriate under Rule 26 of the Rules of Court,
which, as a mode of discovery, contemplates of interrogatories
that would clarify and tend to shed light on the truth or falsity
of the allegations in the pleading. Rule 26 does not refer to a
mere reiteration of what has already been alleged in the
pleadings.
Hence, the DBP did not even have to file its Comment
on Go’s Request for Admission, which merely reproduced the
allegations in her complaint. DBP’s Answer itself controverts
the averments in the complaint and those recopied in the
request for admission.
Even assuming that a reply to the request is needed,
it is undisputed that the DBP filed its Comment either
admitting or specifically denying again the matters sought to
be admitted and stating the reasons therefor. That the
Depositions
Comment was not under oath is not a substantive, but merely
a formal, defect which can be excused in the interest of justice
conformably to the well-entrenched doctrine that all pleadings
should be liberally construed as to do substantial justice. The
filing of such Comment substantially complied with Rule 26.
Consequently, the DBP cannot be deemed to have impliedly
admitted the matters set forth in the Request for Admission for
the mere reason that its Comment was not under oath.
The Court of Appeals also erred in ruling that the DBP
failed to timely raise its objections to the impropriety of the
matters requested for admission.
At the time Go made use of discovery proceedings
under Rule 26, the governing rule before its amendment took
effect on 1 July 1997 read: "Objections on the ground of
irrelevancy or impropriety of the matter requested shall be
promptly submitted to the court for resolution."
Petitioner DBP’s objection to the impropriety of some
of the matters requested was promptly made as early as the
filing of its comment on the request for admission. DBP’s
comment consistently averred that it had already dealt with
the matters in question in its answer, either admitting or
specifically denying them. Moreover, during the hearing, the
counsel for DBP manifested the foregoing in open court. In so
doing, the DBP, in effect, argued that the matters in question
are redundant and, therefore, improper subjects for admission.
M. Request for admission instead of Offer to
Stipulate
MANZANO V DESPABILADERAS
FACTS: In 1989, respondent Luz Despabiladeras obtained on
credit from petitioner Roger Manzano various construction
materials, which she used in her construction project at the
Camarines Sur Polytechnic Colleges (CSPC). Petitioner claims
that the materials costs around P307K of which only P130K
was paid by respondent despite payment by CSPC for the
project. Petitioner filed a sum of money claim with damages in
the RTC of Iriga City, in her answer with counterclaim
respondent alleged that petitioner substantially altered the cost
of materials and that she made additional payments via two
checks (+P57K). In his reply, petitioner alleges that the
checks represented payment for other obligations.
The issues were joined and in the pre-trial, both
parties agreed that petitioner shall make an offer to
stipulate to respondent to determine the cost of the materials
in dispute and the latter will state her comment or objections.
Instead of making an offer to stipulate, petitioner filed a
request for admission asking respondent to admit within 15
days that (1. That respondent received the materials from
petitioner and 2. Of the P307K, only P130K was paid by
respondent). Respondent did not answer. RTC ordered the
requested facts be admitted confirmed and later on ruled in
favor of petitioner. CA set aside the decision of the RTC
ISSUE: What is the legal consequence when a request for
admission of material and relevant facts pursuant to Rule 26 is
not answered under oath within the period stated in the Rules
by a party litigant served therefore?
70
 emedial Law Review
Digests
HELD: It is deemed to have been admitted. The agreement of
the parties during the pre-trial conference was that "the
petitioner shall submit an offer to stipulate showing an
itemized list of construction materials delivered to the
respondent together with the cost claimed by the petitioner
within fifteen 15 days furnishing copy thereof to the
respondent who will state her objections if any, or comment
thereon within the same period of time." In substantial
compliance with said agreement, petitioner chose to instead
file a request for admission, a remedy afforded by a party
under Rule 26.
Respondent having failed to discharge what is
incumbent upon her under Rule 26, that is, to deny under oath
the facts bearing on the main issue contained in the "Request
for Admission," she was deemed to have admitted that she
received the construction materials, the cost of which was
indicated in the request and was indebted to petitioner in the
amount of P184,610.50 (P314,610.50 less the partial payment
of P130,000.00).
During the trial, however, petitioner admitted that aside from
the P130,000.00 partial payment, he had received a total
of P122,000.00 (P97,000.00 plus P25,000.00). Respondent
thus had a remaining balance of P62,610.50.
N. Failure to respond to a request for Admission
LIMOS, DELOS REYES AND SPOUSES DELOS REYES V
SPOUSES ODONES
FACTS: Spouses Odones (Spouses) filed a complaint for
Annulment of Deed, Title and Damages against petitioners
Limos, Delos Reyes and Spouses Delos Reyes because they
allegedly owned a parcel of land by virtue of an Extrajudicial
Succession of Estate and Sale executed by the surviving
grandchildren and heirs of Donata Lardizabal. They delayed
registering the document of conveyance and found that the
OCT was cancelled and replaced by TCT in the name of the
petitioners. Limos et al allegedly purchased it from Donata
Lardizabal and her husband Razalan. They then subdivided the
lot among themselves and had 3 new TCT’s issued.
Spouses sought the cancellation of these new TCTs on the
ground that the signatures of Lardizabal and Razalan in the
Deed of Absolute Sale were forgeries. Limos et al filed a
Motion for Bill of Particulars claiming ambiguity in respondents’
claim that their vendors are the only heirs of Donata
Lardizabal. TC denied.
In their answer, Limos et al pleaded affirmative defenses,
which also constitute grounds for dismissal of the complaint.
These grounds were: (1) failure to state a cause of action
since title is void because the Extrajudicial Succession of Estate
and Sale was not published and it contained formal defects,
the vendors are not the legal heirs of Lardizabal, and Spouses
Odones are not the real parties-in-interest; (2) non-joinder of
the other heirs of Lardizabal as indispensable parties; and (3)
Spouses claim is barred by laches.
In their Reply, the Spouses denied the foregoing affirmative
defenses and appended the sworn statement of Amadeo
Razalan denying he ever sold the property to the petitioners
nor was he the heir of Lardizabal.
Limos et al filed a Request for Admission reiterating the
issues in their affirmative defense. Spouses Odones failed to
Depositions
respond to the Request so petitioners filed a Motion to Set for
Preliminary Hearing on the Special and Affirmative Defenses,
arguing that failure to respond or object to the Request
amounted to an implied admission pursuant to Section 2 of
Rule 26 of the Rules of Court. Spouses filed a comment
contending that the facts sought to be admitted were not
material and relevant to the issue of the case as required by
Rule 26 of the Rules of Court. They emphasized that the only
issue was whether the 1972 Deed of Absolute Sale upon which
Limos et al base their TCTs is valid. RTC denied Limos et al’s
motion for items 1-4 were already pleaded in their affirmative
defense while items 5-7 were effectively denied by the
Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and Sale appended to the
complaint and by the Sinumpaang Salaysay of Amadeo
Razalan.
Limos et al filed petition for certiorari to CA. CA dismissed.
Now filed MR with SC.
ISSUE: Did the Spouses impliedly admit the affirmative
defenses of Limos et al by failing to respond to the Request
resulting to holding of the preliminary hearing?
HELD: NO! The matters in the Request for Admission were the
same affirmative defenses pleaded in their Answer which the
Spouses already denied in their Reply. The said defenses were
also controverted in the complaint and its annexes. A request
for admission is not intended to merely reproduce or reiterate
the allegations of the requesting party’s pleading but should
set forth relevant evidentiary matters of fact described in the
request, whose purpose is to establish said party’s cause of
action or defense. Unless it serves that purpose, it is pointless,
useless, and a mere redundancy.
The rules on modes of discovery in Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 26
of the Rules of Court, provide:
Section 1. Request for admission. – At any time after issues
have been joined, a party may file and serve upon any other
party a written request for the admission by the latter of the
genuineness of any material and relevant document described
in and exhibited with the request or of the truth of any
material and relevant matter of fact set forth in the request.
Copies of the documents shall be delivered with the request
unless copies have already been furnished.
SEC. 2 Implied admission. – Each of the matters of which an
admission is requested shall be deemed admitted unless,
within a period designated in the request, which shall be not
less than fifteen (15) days after service thereof, or within such
further time as the court may allow on motion, the party to
whom the request is directed files and serves upon the party
requesting the admission a sworn statement either denying
specifically the matters for which an admission is requested or
setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully
either admit or deny those matters.
xxxx
Under these rules, a party who fails to respond to a Request
for Admission shall be deemed to have impliedly admitted all
the matters contained therein. It must be emphasized,
however, that the application of the rules on modes of
discovery rests upon the sound discretion of the court.
O. Amparo Rule likened to Production Order
71
 emedial Law Review
Digests
SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, AFP, CHIEF OF
STAFF VS MANALO
FACTS: In Feb 2006, members of the CAFGU summoned to a
meeting all the residents of their barangay in San Idelfonso,
Bulacan but the MANALOs (Raymond and Reynaldo) were not
able to attend coz they weren’t informed. When RAYMOND
was sleeping in their house, several armed soldiers entered the
house looking for a certain Bestre. Even though mother of
Raymond said he was not Bestre, RAYMOND was slapped,
handcuffed, kicked and forced him to enter a van (Raymond
recognized the people as CAFGU members). Raymond was
blindfolded and beaten up inside the van. RAYMOND was
brought to a house and there was continuously interrogated if
he was a NPA member and asked where his comrades are.
Each time he answered that he is not, they hit him. Raymond
was detained for 18 months where he was transferred to
different camps.
[Note: The rest of the facts stated of how Raymond lived while
being detained, how his brother Reynaldo was brought in as
well as other detainees, how they were first tortured, nursed
back to health then tortured again, how they were allowed to
go out and work within the camps, how they saw the CAFGU
soldiers kill NPA, how they planned their escape]
Basically MANALOs were abducted and detained for 18
months!
Eventually, MANALOs and other detainees were able to escape
(when the guards were sleeping after a drinking session) and
subsequently filed a petition for prohibition, injunction and
TRO against SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, AFP, and
CHIEF OF STAFF (MILITARY) to stop them and/or their agents
from depriving MANALOs of their right to liberty and other
basic rights and other ancillary remedies. While the case was
pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect
on October 24, 2007. MANALOs sought to have their petition
be considered Petition for the Writ of Amparo, which the SC
granted and remanded the case to the CA. The CA granted the
privilege of the writ of amparo and ordered MILITARY to
furnish the MANALOs and the court with: (reliefs granted by
CA)
1. all official and unofficial investigations reports as to
the MANALO’s custody, except those already in file
with the court,
2. confirm the present places of official assignment of
two military officials involved, and
3. produce all medical reports and records of the
MANALOs while under military custody. MILITARY
appealed to SC seeking to reverse and set aside CA
decision.
ISSUE: (In relation to topic) MILITARY argues that the reliefs
granted by the CA (see numbered list above).
RATIO:
The Court promulgated the Amparo Rule “in light of the
prevalence of extralegal killing and enforced disappearances.”
The writ of amparo serves both preventive and curative roles
in addressing the problem of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the
expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses; it
Depositions
is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of
perpetrators as it will inevitably yield leads to subsequent
investigation and action.
IN relation to topic:
With respect to the first and second reliefs,
MILITARY argue that the production order sought by
respondents partakes of the characteristics of a search
warrant5. Thus, they claim that the requisites for the issuance
of a search warrant must be complied with prior to the grant
of the production order. But since MANALO’s allegations are
self-serving without supporting details, it does not qualify as
such. SC held this to be invalid.
The production order under the Amparo Rule
should not be confused with a search warrant for law
enforcement under Article III, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution. This Constitutional provision is a
protection of the people from the unreasonable
intrusion of the government, not a protection of the
government from the demand of the people such as
respondents. The amparo production order may be
likened to the production of documents or things under
Section 1, Rule 276 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Not so Impt
With respect to the second and third reliefs, MILITARY
assert that the disclosure of the present places of assignment
of the military officers and submission of medical list is
unnecessary in the resolution of the petition for a writ
of amparo. But SC held that since the officers are both directly
implicated in the abduction and detention, it is relevant n
ensuring the safety of MANALOs that these military officers can
be served with notices and court processes in relation to any
investigation and action for violation of the MANALO’s rights.
The list of medical personnel is also relevant in securing
information to create the medical history of MANALOs and
make appropriate medical interventions, when applicable and
necessary.
FOR REFERENCE: Production Order Provisions in
Amparo
5
(1) the application must be under oath or affirmation;
(2) the search warrant must particularly describe the place to be
searched and the things to be seized;
(3) there exists probable cause with one specific offense; and
(4) the probable cause must be personally determined by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce.
6
Section 1. Motion for production or inspection order.
Upon motion of any party showing good cause
therefor, the court in which an action is pending may (a)
order any party to produce and permit the inspection and
copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving
party, of any designated documents, papers, books of
accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things,
not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material
to any matter involved in the action and which are in his
possession, custody or control…
72
 emedial Law Review
Digests
SEC. 14. Interim Reliefs. Upon filing of the petition or at
anytime before final judgment, the court, justice or judge may
grant any of the following reliefs:
(a) Temporary Protection Order. – The court, justice or
judge, upon motion or motu proprio, may order that the
petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the
immediate family be protected in a government agency or by
an accredited person or private institution capable of keeping
and securing their safety. If the petitioner is an organization,
association or institution referred to in Section 3(c) of this
Rule, the protection may be extended to the officers involved.
The Supreme Court shall accredit the persons and private
institutions that shall extend temporary protection to the
petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the
immediate family, in accordance with guidelines which it shall
issue.
The accredited persons and private institutions shall comply
with the rules and conditions that may be imposed by the
court, justice or judge.
(c) Production Order. The court, justice or judge, upon verified
motion and after due hearing, may order any person in
possession, custody or control of any designated documents,
papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or
tangible things, or objects in digitized or electronic form, which
constitute or contain evidence relevant to the petition or the
return, to produce and permit their inspection, copying or
photographing by or on behalf of the movant.
The motion may be opposed on the ground of national security
or of the privileged nature of the information, in which case
the court, justice or judge may conduct a hearing in chambers
to determine the merit of the opposition.
The court, justice or judge shall prescribe other conditions to
protect the constitutional rights of all the parties.
P. Documents to be produced should be described
with particularity
SOLIDBANK CORPORATION VS GATEWAY
ELECTRONICS CORPORATION
FACTS GATEWAY obtained a loan from SOLIDBANK, covered
by promissory notes. As a security for said loan, GATEWAY
assigned to Solidbank the proceeds of its Back-end Services
Agreement with Alliance Semiconductor (ALLIANCE).
GATEWAY failed to pay. When demands to pay were
unheeded, SOLIDBANK filed a complaint for collection of a sum
of money. A motion for production and Inspection of
Documents was filed on the basis of information
received from ALLIANCE that GATEWAY had already
received from ALLIANCE payment for the Back-end
Agreement. RTC granted the motion was. Gateway presented
the invoices representing the billings sent by Gateway to
Alliance in relation to the Back-end Services Agreement.
Unsatisfied with the documents produced by GATEWAY,
SOLIDBANK filed a motion to cite the former in contempt for
refusal to produce documents. GATEWAY opposed saying they
complied with the Order. RTC denied Motion but the court
reprimanded GATEWAY for not exerting diligent efforts to
produce the documents and thereafter, pronounced as
established, documents not produced by GATEWAY. CA
Depositions
nullified the ruling of the trial court. It ruled that both the
Motion for Production of Documents and the of the trial court
failed to comply with the provisions of Section 1, Rule 27 of
the Rules of Court. It further held that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the matters
regarding the contents of the documents sought to be
produced but which were not produced by Gateway shall be
deemed established in accordance with Solidbank’s claim.
ISSUE W/N SOLIDBANK’s Motion for Production and Inspection
complies with the Rules of Court. – NO.
HELD
Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Court provides the
mechanics for the production of documents and the inspection
of things during the pendency of a case. It also deals with the
inspection of sources of evidence other than documents, such
as land or other property in the possession or control of the
other party. The purpose of the statute is to enable a party-
litigant to discover material information which, by reason of an
opponent's control, would otherwise be unavailable for judicial
scrutiny, and to provide a convenient and summary method of
obtaining material and competent documentary evidence in the
custody or under the control of an adversary. It is a further
extension of the concept of pretrial. Rule 27 of the Revised
Rules of Court permits “fishing” for evidence, the only
limitation being that the documents, papers, etc., sought to be
produced are not privileged, that they are in the possession of
the party ordered to produce them and that they are material
to any matter involved in the action. Mutual knowledge of all
relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper
litigation either party may compel the other to disgorge
whatever facts he has in his possession.
In this case, GATEWAY assigned to SOLIDBANK the
proceeds of its Back-end Services Agreement with Alliance and
by virtue of the assignment, GATEWAY was obligated to remit
to SOLIDBANK all payments received from ALLIANCE.
Solidbank was able to show good cause for the production of
the documents and why these are material to the action.
However, the motion was fatally defective because of its
failure to specify with particularity the documents it
required Gateway to produce. Since the motion for
production and inspection of documents called for a blanket
inspection. SOLIDBANK’s request for inspection of "all
documents pertaining to, arising from, in connection with or
involving the Back-end Services Agreement" was simply too
broad and too generalized in scope.
SC held that a motion for production and inspection
of documents should not demand a roving inspection of a
promiscuous mass of documents. The inspection should be
limited to those documents designated with sufficient
particularity in the motion, such that the adverse party can
easily identify the documents he is required to produce
OTHER NOTES:
The requisites in order that a party may compel the
other party to produce or allow the inspection of
documents or things (according to Security Bank vs
CA)
73
 emedial Law Review Depositions
Digests
(a) The party must file a motion for the production or
inspection of documents or things, showing good cause
therefor;
(b) Notice of the motion must be served to all other parties of
the case;
(c) The motion must designate the documents, papers, books,
accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things
which the party wishes to be produced and inspected;
(d) Such documents, etc., are not privileged;
(e) Such documents, etc., constitute or contain evidence
material to any matter involved in the action, and
(f) Such documents, etc., are in the possession, custody or
control of the other party

74
 emedial Law Review
Digests
RULES 30-32: TRIAL, TRIAL BY
COMMISSIONERS, HEARINGS AND
CONSOLIDATION OF CASES
LOURDES DE CASTRO V. CRISPINO DE CASTRO
FACTS: The court granted Crispino de Castro’s petition
for nullity of marriage, on the ground of psychological
incapacity after Lourdes (his wife) failed to file an
answer. Lourdes filed a motion for leave to file an
omnibus motion seeking a new trial or reconsideration
alleging that she was misled and prevented from
participating in the annulment case because Crispino
promised support for their children. TC granted the
omnibus motion and conducted hearings. However,
when Lourdes was to present her first witness on July
17, 2002 the trial court had to reset the hearing
because there was no return of the notice sent. The
trial court reset the hearings 12 more times after that.
On Aug 20, 2003 the trial court denied Lourdes’
request to cancel the hearing due to unavailability of
witness. TC deemed to have waived her right to
present evidence due to failure to present evidence on
that day. On Dec. 12, 2003 the court denied Lourdes’
request to reconsider the denial claiming her absence
were justifiable with no intent to delay proceedings.
Lourdes filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
which CA denied. In this petition, Lourdes claims that
CA erred in ruling that Judge Umali did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in ruling that she waived her
right to present further evidence when she failed to
appear at the Aug 20 hearing.
ISSUE: Whether TC lower courts erred in ruling that
she waived her right to present further evidence when
she failed to appear at the August 20, 2003 hearing
HELD: NO
A motion for postponement based on a case that is not
unavoidable or one that could not have been foreseen
may be properly denied by the trial court; Case at Bar.
In the case at bar, petitioner’s excuse — that
she was still in the U.S. taking care of her newborn
grandchild, while her witness, Dr. Maria Cynthia
Ramos-Leynes, who conducted a psychiatric evaluation
on her, was likewise out of the country, attending a
convention—was unjustified. These reasons were
“not unavoidable and one that could not have
been foreseen.” The date of the trial was set one
month prior, and as of July 25, 2003, petitioner was in
the U.S. Certainly, petitioner would know in advance if
she could make it to the August 20, 2003 hearing.
Likewise, attending a convention is a scheduled event,
also something known in advance. It is the basic duty
of a litigant to move for postponement before the day
of the hearing, so that the court could order its
resetting and timely inform the adverse party of the
new date. This was not the case at bar for the subject
motion was presented only on the day of the trial
without any justification. We thus hold that the trial
CivPro - 2
court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion
for postponement.
ZULUETA V. ASIA BREWERY
FACTS:
- Respondent Asia Brewery, Inc., is engaged in the
manufacture, the distribution and sale of beer;
while Petitioner Perla Zulueta is a dealer and an
operator of an outlet selling the former’s beer
products. A Dealership Agreement governed their
contractual relations.
- Zulueta filed a complaint in the Iloilo RTC for
breach of contract, specific performance and
damages against Asia Brewery for alleged violation
of their Dealership Agreement.
- Asia Brewery, while to case in Iloilo was pending,
filed a complaint in the Makati RTC against Zulueta
for collection of sum of money for unpaid beer
products bought by the latter.
- Zulueta moved to dismiss the case in Makati based
on splitting a cause of action and violation against
multiplicity of suits but was denied. Later on, he
moved that the case in Iloilo and Makati be
consolidated. The consolidation was granted.
- Asia Brewery appealed via certiorari. CA ruled in
favor of Asia Brewery and set aside the order to
consolidate saying that there is no common issue
of law or fact between the two cases since the
Iloilo case was about the alleged violation of the
dealership agreement while the Makati case was
about the debt of Zulueta for unpaid beer
products. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N consolidation is proper.
HELD/RATIO: YES.
Zulueta’s obligation to pay for the beer products
delivered by respondent can exist regardless of an
alleged breach in the Dealership Agreement. However,
this obligation and the relationship between
respondent and petitioner, as supplier and distributor
respectively, arose from the Dealership Agreement
which is the subject of inquiry in the Iloilo case. In
fact, petitioner herself claims that her obligation to pay
was negated by respondent’s contractual breach. In
other words, the non-payment -- the res of the Makati
case -- is an incident of the Iloilo case.
The issues in both civil cases pertain to the
respective obligations of the same parties under the
Dealership Agreement. Thus, every transaction as well
as liability arising from it must be resolved in the
judicial forum where it is put in issue. The
consolidation of the two cases then becomes
imperative to a complete, comprehensive and
consistent determination of all these related issues.
Two cases involving the same parties and
affecting closely related subject matters must be
ordered consolidated and jointly tried in court, where
the earlier case was filed. The consolidation of cases
76
 emedial Law Review
Digests
is proper when they involve the resolution of common
questions of law or facts.
[The SC said that there should have been outright
dismissal of the petition for certiorari of Asia Brewery
since it was filed out of time (nag-retroact yung 60-
day period, akala nila e 90 days pa rin to file a petition
for certiorari). Tapos retained counsel lang ang nag-
sign nung CNFS. And finally, wala daw explanation why
registered mail and not personal service ang ginamit to
serve the petition for certiorari sa counsel ni Zulueta.]
SPOUSES YU AND LEYTE LUMBER YARD &
HARDWARE CO., INC. V. BASILIO MAGNO
CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
ENTERPRISES AND THE ESTATE OF BASILIO
MAGNO
Facts: Spouses Roque Yu, Sr. and Asuncion Yu
(spouses Yu) are controlling stockholders of Leyte
Lumber, a business engaged in the sale of lumber,
building and electrical supplies and other construction
materials. Engr. Basilio Magno (Magno) entered into a
verbal agreement with Leyte Lumber through Roque.
Leyte Lumber agreed to supply Magno with building
materials he may need in his construction business.
Magno's business later became Basilio G. Magno
Construction and Development Enterprises, Inc. (BG
Magno).
Subsequently, Roque and Magno entered into a
joint venture, the Great Pacific Construction Company
(GREPAC), with Yu as President and Magno as Vice
President. The relationship between Yu and Magno
continued until Magno's death in 1978.
In 1979, the spouses Yu and Leyte
Lumber instituted two separate complaints for sums of
money with damages and preliminary attachment
against BG Magno and the estate of Magno
(estate). One was Civil Case No. 5822, instituted by
Leyte Lumber against BG Magno and the estate, to
collect on the principal amount of P1,270,134.87 for
construction materials claimed to have been obtained
on credit by BG Magno. The other was Civil Case No.
5823, filed by the Yu spouses against BG Magno and
the estate, to collect upon loans and advances
amounting to P3,575,000.00 allegedly made by the
spouses to BG Magno.
Civil Case No. 5822 was raffled to RTC Branch
8. The Court rendered a decision in favor of BG Magno
and the estate, dismissing the complaint and ordered
both Spouses Yu and Leyte Lumber to return the
overpayment of P620,239.61 of BG Magno. On the
same day, the RTC Branch 6, in Civil Case No. 5823,
rendered a decision in favor BG Magno and the estate,
dismissing the complaint and ordered both Spouses Yu
and Leyte Lumber to return the overpayment of
P1,602,625.52, damages, attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses.
The two separate decisions were penned by
Judge Francisco, the presiding judge of Branch 6 to
CivPro - 2
which only Civil Case No. 5823 was raffled. The parties
did not move for a reconsideration of the two decisions
nor did they call the attention of Judge Francisco on
the absence of an order for consolidation of the two
cases. Instead, they directly interposed their
respective appeals to the CA.
In the CA, the two cases were consolidated. CA
modified the decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 5822
but reversed the decision in Civil Case No. 5823,
ordering B.G. Magno to pay the Spouses Yu and Leyte
Lumber P625,000.00 plus attorneys fees and cost of
suit. The spouses Yu filed an MR. CA denied the
motion, hence the the present petition for review
under Rule 45 to set aside the CA decision.
Issues: 1. W/N it was proper for Judge Francisco of
Branch 6 to render a decision in a case filed and heard
in Branch 8, in the absence of a motion or order of
consolidation of the two cases? Yes, it was proper.
2. W/N Branch 6 could consider the evidence
presented in Branch 8? Yes, it could since there was
consolidation of both cases.
Held and Ratio:
1. There was nothing irregular in procedure taken by
Judge Francisco of Branch 6 in formulating the decision
in Civil Case No. 5822 which was pending and tried in
Branch 8. The records show that there had been a
previous agreement to either transfer or consolidate
the two cases for decision by judge Francisco of Branch
6.
As early as six months prior to the
promulgation of Judge Francisco’s decisions in the two
cases, there appears to have been a transfer or
consolidation of said cases in Branch 6 and the parties
knew of it, albeit the actual date when the two cases
were consolidated or transferred does not appear on
record. Nonetheless, the fact remains that no
opposition or objection in any manner was registered
by either of the parties to the same, thereby evincing
their consent thereto. SC cited several instances: i.e.
when BG Magno and the estate filed a Motion to Lift,
Dissolve and Quash the Writs of Attachment with
Branch 6, the caption thereof indicated the docket
numbers of both cases; when the longstanding counsel
of both spouses Yu and Leyte Lumber filed his Motion
to Withdraw as Counsel and when their new counsel
entered his Formal Appearance, in the caption thereof
was also written the docket numbers of both cases. It
is, therefore, already too late in the day for both
spouses Yu and Leyte Lumber to question the
competence of Judge Francisco to render the separate
decisions in the two cases.
2. Consolidation by Branch 6 was proper. A court may
order several actions pending before it to be tried
together where they arise from the same act, event or
transaction, involve the same or like issues, and
depend largely or substantially on the same evidence,
provided that the court has jurisdiction over the case
to be consolidated and that a joint trial will not give
77
 emedial Law Review
Digests
one party an undue advantage or prejudice the
substantial rights of any of the parties. Moreover,
consolidation of actions is expressly authorized under
Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court.1
The obvious purpose of the above rule is to
avoid multiplicity of suits, to guard against oppression
and abuse, to prevent delays, to clear congested
dockets, to simplify the work of the trial court; in short
the attainment of justice with the least expense and
vexation to the parties litigants.
Consolidation of actions is addressed to the
sound discretion of the court, and its action in
consolidating will not be disturbed in the absence of
manifest abuse of discretion. Here, Judge Francisco did
not abuse his discretion in ordering the joint trial of the
two cases: the two cases were filed just a few months
apart; they involve simple cases of collection of sums
of money between identical parties and no other; the
respondents (BG Magno and the estate, as defendants
therein) claim, in both cases, essentially the same
defense, which is overpayment; they cover the same
period of transacting continuous business that spans
four years; they relate to simple issues of fact that are
intimately related to each other; they entailed the
presentation of practically identical evidence and
witnesses; in fact, a broad part of the evidence and
testimonies in one case was totally adopted or
reproduced in the other by either or both parties. And
the trial court, being multi-sala courts, its Branches 6
and 8 possessed jurisdiction to try either or both cases
on their own.
Likewise, it became apparent that, after the
commissioner filed his reports (in Civil Case No. 5822)
in the Court and the parties their comments thereto,
but before trial could commence, the claims and
defenses of the parties in Civil Case No. 5823 are
covered by and may be threshed out by a
consideration of the evidence presented in Civil Case
No. 5822 as well, which consisted mainly of the reports
of the commissioner. Based on the commissioner’s
reports in the case pending in Branch 8 (Civil Case No.
5822), the spouses Yu and Leyte Lumber’s claims,
including those in Branch 6, appear to have been paid;
indeed, this is in essence the defense of the BG Magno
and the estate as set forth in their Answers to
the two complaints. Yet, despite all these, neither of
the lawyers for the parties sought a consolidation of
the two cases, which would otherwise have been
mandatory.
Having given their assent to the consolidation
of Civil Case Nos. 5822 and 5823, the evidence in each
case effectively became the evidence for both, and
there ceased to exist any need for the deciding judge
to take judicial notice of the evidence presented in
each case.
1
“Section 1. Consolidation. — When actions involving a
common question of law or fact are pending before the court,
it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in
issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated;
and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein
as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.”
CivPro - 2
SC also expressed its disapproval over the
failure of the spouses Yu and Leyte Lumber’s counsel
to seek consolidation of the cases, which led to a
simple collection case to remain pending for twenty-
seven years. Moreover, SC held that the filing of the
two cases in different branches of the court may be
held to be tantamount to forum shopping which not
only put the respondents to additional unnecessary
expense, but wasted the precious time of the courts as
well.
SC likewise admonished RTC Branches 6 and 8
for the manner in which the case before each sala was
handled and conducted (for failing to order
consolidation in the records of the cases).
MEGA LAND V. CE CONSTRUCTION
Facts: Mega-Land Resources and Development
Corporation and C-E Construction Corporation were the
partiess in a matter submitted for arbitration to the
espondent Construction Industry Arbitration
Commission (CIAC). The subject of the dispute was not
mentioned in the case. On 19 June 2002, the CIAC
rendered a decision ordering Mega Land to pay CE
P18.6 Million, plus interest.
Mega Land received a copy of the CIAC
decision on 20 June 2002. Following Section 4, Rule 43
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, it had 15 days, or
until July 5 to appeal the same to the Court of
Appeals. Before the CIAC, Mega Land was represented
by the Fajardo Law Offices. On July 4, Mega Land,
through Fajardo Law Offices, filed a Motion for
Extension of Time to file a Petition for Review Under
Rule 43. The motion was docketed as CA-G.R. No.
71485 ("first case"), and it sought an extension until
20 July 2002 to file the petition for review. The reason
offered in the motion was "the voluminous records, the
complexity of the legal and factual issues, and
generally, the difficulty on the part of petitioner’s
counsel due to its other professional obligations to
timely file the petition."
However, on July 5, Mega Land, this time
through its President and General Manager Sy Siong
Lato (Sy), filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File
Petition for Review on Certiorari Under Rule 43. The
new motion for extension was assigned its own docket
number, CA-G.R. SP No. 71504 ("second case") and
also sought an extension until 20 July 2002 to file the
petition for review. The reason offered in this second
motion was it was mutually agreed between petitioner
and its counsel, the Fajardo Law Offices, that Mega
Land should secure another counsel due to "the
disagreements and/or differences of opinion in the
handling of the case." as a consequence of which it
went into the process of retaining the services of
another lawyer for the case.
Mega Land later said that the filing made by
Fajardo Law Offices in the first case was without its
prior knowledge.
78
 emedial Law Review
Digests
The first case was raffled to the CA’s 16th Division.
Despite the apparent termination of services of the
Fajardo Law Offices, no move was undertaken to
withdraw or otherwise disavow the motion earlier filed
by that counsel. The second case was raffled to the
CA’s 5th Divison. Both divisions granted the extension
up to July 20. Justice Buzon wrote the resolution in
the first case and Justice Regino wrote the one for the
second case.
Mega Land hired Atty. Richard S. Flores to
represent it before the CA. Atty. Flores filed a Motion
for Second Extension of Time to File Petition for Review
with Formal Entry of Appearance, offering as reason
the fact that his services were contracted only on 15
July 2002, or five (5) days before the expiration of the
extended reglementary period. The extension asked
for a new period of 15 days, or until 4 August 2002,
through the motion filed by Atty. Flores.
The caption used in the new motion for
extension by Atty. Flores is that of the second case
which was initiated by the motion filed by Sy in behalf
of petitioner. By this time, the former 5th Division
hearing that case had been reorganized, and the
second motion for extension was assigned to the
Special 3rd Division. It granted the second motion for
extension, again through a Resolution by Justice
Regino.
Remember that there are now 2 cases with the
CA. In the first case, no further pleading was filed by
Mega Land or the Fajardo Law Offices after the
granting of the initial motion for extension therein.
Thus, the period elapsed on July 20. In the second
case, because of the 2 motions for extension, Mega
Land had until 4 August 2002 to file its petition.
On 1 August 2002, Atty. Flores, filed, in behalf
of Mega Land a Petition for Review of the earlier CIAC
decision. The caption of the petition clearly states the
docket number as "CA-G.R. SP No. 71485," that of the
first case, or the same docket number under which the
earlier motion for extension filed by Fajardo Law
Offices was docketed.
Mega Land’s right to file a petition in the first
case had expired on 20 July 2002. The 16th Division
then issued a Resolution which noted that Mega Land
had been granted an extension until 20 July 2002 to
file the petition, but that the petition had actually been
filed only on 2 August 2002. The Sixteenth Division
likewise noted that while the Petition for Review
alleged that a motion for second extension of time had
been filed, the Judicial Records Division of the
appellate court verified that no such motion had been
filed. It said the petition was filed out of time.
In the meantime, the second case which had
been reassigned to the 3rd Divison of the CA, issued a
Resolution on October 8, 2002 dismissing Mega Land’s
appeal because it failed to file a petition for review.
Mega Land filed an MR of the CA 16th Divison’s
Resolution (first case). In it, Atty. Flores said that he
was confused with the case number since Mega Land
did not inform him that it also filed a Motion for
Extension of time to file Petition for Review before the
CivPro - 2
CA and paid the necessary docket fees. He basically
explained the existence of the two cases. The MR was
denied. The CA 16th Division said that the MR should
have been filed in the “second case.”
Issue: Whether or not Mega Land was accorded due
process.
Held: It was.
Ratio: It was Atty. Flores himself who drafted and filed
the second Motion for Extension in the second case;
thus, it should have been a simple matter of writing in
the petition he eventually filed, the same and only
docket number he had used earlier when he filed the
motion. But he did not do so. Settled is the rule that
the negligence of counsel binds the client.
Forum shopping consists of filing multiple suits
involving the same parties for the same cause of
action, either simultaneously or successively for the
purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. It exists
when, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a
party seeks a favorable opinion in another, or when he
institutes two or more actions or proceedings grounded
on the same cause, on the gamble that one or the
other court would make a favorable disposition. There
certainly is all the opportunity to accomplish the wrong
intended by forum-shopping through the filing of two
petitions for review with a collegiate court such as the
Court of Appeals, as each petition would be docketed
separately and assigned to a division of that court,
thus allowing two different divisions to act
independently as each considers and treats the
petition. Thus, no petition for review on certiorari may
be filed in the Court of Appeals if there is already a
similar petition already filed or pending with that same
court.
The filing of each motion for extension along
with the corresponding full docket fees gives rise to a
separate case before the Court of Appeals or Supreme
Court that is accordingly docketed and raffled for
evaluation and eventual deliberation. If each of the
cases involve the same petitioner, the same
respondents, and seek the extension of time to file a
petition or appeal concerning the same decision of the
lower court or tribunal, then all the opportunity and
dangers of forum shopping are imminent. The evil
itself would finally be actualized once a separate
appeal or petition for each case is actually filed.
Thus, even if forum-shopping had not yet been
consummated, the steps undertaken by Mega Land
herein may give rise to a prima facie indication that it
was about to commit forum-shopping. A party who
commits such error in good faith has the obligation to
correct the same upon becoming aware of the
anomaly.
The fact that the petition for review intended
for filing in the second case bore instead the docket
number of the first case indicates that Mega Land and
its new counsel, Atty. Flores, knew of the first case
earlier initiated by Fajardo Law Offices. In short, at the
time the petition was filed with the Court of Appeals,
79
 emedial Law Review
Digests
Mega Land had known that there were two similar
cases involving the same parties and causes of action.
There were a variety of things Mega Land could
have done. It could have moved to withdraw either
any of the motions for extension of time, so that there
would be only one case pending with the appellate
court. It really would not matter if it were the first case
or the second case which was withdrawn, since either
case was a viable vehicle for Mega Land’s intended
appeal. Had it done this at the onset, even if later the
filed petition itself stated the wrong docket number,
the Court of Appeals could have easily recorded the
pleading under the case that remained in existence
since it would anyway be incapable of filing the same
under the records of a case that had already been
withdrawn. Our procedural rules were not crafted with
the intent of unilaterally conferring fatal consequences
on simple typographical errors.
The "fiasco" ensued merely from applying the
correct legal procedures. Even as no petition was
timely filed in the first case after no second motion for
extension was sought therein, said case had not yet
been closed and terminated upon the belated filing of
the appeal. Since the appeal was filed beyond the
reglementary period, its dismissal was in accord with
the rules of procedure. At the same time, since no
petition was filed at all in the second case despite the
providential granting of two successive motions for
extension, the appeal was correctly dismissed.
There was no obligation on the part of the
Sixteenth Division to forward the petition filed to the
Third Division instead of dismissing the same. The
docket number indicated in the caption of that petition
made it clear that the same was addressed to the
Sixteenth Division instead of the Third.
It should be remembered that there is no
inherent right of appeal, as appeals are purely
statutory. Since the right to appeal is neither a natural
right nor a part of due process, it may be exercised
only in the manner and in accordance with the
provisions of law.
A pleading filed in one case does not bind the
proceedings in another case, even if both cases are
heard by just one court.
We have duly considered that perhaps this
entire untidiness could have been avoided had the
Court of Appeals at the outset consolidated the two
cases. Yet such consideration is ultimately of no
moment to petitioner. For one, under the 2002
Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (RIRCA), there is
no mandatory obligation to consolidate related cases.
The language utilized in Rule 3, Section 3 of the
RIRCA, which authorizes consolidation is cases, is
merely directory in character, providing as it does:
"[w]hen related cases are assigned to different
Justices, they may be consolidated and assigned to
one Justice." More importantly perhaps, the
consolidation of cases was never intended to cure the
defect of forum-shopping. If one litigant has filed
multiple suits involving the same parties for the same
cause of action, the consolidation of these suits is not
CivPro - 2
the correct palliative. These suits should instead be
dismissed on the ground of forum-shopping.
Rule 33: DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE
RADIOWEALTH VS. DEL ROSARIO
FACTS: The Vicente spouses jointly and severally
executed, signed and delivered in favor of Radiowealth
Finance Company a promissory note for 138,948
pesos. Pertinent provisions of the promissory note
provide that payment was to be made in installments
(11,579 payable for 12 consecutive months) and that a
late penalty charge of 2.5% shall be added to each
unpaid installment from due date thereof until fully
paid. It is also agreed that if default be made in the
payment of any of the installments or late payment
charges thereon as and when the same becomes due
and payable, the total principal sum then remaining
unpaid, together with the agreed late payment charges
thereon, shall at once become due and demandable
without need of notice or demand.
The Vicente spouses defaulted on the monthly
installments. Despite repeated demands, they failed to
pay their obligations under the promissory note.
Radiowealth filed a complaint for the Collection
of a Sum of Money before RTC Manila. During the trial,
Radiowealth’s collection and credit officer Jasmer
Famatico presented in evidence the check payments,
the demand letter, the customer’s ledger card, another
demand letter and Metropolitan Bank dishonor slips.
He admitted that he did not have any personal
knowledge of the transaction or the execution of any of
the documentary evidence which had been merely
endorsed to him. The trial court issued an order
terminating the presentation of evidence by
Radiowealth. Thus, the latter formally offered its
evidence and exhibits and rested its case.
The Vicente spouses filed a Demurrer to
Evidence for alleged lack of cause of action. It was
granted on the ground that the evidence presented by
Radiowealth were merely hearsay. However, the CA
reversed ruling that the judicial admissions (admitted
the due execution and genuineness of the promissory
note and demand letter) of the Vicente spouses
established their indebtedness to Radiowealth. It
remanded the case for further proceedings.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in remanding the case to
the trial court instead of rendering judgment on the
basis of Radiowealth’s evidence??? YES.
RULING:
Section 1, Rule 33 of the Rules of Court reads as
follows:
SECTION 1. Demurrer to evidence.—After the
plaintiff has completed the presentation of his
evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on
the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff
has shown no right to relief. If his motion is denied,
he shall have the right to present evidence. If the
80
 emedial Law Review
Digests
motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal
is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the
right to present evidence.
Explaining the consequence of a demurrer to
evidence, the Court in Villanueva Transit v.
Javellana pronounced:
“The rationale behind the rule and doctrine is simple
and logical. The defendant is permitted, without
waiving his right to offer evidence in the event that his
motion is not granted, to move for a dismissal (i.e.,
demur to the plaintiff’s evidence) on the ground that
upon the facts as thus established and the applicable
law, the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If the
trial court denies the dismissal motion, i.e., finds that
plaintiff’s evidence is sufficient for an award of
judgment in the absence of contrary evidence, the
case still remains before the trial court which should
then proceed to hear and receive the defendant’s
evidence so that all the facts and evidence of the
contending parties may be properly placed before it for
adjudication as well as before the appellate courts, in
case of appeal. Nothing is lost. The doctrine is but in
line with the established procedural precepts in the
conduct of trials that the trial court liberally receive all
proffered evidence at the trial to enable it to render its
decision with all possibly relevant proofs in the record,
thus assuring that the appellate courts upon appeal
have all the material before them necessary to make a
correct judgment, and avoiding the need of remanding
the case for retrial or reception of improperly excluded
evidence, with the possibility thereafter of still another
appeal, with all the concomitant delays. The rule,
however, imposes the condition by the same token
that if his demurrer is granted by the trial court, and
the order of dismissal is reversed on appeal, the
movant losses his right to present evidence in his
behalf and he shall have been deemed to have elected
to stand on the insufficiency of plaintiff’s case and
evidence. In such event, the appellate court which
reverses the order of dismissal shall proceed to render
judgment on the merits on the basis of plaintiff’s
evidence.”
In other words, defendants who present a
demurrer to the plaintiff’s evidence retain the right to
present their own evidence, if the trial court
disagrees with them; if the trial court agrees with
them, but on appeal, the appellate court
disagrees with both of them and reverses the dismissal
order, the defendants lose the right to present their
own evidence. The appellate court shall, in addition,
resolve the case and render judgment on the merits,
inasmuch as a demurrer aims to discourage prolonged
litigations.
In the case at bar, the trial court, acting on the
Vicente spouses’ demurrer to evidence, dismissed the
complaint on the ground that Radiowealth had adduced
mere hearsay evidence. However, on appeal, the CA
reversed the trial court because the genuineness and
the due execution of the disputed pieces of evidence
had in fact been admitted by the Vicente spouses.
CivPro - 2
Applying Rule 33, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules
of Court, the CA should have rendered judgment on
the basis of the evidence submitted by
Radiowealth. While the CA correctly ruled that the
documentary evidence submitted by Radiowealth
should have been allowed and appreciated and that
Radiowealth presented quite a number of documentary
exhibits, the SC agrees with Radiowealth that the CA
had sufficient evidence on record to decide the
collection suit. A remand is not only frowned upon by
the Rules, it is also logically unnecessary on the basis
of the facts on record.
PEOPLE VS CACHOLA
FACTS. In just an instant, 12-year-old Jessie E.
Barnachea lost his mother, an elder brother, an uncle,
and a cousin as a result of the carnage that took place
at around 6:00 p.m. of 28 December 1999 right inside
their house in Brgy. Calumbaya, Bauang, La Union.
Their horrible death was attributed to herein accused-
appellants.
At the trial before the RTC the prosecution
presented as witnesses Jessie and his brother and
neighbors, as well as several police officers. Their
testimonies disclose that when Jessie was about to
leave their house to watch cartoons in his uncles house
next door, two armed men suddenly entered the front
door of their house. The two ordered Jessie to drop to
the floor, and then hit him in the back. Without much
ado, the intruders shot to death Jessies uncle,
Victorino V. Lolarga. Jessie forthwith crawled and hid
under a bed, from where he saw the feet of a third
man who had also entered the house. The men
entered the kitchen and continued shooting. When the
rampage was over and after the malefactors had
already departed, Jessie came out of his hiding place
and proceeded to the kitchen. There he saw his
mother, Carmelita Barnachea; his brother Felix
Barnachea, Jr.; and his cousin Rubenson Abance - all
slaughtered.
Meanwhile, Jessies eldest brother, Robert E.
Barnachea testidfied that he saw armed men running
towards their house. He scampered away and hid at
the back of his uncles house. From where he was
hiding, he noticed a stainless jeep, with blue rim and
marking fruits and vegetables dealer, parked in front
of the fence of their house. In the next instant, he
heard gunshots and then saw men running from his
house. The men hurriedly boarded the jeep and left
the place. The jeep did not go unnoticed by the
neighbors. Russel Tamba was with some friends in
front of Rodas Store, around 100 meters away from
the Barnachea residence, when the jeep passed by
very slowly going towards the Barnachea residence.
After the prosecution had rested its case, the defense
counsels orally asked for leave of court to file a
demurrer to evidence. The trial court denied the
motion outright and set the schedule for the
presentation of the evidence for the defense. Instead
81
 emedial Law Review
Digests
of presenting their evidence, however, the appellants,
through their respective counsels, filed a Demurrer to
Evidence even without leave of court.
On 26 September 2000, the trial court
rendered a decision (1) convicting (a) Cachola and
Amay, as principals, of four counts of murder; and (b)
Marquez, Laegen, Sagun, Guerzo, Ignacio, and
Echabaria, as accomplices, of four counts of murder.
Appelants contest that the court erred because
they were not allowed to present evidence after filing
their demurrer to evidence without leave of court.
ISSUE. Whether the trial court erred in not allowing the
appellants to present evidence after filing their
demurrer to evidence without leave of court. – NO.
RATIO. Section 15, Rules 119 of the Rules of Court is
clear on the matter, thus:
SEC. 15. - Demurrer to evidence. - After the
prosecution has rested its case, the court may dismiss
the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence: (1)
on its own initiative after giving the prosecution an
opportunity to be heard; or (2) on motion of the
accused filed with prior leave of court.
If the court denies the motion for dismissal,
the accused may adduce evidence in his
defense. When the accused files such motion to
dismiss without express leave of court, he waives the
right to present evidence and submits the case for
judgment on the basis of the evidence for the
prosecution. (Underscoring supplied).
The filing by the appellants of a demurrer to
evidence in the absence of prior leave of court was a
clear waiver of their right to present their own
evidence. Furthermore, it cannot be said that the
waiver was not clear. The trial court postponed the
hearings on the motion for demurrer, even after leave
of court had been denied, and then granted extensions
to Amay until he finally adopted the position of his co-
Appellants. At no time other than in this automatic
review was there any attempt that is contrary to the
waiver of the presentation of evidence.
RULES 34 AND 35: JUDGMENT ON
THE PLEADINGS AND SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
WOOD TECHNOLOGY CORP V. EQUITABLE
BANKING CORP.
Facts: The case originated from a Complaint for Sum
of Money filed by respondent Equitable Bank against
the Wood Technology Corporation (WTC), Cordova and
Young. The Complaint alleged that WTC obtained from
Equitable Bank a loan in the amount of US$75,000,
with 8.75% interest per annum, as evidenced by a
Promissory Note signed by Cordova and Young as
representatives of WTC. Cordova and Young executed
a Surety Agreement binding themselves as sureties of
WTC for the loan. Respondent bank made a final
CivPro - 2
demand for WTC to pay its obligation but petitioners
failed to pay. In their Answer, petitioners admitted that
WTC obtained the loan and that Cordova and Young
bound themselves as its sureties. They also claimed
that the loan had not yet matured as the maturity date
was purposely left blank, to be agreed upon by the
parties at a later date. Since no maturity date had
been fixed, the filing of the Complaint was premature,
and it failed to state a cause of action. They further
claimed that the promissory note and surety
agreement were contracts of adhesion with terms on
interest, penalty, charges and attorney’s fees that
were excessive, unconscionable and not reflective of
the parties’ real intent. Equitable Bank moved for a
judgment on the pleadings. RTC rendered judgment
based on the pleadings in favor of Equitable Bank. CA
affirmed. The appellate court ruled that there was no
need to present evidence to prove the maturity date of
the promissory note, since it was payable on demand.
MR denied.
Issue: WON CA erred in affirming the RTC’s judgment
on the pleadings
HELD: The SC held that the ruling of the RTC as
affrimed by the CA is valid as a summary judgment
and not a judgment on the pleadings.
At the outset, we must stress the Court’s policy
that cases and controversies should be promptly and
expeditiously resolved. The Rules of Court seeks to
shorten the procedure in order to allow the speedy
disposition of a case. Specifically, we have rules on
demurrer to evidence, judgment on the pleadings, and
summary judgments. In all these instances, a full
blown trial is dispensed with and judgment is rendered
on the basis of the pleadings, supporting affidavits,
depositions and admissions of the parties.
The RTC knew that the Answer asserted special
and affirmative defenses. the CA recognized that
certain issues were raised, but they were not genuine
issues of fact, WBC insisted that they raised genuine
issues; and Equitable argued that WBC’s defenses did
not tender genuine issues. However, whether or not
the issues raised by the Answer are genuine is not the
crux of inquiry in a motion for judgment on the
pleadings. It is so only in a motion for summary
judgment. In a case for judgment on the pleadings,
the Answer is such that no issue is raised at all. The
essential question in such a case is whether there are
issues generated by the pleadings.
This is the distinction between a proper case of
summary judgment, compared to a proper case for
judgment on the pleadings. In Narra Integrated
Corporation v. CA: The existence or appearance of
ostensible issues in the pleadings, on the one hand,
and their sham or fictitious character, on the other, are
what distinguish a proper case for summary judgment
from one for a judgment on the pleadings. In a proper
case for judgment on the pleadings, there is no
ostensible issue at all because of the failure of the
defending party’s answer to raise an issue. On the
82
 emedial Law Review
Digests
other hand, in the case a of a summary
judgment, issues apparently exist i.e. facts are
asserted in the complaint regarding which there is as
yet no admission, disavowal or qualification; or specific
denials or affirmative defenses are in truth set out in
the answer but the issues thus arising from the
pleadings are sham, fictitious or not genuine, as shown
by affidavits, depositions, or admissions.
Applying the requisites of a judgment on the
pleadings vis-à-vis a summary judgment, the
judgment rendered by the RTC was not a judgment on
the pleadings, but a summary judgment. Summary
judgment is a procedure aimed at weeding out sham
claims or defenses at an early stage of the litigation. In
a summary judgment, the crucial question is: are the
issues raised by petitioners not genuine so as to justify
a summary judgment? A “genuine issue” means an
issue of fact which calls for the presentation of
evidence, as distinguished from an issue which is
fictitious or contrived, an issue that does not constitute
a genuine issue for trial. The judgment rendered by
the trial court is valid as a summary judgment, and its
affirmance by the Court of Appeals, as herein clarified,
is in order.
BASCUG VS ARANDAY
Facts: Laurentino Bascug filed a complaint charging
Judge Aranday with grave misconduct, knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment, malicious delay in the
administration of justice and violation of the code of
judicial conduct.
(There are several cases from which the admin
complaint arose from. But only the facts related to the
charge of grave misconduct is related to judgment on
the pleadings)
RELATED PART: In the civil case of Vicente
Ditching vs Odisco Farms System Cooperative
Foundation, Bascug charged Judge Aranday with gross
misconduct when he directed a judgment on the
pleadings. Bascug who was actually the president of
Odisco Farms, claims that Judge Aranday declared the
parties as having agreed to the rendition of a
judgment on the pleadings even when Odisco Farms
never agreed to it. In fact, Bascug alleges that Odisco
Farms did not submit any memorandum for judgment
on the pleadings required by Judge Aranday in one of
his orders. Nevertheless, despite the absence of such
memorandum, Judge Aranday rendered judgment
based on the pleadings in favor of Vicente Ditching et
al. An MR was filed but was denied. Case was brought
to the CA and the case was remanded for further
proceeding.
Judge Aranday contends that parties had
manifested that they had no objection to the
submission of the case for judgment on the pleadings.
Issue: Whether Judge Aranday was correct in
rendering a judgment on the pleadings? NO
CivPro - 2
Held: Sec1, Rule34 of the Rules of Court provides,
“where an answer fails to tender an issue or otherwise
admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s
pleading, the court may on motion of that party, direct
judgment on such pleading.”
Judge Aranday states that both parties agreed
to have judgment on the pleadings but the minutes of
the session merely stated that both parties will submit
their respective memoranda for judgment on the
pleadings. Only Vicente Ditching submitted a
memorandum while Odisco Farms did not. In fact, in
the MR submitted, Odisco Farms pointed out that the
“parties presented widely opposing contentions in their
respective pre-trial brief, and the court cannot rely on
conjectures on the wild monetary claims of Ditching”.
In view of these objections, there was no clear
agreement to submit the case to a judgment on the
pleadings, much less an implied admission of each
other’s factual allegations that would support a
submission by the parties to the judgment on the
pleadings.
ELAND PHIL. V. GARCIA
FACTS: Respondents Azucena Garcia, Elino Fajardo,
and Teresa Malabanan, the heir of Tiburcio Malabanan,
filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title with Writ of
Preliminary Injuction with RTC against Petitioner Eland
Phils., Inc. Respondents Garcia et al claimed that they
are owners, in fee simple title, of a parcel of land by
occupation and possession under the provision of Sec.
48(b) of the Public Land Law or Commonwealth Act
No. 141, as amended. For having been in continuous,
public, and adverse possession as owners for at least
30 years, respondents further claimed that they were
not aware of any person or entity who had a legal or
equitable interest or claim on the same lot until the
time they were requesting that the lot be declared for
tax purposes. They found out that the lot was the
subject of a land registration proceeding that had
already been decided by the same court where their
complaint was filed. (Note: There are a lot of motions
in between, read original case for more details on the
matter)
TC declared Eland in Default and allowed
Garcia et al to present evidence ex parte. Eland filed
an MR which was granted. TC then admitted Eland’s
Answer Ad Cautelam. Garcia et al filed a Motion for
Clarification as to whether or not the evidence
presented ex parte was nullified by the admission of
Eland’s Answer Ad Cautelam. Eland filed its Comment.
Pre-trial conference was scheduled wherein the
parties submitted their pre-trial briefs. However, Eland
filed a Motion to Suspend the Proceedings because it
filed with the CA a petition for certiorari for the denial
of its MTD. The petition was subsequently denied.
Hence, the TC ruled that the reception of evidence
presented by Garcia et al before the Clerk of Court
remained as part of the records of the case and that
Eland had the right to cross-examine the witness and
83
 emedial Law Review
Digests
to comment on the documentary exhibits already
presented. Eland filed a MR which was denied.
Eventually, Garcia et al filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment to which Eland filed its Opposition.
TC however granted the Motion for Summary
Judgment. CA dismissed Eland’s appeal.
ISSUES:
1. WON the 10 day notice rule under Rule 35 Sec. 3
was violated
2. WON the a motion for summary judgment in an
action for quieting of title is proper
3. WON the CA erred in holding that there are no
genuine factual and triable issues in the case
(*other issues were not included in this digest)
HELD:
1. NO, there was substantial compliance.
Eland claimed that the 10 day notice rule
under Rule 35 Sec. 3 was violated when they received
a copy of the motion for summary judgment only on
the very same day that the motion is set for hearing.
Eland further claims that the TC never conducted any
hearing on the motion for summary judgment.
The above contention, however, is misguided.
The CA was correct in its observation that there was
substantial compliance with due process. The CA ruled,
as the records show, that the 10 day notice rule was
substantially complied with because when Garcia et al
filed the motion for summary judgment on August 9,
1999, they furnished petitioner with a copy thereof on
the same day as shown in the registry receipt and that
the motion was set for hearing on August 20, 1999, or
10 days from the date of the filing thereof.
2. YES.
Eland further argues that summary judgment
is not proper in an action for quieting of title. The
Court however disagrees. This Court has already ruled
that any action can be the subject of a summary
judgment with the sole exception of actions for
annulment of marriage or declaration of its nullity or
for legal separation.
3. YES.
Proceeding to the main issue, this Court finds
that the grant of summary judgment was not proper.
A summary judgment is permitted only if there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and a moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
A summary judgment is proper if, while the pleadings
on their face appear to raise issues, the affidavits,
depositions, and admissions presented by the moving
party show that such issues are not genuine.
It must be remembered that the non-
existence of a genuine issue is the determining
factor in granting a motion for summary judgment,
and the movant has the burden of proving such
nonexistence. The TC found no genuine issue as to any
material fact that would necessitate conducting a full-
CivPro - 2
blown trial. However, a careful study of the case
shows otherwise.
The facts pleaded by Garcia et al in their
motion for summary judgment have been duly
disputed and contested by Eland, raising genuine
issues that must be resolved only after a full-blown
trial. When the facts as pleaded by the parties are
disputed or contested, proceedings for
summary judgment cannot take the place of trial. In
the present case, the petitioner was able to point out
the genuine issues. A genuine issue is an issue of fact
that requires the presentation of evidence as
distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false
claim.
It is of utmost importance to remember that
petitioner is already the registered owner (Original
Certificate of Title [OCT] No. 0-660 issued by the
Register of Deeds) of the parcel of land in question,
pursuant to a decree of registration based on the
ruling of the same court that granted the summary
judgment for the quieting of title.
By granting the summary judgment, the TC
has in effect annulled its former ruling based on a
claim of possession and ownership of the same land for
more than 30 years without the benefit of a full-blown
trial. The fact that Garcia et al seek to nullify the
original certificate of title issued to Eland on the claim
that the former were in possession of the same land
for a number of years, is already a clear indicium that
a genuine issue of a material fact exists. This, together
with the failure of Garcia et al to show that there were
no genuine issues involved, should have been enough
for the TC to give the motion for summary judgment,
filed by Garcia et al, scant consideration. TCs have
limited authority to render summary judgments and
may do so only when there is clearly no genuine issue
as to any material fact.
RULE 36: JUDGMENT
SPS. CONSING V. CA
FACTS:
- Sps. Consing purchased on credit various grades of
fertilizer through SPCMA (Sugar Producers’
Cooperative Marketing Assoc) on the strength of
the documents presented by them (Promissory
Note and a Certification by PNB)
- Documents: Certification by PNB to show that the
spouses have an agricultural crop loan line of
P3.9M with a fertilizer allotment of P1.39M; a PN
worth P481K
- But when SPCMA presented the PN to PNB, it
refused to honor it saying that the spouses no
longer had fertilizer line with PNB
- SPCMA filed a collection suit vs. Sps. Consing
- RTC ruled in favor of SPCMA. CA affirmed the
decision
- CA: In the PN, spouses bound themselves to pay
SPCMA and that the Certification does not show
that PNB guaranteed the transaction. Under Art.
84
 emedial Law Review
Digests
2055 of the CC, guaranty cannot be presumed but
must be express.
ISSUE: For the purposes of Judgment: was the
decision of the RTC proper? NO
HELD: SC: The SC brought to our attention the 2-
page decision of the RTC. While Judge Querubin
Querubin mentioned his factual findings, the legal
basis of his ruling is not set out in the decision. Judge
Querubin failed to meet faithfully the requirement
demanded by the Constitution from the courts in
rendering their decisions.
Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution declares
that:
Sec. 14. No decision shall be rendered by
any court without expressing therein clearly
and distinctly the facts and the law on which it
is based.
No petition for review or motion for
reconsideration of a decision of the court shall
be refused due course or denied without
stating the legal basis therefor.
The court must inform the parties to a case of
the legal basis for the court’s decision so that if a party
appeals, it can point out to the appellate court the
points of law to which it disagrees. Every judge should
know the constitutional mandate and the rationale
behind it. Judge Querubin should have known the
exacting standard imposed on courts by Section 14,
Article VIII of the Constitution and should not have
sacrificed the constitutional standard for brevity’s sake.
The failure of the trial court decision to measure
up to the standard set by the Constitution is too gross
to ignore as it is in stark contrast to the CA’s decision.
The CA’s decision, while also brief, being only three
pages long, laid down the factual and legal reasons
why Antonio and Soledad are the ones liable to
SPCMA, and not PNB. The CA’s discussion of the
merits of this case enabled the parties to pinpoint the
proper issues that we now review.
Side note: the SC upheld the decision of the CA,
holding the spouses liable
(interest issue – they were claiming that there
was double imposition of interest: sps. Consing did
not only bind themselves to pay the principal amount,
they also promised to pay (1) the interest of 1% per
month on all the overdue accounts, (2) the additional
sum of 25% of the total amount due as attorney’s
fees, and (3) 10% of the indebtedness as liquidated
damages which, in either case, shall not be less than
P250. Since they freely entered into the contract, the
stipulations in the contract are binding on them.)
HEIRS OF VALDEZ, SPS. MALVAR V. CA AND LC
LOPEZ RESOURCES
Case is a bit complicated. Did my best. Please bear
with the digest.
CivPro - 2
Main point: Conflicting resolutions were issued on the
same date and in the same case.
There was an earlier case for quieting of title
and declaration of nullity of transfer certificates filed
with the RTC Branch 71 of Antipolo entitled Manila
Construction v. Sps Dela Rosa. Herein plaintiffs, the
Valdez heirs and the Sps. Malvar were among the
plaintiffs in that case. The RTC granted them an
injunction order and later, a writ of prelim mandatory
injunction to place them in possession of the land
disputed in the case. The Sheriff of RTC implemented
the order and the writ in the property of herein
defendants, Lopez Resources. They tore down the
fences enclosing the property, but Lopez Resources
succeeded in maintaining possession.
On April 3 Lopez Resources went to the CA to
question the order and the writ (It was a petition for
certiorari and prohibition). It claimed that the RTC
committed GAD in depriving it of its property because
it wasn’t a party to the case and the property against
which the writ was enforced was not part of the land
disputed in the said case. This case was assigned to
CA’s 9th division. There was an issue with regard to its
verification and certification against forum shopping,
because it was not signed by a duly authorized
representative of Lopez Resources. The CA dismissed
the petition without prejudice. This resolution was
issued May 5, 2003.
Lopez Resources then filed another similar
petition. (It re-filed the same case). This second case
was raffled to the CA 7th division. Also on May 5, 2003,
the 7th division issued a resolution requiring herein
petitioners, Heirs of Valdez and Sps Malvar to file their
comment on the Lopez Resources’ petition and for
Lopez Resources to correct its error on the certification
against non-forum shopping.
Lopez Resources and herein petitioners
received the CA Resolution ordering the dismissal of
the case, but the other parties in the case only
received the Resolution requiring them to comment.
Because of the conflict, CA issued another Resolution
to clarify its “clerical error” 86 days after the 2
conflicting resolutions were issued. (CA claimed that
the resolution for dismissal was only a draft and was
not meant to be delivered).
Instead of a comment, herein petitioners
moved for the dismissal of the (2nd) petition because
(1) CA has no jurisdiction over the case, since the 1st
petition’s dismissal had become final and (2) even if
the court has jurisdiction, the re-filed petition (the 2nd
one) should be dismissed on the ground of litis
pendentia, since the CA has not terminated the
proceedings in the 1st petition.
Issue: should the petition filed by Lopez Resources be
denied? No.
Ruling: No GAD committed by CA. In both resolutions,
what is clear is that the court intended to allow a
rectification of the deficiency in Lopez Resources' non-
85
 emedial Law Review
Digests
forum shopping certification in view of the merits that
the face of the petition showed. It was within the CA's
power to issue what either resolution decreed without
committing GAD. Re: 1st Resolution, CA correctly
dismissed the petition for the deficiency it found in the
non-forum shopping certification. Section 5, Rule 7 of
the ROC provides that failure to comply… shall be
cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice.
Re: 2nd Resolution, CA could also require the
respondents to comment, with the obligation on the
part of the petitioner to undertake rectification, and
this action is actually supported by jurisprudence. In
several cases, SC allowed initiatory pleadings or
petitions with initially defective verifications and
certifications of non-forum shopping on the ground of
substantial compliance. Strict compliance with the
requirement merely underscores its mandatory nature,
in that it cannot be dispensed with. The subsequent
submission of the required documents (such as the
secretary's certificate) constituted substantial
compliance with the procedural rules that justified
relaxation of the requirements in the interest of
justice. In the absence of any showing that the twin
issuance was attended by partiality no GADALEJ exists.
On the finality of judgment: Because the
mistake was on the part of the court, none of the
parties should suffer. The parties all acted pursuant to
the resolution they respectively received. Lopez
Resources could not be legally faulted, since it merely
accepted the dismissal and chose to re-file its petition,
this time supplying the deficiency that tainted its first
petition. The re-filing was done on May 23, 2003, i.e.,
prior to the finality of the resolution of dismissal. By
this act, Lopez Resources effectively kept its petition
legally alive.
The issuance of two conflicting resolutions can
only mean that no definite, specific determination was
made by the court. It is error to conclude that one
resolution lapsed to finality while the other did not. In
legal effect, there was effectively no definite resolution
that could have lapsed to finality because of the
mistake the court committed. This status continued
until a clarification was made by the issuing court,
dated August 1.
Even granting that the 1st Resolution became
final and executory, the rule on immutability of
judgment does not apply in cases where what is
to be modified or altered involves: (a) the
correction of clerical errors; (b) the so-
callednunc pro tunc entries which cause no
prejudice to any party; (c) void judgments [such
as a dismissal without prejudice that was not
intended to be issued] and those where
circumstances transpire after the finality that
render the execution or enforcement, as in this
case, of the judgment unjust or inequitable. To be
sure, the rule does not apply in cases where a
supervening event took place- such as the
mistake undisputably committed by the court
(i.e., the unintended release of one of the resolutions,
thus resulting in the conflict and confusion).
CivPro - 2
The 9th Division's clarificatory resolution of
August 1is valid. The CA never lost jurisdiction over
the case despite the re-filing of the petition;
jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost except for
reasons that are not present in this case.
The question of whether Lopez Resources
forum shopped when it re-filed its petition is rendered
moot and academic. Lopez Resources, who cannot be
blamed for the CA's mistake, only followed what the
assailed 1st resolution allowed.It cannot be said that it
forum shopped by filing another petition while the 1st
petition was pending. Insofar as it was concerned, its
1st petition had been dismissed without prejudice;
hence, there was no bar, either by way of forum
shopping, litis pendentia or res judicata, to the petition
it re-filed. Lopez Resources did not lack good faith.
After its re-filed petition and after receipt of the August
1 Resolution, it immediately filed a Manifestation and
Motion for Clarification to seek guidance on which of
the two petitions should subsist.
INTRAMUROS TENNIS CLUB V. PHILIPPINE
TOURISM AUTHORITY
FACTS: Private respondent Philippine Tourism
Authority (Tourism Authority) owns the Victoria Tennis
Courts in Intramuros, Manila by virtue of PD 1763. In a
Memorandum of Agreement executed in 1987, Tourism
Authority transferred the management, operation,
administration and development of the Victoria Tennis
Courts to petitioner Philippine Tennis Association
(Tennis Association) for a period of 10 years. Petitioner
Intramuros Tennis Club (ITC) is an affiliate of Tennis
Association and has for its members tennis players and
enthusiasts who regularly use the facilities of the
Victoria Tennis Courts.
During the effectivity of the MOA, the Tourism
Authority wrote to the Tennis Association alleging
violations by the Tennis Association of the terms and
conditions of the MOA. The former demanded the
surrender of the possession of Victoria Tennis Courts.
The Tourism Authority wrote a second letter
demanding the Tennis Association to vacate the
premises and to give way to the Tourism Authority’s
golf course expansion program with private respondent
Club Intramuros.
Petitioners Tennis Association instituted a case
for preliminary injunction, damages and prayer for TRO
with the RTC. Among others, it alleged that by
complying with the demand to vacate, petitioner ITC
stands to sustain liability because it had prior
commitments to use the Victoria Tennis Courts for two
activities.
The TRO was granted as well as the
preliminary injunction.
Tourism Authority filed a motion to dismiss
stating that in view of the expiration of the MOA,
petitioner’s cause of action was moot and academic.
Motion to Dismiss was granted. Petitioners Tennis
Association appealed. While the appeal was pending,
86
 emedial Law Review
Digests
respondents Tourism Authority filed a motion for
execution of judgment pending appeal. It alleged that
there was an urgent necessity on the part of
respondents to immediately take possession of the
Victoria Tennis Courts by reason of its being heavily
deteriorated and unsanitized because of petitioner’s
failure to maintain its good condition. Court granted
the motion for execution.
In their MR, petitioners argue that under Sec.
2, Rule 39 of the ROC, respondent Court should have
conducted hearings to ascertain whether there were
good reasons to issue the writ of execution pending
appeal. Such was denied. Hence, the present civil
action for certiorari.
ISSUE:
W/N the RTC order granting the Motion to
Dismiss was a “final order”? YES, IT WAS.
W/N CA committed GADLEJ when it ordered
execution pending appeal of the judgment of
the RTC? NO, THEY DID NOT.
HELD: Note first that the respondent court may order
execution pending appeal when the ff. conditions are
present: 1) there must be a judgment or final order;
2) the trial court must have lost jurisdiction over the
case; 3) there must be “good reasons” to allow
execution; 4) such good reasons must be stated in a
special order after due order.
The RTC order which granted the Tourism
Authority’s motion to dismiss was a final order within
the contemplation of Sec. 2, Rule 39 of ROC. There is a
difference between a “final” judgment or order and one
which has “become final” or one that has become “final
and executory.”
A “final” judgment or order is one that finally
disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the court
to do in respect thereto-such as an adjudication on the
merits which, on the basis of the evidence presented
at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and
obligations of the parties and which party is in the
right, or a judgment or order that dismisses an action
on the ground of res judicata or prescription, for
instance.
A “final” judgment or order in the sense just
described becomes “final and executory” upon
expiration of the period to appeal therefrom where no
appeal has been duly perfected or, an appeal
therefrom having been taken, the judgment of the
appellate court in turn becomes final. It is called “final
and executory” judgment because execution at such
point issues as a matter of right.
By its provisional nature, the remedy of
execution pending appeal requires only a “final”
judgment or order and a “final and executory”
judgment or order. The RTC order granting the Motion
to Dismiss, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction and
held private respondents entitled to possess the
Victoria Tennis Courts is a final order within the
contemplation of Rule 39 of ROC, inasmuch as it
makes an adjudication on the merits of the case and
CivPro - 2
dismisses petitioners’ action. Furthermore, at the time
the motion for execution pending appeal was filed, the
RTC had already lost jurisdiction over the case as
petitioners’ appeal had already been perfected and the
records of the case transmitted to respondent court.
We uphold CA’s position in granting the motion
for execution pending appeal without a full-blown or
trial-type hearing as long as there was opportunity to
be heard.
The only issue remaining is whether or not
there was GADLEJ in granting the motion. Execution of
a judgment pending appeal is an exception to the
general rule that only a final judgment may be
executed. Thus the existence of good reasons is
essential. In this case, the Court said that good
reasons to grant the motion exist. The tennis court
was deteriorating thus respondent has to take
possession to save it from its condition.
RULE 37: MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION AND NEW TRIAL
FERNANDEZ V. CA
Facts: Olivares filed a complaint for unlawful detainer
against Fernandez in the MeTC. This was dismissed for
a lack of a sufficient cause of action. Olivares appealed
to the RTC and the court reversed the ruling of the
MeTC.
The copy of the decision was received by
Fernandez on June 28, 1994. On July 12 (14 days after
receipt), he filed an MR. He received copy of its denial
on Nov. 29. After this, he filed a motion for extension
of time to file a petition for review with the CA on Dec.
1. This was granted by the CA but Fernandez only
received the decision on Dec. 12.
In the meantime, he filed a motion for new
trial (newly discovered evidence) with the RTC on Dec.
9 (way past the 15-day period). This was denied by
the RTC on the ground that when Fernandez went to
the CA and filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File
Petition for Review, and the Court of Appeals
accordingly acted on the same by granting the
extension sought, jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
over the parties and the subject matter had already
attached.
Issue: Was the motion for new trial filed on time? –
NO.
Decision: It is without question that Fernandez
received a copy of the RTC Decision on 28 June 1994.
Fourteen (14) days after the receipt of the decision, he
filed an MR. This motion was denied by the RTC and
the Order of denial was received by Fernandez on 29
November 1994. Applying Rule 37, Section 1 of the
Revised Rules of Court2, he had only one (1) day left to
2
Section 1. Grounds of and period for filing motion for new
trial or reconsideration. – Within the period for taking an
appeal, the aggrieved party may move the trial court to set
87
 emedial Law Review
Digests
file a motion for new trial since a motion for new trial
should be filed within the period to appeal, that is,
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment.
The motion for new trial suspends the running of the
period to appeal but does not extend the time within
which an appeal must be perfected. Hence if denied, a
movant, like Fernandez in this case has only the
balance of the reglementary period within which to
appeal.
Since 30 Nov. 30 was a holiday, Fernandez had
up to 01 December 1994 to file the motion for new
trial. Instead of a motion for new trial, he filed before
the Court of Appeals on 01 December 1994 the motion
for extension of time to file petition for review.
Thereafter, and pending the resolution of his motion
before the Court of Appeals, Fernandez went back to
the RTC and filed on 09 December 1994 a motion for
new trial.
Applying the foregoing, Fernandez's motion for
new trial was filed out of time. The fifteen (15)-day
period for filing a motion for new trial cannot be
extended. Motions for extension of time to file a
motion for new trial or reconsideration may be filed
only in connection with cases pending before the
Supreme Court, which may in its sound discretion
either grant or deny the extension requested. No such
motion may be filed before any lower courts.
Side Issue: Does a motion for an extension of time to
file a petition for review divest the RTC of its
jurisdiction?
No. Jurisdiction is lost once an appeal is
perfected. An appeal is perfected when there is a
timely filing of the petition (such as petition for review)
and the payment of docket and other lawful fees.
In this case, the CA has not yet acquired
jurisdiction over the case because Fernandez merely
filed a motion for extension of time to file petition for
review but not the petition for review itself.
RP VS. PERALTA, ET AL. (sorry magulo talaga ang
daming dates)
Facts: The private respondents (there are several of
them), filed a complaint for the recovery of possession
and ownership of real property against the republic
and the DENR (petitioners). They alleged that the land
in litigation originally belonged to their father,
Benedicto Alonday, who applied and was issued a
homestead patent and the corresponding OCT. They
also alleged that they had bought the land from their
father, for which they were issued the corresponding
TCT. Later on however, the Bureau of Forest
Development (BFD) asked from, and was given
permission by Benedicto to use a portion of the land.
The BFD then constructed a building on the land. The
aside the judgment or final order and grant a new trial for one
or more of the following causes materially affecting the
substantial rights of said party.
CivPro - 2
private respondents asked the BFD to vacate but the
latter refused, hence the complaint.
The RTC ruled for the private respondents.
Here are the events that followed:
May 6, 1997 – RTC ruled for private
respondents
May 20, 1997 – petitioners received the
RTC decision
May 30, 1997 – petitioners filed MR, this
was 5 days before the expiration of the
period to appeal
June 11, 1997 – RTC issued an order
expunging the MR, because it was a mere
scrap of paper considering that the
petitioners did not file any notice of
hearing as required by the ROC. Note that
under Rule 15, notice of hearing on
motions should be sent to the opposing
party at least 3 days before the hearing.
July 14, 1997 – petitioners, unaware of the
June 11 order, filed a manifestation with
notice of hearing on MR, appending thereto
a notice of hearing of their May 30 MR
July 18, 1997 – petitioners received a copy
of the June 11 order
July 22, 1997 – petitioner filed their notice
of appeal from the June 11 decision. The
private respondents opposed on the
ground that the MR filed in May 30 was a
mere scrap of paper, hence it did not toll
the reglementary period for appeal
August 11, 1997 – RTC received the notice
of appeal filed by the petitioners last July
22
January 29, 1999 – RTC issued an order
giving due course to the appeal. It ruled
that the petitioners still had 5 days from
June 18, 1997 (the date when they
received the June 11 order) within which to
perfect their appeal (FYI: it took this long
because the RTC remained vacant for some
time)
February 5, 1999 – the RTC nevertheless
dismissed the appeal based on recent
jurisprudence (which was not mentioned)
that they failed to perfect their appeal
within the reglementary period.
February 26, 1999 – petitioners filed a MR
May 6, 1999 – MR denied
So after all of this shit, the petitioners filed certiorari
with CA which dismissed ruling that because the May
30 MR filed by the petitioners did not comply with the
ROC, it was a mere scrap of paper which did not toll
the period to file an appeal.
Issue: W/N the MR filed by the petitioners in May 30
was defective? YES!
Held/Ratio:
Motion for Reconsideration
88
 emedial Law Review
Digests
Sec. 2, Rule 37 – a MR or a MNT shall be: (1)
made in writing; (2) stating the ground(s) therefore;
(3) with written notice served by the movant on the
adverse party.
Need for notice
The written notice is prescribed by Rule 15
(sections 4 and 5). The notice requirement, are
mandatory and non-compliance therewith is fatal and
renders the motion pro forma; a worthless piece of
paper. It is vital for due process. The notice for hearing
is required in order for the opposing party to voice out
its opinion on the motion. In cases of MR or MNT, the
running of the period for appeal is not tolled by the
mere filing or pendency of said motion, notice is
needed.
In this case, the OSG (the one who filed the
MR on behalf of the RP) merely stated that the failure
to file the notice was due to inadvertence. No sufficient
justification was given for the lack of notice.
NONETHELESS, the SC directed the reopening
of the case considering that it is one of public interest.
The land in dispute is part of the forest reserve, as
found by the SC. So the State should not be prejudiced
by the negligence of the OSG to follow procedural
rules.
PEOPLE vs. ODILAO
FACTS: Odilao was charged with estafa. Information
was filed with the RTC and a warrant of arrest was
issued. Odilao moved for reinvestigation. Thus the RTC
deferred the service of the warrant of arrest to give
way for the reinvestigation. After the reinvestigation
was conducted, the prosecutor found no probable
cause and moved to dismiss the case. The private
complainant filed a petition for review before the DOJ
seeking the reversal of the reinvestigation report. The
RTC deferred ruling on the Motion to Dismiss filed by
the prosecutor pending determination of the DOJ.
However, more than a year after, RTC denied the
Motion to Dismiss rationalizing that pursuant to the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure which took effect
in 2001, the court is now vested with the power to
determine probable cause. The RTC thereafter,
reinstated the warrant.
Odilao went to the CA via a petition for
certiorari and prohibition. The CA granted the petition
and ordered the RTC to defer proceedings pending
resolution by the DOJ.
The People through the OSG seasonably filed a
petition for review on certiorari with the SC. However,
without knowledge of the SC, private complainant
(without the conformity of the OSG) filed before the CA
a Motion for Reconsideration which was favorably
acted upon (i.e. on reconsideration, CA reversed itself
and ruled to implement the warrant).
CivPro - 2
ISSUE: Whether or not CA may take cognizance of the
MR even if a petition for review on certiorari had
already been filed with the SC – NO
HELD: Section 15, Rule VI of the 2002 Internal Rules
of the Court of Appeals3 (effective August 22, 2002),
explicitly provides that when the movant has filed with
the SC a petition for review on certiorari, any MR filed
with the CA is considered abandoned. Prudence
dictates that the Court of Appeals should have first
required private complainant to secure the conformity
of the OSG; or required the latter to comment on the
motion for reconsideration of the private complainant.
NEYPES V CA
Facts: Neypes, along with other petitioners, filed an
action for annulment of judgment and titles of land
and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary
injunction against Bureau of Lands, Land Bank, and
the heirs of Bernardo del Mundo. The heirs of del
Mundo filed an MR claiming that the action had already
prescribed. The RTC Judge ruled agreed with the heirs
and dismissed the case because of prescription.
On Feb 12, 1998, the TC rendered the decision that
the action had prescribed.
On March 3, 1998, Neypes received the copy of the
decision.
On March 18, 1998 (15 days after receipt), Neypes
filed an MR.
On July 1, 1998, the TC denied the MR.
On July 22, 1998, Neypes received the order denying
the MR.
On July 27, 1998, Neypes filed a notice of appeal,
paying the appeal fees on August 3, 1998.
The court a quo denied the notice of appeal claiming it
was 8 days late. Neypes claimed that they were not
late and that the 15-day period only started when they
received the order denying the MR. CA claimed that
the 15-day period started way back in March 3 when
Neypes received the copy of the decision.
Issue: When should the reglementary period start?
How many days are left, if any?
Held: An appeal should be taken within 15 days from
the notice of judgment or final order appealed from. A
final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a
case, leaving nothing more for the court to do with
respect to it. It is an adjudication on the merits which,
3
SEC. 15. Effect of Filing an Appeal in the Supreme Court. -
No motion for reconsideration or rehearing shall be acted
upon if the movant has previously filed in the Supreme Court
a petition for review on certiorari or a motion for extension of
time to file such petition. If such petition or motion is
subsequently filed, the motion for reconsideration pending in
this Court shall be deemed abandoned.
89
 emedial Law Review
Digests
considering the evidence presented at the trial,
declares categorically what the rights and obligations
of the parties are; or it may be an order or judgment
that dismisses an action. In this case, what should be
deemed the final order – the Feb 12 order dismissing
the complaint or the July 1 order denying the MR?
The July 1 order denying the MR. The order denying
the motion for reconsideration is the final order
which finally disposed of the issues involved in
the case. Hence, the reglementary period should
start from the receipt of the order denying the
MR.
On the issue of how many days are left to file a
notice of appeal if the MR is denied, the Court said that
parties are given a fresh period to file a notice of
appeal. A fresh period of 15 days within which to file
the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court is given
to appellants, counted from receipt of the order
dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration. This is also the rule for appeals this
“fresh period rule” shall also apply to Rule 40 (appeals
from MTC to RTC); Rule 42 (petitions for review from
the RTC to the CA); Rule 43 (appeals from quasi-
judicial agencies to the CA) and Rule 45 governing
appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. In sum, a
party litigant may either file his notice of appeal
within 15 days from receipt of the Regional Trial
Court’s decision or file it within 15 days from
receipt of the order (the “final order”) denying
his motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day
period may be availed of only if either motion is
filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and
executory after the lapse of the original appeal
period provided in Rule 41, Section 3. (fresh
period rule)
So, given that Neypes had a fresh 15 days to
file a notice of appeal from the receipt of the order
denying his MR (July 22), his filing a notice of appeal
on July 27 was on time.
TAN V CA
Facts: Petitioner Annie Tan, owner of AJ & T Trading,
leased a portion of the ground floor of her building in
Binondo in favor of private respondent Bloomberry
Export Manufacturing. The lease was for five years at
a monthly rental of P20k for the first three years. Tan
filed for ejectment against Bloomberry for several
alleged violations of the lease contract (e.g. failure to
pay rentals on time and encroachment on the adjacent
premises without her consent). Then, Bloomberry tried
to pay the rent, but it was refused by Tan, so
Bloomberry filed a case for consignation. The two
cases were consolidated. MTC Manila ruled that Tan
failed to substantiate her case with that degree of
proof required by law. It dismissed the complaint for
ejectment. Meanwhile, the case for consignation
became moot and academic for Tan’s failure to appeal
the MTC decision, thus allowing Bloomberry to consign
CivPro - 2
all due rental payments to the court. On appeal, the
RTC affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC. Tan then
filed an MR of this decision. The MR, however, did not
contain any notice of hearing. Thus, Bloombery filed
an ex-parte Motion for Entry of Judgment upon the
ground that said MR is a mere scrap of paper which
should not merit the attention of the RTC. RTC,
however, set the MR for hearing. CA reversed RTC’s
Order.
Issue: Whether the omission of a notice of hearing of
an MR is a fatal defect which does not stop the running
of the period to appeal – Yes. Petition denied; CA
decision affirmed.
Ruling: Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of
Court are mandatory.
“SEC. 4. Hearing of motion.—Except for motions which
the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights
of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set
for hearing by the applicant.
“Every written motion required to be heard and the
notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a
manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at
least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless
the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter
notice.(4a)
“SEC. 5. Notice of hearing.—The notice of hearing
shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and shall
specify the time and date of the hearing which must
not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the
motion.(5a)”
A motion which does not meet the
requirements of Section 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the
Rules of Court is considered a worthless piece of paper
which the clerk has no right to receive and the court
has no authority to act upon. Service of copy of a
motion containing notice of the time and place of
hearing of said motion is a mandatory requirement and
the failure of the movant to comply with said
requirements renders his motion fatally defective. This
requirement of notice of hearing equally applies to a
motion for reconsideration. Without such notice, the
motion is pro forma. And a pro forma motion for
reconsideration does not suspend the running of the
period to appeal.
For failing to attach a notice of hearing to the
Motion for Reconsideration, Tan proffers the following
excuses: (1) her former counsel’s messenger, due to
an honest mistake, inadvertently omitted the fourth
page of the motion containing the crucial Notice of
Hearing; and (2) because of the pressure of work, her
former counsel was unable to follow up such motion
until the day said counsel requested the setting of a
hearing. The Court is not convinced.
First, it is unfair to place the blame for such
omission on the messenger. The burden of preparing
90
 emedial Law Review
Digests
a complete pleading falls on counsel’s shoulders, not
on the messenger’s. Second, it is incredible that the
fourth page containing the Notice of Hearing was left
behind due to honest mistake. In fact, there was no
such page. On the third page, at the end of the
pleading, a “copy-furnished” notation is found,
indicating that the motion ended exactly there. Tan’s
counsel simply failed to include a notice of hearing.
Finally, the fact that Tan filed for a Motion to set the
time and date for hearing belies the excuse that an
alleged fourth page had been left behind. What is clear
from the evidence is that said counsel filed the MR only
after Bloomsberry had submitted its Motion for Entry of
Judgment.
A liberal construction of the rule has been
allowed by this Court in the following cases: (1) where
a rigid application will result in a manifest failure or
miscarriage of justice, especially if a party successfully
shows that the alleged defect in the questioned final
and executory judgment is not apparent on its face or
from the recitals contained therein; (2) where the
interest of substantial justice will be served; (3) where
the resolution of the motion is addressed solely to the
sound and judicious discretion of the court; and (4)
where the injustice to the adverse party is not
commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness
in not complying with the procedure prescribed. Tan
has failed to demonstrate that the case at bar falls
under any of these exceptions. There is no miscarriage
of justice to speak of. Having failed to observe very
elementary rules of procedure which are mandatory,
Tan caused her own predicament. To exculpate her
from the compulsory coverage of such rules is to
undermine the stability of the judicial process, as the
bench and bar will be confounded by such irritating
uncertainties as when to obey and when to ignore the
Rules.
RULE 38: PETITION FOR RELIEF
FROM JUDGMENT
ALABAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS and FRANCISCO
PROVIDO
FACTS: On Nov. 8, 2000, respondent Francisco
Provido filed a petition with the RTC for the probate of
the Last Will and Testament of the late Soledad
Provido Elevencionado (decedent). Francisco alleged
that he was the heir of the decedent and the executor
of her will. The RTC rendered a Decision, allowing the
probate of the decedent’s will and directing the
issuance of the letters testamentary to Francisco. More
than 4 months later, Cynthia Alaban and others
(Petitioners), who were claiming to be the intestate
heirs of the decedent, filed a (1) motion for the
reopening of the probate proceedings, (2) an
opposition to the allowance of the will of the decedent,
as well as an (3) opposition to the issuance of the
letters testamentary to Francisco. The RTC, through an
Order, denied Petitioners’ motion saying that its
CivPro - 2
Decision was already final and executor even before
their filing of the motion to reopen.
Petitioners then filed a petition seeking the
annulment of the RTC’s Decision and Order with the
CA. They claimed that after the death of the decedent,
Petitioners and Francisco held several conferences to
discuss the division of the decedent’s estate and that a
compromise agreement was drafted by the Petitioner
but Francisco refused to sign it. They opined that
Francisco feigned interest in participating in the
compromise agreement so that they would not suspect
his intention to secure the probate of the will.
Petitioners alleged that they learnt of the probate
proceedings only on Oct. 4, 2001 and that the Decision
must be annulled and set aside on the ground of
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction of the RTC. The
CA, in its Resolution, dismissed Petitioners’ petition. It
found that there was no showing that Petitioners failed
to avail of or resort to the ordinary remedies of new
trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment or other
appropriate remedies through their own fault.
ISSUE: W/N the CA committed GADLEJ when it
dismissed Petitioners’ petition for the alleged
failure to show that they have not availed of or
resorted to other remedies.
(NOTE: Petitioners’ contention was that they were not
made parties to the case, the decision of which they
seek to annul, thus, they could not have availed of the
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for
relief from judgment and others.)
HELD/RATIO: NO. Petition is DENIED.
Section 37 of the Rules of Court allows an
aggrieved party to file a motion for new trial on the
ground of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence. The same Rule permits the filing of a
motion for reconsideration on the grounds of
excessive award of damages, insufficiency of evidence
to justify the decision or final order, or that the
decision or final order is contrary to law. Both motions
should be filed within the period for taking an appeal,
or fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or
final order. Meanwhile, a petition for relief from
judgment under Section 3 of Rule 38 is resorted to
when a judgment or final order is entered, or any other
proceeding is thereafter taken, against a party in any
court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence. Said party may file a petition in the same
court and in the same case to set aside the judgment,
order or proceeding. It must be filed within sixty (60)
days after the petitioner learns of the judgment and
within six (6) months after entry thereof. A MNT or
reconsideration and a petition for relief from
judgment are remedies available only to parties
in the proceedings where the assailed judgment
is rendered. In fact, it has been held that a person
who was never a party to the case, or even summoned
to appear therein, cannot avail of a petition for relief
91
 emedial Law Review
Digests
from judgment. However, Petitioners in this case are
mistaken in asserting that they are not or have not
become parties to the probate proceedings.
Under the Rules of Court, any executor,
devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any other
person interested in the estate may, at any time after
the death of the testator, petition the court having
jurisdiction to have the will allowed. Notice of the time
and place for proving the will must be published for
three (3) consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province, as well as furnished
to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and
devisees of the testator. A proceeding for the
probate of a will is one in rem, such that with the
corresponding publication of the petition the court's
jurisdiction extends to all persons interested in said will
or in the settlement of the estate of the decedent. It is
the publication of such notice that brings in the
whole world as a party in the case and vests the
court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it. Thus,
even though petitioners were not mentioned in
the petition for probate, they eventually became
parties thereto as a consequence of the
publication of the notice of hearing. As parties to
the probate proceedings, petitioners could have
validly availed of the remedies of motion for new
trial or reconsideration and petition for relief
from judgment. In fact, petitioners filed a motion to
reopen, which is essentially a motion for new trial, with
petitioners praying for the reopening of the case and
the setting of further proceedings. However, the
motion was denied for having been filed out of time,
long after the Decision became final and executory.
Conceding that petitioners became aware of
the Decision after it had become final, they could have
still filed a petition for relief from judgment after the
denial of their motion to reopen. Petitioners claim that
they learned of the Decision only on 4 October 2001 (4
months from the time the Decision had attained
finality). But they failed to avail of the remedy. For
failure to make use without sufficient justification of
the said remedies available to them, petitioners could
no longer resort to a petition for annulment of
judgment; otherwise, they would benefit from their
own inaction or negligence.
SAMARTINO v. RAON, CRISOSTOMO
FACTS: Raon (sister) and Crisostomo (husband) are
the surviving heirs of the late Filomena Bernardo-
Crisostomo. Among the properties left by Filomena is
her ½ share in a parcel of land in Noveleta, Cavite,
with TCT registered in the names of co-owner Filomena
Bernardo and Lido Beach Corporation.
Raon and Crisostomo filed an ejectment case
against Regalado Samartino before the MTC of
Noveleta, Cavite, alleging that during the lifetime of
Filomena she leased her share in the property to
Regalado Samartino for a period of 5 years counted
from 1986; that the lease expired and was not
CivPro - 2
extended; and that Samartino refused to vacate the
property despite demands.
Summons was served on the brother of
Regalado Samartino (Roberto) because at that time ,
Samartino was confined at the National Bureau of
Investigation Treatment and Rehabilitation Center
(NBI-TRC) undergoing treatment and rehabilitation for
drug dependency. Thus a liaison officer of the NBI-TRC
appeared before the trial court with a certification that
Samartino will be unable to answer the complaint
within the reglementary period, inasmuch as it will
take six months for him to complete the rehabilitation
program and before he can be recommended for
discharge
MTC, despite the written certification from NBI-
TRC, granted Raon and Crisostomo’s motion to declare
Samartino in default, allowed presentation of
evidence ex-parte. On March 21, 1996, MTC ruled in
favor of Raon and Crisostomo.
RTC affirmed. Decision became final. A
Writ of Execution was issued.
Samartino filed with RTC of Cavite, a petition
for relief from judgment. He also submitted an affidavit
of merit alleging that the parcel of land from which he
was being evicted had been sold to him by Filomena
Bernardo-Crisostomo, as evidenced by the Deed of
Absolute Sale. This was dismissed by the RTC on the
ground that it was filed out of time. Two MRs were also
denied.
ISSUE: WON the RTC erred in denying the petition for
relief for being filed out of time—YES
RATIO: According to the RTC, the petition for relief,
filed on November 25, 1996, was late because
Samartino had actual knowledge of the judgment in
the ejectment case since March 1996 (MTC
decision). This is wrong. The period within which to
file a petition for relief should have been reckoned
from the date he learned of the RTC judgment on the
ejectment case. It should not have been counted
from the date of the MTC’s decision because,
precisely, Samartino timely appealed the same.
It was the RTC’s decision that became final and,
hence, was the proper subject of the petition for
relief from judgment. A petition for relief is only
available against a final and executory judgment.
Section 3, Rule 38: a verified petition for relief
must be filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner
learns of the judgment, final order, or other
proceeding to be set aside and not more than six (6)
months after such judgment or final order has been
entered or such proceeding has been taken. It must be
accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud,
accident, mistake, or excusable negligence relied upon,
and the facts constituting petitioner’s good and
substantial cause of action or defense.
It is not clear from the records of the case at
bar when Samartino learned of the decision of the RTC
affirming the judgment of theMTC. What appears is
that the said decision became final only on August
92
 emedial Law Review
Digests
15, 1996, and must have been entered sometime
thereafter. Hence, the petition for relief filed on
November 25, 1996 was well within the six-month
period prescribed by the Rules.
OTHER NOTES: (On summons) Service of summons
upon the defendant shall be by personal service first
and only when the defendant cannot be promptly
served in person will substituted service be availed of.
In this case, the sheriff’s return failed to show
the reason why personal service could not be made
(that prompt and personal service on the defendant
was impossible, the efforts made to find defendant
personally and that said efforts failed hence the resort
to substituted service). It also failed to state that
petitioner’s brother, on whom substituted service of
summons was effected, was a person of suitable age
and discretion residing at petitioner’s residence. Thus,
ineffective substituted service. So the trial court did
not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Samartino.
Thus, judgement null and void. CASE REMANDED TO
MTC.
RULE 39: EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT
Sps. CAPA v. CA
FACTS: Spouses Capa owned a motor banca (M/B CLM
Zoltan), which they used for their fish trading
business. Private respondent United Vismin Shipping
Lines owned a motorized vessel (M/V Cebu Pearl),
manned by Capt. Yhapon.
One fateful evening in April 1993, the 2 vessels
collided in the waters of Dumaguete, resulting into the
sinking of Zoltan.
Aug. 1993, Capa spouses filed a complaint for
damages with RTC Cebu, against Vismin and spouse of
Yhapon.
RTC Cebu ruled in favor of spouses Capa. It
ordered Vismin and Yhapon to pay actual, moral,
exemplary damages, loss of profits, attys fees and
litigation expenses.
Spouses Cada filed an Urgent Motion for
Execution Pending Appeal, claiming that Vismin
already gave notice to the MARINA that it was ceasing
its operations. A few days after this urgent motion was
filed, Vismin and Yhapon filed their notice of appeal.
The RTC granted petitioners' motion for
execution after petitioners' submission of a certification
from MARINA that Vismin had suspended operation of
its five vessels. A writ of execution pending appeal was
issued to Sheriff Belarmino. Sheriff issued a notice of
levy, addressed to the Regional Director of the
MARINA, levying on 2 vessels registered under
Vismin’s name.
The levy prompted the other private
respondent Jocelyn Raco, through her attorney-in-fact
Tolosa, to file a Third-Party Claim, claiming ownership
over the vessels levied upon by the sheriff. A notice of
the claim was sent to petitioners by Sheriff Belarmino
CivPro - 2
who required the Cadas to file an indemnity bond in
the amount of P2.7 million.
Vismin and Yhapon filed a Motion to Quash
Levy on the ground that petitioner Cadas were not
required to put up a bond in favor of Vismin (as
security in case the appealed decision will be
reversed). RTC however, didn’t rule on this motion
because it lost jurisdiction with the perfection of the
appeal.
In the CA, petitioner Cada filed a motion to
approve sheriff’s indemnity bond, for the levy of the
subject vessel. 3rd party claimant Raco filed an
opposition. But, the CA eventually denied the motion
to approve sheriff’s indemnity bond. MR denied.
Cada spouses thereafter filed with the CA a
Motion to Deny Third Party Claim. They assert that it
wasn’t Raco who really signed the claim, but mere the
atty-in-fact Tolosa. That was when CA issued its
assailed resolution in this case. CA just took note of
the motion to deny 3rd party complaint. CA held that
said motion should have been filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu, not CA.
Cada spouses now say CA acted with GADLEJ
in refusing to rule on the motion to deny 3rd party
claim because Cada believes that the RTC already lost
jurisdiction. Also, petitioners argue that the third-party
claim is a nullity since the affidavit where third-party
claimant Raco stated that she is the owner and has the
right to possess the levied properties, was not signed
by her but by Tolosa, her attorney in-fact.
On the other hand, private respondents aver
that the third party claim was filed in accordance with
Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court; that the levy
was never perfected because of petitioners' failure to
have the sheriff's indemnity bond approved by the CA,
Same position is taken by Vismin and Yhapon.
ISSUE: W/N the CA committed grave abuse of
discretion when it did not act on petitioners' Motion to
Deny Third-Party Claim with Motion to Admit Claim for
Damages on the ground that the same should have
been filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu.
HELD/RATIO: No. Decision affirmed. RTC has
jurisdiction to issue execution pending appeal.
HOWEVER, unfortunately appeal was not
perfected. There is a valid 3rd party claim.
Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court
explains that the trial court loses jurisdiction over a
case upon perfection of appeal. “A party's appeal by
notice of appeal is deemed perfected as to him upon
the filing of the notice of appeal in due time. xxxx In
appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction
over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed
in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of
the other parties.”
In either case, prior to the transmittal of
the original record or the record on appeal, the
court may issue orders for the protection and
preservation of the rights of the parties which do
not involve any matter litigated by the appeal,
93
 emedial Law Review
Digests
approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent
litigants, order execution pending appeal in
accordance with Section 2 of Rule 39, and allow
withdrawal of the appeal.
On the other hand, Section 2, Rule 39 provides:
SEC. 2. Discretionary execution. —
(a) Execution of a judgment or a final order
pending appeal. — On motion of the prevailing
party with notice to the adverse party filed in
the trial court while it has jurisdiction over the
case and is in possession of either the original
record or the record on appeal, as the case
may be, at the time of the filing of such
motion, said court may, in its discretion, order
execution of a judgment or final order even
before the expiration of the period to appeal.
After the trial court has lost jurisdiction, the
motion for execution pending appeal may be
filed in the appellate court.
Discretionary execution may only issue upon
good reasons to be stated in a special order
after due hearing.
Clearly, as long as the motion for
execution pending appeal is filed within the
period for perfecting the appeal and prior to the
transmittal of the records to the CA, the trial
court may order execution pending appeal upon
good reasons to be stated in the Order granting
execution pending appeal. The trial court granted
petitioners' motion for execution pending appeal and
issued the writ of execution commanding sheriff
Belarmino to levy the properties of United Vismin.
However, a third party-claim was filed by
Raco through her attorney-in-fact Tolosa
pursuant to Section 16, Rule 3.
In this case, Raco availed of the remedy known
as terceria, by serving on the officer making the levy
an affidavit of his title and a copy thereof upon
petitioners. Upon receipt of such affidavit, sheriff
Belarmino who is not bound to keep the properties
because of such third party claim, notified petitioners
of such claim and required them to post an indemnity
bond in the amount of P2,700,000.00 on February 4,
2002 to answer for any liability he may incur by reason
of such execution. The matter of the invalidity of
the affidavit of the third-party claimant was
never raised by petitioners in the trial court
which could have still ruled on the same since
the records were still with it at the time such
third party claim was filed. Moreover, petitioners
even filed an indemnity bond.
Petitioners then filed a Motion to Deny Third-
Party Claim with Motion to Admit Claim for Damages
which is a complete turn around from their motion to
approve indemnity bond. The CA did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in not acting on the same since the
invalidity of the affidavit of third-party claim should
have been raised at the earliest opportunity which is in
the trial court. Petitioners could have then moved for
the quashal of the same, thus they could not now
invoke the jurisdiction of the CA to rule on the same
CivPro - 2
when they in fact had already waived the alleged
defect in the affidavit when they sought from the CA
the approval of the indemnity bond they posted in the
trial court.
A third party claimant or any third person may
vindicate his claim to his property wrongfully levied by
filing a proper action which is distinct and separate
from that in which the judgment is being enforced.
Such action would have for its object the recovery of
the possession of the property seized by the sheriff, as
well as damages resulting from the allegedly wrongful
seizure and detention thereof despite the third-party
claim; and it may be brought against the sheriff, of
course, and such other parties as may be alleged to
have colluded with the sheriff in the supposedly
wrongful execution proceedings, such as the judgment
creditor himself.
The same paragraph also provides a remedy to
a judgment obligee when a frivolous and plainly
spurious claim was filed by a third-party claimant, i.e.,
to file his claim for damages in the same court where
the third-party claimant filed his third-party claim or to
file a separate action.
NAVAROSA V. COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner Charito Navarosa and respondent
Roger Esto were mayoral candidates for the
city of Libacao in Aklan during the May 2001
elections. The COMELEC proclaimed Navarosa
as winner by three votes. Alleging
irregularities, Esto then filed an election
protest before the Kalibo RTC, with Navarosa
filing a counter-protest.
The RTC ruled in favor of Esto, declaring that
Esto won by 42 votes over Navarosa. While
Navarosa appealed the RTC's ruling before the
COMELEC, Esto filed a motion for execution of
judgment pending appeal. Navarosa offered to
stay execution by filing a supersedeas bond.
The RTC granted both motions subject to the
filing of bonds, ruling that the SC has
recognized executions of judgments pending
appeal in election cases in accordance with
Sec. 2, Rule 39. Esto filed a petition for
certiorari with the COMELEC against the RTC.
The COMELEC affirmed the RTC's order
granting execution pending appeal and nullified
the stay of execution.
Issue: Can the RTC stay executions pending appeal in
an election contest?
Held: No. Sec. 3 of Rule 39 not applicable to election
cases.
While present election laws are silent as to
execution pending appeal in election protests,
Sec. 2 (providing for execution pending
appeal), Rule 39 applies in suppletory
94
 emedial Law Review
Digests
character. The primordial public interest of
preventing delays in the exercise of office by
the protestant by prolonging the protest
justifies the suppletory application.
Nevertheless, Sec. 3 (providing for
discretionary execution) of Rule 39 does not
apply to election cases. It can only find
application in ordinary civil application where
the judgments and orders are capable of
pecuniary estimation. Said characteristics are
absent in election cases and the underlying
public interest renders a supersedeas bond
insufficient.
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL v. CA and SPOUSES
TORRALBA
FACTS: The RTC of QC rendered a decision in a civil
case entitled “Spouses Alex and Ophelia Torralba v.
International School, Inc. (Manila), Dr. Rodney C.
Hermes, Noli Reloj and Danilo de Jesus” involving a
complaint for damages due to the death of the
spouses’ only son, Ericson, while in the custody of
International School (ISM) and its officers. The RTC
ruled in favor of the defendants and dismissed the
complaint of the Torralbas. ISM appealed to the CA.
During the pendency of the appeal, the
spouses filed a motion for execution pending appeal
before the lower court on the grounds that the appeal
is merely dilatory and that the filing of the bond is
another good reason for the execution of a judgment
pending appeal. This was opposed by ISM.
The lower court granted execution pending
upon the posting of a bond in the amount of P5 million
by the spouses. In an ex-parte motion, Deputy Sheriff
Doroni informed the lower court to the Writ of
Execution Pending Appeal issued by the court, a Notice
of Garnishment of ISM's bank deposits at Global
Consumer Banking, Citibank N.A. (Citibank) was
served by him to Citibank on July 18, 1996; and that
on July 24, 1996, he received a letter from Citibank’s
informing him that ISM's bank deposits with the said
bank in the amount of P5.5 million were on
"hold/pledge". In the meantime, ISM filed a motion for
reconsideration or for approval of supersedeas bond in
the amount of P5.6 million.
The lower court issued an Order directing
Citibank to release to Deputy Sheriff Doroni in cash or
check the P5.5 million, subject of the Notice of
Garnishment.The following day, the spouses Torralba
filed an urgent ex parte motion to encash and receive
the proceeds of the Citibank Manager's check
representing the amount garnished in execution. ISM
filed an urgent motion to stop delivery of garnished
funds to the spouses Torralba. The lower court issued
an order suspending the execution process there being
no opposition filed in relation thereto and pending
resolution of ISM's motion for reconsideration (or to
approval of supersedeas bond). The spouses Torralba
CivPro - 2
then filed an opposition to ISM's motion for
reconsideration.
The lower court denied ISM's motion for
reconsideration and authorized and directed Deputy
Sheriff Doroni to encash the Citibank Manager's Check
payable to the said court in the amount of P5.5 million
and to turn over the proceeds therefor after deducting
all legal fees and charges if any, to the plaintiffs or
their representative.
ISM filed a petition for certiorari before the CA,
seeking the nullification of the assailed orders for
having been issued in excess of jurisdiction and with
grave of discretion. CA dismissed the petition for lack
of merit. Hence, ISM brought the case to the SC.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals
erred in finding that the lower court did not commit
any grave abuse of discretion in granting execution
pending appeal of its decision – YES
(2) Whether or not the filing of a bond can be
considered a good reason to justify immediate
execution under Section 2, Rule 39 – NO
HELD:
(1) In upholding the writ of execution pending
appeal, the Court of Appeals observed that the lower
court had, prior to it its issuance, duly noted the
presence of the circumstances laid down by Section 2,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, 23 allowing execution as
an exception, or pending appeal, even before final
Judgment, to wit:
(a) There must be a motion by the prevailing party
with notice to the adverse party;
(b) There must be good reasons for issuing the
execution; and
(c) The good reasons must be stated in a special
order.
Likewise, the Court of Appeals accepted as
"good reasons" that ISM's appeal appears to be
dilatory in view of its virtual admission of fault when it
adopted the project "Code Red" consisting of safety
and emergency measures only after the death of
plaintiffs-spouses Torralba's son, and the delay of the
case which already affected plaintiffs spouses Torralbas
financially.
For purposes only of determining the
correctness of the writ of execution pending appeal,
the SC could not see how the lower courts came upon
the conclusion of virtual admission of fault or
negligence by ISM based on ISM's swimming coach’s
admission that he read the school paper article
introducing "Code Red". As correctly pointed out by
ISM, the article was not an official statement of the
school, but merely an opinion of its author. Moreover,
the statement of Mr. Noli Reloj that he read the article
on "Code Red" cannot be construed as an admission of
liability by the school. Clearly then, the conclusion of
the lower courts that the appeal is dilatory based solely
on the foregoing exchange rests on shaky ground.
95
 emedial Law Review
Digests
(2) The Court cited the case of Roxas v. CA and
held that the mere filing of a bond by the successful
party is not a good reason for ordering execution
pending appeal, as "a combination of circumstances is
the dominant consideration which impels the grant of
immediate execution, the requirement of a bond is
imposed merely as an additional factor, no doubt for
the protection of the defendant's creditor. Since the
have already ruled that the reason that an appeal is
dilatory does not justify execution pending appeal,
neither does the filing of a bond, without anything
more, justify the same.
(The court also noted that writ of execution
pending appeal covered the moral and exemplary
damages adjudged by the lower court against ISM.)
MANACOP v. EQUITABLE PCI BANK
FACTS: Lavine Loungewear Manufacturing (Lavine)
insured its building & supplies against fire w/ PhilFire,
Rizal Suret, TICO, First Lepanto, Equitable Insurance &
Reliance Insurance. Except for the policy issued by
First Lepanto, all the policies provide that: “Loss, if
any, under this policy is payable to Equitable Banking
Corporation-Greenhills Branch, as their interest may
appear subject to the terms, conditions, clauses and
warranties under this policy.”
A fire gutted Lavine’s buildings & their
contents, thus claims were made against the policies.
The insurance proceeds payable to Lavine amounted to
about P112M. The insurance companies expressed
their willingness to pay the insurance proceeds, but
only to the rightful claimant. (Lavine was indebted to
Equitable Bank, and there was a dispute as to whether
the insurance proceeds should be paid directly to
Equitable Bank, or to Lavine first who would then pay
Equitable Bank.)
The RTC ruled in favor of petitioners & ordered
the insurance companies to pay Lavine, as well as
Equitable Bank to refund Lavine. First Lepanto,
PhilFire, Rizal Surety, and Equitable Bank filed a Notice
of Appeal. Meanwhile, petitioners filed a Motion for
Execution Pending Appeal. Judge Lavina granted the
Motion for Execution Pending Appeal & issued a Writ of
Execution.
Without filing an MR from the decision of the
RTC, and even before the RTC could rule on the Motion
for Execution Pending Appeal, Equitable Bank filed a
Petition for Certiorari. Its Petition for Certiorari assailed
the RTC decision (and NOT the order granting the
Motion for Execution Pending Appeal & the Writ of
Execution).
On the other hand, First Lepanto & Philfire filed
a Petition for Certiorari assailing the RTC’s order
granting the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal &
the Writ of Execution.
ISSUE:
(a) W/N the Petition for Certiorari assailing the RTC
judgment was proper.
CivPro - 2
(b) W/N the Petition for Certiorari assailing the order
granting the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal &
the Writ of Execution was proper.
RULING:
(a) NO. Simultaneous filing of a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 and an ordinary appeal under Rule 41
cannot be allowed since 1 remedy would necessarily
cancel out the other. The existence & availability of the
right of appeal proscribes resort to certiorari because
one of the requirements for availment of the latter is
precisely that there should be no appeal. It is
elementary that for certiorari to prosper, it is not
enough that the trial court committed GADLJEC; the
requirement that there is no appeal, nor any plain,
speedy & adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law must likewise be satisfied.
It is well-settled that the remedy to obtain
reversal or modification of the judgment on the merits
is appeal. This is true even if the error, or 1 of the
errors, ascribed to the trial court rendering the
judgment is its lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter, or the exercise of power in excess thereof, or
grave abuse of discretion in the findings of fact or of
law set out in the decision. Thus, while it may be true
that a final order or judgment was rendered under
circumstances that would otherwise justify resort to a
special civil action under Rule 65, the latter would
nonetheless be unavailing if there is an appeal or any
other plain, speedy & adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
(b) YES. An appeal from a judgment does NOT bar a
certiorari petition against the order granting execution
pending appeal & the issuance of the writ of execution.
Certiorari lies against an order granting execution
pending appeal where the same is not founded upon
good reasons.2 The fact that the losing party had also
appealed from the judgment does NOT bar the
certiorari proceedings, as the appeal could not be an
adequate remedy from such premature execution.
Additionally, there is no forum-shopping where in 1
petition a party questions the order granting the
motion for execution pending appeal & at the same
time questions the decision on the merits in a regular
appeal before the appellate court. After all, the merits
of the main case are not to be determined in a petition
questioning execution pending appeal & vice versa.
Since the execution of a judgment pending
appeal is an exception to the general rule, the
existence of good reasons is essential. In the case at
bar, petitioners insist that execution pending appeal is
justified because the insurance companies admitted
their liabilities under the insurance contracts and thus
have no reason to withhold payment. We are not
persuaded. The fact that the insurance companies
admit their liabilities is not a compelling or superior
circumstance that would warrant execution pending
appeal. On the contrary, admission of their liabilities &
willingness to deliver the proceeds to the proper party
militate against execution pending appeal since there
96
 emedial Law Review
Digests
is little or no danger that the judgment will become
illusory.
There is likewise no merit in petitioners’
contention that the appeals are merely dilatory
because, while the insurance companies admitted their
liabilities, the matter of how much is owing from each
of them & who is entitled to the same remain
unsettled. Besides, that the appeal is merely dilatory is
not a good reason for granting execution pending
appeal.
Lastly, petitioners assert that Lavine’s financial
distress is sufficient reason to order execution pending
appeal. Citing Borja v. CA, they claim that execution
pending appeal may be granted if the prevailing party
is already of advanced age & in danger of extinction.
Borja is not applicable to the case at bar
because its factual milieu is different. In Borja, the
prevailing party was a natural person who, at 76 years
of age, “may no longer enjoy the fruit of the judgment
before he finally passes away.” Lavine, on the other
hand, is a juridical entity whose existence cannot be
likened to a natural person. Its precarious financial
condition is not by itself a compelling circumstance
warranting immediate execution & does not outweigh
the long standing general policy of enforcing only final
and executory judgments.
CURATA V PPA
FACTS: (it’s a very complicated case composed of 7
consolidated cases but for our topic I pinpointed the
relevant facts nalang)
2 Executive orders (385 and 431) placed the
BPZ under the PPA’s jurisdiction in pursuance of this
the PPA instituted expropriation proceedings for 185
lots represented by 231 individuals and entities. The
PPA offered to pay for just compensation which the
parties rejected. The defendants were divided into 3
groups: Dimayacyac, Ortega and Cruz Groups. There
were also individuals not included in the groups.
THE FIRST COMPENSATION ORDER
The RTC ordered the expropriation of the lots
so the Commissioners were asked to conduct a report
and later the RTC gave their first compensation order
ordering the PPA to pay the Dimayacyac group 5500
instead of 4800 as recommended. Dimayacyac moved
for execution citing that the group consisted of
members who were of advanced age which was
opposed by PPA but which was nevertheless allowed by
the RTC in the July 24, 2000 Order granting the motion
of execution.
July 31, 2000- RTC issued Order issuing a writ
of execution.
August 2 and 3 - Then a notice of
garnishment was issued to LBP Batangas City Branch
by Sheriff Quino.
August 10- PPA filed a "Notice of Appeal with
Motion for Extension of Time to File Record on Appeal
and Pay Appeal Fee."
CivPro - 2
August 25- Within the period of extension
requested, PPA filed its Record on Appeal. The RTC
issued an Order denying PPA’s Notice of Appeal from
the July 10, 2000 Order (First Compensation Order) on
the ground of non-payment of appeal fee.
August 28 Order- the RTC denied PPA’s Record on
Appeal.
September 18- the RTC denied PPA’s Motion for
Reconsideration of the August 25, 2000 RTC order.
PPA challenged the execution pending appeal of the
July 24 Order, the July 31 Order and the August 2 and
3 Notices of Garnishment. In its supplemental petition,
PPA assailed the August 25, Order which denied PPA’s
motion, the August 28 Order which denied the PPA’s
record on appeal and the September 18 Order which
denied PPA’s motion for reconsideration.
The CA allowed the appeal of PPA and nullified
the questioned RTC orders.
Curata et al now assail the CA order allowing
PPA’s appeal despite the alleged finality of the July 10,
2000 Order (First Compensation Order).
ISSUE: W/n execution pending appeal is applicable to
expropriation proceedings? NO!
HELD: SC ruled that discretionary execution of
judgments pending appeal under Sec. 2(a) of Rule 39
does not apply to eminent domain proceedings.
In Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus and Paredes,
“When the Government is plaintiff the judgment will
naturally take the form of an order merely requiring
the payment of the award as a condition precedent to
the transfer of the title, as a personal judgment
against the Government could not be realized upon
execution.”
In Commissioner of Public Highways v. San
Diego, Chief Justice Teehankee explained the
rationale on why government funds and properties
cannot be seized under a writ of execution, thus:
The universal rule that where the State gives
its consent to be sued by private parties either by
general or special law, it may limit claimant’s action
"only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to
the stage of execution" and that the power of the
Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since
government funds and properties may not be seized
under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such
judgments, is based on obvious considerations of
public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be
covered by the corresponding appropriation as
required by law. The functions and public services
rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be
paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds
from their legitimate and specific objects, as
appropriated by law.
PPA’s monies, facilities and assets are
government properties so they are exempt from
execution whether by virtue of a final judgment
or pending appeal. PPA funds may not be garnished
absent an allocation by its Board or by statutory grant.
If the PPA funds cannot be garnished and its
97
 emedial Law Review
Digests
properties, being government properties, cannot be
levied via a writ of execution pursuant to a final
judgment, then the trial court likewise cannot grant
discretionary execution pending appeal, as it would run
afoul of the established jurisprudence that government
properties are exempt from execution. What cannot be
done directly cannot be done indirectly.
GARCIA v. PAL
Facts: PAL filed administrative charges against
petitioners (employees) after they were caught in the
act of sniffing shabu when a team of company security
personnel raided the PAL Center. They were dismissed
after due notice, which prompted them to file a
complaint for illegal dismissal and damages.
The Labor Arbiter ruled in their favor and
ordered PAL to immediately comply with the
reinstatement aspect of the decision. But prior to this,
the SEC placed PAL under rehabilitation receivership
due to severe financial losses. On appeal, the NLRC
reversed the decision. However, the Labor Arbiter
subsequently issued a Writ of Execution on the
reinstatement aspect and Notice of Garnishment. The
NLRC affirmed their validity but suspended and
referred the action to the Rehabilitation Receiver.
PAL went to the CA, arguing that the
subsequent finding of a valid dismissal removes the
basis for implementing the reinstatement aspect of the
decision and the impossibility to comply with such due
to corporate rehabilitation. The CA partially granted
the petition and reinstated the NLRC Resolution insofar
as it suspended the proceedings. Subsequently, SEC
granted PAL’s request to exit from rehabilitation
proceedings.
Issues:
1. Whether the LA’s order of reinstatement is
immediately executory pending appeal – YES
2. Whether it is obligatory on the part of the
employer to reinstate and pay wages during
the period of appeal despite reversal of said
order – YES
3. Given these, whether petitioners are entitled to
their salaries - NO
Ratio:
Immediate Execution of Reinstatement Order
The SC cites seemingly divergent decisions
concerning reinstatement pending appeal, or
particularly, the option of payroll reinstatement. One
view is that a dismissed employee whose case was
favorably decided by the LA is entitled to receive
wages pending appeal upon reinstatement, which is
immediately executory. Unless there is a restraining
order, it is ministerial upon the LA to implement the
order of reinstatement and it is mandatory on the
eployer to comply therewith (Air Philippines v.
Zamora). The other view is found in the case of
Genuino v. NLRC, which says that if the decision of the
CivPro - 2
LA is later reversed on appeal upon the finding that the
ground for dismissal is valid, then the employer has
the right to require the dismissed employee on payroll
reinstatement to refund the salaries received while the
case was pending on appeal. However, if the
employee was reinstated to work during the pendency
of the appeal, he is entitled to compensation for actual
services rendered without need of refund.
PAL argues that there is no point in releasing
the wages to petitioners since their dismissal was
found to be valid, and to do so would constitute unjust
enrichment. But the SC said that the social justice
principles of labor law outweigh the civil law doctrine of
unjust enrichment. The Genuino ruling not only
disregards the social justice principles but also
institutes a scheme unduly favorable to management.
Under such, the salaries dispensed pendent lite merely
serves as a bond posted in installment by the
employer. For in the event of reversal, the employer
gets back the same amount without having to spend
ordinarily for bond premiums. This contradicts the
proscription that “the posting of a bond by the
employer shall not stay the execution for
reinstatement.”
The SC reaffirms the prevailing principle that
even if the order of reinstatement of the LA is reversed
on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer
to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed
employee during the period of appeal until reversed by
the higher court. The LA’s order of reinstatement is
immediately executory and the employer either has to
re-admit them to work under the same terms and
conditions, or to reinstate them in payroll, and that
failing to exercise the options in the alternative, the
employer must pay the employee’s salaries.
(Note: Separate opinion of Justice Velasco supports
the Genuino case and finds Air Philippines to be
inapplicable because the writ of execution therein was
secured prior to the reversal of the LA’s decision,
unlike in the present case)
Fact of Corporate Rehabilitation
After the LA’s decision is reversed, the employee may
be barred from collecting the accrued wages if it is
shown that the delay in enforcing the reinstatement
pending appeal was without fault on the part of the
employer. While reinstatement pending appeal aims to
aver the continuing threat or danger to the survival of
the employee and his family, it does not contemplate
the period when the employer-corporation itself if
similarly in a judicially monitored state of being
resuscitated in order to survive.
ARCENAS V CA
Facts: The case takes its roots from Civil Case No.
35349 (1st CASE) of the Court of First Instance of Rizal
(now Regional Trial Court), which was an action for
98
 emedial Law Review
Digests
annulment of the foreclosure sale of a barge. After
trial, the trial court rendered judgment.
The trial court ordered only Arcena’s co-
defendant Emilio Espino to return the barge ‘MV Sta.
Lucia I’ to Jose de la Riva and to pay P 48,000.00 a
month as unrealized profit from February 3, 1980 or
until June 18, 1980. The said judgment absolved
petitioner from any liability insofar as the barge is
concerned but found him jointly liable to private
respondent and Antonio Sy, Sr., for moral and
exemplary damages.
De la Riva filed a motion for issuance of a writ
of execution with the trial court. This was granted.
However, despite the writ of execution, private
respondent failed to enforce the judgment.
Five (5) years from the time of the entry of
judgment, de la Riva filed a complaint for revival of
judgment and sum of money with damages before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig (2nd CASE). The complaint
alleged that Arcenas could be served with summons at
BF Homes, Pamplona Las Piñas, Metro Manila.
The sheriff returned the summons unserved for
the reason that Arcenas was already residing in the
United States. Alias summons was served on his
mother by substituted service.
Arcenas failed to file his answer and was
declared in default. Thereafter, de la Riva was allowed
to adduce his evidence ex-parte. The trial court
rendered a decision against Arcenas. This revived
judgment now subject of this case, substantially
modified the original judgment by directing Arcenas to
pay private respondent the sum of P171,022.00
representing double the value of the barge;
P10,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages; and
15% of the amount recoverable by way of attorney’s
fees.
Arcenas filed a petition with the CA to annul
the said revived judgment on the ground that, the RTC
did not acquire jurisdiction over his person and that
the revived judgment substantially altered the original
judgment. CA denied.
Issue:
Did the court acquire jurisdiction over his
person? (side issue)
Is the revived judgment void for substantially
altering the original judgment? (pertinent
issue)
Held:
Did the court acquire jurisdiction over his person?
NO. Arcenas was no longer residing and found in the
Philippines. He left for the United States in June of
1993 as evidenced by the Sheriff’s Return. Hence,
summons could have been served on him either
personally or by publication. However, since the
complaint filed against him was one in personam and
did not involve the personal status of the private
respondent, nor any property in the Philippines in
which Arcenas had or claimed an interest, or which de
la Riva had attached, summons should have been
CivPro - 2
served on him personally. The deputy sheriff should
not have served the summons by substituted service.
Having failed to serve the summons on the person of
the petitioner, the Regional Trial Court did not validly
acquire jurisdiction over him.
Is the revived judgment void for substantially
altering the original judgment?
In the 1st case, the judgment of the trial court ordered
only petitioner’s co-defendant Emilio Espino to return
the barge ‘MV Sta. Lucia I’ to private respondent Jose
de la Riva and to pay P 48,000.00 a month as
unrealized profit from February 3, 1980 or until June
18, 1980. The said judgment absolved petitioner from
any liability insofar as the barge is concerned but
found him jointly liable to private respondent and
Antonio Sy, Sr., for moral and exemplary damages. On
the other hand, the revived judgment now subject of
this case, substantially modified the original judgment
by directing petitioner to pay private respondent the
sum of P171,022.00 representing double the value of
the barge; P10,000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages; and 15% of the amount recoverable by way
of attorney’s fees.
These new monetary awards can not be
allowed since they were not adjudged in the original
judgment which had long become final and executory.
For, it is a fundamental rule that when a final
judgment becomes executory, it thereby becomes
immutable and unalterable. The judgment may no
longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct what is perceived to
be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and
regardless of whether the modification is attempted to
be made by the court rendering it or by the highest
Court of the land. The only recognized exceptions are
the correction of clerical errors or the making of so-
called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice
to any party, and, of course, where the judgment is
void. Any amendment or alteration which substantially
affects a final and executory judgment is null and void
for lack of jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings
held for that purpose.
INFANTE V. ARAN BUILDERS
Facts:
Aran Builders filed before the RTC of
Muntinlupa City an action for revival of
judgment against Infante
The judgment sought to be revived was
rendered by the Makati RTC which is an action
for specific performance and damages
Infante filed a motion to dismiss the action for
revival of judgment on the grounds that
Muntinlupa RTC has no jurisdiction over the
persons of the parties and that venue was
improperly laid. Aran Builders opposed the
motion
Muntinlupa RTC denied the motion to dismiss
99
 emedial Law Review
Digests
due to the following reasons:
1. When the decision was rendered by the
Makati RTC, there was still no RTC in
Muntinlupa
2. The case at bar is a revival of a judgment
which declared the plaintiff as the owner of
a parcel of land located in Muntinlupa City.
It is this judgment which is sought to be
enforced thru this action which necessarily
involves the interest, possession, title, and
ownership of the parcel of land located in
Muntinlupa city and adjudged to Infante.
Hence, the complaint should be filed in
Muntinlupa City where the property is
located, as there are now Regional Trial
Courts in said city
MR denied by Muntinlupa RTC
CA ruled in favor of Aran Builders. CA held that
since the judgment sought to be revived was
rendered in an action involving title to or
possession of real property, or interest therein,
the action for revival of judgment is then an
action in rem which should be filed with the
Regional Trial Court of the place where the real
property is located. MR denied.
Issue: Where is the proper venue of the present action
for revival of judgment?
Held: Muntinlupa RTC
Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure provides that after the lapse of five (5)
years from entry of judgment and before it is barred
by the statute of limitations, a final and executory
judgment or order may be enforced by action. The
Rule does not specify in which court the action for
revival of judgment should be filed.
The proper venue depends on the
determination of whether the present action for revival
of judgment is a real action or a personal action. If the
action for revival of judgment affects title to or
possession of real property, or interest therein, then it
is a real action that must be filed with the court of the
place where the real property is located. If such action
does not fall under the category of real actions, it is
then a personal action that may be filed with the court
of the place where the plaintiff or defendant resides.
The allegations in the complaint for revival of
judgment determine whether it is a real action or a
personal action. The complaint for revival of judgment
alleges that a final and executory judgment has
ordered Infanta to execute a deed of sale over a parcel
of land in Ayala Alabang Subdivision in favor of Aran
Builders; pay all pertinent taxes in connection with
said sale; register the deed of sale with the Registry of
Deeds and deliver to Ayala Corporation the certificate
of title issued in the name of Aran Builders.
The previous judgment has conclusively
declared Aran Builders’ right to have the title over the
disputed property conveyed to it. It is undeniable that
Aran Builders has an established interest over the lot
CivPro - 2
in question; and to protect such right or interest, Aran
Builders brought suit to revive the previous judgment.
The sole reason for the present action to revive is the
enforcement of Aran Buidlers’ adjudged rights over a
piece of realty. Verily, the action falls under the
category of a real action, for it affects Aran Builders’
interest over real property. The present case for
revival of judgment being a real action, the complaint
should indeed be filed with the Regional Trial Court of
the place where the realty is located.
Section 18 of BP129 provides that a branch of
the Regional Trial Court shall exercise its authority only
over a particular territory defined by the Supreme
Court. Originally, Muntinlupa City was under the
territorial jurisdiction of the Makati Courts. However,
the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981 took effect
and said law provided for the creation of a branch of
the Regional Trial Court in Muntinlupa. Thus, it is now
the Regional Trial Court in Muntinlupa City which has
territorial jurisdiction or authority to validly issue
orders and processes concerning real property within
Muntinlupa City.
JOSEF v. SANTOS
FACTS:
- Petitioner Albino Josef bought shoe materials on
credit from respondent Otelio Santos.
- Josef failed to pay so Santos filed a case for
collection of sum of money.
- Marikina RTC found Josef liable. Josef appealed but
CA affirmed RTC. Josef went to SC via certiorari
but it was dismissed. The Judgment became final
and executory.
- Santos moved for issuance of a writ of execution,
which was opposed by Josef. Still, the writ was
granted and subsequently issued and enforced.
- Certain personal properties subject of the writ of
execution were auctioned off. Thereafter, a real
property located at Marikina City was sold by way
of public auction to fully satisfy the judgment
credit. Santos emerged as the winning bidder and
a Certificate of Sale was issued in his favor.
- Josef filed an original petition for certiorari with the
CA, questioning the sheriff’s levy and sale of the
personal and real properties. Josef claimed that the
personal properties did not belong to him but to
his children; and that the real property covered
was his family home thus exempt from execution.
- CA dismissed the petition for failure to file a
motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s order
granting the motion for execution and ordering the
issuance of a writ therefor, as well as for his failure
to indicate in his petition the timeliness of its filing
as required under the Rules of Court. MR was also
denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N the writ of execution was valid.
HELD/RATIO: NO.
100
 emedial Law Review
Digests
As early as during proceedings prior to the
issuance of the writ of execution, Josef brought the
issue of exemption from execution of his home, which
he claimed to be a family home in contemplation of the
civil law. However, instead of inquiring into the nature
of petitioner’s allegations in his opposition, the trial
court ignored the same and granted Santos’s motion
for execution.
The order did not resolve nor take into account
petitioner’s allegations in his Opposition, which are
material and relevant in the resolution of the motion
for issuance of a writ of execution. This is serious error
on the part of the trial court. It should have made an
earnest determination of the truth to petitioner’s claim
that the house and lot in which he and his children
resided was their duly constituted family home. Since
it did not, its Order is thus null and void.
The same is true with respect to personal
properties levied upon and sold at auction. Despite
petitioner’s allegations in his Opposition, the trial court
did not make an effort to determine the nature of the
same, whether the items were exempt from execution
or not, or whether they belonged to petitioner or to
someone else.
Respondent moved for issuance of a writ of
execution on February 17, 2003 while petitioner filed
his opposition on June 23, 2003. The trial court
granted the motion on July 16, 2003, and the writ of
execution was issued on August 20, 2003. Clearly, the
trial court had enough time to conduct the crucial
inquiry that would have spared petitioner the trouble
of having to seek relief all the way to this Court.
Indeed, the trial court’s inaction on petitioner’s plea
resulted in serious injustice to the latter, not to
mention that its failure to conduct an inquiry based on
the latter’s claim bordered on gross ignorance of the
law.
Being void, the July 16, 2003 Order could not
have conferred any right to respondent. Any writ of
execution based on it is likewise void.
Indeed, petitioner’s resort to the special civil
action of certiorari in the Court of Appeals was belated
and without benefit of the requisite motion for
reconsideration, however, considering the gravity of
the issue, involving as it does matters that strike at
the very heart of that basic social institution which the
State has a constitutional and moral duty to preserve
and protect, as well as petitioner’s constitutional right
to abode, all procedural infirmities occasioned upon
this case must take a back seat to the substantive
questions which deserve to be answered in full.
The SC directed the RTC to conduct the
necessary inquiries about the properties subject of
attachment.
D’ ARMOURED SECURITY AND INVESTIGATION
AGENCY, INC., vs. ARNULFO ORPIA, et. al.
Facts: Orpia et. al, who were employed as security
guards by D’Armoured Security and Investigation
CivPro - 2
Agency, Inc. (D’ Armoured) and assigned to Fortune
Tobacco, Inc. (Fortune Tobacco), filed with the Labor
Arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal and various
monetary claims against D’ Armoured and Fortune
Tobacco.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision in favor
of Orpia et. al. Only Fortune Tobacco interposed an
appeal to the NLRC. D Armoured did not appeal. The
NLRC affirmed with modification the Arbiter’s decision
and dismissed the complaint against Fortune Tobacco.
This decision became final and executory. As such, the
award specified in the Arbiter’s decision became the
sole liability of D’ Armoured.
Upon Orpia et. al’s motion, the Arbiter issued a
writ of execution. Eventually, the sheriff served a writ
of garnishment upon the Chief Accountant of Foremost
Farms, Inc., a corporation with whom D’ Armoured has
an existing services agreement. D’ Armoured filed
with the NLRC a “Motion to Quash/Recall Writ of
Execution and Garnishment” which was opposed by
Orpia et. al.
The Arbiter denied the motion and directed the
sheriff to release the garnished sum of money to Orpia
et. al pro rata. When D’ Armoured’s MR was denied, it
interposed an appeal to the NLRC. The NLRC dismissed
the appeal for failing to post a bond within the
reglementary period. MR denied. D’ Armoured filed
with the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition. CA
dismissed the petition, hence, this petition for review
on certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not D’ Armoured’s monthly
receivables from the Foremost Farms, Inc. (garnishee)
are exempt from execution.
Held and Ratio: D’ Armoured’s monthly receivables
may be garnished. An order of execution of a final
and executory judgment, as in this case, is not
appealable, otherwise, there would be no end to
litigation. On this ground alone, the instant petition is
dismissible.
Assuming that an appeal is proper, Section 1,
Rule IV of the NLRC Manual on Execution of Judgment
provides enumerates what properties are exempt from
execution.4 It is apparent that the exemption pertains
4
“Rule IV
EXECUTION
SECTION 1. Properties exempt from execution. – Only
the properties of the losing party shall be the subject of
execution, except:
(a) The losing party’s family home constituted in
accordance with the Civil Code or Family Code or as may be
provided for by law or in the absence thereof, the homestead
in which he resides, and land necessarily used in connection
therewith, subject to the limits fixed by law;
(b) His necessary clothing, and that of his family;
(c) Household furniture and utensils necessary for
housekeeping, and used for that purpose by the losing party
such as he may select, of a value not exceeding the amount
fixed by law;
(d) Provisions for individual or family use sufficient for
three (3) months;
101
 emedial Law Review
Digests
only to natural persons and not to juridical entities.
On this point, the CA correctly ruled that D’Armoured,
being a corporate entity, does not fall within the
exemption provided for under Section 13 of Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court:
‘SECTION 13. Property exempt from
execution. – Except as otherwise expressly
provided by law, the following property, and
no other, shall be exempt from execution:
x x x x x x
xxx
(i) So much of the salaries, wages or
earnings of the judgment obligor for
his personal services within the four
months preceding the levy as are necessary
for the support of his family.’
The exemption under this procedural rule
should be read in conjunction with Art. 1708 of the
Civil Code, the substantive law which proscribes the
execution of employee’s wages: “Art. 1708. The
laborer’s wage shall not be subject to execution or
attachment, except for debts incurred for food, shelter,
clothing and medical attendance.”
Thus, the exemption under Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court and Article 1708 of the New Civil Code
is meant to favor only laboring men or women whose
works are manual. Persons belonging to this class
usually look to the reward of a day’s labor for
immediate or present support, and such persons are
more in need of the exemption than any other [Gaa vs.
Court of Appeals, 140 SCRA 304 (1985)].
In this context, exemptions under this rule are
confined only to natural persons and not to
juridical entities such as D’ Armoured. Thus, the
rule speaks of salaries, wages and earning from the
‘personal services’ rendered by the judgment obligor.
The rule further requires that such earnings be
intended for the support of the judgment debtor’s
family. Necessarily, D’ Armoured which is a corporate
entity, does not fall under the exemption. If at all, the
exemption refers to D’ Armoured’s individual
employees and not to D’ Armoured as a corporation.
CAJA V. SHERIFF NANQUIL
(e) The professional libraries of attorneys, judges,
physicians, pharmacists, dentists, engineers, surveyors,
clergymen, teachers, and other professionals, not exceeding
the amount fixed by law;
(f) So much of the earnings of the losing party for his
personal services within the month preceding the levy as are
necessary for the support of his family;
(g) All monies, benefits, privileges, or annuities accruing
or in any manner growing out of any life insurance;
(h) Tools and instruments necessarily used by him in his
trade or employment of a value not exceeding three thousand
(P3,000.00) pesos;
(i) Other properties especially exempted by law.”
CivPro - 2
Facts: Florentino A. Caja was a defendant in a
Complaint for Sum of money named "Triangle Ace
Corporation, Rep. by its General Manager, Mr. David J.
Sagun vs. Subic Realty Corporation, Florentino Caja
and Erickson Y. Caja." Judge Ubiadas decided in favour
of Triangle Corp and ordered the defendants to pay
jointly and solidarily the amount of P956,285.00 with
interest at the rate of 18% per annum, plus 10% as
atty.’s fees plus costs. A Writ of Execution, addressed
to Sheriff Nanquil, was issued.
On February 27, 1997, Nanquil sent a Notice of
Garnishment to the Manager of PAG-IBIG instructing it
not to deliver, transfer or dispose defendants’ money,
credits, shares, interests and deposits therein except
upon orders from the court.
On May 19, 1997, per Sheriff’s Return, the
Writ of Execution was returned unsatisfied. Hence, an
Alias Writ of Execution was subsequently issued on
May 19, 1997.
Per Notice of Levy dated May 19, 1997, Sheriff Nanquil
levied a parcel of land declared in the name of Subic
Realty Corporation with a total assessed value of
P1,786,870.00.
On July 1, 1997, Sheriff Nanquil levied two
personal properties of the defendants: one payloader
and one dump truck. On the same day, he issued an
Additional Notice of Levy for 77 pieces of G.I. Sheets.
On January 18, 2000, Realty Corporation,
Florentino Caja and Erickson Y. Caja filed a Motion to
Lift Levy on Execution praying that the levy on their
real property be lifted on the ground that the levy on
their personal properties is sufficient to satisfy the
judgment. They likewise asked the lower court to
direct the sheriff to conduct the appropriate execution
sale.
Judge Ubiadas denied the Motion to Lift Levy
arguing that it cannot be determined at that time if the
amount levied is way above the amount necessary to
satisfy the judgment creditor. He further ordered
Sheriff Nanquil to immediately schedule the auction
sale of defendants’ real and personal properties that
were levied in accordance with the writ of execution.
On April 26, 2001,Caja filed with the Office of
the Acting Court Administrator this complaint for Grave
Misconduct and Gross Ignorance of the Rules on
Execution under the Rules of Court against Sheriff
Nanquil.
He alleged that Nanquil made an “over levy”
because Nanquil issued a Notice of Levy of the real
property owned by Subic Realty Corporation with an
assessed value of PhP1,786,870.00 and that he also
issued a Notice of Levy on the personal properties of
the defendant Subic Realty Corporation with assessed
value fixed at PhP2,900,000.00.
He also alleged that instead of delivering the
levied properties to the court for execution sale,
Nanquil delivered them directly to the judgment
creditor (Triangle Ace Corporation) without conducting
the auction sale as provided in Rule 39, Section 19 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure.
102
 emedial Law Review
Digests
He also said Nanquil violated Rule 9 Sec. 39
because Nanquil did not levy the personal properties
first.
On May 23, 2001, Sheriff Nanquil issued a
Notice of Sheriff’s Sale announcing that on June 14,
2001, the payloader, dumptruck and G.I. sheets would
be sold at public auction. Ubiadas then forwarded to
Nanquil’s comment in which he said, among other
things, that he levied the aforesaid real property
instead of the personal properties for the reason that
undersigned Sheriff could not find any attachable
personal properties of the defendants enough to satisfy
the judgment debt despite diligent efforts exerted;
that only after did he find out of the other personal
properties, that he kept the said equipment in a vacant
lot owned by Triangle considering that there is no
available place in the Hall of Justice of Olongapo City
neither in any other place in Olongapo City that would
not be exposed to elements; and that the real property
was not included in the auction sale as the same is
mortgaged with a certain bank in Bulacan according to
the Register of Deeds of Zambales in the amount of
P10,000,000.00.
The matter was referred to the Executive
Judge of Olongapo City for investigation, report and
recommendation. Since Nanquil was assigned to the
Executive Judge, the matter was referred to Judge
Lazo. Caja and Nanquil filed their position papers, and
then they, along with certain witnesses testified. They
then filed their respective memoranda.
Judge Lazo recommended that the
administrative complaint against respondent sheriff be
dismissed for lack of merit. The report was referred to
the Office of the Court Administrator. In his
memorandum to Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno,
the Court Administrator recommended the dismissal of
the administrative complaint against respondent
sheriff.
Issue: Whether Sheriff Nanquil was guilty of gross
misconduct in the execution of the judgment.
Held: Yes he was.
Ratio: At the outset, it must be determined whether or
not the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which took effect
on July 1, 1997 applies to the case at bar. It is
apparent that Nanquil, after Judge Eliodoro G. Ubiadas
rendered his decision on November 19, 1996, issued a
Notice of Garnishment dated February 27, 1997 and a
Notice of Levy on real property dated May 19, 1997.
Thereafter, on July 1, 1997, he issued a Notice of Levy
and an Additional Notice of Levy on personal
properties.
Inasmuch as respondent sheriff started levying
the properties of complainant before the effectivity of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and considering
further that the provision he is invoking was inexistent
then, it is only proper to apply the rules prevailing
when he began levying complainant’s properties. To do
otherwise would create unfairness and cause inequity
in the application of the rules.
CivPro - 2
Section 8 of Rule 39 (old rules) reads:
Sec. 8. ....(a) If the execution be against the
property of the judgment debtor, to satisfy the
judgment, with interest, out of the personal
property of such debtor, and if sufficient
personal property cannot be found, then out of
his real property; x x x.
It is clear in Section 8(a) of Rule 39 that
satisfaction of the judgment must be carried out first
through the personal property of the judgment debtor,
and then through his real property.
After the decision of the lower court became
final and a writ of execution was issued, the first thing
respondent sheriff did was to serve a Notice of
Garnishment to the Manager of PAG-IBIG, advising the
latter not to deliver, transfer or dispose of money
credits, shares, interests, and deposits in his control
and possession belonging to Subic Realty Corporation,
Florentino Caja and Erickson Y. Caja. Subsequently, an
alias writ of execution was issued and pursuant
thereto, he levied the real property of complainant on
May 19, 1997 and then the latter’s personal properties
on July 1, 1997.
Clearly, what respondent sheriff levied first
was personal property via garnishment. Garnishment
is considered as a specie of attachment for reaching
credits belonging to the judgment debtor and owing to
him from a stranger to the litigation. It involves
money, stocks, credits, and other incorporeal property
which belong to the party but is in the possession or
under the control of a third person. Since the
properties involved in garnishment are personal
properties, garnishment is thus a levy on personal
property.
We, however, find that respondent sheriff still
violated the rule that satisfaction of the judgment must
be carried out first through the personal property of
the judgment debtor, and then through his real
property. After levying the real property of
complainant, respondent sheriff then levied
complainant’s personal properties which is a direct
violation of Section 8, Rule 39 and of the writ and alias
writ of execution issued by the court.
Nanquil was negligent when he immediately
levied the real property of complainant without
checking if the latter has other personal properties that
could satisfy the judgment. He could have easily asked
the Land Transportation Office if complainant had
vehicles registered in his name. If he had done so,
respondent sheriff could have known that complainant
had vehicles which he could levy first before levying
any real property. He should have exhausted all means
before going after the real property. This, he did not
do. It was only after levying complainant’s real
property and after discovering that said property was
encumbered did he look for other personal property.
Second, the claim that the judgment creditor
desisted from proceeding with the levy on the real
property is no excuse. The levy on complainant’s real
property was already effected and annotated as shown
by Entry No. 122714 in TCT No. T-46478. It was the
103
 emedial Law Review
Digests
sale of the real property in an execution sale which the
judgment creditor did not insist on because the same
was already mortgaged for P10,000,000.00 in favor of
Town Savings and Loan Bank of Bulacan. It was the
sale of the levied real property in an execution sale
which did not push through.
Levy is different from an execution sale. Levy
has been defined as the act or acts by which an officer
sets apart or appropriates a part or the whole of a
judgment debtor’s property for the purpose of
satisfying the command of the writ of execution. On
the other hand, an execution sale is a sale by a sheriff
or other ministerial officer under the authority of a writ
of execution which he has levied on property of the
debtor. In the case before us, there was a levy on real
property but the levied property was not sold in an
execution sale because said property, if sold, will not
satisfy the judgment debt because of an existing
encumbrance thereon.
There being a levy on the complainant’s real property,
the amount thereof must be considered in determining
if there was an overlevy. As gathered from the Tax
Declaration of the real property involved, including its
improvements, its assessed value amounted to
P1,786,870.00. It must be remembered, however, that
said property is mortgaged for P10,000,000.00 in favor
of Town Savings and Loan Bank of Bulacan. The fact
that the property is mortgaged for ten million pesos
only means that its value is more than said amount.
This Court takes judicial notice of the fact that the
value of a property is usually bigger than the amount
for which it can be mortgaged. No person, in the
ordinary course of business, would give a loan which is
bigger than the value of the property that is used to
secure such debt. Certainly, the issue of what is bigger
-- the amount of the loan or the amount of the security
for its payment -- is within public knowledge and
capable of unquestionable demonstration.
The amount of the real property levied upon is
definitely more than ten million pesos since the
property was mortgaged for ten million. This amount
alone is more or less ten times greater than the
judgment debt. As it is, there is already a clear case of
overlevy. Although the levied realty was not auctioned
at an execution sale, its value should still be taken into
account in computing the total amount levied by
respondent sheriff.
Respondent sheriff’s answer that he cannot
remember if he did leave a copy of the Notice of Levy
with the judgment debtor only shows that he was not
performing his duty as sheriff. As sheriff, it was his
duty to give the notice of levy or receipt to the person
to whom the personal properties were taken. If no one
would like to receive the same, it was his duty to leave
copies of the notice at the place where he levied the
personal property. Thereafter, he should have reported
the proceedings by filing a report or return to the
court. In the case at bar, even assuming that no one
was willing to accept the notice of levy, the record is
bereft of any evidence showing that respondent sheriff
reported his failure to leave a copy of the notice of
CivPro - 2
levy. Sheriffs are officers of the court who serve and
execute writs addressed to them by the court, and who
prepare and submit returns of their proceedings. Here,
Nanquil was remiss in his duty as a sheriff.
Respondent sheriff’s argument that he kept the levied
personal properties at the judgment creditor’s place
because the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City does
not have any warehouse or place to keep the same
does not hold water. A levying officer must keep the
levied properties securely in his custody. The levied
property must be in the substantial presence and
possession of the levying officer who cannot act as
special deputy of any party litigant. They should not
have been delivered to any of the parties or their
representative. The court’s lack of storage facility to
house the attached properties is no
justification. Respondent sheriff could have deposited
the same in a bonded warehouse or could have sought
prior authorization from the court that issued the writ
of execution.
In the case at bench, respondent sheriff
brought the personal properties he levied directly to
the vacant lot of Triangle Ace Corporation, , in violation
of the rule requiring him to safely keep them in his
capacity, after issuing the corresponding receipt
therefor. There is nothing in the record that shows that
prior to his delivery of the levied properties to Triangle
Ace Corporation, he sought permission of the court
that issued the writ he enforced to keep the properties.
The last irregularity complainant claims that
respondent sheriff committed was it took the latter
almost four years from the time he levied the personal
properties on July 1, 1997 to schedule the auction sale
thereof, causing the chattels to deteriorate greatly in
value. Nanquil said that the sale was authorized by the
court through its order dated March 8, 2001. On this
note, the SC sided with Nanquil, saying the sheriff is
not liable for the delay as a lot of procedural matters
intervened.
Sheriffs play an important role in the
administration of justice and they should always hold
inviolate and invigorate the tenet that a public office is
a public trust. Being in the grassroots of our judicial
machinery, sheriffs and deputy sheriffs are in close
contact with the litigants; hence, their conduct should
all the more maintain the prestige and the integrity of
the court. By the very nature of their functions,
sheriffs must conduct themselves with propriety and
decorum, so as to be above suspicion. Sheriffs cannot
afford to err in serving court writs and processes and
in implementing court orders lest they undermine the
integrity of their office and the efficient administration
of justice.
It is undisputable that the most difficult phase
of any proceeding is the execution of judgment. The
officer charged with this delicate task is the sheriff.
Despite being exposed to hazards that come with the
implementation of the judgment, the sheriff must
perform his duties by the book. Respondent Nanquil
failed to perform what was expected of him. As above
discussed, his negligence in the discharge of his duties
104
 emedial Law Review
Digests
and his failure to strictly comply with the provisions of
the Rules of Court have left a stain not only on himself
but more importantly in the office he holds which may
lead to the erosion of the people’s faith and confidence
in the judicial system.
ZAMORA VS. VILLANUEVA
FACTS: Atty. Stanley Zamora is the counsel for
plaintiff in a civil case entitled “Sps. Mario and
Carmelita Cruel vs. Sps. Ernesto and Lulu Pe Lim”.
Zamora narrates that on June 22, 2008, the RTC
granted plaintiff’s motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution. Consequently, he informed the Deputy
Sheriff, Ramon Villanueva, that the defendant has real
property in Nasugbu, Batangas and requested him to
prepare the Notice of Levy on the property. Villanueva
in turn demanded from Zamora 10,000 pesos allegedly
to defray the expenses for the execution proceedings.
Zamora agreed and paid 5,000 pesos as advance
payment, the balance to be paid upon the transfer of
the property in the name of his client.
Villanueva proceeded to Nasugbu, Batangas to
annotate the notice of levy on the property’s title. After
the notice had been annotated on the title, he refused
to proceed with the execution sale unless and until he
was paid the balance of 5,000 pesos.
Zamora acceded to Villanueva’s request and
paid him the balance of 5,000 pesos. However, before
the date of the execution sale, Villanueva demanded
an additional 5% of the bid price before proceeding
with the sale. This time, Zamora refused to heed his
demand. Hence, Villanueva refused to proceed with the
sale and further refused to accept the bid of Zamora’s
client.
Zamora filed a letter-complaint against
Villanueva before RTC Quezon City charging him with
Gross Misconduct. The Office of the Court
Administrator recommended that Villanueva be
adjudged guilty of Grave Misconduct and be meted the
penalty of suspension for 3 months without pay.
ISSUE#1:
WON Villanueva observed Section 9, Rule 141 of the
Rules of Court relative to the expenses of the
execution sale??? NO.
RULING:
Sec. 9, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court requires the
sheriff to secure the court’s prior approval of the
estimated expenses and fees needed to implement the
writ. Specifically, the Rules provide:
SEC. 9. Sheriffs and other persons serving
processes. — x x x
(l) For money collected by him by order, execution,
attachment, or any other process, judicial or
extrajudicial, the following sums, to wit;
1. On the first four thousand (P4,000.00)
pesos, four (4%) per centum.
CivPro - 2
2. On all sums in excess of four thousand
(P4,000.00) pesos, two (2%) per centum.
In addition to the fees hereinabove fixed, the party
requesting the process of any court, preliminary,
incidental, or final, shall pay the sheriff’s expenses in
serving or executing the process, or safeguarding the
property levied upon, attached or seized, including
kilometrage for each kilometer of travel, guard’s fees,
warehousing and similar charges, in an amount
estimated by the sheriff, subject to the approval of the
court. Upon approval of said estimated expenses, the
interested party shall deposit such amount with the
clerk of court and ex officio sheriff, who shall disburse
the same to the deputy sheriff assigned to effect the
process, subject to liquidation within the same period
for rendering a return on the process. Any unspent
amount shall be refunded to the party making the
deposit. A full report shall be submitted by the deputy
sheriff assigned with his return, and the sheriff’s
expenses shall be taxed as costs against the judgment
debtor.
Thus, a sheriff is guilty of violating the Rules if
he fails to observe the following: (1) prepare an
estimate of expenses to be incurred in executing the
writ, for which he must seek the court's approval; (2)
render an accounting; and (3) issue an official receipt
for the total amount he received from the judgment
debtor. The rule requires the sheriff executing writs or
processes to estimate the expenses to be incurred.
Upon the approval of the estimated expenses, the
interested party has to deposit the amount with the
Clerk of Court and ex-officio Sheriff. The expenses
shall then be disbursed to the executing Sheriff subject
to his liquidation within the same period for rendering
a return on the process or writ. Any unspent amount
shall be refunded to the party who made the deposit.
In the present case, there was no evidence
showing that Villanueva submitted to the court, for its
approval, the estimated expenses for the execution of
the writ before he demanded 10,000 pesos from
Zamora. Neither was it shown that he rendered an
accounting and liquidated the said amount to the
court. Any act deviating from these procedures laid
down by the Rules is misconduct that warrants
disciplinary action.
As regards Villanueva’s refusal to proceed with
the execution sale, allegedly due to the parties’ refusal
to pay the sales commission, nowhere in the Rules can
it be inferred that payment of any such commission is
a pre-requisite to an execution sale. Villanueva’s
refusal to conduct the execution sale was baseless and
illegal.
ISSUE#2: (RELEVANT)
WON Villanueva prematurely adjourned the execution
sale contrary to Section 22, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court??? YES.
RULING:
Section 22, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court clearly shows
that a sheriff has no blanket authority to adjourn the
105
 emedial Law Review
Digests
sale. It is only upon written consent of the judgment
obligor and obligee, or their duly authorized
representatives, that the sheriff may adjourn the sale
to a date and time agreed upon. The sheriff may
adjourn it from day to day when there is no such
agreement but only if it becomes necessary to do so
for lack of time to complete the sale on the day fixed
in the notice or the day to which it was adjourned.
Consequently, Villanueva’s act of unilaterally
adjourning the execution sale is irregular and contrary
to the Rules.
SPS. MAXIMO LANDRITO, JR. and PACITA
EDGALANI, vs. CA; SPS. BENJAMIN SAN DIEGO
and CARMENCITA SAN DIEGO
FACTS. In July 1990, Sps. Landrito and Egalanai
obtained a loan of P350,000.00 from respondent
Carmencita San Diego. To secure payment thereof,
petitioners executed on 02 August 1990 in favor of the
same respondent a deed of real estate mortgage over
a parcel of land. After making substantial payments,
petitioners again obtained and were granted by
Carmencita San Diego an additional loan of 1M Pesos.
To secure this additional loan, the parties executed on
13 September 1991 an “Amendment of Real Estate
Mortgage”, whereunder they stipulated that the loan
shall be paid within six (6) months from 16 September
1991, and if not paid within said period, the mortgagee
shall have the right to declare the mortgage due and
may immediately foreclose the same judicially or
extrajudicially.
Spouses defaulted. Therefore, Carmencita San
Diego sent them on 27 April 1993, a final notice of
demand to settle their financial obligation which
already amounted to P1,950,000.00. On 30 June 1993,
Carmencita San Diego filed a petition for the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage.
On 06 July 1993, said office sent to the parties
a Notice of Sheriff’s Sale, therein announcing that
petitioners’ mortgaged property will be sold in a public
auction to be conducted on 11 August 1993 at 10 am.
As announced, the public auction sale was held and the
mortgaged property sold to respondent Carmencita
San Diego as the highest bidder for P2,000,000.00. On
29 October 1993, respondent San Diego caused the
registration of the sheriff’s certificate of sale with the
Office of the Register of Deeds.
With the petitioners having failed to redeem
their property within the 1-year redemption period
from the date of inscription of the sheriff’s certificate of
sale, the San Diegos caused the consolidation of title
over the foreclosed property in their names.
Petitioners filed their complaint for annulment
of the extrajudicial foreclosure and auction sale, with
damages. San Diego, filed a motion to dismiss. RTC
granted respondents’ motion to dismiss and
accordingly dismissed petitioners’ complaint, saying
that the latter’s cause of action, if any, is already
barred by laches on account of their failure or neglect
CivPro - 2
for an unreasonable length of time to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been
done earlier. CA affirmed.
ISSUE. Whether the CA erred in affirming the assailed
dismissal order by declaring petitioner spouses to have
been guilty of laches in failing to redeem during the
legal period of redemption the foreclosed parcel of
land. – NO. (note: im still trying to figure out the real
issue relevant to the subject matter.)
RATIO. “Sec. 6. In all cases in which an extrajudicial
sale is made under the special power hereinbefore
referred to, the debtor, his successors in interest or
any judicial creditor or judgment creditor of said
debtor, or any person having a lien on the property
subsequent to the mortgage or deed of trust under
which the property is sold, may redeem the same at
any time within the term of one year from and
after the date of the sale; xxx” (Emphasis supplied)
In a long line of cases, this Court has
consistently ruled that the one-year redemption period
should be counted not from the date of
foreclosure sale, but from the time the certificate
of sale is registered with the Register of Deeds.
Here, it is not disputed that the sheriff’s certificate of
sale was registered on 29 October 1993.
It is clear as day that even the complaint filed
by the petitioners with the trial court on 09 November
1994 was instituted beyond the 1-year redemption
period. In fact, petitioners no less acknowledged that
their complaint for annulment of extrajudicial
foreclosure and auction sale was filed about eleven
(11) days after the redemption period had already
expired on 29 October 1994.
Spouses presently insist that they requested
for and were granted an extension of time within which
to redeem their property, relying on a handwritten
note allegedly written by Mrs. San Diego’s husband on
petitioners’ statement of account, indicating therein
the date 11 November 1994 as the last day to pay
their outstanding account in full. Even assuming, in
gratia argumenti, that they were indeed granted such
an extension, the hard reality, however, is that at no
time at all did petitioners make a valid offer to
redeem coupled with a tender of the redemption price.
In Lazo v. Republic Surety & Insurance Co., Inc, this
Court has made it clear that it is only where, by
voluntary agreement of the parties, consisting of
extensions of the redemption period, followed by
commitment by the debtor to pay the redemption
price at a fixed date, will the concept of legal
redemption be converted into one of conventional
redemption. Here, there is no showing whatsoever
that petitioners agreed to pay the redemption price on
or before 11 November 1994, as allegedly set by Mrs.
San Diego’s husband. On the contrary, their act of
filing their complaint on 09 November 1994 to declare
the nullity of the foreclosure sale is indicative of their
refusal to pay the redemption price on the alleged
deadline set by the husband.
106
 emedial Law Review
Digests
It must be remembered that the period of
redemption is not a prescriptive period but a
condition precedent provided by law to restrict the
right of the person exercising redemption. If the
period is allowed to lapse before the right of
redemption is exercised, then the action to enforce
redemption will not prosper, even if the action is
brought within the ordinary prescriptive period.
Moreover, the period within which to redeem the
property sold at a sheriff’s sale is not suspended
by the institution of an action to annul the
foreclosure sale. It is clear, then, that petitioners
have lost any right or interest over the subject
property primarily because of their failure to redeem
the same in the manner and within the period
prescribed by law. Their belated attempts to question
the legality and validity of the foreclosure proceedings
and public auction must accordingly fail.
MARSMONY TRADING INC. VS. CA
Facts: Marmosy Trading, Inc. is a domestic corporation
acting as a distributor of various chemicals from
foreign suppliers. Petitioner Victor Morales is the
President and General Manager of Marmosy Trading,
Inc. Respondent Joselito Hubilla was hired as a
Technical Salesman. Marmosy Trading, Inc. terminated
respondent’s services. Owing to his termination,
Hubilla filed a case for illegal dismissal, illegal
deduction and diminution of benefits against
petitioners before the Labor Arbiter. The LA ruled that
the termination of the services of the complainant to
be illegal and without just and valid cause and ordered
the reinstatement of Hubilla and to pay backwages.
Marsmony filed an appeal to the NLRC but was
denied. This Resolution of the NLRC became final and
executory. Hubilla then filed a Motion for the issuance
of a writ of execution. Marsmony, for their part, further
filed a petition (no mention of what petition) to the
CA. The CA issued a Resolution dismissing outright the
petition. This resolution likewise became final and
executory and an Entry of Judgment was issued by the
appellate court.
Petitioners elevated the decision of the CA to
the SC by a petition for review. The SC denied the
petition. Entry of Judgment was issued and Hubilla
then resorted to a motion for the issuance of
an alias writ of execution. The Labor Arbiter issued a
writ of execution. An MR with Motion to Recall the Writ
of Execution was filed by Marsmony. They assailed the
computation made by the LA and averred that the
company had stopped its operations and that there is
no position to which respondent can be reinstated or
appointed. Petitioners’ MR was denied and the Sheriff
was directed to proceed with the execution.
Undeterred, petitioners again filed before the NLRC a
“Memorandum of Appeal with Prayer for Injunction”.
But this was likewise dismissed by the NLRC for failure
to file a supersedeas bond. Petitioners filed an MR
which was denied for lack of merit. The NLRC likewise
CivPro - 2
emphasized that no further motions for reconsideration
shall be entertained.
Hubilla then filed an ex-parte motion for the
re-computation of his monetary award and for the
issuance of an alias writ of execution the LA issued
an alias Writ of Execution addressed to the NLRC
Sheriff. Pursuant to the writ of execution, the Sheriff
garnished petitioners account with Equitable-PCI Bank.
Petitioners objected to the garnishment by filing an MR
and to recall the order of release and alias writ of
execution alleging that the account with Equitable-PCI
Bank belongs to both petitioner Marmosy Trading, Inc.
and petitioner Victor Morales; that only petitioner
Marmosy Trading, Inc. was the employer of respondent
whereas petitioner Victor Morales, who was president
of the Marmosy Trading, Inc. Petitioners also objected
to the anotation of the notice of levy on the title of the
real property registered in the name of Victor
Morales. Petitioners’ MR was denied. Petitioners again
appealed to the NLRC which denied its appeal. From
the above NLRC Resolution, petitioners again elevated
the case to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65. The petition was denied. MR denied as well.
Issue: WON the decision of the CA allowing the notice
of levy to be anotated on the title of real property
registered in the name of Victor Morales (President of
Marsmony) was proper –YES!
At the outset, the Court takes notice of the fact that
petitioners already exhausted all the remedies
available to them since the time the LA rendered his
decision. In fact, said decision of the LA was elevated
all the way up to the SC. Execution in favor of the
respondent ought to have taken place as a matter of
right. From the finality, this case was remanded to the
LA for execution. Regrettably, due to the series of
pleadings, motions and appeals to the NLRC, including
petitions to the CA, filed by the petitioners, they have
so far successfully delayed the execution of the final
and executory decision in this case. Until the present,
the decision has not yet been executed. The LA’s
decision has long become final and executory and it
can no longer be reversed or modified. Once a
judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing
party should not be denied the fruits of his victory by
some subterfuge devised by the losing party. Final
and executory judgments can neither be amended nor
altered except for correction of clerical errors, even if
the purpose is to correct erroneous conclusions of fact
or of law.
It is no longer legally feasible to modify the
final ruling in this case through the expediency of a
petition questioning the order of execution. This late
in the day, petitioner Victor Morales is barred, by the
fact of a final judgment, from advancing the argument
that his real property cannot be made liable for the
monetary award in favor of respondent. For a reason
greater than protection from personal liability,
petitioner Victor Morales, as president of his
corporation, cannot rely on our previous ruling that “to
107
 emedial Law Review
Digests
hold a director personally liable for debts of a
corporation and thus pierce the veil of corporate
fiction, the bad faith or wrongdoing of the director
must be established clearly and convincingly.”
Judgments of courts should attain finality at some
point lest there be no end in litigation. The final
judgment in this case may no longer be reviewed, or in
any way modified directly or indirectly, by a higher
court, not even by the Supreme Court. The reason for
this is that, a litigation must end and terminate
sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an
effective and efficient administration of justice that,
once a judgment has become final, the winning party
be not deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts
must guard against any scheme calculated to bring
about that result and must frown upon any attempt to
prolong controversies.
BENITEZ VS ACOSTA
Facts: The complainant here is Gloria Benitez in
representation of her mother, Amparo Osla. The
Mother was the defendant in a civil case (Leon Basas
vs Amparo Osilas) filed with the MCTC. It would appear
that judgment was rendered against the Mother for a
sum of money.
Benitez alleges that in implementing the writ of
execution and conducting the execution sale,
respondent Medel Acosta who is the sheriff committed
the following: a) ignored the bid of Gloria Benitez and
Edna Samson; b) sold the jeepney to the highest
bidder, Mario Timbol, who was absent and only sent
his bid through a Joe Castillo who was also absent; c)
sold the jeepney for an unconscionably low price; d)
Mario Timbol and Joe Castillo were merely fronts since
it was Sheriff Acosta who really wanted the jeepney;
e) failed to the deliver the jeepney; f) did not make a
return of the writ of execution; and g) did not comply
with the notice requirements. Sheriff Acosta is then
being charged with grave misconduct, dishonesty and
conduct prejudicial to the best interests of the service.
Issue: Whether there was irregularity in the execution
of the judgment? YES
Held: Sec14, rule39 of the ROC requires the sheriff to:
1) make a return and submit it to the court
immediately upon satisfaction in part or in full of the
judgment; and 2) if the judgment cannot be satisfied
in full, to make a report to the court within 30days
after his receipt of the writ and state why full
satisfaction could not be made. The sheriff shall
continue making a report every 30 days on
proceedings being taken thereon until the judgment is
full satisfied. The reason for this requirement is to
update the court as to the status of the execution and
give it an idea why the judgment has not been
satisfied. It also provides the court an idea as to how
efficient court processes are after the judgment has
been promulgated. The over-all purpose of the
CivPro - 2
requirement is to ensure the speedy execution of
decisions.
Records show that Sheriff Acosta received the
writ of execution on December 11, 1997. Following
Sec14, Rule 39, Sheriff Acosta was supposed to make
a return to the court 30 days after or by January 10,
1998, and every 30 days thereafter until the judgment
has been satisfied. However, to date, no return has
been made. It is well settled that the sheriff’s duty in
the execution of a writ if purely ministerial.
Read Sec9, Rule 39 on Execution of Judgments
for money, how enforced. Under this provision, the
fees collected by the sheriff are required to be paid
over the judgment oblige or the latter’s authorized
representative. In the absence of both, Sheriff is
obligated to pay them over to the clerk of court who
issued the writ, or if this is not possible, to deposit the
amount in the nearest government depository bank.
In this case, when Mario Timbol paid the bid
price, Sheriff Acosta did not turn over the amount to
Atty. Delfin Gruspe as counsel of Leon Basas or the
clerk of court. Rather, Sheriff Acosta turned it over to
Cesar Gruspe, the brother of Atty. Delfin. The minutes
of the public auction show that Leon Basas (the one
who won against the Mother and in whose favor the
auction sale is being conducted) and Cesar Gruspe
were absent. As such, under the rules, Sheriff Acosta
was under obligation to turn over the money to Atty.
Delfin who is the authorized representative of Leon
Basas.
ST. AVIATION SERVICES V. GRAND
INTERNATIONAL AIRWAYS
FACTS: St. Aviation Services Co., Pte., Ltd. (Petitioner)
is a foreign corporation based in Singapore. It is
engaged in the manufacture, repair, and maintenance
of airplanes and aircrafts. Grand International Airways,
Inc. (Respondent) is a domestic corporation engaged
in airline operations.
In 1996, petitioner and respondent executed
an “Agreement for the Maintenance and Modification of
Airbus A 300 B4-103 Aircraft Registration No. RP-
C8882” where petitioner agreed to undertake
maintenance and modification works on respondent’s
aircraft. (Note: They also agreed that the
“construction, validity and performance thereof” shall
be governed by the laws of Singapore and further
agreed to submit any suit arising from their agreement
to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of the Singapore
courts.)
Petitioner undertook the contracted works and
billed respondent the total amount of US$303,731.67
or S$452,560.18. But despite petitioner’s repeated
demands, respondent failed to pay. Petitioner filed with
the High Court of the Republic of Singapore for the
sum S$452,560.18 including interest and costs,
against respondent. Court issued Writ of Summons to
be served extraterritorially or outside Singapore upon
respondent. The court also sought assistance of the
108
 emedial Law Review CivPro - 2
Digests
sheriff of Pasay City. However, despite receipt of or by substituted service. In this case, the Writ of
summons, respondent failed to answer the claim. Summons was served upon respondent at its office.
On motion of petitioner, the Singapore High The sheriff’s return shows that it was received by the
Court rendered a judgment by default against Secretary of the General Manager of respondent
respondent. Petitioner then filed with RTC, Pasay City, company. But respondent completely ignored the
a “Petition for Enforcement of Judgment,” to which summons.
respondent filed a MTD on 2 grounds: 1) Singapore Considering that the Writ of Summons was
High Court did not acquire jurisdiction over its person; served upon respondent in accordance with our Rules,
and 2) the foreign judgment sought to be enforced is jurisdiction was acquired by the Singapore High Court
void for having been rendered in violation of its right to over its person. Clearly, the judgment by default is
due process. RTC denied respondent’s MTD and MR. valid.
Respondent filed with CA a Petition for
Certiorari to set aside RTC decision, which was granted
“without prejudice to the right to initiate another
proceeding before the proper court to enforce its
claim.” Petitioner filed a MR which was denied. Hence,
the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUES:
- Whether the Singapore High Court has acquired
jurisdiction over the person of respondent by the
service of summons upon its office in the
Philippines -YES
- Whether the judgment by default by the Singapore
High Court is enforceable in the Philippines -YES

RULING: (Generally, in the absence of a special

contract, no sovereign is bound to give effect within its
dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of a
foreign country. However, under the rules of comity,
utility and convenience, nations have established a
usage among civilized states by which final judgments
of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are
reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under
certain conditions that may vary in different countries.)
Under Rule 39, Sec. 48, a foreign judgment or
order against a person is merely presumptive evidence
of a right as between the parties and may be repelled,
among others, by want of jurisdiction of the issuing
authority or by want of notice to the party against
whom it is enforced. The party attacking a foreign
judgment has the burden of overcoming the
presumption of its validity.
Respondent contends that the service of
summons is void and that the Singapore Court did not
acquire jurisdiction over it.
Generally, matters of remedy and procedure
such as those relating to the service of process upon a
defendant are governed by the lex fori or the internal
law of the forum, which in this case is the law of
Singapore. In this case, the petitioner moved for leave
of court to serve a copy of the Writs of Summons
outside Singapore, which was granted. This service of
summons outside Singapore is in accordance with
Order 11, r. 4(2) of the Rules of Court 1996 of
Singapore: “xxx c) by a method of service authorized
by the law of that country for service of any originating
process issued by that country.”
In the Philippines, jurisdiction over a party is
acquired by service of summons by the sheriff, his
deputy or other proper court officer either personally

109
 emedial Law Review
Digests
FERNANDO V. SANTAMARIA
FACTS: Fernando filed a complaint against Uy, Chua,
and Borres. She alleged that she obtained 3 loans
from Chua (P5.5M) where she issued a REM over a lot.
Before the 3rd loan was released, she was asked by
Borres (agent of Chua) to sign a Deed of Sale
conveying the lot to Chua for P3M but said that the
deed was merely a formality.
Later, Fernando learned that a new TCT was
issued in the name of Chua. Chua offered to sell back
the property to Fernando for P10M and she agreed but
she came to know that the same lot was sold to Uy for
P7M.
Fernando sought to annul the deeds of sale
and the recovery from Borres P200K which she
allegedly gave as payment of the real property taxes of
the lot as well as the amount of P120,000.00 which
Borres unlawfully deducted from her third loan.
Chua filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
of prescription, and that her cause of action has been
waived or abandoned. The lower court dismissed the
complaint on the grounds of prescription, ratification
and abandonment of cause of action. It held that
Fernando ratified Chua’s act of selling the lot to Uy by
acknowledging that the latter is now the owner of the
lot in her letter offering to repurchase the same and to
pay the incidental expenses of the sale. But later on,
the lower court modified its order by reinstating the
complaint insofar as the action for the recovery of sum
of money against Borres is concerned.
Fernando filed a notice of appeal. Chua filed a
motion to dismiss for failure to file a record on appeal
within the required period. The trial court granted the
motion to dismiss.
Certiorari with CA: trial court affirmed - the
trial court validly rendered several judgments because
the liability of Borres in Fernando’s third cause of
action is distinct from the liability of the other
respondents. To perfect an appeal, the CA ruled that
Fernando must file a record on appeal in addition to
the notice of appeal within 30 days from notice of the
assailed order pursuant to Section 2(a) and 3, Rule 41.
Issue: w/n she was able to perfect her appeal – NO
SC: Fernando’s cause of action against Borres for
collection of sum of money is clearly severable from
her action against the other respondents. Thus,
rendition of several judgments is proper. Under Sec.
2(a) of Rule 41, no record of appeal shall be required
except in specil proceedings and other cases of
multiple or separate appeals where the law or these
Rules so require.
The rationale for requiring the filing of a record
on appeal in cases where several judgment is rendered
is to enable the appellate court to decide the appeal
without the original record which should remain with
the court a quo pending disposal of the case with
respect to the other defendants.
Under Section 2(a) in relation to Section 3, of
Appeals
Rule 41, Fernando is required to file a record on appeal
within 30 days from her date of receipt of the trial
court order. Considering that no record on appeal was
filed, the CA correctly sustained the order of the trial
court dismissing her appeal for failure to perfect the
same within the reglementary period. A fundamental
precept is that the reglementary periods under the
Rules are to be strictly observed for being considered
indispensable interdictions against needless delays and
an orderly discharge of judicial business. The strict
compliance with such periods has more than once been
held to be imperative, particularly and most
significantly in respect to the perfection of appeals.
Upon expiration of the period without an appeal having
been perfected, the assailed order or decision becomes
final and executory and the court loses all jurisdiction
over the case.
Finally, even if we brush aside the procedural
flaws in the instant case, the appeal is still dismissible
because Fernando’s conduct is inconsistent with her
claim of fraud. Instead of impugning the validity of the
sale of the lot to Chua, she accepted the latter’s offer
to resell the property in the amount of P10M. After
learning that Chua sold the same lot to Uy, she again
offered the buy the lot for P13M and to shoulder the
payment of all incidental expenses, thus, confirming
that Uy has a valid title over the property. What is
more, she filed a criminal complaint for estafa against
respondents only on October 6, 1998, or almost 3
years from the time she learned of the alleged
fraudulent transfers of her property.
MADRIGAL TRANSPORT V. LAPANDAY HOLDINGS,
MACONDRAY AND CO., LUIS LORENZO, JR.
Sorry, everything was important
FACTS: Madrigal Transport filed a petition for
Voluntary Insolvency at RTC Manila Br. 49. Later, it
filed a complaint for damages against herein
respondents at RTC Manila Br. 36. In the latter action,
Madrigal Transport alleged that it entered into a joint
venture agreement with Lapanday for operating
vessels for the shipping needs of Del Monte Phils. and
it did so on the strength of Lorenzo’s representations
in his capacity as the chairman of the board of Del
Monte, Lapanday and Macondray. The complaint for
damages was caused by Lapanday and Lorenzo’s
failure to deliver Del Monte charter hire contracts
which was their end of the bargain, and for which
Madrigal Transport obtained a 10M bank loan.
The insolvency court (br. 49) declared Madrigal
Transport insolvent. After this, the respondents filed
motions to dismiss the case pending before br. 36. Br.
36 granted the MTD for failure of the complaint to
state a cause of action, because by Madrigal
Transport’s filing a Petition for Voluntary Insolvency, it
lost the right to institute the complaint for damages,
pursuant to the insolvency law. RTC br 36 held that
the right to prosecute actions belonged to the court-
111
 emedial Law Review
Digests
appointed assignee, not Madrigal. Madrigal thus filed
an MR, which was denied.
Then, it filed a Petition for Certiorari with CA.
The CA issued a resolution requiring Madrigal to
explain why its petition should not be dismissed on the
ground that the questioned lower court orders should
have been elevated by ordinary appeal. CA eventually
ruled that since the main issue in the case was purely
legal, it was an exception to the general rule that
certiorari was not proper when appeal was available.
Respondents filed an MR with the CA.
CA ruling: respondents’ MR granted. Petition
for certiorari filed by Madrigal is dismissed. CA held
that an order granting a motion to dismiss was final,
hence, it is the proper subject of an appeal, not
certiorari (CA was referring to RTC’s dismissal of
Madrigal’s MR).
Madrigal now filed a petition for review under
Rule 45 assailang the CA’s ruling. Madrigal claims it
correctly questioned the RTC’s Order through Pet. for
Certiorari, respondents claim an ordinary appeal was
the proper remedy.
Issue: what’s the proper remedy? Appeal!
Ruling: Under Rule 41, an appeal may be taken from a
judgment or final order that completely disposes of the
case. The manner of appealing an RTC judgment or
final order is: (1) Ordinary appeal (2) Pet. for review;
(3) Appeal by certiorari.
On the other hand, a petition for certiorari is
governed by Rule 65. It may only be issued for the
correction of errors of jurisdiction or GADALEJ. Its
function is limited to keeping the lower court within the
bounds of its jurisdiction. Certiorari’s requisites are:
(1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or
any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction1; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. Certiorari is not the proper remedy if appeal
is available. Remedies of appeal (including
petitions for review) and certiorari are mutually
exclusive, not alternative or successive.
Certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an
appeal, especially if one’s own negligence or error in
one’s choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse.
1
“Without jurisdiction” means that the court acted with
absolute lack of authority. There is “excess of jurisdiction”
when the court transcends its power or acts without any
statutory authority. “Grave abuse of discretion” implies such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be
equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction; in other words,
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and such
exercise is so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion
of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform the
duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
Appeals
One of the requisites of certiorari is that there be no
available appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy. Where an appeal is
available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the
ground therefor is grave abuse of discretion.
SC distinguished Appeal and Certiorari:
As to purpose. Certiorari is for the correction of errors
of jurisdiction, appeal for errors of judgment (meaning
error of law/fact).
As to manner of filing. Over an appeal, the CA
exercises its appellate jurisdiction and power of
review. Over a certiorari, the higher court uses its
original jurisdiction in accordance with its power of
control and supervision over the proceedings of lower
courts. An appeal is thus a continuation of the original
suit, while a petition for certiorari is an original and
independent action that was not part of the trial that
had resulted in the rendition of the judgment or order
complained of. The parties to an appeal are the
original parties to the action; Parties to a petition
for certiorari are the aggrieved party (who thereby
becomes the petitioner) against the lower court or
quasi-judicial agency, and the prevailing parties (the
public and the private respondents, respectively).
As to the Subject Matter. Only judgments or final
orders and those that the Rules of Court so declare are
appealable. An original action for certiorari may be
directed against an interlocutory order of the lower
court prior to an appeal from the judgment or where
there is no appeal or any plain, speedy or adequate
remedy.
As to the Period of Filing. Generally 15 days for appeal
(depends on kind of appeal), a petition
for certiorari should be filed not later than 60 days
from the notice of judgment, order, or resolution.
As to the Need for a Motion for Reconsideration. A
motion for reconsideration is generally required prior
to the filing of a petition for certiorari. Note also that
this motion is a plain and adequate remedy expressly
available under the law. Such motion is not required
before appealing a judgment or final order.
Petitioner was ascribing errors of judgment in
its Petition for Certiorari filed with CA. The issue
raised there was the trial court’s alleged error in
dismissing the Complaint for lack of cause of action.
Petitioner argues that it could still institute the
Complaint, even if it had filed a Petition for Insolvency
earlier. As petitioner was challenging the trial court’s
interpretation of the law the issue involved an error of
judgment, not of jurisdiction. An error of judgment
committed by a court in the exercise of its legitimate
jurisdiction is not necessarily equivalent to “grave
abuse of discretion.”
Also, an order of dismissal, whether correct or
not, is a final order. It is not interlocutory, it leaves
112
 emedial Law Review
Digests
nothing more to be done by the lower court. Therefore
the remedy of the plaintiff is to appeal the order. Citing
Sections 1(a) and 1(h), Rule 41, petitioner further
claims that it was prohibited from filing an appeal.
Section 1(a) of the said Rule prohibits the filing of an
appeal from an order denying an MR, because the
remedy is to appeal the main decision as petitioner
could have done. In fact, under Rule 37, the remedy
against an order denying an MR is to appeal the
judgment or final order. Section 1(h) does not apply,
because the trial court’s Order did not dismiss the
action without prejudice.
There are actually instances when SC
granted certiorari despite the availability of appeal.
Where the exigencies of the case are such that appeal
may not be adequate, either in point of promptness or
completeness, so that a failure of justice could result, a
writ of certiorari may still be issued. The present case
does not fall under the exceptions.
Even assuming that the Order of the RTC was
erroneous, its error did not constitute grave abuse of
discretion. It merely was an error of judgment.
Petitioner availed of certiorari because the 15-day
period within which to file an appeal had already
lapsed. Basic is the rule that certiorari is not a
substitute for the lapsed remedy of appeal.
NAPOCOR v. PADERANGA (Sorry medyo lengthy!)
FACTS: Petitioner NPC filed a complaint for
expropriation against respondents Petrona Dilao, et al
to implement its Leyte-Cebu interconnection project. A
day after the filing of the complaint, NPC filed an
urgent ex-parte motion for the issuance of a writ of
possession of the lands. Dilao filed her Answer with
Counterclaim but Enriquez (one of the defendants) did
not.
The RTC of Danao granted the writ and then
appointed a Board of Commissioners to determine just
compensation. The commissioners submitted their
recommended appraisal but NPC filed an opposition to
this assailing its correctness. The trial court rendered a
decision adopting the findings of the commissioners.
NCP filed a notice of appeal but the trial court
denied for having been filed outside of the
reglementary period, it having failed to file a
record on appeal. NPC filed an MR stating that a
record on appeal was not required, contending
that a record on appeal was not required as the
trial court rendered judgment against all the
defendants including Enriquez as shown by the
dispositive portion of the decision referring to
“Petrona Dilao et al.”2The trial court denied NPC’s
motion for reconsideration, clarifying that the
2
DIGESTER’S NOTE: The petitioner that judgment was
rendered against all defendants because it wants to establish
that there wasn’t any possibility of multiple appeals in this
case. Note that in cases where there are multiple or separate
appeals from a judgment, a record on appeal is required.
Appeals
reference to “Petrona Dilao et al.” in the dispositive
portion of its decision was meant to cover only Dilao
and her co-owner-siblings.
NPC subsequently filed before the trial court a
petition for relief from the denial of its appeal on the
ground that its failure to file a record on appeal was
due to honest mistake and excusable neglect, it having
believed that a record on appeal was not required in
light of the failure of the other defendant, Enriquez, to
file an answer to the complaint. (akala niya, dahil di
nagfile ng answer, di na maga-appeal.)
The trial court denied NPC’s petition for relief
for lack of factual and legal basis. The trial court
granted Dilao et al.’s motion for execution of
judgment.
NPC filed a petition for certiorari with the Court
of Appeals with prayer for temporary restraining order
and a writ of preliminary injunction assailing the trial
court’s order denying its appeal, as well as the order
granting Dilao et al.’s motion for execution. The
appellate court, however, denied NPC’s petition,
it holding that under Rule 41, Section 2 of the
ROC, the filing of a record on appeal is required
in special proceedings and other cases of
multiple or separate appeals, as in an action for
expropriation in which the order determining the
right of the plaintiff to expropriate and the
subsequent adjudication on the issue of just
compensation may be the subject of separate
appeals.
Hence, NPC filed this petition. Essentially, NPC
was arguing that there could be no possibility of
multiple appeals arising from this case because 1) a
complaint for expropriation is a Special Civil Action
under Rule 67 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, not a
“special proceeding” as contemplated under Rule 41,
Section 2 of the Rules of Civil Procedure; 2) that there
is no law or rules specifically requiring that a record on
appeal shall be filed in expropriation cases; and 3) of
the two sets of defendants in the present case, the
Dilaos and Enriquez, the first, while they filed an
answer, did not appeal the trial court’s decision, while
with respect to the second, there is no showing that
summons was served upon her, hence, the trial court
did not acquire jurisdiction over her and, therefore, no
appeal could arise whatsoever with respect to the
complaint against her.
ISSUE: W/N a record on appeal was required? YES.
HELD: Rule 41, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, clearly provides:
SEC. 2. Modes of Appeals. —
(a) Ordinary appeal. — The appeal to the Court
of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional
Trial Court in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of
appeal with the court which rendered the
judgment or final order appealed from and
serving a copy thereof upon the adverse
party. No record on appeal shall be required
113
 emedial Law Review
Digests
except in special proceedings and other cases
of multiple or separate appeals where the law
or these Rules so require. In such cases, the
record on appeal shall be filed and served in
like manner.
While admittedly a complaint for expropriation
is not a special proceeding, the above-quoted rule
requires the filing of a record on appeal in “other cases
of multiple or separate appeal.” Jurisprudential law, no
doubt, recognizes the existence of multiple appeals in
a complaint for expropriation. First appeal may concern
the propriety of the exercise of the power while the
second may pertain to the sufficiency of the just
compensation.
Respecting NPC’s claim that the trial court did
not acquire jurisdiction over the other defendant,
Enriquez, there being no evidence that summons was
served on her and, therefore, no appeal with respect to
the case against her arose, the trial court’s Order of
May 9, 1996 belies said claim:
xxx
In the letter-appeal by defendant
Estefania V. Enriquez addressed to the
Court, defendant did manifest no
opposition to the right of plaintiff to the
use of her land but only wich (sic) that
payment be based on the actual market value
of the property sought to be expropriated. In
comment to said letter-appeal, plaintiff
stressed that the amount deposited was purely
to secure a writ of possession as provided
under PD 42. It agreed with defendant that
the fair market value or actual market value
shall be the basis for the just compensation of
the property.
xxx
That the defendant Enriquez did not file an
answer to the complaint did not foreclose the
possibility of an appeal arising therefrom. In other
words, once the compensation for Enriquez’ property is
placed in issue at the trial, she could, following the
third paragraph of Section 3 of Rule 673, participate
therein and if she is not in conformity with the trial
court’s determination of the compensation, she can
appeal therefrom.
Multiple or separate appeals being existent in
the present expropriation case, NPC should have filed a
record on appeal within 30 days from receipt of the
trial court’s decision. The trial court’s dismissal of its
appeal, which was affirmed by the appellate court, was
thus in order.
3
A defendant waives all defenses and objections not so
alleged but the court, in the interest of justice, may permit
amendments to the answer to be made not later than ten
(10) days from the filing thereof. However, at the trial of the
issue of just compensation, whether or not a defendant
has previously appeared or answered, he may present
evidence as to the amount of the compensation to be paid for
his property, and he may share in the distribution of the
award.
Appeals
En passant, glossing over NPC’s failure to file
record on appeal, its appeal would still not prosper on
substantive grounds. (Pls. Refer to original case for
this part. Di na naman relevant for this particular
provision yung part na ‘to.)
STATE INVESTMENT TRUST INC. V. DELTA
MOTORS
Facts: State Investment Trust Inc. (SITI) filed a
complaint for a sum of money against Delta Motors
Corp. The latter defaulted and was ordered to pay SITI
around 20M. The decision was published in a
newspaper and SITI filed a motion for the issuance of
a writ of execution (Execution 1). This was granted by
the RTC.
Delta received a copy of the ruling and prayed
to the CA that the judgment and order of execution by
the RTC be reversed/annulled on the ground that
summons had been served upon a person not
authorized to receive it. (This shall be referred to as
the FIRST CASE) The CA stated that summons were
properly served but the RTC Judgment had not
attained finality. Note that the CA Decision was silent
on the assailed RTC Order granting the execution.
Delta then appealed to the SC.
Since the judgment had not attained finality,
Delta filed its Notice of Appeal with the RTC, which,
however, dismissed it upon SITI’s motion.
As a result, Delta filed a petition for certiorari
in the CA assailing the RTC’s order dismissing the
appeal (This shall be referred to as the SECOND
CASE). This was granted and it stated that the RTC
was ordered to ELEVATE the records of the case to the
CA, on appeal.
SITI was not pleased, so it elevated the ruling
in the SECOND case to the SC. While SITI’s appeal was
pending, Delta filed an Omnibus Motion with the CA
asking for the annulment of the execution order in the
FIRST case.
The SC denied SITI’s appeal in the SECOND
case. Delta moved for the resolution of their Omnibus
Motion but this too was denied by the SC. Delta
appealed the denial to no avail.
SITI filed an Omnibus Motion of Execution
(Execution 2) over certain properties (Around 4 years
later after the first case). Delta challenged this before
the CA.
The CA ruled in favour of Delta stating that
there can be no execution in the FIRST case because
the case was not yet final and executory. The Omnibus
Motion of Execution by SITI was also not valid because
the case was not final and executory.
N.B. Because of this shitty case, the important shit
here is that there was a writ of execution but the CA
said that it was not final and executory. There was an
appeal filed and the 15-day period lapsed. Plaintiff still
filed for execution despite perfection of the appeal and
it was granted. Was it valid? WAS IT?!
114
 emedial Law Review
Digests
Issue: Was there a valid order of execution?
Decision: No. The RTC had no jurisdiction to issue
such order.
Note that this is an execution pending appeal.
This means that filed a motion must be filed in the trial
court while it has jurisdiction over the case and is in
possession of either the original record or the record
on appeal, as the case may be, at the time of the filing
of such motion, said court may, in its discretion, order
execution of a judgment or final order even before the
expiration of the period to appeal.
So when does the trial court lose jurisdiction
over the case? It loses jurisdiction upon PERFECTION
of an appeal and expiration of time to appeal of the
other parties. This means that arecord on appeal was
filed in due time with the court.
In this case, the appeal filed by Delta was
perfected when it filed its Notice of Appeal.
Considering that it had already filed such Notice, and
that the period of appeal for SITI had already expired,
the RTC no longer had jurisdiction over the case.
Hence, the trial court acted improperly when it issued
its Order granting SITI’s Omnibus Motion. That Motion
was filed four years after the SC had affirmed the CA
Decision directing the elevation of the records on
appeal. For having been issued without jurisdiction,
the Order is plainly null and void.
Delta was not guilty of laches either. It was the
duty of the RTC clerk of court to transmit the records
to the appellate court. The CA in fact ordered the RTC
to elevate those records. Consequently, the RTC was
duty-bound to obey this mandate within ten (10) days
from its receipt of the Notice of the entry of final
judgment. The branch clerk of court, not Delta, was
primarily responsible for seeing to it that the records of
appealed cases were properly sent to the appellate
court without delay.
LAND BANK VS. ARLENE DE LEON AND
BERNARDO DE LEON
Facts: The De Leons filed a petition to fix the just
compensation of a parcel of land with the RTC, acting
as a Special Agrarian Court. The agrarian court issued
a summary judgment fixing the compensation of the
land as follows: (1) P1.2M for 16.7 hectares of
riceland; and (2) P2.9M for 30 hectares of sugarland.
The Dept. of Agrarian Reform (DAR) filed a petition for
review, which was assigned to the CA’s special 3 rd
division. On the other hand, the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP) filed an ordinary appeal, which was
assigned to the CA’s 4th division.
The petition for review of DAR was given due
course. However, the ordinary appeal filed by the LBP
was dismissed on the ground that it was the wrong
mode of appeal. LBP filed a petition for review with the
SC, which affirmed the CA’s ruling.
Appeals
The SC held that the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (CARL) is clear that the proper mode of
appeal from the decisions of special agrarian courts is
a petition for review. Sec. 60 of the CARL states that –
appeals from Special Agrarian Courts shall be taken by
petition for review with the CA. Sec. 61 of the CARL
states that – review by the CA/SC shall be governed by
the ROC. So there is an apparent inconsistency
between these 2 sections.
LBP bases its argument that an ordinary appeal
is proper on Sec. 61. However, as ruled by the SC, the
CARL clearly states in Sec. 60 that the proper mode of
appeal is a petition for review. Hence, Sec. 61 merely
makes a general reference to the ROC and does not
categorically prescribe ordinary appeal as the correct
way of questioning decisions of Special Agrarian
Courts. Thus, the SC interpreted Sec. 61 to mean that
the specific rules for petitions for review in the ROC
and other relevant procedures of appeals shall be
followed in appealed decisions of Special Agrarian
Courts.
The LBP argues that the pertinent provisions in
the CARL violate the rule-making power of the SC,
hence unconstitutional. The SC ruled otherwise holding
that since the pertinent provisions in the CARL are
special procedures and the SC has not yet provided for
a particular process for appeals from decisions of
agrarian courts, the said provisions does not encroach
upon its powers.
So, the LBP this MR.
Issue: What is the proper mode of appeal? Petition for
review!
Held/Ratio:
The Proper Mode of Appeal from Special Agrarian
Courts is a Petition for Review
The SC basically reiterated the ratio in their
previous ruling, as stated in the facts above. The only
thing it added in this MR was that it once and for all
held that the proper mode for appeal from Special
Agrarian Courts is a petition for review. Note that
before this case, there had been several conflicting
decisions by the CA regarding the proper mode of
appeal. For this lack of jurisprudence interpreting
Sections 60 and 61 of the CARL, the SC ruled that LBP
should not be blamed for resorting to the wrong
appeal.
Finally, as a side note, the SC held that this
decision should only apply prospectively in order not to
violate substantive rights. If the ruling is given
retroactive application, it will prejudice LBP’s right to
appeal because pending appeals in the CA will be
dismissed outright on mere technicality thereby
sacrificing the substantial merits thereof. It would be
unjust to apply a new doctrine to a pending case
involving a party who already invoked a contrary view
and who acted in good faith thereon prior to the
issuance of said doctrine.
115
 emedial Law Review
Digests
AGUILAR v COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45)
from the decision of the Special 8th division of the
CA.
Aguilar was appointed as election officer and
Chairman of the Municipal Board of Canvassers in
Laguna during the 1998 elections.
After partially canvassing the votes, he abandoned
his duty and never returned.
The winners of the election were proclaimed but the
certificates of canvass did not bear Aguilar’s
signature as he was missing in action.
Thereafter, he was charged with abandonment and
neglect of duty by COMELEC. He was placed under a
6month suspension.
Aguilar moved twice to reconsider the suspension
claiming that his absence was due to illness, physical
exhaustion and threats from violent groups. Both
MR’s were denied.
Aguilar then appealed to the CSC and filed his Notice
of Appeal together with his appeal memorandum.
CSC affirmed the finding of COMELEC but modified
the penalty by imposing dismissal.
Aguilar appealed to the CA via Rule 43
CA dismissed the appeal ruling that the CSC decision
had already become final in view of the untimely
submission of Aguilar’s MR which was filed 9 days
beyond the 15 day period.
Aguilar contends that he should be excused because
his MR was belated only by 1 day.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Aguilar may be excused – YES
Whether or not Aguilar should be dismissed - NO
HELD:
Aguilar was late only by 1 day and not 9 days. Even
so, this is excused because the deadline for the filing
of the MR fell on a weekend. This explains why
Aguilar was late by a day. In the interest of justice,
procedural rules must be relaxed. Remember that
cases must be disposed off according to their merits
and not merely on technicality.
The COMELEC ruling of suspension should be
followed and not the CSC ruling of dismissal. This is
because according to CSC rules cases appealed to it
should have underwent only one MR. however, in
this case, Aguilar filed 2 MR’s before the COMELEC.
Thus the appeal with the CSC should have been
denied for failure to comply with its rules. That
having been said, the COMELEC ruling had become
final and executory.
ROSALIE VDA DE CARDONA V AMANSEC
Facts: Cardona filed a case of ejectment against
Amansec over a parcel of agricultural land in
Pangasinan. Amansec claimed that the land was
Appeals
actually owned by a 3rd party named Isabel Raroque,
from whom he was leasing the land. The ejectment
case over the land spawned another case filed in the
DARAB. This DARAB case is the relevant case for this,
um, case.
Anyway, Amansec filed in the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) claiming that the
deed of sale entered into by Raroque and Cardona was
void and that an emancipation patent be issued to him
(Amansec). The provincial agrarian reform adjudicator
ruled for Amansec, declaring the deed of sale void and
giving him the emancipation patent. Cardona, instead
of filing her appeal with the DARAB, she decided to file
a petition for review with the Court of Appeals.
Cardona asked for an extension to file her
petition for review. She claimed she got the PARAD
decision on August 7 and thus had until August 30 to
file it. However, she asked for a 15 day extension to
file her petition for review. According to her
calculation, she had until September 15 to file it.
Hence, she filed her petition for review on September
15. Interestingly, the CA granted the extension,
following the calculation of Cardona.
Issue: Was the petition for review filed with the CA
filed on time?
Held: No. It wasn’t. The last day was supposed to be
on September 14. Cardona was negligent in forgetting
that August lasted until August 31, not merely August
30. So they counted wrong. The Court however ruled
that they usually don’t dismiss outright for a one-day
delay. The problem is, Cardona did NOT follow the
appeal process as described by law.
The proper remedy of a decision of the PARAD
was an appeal (within 15 days) to the DARAB and not
a petition for review with the CA, as per the DARAB
New Rules of Procedure. Under the said rules, the
petitioner should have appealed the decision of the
PARAD to the DARAB orally or in writing, and perfected
the said appeal within the requisite period and in the
manner provided therefor. Cardona failed to do so.
The well-entrenched rule is that appeal is merely a
statutory right and must be availed of within the period
and in the manner provided for by law; otherwise,
upon the lapse of the period to appeal from a decision
or final order and no appeal has been perfected by the
aggrieved party, such final order or decision ipso facto
becomes final and executory. The appellate court does
not acquire appellate jurisdiction over a belated appeal
from the said order or decision.
CONEJOS V CA
Facts: Borromeo Bros. Estate, Inc. (“Estate”) owns a
lot in Cebu, being bought by petitioner Teresita
Conejos. Private respondent Eutiquio Plania then
entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (“MOA”)
with Conejos whereby they agreed that each of them
would pay half of the purchase price of the 134 sq. m
116
 emedial Law Review
Digests
lot, and that upon full payment they would equally
divide the lot and register it in their individual names.
Plania averred that after paying P23k (value of his ½
share) to the Estate, Conejos, despite repeated
demands, refused to divide the subject lot and register
it in their individual names conformably with their
agreement.
Plania referred the matter to the Lupon (Office
of the Barangay Captain of Tisa, Cebu). In the Minutes
of Hearing, it is shown that Plania did shell out P23k as
payment, and that he authorized Conejos to sell his
portion of the property. Conejos admitted having sold
the property to Nenita Gavan without remiting the
proceeds of the sale to Plania. Conejos then promised
to pay the P23k to Plania, but she reneged on her
promise, so Plania instituted a complaint for specific
performance/rescission with damages before the
MTCC.
In her Answer, Conejos alleged that (1)
the MOA was mutually abandoned by the parties, (2)
the stipulations contained in the Minutes of the
Hearing were mere proposals by Plania for an amicable
settlement which she rejected, and (3) she never
admitted the veracity of the contents of the Minutes of
the Hearing. All she admitted was the confrontation
between her and Plania before the Lupon.
MTCC dismissed the complaint, ruling that Plania
had failed to present sufficient evidence to substantiate
his allegations because the official receipts proving
payment were issued in Cornejo’s name and not
Plania’s. The court also said that the MOA had been
mutually abandoned by the parties considering that
Plania did not even inform the Estate about the
aforesaid Agreement. Further, MTCC did not give any
probative value to the Minutes of the Hearing, as it
was only signed by the Pangkat Secretary and the
Barangay Chairman but not by Plania and Conejos. The
RTC, however, reversed the MTCC. It ruled that (1) no
evidence was proffered to prove the cancellation of the
MOA, and that a written agreement could not be
considered abandoned by the mere say-so of one of
the parties thereto. Further, RTC reasoned that the
Estate need not even be informed of
the Agreement for its validity because the Estate was
not a party to this, and as such, the
Agreement remained binding as between Plania and
Conejos.
The trial court validated the Minutes of the
Hearing noting that it was an official document issued
by the Pangkat Secretary and attested by
the Pangkat Chairman and that its authenticity was
never put in question. It ruled that the Minutes was
admissible and should be given weight as it did not
lose its evidentiary value as a record of what
transpired during the meeting despite the lack of
signatures of Plania and Conejos. In lending credence
to the claim of Plania that he paid some amounts of
money to the Estate, the RTC stressed that it was
understandable that the official receipts were issued in
the name of Conejos and not in the name of Plania,
considering that Conejos was the original buyer of the
Appeals
property. To require the Estate to issue official
receipts in the names of both Plania and Conejos would
have complicated the matter considering that Estate
was not privy to the Memorandum of Agreement.
Conejos moved for MR but this was denied, hence
she filed a Petition for Review with the Court of
Appeals. Finding no merit in her arguments, the CA
affirmed the RTC concluding that there was dearth of
evidence that the Memorandum of Agreement had
been mutually abandoned by the parties. It likewise
debunked the thesis of Conejos that the Minutes of the
Hearing was unenforceable for lack of signatures.
Conejos's MR having been denied, she filed the instant
Petition for Certiorari.
Issue: Did the CA gravely abuse its discretion (a) in
not ruling that there was mutual cancellation by both
parties of the Memorandum of Agreement ; and, (b) in
giving any probative value to the Minutes of
Hearing and the official receipts presented in evidence
by Plania? No; case dismissed based on procedural
law. Court did not rule on the merits.
Held: Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED as a wrong
remedy and for utter lack of merit.
Ratio: At first glance, Conejos’s Petition for Certiorari
should be summarily dismissed for adopting the wrong
mode of appeal. The Court of Appeals promulgated its
Decision dismissing Conejos's petition for review on 9
January 2001 and received by Conejos on 22 January
2001. Conejos filed a motion for reconsideration on 29
January 2001 but the Court of Appeals denied the
same in its Resolution of 31 May 2001, notice of which
was received by Conejos on 13 June 2001. Conejos's
remedy would have been to file a petition for review on
certiorari before this Court, and, counting fifteen (15)
days from receipt of the resolution denying her motion
for reconsideration Conejos had until 28 June 2001 to
file a petition for review on certiorari before this
Court. However, instead of a petition for review on
certiorari Conejos filed on 13 August 2001 a petition
for certiorari or one (1) month and twenty-five (25)
days after the lapse of the allotted period within which
to file a petition for review on certiorari.
Apparently, Conejos resorted to this special civil
action after failing to appeal within the fifteen (15)-day
reglementary period. This cannot be
countenanced. The special civil action of certiorari
cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal which
Conejos already lost. Certiorari lies only where there
is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. There is no
reason why the question being raised by
Conejos, i.e., whether the appellate court committed a
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitions, could
not have been raised on appeal.
Concededly, there were occasions when this Court
treated a petition for certiorari as one filed under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. However, the circumstances
prevailing in the instant case do not justify a deviation
117
 emedial Law Review
Digests
from a general rule. Notably, the instant petition was
filed way beyond the reglementary period allowed
under Rule 45 without any justifiable reason therefor
nor any reasonable explanation being proffered by
Conejos. In addition, the arguments she cited are
without merit and are in fact mere rehash of the issues
raised before and judiciously resolved by the courts a
quo. The issues require a review of the factual
findings which, verily, could not be done because this
Court is not a trier of facts. More importantly, a
reading of the records of the case strengthens our
disposition that both the trial and the appellate courts
did not abuse their discretion in assessing their factual
findings. We find their conclusions amply supported by
the records of the case and grounded in law.
OAMINAL vs. CASTILLO
FACTS: Petitioner Henry Oaminal filed a complaint
against Respondents Pablito and Guia Castillo with the
RTC for collection of sum of money. Summons
together with the complaint was served upon Ester
Fraginal, secretary of Mrs. Castillo, on May 30, 2000.
On June 6, 2000, the Castillos filed an “Urgent Motion
to Declare Service of Summons Improper and Legally
Defective”, alleging that the Sheriff’s Return has failed
to comply with the Rules on substituted service of
summons. The scheduled hearing of the Urgent Motion
(July 14, 2000) did not take place as RTC Judge
Zapatos took a leave of absence. On Oct. 19, 2000,
Oaminal filed an Omnibus Motion to Declare
Respondents in Default and to Render Judgment
because no Answer was filed by the Castillos. On Nov.
9, 2000, the Castillos then filed the following: (a)
Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam to Admit Motion to
Dismiss and Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim;
(b) Urgent Motion to Dismiss, anchored on the premise
that Oaminal’s complaint was barred by improper
venue and litis pendentia; and (c) Answer with
Compulsory Counterclaim. On Nov. 16, 2000, the RTC
Judge issued an Order denying the Castillos’ Motion
but admitted their Answer. The Castillos then filed an
‘Urgent Motion to Inhibit Ad Cautelam’ against Judge
Zapatos, ‘in the higher interest of substantial justice
and the rule of law’. Judge Zapatos denied the motion
by issuing an Order dated Dec. 27, 2000. Again, on
Jan 22, 2000, the Castillos filed another ‘Urgent
Motion’, praying that the Honorable Court reconsider
its Nov. 16, 2000 Order, by dismissing the case
against them on the ground of improper venue. In the
alternative, the Castillos ‘Urgent Motion’ prayed that
the Judge Zapatos reconsider and set aside its Dec.
27, 2000 Order by inhibiting himself from the case.
Judge Zapatos ruled that the Castillos’ ‘Omnibus
Motion Ad Cautelam to Admit Motion to Dismiss and
Answer with Counterclaim’ was filed outside the period
to file answer, thus he (1) denied the Motion to Admit
Motion to Dismiss and Answer; (2) declared the
Castillos in default; and (3) ordered Oaminal to
present evidence ex-parte within ten days from receipt
Appeals
of the order, otherwise, the case will be dismissed. The
RTC then rendered a decision on the merits in favor of
Oaminal.
On Sept. 11, 2001, the Castillos filed with
the CA a Petition for certiorari, prohibition and
injunction, with a prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction, raising the issue of whether the RTC validly
acquired jurisdiction over them. The CA ruled in favor
of the Castillos, saying that the RTC did not validly
acquire jurisdiction over them because summons had
been improperly served on them.
ISSUE: W/N the Petition for certiorari was
proper.
(NOTE: Oaminal contends that the certiorari Petition
filed by the Castillos with the CA was improper because
other remedies in the ordinary course of law were
available to them.)
HELD/RATIO: YES.
Well-settled is the rule that certiorari will lie only when
a court has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion. As a condition for the
filing of a petition for certiorari, Section 1 of Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court additionally requires that “no appeal
nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law” must be available. It is
axiomatic that the availability of the right of appeal
precludes recourse to the special civil action for
certiorari. Here, the trial court’s judgment was a final
Decision that disposed of the case. It was therefore a
fit subject of an appeal. However, instead of appealing
the Decision, respondents filed a Petition for certiorari.
Be that as it may, a petition for certiorari
may be treated as a petition for review under
Rule 45. Such move is in accordance with the liberal
spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest
of substantial justice, especially (1) if the petition
was filed within the reglementary period for
filing a petition for review; (2) errors of
judgment are averred; and (3) there is sufficient
reason to justify the relaxation of the rules.
Besides, it is axiomatic that the nature of an action is
determined by the allegations of the complaint or
petition and the character of the relief sought. As the
SC explained in Delsan Transport vs CA, “It cannot x x
x be claimed that this petition is being used as a
substitute for appeal after that remedy has been lost
through the fault of petitioner. Moreover, stripped of
allegations of ‘grave abuse of discretion,’ the petition
actually avers errors of judgment rather than of
jurisdiction, which are the subject of a petition for
review”
The present case satisfies all the above
requisites. The Petition for certiorari before the CA
was filed within the reglementary period of appeal. A
review of the records shows that respondents filed
their Petition on Sept. 11, 2001 -- four days after they
had received the RTC Decision. Verily, there were still
118
 emedial Law Review
Digests
11 days to go before the lapse of the period for filing
an appeal. Aside from charging grave abuse of
discretion and lack of jurisdiction, they likewise
assigned as errors the order and the judgment of
default as well as the RTC’s allegedly unconscionable
and iniquitous award of liquidated damages. The SC
finds the latter issue particularly significant,
considering that the trial court awarded P1,500,000 as
liquidated damages without the benefit of a hearing
and out of an obligation impugned by respondents
because of petitioner’s failure to pay. Hence, there are
enough reasons to treat the Petition for certiorari as a
petition for review. In view of the foregoing, the SC
finds that the Petition effectively tolled the finality of
the trial court Decision. Consequently, the CA had
jurisdiction to pass upon the assigned errors.
SEBASTIAN v. Hon. MORALES and the SARENASes
FACTS: Private respondents Sarenases are the heirs of
the Guillermo Sarenas, who died intestate. Guillermo
owned 3 agricultural landholdings in Cabanatuan City
(covered by TCT Nos. NT-8607, 8608, and 8609) and
another parcel of agricultural land in Nueva Ecija (TCT
No. NT-143564).
The tenants tilling the farm lots in Cabanatuan
were issued emancipation patents pursuant to P.D. No.
27.
The heirs of Sarenas filed an application with
DAR Regional Office for retention of over 5 hectares of
the Guillermo’s landholdings. Among the lots they
sought to retain were those awarded to Sebastian (TCT
Nos. 8608) in Cabanatuan.
DAR Regional Office granted private
respondents’ application.
DAR Regional Director set aside the decision
and issued a new order, awarding instead 4.9993
hectares in land covered by TCT NT- 143564 (Nueva
Ecija).
DAR Secretary set aside the decision and
issued a new order, awarding 2.8032 hectares in land
covered by TCT Nos. 8608 (awarded to Sebastian).
The DAR Sec also found that Sebastian appeared to
have allowed cultivation of the landholding by another
person. He ruled that it was "unlawful/illegal to allow
other persons than the tenant-farmers themselves to
work on the land, except if they are only working as an
aide of the latter otherwise, landowners shall have the
recourse against the tenant-farmers”
Sebastian filed a special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition, with prayer for writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction with the CA.
CA dismissed the case, without going into the
merits after finding that "petitioners pursued the
wrong mode of appeal." It found that the orders of
the DAR Secretary sought to be reviewed were final
orders for they finally disposed of the agrarian case
and left nothing more to be decided on the merits.
Hence, the proper remedy available to petitioners
was a petition for review pursuant to Rule 43,
Appeals
Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, not a
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. The CA
also ruled that Sebastian failed to attach a certified
true copy or duplicate original of the assailed order as
required by Rule 46, Section 3, and hence, it had no
alternative but to dismiss the action.
Sebastian admitted that there was error in the
remedy resorted to before the CA. They insist,
however, that a perusal of their initiatory pleading in
would show that said pleading contained all the
features and contents for a petition for review under
Rule 43, Section 6. Hence, the court should have
treated their special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition as a petition for review under Rule 43,
since dismissals based on technicalities are frowned
upon.
ISSUE: WON CA erred in dismissing the case and in
not treating the petition as a petition for review—NO
RATIO: Litigation is not a game of technicalities, but
every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the
prescribed procedure so that issues may be properly
presented and justly resolved. Hence, rules of
procedure must be faithfully followed except only when
for persuasive reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve
a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with his
failure to comply with the prescribed procedure. In the
instant case, Sebastian failed to show any compelling
reason for not resorting to the proper remedy. Instead,
we find from our perusal of their pleadings before the
CA that they stoutly and persistently insisted that the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari was their correct
remedy.
Sebastian’s ground for questioning the orders
of the DAR Secretary was that it was "issued and
promulgated with grave abuse of discretion . . . a
mounting to lack of jurisdiction." Note that this is
precisely the office of an action for certiorari under
Rule 65. Second, after CA dismissed their petition on
the ground that the proper remedy was a petition for
review, Sebastian continued to insist in their MR that
under Section 54 of R.A. No. 6657 (Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law), a petition for certiorari is both
adequate and proper. It was only as an afterthought
that they asked CA to treat their special civil action for
certiorari as a petition for review.
An appeal from the decision of the Court of
Appeals, or from any order, ruling or decision of the
DAR, as the case may be, shall be by a petition for
review with the Supreme Court, within a non-
extendible period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a
copy of said decision.
Section 60 of CARP should be read in relation
to R.A. No. 7902 expanding the appellate jurisdiction
of the Court of Appeals to include:
Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final
judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or
awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-
judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or
commissions…except those falling within the
119
 emedial Law Review Appeals
Digests
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
accordance with the Constitution, the Labor
Code of the Philippines under Presidential
Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of
this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third
paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth
paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of
1948.
With the enactment of R.A. No. 7902, this
Court issued Circular 1-95 governing appeals from all
quasi-judicial bodies to the Court of Appeals by
petition for review, regardless of the nature of
the question raised. Said circular was incorporated
in Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Section 61 of CARP clearly mandates that
judicial review of DAR orders or decisions are governed
by the Rules of Court. The Rules direct that it is Rule
43 that governs the procedure for judicial review of
decisions, orders, or resolutions of the DAR Secretary.
By pursuing a special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 rather than the mandatory petition for review
under Rule 43, petitioners opted for the wrong mode of
appeal. Pursuant to the fourth paragraph of Supreme
Court Circular No. 2-90, "an appeal taken to the
Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals by the
wrong or inappropriate mode shall be
dismissed." Therefore, we hold that the Court of
Appeals committed no reversible error in dismissing
the case.
That a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
should pro forma satisfy the requirements for the
contents of a petition for review under Rule 43 does
not necessarily mean that one is the same as the
other. Or that one may be treated as the other, for
that matter. A petition for review is a mode of appeal,
while a special civil action for certiorari is an
extraordinary process for the correction of errors of
jurisdiction. It is basic remedial law that the two
remedies are distinct, mutually exclusive, and
antithetical. The extraordinary remedy of certiorari is
proper if the tribunal, board, or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions acted without or in
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction and there is no appeal or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in law. A petition for
review, on the other hand, seeks to correct errors of
judgment committed by the court, tribunal, or officer.
In the instant case, Sebastian failed to show
any grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of
jurisdiction on the part of the DAR Secretary. When a
court, tribunal, or officer has jurisdiction over the
person and the subject matter of the dispute, the
decision on all other questions arising in the case is an
exercise of that jurisdiction. Consequently, all errors
committed in the exercise of said jurisdiction are
merely errors of judgment. Under prevailing procedural
rules and jurisprudence, errors of judgment are not
proper subjects of a special civil action for certiorari.

120
 emedial Law Review
Digests
ORBETA v. SENDIONG
FACTS: On March 1925, Simeona Montenegro sold to
spouses Orbeta a 4622 sqm. parcel of land in
Dumaguete. The land sold EXCLUDED a 884 sqm
portion in which the house of Montenegro’s
grandmother was built. This was not included in the
sale. In 1934, Orbeta, in turn, sold the land to spouses
Sendiong.
On December 1956, Sendiong spouses donated
the land to Luis Sendiong who thereafter sold the
easternmost ½ undivided portion to Pretzylou
Sendiong. Luis kept the other undivided half.
In 1968, the Orbeta heirs insisted that
Montenegro execute a quitclaim, which she did,
acknowledging and ratifying the sale of the land to the
spouses Orbeta. On the same day, Orbeta heirs also
executed and Extra-judicial Settlement and Partition
pertaining to the estate of their mother.
Montenegro eventually lost possession over the
884 sqm portion which was excluded in the 1925 sale,
so she filed a complaint against Luis Sendiong for
recovery of possession over said portion. The Orbeta
heirs, for their part, filed a complaint-in-intervention
praying for the recovery of possession of their portion
of the land (2311 sqm out of 4622). However, during
the pendency of this case, the case records were
destroyed by fire in the RTC. Records were not
reconstituted and the complaint was never pursued.
On May 1992, heirs of Montenegro and heirs of
Orbeta, petitioners in this case, filed before the RTC a
new complaint against Pajulas spouses (aka Pretzylou
Sendiong and husband—Luis Sendiong sold to her half
the undivided portion). The heirs filed for recovery of
possession, quieting of title and damages. Petitioners
assert that when Orbeta (husband) sold the subject
property to Sendiong spouses, it was without the
consent of his wife, and therefore, he could have
conveyed only his conjugal share (2311 of 4622 sqm).
Heirs of Montenegro reiterated claim over 884 sqm
portion excluded in the 1925 sale.
Defendant spouses filed their Answer,
asserting that the 1925 sale included the whole lot.
Also, they claim that Luis Sendiong and heirs
peacefully and openly possessed the land ever since
and the fact that Luis Sendiong heirs were not
impleaded as party defendants, even though they are
indispensible parties, as occupants of the half of the
land.
So defendants filed a motion to dismiss, on the
ground of lack of cause of action, because
indispensable parties, heirs of Luis Sendiong were not
impleaded. Petitioners opposed the motion alleging
that Luis heirs were not indispensable because they
were not in possession of the subject land which was
the very issue in the case.
RTC denied MTD. MR denied. Then defendant
spouses filed a Motion to Include Indispensable Parties,
which was denied. After petitioners rested their case,
defendants again filed a Motion to Include
Rule 47
Indispensable Parties. Still denied for lack of merit and
trial ensued.
In 1998, RTC ruled in favor the Montenegro
heirs and Orbeta heirs. Court said the 1925 sale did
not include the 884 sqm portion and that what Mr.
Orbeta sold without wife’s consent was only his
conjugal share. Defendants sought to appeal by filinf
Notice of Appeal, but it was denied by the RTC for a
defective non-forum shopping certificate. Disallowance
of appeal was challenged in the CA but it was affirmed.
Decision became FINAL.
On Aug 2000, respondent Paul Sediong, filed a
Petition for Annulment of the decision with the CA.
Respondent allege that he was not made a party of the
case, as heir of Luis and that he came to know of the
decision only in 1999. Said the TC refused to implead
him despited repeated motions and the decision
encroached on his and sister’s hereditary rights,
without due process.
Petitioners invoke rule on res judicata,
considering the issue on whether respondent is an
indispensable party has already been passed upon.
BUT, CA granted the petition for annulment and
nullified the decision, saying that respondent
was an indispensable party. Any judgment on
petitioners’ claims would affect respondent’s interest in
the land. In the absence of an indispensable party,
case renders ineffectual the proceedings, including
judgment. CA said petition for annulment of judgment
is not barred by estoppels, laches, res judicata or
forum-shopping.
ISSUE: W/N petition for annulment of judgment
should be granted.
HELD/RATIO: YES. CA decision affirmed.
Respondent Paul Sendiong and Lourdes were
indispensable parties to the case. The petitioners are
asserting their right to one half of an UNDIVIDED land.
Luis, inheriting the land from parents occupied half of
the land while Pretzylou, the other. Also, petitioners
are asserting their right over only one half of the whole
land because they base their claim on the fact that
their father sold only his half (conjugal share). But this
being a conjugal property, it would be undivided still.
So the rights of Luis Sendiong will be affected by any
judgment on the petitioners’ claims over the land. He
and Lourdes are indispensable parties.
Now, the matter of whether respondent is
otherwise barred from seeking the annulment of
judgment by estoppel, laches, or procedural infirmities.
Neither laches nor estoppel serves as a bar.
The petition for annulment alleges that respondent
learned of the existence the case only in 1999, or one
year after the decision therein had been rendered.
Since he was not impleaded, there is no basis to
presume that respondent was aware of the civil case
during its pendency before the RTC.
Indeed, a petition for annulment of judgment
was, at that point, the only viable remedy for
respondent to avail of, and it was utilized only one
122
 emedial Law Review
Digests
year after respondent learned of the existence of the
case. Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect
for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to
do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or
should have been done earlier—negligence or omission
to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting
presumption that the party entitled to assert it has
abandoned it or declined to assert it. Considering that
a petition for annulment of judgment based on
extrinsic fraud may be filed within four (4) years from
discovery of the fraud, a similar petition based on lack
of jurisdiction is generally not barred by laches or
estoppel if the petition is filed within one year after
petitioner learns of the questioned decision. This
moreover holds true, as in this case, since
respondent is a foreign resident restrained by time
and distance to undertake an immediate and
proximate response, such as judicial recourse.
Res judicata does not bar the petition for
annulment either because there is no jurisdiction over
the party (Luis heirs) and there is no identity of the
parties in both cases (Luis heirs not party to the
annulled decision).
NERI V. LEYSON
Facts:
Petitioners Nery claim that they are the
children of Mercedes del Rio (who died during
World War II) and are heirs of their maternal
grandmother Agatona del Corro (who was a
widow when she died in 1976). When Mercedes
died, she left her share in the parcel of land
covered by OCT No. RO-0083 and registered in
the name of Agatona.
After Mercedes’ death, her heirs executed an
Extrajudicial Partition and Declaration of Heirs
covering Mercedes’ share in the land. Her
death was duly annotated on the title on Feb.
1964.
On December 2, 1964, a Notice of Lis Pendens
(regarding Civil Case No. R-8646) was
executed and annotated on the title by Atty.
Hermosisima, representing Respondents
Leyson.
o The Leysons previously filed a case for
annulment and cancellation of OCT No.
RO-0083 in Civil Case No. R-8646.
They traced their title through OCT No.
15615, which was in the name of their
father Jose Leyson who acquired the
land through purchase from Rosario
Miranda. The Leysons were in
possession of the property until 1963
when Agatona and her children took
possession of the land. On May 2,
1968, the CFI ruled in favor of the
Leysons declaring OCT No. RO-0083
null and void. Defendants Agatona
appealed the decision to the CA, which
Rule 47
affirmed the CFI’s decision. However,
for failure to appeal the CA decision,
the decision became final and executor
on April 10, 1976 as shown by the
Entry of Judgment.
The Nerys claim that they were not made
parties to the case and that although Mercedes
was impleaded as defendant, she was already
dead when the case was filed in 1964. Thus,
the Nerys argue that the decision in Civil Case
No. R-8646 does not bind them since they
were not parties thereto, and hence, the
decision is null and void.
On January 1991, the Nerys filed this case
against the Leysons seeking the declaration of
nullity of (1) TCT No. 119747 in the name of
the Leysons and (2) the judicial proceedings in
Civil Case No. R-8646. The RTC ruled in favor
of the Leysons. The CA denied the Nerys
appeal.
o CA ruling: The CA ruled that
petitioners’ action for annulment of
title and judicial proceedings was not
barred by res judicata, which was
inapplicable, but by the principle of
conclusiveness of judgment under Rule
39, Section 49, par. (c) of the Rules of
Court. The issue of which between the
two reconstituted titles was valid and
genuine was settled by the CA in the
earlier case (Civil Case No. R-8646).
Issue:
Whether the CA erred in ruling that the Nerys
cause of action was barred by the principle of
conclusiveness of judgment under Rule 39,
Section 49, Paragraph (c) of the Rules of
Court? Yes
Whether the CA erred in ruling that the
decision in Civil Case No. R-8646 became final
and executor against the Nerys? No
Held: Petition denied.
Conclusiveness of Judgment Issue: Petitioners
challenge the application of the “principle of
conclusiveness of judgment” to this case, arguing that
since jurisdiction over them was never acquired by the
trial court, barring their action is tantamount to
deprivation of property without due process of the law.
To bar the petitioners’ action for annulment on
the ground of res judicata, the following
elements should be present: (1) the judgment
being sought to bar the new action must be
final; (2) the decision must have been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction over
the subject matter and the parties; (3) the
disposition of the case must be based on a
judgment or an order on the merits; and (4)
there must be identity of parties, subject
matter and causes of action.
123
 emedial Law Review
Digests
There is clearly no identity of parties between
Civil Case R-8646 and 2379-L. The petitioners
were indispensable parties in Civil Case R-
8646, as they were the legal heirs of Mercedes
del Rio, who was one of the registered owners
in OCT RO-0083/15615 which covered the
disputed land. The Leysons failed to join the
Nerys, in violation of Rule 3, Section 7 of the
Rules of Court. Moreover, petitioners were
never served summons; neither did they join
their relatives in filing the Answer and
Amended Answer nor were they given a
chance to set up their own defenses. Plainly
then, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction
over them. In view of the foregoing discussion,
petitioners should not be bound by the decision
in Civil Case No. R-8646. This, however, does
not justify the reversal of the assailed
Decision.
Annulment of Judgment (important part)
The reason why the herein Petition cannot be
granted is the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction to
annul a final judgment of a co-equal
court. Petitioners allege that the decision in
Civil Case R-8646 passed upon the validity of
OCT RO-0083/15615. Such allegation makes
the root of their present action one for
annulment of a final judgment. This Court
cannot ignore the fact that such action is
outside the jurisdiction of the RTC.
Section 9 of BP 129 vests in the CA
“[e]xclusive jurisdiction over actions for
annulment of judgments of regional trial
courts.” Hence, even if the trial court in Civil
Case No. R-8646 did not acquire jurisdiction
over the petitioners, the trial court in Civil Case
No. 2379-L cannot annul the final judgment in
Civil Case No. R-8646, as jurisdiction over the
subject matter, which in this case is annulment
of final judgment, is vested by law in a higher
court, the CA.
PLATON and LIBRADA CERUILA v. ROSILYN
DELANTAR, represented by her guardian, DSWD
FACTS: Respondent Rosilyn Delantar filed a complaint
against her father, Simplico Delantar for child abuse,
particularly prostitution. Simplico was incarcerated at
the Pasay City Jail which prompted the filing of a
petition for involuntary commitment of Rosilyn in favor
of the DSWD, as the whereabouts of the mother,
Librada Ceruila, was unknown. The petition was
granted by the RTC-Pasay City and Simplico’s motion
to vacate said judgment was denied.
The petitioner spouses Ceruilas filed a petition
before the RTC of Manila, entitled “IN THE MATTER OF
CANCELLATION AND ANNULMENT OF THE BIRTH
CERTIFICATE OF MARIA ROSILYN TELIN
DELANTAR,” praying that the birth certificate of Rosilyn
Rule 47
be canceled and declared null and void for the reasons
that said birth certificate was made an instrument of
the crime of simulation of birth and therefore invalid
and spurious, and it falsified all material entries therein
(such as: name of mother should not be Librada Telin,
the signature of the informant referring to ‘Librada T.
Delantar’ being a forgery, the name of the physician
who allegedly attended at the time of the birth of
Rosilyn, being a fictitious ‘Dr. Santos’, etc.). RTC
granted the petition.
Rosilyn, represented by her legal guardian, the
DSWD, filed, with the CA, a petition for the
annulment of judgment in the petition for
cancellation of entry of her birth certificate. She
claimed that she and her guardian were not notified of
the petition and the subsequent judgment and learned
about the same only from the news a month after the
RTC decision. She argued that the RTC decision was
issued without jurisdiction and in violation of her right
to due process; that the Judge did not have authority
to declare her to be illegitimate; and that mere
correction of entries, not cancellation of the entire
certificate, is the appropriate remedy. CA ruled in favor
of Rosilyn. The CA reasoned that Rosilyn should have
been made a party-respondent to the petition for the
cancellation and annulment of birth certificate. MR
denied.
The spouses claim that the CA should have
exercised its peremptory power to declare the birth
certificate of Rosilyn as null and void ab initio following
the doctrine that where an instrument is void ab
initio for being contrary to law, no amount of
technicalities could correct its inherent nullity;
otherwise, there will be multiplicity of actions as the
parties will have to file cases anew to annul
respondent’s birth certificate.
On the other hand, respondent Rosilyn
contends that the CA has no authority to rule on the
merits of the case since in a petition for annulment of
judgment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, its
authority is limited to ruling on whether or not the
petitioner was denied due process of law; that if the
CA were to rule on the merits of the case, it would
have deprived respondent of due process; and that in
any case, respondent’s record of birth is not void as
Librada was only able to prove that she is not the
mother of respondent.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA should have exercised
its peremptory power to declare the subject birth
certificate null and void ab initio
HELD: No. CA was correct in not exercising such
power.
There is no merit in the contention of
petitioners that because of the false entries in the birth
certificate of Rosilyn, the same is void ab initio, hence
124
 emedial Law Review
Digests
should be nullified under Art. 51 of the Civil Code, or
should be nullified by the CA in exercise of its
peremptory power to declare null and void the said
certificate.
The function of a petition for annulment of
judgment, under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, is not
to replace the trial court’s decision sought to be
annulled. The action under Sections 1, 2 and 7 of said
Rule, to wit:
Section. 1. Coverage. --- This
Rule shall govern the annulment by the
Court of Appeals of judgments or final
orders and resolutions in civil actions
of Regional Trial Courts for which the
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies are no longer available
through no fault of the petitioner.
Sec. 2. Grounds for
annulment. --- The annulment may be
based only on the grounds of extrinsic
fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Extrinsic fraud shall not be a
valid ground if it was availed of, or
could have been availed of, in a motion
for new trial or petition for relief.
Sec. 7. Effect of judgment. ---
A judgment of annulment shall set
aside the questioned judgment or final
order or resolution and render the
same null and void, without prejudice
to the original action being refiled in
the proper court. However, where the
judgment or final order or resolution is
set aside on the ground of extrinsic
fraud, the court may on motion order
the trial court to try the case as if a
timely motion for new trial had been
granted therein.
is merely for the annulment of the RTC Decision on
grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction,
nothing more. The Rules do not allow the CA to
resolve the merits of the petition for the amendment
and cancellation of the birth certificate of Rosilyn or to
substitute its own findings thereon.
SALERA V A1 INVESTORS
FACTS: On August 27, 1992, Teodora Salera, mother
of the petitioners, contracted a P50,000.00 loan and
issued a promissory note to respondent A-1 Investors,
Inc. Salera defaulted and A-1 filed a complaint (First
Case) in the MTC, Quezon City against Teodora and
impleaded her husband, Saturnino Sr. The summons
1
Art. 5. Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or
prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes
their validity.
Rule 47
for the said case was given by the sheriff to the
couple’s son, Samuel at the family’s residence but
Samuel refused to sign receipt of a copy thereof.
Saturnino claims that he was living in Clarin,
Bohol as he ran for mayor and was elected as such in
the 1995 elections. He and his wife did not receive the
summons that was sent in Cebu. Consequently, the
spouses were held in default and a decision was
rendered on November 27, 1996 against the spouses.
Copy of the decision was received by a certain
Joel Ariño, but Saturnino was then still residing in
Bohol. The Salera spouses did not appeal and the
decision became final and executory. On April 23,
1997, Saturnino Sr.’s daughter, Sarah received a writ
of execution and a notice of levy upon Realty pursuant
to writ of execution. Although Sarah was 28 years old
and a college graduate, she simply received the
documents and without reading them, placed them in
her drawer without informing her parents about them,
and completely forgot about them. It was only a week
after that she showed the documents to her parents
The son informed the father of the Notice to
Parties of Public Auction stating that the Sheriff will sell
the Salera spouses property pursuant to a writ of
execution. The property consisted of a parcel of land
covered by a TCT with an area of 405 square meters.
Saturnino filed a complaint for injunction
(Second Case) with damages against A-1 investors
before the RTC of Cebu city and prayed that damages
be awarded in his favor. He also prayed for a TRO and
followed by a preliminary injunction (“PI”). The RTC of
Cebu granted his prayer, issuing a TRO, subsequently
a PI. It gave due course to the argument of Saturnino
as he was unaware of the proceedings in the civil
action; that it was his wife who contracted the debt,
not him; and that even assuming that he is liable as
well, A1 cannot levy on the family home, as it was
exempt from execution.
Saturnino died and was substituted by his children.
The wife waived all her inheritance in the estate of the
husband. A-1 filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition in the CA. the Ca ruled in his favor.
Issue: Whether or not the complaint for injunction
may be treated as a petition to annul the decision in
the earlier case.
RATIO: While petitioners (Salera) are correct that a
complaint for injunction is a recognized remedy to
enjoin the performance of an act, which action falls
within the province of Regional Trial Courts, it must be
taken into account that Saturnino, Sr. sought to
permanently enjoin the public auction of property
levied pursuant to a writ of execution issued in the
First Case on the ground that he was not served with
summons and was denied due process. In doing so,
Saturnino, Sr. was actually seeking the annulment of
the decision in the First Case, which was the basis of
the writ of execution pursuant to which the public
auction was to be held. The proper remedy for
petitioners' predicament is therefore not an action for
125
 emedial Law Review
Digests
injunction, but for annulment of judgment.
It is thus understandable why petitioners are
staunch in claiming, in hindsight, that although the
complaint filed in the RTC of Cebu was captioned
"Injunction with Damages," the allegations therein
suffice to constitute an action for annulment of the
decision in the First Case for lack of due process
amounting to lack of jurisdiction and/or extrinsic fraud.
The issue of whether or not the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Quezon City did not acquire jurisdiction over
the person of Saturnino, Sr. in the First Case and his
exclusion from the proceedings in said case amounted
to extrinsic fraud which denied him of due process
should be properly resolved in an action for annulment
of judgment
Rule 47:
Sec. 2. Grounds for annulment.- The annulment may
be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and
lack of jurisdiction.
Sec. 4. Filing and contents of petition.- The action shall
be commenced by filing a verified petition alleging
therein with particularity the facts and the law
relied upon for annulment, as well as those
supporting the petitioner's good and substantial
cause of action or defense, as the case may be.. . .
A certified true copy of the judgment or final order or
resolution shall be attached to the original copy of the
petition intended for the court and indicated as such by
the petitioner.
The petitioner shall also submit together with
the petition affidavits of witnesses or documents
supporting the cause of action or defense and a sworn
certification that he has not theretofore commenced
any other action involving the same issues in the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different
divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if
there is such other action or proceeding, he must state
the status of the same, and if he should thereafter
learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed
or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other
tribunal or agency thereof within five (5) days
therefrom."
It is clear from the contents of the complaint
filed by the petitioners that the action is not for
annulment of the decision in Civil Case No. 15996. It
does not allege "with particularity the facts and the law
relied upon for annulment, as well as those supporting
the petitioner's good and substantial cause of action"
which petitioners now claim are extrinsic fraud and
lack of jurisdiction. Neither is a certified true copy of
the decision in the First Case attached to the original
copy of the petition intended for the court and
indicated as such by the petitioner. Nor were affidavits
of witnesses or documents supporting the cause of
action, i.e., annulment of judgment on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud, submitted
together with the complaint. Petitioners cannot now
mislead the court into treating the complaint for
Rule 47
injunction as an action for annulment of judgment with
the ancillary remedy of injunction.
COLE V ALFARO
Facts: The case began from a sale of townhouse unit
owned by Agda which gave rise to 5 petitions
stemming from the complaint for non-delivery of title
filed by spouses Aurora, Cinco, Jingco,Cingco-Jingco
and Cole w/ the HLURB Arbiter against Agda and PNB.
On Feb 20, 1991 the HLURB arbiter rendered
judgment against Agda and PNB. HLU Board of
Commisioners affirmed the decision. The Office of the
Pres also affirmed the decision.
Agda questioned the arbiters decision to the
CA via petition for certiorari. After 6 years from
rendering the arbiters decision the CA dismissed the
petition ruling that the HLURB Rules of Procedure
provided that the decision of the Arbiter may be
appealed to the Board and thereafter to the Office of
the President and also laches. The decision became
final and executory on July 23, 1997, and an entry of
judgment was made on November 13, 1997.
On October 21, 1995, Agda filed with the QC
RTC an action for rescission of contracts against
spouses Cole to nullify the “Memorandum of
Agreement” selling one townhouse unit to them. Coles
children substituted him upon his death and his son
Charles moved to dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. TC denied the motion so Cole filed
petition for certiorari with the CA. (1st petition)
The CA dismissed Agda’s complaint because of
forum shopping and that the Boards decision is res
judicata to the rescission case in the RTC. Agda
appealed to the SC. The SC dismissed the appeal for
filing beyond the period which became final and
executory on February 2, 1999.
On August 28, 1997, Agda filed with the CA a
petition for annulment of judgment of the Arbiter’s
decision rendered on February 20 and that of the
Office of the President dated February 27. Cole moved
to dismiss. Because of the inaction by the CA on the
MtD Cole filed a petition for mandamus with
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order
with the SC to compel the CA to resolve his Mtd and to
summarily dismiss the petition for annulment.(2nd
petition) Despite the pending annulment proceeding
Agda on Feb 25, 99 filed a petition for review with the
Office of the pres questioning the Boards decision. The
OoP issued an order requiring Agda to pay the appeal
fee and the Coles to submit memoranda. Cole filed
another petition for certiorari asking for the dismissal
of the petition. SC dismissed the petition and denied
the mr.
On June 30, 1999, CA declared null and void the
arbiters decision and the OoP’s decision dated for
having been rendered without jurisdiction. 2 petitions
for annulment of judgment were filed, the first on July
14, 1999 by Lolita Cole and her son Atty. Cole and the
second, on September 7, 1999, by Charito Cole-Alfaro,
126
 emedial Law Review Rule 47
Digests
daughter of Lolita Cole.(3rd and 4th petitions) While
these cases were pending, Cole moved for the
execution of the arbiters Feb 20 decision but because
of Agda’s petition with the OoP the Arbiter denied
issuance of the writ of execution which led to Cole
filing his 5th petition.

HELD:
The 2nd petition for the dismissal of annulment of
judgment filed by Agda with the CA is dismissed
because it was moot.
The 5th petition questioning the Arbiter’s refusal
to issue the writ of execution is improper and
premature. The 1996 Rules of Procedure of the
HLURB provides that the decision of the Arbiter is
reviewable by the Board of Commissioners. From the
decision of OoP, the aggrieved can resort to the CA
which exercises exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all
final judgments of quasi-judicial agencies. SC
dismissed the petition for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies.
(RELEVANT) 3rd and 4th petition: Under Rule
47 of the Rules of Court, the remedy of annulment of
judgment is confined to decisions of RTC on the ground
of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction,
“RULE 47
“ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENTS OR FINAL ORDERS
AND RESOLUTIONS
“SECTION 1. Coverage.—This Rule shall govern
the annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or
final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional
Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new
trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies are no longer available through no fault of
the petitioner. (n)

“SEC. 2. Grounds for annulment.—The annulment

may be based only on the ground of extrinsic fraud
and lack of jurisdiction.
“Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was
availed of, or could have been availed of, in a motion
for new trial or petition for relief. (n)”
Although the grounds are fraud and lack of
jurisdiction, it cannot prosper because the decision
sought to be annulled was not rendered by the RTC
but by an administrative agency (HLU Arbiter and
Office of the President), so is not within the jurisdiction
of the Court of Appeals. Even assuming that it can be
treated as a petition for review under Rule 43 it should
still be dismissed by the CA because no error of
judgment was imputed. A petition for annulment of
judgment is an initiatory remedy so no error of
judgment can be its subject.

127
 FINALS
COVERAGE:
Provrem

SCA

Crimpro

Evidence

SpecPro (No cases)

 emedial Law Review
Digests
RULE 57: ATTACHMENT
SECURITY PACIFIC v AMELIA TRIA-INFANTE
Facts: Anzures filed a complaint against Villaluz for
violation of BP 22. Anzures filed an Ex-Parte Motion
for Preliminary Attachment praying that pending the
hearing on the merits of the case, a Writ of Preliminary
Attachment be issued ordering the sheriff to attach the
properties of Villaluz. The Writ was issued upon the
posting of a bond duly approved by the court. The
sheriff attached certain properties of Villaluz, which
were duly annotated on the TCTs.
The RTC acquitted Villaluz of the crime but
held her civilly liable. CA affirmed. Villaluz elevated
case (GR 106214) to SC and during its pendency,
posted a counter-bond issued by petitioner Security
Pacific Assurance Corp. On the same day, she filed an
Urgent Motion to Discharge Attachment. The SC
affirmed CA decision.
Anzures moved for execution, RTC issued a
Writ of Execution. Sheriff tried to serve the writ upon
Villaluz, but the latter no longer resided in her given
address. Sheriff sent a Notice of Garnishment upon
Security Pacific by virtue of the counter-bond.
Security Pacific refused to assume its obligation on the
counter-bond it posted for the discharge of the
attachment. Anzures filed a motion to proceed with
the garnishment, which was opposed by Security
Pacific contending that it should not be held liable on
the bond. RTC granted.
Security Pacific filed a petition for certiorari
with the CA, contending that respondent Judge and
sheriff committed grave abuse of discretion and grave
errors of law in proceeding against it on its counter-
attachment bond, despite the fact that said bond was
not approved by the SC and that the condition by
which said bond was issued did not happen. CA
dismissed.
While the case was pending with the SC,
Anzures executed a Memorandum of Understanding,
stipulating the total amount garnished from Security
Pacific as well as the remaining amount sought to be
executed. Security tendered and paid the amount of
P300k upon signing and the balance of P658k was to
be paid in installments. There was a provision in the
MOU which states that the “this contract shall not be
construed as a waiver or abandonment of the appellate
review pending before the SC and that it will be
subject to all such interim orders and final outcome of
said case.”
Before the SC, Security seeks to escape
liability by contending that the writ of attachment
against the real properties of Villaluz was not
discharged (no court order of discharge in GR106214)
and hence, its liability did not accrue. Anzures, on the
other hand, asserts that the filing of the counter-bond
by Villaluz had already ipso facto discharged the
attachment on the properties and made the petitioner
liable on the bond.
ProvRem
Issue: Whether the attachment was ipso facto
discharged by the mere filing of the counter-bond in
court - YES
Ratio: Under the Rules, there are 2 ways to secure the
discharge of an attachment. First, the party whose
property has been attached or a person appearing on
his behalf may post a security. Second, said party
may show that the order of attachment was improperly
or irregularly issued. The first applies in this case. It
should be noted that in the resolution of GR 106214,
the SC permitted Villaluz to file a counter-attachment
bond and required the private respondents to comment
on its sufficiency. It is quite palpable that the
necessary steps in the discharge of an attachment
upon giving the counter-bond have been taken. To
requires a specific order for the discharge when the SC
had already declared that Security is solidarily bound
with Villaluz would be mere surplusage.
Although the SC ruled in Besile Investment
that the mere posting of a counterbond does not
automatically discharge the writ of attachment, since
this needs hearing and order, the SC in this case had
already virtually discharged the attachment after all
the parties were heard on the matter in a previous
resolution.
TORRES V. SATSATIN
Facts: The siblings Sofia Torres (Sofia), Fructosa
Torres (Fructosa), and Mario Torres (Mario) each own
adjacent 20,000 square meters track of land. In 1997,
Nicanor Satsatin (Nicanor) asked petitioners’ mother,
Agripina Aledia, if she wanted to sell their lands. After
consultation with the siblings, Agrapina agreed to allow
Nicanor to sell the properties for them. They
authorized Nicanor, through a Special Power of
Attorney, to negotiate for the sale of the properties.
Nicanor offered to sell the properties to Solar
Resources, Inc. (Solar). Solar allegedly agreed to
purchase the three parcels of land, together with the
10,000-square-meter property owned by a certain
Rustica Aledia, for P35,000,000.00. Nicanor was
supposed to remit to them the total amount of
P28,000,000.00 or P9,333,333.00 each to Sofia,
Fructosa, and the heirs of Mario.
Despite the fact that Solar has already paid the
entire purchase price of P35,000,000.00 to Nicanor,
has only remitted the total amount of P9,000,000.00,
leaving an unremitted balance of P19,000,000.00.
Despite repeated verbal and written demands, Nicanor
failed to remit to them the balance of P19,000,000.00.
Nicanor allegedly acquired a house and lot at Vista
Grande BF Resort Village, Las Piñas City and a car,
which he registered in the names of his unemployed
children.
The siblings then filed a Complaint for sum of money
and damages, against Nicanor and his unemployed
children. They also filed an Ex-Parte Motion for the
Issuance of a Writ of Attachment, alleging among
130
 emedial Law Review
Digests
other things: that respondents are about to depart the
Philippines.
Thereafter, the RTC issued a Writ of
Attachment dated November 15, 2002, directing the
sheriff to attach the estate, real or personal, of the
respondents.
On November 19, 2002, a copy of the writ
of attachment was served upon the respondents.
On the same date, the sheriff levied the real and
personal properties of the respondent, including
household appliances, cars, and a parcel of land
located at Las Piñas, Manila.
On November 21, 2002, summons,
together with a copy of the complaint, was
served upon the respondents.
On the same day respondents filed their
answer, they also filed a Motion to Discharge Writ of
Attachment claiming that there was irregularity in the
issuance and implementation of the writ of
attachment.
Issue: Was there irregularity in the issuance and
implementation of the writ of attachment?
Held: YES. There was irregularity in BOTH the issuance
and implementation. With regard to the
implementation, every bond should be accompanied by
a clearance from the Supreme Court showing that the
company concerned is qualified to transact business,
which is valid only for thirty (30) days from the date of
its issuance. However, it is apparent that the
Certification issued by the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) at the time the bond was issued
would clearly show that the bonds offered by Western
Guaranty Corporation may be accepted only in the
RTCs of the cities of Makati, Pasay, and Pasig.
Therefore, the surety bond issued by the bonding
company should not have been accepted by the RTC of
Dasmariñas, Branch 90, since the certification secured
by the bonding company from the OCA at the time of
the issuance of the bond certified that it may only be
accepted in the above-mentioned cities. Thus, the trial
court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction when it issued the
writ of attachment founded on the said bond.
With regard to the implementation, the grant
of the provisional remedy of attachment involves three
stages: first, the court issues the order granting the
application; second, the writ of attachment issues
pursuant to the order granting the writ; and third, the
writ is implemented. For the initial two stages, it is not
necessary that jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant be first obtained. However, once the
implementation of the writ commences, the court must
have acquired jurisdiction over the defendant, for
without such jurisdiction, the court has no power and
authority to act in any manner against the defendant.
In this case, the trial court had not acquired
jurisdiction by serving summons upon the respondents
prior to or simultaneously with the implementation of
the writ of attachment as required by the rules of
ProvRem
court. The trial court validly issued the writ of
attachment on November 15, 2002, which was
implemented on November 19, 2002, it is to be noted
that the summons, together with a copy of the
complaint, was served only on November 21, 2002.
INSULAR SAVINGS V. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts: Far East Bank and Trust Company instituted an
Arbitration case against Insular Savings Bank. The
dispute involved 3 unfunded checks with a total value
of P25.2M. The checks were drawn against Far East
Bank and were presented by Insular Bank for clearing.
Insular Bank’s account with Philippine Clearing House
Corporation (PCHC) was credited with P25.2M. When
Far East Bank returned the check beyond the
reglementary period, Insular Savings refused to refund
the money to Far East Bank. Pending arbitration, Far
East Bank instituted a civil case praying for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. RTC
granted the application for preliminary attachment
upon posting by Far East Bank of an attachment bond
of P6M. Bond posted and attachment issued. In one of
the arbitration hearing, the banks agreed to divide
between them the disputed amount (P12.6M) while the
dispute has not yet been resolved. Later on, Insular
Savings filed a motion to discharge attachment by
counter-bond in the amount of P12.6M, which was
denied by the court. MR denied as well. Petition for
certiorari to the CA was denied as well ALTHOUGH CA
acknowledged that RTC judge erred in his order that
the counterbond should be P27.2M because he
erroneously included unliquidated claims, such as
actual and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and
expenses of litigation. MR denied.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court erroneously
denied Insular Savings Bank’s motion to discharge
attachment by counterbond in the amount of P12.6M
Held: Yes. Insular Savings Bank wins.
The amount of the counter-attachment bond is
to be measured against the value of the attached
property, as determined by the judge to secure the
payment of any judgment that the attaching creditor
may recover in the action. Without necessarily
diminishing the sound discretion of the issuing judge
on matters of bond approval, the counter-bond should
as much as possible correspond in value to, or
approximately match the attaching creditor’s principal
claim. Excessive attachment should be avoided.
In the case at bar, the records show that the
principal claim is in the amount of P25.2M. However,
before the Arbitration Committee of PCHC, the parties
agreed to equally divide between themselves, on a
temporary basis, the disputed amount, subject to the
outcome of the arbitration proceedings. Therefore, Far
East Bank’s principal claim against Insular Savings
prior to the filing of the motion to discharge
attachment has been pruned down to P12.6M.
131
 emedial Law Review
Digests
Accordingly, the trial court should have allowed a total
discharge of the attachment on a counterbond in the
amount of P12.6M based on the reduced claim of Far
East Bank. If a portion of the claim is already secured,
there is no justifiable reason why such portion should
still be subject of counter-bond.
Section 12 of Rule 57 provides that the court
shall order the discharge of attachment if the movant
“makes a cash deposit, or files a counter-bond . . . in
an amount equal to that fixed by the court in the order
of attachment, exclusive of costs.”
YU v. NGO TE
FACTS:
- Spouses Gregorio and Josefa Yu (Spouses Yu)
purchased from Ngo Yet Te (Te) bars of detergent
soap worth P594,240.00, and issued to the latter
three postdated checks as payment which were
subsequently returned dishonored and stamped
“ACCOUNT CLOSED”.
- Te demanded payment from Spouses Yu but they
refused. Te filed with the RTC a Complaint for
Collection of Sum of Money and Damages with
Prayer for Preliminary Attachment.
- In support of her prayer for preliminary
attachment, Te attached to her Complaint an
Affidavit executed by Sy that Spouses Yu were
guilty of fraud in entering into the purchase
agreement for they never intended to pay the
contract price, and that, based on reliable
information, they were about to move or dispose of
their properties to defraud their creditors.
- Upon Te’s posting of an attachment bond, the RTC
issued an Order of Attachment/Levy on the basis
of which the Sheriff levied and attached Spouses
Yu’s properties in Cebu City consisting of one
parcel of land and several vehicles.
- Spouses Yu filed an Answer with counterclaim for
damages and an Urgent Motion to Dissolve Writ of
Preliminary Attachment. They also filed a Claim
Against Surety Bond in which they demanded
payment from Visayan Surety and Insurance
Corporation (Visayan Surety), the surety which
issued the attachment bond representing the
damages they allegedly sustained as a
consequence of the wrongful attachment of their
properties.
- RTC issued an Order discharging from attachment
some of the vehicles on humanitarian grounds but
maintained custody of the land and the passenger
bus. Spouses Yu filed a MR, which the RTC denied.
- CA: The writ of preliminary attachment issued by
the respondent court was improvidently issued and
should be discharged.
- Te filed a Motion for Reconsideration but to no
avail. Te filed with the SC a Petition for Review
on Certiorari but was denied. Thus, the finding of
the CA on the wrongfulness of the attachment/levy
ProvRem
of the properties of Spouses Yu became conclusive
and binding.
- However, the RTC, apparently not informed of the
SC Decision, rendered a Decision in favor of Te
ordering Spouses Yu to pay the former and saying
that “On the counterclaim, this Court declines to
rule on this, considering that the question of the
attachment which allegedly gave rise to the
damages incurred by the defendants is being
determined by the Supreme Court.”
- Spouses Yu filed with the RTC a MR questioning
the disposition of their counterclaim. RTC said that
nowhere in the decision of the Supreme Court and
for that matter, the Court of Appeal’s decision
which was in effect sustained by the High Court,
contains any ruling or directive or imposition, of
any damages to be paid by the plaintiff to the
defendants. The RTC also denied their 2 Notices of
Appeal.
- Spouses Yu filed with the CA a Petition
for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, which
was granted. They also questioned the RTC
Decision declining to rule on their counterclaim for
damages.
- CA affirmed in toto the RTC Decision but made a
ruling on the counterclaim of Spouses Yu by
declaring that the latter had failed to adduce
sufficient evidence of their entitlement to
damages. They filed a MR but was denied. Hence,
this Petition.
ISSUE: W/N the writ of preliminary attachment was
procured in bad faith entitling Spouses Yu to damages.
HELD/RATIO: NO! To merit an award of actual
damages arising from a wrongful attachment, the
attachment defendant must prove, with the best
evidence obtainable, the fact of loss or injury suffered
and the amount thereof. Such loss or injury must be of
the kind which is not only capable of proof but must
actually be proved with a reasonable degree of
certainty.
As to its amount, the same must be
measurable based on specific facts, and not on
guesswork or speculation. In particular, if the claim for
actual damages covers unrealized profits, the amount
of unrealized profits must be estalished and supported
by independent evidence of the mean income of the
business undertaking interrupted by the illegal seizure.
Spouses Yu insist that the evidence they
presented met the foregoing standards. They point to
the lists of their daily net income from the operation of
said passenger bus based on used ticket stubs issued
to their passengers. They also cite unused ticket stubs
as proof of income foregone when the bus was
wrongfully seized. They further cite the unrebutted
testimony of Josefa Yu that, in the day-to-day
operation of their passenger bus, they use up at least
three ticket stubs and earn a minimum daily income
of P1,500.00.
132
 emedial Law Review
Digests
Spouses Yu’s claim for unrealized income of P1,500.00
per day was based on their computation of their
average daily income for the year 1992. Said
computation in turn is based on the value of three
ticket stubs sold over only five separate days in
1992. By no stretch of the imagination can we consider
ticket sales for five days sufficient evidence of the
average daily income of the passenger bus, much less
its mean income. Not even the unrebutted testimony
of Josefa Yu can add credence to such evidence for
the testimony itself lacks corroboration. Moreover,
petitioners did not present evidence as to the damages
they suffered by reason of the wrongful attachment of
the land.
Nonetheless, the SC recognized that Spouses
Yu suffered some form of pecuniary loss when their
properties were wrongfully seized, although the
amount thereof cannot be definitively ascertained.
Hence, an award of temperate or moderate damages
in the amount of P50,000.00 is in order.
RULE 58: PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION
UNIVERSAL MOTORS CORPORATION vs. JUDGE
FRANCISCO G. ROJAS, SR.
Facts: Universal Motors Corporation (UMC) is the
exclusive assembler and distributor in the Philippines
of Nissan light commercial vehicles and spare parts. It
maintains a network of authorized dealers who
purchase vehicles and spare parts from UMC and resell
them in specified territories in the country. One of
UMC’s dealers was Nissan Specialist Sales Corporation
(NSSC) which ordered from UMC vehicles and
spareparts worth P5,476,500.00. NSSC issued several
postdated checks in favor of UMC to pay for the
purchases. The checks, however, were dishonored due
to insufficient funds. UMC demanded payment but
NSSC repeatedly failed to comply.
Hence, UMC stopped transacting with NSSC,
although NSSC still remained as dealer. UMC later
appointed Nissan Cagayan De Oro Distributors, Inc.
(NICAD) to co-exist as dealer with NSSC to meet the
market demand in Northern Mindanao. In October
2001, because of NSSC’s continued failure and refusal
to pay its obligation, UMC terminated its dealership
agreement with NSSC. It also filed a criminal
complaint for violation of B.P. No. 22 and/or estafa
against the officers of NSSC.
On February 2002, NSSC filed a Civil Case for
breach of contract against UMC and its officers and
NICAD and its officers. The case was raffled to the sala
of respondent Judge Rojas, Sr. On March 1, 2002
Judge Roxas issued an order setting a summary
hearing on March 7, 2002 on the propriety of the
issuance of a TRO. But it was only on March 6, 2001
that the NSSC amended its original complaint to
include a prayer for TRO.
ProvRem
Judge Rojas granted TRO against UMC, NICAD
and their respective officers, essentially enjoining UMC
from transacting with NICAD and to stop NICAD from
continuing sell, deal and market motor vehicles and
spare parts of Nissan. NSSC filed an Urgent Motion to
Fix Bond for Plaintiff/Applicant and Approve/Admit
Defendant’s Counterbond with Prayer to Lift TRO.
Motion was denied.
Judge Rojas later issued a writ of preliminary
injunction after NSSC posted a bond of
P1,000,000.00. UMC filed an Urgent Motion to
Recall/Dissolve Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Judge Roxas denied the same. UMC then filed with the
CA a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition assailing the
preliminary injunction issued by Judge Rojas.
In the meantime, NSSC filed with the RTC a
Motion to Enforce Writ of Preliminary Injunction,
whereas UMC, filed a Manifestation and Motion to
Cancel or Hold Proceedings in Abeyance. Judge Rojas
resolved both motions granting NSSC’s Motion to
Enforce Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
CA held the trial court committed grave abuse
of discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary
injunction for a period of 20 days without requiring
NSSC to issue any bond at all notwithstanding Rule 58,
Section 4 (b) of the Rules of Court. CA also held that
Judge Rojas committed an irregularity when he issued
an Order setting the application for a TRO for hearing,
notwithstanding the fact that NSSC were not applying
for a TRO in their complaint.
Hence, UMC filed the instant complaint against
Judge Rojas for serious misconduct, gross ignorance of
the law, manifest partiality and grave abuse of
discretion. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
found Judge Rojas guilty of grave abuse of discretion
and recommended a fine with warning that a repetition
of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely.
Issue: W/N Judge Rojas committed grave abuse of
discretion when he ordered the issuance of the TRO
and the writ of preliminary injuction.
Held and Ratio: Judge Rojas actions constitute grave
abuse of authority.
First, respondent judge ordered a hearing on the
issuance of a TRO although it was not prayed for in the
complaint. SC did not agree with Judge Rojas’
argument that the caption and the body of the
complaint showed an intent to include a prayer for a
TRO. Nowhere in the allegations in the complaint was
it shown that great or irreparable injury would result to
NSSC, pending hearing on the preliminary injunction.
Under Section 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, a TRO may be issued only if it appears
from the facts shown by affidavits or by the
verified application that great or irreparable
injury would result to the applicant before the
writ of preliminary injunction could be heard. In
addition, Section 4(a) of Rule 58 of the Rules of
Court is clear with regard to the procedure to be
133
 emedial Law Review
Digests
followed in the issuance of writs of preliminary
injunction, i.e., a preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order may be granted only when the
application in the action or proceeding is verified,
and shows facts entitling the applicant to the
relief demanded. Here, the relief sought by NSSC in
the original complaint consisted mainly of its
reinstatement as dealer of Nissan vehicles and spare
parts in Northern Mindanao, and the termination of the
dealership agreement between UMC and NICAD. NSSC
did not allege facts to support an urgent need to issue
a TRO to prevent any great or irreparable injury that it
might suffer while the preliminary injunction is being
heard.
Second, Judge Rojas issued the TRO without
requiring NSSC to post a bond. Sec. 4, Rule 58 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states that “ Unless
exempted by the court, the applicant files with
the court where the action or proceeding is
pending, a bond executed to the party or person
enjoined, in an amount to be fixed by the court,
to the effect that the applicant will pay to such
party or person all damages which he may
sustain by reason of the injunction or temporary
restraining order if the court should finally
decide that the applicant was not entitled
thereto. Upon approval of the requisite bond, a writ
of preliminary injunction shall be issued.”
While Section 4(b) of Rule 58 gives the Judge
Rojas the discretion to require a bond before granting
a TRO, the Rules did not intend to give the judge the
license to exercise such discretion arbitrarily to the
prejudice of the defendant. The bond under Rule 58 is
intended to pay all the damages which the party or
person against whom the TRO or injunction is issued
may sustain by reason thereof should the court finally
decide that the applicant was not entitled thereto.
Hence, it follows that unless it appears that the
enjoined party will not suffer any damage, the
presiding judge must require the applicant to post a
bond, otherwise the courts could become instruments
of oppression and harassment.
SC noted that prior to the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, no bond was required for the availment of a
TRO. However, the present Rules now regulate the
issuance of TROs, not only by requiring a hearing, but
also by imposing a bond on the applicant to prevent
the abuse of this relief by litigants.
The TRO issued by Judge Rojas effectively
enjoined UMC and NICAD, from doing business as
dealer of Nissan vehicles in Northern Mindanao. It
does not require deep thinking to realize the losses
that these companies will suffer if the court orders
them to freeze operations. Not only will they be
deprived of potential earnings from sales but they will
also have to expend for their overhead even if they are
not able to do business. Any fair judge would require
the plaintiff in such case to ensure compensation to
the defendant if it is later found that the former is not
entitled to the injunction. Instead Judge Rojas
rejected UMC’s motion to fix the NSSC’s bond,
ProvRem
although UMC, as defendant therein, had clearly
manifested its willingness to post a counterbond. Such
error on his part is not mere error in judgment. They
were not honest mistakes in the performance of his
duties. There was no urgency or any irreparable injury
which would require the issuance of a TRO and/or
Preliminary Injunction in favor of NSSC. The UMC had
already terminated its dealership agreement with
NSSC as early as October 30, 2001 on clear grounds of
failure to pay its financial obligations, and, thus, the
latter (NSSC) were no longer entitled to avail of the
remedy of injunction as the act to be prevented by the
issuance thereof had long been consummated.
GREENSTAR V. JUDGE ANDIONG
Facts: Greenstar Mangandingan was proclaimed
the Punong Barangay of Basak-Bangco, Madalum,
Lanao del Sur. The losing candidate, Alizaman S.
Sangcopan, on March 3, 2003, filed with the RTC of
Lanao del Sur an action for damages with prayer for
preliminary injunction and/or preliminary mandatory
injunction and temporary restraining order (TRO)
against the seven commissioners of the COMELEC; the
winning and duly proclaimed barangayofficials of
BarangayBasak-Bangco including Greenstar; the Acting
Election Officer; the Board of Election Tellers of
Precinct No. 68A; the Land Bank of the Philippines
(LBP); and the Chief of Barangay Affairs-Department
of Interior and Local Government (DILG), Province of
Lanao del Sur (defendants). Said case was docketed as
Civil Case No. 1912-03.
On March 5, 2003, the Clerk of Court Atty.
Cairoding P. Maruhom issued the summons. Before
these could be served on any of the defendants,
however, Judge Adiong issued a TRO that same day,
without conducting a hearing. He also set the hearing
on the application for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction on March 20, 2003. Greenstar claims that
there is no showing in the records that the case was
raffled to Branch 8 of the RTC presided by Judge
Adiong when said TRO was issued. The sheriff made a
return of service which partly provides that the
defendants were served with summons through Datu
Hassan Mangondaya at his residence in Madalum,
Lanao del Sur.
Greenstar claims that there was no valid
service of summons since Datu Mangondaya had
absolutely nothing to do with the case and was not
even authorized by the court to receive summons for
the defendants.
Six days after issuing the TRO, Judge Adiong,
Greenstar says, without notice or hearing, issued
another order extending the effectivity of the illegally
issued TRO for another twenty (20) days, prior to the
expiration of the TRO's effectivity and in blatant and
open violation of Section 5 of Rule 58 of the Rules of
Court and BP. 224.
On March 20, 2003, Judge Adiong considered
the application for a writ of preliminary injunction
134
 emedial Law Review
Digests
submitted for resolution. The following day, he granted
Sangcopan’s application for a writ of preliminary
injunction then issued the writ on March 25, 2003.
Greenstar claims that he only got a copy of the
summons on March 28, 2003.
On April 15, 2003, Greenstar charged Judge
Adiong, with gross ignorance of the law or procedure;
manifest unfaithfulness to a basic legal rule as well as
injudicious conduct; grave abuse of authority; grave
misconduct; conduct prejudicial to the administration
of justice; violation of Rules 3.01 and 3.02 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct; knowingly rendering an unjust
interlocutory order; and bias and partiality.
In a Supplemental Affidavit-Complaint,
Greenstar also charged Maruhom (Clerk of Court) and
Masbod Sybil (Cash Clerk) with dishonesty, grave
misconduct in office, conduct prejudicial to the orderly
administration of justice, and violation of Section 3,
paragraph (e) of Republic Act No. 3019. Greenstar
claims that Maruhom and Sybil conspired with Judge
Adiong and Atty. Edgar Masorong, Sangcopan’s
counsel, to manipulate the raffle of the case. The case
was raffled to branch 10 but it eventually went to
Adiong’s branch 8.
The complaint and supplemental complaint
having been filed directly with the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA), then Court Administrator directed
Adiong, Maruhom and Sybil to submit their respective
comments.
Judge Adiong argues that the issuance of the
TRO on March 5, 2003 without prior notice and hearing
was valid pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative
Circular No. 20-95, which authorizes the ex
parte issuance of a TRO by an executive judge in
matters of extreme urgency, in order to prevent grave
injustice and irreparable injury. He claims that such
circumstance was clearly obtaining at the time he
issued the TRO. He also claims that when he extended
the TRO to its maximum duration of twenty (20) days
from its issuance, no violation of Section 5 of Rule 58
of the Rules of Court or B.P. Blg. 224 was committed.
The OCA dismissed the case against Maruhom
but found Judge Adiong and Sybil both guilty and fined
them P20,000 each.
Issue: Did Judge Adiong violate Rule 58, Sec. 5?
Held: Yes! Dismissed from the Service!
Ratio: See Rule 58, Sec. 5!
Judge Adiong disregarded Rule 58, sec. 5 of the Rules.
He could not plausibly claim that he issued a 72-hour
TRO under the second paragraph of the rule because,
first, he was not the executive judge. Second, his
order did not state that the TRO was effective for 72
hours only. On the contrary, the defendants were
ordered to desist from releasing the subject funds
"until further orders from this Court." Third, there was
no showing that the order was being issued because of
extreme urgency to justify the issuance of a 72-hour
TRO. Judge Adiong only stated in his order that he was
ProvRem
"[a]cting on the prayer for the issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, without finding that the plaintiff
was entitled thereto."
Judge Adiong's violations of the Rules in
issuing the TRO are patent and inexcusable.
This Court already ruled that failure to abide by
Administrative Circular No. 20-95 (amendments to the
Rule which are now part of the provision) constitutes
the offense of grave abuse of authority, misconduct
and conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of
justice. Indeed, a judge is presumed to know this
Circular. Judge Adiong's failure to comply with the
clear provisions on issuing TROs constitutes gross
ignorance and gross inefficiency.
We also agree that the presumptions of good
faith and regularity in the performance of judicial
functions on the part of Judge Adiong were negated by
the circumstances on record. First, there was no
proper notice to the herein complainant and the other
defendants in Civil Case No. 1912-03 that an
application for the issuance of a TRO had been filed.
Second, Judge Adiong did not conduct a summary
hearing before granting the TRO. Third, as will be
discussed hereafter, he contravened the circular on the
raffle of cases. All these systematically deprived
complainant and the other defendants of knowledge of
and participation in the TRO proceedings and ensured
the unchallenged victory of Sangcopan therein. These
three points, taken together, paint a picture of bias or
partiality on the part of Judge Adiong. His acts amount
to gross misconduct constituting violations of the
following provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
The Court also found that there was no proper
substituted service of summons and that Maruhom
committed a violation when he referred the case to
Judge Adiong’s Branch 8 without conducting a raffle.
Adiong was dismissed from the service and Sybil and
Maruhom were each suspended for 3 months.
LANDBANK VS. CONTINENTAL WATCHMAN
FACTS: Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) caused to
be published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer, a
newspaper of general circulation, an “Invitation to Pre-
Qualify”, inviting reputable securities agencies to pre-
qualify for security guard services in the different LBP
offices, properties and installations nationwide.
Continental Watchman Agency Incorporated (CWAI)
and other security agencies responded to the invitation
and participated in the public bidding.
In a bidding proper held on June 10, 1997, all
the pre-qualified security agencies, CWAI included,
submitted their individual sealed bid proposals to LBP’s
Special Committee for the Selection of Security
Agencies (Bid Committee). It submitted a bid for 3
areas: Area I, II, V (all in Luzon). After all the bids
were opened and evaluated, it turned out that CWAI
was the lowest bidder for those 3 areas. CWAI asked
for a reconsideration but was denied by the Bid
Committee.
135
 emedial Law Review
Digests
CWAI filed with RTC Manila a Petition for Injunction
and Damages with a prayer for a Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction against LBP.
After the hearing, the trial court issued a
Temporary Restraining Order effective for 20 days. At
the same time, it set for hearing CWAI’s application for
preliminary injunction on August 22, 1997. Thereafter,
the trial court issued an order directing the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction.
On August 27, 1997, LBP filed its Answer with
Special and/or Affirmative Defenses and Compulsory
Counterclaim. On September 2, 1997, a writ of
preliminary injunction was accordingly issued. On
January 12, 1998, the trial court denied LPB’s MR of its
order directing the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction.
LBP filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order under Rules 58 and 65 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure alleging that the two
orders of the trial court (August 22, 1997 & January
12, 1998) were issued without jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion. The CA dismissed the
petition ruling that the grant or denial of an injunction
rests on the sound discretion of the trial court, and will
not be interfered except on a clear abuse of discretion
which is wanting in the this case since the trial court
even conducted hearings before issuing a writ of
preliminary injunction.
ISSUE: WON the CA committed grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing the petition??? NO.
[Note: LBP submits that the CA, by dismissing its
petition, in effect compelled it to enter into a contract
for security guard services with CWAI, and as a result,
the case was prematurely resolved.]
RULING: LBP's remedy is an appeal to the SC from
the CA’s decision by way of a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45. Instead, it filed the Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 43 days after it received
the CA’s decision denying its MR. Apparently, LBP
resorted to certiorari because it failed to interpose an
appeal seasonably. This, of course, is a procedural
flaw. Time and again, the SC has reminded members
of the bench and bar that the special civil action of
certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for a lost
appeal.
Admittedly, the SC, in accordance with the
liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the
interest of justice, has the discretion to treat a petition
for certiorari as a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45, especially if filed within the
reglementary period for filing a petition for review. In
this case, however, it finds no reason to justify a
liberal application of the Rules.
Even assuming that the present petition is a
proper remedy, still it is dismissible. Based on the
evidence presented by CWAI, the trial court
found that all the requisites for the issuance of an
injunctive writ were present. Although LBP presented
ProvRem
evidence to rebut CWAI’s assertions, those will be
better assessed and considered in the trial proper. The
assailed injunctive writ is not a judgment on the merits
of the case, contrary to the submission of LBP, for a
writ of preliminary injunction is generally based solely
on initial and incomplete evidence. The evidence
submitted during the hearing of the incident is not
conclusive or complete for only a "sampling" is needed
to give the trial court an idea of the justification for the
preliminary injunction pending the decision of the case
on the merits. As such, the findings of fact and opinion
of a court when issuing the writ of preliminary
injunction are interlocutory in nature and made before
the trial on the merits is commenced or terminated.
Furthermore, it does not necessarily proceed that
when a writ of preliminary injunction is issued, a final
injunction will follow, as erroneously argued by LBP.
There are vital facts that have yet to be presented
during the trial which may not be obtained or
presented during the hearing on the application for the
injunctive writ. Clearly, petitioner's contention that the
trial court and the CA had already disposed of the main
case lacks merit.
Also, the sole object of a preliminary injunction
is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the
case can be heard. Here, after evaluating the evidence
presented by both contending parties, the trial court
held that justice would be better served if the status
quo is preserved until the final determination of the
merits of the case. The SC finds nothing whimsical,
arbitrary, or capricious in such ruling.
Significantly, the rule is well-entrenched that
the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction rests
upon the sound discretion of the trial court. It bears
reiterating that Section 4 of Rule 58 gives generous
latitude to the trial courts in this regard for the reason
that conflicting claims in an application for a
provisional writ more often than not involve a factual
determination which is not the function of the appellate
courts. Hence, the exercise of sound judicial discretion
by the trial court in injunctive matters must not be
interfered with except when there is manifest abuse,
which is wanting in the present case.
BACOLOD CITY WATER DISTRICT, petitioner, vs.
THE HON. EMMA C. LABAYEN, Presiding Judge,
RTC of Bacolod City, Br. 46 and the City of
Bacolod, respondents.
FACTS. Bacolod City filed a case for Injunction With a
Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order And/Or
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against Bacolod
City Water District (BACIWA). The petition stated that
on January 15, 1999, BACIWA published in a local
paper of general circulation, a Schedule of Automatic
Water Rates Adjustments for the years 1999, 2000 and
2001. The rates were supposed to take effect 7 days
after its posting in the local papers or on January 22,
1999. The increase was aborted after BACIWA
unilaterally suspended the January 22, 1999 scheduled
136
 emedial Law Review
Digests
implementation. On March 15, 1999, however, it
announced that the rate hike will be implemented on
April 1, 1999. Bacolod City opposed and prayed that
before the hearing of the main case, a TRO or a
preliminary injunction be issued.
On June 17, 1999, respondent City filed a Motion to
Set [for] Hearing its application for a TRO or
preliminary mandatory injunction. BACIWA opposed
the Motion. Respondent City filed its Reply to
Opposition and reiterated that the application for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order or
preliminary mandatory injunction be heard. On the
same date, BACIWA filed a Manifestation and Motion
stating that the hearing may no longer be necessary as
the respective positions of both parties have already
been presented and amplified in their pleadings and
memoranda.
After a hiatus of nearly seven (7) months, or on
February 18, 2000, respondent City filed an Urgent
Motion for the Issuance of TRO And[/]Or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction praying that the case be set for
hearing on February 24, 2000. On the same date
requested, respondent court heard respondent’s
application for TRO and issued an Order
commanding petitioner to stop, desist and refrain
from implementing the proposed water rates.
BACIWA filed an Urgent MR and Dissolution of
the TRO. Respondent City filed its Opposition On April
6, 2000, respondent court issued an Order finding
petitioner’s Urgent MR and Dissolution of TRO moot
and academic considering BACIWA’s compliance of said
TRO. On April 19, 2000, respondent City filed a
Manifestation praying that respondent trial court issue
a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioner,
stating that the TRO issued expired before the parties
were able to finish the presentation of their respective
witnesses and evidences. On December 21, 2000,
respondent court issued the assailed Decision granting
the final injunction which allegedly confirmed the
previous preliminary injunction.
Petitioner filed its MR of the assailed Decision
on January 11, 2001. RTC denied the MR for lack of
merit in an Order. Petitioner then filed a special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65 in the Court of
Appeals. The CA dismissed the petition for review on
certiorari ratiocinating that in the case at bar, the
[O]rder of public respondent dated 24 February
2000, though termed by BACIWA as a temporary
restraining order, is in fact a preliminary
injunction. It must be further noted that the
temporary restraining order has been elevated to
the same level as the preliminary injunction in
the procedure, grounds and requirements of its
obtention by S[ection] 4, Rule 58. Thus, to set [a]
distinction, the present practice is to categorically refer
to it as a temporary restraining order. In which case,
the omission by the public respondent in referring to
the 24 February 2000 order as a temporary restraining
order could not have been a mere oversight but
deliberate.
ProvRem
ISUUE. Whether a preliminary injunction had been
issued. – NO.
RATIO. The sequence of events and the proceedings
that transpired in the trial court make a clear
conclusion that the Order issued was a temporary
restraining order and not a preliminary injunction.
First, the trial court has always referred to its
Order as a temporary restraining order in the
succeeding Orders it issued on March 10, 2000 and
April 6, 2000. The parties, in their succeeding
pleadings, also referred to the assailed Order as a
temporary restraining order.
Second. Injunction is a judicial writ, process
or proceeding whereby a party is ordered to do or
refrain from doing a certain act. It may be the main
action or merely a provisional remedy for and as an
incident in the main action. The main action for
injunction is distinct from the provisional or
ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction which
cannot exist except only as part or an incident of an
independent action or proceeding. As a matter of
course, in an action for injunction, the auxiliary
remedy of preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory
or mandatory, may issue. Under the law, the main
action for injunction seeks a judgment embodying a
final injunction which is distinct from, and should not
be confused with, the provisional remedy of
preliminary injunction, the sole object of which is to
preserve the status quo until the merits can be heard.
A preliminary injunction is granted at any stage of an
action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final
order. It persists until it is dissolved or until the
termination of the action without the court issuing a
final injunction.
A restraining order, on the other hand, is
issued to preserve the status quo until the hearing
of the application for preliminary injunction which
cannot be issued ex parte. Under Rule 58 of the Rules
of Court, a judge may issue a temporary restraining
order with a limited life of twenty (20) days from date
of issue. If before the expiration of the twenty (20)-
day period the application for preliminary injunction is
denied, the temporary restraining order would be
deemed automatically vacated. If no action is taken
by the judge on the application for preliminary
injunction within the said twenty (20) days, the
temporary restraining order would automatically
expire on the 20th day by the sheer force of law, no
judicial declaration to that effect being necessary.
In the case at bar, since no preliminary
injunction was issued, the temporary restraining
order granted automatically expired after twenty
(20) days under the Rules. The fact that respondent
court merely ordered “the respondent[,] its agents,
representatives or any person acting in his behalf to
stop, desist and refrain from implementing in their
billings the new water rate increase which will start on
March 1, 2000” without stating the period for the
restraint does not convert the temporary restraining
order to a preliminary injunction.
137
 emedial Law Review
Digests
The rule against the non-extendibility of the
twenty (20)-day limited period of effectivity of a
temporary restraining order is absolute if issued by a
regional trial court. The failure of respondent court to
fix a period for the ordered restraint did not lend the
temporary restraining order a breath of semi-
permanence which can only be characteristic of a
preliminary injunction. The twenty (20)-day period
provided by the Rules of Court should be deemed
incorporated in the Order where there is an omission
to do so. It is because of this rule on non-extendibility
that respondent City was prompted to move that
hearings be set for its application of a preliminary
injunction. Respondent City cannot take advantage of
this omission by respondent trial court.
RULE 59: RECEIVERSHIP
CITIBANK VS. CA
Facts: In considering for a loan obtained from Citibank,
private respondent Douglas Anama executed a
promissory note to pay the plaintiff bank the sum of
P418,000.00 in sixty 60 equal successive monthly
installments. To secure payment of the loan, Anama
also constituted a Chattel Mortgage in favor of
petitioner, on various machineries and equipment with
a condition that in case the plaintiff institutes
proceedings for the foreclosure of the mortgage, the
plaintiff shall be entitled to the appointment of a
receiver without a bond. For failure and refusal of
Anama to pay the monthly installment due, Citibank
filed a verified complaint against Anama for the
collection of his unpaid balance and for the delivery
and possession of the chattels covered by the Chattel
Mortgage preparatory to the foreclosure thereof. The
trial court upon proof of default of Anama in the
payment of the said loan, issued an Order of Replevin
over the macheneries and equipment covered by the
Chattel Mortgage. A pre-trial conference was held and
the lower court issued an order for joint management
by Citibank and Anama of the latter's business for ten
(10) days, after which the former would appointed
receiver for the said business. Thus, Citibank took over
private respondent's business as receiver. When
further proposals to settle the case amicably failed, the
lower court proceeded to try the case on the merits.
Citibank presented a Motion for the Issuance of
an Alias Writ of Seizure which the trial court issued.
Anama moved for reconsideration of the aforesaid
order but the same was denied. As a consequence, the
sheriff seized subject properties, dismantled and
removed them from the premises where they were
installed, delivered them to Citibank’s possession and
advertised them for sale at public auction. Anama filed
with the CA a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with Injunction to set aside and annul the
questioned resolution of the trial court. CA granted
petition, holding that the provision of the Rules of
Court on Replevin and Receivership have not been
complied with, in that (1) there was no Affidavit of
ProvRem
Merit accompanying the Complaint for Replevin; (2)
the bond posted by Citibank was insufficient; and (3)
there was non-compliance with the requirement of a
receiver's bond and oath of office.
Issue: (with regard to receivership) WON there was
non-compliance on the part of Citibank of posting a
receiver’s bond –No! WON there was non-compliance
as to the oath of office? –YES!
Ratio: Citibank contends that although it is in
agreement with the CA that a receiver's bond is
separate and distinct from a replevin bond, under the
circumstances it was not required to file a receiver's
bond because it did not assume receivership over the
properties. It is further argued that assuming that it
did assume receivership, the Chattel Mortgage
expressly provides, that in case the MORTGAGEE
institutes proceedings, the MORTGAGEE shall be
entitled as a matter of right to the appointment of a
receiver, without bond, of the mortgaged properties
and of such properties, real or personal, claims and
rights of the MORTGAGOR as shall be necessary or
proper to enable the said receiver to property control
and dispose of the mortgaged properties.
From the evidence on record, it is palpably
clear that petitioner Citibank did, in fact, assume
receivership. The CA found that the requirements of
Section 5, Rule 59 on receivership were not complied
with by the petitioner, particularly the filing or posting
of a bond and the taking of an oath. It should be noted
that under the old Rules of Court which was in effect at
the time this case was still at trial stage, a bond for the
appointment of a receiver was not generally required
of the applicant, except when the application was ex
parte. Therefore, petitioner was not absolutely
required to file a bond. Besides, as stipulated in the
chattel mortgage contract between the parties,
petitioner, as the mortgagee, is entitled to the
appointment of a receiver without a bond.
However, the Court of Appeals was right in
finding a defect in such assumption of receiver in that
the requirement of taking an oath has not been
complied with Section 5, Rule 59, states:
Sec. 5. Oath and bond of receiver. — Before
entering upon his duties, the receiver must be
sworn to perform them faithfully, and must file
a bond, executed to such person and in such
sum as the court or judge may direct, to the
effect that he will faithfully discharge the
duties of receiver in the action and obey the
orders of the court therein.
Consequently, the trail court erred in allowing
the petitioner to assume receivership over the machine
shop of private respondent without requiring the
appointed receiver to take an oath.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS HON.
BERNARDO SALUDARES AND HUNG MING KUK
(receivership was barely discussed)
138
 emedial Law Review
Digests
Facts: PCGG issued a writ of sequestration directed
towards the Lianga Bay Logging Company (LBLC). The
writ of sequestration was based on the ground that the
shares of stock of LBLC owned by Peter Sabido formed
part of illegally acquired wealth. Sabido then filed a
motion to lift the writs of sequestration before the
sandiganbayan which was granted. PCGG filed an MR
which was denied. They then filed the special civil
action of certiorari to contest said order.
In the meantime, private respondent Hung
Ming Kuk filed a complaint for sum of money against
LBLC with a prayer for preliminary attachment. PCGG
was not impleaded nor was the sequestration
proceeding referred to. Trial court granted the writ of
preliminary attachment. Theraefer, Hung Ming Kuk
filed a motion to declare LBLC in default for failure to
file responsive pleadings. RTC declared LBLC in default
and rendered judgment in favor of Hung Ming Kuk.
SC, in relation to the sequestration
proceedings, reversed the sandiganbayan’s decision
and affirmed the validity of the writ of sequestration.
Entry of judgment was issued.
Republic thus now contends that the RTC
cannot attach the properties because the writ of
sequestration is valid. (Basically, at issue is that the
same properties of LBLC is the subject of both the
attachment and the sequestration order)
Issue: Whether attachment was valid considering the
properties were already under sequestration? NO
Held: 1st issue was actually who had jurisdiction- RTC
or Sandiganbayan? SC said that the fact of
sequestration alone did not automatically oust the RTC
of jurisdiction. PCGG must be a party to the suit in
order that the sandiganbayan’s exclusive jurisdiction
may be correctly invoked. In this case, the claim of
Hung Ming Kuk arose from a debt incurred by LBLC.
Hung Ming Kuk extended cash advances and supplied
parts and materials to LBLC. Being a claim for a sum of
money, the complaint falls within the jurisdiction of the
RTC.
This case concerns receivables of Hung Ming
Kuk arising out of a legitimate business contract to
supply goods and services in favor of LBLC. When a
collection suit was filed against LBLC by Hung Ming
Kuk, evidently PCGG could not be the proper party to
defend against such claim. More so, because when
PCGG had not taken over the LBLC's business
operations.
Part where receivership was mentioned: Recall
that the SC declared the writ of sequestration valid.
That resolution said, “the devices the revolutionary
government provided for the recovery of ill gotten
wealth took the form of provisional remedies similar
to... receivership.” The court noted the relationship
between attachment and receivership on one hand,
and sequestration, freeze order and provisional
takeover on the other. SC said the latter are ancillary
ProvRem
remedies in prosecuting the ill gotten wealth of the
Marcoses and are similar to the former.
(No more mention of receivership. SC
discussed preliminary attachment instead)
By an order of attachment, a sheriff seizes
property of a defendant in a civil suit so that it may
stand as security for the satisfaction of any judgment
that may be obtained. When a writ of attachment has
been levied on real property or any interest therein
belonging to the judgment debtor, the levy creates a
lien which nothing can destroy but its dissolution. This
well-settled rule is likewise applicable to a writ of
sequestration.
Attachment is in the nature of a proceeding in
rem. It is against a particular property of a debtor. The
attaching creditor thereby acquires a specific lien upon
the attached property which ripens into a judgment
against the res when the order of sale is made. Such a
proceeding is in effect a finding that the property
attached is an indebted thing and results in its virtual
condemnation to pay for the owner's debt. The law
does not provide the length of time during which an
attachment lien shall continue after the rendition of the
judgment, and it must therefore continue until the
debt is paid, or sale is had under execution issued in
the judgment, or until the judgment is satisfied, or the
statement discharged or vacated in some manner
provided by law.
In this case, the disputed properties of LBLC
were already under custodial egis by virtue of a valid
writ of sequestration when Judge Saludares issued the
writ of attachment. The writ of sequestration
subsisting, it could not be interfered with by the RTC
since the PCGG is a coordinate and co-equal body.
RULE 60: REPLEVIN
TWIN ACE HOLDINGS CORPORATION VS. RUFINA
AND COMPANY
FACTS: Twin Ace Holdings Corporation (Twin Ace;
petitioner) filed a complaint for recovery of possession
of personal property, permanent injunction and
damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
replevin, TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction
against Rufina and Company (Rufina; respondent).
Twin Ace is a private domestic corporation
engaged in the manufacture of rhum, wines, and liquor
under the name and style “Tanduay Distillers.” It has
registered its mark of ownership of its bottles with the
Bureau of Patent, Trademarks and Technology Transfer
under RA 623 (An Act to Regulate the Use of Duly
Stamped or Marked Bottles, Boxes, Casks, Kegs,
Barrels and Other Similar Containers). It makes
substantial investments in brand new bottles which it
buys from glass factories and use the bottles for 5
times in order to recover the cost of acquisition. Twin
Ace sells its products to the public excluding the
bottles and thus retrieves its used empty bottles,
washes and uses them over and over again as
containers.
139
 emedial Law Review
Digests
Rufina is engaged, among others, in the
production, extraction, fermentation and manufacture
of patis and other food seasonings. In producing patis
and other food seasonings, Rufina uses as containers
bottles owned by Twin Ace without any authority or
permission from the latter. Hence, Rufina is unduly
benefited from the use of the bottles.
In its Answer with counter-application for a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction, Rufina claimed that the
marked bottles it used as containers were purchased
from junk dealers; hence, it became the owner
thereof.
TC dismissed the complaint. Twin Ace appealed
to the CA which affirmed decision of TC. MR filed by
Twin Ace was likewise denied by CA. Hence, this
Petition for Review.
ISSUES:
1. WON the CA erred in holding that Rufina is not
covered within the exemption provided by Sec. 6 of RA
623, as amended by RA 5700
2. WON the CA erred in not finding that Twin Ace as
owner of the bottles is entitled to compensation for its
unauthorized use by Rufina (as stated in the case but I
think the proper issue is WON Twin Ace has shown that
it is entitled to the possession of the bottles for it to be
issued a Writ of Replevin)
HELD:
1. NO. Basically, RA 623, as amended by 5700 makes
it unlawful for any person to use the marked bottles
without permission from its owner. However, such Act
provided an exemption:
Sec. 6. The provisions of this Act shall not be
interpreted as prohibiting the use of bottles as
containers for "sisi," "bagoong," "patis," and
similar native products. (this is the exemption Twin
Ace is referring to)
Twin Ace asserts that the provision under the
law affords protection only to small scale
producers/manufacturers who do not have the capacity
to buy new bottles for use in their products and cannot
extend to Rufina which had admitted in its Answer and
affirmed in the TC decision that it is engaged on a
large scale basis. Rufina counters that the law did not
really distinguish between large scale manufacturers
and small time producers.
The earlier case of Twin Ace Holdings
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, applies to the present
petition. In said case, Twin Ace filed a Complaint for
Replevin against Lorenzana Food Corporation to
recover 380 bottles allegedly owned by Twin Ace but
detained and used by Lorenzana Food Corporation as
containers for its native products without its express
permission, in violation of the law. In that case, this
Court acknowledged that the exemption under the law
is unqualified as the law did not make a distinction that
it only applies to small scale industries but not to large
scale manufacturers. Thus, even if the court in said
ProvRem
case held that the exemption is primarily meant to
give protection to small scale industries, it did not
qualify that the protection therein was intended and
limited only to such.
It is worth noting that Lorenzana Food
Corporation which prevailed in the case filed by Twin
Ace against it is certainly not a small scale industry.
Just like Rufina, Lorenzana Food Corporation also
manufactures and exports processed foods and other
related products, e.g., patis, toyo, bagoong, vinegar
and other food seasonings.
In view of these considerations, we find and so
hold that the exemption contained in Section 6 of Rep.
Act No. 623 applies to all manufacturers of sisi,
bagoong, patis and similar native products without
distinction or qualification as to whether they are
small, medium or large scale.
2. NO. Rule 60, Section 2(a), of the Revised ROC
mandates that a party praying for the recovery of
possession of personal property must show by his own
affidavit or that of some other person who personally
knows the facts that he is the owner of the property
claimed, particularly describing it, or is entitled to the
possession thereof. It must be borne in mind that
replevin is a possessory action the gist of which
focuses on the right of possession that, in turn, is
dependent on a legal basis that, not infrequently, looks
to the ownership of the object sought to be
replevied. Wrongful detention by the defendant of the
properties sought in an action for replevin must be
satisfactorily established. If only a mechanistic
averment thereof is offered, the writ should not be
issued.
In this case, Twin Ace has not shown that it is
entitled to the possession of the bottles in question
and consequently there is thus no basis for the
demand by it of due compensation.
SUPERLINES V. PNCC
FACTS: A Superlines bus swerved and crashed into the
radio room of PNCC while the bus was traveling north
and approaching the Alabang northbound exit lane.
During the investigation, the bus was turned over to
the Alabang Traffic Bureau for it to conduct its own
investigation of the incident. Because of lack of
adequate space, the bus was, on request of traffic
investigator Lopera, towed by the PNCC patrol to its
compound where it was stored.
Superlines requested PNCC to release the bus
but it refused despite the willingness of the former to
repair the damaged radio room. PNCC demanded the
sum of P40K for repair although Superlines’ estimate
for the repair of the radio room was only P10K.
Because of the refusal, Superlines filed a complaint for
replevin with damages.
The Lower Court sided with Superlines but
since Superlines is unable to put op the bond for the
issuance of the writ of replevin, it opted to forego the
140
 emedial Law Review
Digests
same and just wait for the court’s final judgment.
Lower Court dismissed Superlines’ complaint
and granted PNCC’s counterclaim and ordered
Superlines to pay P40K in damages. CA affirmed: the
storage of the bus for safekeeping purposes partakes
of the nature of a deposit, hence, custody or authority
over it remained with Lopera who ordered its
safekeeping.
Issue: Whether or not the bus should be released? YES
SC: In a complaint for replevin, the claimant must
convincingly show that he is either the owner or clearly
entitled to the possession of the object sought to be
recovered, and that the defendant, who is in actual or
legal possession thereof, wrongfully detains the same.
Superlines’ ownership of the bus being
admitted by PNCC, consideration of whether
respondents have been wrongfully detaining it is in
order.
Following the conduct of an investigation of the
accident, the bus was towed by PNCC on the request of
Lopera. It was thus not distrained or taken for a tax
assessment or a fine pursuant to law, or seized under
a writ of execution or preliminary attachment, or
otherwise placed under custodia legis.
In upholding the dismissal of Superlines’
complaint, the CA held that while there is no law
authorizing the impounding of a vehicle involved in an
accident by the police authorities, neither is there a
law making the impounding of vehicles involved in
accidents illegal. It added that SC is of the view that
there is yet no clear-cut policy or rule on the matter.
The CA is mistaken. The Constitution grants the right
against unreasonable seizures.
The CA’s reliance on Victory Liner v. Bellosillo to justify
the impounding of vehicles involved in accidents by
police authorities is misplaced. The Victory Liner case
was an administrative case against a trial court judge.
This Court explicitly declined to rule on the legality of
such an order:
It held that “this administrative case is not the right
forum to determine the issue of the legality of
respondent’s order requiring VLI to post a cash bond
for the release of its impounded vehicle. VLI should
have raised that issue in the proper courts and not
directly to us, and much less by way of an
administrative case.”
SC’s statement in Victory Liner on the lack of a
"clear-cut policy" refers to the practice, rightly or
wrongly, of trial court judges of issuing orders for the
impounding of vehicles involved in accidents. It has no
application to the instant case which involves the
seizure and distraint implemented by respondents
upon a verbal order by Lopera without the benefit or
color of legality afforded by a court process, writ or
order.
It is true that property held as evidence in a criminal
case cannot be replevied. But the rule applies only
where the property is lawfully held, that is, seized in
accordance with the rule against warrantless searches
ProvRem
and seizures or its accepted exceptions. Property
subject of litigation is not by that fact alone in custodia
legis. A thing is in custodia legis when it is shown that
it has been and is subjected to the official custody of a
judicial executive officer in pursuance of his execution
of a legal writ. Only when property is lawfully taken by
virtue of legal process is it considered in the custody of
the law, and not otherwise.
LT. GEN. ALFONSO DAGUDAG V. JUDGE
PADERANGA
FACTS: Dagudag is the head of Task Force Sagip
Kalikasan of the DENR. The PNP regional maritime
group of region 7 received information that a vessel of
NMC Container Lines, Inc. was shipping container vans
containing illegal forest products from CDO to Cebu.
The shipments were falsely declared as cassava meal
and corn grains to avoid inspection. A team of PNP,
DENR and Phil Coast Guard members inspected the
container vans in Mandaue port. The crew of the vessel
failed to produce documents for the forest products.
Since nobody claimed the forest products
within a reasonable period, DENR considered them as
abandoned and a seizure receipt was issued to NMC
Container Lines. DENR then posted notices informing
the unknown owner/s of the goods that an admin
adjudication was to be held. During the adjudication,
no one appeared, so it was recommended that the
goods be confiscated in favor of the gov’t.
Out of nowhere, a certain Roger Edma filed a
complaint before Judge Paderanga praying that a writ
of replevin be issued to order DENR, Dagudag et al. to
deliver the forest products to him. Judge issued the
writ.
DENR et al. then filed a motion to quash the
writ of replevin because Edma’s bond was insufficient;
forest products were falsely declared; Edma was not a
party-in-interest; the forest products were
undocumented; they were considered abandoned
already; replevin was not the proper remedy; the
products were lawfully seized under the Revised
Forestry Code; court could not have taken cognizance
of the case because it was pending with DENR and
Edma failed to exhaust his admin remedies. In a
motion to dismiss, they also alleged that the real
defendant is the Republic and that the state cannot be
sued without its consent. Judge denied DENR et al.’s
motion for lack of merit.
Dagudag then filed with the Office of Court
Admin a complaint charging Paderanga with gross
ignorance of the law and conduct unbecoming of a
judge.
Issue: was it proper for the judge to take cognizance
of the replevin suit and to issue the writ of replevin?
No. denial of the motion to quash demonstrates
ignorance of the law.
141
 emedial Law Review
Digests
Ruling: The OCA recommended that that Judge
Paderanga be held liable for gross ignorance of the law
for the ff reasons:
(1) violation the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
Courts should not entertain suits unless the available
administrative remedies have first been resorted to.
Before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of
the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have
availed of all the means of administrative processes
afforded him. The premature invocation of court's
intervention is fatal to one's cause of action. Edma did
not resort to, or avail of, any administrative remedy.
He went straight to court and filed a complaint for
replevin and damages. PD 705 states that all actions
and decisions of the Bureau of Forest Development
Director are subject to review by the DENR Secretary;
(2) the decisions of the DENR Secretary are appealable
to the President; and (3) courts cannot review the
decisions of the DENR Secretary except through a
special civil action for certiorari or prohibition.
(2) Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction,
courts cannot take cognizance of cases
pending before administrative agencies of
special competence.
The DENR is the agency responsible for the
enforcement of forestry laws. The complaint for
replevin itself stated that members of DENR's Task
Force Sagip Kalikasan took over the forest products
and brought them to the DENR Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office. This should
have alerted Judge Paderanga that the DENR had
custody of the forest products, that administrative
proceedings may have been commenced, and that the
replevin suit had to be dismissed outright.
(3) Third, the forest products are already
in custodia legis and thus cannot be the subject of
replevin.
There was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and
the DENR seized the forest products in accordance with
law. Properties lawfully seized by the DENR
cannot be the subject of replevin. Since there was
a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the
seizure was in accordance with law, the properties
seized were validly deemed in custodia legis.
They could not be subject to an action for
replevin for it is property lawfully taken by virtue
of legal process. Under the Revised Forestry Code,
the DENR secretary or his authorized representatives
may order the confiscation of forest products illegally
cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned.
[Minor issues:
ProvRem
Gross ignorance of law: Failure to follow basic legal
commands constitutes gross ignorance of the law from
which no one may be excused, not even a judge.
Violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary: judges should keep themselves
abreast with legal developments; gross inefficiency in
failure to consider so basic a rule; using inappropriate
language in court (said things like “shut up,”
“baloney!” “what kind of a lawyer are you,” “how dare
you say that the court is wrong” “the problem with you
people is you don’t use your heads”]
RULE 61: SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE
MANGONON v. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: Petitioner Ma. Belen B. Mangonon filed, in
behalf of her then minor children Rica and Rina, a
Petition for Declaration of Legitimacy and Support,
with application for support pendente lite with the RTC
Makati against the father and grandfather of the said
twins. In said petition, it was alleged that petitioner
and respondent Federico Delgado were civilly married.
As the marriage was solemnized without the required
consent, it was annulled. Within seven months after
the annulment of their marriage, petitioner gave birth
to twins Rica and Rina. According to petitioner, she,
with the assistance of her second husband Danny
Mangonon, raised her twin daughters as private
respondents had totally abandoned them. At the time
of the institution of the petition, Rica and Rina were
about to enter college in the USA where petitioner,
together with her daughters and second husband, had
moved to and finally settled in. Rica was admitted to
the University of Massachusetts (Amherst) while Rina
was accepted by the Long Island University and
Western New England College. Despite their
admissions to said universities, Rica and Rina were,
however, financially incapable of pursuing collegiate
education because, in essence, their money wasn’t
enough.
Petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Set
Application for Support Pendente Lite for Hearing
because Rica and Rina both badly needed immediate
financial resources for their education. This Motion was
opposed by respondent Francisco (the twins’
grandfather). The trial court granted the prayer for
support pendente lite.
Not satisfied with the Order of the trial court
(because she felt that the amount was not enough),
petitioner brought the case to the Court of Appeals via
Petition for Certiorari. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the holding of the trial court. The MR was denied as
well.
ISSUE: W/N support pendente lite may be granted?
YES.
HELD: Under this ROC, a court may temporarily grant
support pendente lite prior to the rendition of
142
 emedial Law Review ProvRem
Digests
judgment or final order. Because of its provisional support pendente lite. As established by petitioner,
nature, a court does not need to delve fully into the respondent Francisco has the financial resources to pay
merits of the case before it can settle an application for this amount given his various business endeavors.
this relief. All that a court is tasked to do is determine Considering, however, that the twin sisters may have
the kind and amount of evidence which may suffice to already been done with their education by the time of
enable it to justly resolve the application. It is enough the promulgation of this decision, we deem it proper to
that the facts be established by affidavits or other award support pendente lite in arrearsto be computed
documentary evidence appearing in the record. from the time they entered college until they had
After the hearings conducted on this matter as finished their respective studies.
well as the evidence presented, we find that petitioner
was able to establish, by prima facie proof, the filiation
of her twin daughters to private respondents and the
twins’ entitlement to support pendente lite. The next
question is who should be made liable for said award.
[NOTE: THIS PART, ONWARDS, IS MORE
CIV LAW THAN REM]The pertinent provision of the
Family Code on this subject states:
ART. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged
to give support, the liability shall devolve upon the
following persons in the order herein provided:
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters.
The obligation to give support rests principally
on those more closely related to the recipient.
However, the more remote relatives may be held to
shoulder the responsibility should the claimant prove
that those who are called upon to provide support do
not have the means to do so.
There being prima facie evidence showing that
petitioner and respondent Federico are the parents of
Rica and Rina, petitioner and respondent Federico are
primarily charged to support their children’s college
education. In view however of their incapacities as
established, the obligation to furnish said support
should be borne by respondent the twins’ grandfather,
Francisco. Under Article 199 of the Family Code,
respondent Francisco, as the next immediate relative
of Rica and Rina, is tasked to give support to his
granddaughters in default of their parents. The Court
discussed that based on the evidence, Francisco had
ample means to provide support to the twins. It having
been established that respondent Francisco has the
financial means to support his granddaughters’
education, he, in lieu of petitioner and respondent
Federico, should be held liable for support pendente
lite.
Meanwhile, Art. 204 states that the obligor is
given the choice as to how he could dispense his
obligation to give support. Thus, he may give the
determined amount of support to the claimant or he
may allow the latter to stay in the family dwelling. The
second option cannot be availed of in case there are
circumstances, legal or moral, which should be
considered. In this case, the Court said that the second
option is not anymore possible due to strained
relations between the family members involved.
As to the amount of support pendente lite: we
hold respondent Francisco liable for half of the amount
of school expenses incurred by Rica and Rina as

143
 emedial Law Review
Digests
RULE 62: INTERPLEADER
OCAMPO V. TIRONA
Facts: Leonardo Ocampo alleged that he was the
owner of a parcel of land in Pasay City and that he
bought it from Rosauro Breton. Possession and
management of the land was already with him despite
the TCT not being issued yet. Leonora Tirona was the
lessee of the land even before Ocampo bought it.
Upon acquisition of ownership by Ocampo, he
sent a formal notice to Tirona. Tirona religiously paid
her rents until the subject premises were declared
under area for priority development. As such, Tirona
invoked her right to first refusal and refused to pay her
rent until the NHA processed her papers.
Ocampo filed a complaint for unlawful detainer
against Tirona. Tirona’s defense was that Ocampo was
not the owner thus she shouldn’t pay him rent. It
should be noted that Tirona kept changing the theory
of her case stating that Lourdes Rodriguez Yaneza
owned the land when the case was at the MTC and
stating that Breton was the owner when the case was
appealed to the RTC.
Issue: Should the complaint for unlawful detainer
prosper? – YES.
Decision: First, the issue of ownership is not essential
to an action for unlawful detainer. The fact of the lease
and the expiration of its term are the only elements of
the action. The defense of ownership does not change
the summary nature of the action. The affected party
should raise the issue of ownership in an appropriate
action, because a certificate of title cannot be the
subject of a collateral attack.
In actions for forcible entry and [unlawful]
detainer, the main issue is possession de facto,
independently of any claim of ownership or possession
de jure that either party may set forth in his pleadings,
and an appeal does not operate to change the nature
of the original action.
Furthermore, Tirona was estopped from
denying that Ocampo had possession of the lease
agreement. She paid her rent to him until such
declaration of the area for priority development. The
sale of a leased property places the vendee into the
shoes of the original lessor to whom the lessee bound
himself to pay.
Lastly (and more importantly), Tirona should
have used reasonable diligence in hailing the
contending claimants to court. Tirona need not have
awaited actual institution of a suit by Ocampo against
her before filing a bill of interpleader. An action for
interpleader is proper when the lessee does not know
the person to whom to pay rentals due to conflicting
claims on the property.
The action of interpleader is a remedy whereby
a person who has property whether personal or real, in
his possession, or an obligation to render wholly or
partially, without claiming any right in both, or claims
S.C.A.
an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by
the conflicting claimants, comes to court and asks that
the persons who claim the said property or who
consider themselves entitled to demand compliance
with the obligation, be required to litigate among
themselves, in order to determine finally who is
entitled to one or the other thing.
The remedy is afforded not to protect a person
against a double liability but to protect him against a
double vexation in respect of one liability. When the
court orders that the claimants litigate among
themselves, there arises in reality a new action and
the former are styled interpleaders, and in such a case
the pleading which initiates the action is called a
complaint of interpleader and not a cross-complaint.
MAGLENTE, ET AL VS. PADILLA in her capacity as
Manila RTC Judge, and several private
respondents
Facts: Philippine Realty Corp (PRC) owned a parcel of
land in Intramuros, which it leased to petitioner
Maglente. The lease agreement included a right of first
refusal in favor of Maglente, as well as an agreement
whereby PRC prohibited Maglente from subleasing the
property. Nonetheless, Maglente subleased the
property to the private respondents (madami sila so di
ko na lalagay names). Later on, PRC decided to sell the
property and offered the land to Maglente in
accordance with her ROFR. Maglente, together with her
co-petitioners in this case (di ko na din lalagay yung
names nila kasi madami masyado), as co-buyers,
agreed to buy the property from PRC. However, PRC
received a letter from the private respondents which
expressed their desire to purchase the same property.
PRC filed a complaint for interpleader with the
Manila RTC to determine who between the 2 parties
had the right to purchase the property. The RTC ruled
in favor of the Maglente and her co-petitioners,
ordering PRC to execute a deed of sale. CA affirmed.
The SC likewise upheld the CA decision holding that
there had already been a perfected contract between
PRC and the petitioners. So PRC executed a deed of
sale in favor of the petitioners, who then filed a motion
for a writ of possession, because the land was in the
possession of the private respondents. The
respondents argued that the RTC’s decision did not
declare the petitioners as owners entitled to right of
possession but merely determined that they had the
right to purchase. RTC ruled in favor of the
respondents and denied the writ of possession. So the
petitioners filed this special civil action for certiorari.
Issue: Whether a writ of possession should be granted
to a party with a ROFR in an interpleader case?
NOOOOOO!
Held/Ratio: The decision in the interpleader case
merely resolved the question of who had the right to
145
 emedial Law Review
Digests
purchase the property. The directive was only for the
PRC to execute the necessary deed of sale, nothing
more. It was clear at that point that petitioners were
not yet the owners of the property. The execution of
the deed of sale was only preliminary to their eventual
acquisition of the property. Also, although in the SC
decision affirming the RTC the SC refrained from
declaring the petitioners as the owners since, pending
the execution of the deed of sale or delivery of the
property, ownership had yet to transfer to them at that
time.
Thus, petitioners’ argument that the trial
court’s writ of execution in the interpleader case
carried with it the corollary right to a writ of possession
is without merit. A writ of possession complements the
writ of execution only when the right of possession or
ownership has been validly determined in a case
directly relating to either. The interpleader case
obviously did not delve into that issue.
Furthermore, the rule is that the enforcement
of a judgment may not vary or alter the tenor of the
judgment but must strictly conform to it. The RTC
cannot therefore be faulted for refusing to issue a writ
of possession to petitioners as its issuance would not
be in conformity with the judgment in the interpleader
case.
Some other matters discussed
A writ of possession shall issue only in the
following instances: (1) land registration proceedings;
(2) extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage of real
property; (3) judicial foreclosure of property provided
that the mortgagor has possession and no third party
has intervened, and (4) execution sales.12 Here,
petitioners seek the writ as a consequence of the trial
court’s decision ordering the execution of a contract of
sale/contract to sell in their favor. The writ does not lie
in such a case.
Petitioners cannot recover possession of the
property via a mere motion. They must file the
appropriate action in court against respondents to
recover possession. While this remedy can delay their
recovery, the SC ruled that it cannot permit an
abbreviated method without subverting the rules and
processes established for the orderly administration of
justice.
ARREZA v DIAZ
FACTS: Bliss Development Corporation is the owner of
a housing complex located in Balara Quezon City. It
instituted an interpleader case against Arreza and Diaz
who were conflicting claimants of the property. the
RTC ruled in favor of Arreza. In view of said decision,
Bliss executed a contract to sell the property to Arreza
and Diaz was compelled to transfer possession
together with all improvements to Arreza.
Thereafter, Diaz instituted a claim against
Arreza and Bliss for the reimbursement of the cost of
the improvements which amounted to approximately
S.C.A.
1.7 M inclusive of 8% interest. Arreza filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground of res judicata and lack of cause
of action. RTC dismissed the Motion to Dismiss and the
Motion for Reconsideration of Arreza. This prompted
Arreza to file a petition for certiorari with the CA. CA
dismissed the petition saying that res judicata does not
apply because the interpleader case only settled the
issue on who had a better right. It did not determine
the parties’ respective rights and obligations.
ISSUE: Whether or not the claim for reimbursement is
barred by res judicata – YES
HELD: An examination of the answer filed by Diaz
showed that he asserted his status as a buyer in good
faith and for value and he prayed that affirmative relief
arising out of the rights of a buyer in good faith and for
value be granted. This only means that Diaz expected
that the court shall award him damages in the form of
reimbursement in case judgment is rendered in favor
of Arreza.
Diaz contends that in the pre-trial of the
interpleader case, reimbursement and damages was
never put in issue. Thus it could not have been the
subject of the interpleader and consequently, not
barred by res judicata. Diaz says it was incumbent on
Arreza to include the damages as an issue. The
Supreme Court said that (1) it is not the duty of the
petitioner to do the lawyering against the respondent
and (2) in a complaint for interpleader shall determine
the rights and obligations of the parties and adjudicate
their respective claims. Such rights, obligations, and
claims could only be adjudicated if put forward by the
aggrieved party in assertion of his rights. That party in
this case referred to respondent Diaz. The second
paragraph of Section 5 of Rule 62 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure provides that the parties in an
interpleader action may file counterclaims, cross-
claims, third party complaints and responsive
pleadings thereto, "as provided by these Rules." The
second paragraph was added to Section 5 to expressly
authorize the additional pleadings and claims
enumerated therein, in the interest of a complete
adjudication of the controversy and its incidents
Having failed to set up his claim for
reimbursement, said claim of respondent Diaz being in
the nature of a compulsory counterclaim is now
barred.
RULE 63: DECLARATORY RELIEF
ALMEDA V BATHALA MARKETING
Facts: Bathala Marketing leased the property belonging
to Almeda. It was a 4-year lease contract which
started on May 1, 1997. The parties stipulated that the
present rental price was based on the present rate of
assessment, and that in the event that any new tax or
burden was imposed by authorities, the rental price
will be increased to reflect such new tax or burden
(there was also a provision which provided for the
146
 emedial Law Review
Digests
decrease of the rental price in the event that the taxes
were lowered).
There was another provision which provided
that in the event of extraordinary inflation or deflation,
the value of the peso at the time of the establishment
of the contract was to be followed.
Come December 1997, Almeda advised
Bathala that VAT will now be applied to the rentals.
Bathala contended that since VAT was already in effect
when the contract was entered into, then no increase
should be done. In January 1998, Almeda told Bathala
that the rent was to be increased by 73% because of
inflation. Bathala rejected the claim, saying that only
the court can pronounce extraordinary inflation.
Bathala instituted an action for declaratory
relief. After, Almeda filed an ejectment case against
Bathala. Almeda also moved for the dismissal of the
declaratory relief because it claimed that Bathala was
already in breach of its obligation. The RTC and CA
ruled for Bathala.
Issue: Was the action for declaratory relief proper?
Held: Yes, it certainly was.
Declaratory relief is defined as an action by any person
interested in a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, executive order or resolution, to determine
any question of construction or validity arising from
the instrument, executive order or regulation, or
statute, and for a declaration of his rights and duties
thereunder. The only issue that may be raised in such
a petition is the question of construction or validity of
provisions in an instrument or statute. Corollary is the
general rule that such an action must be justified, as
no other adequate relief or remedy is available under
the circumstances. [
The requisites are: 1) the subject matter of the
controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, statute, executive order or
regulation, or ordinance; 2) the terms of said
documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and
require judicial construction; 3) there must have been
no breach of the documents in question; 4) there must
be an actual justiciable controversy or the ripening of
one between persons whose interests are adverse; 5)
the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and
6) adequate relief is not available through other means
or other forms of action or proceeding.
After Almeda demanded payment of adjusted
rentals and in the months that followed, Bathala
complied with the terms and conditions set forth in
their contract of lease by paying the rentals stipulated
therein. Bathala religiously fulfilled its obligations to
petitioners even during the pendency of the present
suit. Bathala did not breach the contract. Thus, Bathala
is not barred from instituting the petition for
declaratory relief.
Issue: Is declaratory relief proper given that there is
already a separate action for ejectment, and thus the
issues should be ventilated there?
S.C.A.
In Panganiban v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation,
the SC held that the petition for declaratory relief
should be dismissed in view of the pendency of a
separate action for unlawful detainer. However, in that
case, the unlawful detainer case had already been
resolved by the trial court before the dismissal of the
declaratory relief case. Here, the trial court had not yet
resolved the rescission/ejectment case during the
pendency of the declaratory relief petition. In fact, the
trial court, where the rescission case was on appeal,
itself initiated the suspension of the proceedings
pending the resolution of the action for declaratory
relief.
There was a case where the declaratory relief
action was dismissed because the issue therein could
be threshed out in the unlawful detainer suit (Teodoro
v Mirasol). But in that case, there was already a
breach of contract at the time of the filing of the
declaratory relief petition.
Thus, it is proper to entertain the instant
declaratory relief action, even with the pendency of the
ejectment/rescission case before the trial court. The
resolution of the present petition would write finis to
the dispute, as it would settle once and for all the
question of the proper interpretation of the two
contractual stipulations subject of this controversy.
MALANA V TAPPA
FACTS: Petitioners Carmen Danao Malana, et al.
(“Danao heirs”) alleged to be the owners of a land in
Tugegarao which they inherited from Anastacio
Danao. During the lifetime of Danao, he allowed
Consuelo Pauig (family member of Tappa) to build on
and occupy the southern portion of the subject
property. Danao and Consuelo agreed that the latter
would vacate the said land at any time that Danao and
his heirs might need it. Danao heirs claimed that
respondents Benigno Tappa, et al. continued to occupy
the subject property even after Consuelo’s death,
building their residences thereon using permanent
materials. Danao heirs also learned that Tappa, et al.
were claiming ownership over the subject
property. Averring that they already needed it, Danao
heirs demanded that respondents vacate the
same. The call was unheeded. Meanwhile, Danao heirs
referred their land dispute to the Lupong
Tagapamayapa. During the conciliation proceedings,
respondents asserted that they owned the subject
property and presented documents ostensibly
supporting their claim of ownership. The heirs opposed
this, saying that the documents were falsified and
highly dubious. This notwithstanding, Tappa, et al.
created a cloud upon the heirs’ title to the
property. Thus, the heirs filed a case for
Reivindicacion, Quieting of Title, and Damages in the
RTC.
147
 emedial Law Review
Digests
Issue: Did the judge commit grave abuse of discretion
in motu proprio dismissing the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction? – No GAD. Petition is dismissed. RTC
should remand the records to the MTC.
Held: An action for declaratory relief should be filed by
a person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or
other written instrument, and whose rights are
affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation
or an ordinance. The relief sought under this remedy
includes the interpretation and determination of the
validity of the written instrument and the judicial
declaration of the parties’ rights or duties thereunder.
Petitions for declaratory relief are governed by
Rule 63. Section 1 states that an action for the
reformation of an instrument, to quiet title, and to
consolidate ownership in a sale with a right to
repurchase “may” be brought under the RTC. These
remedies are considered similar to declaratory relief
because they result in the adjudication of the legal
rights of the litigants, often without the need of
execution. Whereas the Rules of Court uses “may,” the
amended Judicial Reorganization Act uses the word
“shall” in determining jurisdiction. JRA explicitly
requires the MTC to exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction over all civil actions which involve title to
or possession of real property where the assessed
value does not exceed P20,000 (OMM) or P50,000
(MM). In this case, the assessed value of the subject
property is only P410.00; therefore, the jurisdiction is
with the MTC, not the RTC.
Further, an action for declaratory relief
presupposes that there has been no actual breach of
the instruments involved or of rights arising
thereunder. The purpose of an action for declaratory
relief is to secure an authoritative statement of the
rights and obligations of the parties under a statute,
deed or contract for their guidance in the enforcement
thereof, and not to settle issues arising from an alleged
breach thereof. Where the law or contract has already
been contravened prior to the filing of an action for
declaratory relief, the courts can no longer assume
jurisdiction over the action. In the present case, the
case for quieting of title was filed after Danao heirs
already demanded, and Tappa refused to vacate the
subject property. Since the heirs had already been
deprived of the possession of their property, the
proper remedy for them is the filing of an accion
publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, not a case for
declaratory relief. An accion publiciana is a suit for the
recovery of possession, filed one year after the
occurrence of the cause of action or from the unlawful
withholding of possession of the realty. Jurisdiction
over such an action would depend on the value of the
property involved. Given that the property is only
at P410.00, then the MTC, not the RTC, has jurisdiction
over an action to recover the same.
DBM VS. MANILA’S FINEST RETIREES ASSOC.
S.C.A.
FACTS: With the issuance of PD 765 in 1975, the
Integrated National Police (INP) was constituted and to
be composed of the Phil. Constabulary (PC), as the
nucleus, and the integrated police forces as
components thereof. PD 1184 was then issued in 1977
to professionalize the INP and promote career
development. Then, in 1990, RA 6975 (PNP Law) was
enacted. Under Sec. 23 of this law, the PNP would
initially consist of the members of the INP, created
under PD 765, as well as the officers and enlisted
personnel of the PC. About 8 years later, RA 8551 (PNP
Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998) was enacted,
amending the PNP Law and reengineered the
retirement scheme in the police organization. Under
this new law, PNP personnel stood to collect more
retirement benefits that what the INP members of
equivalent rank, who had retired under the INP Law.
Thus, all INP retirees, lead by the Manila’s Finest
Retirees Assoc., filed a petition for declaratory
relief with the RTC of Manila, impleading DBM, PNP,
NAPOLCOM, CSC and GSIS as respondents. Said
petition alleged that INP retirees, although equally
situated with the PNP retirees with regard to
retirement benefits prior to the enactment of the PNP
Law, were unconscionably and arbitrarily excluded
from the higher and adjusted benefits accorded to the
PNP retirees.
The RTC rules in favor of the INP retirees. It
held that the PNP Law, as amended, did not abolish
the INP but merely provided for the absorption of its
police functions by the PNP. Thus, INP retirees are
entitled to the same benefits as the PNP retirees. In
the same decision, the RTC ordered the proper
adjustments of the INP retirees’ benefits and its
immediate implementation. Said decision was
appealed by the DBM, etc. to the CA. However, the CA
affirmed the RTC decision.
ISSUE: W/N the trial court erred in ordering the
immediate adjustments of the INP retirees’
benefits when the basic petition filed before it
was one for declaratory relief.
HELD/RATIO: NO. RTC and CA decisions are
affirmed.
Although herein petitioners DBM, etc. had a
valid point, it must be remembered that the execution
of judgments in a petition for declaratory relief is not
necessarily indefensible. In PDIC v. CA, the SC
categorically ruled:
“Now, there is nothing in the nature of a special civil
action for declaratory relief that proscribes the filing of
a counterclaim based on the same transaction, deed or
contract subject of the complaint. A special civil action
is after all not essentially different from an ordinary
civil action, which is generally governed by Rules 1 to
56 of the Rules of Court, except that the former deals
with a special subject matter which makes necessary
some special regulation. But the identity between their
fundamental nature is such that the same rules
governing ordinary civil suits may and do apply to
148
 emedial Law Review
Digests
special civil actions if not inconsistent with or if they
may serve to supplement the provisions of the peculiar
rules governing special civil actions.”
Also, in Matalin Coconut Co., Inc. v.
Municipal Council of Malabang, Lanao del Sur, the
SC ruled:
x x x Under Sec. 6 of Rule 64, the action for
declaratory relief may be converted into an ordinary
action and the parties allowed to file such pleadings as
may be necessary or proper, if before the final
termination of the case "a breach or violation of an …
ordinance, should take place." In the present case, no
breach or violation of the ordinance occurred. The
petitioner decided to pay "under protest" the fees
imposed by the ordinance. Such payment did not affect
the case; the declaratory relief action was still proper
because the applicability of the ordinance to future
transactions still remained to be resolved, although the
matter could also be threshed out in an ordinary suit
for the recovery of taxes paid …. In its petition for
declaratory relief, petitioner-appellee alleged that by
reason of the enforcement of the municipal ordinance
by respondents it was forced to pay under protest the
fees imposed pursuant to the said ordinance, and
accordingly, one of the reliefs prayed for by the
petitioner was that the respondents be ordered to
refund all the amounts it paid to respondent Municipal
Treasurer during the pendency of the case. The
inclusion of said allegation and prayer in the petition
was not objected to by the respondents in their
answer. During the trial, evidence of the payments
made by the petitioner was introduced. Respondents
were thus fully aware of the petitioner's claim for
refund and of what would happen if the ordinance were
to be declared invalid by the court.
The SC sees no reason for treating this case
differently from PDIC and Matalin. This disposition
becomes all the more appropriate considering that the
retirees, as petitioners in the RTC, pleaded for the
immediate adjustment of their retirement benefits to
which the herein petitioners, as respondents in the
same court, did not object to. Being aware of said
prayer, the petitioners then already knew the logical
consequence if, as it turned out, a declaratory
judgment is rendered in the retirees’ favor. At bottom
then, the trial court’s judgment forestalled multiplicity
of suits which, needless to stress, would only entail a
long and arduous process. Considering their obvious
advanced years, the respondents can hardly afford
another protracted proceedings.
MEJIA v. GABAYAN
*This is a confusing case, a lot of petitions were filed
at paulit ulit yung nangyayari, but the Declaratory
Relief part was very short, not the main issue*
FACTS: Mejia is the registered owner of a parcel of
land located in Isabela. The lot was a portion of a large
tract of land covered by a homestead patent granted
to his father.
S.C.A.
On August 13, 1978, the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform, issued Certificates of Land Transfer (CLT) over
portions of the property to the following tenant-
beneficiaries: Carlos Ramos, Danceso Gavino,
Francisca Rueme, Pedro Gavino (some of respondents
in present case)
In the meantime, the Court’s decision in Alita
v. Court of Appeals was promulgated, wherein it was
held that properties covered by homestead patents
were not covered by PD No. 27.
Mejia filed a petition with the DAR, for the
exclusion of the property from PD No. 27.
Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) issued an
Order recommending the denial of the petition.
Instead of pursuing his appeal in the DAR case,
Mejia opted to file a complaint in the RTC of
Isabela against the tenant-respondents for
declaratory relief and recovery of the possession
of the property alleging that the parcel of land was
originally owned by his father to whom a homestead
patent was granted and that the land was not covered
by PD No. 27 as held by this Court in Alita v. Court of
Appeals;
In their answer to the complaint, the tenant-
respondents averred that there was a pending petition
with DAR filed by Mejia for the exclusion of the
property from the coverage of PD No. 27; the action
was beyond the jurisdiction of the court because the
dispute between the parties is agrarian, and as such,
within the original exclusive jurisdiction of the
Department of Agrarian Reform and Adjudication
Board (DARAB).
On January 25, 1995, the RTC rendered a
summary judgment in favor of Mejia and against the
tenant-respondents. Tenant-respondents appealed the
decision to the CA.
In the meantime, on May 23, 1995, the DAR
Regional Director issued an Order granting the petition
of Mejia exempting his property from the PD 27, BUT
ordering him to allow the respondents-tenants to
remain in possession of the property and to execute
Leasehold Contracts in their favour. Plus, DAR Sec
ruled that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the action
of Mejia (declaratory relief and recovery of possession
case). This order became final and executory.
Despite the DAR ruling becoming final and executory,
Mejia filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution of the judgment in the RTC CASE. The trial
court issued a writ of execution. (The writ was
implemented but Mejia failed to take actual possession
of the property)
(Basically there are 2 cases: 1) Agrarian case
where Mejia sought the exclusion of her land from PD
27 and 2) RTC case for declaratory relief and recovery
of possession of the property. RTC rendered a
judgement first ruling that the property was exempt
from PD 27. Subsequently, DAR Secretary ruled the
same BUT allowed the tenant-respondents to stay in
possession and to have Leasehold Contracts executed
in their favour. Mejia wants to implement the RTC
decision)
149
 emedial Law Review
Digests
The issue now is, which decision should prevail?
Mejia avers that the RTC decision had long become
final and executory and can no longer be modified or
set aside; that the trial court was duty-bound to
implement its decision; that the Order of the DAR
Secretary is not a supervening event barring the
enforcement of the RTC’s final and executory decision.
The tenant-respondents, on the other hand, aver that
RTC is mandated to respect the Order of the DAR
Secretary; that the Order of the DAR is a special and
exceptional circumstance warranting the suspension of
the execution of the decision of the trial court in the
higher interest of justice.
ISSUE: WON the execution of the RTC ruling should
suspended-- YES
The general rule is that it is the ministerial
duty of the court to order the execution of its final
judgment. However, Rule 135, Section 5(g) of the
Rules of Court provides that the trial court may amend
and control its process and orders so as to make them
conformable to law and justice.
More importantly, it is the DAR who has
jurisdiction over the case. Having first acquired
jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter, DAR
retained the same until final disposition of the case.
Mejia ought to exhaust all administrative
remedies before seeking judicial recourse. Based
on case law, an action for declaratory relief is
proper only if adequate relief is not available
through other existing forms of actions or
proceedings. A petition for a declaratory relief
cannot be made a substitute for all existing
remedies and should be used with caution. Relief
by declaratory judgment is sui generis and not
strictly legal or equitable yet its historical affinity
is equitable. The remedy is not designed to
supplant existing remedies. The remedy is purely
statutory in nature and origin. A declaratory
judgment does not create or change substantial
rights or modify any relationship or alter the
character of controversies.
RULE 64: REVIEW OF JUDGMENT OF
COA OR COMELEC
RULE 65: CERTIORARI,
PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS
A. Certiorari
REPULIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (represented by
DEPED) v. CARMEL DEVELOPMENT, INC.
FACTS: Carmel Development Inc. filed a complaint for
recovery of possession of a parcel of land in Caloocan
city occupied by Pangarap Elementary and High
Schools, which were established by DepEd so Carmel
S.C.A.
filed a case against them and the Caloocan school
board.
DEPED filed a motion for extension of time to
file an answer and later on filed a manifestation with
motion to dismiss. But Carmel filed a motion to declare
the defendants in default for failing to file an answer.
This was granted by the court and allowed them to
present evidence ex parte.
DEPED filed a MR and motion to lift order of
default saying that it filed its motions on time and that
Carmel failed to notify and furnish it with a copy of the
motion to declare in default. DEPED also asserts that
the case should be dismissed on the ground of forum
shopping, in violation of SC Admin Order 04-94.
The trial court, in the interest of justice, lifted
the order of default but it denied the dismissal of the
case. DEPED also claims Carmel is forum shopping
because there are 2 other civil cases pending involving
the same parties and subject matter in the Caloocan
RTCs. As proof, it attached duplicate copies of the
other trial courts orders. Since the TC denied the
MTD, DEPED filed a petition for certiorari (R65) seeking
to annul the trial court’s orders. The CA dismissed this
and the MR was later denied.
DEPED presents the fact that the
Verification/Certification of Carmel was signed only by
Carmel’s counsels. DEPED also contends that there are
2 other civil cases pending in another branch of RTC
Caloocan but CA resolved that trial court rightfully
denied the MD because DEPED failed to attach the
proper pleadings in those other civil cases. (They filed
only duplicate originals, not certified true copies. CA
held that under Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, it is required that the petition shall
be accompanied by a certified true copy of the assailed
orders and not by mere duplicate originals. Hence this
petition.
ISSUE: W/N the case should be dismissed for not
being accompanied by certified true copies of the
assailed decision and resolution but only the duplicate
originals.
W/N the CA acted with GADLEJ in denying the MD
though the pleadings show litis pendentia.
W/N the CA erred in ruling that Carmel complied with
SC Admin Cirular 04-94.
HELD/RATIO:
1. Yes, duplicate originals are
allowed. Rule 46 should be harmonized with Rule
65.
The issue here is whether duplicate originals
are allowed or only certified true copies are allowed
pursuant to R65, Sec. 1 (because DEPED submitted
duplicate originals).
Rule 46, Sec. 3 governs the filing for original
actions for certiorari and it states that the petition for
certiorari “be accompanied by a clearly legible
duplicate original or certified true copy of the
judgment, order, resolution, or ruling subject thereof x
x x.” It also provides in Sec. 2 that the rule is
150
 emedial Law Review
Digests
“applicable to certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and
quo warranto actions. Except as otherwise
provided, the actions for annulment of judgment shall
be governed by Rule 47, for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus by Rule 65, and for quo warranto by Rule
66.”
So Carmel interprets the phrase “except as
otherwise provided” that since there is a provision in
Rule 65 states that “the petition shall be accompanied
by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or
resolution subject thereof x x x.” then Rule 46 will not
apply because it is contrary to the specific provision in
Rule 65.
However, the SC held that Rule 46 should be
construed in relation to Rule 65 without rendering any
of its provisions useless. This is evident in Section 6 of
Rule 65 which provides that “[i]n petitions
for certiorari before the Supreme Court and the Court
of Appeals, the provision of Section 2, Rule 56, shall be
observed.” Section 2 of Rule 56 which governs the
procedure in the Supreme Court, specifically original
cases filed therein, provides in turn:
Sec. 2. Rules applicable. – The procedure in original
cases for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto and habeas corpus shall be in accordance
with the applicable provisions of the Constitution, laws,
and Rule 46, 48, 49, 51 and 52 and this Rule, subject
to the following provisions:
a) All references in said Rules to the Court of
Appeals shall be understood to also apply
to the Supreme Court;
b) The portions of said Rule dealing strictly
with and specifically intended for appealed
cases in the Court of Appeals shall not be
applicable; and
x x x.”
This simply means that “the following rules which are
of primary governance in the Court of Appeals, viz.:
Rule 46 (Original Actions in the Court of Appeals), Rule
48 (Preliminary Conference), Rule 49 (Hearings on
Oral Argument), Rule 51 (Judgment), and Rule 52
(Motion for Reconsideration) have been expressly
made applicable to original actions in the Supreme
Court save for those portions which deal strictly with
and are specifically intended for appealed cases in the
Court of Appeals.”
In fine, Rule 46 primarily governs original
actions for certiorari filed in the Court of Appeals
but Rule 65 generally serves to supplement the
same. Rules 46 and 65 co-exist with each other
and should be construed so as to give effect to
every provision of both rules.
In short, duplicate originals1 are allowed.
1 in QC and withdrew tax exemptions in general. They
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 3-96 defines
duplicate originals in this wise:
“1. The “duplicate original copy” shall be understood to be that copy
of the decision, judgment, resolution or order which is intended for and
furnished to a party in the case or proceeding in the court or
adjudicative body which rendered and issued the same. xxx.
2. The duplicate original copy must be duly signed or initialed by the
authorities or the corresponding officer or representative of the issuing
S.C.A.
2. Yes, the petition should be dismissed
because of litis pendentia.
The Department of Education points out
that aside from Civil Case No. 18264, subject of
the instant petition, there are two other cases
pending before another court involving identical
parties, issues and reliefs prayed for. The
Department of Education asserts that in Civil Case
No. 18264, Carmel seeks to recover possession
against the Department of Education and the
School Board the parcel of land allegedly occupied
by Pangarap High School. In Civil Case No. 17762,
Carmel seeks to enjoin Clarita M. Martinez, school
principal of Pangarap High School and a
representative of the Department of Education,
from proceeding with the construction of additional
school buildings on the same parcel of
land. Meanwhile, Civil Case No. C-16181 is an
action for declaration of ownership and quieting of
title involving the same parcel of land. In sum, the
Department of Education argues that all three
cases revolve around the same parties' conflicting
claims of ownership and possession over the
same parcel of land.
3. Yes, the Verification/Certification is
defective for being signed only by the
counsel and not the petitioner itself.
A cursory examination of Carmel’s complaint
shows that the certification against forum shopping
found at the end thereof was attested by its
counsel Juan Victor R. Llamas and not by plaintiff
or any of the principal parties as required by the
rule. This is fatal to Carmel’s cause. The
certification against forum shopping must be by
the plaintiff or any of the principal parties and not
by the attorney. It is mandatory that the
certification be executed by the petitioner himself,
and not by the attorney.
B. Prohibition
CITY GOV’T OF QC VS BAYANTEL
FACTS: BAYANTEL, is a legislative franchise holder
under RA 3259, which required it to pay real property
taxes to the gov’t. When the LGC took effect, it
granted local governments within the Metro Manila
Area the power to levy tax on real properties. After
LGC took effect, Congress amended BAYANTEL’s
original franchise, where it had the latter pay franchise
tax which is to be “in lieu of all taxes”. BAYANTEL
owned several real properties in QC. Gov’t of QC, by
virtue of the Consti and LGC, enacted QC Revenue
Code, imposing real property tax on all real properties
assessed BAYANTEL’s properties. Meanwhile, RA 7925
("Public Telecommunications Policy Act of the
entity, or shall at least bear the dry seal thereof or any other official
indication of the authenticity and completeness of such copy. xxx.”
151
 emedial Law Review
Digests
Philippines") took effect, which aims to level the
playing field among telecommunications companies.
BAYANTEL sought to have its properties
excluded from paying real property taxes, but was
denied. QC Treasurer sent delinquency notices and
issued warrants to levy the properties for public
auction. BAYANTEL, which originally appealed to LBAA,
withdrew its appeal and filed a petition for prohibition
with TRO with the RTC. RTC issued the TRO, followed
by a writ of preliminary injunction and ultimately
declared BAYANTEL’s QC properties as exempt from
real property tax.
Related to topic: QC Gov’t argues that RTC erred in
giving due course to the petition for prohibition as
BAYANTEL failed to avail of available administrative
remedies provided in the LGC. The appeal mechanics
under the LGC constitute Bayantel’s plain and speedy
remedy in this case.
ISSUE: W/N Bayantel is required to exhaust
administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief
with the trial court. – NO.
RATIO: Section 22 of rule 65 governs petitions for
prohibition. Since BAYANTEL’s properties were
already levied because of nonpayment of real
property taxes, an appeal to the LBAA is not a
speedy and adequate remedy. One of the
recognized exceptions to the exhaustion- of-
administrative remedies rule is when, as here,
only legal issues are to be resolved.
It should be noted that before an appeal to the
LBAA can be considered in this case, prior payment
under protest of P43M should be given. Given this
reality, an appeal to the LBAA may not be considered
as a plain, speedy and adequate remedy. It is thus
understandable why Bayantel opted to withdraw its
earlier appeal with the LBAA and, instead, filed its
petition for prohibition.
Not so Important
OTHER ISSUE: W/N BAYANTEL’s properties are exempt
from real property tax under its legislative franchise. –
YES.
Bayantel’s franchise being national in character, the
"exemption" thus granted under Section 14 of RA 3259
applies to all its real or personal properties found
anywhere within the Philippine archipelago. The LGC
withdrew all exemptions but Congress amended
2
SEC. 2. Petition for prohibition. – When the proceedings of any
tribunal, … are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may
file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter
specified therein, or otherwise, granting such incidental reliefs as law
and justice may require.
S.C.A.
Bayantel’s original franchise. This means, although the
exemption under RA 3259 was impliedly repealed by
the LGC, such exemption was expressly revived under
RA 7633. The LGC gives LGUs the power to tax real
properties not specifically exempted (like BAYANTEL’s
properties).
C. Mandamus
LAMBINO V. COMELEC
FACTS: Lambino et al gathered signatures and filed a
petition with the Comelec for the holding of a plebiscite
that will ratify their initiative petition under the
Initiative and Referendum Act (RA 6735). In
substance, their initiative petition sought to amend the
Constitution by adopting a unicameral-parliamentary
form of government. They claimed that their petition
was supported by at least 12% of all registered voters,
with each legislative district being represented by at
least 3% of its registered voters.
The Comelec denied the initiative petition for
lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions.
The Comelec invoked the case of Santiago v. Comelec
where the SC declared RA 6735 inadequate to
implement the 1987 Constitution’s initiative clause.
Lambino now go to the SC seeking the
issuance of the writs of certiorari and mandamus to set
aside the Comelec’s resolution and to compel the
Comelec to give due course to their initiative
petition.
ISSUE: Was there GAD in denying the Initiative
petition? – NO.
HELD: Petitioners failed to comply with the
requirements of the Constitution for conducting an
initiative. The people signing the proposal must sign
the entire proposal and the proposal must be
embodied in the petition. These two elements are
present only if the full text of the amendments is first
shown to the people who express their assent by
signing such proposal in a petition. A signature sheet is
meaningless if the person signing has not first seen
what he is signing. The signature sheet which the
people signed merely asked the people if they wanted
a change in the form of government into a
parliamentary system.
Moreover, the initiative petition contained
matters totally unrelated to the change in the form of
government. This forces people to sign a petition that
effectively contains two propositions, one of each they
may find unacceptable.
Further, an initiative petition applies only to
amendments and not revision. A revision implies a
change that alters a basic principle in the constitution,
like altering the principle of checks and balances or
separation of powers. The initiative here is an a
revision and not merely an amendment.
Lastly, RA 6735 provides that the people must
sign the petition. The 6.3 million signatories did not
152
 emedial Law Review
Digests
sign the petition. Only petitioners and their counsels
did.
No GAD can be attributed to the Comelec in
dismissing the initiative petition where it merely
followed the SC’s ruling in the case of Santiago, and
PIRMA v. Comelec.
Where was the Mandamus discussion in this
case? - There was none, perhaps the Court did not
need to discuss whether mandamus was proper for two
reasons. First, petitioners failed to show a clear legal
right since their initiative petition was fatally defective.
Second, the Comelec did not unlawfully neglect the
performance of its duty since petitioners did not
comply with the requirements of an initiative petition.
ESQUIVEL VS OMBUDSMAN
Facts: PO2 Herminigildo Eduardo and SPO1 Modesto
Catacutan charged Mayor Antonio Esquivel and his
brother Baranggay Eboy Esquivel with illegal arrest,
arbitrary detention, maltreatment, attempted murder
and grave threats. Others who participated in the
alleged crime were also charged.
The charge was initially filed with the PNP-
CIDG (Criminal Investigation and Detection Group).
Their initial investigation shows that while Eduardo was
about to eat lunch, the 2 Esquivels together with
others disarmed him of his service pistol. He was then
forced to board a vehicle and brought to the Municipal
Hall.
While on board the vehicle, Mayor Esquivel
mauled him and threatened to kill him. Upon arriving
at the municipal hall, the mayor ordered Eduardo to be
killed. At this point, Catacutan arrived to verify what
happened to his teammate. He was also threatened.
The mayor struck Eduardo in the nape with a handgun
while Eboy was holding him. Eduardo lost
consciousness. When he woke up, he was released but
not before being forced to sign a statement in the
police blotter that he was in good physical condition.
Eduardo surmises that this happened because the
mayor believed him to be among the law enforcers
who raided a jueteng den wherein members of a crime
syndicate who are connected to the mayor where
arrested.
The records were forwarded by the PNP-CIDG
to the ombudsman. The deputy ombudsman
recommended Mayor Esquivel and Bgy. Captain Eboy
Esquivel to be both indicted for the crime of less
serious physical injuries while Mayor Esquivel alone for
grave threats. Charges against the others were
dismissed. Ombudsman approved this resolution so
informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan.
Esquivels brought the matter to the SC via
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus alleging grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the ombudsman
when it failed to consider the exculpatory evidence.
Said evidence is the admission of Eduardo that he was
in good physical condition (the one he was forced to
S.C.A.
sign). As such, Eduardo is stopped from claiming that
it was injured. Eduardo counters by saying this is issue
is factual in nature and thus, is not the proper subject
of a certiorari action. Also, it is alleged Sandiganbayan
has no jurisdiction over the case.
Issue: Whether the petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus was proper?
Held: NO!
(Note: This case is under mandamus only.
There is only 1paragraph in the case relating to
mandamus. But I’ll discuss certiorari and prohibition as
well)
Eduardo admitted signing the document but
the admission merely applied to the execution of such
and not to its truthfulness. Esquivels’ argument is
evidentiary in nature and its probative value can be
best passed upon after a full blown trial on the merits.
As such, certiorari is not the proper remedy. The SC is
not a trier of facts.
Prohibition is a writ directed to the court itself,
commanding it to cease from the exercise of a
jurisdiction to which it has no legal claim. Here,
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction over the criminal cases is
clearly found on law (since one of the accused, Mayor
esquivel, is of salary grade 27, sandiganbayan had
jurisdiction. It is only when none of the accused are
occupying positions corresponding to salary grade27 or
higher will the rtc or mtc have jurisdiction). Being an
extraordinary remedy, prohibition cannot be resorted
to when the ordinary and usual remedies provided by
law are adequate and available.40 Prohibition is granted
only where no other remedy is available or sufficient to
afford redress. That the petitioners have another and
complete remedy at law, through an appeal or
otherwise, is generally held sufficient reason for
denying the issuance of the writ.41 In this case,
petitioners were not devoid of a remedy in the ordinary
course of law. They could have filed a motion to quash
the informations at the first instance but they did not.
Also, a writ of prohibition will not be issued against an
inferior court unless the attention of the court whose
proceedings are sought to be stayed has been called to
the alleged lack or excess of jurisdiction. The
foundation of this rule is the respect and consideration
due to the lower court and the expediency of
preventing unnecessary litigation. Here, the issue of
jurisdiction was raised only in the SC and not before
the sandiganbayan.
MANDAMUS: it is employed to compel the
performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this
being its chief use and not a discretionary duty. The
duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same
requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor
judgment. Hence, this Court cannot issue a writ of
mandamus to control or review the exercise of
discretion by the Ombudsman, for it is his discretion
and judgment that is to be exercised and not that of
the Court. When a decision has been reached in a
matter involving discretion, a writ of mandamus may
153
 emedial Law Review
Digests
not be availed of to review or correct it, however
erroneous it may be. Moreover, as earlier discussed,
petitioners had another remedy available in the
ordinary course of law. Where such remedy is available
in the ordinary course of law, mandamus will not lie.
RULE 66: QUO WARRANTO
LIBAN V GORDON
FACTS: Liban et al, officers of QC Red Cross Chapter
filed a Petition to declare Gordon as having forfeited
his seat to the Senate because he was serving as the
PNRC (Red Cross) Chairman of the Board of
Governors.
Gordon was elected Chairman during his
incumbency, Liban alleges that it violated Sec 13 of Art
6 of the Consti which prohibits Senators from holding
any other office or employment in the gov’t or the
gocc’s. Accdg to Camporedondo v. NLRC, PNRC is a
government-owned or controlled corporation.
Gordon in his response says that Liban et al
have no standing to file the petition which appears to
be an action for quo warranto, since it alleges that
respondent committed an act which constitutes a
ground for forfeiture of his public office. They don’t
claim to be entitled to the Senate office. Under
Section 1, Rule 66 of the Rules of Civil Procedure,
only a person claiming to be entitled to a public
office usurped or unlawfully held by another may
bring an action for quo warranto in his own
name. Also it’s already barred by prescription since it
should be commenced within one year after the and in
this case, he’s been working for PNRC for the past 40
years. PNRC is also not a GOCC so the prohibition
doesn’t apply.
In their Reply, Liban claims that its neither an
action for quo warranto nor an action for declaratory
relief. They maintain that the petition is a taxpayer’s
suit questioning the unlawful disbursement of funds,
considering that respondent has been drawing his
salaries and other compensation as a Senator even if
he is no longer entitled to his office.
ISSUES:
1. W/N PNRC is a GOCC? NO, its a Private
Organization Performing Public Functions.
2. W/N Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution
applies? No, not an office/ employment under the
control of Executive dep’t so not considered as
prohibited.
3. W/N Gordon should be automatically removed? No.
4. W/N Liban et al may legally institute quo
warranto petition against Gordon?
HELD: Liban et al Have No Standing to File this
Petition
Section 1, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court provides:
S.C.A.
Section 1. Action by Government against
individuals. – An action for the usurpation of a public
office, position or franchise may be commenced by a
verified petition brought in the name of the Republic of
the Philippines against:
(b) A public officer who does or suffers an act
which by provision of law, constitutes a ground for the
forfeiture of his office; or
Liban et al are alleging that by accepting the
position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors,
Gordon has automatically forfeited his seat in the
Senate. In short, they filed an action for usurpation
of public office against Gordon, a public officer who
allegedly committed an act which constitutes a ground
for the forfeiture of his public office. Clearly, such an
action is for quo warranto, specifically under Section
1(b), Rule 66 of the Rules of Court.
Quo warranto is generally commenced by
the Government as the proper party plaintiff.
However, under Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of
Court, an individual may commence such an
action if he claims to be entitled to the public
office allegedly usurped by another, in which
case he can bring the action in his own name. The
person instituting quo warranto proceedings in
his own behalf must claim and be able to show
that he is entitled to the office otherwise the
action may be dismissed at any stage. In the
present case, petitioners do not claim to be entitled to
the Senate office and so have no standing to file the
present petition.
DIVINAGRACIA VS CONSOLIDATED
BROADCASTING SYSTEM (CBS) AND PEOPLE’S
BROADCASTING SERVICE (PBS)
FACTS: CBS and PBS (C/PBS), two of the three
networks that operate “Bombo Radyo Philippines”,
operate radio broadcasting services by virtue of their
legislative franchises (RA 7477 and 7582). Under the
RAs, there is common provision, aimed towards the
“constitutional mandate to democratize ownership of
public utilities”, that C/PBS should offer 30% of its
common stocks to the public. Following these laws,
NTC thus granted Provisional Authorities3 to C/PBS.
DIVINAGRACIA then filed 2 complaints against
C/PBS, alleging that he was the owner of 12% of the
shares of stock” of C/PBS separately, and that both
stations failed to make the 30% public offering of their
stocks as mandated by the RAs. For this failure, he
prayed to cancel the Provisional Authorities
granted to C/PBS as well as in its legislative
franchises. NTC dismissed, saying it was not
competent to render a ruling on that issue, that the
complaint was a collateral attack on the legislative
franchises of C/PBS, and that the same is more
properly the subject of an action for quo warranto to
3
This allowed them to install, operate and maintain various AM and
FM broadcast stations in various locations throughout the nation.
154
 emedial Law Review
Digests
be commenced by the Solicitor General in the name of
the Republic of the Philippines, pursuant to Rule 66 of
the Rules of Court.
CA: Affirmed.
DIVINAGRACIA counters that NTC has the power to
cancel Provisional Authorities and CPCs, or in effect,
the power to cancel the licenses that allow broadcast
stations to operate.
ISSUE: W/N NTC has the authority to cancel
Provisional Authorities and Certificates of Public
Convenience it issued to legislative franchise-holders.
(Related Issue: W/N a quo warranto is a more
appropriate remedy? – YES!)
HELD: There is in fact a more appropriate, more
narrowly-tailored and least restrictive remedy that is
afforded by the law for DIVINAGRACIA, which is quo
warranto under Rule 664. The special civil action of quo
warranto is a prerogative writ by which the
Government can call upon any person to show by what
warrant he holds a public office or exercises a public
franchise. A forfeiture of a franchise will have to be
declared in a direct proceeding for the purpose brought
by the State because a franchise is granted by law and
its unlawful exercise is primarily a concern of
Government.
Quo warranto is specifically available as a
remedy if it is thought that a government corporation
has offended against its corporate charter or misused
its franchise. The determination of the right to the
exercise of a franchise, or whether the right to enjoy
such privilege has been forfeited by non-user, is more
properly the subject of the prerogative writ of quo
warranto, the right to assert which, as a rule, belongs
to the State ‘upon complaint or otherwise,’ the reason
being that the abuse of a franchise is a public wrong
and not a private injury.”
DIVINAGRACIA argues that since their prayer
involves the cancellation of the provisional authority
and CPCs, and not the legislative franchise, then quo
warranto fails as a remedy. This is without merit, as
the authority of the franchisee to engage in broadcast
operations is derived in the legislative mandate. To
cancel the provisional authority or the CPC is, in effect,
to cancel the franchise or otherwise prevent its
exercise. What could happen is that if the courts
conclude that private respondents have violated the
terms of their franchise and thus issue the writs of quo
warranto against them, then the NTC is obliged to
cancel any existing licenses and CPCs since these
permits draw strength from the possession of a valid
franchise.
4
Section 1: “an action for the usurpation of a public office, position or
franchise may be brought in the name of the Republic of
the Philippines against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or
unlawfully holds or exercises public office, position or franchise.”
S.C.A.
OTHER NOTES:
Licenses issued by the NTC such as CPCs and
provisional authorities are junior to the legislative
franchise enacted by Congress. The licensing authority
of the NTC is not on equal footing with the franchising
authority of the State through Congress. The issuance
of licenses by the NTC implements the legislative
franchises established by Congress. NTC cannot,
without clear and proper delegation by Congress,
prevent the exercise of a legislative franchise by
withholding or canceling the licenses of the franchisee.
And the role of the courts, through quo
warranto proceedings, neatly complements the
traditional separation of powers that come to bear in
our analysis. DIVINAGRACIA’s theory that NTC has the
presumed authority to cancel licenses and CPCs issued
to due holders of legislative franchise to engage in
broadcast operations would violate the separation of
powers.
RULE 67: EXPROPRIATION
BARDILLON v. BGY. MASILI OF CALAMBA
Facts: Respondent Bgy. Masili filed 2 complaints for
eminent domain owned by petitioner Bardillon. The 1 st
complaint was filed with the MTC following a failure to
reach an agreement on the purchase offer of P200k.
The MRC dismissed the case for lack of interest for
failure of Bgy. and its counsel to appear at pre-trial.
The 2nd complaint was filed before the RTC
over the same lot and for the same purpose (erection
of a multi-purpose barangay hall). Bardillon filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata. Judge
denied motion holding that the MTC which ordered the
dismissal of the first case had no jurisdiction over the
expropriation proceeding. RTC decided in favor of
Brgy. and issued a Writ of Possession.
CA dismissed petition, no grave abuse of
discretion because the 2nd complaint was not barred by
res judicata, since the MTC had no jurisdiction over the
action. Bardillon claims that since the value of the
land is only P11k, the MTC had jurisdiction over the
case.
Issues:
Whether the MTC had jurisdiction over the case
– NO
Whether the dismissal before the MTC
constituted res judicata – NO
Whether the CA erred when it ignored the
issue of entry upon the premises (writ of
possession) - NO
Ratio:
Jurisdiction
An expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of
a sum of money. Rather, it deals with the exercise by
the government of its authority and right to take
property for public use. As such, it is incapable of
155
 emedial Law Review
Digests
pecuniary estimation and should be filed with the
RTCs.
The SC explained in Brgy. San Roque v. Heirs
of Pastor that the primary consideration in an
expropriation suit is whether the government has
complied with the requisites for the taking of private
property. The courts determine the authority of the
government entity, the necessity of the expropriation,
and the observance of due process. The subject of
expropriation suits is the government’s exercise of
eminent domain, a matter that is incapable of
pecuniary estimation. Although the value of the
property is estimated in monetary terms, this is merely
incidental to the suit. The amount is determined only
after the court is satisfied with the propriety of the
expropriation.
Res Judicata
One of the requisites of the doctrine of res judicata is
that the court that rendered the final judgment had
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties.
Since the MTC had no jurisdiction over expropriation
proceedings, res judicata does not apply even if the
Order of dismissal may have been an adjudication on
the merits.
Legality of Entry into Premises
Bardillon argued that the CA erred when it ignored the
RTC’s Writ of Possession over her property issued
despite the pending MR. SC not persuaded. The
requirement for the issuance of a writ of possession in
an expropriation case are governed by Sec. 2, Rule 67.
On the part of the LGUs, it is also governed by Sec.
195 of the LGC. The requisites for authorizing
immediate entry are: 1) the filing of a complaint for
expropriation sufficient in form and substance and 2)
the deposit of the amount equivalent to 15% of the
FMV of the property to be expropriated based on its
current tax declaration. In the instant case, the
issuance of the Writ after it had filed the Complaint
and deposited the amount required was proper.
The issue of the necessity of the expropriation
is a matter properly addressed to the RTC in the
course of the proceedings. If petitioner objects to the
necessity of the takeover of her property, she should
say so in her Answer. The RTC has the power to
5
SECTION 19. Eminent Domain. — A local government unit may,
through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance,
exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or
welfare for the benefits of the poor and the landless, upon payment of
just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and
pertinent laws; Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain
may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been
previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted:
Provided, further, That the local government unit may immediately take
possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation
proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at
least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property
based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated:
Provided, finally, That the amount to be paid for the expropriated
property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair
market value at the time of the taking of the property."
S.C.A.
inquire into the legality of the exercise of the right of
eminent domain and to determine whether there is a
genuine necessity for it.
REPUBLIC V MANGOTARA
Facts: (Long and confusing case)
7 consolidated cases stemmed from the 1914
case of Cacho v. Government of the United States
(1914 Cacho case).
1914 Cacho Case
In the early 1900s, the late Dona Demetria
applied for the registration of 2 parcels of land in the
Municipality of Iligan, Moro Province (now called Iligan
City, Lanao Del Norte). Only the Government opposed
Doña Demetria's applications for registration on the
ground that the two parcels of land were the property
of the United States and formed part of a military
reservation, generally known as Camp Overton.
The land registration court ruled that the
applicant Doña Demetria Cacho is owner of the portion
of land occupied and planted by the deceased Datto
Anandog only; and her application as to all the rest of
the land solicited in said case is denied. Moreover, the
applicant should present the corresponding deed from
Datto Darondon on or before the above-mentioned
30th day of March, 1913. Final decision in these cases
is reserved until the presentation of the said deed and
the new plan. Dissatisfied, Doña Demetria appealed to
the Supreme Court. SC affirmed the LRC Decision.
83 years later, the Court was again called upon
to settle a matter concerning the registration of the
Lots in the case of Cacho v. CA.
1997 Cacho case
Teofilo Cacho (Teofilo), claiming to be the late
Doña Demetria's son and sole heir, filed before the
RTC a petition for reconstitution of two original
certificates of title (OCTs). RTC granted Teofilo's
petition and ordered the reconstitution and re-issuance
of Decree Nos. 10364 and 18969. The original issuance
of these decrees presupposed a prior judgment that
had become final.
CA reversed the RTC Decision. Teofilo appealed
to the SC. The SC reversed the judgment of the CA
and reinstated the decision of the RTC approving the
re-issuance of Decree Nos. 10364 and 18969. The
Court found that such decrees had in fact been issued
and had attained finality, as certified by the Acting
Commissioner, Deputy Clerk of Court III, Geodetic
Engineer, and Chief of Registration of the then Land
Registration Commission. MR denied. Hence, the
decrees of registration were re-issued bearing new
numbers and OCTs were issued for 2 parcels of land in
Dona Demetria’s name.
THE ANTECENT FACTS OF THE PETITIONS AT BAR
The dispute did not end with the termination of the
1997 Cacho case. Another 4 cases involving the same
156
 emedial Law Review
Digests
parcels of land were instituted before the trial courts
during and after the pendency of the 1997 Cacho case.
These cases are: (1) Expropriation Case (2) Quieting
of Title Case (3) Ejectment or Unlawful Detainer Case
and (4) Cancellation of Titles and Reversion Case.
These cases proceeded independently of each other in
the courts a quo until they reached the SC, that
consolidated the seven Petitions.
Note: I’ll just discuss the expropriation issue, the case
is very long with lots of different issues
The Complaint for Expropriation was originally filed by
the Iron and Steel Authority (ISA), now the NSC,
against Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation (MCFC),
and the latter's mortgagee, the Philippine National
Bank (PNB). During the existence of ISA, Pres. Marcos
issued Presidential Proclamation No. 2239, reserving in
favor of ISA a parcel of land in Iligan City. MCFC
occupied certain portions of this parcel of land. When
negotiations with MCFC failed, ISA was compelled to
file a Complaint for Expropriation.
When the statutory existence of ISA expired
during the pendency of Civil Case No. 106, the RTC-
Branch 1 allowed the substitution of the Republic for
ISA as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 106.
Alleging that the lots involved in the 1997
Cacho case encroached and overlapped the parcel of
land subject of the case, Republic filed with the RTC a
Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Complaint and
to Admit the Attached Supplemental Complaint,
seeking to implead Teofilo Cacho and Demetria Vidal
and their respective successors-in-interest,
LANDTRADE and AZIMUTH. However, the RTC denied
the Motion of the Republic for leave to file and to admit
its Supplemental Complaint. RTC agreed with MCFC
that the Republic did not file any motion for execution
of the judgment of this Court in the ISA case. Since no
such motion for execution had been filed within the
prescriptive period of 5 years, RTC ruled that its Order
dated November 16, 2001, which effected the
substitution of the Republic for ISA as plaintiff in the
case, was an honest mistake. MR of the Republic
denied because MCFC (the only defendant left in the
case) is NOT a proper party defendant in the complaint
for expropriation. Hence, the case was dismissed. The
Republic filed with the SC the consolidated Petition for
Review on Certiorari and Petition for Certiorari under
Rules 45 and 65.
Issues:
1. Who are the proper parties in an expropriation
proceeding?
2. W/N forum shopping was committed by the
Republic with the filing of the expropriation and
reversion complaint
First Issue:
The court ruled that defendants in an
expropriation case are NOT limited to the owners of
the property to be expropriated, and just
compensation is not due to the property owner alone.
S.C.A.
They include all other persons owning, occupying or
claiming to own the property. In the American
jurisdiction, the term 'owner' when employed in
statutes relating to eminent domain to designate the
persons who are to be made parties to the proceeding,
refer, as is the rule in respect of those entitled to
compensation, to all those who have lawful interest in
the property to be condemned, including a mortgagee,
a lessee and a vendee in possession under an
executory contract. Every person having an estate or
interest at law or in equity in the land taken is entitled
to share in the award. If a person claiming an interest
in the land sought to be condemned is not made a
party, he is given the right to intervene and lay claim
to the compensation.
At the time of the filing of the Complaint for
Expropriation, possessory/occupancy rights of MCFC
over the parcels of land sought to be expropriated
were undisputed. Letter of Instructions No. 1277
expressly recognized that portions of the lands
reserved by Presidential Proclamation No. 2239 for the
use and immediate occupation by the NSC, were then
occupied by an idle fertilizer plant/factory and related
facilities of MCFC. It was ordered in the same Letter of
Instruction that NSC shall negotiate with the owners of
MCFC, for and on behalf of the Government, for the
compensation of MCFC's present occupancy rights on
the subject lands. Being the occupant of the parcel
of land sought to be expropriated, MCFC could
very well be named a defendant in the case. The
RTC evidently erred in dismissing the Complaint
for Expropriation against MCFC for not being a
proper party. Also erroneous was the dismissal
by the RTC of the original Complaint for
Expropriation for having been filed only against
MCFC, the occupant of the subject land, but not
the owner/s of the said property. Dismissal is not
the remedy for misjoinder or non-joinder of
parties.
The owner of the property is not necessarily an
indispensable party in an action for expropriation.
According to Rule 67, Section 1, expropriation
proceedings may be instituted even when "title to the
property sought to be condemned appears to be in the
Republic of the Philippines, although occupied by
private individuals." The same rule provides that a
complaint for expropriation shall name as defendants
"all persons owning or claiming to own, or occupying,
any part thereof or interest" in the property sought to
be condemned. Clearly, when the property already
appears to belong to the Republic, there is no
sense in the Republic instituting expropriation
proceedings against itself. It can still, however,
file a complaint for expropriation against the
private persons occupying the property. In such
an expropriation case, the owner of the property
is not an indispensable party.
To recall, Presidential Proclamation No.
2239 explicitly states that the parcels of land
reserved to NSC are part of the public domain,
hence, owned by the Republic. Letter of
157
 emedial Law Review
Digests
Instructions No. 1277 recognized only the
occupancy rights of MCFC and directed NSC to
institute expropriation proceedings to determine
the just compensation for said occupancy rights.
Therefore, the owner of the property is not an
indispensable party in the original Complaint for
Expropriation.
Moreover, the right of the Republic to be
substituted for ISA as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 106
had long been affirmed by no less than this Court in
the ISA case. The failure of the Republic to actually file
a motion for execution does not render the substitution
void. A writ of execution requires the sheriff or other
proper officer to whom it is directed to enforce the
terms of the writ. The Order of the RTC should be
deemed as voluntary compliance with a final and
executory judgment of this Court, already rendering a
motion for and issuance of a writ of execution
superfluous.
Second Issue: The Republic did not commit
Forum shopping
Forum-shopping takes place when a litigant
files multiple suits involving the same parties, either
simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable
judgment. Thus, it exists where the elements of litis
pendentia are present, namely: (a) identity of parties,
or at least such parties who represent the same
interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted
and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the
same facts; and (c) the identity with respect to the two
preceding particulars in the two cases is such that any
judgment that may be rendered in the pending case,
regardless of which party is successful, would amount
to res judicata in the other case.
Here, the elements of litis pendencia are
wanting. There is no identity of rights asserted and
reliefs prayed for in Civil Case No. 106 (expropriation)
and Civil Case No. 6686 (cancellation of OCTs of Dona
Demetria because the certificates exceeded the areas
granted by the LRC – reversion).
Expropriation vis-à-vis reversion
The Republic is not engaging in contradictions
when it instituted both expropriation and reversion
proceedings for the same parcels of land. The
expropriation and reversion proceedings are distinct
remedies that are not necessarily exclusionary of each
other. The filing of a complaint for reversion does not
preclude the institution of an action for expropriation.
Even if the land is reverted back to the State, the
same may still be subject to expropriation as against
the occupants thereof.
Also, Rule 67, Section 1 of the Rules of Court
allows the filing of a complaint for expropriation even
when "the title to any property sought to be
condemned appears to be in the Republic of the
Philippines, although occupied by private individuals,
or if the title is otherwise obscure or doubtful so that
the plaintiff cannot with accuracy or certainty specify
who are the real owners."
S.C.A.
Hence, the filing by the Republic of the
Supplemental Complaint for Expropriation impleading
Teofilo, Vidal, LANDTRADE, and AZIMUTH, is not
necessarily an admission that the parcels of land
sought to be expropriated are privately owned. At
most, the Republic merely acknowledged in its
Supplemental Complaint that there are private persons
also claiming ownership of the parcels of land. The
Republic can still consistently assert, in both actions
for expropriation and reversion, that the subject
parcels of land are part of the public domain.
In sum, the RTC erred in dismissing the
original Complaint and disallowing the Supplemental
Complaint. The Court reinstates the Complaint for
Reversion of the Republic.
REPUBLIC V. CA, REYES
FACTS:
- The Republic, through the DPWH, wrote a letter to
Rosario Reyes requesting permission to enter into
a portion (663 sqm out of 1043 sqm) of a parcel of
land owned by the latter in Cagayan de Oro City,
for the construction of an extension of a street.
- The Republic took possession of Reyes’ property
without initiating expropriation proceedings.
- Reyes filed a complaint claiming just compensation
and damages against the Republic with RTC.
- RTC appointed 3 commissioners to determine the
FMV of the property as well as the consequential
benefits and damages of its expropriation.
- The commissioners said the highest price for the
subject property was P4K per sqm. The Republic
offered P 3.2K per sqm. This was accepted by
Reyes and filed an Urgent Motion to Deposit the
Amount of P 2,121,600 in May 1994. However, the
Republic deposited the check only in October 1994.
- RTC ordered the commissioners to submit their
report but were unable to do so. So upon Reyes’
motion, the RTC ordered the appointment of new
commissioners. The new commissioners made a
report valuing the property higher taking into
consideration its location and the prevailing market
values of lots near it.
- The new commissioners stated in their report that
the Republic took not 663 sqm but 746 sqm.
Hence, only 297 sqm was left. But that after
deducting the setback area, the usable/buildable
area left to Reyes would only be a little over 50
sqm. It is neither ideal for purposes of any building
because it is small and is triangular in shape.
- RTC: Just compensation = P 5,526,000 (later
amended to P 4,696,000). Also awarded damages.
The Republic appealed.
- CA: REMANDED the case. The commissioners’
recommendations on just compensation were not
supported by valid documents. Also, it was
unclear in the RTC decision whether the trial court
merely adopted the commissioners’
recommendations or the court made its own
158
 emedial Law Review
Digests
independent valuation of the subject property.
Thus, CA held that a reconvening of the
commissioners or an appointment of new
commissioners to determine just compensation
was necessary. Moreover, consequential damages
should be awarded in lieu of actual damages for
private respondent’s alleged loss of income from
the remaining 297-sqm lot.
- The Republic filed a MR but was denied. Hence,
this appeal.
ISSUE: (1) W/N the case should be remanded; (2)
W/N consequential damages should be awarded.
HELD: (1) YES. The procedure for determining just
compensation is set forth in Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure. Section 5 of Rule 67 partly states
that “upon the rendition of the order of expropriation,
the court shall appoint not more than three (3)
competent and disinterested persons as commissioners
to ascertain and report to the court the just
compensation for the property sought to be taken.”
However, Rule 67 presupposes a prior filing of
complaint for eminent domain with the appropriate
court by the expropriator. If no such complaint is filed,
the expropriator is considered to have violated
procedural requirements, and hence, waived the usual
procedure prescribed in Rule 67, including the
appointment of commissioners to ascertain just
compensation. When there is no action for
expropriation and the case involves only a complaint
for damages or just compensation, the provisions of
the Rules of Court on ascertainment of just
compensation (i.e., provisions of Rule 67) are no
longer applicable, and a trial before commissioners is
dispensable.
In this case, petitioner took possession of the
subject property without initiating expropriation
proceedings. Consequently, private respondent filed
the instant case for just compensation and damages.
To determine just compensation, the trial court
appointed three commissioners pursuant to Section 5
of Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. None
of the parties objected to such appointment.
The trial court’s appointment of commissioners in this
particular case is not improper. The appointment was
done mainly to aid the trial court in determining just
compensation, and it was not opposed by the parties.
Besides, the trial court is not bound by the
commissioners’ recommended valuation of the subject
property. The court has the discretion on whether to
adopt the commissioners’ valuation or to substitute its
own estimate of the value as gathered from the
records.
However, the trial court’s decision is not clear
as to its basis for ascertaining just compensation. The
trial court mentioned in its decision the valuations in
the reports of the City Appraisal Committee and of the
commissioners appointed pursuant to Rule 67. But
whether the trial court considered these valuations in
S.C.A.
arriving at the just compensation, or the court made
its own independent valuation based on the records,
was obscure in the decision. The trial court simply
gave the total amount of just compensation due to the
property owner without laying down its basis. Thus,
there is no way to determine whether the adjudged
just compensation is based on competent evidence.
For this reason alone, a remand of the case to the trial
court for proper determination of just compensation is
in order.
(2) YES. Consequential damages are awarded if as a
result of the expropriation, the remaining property of
the owner suffers from an impairment or decrease in
value. Thus, there is a valid basis for the grant of
consequential damages to the property owner, and no
unjust enrichment can result therefrom.
NPC V. SANTA LORO VDA. DE CAPIN AND SPS.
JULITO QUIMCO AND GLORIA CAPIN
Facts: NPC is a GOCC duly organized under RA No.
6395. Pursuant to its 230 KV Leyte-Cebu
Interconnection Project (Project), NPC expropriated
several parcels of land in Cebu to be traversed and
affected by its transmission towers and lines. Among
the lots affected were those of Capin and Sps. Quimco
(respondents).
To be able to enter the said properties, NPC
obtained from each them "Permission to Enter for
Construction of Transmission Line Project". These
permits were signed by respondents upon
representation by NPC that it would pay them just
compensation for the intrusion into their properties.
Thereafter, NPC began to construct on the properties
its power lines and transmission towers, which were
completed in 1996. NPC paid the respondents the
amounts of P8,015.90 and P5,350.49, respectively.
Only later did they discover that in comparison to the
measly sums they were paid by NPC, the other
landowners within their area who resisted the
expropriation in court or who entered into compromise
agreements with NPC were paid P448.30
to P450.00/sq. m. as just compensation for the
portions of their properties similarly affected by NPC’s
Project.
Accordingly, they filed a Complaint for
Rescission of Agreement, Recovery of Possession of
Parcels of Land, Removal of Tower and Transmission
Lines, Damages and Other Reliefs, against NPC before
the RTC. NPC countered that their claim for
compensation for the full value of their properties was
repugnant to Section 3-A of its Charter, according to
which, NPC is obligated only to pay the easement fee
equivalent to 10% of the market value of the land as
just compensation, plus the cost of damaged
improvements. (In short NPC was saying that there
was no expropriation but only easement.)
At the Pre-trial, the parties agreed that the
only issue for resolution by the RTC was the
159
 emedial Law Review
Digests
determination of the amount of just compensation due.
Hence, the RTC, upon motion of respondents, issued
an Order allowed them to file a Motion of Summary
Judgment. The RTC gave NPC a 15-day period from
receipt of such to file its Opposition to or Comment on
the Motion for Summary Judgment. RTC further
granted NPC’s Motion for Extension of Time to file their
comment. But despite the 15 days extension given,
NPC still failed to file its Comment. Consequently, RTC
deemed Capin and Sps. Quimco’s Motion for Summary
Judgment submitted for resolution.
RTC rendered a Resolution favoring
respondents & ordered NPC to pay damages of
P448.33/sq. m. for the 3,199 sq.m. of respondents’
lots taken by NPC. NPC filed MR for just compensation
to be reduced to P25.00/ sq.m. and a Supplemental
MR for reduction of the interest rate (from 14% to 6%
per annum). RTC affimed its Resolution but reduced
imposable rate to 6%/annum from filing of the
complaint, and 12% / annum from the time judgment
become final and executory until fully satisfied. NPC
appealed to the CA. CA affirmed the RTC. MR denied.
Hence, the present Petition for Review before the SC.
Issues: 1. W/N NPC only acquired an easement of
right of way on the properties (consequently making it
liable to pay only an easement fee not exceeding 10%
of the fair market value of the portion of their property
actually affected by the Interconnection Project,
pursuant to Section 3-A(b) of its Charter)?
Expropriation is not limited to the acquisition of real
property with a corresponding transfer of title or
possession. The right-of-way easement resulting in a
restriction or limitation on property rights over the land
traversed by transmission lines also falls within the
ambit of the term "expropriation." After NPC’s
transmission lines were fully constructed on portions of
Capin and Sps. Quimco’s lots, NPC imposed restrictions
thereon such as the prohibition against planting or
building anything higher than three meters below the
area traversed by said lines. In addition, Spouses
Quimco, holders of a Small Scale Quarry Permit, were
also prohibited from continuing their quarry business
near NPC’s transmission towers because of the great
possibility that it could weaken the foundation thereof.
Hence, the respondents suffered substantial loss of
income. Considering the nature and effect of the
installation of the 230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission
lines, the limitation imposed by NPC against the use of
the land for an indefinite period deprives respondents
of its ordinary use.
NPC’s acquisition of an easement of right of
way on the lands amounted to an expropriation of the
portions of the latter’s properties and perpetually
deprived Capin and Sps. Quimco of their proprietary
rights thereon and for which they are entitled to a
reasonable and just compensation. Just compensation
is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property
taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure
is not the taker’s gain, but the owner’s loss. The word
S.C.A.
"just" is used to intensify the meaning of the word
"compensation" and to convey thereby the idea that
the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be
taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample.
Moreover, the valuation of a property in the tax
declaration cannot be an absolute substitute to just
compensation or rather, the market value stated in the
tax declaration of the condemned property is no longer
conclusive. It is violative of due process to deny to the
owner the opportunity to prove that the valuation in
the tax documents is unfair or wrong. It is also
repulsive to the basic concepts of justice and fairness
to allow the haphazard work of a minor bureaucrat or
clerk to absolutely prevail over the judgment of a court
which is promulgated only after expert commissioners
have actually viewed the property, after evidence,
arguments pro and con have been presented, and after
all factors and considerations essential to a fair and
just determination have been judicially evaluated. 10%
of the market value of the expropriated property
cannot in any way be considered as the fair and full
equivalent to the loss sustained by the owner of the
property, such would be 90% less than what is due
him. Thus, Section 3A of NPC’s Charter cannot prevail
over the mandate of our Constitution on the payment
of just compensation.
2. W/N the RTC erred in fixing the fair market value for
the lots at P448.33/sq.m. based on a previous RTC
decision in Civil Case No. DNA-379 (which was further
based on another decision of the same RTC, Civil Case
No. DNA-373)? *In Civil Case No. DNA-379, the RTC
ordered NPC to pay just compensation
of P448.33/sq.m. for the lot owned by the heirs of
Gingco which was similarly traversed by NPC’s
transmission lines; whereas in Civil Case No. DNA-373,
the RTC considered the opinion values of the
Committee on Appraisal in determining the fair market
value of the properties involved therein.
Although it is a Decision in another case, the
RTC can take cognizance thereof when Capin and Sps.
Quimco presented the same for its consideration. The
lot of the heirs of Gingco and those of the herein Capin
and Sps. Quimco are all located within the same area,
separated only by a lot owned by the Loros. The lots
owned by Capin and Sps. Quimco are even more
advantageously situated than the lot owned by the
heirs of Gingco since their properties are traversed by
a barangay road and near quarry areas of Llyons
Richfield Industrial Corporation. The lots of Capin and
Sps. Quimco (effectively taken in June 1996) and of
the heirs (July 1996) were all affected by the
Interconnection Project and were taken by NPC at
about the same time. Since the personalities and
properties in both Civil Cases were essentially in
similar situations, then the just compensation awarded
for the property in the former case was a logical and
reasonable basis for fixing or determining the just
compensation due in the latter. Furthermore, NPC was
given ample time to study, challenge, and controvert
160
 emedial Law Review
Digests
the evidences (including the above case), yet it failed
to do so.
3. W/N the RTC erred when it resolved the complaint
using the Rules of Court on Summary Judgment (which
apply only to the ordinary taking of properties) when
complaint is actually for "reversed eminent domain,"
requiring the appointment of commissioners for the
determination of just compensation, as provided under
Section 5, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court?
The present case stemmed an ordinary civil
action for the rescission of Capin and Sps. Quimco’s
agreement with NPC, as well as recovery of the
possession of the lots taken, for failure of NPC to
comply with its obligation to pay just compensation for
Capin and Sps. Quimco’s properties. Payment of just
compensation or damages was an alternative remedy,
akin to specific performance by NPC of its obligation
under its agreement with Capin and Sps. Quimco,
which would prevent the rescission of the agreements
altogether and the return of the possession of the
properties to Capin and Sps. Quimco. The parties, at
the Pre-Trial Conference, implicitly agreed to pursue
the remedy for payment of damages rather than
rescission of the agreement. Clearly, the proceedings
before the RTC were not for expropriation, but were for
damages, to which Section 5, Rule 67 of the Revised
Rules of Court is irrelevant.
SC made reference to NPC v. CA, where it
ruled that: “.. case ceased to be an action for
expropriation when NPC dismissed its complaint for
expropriation. Since this case has been reduced to a
simple case of recovery of damages, the provisions of
the Rules of Court on the ascertainment of the just
compensation to be paid were no longer applicable. A
trial before commissioners, for instance, was
dispensable." NPC herein cannot hide behind the
mantle of protection of procedural laws when it has so
arbitrarily violated Capin and Sps. Quimco’s right to
just compensation for their properties taken for public
use.
APO FRUITS V. CA
Facts: Apo Fruits Corporation (AFC) and Hijo
Plantation, Inc. (HPI) offered to sell their land pursuant
to RA 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, or
CARL). The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
referred their voluntary-offer-to-sell (VOS) applications
to Land Bank for initial valuation. Land Bank fixed the
just compensation at P165,484.47/hectare, that
is, P86,900,925.88, for AFC, and P164,478,178.14, for
HPI. The valuation was rejected, prompting Land Bank,
upon the advice of DAR, to open deposit accounts in
the names of AFC and HPI, and to credit in said
accounts the sums of P26,409,549.86 (AFC)
and P45,481,706.76 (HPI). AFC and HPI withdrew the
amounts in cash from the accounts, but afterwards,
they filed separate complaints for determination of just
S.C.A.
compensation with the DAR Adjudication Board
(DARAB).
When DARAB did not act on their complaints
for determination of just compensation after more than
three years, AFC and HPI filed complaints for
determination of just compensation with the RTC in
Tagum City, acting as a special agrarian court (SAC).
Summonses were served to Land Bank and DAR, which
respectively filed their answers. The RTC conducted a
pre-trial, and appointed commissioners to determine
the proper valuation of the properties.
The RTC rendered a decision valuing the land
at P103.33 per square meter (substantially the same
price AFC and HPI wanted). It ordered the DAR and
Land Bank to pay AFC and HPI P1,383,179,000.00 for
the land and its standing crops. Interest equivalent to
the market interest rates aligned with 91-day Treasury
Bills, from the date of taking up to full payment was
imposed. It also ordered DAR and Land bank to pay
the Commissioner’s fees, and the attorney’s fees, to be
computed at 2 ½ % and 10% of the just compensation
of the land and standing crops plus interest equivalent
to the interest of the 91-Day Treasury Bills from date
of taking until full payment, respectively. They were
also ordered to pay the costs.
Land Bank filed an MR. The decision was
modified and an interest at the rate of 12% per annum
was fixed from the time the complaint was filed up to
the time of the finality of the decision. The same
interest rate was imposed on the total obligation from
the time it became final and executor up to its full
payment. The interest on the attorney’s fees and
Commissioner’s fees were removed. As to all other
aspects, the decision remained the same.
Land Bank filed a notice of appeal. The RTC
denied it saying the proper remedy was a petition for
review since it was acting as a SAC. To question the
RTC’s denial, Land Bank filed a petition for certiorari
with the CA. The CA granted the petition and
eventually nullified the RTC’s orders.
AFC and HPI then filed a petition for review on
certiorari praying that the CA be reversed and that the
RTC decision be declared final an executory. The SC 3rd
Division said that the granting of the appeal was
correct but that the RTC’s decision regarding the
payment and amount should be affirmed.
Land Bank filed an MR which the 3rd Division
partially granted. The new decision deleted the award
of attorney’s fees. It also remanded the case to the
RTC for a hearing on the amount of Commissioner’s
fees. Most importantly, it deleted the 12% interest
rate per annum in the total amount of just
compensation.
Both AFC and HPI and Land Bank filed MRs
which were denied. Entry of judgment was made on
May 16, 2008. Despite this, AFC and HPI still filed on
May 28, 2008 several motions, namely: (1) motion for
leave to file and admit second motion for
reconsideration; (2) second motion for reconsideration
(with respect to the denial of the award of legal
interest and attorney's fees); and (3) motion to refer
161
 emedial Law Review
Digests
the second motion for reconsideration to the Honorable
Court en banc.
The case was referred to the SC en banc.
Issue: WON interest and attorney’s fees should be
awarded to AFC and HPI.
Held: No! The second motion for reconsideration (with
respect to the denial of the award of legal interest and
attorney's fees) is denied, because, firstly, to grant it
is to jettison the immutability of a final decision – a
matter of public policy and public interest, as well as a
time-honored principle of procedural law; and
secondly, to award interest and attorney’s fees despite
the fact that Land Bank paid the just compensation
without undue delay is legally and factually
unwarranted.
Ratio: (On the interest and attorney’s fees) The taking
of property under CARL is an exercise by the State of
the power of eminent domain. A basic limitation on the
State’s power of eminent domain is the constitutional
directive that private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation. Just
compensation refers to the sum equivalent to the
market value of the property, broadly described to be
the price fixed by the seller in open market in the
usual and ordinary course of legal action and
competition, or the fair value of the property as
between one who receives and one who desires to sell.
It is fixed at the time of the actual taking by the State.
Thus, if property is taken for public use before
compensation is deposited with the court having
jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must
include interests on its just value, to be computed
from the time the property is taken up to the time
when compensation is actually paid or deposited with
the court.
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco, the
Court came to explicitly rule that interest is to be
imposed on the just compensation only in case of
delay in its payment, which fact must be sufficiently
established. Significantly, Wycoco was moored on
Article 2209, Civil Code, which provides:
Article 2209. If the obligation consists in the
payment of money and the debtor incurs in delay,
the indemnity for damages, there being no stipulation
to the contrary, shall be the payment of the interest
agreed upon, and in the absence of stipulation, the
legal interest, which is six per cent per annum. (1108)
`The history of this case proves that Land
Bank did not incur delay in the payment of the just
compensation. As earlier mentioned, after AFC and HPI
voluntarily offered to sell their lands on October 12,
1995, DAR referred their VOS applications to Land
Bank for initial valuation. Land Bank initially fixed the
just compensation at P165,484.47/hectare, that is,
P86,900,925.88, for AFC, and P164,478,178.14, for
HPI. However, they rejected Land Bank’s initial
valuation, prompting Land Bank to open deposit
accounts in the petitioners’ names, and to credit in
S.C.A.
said accounts the amounts equivalent to their
valuations. Although AFC withdrew the amount of
P26,409,549.86, while HPI withdrew P45,481,706.76,
they still filed with DARAB separate complaints for
determination of just compensation. When DARAB did
not act upon their complaints for more than three
years, AFC and HPI commenced their respective
actions for determination of just compensation in the
Tagum City RTC, which rendered its decision on
September 25, 2001.
It is true that Land Bank sought to appeal the
RTC’s decision to the CA, by filing a notice of appeal;
and that Land Bank filed in March 2003 its petition for
certiorari in the CA only because the RTC did not give
due course to its appeal. Any intervening delay thereby
entailed could not be attributed to Land Bank,
however, considering that assailing an erroneous order
before a higher court is a remedy afforded by law to
every losing party, who cannot thus be considered to
act in bad faith or in an unreasonable manner as to
make such party guilty of unjustified delay. As stated
in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Kumassie Plantation:
The mere fact that LBP appealed the decisions
of the RTC and the Court of Appeals does not mean
that it deliberately delayed the payment of just
compensation to KPCI. x x x It may disagree with DAR
and the landowner as to the amount of just
compensation to be paid to the latter and may also
disagree with them and bring the matter to court for
judicial determination. This makes LBP an
indispensable party in cases involving just
compensation for lands taken under the Agrarian
Reform Program, with a right to appeal decisions in
such cases that are unfavorable to it. Having only
exercised its right to appeal in this case, LBP cannot be
penalized by making it pay for interest.
The Third Division justified its deletion of the
award of interest thuswise:
AFC and HPI now blame LBP for allegedly
incurring delay in the determination and payment of
just compensation. However, the same is without basis
as AFC and HPI’s proper recourse after rejecting the
initial valuations of respondent LBP was to bring the
matter to the RTC acting as a SAC, and not to file two
complaints for determination of just compensation with
the DAR, which was just circuitous as it had already
determined the just compensation of the subject
properties taken with the aid of LBP.
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco,
citing Reyes v. National Housing Authority and
Republic v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that the
interest of 12% per annum on the just compensation is
due the landowner in case of delay in payment, which
will in effect make the obligation on the part of the
government one of forbearance. On the other hand,
interest in the form of damages cannot be applied,
where there was prompt and valid payment of just
compensation. Thus:
The constitutional limitation of "just
compensation" is considered to be the sum equivalent
to the market value of the property, broadly described
162
 emedial Law Review
Digests
to be the price fixed by the seller in open market in the
usual and ordinary course of legal action and
competition or the fair value of the property as
between one who receives, and one who desires to
sell, it being fixed at the time of the actual taking by
the government. Thus, if property is taken for public
use before compensation is deposited with the court
having jurisdiction over the case, the final
compensation must include interests on its just value
to be computed from the time the property is taken to
the time when compensation is actually paid or
deposited with the court. In fine, between the taking of
the property and the actual payment, legal interests
accrue in order to place the owner in a position as
good as (but not better than) the position he was in
before the taking occurred.
It is explicit from LBP v. Wycoco that interest
on the just compensation is imposed only in case of
delay in the payment thereof which must be
sufficiently established. Given the foregoing, we find
that the imposition of interest on the award of just
compensation is not justified and should therefore be
deleted.
REPUBLIC VS. HOLY TRINITY DEVELOPMENT INC.
FACTS: The Republic of the Philippines, represented by
the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB), filed with the RTC a
Consolidated Complaint for Expropriation against
landowners whose properties would be affected by the
construction, rehabilitation, and expansion of the North
Luzon Expressway. The Holy Trinity Reality and
Development Corporation was one of the affected
landowners.
TRB filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the
Issuance of a Writ of Possession, manifesting that it
deposited a sufficient amount to cover the payment of
100% of the zonal value of the affected properties (in
the total amount of 28,406,700 pesos) with the Land
Bank of the Philippines, South Harbor Branch (LBP-
South Harbor), an authorized government depository.
TRB maintained that since it had already complied with
the provisions of Sec. 4 of RA 8974 in relation to Sec.
2 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the issuance of the
writ of possession becomes ministerial on the part of
the RTC.
RTC issued an Order for the Issuance of the
Writ of Possession as well as the Writ of Possession
itself. Holy Trinity moved for reconsideration.
The Sheriff filed with the RTC a Report on Writ
of Possession stating that since none of the landowners
voluntarily vacated the properties subject of the
expropriation proceedings, the assistance of the PNP
would be necessary in implementing the Writ of
Possession. Accordingly, TRB, through OSG, filed with
the RTC an Omnibus Motion praying for an Order
directing the PNP to assist the Sheriff in the
implementation of the Writ of Possession.
The Holy Trinity filed with the RTC a Motion to
Withdraw Deposit, praying that it be allowed to
S.C.A.
withdraw 22,968,000 out of 28,406,700, including the
interest which accrued thereon. RTC granted the
motion (except as to the interest) since Holy Trinity
already proved its absolute ownership over the
properties and paid the taxes due to the government.
RTC conducted a hearing on the accrued
interest, after which it directed the issuance of an
Order of Expropriation, and granted TRB a period of 30
days to inquire from LBP-South Harbor whether the
deposit made by DPWH with the bank relative to the
expropriation proceedings is earning interest or not.
TRB submitted a Manifestation to which was attached
the letter by Atty. Osoteo stating that the DPWH
Expropriation Account was an interest bearing current
account.
RTC resolved the issue by ruling that the
interest earnings from the deposit of 22,968,000
(under the principle of accession) are considered as
fruits and should properly pertain to the property
owner (in this case, Holy Trinity). Upon motion of TRB,
it issued an Order of Expropriation. But later on, it
reversed itself stating that the issue as to who is
entitled to the payment of interest should be ventilated
before the Board of Commissioners. The CA reversed.
ISSUE:
WON Holy Trinity is only entitled to the amount
equivalent to the zonal value of the expropriated
property and not to the accrued interest? –NO.
Holy Trinity is also entitled to the accrued
interest.
Note: TRB is contending that Holy Trinity is only
entitled to the exact amount as defined in Sec. 4 of RA
8974 and Sec. 2 Rule 67 (hindi daw kasama ang
interest).
RULING:
TRB failed to distinguish between the expropriation
procedures under RA 8974 and Rule 67. The former
specifically governs expropriation proceedings for
national government infrastructure projects. In the
case of Republic vs. Gingoyon, the SC ruled that under
RA 8974, the government is required to make
immediate payment to the property owner upon the
filing of the complaint to be entitled to a writ of
possession, whereas in Rule 67, the government is
authorized only to make an initial deposit with an
authorized government depositary.
In the case at bar, the proceedings deal with
the expropriation of properties intended for a national
government infrastructure project. Thus, the RTC was
correct in applying the procedure laid out in RA 8974,
by requiring the deposit of the amount equivalent to
100% of the zonal value of the properties sought to be
expropriated.
The controversy though arises not from the
amount of the deposit but as to the ownership of the
interest that had since accrued on the deposited
amount.
The SC agrees with the ruling of the CA. The
critical factor in the different modes of effecting
163
 emedial Law Review
Digests
delivery which gives legal effect to the act is the actual
intention to deliver on the part of the party making
such delivery. The intention of the TRB in depositing
such amount through DPWH was clearly to comply with
the requirement of immediate payment in RA 8974, so
that it could already secure a writ of possession over
the properties subject of the expropriation and
commence implementation of the project. In fact, TRB
did not object to Holy Trinity’s Motion to Withdraw
Deposit with the RTC, for as long as it shows (1) that
the property is free from any lien or encumbrance and
(2) that it is the absolute owner thereof.
A close scrutiny of TRB's arguments would
further reveal that it does not directly challenge the
CA’s determinative pronouncement that the interest
earned by the amount deposited in the expropriation
account accrues to Holy Trinity by virtue of accession.
TRB only asserts that Holy Trinity is entitled only to an
amount equivalent to the zonal value of the
expropriated property, nothing more and nothing less.
The SC agrees in TRB's statement since it is
exactly how the amount of the immediate payment
shall be determined in accordance with Sec4 of RA
8974, i.e., an amount equivalent to 100% of the zonal
value of the expropriated properties. However, TRB
already complied therewith by depositing the required
amount in the expropriation account of DPWH with
LBP-South Harbor. By depositing the said amount,
TRB is already considered to have paid the same to
Holy Trinity, and Holy Trinity became the owner
thereof. The amount earned interest after the deposit;
hence, the interest should pertain to the owner of the
principal who is already determined as the Holy
Trinity. The interest is paid by LBP-South Harbor on
the deposit, and TRB cannot claim that it paid an
amount more than what it is required to do so by law.
Nonetheless, the SC finds it necessary to
emphasize that Holy Trinity is determined to be the
owner of only a part of the amount deposited in the
expropriation account, in the sum of P22,968,000.00.
Hence, it is entitled by right of accession to the
interest that had accrued to the said amount only.
(RULE 68) JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE
HUERTA ALBA RESORT, INC., petitioner,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SYNDICATED
MANAGEMENT GROUP, INC.,respondents.
FACTS. In a complaint for judicial foreclosure of
mortgage with preliminary injunction filed on October
19, 1989 before the RTC, the Syndicated Management
Group, Inc. (“SMGI”) sought the foreclosure of 4
parcels of land mortgaged by Huerta Alba Resort
(“Huerta”) to Intercon Fund Resource, Inc.
(“Intercon”).
SMGI instituted the case as mortgagee-
assignee of a loan amounting to P8.5 million obtained
by Huerta from Intercon, in whose favor petitioner
mortgaged the aforesaid parcels of land as security for
the said loan. RTC came out with its decision “granting
S.C.A.
herein private respondent SMGI’s complaint for judicial
foreclosure of mortgage”. Huerta appealed, filed a
petition for certiorari, MR, leave to present second MR,
but to no avail.
On March 14, 1994, the Resolution became
final and executory and was entered in the Book of
Entries of Judgment. Accordingly, on July 15, 1994 a
writ of execution issued and, on July 20, 1994, a
Notice of Levy and Execution was issued by the Sheriff
concerned, who issued on August 1, 1994 a Notice of
Sheriff’s Sale for the auction of subject properties on
September 6, 1994.
On September 6, 1994, the scheduled auction
sale of subject pieces of properties proceeded and
SMGI was declared the highest bidder. Certificate of
Sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds on
October 21, 1994. On February 10, 1995, the lower
court confirmed the sale of subject properties to
SMGI. Conformably, the Transfer Certificates of Title to
subject pieces of property were then issued to the
private respondent.
SMGI filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of
Possession with the TC Huerta filed a “Motion to
Compel Private Respondent to Accept Redemption.” It
was the first time petitioner ever asserted the right to
redeem subject properties under Section 78 of R.A.
No. 337, the General Banking Act; theorizing that the
original mortgagee (Insular), being a credit institution,
its assignment of the mortgage credit to petitioner did
not remove petitioner from the coverage of Section 78
of R.A. No. 337. Therefore, according to Huerta, it
should have the right to redeem subject properties
within one year from registration of the auction sale,
and concluded that in view of its “right of redemption,”
the issuance of the titles over subject parcels of land to
the SMGI was irregular and premature.
TC denied private respondent‘s motion for a
writ of possession, opining that Section 78 of the
General Banking Act was applicable and therefore, the
petitioner had until October 21, 1995 to redeem the
said parcels of land. CA reversed.
ISSUE. Whether or not the petitioner has the one-year
right of redemption of subject properties under Section
78 of Republic Act No. 337 otherwise known as the
General Banking Act. The petition is not visited by
merit.
RATIO. From the various decisions, resolutions and
orders a quo it can be gleaned that what petitioner has
been adjudged to have was only the equity of
redemption over subject properties. On the distinction
between the equity of redemption and right of
redemption, the case of Gregorio Y. Limpin vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, comes to the fore. Held
the Court in the said case:
The right of redemption in relation to a
mortgage - understood in the sense of a prerogative to
re-acquire mortgaged property after registration of the
foreclosure sale - exists only in the case of
the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage. No such
164
 emedial Law Review
right is recognized in a judicial foreclosure
except only where the mortgagee is the
Philippine National Bank or a bank or banking
institution.
Where a mortgage is foreclosed
extrajudicially, Act 3135 grants to the mortgagor the
right of redemption within one (1) year from the
registration of the sheriff’s certificate of foreclosure
sale.
Where the foreclosure is judicially
effected, however, no equivalent right of redemption
exists. The law declares that a judicial foreclosure sale,
‘when confirmed by an order of the court, x x shall
operate to divest the rights of all the parties to the
action and to vest their rights in
purchaser, subject to such rights of redemption as may
be allowed by law.’ Such rights exceptionally ‘allowed
by law’ (i.e., even after confirmation by an order of the
court) are those granted by the charter of the
Philippine National Bank (Acts No. 2747 and 2938),
and the General Banking Act (R.A. 337). These laws
confer on the mortgagor, his successors in interest or
any judgment creditor of the mortgagor, the right to
redeem the property sold on foreclosure - after
confirmation by the court of the foreclosure sale -
which right may be exercised within a period of one (1)
year, counted from the date of registration of the
certificate of sale in the Registry of Property.
But, to repeat, no such right
redemption exists in case of judicial foreclosure of a
mortgage if the mortgagee is not the PNB or a bank or
banking institution. In such a case, the foreclosure
sale, ‘when confirmed by an order of the court. x x
shall operate to divest the rights of all the parties to
the action and to vest their rights in the purchaser.’
There then exists only what is known as the equity of
redemption. This is simply the right of the defendant
mortgagor to extinguish the mortgage and retain
ownership of the property by paying the secured debt
within the 90-day period after the judgment becomes
final, in accordance with Rule 68, or even after the
foreclosure sale but prior to its confirmation.
Section 2, Rule 68 provides that -
‘ x x If upon the trial x x the court shall find the
facts set forth in the complaint to be true, it shall
ascertain the amount due to the plaintiff upon
the mortgage debt or obligation, including
interest and costs, and shall render judgment for
the sum so found due and order the same to be
paid into court within a period of not less
than ninety (90) days from the date of the
service of such order, and that in default of such
payment the property be sold to realize the
mortgage debt and costs.’
This is the mortgagor’s equity (not right) of
redemption which, as above stated, may be exercised
by him even beyond the 90-day period ‘from the date
of service of the order,’ and even after the foreclosure
sale itself, provided it be before the order of
confirmation of the sale. After such order of
S.C.A.
Digests
confirmation, no redemption can be effected any
longer.”[8](Underscoring supplied)
As regards to whether Huerta failed to
seasonably invoke its purported right under Section 78
of R.A. No. 337. The Court held that it was too late in
the day for petitioner to invoke a right to redeem
under Section 78 of R.A. No. 337. Petitioner failed to
assert a right to redeem in several crucial stages of the
Proceedings.
BACALING V. MUYA
Facts: The spouses Ramon Bacaling were the owners
the of 3 parcels of land in Iloilo City. In 1955, the
landholding was subdivided 110 sub-lots and approved
as "residential" or "subdivision" by the National Urban
Planning Commission (NUPC) and the Bureau of Lands.
It was referred to as the Bacaling-Moreno Subdivision.
A real estate loan of P600k was granted to the spouses
Bacaling by GSIS for the development of the
subdivision. To secure the repayment of the loan, the
Bacalings executed in favor of the GSIS a real estate
mortgage over their parcels of land including the sub-
lots. The Bacalings failed to pay the amortizations on
the loan and consequently the mortgage constituted on
the sub-lots was foreclosed by the GSIS. After a court
case that reached all the way to the SC, Nelita
of Bacaling (by then a widow) in 1989 was eventually
able to restore to herself ownership of the 110 sub-
lots.
In 1972, respondents Felomino Muya, and 4
others clandestinely entered and occupied the entire
110 sub-lots. Muya claimed that they were legally
instituted by Bacaling as tenant-tillers and later on
their relationship changed into a leasehold. In 1980,
they secured certificates of land transfer in their
names for the 110 sub-lots. Jose Juan Tong, bought
the sub-lots after Bacaling has repurchased the subject
property GSIS. To secure performance of the contract
of absolute sale and facilitate the transfer of title of the
lots to Jose Juan Tong, Bacaling appointed him in 1992
as her attorney-in-fact, under an irrevocable special
power of attorney.
Using the irrevocable special power of attorney
executed in his favor, petitioner Tong (together with
Bacaling) filed a petition for cancellation of the
certificates of land transfer against respondents with
the Department of Agrarian Reform(DAR). The DAR,
however, dismissed the petition on the ground that
there had been no legitimate conversion of the
classification of the 110 sub-lots from agricultural to
residential. Bacaling and Tong appealed the adverse
DAR Orders to the Office of the President which
reversed the DAR decision. The OP Decision found that
the sub-lots had been completely converted from
agricultural to residential lots as a result of the
declarations of the NUPC and the Bureau of Lands.
Muya elevated the OP Decision to the Court of
Appeals. CA reversed the OP Decision and validated
the certificates of land transfers in favor of
165
 emedial Law Review
Digests
respondents. Tong moved for reconsideration but was
denied.
Issues: 1. WON Muya, et. al. are agricultural
lessees –NO (relevant to Judicial Foreclosure)
2. WON Tong has the requisite interest to
litigate the petition for review on certiorari -
YES
3. WON the sub-lots are residential lots -YES
OP Decision reinstated, Certificate of Land Transfer to
Muya, et. al declared Viod Ab Initio, and they were
ordered to vacate the sub-lots.
Ratio: 1. The requisites in order to have a valid
agricultural leasehold relationship are: (1) The parties
are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural
lessee; (2) The subject matter of the relationship is
agricultural land; (3) There is consent between the
parties to the relationship; (4) the purpose of the
relationship is to bring about agricultural production;
(5) There is personal cultivation on the part of the
tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) The harvest is
shared between the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessee.
The first, third and sixth requisites are
lacking. One legal conclusion adduced from the facts
in Government Service Insurance System v. Court of
Appeals provides that GSIS, not Bacaling, was the
owner of the subject properties from 1961 up to
1989 as a result of the foreclosure and
confirmation of the sale of the subject
properties. Although the confirmation only came in
1975, the ownership is deemed to have been vested to
GSIS way back in 1961, the year of the sale of the
foreclosed properties. This is due to the fact that
the date of confirmation by the trial court of the
foreclosure sale retroacts to the date of the
actual sale itself.
Thus, the respondents cannot validly claim that
they are legitimate and recognized tenants of the
subject parcels of land for the reason that their
agreement to till the land was not with GSIS, the real
landowner. There is no showing that GSIS consented
to such tenancy relationship nor is there proof that
GSIS received a share in the harvest of the
tenants. Consequently, the respondents cannot claim
security of tenure and other rights accorded by our
agrarian laws considering that they have not been
validly instituted as agricultural lessees of the subject
parcels of land
The pendency of the GSIS case cannot be
construed as a maintenance of status quo with
Bacaling as the owner from 1957 up to 1989 for the
reason that what was appealed to this Court was only
the issue of redemption, and not the validity of the
foreclosure proceedings including the public auction
sale, the confirmation of the public auction sale and
the confirmation and transfer of ownership of the
foreclosed parcels of land to GSIS. The ownership of
GSIS over the subject parcels of land was not
S.C.A.
disputed. There was no longer any right of redemption
in a judicial foreclosure proceeding after the
confirmation of the public auction. Only foreclosures of
mortgages in favor of banking institutions and those
made extrajudicially are subject to legal
redemption. Since GSIS is not a banking institution
and the procedure of the foreclosure is not
extrajudicial in nature, no right of redemption exists
after the judicial confirmation of the public auction sale
of the said lots.
2. Petitioner Jose Juan Tong possesses adequate and
legitimate interest to file the instant petition. As
transferee of the sub-lots through a contract of sale
and as the attorney-in-fact of Nelita Bacaling, former
owner of the subject lots, under an irrevocable special
power of attorney, petitioner Tong stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the instant
case as well as the orders and decisions in the
proceedings a quo.
3. The sub-lots are indeed residential. In Tiongson v.
Court of Appeals, the "key factor in ascertaining
whether there is a landowner-tenant relationship xxx is
the nature of the disputed property.” In the case at
bar, the indubitable conclusion from established facts
is that the one hundred ten (110) sub-lots, originally
three (3) parcels of land, have been officially classified
as residential since 1955.
TERESITA MONZON VS SPS. RELOVA & SPS.
PEREZ VS ADDIO PROPERTIES (INTERVENOR)
Facts: Spouses Relova and Perez filed a petition for
Injunction. They allege that Monzon issued a PN in
favor of sps. Perez. The amount was P600K and
secured by Lot2A. A deed of absolute sale over the
parcel of land was later executed in favor of the Perez
spouses. Same thing happened with sps. Relova. A PN
in the amount of P200k was issued secured by Lot2B.
A deed of conditional sale over the parcel of land was
later issued in favor of sps. Relova.
It appears that Monzon was indebted to the
Coastal Lending Corporation. Coastal Lending then
extrajudicially foreclosed the property of Monzon which
included Lots2A and 2B. The winning bidder in this
extrajudicial foreclosure was Addio properties. Of the
amount paid by Addio, there was a residue of roughly
P1.6M (indebtedness of Monzon was only P3.4M++
while Addio paid P5M++ for the property that’s why
there’s an excess). This residue is in the custody of
Atty. Luna as Branch Clerk of Court.
The petition for injunction was filed to order
Atty. Luna to deliver the residue to spouses Relova and
Perez instead of delivering them to Monzon. Monzon
argues that she had already performed her obligation
to the spouses Relova and Perez via the dacion en
pago. Also, it is argued that the funds in the custody of
Atty. Luna cannot be acquired by them without a writ
of preliminary attachment or a writ of garnishment.
166
 emedial Law Review
Digests
RTC: Atty. Luna should deliver the residue to
spouses Relova and Perez. At this point in time, Addio
properties intervened.
CA: Affirmed RTC
Issue: Whether the spouses Relova and Perez have a
right to the residue? – NO!
Held: Spouses Relova and Perez rely on Section4,
Rule68 of the Rules of Court: “SEC. 4. Disposition of
proceeds of sale.--The amount realized from the
foreclosure sale of the mortgaged property shall, after
deducting the costs of the sale, be paid to the person
foreclosing the mortgage, andwhen there shall be
any balance or residue, after paying off the
mortgage debt due, the same shall be paid to
junior encumbrancers in the order of their
priority, to be ascertained by the court, or if there be
no such encumbrancers or there be a balance or
residue after payment to them, then to the mortgagor
or his duly authorized agent, or to the person entitled
to it.”
However, Rule68 governs the judicial
foreclosure of mortgages. Extrajudicial foreclosures, as
what happened in this case, is governed by a different
set of laws (Act3135 as amended by Act4118). Unlike
Rule68 which governs judicial foreclosure sales, there
is no rule covering extrajudicial foreclosure sales that
grants to junior encumbrancers the right to receive the
balance of the purchase price. The only right given to
them is the right to redeem the foreclosed properties.
But even if Rule68 is to be applied to
extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages, the right can
only be given to 2nd mortgagees who are made parties
to the judicial foreclosure. A 2nd mortgagee is not an
indispensable party in a proceeding to foreclose a 1 st
mortgage on real property because a valid decree may
be made as between the mortgagor and the 1 st
mortgagee without regard to the 2nd mortgagee. But
the effect of the failure to make the 2 nd mortgagee a
party to the proceeding is that his lien on the equity of
redemption is not affected by the decree of foreclosure
(I sort of don’t get this. Hehe)
The rule is now settled that a mortgage
creditor may elect to waive his security and bring,
instead, an ordinary action to recover the indebtedness
with the right to execute a judgment thereon on all the
properties of the debtor including the subject matter of
the mortgage, subject to the qualification that if he
fails in the remedy elected by him, he cannot pursue
further the remedy he has waived. Case is remanded
and Spouses Relova and Perez are to manifest whether
they want their Petition for Injunction to be construed
as a collection of sum of money (different
consequences whether the answer in the affirmative or
negative but I won’t discuss this part anymore).
RULE 69: JUDICIAL PARTITION
SEPULVEDA V. PELAEZ
S.C.A.
FACTS: Atty. Pacifico Pelaez filed a complaint against
his granduncle, Pedro Sepulveda, Sr., for the recovery
of possession and ownership of his share of several
parcels of land; and for the partition thereof among
the co-owners. In his complaint, the private
respondent alleged that his mother Dulce died
intestate and aside from himself, was survived by her
husband Rodolfo Pelaez and her mother Carlota
Sepulveda. Dulce’s grandfather Vicente Sepulveda died
intestate and Dulce was then only about four years old.
The private respondent alleged that he himself
demanded the delivery of his mother s share in the
subject properties on so many occasions, the last of
which was in 1972, to no avail.
The private respondent further narrated that
his granduncle executed an affidavit stating that he
was the sole heir of Dionisia when in fact, the latter
was survived by her three sons, Santiago, Pedro and
Vicente. Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. also executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of the City of Danao for
P7,492.00. According to the private respondent, his
granduncle received this amount without his (private
respondent’s) knowledge.
The trial court ruled that the private
respondent’s action for reconveyance based on
constructive trust had not yet prescribed when the
complaint was filed; that he was entitled to a share in
the proceeds of the sale of the property to Danao City;
and that the partition of the subject property among
the adjudicatees thereof was in order. The petitioner
appealed the decision to the CA, which rendered
judgment on January 31, 2002, affirming the appealed
decision with modification. The petitioner now comes
to the Court via a petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC S judgment was
validly rendered
HELD: NO
The petition is granted for the sole reason that
the respondent failed to implead as parties, all the
indispensable parties in his complaint.
The failure of the private respondent to implead
the other heirs as parties-plaintiffs constituted a legal
obstacle to the trial court and the appellate court’s
exercise of judicial power over the said case, and
rendered any orders or judgments rendered therein a
nullity.
Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court provides
that in an action for partition, all persons interested in
the property shall be joined as defendants.
Section 1. Complaint in action for
partition of real estate.- A person
having the right to compel the partition
of real estate may do so as in this rule
prescribed, setting forth in his
complaint the nature and extent of his
title and an adequate description of the
real estate of which partition is
demanded and joining as defendants
all the other persons interested in the
167
 emedial Law Review
Digests
property.
Thus, all the co-heirs and persons having an
interest in the property are indispensable parties; as
such, an action for partition will not lie without the
joinder of the said parties. The mere fact that Pedro
Sepulveda, Sr. has repudiated the co-ownership
between him and the respondent does not deprive the
trial court of jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
action for partition, for, in a complaint for partition, the
plaintiff seeks, first, a declaration that he is a co-owner
of the subject property; and, second, the conveyance
of his lawful shares.
Rodolfo Pelaez is an indispensable party he being
entitled to a share in usufruct, equal to the share of
the respondent in the subject properties. The plaintiff
is mandated to implead all the indispensable parties,
considering that the absence of one such party renders
all subsequent actions of the court null and void for
want of authority to act, not only as to the absent
parties but even as to those present. Without the
presence of all the other heirs as plaintiffs, the trial
court could not validly render judgment and grant
relief in favor of the private respondent.
In the present action, the private respondent, as
the plaintiff in the trial court, failed to implead the
following indispensable parties: his father, Rodolfo
Pelaez; the heirs of Santiago Sepulveda, namely, Paz
Sepulveda and their children; and the City of Danao
which purchased the property from Pedro Sepulveda,
Sr. and maintained that it had failed to pay for the
purchase price of the property.
To reiterate, the absence of an indispensable
party renders all subsequent actions of the court null
and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the
absent parties but even as to those present. Hence,
the trial court should have ordered the dismissal of the
complaint.
Just in case sir asks: 2 Stages in an action for judicial
partition
1. The determination of whether or not a co-
ownership in fact exists and a partition is
proper, that is, it is not otherwise legally
proscribed and may be made by voluntary
agreement of all the parties interested in the
property
2. The second stage commences when the parties
are unable to agree upon the partition ordered
by the court. In that event, partition shall be
effected for the parties by the court with the
assistance of not more than three (3)
commissioners. This second phase may also
deal with the rendition of the accounting itself
and its approval by the Court after the parties
have been accorded the opportunity to be
heard thereon, and an award for the recovery
by the party or parties thereto entitled of their
just shares in the rents and profits of the real
estate in question
S.C.A.
RULE 70: EJECTMENT
UY V. SANTIAGO
FACTS: The MTC rendered a decision in favor of Uy in
4 consolidated ejectment cases. Palomado et al
appealed the cases to the RTC which affirmed in toto
the decision of the MTC. Uy filed a motion for
execution pending appeal while Palomado filed a
Petition for Review before the CA. RTC Judge Santiago
denied the motion for execution pending appeal. Uy
filed an MR which was likewise denied.
Uy filed a Petition for Mandamus for the
issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal. As
basis for denying Uy’s Motion for Execution Pending
Appeal, Judge Santiago cited Palomado’s compliance
with the requirements to stay immediate execution of
judgment, namely: (1) perfection of appeal; (2) filing
of a supersedeas bond; and (3) periodic deposit of the
rentals falling due during the pendency of the appeal.
Uy contends that Rule 70, Section 10, which
enumerated the above-mentioned requirements, has
already been expressly repealed by Rule 70, Section
21 and that the execution of appealed ejectment
decisions with the RTC cannot now be stayed.
Issue: w/n the decisions of RTC in appealed ejectment
cases pending appeal w/ CA are immediately executor
– YES!
RATIO: Sec. 19 is applicable only to ejectment cases
pending appeal with the RTC, and Sec. 21 applies to
those decided by the RTC. Under Sec. 19, the other
party may file a supersedeas bond to stay the appeal
while under Sec. 21, the decision of the RTC is
immediately executory.
It is only execution of the MTC judgment
pending appeal with the RTC which may be stayed by a
compliance with the requisites provided in Rule 70,
Section 19. On the other hand, once the RTC has
rendered a decision in its appellate jurisdiction, such
decision shall, under Rule 70, be immediately
executory, without prejudice to an appeal, via a
Petition for Review, before the CA and/or SC.
Palomado’s argument that execution pending
appeal would deprive them of their right to due
process of law as it would render moot and academic
their Petition for Review before the CA deserves scant
consideration. Finding the issuance of the writ of
execution pending appeal a clear duty of respondent
Judge under the law, mandamus can and should lie
against him.
SERRANO ET AL V. SPS. GUTIERREZ
FACTS: Respondents Sps. Gutierrez filed a complaint
for forcible entry against herein petitioners. The lot
subject of the controversy is an untenanted
agricultural land in Lubao, Pampanga owned by Sps.
Gutierrez. They alleged that herein petitioners, by
168
 emedial Law Review
Digests
means of strategy and stealth, entered the lot and
constructed concrete structures and dumped truckload
of filling materials, all without knowledge and consent
of the spouses. The latter demanded that they leave,
but Serrano et al. refused. Serrano’s group claimed
that the lot was part of Albino Morales’s estate and
they were his heirs.
Pampanga MTC ruled that since the real issue
involved was a question of ownership and not mere
possession de facto, it had no jurisdiction and it
dismissed the case.
Sps Gutierrez appealed the case to RTC of
Guagua Pampanga, which ordered Serrano et al to
vacate, since all they could present were Tax Decs.
Serrano et al appealed to the CA questioning RTC’s
jurisdiction (because they claim since the land is
agricultural, DARAB should have jurisdiction) and the
adjudication of ownership by the RTC (since this is only
an ejectment case). CA upheld the RTC ruling.
Issues: w/n RTC had jurisdiction over the case – YES.
[issue as stated in the case: did the RTC err in
applying Rule 40, Sec 86 in deciding the ejectment
case on appeal? –No] Serrano et al argue that the MTC
acted without jurisdiction in dismissing the case, hence
RTC cannot decide it on appeal. Petition denied
Ruling: MTC clearly erred in dismissing the case for
lack of jurisdiction. RA 7691 states that ejectment
cases fall exclusively with the MTC, “provided that
when in such cases defendant raises the question of
ownership and the question of possession cannot be
resolved without deciding the issue on ownership, the
issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine
the issue of possession.” Rule 70, Sec 16 affirms such
provisional determination of ownership in ejectment.
Inferior courts have jurisdiction to resolve questions of
ownership whenever necessary to decide the question
of possession in ejectment cases.
Thus, the RTC also erred in agreeing with the
MTC decision to dismiss the case. It misapplied Sec 8
of Rule 40, which involves lack of jurisdiction of the
MTC (MTC erroneously thought it had no jurisdiction).
Nevertheless, RTC could still its exercise appellate
jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioners submit that since the property is
valued at 13.3k, then the case is removed from the
RTC jurisdiction which is limited to actions involving
6
Appeal from orders dismissing case without trial; lack of
jurisdiction.—If an appeal is taken from an order of the lower court
dismissing the case without a trial on the merits, the RTC may affirm or
reverse it. In case of affirmance and the ground of dismissal is lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, the RTC, if it has jurisdiction
thereover, shall try the case on the merits as if the case was originally
filed with it. In case of reversal, the case shall be remanded for further
proceedings.
If the case was tried on the merits by the lower court without
jurisdiction over the subject matter, the RTC on appeal shall not
dismiss the case if it has original jurisdiction thereof, but shall decide
the case in accordance with the preceding section, without prejudice to
the admission of amended pleadings and additional evidence in the
interest of justice
S.C.A.
real property exceeding 20k OMM or 50k in MM. This is
wrong. That provision pertains to the original
jurisdiction of the RTC. Because of its appellate
jurisdiction over cases decided by the MTCs, MCTCs,
etc, the amount of the lot is immaterial. All cases
decided by the MTCs are generally appealable to the
RTC, irrespective of the amount involved. RTC may
resolve the case on the merits.
Finally, as regards the finding that it is the Sps
Gutierrez who are entitled to the property, the CA
ruling is affirmed. The spouses presented OCT, Deed of
Sale and TCTs to prove their ownership. Serrano et al
only had Tax Decs.
RULE 71: CONTEMPT
CURATA V. PPA
(This is a very painfully looooooooong case but I
had to trim it down to include only the
essentials.)
FACTS:
This is an expropriation case initiated on October 14,
1999 by the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) against
231 individuals or entities who owned the subject lots.
This is a consolidation of several petitions, but central
to these is the matter of just compensation for the lots
sought to be expropriated by PPA for the Batangas
Port Zone (BPZ) project (Phase II).
(Relevant facts, in brief)
The lower courts issued two compensation
orders directing PPA to issue just compensation to the
landowners. However, PPA filed separate/several
appeals to these compensation orders, as the
defendants were practically divided into three groups.
Briefly, several orders were issued by the court and
noteworthy were the writs of execution ordering PPA to
pay the lot owners the just compensation and the
notice of garnishment issued to the Philippine Veterans
Bank. PPA naturally appealed the orders granting
issuance of the writs. During the pendency of one of
the appeals of the PPA, the CA issued a TRO enjoining
respondent Judge Paterno Tac-An from implementing
the orders granting the writ of Execution to one of the
defendant groups. Despite that, respondent judge still
issued the said orders. Another order was issued by
the CA enjoining said judge from implementing the
orders and from proceeding with the Civil Case 5447
(PPA v. One of the defendant owners). However,
respondent judge still proceeded with the case. PPA
filed a petition citing respondent judge for contempt.
On the other hand, the First Division of the
Court considered as moot the issue raised by PPA on
the denial of its contempt petition, in view of the
compulsory retirement of Judge Tac-an on July 8,
2007.
ISSUE: Whether the retirement of Judge Tac-an should
still be cited for contempt? YES.
169
 emedial Law Review
Digests
HELD: The objective of criminal contempt is to
vindicate public authority. It is an effective instrument
of preserving and protecting the dignity and authority
of courts of law. Any act or omission that degrades or
demeans the integrity of the court must be sanctioned,
lest it prejudice the efficient administration of justice if
left unpunished. Contempt of court applies to all
persons, whether in or out of government. Thus, it
covers government officials or employees who retired
during the pendency of the petition for contempt.
Otherwise, a civil servant may strategize to avail
himself of an early retirement to escape the sanctions
from a contempt citation, if he perceives that he would
be made responsible for a contumacious act. The
higher interest of effective and efficient administration
of justice dictates that a petition for contempt must
proceed to its final conclusion despite the retirement of
the government official or employee, more so if it
involves a former member of the bench. While there is
still no definitive ruling on this issue when the
respondent charged with contempt has retired, we
apply by analogy the settled principle in administrative
disciplinary cases that separation from service does
not render the case moot and academic.
Based on the totality of the circumstances, the
Court finds Judge Paterno Tac-an guilty of indirect
contempt of court.7
A person guilty of indirect contempt may be
punished by a fine not exceeding PhP 30,000 or
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months or both.
Judge Tac-an violated four (4) resolutions/processes of
the CA, namely: the January 10, 2000 TRO, the March
15, 2005 Writ of Preliminary Injunction, the April 19,
2005 TRO and the June 3, 2005 Resolution, for which
he is hereby fined PhP 30,000 for each violation.
FUENTES V. ALBARRACIN
Facts: Judge Albarracin issued an ex-parte motion for
demolition of buildings and other properties of
Fuentes, et. al. This stemmed from a forcible entry
case filed by JS Francisco and Sons against Fuentes,
et. al., which was decided in favour of the former.
Fuentes filed for a petition for annulment of judgment
but Albarracin still issued for the demolition of the
buildings despite such pending petition. As a result,
Fuentes, et. al filed an administrative complaint for
gross ignorance of the law against Albarracin.
7
His acts––issuing the February 1 and 2, 2005 Orders implementing
the May 29, 2001 and November 18, 2004 Orders and the related
February 2, 2005 Notice of Garnishment in defiance of the January 10,
2005 TRO; setting the Bureau of Treasury’s Manifestation and Motion
for hearing on April 25, 2005 in disregard of the March 15, 2005
injunctive writ of the CA; issuing the April 26, 2005 Order disobeying
the April 19, 2005 TRO and the March 15, 2005 writ of preliminary
injunction; and lastly, conducting a hearing on June 21, 2005 for Civil
Case No. 5447, thus violating the June 3, 2005 CA Order––are
contumacious, continuing acts in clear disobedience and disrespect of
the resolutions of the CA.
S.C.A.
It was the contention of Fuentes that they did
not receive a copy of the ex-parte motion nor was the
motion set for hearing. Albarracin asserts that a
hearing is not necessary because the special writ of
demolition had already been granted after several
hearings and the ex-parte motion was merely for the
enforcement or implementation of said writ. He further
denies Fuentes’ charge that the granting of JS
Francisco’s motion which directed the sheriff to enforce
the special writ of demolition despite the pendency of
the case for annulment of reflects gross ignorance of
the law. He argues that the RTC where the forcible
entry cases were elevated did not issue any TRO or
any injunctive relief to restrain him from granting the
motion to enforce/implement the writ of demolition.
The OCA stated that there was no gross
ignorance of the law on the part of Judge Albarracin
and fined Fuentes, et. al for filing a baseless
administrative case.
Issue(s): Should the administrative complaint
prosper? Was the imposition of a fine against Fuentes,
et. al proper?
Decision: No, the complaint should not prosper.
Gross ignorance of the law is more than an
erroneous application of legal provisions. In the
absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of
a judge in his judicial capacity are generally not
subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts
are erroneous. For liability to attach for ignorance of
the law, the assailed order, decision or actuation of the
judge in the performance of official duties must not
only be found to be erroneous but, most importantly, it
must be established that he was moved by bad faith,
dishonesty, hatred or some other like motive. The
evidence reveals that Judge Albarracin notified Fuentes
and conducted a hearing before the issuance of the
writ of execution and special writ of demolition
The imposition of fines against Fuentes was
also improper. They must be given an opportunity to
refute the charges by adducing evidence on specific
charges against them, not in a mere administrative
case which involves a matter different from the alleged
culpability of Fuentes, et. al.
More importantly, assuming that there were
“delaying tactics,” remedial action may be enforced
against them through contempt of court proceedings.
Contempt of court is a defiance of the
authority, justice or dignity of the court, such conduct
as tends to bring the authority and administration of
the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice
parties, litigant or their witnesses during litigation.
There are two kinds of contempt punishable by
law: direct contempt and indirect contempt. Direct
contempt is committed when a person is guilty of
misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to
obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same,
including disrespect toward the court, offensive
personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or
170
 emedial Law Review S.C.A.
Digests
to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or
deposition when lawfully required to do so.
Indirect contempt or constructive contempt is
that which is committed out of the presence of the
court. Any improper conduct tending, directly or
indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice would constitute indirect
contempt. The employment of delaying tactics to
obstruct the administration of justice falls under this
latter category.
Section 3, Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of
Court provides for the following requisites prior to
conviction of indirect contempt: (a) a charge in writing
to be filed; (b) an opportunity given to the respondent
to comment thereon within such period as may be
fixed by the court; and (c) to be heard by himself or
counsel. With respect to constructive contempts or
those which are committed without the actual presence
of the court, it is essential that a hearing be allowed
and the contemner permitted, if he so desires, to
interpose a defense to the charges before punishment
is imposed. The proceedings for punishment of indirect
contempt are criminal in nature.
Section 4 of Rule 71, however, provides that
proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated
motu proprio by the court against which the contempt
was committed by an order or any other formal charge
requiring the respondent to show cause why he should
not be punished for contempt. There is no way for this
Court to initiate indirect contempt proceedings against
Fuentes for the injury was not committed against this
tribunal, but against Judge Albarracin.

171
 emedial Law Review
Digests
A. Venue in Criminal Cases is Jurisdictional
ISIP VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Facts: In this case, several criminal charges were
made against the Isip spouses: against Manuel Isip – 1
estafa; against Marietta Isip – 7 counts of violating
BP22; against the spouses – 5 counts estafa. These
were all filed with the RTC of Cavite. The private
complainant was Atty. Leonardo Jose who had
allegedly given several pieces of jewelry to the spouses
for them to sell at a commission basis. The spouses
apparently had refused to return the jewelry and
instead had given unfunded check payments to Atty.
Jose.
Just to summarize their transactions, here’s
what happened: the Isips were business associates of
Jose’s father; they were engaged in buying and selling
pledged and unredeemed pawned jewelry; the Isips
were introduced to Jose by the his father; they then
entered into several transactions wherein the Isips
would go to Jose’s ancestral residence in Cavite where
Jose would hand over pieces of jewelry to the spouses
who agreed to sell them at a commission or, if not
sold, return them to Jose; basically what happened
was that every time the deadline came for the Isips to
account for the jewelry, they did not return them but
instead gave check payments, which bounced.
Now in connection with jurisdiction, the
defense for the Isips argued that none of the elements
of the offenses charged happened in Cavite: that the
transactions did not happen in Cavite but rather in
Manila, specifically in Towers Condo in Ermita; that
Jose was a resident of Bigasan, Makati; that Jose was
working with the Bureau of Customs, meaning his
office was in Manila.
The RTC found the Isips guilty! It found that
the transactions indeed happened in Cavite. CA
affirmed, ruling that the RTC of Cavite had territorial
jurisdiction over the offenses charged. Note that when
the case went up to the CA, Marietta Isip died.
Issue: W/N the RTC of Cavite has jurisdiction over the
offenses charged?
Held/Ratio:
Venue in criminal cases is jurisdictional
The place where the crime was committed
determines not only the venue of the action but is an
essential element of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental
rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in
criminal cases, the offense should have been
committed or any one of its essential ingredients
should have taken place within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in
criminal cases is the territory where the court has
jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense
allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it
cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an
offense allegedly committed outside of that limited
territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over
CrimPro
the criminal case is determined by the allegations in
the complaint or information. And once it is so shown,
the court may validly take cognizance of the case.
However, if the evidence adduced during the trial
shows that the offense was committed somewhere
else, the court should dismiss the action for want of
jurisdiction.
SC ruled that Jose had sufficiently shown that
the transactions happened in his ancestral home in
Cavite thereby showing that venue was properly laid.
Hence, the Isips had the task of proving otherwise,
which they failed to do. Isip argues that since he and
his late wife actually resided in Manila, convenience
alone suggests that the transaction was entered into in
Manila. SC did not agree. The fact that Cavite City is a
bit far from Manila does not necessarily mean that the
transaction cannot or did not happen there. Distance
will not prevent any person from going to a distant
place where he can procure goods that he can sell so
that he can earn a living. Moreover, the fact that the
checks issued by Marietta Isip in all the transactions
with complainant were drawn against accounts with
banks in Manila or Makati likewise cannot lead to the
conclusion that the transactions were not entered into
in Cavite City.
As a side note, in support of the SC’s finding
regarding venue, it also stated that the trial court’s
assessment deserves great weight. Hence, it followed
the rule that when the TC’s findings have been
affirmed by the CA, said findings are generally
conclusive and binding upon the SC.
Won’t go into the merits but SC ultimately
affirmed the conviction.
NOTE: Digest by Gen Endaluz from 4A
LAND BANK OF THE PHILS. V. RENE RALLA
BELISTA
FACTS
o Sps. Pablo Ralla and Carmen Munoz Ralla had
donated their 8 parcels of lot located in Ligao, Albay
to their daughter, Rene Ralla Belista (respondent)
o The eight (8) parcels of lot were placed by the DAR
under the coverage of the CARP. Consequently,
Belista claimed payment of just compensation over
said agricultural lands.
o DAR's evaluation of the subject farms was
only P227,582.58, while Land Bank of the Philippines
(LBP) assessed the same at P317,259.31.
o Believing that her lots were grossly underestimated,
Belista filed a Petition for Valuation and Payment of
Just Compensation against LBP before the DARAB-
Regional Adjudicator.
o DARAB-Regional Adj issued a Decision, in favor of
Belista fixing the just compensation at
P2,896,408.91. Both parties filed an MR so DARAB-
Regional Adj issued another Order fixing the just
compensation at P2,540,211.58.
173
 emedial Law Review
Digests
o LBP filed an original Petition for Determination of
Just Compensation at the RTC. The court a quo motu
propio dismissed the case for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies and/or comply with Sections
5, 6, and 7, Rule XIX, 2003 DARAB Rules of
Procedure.
o LBP filed an MR arguing that the DARAB 2003 Rules
of Procedure does not apply to Special Agrarian
Courts (SAC) nor its precursor DARAB Case and that
the ground for dismissal of the case is not among the
instances when a court may dismiss a case on its
motion.-> TC denied! So LBP filed this case for
Petition for Review.
o The CA ruled that under Section 5, Rule XIX of the
2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure, an appeal from the
adjudicator's resolution shall be filed before the
DARAB and not before the RTC; that LBP's filing of
the case before the RTC without first seeking the
intervention of the DARAB is violative of the doctrine
of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. The
CA found that LBP's petition for determination of just
compensation was filed in the RTC on October 28,
2003 when the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure was
already in effectand under its transitory provision, it
is provided that the 2003 Rules shall govern all cases
filed on or after its effectivity; and, since an appeal
from the adjudicator's resolution should first be filed
with the DARAB, the RTC, sitting as an SAC did not
err in dismissing the case.
ISSUE:
W/N it is necessary that in cases involving claims for
just compensation under R.A. 6657 that the decision of
the Adjudicator must first be appealed to the DARAB
before a party can resort to the RTC sitting as SAC.
NO!
RATIO:
o LBP’s arguments: that the petition for valuation and
payment of just compensation was filed with the
DARAB- Regional Adjudicator in 2002, long before
the effectivity of the 2003 Rules of Procedure; that
under the transitory provision of the 2003 DARAB
Rules, all cases pending with the Board and the
adjudicators prior to the date of the Rules' effectivity
shall be governed by the DARAB Rules prevailing at
the time of their filing; that clear from the transitory
provision that it is the proceeding of the DARAB
which is governed by the 2003 DARAB Rules of
Procedure, thus, it is the date of filing of the petition
with the DARAB or any of its adjudicators which is
the reckoning date of the applicability of the 2003
DARAB Rules and not the date of filing with the SAC;
that under the 1994 DARAB Rules prevailing at the
time of the filing of Belista's claim for just
compensation, the Rules provided that the decision
of the adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary
determination of just compensation shall not be
appealable to the Board, but shall be brought directly
to the RTC; that it was in the observance of the 1994
CrimPro
DARAB Rules that petitioner brought the
adjudicator's decision to the RTC sitting as SAC.
o Belista’s arguments: LBP's petition with the RTC is
an original action and, since the case was filed at a
time when appeal to the DARAB Central Office was
already provided in the 2003 DARAB Rules before
resorting to judicial action, the RTC correctly
dismissed the petition, which was correctly affirmed
by the CA.
o Sections 50 and 57 of RA No. 6657 provide:
Section 50. Quasi-judicial Powers of the DAR. –
The DAR is hereby vested with primary
jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters and shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters
involving the implementation of agrarian
reform, except those falling under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of
Agriculture (DA) and the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) x
xx
Section 57. Special Jurisdiction. – The Special
Agrarian Court shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the
determination of just compensation to
landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal
offenses under this Act. x x x
o Clearly, under Section 50, DAR has primary
jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian
reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction
over all matters involving the implementation of
agrarian reform, except those falling under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the DA and the DENR.
Further exception to the DAR's original and exclusive
jurisdiction are all petitions for the determination of
just compensation to landowners and the
prosecution of all criminal offenses under RA No.
6657, which are within the jurisdiction of the RTC
sitting as a Special Agrarian Court. Thus, jurisdiction
on just compensation cases for the taking of lands
under RA No. 6657 is vested in the courts.
o Thus, Special Agrarian Courts, which are Regional
Trial Courts, are given original and exclusive
jurisdiction over two categories of cases, to wit: (1)
"all petitions for the determination of just
compensation to landowners" and (2) "the
prosecution of all criminal offenses under [R.A. No.
6657]." The provisions of §50 must be construed in
harmony with this provision by considering cases
involving the determination of just compensation and
criminal cases for violations of R.A. No. 6657 as
excepted from the plenitude of power conferred on
the DAR. Indeed, there is a reason for this
distinction. The DAR is an administrative agency
which cannot be granted jurisdiction over cases of
eminent domain (for such are takings under R.A. No.
6657) and over criminal cases.
***SO, TRANQUIL SUMMARIZES THE RATIO AS***
“sec 50 of the DAR Law says that the DAR has Primary
jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian
174
 emedial Law Review
Digests
reform matters, with an exception that the DAR
doesn’t have original or exclusive jurisdiction over
what? Determination of, just compensation, that is a
JUDICIAL FUNCTION. Number 2, and this is what you
want to hear, ALL CRIMINAL OFFENSES UNDER RA
6657 ARE WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE RTC
SITTING AS A SPECIAL AGRARIAN COURT. In simple
words, all criminal cases or offenses arising from
violation of said law, ra6657 shall be instituted where?
In the regional trial court acting as a special agrarian
court.”
B. Jurisdiction to Issue Hold Departure
Orders
MONDEJAR V BUBAN
Facts: Buban was the judge in the case of People v
Mondejar, which was a BP 22 case against Mondejar
docketed in the Tacloban MTCC. During the case,
Buban issued a “hold departure order” against
Mondejar. Mondejar filed an admin case against Buban
for gross ignorance of the law. She claims that
according to SC Circular 39-97, the “hold departure
order” can only be issued in criminal cases under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC (take note that BP 22
cases are under the MTC). She also claimed that she
was not given the opportunity to be heard.
Buban’s excuse was that he was not aware of
such circular. After he managed to get a copy of such
circular from the Executive Judge of the Tacloban RTC,
he lifted the “hold departure order”. On the due
process issue, he claimed that Mondejar was notified
but did not show up in the hearing (this issue was not
touched upon in the decision)
The OCA recommended that he be
reprimanded.
Issue: Was Buban grossly ignorant of the law?
Held: Yes. Judge Buban reprimanded.
Circular No. 39-97 limits the authority to issue
hold-departure orders to criminal cases within the
jurisdiction of second level courts. Paragraph No. 1 of
the said circular specifically provides that "hold-
departure orders shall be issued only in criminal cases
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regional trial
courts." Clearly then, criminal cases within the
exclusive jurisdiction of first level courts do not fall
within the ambit of the circular, and it was an error on
the part of Buban to have issued one in the instant
case.
Canon 3, Rule 3.01 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct exhorts judges to be "faithful to the law and
maintain professional competence." The Court, in
exercising administrative supervision of all lower
courts, has not been remised in reminding the
members of the bench to exert due diligence in
keeping abreast with the development in law and
jurisprudence. Besides, Circular No. 39-97 is not a new
circular. It was circularized in 1997 and violation of
CrimPro
which has been accordingly dealt with in numerous
cases before the Court. Judge Buban cannot be
excused for his infraction. Judges should always be
vigilant in their quest for new developments in the law
so they could discharge their duties and functions with
zeal and fervor.
C. Jurisdiction determined by the allegations
of the Complaint
FOZ V FAJARDO
Facts: Petitioners Vicente Foz Jr. (columnist) and
Danny Fajardo (editor-publisher) of Panay News, a
publication in Iloilo City, were charged with libel for
maligning the integrity of Dr. Edgar Portigo. The article
portrayed Dr. Portigo as an incompetent SMC company
doctor and an opportunist who enriched himself at the
expense of the poor. He allegedly gave wrong
diagnosis to patients and charged exorbitantly for his
services. The accusations impugning his reputation
were argued to be false and malicious. RTC found
petitioners guilty of libel. CA affirmed in toto.
Issue: Did the RTC acquire jurisdiction over the libel
case? NO.
Ratio: First, that petitioners raised the issue of
jurisdiction for the first time is of no moment. No
laches obtaining in this case, the Court keeps with the
general rule that lack of jurisdiction may be raised at
any stage, even on appeal. No express agreement or
implicit waiver may confer jurisdiction upon the court,
as such is conferred by law.
Second, venue in criminal cases is an essential
element of jurisdiction. In criminal cases, territorial
jurisdiction is the territory where the court may hear
and try the offense allegedly committed therein by the
accused. The jurisdiction of a court over the
criminal case is determined by the allegations in
the complaint or information. And once it is so
shown, the court may validly take cognizance of
the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the
trial show that the offense was committed somewhere
else, the court should dismiss the action for want of
jurisdiction.
To apply Art. 3601 of RPC on the rules on
venue for libel cases, since Dr. Portigo is a private
1
A) Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person,
the criminal action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the
province or city where the libelous article is printed and first
published.
B) If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action
may also be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province where
he actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense.
C) If the offended party is a public officer whose office is
in Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action may
be filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila.
D) If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside
of Manila, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the
province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of
the offense.
175
 emedial Law Review
Digests
individual at the time of the publication of the alleged
libelous article, the venue of the libel case may be in
(1) the province or city where the libelous article was
printed and first published, or in (2) the province
where Dr. Portigo (offended party) actually resided at
the time of the commission of the offense.
The allegations in the Information that “Panay
News, a daily publication with a considerable
circulation in the City of Iloilo and throughout the
region” only showed that Iloilo was the place
where Panay News was in considerable circulation, but
did not establish that the said publication was printed
and first published in Iloilo City.
Moreover, the Information filed against
petitioners failed to allege the residence of Dr. Portigo.
The residence of person is his personal, actual or
physical habitation or his actual residence or place of
abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency. No particular length of time of residence
is required; only that it must be something beyond a
transient stay in the place. While it was mentioned
that Dr. Portigo practiced in Iloilo City, such allegation
did not clearly and positively indicate that he was
actually residing in Iloilo City at the time of the
commission of the offense. It is possible that Dr.
Portigo was actually residing in another place. One
who transacts business in a place and spends
considerable time thereat does not render such person
a resident therein. Pursuit of business in a place is not
conclusive of residence there for purposes of venue.
D. Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
PEOPLE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS: Victoria Amante was a member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Cebu. She
was able to secure of a cash advance under a
disbursement voucher in order to defray seminar
expenses of the Committee on Health and
Environmental Protection, which she headed. After
almost 2 years since she obtained the cash advance,
no liquidation was made. Thus, City Auditor Manolo
Tulibao issued a demand letter to Amante asking her
to settle her unliquidated cash advance within 72 hrs
from her receipt of the letter. Months later, the COA
submitted an investigation report to the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas (OMB-Visayas) stating
the recommendation that Amante be further
investigated to ascertain whether appropriate charges
could be filed against her under PD 1445 (Auditing
Code of the Philippines). OMB-Visayas then issued a
Resolution recommending the filing of an information
for Malversation of Public Funds against Amante,
afterwhich the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP)
prepared a memorandum finding probable cause to
indict Amante. The OSP filed an information with the
Sandiganbayan accusing Amante for violating Sec. 89
of PD1445. After the case was raffled to the Third
Division of the Sandiganbayan, Amante filed a Motion
to Defer Arraignment and Motion for Reinvestigation,
CrimPro
contesting, among others, the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan over the case since she was then a
local officer who was ooccupying a position of Salary
Grade 26, whereas Sec. 4 of RA 8249 provides that the
Sandiganbayan shall have original jurisdiction only in
cases where the accused holds a position classified as
Grade 27 or higher. The OSP filed its opposition,
contending that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction
over Amante since she was then a member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, thus, falling
under those enumerated under Sec. 4 of PD 1606, as
amended by RA 7975 and RA 8249. The
Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution dismissing the case
against Amante on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE: W/N a member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod under Salary Grade 26 who was
charged with a violation of the Auditing Code of
the Philippines falls within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. – YES.
RATIO: The applicable law in this case is Section 4 of
P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of RA 7975
which took effect on May 16, 1995, which was again
amended on February 5, 1997 by RA 8249. The above
law is clear as to the composition of the original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Under Section 4(a),
the following offenses are specifically enumerated:
violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No.
1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code. In order for the
Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction over the
said offenses, the latter must be committed by,
among others, officials of the executive branch
occupying positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and
higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989. However, the law is
not devoid of exceptions. Those that are
classified as Grade 26 and below may still fall
within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
provided that they hold the positions thus
enumerated by the same law. Particularly and
exclusively enumerated are provincial governors, vice-
governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and
other provincial department heads; city mayors, vice-
mayors, members of the sangguniang
panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers ,
and other city department heads; officials of the
diplomatic service occupying the position as consul and
higher; Philippine army and air force colonels, naval
captains, and all officers of higher rank; PNP chief
superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank; City
and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and
officials and prosecutors in the Office of the
Ombudsman and special prosecutor; and presidents,
directors or trustees, or managers of government-
owned or controlled corporations, state universities or
educational institutions or foundations. In connection
with this, Section 4(b) of the same law provides that
176
 emedial Law Review
Digests
other offenses or felonies committed by public officials
and employees mentioned in subsection (a) in relation
to their office also fall under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. By simple analogy, applying the
provisions of the pertinent law, respondent
Amante, being a member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod at the time of the alleged
commission of an offense in relation to her office,
falls within the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
Also, although the violation of the Auditing
Code is not included in the offenses provided for in
Sec. 4(a) (violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended,
R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of
the Revised Penal Code), the law is broad enough to
include other offenses or felonies in relation to the
public officer’s office. The said other offenses and
felonies are broad in scope but are limited only to
those that are committed in relation to the public
official or employee's office. This Court had ruled
that as long as the offense charged in the
information is intimately connected with the
office and is alleged to have been perpetrated
while the accused was in the performance,
though improper or irregular, of his official
functions, there being no personal motive to
commit the crime and had the accused not have
committed it had he not held the aforesaid office,
the accused is held to have been indicted for "an
offense committed in relation" to his office. Like
in the case of Lacson vs. Executive Secretary, where
the crime involved is murder, the SC ruled that: “The
phrase "other offenses or felonies" is too broad as to
include the crime of murder, provided it was
committed in relation to the accused’s official
functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what
determines the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction is the
official position or rank of the offender – that is,
whether he is one of those public officers or employees
enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4.” With this,
the SC ruled that a close reading of the Information
filed against respondent Amante for violation of The
Auditing Code of the Philippines reveals that the said
offense was committed in relation to her office, making
her fall under Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended.
SERRANA V. SANDIGANBANYAN
(Sorry, this is a long digest but mostly because I
included the pertinent law provisions just in case sir
asks for an enumeration.)
FACTS: Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior
student of the UP-Cebu, thus a government scholar.
She was appointed by President Joseph Estrada as a
student regent of UP, to serve a one-year term.
Serrana, with her siblings and relatives, registered
with the Securities and Exchange Commission the
Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc.
(OSRFI).
CrimPro
One of the projects of the OSRFI was the
renovation of the Vinzons Hall Annex in UP Diliman.
President Estrada gave P15,000,000.00 to the OSRFI
as financial assistance for the proposed renovation.
The source of the funds, according to the information,
was the Office of the President.
The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to
materialize. The succeeding student regent, Kristine
Clare Bugayong, and Christine Jill De Guzman,
Secretary General of the KASAMA sa U.P filed a
complaint for Malversation of Public Funds.
Serrana moved to quash the
information, claiming Sandiganbayan does not have
any jurisdiction over the offense charged or over her
person, in her capacity as UP student regent.
1. Serrana claimed that R.A. No. 3019, as
amended by R.A. No. 8249, enumerates the
crimes or offenses over which the Sandiganbayan
has jurisdiction. It has no jurisdiction over the
crime of estafa. It only has jurisdiction over Crimes
Committed by Public Officers, Title VII, Book II of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Estafa falling under
Title X, Chapter VI (Crimes Against Property), Book
II of the RPC is not within the Sandiganbayan’s
jurisdiction.
2. She likewise said that the Sandiganbayan
had no jurisdiction over her person. As a student
regent, she was not a public officer since she
merely represented her peers, in contrast to the
other regents who held their positions in an ex
officio capacity; that she was a simple student and
did not receive any salary as a student regent.
3. She further contended she had no power or
authority to receive monies or funds, such power
was vested with the Board of Regents (BOR) as a
whole. Since it was not alleged in the information
that it was among her functions or duties to
receive funds, or that the crime was committed in
connection with her official functions, the same is
beyond the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan citing
the case of Soller v. Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE: DID SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT QUASHING THE
INFORMATION AND DISMISING THE CASE
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT IS HAS NO JURISDICTION
OVER THE OFFENSE CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION
(WON Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case)—
Sandiganbayan HAS jurisdiction
RATIO:
1. The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan isset by
P.D. No. 1606, as amended, not by R.A. No.
3019, as amended.
It is P.D. No.1606, as amended, rather than
R.A. No. 3019, as amended, that determines the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No.
1486, which was amended by P.D. No. 1606
(expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan);
177
 emedial Law Review CrimPro
Digests
amended by P.D. No. 1861, further altering the thereof classified as Grade “Grade '27'â€
Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975 made and up under the Compensation and Position
succeeding amendments, again amended by R.A. No. Classification Act of 1989;
8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. " _____(3) Members of the judiciary without
As it now stands, the Sandiganbayan has prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
jurisdiction over the following:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall " _____(4) Chairmen and members of
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases Constitutional Commission, without prejudice
involving: to the provisions of the Constitution; and
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and " _____(5) All other national and local officials
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, classified as Grade “Grade '27'†and
and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of higher under the Compensation and Position
the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of Classification Act of 1989.
the accused are officials occupying the B. Other offenses of felonies whether simple or
following positions in the government, whether complexed with other crimes committed by the
in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at public officials and employees mentioned in
the time of the commission of the offense: subsection a of this section in relation to their
office.
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in
the positions of regional director and higher, connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14
otherwise classified as Grade “27†and and 14-A, issued in 1986.
higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 989 (Republic Act No. " _____In cases where none of the accused
6758), specifically including: are occupying positions corresponding to
Salary Grade “Grade '27'†or higher, as
"_____ (a) Provincial governors, vice- prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758,
governors, members of thesangguniang or military and PNP officer mentioned above,
panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be
assessors, engineers, and other city vested in the proper regional court,
department heads; metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court,
and municipal circuit trial court, as the case
"_____(b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members may be, pursuant to their respective
of the sangguniang panlungsod, city jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other Blg. 129, as amended.
city department heads;
" _____The Sandiganbayan shall exercise
"_____(c ) Officials of the diplomatic service exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final
occupying the position of consul and higher; judgments, resolutions or order of regional trial
courts whether in the exercise of their own
" _____(d) Philippine army and air force original jurisdiction or of their appellate
colonels, naval captains, and all officers of jurisdiction as herein provided.
higher rank;
" _____The Sandiganbayan shall have
"_____(e) Officers of the Philippine National exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for
Police while occupying the position of provincial the issuance of the writs of mandamus,
director and those holding the rank of senior prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus,
superintended or higher; injunctions, and other ancillary writs and
processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and
" _____(f) City and provincial prosecutors and over petitions of similar nature, including quo
their assistants, and officials and prosecutors warranto, arising or that may arise in cases
in the Office of the Ombudsman and special filed or which may be filed under Executive
prosecutor; Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986:
Provided, That the jurisdiction over these
" _____(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme
managers of government-owned or controlled Court.
corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations. " _____The procedure prescribed in Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the
" _____(2) Members of Congress and officials implementing rules that the Supreme Court

178
 emedial Law Review
Digests
has promulgated and may thereafter
promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for
review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to
appeals and petitions for review filed with the
Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the
Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan
to the Supreme Court, the Office of the
Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor,
shall represent the People of the Philippines,
except in cases filed pursuant to Executive
Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
" _____In case private individuals are charged
as co-principals, accomplices or accessories
with the public officers or employees, including
those employed in government-owned or
controlled corporations, they shall be tried
jointly with said public officers and employees
in the proper courts which shall exercise
exclusive jurisdiction over them.
" _____Any provisions of law or Rules of Court
to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal
action and the corresponding civil action for
the recovery of civil liability shall, at all times,
be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly
determined in, the same proceeding by the
Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the
filing of the criminal action being deemed to
necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil
action, and no right to reserve the filing such
civil action separately from the criminal action
shall be recognized: Provided, however, That
where the civil action had heretofore been filed
separately but judgment therein has not yet
been rendered, and the criminal case is
hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the
appropriate court, said civil action shall be
transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the
appropriate court, as the case may be, for
consolidation and joint determination with the
criminal action, otherwise the separate civil
action shall be deemed abandoned."
Upon the other hand, R.A. No. 3019 is a
penal statute which represses certain acts of public
officers and private persons which constitute graft or
corrupt practices or which may lead thereto. Section
10 of R.A. No. 3019 provides that all prosecutions for
violation of the said law should be filed with the
Sandiganbayan.
R.A. No. 3019 does NOT contain an
enumeration of the cases over which the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. In fact, Section 4 of
R.A. No. 3019 erroneously cited by Serrana, deals not
with the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan but with
prohibition on private individual:
Section 4. Prohibition on private individuals.
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person having family or
close personal relation with any public official to
capitalize or exploit or take advantage of such family
CrimPro
or close personal relation by directly or indirectly
requesting or receiving any present, gift or material or
pecuniary advantage from any other person having
some business, transaction, application, request or
contract with the government, in which such public
official has to intervene. Family relation shall include
the spouse or relatives by consanguinity or affinity in
the third civil degree. The word close personal
relations shall include close personal friendship, social
and fraternal connections, and professional
employment all giving rise to intimacy which assures
free access to such public officer.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to
induce or cause any public official to commit any of the
offenses defined in Section 3 hereof.
In fine, the two statutes differ in that P.D. No. 1606,
as amended, defines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan while R.A. No. 3019, as amended,
defines graft and corrupt practices and provides for
their penalties.
2. Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the
offense of estafa.
Relying on Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606,
Serrana contends that estafa is not among those
crimes cognizable by Sandiganbayan. We note that in
hoisting this argument, petitioner isolated the first
paragraph of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, without
regard to the succeeding paragraphs of the said
provision. The rule is well-established in this
jurisdiction that every section, provision or clause of
the statute must be expounded by reference to each
other in order to arrive at the effect contemplated by
the legislature.
Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads:
B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or
complexed with other crimes committed by the public
officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of
this section in relation to their office.
Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction
over other felonies committed by public officials in
relation to their office.
We see no plausible or sensible reason to
exclude estafa as one of the offenses included in
Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606. The jurisdiction is
simply subject to the twin requirements that (a) the
offense is committed by public officials and employees
mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended, and that (b) the offense is committed in
relation to their office.
The 1987 Constitution does not define who are
public officers. Rather, the varied definitions and
concepts are found in different statutes and
jurisprudence. In Aparri v. Court of Appeals the Court
held that:
A public office is the right, authority, and duty
created and conferred by law, by which for a given
period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure
of the creating power, an individual is invested with
some portion of the sovereign functions of the
179
 emedial Law Review
Digests
government, to be exercise by him for the benefit of
the public
Serrana claims she is not a public officer with
Salary Grade 27; she is, in fact, a regular tuition fee-
paying student. This is bereft of merit. It is not only
the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. While the first part of Section 4(A)
covers only officials with Salary Grade 27 and higher,
its second part specifically includes other executive
officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade
27 and higher but who are by express provision of law
placed under the jurisdiction of the said court. Serrana
falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as
she is placed there by express provision of law
Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly
vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over
Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations.
Serrana falls under this category. As the
Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs
functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a
non-stock corporation.
Moreover, it is well established that
compensation is not an essential element of public
office. At most, it is merely incidental to the public
office.
Moreover, UP is maintained by the Government
and it declares no dividends and is not a corporation
created for profit. Serrana is therefore a public officer
by express mandate of P.D. No. 1606 and
jurisprudence.
3. The offense charged was committed in relation
to public office, according to the Information.
Serrana likewise argues that even assuming
she is a public officer, the Sandiganbayan would still
not have jurisdiction over the offense because it was
not committed in relation to her office because she had
no power or authority to act without the approval of
the BOR. Resultantly, her act was done in a private
capacity and not in relation to public office.
Jurisdiction is determined by the averments in the
information. It is not affected by the pleas or the
theories set up by defendant or respondent in an
answer, a motion to dismiss, or a motion to quash.
4. Source of funds is a defense that should be
raised during trial on the merits.
It is contended by Serrana that the amount
came from President Estrada’s private funds and not
from the government coffers.
The Court cannot agree. The information
alleges that the funds came from the Office of the
President and not its then occupant, President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada. Again, it is the averments that
determine jurisdiction, not the defenses or theories of
the defendant or respondent.
ESQUIVEL vs. OMBUDSMAN
CrimPro
FACTS: PO2 Eduardo and SPO1 Catacutan are
assigned to the Regional Intelligence and Investigation
Division of San Fernando Pampanga. They filed their
complaint-affidavits with the CIDG against petitioners
Antonio Esquivel (the municipal mayor Jaen, Nueva
Ecija) and his brother Eboy Esquivel. They crimes
complained of were illegal arrest, arbitrary detention,
maltreatment, attempted murder and grave threats.
Several other police officers were accused with the
Esquivels.
The initial investigation showed that on March
1998, Eduardo was in his parents’ house, about to eat
lunch when Equivels arrived with other police officers.
They disarmed Eduardo and forced him to board their
vehicle and brought him to the municipal hall. On the
way, Mayor Esquivel mauled him and threatened to kill
him while pointing a gun at Eduardo.
Upon arrival at the town hall, Mayor Esquivel
ordered a certain SPO1 Espiritu to kill Eduardo but
SPO1 Catacutan arrived to verify what happened to
Eduardo. The mayor threatened him as well. The
mayor continued to harass, threaten and inflict
physical injuries upon Eduardo until he lost
consciousness. When he woke up, he was released but
no before he signed a statement in a police blotter that
he was in good physical condition. The alleged motive
for this was because the mayor believed Eduardo and
Catacutan were among the law enforcers who raided a
jueteng den connected to the mayor.
After investigation, the CIDG forwarded the
findings to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman,
which conducted a preliminary investigation and
required the submission of counter-affidavits. In their
counter-affidavits, the Esquivels allege that Eduardo
was actually a fugitive with a warrant of arrest for
malversation and they just confiscated his gun for
illegal possession.
In June 1998, the Deputy Ombudsman issued
a resolution recommending that both Esquivels be
indicted for less serious physical injuries and grave
threats. As to the charges against other petitioners,
they were dismissed. Then Ombudsman Desierto
approved this. So, the separate informations were filed
against the Esquivels in the Sandiganbayan.
Accused filed an MR but this was denied.
Esquivels were arraigned, pleaded not guilty. With the
denial of their MR, they elevate the matter to the SC
alleging GADLEJ in the issuance of the resolution of the
deputy ombudsman.
Petitioners theorize that the Sandiganbayan
has no jurisdiction over their persons as they hold
positions excluded in Republic Act No. 7975. As the
positions of municipal mayors and barangay captains
are not mentioned therein, they claim they are not
covered by said law under the principle of expressio
unius est exclusio alterius.
ISSUE: W/N the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over
the cases against both Mayor Esquivel and Eboy
180
 emedial Law Review
Digests
Esquivel. - Yes, Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction.
Esquivels are wrong!
RATIO: Petitioners’ claim lacks merit. In Rodrigo, Jr.
vs. Sandiganbayan, Binay vs.
Sandiganbayan, and Layus vs. Sandiganbayan, we
already held that municipal mayors fall under the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Nor can Barangay Captain Mark
Anthony Esquivel claim that since he is not a municipal
mayor, he is outside the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction.
R.A. 7975, as amended by R.A. No. 8249, provides
that it is only in cases where "none of the accused
(underscoring supplied) are occupying positions
corresponding to salary grade ‘27’ or higher" that
"exclusive original jurisdiction shall be vested in the
proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court,
municipal trial court, and municipal circuit court, as the
case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions
as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
amended." Note that under the 1991 Local
Government Code, Mayor Esquivel has a salary grade
of 27. Since Barangay Captain Esquivel is the co-
accused in Criminal Case No. 24777 of Mayor Esquivel,
whose position falls under salary grade 27, the
Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse of
discretion in assuming jurisdiction over said criminal
case, as well as over Criminal Case No. 24778,
involving both of them. Hence, the writ of certiorari
cannot issue in petitioners’ favor.
E. Jurisdiction of the Ombudsman
DOJ V. LIWAG
Facts: Alleging that she was a former undercover
agent of the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task
Force and the PNP Narcotics Group, Mary Ong filed
with a complaint-affidavit on January 8, 2001 with the
Ombudsman against PNP General Panfilo Lacson, PNP
Colonel Michael Ray B. Aquino, other high-ranking
officials of the PNP, and several private individuals. The
Ombudsman found the complaint-affidavit of Ong
sufficient in form and substance and thus required
respondents therein to file their counter-affidavits on
the charges. Respondents submitted their counter-
affidavits and prayed that the charges against them be
dismissed.
On March 9, 2001, Ong and other witnesses
executed sworn statements before the NBI alleging the
same facts and circumstances in Ong’s complaint-
affidavit before the Ombudsman. NBI Director Wycoco
wrote a letter to DOJ Secretary Hernando Perez
recommending the investigation of Lacson, Aquino,
other PNP officials, and private individuals for the
alleged crimes of: (1) kidnapping for ransom of Zeng
Jia Xuan, Hong Zhen Quiao, Zeng Kang Pang, James
Wong and Wong Kam Chong; (2) murder of Wong Kam
Chong; (3) kidnapping of ransom and murder of Chong
Hiu Ming.
CrimPro
On May 7, 2001, a panel of prosecutors from
DOJ subpoenaed Lacson, Aquino, and other persons
named in the witnesses’ sworn statements. The
subpoena directed them to submit their counter-
affidavits and controverting evidence on the scheduled
preliminary investigation on the complaint filed by the
NBI on May 18, 2001.
Through a letter dated May 18, 2001, Lacson
and Aquino manifested that the DOJ panel of
prosecutors should dismiss the complaint filed
therewith by Ong since there are complaints pending
before the Ombudsman alleging a similar set of facts
against them. Furthermore, citing Uy v.
Sandiganbayan, they claimed that the Ombudsman
has primary jurisdiction over criminal cases cognizable
by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this
primary jurisdiction, he may take over, at any stage,
from any investigatory agency of Government, the
investigation of such cases involving public officials,
including police and military officials such as private
respondents.
The DOJ construed the letter as a motion to
dismiss and on May 28, 2011 denied the dismissal of
the cases. On the same day, the Solicitor General
received a copy of a Petition for Prohibition filed by
Lacson and Aquino before the RTC-Manila.
On June 22, 2001, Judge Liwag granted the
Petition for Prohibition against DOJ and issued a Writ
of Preliminary Injunction enjoining the DOJ from
conducting the preliminary investigation against
Lacson and Aquino.
The DOJ and NBI filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition challenging Judge Liwag’s Order and
Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Issue: Whether the DOJ has jurisdiction to conduct a
preliminary investigation despite the pendency before
the Ombudsman of a complaint involving the same
accused, facts, and circumstances? - No jurisdiction.
Petition dismissed.
RATIO:
1. Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction.
Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989
provides that the Office of the Ombudsman has
“primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of its primary
jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any
investigatory agency of the Government, the
investigation of such cases.” This power to take over a
case at any time is not given to other investigative
bodies. This means that the power of the
Ombudsman to investigate cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan is not co-equal with other
investigative bodies, such as the DOJ. The
Ombudsman can delegate the power but the delegate
cannot claim equal power.
Thus, while the DOJ has general jurisdiction to
conduct preliminary investigation of cases involving
violations of the Revised Penal Code, this general
jurisdiction cannot diminish the plenary power and
181
 emedial Law Review
Digests
primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate
complaints specifically directed against public officers
and employees. The Office of the Ombudsman is a
constitutional creation. In contrast, the DOJ is an
extension of the executive department, bereft of the
constitutional independence granted to the
Ombudsman.
2. No concurrent jurisdiction
Under the doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction,
when judicial/quasi-judicial bodies have equal
jurisdiction to deal with the same subject matter, the
body or agency that first takes cognizance of the
complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of
the others. Assuming there is concurrent jurisdiction
between the Ombudsman and the DOJ in the conduct
of preliminary investigation, this concurrence is not to
be taken as an unrestrained freedom to file the same
case before both bodies or be viewed as a contest
between these bodies as to which will first complete
the investigation. In the present case, it is the
Ombudsman before whom the complaint was
initially filed. Hence, it has the authority to
proceed with the preliminary investigation to the
exclusion of the DOJ.
Unlike the cases of Cojuangco v. PCGG which
upheld the jurisdiction of the PCGG over the alleged
use of coco levy funds; Sanchez v. Demetriou where
the Court recognized the authority of DOJ prosecutors
to conduct preliminary investigation against Mayor
Sanchez for the alleged rape-slay of Sarmenta and the
killing of Gomez; and Aguinaldo v. Domagas where the
Court affirmed the authority of the DOJ panel of
prosecutors to file an information without previous
authority from the Ombudsman, there was no
simultaneous exercise of power between two
coordinate bodies and no conflicting findings or orders.
In this case, however, the complaint was filed ahead
with the Office of Ombudsman for preliminary
investigation. Moreover, to allow the same complaint
to be filed successively before 2 or more investigative
bodies would: (1) promote multiplicity of proceedings;
(2) cause undue difficulties on respondent; (3) result
in conflicting resolutions regarding the guilt of
respondent; and (4) entail unnecessary expenditure of
public funds.
[More on Ombudsman’s authority]
Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution
specifically vests in the Office of the Ombudsman
the plenary power to investigate any malfeasance,
misfeasance or non-feasance of public officers or
employees. To discharge its duty effectively, the
Constitution endowed the Office of the
Ombudsman with special features which puts it a
notch above other grievance-handling,
investigate bodies. The Office of the Ombudsman
was likewise envisioned by the Constitution to serve as
the principal and primary complaints and action center
for the aggrieved layman baffled by the bureaucratic
maze of procedures. For this purpose, it was granted
CrimPro
more than the usual powers given to prosecutors. It
was vested with the power to investigate complaints
against a public office or officer on its own initiative,
even without a formal complaint lodged before it. It
can inquire into acts of government agencies and
public servants based on reports in the media and
those which come to his attention through sources
other than a complaint. The method of filing a
complaint with the Ombudsman is direct, informal,
speedy and inexpensive. All that may be required
from a complainant is sufficient information detailing
the illegal or improper acts complained of. The
ordinary citizen, who has become increasingly
dependent on public agencies, is put to minimal
expense and difficulty in getting his complaint acted on
by the Office of the Ombudsman. Vis-à-vis other
prosecutors, the exercise by the Ombudsman of
its power to investigate public officials is
given preference over other bodies.
LAZATIN v. DESIERTO (as Ombudsman)
Petitioners: Carmelo Lazatin, Marino Morales, Teodoro
David and Angelito Pelayo
Respondents: Hon. Aniano Desierto (Omb) and
Sandiganbayan
FACTS: The Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau of
the Office of the Ombudsman filed a Complaint-
affidavit, charging petitioners Lazatin et al. with Illegal
Use of Public Funds as defined and penalized under
Article 220 of the RPC and violation of Section 3 (a)
and (e) of RA 3019. The complaint alleged that there
were irregularities in the use of Congressman Lazatin
of his Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) for 1996
(he was both proponent and implementer of the
projects funded from his CDF; he signed vouchers and
supporting papers pertinent to the disbursement as
Disbursing Officer; and he received, as claimant,
eighteen (18) checks amounting to P4,868,277.08).
Thus, Lazatin, with the help of Morales, Pelayo, David,
was allegedly able to convert his CDF into cash.
A preliminary investigation was conducted and
the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau
(EPIB) thereafter issued a resolution recommending
the filing against petitioners of 14 counts each of
Malversation of Public Funds and violation of Section
3(e) of RA 3019. This resolution was approved by
Ombudsman Desierto. Hence, 28 informations were
filed against petitioners in the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioners Lazatin et al. filed their respective
Motions for reconsideration/reinvestigation which were
granted. The Office of Special Prosecutors (OSP)
recommended the dismissal of the cases for lack or
insufficiency of evidence. However, Desierto ordered
the Office of the Legal Affiars (OLP) to review the OSP
resolution. In a memorandum, the OLA recommended
that the OSP resolution be disapproved and the OSP be
directed to proceed with the trial. Desierto adopted the
OLA memorandum. The cases were then returned to
182
 emedial Law Review
Digests
the Sandiganbayan for continuation of criminal
proceedings.
Hence, petitioners Lazatin et al. filed a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65. They contend that the
Ombudsman had no authority to overturn the OSP's
Resolution because, under Section 13, Article XI of the
1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman is clothed only
with the power to watch, investigate and recommend
the filing of proper cases against erring officials, but it
was not granted the power to prosecute. They point
out that under the Constitution, the power to
prosecute belongs to the OSP, which was intended by
the framers to be a separate and distinct entity from
the Office of the Ombudsman. Petitioners conclude
that, as provided by the Constitution, the OSP being a
separate and distinct entity, the Ombudsman should
have no power and authority over the OSP. Thus,
petitioners maintain that R.A. No. 6770 (The
Ombudsman Act of 1989), which made the OSP an
organic component of the Office of the Ombudsman,
should be struck down for being unconstitutional.
ISSUE: Whether Ombudsman Desierto acted with
GADLEJ – NO.
RATIO: Petitioners' attack against the constitutionality
of R.A. No. 6770 is stale. It has long been settled
that the provisions of R.A. No. 6770 granting the Office
of the Ombudsman prosecutorial powers and placing
the OSP under said office have no constitutional
infirmity.
The Court cited the case of Acop v. Office of
the Ombudsman. In that case, the Court held that
giving prosecutorial powers to the Ombudsman is in
accordance with the Constitution as paragraph 8,
Section 13, Article XI provides that the Ombudsman
shall “exercise such other functions or duties as may
be provided by law.” The constitutionality of Section 3
of R.A. No. 6770, which subsumed the OSP under the
Office of the Ombudsman, was likewise upheld by the
Court in Acop.
More recently, in Office of the Ombudsman v.
Valera, the Court declared that the OSP is “merely a
component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may
only act under the supervision and control, and upon
authority of the Ombudsman” and ruled that under
R.A. No. 6770, the power to preventively suspend is
lodged only with the Ombudsman and Deputy
Ombudsman. The Court's ruling in Acop that the
authority of the Ombudsman to prosecute based on
R.A. No. 6770 was authorized by the Constitution was
also made the foundation for the decision in Perez v.
Sandiganbayan, where it was held that the power to
prosecute carries with it the power to authorize the
filing of informations, which power had not been
delegated to the OSP. It is, therefore, beyond cavil
that under the Constitution, Congress was not
proscribed from legislating the grant of additional
powers to the Ombudsman or placing the OSP under
the Office of the Ombudsman.
CrimPro
NOTE: Digest by Trian Lauang from 4A
PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING
COMMITTEE v. DESIERTO
Facts:
A complaint was filed by Orlando Savlador in his
capacity as consultant of the PCGG detailed with the
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact Finding Committee on Behest
Loans against private respondents who were former
officers of the Development Bank of the Philippines and
Pagdanan Timber Products (PTPI), and were charged
with the violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. The Fact-Finding Committee upon
investigation, determined that in 1974 the said
respondents effected a loan transaction between the
DBP and the PTPI which bore the characteristics of a
behest loan.
The complaint was filed in the Office of the
Ombdudsman for violation of RA 3019 (Anti Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act). In 1998 the Ombudsman
dismissed the complaint and held that (1) there was no
evidence that the loan was a behest loan at the
command or urging of previous government officials
(Marcos); (2) PTPI complied with the DBP requirement
that it would increase its paid up capital; (3) the loan
was not undercollateralized and (4) the complaint was
barred by prescription.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, alleging
that the Ombusmand committed grave abuse of
discretion in (1) holding that the offenses charged in
the complaint had already prescribed and (2)
dismissing the complaint for lack of probable cause to
indict private respondents for violation of RA 3019.
Issue: Whether the Ombudsman committed grave
abuse of discretion in (1) holding that the offenses
charged in the complaint had already prescribed and
(2) dismissing the complaint for lack of probable cause
to indict private respondents for violation of the Anti
Graft and Courrpt Practices Act.
Held: (1) YES,NO. Petition is Dismissed,
Ombudsman’s decision affirmed.
1. The Ombudsman incorrectly held that the ten year
prescriptive period commenced on the date of the
violation of RA 3019. Prescription as provided by law
shall begin to run from the day of the commission of
the violation of the law, and if the same be not know
at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation
and punishment. Thus in this case it was impossible for
the State to have known the violations of RA 3019
committed in 1974 as the transactions were done with
the connivance and conspiracy between the
beneficiaries of the loans and the public officials
involved.
Therefore the prescriptive period commenced
from the date of discovery of the offense in 1992 after
the the investigation of the Committee. Prescription did
not set in when the complaint was filed in 1998 or
183
 emedial Law Review
Digests
after six years.
2. The Ombudsman did not act with grave abuse of
discretion when he found that there was no evidence
to establish probable cause to sustain the charges.
There was no evidence on record to prove that the
loan between DPB and PTPI was granted at the behest,
command, or urging by previous government officials.
1) the loan accommodation was not
undercollateralized; 2) PTPI complied with the DPB
requirements to increase its paid up capital; 3) the
loan proposal was studied and evaluated by the DBP;
4) petitioners did not point out circumstances or overt
acts indicating criminal design by the parties; and 5)
the fact that the loan was approved on within 5 days
did not manifest or prove partiality or bad faith as
there was full compliance with banking laws, practices,
and procedures.
In sum it cannot be concluded that the
Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in
finding lack of probable cause. the Ombudsman has
discretion to determine whether a criminal case, given
its facts and circumstances, should be filed or not. It is
basically his call and he may dismiss the complaint
forthwith should he find it to be insufficient in form or
substance or should he find it otherwise, to continue
tith the inquirey; or he may proceed with the
investigation if, in his view, the complaint is in due and
proper form and substance.
The Ombudsman has the power to investigate
and prosecute any act or omission of a public officer or
employee when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. It has been the
consistent ruling of the court not to interfere with the
Ombudsman’s exercise of his investigatory and
prosecutory powers as long as his rulings are
supported by substantial evidence.
CASTRO v DELORIA
FACTS: Castro was charged by the Ombudsman
before the RTC with Malversation of public funds. The
information alleged that Castro was a revenue officer
of the BIR who misappropriated 556K+ of collections.
Castro pleaded NOT GUILTY on arraignment. On Aug
31, 2001, Castro filed a Motion to Quash on the
grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack of authority of
the Ombudsman to conduct the preliminary
investigation and file the Information since it failed t to
allege her salary grade -- a material fact upon which
depends the jurisdiction of the RTC. Citing Uy v.
Sandiganbayan, petitioner further argued that as she
was a public employee with salary grade 27, the case
filed against her was cognizable by the RTC and may
be investigated and prosecuted only by the public
prosecutor, and not by the Ombudsman whose
prosecutorial power was limited to cases cognizable by
theSandiganbayan.
The RTC denied & held that the (1) jurisdiction
of the RTC over the case did not depend on the salary
CrimPro
grade, but on the penalty imposable upon the latter for
the offense charged. It also (2) sustained the
prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman since in the
cited case the court later overturned their decision in a
clarificatory resolution. Finally, it said that the (3)
Motion to Quash was contrary to Sec. 1, Rule 117, for
it was filed after Castro pleaded not guilty under the
Information.
Castro contends that the prevailing jurisprudence from
Aug 9, 1999 til May 20, 2001 was that the
Ombudsman had no prosecutorial powers over cases
cognizable by the RT and since the investigation and
prosecution against Castro was conducted by the
Ombudsman beginning April 26, 2000, then the August
9, 1999 Decision in Uy was applicable, notwithstanding
that the decision was set aside in the March 20, 2001
Resolution. So, the Information that was filed against
petitioner was void for at that time the Ombudsman
had no investigatory and prosecutorial powers over the
case.
Castro filed an MR which was denied so filed a petition
for certiorari w/ CA also dismissed. Filed 65 with SC.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the Ombudsman had the authority to file
the information in light of the ruling in the First
"Uy vs. Sandiganbayan" case, which declared
that the prosecutorial powers of the
Ombudsman is limited to cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan. – YES.
2. W/N the clarificatory Resolution in the Uy vs.
Sandiganbayan case can be made applicable to
the Castro, without violating the constitutional
provision on ex-post facto laws and denial of
the accused to due process. – YES.
RATIO: In the case of Office of the Ombudsman v.
Enoc, similar grounds were raised and the SC held that
the Ombudsman has powers to prosecute not only
graft cases within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan but also those cognizable by the
regular courts. It held:
The power to investigate and to prosecute
granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and
unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission of any
public officer or employee when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.
The law does not make a distinction between cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable
by regular courts. It has been held that the clause "any
illegal act or omission of any public official" is broad
enough to embrace any crime committed by a public
officer or employee.
The reference made by RA 6770 to cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, particularly in
Section 15(1) giving the Ombudsman primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, and Section 11(4) granting the Special
Prosecutor the power to conduct preliminary
investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, should not be
184
 emedial Law Review
Digests
construed as confining the scope of the investigatory
and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to such
cases.
Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Office of the
Ombudsman should not be equated with the limited
authority of the Special Prosecutor under Section 11 of
RA 6770. The Office of the Special Prosecutor is merely
a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may
only act under the supervision and control and upon
authority of the Ombudsman. Its power to conduct
preliminary investigation and to prosecute is limited to
criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Certainly, the lawmakers did not
intend to confine the investigatory and prosecutory
power of the Ombudsman to these types of cases. The
Ombudsman is mandated by law to act on all
complaints against officers and employees of the
government and to enforce their administrative, civil
and criminal liability in every case where the evidence
warrants. To carry out this duty, the law allows him to
utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate any
fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government
service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to
assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain
cases. Those designated or deputized to assist him
work under his supervision and control. The law
likewise allows him to direct the Special prosecutor to
prosecute cases outside the Sandiganbayan’s
jurisdiction in accordance with Section 11(4c) of RA
6770.
In the case of Office of Ombudsman v. Hon.
Breva, court held that the March 20, 2001 Resolution,
that the Ombudsman has prosecutorial powers in cases
cognizable by the RTC, extends even to criminal
information filed or pending at the time when its
August 9, 1999 Decision was the operative ruling on
the issue.
F. Review of Decisions of the Ombudsman
ANTONINO V. OMBUDSMAN
Facts:
On Oct. 3, 1963, Pres. Macapagal issued
Presidential Proclamation No. 168 which withdrew
from sale and settlement and reserved for
recreational and health resort site purposes (under
the administration of the municipality of General
Santos) a parcel of land (Mr-1660-D).
On January 22, 1968, RA 5412 (Charter of the City
of General Santos) was enacted. Through RA 5412,
the National Government ceded to the City of Gen
San ownership and possession to all lands of the
public domain within the city. Meanwhile, RA 6386
provided that all incomes derived from the
disposition of all lands of the public domain within
the city shall accrue exclusively to Gen San.
Mr-1660-D was subsequently divided into 3 lots:
Lot Y-1, Lot X, Lot Y-2. On February 25, 1983,
President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2273
amending Proclamation No. 168 excluding Lots Y-1
CrimPro
& Y-2 from the coverage of Proclamation No. 168.
Thus, only Lot X remained covered by Proclamation
No. 168 and thus reserved for recreational and
health site purposes.
After the exclusion of Lots Y-1 & Y-2, the Heirs of
Cabalo Kusop applied for Free Patent and
consequently Certificates of Title were issued in
1983.
In 1984, the local government of Gen San filed two
cases against the Heirs of Kusop for the
Declaration of Nullity of Titles while the Heirs of
Kusop filed a case against Gen San for injunction
and damages. The three cases were consolidated
before the RTC-Gen San, presided by Judge Andre.
On May 1991, the Sanggunaing Panlungsod of Gen
San passed Resolution No. 87 approving the
Compromise Agreement between Gen San and the
Heirs of Kulop. The Compromise Agreement stated
that the Heirs would receive 20,000 square meters
from Lots Y-1 & Y-2 and donate the remaining 17,
658 square meters to the City, “which if added to
Lot X previously donated to the City as stated in
par. 7 of the WHEREAS clause … the City shall
retain a total of 32, 678 square meters.”
Judge Andre approved and adopted the Agreement
as judgment in the three consolidated cases. A
Writ of Execution was issued on Nov. 28, 1995.
However, through a Motion for Exclusion and
Motion for Issuance of Clarificatory Order, Lot X
was excluded from the judgment.
On July 23, 1997, private respondents applied for
Miscellaneous Sales Patent over portions of Lot X.
Public respondent Jonillo (Deputy Land
Management Inspector) recommended for the
approval of the survey authority requested by the
private respondents. On the same day, the Survey
Authority was issued to private respondents by
public respondent CENR Officer Rivera. As a result,
Lot X was subdivided into 16 lots.
On August 2, 1997, respondent City Mayor Nunez
issued 1st Indorsements addressed to CENRO,
DENR stating that her office would not object to
whatever legal proceedings said office may pursue
on applications covering portions of Lot X. Thus,
Jonillo and City Assessor Dinopol, together with the
recommendation of Rivera, submitted an appraisal
of lots X-1 to X-16 stating therein the appraisal
amount of P100.00 per square meter and existing
improvements of residential light house per lot
with an appraised value ranging from P20,000.00
to P50,000.00.
On August 4, 1997, Jonillo wrote the Regional
Executive Director of DENR recommending the
private sale of the subject lots to private
respondents without public auction. Rivera also
issued recommendation letters to the PENR Officer
for the approval of the appraisal of the subject lots
and of the private sale. A notice of sale was issued
by respondent Diaz stating therein that the subject
lots will be sold on Sept. 5, 1997.
185
 emedial Law Review
Digests
On Sept 18, 1997, Certificates of Titles were issued
by the RD-Gen San (respondent Cruzabra) which
were also signed by respondent Momongan (DENR
Regional Executive Director). Sometime on Sept 24
& 25 the registered owners (except for lots X-6, X-
7, X-15, and X-16) sold their lots, through their
attorney-in-fact, respondent Atty. Flaviano to the
AFP-Retirement and Separation Benefits System
for P2,997,000.00 each. TCTs were issued in the
name of the AFP-RSBS. The registered owners of
lots X-6 and X-7 executed a Deed of Exchange
with AFP-RSBS (represented by Jose Ramiscal)
while lots X-15 and X-16 were exchanged with one
office unit or condo unit to be given or ceded to
Atty. Flaviano.
Based on the foregoing, petitioner filed a verified
complaint-affidavit before the Ombudsman against
all the above-mentioned respondents for violation
of Paragraphs (e), (g) and (j), Section 3 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended, and for
malversation of public funds or property through
falsification of public documents.
Ombudsman’s Ruling: Charges against
respondents ROSALITA NUÑEZ, AUGUSTUS
MOMONGAN, ABEDNEGO ADRE, ASTERIA
CRUZABRA, PEDRO NALANGAN III, JULIO DIAZ
and AGAPITO BORINAGA DISMISSED. MR denied.
Issue: Whether the Ombudsman committed GADALEJ
by dismissing the charges against respondents despite
clear and convincing evidence of direct participation
and involvement in the conspiracy to cheat and
defraud the City of Gen San through the illegal
disposition of Lot X? – NO.
RATIO:
1. Procedural Infirmity
Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of
1989) provides:
SEC. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. – (1) All
provisionary orders of the Office of the Ombudsman
are immediately effective and executory.
A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or
decision of the Office of the Ombudsman must be filed
within five (5) days after receipt of written notice and
shall be entertained only on any of the following
grounds:
(1) New evidence has been discovered which
materially affects the order, directive or decision;
(2) Errors of law or irregularities have been committed
prejudicial to the interest of the movant. The motion
for reconsideration shall be resolved within three (3)
days from filing: Provided, That only one motion for
reconsideration shall be entertained.
Other than the statement of material dates wherein
petitioner claimed that she received through counsel
the assailed Resolution of the Ombudsman on January
21, 2000, she failed to establish that her Motion for
Reconsideration was indeed filed on time, and thus,
failed to refute the assertion of the respondents based
on the aforementioned Certification that petitioner was
CrimPro
personally served a copy of the assailed Resolution on
February 24, 1999. Thus the Ombudsman should have
denied the motion for reconsideration since at the time
of its filing, the assailed Resolution was already final.
2. Substantive Issue
Under Sections 12 and 13, Article XI of the
1987 Constitution, and pursuant to R.A. No. 6770, the
Ombudsman has the power to investigate and
prosecute any act or omission of a public officer or
employee when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. Well-settled is
the rule that this Court will not ordinarily
interfere with the Ombudsman's exercise of his
investigatory and prosecutory powers without
good and compelling reasons that indicate
otherwise. The rule is based not only upon respect for
the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by
the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman, but
upon practicality as well.
The rule is not absolute. The aggrieved party
may file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court when the finding of the Ombudsman is
tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The Court laid down the following exceptions in
Collantes v. Marcelo:
1. When necessary to afford adequate
protection to the constitutional rights of the
accused;
2. When necessary for the orderly
administration of justice or to avoid oppression
or multiplicity of actions;
3. When there is a prejudicial question that is
sub judice;
4. When the acts of the officer are without or
in excess of authority;
5. Where the prosecution is under an invalid
law, ordinance or regulation;
6. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
7. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the
offense;
8. Where it is a case of persecution rather than
prosecution;
9. Where the charges are manifestly false and
motivated by the lust for vengeance;
10. When there is clearly no prima facie case
against the accused and a motion to quash on
that ground has been denied.
Grave abuse of discretion exists where a power
is exercised in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility so patent and gross as to amount to evasion
of positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by, or in contemplation of law.
The alleged grave abuse of discretion
imputed to the Ombudsman is found wanting in
this case. Thus, this Court finds no reason to
deviate from the general rule. We concur with the
186
 emedial Law Review
Digests
disquisition of GIO I Rubillar-Arao in dismissing the
charges against respondents, as approved by
Ombudsman Desierto, thus:
1. Respondent Abednego Adre – His participation
extends only to his issuance of an Order excluding Lot-
X from the coverage of the Compromise Agreement. A
review of the terms and conditions of the subject
Compromise Agreement confirms the Order of the
respondent that indeed Lot X was excluded. The Order
of respondent judge was made in accordance with the
facts of the case.
2. Respondents Nuñez and Nalangan – The contents of
the Indorsements cannot be construed as a waiver on
the part of General Santos City on its claim over Lot-X.
On the contrary, it has given DENR the authority to
take the necessary legal proceedings relative to the
titling of the property. Moreover, it should be taken
into account that DENR has the responsibility,
authority and the power to grant alienable and
disposable lands to deserving claimants.
Based on these circumstances, there is no evidence to
prove that respondents Nuñez and Nalangan gave
unwarranted benefit to the claimants by issuing said
Indorsements. In fact, they protected the interest of
the government over Lot-X by immediately filing a
case for nullification of titles upon knowing of the
issuances thereof.
Indeed, while the Ombudsman's
discretion in determining the existence of
probable cause is not absolute, nonetheless,
petitioner must prove that such discretion was
gravely abused in order to warrant the reversal
of the Ombudsman's findings by this Court. In
this respect, petitioner fails.
G. Procedure before the Ombudsman
SESBREÑO V JUDGE AGLUGUB
Facts: Complainant (NOT NAMED) filed three (3)
separate complaints against Enrique Marcelino et al.,
all from the Traffic Management Unit of San Pedro,
Laguna, for Falsification, Grave Threats and Usurpation
of Authority. The three (3) cases were assigned to
Judge Aglugub’s branch and subsequently consolidated
for disposition.
After conducting a preliminary examination,
judge Aglugub issued a Consolidated Resolution
dismissing the cases for Falsification and Grave
Threats for lack of probable cause, and setting for
arraignment the case for Usurpation of Authority.
Except for Marcelino who failed to appear during the
arraignment, all of the accused were arraigned. Judge
Aglugub issued a warrant for Marcelino’s arrest.
Subsequently, complainant filed a Private
Complainants’ Urgent Manifestation alleging that the
accused were also charged with violation of Republic
Act No. 10 (R.A. 10) and praying that warrants of
arrest be likewise issued against all of the accused.
Acting upon this manifestation, judge Aglugub
issued an Order stating that a charge for violation of
CrimPro
R.A. 10 was indeed alleged in the complaint for
Usurpation of Authority but was not resolved due to
oversight. However, Judge Aglugub found no probable
cause and dismissed the charge for violation of R.A.
10. Further, citing Sec. 6(b), Rule 112 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rules), judge Aglugub
denied complainant’s prayer for the issuance of
warrants of arrest against the accused and ordered
the records forwarded to the Provincial
Prosecutor’s Office (PPO) for review.
Thereafter, complainant’s counsel, Atty. Raul
Sesbreño (Atty. Sesbreño), filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for
Issuance of Warrant of Arrest Against Non-Appearing
Accused. Judge Aglugub, however, did not act on these
motions allegedly because the court had already lost
jurisdiction over the case by then.
The PPO affirmed respondent’s order and
remanded the case to the court for further proceedings
on the charge of Usurpation of Authority.
The foregoing circumstances brought about the
filing of the instant administrative complaint.
Sesbreño asserts that respondent judge erred
in conducting a preliminary investigation for the charge
of Usurpation of Authority; in not issuing warrants of
arrest for failure of the accused to appear during trial;
in issuing her Order dated February 12, 2004
dismissing the complaint for violation of R.A. 10; and
in transmitting the records of the case to the PPO
instead of the Office of the Ombudsman.
Issues:
Whether Judge Aglugub erred in conducting a
preliminary investigation for usurpation of authority –
NO
Whether Judge Aglugub erred in not issuing warrants
of arrest for failure of accused to appear during trial –
NO
Whether Judge Aglugub erred in dismissing the
complaint for violation of RA 10 – NO
Whether Judge Aglugub erred in transmitting the
records of the case to the PPO instead of the
Office of the Ombudsman –NO (ISSUE RELATED
TO TOPIC)
Ratio:
On 1st and 2nd issues (Preliminary investigation on
usurpation of authority, Issuing warrants of arrest for
failure of the accused to appear during trial)
A preliminary investigation is required before
the filing of a complaint or information for an offense
where the penalty prescribed by law is at least four (4)
years, two (2) months and one (1) day without regard
to the fine. Thus, a preliminary investigation is not
required nor was one conducted for the charge of
violation of usurpation of authority which is punishable
by prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods or from six (6) months and one (1) day to four
(4) years and two (2) months.
This being so, Sec. 9, Rule 112 of the Rules is
applicable. Said section provides that if a complaint or
187
 emedial Law Review
Digests
information is filed directly with the Municipal Trial
Court, the procedure laid down in Sec. 3(a), Rule 112
of the Rules shall be observed. If the judge finds no
sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial, he
shall dismiss the complaint or information. Otherwise,
he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment
order if the accused had already been arrested, and
hold the latter for trial. However, the judge is given
the discretion to merely issue summons instead
of a warrant of arrest if he does not find it
necessary to place the accused under custody.
In this case, judge Aglugub, following the
foregoing procedure, found probable cause to hold the
accused for trial for the charge of Usurpation of
Authority and forthwith set their arraignment and the
pre-trial. There is nothing irregular in the course of
action taken by judge Aglugub. Neither is there merit
in Sesbreno’s contention that judge Aglugub should
have issued a warrant of arrest against the accused for
their failure to appear during the initial presentation of
evidence for the prosecution for the charge of
Usurpation of Authority. The issuance of a warrant
of arrest for non-appearance of the accused
during trial is discretionary upon the judge.
On 3rd and 4th issues (dismissal of RA 10 complaint,
transmitting the records of the case to the PPO
instead of the Office of the Ombudsman)
When judge Aglugub dismissed the complaint
for violation of R.A. 10, she merely did so to correct an
oversight.
With respect to the issue of whether
respondent should have transmitted her Order dated
February 12, 2004 dismissing the charge of violation of
R.A. 10 to the Office of the Ombudsman instead of the
PPO, This issue has already beeen answered by
Administrative Order No. 8 entitled Clarifying and
Modifying Certain Rules of Procedure of the
Ombudsman, which provides “that all prosecutors are
now deputized Ombudsman prosecutors.” Moreover,
“[R]esolutions in Ombudsman cases against public
officers and employees prepared by a deputized
assistant prosecutor shall be submitted to the
Provincial or City Prosecutor concerned who shall, in
turn, forward the same to the Deputy Ombudsman of
the area with his recommendation for the approval or
disapproval thereof. The Deputy Ombudsman shall
take appropriate final action thereon, including the
approval of its filing in the proper regular court or the
dismissal of the complaint, if the crime charged is
punishable by prision correccional or lower, or fine of
not more than P6,000.00 or both. Resolutions
involving offenses falling within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan shall be forwarded by the Deputy
Ombudsman with his recommendation thereon to the
Office of the Ombudsman.”
Thus, judge Aglugub did not err and was, in
fact, merely acting in accordance with law when she
forwarded the case for violation of R.A. 10 to the PPO.
CrimPro
H. Power of the Secretary of Justice over
Prosecutors
PUNZALAN V DELA PEÑA
*I included all the facts in case sir asks for the details
which led to the issue at hand.
*Side note lang yung relevant sa topic natin.
FACTS: Punzalan and the Plata families were
neighbors. On Aug. 13, 1997, Dela Peña, a house
boarder of the Platas, was in front of a store near their
house when the group of Rainier Punzalan, Randall
Punzalan, Ricky Eugenio, Jose Gregorio, Alex “Toto”
Ofrin, and others arrived. Eugenio shouted at Dela
Peña, “Hoy, kalbo, saan mo binili ang sumbrero mo?”
Dela Peña replied, “Kalbo nga ako, ay pinagtatawanan
pa ninyo ako.” Irked by the response, Gregorio slapped
Dela Peña while Rainier punched him in the
mouth. The group then ganged up on him. Somebody
shouted, “Yariin na ‘yan!” Thereafter, Ofrin kicked Dela
Peña and tried to stab him with a balisong but missed.
While Dela Peña was fleeing, he met Robert
Cagara, the Platas’ family driver, who was carrying a
gun. He grabbed the gun and pointed it to the group
chasing him to scare them. Michael Plata, who was
nearby, intervened and tried to wrestle the gun away
from Dela Peña. The gun accidentally went off and hit
Rainier Punzalan on the thigh. The group ran after
them and when they got to the Platas’ house, shouted,
“Lumabas kayo d’yan, putang ina ninyo! Papatayin
namin kayo!”
Rainier Punzalan filed a criminal complaint
against Michael Plata for Attempted Homicide and
against Robert Cagara for Illegal Possession of
Firearm.
In turn, Plata, Cagara and Dela Peña filed
several counter-charges for grave oral defamation,
grave threats, robbery, malicious mischief and slight
physical injuries against the Punzalans, including one
for Attempted Murder filed by Dela Peña against
Rainier and Randall Punzalan and fourteen others and
one for Grave Threats filed by Dela Peña against Ofrin.
In their counter-affidavit, the Punzalans argued
that the charges against them were fabricated in order
to dissuade them from testifying in the Attempted
Homicide and Illegal Possession of Firearm cases
instituted by Rainier against Plata and Cagara,
respectively.
Cagara also filed a complaint for Grave Oral
Defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan, mother of
Rainier, alleging that on October 16, 1997 at the Office
of the Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City, Rosalinda
approached him, and within hearing distance of other
people, told him, “Hoy Robert, magkanong ibinigay ng
mga Plata sa iyo sa pagtestigo? Dodoblehin ko at
ipapasok pa kita ng trabaho.” In her defense,
Rosalinda denied having uttered the alleged
defamatory statements.
On July 28, 1998, the Assistant City Prosecutor
of Mandaluyong City dismissed the complaint for Grave
Oral Defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan, holding
188
 emedial Law Review
Digests
that Cagara failed to show that the alleged defamatory
statements would cast dishonor, discredit or contempt
upon him. He also found that the statements were
uttered by Rosalinda in a state of distress and were not
actionable. The charge of Attempted Murder against
Rainier, Randall and 14 others was also dismissed
because complainant Dela Peña’s claim that he
accidentally shot Rainier forms part of the defense of
Michael Plata in the Attempted Homicide case
previously filed by Rainier against the latter.
Dela Peña and Cagara separately appealed to
the DOJ. On March 23, 2000, then Justice Secretary
Artemio Tuquero issued a Resolution modifying the
July 28, 1998 Joint Resolution of the Assistant City
Prosecutor.
Petitioners, Rosalinda, Rainier and Randall
Punzalan, together with their co-respondents, filed
separate MR. On June 6, 2000, the Secretary of
Justice set aside the March 23, 2000 Resolution
and directed the withdrawal of the Informations
against the movants, Punzalan et al. (Reason:
Oral Defamation case should be dismissed because the
alleged defamatory statements were uttered without
malice as Rosalinda was then in a state of shock and
anger. Anent the Attempted Homicide case filed by
Dela Peña against Rainier, the Secretary held that the
allegations in support thereof should first be threshed
out in the trial of the Attempted Homicide case filed by
Rainier against Michael Plata. He added that Dela Peña
failed to prove that Rainier, Randall and his
companions intended to kill him.)
Respondents’ MR was denied. Hence, they filed
a petition for certiorari with the CA, which reversed
June 6, 2000 Resolution where Secretary of Justice
directed the withdrawal of informations for slight oral
defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan and attempted
homicide against the respondents.
Petitioners’ MR was denied. Hence, the instant
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in setting aside the
resolutions of the Secretary of Justice –YES
RATIO: The Secretary of Justice did not commit grave
abuse of discretion to justify interference by the
Courts.
A petition for certiorari is the proper remedy
when any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy at law.
We now resolve whether the Secretary of
Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in his
Resolutions dated June 6, 2000 and October 11, 2000.
Under the Revised Administrative Code, the Secretary
of Justice exercises the power of direct control and
supervision over the decisions or resolutions of the
prosecutors. “Supervision and control” includes the
authority to act directly whenever a specific function is
CrimPro
entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; to
direct the performance of duty; and to approve, revise
or modify acts and decision of subordinate officials or
units.
In the case of People v. Peralta, we reiterated
the rule that the right to prosecute vests the
prosecutor with a wide range of discretion – the
discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the
exercise of which depends on a variety of factors which
are best appreciated by prosecutors.
In the case of Hegerty v. Court of Appeals, we
declared that: A public prosecutor, by the nature of his
office, is under no compulsion to file a criminal
information where no clear legal justification has been
shown, and no sufficient evidence of guilt nor prima
facie case has been presented by the petitioner.
We need only to stress that the determination
of probable cause during a preliminary investigation or
reinvestigation is recognized as an executive function
exclusively of the prosecutor. An investigating
prosecutor is under no obligation to file a criminal
action where he is not convinced that he has the
quantum of evidence at hand to support the
averments. Prosecuting officers have equally the duty
not to prosecute when after investigation or
reinvestigation they are convinced that the evidence
adduced was not sufficient to establish a prima facie
case. Thus, the determination of the persons to be
prosecuted rests primarily with the prosecutor who is
vested with discretion in the discharge of this function.
Thus, the question of whether or not to dismiss
a complaint is within the purview of the functions of
the prosecutor and, ultimately, that of the Secretary of
Justice.
The reasons of the Secretary of Justice in
directing the City Prosecutor to withdraw the
informations for slight oral defamation against
Rosalinda Punzalan and for attempted homicide
against the other respondents other than Rosalinda
Punzalan is determinative of whether or not he
committed grave abuse of discretion.
First, in the charge of slight oral defamation,
the records show that the defamatory remarks were
uttered within the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Mandaluyong City. The CA in its Decision stated the
settled rule that the assessment of the credibility of
witnesses is best left to the trial court in view of its
opportunity to observe the demeanor and conduct of
the witnesses on the stand. The City Prosecutor, the
proper officer at the time of the occurrence of the
incident, is the best person to observe the demeanor
and conduct of the parties and their witnesses and
determine probable cause whether the alleged
defamatory utterances were made within the hearing
distance of third parties. The investigating prosecutor
found that no sufficient evidence existed. The
Secretary of Justice in his Resolution affirmed the
decision of the City Prosecutor.
As to the charge of attempted homicide against
the herein petitioners other than Rosalinda Punzalan,
the Secretary of Justice resolved to dismiss the
189
 emedial Law Review
Digests
complaint because it was in the nature of a
countercharge. The DOJ in a Resolution had already
directed that Dela Peña be likewise investigated for the
charge of attempted homicide in connection with the
shooting incident that occurred on August 13, 1997
making him a party to the case filed by Rainier
Punzalan. This resulted in the resolution of the
Secretary of Justice that the complaint of Dela Peña
should be threshed out in the proceedings relevant to
the shooting incident that resulted in the serious injury
of Rainier Punzalan.
In the case at bar, therefore, the Secretary of
Justice did not commit grave abuse of discretion
contrary to the finding of the CA. It is well-settled in
the recent case of Samson, et al. v. Guingona that the
Court will not interfere in the conduct of preliminary
investigations or reinvestigations and leave to the
investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion
in the exercise of determination of what constitutes
sufficient evidence as will establish probable cause for
the filing of information against an offender.
Moreover, his findings are not subject to review unless
shown to have been made with grave abuse.
I. Role of the Office of the Solicitor General
in Criminal Cases
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARTURO F.
DUCA
FACTS: The MCTC and RTC convicted respondent
Arturo Duca of the crime of Falsification of Official
Document by causing the preparation of a Declaration
of Real Property over a bungalow type residential
house by making it appear that the signature
appearing on the sworn statement of owner is that of
his brother, Aldrin F. Duca, when the truth of the
matter is not. The CA reversed the conviction.
The Antecedent Facts: Private complainant
Calanayan, earlier filed an action for ejectment and
damages against the Ducas The case was decided in
favor of Calanayan. The public auction of the lot owned
by Cecilia Duca (mother of accused Arturo) was held
and a certificate of sale was issued. However, Cecilia
Duca testified that the house erected on the lot subject
of the ejectment case is owned by her son Aldrin Duca
(brother of accused Arturo). In support of such
claim she presented a Property Index. At the
back of the said document is a sworn statement
showing the current and fair market value of the
property, which is a bungalow, with the
signature affixed on top of the typewritten name
Aldrin F. Duca.
According to the prosecution, accused Arturo
made it appear that the signature is that of his brother
Aldrin who was out of the country at that time. Aldrin
arrived in the Philippines only on December 12, 2001,
as evidenced by a certification from the Bureau of
Immigration, Manila. That because of the
misrepresentation, Cecilia and Arturo were able
to mislead the RTC such that they were able to
CrimPro
get a TRO against the Sheriff and the policemen
ordering them to stop from evicting the Ducas
from the property in question.
At the CA, the court resolved to acquit the
accused. The CA ruled that the prosecution failed to
establish the fact that accused Arturo was not duly
authorized by his brother Aldrin in procuring the tax
declaration. On the contrary, the defense was able to
establish that accused Arturo Duca was duly
authorized by his brother Aldrin to secure a tax
declaration on the house erected on the land
registered under their mother’s name. Hence, it can be
deduced that accused Arturo could not have falsified
the Tax Declaration of Real Property under the
Property Index.
Petitioner Republic now brings the case to
the SC and argues that the prosecution was
denied due process when the CA resolved the
respondent’s appeal without notifying the People
of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General,
of the pendency of the same and without
requiring the Solicitor General to file his
comment. Petitioner contends that once the case is
elevated to the CA or this Court (SC), it is only the
Solicitor General who is authorized to bring or defend
actions on behalf of the People. Thus, the CA gravely
abused its discretion when it acted on respondent’s
appeal without affording the prosecution the
opportunity to be heard. Consequently, the decision of
the CA acquitting respondent should be considered
void for being violative of due process.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Republic was denied
due process. (YES)
HELD: The authority to represent the State in appeals
of criminal cases before the CA and the Supreme Court
is solely vested in the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG). Under Presidential Decree No. 478, among the
specific powers and functions of the OSG was to
"represent the government in the Supreme Court and
the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings." This
provision has been carried over to the Revised
Administrative Code particularly in Book IV, Title III,
Chapter 12 thereof. Without doubt, the OSG is the
appellate counsel of the People of the Philippines in all
criminal cases. Likewise, Under Section 5, Rule 110 of
the Rules of Court all criminal actions commenced by
complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the
direction and control of the fiscal. The fiscal
represents the People of the Philippines in the
prosecution of offenses before the trial courts at
the metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial
courts, municipal circuit trial courts and the
regional trial courts. However, when such
criminal actions are brought to the Court of
Appeals or this Court, it is the Solicitor General
who must represent the People of the Philippines
not the fiscal. Indeed, in criminal cases, as in the
instant case, the Solicitor General is regarded as the
appellate counsel of the People of the Philippines and
190
 emedial Law Review
Digests
as such, should have been given the opportunity to be
heard on behalf of the People. The records show that
the CA failed to require the Solicitor General to file his
Comment on Duca’s petition. A copy of the CA
Resolution which required the filing of Comment was
served upon counsel for Duca, counsel for private
complainant Calanayan and RTC Judge. Nowhere was
it shown that the Solicitor General had ever been
furnished a copy of the said Resolution. The failure of
the CA to require the Solicitor General to file his
Comment deprived the prosecution of a fair
opportunity to prosecute and prove its case. The
assailed decision of the CA acquitting the respondent
without giving the Solicitor General the chance to file
his comment on the petition for review clearly deprived
the State of its right to refute the material allegations
of the said petition filed before the CA. The said
decision is, therefore, a nullity.
Further, the CA should have been guided by
the following provisions of Sections 1 and 3 of Rule 42
of the 1997 Rules of Court. Respondent failed to serve
a copy of his petition on the OSG and instead served a
copy upon the Assistant City Prosecutor of Dagupan
City. The service of a copy of the petition on the People
of the Philippines, through the Prosecutor would be
inefficacious for the reason that the Solicitor General is
the sole representative of the People of the Philippines
in appeals before the CA and the Supreme Court. The
respondent’s failure to have a copy of his petition
served on the People of the Philippines, through the
OSG, is a sufficient ground for the dismissal of the
petition as provided in Section 3, Rule 42 of the Rules
of Court. Thus, the CA has no other recourse but to
dismiss the petition. However, the CA, instead of
dismissing respondent’s petition, proceeded to resolve
the petition and even acquitted respondent without the
Solicitor General’s comment. We, thus, find that the
CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering its assailed
decision.
RULE 110 : COMPLAINT OR
INFORMATION
A. SUFFICIENCY OF A COMPLAINT OR
INFORMATION
PEOPLE v. EDGARDO DIMAANO
FACTS: Maricar Dimaano charged her father, Edgardo
Dimaano (respondent herein) with two (2) counts of
rape and one (1) count of attempted rape. At the time
of the commission of the crime, complainant Maricar,
was 10 years old. The one relevant to the lesson is the
complaint/information for attempted rape which
states:
That on or about the 1st day of January 1996, in
the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, try
CrimPro
and attempt to rape one Maricar Dimaano y
Victoria, thus commencing the commission of
the crime of Rape, directly by overt acts, but
nevertheless did not perform all the acts of
execution which would produce it, as a
consequence by reason of cause other than his
spontaneous desistance that is due to the timely
arrival of the complainant's mother.
ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint or information
for attempted rape sufficiently alleged the specific acts
or omissions constituting the offense. (NO)
HELD: For complaint or information to be sufficient,
one of the requirements is that it must allege the acts
or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense. The acts or omissions complained of must be
alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person
of common understanding to know what offense is
intended to be charged, and enable the court to
pronounce proper judgment. No information for a
crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and
clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. Every
element of the offense must be stated in the
information. What facts and circumstances are
necessary to be included therein must be determined
by reference to the definitions and essentials of the
specified crimes.
Notably, the above-cited complaint upon which
the appellant was arraigned does not allege specific
acts or omission constituting the elements of the crime
of rape. Neither does it constitute sufficient allegation
of elements for crimes other than rape, i.e., Acts of
Lasciviousness. The allegation therein that the
appellant 'tr[ied] and attempt[ed] to rape the
complainant does not satisfy the test of sufficiency of a
complaint or information, but is merely a conclusion of
law by the one who drafted the complaint. This
insufficiency therefore prevents this Court from
rendering a judgment of conviction; otherwise we
would be violating the right of the appellant to be
informed of the nature of the accusation against him.
WHEREFORE , appellant Edgardo
Dimaano GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the(two
counts of consummated) crime of rape committed
against his own daughter. Appellant is
however ACQUITTED for the crime of attempted rape
for failure of the complaint to allege the specific acts or
omissions constituting the offense.
SASOT v. PEOPLE
FACTS:
- NBA Properties, Inc., is a foreign corporation and is
the registered owner of NBA trademarks and
names of NBA basketball teams. These names are
used on garment products, which are allegedly
registered with the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks
and Technology Transfer.
191
 emedial Law Review
Digests
- Petitioners are engaged in the manufacture,
printing, sale, and distribution of counterfeit “NBA”
garment products. Hence, NBA recommended
petitioners’ prosecution to the NBI for unfair
competition.
- Via SPA, Rick Welts, as President of NBA
Properties, Inc., constituted the law firm of Ortega,
Del Castillo, Bacorro, Odulio, Calma & Carbonell,
as the company’s attorney-in-fact, and to act for
and on behalf of the company, in the filing of
criminal, civil and administrative complaints,
among others. The Special Power of Attorney was
notarized by Nicole Brown of New York County and
certified by the County Clerk and Clerk of the
Supreme Court of the State of New York. The
Consul of the Consulate General of the Philippines,
New York, authenticated the certification. Welts
also executed a Complaint-Affidavit before a
Notary Public of the State of New York.
- The Prosecution Attorney recommended the filing
of an Information against the Sasots for unfair
competition.
- Before arraignment, petitioners filed a Motion to
Quash the Information because the facts charged
do not constitute an offense and that the court has
no jurisdiction because the complaint was
defective. Petitioners argue that the fiscal should
have dismissed Welts’s complaint because under
the rules, the complaint must be sworn to before
the prosecutor and the copy on record appears to
be only a fax transmittal.
- The trial prosecutor of the RTC-Manila filed his
Comment/Opposition to the motion to quash,
stating that he has the original copy of the
complaint, and that complainant has an attorney-
in-fact to represent it. Prosecutor Guray also
contended that the State is entitled to prosecute
the offense even without the participation of the
private offended party, as the crime charged is a
public crime.
- The trial court denied petitioners’ motion to quash.
CA dismissed petitioners’ petition for certiorari. MR
also denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N the complaint should be dismissed. – NO.
HELD/RATIO: Under Section 3, Rule 112 of the 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure, a complaint is
substantially sufficient if it states the known address of
the respondent, it is accompanied by complainant’s
affidavit and his witnesses and supporting documents,
and the affidavits are sworn to before any fiscal, state
prosecutor or government official authorized to
administer oath, or in their absence or unavailability, a
notary public who must certify that he personally
examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they
voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits.
All these have been duly satisfied in the complaint filed
before Prosecution Attorney. It must be noted that
even the absence of an oath in the complaint does not
necessarily render it invalid. Want of oath is a mere
CrimPro
defect of form, which does not affect the substantial
rights of the defendant on the merits.
In this case, Welts’s Complaint-Affidavit
contains an acknowledgement by Notary Public Nicole
Brown of the State of New York that the same has
been subscribed and sworn to before her on February
12, 1998, duly authenticated by the Philippine
Consulate. While the copy on record of the complaint-
affidavit appears to be merely a photocopy thereof,
Prosecution Attorney Gutierrez stated that
complainant’s representative will present the
authenticated notarized original in court, and
Prosecutor Guray manifested that the original copy is
already on hand. It is apt to state at this point that the
prosecutor enjoys the legal presumption of regularity
in the performance of his duties and functions, which
in turn gives his report the presumption of accuracy.
Moreover, records show that there are other
supporting documents from which the prosecutor
based his recommendation.
Consequently, if the information is valid on its
face, and there is no showing of manifest error, grave
abuse of discretion and prejudice on the part of public
prosecutor, as in the present case, the trial court
should respect such determination.
MARCELO LASOY and FELIX BANISA vs. HON.
MONINA A. ZENAROSA
Facts: Marcelo Lasoy and Felix Banisa were charged
with the crime of violating Sec. 4, RA No. 6425
(Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972). Upon arraignment,
both Lasoy and Banisa pleaded guilty and were
sentenced to suffer a jail term of 6 months 1 day. On
the same date, both applied for probation.
Subsequently however, the People of the
Phils., thru Asst. City Prosecutor Escasa-Ramos, filed
two separate motions: first, to admit amended
Information, and second, to set aside the arraignment
of both Lasoy and Banisa, as well as the decision of the
RTC. The motion alleged that both Lasoy and Banisa
was arraigned under an invalid information. Both the
request for inquest proceedings and the joint affidavit
of the Poseur-buyer and arresting officer stated Lasoy
and Bainsa were apprehended with approximately 45
kilos of marijuana leaves. But per People, the
information was fraudulently altered to charge them
with selling 42.410 grams of dried marijuana fruiting
tops instead of 42.410 kilos. RTC denied the motion.
Upon second motion, RTC granted on the
ground that per SC Resolution in G.R. No. 119131
(Gulhoran vs. Hon. Escano, Jr.), jurisdiction over drug
of small quantity should be tried by the MTC.
Accordingly, a second information this time charging
Lasoy and Banisa of selling 42.410 kilos of marijuana
fruiting tops was filed and raffled to Branch 76 of the
RTC Quezon City presided by Judge Zenarosa.
Both Lasoy and Banisa filed a Motion to Quash.
RTC denied their motion to quash, and scheduled their
arraignment under the amended information. MR
192
 emedial Law Review
Digests
denied. Hence, the instant Petition for Certiorari with
prayer for injunction and TRO.
Issues:
a. W/N the first information is valid? Valid.
b. W/N the RTC where the first information and
Criminal Case was filed and tried, had
jurisdiction to try the case? RTC has
jurisdiction.
Held and Ratio:
a. An information is valid as long as it distinctly
states the statutory designation of the offense and the
acts or omissions constitutive thereof. In other words,
if the offense is stated in such a way that a person of
ordinary intelligence may immediately know what is
meant, and the court can decide the matter according
to law, the inevitable conclusion is that the information
is valid. It is not necessary to follow the language of
the statute in the information. The information will be
sufficient if it describes the crime defined by law.
Applying the foregoing, the first information is
valid inasmuch as it sufficiently alleges the manner by
which the crime was committed. Verily the purpose of
the law, to apprise the accused of the nature of the
charge against them, is reasonably complied with.
Furthermore, the first information, applying Rule
110, Section 62 shows on its face that it is valid.
With respect to the trial court’s point of view that
the accused cannot claim their right against double
jeopardy because they “participated/ acquiesced to the
tampering,” we hold that while this may not be far-
fetched, there is actually no hard evidence
thereof. Worse, the accused were already arraigned,
entered a plea of guilty and convicted under the first
information. Granting that alteration/tampering took
place and the accused had a hand in it, this does not
justify the setting aside of the decision dated 16 July
1996. The alleged tampering/alteration allegedly
participated in by the accused may well be the subject
of another inquiry.
Rule 110, Sec. 143 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure is emphatic. If it appears at any time before
judgment that a mistake has been made in charging
the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original
complaint or information upon the filing of a new one
charging the proper offense in accordance with Rule
119, Section 11, provided the accused would not be
placed thereby in double jeopardy, and may also
require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance
at the trial.
2
Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. – A complaint or
information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the
designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended
party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the
place wherein the offense was committed.
3
Sec. 14. Amendment. – The information or complaint may be
amended, in substance or form, without leave of court, at any time
before the accused pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all
matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the court, when the
same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the accused.
CrimPro
In Sanvicente v. People, this Court held that given
the far-reaching scope of an accused’s right against
double jeopardy, even an appeal based on an alleged
misappreciation of evidence will not lie. The only
instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when
the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as
where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to
present its case or where the trial was a sham.
The Constitution is very explicit. Article III,
Section 21, mandates that no person shall be twice put
in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. In
this case, the accused had been arraigned and
convicted. In fact, they were already in the stage
where they were applying for probation. It is too late
in the day for the prosecution to ask for the
amendment of the information and seek to try again
accused for the same offense without violating
procedural rules and their rights guaranteed under the
Constitution.
b. A later resolution superseding the resolution
cited by the RTC, Admin. Order No. 51-96 dated 03
May 1996, vests the RTC with jurisdiction to try the
first case. The resolution designated RTC branches to
exclusively try and decide cases of, among others,
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, committed
within their territorial jurisdictions. Subsequently, A.M.
No. 96-8-282-RTC dated 27 August 1996, further
clarified jurisdiction of RTCs to exclusively try and
decide cases of violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act,
regardless of the quantity of the drugs involved.
This issue is further settled by the concurring
opinion of Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., in People
v. Velasco: “. .. [A]ll drug-related cases, regardless of
the quantity involved and the penalty imposable
pursuant to R.A. No. 7659, as applied/interpreted
in People vs. Simon (G.R. No. 93028, 29 July 1994;
234 SCRA 555), and of the provisions of R.A. No. 7691
expanding the jurisdiction of the MeTCsand MCTCs, still
fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of RTCs, in
view of Section 39 of R.A. No. 6425 (the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972). R.A. No. 7659 and R.A. No. 7691
have neither amended nor modified this Section.
B. SUBSTITUTION OF INFORMATION
SALUDAGA V. SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts: An Information charging Saludaga and Genio
with violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019,
by causing undue injury to the government was filed.
It read:
...., accuses QUINTIN B. SALUDAGA and SPO2 FIEL E.
GENIO, for VIOLATION OF SECTION 3(e)..., committed
as follows:
That in or about the months of November and
December, 1997, at the Municipality of Lavezares,
Province of Northern Samar, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named
accused, public officials, being the Municipal Mayor and
193
 emedial Law Review
Digests
PNP Member of Lavezares, Northern Samar in such
capacity and committing the offense in relation to
office, conniving, confederating and mutually helping
with one another, and with the late Limpio Legua, a
private individual, with deliberate intent, with evident
bad faith and manifest partiality, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter into a Pakyaw
Contract for the Construction of Barangay Day Care
Centers for Barangays Mac-arthur and Urdaneta,
Lavezares, Northern Samar, each in the amount of
FORTY-EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS
(P48,500.00), Philippine Currency, or a total amount of
NINETY-SEVEN THOUSAND PESOS (P97,000.00),
Philippine Currency, without conducting a competitive
public bidding, thus depriving the government the
chance to obtain the best, if not, the most reasonable
price, and thereby awarding said contracts to Olimpio
Legua, a non-license contractor and non-accredited
NGO, in violation of Sec. 356 of Republic Act No. 7160
(The Local Government Code) and COA Circular No.
91-368, to the damage and prejudice of the
government...
This case went to the 3rd Division of the
Sandiganbayan. It granted Saludaga and Genio’s
motion to quash and dismissed the information "for
failure of the prosecution to allege and prove the
amount of actual damages caused the government, an
essential element of the crime charged."
The information was re-filed. It went to the 4th
Division of the Sandiganbayan charging Saludaga and
Genio for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, by
giving unwarranted benefit to a private person, to the
prejudice of the government. It now read:
That in or about the months of November and
December, 1997 at the Municipality of Lavezares,
Province of Northern Samar, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused QUINTIN
B. SALUDAGA, a high ranking public official being then
the Mayor of Lavezares, Northern Samar, and
committing the crime herein charged while in the
discharge of his official administrative function,
conspiring and conniving with accused SPO2 FIEL B.
GENIO, a member of Lavezares Police Force (PNP) and
with the late OLIMPIO LEGUA, a private individual, with
deliberate intent, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and criminally give unwarranted benefit or
advantage to the late Olimpio Legua, a non-license
contractor and non-accredited NGO, through evident
bad faith and manifest partiality by then and there
entering into a Pakyaw Contract with the latter for the
Construction of Barangay Day Care Centers for
barangays Mac-Arthur and Urdaneta, Lavezares,
Northern Samar, in the amount of FORTY EIGHT
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P48,500.00) each
or a total of NINETY SEVEN THOUSAND PESOS
(P97,000.00) Philippine Currency, without the benefit
of a competitive public bidding to the prejudice of the
Government and public interest....
Saludaga and Genio filed a motion for
preliminary investigation. They contend that the failure
of the prosecution to conduct a new preliminary
CrimPro
investigation before the filing of the second
Information constituted a violation of the law because
the latter charged a different offense–that is, violation
of Section 3(e) by giving unwarranted benefit to
private parties. Hence, there was a substitution of the
first Information. They argue that assuming that no
substitution took place, at the very least, there was a
substantial amendment in the new information and
that its submission should have been preceded by a
new preliminary investigation. Further, they claim that
newly discovered evidence mandates re-examination
of the finding of a prima facie cause to file the case.
The Sandiganbayan denied their motion. It
said there is no substituted information or substantial
amendment that would warrant the conduct of a new
preliminary investigation. Saludaga and Genio filed an
MR which was denied.
Issue: Whether or not the new information was for a
different offense that would require a new preliminary
investigation.
Held: No! The Sandiganbayan committed no grave
abuse of discretion.
Ratio: Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 reads: (e)
Causing any undue injury to any party, including the
Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official, administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith
or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall
apply to officers and employees charged with the grant
of licenses or permits or other concessions.
R.A. 3019, Section 3, paragraph (e), as
amended, provides as one of its elements that the
public officer should have acted by causing any undue
injury to any party, including the Government, or by
giving any private party unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his
functions. The use of the disjunctive term "or"
connotes that either act qualifies as a violation of
Section 3 paragraph (e), or as aptly held in Santiago,
as two (2) different modes of committing the offense.
This does not however indicate that each mode
constitutes a distinct offense, but rather, that an
accused may be charged under either mode or under
both.
There is no substituted information. The new
information charged the same offense, that is,
violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. Only
the mode of commission was modified. While
jurisprudence, the most recent being Talaga, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan, provides that there are two (2) acts or
modes of committing the offense, thus: a) by causing
any undue injury to any party, including the
government; or b) by giving any private party any
unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference, it does
not mean that each act or mode constitutes a distinct
offense. An accused may be charged under either
mode or under both should both modes concur.
194
 emedial Law Review
Digests
There are also no substantial amendments in
the information warranting a new preliminary
investigation. The new info is founded on the same
transaction as the first info, that of entering into a
Pakyaw Contract for the construction of barangay day
care centers for barangays Mac-Arthur and Urdaneta,
Lavezares, Northern Samar. The evidentiary
requirements for the prosecand defense remain the
same.
Take note of People v. Lacson: The case may
be revived by the State within the time-bar either by
the refiling of the Information or by the filing of a new
Information for the same offense or an offense
necessarily included therein. There would be no need
of a new preliminary investigation. However, in a case
wherein after the provisional dismissal of a criminal
case, the original witnesses of the prosecution or some
of them may have recanted their testimonies or may
have died or may no longer be available and new
witnesses for the State have emerged, a new
preliminary investigation must be conducted before an
Information is refiled or a new Information is filed. A
new preliminary investigation is also required if aside
from the original accused, other persons are charged
under a new criminal complaint for the same offense or
necessarily included therein; or if under a new criminal
complaint, the original charge has been upgraded; or if
under a new criminal complaint, the criminal liability of
the accused is upgraded from that as an accessory to
that as a principal. The accused must be accorded the
right to submit counter-affidavits and evidence.
C. AMENDED INFORMATION
BONIFACIO VS. RTC OF MAKATI
FACTS: Jessie John Gimenez filed, in behalf of the
Yuchengco Family and the Malayan Insurance Co.,
Inc., a criminal complaint before the Makati City
Prosecutor’s Office 13 counts of Libel against the
officers, trustees, and members of Parents Enabling
Parents Coalition, Inc. (PEPCI), and the administrator
of the website www.pepcoalition.com [collectively, the
accused].
PEPCI appears to have been formed by a large
group of disgruntled planholders of Pacific Plans, Inc.
(PPI), a wholly owned subsidiary of the Great Pacific
Life Assurance Corporation which is owned by the
Yuchengco Group of Companies (YGC). PEPCI
previously purchased traditional pre-need education
plans but were unable to collect thereon or avail of the
benefits thereunder after PPI, due to liquidity
concerns, filed for corporate rehabilitation with prayer
for suspension of payments before RTC Makati City.
Decrying PPI’s refusal/inability to honor its
obligations under the educational pre-need plans,
PEPCI sought to provide a forum by which the
planholders could seek redress for their pecuniary loss
under their policies by maintaining a website on the
internet under the address of www.pepcoalition.com.
Gimenez alleged that PEPCI also owned, controlled,
CrimPro
and moderated on the internet a blogspot under the
website address www.pacificnoplan.blogspot.com, as
well as a yahoo e-group at
no2pep2010@yahoogroups.com. Gimenez further
alleged that the articles in the websites contained
highly derogatory statements and false accusations,
relentlessly attacking YGC and Malayan.
The Makati City Prosecutor’s Office, finding
probable cause to indict the accused, filed 13
Information charging them with Libel. Several of the
accused appealed by Petition for Review to the
Secretary of Justice. The latter reversed the finding of
probable cause and accordingly directed the
withdrawal of the Information for Libel filed in court.
The Justice Secretary opined that the crime of
“internet libel” was non-existent, hence, the accused
could not be charged with libel under Art. 353 of RPC.
The accused, now petitioners in this case, filed
a Motion to Quash before RTC Makati City the
Information for Libel on the following grounds: (1) it
failed to vest jurisdiction on RTC Makati City (2) acts
complained of are not punishable by law since internet
libel is not covered by Art. 353 of RPC (3) Information
is fatally defective for failure to designate the offense
charged and the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense of libel.
The trial court granted the Motion to Quash.
Later on, however, it granted the prosecution’s MR and
ordered the public prosecutor to amend the
Information to cure the defect of want of venue. The
Information was amended and was admitted by the
trial court.
Note: The accused were contending that the
prosecution failed to allege that the libelous articles
were “printed and first published” in Makati and that
the prosecution erroneously laid the venue of the case
in the place where the offended party accessed the
internet-published article. On the part of the
prosecution, it insisted that the Information need not
allege in verbatim that the libelous publication was
“printed and first published” in the appropriate venue.
It pointed out that Malayan has an office in Makati of
which Helen (one of the Yuchengco) is a resident.
ISSUE: WON RTC Makati City committed grave abuse
of discretion in admitting the amended complaint? YES.
RULING: Where the complainant is a private
individual, the venue of libel cases is limited to only
either of the 2 places, namely: (1) where the
complainant actually resides at the time of the
commission of the offense; or (2) where the alleged
defamatory article was printed and first published. In
the case at bar, the Amended Information opted to lay
the venue by availing of the 2nd option. It state that
the offending article was first published and accessed
by Gimenez in Makati City. It considered the phrase to
be equivalent to the requisite allegation of printing and
first publication.
The insufficiency of the allegations in the
Amended Information becomes more pronounced upon
195
 emedial Law Review
Digests
an examination of the rationale for the amendment of
Art. 360 (old rule for crime of libel) by RA 4363. Before
Art. 360 was amended, the rule was that a criminal
action for libel may be instituted in any jurisdiction
where the libelous article was published or circulated,
irrespective of where it was written or printed. Under
this rule, the criminal action is transitory and the
injured party has a choice of venue. Experience had
shown that under the old rule, the offended party
could harass the accused in a libel case by laying the
venue of the criminal action in a remote or distant
place. To forestall such harassment, RA 4363 was
enacted. It lays down specific rules as to the venue of
the criminal action so as to prevent the offended party
in written defamation cases from inconveniencing the
accused by means of out-of-town libel suits, meaning
complaints filed in remote municipal courts.
Clearly, the evil sought to be prevented by the
amendment to Art. 360 was the indiscriminate or
arbitrary laying of the venue in libel cases in distant,
isolated or far-flung areas, meant to accomplish
nothing more than harass or intimidate an accused.
The disparity or unevenness of the situation becomes
even more acute where the offended party is a person
of sufficient means or possesses influence, and is
motivated by spite or the need for revenge.
If the circumstances as to where the libel was
printed and first published are used by the offended
party as basis for the venue in the criminal action, the
Information must allege with particularity where the
defamatory article was printed and first published, as
evidenced or supported by, for instance, the address of
their editorial or business offices in the case of
newspapers, magazines, or serial publications. This
pre-condition becomes necessary in order to forestall
any inclination to harass.
The same measure cannot be reasonably
expected when it pertains to defamatory material
appearing on a website on the internet as there would
be no way of determining the situs of its printing and
first publication. To credit Gimenez’s premise of
equating his first access to the defamatory article on
petitioners’ website in Makati with “printing and first
publication” would spawn the very ills that the
amendment to Art. 360 of RPC sought to discourage
and prevent. It hardly requires much imagination to
see the chaos that would ensue in situations where the
website’s author or writer, a blogger or anyone who
posts messages therein could be sued for libel
anywhere in the Philippines that the private
complainant may have allegedly accessed the
offending website.
To hold that the Amended Information
sufficiently vested jurisdiction in the courts
of Makati simply because the defamatory article
was accessed herein would open the floodgates to the
libel suit being filed in all other locations where
the pepcoalition website is likewise accessed or
capable of being accessed.
CrimPro
D. FILING OF INFORMATION IF THERE IS A
PENDING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
BRIG. GEN. (Ret.) JOSE RAMISCAL, JR.
vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
THE FACTS. Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr. was a retired officer of
the AFP, with the rank of Brigadier General, when he
served as President of the AFP-Retirement and
Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS) from 5 April
1994 to 27 July 1998. During Ramiscal’s term as
president, the Board of Trustees of AFP-RSBS
approved the acquisition of a land for development as
housing projects.
Ramiscal caused the payment to the individual
vendors of the purchase price of P10,500.00/sqm.
Subsequently, Flaviano executed and signed unilateral
deeds of sale over the same property. The unilateral
deeds of sale reflected a purchase price of
only P3,000.00/sqm instead of the actual purchase
price of P10,500.00/sqm.
On 18 December 1997, Antonino, the
Congresswoman of South Cotabato, filed in the
Ombudsman a complaint-affidavit against Ramiscal.
After preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman, found
Ramiscal probably guilty. On 28 January 1999, the
Ombudsman filed informations for violation of Section
3(e) of RA 3019 and for falsification of public
documents.
Ramiscal filed his first MR dated 12 February
1999, with a supplemental motion dated 28 May
1999, of the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause
against him. In a memorandum dated 22 November
2001, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OMB-OSP)
recommended that Ramiscal be excluded from the
informations. On review, the Office of Legal Affairs
(OMB-OLA), in a memorandum dated 18 December
2001, recommended the contrary. In a memorandum
dated 21 August 2002, the OMB-Military adopted the
memorandum of OMB-OSP recommending the
dropping of petitioner's name from the informations.
Acting Ombudsman Margarito Gervacio approved
the recommendation of the OMB-Military.
However, the recommendation of the OMB-Military was
not manifested before the Sandiganbayan as a final
disposition of petitioner's first motion for
reconsideration.
A panel of prosecutors was tasked to review
the records of the case. In its 19 December 2005
memorandum, the panel of prosecutors recommended
the following that the MR filed by Ramiscal be
DENIED. Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez
approved the recommendation of the panel of
prosecutors. Upon receipt of the final findings of the
Ombudsman, the Sandiganbayan scheduled the
arraignment.
On 26 January 2006, petitioner filed his second
motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman's finding
of probable cause against him. On 26 February 2006,
petitioner was arraigned. On 9 March 2006, petitioner
196
 emedial Law Review
Digests
filed a motion to set aside his arraignment pending
resolution of his second MR.
The Sandiganbayan, however, pointed out that
petitioner's second motion for reconsideration of the
Ombudsman's finding of probable cause against him
was a prohibited pleading. The Sandiganbayan
explained that whatever defense or evidence petitioner
may have should be ventilated in the trial of the case.
ISSUE. Did the Sandiganbayan commit grave abuse of
discretion when it denied Ramiscal’s motion to set
aside his arraignment pending resolution of his second
motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman's finding
of probable cause against him? NO.
RATIO. Sandiganbayan argues that petitioner's motion
for reconsideration, filed on 26 January 2006 and
pending with the Ombudsman at the time of his
arraignment, violated Section 7, Rule II of the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as
amended. Respondent court maintains that the
memorandum of the panel of prosecutors finding
probable cause against petitioner was the final decision
of the Ombudsman.
The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman, as amended by Administrative Order No.
15, Series of 2001, sanction the immediate filing of an
information in the proper court upon a finding of
probable cause, even during the pendency of a motion
for reconsideration. Section 7, Rule II of the Rules, as
amended, provides:
Section 7. Motion for Reconsideration. -
a) Only one motion for reconsideration or
reinvestigation of an approved order or
resolution shall be allowed, the same to be
filed within five (5) days from notice thereof
with the Office of the Ombudsman, or the
proper Deputy Ombudsman as the case may
be, with corresponding leave of court in cases
where the information has already been filed in
court;
b) The filing of a motion for
reconsideration/reinvestigation shall not
bar the filing of the corresponding information
in Court on the basis of the finding of probable
cause in the resolution subject of the
motion. (Emphasis supplied)
If the filing of a motion for reconsideration of
the resolution finding probable cause cannot bar the
filing of the corresponding information, then neither
can it bar the arraignment of the accused, which in the
normal course of criminal procedure logically follows
the filing of the information.
An arraignment is that stage where, in the
mode and manner required by the Rules, an accused,
for the first time, is granted the opportunity to know
the precise charge that confronts him. The accused is
formally informed of the charges against him, to which
he enters a plea of guilty or not guilty.
Under Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8493,
otherwise known as the Speedy Trial Act of 1998, the
CrimPro
court must proceed with the arraignment of an
accused within 30 days from the filing of the
information or from the date the accused has appeared
before the court in which the charge is pending,
whichever is later.
E. PRESCRIPTION
PANAGUITON V. DOJ
Facts: Cawili borrowed various sums of money
amounting to P1.9M from Panaguiton. Cawili and his
business associate, Tongson, jointly issued in favor of
Panaguiton 3 checks in payment of the said loans. All 3
checks bore the signatures of both Cawili and Tongson.
The checks bounced. Panaguiton made formal
demands upon Cawili and Tongson but to no avail.
Panaguiton filed, on August 24, 1955, a complaint
against Cawili and Tongson for violating BP 22 before
the Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office. Tongson claimed
that he had been unjustly included as party-
respondent Panaguiton, he had lent
various sums to Cawili and had filed BP 22 cases
against Cawili as well. Tongson pointed out that his
signatures on the said checks had been falsified. To
counter these allegations, petitioner presented several
documents showing Tongson’s signatures, which were
purportedly the same as the those appearing on the
checks. In a resolution, City Prosecutor Lara found
probable cause only against Cawili and dismissed the
charges against Tongson. Panaguiton filed a partial
appeal before the DOJ even while the case against
Cawili was filed before the proper
court. Assistant City Prosecutor (ACP) Sampaga
dismissed the complaint against Tongson. In her
resolution, ACP Sampaga held that the case had
already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326, which
provides that violations penalized by BP 22 shall
prescribe after 4 years. The filing of the complaint
before the Quezon City Prosecutor did not interrupt the
running of the prescriptive period, as the law
contemplates judicial, and not administrative
proceedings. Upon appeal, the DOJ flip-flopped in its
decisions but eventually ruled through the assailed
resolution that the offense had already prescribed and
ordered the withdrawal of the 3 informations.
Panaguiton thus filed a petition for certiorari before the
CA which was dismissed for
failure to attach a proper verification and
certification of non-forum shopping.
Issue: (Procedural) WON there was substantial
compliance with the verification requirement –YES!
(Substantial) WON the filing of a complaint in the
Office of the City Prosecutor interruptes the
running of the prescriptive period for violation of
BP 22 –YES!
Ruling: Panaguitan’s filing of his complaint–affidavit
before the Office of the City Prosecutor on August 24,
1995 signified the commencement of the proceedings
197
 emedial Law Review
Digests
for the prosecution of the accused and thus effectively
interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses
they had been charged under BP 22.
Ratio: The verification is merely a formal requirement.
The court may simply order the correction of unverified
pleadings or act on them and waive strict compliance
with the rules. In the case at bar, we find that by
attaching the pertinent verification to his motion for
reconsideration, petitioner sufficiently complied with
the verification requirement.
There is no question that Act No. 3326,
appropriately entitled An Act to Establish Prescription
for Violations of Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances
and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin, is the
law applicable to offenses under special laws which do
not provide their own prescriptive periods. It must be
pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed
on Dec. 4, 1926, preliminary investigation of criminal
offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus,
the phraseology in the law, “institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment,” and
the prevailing rule at the time was that once a
complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for
preliminary investigation, the prescription of the
offense is halted.
While it may be observed that the term
“judicial proceedings” in Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326
appears before “investigation and punishment” in the
old law, with the subsequent change in set-up whereby
the investigation of the charge for purposes of
prosecution has become the exclusive function of the
executive branch, the term “proceedings” should now
be understood either executive or judicial in character:
executive when it involves the investigation phase and
judicial when it refers to the trial and judgment stage.
With this clarification, any kind of investigative
proceeding instituted against the guilty person which
may ultimately lead to his prosecution should be
sufficient to toll prescription.
In this case, Panaguiton filed his complaint-
affidavit on August 24, 1995, well within the 4-year
prescriptive period. He likewise timely filed his appeals
and MR on the dismissal of the charges against
Tongson. He went through the proper channels, within
the prescribed periods. However, from the time
petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit with the Office of
the City Prosecutor up to the time the DOJ issued the
assailed resolution, an aggregate period of 9 years had
elapsed. Clearly, the delay was beyond petitioner’s
control. Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not
sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes,
should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further
simply because of circumstances beyond their control,
like the accused’s delaying tactics or the delay and
inefficiency of the investigating agencies.
F. CONTROL AND DIRECTION OF CRIMINAL
ACTION
STATE PROSECUTOR PINOTE V AYCO
CrimPro
Facts: On August 13, and 20 of 2004, Judge Roberto
Ayco(RTC of South Cotabato) in the criminal case of
people v vice mayor Salvador Ramos(accused of
violating PD 1866/illegal possession of firearms)
allowed the defense to present its evidence consisting
of testimony of two witnesses, even in the absence of
the State prosecutor RingcarPinote.
State Prosecutor Pinote was undergoing
medical treatment at the Philippine Heart Center in
Quezon City on August 13 and 20, 2004. In the
subsequent proceedings, Pinote refused to cross-
examine the two defense witnesses even if being
ordered by Judge Ayco since Pinote claims that the
proceedings on the 13th and 20th in his absence were
void.
A manifestation was filed on November 12,
2004 by Pinote before the trial court praying that he
should not be coerced to cross examine the two
defense witnesses and that their testimonies be
stricken off the record.
By order of the court, Judge Ayco considered
the prosecution to have waived its right to cross
examine the two defense witnesses
As such, Pinote filed an administrative
complaint against Judge Ayco alleging Gross ignorance
of the law, grave abuse of authority and serious
misconduct.
Issue: W/N the presentation of the defense witness
without a public prosecutor or private prosecutor
allowed? No. It cannot even be rectified by
subsequently giving the prosecution a chance to cross-
examine the witnesses.
Held:
Rule 110, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure reads:
Sec. 5. Who must prosecute criminal actions. — All
criminal actions commenced by a complaint or
information shall be prosecuted under the direction
and control of the prosecutor. In case of heavy work
schedule or in the event of lack of public prosecutors,
the private prosecutor may be authorized in writing by
the Chief of the Prosecution Office or the Regional
State Prosecution Office to prosecute the case subject
to the approval of the Court. Once so authorized to
prosecute the criminal action, the private prosecutor
shall continue to prosecute the case up to the end of
the trial even in the absence of a public prosecutor,
unless the authority is revoked or otherwise
withdrawn.
Thus, as a general rule, all criminal actions shall be
prosecuted under thecontrol and direction of the public
prosecutor.
Violation of criminal laws is an affront to the
People of the Philippines as a whole and not merely to
the person directly prejudiced, he being merely the
complaining witness. It is on this account that the
presence of a public prosecutor in the trial of criminal
cases is necessary to protect vital state interests,
198
 emedial Law Review
Digests
foremost of which is its interest to vindicate the rule of
law, the bedrock of peace of the people.
Respondent's lament about complainant's
failure to inform the court of hisinability to attend the
August 13 and 20, 2004 hearings or to file a motion
forpostponement thereof or to subsequently file a
motion for reconsideration of his Orders allowing the
defense to present its two witnesses on said dates may
bemitigating. It does not absolve respondent of his
utter disregard of the Rules.
Judge Ayco is ordered to pay P5,000 with
warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in
the future shall be dealt with more severely.
RULE 111 : CIVIL ASPECT OF A
CRIMINAL CASE
A. RULE ON CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM
DELICT
BUN TIONG V BALBOA
FACTS: The spouses Benito Lo Bun Tiong and Caroline
Siok Ching Teng (petitioners) charge Vicente Balboa
(respondent) with forum shopping.
Civil Case: On Feb. 24, 1997, Balboa filed with
RTC of Manila for Collection of Sum of Money
against the spouses based on the 3 post-dated
checks issued by Caroline with the total amount of
P5,175,250.
Criminal Cases: On July 21, 1997, separate
criminal complaints for violation of BP 22 were filed
against Caroline with MTC of Manila, covering the
said 3 checks.
Civil Case: On Aug. 11, 1998, RTC found the
spouses liable.
Criminal Cases: On Dec. 5, 2001, MTC acquitted
Caroline of BP 22 for failure of the prosecution to
prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt but found
to be civilly liable.
Criminal Cases: Spouses sought partial
reconsideration of the MTC Decision praying for the
deletion of the award of civil indemnity but it was
denied. Caroline appealed to the RTC.
Civil Case: Spouses brought to the CA on appeal
the RTC Decision, which was dismissed on Nov. 20,
2002. Spouses moved for reconsideration of the
CA Decision, but such was denied per Resolution
dated April 21, 2003.
Criminal Cases: On May 8, 2003, the RTC as an
appellate court, rendered its Decision, modifying
the MTC Decision by deleting the award of civil
damages.
Spouses contend that the assailed CA Decision
and Resolution should be reconsidered (because
according to them the CA allowed Balboa to recover
twice by not allowing the appeal in the Civil Case - This
was confusing because RTC already deleted the award
of civil damages in the Criminal Cases) and the RTC
CrimPro
Decision dated Aug. 11, 1998 dismissed due to
Balboa’s act of filing Criminal and Civil Cases
constitutes forum shopping.
ISSUE: WON Balboa committed forum shopping - NO
RATIO: Forum shopping is the institution of two or
more actions or proceedings grounded on the same
cause, on the supposition that one or the other court
would render a favorable disposition.
There is forum shopping when the following
elements concur: (1) identity of the parties or, at
least, of the parties who represent the same interest in
both actions; (2) identity of the rights asserted and
relief prayed for, as the latter is founded on the same
set of facts; and (3) identity of the two preceding
particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the
other action will amount to res judicata in the action
under consideration or will constitute litis pendentia.
In Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corp. v. Asia
Dynamic Electrix Corp., the Court ruled that there is
identity of parties and causes of action between a civil
case for the recovery of sum of money as a result of
the issuance of bouncing checks, and a criminal case
for the prosecution of a B.P. No. 22 violation. Thus, it
ordered the dismissal of the civil action so as to
prevent double payment of the claim. The Court
stated:
“xxx The prime purpose of the criminal action is to
punish the offender to deter him and others from
committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him
from society, reform or rehabilitate him or, in general,
to maintain social order. The purpose, meanwhile, of
the civil action is for the restitution, reparation or
indemnification of the private offended party for the
damage or injury he sustained by reason of the
delictual or felonious act of the accused. Xxx”
This was reiterated in the case of Silangan
Textile Manufacturing Corp. v. Demetria. In both
cases (Hyatt and Silangan), the Court applied Supreme
Court Circular No. 57-97 effective September 16,
1997,4 which was later adopted as Rule 111(b) of the
2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.5
4
1. The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall
be deemed to necessarily include the corresponding civil action, and
no reservation to file such action separately shall be allowed or
recognized.
5
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall
be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to
file such civil action separately shall be allowed.
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions,
the offended party shall pay in full the filing fees based on the amount
of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual
damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks to
recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages,
the offended party shall pay the filing fees based on the amounts
alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these
damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based
on the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial
thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the
criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If
199
 emedial Law Review
Digests
Back to the present case:
However, the Civil Case was filed on Feb. 24,
1997, and Criminal Cases on July 21, 1997, prior to
the adoption of Supreme Court Circular No. 57-97 on
Sept. 16, 1997. Thus, at the time of filing of Civil Case
and Criminal Cases, the governing rule is Section 1,
Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules of Court.6
Under the foregoing rule, an action for the
recovery of civil liability arising from an offense
charged is necessarily included in the criminal
proceedings, unless (1) there is an express waiver of
the civil action, or (2) there is a reservation to institute
a separate one, or (3) the civil action was filed prior to
the criminal complaint. Since Balboa instituted the
civil action prior to the criminal action, then Civil
Case may proceed independently of Criminal
Cases, and there is no forum shopping to speak
of.
Even under the amended rules, a separate
proceeding for the recovery of civil liability in cases of
violations of B.P. No. 22 is allowed when the civil case
is filed ahead of the criminal case. Thus, in the Hyatt
case, the Court noted, viz.:
“xxx This rule [Rule 111(b) of the 2000 Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure] was enacted to help declog
court dockets which are filled with B.P. 22 cases as
creditors actually use the courts as collectors. Because
ordinarily no filing fee is charged in criminal cases for
actual damages, the payee uses the intimidating effect
of a criminal charge to collect his credit gratis and
sometimes, upon being paid, the trial court is not even
informed thereof. The inclusion of the civil action in the
criminal case is expected to significantly lower the
number of cases filed before the courts for collection
based on dishonored checks. It is also expected to
expedite the disposition of these cases. Instead of
instituting two separate cases, one for criminal and
another for civil, only a single suit shall be filed and
tried. It should be stressed that the policy laid down by
the Rules is to discourage the separate filing of the
civil action. The Rules even prohibit the reservation of
a separate civil action, which means that one can no
longer file a separate civil case after the criminal
complaint is filed in court. The only instance when
separate proceedings are allowed is when the
civil action is filed ahead of the criminal
case. Even then, the Rules encourage the
the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in
accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the
civil and criminal actions.
6
SEC. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - When a criminal
action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is
impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes the recovery of indemnity under
the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or
omission of the accused. xxx (Emphasis supplied)
CrimPro
consolidation of the civil and criminal cases. We have
previously observed that a separate civil action for the
purpose of recovering the amount of the dishonored
checks would only prove to be costly, burdensome and
time-consuming for both parties and would further
delay the final disposition of the case. This multiplicity
of suits must be avoided. Where petitioners' rights
may be fully adjudicated in the proceedings before the
trial court, resort to a separate action to recover civil
liability is clearly unwarranted. (Emphasis supplied)”
Moreover, the RTC, in its Decision in Criminal
Case, already deleted the award of civil damages.
Records do not disclose that appeal had been taken
therefrom. There is, therefore, no double recovery of
the amounts covered by the checks or unjust
enrichment on the part of respondent.
B. INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION
C. DEATH OF THE ACCUSED
D. ACQUITTAL
E. SUBSTITUTION
F. PREJUDICIAL QUESTION
JOSE v. SUAREZ
FACTS: Spouses Suarez regularly borrows money from
Jose with an interest rate of 1% per day which she
later on increased to 5% a day. Spouses Suarez had
no choice but to agree to the interest rate and in
exchange, they issued postdated checks in payment
thereof. When they were having difficulty in meeting
their obligations, Suarez filed a complaint seeking the
annulment of the interest rate for being
unconscionable AND to enjoin defendant from filing
BP22 case.
Jose filed several counts of violation of BP22
against Suarez. Suarez filed a motion to suspend the
proceedings but was denied. Suarez filed a motion for
writ of preliminary injunction and/or TRO before the
RTC claiming prejudicial question. Denied.
They elevated the case to CA which concluded
that if the checks subject of the criminal cases were
later on declared null and void, then said checks could
not be made the bases of criminal prosecutions under
BP22. In other words, the outcome of the
determination of the validity of the said checks is
determinative of guilt or innocence of accused in the
criminal case.
ISSUE: w/n the validity of the interest rates is a
prejudicial question to the BP22 case
SC: NO. CA decision reversed.
A prejudicial question generally comes into play in a
situation where a civil action and a criminal action are
both pending and there exists in the former an issue
200
 emedial Law Review
Digests
which must be preemptively resolved before the latter
may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in
the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris
et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in
the criminal case. The rationale behind the principle of
prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting
decisions.
It has two essential elements: (i) the civil
action involves an issue similar or intimately related to
the issue raised in the criminal action; & (ii) the
resolution of such issue determines w/n the criminal
action may proceed.
Now the prejudicial question posed by Suarez
is simply this: whether the daily interest rate of 5% is
void, such that the checks issued by respondents to
cover said interest are likewise void for being contra
bonos mores, and thus the cases for BP22 will no
longer prosper.
In the first place, the validity or invalidity of
the interest rate is not determinative of the guilt of
respondents in the criminal cases. SC has
consistently declared that the cause or reason for the
issuance of a check is inconsequential in determining
criminal culpability under BP22. In several instances,
SC said that what the law punishes is the issuance of a
bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was
issued or the terms and conditions relating to its
issuance.
Therefore, w/n the interest rate imposed by
Jose is eventually declared void for being contra bonos
mores will not affect the outcome of the BP22 cases
because what will ultimately be penalized is the mere
issuance of bouncing checks.
RULE 112 : PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION
Community Rural Bank V. Judge Talavera
FACTS: Community Rural Bank (Bank for short) filed a
complaint with the prosecutor’s office of Cabanatuan
charging several persons (the accused) with Estafa.
After preliminary investigation, 6 informations for
estafa were filed, 2 of which were raffled to the branch
where respondent, Judge Talavera, presided.
The accused appealed the finding of the Fiscal
to the DOJ, which the latter denied, so Judge Talavera
issued a warrant of arrest with no bail against the
accused.
Later, the accused filed with Judge Talavera a
motion for reinvestigation and to lift the warrant of
arrest. Bank was not notified of this motion. Judge
granted the motion without any hearing thereon. When
the reinvestigation was conducted, the Bank was still
not notified.
The assistant provincial prosecutor who
conducted the reinvestigation reversed the earlier
findings of the fiscal. On the same day, a motion to
dismiss was filed with Judge, which he granted, and he
CrimPro
also ordered the release of the accused. The Bank was
never notified of any of these proceedings.
Bank then filed an MR arguing it was deprived
of due process. It also asked that the criminal
information be reinstated. Judge denied this. Now,
Bank filed the present case charging Judge Talavera
with serious misconduct and gross inefficiency.
Issue: Did Judge commit gross ignorance? - Yes
Motion for Reinvestigation. Judge should not
have entertained the motion for reinvestigation, since
DOJ Secretary Serafin Cuevas already denied with
finality the appeal of the accused, finding that there
was prima facie evidence against the accused. Under
Dept Order No. 223 (Rules Governing Appeals from
Resolutions in Preliminary Investigations or
Reinvestigations), a motion for reinvestigation may be
filed on the ground of newly discovered evidence and
this must be filed before the DOJ Secretary rules on an
appeal from the resolution in a preliminary
investigation. Here, the motion for reinvestigation was
filed 3 months after the DOJ Secretary already denied
their appeal with finality. Clearly, therefore, Judge
Talavera was wrong in granting the motion. Also, there
was no newly discovered evidence. Moreover,
considering that a prima facie case was found to exist
against the accused during the preliminary
investigation, Judge Talavera should have exercised
great restraint in granting a reinvestigation. The court
stressed thata preliminary investigation is
essentially prefatory and inquisitorial. It is not a
trial of the case on the merits and has no
purpose except to determine whether a crime
has been committed, and whether there is
probable cause to believe that the accused is
guilty of that crime. A preliminary investigation
is not the occasion for a full and exhaustive
display of the parties’ evidence, which needs to
be presented only to engender a well-grounded
belief that an offense has been committed, and
that the accused is probably guilty thereof.
Motion to Dismiss.It was also error for the
Judge to grant the Motion to Dismiss by relying merely
on the resolution of the prosecutor who conducted the
reinvestigation. In his Order, he merely stated that the
motion to dismiss is meritorious, and nothing more.
The Order failed to demonstrate an independent
evaluation or assessment of the evidence against the
accused. The Judge acted with undue haste when he
granted the Motion only a day after the reinvestigation
was concluded.This leads to the conclusion that the
judge did not personally evaluate the parties’ evidence
before acting on the Motion.The discretion to grant a
Motion to Dismiss rests solely with the court. However,
mere approval of the position taken by the prosecution
is not equivalent to the discretion required.Once a
complaint or an information is filed in court, the judge
-- not the prosecutor -- assumes full control of the
controversy. A grant of the motion to dismiss is
equivalent to a disposition of the case itself, which is a
201
 emedial Law Review
Digests
subject clearly within the court’s exclusive jurisdiction
and competence. When Judge issued the warrants of
arrest without bail against all the accused, it is
presumed that he had studied the Information and the
Resolution of the prosecutor and agreed with the
latter’s findings of probable cause. Thus, the grant of
the Motion for Reinvestigation and of the Motion to
Dismiss for alleged insufficiency of evidence posed a
serious contradiction of the earlier finding of probable
cause.
Finally, Judge granted both of the Motions
despite the obvious lack of notice to the Bank and lack
of hearing. This lapse effectively deprived it of its day
in court.
SERAG V. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts: Atty. Jesus Sibya, Jr. a mayoralty candidate in
Iloilo was shot. His driver Norberto Salamat was also
wounded. Hence, a criminal complaint for murder and
attempted murder was filed against Napao who was an
incumbent mayor at that time and Sebastian Serag.
The prosecutor filed two informations: (1) for Murder
with the Use of Unlicensed Firearms, and (2)
Attempted Murder with the Use of Unlicensed Firearms
against Serag and Napao and 7 others.
The wounded driver Salamat and wife of the
victim Ma. Daisy Sibya filed before the provincial
prosecutor a supplemental complaint for murder,
frustrated murder and violation of PD 1866 (Illegal
possession of firearms) against Napag, Serag and 16
others. Provincial Prosecutor issued an order finding
probable cause for murder and attempted murder with
the use of unlicensed firearms. Hence, an amended
information was filed (to include the use of unlicensed
firearms). Napao and the other accused filed a petition
for review to appeal the said resolution before the DOJ.
The trial court found probable cause for
murder and attempted murder. Warrants of arrest
were issued against the accused who were still at
large.
Pending the resolution by the Secretary of
Justice of the said petition for review, the proceedings
were suspended. However, the accused were still set
to be arraigned. A day before the said arraignment,
the Secretary of Justice affirmed with modification the
resolution and downgraded the charges from murder
to Homicide. Provincial prosecutor was likewise
ordered to amend the Amended Informations
accordingly.
The wife of the victim, Daisy, filed an MR to
appeal the said resolution.
In compliance with the order of the DOJ,
provincial prosecutor filed before the RTC a motion for
leave to file a second amended information for
homicide and attempted homicide. Private prosecutors
opposed the motion and moved for deferment because
they said that Daisy had earlier filed an MR questioning
the resolution downgrading the charges. They said that
it would be premature to file a motion for the
CrimPro
admission of the second amended information and for
the court to admit the same. But the RTC still granted
the motion of the provincial prosecutor and admitted
the second amended information for homicide. The
attempted homicide case however was dismissed on
the ground that it had no jurisdiction over the said
case. RTC said they had not received a copy of Daisy’s
MR. Hence, the court arraigned the accused for
homicide, who pleaded not guilty.
Taking into account the finding of the DOJ, the
court held that the finding of probable cause for
murder against the accused did not bar it from
admitting the Second Amended Information for
Homicide. Likewise, the pendency of Daisy’s MR of the
Resolution of the Secretary of Justice was not a valid
reason for the deferment of the arraignment of the
accused for homicide.
The private complainant (Daisy) forthwith
assailed the orders of the trial court and the
arraignment of the accused via a petition
for certiorari in the CA. She insisted that the admission
by the RTC of the Second Amended Information
downgrading the crime charged therein to Homicide
and the arraignment of the accused therein on June 6,
2002 were premature since the Secretary of Justice
had not yet resolved her motion for reconsideration of
the May 20, 2002 Resolution.
CA issued a TRO enjoining the RTC from
proceeding with the case.
In the meantime, DOJ issued a resolution
granting the MR of private complainant Daisy and set
aside the resolution downgraded the offense to
homicide. The Secretary of Justice opined that the
killing of the deceased was, after all, qualified by
treachery. Secretary also said that he cannot be
stopped from taking cognizance of the case and
resolving the MR despite the arraignment of the
accused. He directed the Provincial Prosecutor to
withdraw the Second Amended Information for
Homicide and Attempted Homicide and to file, instead
separate Informations for Murder and Attempted
Murder.
The accused-petitioners filed an MR of the said
resolution. They argued that, with their arraignment in
the RTC and the MTC, the Secretary of Justice should
have denied the private complainant’s motion for
reconsideration. DOJ denied said motion.
Juan Napao and the other petitioners in the
Department of Justice filed a petition for certiorari with
the CA assailing the November 18, 2002 Resolution of
the Secretary of Justice, and praying for the
reinstatement of Resolution No. 258 (wherein the
charges against them were downgraded).
The Provincial Prosecutor filed a Motion with
the trial court for the withdrawal of the Second
Amended Information for homicide and for the
reinstatement of the Amended Information for murder.
However, in view of the temporary restraining order
issued by the CA, the trial court suspended the
proceedings.
202
 emedial Law Review
Digests
CA eventually issued an order nullifying the
order downgrading the offense. It also issued an order
nullifying the arraignment. Of course, the accused-
petitioners questioned this saying CA acted with
GADLEJ when it issued the order nullifying their
arraignment. They insist that the CA should have
dismissed the petition of Daisy for being moot and
academic because they were already arraigned.
ISSUE: W/N the CA committed GADLEJ? No, petition is
denied.
HELD: The appellate court’s nullification of the June 6,
2002 and July 26, 2002 Orders of the RTC and the
arraignment of the petitioners on June 6, 2002 are
well-founded. Section 13 of DOJ Circular No. 70 reads:
SECTION 13. Motion for reconsideration.— The
aggrieved party may file a motion for
reconsideration within a non-extendible period
of ten (10) days from receipt of the resolution
on appeal, furnishing the adverse party and
the Prosecution Office concerned with copies
thereof and submitting proof of such service.
No second or further motion for
reconsideration shall be entertained.
The private respondent (Daisy) received a copy
of Resolution No. 258 of the Secretary of Justice
downgrading the charges from murder and attempted
murder to homicide and attempted homicide. She had
the right to file a motion for reconsideration of the
aforesaid resolution on or before June 6, 2002. it
behooved the RTC to suspend the proceedings until
after the Secretary of Justice had resolved such motion
with finality, including the consideration of the motion
of the Provincial Prosecutor for the admission of the
Second Amended Information for homicide, the
dismissal of Criminal Case No. 926, and the
arraignment of the petitioners for homicide. It was, in
fact, premature for the Provincial Prosecutor to file
such motion for the admission of the Second Amended
Information since the Secretary of Justice had not yet
resolved the said motion; after all, he may still
reconsider Resolution No. 258, which he did,
effectively reversing his previous ruling and thus
reverting to the original charges of murder and
attempted murder.
Accordingly, we rule that the trial court in a
criminal case which takes cognizance of an accused’s
motion for review of the resolution of the investigating
prosecutor or for reinvestigation and defers the
arraignment until resolution of the said motion must
act on the resolution reversing the investigating
prosecutor’s finding or on a motion to dismiss based
thereon only upon proof that such resolution is already
final in that no appeal was taken therefrom to the
Department of Justice.
In fine, the RTC acted with inordinate and
precipitate haste when it granted the Provincial
Prosecutor’s motion for the admission of the Second
Amended Information for homicide, ordered the
withdrawal of Criminal Case No. 926 for attempted
CrimPro
homicide based on Resolution No. 258 of the DOJ
Secretary, and arraigned the accused therein for
homicide. Quoting the CA:
“Public respondent also erroneously found that
the pendency of the motion for
reconsideration, and the other reasons given,
not compelling for the court to defer its action
on the motion to admit. As earlier stated,
Department Circular No. 70 places the duty
upon the appellant and the trial prosecutor to
see to it that, pending resolution of the appeal,
the proceedings in court are held in abeyance.”
It should be considered that the motion to
defer was even with the conformity of the public
prosecutor and the appearance of the private
prosecutors is pursuant to Section 16, Rule 110 of the
2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit:
Intervention of the offended party in criminal
action.—Where the civil action for recovery of
civil liability is instituted in the criminal action
pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may
intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the
offense.
All these facts taken together, there appears to
be an undue haste on the part of the public respondent
in admitting the second amended informations for
homicide and attempted homicide and ordering the
arraignment of the private respondents to the said
informations. As a result of the assailed Orders issued
by public respondent, the private respondents were
arraigned for homicide and attempted homicide.
The DOJ cannot be stripped of his authority to
act on and resolve the aforesaid motion of the private
complainant on the Prosecutor’s insistence that the
accused be arraigned on June 6, 2002. Indeed, under
Section 7 of DOJ Circular No. 70, the Secretary of
Justice may resolve the said motion despite the
arraignment of the petitioners:
SECTION 7. Action on the petition. – The
Secretary of Justice may dismiss the petition
outright if he finds the same to be patently
without merit or manifestly intended for delay,
or when the issues raised therein are too
unsubstantial to require consideration.
If an information has been filed in court
pursuant to the appealed resolution, the
petition shall not be given due course if the
accused had already been arraigned. Any
arraignment made after the filing of the
petition shall not bar the Secretary of Justice
from exercising his power of review.
Soriano v. People
Facts: The Office of Special Investigation (OSI) of
the BSP transmitted a letter to the Chief State
Prosecutor of the DOJ. The letter attached as annexes
five affidavits, which would allegedly serve as bases for
filing criminal charges for Estafa thru Falsification of
Commercial Documents, in relation to PD No. 1689,
203
 emedial Law Review
Digests
and for Violation of Section 83 of RA 337 (General
Banking Law), as amended by PD 1795, against Hilario
P. Soriano.
This letter stated that spouses Enrico and
Amalia Carlos appeared to have an outstanding loan of
P8 million with the Rural Bank of San Miguel (Bulacan),
Inc. (RBSM), but had never applied for nor received
such loan; that it was Soriano, who was then president
of RBSM, who had ordered, facilitated, and received
the proceeds of the loan; and that the P8 million loan
had never been authorized by RBSM's Board of
Directors and no report thereof had ever been
submitted to the Department of Rural Banks,
Supervision and Examination Sector of the BSP. The
letter of the OSI, which was not subscribed under
oath, ended with a request that a preliminary
investigation be conducted and the corresponding
criminal charges be filed against petitioner at his last
known address.
The State Prosecutor conducted a preliminary
investigation. Finding probable cause, he filed two
separate informations against Soriano.
Soriano filed a motion to quash contending
that the letter transmitted by the BSP to the DOJ
constituted the complaint and hence was defective for
failure to comply with the mandatory requirements of
Section 3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, such as
the statement of address of the accused and oath and
subscription. Moreover, Soriano argued that the
officers of OSI, who were the signatories to the “letter-
complaint,” were not authorized by the BSP Governor,
much less by the Monetary Board, to file the
complaint. According to Soriano, this alleged fatal
oversight violated Section 18, pars. (c) and (d) of the
New Central Bank Act (RA 7653).
The RTC and CA dismissed the motion to
quash.
Issue: Was the complaint defective? No.
Decision: A similar case (Soriano v. Hon. Casanova)
stated that the letter was not intended to be the
complaint, as envisioned under the Rules. They did
not contain averments of personal knowledge of the
events and transactions constitutive of any offense.
The letters merely transmitted for preliminary
investigation the affidavits of people who had personal
knowledge of the acts of Soriano. The SC ruled that
the affidavits, and not the letters transmitting them,
initiated the preliminary investigation. Since these
affidavits were subscribed under oath by the witnesses
who executed them before a notary public, then there
was substantial compliance with Section 3(a), Rule 112
of the Rules of Court.
The Court also relied on the ruling in Santos-
Concio v. DOJ wherein instead of a transmittal letter
from the BSP, the Court in Santos-Concio was faced
with an NBI-NCR Report, likewise with affidavits of
witnesses as attachments. It stated that since the
affidavits, not the letters transmitting them, were
CrimPro
intended to initiate the preliminary investigation, we
hold that Section 3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court
was substantially complied with.
As for Soriano’s allegation, since the offenses
for which Soriano was charged were public crimes,
authority holds that it can be initiated by “any
competent person” with personal knowledge of the
acts committed by the offender. Thus, the witnesses
(Carlos spouses) who executed the affidavits clearly
fell within the purview of “any competent person” who
may institute the complaint for a public crime.
This is bolstered by the case of Ebarle v.
Sucaldito, wherein the court stated that a complaint
for purposes of preliminary investigation by the fiscal
need not be filed by the offended party. The rule has
been that, unless the offense subject thereof is one
that cannot be prosecuted de oficio, the same may be
filed, for preliminary investigation purposes, by any
competent person.
SAMUEL LEE AND MAYBELLE LIM VS. KBC BANK
Facts: Midas Diversified Export Corporation (MDEC)
obtained 2 loans from KBC Bank (Belgian corp licensed
to do business here). By reason of these loans MDEC
executed the following documents: 2 PNs; and 2 deeds
of assignment. These documents were executed by Lee
(assts treasurer and director of MDEC) and Lim
(treasurer and asst secretary of MDEC). The subject
matters of the deeds of assignment were 2 Confirmed
Purchase Orders, which were allegedly issued by Otto
Versand (German corp) in favor of MDEC, covering
certain goods (jeans).
MDEC defaulted in payment. KBC sent a letter
to Otto Versand verifying the validity of the Confirmed
Purchase Orders. Otto Versand then sent a fax
message to KBC stating that it did not issue such
orders and that it would not pay MDEC any amount.
Complaint-affidavit was filed by KBC, charging Lee and
Lim of estafa. State Prosecutor Subia found probable
cause and recommended that 2 counts of estafa be
filed. So informations were filed with the RTC. RTC
Judge Dumayas issued warrants of arrest against Lee
and Lim.
Lee and Lim then filed a petition for review
with the DOJ challenging State Prosecutor Subia’s
resolution finding probable cause. DOJ Secretary Perez
directed the withdrawal of the informations filed
reasoning out that the fax message constituted
hearsay evidence since there was no sworn statement
from an officer of Otto Versand presented to attest to
the allegation that the purchase orders were fake. Note
that at this point, Lee and Lim had not been arraigned.
Upon a motion for the withdrawal of the informations,
RTC Judge Dumayas issued a one-page order granting
the same.
KBC filed a petition for review to the CA. The
CA reversed the RTC decision holding that “a
preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full
and exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence; it is for
204
 emedial Law Review
Digests
the presentation of such evidence only as may
engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has
been committed and that the accused is probably
guilty thereof. The issue of admissibility of evidence is
a matter best decided in a full-blown trial, not in a
preliminary investigation.” So Lee and Lim filed the
present petition.
Issue: W/N the admissibility of the fax message can
be determined during preliminary investigation? NO!
SC agreed with CA.
Held/Ratio:
Preliminary investigation not the occasion for full and
exhaustive display of evidence
SC ruled that whether the fax message is
admissible in evidence and whether the element of
deceit in the crime of estafa is present are matters
best ventilated in a full-blown trial, not in the
preliminary investigation. In Andres vs. Justice
Secretary Cuevas the SC held that: “a preliminary
investigation is not the occasion for the full and
exhaustive display of evidence. The presence or
absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in
nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed
upon after a full-blown trial on the merits.”
In short, the validity and merits of accusations
and defenses, as well as the admissibility of evidence,
are better ventilated during trial proper than at the
preliminary investigation level.
(side note) RTC Judge Dumayas should’ve decided the
motion to withdraw upon his own personal
determination
SC also held that RTC Judge Dumayas should
not have relied solely on the recommendation of the
DOJ Secretary to have the informations withdrawn.
Citing several cases, the SC held that “a judge acts
with GADLEJ when he grants a prosecutor’s motion to
dismiss the criminal charges against an accused on the
basis solely of the recommendation of the secretary.
Such reliance on the secretary is an abdication of the
trial court’s duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima
facie case.
Furthermore, the trial court is not bound to
adopt the resolution of the DOJ Secretary since it is
mandated to independently evaluate or assess the
merits of the case. In other words, the dismissal of the
case was based upon considerations other than the
judge’s own personal individual conviction that there
was no case against the accused.
OKABE v GUTIERREZ
FACTS: Maruyama sued Okabe for estafa. It was
alleged in the complaint that Maruyama entrusted to
Okabe a sum of money for the latter, who was
engaged in the business of door to door delivery, to
remit to the Philippines. Okabe failed to remit such
amount.
The complaint for estafa was filed with the 2 nd
assistant city prosecutor for preliminary investigation.
CrimPro
During the preliminary investigation, both Okabe and
Marumaya were given the chance to adduce
evidences/affidavits on their behalf. The 2nd assistant
city prosecutor found probable cause and issued a
resolution and the corresponding information.
Appended thereto was the Maruyama’s complaint
affidavit. These documents were forwarded to the city
prosecutor for approval.
Then the information was filed with the RTC of
Pasay. A warrant of arrest was issued but Okabe was
able to post bail in the amount of 40,000 thereby
allowing her to freely leave the Philippines for Japan.
Upon the instance of the prosecution, a hold-departure
order was issued by the court.
Okabe filed a motion for judicial determination
of probable cause. She claims that the documents
attached to the resolution of the investigating
prosecutor were insufficient to warrant a finding of
probable cause. She contends that it behooved the
investigating prosecutor to submit the following to the
trial court to enable it to determine the presence or
absence of probable cause: (a) copies of the affidavits
of the witnesses of the complainant; (b) the counter-
affidavit of Okabe and those of her witnesses; (c) the
transcripts of stenographic notes taken during the
preliminary investigation; and, (d) other documents
presented during the said investigation.
ISSUE:
a. Whether or not the trial court judge should
have required the production of the affidavits
of Maruyama’s witnesses, their documentary
evidences, stenographic notes of the
preliminary investigation and Okabe’s counter-
affidavit for the purposes of determining
probable cause for the issuance of the warrant
of arrest – YES
b. Whether or not posting of bail bars the accused
from questioning the legality of the arrest or
the conduct of preliminary investigation - NO
HELD: The case of Webb v De Leon and Ho v People
say that for the purposes of determining the existence
or non-existence of probable cause for the purpose of
issuing a warrant of arrest, the judge should not rely
solely on the said report. The judge should consider
not only the report of the investigating prosecutor but
also the affidavit/affidavits and the documentary
evidence of the parties, the counter-affidavit of the
accused and his witnesses, as well as the transcript of
stenographic notes taken during the preliminary
investigation, if any, submitted to the court by the
investigating prosecutor upon the filing of the
Information. This rule is now embodied section 8(a) of
Rule 112 (but which is section 7 (a) in our codal) which
mandates that an information filed in court shall be
supported by affidavits and counter-affidavits of the
parties and their witnesses, other supporting
documents and the resolution of the case. The reason
for this rule is because the law aims not only to acquit
205
 emedial Law Review
Digests
the innocent but to like insulate the clearly innocent
from false charges and from the strong arm of the law.
Section 26 of the Rule 114 says that an
application for or admission to bail shall not bar the
accused from challenging the validity of his arrest or
the legality of the warrant issued therefor, or from
assailing the regularity or questioning the absence of a
preliminary investigation of the charge against him,
provided that he raises them before entering his plea.
This is a curative rule because modified the previous
rulings of the SC saying that posting of bail is a bar to
challenging the validity of the arrest. Being curative
and procedural in nature, it applies retroactively. It
must favor Okabe. Besides, every waiver of a right to
question the validity of an arrest must be
unequivocally established by the conduct of the
accused. In this case, the series of acts by Okabe point
to the conclusion that she was insistent about the fact
that the arrest was ordered with insufficient finding of
probable cause. In fact, she immediately filed a motion
for judicial determination of probable cause.
RULE 113 : ARREST
PEOPLE V DE LEON (2010)
Facts: De Leon was convicted under the DDA in the
RTC, for selling and possession of shabu. He assails his
conviction, claiming that the buy-bust operation
against him was against the law. He also claims that
the chain of custody was not established.
According to the prosecution, an informant told
the police that de Leon was selling Shabu. So one of
the police operatives went to de Leon and the
informant introduced him to de Leon as a buyer of
shabu. De Leon handed him a plastic of shabu and in
exchange, the operative handed him P200 in marked
bills. After the exchange, de Leon was arrested by
police officers.
The plastic of shabu was brought by the police
officers to the police station where one of the police
officers placed his initials on the plastic. It was
subsequently turned over to a police investigator who
sent it to the crime lab. A forensic investigator
conducted examinations on it and determined that it
was shabu
In his defense, de Leon claims that he was
going around looking for a loan, and was suddenly
arrested by the police officers. De Leon claims that the
buy-bust operation was full of irregularities, hence his
arrest was illegal. He notes that the Pre-Operation
Report was full of discrepancies and that the Joint
Sworn Affidavit of Apprehension of the policemen who
arrested him failed to mention that they placed their
markings on the plastic sachets.
Issue: Was the buy-bust operation valid?
Held: It was valid. Such irregularities cannot overturn
the finding of the presence in this case of the elements
of violation to the DDA. A buy-bust operation is a form
of entrapment whereby ways and means are resorted
to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the
CrimPro
lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. In
this jurisdiction, the operation is legal and has been
proved to be an effective method of apprehending drug
peddlers, provided due regard to constitutional and
legal safeguards is undertaken.
Here, the buy-bust operation conducted by the
police officers, who made use of entrapment to capture
appellant in the act of selling a dangerous drug, was
valid and legal. Moreover, the defense has failed to
show any evidence of ill motive on the part of the
police officers. Even de Leon himself declared that it
was the first time he met the police officers during his
cross-examination. There was, therefore, no motive for
the police officers to frame up de Leon.
Likewise, the identity of de Leon as the person
who sold the dangerous drugs to the policeman and
the one in possession of the shabu cannot be doubted
anymore. Such positive identification prevails over his
defenses of denial and alibi. These defenses have been
invariably viewed by the Court with disfavor, for they
can easily be concocted but difficult to prove, and they
are common and standard defense ploys in most
prosecutions arising from violations of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act.
Issue: Was the chain of custody rule followed? (in case
sir asks)
Held: Yes. A close examination of the law reveals that
it admits of certain exceptions. Thus, contrary to the
assertions of de Leon, Sec. 21 of the DDA need not be
followed as an exact science. Non-compliance with
Sec. 21 does not render an accused’s arrest illegal or
the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible.
What is essential is "the preservation of the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the
same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt
or innocence of the accused.
In the instant case, there was substantial
compliance with the law and the integrity of the drugs
seized from appellant was preserved. The chain of
custody of the drugs subject matter of the case was
shown not to have been broken. The factual milieu of
the case reveals that after the policeman seized and
confiscated the dangerous drugs, as well as the
marked money, de Leon was immediately arrested and
brought to the police station for investigation, where
the sachet of suspected shabu was marked with the
officer’s initials. Immediately thereafter, the
confiscated substance, with a letter of request for
examination, was submitted to the PNP Crime Lab for
examination to determine the presence of any
dangerous drug. Per the report, the specimen
submitted contained shabu, a dangerous drug. The
examination was conducted by a Forensic Chemical
Officer of the PNP Crime Lab, whose stipulated
testimony clearly established the chain of custody of
the specimens he received. Thus, it is without a doubt
that there was an unbroken chain of custody of the
illicit drug purchased from de Leon.
206
 emedial Law Review
Digests
PEOPLE V. LAGUIO
Facts: Police operatives sent an entrapment to catch
Redentor Teck (alias “Frank”) and Joseph Junio selling
drugs. Caught in the act, the two were arrested. They
did not disclose their source of shabu, but they
admitted working for Lawrence Wang (public
respondent)’s modeling agency. They also disclosed
that they knew of a scheduled delivery of shabu early
the following morning, and that their employer (Wang)
could be found at the Maria Orosa Apartment in
Malate, Manila. The police operatives decided to look
for Wang to shed light on the illegal drug activities of
Frank and Junio.
Under surveillance, Wang came out of the
apartment and walked towards a parked BMW car. On
nearing the car, police officers approached Wang,
introduced themselves, asked his name and, upon
hearing that he was Lawrence Wang, immediately
frisked him and asked him to open the back
compartment of the BMW car. When frisked, they
found an unlicensed pistol. At the same time, in his car
were bags of shabu, P650,000.00 cash, electronic and
mechanical scales and an unlicensed handgun.
Wang filed a Demurrer to Evidence, praying for
his acquittal and the dismissal of the three cases
against him for lack of a valid arrest and search
warrants and the inadmissibility of the prosecution’s
evidence against him. RTC Judge Laguio granted the
demurrer.
Issue: Whether there was lawful arrest, search and
seizure by the police operatives in this case despite the
absence of a warrant of arrest and/or a search
warrant.
Held: (The topic is under “Arrest,” but there is a
discussion on double jeopardy in this case. In brief: An
order granting an accused’s demurrer to evidence is a
resolution of the case on the merits, and it amounts to
an acquittal. Generally, any further prosecution of the
accused after an acquittal would violate the
constitutional proscription on double jeopardy.)
Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the New Rules of
Court, a peace officer may arrest a person without a
warrant under these grounds: (a) arrest of a suspect in
flagrante delicto; (b) arrest of a suspect where, based
on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is
probable cause that said suspect was the author of a
crime which had just been committed; (c) arrest of a
prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is
pending.
For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught
in flagrante delicto under paragraph (a) of Section 5 to
be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to
be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that
he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act
CrimPro
is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer.
The facts and circumstances surrounding the
present case did not manifest any suspicious behavior
on the part of private respondent Lawrence Wang that
would reasonably invite the attention of the police. He
was merely walking from his apartment and was about
to enter the parked BMW car when the police
operatives arrested him, frisked and searched his
person and commanded him to open the compartment
of the car, which was later on found to be owned by
his friend, David Lee. He was not committing any
visible offense then. Therefore, there can be no valid
warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto under paragraph
(a) of Section 5. It is settled that "reliable information"
alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious
enterprise in the presence and within the view of the
arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute
probable cause that would justify an in flagrante
delicto arrest.
Neither may the warrantless arrest be justified
under paragraph (b) of Section 5. What is clearly
established from the testimonies of the arresting
officers is that Wang was arrested mainly on the
information that he was the employer of Frank and
Junio who were previously arrested and charged for
illegal transport of shabu. Frank and Junio did not even
categorically identify Wang to be their source of the
shabu they were caught with in flagrante delicto. Upon
the duo’s declaration that there will be a delivery of
shabu on the early morning of the following day, which
is only a few hours thereafter, and that Wang may be
found in Maria Orosa Apartment along Maria Orosa
Street, the arresting officers conducted "surveillance"
operation in front of said apartment, hoping to find a
person which will match the description of one
Lawrence Wang. These circumstances do not
sufficiently establish the existence of probable cause
based on personal knowledge as required in paragraph
(b) of Section 5.
And doubtless, the warrantless arrest does not
fall under paragraph (c) of Section 5. The inevitable
conclusion, as correctly made by the trial court, is that
the warrantless arrest was illegal. Ipso jure, the
warrantless search incidental to the illegal arrest is
likewise unlawful. The People’s contention that Wang
waived his right against unreasonable search and
seizure has no factual basis. While we agree in
principle that consent will validate an otherwise illegal
search, however, based on the evidence on record,
Wang resisted his arrest and the search on his person
and belongings. Moreover, during arraignment, he
continued to object to the validity of the warrantless
arrest and search.
VALDEZ vs. PEOPLE
FACTS: In 2003, Valdez had in his possession and
custody dried marijuana leaves wrapped in cellophane
and newspaper page, without first securing the
207
 emedial Law Review
Digests
necessary permit or prescription from the proper gov’t
agency. He was then charged with violation of Sec. 11
of RA 9165. On arraignment, Valdez pleaded not
guilty. During trial, the prosecution presented the
testimony of the 3 barangay tanods (Bautista, Aratas
and Ordoño) who arrested Valdez. While the three
were conducting the routine patrol during the night of
the incident, they noticed Valdez, lugging a bag, alight
from a mini-bus. They then observed that Valdez, who
appeared suspicious to them, seemed to be looking for
something. Thus, they approached Valdez but he
purportedly attempted to run away. The tanods chased
Valdez, arrested and brought him to the house of Brgy.
Capt. Mercado. Bautista testified that it was Mercado
who instructed him to open Valdez’ bag, where the
mariajuana leaves were found. Aratas and Ordoño
corroborated Bautista’s testimony on most material
points. On cross-examination, however, Aratas
admitted that he himself brought out the contents of
Valdez’ bag before the latter was taken to Mercado’s
house. Nonetheless, he claimed that at Mercado’s
house, it was Valdez’ himself who brought out the
contents of his bag upon orders from Mercado. For his
part, Ordoño testified that it was he who was ordered
by Mercado to open Valdez’ bag and that it was then
that they saw its contents. Valdez denied the charges.
He basically alleged that while he was walking after
alighting from the bus, witness Ordoño allegedly
approached him and asked where he was going.
Ordoño then purportedly requested to see the contents
of his bag and Valdez acceded. It was at this point that
Bautista and Aratas joined them. After inspecting all
the contents of his bag, Valdez testified that he was
restrained by the tanod and taken to the house of
Mercado. It was Aratas who carried the bag until they
reached their destination. At Mercado’s house, his bag
was opened by the tanod and Mercado himself. They
took out an item wrapped in newspaper, which later
turned out to be marijuana leaves. Valdez denied
ownership of the marijuana. The RTC found Valdez
guilty. The CA affirmed the RTC decision.
ISSUE: W/N the drugs were seized pursuant to a
lawful warrantless arrest that would make the
drugs admissible as evidence? (NOTE: Valdez
never raised the irregularity of his arrest before
arraignment, but to determine the admissibility of the
seized drugs in evidence, it is indispensable to
ascertain whether or not the search which yielded the
alleged contraband was lawful.)
HELD/RATIO: NO. Thus, the seized marijuana is
inadmissible as evidence.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides the only occasions on which a
person may be arrested without a warrant.7 It is
7
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
CrimPro
obvious that based on the testimonies of the arresting
barangay tanod, not one of these circumstances was
present at the time Valdez was arrested. By their own
admission, Valdez was not committing an offense at
the time he alighted from the bus, nor did he appear to
be then committing an offense. The tanods did not
have probable cause either to justify Valdez’
warrantless arrest. For the exception in Section
5(a), Rule 113 to operate, this SC ruled that two
(2) elements must be present: (1) the person to
be arrested must execute an overt act indicating
that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime;
and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or
within the view of the arresting officer. Here,
Valdez’ act of looking around after getting off the bus
was but natural as he was finding his way to his
destination. The allegation that he attempted to run
away as the tanod approached him is irrelevant and
cannot by itself be construed as adequate to charge
the tanod with personal knowledge that Valdez had
just engaged in, was actually engaging in or was
attempting to engage in criminal activity. More
importantly, Valdez testified that he did not run away
but in fact spoke with the barangay tanod when they
approached him.
Even taking the prosecution’s version generally
as the truth, the conclusion will not be any different. It
is not unreasonable to expect that Valdez, walking the
street at night, after being closely observed and then
later tailed by three unknown persons, would attempt
to flee at their approach. Flight per se is not
synonymous with guilt and must not always be
attributed to one’s consciousness of guilt. Alone, and
under the circumstances of this case, Valdez’ flight
lends itself just as easily to an innocent explanation as
it does to a nefarious one. The supposed acts of
Valdez, even assuming that they appeared dubious,
cannot be viewed as sufficient to incite suspicion of
criminal activity enough to validate his warrantless
arrest. If at all, the search most permissible for the
tanod to conduct under the prevailing backdrop of the
case was a stop-and-frisk to allay any suspicion they
have been harboring based on Valdez’ behavior.
However, a stop-and-frisk situation, following Terry v.
Ohio, must precede a warrantless arrest, be limited to
the person’s outer clothing, and should be grounded
upon a genuine reason, in light of the police officer’s
experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the
belief that the person detained has weapons concealed
about him.
Accordingly, Valdez’ waiver of his right to
question his arrest notwithstanding, the marijuana
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment
or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
208
 emedial Law Review
Digests
leaves allegedly taken during the search cannot be
admitted in evidence against him as they were seized
during a warrantless search which was not lawful. As in
People vs. Bacla-an, the SC ruled “A waiver of an
illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a waiver
of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an
illegal warrantless arrest. The following searches
and seizures are deemed permissible by
jurisprudence: (1) search of moving vehicles (2)
seizure in plain view (3) customs searches (4)
waiver or consent searches (5) stop and frisk
situations (Terry Search) and (6) search
incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a
valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an
equally valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule,
an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with
a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court
recognize permissible warrantless arrests, to wit:
(1) arrests in flagrante delicto, (2) arrests
effected in hot pursuit, and, (3) arrests of
escaped prisoners.” Thus, when Valdez was arrested
without a warrant, he was neither caught in flagrante
delicto committing a crime nor was the arrest effected
in hot pursuit. Verily, it cannot therefore be reasonably
argued that the warrantless search conducted on
Valdez was incidental to a lawful arrest. Even granting
that Valdez admitted to opening his bag when Ordoño
asked to see its contents, his implied acquiescence, if
at all, could not have been more than mere passive
conformity given under coercive or intimidating
circumstances and hence, is considered no consent at
all within the contemplation of the constitutional
guarantee. As a result, Valdez’ lack of objection to
the search and seizure is not tantamount to a
waiver of his constitutional right or a voluntary
submission to the warrantless search and
seizure.
ROLITO GO y TAMBUNTING vs. CA
FACTS: On July 2, 1991, Eldon Maguan and Rolito Go
had a near-collision incident in San Juan. After that, Go
alighted from his car, walked over and shot Maguan
inside his car. Go then left the scene but a security
guard at a nearby restaurant was able to get his
license plate.
On July 8, 1991, Go , with 2 lawyers,
presented himself before San Juan Police Station to
very news reports that he was being hunted by the
police. He was detained. An eyewitness to the shooting
was able to positively identify him as the gunman.
That same day, a complaint for frustrated homicide
was filed with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Rizal. He was informed, in the presence of his lawyers,
that he could avail himself of his right to preliminary
investigation but that he must first sign a waiver of the
provisions of Article 125 of the RPC. Go refused to sign
the waiver.
CrimPro
Initially, he was released on bail but CA issued
an Order wherein the bail grant was recalled so Go had
to surrender himself. He was detained again.
CA said that Go's warrantless arrest was valid
because the offense for which he was arrested and
charged had been "freshly committed." When he
showed up at the police station, was already an
existing manhunt for him; he was positively identified
by an eyewitness.
Solicitor General argues Go was validly
arrested without warrant because his identity as the
gunman had been sufficiently established, was validly
arrested six (6) days later at the San Juan Police
Station. The Solicitor General relies In the Matter of
the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Roberto Umil, etc.,
v. Ramos, et al. where the SC upheld a warrantless
arrest as valid although made 14 days after the killing.
Go argues that he was not lawfully arrested
without warrant because he went to the police station
6 days after the shooting. Thus the crime had not been
"just committed" at the time that he was arrested.
Since there had been no lawful warrantless arrest.
Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which
establishes the only exception to the right to
preliminary investigation, is not applicable.
ISSUE: WON there was a lawful warrantless arrest—
NO
First, the reliance of both petitioner and the Solicitor
General upon Umil v. Ramos is, in the circumstances of
this case, misplaced. In Umil v. Ramos there was a
valid warrantless arrest because the offense
(subversion) constituted "continuing crimes." Here, the
offense was murder, not a continuing crime.
Secondly, the warrantless "arrest" does not fall within
the terms of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure. Go's "arrest" took place 6 days
after the shooting. The "arresting" officers obviously
were not present at the time petitioner allegedly shot
Maguan. Neither could the "arrest" effected 6 days
after be reasonably regarded as effected "when the
shooting had in fact just been committed". Plus, none
of the "arresting" officers had any "personal
knowledge" of facts indicating that Go was the
gunman. The police merely relied on the statements of
an alleged eyewitness.
**On Preliminary Investagion: WON Go had effectively
waived his right to preliminary investigation.-- NO
From the very start Go demanded that a preliminary
investigation be conducted. It wasn’t waived when he
incorrectly filed an omnibus motion for release and
preliminary investigation with the Prosecutor (should
be filed with the RTC). Plus, the Prosecutor himself
filed the same with the RTC days after filing the
information for murder.
RULE 114 : BAIL
MABUTAS vs. JUDGE NORMA C. PERELLO
209
 emedial Law Review
Digests
FACTS: These are 2 administrative cases against
respondent Judge Perello.
In the 1st admin case, was filed by Mabutas,
regional director of PDEA. He alleges irregularities
committed by Judge Perello in granting bail to accused
Aiza Omadan in a drug case for possession of shabu.
Mabutas based this complaint on a memorandum by
one of the police inspectors (Butuyan). Omasan was
arrested in 2003. Butuyan was notified of a scheduled
preliminary investigation of Omadan’s case. When he
went to the Office of the Prosecutor, the Asst. City
Prosecutor merely asked them to sign the minutes but
Omadan and her counsel were not there. A few days
later, they Butuyan received a subpoena for the
arraignment of Omadan. However, during the
arraignment, Buyutan, et al were surprised when they
were called to the witness stand because there was
also a bail hearing that same day. They weren’t able to
prepare so they asked for postponement from the
Judge but she refused. The police investigators
delivered a communiqué (message) to the prosecutor
that in the event the case would be granted, they
should defer implementing it because the PDEA was
going to present its evidence. However, they were
again surprised to learn that Omadan was released on
bail.
Judge Perello found that evidence of guilt is
not strong and that there was irregularity in service of
the arrest warrant so the bail was granted to the tune
of P1 Million.
(MORE IMPORTANT) The 2nd administrative
case originated from Prosecutor Togononon, who
accuses Judge Perello of partiality, serious misconduct
and gross ignorance of the law in her action of
granting bail in 4 cases for violation of RA 9165
(drugs) pending before her.
In the said case, accused Pascual was charged
with selling shabu. Pascual motioned for bail on the
ground that the quantity of shabu was minimal and
that she was nine months pregnant at that time.
On the day of Pascual’s arraignment, the motion
for bail was granted without any hearing for
P200K. So the prosecutor filed a MR because the crime
charged was a capital offense and bail was not allowed
as a matter of right hence hearing was supposed to be
indispensable, but Judge denied this.
Similarly there was another accused in a drug
case, Uy, who was accused of selling drugs after a
buy-bust operation but Judge Perello granted bail
to him without hearing because the quantity being
“pushed” was minimal, only 0.12g.
Judge Perello answers that in the latter 2
cases, she didn’t conduct hearing anymore because
the crimes charged were not capital offenses because
the drugs involved were minimal (less than 5g). She
believes that shabu is not a dangerous drug but merely
a controlled precursor so selling it will only be
punishable by 12-20 years, hence bailable and hearing
not required.
CrimPro
Investigating Justice recommended the
dismissal of Judge Perello for gross ignorance of the
law for her failure to conduct any hearing on the
application for bail. As to the Omando case, she was
exonerated.
ISSUE: W/N Judge Perello should be dismissed for
gross ignorance of the law for conducting bail hearings
before granting the bails.
HELD/RATIO: Yes. But merely suspended for 6
months. Should have conducted bail hearings!
The Constitution provides that all persons
charged with criminal offenses shall be entitled to post
bail except if charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua (or life imprisonment or death)
when evidence of guilt is strong.
The matter of determining whether or not the
evidence is strong is a matter of judicial discretion that
remains with the judge. Such discretion must be
sound and exercised within reasonable bounds.
Under the present rules, a hearing on an
application for bail is mandatory. Whether bail is a
matter of right or of discretion, the prosecutor should
be given reasonable notice of hearing, or at least his
recommendation on the matter must be sought.
In case an application for bail is filed, the judge
is entrusted to observe the following duties:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of
right or discretion, notify the prosecutor of
the hearing of the application for bail or require
him to submit his recommendation;
2. Where bail is a matter of
discretion, conduct a hearing of the
application for bail regardless of whether or
not the prosecution refuses to present
evidence to show that the guilt of the accused
is strong for the purpose of enabling the court
to exercise its sound discretion;
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused
is strong based on the summary of evidence of
the prosecution; and
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong,
discharge the accused upon the approval of the
bail bond. Otherwise the bail should be denied.
In the Omadan case, she complied with these
duties. HOWEVER, in the Pascual and Uy cases, she
didn’t comply with procedure. She did not conduct the
requisite hearings. In so doing, it was respondent
Judge’s defense that under R.A. No. 9165, shabu is not
a dangerous drug but merely a controlled precursor, in
which the selling of less than 5 grams is punishable
only with imprisonment of 12 years to 20 years, and as
such, bail is a matter of right and a hearing is not
required.
A plain reading of the law would immediately
show that shabu is a dangerous drug and not a
controlled precursor. If only respondent Judge
prudently went over the pertinent provisions of R.A.
No. 9165, she would have easily ascertained that. She
needed only to read the law plainly and even keep
210
 emedial Law Review
Digests
herself abreast of jurisprudence to know that shabu is
a dangerous drug, hence selling it is a capital offense.
Regardless of quantity, the sale, trade,
administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution and
transportation of shabu is punishable by life
imprisonment to death. Being a capital offense, it is
incumbent upon respondent Judge to hold a hearing on
the petitions/motions for bail filed by the accused
therein to determine whether evidence of guilt is
strong. To grant an application for bail and fix the
amount thereof without a hearing duly called for
the purpose of determining whether the evidence
of guilt is strong constitutes gross ignorance or
incompetence whose grossness cannot be
excused by a claim of good faith or excusable
negligence.
LEVISTE V. CA
Facts: Jose Antonio Leviste (Leviste) was charged
with the murder of Rafael de las Alas. The RTC-Makati
convicted Leviste for the lesser crime of homicide and
sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 6
years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 12
years and one day of reclusion perpetual as maximum.
Leviste appealed his conviction with the CA.
Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application for
admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced
age and health condition. Leviste also claimed the
absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part.
The CA denied the application for bail invoking
the principle that “discretion to extend bail during the
course of appeal should be exercised ‘with grave
caution and only for strong reasons.’” The CA found
that Leviste failed to show that he suffered from
ailment of such gravity that his continued confinement
during trial will permanently impair his health or put
his life in danger. In denying the application for bail,
the CA made a preliminary evaluation of Leviste’s case
and determined that there was no substantial reason
sufficient to overturn the evidence of his guilt. CA also
denied Leviste’s MR.
Leviste filed this petition for certiorari claiming
that the denial of his application for bail amounted to
grave abuse of the discretion since the conditions
justifying denial of bail under the 3rd paragraph of Sec.
5, Rule 114 were not present.
Issue: Did the CA commit GADALEJ? (in an application
for bail pending appeal by an appellant sentenced by
the trial court to a penalty of imprisonment for more
than 6 years, should bail be automatically be granted
absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court?)
Held: Petition denied, no GADALEJ. The right to bail
under par. 3 of Section 5 is discretionary.
A. The application for bail pending appeal has two
stages
CrimPro
(1) The determination of discretion stage, where
the appellate court must determine whether any of the
circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule
114 is present. This will establish whether or not the
appellate court will exercise sound discretion or
stringent discretion in resolving the application for bail
pending appeal
(2) The exercise of discretion stage where,
assuming the appellant’s case falls within the first
scenario allowing the exercise of sound discretion, the
appellate court may consider all relevant
circumstances, other than those mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114, including
the demands of equity and justice; on the basis
thereof, it may either allow or disallow bail.
B. Interpretation of the rule
The third paragraph8 Section 5, Rule 114 applies to 2
scenarios where the penalty imposed on the appellant
applying for bail is imprisonment exceeding 6 years:
1. When the circumstances enumerated
under Section 5, paragraph 3 (such as
recidivism, habitual delinquency, etc) are
not present.
2. The existence of at least one of the said
circumstances.
In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial
discretion. Even if the bail-negating circumstances in
the third paragraph are absent, bail may be denied.
Thus, the appellate court’s denial of bail pending
appeal where none of the said circumstances exists
does not, by and of itself, constitute abuse of
discretion.
On the other hand, in the second situation, the
appellate court exercises a more stringent discretion to
carefully ascertain whether any of the enumerated
circumstances in fact exist. This is so because the
existence of any of those circumstances is by itself
sufficient to deny or revoke bail. Nonetheless, a
finding that none of the said circumstances is
present will not automatically result in the grant
of bail. Such finding will simply authorize the
8
Sec. 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional
Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is
discretionary. …
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment
exceeding six (6) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail
shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to
the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual
delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the
circumstance of reiteration;
(b)That he has previously escaped from legal confinement,
evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without a valid
justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation,
parole, or conditional pardon;
(d)That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability
of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another
crime during the pendency of the appeal.
211
 emedial Law Review
Digests
court to use the less stringent sound discretion
approach. However, if the appellate court determines
the existence of any of the circumstances, it has no
other option except to deny or revoke bail pending
appeal. Conversely, if the appellate court grants bail
pending appeal, grave abuse of discretion will thereby
be committed.
Leviste’s interpretation that the grant of bail
pending appeal is always subject to limited discretion
(i.e. restricted to the determination of whether any of
the five bail-negating circumstances exists) is trivial. It
reduces the appellate court into a mere fact-finding
body whose authority is limited to determining whether
any of the 5 circumstances exists. This unduly
constricts judicial discretion into merely filling out the
checklist of circumstances. It should be noted that
judicial discretion is a choice between two alternatives
or among a possibly infinite number of options. By
severely clipping the appellate court’s discretion
and relegating that tribunal to a mere fact-
finding body in applications for bail pending
appeal in all instances where the penalty
imposed by the trial court on the appellant is
imprisonment exceeding six years, petitioner’s
theory effectively renders nugatory the provision
that “upon conviction by the Regional Trial
Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment,admission to bail is discretionary.”
Moreover, to limit the bail-negating
circumstances to the five situations is wrong. The
very language of the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule
114 contradicts the idea that the enumeration of the
five situations therein was meant to be exclusive. The
provision categorically refers to “the following or other
similar circumstances.” Hence, under the rules,
similarly relevant situations other than those
listed may be considered in the allowance, denial
or revocation of bail pending appeal.
In our jurisdiction, the trend towards a strict
attitude towards the allowance of bail pending appeal
is anchored on the principle that judicial discretion —
particularly with respect to extending bail — should be
exercised not with laxity but with caution and only for
strong reasons. Grave caution must attend the
exercise of judicial discretion in granting bail pending
appeal considering that the accused has been in fact
convicted by the trial court.
C. Summary on Rules of Bail:
Under the present rules, the availability of bail pending
appeal may be summarized as follows:
1. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court
wherein a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6
years but not more than 20 years is imposed,
and not one of the circumstances stated in
Sec. 5 or any other similar circumstance is
present and proved, bail is a matter of
discretion.
2. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court
imposing a penalty of imprisonment exceeding
CrimPro
6 years but not more than 20 years, and any
of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any
other similar circumstance is present and
proved, no bail shall be granted by said
court.
DOMINGO V. PAGAYATAN
Petitioner: Commissioner Andre Domingo
Respondent: Executive Judge Ernesto P. Pagayatan,
RTC Branch 46 San Jose, Occidental Mindoro
FACTS:The Bureau of Immigration (BOI) Board of
Commissioners (BOC) issued Summary Deportation
Order (SDO) No. ADD-2001-057 against Ernesto M.
Peñaflorida, a U.S. citizen, after finding that he was an
overstaying and undocumented alien, in violation of
the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940. Peñaflorida
was also a fugitive from justice since he stood indicted
in the United States for health care fraud which
resulted in more than $1,376,000.00 losses to the U.S.
Federal Government. No appeal was filed with the
Office of the President. The SDO became final and
executor.
Respondent Judge Pagayatan issued a Notice
of Arraignment requiring the production of Peñaflorida.
On the scheduled hearing, Judge Pagayatan denied the
P40,000 bail recommended by the Provincial
Prosecutor for the provisional release of the accused
on the ground that the crime Peñaflorida was charged
with involved large scale estafa, a non-bailable
offense. Judge Pagayatan ordered the commitment of
Peñaflorida to the Provincial Jail in Magbay, San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro. However, later on that same day,
the BOI received information that respondent judge
had allowed the release from detention of Peñaflorida
without the interdepartmental courtesy of affording
prior notice to the BOI of such action. Commissioner
Domingo was appalled not only by the respondent’s
employment of legal subterfuges in ordering the
release of Peñaflorida whose Summary Deportation
Order had already become final and executory, but
also by the respondent’s bad faith in deceiving them
into surrendering the custody of an undesirable alien
federal fugitive to the Provincial Jail at Magbay, San
Jose, Occidental Mindoro.
As a result, Commissioner Domingo filed a
letter-complaint with the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) charging Pagayatan with gross
ignorance of the law.
In his Comment, Judge Pagayatan explained
that the prosecution and the defense jointly
manifested that it would be fair and just if the court
would fix the bail bond for the provisional release of
the accused Peñaflorida at P250,000.00 and that he
granted the motion to fix bail; and that at the time he
issued the order fixing the bail bond, he was not aware
that a deportation order has already been issued by
the BOI.
212
 emedial Law Review
Digests
In its Evaluation Report, the OCA recommends
to the Court that respondent be fined P5,000 for Gross
Ignorance of the Law.
ISSUE: Whether Judge Pagayatan was guilty of gross
ignorance of the law in granting the bail of the accused
without conducting a hearing – YES
HELD: Under the rules on bail, a hearing is mandatory
in granting bail whether it is a matter of right or
discretion. A hearing is indispensable for the court to
ask searching questions from which it may infer the
strength of the evidence of guilt, or the lack of it,
against the accused, in cases where the offense is
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. After hearing, the court’s order granting
or refusing bail must contain a summary of the
evidence for the prosecution and based thereon, the
judge should then formulate his own conclusion as to
whether the evidence so presented is strong enough as
to indicate the guilt of the accused. Otherwise, the
order granting or denying the application for bail may
be invalidated because the summary of evidence for
the prosecution which contains the judge’s evaluation
of the evidence may be considered as an aspect of
procedural due process for both the prosecution and
the defense.
The herein respondent granted bail to the
accused Peñaflorida without conducting a hearing
despite his earlier pronouncement in the Order denying
bail as he considered the crime the accused Peñaflorida
was charged with to be a non-bailable offense. The
manifestation of the prosecutor that he is not ready to
present any witness to prove that the prosecution’s
evidence against the accused is strong, is never a
basis for the outright grant of bail without a
preliminary hearing on the matter. A hearing is
required even when the prosecution refuses to adduce
evidence or fails to interpose an objection to the
motion for bail.
The joint manifestation of the prosecution and
the defense that it would be fair and just if the court
would fix the bail bond for the provisional release of
the accused at P250,000 does not justify the granting
of bail without a hearing in a case involving a non-
bailable offense. A hearing is necessary for the court to
take into consideration the guidelines in fixing the
amount of bail set forth in Section 9, Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Respondent judge should have ascertained
personally whether the evidence of guilt is strong and
endeavored to determine the propriety of the amount
of bail recommended. To do away with the requisite
bail hearing “is to dispense with this time-tested
safeguard against arbitrariness.”
Although the Domingo failed to prove that
Judge Pagayatan had prior knowledge of the existence
of the deportation order or was informed by the BOI of
such order, respondent judge cannot escape
administrative liability by invoking unawareness of the
deportation order. Absent evidence of malice,
CrimPro
respondent’s lack of knowledge of the deportation
order will only free him from administrative liability for
gross misconduct but not for gross ignorance of the
law for disregarding the rules on bail.
TRINIDAD LACHICA V JUDGE ROSABELLATORMIS
FACTS: On July 2, 2003, Domugho was apprehended
by PO3 Epifanio G. Sanjorjo at around 8:45 p.m. and
was brought to the police station for booking and
custody at 9:30 p.m.
The next day at 8:30 am, the complainant
Lachica was surprised to receive a call from the
accused informing her that she was released from
confinement at 10:00 PM. Complainant inquired from
the police station about the incident and learned that
the accused was released because the respondent
judgeRosabellaTormis (MTC of Cebu) called the police
station and told the desk officer that the accused had
posted a cash bail bond and may already be released.
Complainant learned that there was no release order in
the case records of the accused. It was only at 1:00
pm that day that she was shown a copy thereof.
The police blotter showed no entry that an
order of release was received by the police.
In an affidavit dated October 2, 2003, Lachica
charged respondent Judge Tormis of Abuse of
Authority relating to the criminal case of the accused
The respondent Judge asserts in her comment
that at 7:00 pm, she issued the Order of Release after
the accused posted a cash bond. She claimed that the
accused was released by virtue of the Order of Release
and not on the basis of her alleged telephone call to
the police station.
The case was referred to the Executive judge
of the RTC, Cebu for investigation and it was found
inter alia that:
1. The accused was arrested at 8:45 pm, after
her classes at Southwestern University. She
could not have appeared before respondent
judge prior to her arrest since she was in
school.
2. No one saw the release order of the Judge,
except for the judge herself
3. The accused was released without a Release
order and only upon the telephone call of
respondent judge.
4. It was physically impossible for the respondent
judge to have signed the Release order before
1:00 pm of July 3 2004, since she was in
Manila.
5. The signature appearing on the receipt for the
cash bond, the release order and the signature
of the respondent judge on her comment dated
December 10, 2003, do not appear to be
signed by the same person.
The executive judge imposed a 3month
suspension. This was upheld by the Office of the court
of administrator.
213
 emedial Law Review
Digests
Issue: Was the judge guilty of gross misconduct in
abusing her authority when she personally accepted
the cash bond of the accused? YES!
Held: It is undisputed that respondent judge personally
received the cash bail bond for the accused. For this
act alone, respondent is already administratively liable.
Section 14, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure specifies the persons with whom a cash bail
bond may be deposited, namely: the collector of
internal revenue or the provincial, city or municipal
treasurer. A judge is not authorized to receive the
deposit of cash as bail nor should such cash be kept in
his office.
The respondent judge is guilty of gross
misconduct for having abused her judicial authority
when she personally accepted the cash bail bond of the
accused and for deliberately making untruthful
statements in her comment with intent to mislead this
Court.
The rules specify the persons with whom a
cash bail bond may be deposited namely: the collector
of internal revenue, or the provincial, city or municipal
treasurer. Section 14 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure (effective December 1, 2000)
provides:
SEC. 14. Deposit of Cash as bail. — The
accused or any person acting in his behalf may
deposit in cash with the nearest collector of
internal revenue or provincial, city or municipal
treasurer the amount of the bail fixed by the
court, or recommended by the prosecutor who
investigated or filed the case. Upon submission
of a proper certificate of deposit and of a
written undertaking showing compliance with
the requirements of section 2 of this Rule, the
accused shall be discharged from custody. The
money deposited shall be considered as bail
and applied to the payment of fine and costs
while the excess, if any, shall be returned to
the accused or to whoever made the deposit.
A judge is not one of those authorized to
receive the deposit of cash as bail, nor should such
cash be kept in the office of the judge.
This is not the first time that respondent judge
was sanctioned by this Court. It appears that aside
from this case, respondent judge has been
administratively charged eight (8) other times. Of
these cases three (3) have been dismissed.
Clearly, being chastised thrice has not
reformed respondent. For the foregoing considerations,
we find that the penalties recommended by the
investigating judge and the OCA are not
commensurate to respondent judge's misconduct
which is aggravated by her past misdeeds. Respondent
judge's infraction merits suspension from the service
for six (6) months.
SERAPIO V. SANDIGANBAYAN
CrimPro
The Ombudsman conducted a preliminary
investigation &recommended that Erap be charged
with plunder bec of Chavit’s testimony. The
information was filed and later amended to include
Serapio, a trustee of Erap’s Muslim Youth
foundation.No bail was recommended for the
provisional release of all the accused. Serapio filed for
reinvestigation which was denied. The
Sandiganbayan(SB) then found probable cause to issue
warrants of arrest for the accused. Serapiovoluntarily
surrendered on the same day to PNP Chief and has
since been detained at Camp Crame for said charge.
On April 27- Serapiofiled an Urgent Petition for
Bail which was set for hearing on May 4.During the
hearing, the SB issued an order declaring that the
petition for bail can and should be
heard before Serapio’s arraignment on June 27, 2001
and even before the other accused filed their
respective petitions for bail. Accordingly, they set the
hearing for the reception of evidence on May 21 to 25,
2001.
On May 17- the Ombudsman filed an urgent
motion for early arraignment and a motion for joint
bail hearings of Serapio et al. The SB reset the
hearings for bail to June 18 to 28, 2001 to enable the
court to resolve the prosecution’s pending motions
andSerapio’s motion that his petition for bail be heard
as early as possible. During the hearings on the
petitions for bail the SB required the attendance of
Serapio and others.
On June 15-the SB issued an Order cancelling the
bail hearing and reset it to June 26.
On June 26- There was no bail hearing because
Serapio filed with the SB a motion to quash the
amended Information. The prosecution objected to the
holding of bail hearing they contended that Serapio’s
motion to quash the amended Information was
antithetical to his petition for bail.
The SB reset the arraignment and the hearing on
the petition for bail of Serapio for July 10, 2001 to
enable it to resolve the motion to quash ofSerapio but
before the SB could resolve he already filed with SC a
Petition for Habeas Corpus and Certiorari.
On July 9- the SBdenied motion to quash the
amended Information.
On July 10- just before his arraignment in
another Criminal Case Serapio manifested to the SB
that he was going to file a MR of the July 9 Resolution.
The SB, however, declared that there was no provision
in the Rules of Court or in the SB’s rules granting the
right to Serapio to file a motion for the reconsideration
of an interlocutory order issued by it and ordered
Serapio to orally argue his motion for
reconsideration. When he refused, the SB proceeded
with his arraignment. Serapio refused to plead,
impelling the court to enter a plea of not guilty for him.
On July 20-Serapio filed with the Court a Petition
for Certiorari, alleging that the SB acted GADALEJ in
issuing its July 9Resolution denying his motion to
quash&for the nullification of a resolution of the SB
denying his motion to fix bail.
214
 emedial Law Review
Digests
On August 9-filed another certiorari case bec of
denial.
There are many issues here but I will be focusing
on bail.
(1) Whether or not Serapio should first be
arraigned before hearings of his petition for bail
may be conducted Discussion is moot bec he was
arraigned but relevant to bail. SB wrong.
The arraignment of an accused is not a
prerequisite to the conduct of hearings on his petition
for bail. A person is allowed to petition for bail as soon
as he is deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or
voluntary surrender.
The rule is that a person deprived of his liberty by
virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender may apply
for bail as soon as he is deprived of his liberty, even
before a complaint or information is filed against
him.For when bail is a matter of right, an accused may
apply for and be granted bail even prior to
arraignment. Further, if the court finds in such case
that the accused is entitled to bail because the
evidence against him is not strong, he may be granted
provisional liberty even prior to arraignment; for in
such a situation, bail would be “authorized” under the
circumstances. In fine, the SB committed a grave
abuse of its discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction in ordering the arraignment of Serapio
before proceeding with the hearing of his petition for
bail.
(2) Whether Serapiomay file a motion to quash
the amended Information during the pendency of
his petition for bail ->YES
The Court finds that no inconsistency between an
application for bail and filing a motion to quash. Bail is
the security given for the release of a person in the
custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman,
to guarantee his appearance before any court as
required under the conditions set forth under the
ROC. Its purpose is to obtain the provisional liberty of
a person charged with an offense until his conviction
while at the same time securing his appearance at the
trial.
On the other hand, a motion to quash is the mode
by which an accused assails the validity of a criminal
complaint or Information filed against him for
insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects
which are apparent in the face of the Information. An
accused may file a motion to quash the Information, as
a general rule, before arraignment.
The right of an accused right to seek provisional
liberty when charged with an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, or
when charged with an offense punishable by such
penalties but after due hearing, evidence of his guilt is
found not to be strong, does not preclude his right to
assail the validity of the Information charging him with
such offense.
(3) Whether a joint hearing of the petition for
bail of Serapio and those of the other accused is
mandatory ->NO. SB wrong.
CrimPro
There is no provision in the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure or the Rules of Procedure of the SB
governing the hearings of two or more petitions for bail
filed by different accused or that a petition for bail of
an accused be heard simultaneously with the trial of
the case against the other accused. The matter of
whether or not to conduct a joint hearing of two or
more petitions for bail filed by two different accused or
to conduct a hearing of said petition jointly with the
trial against another accused is addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court. Unless grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction is
shown, the Court will not interfere with the exercise by
the SB of its discretion.
In Ocampo vs. Bernabe, the SC held that in a
petition for bail hearing, the court is to conduct only a
summary hearing, meaning such brief and speedy
method of receiving and considering the evidence of
guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose
of the hearing which is merely to determine the weight
of evidence for purposes of bail. The court does not try
the merits or enter into any inquiry as to the weight
that ought to be given to the evidence against the
accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the
trial or on what further evidence may be offered
therein. It may confine itself to receiving such
evidence as has reference to substantial matters,
avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the examination
and cross-examination of witnesses, and reducing to a
reasonable minimum the amount of corroboration
particularly on details that are not essential to the
purpose of the hearing.
Although a joint hearing will avoid duplication of
time and effort, the proceeding in this caseis different
since it will no longer be summary. As against Erapit
will be a full-blown trial & will be prejudicial to Serapio
as it will unduly delay the determination of the issue of
the right of Serapio to obtain provisional liberty.
(4) Whether the People waived their right to
adduce evidence in opposition to the petition for bail of
Serapio and failed to adduce strong evidence of guilt of
Serapio for the crime charged
Serapio alleged that prosectried to delay the bail
hearings by filing dilatory motions, but its actually
Serapio and his co-accused who caused the delay in
the trial by filing numerous manifestations and
pleadings with the SB.
The Prosec argued further that bail is not a matter
of right in capital offenses. In support thereof, they
cite Article III, Sec 13 of the Constitution, which
states that—
“All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence
of guilt is strong, shall before conviction be
bailable....”
Also cited Rule 114, Secs. 7 and 4 of the Revised
Rules of Court which provide:
“Sec. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable.—
No person charged with a capital offense, or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
215
 emedial Law Review
Digests
imprisonement, shall be admitted to bail when
evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage
of the criminal prosecution.
Sec. 4. Bail, a matter of right, exception.—All persons
in custody shall be admitted to bail as a matter of
right, with sufficient sureties, or released on
recognizance as prescribed by law or this Rule x xx (b)
and before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment.”
BUTa person charged with a capital offense is not
absolutely denied the opportunity to obtain provisional
liberty on bail pending the judgment of his
case. However, as to such person, bail is not a matter
of right but is discretionary upon the court.Had the rule
been otherwise, the Rules would not have provided for
an application for bail by a person charged with a
capital offense under Rule 114, Section 8 which states:
“Sec. 8. Burden of proof in bail application. — At the
hearing of an application for bail filed by a person
who is in custody for the commission of an offense
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, the prosecution has the burden of
showing that the evidence of guilt is strong...”
There must be a showing that the evidence of
guilt against a person charged with a capital offense is
not strong for the court to grant him bail. Thus, upon
an application for bail by the person charged with a
capital offense, a hearing thereon must be conducted,
where the prosecution must be accorded an
opportunity to discharge its burden of proving that the
evidence of guilt against an accused is strong.The
prosecution shall be accorded the opportunity to
present all the evidence it may deems necessary for
this purpose.When it is satisfactorily demonstrated that
the evidence of guilt is strong, it is the court’s duty to
deny the application for bail. However, when the
evidence of guilt is not strong, bail becomes a matter
of right.
In this case, Serapio is not entitled to bail as a
matter of right at this stage since the prosecution did
not waiveits right to adduce evidence in opposition to
the petition for bail of Serapio. Furthermore, the Court
has previously ruled that even in cases where the
prosecution refuses to adduce evidence in opposition
to an application for bail by an accused charged with a
capital offense, the trial court is still under duty to
conduct a hearing on said application.
Accordingly, Serapio cannot be released from
detention until the SB conducts a hearing of his
application for bail and resolve the same in his
favor. Even then, there must first be a finding that the
evidence against Serapio is not strong before he may
be granted bail.
RULE 115 : RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
CRISOSTOMO v SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS: Edgar Crisostomo was a member of the PNP
and a jail guard the Solano Municipal Jail in Solano,
CrimPro
Nueva Vizcaya. He was charged and convicted by the
Sandiganbayan of murder after allegedly killing a
detention prisoner – Renato Suba – while the latter
was in his custody.
Prosecution alleged that Crisostomo conspired
with other inmates of the municipal jail to murder
Renato Suba who was then a detention prisoner. Suba
was detained after assaulting someone. He was visited
by his brother and was found in good physical
condition but hours after, the brother was summoned
back to the jail only to discover Suba dead. Crisostomo
was the only jail guard on duty at the time of the
death. Also, there were discrepancies as the number of
prisoners as indicated in the manifest and those that
were surrendered after the incident. The guilt of
Crisostomo became even more apparent when he
jumped bail during the trial. According to the autopsy
report, Suba sustained injuries inconsistent with
suicide.
Defense’ only witness was one Calingayan who
was also a detention prisoner. He testified that Suba
hanged himself with a thin blanket – suicide.
Sandiganbayan convicted both Crisostomo and
Calingayan based solely on circumstantial evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not Crisostomo was convicted
without procedural due process - YES
HELD: Records show that the hearing for the
defense’s presentation of evidence was set for June 21,
22, 23 of 1995. The June 21 hearing postponed
because the Sandiganbayan 2nd division did not have
quorum. Crisostomo was present during this time and
even on hearing prior to this date (when the
prosecution was the one presenting its evidence). On
June 22, neither Crisostomo nor his counsel appeared.
Sandiganbayan, on the same day, ruled that
Crisostomo, because of such absence, waived his right
to present his evidence and thus the case is deemed
submitted for resolution upon the filing of memoranda.
Also during this day, Sandiganbayan ordered the
forfeiture of Crisostomo’s bail bond. These acts of the
Sandiganbayan are all in violation of Crisostomo’s
rights.
First, Section 2(c) Rule 114 and Section 1(c)
Rule 115 say that non appearance of an accused on a
day set for hearing would result to the waiver of his
right to present evidence only for the particular day or
until he has appeared for hearing. There is no reason
for the Sandiganbayan to totally foreclose Crisostomo’s
right to present evidence merely on an absence of 1
day in view of (1) the provision just cited and (2) the
fact that Crisostomo may possibly face a death
sentence. Given the gravity of the penalty, it behooved
the Sandiganbayan to have given Crisostomo the
opportunity to present evidence. Besides, this was the
only time Crisostomo absented himself as he was
always faithful present during the prior hearings.
Second, it was an error for the Sandiganbayan
to automatically forfeit the bail bond. Cancelling a bail
bond is justified only in instances where the
216
 emedial Law Review
Digests
attendance of the accused is required and the latter
fails to appear. In this case, the presence of
Crisostomo was not at all required during the June 22
hearing. In fact, even if it was required, no notice was
received by him because his former counsel
disappeared without any say. As soon as Crisostomo
obtained the services of a new counsel he manifested
that he did not go into hiding.
SIDENOTE: Crisostomo was acquitted because the
prosecution failed to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. The circumstantial evidence relied
upon by the Sandiganbayan (ie. That Crisostomo was
the only jailer at the time of the incident and had the
keys to all the jail cells; that Crisostomo’s position
during the incident relative to the position of the body
was such as to conclude that he participated in the
killing) was insufficient to warrant a conviction. Also,
prosecution failed to prove the existence of conspiracy.
Not just because several people may have participated
in the killing doesn’t mean that all were animated by a
purpose to kill the victim.
ANDRADA v. PEOPLE
Facts:An Information was filed with the City Prosecutor
of Baguio City charging Andrada with frustrated
murder. During the hearing, evidence for the
prosecution showed that a group of policemen dropped
by a restaurant for a snack. While one of the
policemen was talking to a woman who passed by their
table, Andrada approached him and scolded him.
Andrada was advised to go home because he was
drunk. When Adrada left, one of the policemen heard
his companion (the one who spoke to the woman)
moaning in pain and found him sprawled on the floor
while Andrada was hacking him on the head with a
bolo. Andrada ran away but was arrested in a waiting
shed. They brought him back to the restaurant where
they recovered the bolo. Witnesses were interviewed
and they pointed to Andrada as the culprit.
Andrada interposed self-defense and invoked
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
His version was that while they were drinking beer
with a hospitality girl inside the restaurant, three
military men occupied the table next to them. Without
any warning or provocation, two of them approached
him, slapped his face several times and pointed their
guns to his head because he was “so boastful.”
Fearing that he might be killed while being dragged
outside, Andrada pulled out his bolo (wrapped in
newspaper) and swung it at the two men and ran
away.
The RTC found him guilty. The CA found him
to be entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance
of minority, as he was only 17 years old at the time of
the incident. On a petition for review on certiorari
before the SC, Andrada claimed that his right to due
process was violated because of the gross
negligence/incompetence of his counsel who: 1) Failed
to present all the witnesses who could have testified
CrimPro
that he is innocent; 2) Failed to present the medical
certificate showing the injuries inflicted upon him by
the victim; 3) Did not notify him to attend the hearing
when one of the policemen was cross-examined, and
4) Failed to submit a memorandum.
The OSG counters that there was no violation
of his right to due process since he was represented by
counsel of his own choosing. If the counsel’s
performance and competence fell short of Andrada’s
expectation, then he should not blame either the trial
court or the CA.
Issue: Whether Andrada was denied due process due
to his counsel’s gross negligence/incompetence – NO
Ratio:In criminal cases, the negligence or
incompetence of counsel to be deemed gross must
have prejudiced the constitutional right of an accused
to be heard. In this case, however, records show that
counsel actively participated in the cross-examination
of the witnesses to test their credibility. The fact that
he did not choose to present other witnesses did not
affect any of Andrada’s substantial rights. Counsel
might have valid reasons for choosing not to.
Andrada was present during the hearing. If he
believed that his counsel de parte was not competent,
he could have secured the services of a new counsel.
Having decided to retain the services of his counsel
during the entire proceedings, he must be deemed
bound by any mistake committed by him. The long-
standing rule in this jurisdiction is that a client is
bound by the mistakes of his lawyer. Mistakes of
attorneys as to the competency of a witness, the
sufficiency, relevancy or irrelevancy of certain
evidence, the proper defense or the burden of proof,
failure to introduce evidence, to summon witnesses,
and to argue the case, unless they prejudice the client
and prevent him from properly resting his case, do not
constituted gross incompetence or negligence. The SC
found that the counsel was not so inept or motivated
by bad faith or so careless and negligence of his duties
so as to seriously prejudice the substantial rights of
Andrada.
OLIVAREZ V. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts: Cristina Elitiong (16 years old) and her
brothers were employed by Isidro Olivarez (64 years
old) as sampaguita garlands maker. On July 20, 1997,
Olivarez called Elitiongand asked her if she had told
her mother that he gave her money, and when she
said that she did not, he embraced her and held her
breast. The other workers were facing the street so
that the two were not seen. He pulled her to the
kitchen and, closing the kitchen door, kissed her on
the lips. She pushed him away and went back to her
station. When she arrived at her home, she first told
her mother that she no longer wished to go back.
Then she finally told her mother what happened.
217
 emedial Law Review
Digests
On the other hand, Olivarez denies the
accusations of Elitiong and claims that he was at the
Caltex station, during those times, waiting for the
shipment of flowers from Pampanga.
The trial court found Olivarez guilty of violation
of RA 7610 (Anti-Child Abuse Law). CA affirmed. MR
denied. Hence, this petition for review. Petitioner
alleges that his right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him was violated for
failure to allege in the information the essential
elements of the offense for which he is being charged.
Issue: W/N the right of Olivarez to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him was
violated – NO.
Held: The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5,
Article III of R.A. 7610 are as follows: (1) The accused
commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct, (2) The said act is performed with a child
exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse and (3) The child, whether male or female, is
below 18 years of age.
The first element is present because it was
established beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner
kissed Cristina and touched her breasts with lewd
designs as inferred from the nature of the acts
themselves and the environmental circumstances.
The second element is likewise present. A child
is deemed subjected to other sexual abuse when the
child indulges in lascivious conduct under the coercion
or influence of any adult. In this case, Cristina was
sexually abused because she was coerced or
intimidated by petitioner to indulge in a lascivious
conduct. Furthermore, it is inconsequential that the
sexual abuse occurred only once.
Olivarez contends that the information failed to
allege that Cristina was a child below 18 years of age
at the time the offense was committed. While it is
necessary to allege the essential elements of the crime
in the information, the failure to do so is not an
irremediable vice. When the complaint or the
resolution by the public prosecutor which contain the
missing averments is attached to the information and
form part of the records, the defect in the latter is
effectively cured, and the accused cannot successfully
invoke the defense that his right to be informed is
violated.
In the case at bar, the missing averment in
the information is supplied by the Complaint, which
expressly states that Elitiong is 16 years old. Olivarez
was furnished a copy of the Complaint which was
mentioned in the information, hence he was
adequately informed of the age of the complainant.
The prosecution has also established the minority of
the offended party through competent evidence.
Cristina testified that she was 16 years old and a
certification from the Office of the Local Registrar of
San Pedro, Laguna was presented showing that she
was born on October 17, 1980.The third element of
sexual abuse is therefore present.
CrimPro
The information merely states that
petitioner was being charged for the crime of “violation
of R.A. 7610” without citing the specific sections
alleged to have been violated by petitioner.
Nonetheless, we do not find this omission sufficient to
invalidate the information. The character of the crime
is not determined by the caption or preamble of the
information nor from the specification of the provision
of law alleged to have been violated, they may be
conclusions of law, but by the recital of the ultimate
facts and circumstances in the complaint or
information. The sufficiency of an information is not
negated by an incomplete or defective designation of
the crime in the caption or other parts of the
information but by the narration of facts and
circumstances which adequately depicts a crime and
sufficiently apprise the accused of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him.
True, the information herein may not refer
to specific section/s of R.A. 7610 alleged to have been
violated by the petitioner, but it is all to evident that
the body of the information contains an averment of
the acts alleged to have been performed by petitioner
which unmistakably refers to acts punishable under
Section 5 of R.A. 7610. As to which section of R.A.
7610 is being violated by Olivarez is inconsequential.
What is determinative of the offense is the recital of
the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint
or information.The prosecution has proved beyond
reasonable doubt that petitioner committed acts of
sexual abuse against Elitiong.
JOEL LIBUIT V. PEOPLE
FACTS: Accused Libuit is charged with Estafa with with
abuse of confidence. Complainant Domingo del Mundo
delivered and brought his car to the motor shop and
owned and/or operated by Joel Libuit and Julius Libuit
for repair of its damaged parts, which car was received
by Jose Bautista, then mechanic in the said motor
shop.
However, it was alleged that accused Joel
Libuit, once in possession of the said car, with intent to
defraud and with abuse of confidence, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated instead of
complying with his obligation or duty to return or
deliver the repaired car to Domingo del Mundo.
Accused (Libuit) testified on direct
examination. However, his defense counsel, Atty.
Mendoza, withdrew from the case after his initial cross-
examination. On motion of the accused, the
continuation of his cross-examination was reset to give
him time to engage the services of another counsel.
The petitioner eventually secured the services of Atty.
Dimayuga.
At the subsequent hearings, Atty. Dimayuga
failed to appear despite notices. On motion of the
prosecution, the trial court issued an Order striking
from the records the petitioner’s direct testimony and
218
 emedial Law Review
declaring the case submitted for decision on the basis
of the evidence already on record.
In the CA, accused claims that he had been
deprived his right to counsel. However, the CA held
that the RTC never deprived the petitioner of his right
to counsel as he was represented by a counsel de
parte, Atty. Mendoza. When said counsel withdrew,
the RTC allowed the resetting of the petitioner’s cross-
examination to give him time to engage the services of
another counsel. It ordered the striking of his
testimony from the records only after his new counsel
failed to appear at the subsequent hearings.
ISSUE: Was petitioner deprived of his right
counsel? (NO)
HELD: Petitioner contends that the trial court should
have appointed a counsel de oficio when his counsel
consistently failed to appear for his cross-examination.
The duty of the court to appoint a counsel de
oficio for the accused who has no counsel of choice and
desires to employ the services of one is mandatory
only at the time of arraignment. No such duty exists
where the accused has proceeded to arraignment and
then trial with a counsel of his own choice. Worth
noting, when the time for the presentation of evidence
for the defense arrived, and the defendant appeared
by himself alone, the absence of his counsel was
inexcusable.
In the present case, since the petitioner was
represented by counsel de parte at the arraignment
and trial, the trial court could not be deemed duty-
bound to appoint a counsel de oficio for the
continuation of his cross-examination. Indeed, after
his initial cross-examination, the trial court granted the
petitioner’s motion to postpone, giving him sufficient
time to engage the services of another counsel. The
failure of Atty. Dimayuga, his newly hired lawyer, to
appear at the subsequent hearings without reason was
sufficient legal basis for the trial court to order the
striking from the records of his direct testimony, and
thereafter render judgment upon the evidence already
presented. In fact, the repeated failure to appear of
defendant’s counsel at the trial may even be taken as
a deliberate attempt to delay the court’s proceedings.
At the most, the appointment of a counsel de
oficio in a situation like the present case would be
discretionary with the trial court, which discretion will
not be interfered with in the absence of grave
abuse. This Court is convinced that the trial court had
been liberal in granting postponements asked by the
petitioner himself. We think that such liberality
removes any doubt that its order was tainted with
grave abuse of discretion.
VIDALLON-MAGTOLIS v. SALUD
(Actually, hindi ko alam kung ano yung related sa
Rights of the Accused sa case na ‘to. More on Evidence
siya.)
CrimPro
Digests
FACTS: In a criminal case, Lagua was found guilty by
the RTC of homicide. On appeal, Lagua filed a Very
Urgent Petition for Bail, which the CA granted upon
posting the required bond. Lagua’s bond was approved
in a Resolution which was brought to the Office of the
Division Clerk of Court, Atty. Madarang, for
promulgation. Around that time, respondent Salud’s
unusual interest on the case became noticeable and he
started making inquiries about the case. When Atty.
Madarang finally directed the typing of the Order of
Release Upon Bond, Salud went to the former’s office
and assisted in arranging and stapling of the papers for
release. It was he who ultimately serve the resolution
to and order of release in the Lagua case to the National
Penitentiary.
In the meantime, Atty. Madarang received a
telephone call from a certain Melchor, who introduced
herself as Lagua’s relative, asking her how much more
would they have to give to facilitate Lagua’s release.
The caller also informed her that they had sought the
help of a certain Valdez of the RTC where the criminal
case originated, but were told that they still had a
balance to be paid to Justice Magtolis and Atty.
Madarang through Salud.
Then, Atty. Madarang called the RTC,
pretending to be Lagua’s relative, and asked for
Valdez, who turned out to be the Process Server of the
RTC. She was informed that Valdez was not there at
the time and reminded her about the her outstanding
balance. After making the call, she coordinated with
the Acting Chief of the Mailing Section, Ms. Secarro.
She got Salud’s number from Secarro and started
texting him about the same time Sacarro did. Again,
she represented herself as a relative of Lagua. Most of
Salud’s text messages were stored in Atty. Madarang’s
cellphone. After discovering the corrupt acts of Salud,
Atty. Madarang accompanied him to Justice Magtolis,
where out of the confrontation, it was discovered that
Salud did not properly serve the copies of the
Resolution and Order of Release upon Lagua and his
counsel. An administrative complaint for inefficiency
and gross misconduct was thus filed by Justice
Magtolis against Salud.
During the hearings, witnesses narrated their
experiences with the respondent wherein the latter
also tried to “help” them with their cases after paying a
certain amount.
ISSUE: W/N Salud should be guilty of inefficiency and
gross misconduct. – YES.
HELD/RATIO: The complainant in administrative
proceedings has the burden of proving the allegations
in the complaint by substantial evidence. If a court
employee is to be disciplined for a grave offense, the
evidence against him must be competent and derived
from direct knowledge; as such, charges based on
mere suspicion and speculation cannot be given
credence. Thus, if the complainant fails to substantiate
a claim of corruption and bribery, relying on mere
conjectures and suppositions, the administrative
219
 emedial Law Review
Digests
complaint must be dismissed for lack of merit.
However, in administrative proceedings, the quantum
of proof required to establish malfeasance is not proof
beyond reasonable doubt but substantial evidence,
i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion, is required. The findings of investigating
magistrates on the credibility of witnesses are given
great weight by reason of their unmatched opportunity
to see the manner of the witnesses as they testified.
To determine the credibility and probative weight of
the testimony of a witness, such testimony must be
considered in its entirety and not in truncated parts. To
determine which contradicting statements of a witness
is to prevail as to the truth, the other evidence
received must be considered such as the actuations of
the respondent contrary to a normal person’s
reactions.
The respondent's claim that the admission of
the text messages as evidence against him constitutes
a violation of his right to privacy is unavailing. Text
messages have been classified as ephemeral electronic
communication under Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules
on Electronic Evidence, and 'shall be proven by the
testimony of a person who was a party to the same or
has personal knowledge thereof. Any question as to
the admissibility of such messages is now moot and
academic, as the respondent himself, as well as his
counsel, already admitted that he was the sender of
the first three messages on Atty. Madarang's cell
phone.
As ratiocinated in Nuez v. Cruz-Apao,
Ephemeral electronic communications shall be proven
by the testimony of a person who was a party to the
same or who has personal knowledge thereof ' . In this
case, complainant who was the recipient of the said
messages and therefore had personal knowledge
thereof testified on their contents and import.
Respondent herself admitted that the cellphone
number reflected in complainant's cellphone from
which the messages originated was hers. Moreover,
any doubt respondent may have had as to the
admissibility of the text messages had been laid to rest
when she and her counsel signed and attested to the
veracity of the text messages between her and
complainant.
HERRERA V. ALBA
Facts: Rosendo Alba, represented by his mother,
Armi Alba, filed before the RTC a petition for
compulsory recognition, support and damages against
Rosendo Herrera. Herrera denied that he is the
biological father of Rosendo and also denied physical
contact with Rosendo’s mother.
Rosendo filed a motion to direct the taking of
DNA paternity testing to abbreviate the proceedings.
Herrera opposed and contended that it has not gained
acceptability. He further argued that DNA paternity
testing violates his right against self-incrimination. RTC
CrimPro
granted motion to conduct DNA paternity testing. MR
denied. Herrera filed before the CA a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65. Denied. MR denied as
well. Hence, the present Petition for Review.
Issue: W/N the proposed DNA paternity testing
violates Herrera’s right against self-incrimination (Rule
115, sec. 1(e) of Crim Pro)? No violation. The privilege
is applicable only to testimonial evidence.
Held and Ratio: SC quoted RTC’s ruling with
approval: “Obtaining DNA samples from an accused in
a criminal case or from the respondent in a paternity
case, contrary to the belief of respondent in this
action, will not violate the right against self-
incrimination. This privilege applies only to evidence
that is “communicative” in essence taken under duress
(People vs. Olvis, 154 SCRA 513, 1987). The Supreme
Court has ruled that the right against self-incrimination
is just a prohibition on the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communication (testimonial
evidence) from a defendant, not an exclusion of
evidence taken from his body when it may be
material. As such, a defendant can be required to
submit to a test to extract virus from his body (as cited
in People vs. Olvis, Supra); the substance emitting
from the body of the accused was received as evidence
for acts of lasciviousness (US vs. Tan Teng, 23 Phil.
145); morphine forced out of the mouth was received
as proof (US vs. Ong Siu Hong, 36 Phil. 735); an order
by the judge for the witness to put on pair of pants for
size was allowed (People vs. Otadora, 86 Phil. 244);
and the court can compel a woman accused of adultery
to submit for pregnancy test (Villaflor vs. Summers, 41
Phil. 62), since the gist of the privilege is the
restriction on “testimonial compulsion.”
The policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule
on the investigation of the paternity and filiation of
children, especially of illegitimate children, is without
prejudice to the right of the putative parent to claim
his or her own defenses. Where the evidence to aid
this investigation is obtainable through the facilities of
modern science and technology, such evidence should
be considered subject to the limits established by the
law, rules, and jurisprudence.
*just in case: this case also ruled for
admissibility of DNA testing to establish paternity
provided: If the value of W is less than 99.9%, the
results of the DNA analysis should be considered as
corroborative evidence. If the value of W is 99.9% or
higher then there is refutable presumption of paternity.
This refutable presumption of paternity should be
subjected to the Vallejo standards, which declared
that: “In assessing the probative value of DNA
evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among
other things, the following data: how the samples
were collected, how they were handled, the possibility
of contamination of the samples, the procedure
followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper
standards and procedures were followed in conducting
220
 emedial Law Review
Digests
the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who
conducted the tests.”
YULO V. PEOPLE
Facts: Josefina Dimalanta brought Lilany Yulo to Myrna
Roque. Josefina told Myrna that Yulo was trustworthy
and a good payer. Because of this Myrna encashed
certain checks of Yulo. There were two Equitable bank
checks (40,000 and 16,200) and one from BPI
(40,000).
When Myrna presented the checks for payment
they were dishonored. The EB checks were "Drawn
Against Insufficient Funds," while the BPI check was
stamped "Account Closed."Myrna asked Josefina for
Yulo’s address but Josefina refused to give it and
merely guaranteed that Yulo would pay. When no
payment was forthcoming, Myrna lodged a complaint.
Yulo admitted having issued the checks in question
but claimed that she merely lent them to Josefina. In
turn, Josefina delivered the checks to her friend who
showed them to a jeweler as "show money." It was
understood that the checks were not to be deposited.
Yulo vehemently denied having any transaction with
Myrna.
The RTC convicted Yulo to pay the checks and
to 1 year imprisonment for each check issued. The
Court of Appeals affirmed it in a decision dated
January 31, 1997. Yulo filed an MR but the CA only
resolved it on March 16, 2000.
Issue: Whether or not Yulo’s right to a speedy
disposition of the case was violated. – NO.
Held: The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like
the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when
the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious,
and oppressive delays, or when unjustified
postponements of the trial are asked for and secured,
or when without cause or justifiable motive a long
period of time is allowed to elapse without the party
having his case tried. To determine whether the right
has been violated, the following factors may be
considered: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the
reasons for such delay; (3) the assertion or failure to
assert such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice
caused by the delay.
In the instant case, we the delay was
sufficiently explained by the Court of Appeals.
The ponente of the decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 17513,
Associate Justice Jainal D. Rasul, retired during the
pendency of petitioner’s motion for reconsideration
filed on March 4, 1997. However, the case was
assigned to Associate Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole
only on February 28, 2000 and brought to her
attention on March 2, 2000. We note that it took
Justice Gozo-Dadole only two (2) weeks from notice to
resolve the motion. Clearly, she did not incur any
delay. We, therefore, rule that there has been no
violation of the petitioner’s right to a speedy trial.
CrimPro
The SC said that all the elements of BP 22 are present
and upheld the conviction.
PETITION FOR RADIO AND TELEVISION
COVERAGE OF THE MULTIPLE MURDER CASES
AGAINST MAGUINDANAO GOVERNOR AMPATUAN
FACTS:On November 23, 2009, 57 people, including
32 journalists and media practitioners, were killed
while on their way to Shariff Aguak in Maguindanao.
This tragic incident, which came to be known as
“Maguindanao Massacre”, spawned charges for 57
counts of murder and an additional charge of rebellion
against 197 accused. Note that there was a transfer of
venue. The cases are being tried by Presiding Judge
Jocelyn Solis-Reyes of RTC Quezon City.
On November 19, 2010, the National Union of
Journalists of the Philippines (NUJP), ABS-CBN
Broadcasting Corporation, GMA Network, Inc., relatives
of the victims, individual journalists from various
entities, and members of the academe filed a petition
before the SC praying that live television and radio
coverage of the trial in these criminal cases be
allowed, recording devices (still cameras, tape
recorders) be permitted inside the courtroom to assist
the working journalists, and reasonable guidelines be
formulated to govern the broadcast coverage and the
use of devices.
In a related move, the National Press Club of
the Philippines (NPC) and Alyansa ng Filipinong
Mamamahayag (AFIMA) filed a petition praying that
the SC constitute RTC Quezon City as a special court
(to focus only on the Maguindanao Massacre Trial),
and allow the installation inside the courtroom of a
sufficient number of video cameras that shall beam the
audio and video signals to the television monitors
outside the court.
ISSUE: WON the absolute ban on live television and
radio coverage of court proceedings should be lifted?
YES, but subject to the guidelines to be issued by the
SC.
RULING: In the case of Re: Live TV and Radio
Coverage of the Hearing of President Corazon Aquino’s
Libel Case, the SC concluded that live radio and
television coverage of court proceedings shall not be
allowed considering the prejudice it poses to the
defendant’s right to due process as well as to the fair
and orderly administration of justice, and considering
further that the freedom of the press and the right of
the people to information may be served and satisfied
by less distracting, degrading, and prejudicial means.
The SC had another unique opportunity in the case of
Re: Request Radio-TV Coverage of the Trial in the
Sandiganbayan of the Plunder Cases Against the
Former President Joseph Estrada to revisit the question
of live radio and television coverage of court
proceedings in a a criminal case. It held that the
propriety of granting or denying the instant petition
221
 emedial Law Review
Digests
involves the weighing out of the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to
public information, on the one hand, and the
fundamental rights of the accused, on the other hand,
along with the constitutional power of a court to
control its proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial
trial. The petition was denied. However, in resolving
the MR, it provided a glimmer of hope when it ordered
the audio-visual recording of the trial for documentary
purposes subject to the conditions set by the SC.
Note: The indication of “serious risks” posed by
live media coverage to the accused’s right to due
process was left unexplained and unexplored in Aquino
and Estrada. So the SC thought that compliance with
regulations, not curtailment of a right, provides a
workable solution to such concern while maintaining
the underlying principles held in Aquino and Estrada.
One apparent circumstance that sets the Maguindanao
Massacre cases apart from these earlier cases is the
impossibility of accommodating even the parties to the
cases (private complainants/families of the victims and
other witnesses) inside the courtroom. In the Estrada
case, the SC held that a courtroom should have
enough facilities for a reasonable number of the public
to observe the proceedings, not too small as to render
the openness negligible, and not too large as to
distract the trial participants from their proper
functions.
Even before considering what is a “reasonable
number of the public” who may observe the
proceedings, the peculiarity of the subject criminal
cases is that the proceedings already necessarily entail
the presence of hundreds of families. It cannot be
gainsaid that the families of the 57 victims and of the
197 accused have as much interest, beyond mere
curiosity, to attend or monitor the proceedings as
those of the impleaded parties or trial participants. It
bears noting at this juncture that the prosecution and
the defense have listed more than 200 witnesses each.
The impossibility of holding such judicial proceedings in
a courtroom that will accommodate all the interested
parties, whether private complainants or accused, is
unfortunate enough. What more if the right itself
commands that a reasonable number of the general
public be allowed to witness the proceeding as it takes
place inside the courtroom. Technology tends to
provide the only solution to break the inherent
limitations of the courtroom, to satisfy the imperative
of a transparent, open and public trial.
In so allowing pro hac vice the live
broadcasting by radio and television of the
Maguindanao Massacre cases, the SC lays down the
following guidelines toward addressing the concerns
mentioned in Aquino and Estrada:
(a) An audio-visual recording of the
Maguindanao massacre cases may be made both
for documentary purposes and for transmittal to
live radio and television broadcasting.
(b) Media entities must file with the trial court a
letter of application, manifesting that they
CrimPro
intend to broadcast the audio-visual recording of
the proceedings and that they have the
necessary technological equipment and technical
plan to carry out the same, with an undertaking
that they will faithfully comply with the
guidelines and regulations and cover the entire
remaining proceedings until promulgation of
judgment.
No selective or partial coverage shall be
allowed. No media entity shall be allowed to
broadcast the proceedings without an
application duly approved by the trial court.
(c) A single fixed compact camera shall be
installed inconspicuously inside the courtroom to
provide a single wide-angle full-view of the sala
of the trial court. No panning and zooming shall
be allowed to avoid unduly highlighting or
downplaying incidents in the proceedings. The
camera and the necessary equipment shall be
operated and controlled only by a duly
designated official or employee of the Supreme
Court. The camera equipment should not
produce or beam any distracting sound or light
rays. Signal lights or signs showing the
equipment is operating should not be visible. A
limited number of microphones and the least
installation of wiring, if not wireless technology,
must be unobtrusively located in places
indicated by the trial court.
The Public Information Office and the Office of
the Court Administrator shall coordinate and
assist the trial court on the physical set-up of
the camera and equipment.
(d) The transmittal of the audio-visual recording
from inside the courtroom to the media entities
shall be conducted in such a way that the least
physical disturbance shall be ensured in keeping
with the dignity and solemnity of the
proceedings and the exclusivity of the access to
the media entities.
The hardware for establishing an interconnection
or link with the camera equipment monitoring
the proceedings shall be for the account of the
media entities, which should employ technology
that can (i) avoid the cumbersome snaking
cables inside the courtroom, (ii) minimize the
unnecessary ingress or egress of technicians,
and (iii) preclude undue commotion in case of
technical glitches.
If the premises outside the courtroom lack space
for the set-up of the media entities’ facilities, the
media entities shall access the audio-visual
recording either via wireless technology
accessible even from outside the court premises
or from one common web broadcasting platform
222
 emedial Law Review
Digests
from which streaming can be accessed or
derived to feed the images and sounds.
At all times, exclusive access by the media
entities to the real-time audio-visual recording
should be protected or encrypted.
(e) The broadcasting of the proceedings for a
particular day must be continuous and in its
entirety, excepting such portions thereof where
Sec. 21 of Rule 119 of the Rules of
Court[27] applies, and where the trial court
excludes, upon motion, prospective witnesses
from the courtroom, in instances where,inter
alia, there are unresolved identification issues or
there are issues which involve the security of
the witnesses and the integrity of their
testimony (e.g., the dovetailing of corroborative
testimonies is material, minority of the
witness).
The trial court may, with the consent of the
parties, order only the pixelization of the image
of the witness or mute the audio output, or
both.
(f) To provide a faithful and complete broadcast
of the proceedings, no commercial break or any
other gap shall be allowed until the day’s
proceedings are adjourned, except during the
period of recess called by the trial court and
during portions of the proceedings wherein the
public is ordered excluded.
(g) To avoid overriding or superimposing the
audio output from the on-going proceedings, the
proceedings shall be broadcast without any
voice-overs, except brief annotations of scenes
depicted therein as may be necessary to explain
them at the start or at the end of the
scene. Any commentary shall observe the sub
judice rule and be subject to the contempt
power of the court;
(h) No repeat airing of the audio-visual
recording shall be allowed until after the finality
of judgment, except brief footages and still
images derived from or cartographic sketches of
scenes based on the recording, only for news
purposes, which shall likewise observe the sub
judice rule and be subject to the contempt
power of the court;
(i) The original audio-recording shall be
deposited in the National Museum and the
Records Management and Archives Office for
preservation and exhibition in accordance with
law.
(j) The audio-visual recording of the
proceedings shall be made under the supervision
and control of the trial court which may issue
CrimPro
supplementary directives, as the exigency
requires, including the suspension or revocation
of the grant of application by the media
entities.
(k) The Court shall create a special committee
which shall forthwith study, design and
recommend appropriate arrangements,
implementing regulations, and administrative
matters referred to it by the Court concerning
the live broadcast of the proceedings pro hac
vice, in accordance with the above-outlined
guidelines. The Special Committee shall also
report and recommend on the feasibility,
availability and affordability of the latest
technology that would meet the herein
requirements. It may conduct consultations
with resource persons and experts in the field of
information and communication technology.
(l) All other present directives in the conduct of
the proceedings of the trial court (i.e.,
prohibition on recording devices such as still
cameras, tape recorders; and allowable number
of media practitioners inside the courtroom)
shall be observed in addition to these guidelines.
Indeed, the SC cannot gloss over what
advances technology has to offer in distilling the
abstract discussion of key constitutional precepts into
the workable context. Technology per se has always
been neutral. It is the use and regulation thereof that
need fine-tuning. Law and technology can work to the
advantage and furtherance of the various rights herein
involved, within the contours of defined guidelines.
RULE 116 : ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA
BERNADETTE ADASA VS. CECILLE ABALOS
FACTS: Respondent Cecille Abalos alleged in the
complaints-affidavits that petitioner Bernadette Adasa,
through deceit, received and encashed two checks
issued in the name of Abalos without the latter’s
knowledge and consent and that despite repeated
demands by Abalos, Adasa failed and refused to pay
the proceeds of the checks. Adasa filed a counter-
affidavit admitting that she received and encashed the
2 checks. Then she alleged in a Supplemental affidavit
claiming that it was instead Bebie Correa who received
the 2 checks, but that Correa had already left the
country.
A resolution was issued by the Office of the City
Prosecutor (OCP) of Iligan City finding probable cause
against Adasa and ordering the filing of 2 separate
Informations for Estafa Thru Falsification of
Commercial Document by a Private Individual.
Consequently, 2 separate criminal cases were filed
docketed as Criminal Cases No. 8781 and No. 8782.
This instant petition concerns only one of these
criminal cases (Criminal Case No. 8782).
223
 emedial Law Review
Digests
On 8 June 2001, upon motion of Adasa, the trial
court issued an order directing the OCP of Iligan City to
conduct a reinvestigation. After conducting the
reinvestigation, OCP issued a resolution affirming the
finding of probable cause. Meanwhile, during her
arraignment on 1 October 2001 in Criminal Case No.
8782, petitioner entered an unconditional plea of not
guilty.
Dissatisfied with the finding of the OCP, Adasa
later filed a Petition for Review before the DOJ. In a
Resolution, the DOJ reversed and set aside the
resolution of the OCP and directed the said office to
withdraw the Information for Estafa.
Abalos thereafter filed a MR arguing that the DOJ
should have dismissed outright the petition for review
since Section 7 of DOJ Circular No. 70 mandates that
when an accused has already been arraigned and
the aggrieved party files a petition for review before
the DOJ, the Secretary of Justice cannot, and should
not take cognizance of the petition, or even give due
course thereto, but instead deny it outright.
On Feb. 2003, the trial court granted Adasa’s
“Motion to Withdraw Information” and dismissed
Criminal Case No. 8782.
Abalos filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA
regarding the DOJ resolution. CA granted the petition
and reversed the resolution of the DOJ. CA emphasized
that Section 7 of DOJ Circular used the phrase “shall
not”.
Sec 7. If an information has been filed in court
pursuant to the appealed resolution, the petition shall
not be given due course if the accused had already
been arraigned
While the permissive word "may" in Section 129
would seem to imply that the Secretary of Justice has
discretion to entertain an appeal notwithstanding the
fact that the accused has been arraigned. This
provision should not be treated separately, but should
be read in relation to Section 7.
ISSUE: Is the over-all language of Sections 7 and 12
of Department Circular No. 70 permissive and directory
such that the Secretary of Justice may entertain an
appeal despite the fact that the accused had been
arraigned? NO.
RATIO: CA is correct. When an accused has already
been arraigned, the DOJ must not give the appeal or
petition for review due course and must dismiss the
same. Arraignment of the accused prior to the filing of
the appeal or petition for review is set forth as one of
the grounds for its dismissal. Therefore, in such
instance, the DOJ, noting that the arraignment of an
accused prior to the filing of an appeal or petition for
review is a ground for dismissal under Section 12,
9
The Secretary may reverse, affirm or modify the appealed
resolution. He may, motu proprio or upon motion, dismiss the
petition for review on any of the following grounds:
(e) That the accused had already been arraigned when the
appeal was taken; x x x.
CrimPro
must go back to Section 7 and act upon as mandated
therein. In other words, the DOJ must not give due
course to, and must necessarily dismiss, the appeal.
To give the second sentence of Section 12 in
relation to its paragraph (e) a directory application
would not only subvert the avowed objectives of the
Circular, that is, for the expeditious and efficient
administration of justice, but would also render its
other mandatory provisions - Sections 3, 5, 6 and 7,
nugatory.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. OSCAR M.
DOCUMENTO
FACTS: Oscar Documento was charged before the RTC
with 2 counts of Rape, as defined and punished under
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. He was accused
of raping his daughter AAA, a minor, 16 years of age.
One information was for the alleged rape committed on
April 22, 1996 at Ochoa Avenue, Butuan City, and
another information was for the alleged rape
committed on October 15, 1995 at Barangay
Antongalon, Butuan City. Upon arraignment,
Documento pled not guilty. Subsequently, however, he
changed his earlier plea to one of guilt. As such, the
RTC ordered a re-arraignment and entered appellant’s
plea of guilt to the charges. Thereafter, the
prosecution presented evidence consisting of the
testimonies of private complainant herself, AAA, her
mother, BBB, and Dr. Johann A. Hugo. Their
testimonies established that Documento started
sexually molesting his daughterwhen she was 10
years old. Eventually, AAA became pregnant and gave
birth in 1993. Documento raped AAA on a number of
occasions in the houses both located in Butuan City.
AAA’s mother, who was working in Manila, searched
for Documento and AAA. Upon learning that
Documento and AAA were in Butuan City, she went to
the Butuan Police Station and requested assistance in
securing custody of AAA. As soon as Documento was
arrested, AAA informed the police that Documento
raped her. Dr. Hugo testified that AAA was in fact
raped. Documento testified as the sole witness for the
defense. He asseverated that he pled guilty to the
crime of Rape only because Prosecutor Salise
convinced him to do so. Documento contended that he
did not rape AAA, and that, to the contrary, they had a
consensual, sexual relationship. He further alleged that
the incident did not happen in Butuan City, but in
Clarin, Misamis Occidental. Finally, on cross-
examination, Documento disowned the handwritten
letters he had supposedly written to his wife and to
AAA, asking for their forgiveness. The RTC convicted
Documento of both counts of Rape. CA affirmed.
ISSUES:
1. WON the prosecution failed to establish that
the 2 counts of rape were perpetrated in
Butuan City – NO!
224
 emedial Law Review
Digests
2. WON the Court gravely erred in failing to
conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntainess and full comprehension by
accused of the consequences of his plea –
YES!(but this was not enough to remand the
case to the trial court)
RATIO: 1. Contrary to the insistence of Documento
that the prosecution failed to establish that 2 counts of
Rape were perpetrated in Butuan City, the CA pointed
to specific parts of the records which show that,
although AAA did not specifically mention "Butuan
City" in her testimony, the incidents in the present
cases transpired in Barangay Antongalon and on Ochoa
Avenue, both in Butuan City. The 2 informations also
clearly state that the crimes were perpetrated in
Butuan City. The inclusion of the two Barangays in the
City of Butuan is a matter of mandatory judicial notice
by the trial court.
2. It is true that the appellate court noted the
trial court’s failure to conduct the prescribed
"searching inquiry" into the matter of whether or not
Documento’s plea of guilt was improvidently made.
Nonetheless, it still found the conviction of appellant
proper. Nothing in the records of the case at bench
shows that the trial court complied with the guidelines
set forth by the Supreme Court in a number of cases
after appellant’s re-arraignment and guilty plea. The
questions propounded to appellant during the direct
and cross-examination likewise fall short of these
requirements. The appellant was not fully apprised of
the consequences of his guilty plea. In fact, as argued
by appellant, "the trial court should have informed him
that his plea of guilt would not affect or reduce the
imposable penalty, which is death as he might have
erroneously believed that under Article 63, the death
penalty, being a single indivisible penalty, shall be
applied by the court regardless of any mitigating
circumstances that might have attended the
commission of the deed." Moreover, the trial court
judge failed to inform appellant of his right to adduce
evidence despite the guilty plea.
With the trial court’s failure to comply with the
guidelines, appellant’s guilty plea is deemed
improvidently made and thus rendered inefficacious.
This does not mean, however, that the case should be
remanded to the trial court. This course of action is
appropriate only when the appellant’s guilty plea was
the sole basis for his conviction.
As held in People v. Mira: Notwithstanding the
incautiousness that attended appellant’s guilty plea,
we are not inclined to remand the case to the trial
court as suggested by appellant. Convictions based on
an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such
plea is the sole basis of the judgment. If the trial court
relied on sufficient and credible evidence in finding the
accused guilty, the judgment must be sustained,
because then it is predicated not merely on the guilty
plea of the accused but also on evidence proving his
commission of the offense charged.
CrimPro
VIRATA VS SANDIGANBAYAN
(sorry! Long case)
FACTS: Cesar Virata is one of the defendants in the
case of Republic vs Romualdez which was filed by the
PCGG. The case involves the recovery of ill-gotten
wealth allegedly amassed by the defendants in that
case during the marcos years. The complaint was
amended 3times. The last amended complaint filed
with the sandiganbayan states the following relevant
allegations against virata:
[summarized version]
Par.14: “defendants...engaged in devises,
schemes and strategems to unjustly enrich themselves
by... (b) giving meralco undue advantage (increasing
power rates while reducing electric franchise tax); (g)
justify meralco’s anomalous acquisition of electric
cooperatives; (m) manipulated the formation of
Erecton Holdings for the purpose of assuming the
obligation of Erecton Inc with Philguarantee (Virata is
an official of philguarantee) so that Erecton Inc can
borrow more capital its obligation with philguarantee
amounting to more than P2B.”
Par.17: “acting as dummies, nominees...to
conceal and prevent recovery of assets illegally
obtained.”
Par.18: “Acts of defendant... constitute gross
abuse of official position... to the grave and irreparable
damage of the Filipino people.”
Virata filed a bill of particulars asserting that
these allegations are vague and not averred with
sufficient definiteness to enable him to effectively
prepare his responsive pleadings. Sandiganbayan
partially granted the motion. Only with regard to
par.17 and 18 was the republic required to file a bill of
particulars. As to the others, Sandiganbayan declared
them to be clear and specific enough to allow Virata to
file an intelligent responsive pleading.
OSG submitted the bill of particulars relating to
par17 and 18. Virata filed a motion to strike out this
bill of particular and to defer the filing of his answer. It
is alleged that the bill of particulars aver for the first
time new actionable wrongs allegedly committed by
him in various official capacities and that the
allegations do not indicate that he was a dummy,
nominee or agent (which was the allegation in the
complaint) but rather a government officer acting in
his own name.
Meanwhile, Virata filed a petition for certiorari
with the SC with regard to the denial of his bill of
particulars with regard to par.14 and sections b,g and
m. SC granted the petition. OSG filed a manifestation
that since PCGG is the investigating body with the
complete records of the case, it is in a better position
to supply the bill of particulars. Thus, PCGG submitted
a bill of particulars (no.2) in relation to par.14 and
subparagraphs b,g and m.
Virata filed a comment with a motion to
dismiss. According to him, bill of particulars no.2 is
merely a rehash of the assertions made in the last
225
 emedial Law Review
Digests
amended complaint hence, it is not the bill of
particulars required by the court. As to the 1 st bill of
particulars, it allegedly shows that new imputations are
being made which are different from the charge in the
complaint. Sandiganbayan found the bill of particulars
to be sufficient, hence, this recourse to the SC.
ISSUE: Whether the bill of particulars should be
admitted or not? NO!
HELD: The rule is that a complaint must contain the
ultimate facts constituting plaintiff's cause of action. A
cause of action has the following elements: (1) a right
in favor of the plaintiff; (2) an obligation on the part of
the named defendant to respect or not to violate such
right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such
defendant violating the plaintiff’s right. As long as the
complaint contains these three elements, a cause of
action exists. Even though the allegations are vague,
dismissal is not the proper remedy. Thus, the rules of
court provide that a party may move for more definite
statement or for a bill of particulars of any matter
which is not averred with sufficient definiteness or
particularity to enable him properly to prepare his
responsive pleading or to prepare for trial. Such
motion shall point out the defects complained of and
the details desired. An order directing the submission
of such statement or bill is proper where it enables the
party asking for it to intelligently prepare a responsive
pleading, or adequately to prepare for trial.
It is the office of the bill of particulars to inform
the opposite party and the court of the precise nature
and character of the cause of action or defense which
the pleader has attempted to set forth and thereby to
guide his adversary in his preparations for trial, and
reasonably to protect him against surprise at the trial.
It gives information of the specific proposition for
which the pleader contends, in respect to any material
and issuable fact in the case, and it becomes a part of
the pleading which it supplements. It has been held
that a bill of particulars must inform the opposite party
of the nature of the pleader's cause of action or
defense, and it must furnish the required items of the
claim with reasonable fullness and precision. Generally,
it will be held sufficient if it fairly and substantially
gives the opposite party the information to which he is
entitled. It should be definite and specific and not
contain general allegations and conclusions. It should
be reasonably certain and as specific as the
circumstances will allow.
Bill of particular for Par14 (b): Complaint
alleges virata’s alleged active collaboration in reducing
taxes. Yet, there is nothing in the bill of particular
about this active collaboration. It is silent as to what
acts of Virat that establish that he collaborated in
reducing the taxes.
Par14(g): BOP (bill of particular) on this also
failed to set forth particularly or specifically the
charges against virata. It is full of generalizations and
indefinite statements. So many questions about the
alleged acts which were not answered (ie. What were
CrimPro
these electric coops? Why were their acquisition
anomalous? Etc)
Par14(m): BOP is merely a restatement of the
charge in the complaint. Clearly, republic failed to
amplify the charges against Virata. The important
question as to what particular acts of Virata that
constituted support and assistance in the formation of
Erectors Holdings is left unanswered.
With regard to the 1st bill of particular,
basically SC had the same findings. That is, BOP failed
to supply Virata with material matters which he needs
in order to file a responsive pleading. Further, the 1 st
BOP contains new matters which are not covered by
the charges in the complaint. The complaint alleges
that he was acting as a dummy but the BOP state that
he acted in his official capacity. Therefore, under the
BOP he acted as agent of the government whereas in
the complaint he allegedly acted as agent of his co-
defendants.
The two bills of particulars filed by the Republic
failed to properly amplify the charges leveled against
Virata because, not only are they mere reiteration or
repetition of the allegations set forth in the expanded
Second Amended Complaint, but, to the large extent,
they contain vague, immaterial and generalized
assertions which are inadmissible under our procedural
rules.
As a result, SC orders the dismissal of the
complaint in so far as the charges against Virata are
concerned. This is justified under the rules of court
(failure to prosecute –plaintiff... fails to comply with
these rules or any order of the court)
Side issues: Whether PCGG can file the BOP in
behalf of the republic (contention is that only OSG can
act in behalf of republic)? YES. Admin code gives
power to the OSG to deputize legal officers and to call
on any dep’t...etc., as may be necessary to fulfil its
functions. Here, OSG called PCGG for assistance and
authorized it to file the BOP.
RULE 117 : MOTION TO QUASH
LOS BAÑOS V. PEDRO
*sorry mahaba, the court compared MTQ and
provisional dismissal kasi
FACTS: Pedro was charged for carrying a loaded
firearm without the authorization of the COMELEC a
day before the May 14, 2001 national and local
elections. The accusation was based on the Omnibus
Election Code (Code) after the Marinduque Philippine
National Police (PNP) caught Pedro illegally carrying his
firearm at a checkpoint at Boac, Marinduque. The Boac
election officer filed a criminal complaint against Pedro
for violating the election gun ban. After an inquest, the
Marinduque provincial prosecutor filed Information
against Pedro with the Marinduque RTC for violation of
the Code’s Article XXII, Sec. 261 (q), in relation to
Sec. 264. The Information reads:
“That on or about the 13th day of May 2001 at
about 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon, in [S]itio
226
 emedial Law Review
Digests
Bantauyan, [B]arangay Bantad, Municipality of
Boac, Province of Marinduque, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously carry a
Revolver Cal. 357, Magnum Ruger 100 loaded
with six (6) ammunitions, with Serial No. 173-
56836 outside his residence during the election
period, without authorization in writing from
the Commission on Election[s].”
RTC granted Pedro’s Motion for Preliminary
Investigation, which, however, did not materialize.
Instead, Pedro filed for Motion to Quash arguing that
the Information "contains averments which, if true,
would constitute a legal excuse or justification and/or
that the facts charged do not constitute an offense."
Pedro attached to his motion a COMELEC Certification
dated September 24, 2001 that he was "exempted"
from the gun ban. The provincial prosecutor opposed
the motion.
The RTC quashed the Information and ordered
the police and the prosecutors to return the seized
articles to Pedro.
The petitioner, private prosecutor Ariel Los
Baños, representing the checkpoint team, moved to
reopen the case, as Pedro’s COMELEC Certification was
a "falsification," and the prosecution was "deprived of
due process" when the judge quashed the information
without a hearing. Attached to Los Baños’ motion were
two COMELEC certifications stating that: (1) Pedro was
not exempted from the firearm ban; and (2) the
signatures in the COMELEC Certification of September
24, 2001 were forged.
The RTC reopened the case for further
proceedings, as Pedro did not object to Los Baños’
motion. Pedro moved for the reconsideration of the
RTC’s order primarily based on Rule 117, Sec.
8, arguing that the dismissal had become permanent.
He likewise cited the public prosecutor’s lack of
express approval of the motion to reopen the case.
The public prosecutor, however, manifested his
express conformity with the motion to reopen the
case. The RTC rejected the position that Rule 117, Sec.
8 applies, and explained that this provision refers to
situations where both the prosecution and the accused
mutually consented to the dismissal of the case, or
where the prosecution or the offended party failed to
object to the dismissal of the case, and not to a
situation where the information was quashed upon
motion of the accused and over the objection of the
prosecution. The RTC, thus, set Pedro’s arraignment
date.
Pedro filed with the CA a petition for certiorari
and prohibition to nullify the RTC’s mandated
reopening. He argued that the RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in its ruling. CA denied the petition for the
reason that there is no grave abuse of discretion but
discussed that the TC erred in ruling that Rule 117,
Sec. 8 of the ROC does not apply to the case at bar.
Pedro filed a MR which was granted.
CrimPro
Los Baños also contends that the CA gravely
erred when: (1) it ruled in effect that the Order dated
November 22, 2001 granting the MTQ is considered a
provisional dismissal, which became permanent one
year from the prosecutor’s receipt of the order; the
order to quash the Information was based on Rule
117, Sec. 3 not on Sec. 8; (2) it granted Pedro’s MR
and denied Los Baños’ motion for modification of
judgment, when Rule 117, Sec. 6 of clearly provides
that an order granting a MTQ is not a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense.
ISSUE: WON Rule 117, Sec. 8 of the ROC is applicable
to the case – NO
HELD: NO. The RTC decision reopening the case
prevails.
Motion to Quash
A MTQ is the mode by which an accused assails, before
entering his plea, the validity of the criminal complaint
or the criminal information filed against him for
insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defect
apparent on the face of the Information.
Provisional Dismissal
A case is provisionally dismissed if the following
requirements concur:
1) the prosecution with the express conformity of
the accused, or the accused, moves for a
provisional dismissal (sin perjuicio) of his case; or
both the prosecution and the accused move for its
provisional dismissal;
2) the offended party is notified of the motion for a
provisional dismissal of the case;
3) the court issues an order granting the motion
and dismissing the case provisionally; and
4) the public prosecutor is served with a copy of
the order of provisional dismissal of the case.
In People v. Lacson, we ruled that there
are sine quanon requirements in the application of the
time-bar rule stated in the second paragraph of Rule
117, Sec. 8 of the ROC. We also ruled that the time-
bar is a special procedural limitation qualifying the
right of the State to prosecute, making the time-bar an
essence of the given right or as an inherent part
thereof, so that the lapse of the time-bar operates to
extinguish the right of the State to prosecute the
accused.
Comparison of MTQ vs. Provisional Dismissal
A dismissal based on a MTQ and a provisional dismissal
are different from one another as concepts, in their
features, and legal consequences. While the provision
on provisional dismissal is found within Rule 117, it
does not follow that a MTQ results in a provisional
dismissal to which Rule 117, Sec. 8 applies.
First, Rule 117, Sec. 8 does not exactly state
what a provisional dismissal is. The modifier
"provisional" directly suggests that the dismissals
which Sec. 8 essentially refers to are those that are
227
 emedial Law Review
Digests
temporary in character (i.e., to dismissals that are
without prejudice to the re-filing of the case), and not
the dismissals that are permanent (i.e., those that bar
the re-filing of the case).
Second, Sec. 8 does not state the grounds that
lead to a provisional dismissal. This is in contrast with
a MTQ whose grounds are specified under Sec. 3. The
delimitation of the grounds available in a MTQ suggests
that it is a class in itself, with specific and closely-
defined characteristics. A necessary consequence is
that where the grounds cited are those listed under
Sec. 3, then the appropriate remedy is to file a MTQ.
Conversely, where a ground does not appear under
Sec. 3, then a MTQ is not a proper remedy. A motion
for provisional dismissal may then apply if the
conditions required by Sec. 8 obtain.
Third, consequences of a meritorious MTQ is
different from provisional dismissal. The failure of the
Rules to state under Sec. 6 (which provides for the
effects of sustaining a MTQ – the dismissal is not a bar
to another prosecution for the same offense – unless
the basis for the dismissal is the extinction of criminal
liability and double jeopardy) that a Sec. 8 provisional
dismissal is a bar to further prosecution shows that the
framers did not intend a dismissal based on a MTQ and
a provisional dismissal to be confused with one
another; Sec. 8 operates in a world of its own separate
from MTQ, and merely provides a time-bar that
uniquely applies to dismissals other than those
grounded on Sec. 3.
(Just in case… The court also included the following
differences between a MTQ and Provisional Dismissal:
First, a MTQ is invariably filed by the accused
to question the efficacy of the complaint or
information filed against him or her (Rule 117,
Sections 1 and 2); in contrast, a case may be
provisionally dismissed at the instance of either the
prosecution or the accused, or both, subject to the
conditions enumerated under Rule 117, Sec. 8.
Second, the form and content of a MTQ are as
stated under Rule 117, Sec. 2; these requirements
do not apply to a provisional dismissal.
Third, a MTQ assails the validity of the criminal
complaint or the criminal information for defects or
defenses apparent on face of the information; a
provisional dismissal may be grounded on reasons
other than the defects found in the information.
Fourth, a MTQ is allowed before the
arraignment (Rule 117, Sec. 1,); there may be a
provisional dismissal of the case even when the
trial proper of the case is already underway
provided that the required consents are present.
Fifth, a provisional dismissal is, by its own
terms, impermanent until the time-bar applies, at
which time it becomes a permanent dismissal. In
contrast, an information that is quashed stays
quashed until revived; the grant of a MTQ does not
per se carry any connotation of impermanence,
and becomes so only as provided by law or by the
Rules. In re-filing the case, what is important is
CrimPro
the question of whether the action can still be
brought, i.e., whether the prescription of action or
of the offense has set in. In a provisional dismissal,
there can be no re-filing after the time-bar, and
prescription is not an immediate consideration.)
Quashal and provisional dismissal are different
concepts whose respective rules refer to different
situations that should not be confused with one
another. If the problem relates to an intrinsic or
extrinsic deficiency of the complaint or information, as
shown on its face, the remedy is a MTQ under the
terms of Rule 117, Sec. 3. All other reasons for
seeking the dismissal of the complaint or information,
before arraignment and under the circumstances
outlined in Rule 117, Sec. 8, fall under provisional
dismissal.
Thus, we conclude that Rule 117, Sec. 8 does
not apply to the reopening of the case that the RTC
ordered and which the CA reversed; the reversal of the
CA’s order is legally proper.
Pedro’s MTQ
The grounds Pedro cited in his MTQ are that the
Information contains averments which, if true, would
constitute a legal excuse or justification [Sec. 3(h),
Rule 117], and that the facts charged do not constitute
an offense [Sec. 3(a), Rule 117]. We find from our
examination of the records that the Information duly
charged a specific offense and provides the details on
how the offense was committed. On the other hand,
we do not see on the face or from the averments of
the Information any legal excuse or justification. The
cited basis, in fact, for Pedro’s MTQ was a COMELEC
Certification (granting him an exemption from the ban
and a permit to carry firearms during the election
period). This COMELEC Certification is a matter aliunde
that is not an appropriate motion to raise in, and
cannot support, a MTQ grounded on legal excuse or
justification found on the face of the Information.
Significantly, no hearing was ever called to allow the
prosecution to contest the genuineness of the
COMELEC certification.
Thus, the RTC grossly erred in its initial ruling
that a quashal of the Information was in order. Pedro,
on the other hand, also misappreciated the true
nature, function, and utility of a MTQ. As a
consequence, a valid Information still stands, on the
basis of which Pedro should now be arraigned and
stand trial.
(Just in case… The Information was not rendered
defective by the fact that Pedro was charged of
violating Sec. 261(q) of the Code, instead of Sec. 32 of
R.A. No. 7166, which amended Sec. 261(q); these two
sections aim to penalize among others, the carrying of
firearms (or other deadly weapons) in public places
during the election period without the authority of the
COMELEC. The established rule is that the character of
the crime is not determined by the caption or preamble
of the information or from the specification of the
228
 emedial Law Review
Digests
provision of law alleged to have been violated; the
crime committed is determined by the recital of the
ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or
information. Further, in Abenes v. Court of Appeals, we
specifically recognized that the amendment under Sec.
32 of R.A. No. 7166 does not affect the prosecution of
the accused who was charged under Sec. 261(q) of the
Code.)
LAZARTE V SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS: NHA awarded a contract for infrastructure
works with A.C. Cruz Construction which was funded
by World Bank in the amount of P7.67M. During the
construction, the Project Engineer discovered that the
company issued a report on an additional work for the
excavation of unsuitable materials and road filling
works but after further investigation, learned that
there was no such actual work done (ghost activity).
The project engineer filed a recommendation with the
project office to terminate the contract with the
construction company. After several referrals, the NHA
decided to rescind the said contract due to the
anomalies discovered. However, despite the
rescission, the construction company continued to
work on the project until the project was awarded to
the new construction company, Triad Construction.
Further investigations revealed that AC Cruz
Construction was doing ghost activities and was
undertaking substandard and defective works. In
addition, officers of the NHA have overpaid AC Cruz
Construction for the portion that was already started
and finished by the said company (P232K overpaid)
(they were paid P1M for the partial work done).
Because of this, several officers of the NHA were
charged with violating Sec.3 of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.
Petitioner filed a motion to quash on the ff
grounds: 1) the facts charged in the information do not
constitute an offense; (2) the information does not
conform substantially to the prescribed form; (3) the
constitutional rights of the accused to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusations against them
have been violated by the inadequacy of the
information; and (4) the prosecution failed to
determine the individual participation of all the accused
in the information.
Sandiganbayan denied the motion to quash of
petitioner. So Pet filed a petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: w/n the motion to quash should be granted.
NO
HELD: The denial of a motion to quash is not
correctible by certiorari. Well-established is the rule
that when a motion to quash in a criminal case is
denied, the remedy is not a petition for certiorari but
for petitioners to go to trial without prejudice to
reiterating the special defenses invoked in their motion
to quash. Remedial measures as regards interlocutory
CrimPro
orders, such as a motion to quash, are frowned upon
and often dismissed. The evident reason for this rule is
to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single court.
This general rule, however, is subject to
certain exceptions. If the court, in denying the motion
to dismiss or motion to quash acts without or in excess
of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, then
certiorari or prohibition lies.And in the case at bar, the
Court does not find the Sandiganbayan to have
committed grave abuse of discretion.
The fundamental test in reflecting on the
viability of a motion to quash on the ground that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense is whether
or not the facts asseverated, if hypothetically
admitted, would establish the essential elements of the
crime defined in law. Matters aliunde will not be
considered.
The Court finds that the Information alleges
the essential elements of violation of Section 3(e) of
R.A. No. 3019. The Information specifically alleges that
petitioners are public officers working under the NHA;
and in such capacity and committing the offense in
relation to the office and while in the performance of
their official functions, connived, confederated and
mutually helped each other and with accused Arceo C.
Cruz (owner of company), with deliberate intent
through manifest partiality and evident bad faith gave
unwarranted benefits to the latter, A.C. Cruz
Construction and to themselves, to the damage and
prejudice of the government.
PEOPLE v. LACSON
This is a resolution of an MR. No facts were stated, I
just got these based on what I gathered from
scattered kwentos in the decision.
FACTS: Ping Lacson was once indicted for murder for
allegedly being responsible for killing 11 people. These
criminal cases were provisionally dismissed by Judge
Agnir on March 1999. At that time, the Rules on
CrimPro as we know now did not yet exist, because it
was only in December 1, 2000 that these rules were
passed. Basically, Lacson questions the applicability of
the time-bar under Sec 8, Rule 117 – whether it should
be prospective or retroactive. The rule provides
(among others) that for offenses punishable by
imprisonment of more than 6 years, their provisional
dismissal shall become permanent after 2 years from
issuance of the order without the case having been
revived. Lacson argues that herein petitioners
(includes SOJ, DirGen of PNP, State Prosec, etc) re-
filed informations against him on June 6, 2001, which
is beyond the 2-year bar, following Sec 8 Rule 117. He
wants retroactive application of the CrimPro rules,
because he said it is more favorable to the accused. He
used the criminal law doctrine because he claims that
CrimPro is a branch of Crim. He also argues that if the
time-bar rule were to be applied prospectively only, it
would give the state more than 2 years to revive the
cases against him, which would violate his right to
229
 emedial Law Review
Digests
speedy disposition of the case and equal protection of
the law. (equal protection: because he claims that he
was singled out to derail his candidacy for the
presidency)
ISSUE: Should the time-bar rule under Rule 117 be
applied retroactively? – No.
RULING: The court is not mandated to apply Sec
8 retroactively simply because it is more
favorable to the accused. This rule was made
also for the benefit of the state. The court (which
issued the rule pursuant to its power under the
constitution to promulgate rules of procedure in
courts) believed that the time limit was reasonable for
the state to revive provisionally dismissed cases. This
time-bar should be respected unless it is shown
that the period is manifestly short or insufficient
that the rules become a denial of justice.
Moreover, the power of the court to promulgate rules
of procedure under the constitution carries with it the
power to determine whether to give the said rules a
prospective or retroactive effect. (According to Rule
144, the court may not apply the rules to actions
pending before it if in its opinion their application
would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which
event, the former procedure shall apply.)
When the Court approved Section 8, it
intended the new rule to be applied prospectively, for if
otherwise, it would defeat the very purpose for which it
was intended which is to give the State a period of two
years from notice of the provisional dismissal of
criminal cases with the express consent of the
accused. It would be a denial of the State’s right to
due process for the Court to apply the new rule
retroactively considering that the criminal cases were
provisionally dismissed on March 29, 1999 before the
new rule took effect on December 1, 2000. A
retroactive application of the time-bar will result in
absurd, unjust and oppressive consequences to the
State and to the victims of crimes and their heirs. If
the Court applied the new time-bar retroactively, the
State would have only one year and three months or
until March 31, 2001 within which to revive these
criminal cases. The period is short of the two-year
period fixed under the new rule. On the other hand, if
the time limit is applied prospectively, the State would
have two years from December 1, 2000 or until
December 1, 2002 within which to revive the cases.
The period from April 1, 1999 to November 30,
1999 should be excluded in the computation of the
two-year period because the rule prescribing it was not
yet in effect at the time and the State could not be
expected to comply with the time-bar.Statutes
regulating the procedure of the courts will be
construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage. In
that sense and to that extent, procedural laws
are retroactive. However, this case is different,
because when the petitioners re-filed the Informations
on June 6, 2001,the original criminal cases had long
CrimPro
since been terminated (provisionally dismissed). The
two-year bar in the new rule should not be reckoned
from March 29, 1999, but from December 1, 2000
when the new rule took effect.
Finally, even assuming that the time-bar
should apply retroactively, Lacson still failed to comply
with the essential prerequisite of Sec 8, Rule 117. He
admitted that he did not give his express consent to
the provisional dismissal of the said cases. Thus, he in
fact admitted that one of the essential requisites of
Section 8, Rule 117 was absent.While it may be true
that the trial court may provisionally dismiss a criminal
case if it finds no probable cause, absent the express
consent of the accused to such provisional
dismissal, the latter cannot thereafter invoke
Section 8 to bar a revival thereof.
RULE 118 : PRE-TRIAL
OCA v. ESPANOL
FACTS: Judge Dolores L. Espanol was set for
compulsory retirement on January 9, 2004. Prior to
this, on the basis of the findings of the audit team, a
memo was sent to her directing her to decided all
cases submitted for decision, resolve all
motions/incidents submitted for resolution and to take
actions on the unacted cases as tabulated in the
memo. Judge submitted her compliance with the
memo. Judge Español in her compliance pointed out
that the directive requiring [her] to take appropriate
action in the cases was received by her two (2) days
before her compulsory retirement and due to human
limitations, all the listed cases for action could not be
completely done.
The OCA’s investigation showed that upon her
compulsory retirement on January 9, 2004, Judge
Español left a total of 69 cases that had not been acted
upon. Respondent judge gave several excuses for the
delay. Respondent denied the charges of gross
inefficiency leveled against her.
ISSUE: W/N respondent judge has committed gross
inefficiency
HELD: The 1987 Constitution mandates trial judges to
dispose of the court’s business promptly and to decide
cases and matters within three (3) months from the
filing of the last pleading, brief or memorandum. In
the disposition of cases, members of the bench have
always been exhorted to observe strict adherence to
the foregoing rule to prevent delay, a major culprit in
the erosion of public faith and confidence in our justice
system.
A clear failure to comply with the reglementary
period is regarded as inexcusable gross inefficiency.
To solve these problems (in delay), this Court
has, in several instances, advised judges to follow
certain guidelines to facilitate speedy case disposition.
Among these measures is the discouragement of
continuances, except for exceptional reasons. To
230
 emedial Law Review
Digests
enforce due diligence in the dispatch of judicial
business without arbitrarily or unreasonably forcing
cases to trial when counsels are unprepared, judges
should endeavor to hold them to a proper appreciation
of their duties to the public, as well as to their own
clients and to the adverse party.
In criminal cases, pretrial is mandatory
because, at the outset, litigation is abbreviated
by the identification of contentious issues. In civil
cases, judges are also required to take advantage of
the pretrial conference to arrive at settlements and
compromises between the parties, to ask the latter to
explore the possibility of submitting their cases to any
of the alternative modes of dispute resolution, and at
least to reduce and limit the issues for trial. Judges
are further directed to implement and observe strictly
the provisions of Section 2 of Rule 119, providing for a
continuous day-to-day trial as far as practicable until
termination.
They should be rational and realistic in
calendaring cases. Only a sufficient number should be
calendared in order to permit them to hear all the
cases scheduled. Hence, unless the docket of the court
requires otherwise, not more than four cases daily
should be scheduled for trial. A continuous and
physical inventory of cases on a monthly basis is also
recommended, so that they would be aware of the
status of each case.
With the assistance of the clerk of court, a
checklist should be prepared, indicating the steps to be
taken to keep cases moving. While decision-writing is a
matter of personal style, judges are well-advised to
prepare concise but complete as well as correct and
clear decisions, orders or resolutions. With a table or
calendar indicating the cases submitted for decision,
they should note the exact day, month and year when
the 90-day period is to expire.
At times, circumstances beyond their control
result in the accumulation of ripe cases to a daunting
number, making it humanly impossible for them to
comply with the constitutionally mandated 90-day
period. In such instances, all that they should do
is write a request for extension from the
Supreme Court, stating therein their reasons for
the delay. Such administrative requirement finds
basis in the 1987 Constitution.
As we have stated in Maquiran v. Lopez, a
heavy case load may excuse the failure of judges to
decide cases within the reglementary period, but not
their failure to request an extension of time within
which to decide them on time.
***
FOR MICKEY INGLES: We close this Decision with a
final exhortation. The magistracy is a very exacting
and demanding vocation. Judges are expected to
embody “four character traits: integrity,
independence, intelligence and industry.” Moreover, in
the performance of their tasks, they must exhibit “four
work habits; namely, excellence, ethics, effectiveness
and expeditiousness.” Only those who patiently
CrimPro
cultivate these four character traits and four work
habits can succeed in journeying through the straight
and narrow judicial path.
PEOPLE V. SUNGA
FACTS: Jocelyn Tan, a 15 year old girl was raped then
killed by smashing a stone on her head. An information
was filed in the RTC of Puerto Princesa City charging
Sunga, among others for the crime of rape with
homicide. The prosecution relied on 2 supposed
extrajudicial confessions made by Sunga.
Exhibit A was a sworn statement bearing
Sunga’s signature and that of his assisting counsel,
Atty. Agustin Rocamora (Atty. Rocamora), Puerto
Princesa City Legal Officer, stating that he knew details
about Jocelyn’s death. This was executed after being
informed of his rights under custodial investigation. He
chose Atty. Rocamora. Atty. Rocamora briefly
conferred with Sunga, asking him if he wanted to give
a confession and informing him of the consequences
thereof. Thereafter, the investigation proceeded with
Sunga voluntarily giving his answers to questions
before the police precinct.
Exhibit I was executed before the Special
Investigator of the Puerto Princesa office of the NBI.
This statement embodied a waiver by Sunga of his
right to counsel.
Sunga claims that he was subjected to violence
and intimidation in executing “Exhibit A”. He then
retracted his statements in “Exhibit I”.
ISSUE: Were the extrajudicial admissions valid? – NO.
HELD: A person under investigation for the
commission of an offense is guaranteed the following
rights by the Constitution: (1) the right to remain
silent; (2) the right to have competent and
independent counsel of his own choice, and to be
provided with one if he cannot afford the services of
counsel; and (3) the right to be informed of these
rights.
With regard to his admission under “exhibit A”,
such was invalid because Atty. Rocamora was the City
Legal Officer of Puerto Princesa. Independent counsel
for the accused in custodial investigations cannot be a
special counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of
the police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is
admittedly adverse to the accused. A legal officer of
the city, like Atty. Rocamora, provides legal aid and
support to the mayor and the city in carrying out the
delivery of basic services to the people, which includes
maintenance of peace and order and, as such, his
office is akin to that of a prosecutor who
unquestionably cannot represent the accused during
custodial investigation due to conflict of interest.
Furthermore, Atty. Rocamora did not, if at all,
fully apprise Sunga of his rights and options prior to
giving his (Sunga’s) admission. Evidently, Atty.
231
 emedial Law Review
Digests
Rocamora merely acted to facilitate the taking of the
admission from Sunga.
Exhibit I is also inadmissible due to the
absence of counsel to assist him when he executed it
before the NBI of Puerto Princesa City. As to the
waiver of the right to counsel in the exhibit, such was
not a valid waiver for, on its face, it was executed not
in the presence of counsel, contrary to the express
requirement of the Constitution.
The testimony of Sunga during the preliminary
investigation before the Municipal Trial Court whereby
he expressly acknowledged having executed Exhibit
"A" and affirmed the contents thereof did not render
his extrajudicial admission into a judicial one which
could be used against him and his co-appellants.
Neither could his other statements in such proceeding
admitting his participation in the crime be utilized to
establish his and the other appellants’ guilt. For in that
preliminary investigation, Sunga again was effectively
denied of his essential right to counsel. Atty. Rocamora
was appointed Sunga’s counsel de officio but just like
the assistance he extended during the execution of
Exhibit "A," Atty. Rocamora utterly did nothing in
defense of Sunga’s cause. While Sunga was being
asked by the judge a barrage of questions calling for
answers which could and did incriminate him, Atty.
Rocamora did not offer the slightest objection to shield
his client from the damning nature thereof.
IMPORTANT: The right to counsel applies in certain
pretrial proceedings that can be deemed "critical
stages" in the criminal process. The preliminary
investigation can be no different from the in-custody
interrogations by the police, for a suspect who takes
part in a preliminary investigation will be subjected to
no less than the State’s processes, oftentimes
intimidating and relentless, of pursuing those who
might be liable for criminal prosecution.
RULE 119 : TRIAL
PEOPLE vs. JUDGE HERNANDEZ (Pasig RTC),
ATTY. SALAYON and ATTY. LLORENTE (2006)
FACTS: This is a case about the right to speedy trial.
Bear with me for I need to include the dates in the
facts. To help you out, I underlined the important
dates to remember. Here we go…
Based on a complaint filed by senatorial
candidate Aquilino Pimentel Jr. (for the 1995
elections), 321 informations were filed against Salayon
and Llorente (Chairman and Vice-Chairman of Pasig
City Board of Canvassers) for violating the Electoral
Reforms Law. They allegedly did some “dag-dag
bawas” to decrease the votes in favor of Pimentel.
Eventually, all these cases were consolidated, upon the
motion of the accused, before Judge Hernandez (RTC
Pasig).
Senior State Prosecutor Bagabuyo filed an
Omnibus Motion to hold in abeyance all orders of the
court prior to his appearance as counsel, including the
CrimPro
order to consolidate the cases. Judge Hernandez
issued an order holding that there should only be 1
information filed, and setting arraignment and pre-
trial. The People filed an MR which was denied.
Arraignment was then set for June 15, 2001.
During the arraignment Senior State
Prosecutor Bagabuyo was absent but it still proceeded
in the presence of the public prosecutor assigned in
the trial court. The accused pleaded not guilty. Judge
Hernandez issued an order setting the pre-trial for
June 29, 2001. Before the schedule pre-trial, the
People filed a Motion to Postpone and MR on the
ground of lack of notice to the prosecution. So the trial
court reset the hearing to July 6, 2001. When the said
date came, Senior State Prosecutor Bagabuyo did not
appear for he was indisposed. Hearing was reset to
July 26, 2001. But again, Bagabuyo was absent.
Hearing was cancelled and again reset to August 2,
2001. The trial court included in its order a warning
that if Bagabuyo fails to appear at the next scheduled
hearing, the Legal Dept of the COMELEC shall make its
appearance and take over the prosecution of the case.
Eventually, the trial court denied the Motion to
Postpone, as well as the MR. Nevertheless, the pre-
trial and trial were AGAIN cancelled and reset to
September 4, 2001 because of the prosecution’s
manifestation that it was appealing the trial court’s
order to a higher court. The trial court again warned
the prosecution that in the event that they do not get
any restraining order to stop the proceedings before it,
the hearing shall proceed as scheduled (take note of
this, we’ll go back to this in the ratio).
True enough, Bagabuyo filed a petition for
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, injunction w/ a
prayer for a TRO with the CA. Petition was dismissed
because it was filed without the participation of the
OSG. He then filed a Motion for Extension of Time to
File Petition for Review on Certiorari with the SC which
was granted. But when the Petition for Review was
filed, the SC denied the same for being filed out of
time (it was filed beyond the period of extension
given).
Meanwhile, the September 4, 2001 hearing did
not proceed because again, Bagabuyo was absent.
Apparently, he had his tooth extracted. But one of the
lawyers involved in the case actually saw Bagabuyo at
the Office of the Clerk in the 1st floor of the same
building where the court was.
Finally, the accused moved for the dismissal on
the ground of denial of their right to speedy trial. The
trial court gave the prosecution another chance,
denying the motion and setting the next hearings on
October 3 & 15, 2001, with a warning that failure to
proceed will be dealt with accordingly. Of course, when
October 3 came, the prosecution refused to proceed
because of its pending petition with the CA (case didn’t
say what petition this was exactly). So, the accused
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of violation of
right to speedy trial On October 4. This time, the trial
court granted. CA affirmed.
232
 emedial Law Review
Digests
SO IN SHORT, BAGABUYO WAS ALWAYS
ABSENT DURING THE HEARINGS.
ISSUE: W/N the right of the accused to speedy trial
was violated? YES!
HELD/RATIO:
Time limit within which trial must commence after
arraignment – see Sec. 6 Rule 119, ROC
“The time limit with respect to the period from
arraignment to trial shall be… 80 days.” SC ruled that
111 days have elapsed from the time the accused were
arraigned on June 15, 2001 up to the filing of their
Motion to Dismiss on October 4, 2001.
When is the right violated?
The right is violated only when the proceeding
is attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive
delays. SC held here that the cancellation of hearings
by the prosecution w/o any valid ground is certainly
vexatious, capricious and oppressive. A dismissal by
the court based on this ground is not tantamount to
GADLEJ.
People invokes the exclusions provided in Sec. 3 (a)(3)
and (f), Rule 119
Sec. 3 of Rule 119 provides for delays which
shall be excluded in computing the time w/in which
trial must commence. The People particularly invokes
the following provisions: Sec. 3 (a)(3) – delay resulting
from extraordinary remedies against interlocutory
orders; and Sec. 3 (f) – delay resulting from a
continuance if the court granted it upon finding that
the ends of justice served outweighs the best interest
of the public and the accused in a speedy trial.
SC held that delay resulting from extraordinary
remedies against interlocutory orders must be read in
harmony with Sec. 7 Rule 65 which states that the
“petition under Rule 65 shall not interrupt the course
of the principal case unless a TRO or a writ of
preliminary injunction has been issued against public
respondent from further proceeding in the case.” Judge
Hernandez clearly spelled this out in one of his orders
when he warned that if the prosecution fails to get a
TRO, the hearing on September 4 shall proceed as
scheduled.
As for Sec. 3(f), the SC ruled that nowhere in
the his orders did Judge Hernandez make a ruling that
the ends of justice that will be served outweighs the
best interest of the public and the accused in a speedy
trial. To the contrary, the trial court was compelled to
grant the continuances because of the prosecutions
repeated absence.
Purpose of right of accused to speedy trial
The right to speedy trial and to speedy
disposition of cases are designed to prevent the
oppression of the accused by holding criminal
prosecution suspended for an indefinite time, and to
prevent delays in the administration of justice. It
assures that an innocent person may be freed from the
CrimPro
anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if
otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the
shortest possible time compatible with the
presentation and consideration of his defenses.
Balancing Test
In determining whether there was been a
violation of the right, balancing the societal interests
and the rights of the accused is needed. This compels
the court to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc
basis.
4 factors considered in determining existence of
violation of right to speedy trial
(1) Length of delay; (2) reason for delay; (3)
defendant’s assertion of his right; and (4)
prejudice to the defendant.
Laws related to right to speedy trial
Sections 14 (2) and 16 of Article III 1987 Constitution;
RA 8493 “Speedy Trial Act of 1998”; SC Circular No,.
38-98, Rule Implementing RA 8493 (this was adopted
in 2000 Revised ROC).
Remedy for dismissal based on violation of right to
speedy trial is Certiorari Rule 65, not an appeal
Since a dismissal based on violation of right to
speedy trial is tantamount to an acquittal, an appeal is
not the proper remedy. If an appeal was filed, it would
be violative of the right of the accused against double
jeopardy (see Sec. 1 Rule 122). The order granting
dismissal can be challenged through certiorari 65 if the
judge committed GADLEJ.
DAYAP v SENDIONG
FACTS: Dayap was charged with reckless imprudence
resulting to homicide, less serious physical injuries and
damage to property. It was alleged that Dayap was the
driver of a cargo truck which figured in an accident
with a Colt Galant driven by Lou Gene Sendiong
causing instant death to the latter and less serious
physical injuries to the latter’s passenger. The MTC
granted Dayap Demurrer to Evidence saying that
prosecution failed to establish that Dayap was really
the one driving the cargo truck. The MTC further stated
that prosecution also wasn’t able to prove the death
and injuries of the victim as there were not death
certificate and medical certificates submitted as
evidence. The MTC gave credence to the evidence of
the Dayap, showing that it was the victim’s car which
swerved into the cargo truck’s lane thereby being the
proximate cause of the accident. The MTC relied on the
accident sketch contained in the police blotter to
support this conclusion.
Aggrieved, Sendiong filed a petition for
certiorari under 65 with the RTC. The RTC affirmed the
acquittal of Dayap but ordered the case remanded to
the MTC for the hearing of the civil aspect.
233
 emedial Law Review
Digests
Sendiong filed a petition for review (42) with
the CA. the CA concluded that it was the RTC which
had jurisdiction and not the MTC. The CA explained
that according to Cuyos v Garcia, jurisdiction over
damage to property cases should be determined by the
imposable fine and not the penalty for the physical
injuries and following BP 129, MTC only has jurisdiction
over those felonies with imposable fine not exceeding
10,000. Since in this case, no proof of total damage
was given and Sendiong claims 1.5M in civil damages,
the same should have been brought before the RTC.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not a grant of a demurrer is
reviewable – ONLY UNDER 65
2. Whether or not remand to the MTC of the case
for the determination of civil liability was
proper – NO
HELD: A grant of a demurrer to evidence is
tantamount to an acquittal and cannot be reviewed on
appeal otherwise, the constitutional guarantee against
double jeopardy is offended. A demurrer must be filed
after the prosecution rests its case. It entails and
appreciation of the evidence of the prosecution and
when the same if found insufficient to support a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt, the demurrer is
proper. Once granted, the court must enter a partial
judgment of conviction but must continue with the trial
for the reception of the defense’ evidence on the civil
aspect. This is because at the moment the demurrer is
granted, only prosecution’s evidence (both as to the
criminal and civil aspect) is on record. However, the
grant of a demurrer may still be reviewed by the
courts but only on grounds of GADLEJ under rule 65.
In this case, there being not finding of GADLEJ on the
part of the MTC, the demurrer stands.
The acquittal of an accused does not carry with
it the extinction of civil liability when (1) acquittal was
based on reasonable doubt (2) court determines that
there is only a civil liability (3) the civil liability of the
accused does not arise or is not based on the crime for
which he was acquitted. On the other hand, acquittal
of an accused carries the extinction of civil liability
when (1) there is a finding on the final judgment in the
criminal action that the act or omission from which the
civil liability may arise did not exist or (2) the accused
did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him. In
this case, the acquittal by the MTC was based on
findings that the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist and that petitioner did
not commit the acts or omission imputed to him;
hence, petitioner’s civil liability has been extinguished
by his acquittal. Thus, because there was no civil
liability to hear, the case should not have been
remanded to the MTC.
SALAZAR V. PEOPLE
FACTS: Anamer Salazar purchased 300 cavans of rice
CrimPro
from J.Y. Brothers Marketing. As payment for these,
she indorsed a check drawn by one Nena Timario,
which J.Y. Bros. accepted. Upon presentment, the
check was dishonored as it was drawn under a closed
account. After she was informed of such dishonor,
Salazar replaced the check with a second one. This,
however, was returned with the word “DAUD” (Drawn
against uncollected deposit). Salazar and Timario were
charged with estafa.
Salazar filed a Demurrer to Evidence with leave
of court. RTC rendered a judgment acquitting Salazar
of the crime (crim aspect) but ordering her to remit to
J.Y. Bros. the payment of her purchase (civ aspect).
Salazar claims that after her demurrer was granted,
she was denied due process as she was not given the
opportunity to adduce evidence to prove that she was
not civilly liable to J.Y. Bros. She thus filed an MR on
the civil aspect of the decision, with a plea that she be
allowed to present evidence, pursuant to Rule 33 of
the Rules of Court. The court denied the MR.
ISSUES: Does the acquittal of the accused in the
criminal offense prevent a judgment against her on the
civil aspect of the case? – No. Was the denial of the MR
proper? – No.
HELD: Case is set aside and nullified. SC ordered that
the case be continued for trial for Salazar to adduce
evidence on the civil aspect; also for J.Y. Bros. by way
of rebuttal, as provided for in Sec.11, Rule 119.
Ratio:
Criminal and civil case instituted. According to Section
1 (a), Rule 111, when a criminal action is instituted,
the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted
with the criminal action, unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action. The reservation of the right to institute
separately the civil action shall be made before the
prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under
circumstances affording the offended party a
reasonable opportunity to make such reservation. In
this case, Salazar was charged with estafa. The civil
action arising from the delict was impliedly instituted
since there was no waiver of the civil liability or a
reservation of the civil action by J.Y. Bros. Neither did
it file a civil action before the institution of the criminal
action.
Acquittal in criminal case does not prevent civil
case. The Rules provide that the extension of the penal
action does not carry with it the extension of the civil
action. The acquittal of the accused in a criminal case
does not prevent a judgment against a person on the
civil aspect of the case where a) the acquittal is based
on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of
evidence is required; b) where the court declared that
the liability of the accused is only civil; c) where the
civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is
234
 emedial Law Review
Digests
not based upon the crime of which the accused was
acquitted.
In addition, the civil action based on the delict
is extinguished if there is a finding in the final
judgment in the criminal action that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not
exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or
omission imputed to him.
If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt
but the court renders judgment on the civil aspect of
the criminal case, the prosecution cannot appeal from
the judgment of acquittal as it would place the accused
in double jeopardy. However, the aggrieved party or
the accused or both may appeal from the judgment on
the civil aspect of the case within the period therefor.
After the prosecution has rested its case, the accused
has the option either to (a) file a demurrer to evidence
with or without leave of court under Section 23, Rule
119, or to (b) adduce his evidence unless he waives
the same.
After an acquittal or grant of the demurrer, the
trial should have proceeded with the presentation of
evidence on the civil aspect of the case. This is so
because when the accused files a demurrer to
evidence, the accused has not yet adduced evidence
both on the criminal and civil aspect of the case. The
only evidence on record is the evidence for the
prosecution.
In this case, Salazar was granted leave of
court to file a demurrer to evidence. The court issued
an order granting the demurrer on its finding that her
liability was not criminal but only civil. However, even
before she could adduce evidence on the civil aspect of
the case, the court rendered judgment and ordered her
to pay for her purchases from J.Y. Bros. Patently,
therefore, she was denied her right to due process.
Case must be continued for trial.
MANGUERRA vs. RISOS, YONGCO, ABARQUEZ and
BONJE
FACTS: On Nov. 4, 1999, respondents (Risos, Yongco,
Abarquez and Bonje) were charged with Estafa through
Falsification of Public Documents before the RTC of
Cebu. It was alleged that the respondents made it
appear that Manguerra, owner of the Gorordo
Property, affixed her signature in a deed of real estate
mortgage over said property. However, prior to this
(Sept 1999), Manguerra, a resident of Cebu, was
unexpectedly confined in Makati Med. while on
vacation in Manila. She was required to stay in Manila
for further treatment. On Nov. 24, 1999, respondents
filed a Motion for Suspension of the Proceedings in the
Criminal Case on the ground of prejudicial question.
They argued that the civil case filed against them for
declaration of nullity of the mortgage should first be
resolved. The RTC judge granted the motion,
afterwhich Manguerra filed a MR which was later on
denied. On Aug. 16, 2000, Manguerra’s counsel filed a
motion to take the former’s deposition, since her weak
CrimPro
physical condition and old age limited her freedom of
mobility. The RTC granted the motion and directed that
Manguerra’s deposition be taken before the clerk of
court of Makati. The respondents filed a MR, but was
denied by the RTC. Aggrieved, the respondents filed a
SCA for certiorari before the CA, assailing the 2 RTC
decisions granting the (1) motion for deposition as well
as the (2) denial of their MR. The CA resolved the
petition in favor of the respondents by setting aside
the RTC decisions. It declared that the examination of
prosecution witnesses, as in the present case, is
governed by Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure and not Rule 23 of the Rules of
Court, which applies to depositions in civil cases.
Pursuant to the specific provision of Section 15, Rule
119, Manguerra’s deposition should have been taken
before the judge or the court where the case is
pending, which is the RTC of Cebu, and not before the
Clerk of Court of Makati City; and thus, in issuing the
assailed order, the RTC clearly committed grave abuse
of discretion.
ISSUE: W/N the Rule 23 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure applies to the deposition of petitioner
Manguerra?
HELD/RATIO: NO. Rule 119 of Criminal Procedure
is applicable.
It is basic that all witnesses shall give their
testimonies at the trial of the case in the presence of
the judge. This is especially true in criminal cases in
order that the accused may be afforded the
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses pursuant
to his constitutional right to confront the witnesses
face to face. It also gives the parties and their counsel
the chance to propound such questions as they deem
material and necessary to support their position or to
test the credibility of said witnesses. Lastly, this rule
enables the judge to observe the witnesses’ demeanor.
This rule, however, is not absolute. As exceptions,
Rules 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court provide for the
different modes of discovery that may be resorted to
by a party to an action. These rules are adopted either
to perpetuate the testimonies of witnesses or as
modes of discovery. In criminal proceedings, Sections
12, 13 and 15, Rule 119 of Criminal Procedure, which
took effect on December 1, 2000, allow the conditional
examination of both the defense and prosecution
witnesses. Manguerra contends that her advanced age
and health condition exempt her from the application
of Section 1510, Rule 119 of the Rules of Criminal
10
Section 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. –
When it satisfactorily appears that a witness for the
prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as
directed by the court, or has to leave the Philippines with no
definite date of returning, he may forthwith be conditionally
examined before the court where the case is pending. Such
examination, in the presence of the accused, or in his
absence after reasonable notice to attend the examination
has been served on him, shall be conducted in the same
manner as an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of
235
 emedial Law Review
Digests
Procedure, and thus, calls for the application of Rule
23 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. However, the SC
finds such contention bereft of merit. Rule 119
specifically states that a witness may be
conditionally examined: 1) if the witness is too
sick or infirm to appear at the trial; or 2) if the
witness has to leave the Philippines with no
definite date of returning. Thus, when Manguerra
moved that her deposition be taken, had she not been
too sick at that time, her motion would have been
denied. Instead of conditionally examining her outside
the trial court, she would have been compelled to
appear before the court for examination during the
trial proper. Undoubtedly, the procedure set forth
in Rule 119 applies to the case at bar. It is thus
required that the conditional examination be
made before the court where the case is pending.
It is also necessary that the accused be notified, so
that he can attend the examination, subject to his right
to waive the same after reasonable notice. As to the
manner of examination, the Rules mandate that it be
conducted in the same manner as an examination
during trial, that is, through question and answer.
Rule 119 categorically states that the
conditional examination of a prosecution witness shall
be made before the court where the case is pending.
Contrary to Manguerra’s contention, there is nothing in
the rule which may remotely be interpreted to mean
that such requirement applies only to cases where the
witness is within the jurisdiction of said court and not
when he is kilometers away, as in the present case.
Therefore, the court may not introduce exceptions or
conditions. Neither may it engraft into the law (or the
Rules) qualifications not contemplated. When the
words are clear and categorical, there is no room for
interpretation. There is only room for application. It is
true that Section 3, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court
provides that the rules of civil procedure apply to all
actions, civil or criminal, and special proceedings. In
effect, it says that the rules of civil procedure have
suppletory application to criminal cases. However, it
is likewise true that the criminal proceedings are
primarily governed by the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Considering that Rule 119
adequately and squarely covers the situation in
the instant case, SC finds no cogent reason to
apply Rule 23 suppletorily or otherwise.
To reiterate, the conditional examination of a
prosecution witness for the purpose of taking his
deposition should be made before the court, or at least
before the judge, where the case is pending. Such is
the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of the
Rules. As correctly held by the CA, if the deposition is
made elsewhere, the accused may not be able to
attend, as when he is under detention. More
importantly, this requirement ensures that the judge
would be able to observe the witness’ deportment to
the accused to attend the examination after notice shall be
considered a waiver. The statement taken may be admitted in
behalf of or against the accused.
CrimPro
enable him to properly assess his credibility. This is
especially true when the witness’ testimony is crucial
to the prosecution’s case.
SALVANERA v. PEOPLE (and Lucita Parane, wife
of victim)
FACTS: Rimberto Salvanera, together with Feliciano
Abutin, Domingo Tampelix , and Edgardo Lungcay (still
at large) is charged with the murder of Ruben Parane.
Salvanera was the alleged mastermind; Lungcay, the
hired hitman; Abutin, the driver of the motorcycle
which carried Lungcay to the place of the commission
of the crime; while Tampelix delivered the blood
money to Lungcay.
Salvanera applied for bail. This was granted.
The prosecution, moved for the discharge of accused
Feliciano Abutin and Domingo Tampelix, to serve as
state witnesses. This was denied.
The prosecution appealed to the CA, alleging
that the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion when it denied the motion to discharge
accused Abutin and Tampelix to be state witnesses and
granting Salvanera’s application for bail considering
the prosecution had not yet rested its case in the
hearing for the discharge of the two accused.
Prosecution alleged that the testimonies of the two
accused are absolutely necessary to establish that
Salvanera masterminded the murder.
CA sustained the prosecution. It discharged
Abutin and Tampelix to become state witnesses, and
cancelled the bail bond of Salvanera.
ISSUE:
1. WON CA erred in discharging the 2 accused to
be state witnesses –NO
2. WON CA erred in cancelling the bail bond of
Salvanera—NO
RATIO: In the discharge of an accused in order that
he may be a state witness, the following conditions
must be met:
(1) Two or more accused are jointly charged with the
commission of an offense;
(2) The motion for discharge is filed by the prosecution
before it rests its case;
(3) The prosecution is required to present evidence
and the sworn statement of each proposed state
witness at a hearing in support of the discharge;
(4) The accused gives his consent to be a state
witness; and
(5) The trial court is satisfied that:
a) There is absolute necessity for the
testimony of the accused whose discharge is
requested;
b) There is no other direct evidence available
for the proper prosecution of the offense
committed, except the testimony of said
accused;
236
 emedial Law Review
Digests
c) The testimony of said accused can be
substantially corroborated in its material points;
d) Said accused does not appear to be the
most guilty; and,
e) Said accused has not at any time been
convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
According to Salvanera, the testimony of an
accused sought to be discharged to become a state
witness must be substantially corroborated, not by a
co-accused likewise sought to be discharged, but by
other prosecution witnesses who are not the accused
in the same criminal case. He contends that it is a
notorious fact in human nature that a culprit,
confessing a crime, is likely to put the blame on
others, if by doing so, he will be freed from any
criminal responsibility. Thus, Salvanera supposes that
Abutin and Tampelix will naturally seize the
opportunity to be absolved of any liability by putting
the blame on one of their co-accused. He argues that
the curent prosecution witnesses Parane and Salazar,
who are not accused, do not have personal knowledge
of the circumstances surrounding the alleged
conspiracy. Thus, they could not testify to corroborate
the statement of Abutin and Tampelix that petitioner is
the mastermind or the principal by induction.
This reasoning is wrong. To require the two
prosecution witnesses Parane and Salazar to
corroborate the testimony of Abutin and Tampelix on
the exact same points is to render nugatory the other
requisite that "there must be no other direct evidence
available for the proper prosecution of the offense
committed, except the testimony of the state
witness." The corroborative evidence required by the
Rules does not have to consist of the very same
evidence as will be testified on by the proposed state
witnesses.
A conspiracy is more readily proved by the acts
of a fellow criminal than by any other method. As part
of the conspiracy, Abutin and Tampelix can testify on
the criminal plan of the conspirators. Where a crime is
contrived in secret, the discharge of one of the
conspirators is essential because only they have
knowledge of the crime. It is enough that the
testimony of a co-conspirator is corroborated by some
other witness or evidence. In the case at bar, we are
satisfied from a reading of the records that the
testimonies of Abutin and Tampelix are corroborated
on important points by each other’s testimonies and
the circumstances disclosed through the testimonies of
the other prosecution witnesses, and "to such extent
that their trustworthiness becomes manifest."
In Mapa v. Sandiganbayan, we held:
The decision to grant immunity from prosecution forms
a constituent part of the prosecution process. It is
essentially a tactical decision to forego prosecution of a
person for government to achieve a higher objective.
Its justification lies in the particular need of the State
to obtain the conviction of the more guilty criminals
who, otherwise, will probably elude the long arm of the
law. Whether or not the power should be exercised,
CrimPro
who should be extended the privilege, the timing of its
grant, are questions addressed solely to the sound
judgment of the prosecution. The power to prosecute
includes the right to determine who shall be
prosecuted and the corollary right to decide whom not
to prosecute.
In reviewing the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion in these areas, the jurisdiction of the
respondent court is limited. For the business of a court
of justice is to be an impartial tribunal, and not to get
involved with the success or failure of the prosecution
to prosecute. Every now and then, the prosecution
may err in the selection of its strategies, but such
errors are not for neutral courts to rectify, any more
than courts should correct the blunders of the defense.
CA was also correct in cancelling the bail bond of
Salvanera. The grant of his application for bail is
premature. It has to await the testimony of state
witnesses Abutin and Tampelix in considering whether
he is entitled to bail.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. PABLO
L. ESTACIO, JR. and MARITESS ANG, Appellants.
FACTS: At first, appellant Maritess Ang was charged
with kidnapping for ransom in the QC RTC. In the
Information, it was alleged that she conspired with 2
unknown persons to kidnap a businessman, Charlie
Chua from Casa Leonisa Bar in QC, and later on
demanded ransom money (P15 million).
Later on, the Information was amended to
implead the other appellant in this case, Estacio. The
information was also changed the crime charged from
kidnapping for ransom to kidnapping with murder. It
was further alleged that the victim was brought to
Bulacan and that he was killed by stabbing using a fan
knife.
Later on, the Information was further amended
to additionally implead one Hildo Sumipo, who was
later discharged as a state witness.
Prosecution, upon its presentation of evidence,
presented that the crime happened on the evening of
Oct 10, when Ang arrived with Estacio and Sumipo at
the Casa Leonisa where they met Chua. Past midnight,
the 4 boarded Chua’s car, with the victim driving. Then
later, Estacio pulled out a gun and pulled Chua to the
backseat, tied his hands and taped his mouth. Sumipo
took the wheel.
Although Sumipo tried to dissuade Ang and
Estacio, they decided that they would kill Chua so that
he would not take revenge. They brought him to a
grassy place and left him there. On their way home,
Ang told Estacio, “Honey, sana hindi muna natin
pinatay si Charlie (Chua) para makahingi tayo nang
pera sa magulang niya.”
The next day, Estacio called up Chua’s mother
and demanded the P15M ransom. Mother said they
couldn’t afford that. It was lowered to 10M then to 5M.
Partial ransom money was to be left at Pizza Hut
Greenhills but when Estacio and Sumipo saw patrol
237
 emedial Law Review
Digests
cars in the area they left. Sumipo soon learned that
Ang and Estacio sold Chua’s gun, watch, and necklace
from the proceeds of which he was given P7,000.
Sumipo later on surrendered to the NBI.
Estacio surrendered to the police a few days after.
Police informed Chua’s mother that Estacio admitted to
killing Chua and offered to accompany them to the
crime scene. So the police, accompanied by the
victim’s mother and Estacio, went to the crime scene
and recovered the remains of the victim which was
identified by his mother.
Sumipo explained in an affidavit, which he
identified in open court, that Maritess got angry with
the victim after he lent money to her husband, one
Robert Ong, enabling him to leave the country without
her knowledge, while Estacio was jealous of the victim
with whom Maritess had a relationship.
Estacio explained in his affidavit that the
stabbing with the fan knife was accidental. On cross-
examination he said that during the quarrel in the car
there was confusion because there were talks of Chua
getting back at them so the stabbing happened.
RTC QC convicted Estacio and Ang of
“kidnapping on the occasion of which the
victim was killed” and sentenced them to
death. So this case is forwarded to the SC for
automatic review. But the SC referred the
matter for intermediate review to the CA. CA
affirmed, with modification on the amount of
damages awarded to victim’s family.
ISSUE: W/N the court erred in discharging Sumipo as
state witness and relying on his testimony for the
conviction of the Ang and Estacio.
HELD/RATIO: The conditions for the discharge of an
accused as a state witness are as follows:
(a) There is absolute necessity for the
testimony of the accused whose discharge is
requested;
(b) There is no other direct evidence available
for the proper prosecution of the offense
committed, except the testimony of said
accused;
(c) The testimony of said accused can be
substantially corroborated in its material
points;
(d) Said accused does not appear to be the
most guilty; and
(e) Said accused has not at any time been
convicted of any offense involving moral
turpitude.
These conditions were established by the
prosecution. Sumipo was the only person other than
appellants who had personal knowledge of the acts for
which they were being prosecuted. Only he could
positively identify appellants as the perpetrators of the
crime. He does not appear to be the most guilty. He
did not participate in planning the commission of the
crime. He in fact at first thought that Maritess was
joking when she said, "Diretsong dukot na rin kay
CrimPro
Charlie." He tried to dissuade appellants from pursuing
their plan. He did not participate in the actual
stabbing. And he tried to extricate himself from the
attempts to extract ransom from the victim’s family.
Sumipo’s testimony was corroborated on
material points. The victim’s mother testified regarding
the demands for ransom. Cesar Moscoso, an employee
of Casa Leonisa, testified to seeing the victim, Estacio,
and Maritess at the bar-restaurant on the day and at
the time in question. Henry Hong, the victim’s cousin
who arrived at Pizza Hut, Greenhills ahead of the
victim’s brother during the scheduled delivery of the
ransom, testified to seeing Estacio there with
companions. And the victim’s skeletal remains
were found at the scene of the crime upon Estacio’s
information and direction.
And there is no proof that Sumipo had, at any
time, been convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude.
Even assuming arguendo that the discharge of
Sumipo as a state witness was erroneous, such error
would not affect the competency and quality of his
testimony. His testimony can still be admitted against
Ang and Estacio.
On the issue of whether kidnapping with murder
was proven: NO
The SC finds the offense of which the
appellants were convicted was erroneously designated.
The crime charged was kidnapping with murder. In
such special complex crime, the elements of both
kidnapping and murder must be sufficiently proven. In
this case however, the kidnapping was not sufficiently
proven. It was found that appellants bound and
gagged Chua and transported him to Bulacan against
his will but there was no intention to detain or confine
him. They wasted no time in killing him, which was
their intention from the beginning. The ransom was a
mere after thought. The crime committed was plain
murder, qualified by treachery.
RULE 120 : JUDGMENT
MERENCILLO V. PEOPLE (2007)
FACTS: Merencillo was charged for violating Sec. 3(b)
of RA 3019 and for direct bribery under Art. 210 of the
RPC. Merencillo pleaded not guilty to both charges.
Facts established by prosecution:
Lucit Estillore went to the BIR Office in
Tagbilaran to register the sale of real property
to Ramasola Superstudio, Inc.
Fuentes entertained Estillore and computed
doc stamp tax (P37,500) and capital gains tax
(P125,000) due on the transaction. The
computation was approved by Merencillo
(accused) in his capacity as group supervisor.
Estillore paid the taxes and submitted the
application with the relevant documents to
Fuentes for processing. Fuentes prepared the
revenue audit reports and submitted them
238
 emedial Law Review
Digests
together with the application for the CAR to
Merencillo for preliminary approval. Fuentes
advised Estillore that the CAR would be
released after 7 days.
On the same day, Maria Cesar (private
complainant) received a call from Estillore who
told her that Merencillo wanted to see her
(Cesar) for some negotiation. Merencillo
demanded P20k in exchange for the approval
of the CAR.
The following day, Merencillo called up Cesar
following up his demand and that she could get
the CAR after 4 or 5 days.
Cesar returned to the BIR Office after 5 days.
When Merencillo saw her, he repeated his
demand for P20k although the CAR had been
signed by RDO Balagon the day before and
was ready for release. The releasing clerk was
still waiting for Merencillo’s go signal to release
the document.
Cesar complained to RDO Balagon.
Subsequently, Cesar received a call from
Merencillo informing her that she could get the
CAR but reminded her of his demand and his
willingness to accept a lesser amount.
Cesar reported the matter to PNP Bohol though
Senior Superintendent Baraguer.
Baraguer referred Cesar’s complaint to the
chief of police of Tagbiliran City who
coordinated w/ Cesar to entrap Merencillo.
Cesar prepared 2 bundles of bogus money
(P100 on each side of the 2 bundles to make it
appear that the 2 bundles amounted to P10k
each or a total of P20k). The serial numbers of
the 4 P100 were recorded.
On the appointed day of entrapment, Cesar
called Merencillo and pleaded for the release of
the CAR and a reduction of his demand.
Instead of discussing the matter on the phone,
Merencillo asked Cesar to see him in his Office.
Cesar went to his Office w/ 2 bundles of bogus
money inside an envelope.
Merencillo handed the CAR to Cesar. While
Cesar signed the acknowledgement for the
release of the CAR, Merencillo informed her
that he was going down to the 2nd floor (w/c
Cesar took as cue for her to follow).
Upon reaching the 3rd floor lobby, Cesar
handed the (thick) envelope. Before Cesar
could answer, a member of the PNP
entrapment team photographed Merencillo
holding the envelope. Merencillo panicked and
eventually threw the envelope (containing
bogus money) towards the window (but since
it hit the ceiling, it bounced and fell to the 1 st
floor of the BIR Building. The PNP Entrapment
team introduced themselves to Merencillo and
invited him to go to their headquarters.
Charges were filed against Merencillo.
During the trial, Merencillo’s evidence
consisted of mere general denial of the charges
CrimPro
against him. He claimed that he never asked
for money and that the demand for money
only in Cesar’s mind after she was told that
there was a misclassification of the asset and
additional taxes to be paid.
RTC found Merencillo guilty.
Merencillo appealed to the Sandiganbayan
(SB), which denied the appeal and affirmed the
RTC decision (but reducing the penalty).
Merencillo appealed to the SC on a petition for
review.
ISSUES: whether the SB is at fault for (1) refusing to
believe his evidence over the prosecutions and (2)
failure to recognize that he was placed in double
jeopardy
Merencillo faults the SB for affirming the RTC decision
and disregarding his evidence. He claims that, had the
RTC and the Sandiganbayan not ignored the
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution’s
witnesses, he would have been acquitted.
HELD: Petition denied.
(1) Trial Court’s Evaluation of Evidence Will Not Be
Disturbed
Both the RTC and the SB found the testimonies
of the Merencillo’s witnesses sufficient and credible
enough to sustain conviction. The calibration of
evidence and the relative weight thereof belongs to the
appellate court. Its findings and conclusions cannot be
set aside by the SC unless there is no evidence on
record to support them. In this case, the findings of
fact of the SB, affirming the factual findings of the
RTC, were amply supported by evidence and the
conclusions therein were not against the law and
jurisprudence. There is no reason to disturb the
congruent findings of the trial and appellate courts.
Contrary to petitioner’s contention, the RTC
and the SB considered the alleged inconsistencies in
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Both
courts, however, ruled that the inconsistencies referred
only to minor details that did not detract from the
truth of the prosecution’s testimonial evidence. We
agree.
Witnesses testifying on the same event do not
have to be consistent in each and every detail.
Differences in the recollection of the event are
inevitable and inconsequential variances are commonly
regarded as signs of truth instead of falsehood.
Inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses with respect to minor details and collateral
matters do not affect either the substance of their
declaration, their veracity or the weight of their
testimony. In fact, such minor flaws may even
enhance the worth of a testimony for they guard
against memorized falsities.
Minor discrepancies or inconsistencies do not
impair the essential integrity of the prosecution’s
evidence as a whole or reflect on the witnesses’
honesty. The test is whether the testimonies agree
239
 emedial Law Review
Digests
on essential facts and whether the respective
versions corroborate and substantially coincide
with each other so as to make a consistent and
coherent whole. Thus, inconsistencies and
discrepancies in details which are irrelevant to the
elements of the crime cannot be successfully invoked
as grounds for acquittal.
The RTC and the SB correctly ruled that the
inconsistencies pointed out by petitioner were neither
material nor relevant to the elements of the offenses
for which he was charged. For instance, whether or not
it was petitioner himself who handed the CAR to
private respondent was immaterial. The fact was that
petitioner demanded and received money in
consideration for the issuance of the CAR.
(2) Petitioner Was Not Placed In Double Jeopardy
No double jeopardy. The rule against double
jeopardy prohibits twice placing a person in jeopardy
of punishment for the same offense. The test is
whether one offense is identical with the other or
is an attempt to commit it or a frustration
thereof; or whether one offense necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the other,
as provided in Section 7 of Rule 117 of the Rules
of Court.
A comparison of the elements of the crime of
direct bribery defined and punished under Article 210
of the Revised Penal Code and those of violation of
Section 3(b) of RA 3019 shows that there is neither
identity nor necessary inclusion between the two
offense. The violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019 is
neither identical nor necessarily inclusive of direct
bribery. While they have common elements, not all the
essential elements of one offense are included among
or form part of those enumerated in the other.
Although the two charges against petitioner
stemmed from the same transaction, the same act
gave rise to two separate and distinct offenses. No
double jeopardy attached since there was a variance
between the elements of the offenses charged.
CONSULTA v. PEOPLE
FACTS: Appellant Pedro Consulta was charged and
convicted with Robbery with Intimidation of Persons. It
was alleged in the Information that Consulta stole
private complainant Nelia Silvestre's 18k gold
necklace. It was alleged that At about 2:00 o’clock in
the afternoon of June 7, 1999, Nelia, together with
Maria Viovicente and Veronica Amar, boarded a tricycle
on their way to Pembo, Makati City. Upon reaching
Ambel Street, appellant and his brother Edwin
Consulta (Edwin) blocked the tricycle and under their
threats, the driver alighted and left. Appellant and
Edwin at once shouted invectives at Nelia, saying
“Putang ina mong matanda ka, walanghiya ka, kapal
ng mukha mo, papatayin ka namin.” Appellant added
“Putang ina kang matanda ka, wala kang kadala dala,
CrimPro
sinabihan na kita na kahit saan kita matiempuhan,
papatayin kita.”
Appellant thereafter grabbed Nelia’s 18K gold
necklace with a crucifix pendant which, according to an
“alajera” in the province, was of 18k gold, and which
was worth P3,500, kicked the tricycle and left saying
“Putang ina kang matanda ka! Kayo mga nurses lang,
anong ipinagmamalaki niyo, mga nurses lang kayo.
Kami, marami kaming mga abogado. Hindi niyo kami
maipapakulong kahit kailan!”
Consulta denied the charges and claimed that
Nelia fabricated the charges to spite him and his family
(he claimed that Nelia was harrassing him and his
family). The trial court, however, convcited him of
Robbery, holding that intent to gain on appellant’s part
“is presumed from the unlawful taking” of the
necklace, and brushing aside appellant’s denial and
defense. The CA affirmed with modification on the
penalty.
ISSUE: Whether Consulta has committed the crime for
which he was charged and whether the prosecution
was able to prove the guilt of the appellant beyond
reasonable doubt - NO. But he is still liable for
Grave Coercion (an offense necessarily included
in the offense charged).
HELD: (Consulta was charged with Robbery with
Intimidation of Persons but was convicted of Robbery
only.)
The elements of robbery are: 1) there is a
taking of personal property; 2) the personal property
belongs to another; 3) the taking is with animus
lucrand (intent to gain); and 4) the taking is with
violence against or intimidation of persons or with
force upon things.
The Court held that under the circumstances
surrounding the incidental encounter of the parties, the
taking of Nelia’s necklace does not indicate presence of
intent to gain on appellant’s part.That intent to gain on
appellant’s part is difficult to appreciate gains light
given his undenied claim that his relationship with
Nelia is rife with ill-feelings, manifested by, among
other things, the filing of complaints against him by
Nelia and her family which were subsequently
dismissed or ended in his acquittal.
Absent intent to gain on the part of appellant,
robbery does not lie against him. He is not necessarily
scot-free, however. From the pre-existing sour
relations between Nelia and her family on one hand,
and appellant and family on the other, and under the
circumstances attendant to the incidental encounter of
the parties, appellant’s taking of Nelia’s necklace could
not have been animated with animus lucrandi.
Appellant is, however, just the same, criminally liable.
For “[w]hen there is variance between the
offense charged in the complaint or information and
that proved, and the offense as charged is included in
or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused
shall be convicted of the offense proved which is
included in the offense charged, or of the offense
240
 emedial Law Review
Digests
charged which is included in the offense proved.” (Rule
120, Section 4).
(RULE 20) SEC. 5. When an offense
includes or is included in another. –
An offense charged necessarily
includes the offense proved when some
of the essential elements or ingredients
of the former, as alleged in the
complaint or information, constitute
the latter. And an offense charged is
necessarily included in the offense
proved, when the essential ingredients
of the former constitute or form part of
those constituting the latter.
Grave coercion, like robbery, has violence for
one of its elements. Under Article 286 of the RPC,
grave coercion is committed when "any person who,
without authority of law, shall, by means of violence,
threats or intimidation, prevent another from doing
something not prohibited by law or compel him to do
something against his will, whether it be right or
wrong." The Court found that by appellant’s
employment of threats, intimidation and violence
consisting of uttering of invectives, driving away of the
tricycle driver, and kicking of the tricycle, Nelia was
prevented from proceeding to her destination.
Hence, the Court set aside the CA decision
(Robbery conviction) and found Consulta guilty of
Grave Coercion.
NICDAO VS CHING
FACTS: In October 1995, Clarita Nicdao, as the
proprietor/manager of Vignette Superstore, together
with her husband, approached Ching, a Chinese
national, to borrow money. This was done in order for
the Nicdao spouses to settle their financial obligations
in the business. They agreed that respondent Nicdao
would leave the checks undated and that she would
pay the loans within one year. However, when
petitioner Ching went to see her after the lapse of one
year to ask for payment, respondent Nicdao allegedly
said that she had no cash.
On October 6, 1997, petitioner Ching deposited
the checks that she issued to him. As he earlier stated,
the checks were dishonored by the bank for being
"DAIF."(drawn against insufficient cheverloo). Shortly
thereafter, petitioner Ching, together with Emma
Nuguid, wrote a demand letter to respondent Nicdao
which, however, went unheeded. Accordingly, they
separately filed the criminal complaints against the
latter.
Eleven (11) Informations were filed with the
MCTC of Dinalupihan-Hermosa, Province of Bataan. At
about the same time, fourteen (14) other criminal
complaints also for violation of BP 22, were filed
against respondent Nicdao by Emma Nuguid, said to
be the common law spouse of petitioner Ching. As
such, there are now 2 criminal cases, one for the 11
informations, the other for 14 infromations.
CrimPro
Petitioner Ching explained that from October
1995 up to 1997, he regularly delivered money to
respondent Nicdao, in the amount of P1,000,000.00
until the total amount reached P20,000,000.00. He did
not ask respondent Nicdao to acknowledge receiving
these amounts. Petitioner Ching claimed that he was
confident that he would be paid by respondent Nicdao
because he had in his possession her blank checks. On
the other hand, the latter allegedly had no cause to
fear that he would fill up the checks with just any
amount because they had trust and confidence in each
other. When asked to produce the piece of paper on
which he allegedly wrote the amounts that he lent to
respondent Nicdao, petitioner Ching could not present
it; he reasoned that it was not with him at that time.
The defense of Nicdao alleged that sometime
in 1995, she was informed by her employee that one
of her checks was missing. At that time, she did not let
it bother her thinking that it would eventually surface
when presented to the bank. Respondent Nicdao could
not explain how the said check came into petitioner
Ching’s possession.
After due trial, on December 8, 1998, the
MCTC rendered judgment in Criminal Cases Nos. 9433-
9443 convicting respondent Nicdao of eleven (11)
counts of violation of BP 22.
The MCTC gave credence to petitioner Ching’s
testimony that respondent Nicdao borrowed money
from him in the total amount of P20,950,000.00.
Petitioner Ching delivered P1,000,000.00 every month
to respondent Nicdao from 1995 up to 1997 until the
sum reached P20,000,000.00.
Incidentally, on January 11, 1999, the MCTC
likewise rendered its judgment in Criminal Cases Nos.
9458-9471 and convicted respondent Nicdao of the
fourteen (14) counts of violation of BP 22 filed against
her by Nuguid.
RTC affirmed in toto the 2 judgements of the
MTC. Nicdao appealed to CA via Petition for Review on
the 2 cases. CA reversed stating that Nicdao has
already paid her loan obligations. Notwithstanding the
acquittal in the CA, Nicdao appealed to the SC to assail
the civil aspect of the case.
She contends that according to Supreme Court
Circular No. 57-97 dated September 16, 1997: The
criminal action for violation of Batas PambansaBlg. 22
shall be deemed to necessarily include the
corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file
such civil action separately shall be allowed or
recognized.
As such, the criminal action for violation of BP
22 necessarily includes the corresponding civil action,
which is the recovery of the amount of the dishonored
check representing the civil obligation of the drawer to
the payee.
On the other hand, petitioner Ching theorizes
that, under Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of
Court, the civil action for the recovery of damages
under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 arising from the
same act or omission of the accused is impliedly
instituted with the criminal action.
241
 emedial Law Review
Digests
ISSUE: Whether or not the acquittal in the criminal
case of BP22 necessarily includes the dismissal of the
civil case arising from the same transaction.
HELD: No. Nicdao is wrong.
Notwithstanding respondent Nicdao’s acquittal,
petitioner Ching is entitled to appeal the civil aspect of
the case within the reglementary period
It is axiomatic that "every person criminally
liable for a felony is also civilly liable."34 Under the
pertinent provision of the Revised Rules of Court, the
civil action is generally impliedly instituted with the
criminal action. At the time of petitioner Ching’s filing
of the Informations against respondent Nicdao, Section
1 Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court, quoted
earlier, provided in part:
(GENERAL RULE) SEC. 1. Institution of criminal
and civil actions. – When a criminal action is instituted,
the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is
impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves his
right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes the recovery of
indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages
under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines arising from the same act or omission
of the accused.
(RELEVANT WITH JUDGMENT) As a corollary to
the above rule, an acquittal does not necessarily carry
with it the extinguishment of the civil liability of the
accused. Section 2(b)of the same Rule, also quoted
earlier, provided in part:
(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it
extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds
from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact
from which the civil might arise did not exist.
It is also relevant to mention that judgments of
acquittal are required to state "whether the evidence
of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt
of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment
shall determine if the act or omission from which the
civil liability might arise did not exist.
In Sapiera v. Court of Appeals, the Court
enunciated that the civil liability is not extinguished by
acquittal: (a) where the acquittal is based on
reasonable doubt; (b) where the court expressly
declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal
but only civil in nature; and (c) where the civil liability
is not derived from or based on the criminal act of
which the accused is acquitted. Thus, under Article 29
of the Civil Code –
ART. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is
acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been
proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for
damages for the same act or omission may be
instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance
of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court
may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for
CrimPro
damages in case the complaint should be found to be
malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal
is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so
declare. In the absence of any declaration to that
effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision
whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.
From the foregoing, petitioner Ching correctly
argued that he, as the offended party, may appeal the
civil aspect of the case notwithstanding respondent
Nicdao’s acquittal by the CA. The civil action was
impliedly instituted with the criminal action since he
did not reserve his right to institute it separately nor
did he institute the civil action prior to the criminal
action.
RULE 121: NEW TRIAL OR
RECONSIDERATION
IN RE: WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS OF REYNALDO
DE VILLA
FACTS: Reynaldo de villa was convicted of raping his
12 year old niece Aileen. Part of his conviction was
based on the fact that the timeline if her rape fit the
time she gave birth to Leahlyn an eight month old
premature baby. After 3 years, June, the son or
Reynaldo then found out from Free Legal Assistance
Group (FLAG) that DNA testing can be conducted to
determine the paternity of the child. They requested
for testing which was denied by the court so instead
June asked one of his nephews to have Leahlyn spit in
a sterile cup and sent it for testing. The results
revealed that Reynaldo couldn’t have sired
Leahlyn.Reynaldo De Villa then filed for habeas corpus
with Director of prisons and a petition for new trial
based on a DNA test conducted on him and the child
born of the alleged rape.
ISSUE1: W/N the writ of habeas corpus will issue?
NO! The writ is being used to collaterally attack the
decision convicting Reynaldo. The relief is for those
who are illegally deprived of their freedom and not
when an individual’s liberty is restrained through
some legal process. In Feria v CA, the court
provided the limited grounds to which habeas
corpus can be used as a post-conviction remedy,
when (a) there has been a deprivation of a
constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a
person; (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose
the sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty has been
imposed, as such sentence is void as to such
excess.None of these were present, although the
defense counsel abruptly left. Also Leahlyn’s
paternity is not determinative of whether rape
occurred but the result may be used to cast doubt
and result in an acquittal.
ISSUE2: W/N the motion for NEW TRIAL will prosper?
No!
242
 emedial Law Review
Under Rule 121, Sec 1, a motion for new trial may
be filed at any time before a judgment of
conviction becomes final, that is, within
fifteen (15) days from its promulgation or
notice. Upon finality of the judgment, therefore,
a motion for new trial is no longer an
available remedy. Section 2 of Rule 121
mentions a ground
(b) That new and material evidence has
been discovered which the accused could
not with reasonable diligence have
discovered and produced at the trial and
which if introduced and admitted would
probably change the judgment.
There are two elements to consider with a
MNT, first that it is filed on time and second that it
based on either the 2 grounds provided by law. This
case fails on both parts. The MNT was filed long after
the decision had attained finality. Also it failed to prove
that the DNA test constituted as “newly discovered
evidence.”
A motion for new trial based on newly-
discovered evidence may be granted only if the
following requisites are met: (a) that the evidence
was discovered after trial; (b) that said evidence
could not have been discovered and produced at
the trial even with the exercise of reasonable
diligence; (c) that it is material, not merely
cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and (d) that
the evidence is of such weight that that, if
admitted, it would probably change
judgment.
Although the evidence was discovered after trial the
claim that they were unaware of the existence of DNA
testing until after trial speaks of negligence and they
are bound by it and although the DNA test proved that
Reynaldo was not the father it failed to disprove that
Reynaldo raped Aileen.
SUMIRAN VS SPOUSES DAMASO
FACTS: SUMIRAN filed a complaint for sum of money
and damages, and a BP 22 case against spouses
DAMASO in the RTC. The cases were consolidated. RTC
acquitted DAMASOs in the crim case.
March 6 – SUMIRAN filed MR to Feb 21
decision.
May 9 – RTC denied MR
May 19 – Date of receipt of Order denying MR
May 29 – SUMIRAN filed Notice of Appeal
RTC said notice of appeal filed out of time since
decision was rendered in Feb 21. RTC said that since
SUMIRAN filed MR on the 13th day, his notice of appeal
was filed late since it was 10 days after receiving the
order denying MR.
ISSUE: W/N SUMIRAN’s period to appeal has lapsed. -
NO.
CrimPro
Digests
RATIO: In Neypes vs CA., the court allowed a fresh
period of 15 days within which to file a notice of appeal
in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order
dismissing or denying a motion for new trial or motion
for reconsideration. The retroactivity of this Neypes
rule was stated Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. v. Homena-
Valencia, where the court stated that procedural laws
may be given retroactive effect to actions pending,
there being no vested rights in the rules of procedure.
Amendments to procedural rules are procedural or
remedial in character as they do not create new or
remove vested rights, but only operate in furtherance
of the remedy or confirmation of rights already
existing.
The “fresh period rule” is a procedural law as it
prescribes a fresh period of 15 days within which an
appeal may be made in the event that the motion for
reconsideration is denied by the lower court. Following
the rule on retroactivity of procedural laws, the “fresh
period rule” should be applied to pending actions.
Since the case was already pending during the
Neypes ruling (Sept. 14, 2005), SUMIRAN is entitled to
a ‘fresh period’ of 15 days counted from May 19, date
of receipt of order denying his MR. When he filed a
notice of appeal on May 29, only 10 days had elapsed
and his period to appeal had not yet lapsed.
RULE 122-125
the PEOPLE v. ABON
(Incestuous rape case)
Facts: While his 13-year-old daughter was sleeping,
Abon raped her by inserting his penis into her vagina
and made a push and pull movement for about 20 to
30 minutes. Because her grandmother did not believe
her, she went to a friend’s house who helped her
report the incident to the police. The physical
examination found her hymen to have already been
ruptured and that she had old lacerations inflicted
approximately 3 months before.
Abon pleaded not guilty and interposed denial
and alibi as defenses. He claimed he was working in
another place (Rizal) and did not see his children who
were living in Pangasinan. He said his daughter filed
the case against him because he used to whip her very
hard on the buttocks with a stick.
The RTC imposed the death penalty. On
automatic review, CA affirmed, observing that Abon
failed to show any inconsistency in daughter’s
testimony and neither did he prove any ill-motive
which would prompt her to concoct her incest rape
story. Abon appealed to the SC.
Issue: Whether death penalty is the proper penalty -
NO
The SC discussed appeals as a preliminary matter,
which is the important topic here.
243
 emedial Law Review
Digests
HELD:
Rules on Appeal
An appeal is a proceeding undertaken to have a
decision reconsidered by bringing it to a higher court
authority. It is not a right but a mere statutory
privilege to be exercised only and in the manner and in
accordance with the provisions of law.
Sec. 3 of Rule 122 provides that where the
penalty imposed by the RTC is reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, an appeal is made directly to the SC
by filing a notice of appeal with the court which
rendered the judgment or final appeal from and by
serving a copy upon the adverse party. On the other
hand, a case where the penalty imposed is death will
be automatically reviewed by the SC without a need
for filing a notice of appeal. However, the case of
Mateo modified these rules by providing an
intermediate review of the cases by the CA where the
penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life
imprisonment, or death.
Pursuant to this, the SC issued AM No. 00-5-
03-SC 2004-10-12, amending the governing review of
death penalty cases, the pertinent provision of which
reads:
(c) The appeal in cases where the
penalty imposed by the Regional
Trial Court is reclusion perpetua,
life imprisonment or where a
lesser penalty is imposed for
offenses committed on the same
occasion or which arose out of the
same occurrence that gave rise to
the more, serious offense for
which the penalty of death,
reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment is imposed, shall be
by notice of appeal to the Court of
Appeals in accordance with
paragraph (a) of this Rule.
(d) No notice of appeal is necessary in
cases where the Regional Trial Court
imposed the death penalty. The Court
of Appeals shall automatically review
the judgment as provided in Section 10
of this Rule.
The CA judgment in these cases may be
appealed to the SC by notice of appeal filed with the
CA.
Also affecting the rules on appeal is the
enactment of RA 9346 or An Act Prohibiting the
Imposition of the Death Penalty, which took effect in
2006. Under Sec. 2, the imposition of the death
penalty is prohibited and in lieu thereof, it imposes the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated
makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the
RPC, or life imprisonment, if otherwise. Hence, in the
provisions of the Rules of Court on appeals, death
penalty cases are no longer operational.
SC said penalty imposed is reduced to
reclusion pereptua without eligibility for parole.
CrimPro
ROSIE QUIDET V PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Version of the Prosecution
On October 19, 1991, at around 8pm, Jimmy,
Andrew, Edwin Balani, and Rolando Mabayo visited a
friend in Sitio Punta. Along the way, they saw Taban,
together with Quidet and Tubo, come out of the house
of one Tomas Osep. Taban suddenly stabbed Andrew
on the chest with a knife. Andrew retaliated by boxing
Taban. Jimmy tried to pacify Andrew and Taban but
the latter stabbed him in the abdomen. Taban then
immediately fled.
Meanwhile, after Jimmy fell down, Tubo threw
a drinking glass at Andrew's face while Quidetboxed
Andrew's jaw. Tubo stabbed Jimmy who was then lying
face down on the ground twice on the back with an ice
pick after which he fled. Quidet then boxed Jimmy's
mouth. At this juncture, Balani rushed to Jimmy's aid
and boxed Quidet who retaliated by punching Balani.
Thereafter, Quidet left the scene. Mabayo was unable
to help Jimmy orAndrew because he was shocked by
the incident.
Version of the Defense
On the night of the stabbing incident, Taban,
Tubo and Quidet were drinking liquor in the house of
Osep. Taban left the group to urinate on a nearby
coconut tree. Outside Osep's house, he was suddenly
boxed by Andrew and kicked by Jimmy causing him to
fall near a fishing boat. ThereTaban found a fishing
knife with which he stabbed Jimmy and Andrew in
order to defend himself. After which, he fled for fear
for his life. Meanwhile, Quidetwent out to look for
Taban. As he was stepping out of Osep's house, he
was boxed by Balani. Quidet fought back. Andrew tried
to help Balani but Quidet was able to evade Andrew's
attacks. Instead, Quidet was able to box Andrew.
Petitioner then called out to Tubo to come out and run.
When Tubo stepped out of the house, neither Taban
nor petitioner was present but he saw a person being
lifted by several people. Upon seeing this, Tubo,
likewise, fled for fear for his life.
FACTS:
On January 13, 1992, Rosie Quidet, Feliciano
Taban, Jr., and Aurelio Tubo were charged with
homicide for the death of Jimmy Tagarda. On the same
date, they were charged with frustrated homicide for
the stab wounds sustained by Jimmy's cousin, Andrew
Tagarda
Upon arraignment, all the accused entered a
plea of not guilty in the frustrated homicide case. In
the homicide case, only Taban entered a voluntary
plea of guilt
The trial court rendered a partial
judgmentsentencing Taban to imprisonment and
ordering him to pay the heirs of Jimmy P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity.Thereafter, joint trial ensued.
RTC rendered a judgment finding Quidet and
Tubo guilty of homicide and all three accused guilty of
244
 emedial Law Review
Digests
frustrated homicide. The trial court found that the
stabbing of Jimmy and Andrew was previously planned
by the accused. The active participation of all three
accused proved conspiracy in the commission of the
crimes. Furthermore, the positive identification of the
accused by the prosecution witnesses cannot be offset
by the defense of plain denial.
The CA held that conspiracy was duly
established as shown by the concerted acts of the
accused in inflicting mortal wounds on Jimmy. Hence,
all of the accused are guilty of homicide for the death
of Jimmy.The CA, however, disagreed with the trial
court's finding that the accused are liable for frustrated
homicide with respect to the injuries sustained by
Andrew. According to the CA, the accused failed to
inflict mortal wounds on Andrew because the latter
successfully deflected the attack. Andrew suffered only
minor injuries which could have healed within five to
seven days even without medical treatment. The crime
committed, therefore, is merely attempted homicide.
ISSUE: W/N the decision of the CA finding Quidet to
have acted in conspiracy with the other accused
(Taban and Tubo) in the commission of the offenses
charged is in accordance with law and/or jurisprudence
HELD: The existence of conspiracy was not proved
beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, Quidet is criminally
liable only for his individual acts. Conspiracy exists
when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it.The essence of conspiracy is the unity of
action and purpose. Its elements, like the physical acts
constituting the crime itself, must be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. When there is conspiracy, the act of
one is the act of all.
To determine if Quidet conspired with Taban
and Tubo, the focus of the inquiry should necessarily
be the overt acts of Quidetbefore, during and after the
stabbing incident. From this viewpoint, we find several
facts of substance which militate against the finding
that petitioner conspired with Taban and Tubo.
First, there is no evidence that Quidet, Taban
or Tubo had any grudge or enmity against Jimmy or
Andrew. The prosecution eyewitnesses, as well as the
three accused were one in testifying that there was no
misunderstanding between the two groups prior to the
stabbing incident.
Second, the stabbing incident appears to have
arisen from a purely accidental encounter between
Taban's and Andrew's groups with both having had a
drinking session.
Third, unlike Taban and Tubo, Quidet was
unarmed during the incident, thus, negating his intent
to kill the victims. By the prosecution witnesses'
account, petitioner's participation was limited to boxing
Andrew and Jimmy after Taban and Tubo had stabbed
the victims. His acts were neither necessary nor
indispensable to the commission of the crimes as they
were done after the stabbing. Thus, Quidet's act of
boxing the victims can be interpreted as a mere show
CrimPro
of sympathy to or camaraderie with his two co-
accused.
Taken together, the evidence of the
prosecution does not meet the test of moral certainty
in order to establish that Quidet conspired with Taban
and Tubo to commit the crimes of homicide and
attempted homicide.
For failure of the prosecution to prove
conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt, Quidet's liability
is separate and individual. Considering that it was duly
established that Quidet boxed Jimmy and Andrew and
absent proof of the extent of the injuries sustained by
the latter from these acts, Quidetshould only be made
liable for two counts of slight physical injuries.
[APPEAL]In the frustrated homicide case, the
CA correctly modified the crime to attempted homicide
because the stab wounds that Andrew sustained were
not life-threatening. Although Taban and Tubo did not
appeal their conviction, this part of the appellate
court's judgment is favorable to them, thus, they are
entitled to a reduction of their prison terms.The rule is
that an appeal taken by one or more of several
accused shall not affect those who did not appeal
except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court
is favorable and applicable to the latter.
Petition partially granted. Rosie Quidet is found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of slight physical
injuries. Feliciano Taban, Jr. and Aurelio Tubo are
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of attempted
homicide
DEUS V. PEOPLE
FACTS: Accused Deus was charged for the crime of
illegal sale of shabu, in violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act. He was caught through a buy-bust
operation.
On May 17, 2006, the RTC rendered judgment
finding accused Deus guilty. Accused filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, which the RTC denied on May 17,
2006. On August 24, 2006, accused filed a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the
CA. He raised as issue the failure of the trial court
judge to comply with Rule 118 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure requiring that the pre-trial order be signed
by the accused and his counsel. The CA then appointed
and designated the Public Attorney's Office (PAO) as
counsel de oficio for the accused. PAO filed a motion to
admit the petition for certiorari to appeal his conviction
for the crime of illegal sale of shabu.
According to the CA, in the higher interest of
justice, the petition for certiorari filed by PAO is
admitted (note: not granted ha, just admitted for the
court to consider). In resolving the petition, the CA
dismissed this petition for certiorari.
From the CA, the accused filed a Petition for
Review in the SC. He urges the application of Section
245
 emedial Law Review
Digests
8, Rule 12411 of the Rules of Court by analogy to the
petition for certiorari filed before the CA. He argues
that the appellate court should not have dismissed his
petition for certiorari since he was represented by a
counsel de oficio. Essentially, he appeals for a liberal
interpretation of the rules of procedure in the interest
of substantial justice.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the accused resorted to a
proper mode of appeal from the RTC’s decision
to the CA. (NO. Accused should have filed
an appeal to the CA, and not a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65.)
2. Should a liberal interpretation of the rules of
procedure be made considering that accused
acted without the assistance of counsel when
he filed his urgent motion for reconsideration
of the RTC’s judgment of conviction and the
special civil action for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals. (YES)
HELD:
1. Re issue #1: A perusal of the petition reveals that
the assailed Decision (decision of conviction) was
rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction. As such, the proper remedy for a party
aggrieved thereby is an ordinary appeal pursuant
to Sections 3 and 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure as amended, which can be
availed of by filing a notice of appeal with the court
which rendered the judgment, within fifteen (15)
days from notice thereof. However, instead of filing
an appeal within 15 days from notice of the denial
of his motion for reconsideration of the subject
decision on June 24, 2006, accused-petitioner
resorted to the instant petition for certiorari which
the Court cannot treat as an appeal for having
been filed on August 24, 2006 or way beyond the
period to appeal.
2. Re issue #2: The SC in this case qualified its
answer. In sum, it said that the judgment of
conviction became final and executory since
accused resorted to the wrong mode of appeal,
hence the running of the reglementary period was
not tolled. However, in the interest of justice, the
case is remanded.
In detail, the SC said: Since the judgment
of conviction had not been appealed within the
11
SEC. 8. Dismissal of appeal for abandonment or
failure to prosecute. —The Court of Appeals may, upon
motion of the appellee or motu proprio and with notice to the
appellant in either case, dismiss the appeal if the appellant
fails to file his brief within the time prescribed by this Rule,
except where the appellant is represented by a counsel de
oficio.
The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the
appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant
escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a
foreign country during the pendency of the appeal. (8a)
CrimPro
time and in the manner prescribed by the rules, it
became final and executory upon the lapse of the
reglementary appeal period.
Petitioner likewise erred in contending that
Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court prohibits
the dismissal of the certiorari petition when
appellant is represented by a counsel de oficio.
First, said provision only refers to dismissal
of appeal for abandonment or failure to prosecute.
Second, the dismissal of the appeal is conditioned
on the appellant's failure to file a brief. An
appellant's brief is a pleading filed in an ordinary
appeal. Clearly, Section 8 contemplates an
ordinary appeal filed before the Court of Appeals.
The aforecited legal principles
notwithstanding, we agree with the OSG that the
appellate court should have treated the certiorari
petition as an appeal. Petitioner was not
represented by counsel when he filed the petition
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. Thus, he
cannot be presumed to know the legal remedies to
take in pursuing his appeal. Moreover, his right to
liberty is at stake. These attending circumstances
should have spurred the appellate court to relax
the rules of procedure in the interest of substantial
justice.
TAMAYO v. PEOPLE
FACTS:
- Petitioner Aurora Tamayo and her friend, Erlinda
Anicas (Anicas), were charged with estafa.
- According to the information, Tamayo and Anicas
were given 120K by the Sotto spouses for the
assembly of a jeepney. They eventually became
suspicious when no progress was being shown.
Hence, they sent a lawyer to get reimbursement.
Unfortunately, the found out that the money was
misappropriated for the petitioner’s personal use.
- As a defense, Tamayo said that she gave the
money to one Ernesto Rayana who was supposed
to assemble the jeep. Tamayo and Rayana
allegedly had problems resulting to the former
filing a complaint against the latter before the
officials of the barangay where Ravana resided.
Eventually, he also sued Rayana for estafa but the
latter has gone into hiding.
- RTC convicted Tamayo. CA affirmed. The decision
became final and executor and was entered into
the Books of Entries of Judgments. The RTC issued
an Order for her arrest.
- Petitioner filed a Manifestation before the RTC
alleging that while the instant case was pending
with the CA, she and Pedro (Sotto) had settled
their disputes and that Pedro would no longer
pursue the present case against her. She prayed
for the cancellation of the RTC order.
- Petitioner filed a Motion to Suspend the Writ of
Execution of the RTC Order stating that when the
case was pending review in the CA, the Private
246
 emedial Law Review
Digests
Complainant compromised wherein payment was
made by petitioner to the complainant (a receipt
was issued).
- RTC denied petitioner's motion on the ground that
the Decision of the CA was already final and
executor. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N the motion to suspend execution should
be granted.
HELD/RATIO: NO.
Section 7, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides for the rules in modifying a
judgment of conviction, to wit:
SEC. 7. Modification of Judgment. - A judgment of
conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be
modified or set aside before it becomes final or before
appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty is
imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse of
the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the
sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or
served, or when the accused has waived in writing his
right to appeal, or has applied for probation. As can be
gleaned from the foregoing provision, a judgment of
conviction may be modified or set aside only if the
judgment is not yet final. Further, a judgment
becomes final when no appeal is seasonably
perfected.
Under the Rules of Court, judgments of the
Court of Appeals in criminal cases must be appealed by
the accused within fifteen (15) days from service of a
copy thereof upon the accused or her counsel either
(a) by filing a motion for reconsideration, or (b) by
filing a motion for new trial, or (c) by filing a petition
for review oncertiorari to this Court. Petitioner did
nothing of these.
Well-settled is the rule that once a judgment
becomes final and executory, it can no longer be
disturbed, altered or modified in any respect except to
correct clerical errors or to make nunc pro
tunc entries. Nothing further can be done to a final
judgment except to execute it. No court, not even this
Court, has the power to revive, review, or modify a
judgment which has become final and executory. This
rule is grounded on the fundamental principle of public
policy and sound practice that the judgment of the
court must become final at some definite date fixed by
law. It is essential to an effective administration of
justice that once a judgment has become final, the
issue or cause therein should be laid to rest.
As in this case, the alleged compromise
between petitioner and Pedro, wherein petitioner
allegedly reimbursed to Pedro the amount swindled in
exchange for Pedro's consent to dismiss the instant
case, does not extinguish petitioner's criminal liability
for estafa. With regard to the effect of the alleged
compromise on petitioner's civil liability, it is true that
a compromise extinguishes pro tanto the civil liability
of an accused. However, such rule cannot be applied in
favor of petitioner.
CrimPro
Petitioner failed to discharge his burden of
proving through convincing evidence that she and
Pedro had entered into a compromise.
PEOPLE v. FRANCISCO TARUC
FACTS: Francisco Taruc, appellant in this case, is
charged and convicted in the lower courts, of murder
of one Emelito Sualog.
The Information alleges that on or about Nov
8, 1998, in Orion, Bataan, Taruc assaulted Sualog by
shooting him with a .45 gun on the different parts of
his body, inflicting mortal wounds which caused the
latter’s eventual death. Taruc pleaded not guilty to the
crime charged. He was represented by a PAO lawyer.
Trial ensued and on June 2005, RTC came out
with a decision convicting Taruc of MURDER, and
sentenced him to death. The court issued a warrant of
arrest against Taruc so that he may serve sentence.
The case was brought up by automatic review
to the CA. Taruc, through PAO, filed a Motion for
Extension of Time to File Appellant’s Brief. However,
the Notice to File Brief addressed to accused-appellant
Taruc was returned to the CA with postal notation
“moved out.” So the CA directed Taruc’s counsel (PAO)
to furnish it with the present and complete address of
Taruc within 5 days from notice.
The PAO lawyer complied therewith. It
informed the CA that Taruc escaped from prison in
2002 and that he (PAO lawyer) had mo means of
knowing the current whereabouts of Taruc. So the
lawyer asked the CA to direct the warden of the
provincial jail of Bataan (where Taruc was last
confined) to file a certification as to Taruc’s escape.
The OIC warden complied, stating that Taruc was
committed to jail on Nov 10, 2000 but escaped at
about 11pm on August 23, 2002.
Notwithstanding the escape, the CA allowed
the motion for extension of time to filed appealant’s
brief. Because based on jurisprudence (People v.
Flores) the review of death penalty cases are
mandatory. PAO lawyer failed to file the brief at first
but eventually submitted it. The CA rendered a
decision AFFIRMING RTC’s decision of conviction but
modified the penalty from death to RECLUSION
PERPETUA.
The PAO lawyer still appealed the conviction on
a question of law and fact. Hence this case.
ISSUE: W/N Taruc lost his right to appeal his
conviction after he escaped from jail and eluded arrest.
– YES.
HELD/RATIO: In this case, the PAO lawyer of Taruc
continued to file various pleadings and appeals in
behalf of Taruc, even though he already escaped from
jail a long time ago.
An accused is required to be present before the
trial court at the promulgation of the judgment in a
criminal case. If the accused fails to appear before the
247
 emedial Law Review
Digests
trial court, promulgation of judgment shall be made in
accordance with Rule 120, Section 6, paragraphs 4 and
5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. In gist, if
the accused fails to appear on the date of promulgation
in court, with no justifiable reason, he will lose all
remedies available to him (i.e. appeal), and the
decision will still stand and be recorded. Unless he
shows up not later than 15 days after promulgation
with an acceptable and justifiable explanation as why
he failed to appear during promulgation.
Consistently, Rule 124, Section 8, paragraph 2
of the same Rules allows the Court of Appeals, upon
motion or motu proprio, to dismiss the appeal of the
accused-appellant who escapes from prison or
confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign
country during the pendency of the appeal.
In People v. Mapalao, the SC explained that
“once an accused escapes from prison or confinement
or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, he loses his
standing in court and unless he surrenders or submits
to the jurisdiction of the court he is deemed to have
waived any right to seek relief from the court.”
Although Rule 124, Section 8 particularly
applies to the Court of Appeals, it has been extended
to the Supreme Court by Rule 125, Section 1 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
It is indisputable that accused-appellant
herein, by escaping from jail, was not present at the
promulgation by the RTC of its Decision finding him
guilty of the crime of murder. Accused-appellant failed
to surrender and file the required motion within 15
days from the promulgation of the RTC Decision. This
alone already deprived him of any remedy against said
judgment of conviction available under the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, including the right to
appeal the same.
However, the escape of the accused-appellant
did not preclude the Court of Appeals from exercising
its review jurisdiction, considering that what was
involved was capital punishment. Automatic review
being mandatory, it is not only a power of the court
but a duty to review all death penalty cases.
By escaping prison, accused-appellant
impliedly waived his right to appeal. In People v. Ang
Gioc, the Court enunciated that the right of appeal is
granted solely for the benefit of the accused and it
may actually be waived expressly or by implication.
When the accused flees after the case has been
submitted to the court for decision, he will be deemed
to have waived his right to appeal from the judgment
rendered against him.
Thus, having escaped from prison or
confinement, he loses his standing in court; and unless
he surrenders or submits to its jurisdiction, he is
deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from
the court.
RULE 126: SEARCH AND SEIZURE
SPOUSES MARIMLA V. PEOPLE
CrimPro
FACTS: NBI Anti-Organized Crime Lagasca filed two
applications for a search warrant with the RTC of
Manila seeking permission to search the Marimla’s
house in Angeles, Pampanga and the premises of
another house in Porac, Pampanga. The applications
were based on the personal knowledge of Lagasca and
a certain Fernandez who had conducted surveillance
operations and made a test buy at Marimla’s house.
The application was for the alleged violation of RA
6425 and to seize shabu, marijuana and other drug
paraphernalia.
Executive Judge Guariña III of the Manila RTC
issued the search warrants. The search in Angeles City
lead to the seizure of the following:
1. One (1) brick of dried flowering tops wrapped in a
packing tape marked "RCL-1-2677," (net weight -
915.7 grams);
2. One (1) small brick of dried flowering tape wrapped
in a newsprint marked "RCL-2-2677" (net weight -
491.5 grams);
3. Dried flowering tops separately contained in sixteen
(16) transparent plastic bags, altogether wrapped in a
newsprint marked "RCL-3-2677" (net weight - 127.9
grams); and
4. Dried flowering tops separately contained in nine (9)
plastic tea bags, altogether placed in a yellow plastic
bag marked "RCL-4-2677" (net weight - 18.2736
grams).
An information for violation of Section 8,
Article II of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by R.A. No.
7659, was filed against the spouses Marimla before the
RTC of Angeles City.
The spouses filed a Motion to Quash Search
Warrant and to Suppress Evidence Illegally Seized,
claiming the application for search warrant was filed
and issued outside the territorial jurisdiction and and
judicial region of the court where the alleged crime
was committed. As products of a void warrant, they
claim the evidence is inadmissible.
The RTC denied their Motion to quash and the
Marimla’s subsequent MR. The spouses now go to the
SC via Rule 65.
ISSUE: WON the search warrants may be issued
outside the RTC’s territorial jurisdiction? Yes! Valid
exception to Rule 126 Sec. 2
RATIO: Administrative Matter No. 99-10-09-SC
Resolution Clarifying the Guidelines on the Application
for the Enforceability of Search Warrants
In the interest of an effective administration of
justice and pursuant to the powers vested in the
Supreme Court by the Constitution, the following are
authorized to act on all applications for search
warrants involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling,
dangerous drugs and illegal possession of firearms.
The Executive Judge and Vice Executive Judges
of Regional Trial Courts, Manila and Quezon City filed
by the Philippine National Police (PNP), the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Presidential Anti-
Organized Crime Task Force (PAOC-TF) and the
248
 emedial Law Review
Digests
Reaction Against Crime Task Force (REACT-TF) with
the Regional Trial Courts of Manila and Quezon City.
The applications shall be personally endorsed
by the Heads of the said agencies, for the search of
places to be particularly described therein, and the
seizure of property of things as prescribed in the Rules
of Court, and to issue the warrants of arrest, if
justified, which may be served in places outside the
territorial jurisdiction of said courts.
The authorized judges shall keep a special
docket book listing the details of the applications and
the result of the searches and seizures made pursuant
to the warrants issued....xxx
A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC provides that the
guidelines on the enforceability of search warrants
provided therein shall continue until further orders
from this Court. In fact, the guidelines in A.M. No. 99-
10-09-SC are reiterated in A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC
entitled Guidelines On The Selection And Designation
Of Executive Judges And Defining Their Powers,
Prerogatives And Duties, which explicitly stated that
the guidelines in the issuance of search warrants in
special criminal cases by the RTCs of Manila and
Quezon City shall be an exception to Section 2 of Rule
126 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Chapter V. Specific Powers, Prerogatives and Duties of
Executive Judges in Judicial Supervision
Sec. 12. Issuance of search warrants in special
criminal cases by the Regional Trial Courts of Manila
and Quezon City. – The Executive Judges and,
whenever they are on official leave of absence or are
not physically present in the station, the Vice-
Executive Judges of the RTCs of Manila and Quezon
City shall have authority to act on applications filed by
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the
Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Anti-Crime
Task Force (ACTAF), for search warrants involving
heinous crimes, illegal gambling, illegal possession of
firearms and ammunitions as well as violations of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the
Intellectual Property Code, the Anti-Money Laundering
Act of 2001, the Tariff and Customs Code, as
amended, and other relevant laws that may hereafter
be enacted by Congress, and included herein by the
Supreme Court.
The applications shall be personally endorsed
by the heads of such agencies and shall particularly
describe therein the places to be searched and/or the
property or things to be seized as prescribed in the
Rules of Court. The Executive Judges and Vice-
Executive Judges concerned shall issue the warrants, if
justified, which may be served in places outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the said courts.
The Executive Judges and the authorized
Judges shall keep a special docket book listing names
of Judges to whom the applications are assigned, the
details of the applications and the results of the
searches and seizures made pursuant to the warrants
issued.
This Section shall be an exception to Section 2
of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
CrimPro
CHAN VS. HONDA MOTORS
FACTS: The National Bureau of Investigation, through
Special Investigator Glenn Lacaran, applied for search
warrants with the RTC against petitioners (Hon Ne
Chan and Yunji Zeng) for the alleged violation of
Section 168 in relation to Section 170 of RA 8293
(Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines).
RTC Judge Artemio Sipon issued 2 search
warrants. The first warrant was directed against Hon
Ne Chan and John Does, operating under the name
and style ‘Dragon Spirit Motorcycle Center’, located at
No. 192 M.H. del Pilar St. Cor. 10th Ave., Grace Park,
Caloocan City, Metro Manila. The second warrant was
directed against Yunji Zeng and John Does, operating
under the name and style ‘Dragon Spirit Motorcyle
Center’, located at No. 192 E. Delos Santos Ave.,
Caloocan City, Metro Manila.
On the strength of these search warrants, the
NBI agents conducted a search of petitioners’ premises
and seized the following items:
1. From Hon Ne Chan
a. 7 motorcycles bearing the model name
DSM WAVE R
b. 3 motorcycles (DSM SUPER WAVE)
c. 1 motorcycle (WAVE CX)
2. From Yunji Zeng
a. 21 motorcycles (WAVE CX 110)
b. 8 motorcycles (WAVE 110)
c. 35 motorcycles (WAVE 135)
d. 1 motorcycle (WAVE R)
e. 8 motorcycles (SUPER WAVE 110)
f. 2 plastic bags containing various
documents
Petitioners filed with the RTC a Joint Motion to
Quash Search Warrants and to Return Illegally Seized
Items, averring that the search warrants were issued
despite the absence of probable cause and that they
were in the nature of general search warrants. The
motion was granted. The RTC held that the return of
the 22 WAVE CX 110 motorcycle units was proper
since they were never specifically mentioned in the
search warrants. As to the rest of the items seized, the
return was justified due to lack of probable cause.
On appeal, the CA set aside the RTC ruling.
ISSUES:
1. WON probable cause existed in the issuance of
the search warrants? YES.
2. WON search warrants were in the nature of
general search warrants? NO.
3. WON there existed an offense to which the
issuance of the search warrants was
connected? YES.
RULING:
1. The validity of the issuance of a search warrant
rests upon the following factors: (1) it must issued
upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be
249
 emedial Law Review
Digests
determined by the judge himself and not by the
applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination
of probable cause, the judge must examine, under
oath or affirmation, the complainant and such
witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the
warrant issued must particularly describe the place to
be searched and persons or things to be seized.12
In the case at bar, petitioners argue that the
requirements in Rule 126 of the Rules of Court were
not fulfilled because there was no probable cause. In
the application for search warrant by Lacaran, it was
stated that “he has information and verily believes that
petitioners are in possession or has in their control
properties which are being sold, retailed, distributed,
imported, dealt with or otherwise disposed of, or
intended to be used as a means of committing a
violation of Section 168 in relation to Section 170 of
Republic Act No. 8293 otherwise known as the
Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines.” Said
statement, petitioners insist, failed to meet the
condition that probable cause must be shown to be
within the personal knowledge of the complainant or
the witnesses he may produce and not based on mere
hearsay.
It is settled that in determining probable
cause, a judge is duty-bound to personally examine
under oath the complainant and the witnesses he may
present. Emphasis must be laid on the fact that the
oath required must refer to “the truth of the
facts within the personal knowledge of the
petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose
thereof is to convince the committing magistrate,
not the individual making the affidavit and
seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the
existence of probable cause.” Search warrants are
not issued on loose, vague or doubtful basis of fact, or
on mere suspicion or belief.
In the case at bar, petitioners capitalize on the
first paragraph of the application for search warrant
executed by Lacaran to support their argument that he
lacked the personal knowledge required by both the
Rules of Court and by jurisprudence. However, the
very next paragraph of the application reveals the
tremulous nature of their argument for it is clearly
stated therein that far from merely relying on mere
information and belief, Lacaran “personally verified the
report and found it to be a fact.” This removed the
basis of his application from mere hearsay and
supported the earlier finding of probable cause on the
part of the examining judge.
The pronouncement by the RTC that there was
no probable cause since petitioners are not guilty of
unfair competition is premature since all that was
12
Rule 126, Sec. 4: Requisites for issuing search
warrant. – A search warrant shall not issue but upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere
in the Philippines.
CrimPro
presented by respondents before it was evidence which
was sufficient to support a finding of probable cause.
The evidence required in determining probable cause is
far less stringent than that required in the trial on the
merits of the charge involving unfair competition.
2. Petitioners argue that the search warrants
were in the nature of general search warrants since
they included motorcycles bearing the model name
WAVE. They insist that the word WAVE is generic and
that it fails to pass the requirement of particularity of
the items to be seized.
It is elemental that in order to be valid, a
search warrant must particularly describe the place to
be searched and the things to be seized. The
constitutional requirement of reasonable particularity
of description of the things to be seized is primarily
meant to enable the law enforcers serving the warrant
to: (1) readily identify the properties to be seized and
thus prevent them from seizing the wrong items; and
(2) leave said peace officers with no discretion
regarding the articles to be seized and thus prevent
unreasonable searches and seizures. It is not,
however, required that the things to be seized must be
described in precise and minute detail as to leave no
room for doubt on the part of the searching
authorities.
In Bache and Co. (Phil.), Inc. v. Judge Ruiz, it
was pointed out that one of the tests to determine
the particularity in the description of objects to
be seized under a search warrant is when the
things described are limited to those which bear
direct relation to the offense for which the
warrant is being issued. A reading of the search
warrants issued by the RTC in this case reveals that
the items to be seized, including motorcycles, are
those which are connected with the alleged violation of
Section 168 in relation to Section 170 of RA 8293,
notwithstanding the use of the generic word WAVE.
3. Anent petitioners’ contention that the search
warrants were issued in relation to no particular
offense, they rely on the holding of the SC in Savage
v. Judge Taypin where it was held that it is unclear
whether the crime of unfair competition exists since
there was no mention of such crime involving design
patents in RA 8293.
To be sure, the search warrant in Savage was
issued in the face of possible violation of RA 8293. The
acts complained of in said case were the alleged
manufacture and fabrication of wrought iron furniture
similar to that patented by private respondent
therein sans any license or patent for the same, for the
purpose of deceiving or defrauding private respondent
and the buying public.
On the other hand, in the application for
search warrant filed by Lacaran, it is clearly stated that
what respondents are complaining about was the
alleged violation of the goodwill they have
established with respect to their motorcycle models
“WAVE 110 S” and “WAVE 125 S” and which goodwill is
250
 emedial Law Review
Digests
entitled to protection in the same manner as other
property rights. It is quite obvious then that their
cause of action arose out of the intrusion into their
established goodwill involving the two motorcycle
models and not patent infringement, as what existed
in Savage.
SY TAN VS SY TIONG
FACTS: On February 17, 2010, the Court rendered a
Decision in G.R. No. 174570 entitled Romer Sy Tan v.
Sy Tiong Gue, et al.,the decretal portion of which
reads, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition
is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution dated
December 29, 2005 and August 18, 2006, respectively,
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81389
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders of the RTC
dated September 1, 2003 and October 28,
2003 are REINSTATED. The validity of Search Warrant
Nos. 03-3611 and 03-3612 is SUSTAINED.
On March 22, 2010, respondents filed a MR wherein
respondents informed the Court, albeit belatedly, that
the RTC granted their motion for the withdrawal of the
Information filed in Criminal Case No. 06-241375.
According to the Respondents, the RTC took into
consideration the Amended Decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 90368 dated August
29, 2006, which affirmed the findings of the City
Prosecutor of Manila and the Secretary of Justice that
the elements of Robbery were absent. Thus, there was
lack of probable cause, warranting the withdrawal of
the Information.
Conseqently, in view of the withdrawal of the
Information for Robbery, respondents argued that the
quashal of the subject search warrants and the
determination of the issue of whether or not there was
probable cause warranting the issuance by the RTC of
the said search warrants for respondents’ alleged acts
of robbery has been rendered moot and
academic. Verily, there is no more reason to further
delve into the propriety of the quashal of the search
warrants as it has no more practical legal effect.
On the other hand, Tan, in his Comment,
maintains that the motion is a mere reiteration of what
respondents have previously alleged in their Comment
and which have been passed upon by the Court in the
subject decision. Tan alleges that he also filed with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila a Complaint for
Qualified Theft against the respondents based on the
same incidents and that should the Information for
Qualified Theft be filed with the proper court, the
items seized by virtue of the subject search
warrants will be used as evidence therein.
On August 6, 2010, respondents filed their
Reply. According to respondents, even if an
Information for Qualified Theft be later filed on the
basis of the same incident subject matter of the
dismissed case of robbery, Tan cannot include the
CrimPro
seized items as part of the evidence therein. For
respondents, he cannot use the items seized as
evidence in any other offense except in that in which
the subject search warrants were issued.
ISSUE. Whether Tan may utilize the evidence seized by
virtue of the search warrants issued in connection with
the case of Robbery in a separate case of Qualified
Theft. NO.
RATIO. A search warrant may be issued only if there is
probable cause in connection with only one specific
offense alleged in an application on the basis of the
applicant’s personal knowledge and his or her
witnesses. Tan cannot, therefore, utilize the evidence
seized by virtue of the search warrants issued in
connection with the case of Robbery in a separate case
of Qualified Theft, even if both cases emanated from
the same incident.
Section 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides:
Section 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A
search warrant shall not issue except upon probable
cause in connection with one specific offense to
be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and
things to be seized which may be anywhere in the
Philippines.
Moreover, considering that the withdrawal of
the Information was based on the findings of the CA,
as affirmed by this Court, that there was no probable
cause to indict respondents for the crime of Robbery
absent the essential element of unlawful taking, which
is likewise an essential element for the crime of
Qualified Theft, all offenses which are necessarily
included in the crime of Robbery can no longer be filed,
much more, prosper.
GWYN QUINICOT vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
FACTS: Two informations were filed before the RTC of
Negros Oriental charging petitioner Quinicot with
violation of Sections 15 and 16, respectively, of
Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as The
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. When arraigned,
petitioner, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded "Not
Gulity" to the crimes charged. The prosecution
presented three witnesses: PO 1 Marchan, PO2
Germodo and Police Inspector Llena, Forensic Chemist,
PNP Crime Laboratory. From their collective
testimonies, the version of the prosecution is as
follows: An informant called petitioner Quinicot by
phone. Thereafter, PO1 Marchan talked to petitioner
and informed the latter that he was buying P300.00
worth of shabu. A team was formed by team leader
Police Senior Inspector Tolentino to conduct a buy-bust
251
 emedial Law Review
Digests
operation against petitioner. PSI Tolentino gave PO1
Marchan three one- hundred peso billswhich he
marked with his initials. They went to Chin Loong
Restaurant and conducted the buy-bust operation. PO1
Marchan approached petitioner and asked him if he
had shabu worth P300.00. Petitioner answered in the
affirmative. PO1 Marchan gave the P300.00 marked
money, and in return, petitioner gave him a plastic
sachet containing a white crystalline substance. When
PO1 Marchan executed the pre-arranged signal –
touching his hat – PO2 Germodo rushed towards
petitioner and PO1 Marchan and identified themselves
as police officers. Petitioner was informed he violated
the law on selling shabu. PO2 Germodo bodily
searched petitioner and recovered two plastic
sachetsfrom the brown belt purse of the latter. He
likewise recovered from petitioner the marked money,
a disposable lighter, and a tooter. The petitioner was
brought to the police station. PO1 Marchan issued a
receipt for the items recovered from the him. Per
request of PSI Tolentino, the three plastic sachets
containing white crystalline substance were sent to the
Crime Laboratory for forensic laboratory examination.
The results showed that the substance was in fact
shabu. PO1 Marchan disclosed that prior to the buy-
bust, he first saw petitioner at Music Box to familiarize
himself with petitioner’s physical features and voice.
He added he could not reveal the identity of the
informant in court, because it would endanger the life
of the latter. Quinicot, on the other hand, alleged that
no buy-bust operation occurred and that the evidence
allegedly confiscated from him was planted evidence.
He said he ordered take out from Chin Loong
Restaurant and the police officers in civilian attire
forced him to go with them. No warrant of arrest or
search warrant was presented. He was forced to ride a
pedicab and was bought to the police station. During
the inquest proceedings, he knew that the police had
planted the shabu. He denied possession of the shabu
and ownership of the wallet.Trial court found Qiunicot
guilty of violating Sections 15 and 16 of Republic Act
No. 6425. CA affirmed.
ISSUE: WON Quinicot’s guilt was proven beyond
reasonable doubt –YES!
WON the fact that the Receipt of Property Seized was
only signed by PO1 Marchan without any witnesses
was evidence of frame-up –NO!
HELD:
In asserting that there was no buy-bust operation and
that he was framed, petitioner asserts that (1) a
surveillance was not conducted: (2) it was highly
unbelievable that PO1 Marchan would know that
petitioner was a drug pusher and that the former, a
total stranger, would sell shabu to the latter; (3) it was
unlikely that the buy-bust operation was conducted at
noon; (4) the confidential informant was not presented
in court; and (5) the receipt of property seized was
signed only by PO1 Marchan without any
witnesses.
CrimPro
(part relevant to Rule 126) The Receipt of Property
Seized issued by PO1 Domingo Marchan was validly
made. It enumerated the items – three plastic sachets
containing white crystalline substance, and other
paraphernalia – recovered from petitioner’s body after
he was arrested for selling shabu to the poseur-buyer.
The lack of witnesses signing the same, petitioner
claims, is evidence of a frame-up. This contention is
false. The two witnesses were not required to sign the
receipt. This two-witness rule applies only to searches
-- made under authority of a search warrant -- of a
house, room, or any other premises in the absence of
the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his
family. In the case at bar, there was no search warrant
issued and no house, room or premises searched.
Having been caught in flagrante delicto, his identity as
seller and possessor of the shabu can no longer be
disputed. Against the positive testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, petitioner’s plain denial of the
offenses charged, unsubstantiated by any credible and
convincing evidence, must simply fail. Allegations of
frame-up and extortion by the police officers are
common and standard defenses in most dangerous
drugs cases. They are, however, viewed by this Court
with disfavor, for such defenses can be easily
concocted and fabricated. To prove such defenses, the
evidence must be clear and convincing.
(not so important) These assertions will not
exonerate the petitioner. Settled is the rule that the
absence of a prior surveillance or test buy does not
affect the legality of the buy-bust operation. There is
no textbook method of conducting buy-bust
operations. The Court has left to the discretion of
police authorities the selection of effective means to
apprehend drug dealers. A prior surveillance, much
less a lengthy one, is not necessary, especially where
the police operatives are accompanied by their
informant during the entrapment. The fact that the
police officer who acted as back-up was briefed only
for a few minutes does not prove that there was no
buy-bust operation that happened. Also, the
contention of the accused that it would be highly
improbable for PO1 Marchan a complete stranger to
the accused to offer to buy shabu from the latter is not
tenable. What matters in drug related cases is not the
existing familiarity between the seller and the buyer,
but their agreement and the acts constituting the sale
and delivery of the dangerous drug (People v.
Jaymalin, 214 SCRA 685). Besides, drug pushers,
especially small quantity or retail pushers, sell their
prohibited wares to anyone who can pay for the same,
be they strangers or not (People v. Madriaga, 211
SCRA 711). It is also not surprising that the buy-bust
operation was conducted at noontime. As we have
ruled, drug-pushing when done on a small scale, as in
this case, belongs to that class of crimes that may be
committed at any time and at any place.
The non-presentation of the confidential informant is
not fatal to the prosecution. Informants are usually not
252
 emedial Law Review CrimPro
Digests
presented in court because of the need to hide their
identity and preserve their invaluable service to the
police. It is well-settled that except when the petitioner
vehemently denies selling prohibited drugs and there
are material inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
arresting officers, or there are reasons to believe that
the arresting officers had motives to testify falsely
against the petitioner, or that only the informant was
the poseur-buyer who actually witnessed the entire
transaction, the testimony of the informant may be
dispensed with as it will merely be corroborative of the
apprehending officers' eyewitness testimonies.

253
 emedial Law Review
Digests
A. ADMISSIBILITY
GARCILLANO VS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
(Note: Sir did not give any citation for this but I only
found 1 garcillano vs house of reps lang naman.
Also, case is more on Consti rather than evidence.
Super short lang yung for rem)
Facts: Tapes which appears to contain a wiretapped
conversation purportedly between GMA and a high
ranking official of the comelec (Garci) surfaced. The
“hello garci” tapes allegedly contained GMA’s
instructions to garci to manipulate the votes in her
favor.
A congressional investigation in the House of
Reps was conducted. And after a prolonged debate,
the tapes were eventually played in the chambers of
the house. However, the house committees decided to
suspend the hearings indefinitely. Garcia filed a
petition for prohibition and injunction with the SC to
retrain the house committees from using these tape
recordings in their reports and for other purposes.
Later, the house discussion and debates on the hello
garci tapes abruptly stopped.
2years later, the matter was brought to life
again in the Senate after Lacson’s privilege speech.
Lengthy debates ensued as to whether conducting a
legislative inquiry on the matter will violate the Anti-
Wiretapping Law and the Consti. A petition was filed
with the SC by retired justices of the CA to bar the
senate from conducting its scheduled legislative
inquiry. SC did not issue an injunctive writ so the
senate proceeded with its public hearings.
Issue: Whether proceedings of the House and of the
Senate should be stopped? YES.
Held: Petition regarding proceeding in the House is
dismissed for being moot and academic. Recall that the
proceedings have been stopped already. As to the
proceedings in the Senate, SC grants petition to stop
them.
SC reasons out that the Senate cannot be
allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned
legislative inquiry without duly published rules of
procedure, in clear violation of the constitutional
requirement under Art6, sec21: “Senate or the House
of Representatives, or any of its respective committees
may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure."
The requisite of publication of the rules is
intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due
process. What constitutes publication is set forth in
Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that "laws
shall take effect after 15 days following the completion
of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines."
Note that the respondents in this case (house
of reps) admit the senate rules of procedure governing
inquiries in aid of legislation had been published only in
Evidence
1995 and 2006. With respect to the present 14th
Congress, no effort was undertaken for the publication
of these rules when they first opened their session.
[Discussion on jurisprudence and law on when
should Senate publish its rules followed. Basically,
Senate as an institution is continuing. However, with
regard to its day-to-day business, Senate of each
Congress (13th vs 14th vs 15th...etc) acts separately
and independently. Note that Senate has determined
that its MAIN rules are valid from their date of
adoption until they are amended or repealed. However,
with regard to the RULES such as the one governing
inquiries in aid of legislation, it only states that there
must be publication.]
IMPORTANT PART: House of Reps justify their
non-observance of this constitutionally mandated
publication by arguing that the rules have never been
amended since 1995 and that they are published in
booklet form available to anyone for free, and
accessible to the public at the senate’s internet page.
They claim that there was valid publication through the
internet by virtue of the E-Commerce Act.
SC does not agree. R.A. 8792 (E-Commerce)
considers an electronic data message or an electronic
document as the functional equivalent of a written
document only for evidentiary purposes. In other
words, the law merely recognizes the admissibility in
evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data
messages and/or electronic documents. It does not
make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules
and regulations.
E-Commerce Act provides: “For evidentiary
purposes, an electronic document shall be the
functional equivalent of a written document under
existing laws.
This Act does not modify any statutory rule
relating to the admissibility of electronic data
messages or electronic documents, except the rules
relating to authentication and best evidence.”
PEOPLE V LAUGA
FACTS: Lauga was accused of qualified rape for raping
his 13 year old daughter AAA. It was alleged in the
Information that in the afternoon of March 15, 2000,
AAA was left alone at home while her father, Lauga,
went to have a drinking spree at the neighbor’s place.
AAA’s mother and brother, BBB, also went out. At
10pm, Lauga woke AAA up, removed his pants, slid
inside the blanket covering AAA and removed her
pants and underwear; warned her not to shout for help
while threatening her with his fist; and told her that he
had a knife placed above her head. He proceeded to
mash her breast, kiss her repeatedly, and inserted his
penis inside her vagina.
When BBB arrived, he found AAA crying. Lauga
claimed he scolded her for staying out late. BBB
decided to take AAA with him. On their way to their
maternal grandmother’s house, AAA recounted her
harrowing experience with their father. Upon reaching
255
 emedial Law Review
Digests
their grandmother’s house, they told their
grandmother and uncle of the incident, after which,
they sought the assistance of the head of the Bantay
Bayan, Moises Boy Banting.
Banting found Lauga in his house wearing only
his underwear. He invited appellant to the police
station, to which Lauga obliged. At the police outpost,
he admitted that he raped AAA because he was unable
to control himself.
After a physical examination, the medical
certificate of Dra. Alsula shows that the victim’s hymen
was freshly lacerated. On his defense, Lauga asserted
that the charge against him was ill-motivated because
he sometimes physically abuses his wife in front of
their children after engaging in a heated
argument, and beats the children as a disciplinary
measure. He said that, on the day of the alleged rape,
he was furious to find that no food was prepared for
him and when his wife answered back when
confronted, this infuriated him that he kicked her hard
on her buttocks. Later that evening, he was awakened
by the members of “Bantay Bayan” and asked him to
go with them. He later learned that he was under
detention because AAA charged him with rape.
RTC found Lauga guilty of qualified rape. CA
affirmed.
ISSUE:
1. WON the alleged confession made before
a “bantay bayan” is admissible – NO
2. WON the testimony of prosecution witnesses
are credible - YES
HELD:
1. NO. Lauga argued that even if he confessed to
Banting, a "bantay bayan," the confession was
inadmissible in evidence because he was not assisted
by a lawyer and there was no valid waiver of such
requirement.
First, this Court needs to ascertain whether or
not a "bantay bayan" may be deemed a law
enforcement officer within the contemplation of Article
III, Section 12 of the Constitution.
In People of the Philippines v. Buendia, this
Court had the occasion to mention the nature of a
"bantay bayan," that is, "a group of male residents
living in [the] area organized for the purpose of
keeping peace in their community[,which is] an
accredited auxiliary of the x x x PNP."
This Court is convinced that "bantay bayan,"
are recognized by the local government unit to perform
functions relating to the preservation of peace and
order at the barangay level. Thus, any inquiry he
makes has the color of a state-related function and
objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his
constitutional rights provided for under Article III,
Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the
Miranda Rights, is concerned.
Evidence
Therefore, Lauga was already under custodial
investigation when he was apprehended by Banting
and his Miranda Rights should have been observed.
However, the inadmissibility of said confession
does not automatically lead to acquittal. But since in
this case, Lauga’s extrajudicial confession was taken
without a counsel, it is inadmissible in evidence.
2. YES. Lauga assails the inconsistencies in the
testimonies of AAA and her brother BBB. AAA testified
that BBB accompanied her to the house of their
grandmother. Thereafter, they, together with her
relatives, proceeded to look for a "bantay bayan." On
the other hand, BBB testified that he brought her sister
to the house of their "bantay bayan" after he learned
of the incident.
The testimony of AAA does not run contrary to
that of BBB. Both testified that they sought the help of
a "bantay bayan." Their respective testimonies differ
only as to when the help was sought for, which this
Court could well attribute to the nature of the
testimony of BBB, a shortcut version of AAA’s
testimony that dispensed with a detailed account of
the incident.
At any rate, the Court of Appeals is correct in
holding that the assailed inconsistency is too trivial to
affect the veracity of the testimonies. In fact,
inconsistencies which refer to minor, trivial or
inconsequential circumstances even strengthen the
credibility of the witnesses, as they erase doubts that
such testimonies have been coached or rehearsed.
Side Note:
Lauga’s contention that AAA charged him of rape only
because she bore grudges against him is likewise
unmeritorious. As correctly pointed out by the CA:
“Indeed, mere disciplinary chastisement is not strong
enough to make daughters in a Filipino family invent a
charge that would not only bring shame and
humiliation upon them and their families but also bring
their fathers into the gallows of death. The Supreme
Court has repeatedly held that it is unbelievable for a
daughter to charge her own father with rape, exposing
herself to the ordeal and embarrassment of a public
trial and subjecting her private parts to examination if
such heinous crime was not in fact committed. No
person, much less a woman, could attain such height
of cruelty to one who has sired her, and from whom
she owes her very existence, and for which she
naturally feels loving and lasting gratefulness. Even
when consumed with revenge, it takes a certain
amount of psychological depravity for a young woman
to concoct a story which would put her own father to
jail for the most of his remaining life and drag the rest
of the family including herself to a lifetime of shame. It
is highly improbable for the victim against whom no
proof of sexual perversity or loose morality has been
shown to fake charges much more against her own
father. In fact her testimony is entitled to greater
weight since her accusing words were directed against
a close relative.”
256
 emedial Law Review
Digests
B. JUDICIAL NOTICE
CORINTHIAN GARDENS VS SPOUSES TANJANGCO
FACTS: This case relates to a property dispute within
the Corinthian Gardens Subdivision, managed by their
association (“Corinthian”). Sps. Tanjangco alleges that
the perimeter fence of the Cuasos, encroached on their
lot which is directly adjacent to theirs. Because the
Cuasos refused to demolish the fence, the Tanjangcos
filed a suit for Recovery of Possession with Damages.
In turn, the Cuasos filed a Third Party
Complaint against Corinthian, Paraz Construction and
De Dios Realty and Surveying. They ascribed
negligence to Paraz for its failure to ascertain the
proper specifications of their house; and to De Dios
for his failure to undertake an accurate relocation
survey, thereby exposing them to litigation.
They faulted Corinthian for approving their
relocation survey and building plans without verifying
their accuracy, as well as making representations as to
De Dios' integrity and competence (being the firm who
conducted all the previous surveying for the developer,
Corinthian recommended the services of De Dios).
The Cuasos alleged that had Corinthian
exercised diligence in performing its duty, they would
not have been involved in a boundary dispute with the
Tanjangcos. Thus, the Cuasos opined that Corinthian
should also be held answerable for any damages that
they might incur as a result of such construction.
The RTC ruled that the fence did in fact
encroach on the Tanjangco lot. However, since the
Cuasos were builders in good faith, the court gave the
Tanjangcos the option to sell and the former the option
to buy the encroaching portion of the land, at a price
to be agreed upon by both. In the event that the
Cuasos were unable and unwilling to purchase the said
portion, the perimeter wall should be demolished at
the latter's expense. The RTC also ordered the Cuasos
to pay monthly rentals of P2,000.00 commencing from
the time of the filing of the complaint. Paraz was found
negligent for their disregard of the boundaries and was
ordered to pay damages. The complaint with respect to
De Dios and Corinthian was dismissed.
Because the RTC denied their Motion for
Reconsideration, the Tanjangcos appealed to the CA.
The Cuasos and Paraz also appealed.
On appeal, the CA reversed. It held that the
Cuasos were in bad faith and were land grabbers. Thus
the Tanjangcos were given the right to demand the
demolition of the fence, subject to their reimbursement
to the Cuasos of the necessary expenses for the
preservation of the fence. Also, the Cuasos were
ordered to pay, considering its location and category,
P10k a month as rent for the use and occupation of the
lot. They were also ordered to pay hefty sums for
damages and attorney’s fees.
The Cuasos appeal against the Tanjangcos
were dismissed. Paraz, De Dios and Corinthian were all
found negligent, and were ordered to contribute to all
Evidence
judgment sums that the Cuasos would pay under the
decision, and interest on the same.
Only Corinthian filed for reconsideration. Upon
denial by the CA, Corinthian filed for Certiorari,
impleading the Cuasos as one of the respondents in
the third party complaint in the RTC. Both submitted
their respective memorandums to the SC.
ISSUE RELEVANT TO RULE 129:
W/n the CA had legal basis to unilaterally increase the
amount of the adjudged rent from P2,000.00 to
P10,000.00 (which was not prayed for by the
Tanjangcos in their complaint and in the absence of
evidence adduced by the parties)? YES
RULING: The Tanjangcos opine that a court can take
judicial notice of the general increase in the rentals of
real estate, as in this case, where the CA considered
the value of their lot in the "posh-and-swank"
Corinthian Gardens Subdivision and the fact that they
were deprived of it for almost two decades. The
Tanjangcos pray that this Court sustain the ruling of
the CA.
On this issue, the ruling in Spouses Badillo v.
Tayag is instructive:
Petitioners argue that the MTC may take judicial
notice of the reasonable rental or the general price
increase of land in order to determine the amount
of rent that may be awarded to them. In that case,
however, this Court relied on the CA's factual
findings, which were based on the evidence
presented before the trial court. In determining
reasonable rent, the RTC therein took account of
the following factors: 1) the realty assessment of
the land, 2) the increase in realty taxes, and 3) the
prevailing rate of rentals in the vicinity. Clearly,
the trial court relied, not on mere judicial notice,
but on the evidence presented before it.
[C]ourts may fix the reasonable amount of rent
for the use and occupation of a disputed property.
However, petitioners herein erred in assuming that
courts, in determining the amount of rent, could
simply rely on their own appreciation of land
values without considering any evidence. As we
have said earlier, a court may fix the reasonable
amount of rent, but it must still base its action on
the evidence adduced by the parties.
Also, in Herrera v. Bollos the Court declared
that the reasonable amount of rent could be
determined not by mere judicial notice, but by
supporting evidence:
x x x A court cannot take judicial notice of a factual
matter in controversy. The court may take judicial
notice of matters of public knowledge, or which are
capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought
to be known to judges because of their judicial
functions. Before taking such judicial notice, the
court must "allow the parties to be heard thereon."
257
 emedial Law Review
Digests
Hence, there can be no judicial notice on the
rental value of the premises in question without
supporting evidence. Truly, mere judicial notice is
inadequate, because evidence is required for a court to
determine the proper rental value.
Now, contrary to Corinthian's arguments, both
the RTC and the CA found that indeed rent was due
the Tanjangcos because they were deprived of
possession and use of their property. This uniform
factual finding of the RTC and the CA was based on the
evidence presented below. Moreover, in Spouses
Catungal v. Hao, we considered the increase in the
award of rentals as reasonable given the particular
circumstances of each case. We noted therein that the
respondent denied the petitioners the benefits,
including rightful possession, of their property for
almost a decade.
Similarly, in the instant case, the Tanjangcos
were deprived of possession and use of their property
for more than two decades through no fault of their
own. Thus, we find no cogent reason to disturb the
monthly rental fixed by the CA. All told, the CA
committed no reversible error.
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY et al. v. ATIENZA
Note: this digest only contains facts, issue, and ratio in
relation to the topic under which it was assigned.
FACTS: Herein petitioners (SJS, Cabigao, Tumbokon)
filed a case for mandamus (Rule 65) to compel then
Mayor Atienza to enforce Ordinance 8027, which was
enacted in November 2001. Under the said Ordinance,
certain areas in Manila were reclassified from industrial
to commercial area. As such, the businesses of certain
groups, including petroleum companies (Chevron,
Petron and Shell are intervenors in the case, since they
were affected) became disallowed. The ordinance
directed them to cease and desist from operating in
the Pandacan Terminals. Later, a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) was entered into between the
Dept of Energy and the oil companies, which was to be
effective only for 6 months. The agreement was to the
effect that there would be only a ‘scaling down’ of the
Pandacan terminals, and for this purpose, special
business permits were issued to the oil companies. The
MOU was extended for a number of months. (This is
why the petitioners filed a mandamus case - to
compel the Mayor to enforce the Ordinance instead).
In 2007, the SC ruled that it was ministerial for the
mayor to enforce all ordinances.
The 3 oil companies and the DOE filed an MR.
This case is the resolution of such MR. as it turns out,
in the beginning, the 3 companies filed a complaint in
the Manila RTC to have the Ordinance annulled. The
court issued a preliminary injunction, ordering the
Mayor to refrain from enforcing the Ordinance.
Years after (in 2006), Ordinance 8119 known
as the Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan and
Zoning Ordinance was enacted. Because of this new
Evidence
Ordinance, the oil companies filed new complaints to
nullify it and they filed motions to withdraw their
earlier complaint (the one for nullifying the original
ordinance). In effect, their argument was that the later
ordinance superseded that first one, such that it was
error for the SC to rule that the Mayor should enforce
the first ordinance. (recall the SC ruling in the first
paragraph of this digest)
Issue: was the first Ordinance superseded by the
second one? – No.
[should courts take mandatory judicial notice of local
ordinances? – No]
Ruling: The 2007 decision did not take into
consideration the passage of the second Ordinance.
The simple reason was that the SC was never informed
about this ordinance.
While courts are required to take judicial notice
of the laws enacted by Congress, the rule with respect
to local ordinances is different. Ordinances are not
included in the enumeration of matters covered by
mandatory judicial notice under Section 1, Rule 129 of
the Rules of Court.
Section 50 of RA 409provides that: “Judicial
notice of ordinances. - All courts sitting in the city shall
take judicial notice of the ordinances passed by the
SangguniangPanglungsod.”However, this cannot be
taken to mean that the SC, since it has its seat in the
City of Manila, should have taken steps to procure a
copy of the ordinance on its own, relieving the party of
any duty to inform the Court about it. Because even
where there is a statute that requires a court to take
judicial notice of municipal ordinances, a court is not
required to take judicial notice of ordinances that are
not before it and to which it does not have access. The
party asking the court to take judicial notice is
obligated to supply the court with the full text of the
rules the party desires it to have notice of.Counsels
should take the initiative in requesting that a trial court
take judicial notice of an ordinance even where a
statute requires courts to take judicial notice of local
ordinances.
The failure to present the Ordinance is
inexcusable.
G HOLDINGS V. NATIONAL MINES
FACTS:The petitioner, “G” Holdings, Inc. (GHI), is a
domestic corporation primarily engaged in the business
of owning and holding shares of stock of different
companies. MMC was incorporated by the Development
Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and the Philippine
National Bank (PNB) on account of their foreclosure of
Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation’s assets.
Pursuant to a Purchase and Sale Agreement executed
between GHI and Asset Privatization Trust (APT), the
former bought ninety percent (90%) of MMC’s shares
and financial claims. These financial claims were
converted into three Promissory Notes issued by MMC
258
 emedial Law Review
Digests
in favor of GHI totaling P500M and secured by
mortgages over MMC’s properties. Upon the signing of
the Purchase and Sale Agreement and upon the full
satisfaction of the stipulated down payment, GHI
immediately took physical possession of the mine site
and its facilities, and took full control of the
management and operation of MMC.
Almost four years thereafter, a labor dispute
arose between MMC and NAMAWU. Labor secretary
(Quisumbing) said that there was illegal dismissal and
that MMC committed unfair labor practice. He then
ordered the reinstatement of the laid-off workers, with
payment of full backwages and benefits, and directed
the execution of a new collective bargaining agreement
(CBA) incorporating the terms and conditions of the
previous CBA providing for an annual increase in the
workers’ daily wage. In two separate cases filed with
this Court, we sustained the validity of the Quisumbing
Order, which became final and executory. Then DOLE
Secretary Arturo D. Brion, on motion of NAMAWU,
directed the issuance of a partial writ of execution
(Brion Writ), and ordered the DOLE sheriffs to proceed
to the MMC premises for the execution of the same.
The Brion Writ was not fully satisfied because MMC’s
resident manager resisted its enforcement. On motion
of NAMAWU, then DOLE Secretary Patricia A. Sto.
Tomas ordered the issuance of an Alias Writ of
Execution and Break-Open Order (Sto. Tomas Writ).
On October 11, 2002, the respondent acting sheriffs,
the members of the union, and several armed men
implemented the Sto. Tomas Writ, and levied on the
properties of MMC located at its compound in Sipalay,
Negros Occidental.
GHI filed a for Contempt with Prayer for the
Issuance of a TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction
and to Nullify the Sheriff’s Levy on Properties. GHI
contended that the levied properties were the subject
of a Deed of Real Estate and Chattel Mortgage,
executed by MMC in favor of GHI to secure the
aforesaid P550M promissory notes; that this deed was
registered on February 24, 2000; and that the
mortgaged properties were already extrajudicially
foreclosed in July 2001 and sold to GHI as the highest
bidder.
The CA ruled, among others, that the
circumstances surrounding the execution of the
September 5, 1996 Deed of Real Estate and Chattel
Mortgage yielded the conclusion that the deed was
sham, fictitious and fraudulent; that it was executed
two weeks after the labor dispute arose in 1996, but
surprisingly, it was registered only on February 24,
2000, immediately after the Court affirmed with finality
the Quisumbing Order. The CA also found that the
certificates of title to MMC’s real properties did not
contain any annotation of a mortgage lien, and,
suspiciously, GHI did not intervene in the long drawn-
out labor proceedings to protect its right as a
mortgagee of virtually all the properties of MMC.
The CA further ruled that the subsequent
foreclosure of the mortgage was irregular, effected
Evidence
precisely to prevent the satisfaction of the judgment
against MMC.
ISSUE: To decide whether or not CA committed
GADLEJ, the Court has to determine whether or not
GHI and MMC are one and the same company and
whether or not the alleged mortgages were valid
mortgages. To do this, must the court consider its
previous decisions related to the matter? Must it take
judicial notice? YES.
HELD: Judicial notice must be taken by this Court of its
Decision in Maricalum Mining Corporation v. Hon.
Arturo D. Brion and NAMAWU, in which we upheld the
right of herein private respondent, NAMAWU, to its
labor claims. Upon the same principle of judicial
notice, we acknowledge our Decision in Republic of
the Philippines, through its trustee, the Asset
Privatization Trust v. “G” Holdings, Inc., in which GHI
was recognized as the rightful purchaser of the shares
of stocks of MMC, and thus, entitled to the delivery of
the company notes accompanying the said purchase.
These company notes, consisting of three (3)
Promissory Notes, were part of the documents
executed in 1992 in the privatization sale of MMC by
the Asset Privatization Trust (APT) to GHI. Each of
these notes uniformly contains stipulations
“establishing and constituting in favor of GHI”
mortgages over MMC’s real and personal properties.
The stipulations were subsequently formalized in a
separate document denominated Deed of Real Estate
and Chattel Mortgage on September 5, 1996.
Thereafter, the Deed was registered on February 4,
2000.
We find both decisions critically relevant
to the instant dispute. In fact, they should have
guided the courts below in the disposition of the
controversy at their respective levels. To repeat,
these decisions respectively confirm the right of
NAMAWU to its labor claims and affirm the right
of GHI to its financial and mortgage claims over
the real and personal properties of MMC, as will
be explained below. The assailed CA decision
apparently failed to consider the impact of these
two decisions on the case at bar. Thus, we find it
timely to reiterate that: “courts have also taken
judicial notice of previous cases to determine
whether or not the case pending is a moot one or
whether or not a previous ruling is applicable to
the case under consideration.”
However, the CA correctly assessed that the
authority of the lower court to issue the challenged
writ of injunction depends on the validity of the third
party’s (GHI’s) claim of ownership over the property
subject of the writ of execution issued by the labor
department. Accordingly, the main inquiry addressed
by the CA decision was whether GHI could be treated
as a third party or a stranger to the labor dispute,
whose properties were beyond the reach of the Writ of
Execution dated December 18, 2001.
259
 emedial Law Review
Digests
In this light, all the more does it become
imperative to take judicial notice of the two cases
aforesaid, as they provide the necessary perspective to
determine whether GHI is such a party with a valid
ownership claim over the properties subject of the writ
of execution. In Juaban v. Espina, we held that
“in some instances, courts have also taken
judicial notice of proceedings in other cases that
are closely connected to the matter in
controversy. These cases may be so closely
interwoven, or so clearly interdependent, as to
invoke a rule of judicial notice.” The two cases
that we have taken judicial notice of are of such
character, and our review of the instant case cannot
stray from the findings and conclusions therein.
(REGARDING THE MERITS: Court ruled that the
mortgage was valid, hence at that time, MMC had no
more properties to attach. Also, just because the GH
bought majority of the shares of the MMC is not valid
reason per se to pierce the veil of corporate fiction.)
SPOUSES LATIP VS CHUA
FACTS: CHUA, an owner of a commercial building in
Baclaran, filed an unlawful detainer case against
Spouses LATIP for non-payment of their lease of two
cubicles in the building. LATIP countered that the lease
was already paid in full, showing receipts (P2.75M
total), which they paid even before construction of the
building was finished. LATIP averred that the contract
of lease was novated by the purchase of lease rights
over the cubicles.
MetTC: In favor of CHUA.
RTC: Reversed!
CA: Reversed RTC! Said that the P2.75M
merely constituted goodwill money. CA took judicial
notice of this common practice in the area of
Baclaran.
ISSUE: W/N the judicial notice of CA of the alleged
practice of prospective lessees in the Baclaran area to
pay goodwill money to the lessor is valid. – NO.
RATIO: Matters of judicial notice have three material
requisites:
(1) the matter must be one of common and general
knowledge;
(2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not
doubtful or uncertain; and
(3) it must be known to be within the limits of the
jurisdiction of the court.
The principal guide in determining what facts may be
assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety.
Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to
facts evidenced by public records and facts of general
notoriety. Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be
one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is
either: (1) generally known within the territorial
jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate
Evidence
and ready determination by resorting to sources whose
accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable.
Things of “common knowledge,” of which
courts take judicial notice, may be matters coming to
the knowledge of men generally in the course of the
ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters
which are generally accepted by mankind as true and
are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration.
But a court cannot take judicial notice of any fact
which, in part, is dependent on the existence or non-
existence of a fact of which the court has no
constructive knowledge.
In this case, CA’s judicial notice does not meet
the requisite of notoriety. To begin with, only the CA
took judicial notice of this supposed practice to pay
goodwill money to the lessor in the Baclaran area.
Neither the MeTC nor the RTC found that the practice
was of “common knowledge” or notoriously known.
RTC specifically ruled that CHUA, apart from her bare
allegation, adduced no evidence to prove her claim
that the amount of P2.75M simply constituted the
payment of goodwill money.
The practice of payment of goodwill
money in the Baclaran area is an inadequate
subject of judicial notice. Neither was CHUA able to
provide sufficient evidence that, apart from the
belatedly submitted Joint Affidavit of the stallholders of
Roferxane Bldg., the said amount was simply for the
payment of goodwill money, and not payment for
advance rentals by LATIP.
Justices and judges alike ought to be reminded
that the power to take judicial notice must be
exercised with caution and every reasonable doubt on
the subject should be ample reason for the claim of
judicial notice to be promptly resolved in the negative.
C. JUDICIAL ADMISSION
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY vs. ATIENZA
Facts: An ordinance was passed by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Manila. This ordinance reclassified a
certain area from industrial to commercial. This area
included the “Pandacan Terminals” owned by the
certain oil companies (Chevron, Petron and Shell). The
ordinance directed the owners of businesses located
within the reclassified area to cease and desist their
operations within 6 months from the effectivity of the
ordinance. Aggrieved, the oil companies filed separate
complaints for the annulment of the ordinance. In the
case filed by Petron, the parties filed a joint motion to
withdraw complaint and counterclaim, which was
granted.
Thereafter, the city of Manila passed another
ordinance called the Manila Comprehensive Land Use
Plan and Zoning Ordinance of 2006 (I think this was
basically the same with the previous ordinance). So
again, the oil companies filed several complaints
challenging the validity of this new ordinance.
The oil companies are now arguing that the
subsequent ordinance had repealed the earlier one.
260
 emedial Law Review
Digests
They argue that in the case filed by Petron where the
parties filed a joint motion to withdraw, it was stated
therein that “the issue… has been rendered moot and
academic by the passage of [the subsequent
ordinance].” In addition, they also argue that in one of
the complaints filed against the subsequent ordinance,
the city of Manila mentioned in its answer that “[the
earlier ordinance], which in effect, replaced [the
subsequent ordinance]…” Hence, they argue that this
was tantamount to an admission by the city of Manila
that the new ordinance repealed the old one.
Issue: W/N the city of Manila made an admission that
the subsequent ordinance repealed the older one. NO!
Held/Ratio:
Rule 129, Section 4
Judicial admissions. ― An admission, verbal or
written, made by a party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case, does not require
proof. The admission may be contradicted only by
showing that it was made through palpable mistake or
that no such admission was made.
Judicial admission – must be made in the same case in
which it is offered
While it is true that a party making a judicial
admission cannot subsequently take a position
contrary to or inconsistent with what was pleaded, the
Rule 129, Section 4 is not applicable here. The city of
Manila made the statements regarding the ordinances
in the civil cases (complaints for annulment of the
ordinance) which are not "the same" as this case
before the SC. To constitute a judicial admission, the
admission must be made in the same case in which it
is offered.
Hence, the city of Manila is not estopped from
claiming the new ordinance repealed the older one. On
the contrary, it is the oil companies which should be
considered estopped. They rely on the argument that
latter ordinance superseded the older one but, at the
same time, also impugn its (the subsequent
ordinance’s) validity. Parties cannot take vacillating or
contrary positions regarding the validity of a statute or
ordinance.
CUENCO V TALISAY TOURIST SPORTS COMPLEX
FACTS: Cuenco leased from Talisay the Talisay Tourist
Sports Complex for 2 years to be used as cockpit
arena. The contract of lease was subsequently
renewed for 4 years. Cuenco made a deposit
equivalent to 6 months rental or five hundred
thousand pesos. The deposit was for the purpose of
answering any damage which may be caused to the
complex.
Upon expiration of the contract, the lease was
awarded to another lessee. This promted Cuenco to
demand the return of the deposit. After 4 demands
which were all unheeded, Cuenco instituted an action
Evidence
for the collection of a sum of money with the RTC. RTC
ruled in favor of Cuenco.
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the
RTC judgment.
On appeal, the SC reinstated the RTC
judgment but modifying it by ordering Talisay to
deduct 2 months worth of rental from the deposit after
finding that Cuenco overstayed for 2 months. Both
parties filed their respective MR’s. Cuenco claims that
he did not overstay while Talisay claims that an
additional amount be still deducted from the deposit
representing the expense it incurred in renovating the
facility.
ISSUE: Whether or not Cuenco in fact overstayed for 2
months – YES
HELD: It is elementary that the Supreme Court is not
a trier of facts especially if appeal has been taken by
way of petition for review on certiorari under rule 45.
However, as an exception, the SC may review findings
of facts of the findings of the RTC differ from that of
the CA
Borne out by the records of the case is the
testimony of Ateniso Coronado that Cuenco continued
to hold cockfights for two months beyond the
expiration of the lease contract. Such declaration was
neither questioned nor denied by petitioner during the
trial of the case in the RTC and on appeal before the
CA. Neither was it contested by petitioner in his
Memorandum filed with this Court. In effect, such
declaration constitutes a judicial admission and may
not be refuted anymore.
TOSHIBA V CIR
FACTS: Toshiba is registered with PEZA as an
Economic Zone (ECOZONE) export enterprise. It is also
registered with BIR as a VAT-taxpayer. As a tax-
exempt entity and with its export sales VAT-exempt,
Toshiba wants to claim for credit/refund of its
unutilized input VAT payments attributable to its
export sales. CIR opposes this claim, stating that
Toshiba failed to show that the total amount claimed
as VAT input taxes are properly substantiated by
official receipts and invoices, and have been offset
against any output tax. It also said that Toshiba is not
entitled to the credit/refund of its input VAT payments
because, being a PEZA-registered ECOZONE export
enterprise, Toshiba is not subject to VAT. Well-
established is the rule that claims for refund/tax credit
are construed in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer
as it partakes the nature of exemption from tax.
During the trial before the CTA, Toshiba presented
documentary evidence in support of its claim for tax
credit/refund, while the CIR did not present any
evidence at all.
Issue: Is Toshiba VAT-registered and are its export
sales subject to zero-rated VAT? – Yes.
261
 emedial Law Review
Digests
Held: The arguments of the CIR that Toshiba is VAT-
exempt and the latter’s export sales are VAT-exempt
transactions are inconsistent with the explicit
admissions of the CIR in the Joint Stipulation of Facts
and Issues (Joint Stipulation) that Toshiba is a
registered VAT entity and that it is subject to zero
percent (0%) VAT on its export sales.1 The CIR is
bound by these admissions, which it could not
eventually contradict in its MR.
The Joint Stipulation was executed and
submitted by Toshiba and the CIR upon being advised
to do so by the CTA at the end of the pre-trial
conference. The approval of the Joint Stipulation by
the CTA marked the start of the pre-trial process.
Under Rule 18, sec. 2(d), part of the purposes of pre-
trial is the possibility of obtaining stipulations or
admissions of facts and of documents to avoid
unnecessary proof.
The admission having been made in a
stipulation of facts at pre-trial by the parties, it must
be treated as a judicial admission. Section 4, Rule 129
provides that a judicial admission requires no
proof. The admission may be contradicted only by a
showing that it was made through palpable mistake or
that no such admission was made. The Court cannot
lightly set aside a judicial admission especially when
the opposing party relied upon the same and
accordingly dispensed with further proof of the fact
already admitted.
Absent finding of the commission of a mistake,
much more, of a palpable one, the Court holds that the
CIR cannot escape the binding effect of its
judicial admissions. The CIR does not deny that his
counsel, Revenue Attorney Biazon of the BIR, signed
the Joint Stipulation, together with the counsel of
Toshiba. Considering the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duty, Atty. Biazon is
presumed to have read, studied, and understood the
contents of the Joint Stipulation before he signed the
same. It rests on the CIR to present evidence to the
contrary, which it failed to do so.
Further, the judicial admissions of the CIR in
the Joint Stipulation are not intrinsically false,
wrong, or illegal. On the contrary, they are
consistent with the ruling of this Court in a previous
case involving the same parties, CIR v Toshiba,
explaining the VAT treatment of PEZA-registered
enterprises.
An admission made by a party in the course of
the proceedings does not require proof. Thus, in light
of the judicial admissions of Toshiba, the CTA correctly
confined itself to the other factual issues submitted for
resolution by the parties.
1
Toshiba “is a duly registered value-added tax entity in
accordance with Section 107 of the Tax Code, as
amended[,]” that “is subject to zero percent (0%) value-
added tax on its export sales in accordance with then Section
100(a)(2)(A) of the Tax Code, as amended.”
Evidence
D. PARAFFIN TEST
MARTURILLAS V. PEOPLE
FACTS: Marturillas, a barangay capt. in Davao City,
was charged with homicide, for the shooting of the
victim Artemio Pantinople. Basically, around 7:30pm at
the night of the incident, witness Lito Santos, neighbor
of Artemio, heard a gunshot while eating supper. When
he looked outside, he noticed smoke and fire coming
from the muzzle of a big gun, which was about 10
meters away. Moments later, Lito saw Artemio clasping
his chest and staggering towards his (Lito’s) kitchen,
while shouting “Help me, I was shot by the captain.”
Lito however did not approach Artemio right after the
shooting because his own wife warned him that he
might also be shot. Lito then saw Artemio’s wife,
Ernita, who shouted and cried, “Kapitan, bakit mo
binaril ang aking asawa?” Lito did not see who the
shooter was, but Ernita, who also testified during trial,
saw appellant Marturillas carrying with him a long
firearm, which looked like an M-14 rifle. She testified
that she had a clear view of Marturillas at that time
since the place was well illuminated. Immediately after
the shooting incident, Ernita called out to her
neighbors for help. When the police arrived at the
scene, Ernita informed them that it was Marturillas
who was responsible for the shooting. With this
information, the police went to the house of Marturillas
and informed him that he was a suspect in the killing
of Artemio. Marturillas was invited to go to the police
station and was asked by the police to bring with him
his M-14 rifle, to which the accused-appellant
complied. Marturillas was then subjected to paraffin
testing by the PNP Crime Lab the day after the
shooting incident. The next day, the results of the
paraffin test were released which found Marturillas
NEGATIVE for gunpowder nitrates. After trial, the RTC
found Marturillas guilty beyond reasonable doubt. On
appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision, saying that
Marturillas was positively identified as the person
running away from the crime scene immediately after
the gunshot. This fact, together with the declaration of
the victim himself that he had been shot by the
captain, clearly established the latter’s complicity in
the crime. Now with the SC, Marturillas contends
that there should have been no finding of guilt
because of the negative results of the paraffin
test and that the prosecution miserably failed to
establish the type of gun used in the commission of
the crime.
ISSUE: W/N Marturillas should be acquitted on
the ground of the negative results of the paraffin
test. – NO.
RATIO: While they were negative, that fact alone did
not ipso facto prove that he was innocent. Time and
time again, the SC has held that a negative paraffin
test result is not a conclusive proof that a person
has not fired a gun. In other words, it is possible to
262
 emedial Law Review
Digests
fire a gun and yet be negative for nitrates, as when
culprits wear gloves, wash their hands afterwards, or
are bathed in perspiration. Besides, the prosecution
was able to establish the events during the shooting,
including the presence of petitioner at the scene of the
crime. Hence, all other matters, such as the negative
paraffin test result, are of lesser probative value. As
long as the prosecution has presented sufficient proof
of the corpus delicti, even the failure to conduct a
paraffin test is not fatal to its case. In another case,
the SC has ruled that: "Anent the failure of the
investigators to conduct a paraffin test on petitioner,
this Court has time and again held that such failure is
not fatal to the case of the prosecution as scientific
experts agree that the paraffin test is extremely
unreliable and it is not conclusive as to an accused’s
complicity in the crime committed."
E. PHOTOGRAPH AS EVIDENCE
ARMANDO JOSE AND MANILA CENTRAL BUS
LINES V. CA – January 18, 2000
FACTS: Armando Jose is a Bus driver of Manila Central
Bus Lines. The bus collided with a red Ford escort
driven by John Macarubo, a passenger on said car was
private respondent Rommel Abraham. Macarubo died
in the hospital, while Abraham lost his left eye and
suffered a head fracture.
Heirs of Macarubo and Abraham sued Jose and
Bus Co. for damage. On the other hand Bus Co. filed
third party complaint against Juanita Macarubo, the
owner of the Ford escort who likewise filed a
counterclaim against the Bus Co. for damages to her
car.
The RTC ruled in favor of the Bus Co.,
dismissing the complaint for damages of Macarubo and
Abraham. RTC ordered Juanita Macarubo to pay for the
damages to the bus.
The RTC held that Macarubo and Abraham
came from a party the night before. The Ford Escort
broke down at around 11PM in the evening and had to
be repaired and when it was repaired it was already
6AM. Thus the RTC held that at that time, Macarubo
was already tired and he must have been speeding to
get home quickly. This conclusion was supported by 3
pictures that showed that the Bus was at the right lane
and the position of the car indicated that it was
overtaking at the time of the accident.
CA reversed and held the Bus Co liable. It
ruled that the photographs were taken an hour after
the collision and the position of the vehicles could have
been changed in the interim. Moreover, the pictures do
not show that Macarubo was overtaking at the time of
the accident and that he was negligent.
ISSUE: Who is at fault? Macarubo and not the Bus.
HELD: The trial court was justified in relying on the
photographs rather than on Abraham’s testimony
which was obviously biased and unsupported by any
Evidence
other evidence. Physical evidence is a mute but an
eloquent manifestation of truth, and it ranks high in
our hierarchy of trustworthy evidence. Physical
evidence on record should prevail over testimony that
runs counter to it.
Here, the positions of the two vehicles, as
shown in the photographs taken by the Bus Co.’s
inspector about an hour after the collision, disputes
Abraham’s self-serving testimony that the two vehicles
collided because the Bus invaded the lane of the Ford
Escort and clearly shows that the case is exactly the
opposite of what he claimed happened.
Contrary to Abraham’s testimony, the
photographs show clearly that Bus was in its proper
lane and that it was the Ford Escort which usurped the
opposite lane. The three photographs show the Ford
Escort positioned diagonally on the highway, with its
two front wheels occupying Bus’s lane.
Moreover, the testimony of Abraham shows
that more likely the reason for the accident was a
mechanical defect of the Ford Escort due to the failure
of Macarubo to properly repair the vehicle. The defect
was in the cross-joint of the car which should have
been replaced but was merely welded in order for
them to get home quickly.
F. BEST EVIDENCE RULE/SECONDARY EVIDENCE
EDSA SHANGRI-LA HOTEL AND RESORT, INC. et
al. v. BF CORPORATION
FACTS: These are 2 consolidated petitions where the
1st petition is Edsa Shang, Colayco, Samaniego, Chen,
and Tsen. The petitioner in the 2nd petition is Cynthia
Del Castillo.
EDHRI entered into a constraction contract
with BF, where BF was to construct the EDSA Shanri-la
Hotel. Among other things, the contract stipulate for
the payment of the contract price on the basis of
monthly progress billing to ESHRI, which would then
re-measure the work accomplished and prepare a
Progress Payment Certificate for that month’s progress
billing.
The procedure for BF to collect was it should
submit a PROGRESS BILLING to ESHRI’s Engineering
dept. first, and then ESHRI should prepare a Progress
Payment Certificate after re-measuring the progress
done, so BF should follow up release of its payment.
From May 1, 1991 to June 30, 1992, BF adhered to
this process. It submitted a total of 19 progress
billings. Based on PB Nos. 1-13, ESHRI paid P86.5
million.
However, for PB Nos. 14-19, BF alleges that
ESHRI did not re-measure the work done and did not
remit payment. In this regard, BF claimed having been
misled into working continuously on the project by the
assurance of ESHRI that it is processing its progress
payment certificates.
After futile attempts to collect unpaid billings,
BF filed a suit for a sum of money and damages.
ESHRI in its defense, asked BF to refund excess
263
 emedial Law Review
Digests
payments overpaid supposedly for PB Nos. 1-13. They
also alleged incurring delay and inferior work
accomplishment.
RTC ruled in favor of BF. It the dispositive
portion it held Colayco, Samaniego, Dean Del, Chan
and Tsen solidarily liable to pay P24.7 million,
retention sum of P5.8 million, interest, P1M moral and
P1M exemplary damages and P1M attys fees. RTC held
that ESHRI’s refusal to pay BF’s claims is evident of
bad faith. MR denied.
Appeal to the CA. Meanwhile, the RTC granted
BF’s motion for execution pending appeal and ESHRI’s
PNB bank account was garnished for the amount of
P35M. CA issued a writ of preliminary injunction to
enjoin the RTC to lift the garnishment. The CA later on
set aside the garnishment order. But CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC. CA held that ESHRI was remiss in
its obligation to re-measure BF's later work
accomplishments and pay the same. On the other
hand, ESHRI had failed to prove the basis of its
disclaimer from liability, such as its allegation on the
defective work accomplished by BF.
ISSUE: W/N the lower courts erred in allowing the
admission in evidence of PHOTOCOPIES of Progress
Billings Nos. 14-19, as well as the complementing PMIs
and WVOs. ESHRI alleges that BF failed to lay the
basis for the presentation of the photocopies as
secondary evidence, conformably to the best evidence
rule. BF however claims that said documents were in
the possession of ESHRI which refused to hand them
over to BF despite requests.
HELD/RATIO: ADMISSIBLE
The only actual rule that the term "best
evidence" denotes is the rule requiring that the original
of a writing must, as a general proposition, be
produced17 and secondary evidence of its contents is
not admissible except where the original cannot be
had. Rule 130, Section 3 of the Rules of Court
enunciates the best evidence rule:
SEC. 3. Original document must be produced;
exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document
itself, except in the following cases:
(b) When the original is in the custody or
under the control of the party against
whom the evidence is offered, and the
latter fails to produce it after reasonable
notice;
Complementing the above provision is Sec. 6 of Rule
130, which reads:
SEC. 6. When original document is in adverse
party's custody or control. - If the document is
in the custody or under control of the adverse
party, he must have reasonable notice to
produce it. If after such notice and after
satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to
produce the document, secondary evidence
may be presented as in the case of loss.
Evidence
Secondary evidence of the contents of a
written instrument or document refers to evidence
other than the original instrument or document
itself.18 A party may present secondary evidence of the
contents of a writing not only when the original is lost
or destroyed, but also when it is in the custody or
under the control of the adverse party. In either
instance, however, certain explanations must be given
before a party can resort to secondary evidence.
Four factual premises are readily deducible
from the exchanges between the lawyers of the
respective parties, to wit: (1) the existence of the
original documents which ESHRI had possession of; (2)
a request was made on ESHRI to produce the
documents; (3) ESHRI was afforded sufficient time to
produce them; and (4) ESHRI was not inclined to
produce them.
Clearly, the circumstances obtaining in this
case fall under the exception under Sec. 3(b) of Rule
130. In other words, the conditions sine qua non for
the presentation and reception of the photocopies of
the original document as secondary evidence have
been met. These are: (1) there is proof of the original
document's execution or existence; (2) there is proof
of the cause of the original document's unavailability;
and (3) the offeror is in good faith.
Mere fact that the original of the writing is in
the custody of the party against whom it is offered
does not warrant submission of secondary evidence. It
must be proven that the offeror has done everything in
his power to secure the best evidence but the other
party refuses to produce it.
CONCEPCION CHUA GAW V. SUY BEN CHUA
(2008)
Facts:
Spouses Chua Chin and Chan Chi were founders of
3 business enterprises: Hagonoy Lumber, Capitol
Sawmill Corporation, and Columbia Wood
Industries. They had 7 children, including
respondent Suy Ben Chua and petitioner
Concepcion Chua Gaw. On June 19, 1986, Chua
Chin died leaving Chan Chi and his 7 children his
only surviving heirs. At that time, the net worth of
Hagonoy Lumber was P415, 487.20.
On Dec. 8, 1986, the heirs execute a Deed of
Extra-Judicial Partition and Renunciation of
Hereditary Rights in Favor of a Co-Heir, wherein
the heirs voluntarily renounced and waived their
shares (including Chan Chi’s ½ share by virtue of
her share in the conjugal partnership) in Hagonoy
Lumber in favor of their co-heir Chua Sioc Huan.
In May 1988, petitioner Chua Gaw and her
husband Antonio Gaw asked respondent Suy Ben
to lend them P200T for the construction of their
house in Marilao, Bulacan. The parties agreed that
the loan will be payable within 6 months w/o
interest. Suy Ben issued in their favor a check for
264
 emedial Law Review
Digests
P200T which he delivered to the couple’s house in
Marilao.
On Aug. 1990, Chua Sioc Huan executed a Deed of
Sale over all her rights and interests in Hagonoy
Lumber for a consideration of P255T in favor of
Suy Ben.
Because the spouses Gaw failed to settle their
obligation with Suy Ben, he filed a Complaint for
Sum of Money against the spouses Gaw with the
RTC.
In their Answer (w/ Amended Compulsory
Counterclaim), the spouses Gaw claimed that the
P200T was not a loan but their share in the profits
of Hagonoy Lumber. They insisted that Concepcion
Chua Gaw, as one of the compulsory heirs, is
entitled to 1/6 of Hagonoy Lumber which Suy Ben
arrogated to himself. They thus prayed that Suy
Ben make an accounting of the operations of
Hagonoy Lumber and deliver to Concepcion Gaw
her 1/6 share thereof, which was estimated to be
P500T.
In his Answer to the Amended Counterclaim, Suy
Ben explained that his sister Chua Sioc Huan
became the sole owner of Hagonoy Lumber when
they executed the Deed of Partition. In turn, he
became the sole owner when he bought it from
Chua Sioc Huan, as evidenced by the Deed of Sale.
During trial, the spouses Gaw called Suy Ben to
testify as adverse witness under Sec 10, Rule 132.
On direct examination, Suy Ben testified that
Hagonoy Lumber was the conjugal property of his
parents and that he is the current owner of the lots
where Hagonoy Lumber is operating. On cross-
examination, Suy Ben explained that he ceased to
be a stockholder of Capitol Sawmill when he sold
his shares to the other stockholders. He also
testified that Chua Sioc Huan acquired Hagonoy
Lumber by virtue of a Deed of Partition, executed
by the heirs of Chua Chin. In turn, he became the
owner of Hagonoy Lumber when he bought it from
Chua Sioc Huan through a Deed of Sale. On re-
direct examination, Suy Ben stated that he sold his
shares in Capitol Sawmill for P254T (in cash) and
paid the purchase price of P255T for Hagonoy
Lumber (in cash) but said payment was not
covered by a separate receipt but merely delivered
the payment to Chua Sioc Huan at her house
Valenzuela. Although he maintains several
accounts in 3 banks, the amount he paid to Chua
Sioc Huan was not taken from any of them since
he had enough cash in his house because he was
engaged in rediscounting checks of people from
the public market.
On Dec. 1998, Antonio Gaw died.
RTC rendered a Decision in favor of Suy Ben and
denied Concepcion Gaw’s counterclaim. The RTC
held that the validity and due execution of the
Deed of Partition and the Deed of Sale was never
impugned. It said that even if Suy Ben failed to
produce the originals of the document, Concepcion
Gaw judicially admitted the due execution of the
Evidence
Deed of Partition and acknowledged her signature
thereon, thus constituting an exception to the best
evidence rule. As for the Deed of Sale, since the
contents thereof were not put in issue, the RTC
said that non-presentation of the original
document is not fatal so as to affect its authenticity
as well as the truth of its contents.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the
RTC. The CA found petitioner’s argument that the
RTC should have not included Suy Ben’s testimony
as part of her evidence baseless.
Petitioner Concepcion Gaw filed this petition for
review on certiorari assailing the CA decision. Gaw
contends that her case was unduly prejudiced by
the RTC’s treatment of Suy Ben’s testimony as
adverse witness during cross-examination by his
own counsel as part of her evidence.
Issues:
1. Whether there was error in the application of
Rule 132 Section 10 (d) and (e)? No.
2. Whether there was error in the application of
the “best evidence rule” under Rule 130
Section 3? No.
Held: Petition denied.
Rule 132 Section 10 (d) and (e)
Gaw’s case was not prejudiced by the RTC’s treatment
of Suy Ben’s testimony during cross-examination as
her evidence.
The delineation of a piece of evidence as part
of the evidence of one party or the other is only
significant in determining whether the party on whose
shoulders lies the burden of proof was able to meet the
quantum of evidence needed to discharge the burden.
In civil cases, that burden devolves upon the plaintiff
who must establish her case by preponderance of
evidence. Thus, it barely matters who with a piece of
evidence is credited. In the end, the court will have to
consider the entirety of the evidence presented by
both parties. Preponderance of evidence is then
determined by considering all the facts and
circumstances of the case, culled from the
evidence, regardless of who actually presented it.
That the witness is the adverse party does not
necessarily mean that the calling party will not be
bound by the former's testimony. Unlike an ordinary
witness, the calling party may impeach an adverse
witness in all respects as if he had been called by the
adverse party, except by evidence of his bad
character. Under a rule permitting the impeachment of
an adverse witness, although the calling party does not
vouch for the witness' veracity, he is nonetheless
bound by his testimony if it is not contradicted or
remains unrebutted.
A party who calls his adversary as a witness is,
therefore, not bound by the latter's testimony only in
the sense that he may contradict him by introducing
other evidence to prove a state of facts contrary to
265
 emedial Law Review
Digests
what the witness testifies on. A rule that provides
that the party calling an adverse witness shall
not be bound by his testimony does not mean
that such testimony may not be given its proper
weight, but merely that the calling party shall not
be precluded from rebutting his testimony or
from impeaching him. This, the petitioner failed
to do. Petitioner, by her own testimony, failed to
discredit the respondent's testimony on how Hagonoy
Lumber became his sole property.
The “best evidence rule” under Rule 130 Section 3
The RTC's finding that the P200T was as a loan is
supported by the evidence on record.
The allegation that the P200T was advance on
her share in the profits of Hagonoy Lumber is
implausible. When the Suy Ben delivered to the
petitioner the P200T check, it could not have been
given as an advance on petitioner's share in the
business, because at that moment in time both of
them had no participation, interest or share in
Hagonoy Lumber.
It is also worthy to note that both the Deed of
Partition and the Deed of Sale were acknowledged
before a Notary Public. The notarization of a private
document converts it into a public document, and
makes it admissible in court without further
proof of its authenticity. It is entitled to full faith
and credit upon its face. Such a document must be
given full force and effect absent a strong, complete
and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity on account
of some flaws or defects recognized by law. A public
document executed and attested through the
intervention of a notary public is, generally,
evidence of the facts therein express in clear
unequivocal manner.
Petitioner maintains that the RTC erred in
admitting in evidence a mere copy of the Deed of
Partition and the Deed of Sale in violation of the best
evidence rule. The "best evidence rule" as
encapsulated in Rule 130, Section 3, of the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure applies only
when the content of such document is the
subject of the inquiry. Where the issue is only as to
whether such document was actually executed, or
exists, or on the circumstances relevant to or
surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does
not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible. Any
other substitutionary evidence is likewise admissible
without need to account for the original. Moreover,
production of the original may be dispensed with,
in the trial court's discretion, whenever the
opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents
of the document and no other useful purpose will
be served by requiring production.
Accordingly, we find that the best evidence
rule is not applicable to the instant case. Here, there
was no dispute as to the terms of either deed; hence,
the RTC correctly admitted in evidence mere copies of
the two deeds. The petitioner never even denied their
Evidence
due execution and admitted that she signed the Deed
of Partition. As for the Deed of Sale, petitioner had, in
effect, admitted its genuineness and due execution
when she failed to specifically deny it in the manner
required by the rules. The petitioner merely claimed
that said documents do not express the true
agreement and intention of the parties since they were
only provisional paper arrangements made upon the
advice of counsel.
SASAN v. NLRC, E-PCIBank and HI
(Citation in the syllabus is really wrong so I just got
the nearest case to the title which discusses the
relevant topic)
Facts: Respondent Equitable-PCI Bank (E-PCIBank)
entered into a Contract for Services with Helpmate,
Inc. (HI), a domestic corporation primarily engaged in
the business of providing janitorial and messengerial
services. Pursuant to their contract, HI shall hire and
assign workers to E-PCIBank to perform
janitorial/messengerial and maintenance services. The
contract was impliedly renewed year after year.
Petitioners Rolando Sasan, Sr., Leonilo Dayday,
Modesto Aguirre, Alejandro Ardimer, Eleuterio Sacil,
Wilfredo Juegos, Petronilo Carcedo, and Cesar
Peciencia were among those employed and assigned to
E-PCIBank at its branch along Gorordo Avenue, Lahug,
Cebu City, as well as to its other branches in the
Visayas.
Petitioners filed with the Arbitration Branch of
the NLRC in Cebu City separate complaints against E-
PCIBank and HI for illegal dismissal, with claims for
separation pay, service incentive leave pay,
allowances, damages, attorney's fees and costs. Later,
they amended their complaints to include a claim for
13th month pay.
Petitioners claimed that they had become
regular employees of E-PCIBank with respect to the
activities for which they were employed, having
continuously rendered janitorial and messengerial
services to the bank for more than one year; that E-
PCIBank had direct control and supervision over the
means and methods by which they were to perform
their jobs; and that their dismissal by HI was null and
void because the latter had no power to do so since
they had become regular employees of E-PCIBank.
E-PCIBank averred that it entered into a
Contract for Services with HI, an independent job
contractor which hired and assigned petitioners to the
bank to perform janitorial and messengerial services
thereat. E-PCIBank could not be held liable for
whatever misdeed HI had committed against its
employees. HI, on the other hand, asserted that it was
an independent job contractor.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision finding
that HI was not a legitimate job contractor on the
ground that it did not possess the required substantial
capital or investment to actually perform the job,
work, or service under its own account and
266
 emedial Law Review
Digests
responsibility as required under the Labor Code. HI is
therefore a labor-only contractor and the real employer
of petitioners is E-PCIBank which is held liable to
petitioners. Respondents E-PCIBank and HI appealed
the same to the NLRC. In support of its allegation
that it was a legitimate job contractor, HI
submitted before the NLRC several documents
which it did not present before Labor Arbiter
Gutierrez (Certificate of Filing of Certificate of
Increase of Capital Stock, Certificate of Filing Amended
Articles of Incorporation, and General Information
Sheet Stock Corporation of HI, Audited Financial
Statement of HI, Transfer Certificate of Title No.
110173 and Tax Declaration No. GR2K-09-063-00582
registered under the name of HI, Tax Declaration No.
GR2K-09-063-00583 registered under the name of
HI).
The NLRC promulgated its Decision modifying
the ruling of the Labor Arbiter. The NLRC took into
consideration the documentary evidence presented by
HI for the first time on appeal and, on the basis
thereof, declared HI as a highly capitalized venture
with sufficient capitalization, which cannot be
considered engaged in "labor-only contracting." CA
affirmed.
Issue: Whether the CA erred in accepting and
appreciating the pieces of evidence submitted by
respondents during appeal – NO.
Held: The Court found no merit in petitioners'
protestations against the documentary evidence
submitted by HI because they were mere photocopies.
Evidently, petitioners are invoking the best evidence
rule, espoused in Section 3, Rule130 of the Rules of
Court. It provides that:
Section 3. - Original document must be
produced; exceptions. - When the
subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original
document itself x x x.
The above provision explicitly mandates that
when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than
the original document itself. Notably, certified true
copies of these documents, acceptable under the
Rules of Courtwere furnished to the petitioners. Even
assuming that petitioners were given mere
photocopies, again, we stress that proceedings before
the NLRC are not covered by the technical rules of
evidence and procedure as observed in the regular
courts. Technical rules of evidence do not apply if the
decision to grant the petition proceeds from an
examination of its sufficiency as well as a careful look
into the arguments contained in position papers and
other documents.
Petitioners had more than adequate
opportunity when they filed their motion for
Evidence
reconsideration before the NLRC, their Petition to the
Court of Appeals and even to this Court, to refute or
present their counter-evidence to the documentary
evidence presented by HI. Having failed in this respect,
petitioners cannot now be heard to complain about
these documentary evidences presented by HI upon
which the NLRC and the Court of Appeals based its
finding that HI is a legitimate job contractor.
DECS V. DEL ROSARIO
Facts: The Del Rosario’s filed a complaint for recovery
of possession against DECS alleging that the
Kaypombo Primary School (KPPS) was occupying a
portion of the property of the Del Rosarios. DECS, in
its defense, alleged that such property was donated by
Isaias Del Rosario, the father of the Del Rosarios in
this case.
DECS presented witnesses who saw that a
deed of donation was executed by Judge Eli Natividad
and that a resolution was signed in the office of the
municipal mayor. However, the deed and the
resolution got lost in the transfer of records in the old
building to the new building.
The RTC ruled in favor of DECS stating that
they were able to prove the due execution of the deed
of donation and its acceptance, as well as the loss of
the same, in accordance with the Rules on Evidence. It
is recalled that Judge Eli Natividad, then a municipal
councilor of Sta. Maria, testified that he was the
person who prepared the deed of donation and later
notarized the same, and that said deed was duly
executed and signed before him and in his presence.
They stated that a recantation/recollection of witness
is a form of secondary evidence to prove the
existence/content of a document. Since the loss of the
deed subject matter of this case was likewise duly
proved by DECS, exerting the best possible efforts to
locate or secure a copy of the same and without bad
faith on its part, the RTC a greater weight to the
secondary evidence adduced by DECS.
The CA ruled against DECS stating that they
were not able to prove the due execution or existence
of the deed of donation and the resolution, as well as
the loss of these documents as the cause of their
unavailability. The Rule requires that the defendant
must "prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of
its contents in some authentic document, or by the
testimony of the witnesses in the order stated".
However, DECS proceeded with the last resort-
testimony of the witnesses, without even showing any
diligent effort to secure a copy of the deed of donation
and the resolution.
Issue: Was DECS able to prove the loss of the
documents thus making the rule on secondary
evidence applicable? NO.
Decision: In this case, the best or primary evidence of
a donation of real property is an authentic copy of the
267
 emedial Law Review
Digests
deed of donation with all the formalities required by
Civil Code. The duty to produce the original document
arises when the subject of the inquiry are the contents
of the writing in which case there can be no evidence
of the contents of the writing other than the writing
itself. Simply put, when a party wants to prove the
contents of the document, the best evidence is the
original writing itself.
Secondary evidence of the contents of a
document refers to evidence other than the original
document itself. A party may introduce secondary
evidence of the contents of a written instrument not
only when the original is lost or destroyed, but also
when it cannot be produced in court, provided there is
no bad faith on the part of the offeror. However, a
party must first satisfactorily explain the loss of the
best or primary evidence before he can resort to
secondary evidence. A party must first present to the
court proof of loss or other satisfactory explanation for
non-production of the original instrument. The correct
order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss,
contents, although the court in its discretion may
change this order if necessary.
In this case, the CA found inadequate proof
that DECS or the Municipality made a diligent search in
the places where the deed of donation may likely be
found and that the search was unsuccessful.
Prior to the introduction of secondary
evidence, a party must establish the existence and due
execution of the instrument. After a party establishes
the existence and due execution of the document, he
must prove that the document was lost or destroyed.
The destruction of the instrument may be proved by
any person knowing the fact. The loss may be shown
by any person who knew the fact of its loss, or by
anyone who had made, on the judgment of the court,
a sufficient examination in the place [or] places where
the document or papers of similar character are
usually kept by the person in whose custody the
document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or
who has made any other investigation which is
sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument is
indeed lost.
Judge Natividad who claimed to have notarized
the deed of donation failed to account for other copies
of the deed, which the law strictly enjoins him to
record, and furnish to other designated government
offices. As a notary public, The Notarial Law mandates
him to record in his notarial register the necessary
information regarding the instrument acknowledged
before him. The Notarial Law also mandates the notary
public to retain a copy of the instrument acknowledged
before him when it is a contract.
DECS should have produced at the trial the
notarial register where Judge Natividad as the notary
public should have recorded the deed of donation.
Alternatively, DECS should have explained the
unavailability of the notarial register. Judge Natividad
could have also explained why he did not retain a copy
of the deed of donation as required by law. As the
Court of Appeals correctly observed, there was no
Evidence
evidence showing that DECS looked for a copy from
the Clerk of Court concerned or from the National
Archives. All told, these circumstances preclude a
finding that DECS or the Municipality made a diligent
search to obtain a copy of the deed of donation.
G. PAROLE EVIDENCE
ACI PHILS V COQUIA
FACTS: ACI Phils contracted w/Coquia for the purchase
of several thousand tons of flint cullets. After several
deliveries they demanded the reduction of the
purchase price to which Coquia agreed but after
receiving the order they refused to pay further
demanding reductions.(from 4.2 went down to 3.65
then to 3.1)
Coquia filed a complaint for ACI to accept and
pay for the delivery at the reduced price of 3.65. After
3 days, ACI paid.
TC ruled in favor of Coquia and ordered ACI to
accept and pay for the deliveries at 4.20 per kilo +
2.5M in damages plus interest at legal rate + 200k
Attys fees +20k cost of suit.
CA affirmed but deleted Attys fees & cost of
suit. It held that the Purchase Order was a contract of
adhesion which must be strictly construed against ACI,
it was also contrary to the orig agreement since it
reduced the price.
ACI claims that CA was wrong in compelling
them to pay at 4.20 and to pay damages for the
alleged unrealized profits and it wasnot a contract of
adhesion since Coquia had the freedom to negotiate
the terms of the contract she entered. It maintained
that it didn’t exercise any intimidation on Coquia to
agree on the new Purchase order and assuming that it
did it was ratified by the delivery and that the
Statment of Acct already reflected the reduced price. It
alsoentered into the contract upon Coquia’s assurance
that she would promptly deliver. Both courts erred in
refusing to receive evidence aliunde to prove that time
was an important element of the agreement.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the PO was a contract of adhesion? NO! Coquia
has financial savvy, she deals with big corporations like
La Tondena. She was also the one who sought the
contract with ACI. Even the terms and conditions of
the purchase orders themselves don’t show any hint of
one-sidedness.
2. W/N Courts erred in refusing to receive evidence
aliunde to prove that time was an important element
of the agreement? NO! Condition 4 of the PO
specifically mentions that the "delivery date shown on
(the purchase order) shall be of the essence of any
contract arising" and that "delivery must be made in
strict accordance with the order or delivery
schedule..." but the PO didn’t mention when the
cullets were needed.
268
 emedial Law Review
Digests
RATIO: ACI argued that the PO failed to express the
true intent of the parties, i.e., that petitioner entered
into a contract with respondent conditioned upon the
latter's prompt delivery of flint cullets.
TC rejected claim based on the parol
evidence rule.The written document is the best
evidence of its own contents. When the written
contract is established as the repository of the
parties' stipulations, any other evidence is
excluded and the same cannot be used as a
substitute for such contract, nor even to alter or
contradict them.The exception is Sec 9, Rule 130, a
party may present evidence to modify, explain or
add to the terms of the agreement if he puts in
issue in his pleading the failure of the written
agreement to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties. Since an exception was
raised as an issue in the answer, the trial court should
not have been so inflexible as to completely disregard
ACI’s evidence.
Coquia was not given definite days during
which she should deliver the flint cullets but ACI
presented the unrebutted testimony of Batalon, its
materials control manager, to prove that it agreed to
the P4.20 per kilo purchase price only because
Coquiaassured it of prompt deliveries sufficient for
their production requirements.
ACI was able to prove that the second
purchase order with the reduced the price was
accepted by Coquia and they didn’t contain the
quantity to be delivered. And she accepted the
payment for these deliveries without protest.
SEAOIL PETROLEUM CORP. VS AUTOCORP GROUP
FACTS: SEAOIL bought an excavator from AUTOCORP,
where the original cost wasP2.5M but was increased to
P3.1M because payment was in installments (via
checks). This agreement was embodied in a sales
invoice, and included an agreement that ownership will
remain with AUTOCORP until fully paid despite delivery
to SEAOIL. The first 2 checks were good but the
remaining 10 bounced, as SEAOIL stopped payment.
Since SEAOIL refused to pay the balance despite
repeated demands, AUTOCORP filed a complaint for
recovery of personal property.
[*Warning: magulong part] SEAOIL contended
that this isn’t really what happened as it was really
RODRIGUEZ (director of AUTOCORP) who owed YU
(President of SEAOIL) in another transaction involving
their other companies (UNILINE for RODRIGUEZ and
FOCUS for YU). RODRIGUEZ was supposed to pay by
check to AUTOCORP but since there’s a company
policy not to honor checks from its own directors,
RODRIGUEZ asked YU to issue the checks in his behalf,
to be funded by RODRIGUEZ’ own checks. SEAOIL said
RODRIGUEZ stopped payment so it also stopped
payment!
Evidence
Note: Wala sa case, pero I think the latter transaction
(between YU and RODRIGUEZ) was verbal lang. And
this allegation was presented via Yu’s testimony in
court kaya sasabihin ng CA na merely verbal lang yung
transaction.
RTC: against SEAOIL, ordered it to pay balance
to AUTOCORP.
CA: held that the transaction between Yu and
Rodriguez was merely verbal. This cannot alter the
sales contract between Seaoil and Autocorp as this will
run counter to the parol evidence rule which prohibits
the introduction of oral and parol evidence to modify
the terms of the contract. The claim that it falls under
the exceptions to the parol evidence rule has not been
sufficiently proven.
ISSUE: W/N CA erred in partially applying the parol
evidence rule to prove only some terms contained in
one portion of the document but disregarded the rule
with respect to another but substantial portion or entry
also contained in the same document which should
have proven the true nature of the transaction
involved. – NO. (Hinde ko gets to…hinde naman sinabi
sa facts. Sarili kong issue: W/N SEAOIL’s parol
evidence is admissible because it falls under one
of the exceptions [failure to express true
agreement of parties] – NO.)
RATIO: The parol evidence rule forbids any addition
to, or contradiction of, the terms of a written
agreement by testimony or other evidence purporting
to show that different terms were agreed upon by the
parties. Unsubstantiated testimony, offered as proof of
verbal agreements which tends to vary the terms of a
written agreement, is inadmissible under the parol
evidence rule.
The SC invalidated SEAOIL’s contention that
the written agreement failed to express the true intent
and agreement of the parties. It reasoned that
although parol evidence is admissible to explain the
meaning of a contract, it cannot serve the
purpose of incorporating into the contract
additional contemporaneous conditions which
are not mentioned at all in the writing unless
there has been fraud or mistake. Evidence of a
prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is
generally not admissible to vary, contradict or
defeat the operation of a valid contract.
SEAOIL’s contention that the document falls
within the exception to the parol evidence rule is
untenable. Only in cases where "the written contract is
so ambiguous or obscure in terms that the contractual
intention of the parties cannot be understood from a
mere reading of the instrument would the exception
apply.
269
 emedial Law Review
Digests
MARQUEZ v. ESPEJO
Facts: The Espejos were the original registered owners
of 2 parcels of agricultural land: the Lantap property
and the Murong property. The Murong property was
tenanted by petitioners Marquez and Dela Cruz while
the Lantap property was tenanted by Nemi.
Espejos mortgaged both lands to Rural Bank of
Bayombong. They failed to pay and the bank
foreclosed and bought the properties, and eventually
consolidated title to them.
Espejos bought back one of their lots.
However, the Deed of Sale did not mention the
barangay where the property was located but
mentioned the title of the property, which corresponds
to the Murong property. There is no evidence, though,
that the Espejos took possession of the Murong
property, demanded lease rentals from the tenants, or
otherwise exercised acts of ownership. On the other
hand, Nemi continued working on the Lantap property
without any evidence that he ever paid rentals to the
bank or to the landowner.
Meanwhile, Rural Bank executed Deeds of
Voluntary Land Transfer (VLTs) in favor of the tenants
of the Murong property. DAR issued Certificates of
Land Ownership Awards (CLOAs). Both CLOAs stated
that their subjects were parcels of agricultural land in
Barangay Murong.
Esepjos filed complaint after more than 10
years before the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
(RARAD), praying for the cancellation of the CLOAs.
This was based on the theory that the Murong property
was the one they bought back, since the Deed of Sale
refers to the TCT corresponding to it. Rural Bank said
it was the Lantap property that was bought back. The
RARAD gave precedence to the TCT appearing in the
Deed of Sale.
Upon appeal, the DARAB reversed. In assailing
the validity of the CLOAs, Espejos had the burden of
proof. There being no evidence that the DAR filed
personnel were remiss in the performance of their
official duties when they issued these, the presumption
of regular performance of duty prevails. Furthermore,
Espejos failed to support their allegation that they
bought back the Murong property with substantial
evidence.
The CA reversed. Using the Best Evidence
Rule (Sec. 3, Rule 130), it held that the Deed of Sale is
the best evidence as to its contents, particularly the
description of the land. The VLT’s referred to the TCT
of the Lantap property. The additional description that
it was located in Murong was a mere typo. The
technical description in the TCT is more accurate, since
it particularly describes the metes and bounds.
Issue: Whether the Best Evidence Rule should apply
– NO (NOTE: CA actually applied the Parol Evidence
Rule)
Ratio: The Best Evidence Rule states that when the
subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, the
Evidence
best evidence is the original document itself and no
other evidence (such as reproduction, photocopy or
oral evidence) is admissible as a general rule. The
original is preferred because it reduces the chance of
undetected tampering. In the instant case, there is no
room for the application of this Rule because there is
no dispute regarding the contents of the documents.
The real issue is whether the admitted contents of
these documents adequately and correctly express the
true intention of the parties. The dispute reflects an
intrinsic ambiguity in the contracts, arising from an
apparent failure of the instruments to adequately
express the true intention of the parties. To resolve it,
resort must be had to evidence outside the
instruments.
Though the CA cited the Best Evidence Rule, it
appears that what it actually applied was the Parol
Evidence Rule, which is still improper in this case. In
the first place, the Espejos are not parties to the VLTs,
they are strangers to these contracts. Rule 130, sec. 9
provides that parol evidence rule is exclusively
between the parties and their successors-in-interest.
It may not be invoked where at least one of the parties
to the suit is not a party or privy to the written
document, and does not base his claim on the
instrument or assert a right originating from it.
Moreover, the case falls under the exceptions
to the Parol Evidence Rule: 1) intrinsic ambiguity,
mistake or imperfection in the written agreement; and
2) failure of the written agreement to express the true
intent and agreement of the parties. The resolution of
the case necessitates an examination of the parties’
respective parol evidence to determine their true
intent. In case of doubt, it is the intention of the
contracting parties that prevails, for the intention is
the soul of a contract. (Side note: SC ruled that SM of
sale was the Lantap Property based on the
circumstances)
H. DISQUALIFICATION BY REASON OF
IMMATURITY
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. SALVADOR
GOLIMLIM
Facts: Salvador Golimlim was charged of raping
Evelyn Canchela. Evelyn, a mental retardate, stays
with her aunt Jovita and uncle Salvador Golimlim.
When Jovita left the house, Salvador instructed evelyn
to sleep, and soon after she had laid down, he kissed
her and took off her clothes. As he poked at her an
object, which to Evelyn felt like a knife, he proceeded
to insert his penis into her vagina. Later on, Evelyn’s
half-sister, Lorna, allowed her to stay with her (Lorna).
Lorna noticed Evelyn’s growing belly when checked, it
turns out that Evelyn was pregnant. Evelyn told Lorna
that she had sexual intercourse with Salvador while
the latter was holding a knife. The sisters filed a
complaint for rape against Salvador. The trial court
convicted Salvador of rape.
270
 emedial Law Review
Digests
Issue: W/N the court should have given weight and
credence to the contradictory and implausible
testimony of Evelyn, a mental retardate. – YES.
Held: In giving credence to Evelyn’s testimony and
finding against appellant, the trial court made the
following observations:1) Despite her weak and dull
mental state the victim was consistent in her claim
that her Salvador had carnal knowledge of her and was
the author of her pregnancy, and nobody else; 2) She
remains consistent that Salvador raped her only once;
3) That the contradictory statements she made in open
court relative to the details of how she was raped,
although would seem derogatory to her credibility and
reliability as a witness under normal conditions, were
amply explained by the psychiatrist who examined her
and supported by her findings; and 4) Despite her
claim that several persons laid on top of her, the lucid
fact remains that she never pointed to anybody else as
the author of her pregnancy, but Salvador. Which only
shows that the trauma that was created in her mind by
the incident has remained printed in her memory
despite her weak mental state. Furthermore, granting
for the sake of argument that other men also laid on
top of her, this does not deviate from the fact that
Salvador had sexual intercourse with her.
In the present case, no cogent reason can be
appreciated to warrant a departure from the findings of
the trial court with respect to the assessment of
Evelyn’s testimony.
That Evelyn is a mental retardate does not disqualify
her as a witness nor render her testimony bereft of
truth.
Sections 20 and 21 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of
Court provide:
SEC. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. –
Except as provided in the next succeeding
section, all persons who can perceive, and
perceiving, can make known their perception
to others, may be witnesses.
xxx
SEC. 21. Disqualification by reason of mental
incapacity or immaturity. – The following
persons cannot be witnesses:
(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time
of their production for examination, is such
that they are incapable of intelligently making
known their perception to others;
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as
to render them incapable of perceiving the
facts respecting which they are examined and
of relating them truthfully.
A mental retardate or a feebleminded person is
not, per se, disqualified from being a witness, her
mental condition not being a vitiation of her credibility.
It is now universally accepted that intellectual
weakness, no matter what form it assumes, is not a
valid objection to the competency of a witness so long
as the latter can still give a fairly intelligent and
reasonable narrative of the matter testified to.
Thus, in a long line of cases, this Court has
Evidence
upheld the conviction of the accused based mainly on
statements given in court by the victim who was a
mental retardate.
From a meticulous scrutiny of the records of
this case, there is no reason to doubt Evelyn’s
credibility. To be sure, her testimony is not without
discrepancies, given of course her feeblemindedness.
The psychiatrist who examined Evelyn said
that although Evelyn was suffering from moderate
mental retardation with an IQ of 46,she is capable of
perceiving and relating events which happened to her.
Evelyn could give spontaneous and consistent answers
to the same but differently framed questions under
conditions which do not inhibit her from answering.
Salvador’s bare denial is not only an inherently weak
defense. It is not supported by clear and convincing
evidence. It cannot thus prevail over the positive
declaration of Evelyn who convincingly identified him
as her rapist.
I. DISQUALIFICATION BY REASON OF DEATH
SANSON et al. v. CA and MELECIA T. SY, as
Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of the Late
Juan Bon Fing Sy
FACTS: Petitioners herein (Felecito Sanson and his
sister Celedonia Sanson; and Angeles Montinola and
her son Eduardo Montinola) are creditors of the
deceased, Juan Bon Fing Sy. In their capacity as
creditors, petitioners herein filed for the settlement of
the estate of the deceased. There are three
transactions to remember:
1. Transaction between Felecito (creditor) and
deceased (debtor): During the trial, the
Petitioner Felecito Sanson, as creditor, testified
that deceased was indebted to him, as
evidenced by 5 checks. To support Felecito’s
claim, Celedonia (Felecito’s sister) testified as
a witness to the transaction that respondent
issued 5 checks to Felecito, but was dishonored
once it was presented for payment after the
death of respondent. [Note: The first
transaction is between Felecito (creditor) and
deceased (debtor) only. Celedonia was merely
presented as a witness to the transaction to
supported the testimony of his brother
Felecito]
2. Transaction between Celedonia (creditor) and
deceased (debtor): During the trial, Celedonia
claims that deceased was indebted to her, as
evidence by 6 checks. To support her claim,
Felecito (her brother) testified that his sister
tried to enforce the settlement of the check
while the deceased was still alive but she was
assured that the obligation would be settled as
soon as respondent would get well. When
respondent died, Celedonia presented the
checks for payment but were dishonored by
the bank due to closure of account. [Note: The
second transaction is between Celedonia
271
 emedial Law Review
Digests
(creditor) and deceased (debtor) only. Felecito
as a witness to the transaction merely
supported the testimony of his sister. But
Felecito is NOT a creditor of the deceased in
this transaction which he testified]
3. Transaction between the Montinolas (creditors)
and deceased (debtor): With regard to the
Montinola creditors, they claim that the
deceased borrowed money from them as
evidenced by 3 checks. Similarly, they tried to
enforce settlement of the checks before
respondent died but they were told not to
deposit the checks yet because they will be
paid in cash instead, but respondent never did.
When they deposited the checks after
respondent’s death, the checks were
dishonored. [Note: in the case of the Montinola
creditors, the one who testified to the
transaction is Jade, the daughter-in-law of
claimant Angeles and who is at the same time
the wife of claimant Eduardo Montinola, Jr.]
Respondent-Administratix Melecia Sy now objects
to the admission of the checks and check return slips-
exhibits offered in evidence by the claimants upon the
ground that the witnesses who testified thereon are
disqualified under the Dead Man’s Statute which reads:
SEC. 23. Disqualification by reason of death or
insanity of adverse party.—Parties or assignors
of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf
a case is prosecuted, against an executor or
administrator or other representative of a
deceased person, or against a person of
unsound mind, upon a claim or demand
against the estate of such deceased person or
against such person of unsound mind, cannot
testify as to any matter of fact occurring before
the death of such deceased person or before
such person became of unsound mind.
ISSUE: Whether or not the creditors’ evidence of their
claim is incompetent under the dead man’s statute,
and inadmissible. (NO. HENCE, ADMISSIBLE)
HELD: As for the administratrix’s invocation of the
Dead Man’s Statute, the same does not likewise lie.
The rule renders incompetent: 1) parties to a case; 2)
their assignors; or 3) persons in whose behalf a case is
prosecuted. The rule is exclusive and cannot be
construed to extend its scope by implication so as to
disqualify persons not mentioned therein. Mere
witnesses who are not included in the above
enumeration are not prohibited from testifying as to a
conversation or transaction between the deceased and
a third person, if he took no active part therein.
Jade is not a party to the case. Neither is she an
assignor nor a person in whose behalf the case is being
prosecuted. She testified as a witness to the
transaction. In transactions similar to those involved
in the case at bar, the witnesses are commonly family
members or relatives of the parties. Should their
testimonies be excluded due to their apparent interest
Evidence
as a result of their relationship to the parties, there
would be a dearth of evidence to prove the
transactions. In any event, independently of the
testimony of Jade, the claims of the Montinolas would
still prosper on the basis of their documentary
evidence—the checks.
As to the Sansons, the administratix argued that
the law speaks of “parties or assignors of parties to a
case.” Apparently, the testimonies of Sanson and
Saquin on each other’s behalf, as co-parties to the
same case, falls under the prohibition. The
administratix claims that since the law disqualifies
parties to a case or assignors to a case without
distinguishing between testimony in his own behalf and
that in behalf of others, he should be disqualified from
testifying for his co-parties.
However, in denying the claim of the
administratix, the SC held: But Sanson’s and
Celedonia’s claims against the same estate arose from
separate transactions. Sanson is a third party with
respect to Celedonia’s claim. And Celedonia is a third
party with respect to Sanson’s claim. One is not thus
disqualified to testify on the other’s transaction.
In any event, what the Dead Man’s Statute
proscribes is the admission of testimonial evidence
upon a claim which arose before the death of the
deceased. The incompetency is confined to the giving
of testimony. Since the separate claims of Sanson and
Celedonia are supported by checks-
documentary evidence, their claims can be prosecuted
on the bases of said checks.
J. CHILD WITNESS EXAMINATION RULE
PEOPLE V. CANETE
FACTS:
- Spouses Paquito and Sedaria Cañete had 3
children, one of whom was Alma. Later on, the
spouses decided to live separately. As a result,
Alma lived with his father.
- Paquito and Alma lived with the former’s brother,
Kakingcio Cañete, who was also married and had
children. Alma called Kakingcio’s wife Yaya
Alejandra.
- Paquito and Alma eventually went back to their old
home after a while. But Paquito became blind and
a paralytic. So Kakingcio had Paquito and Alma
fetched to live with him and his family again. By
then, Alma was already twelve years old. She
noticed that her uncle Kakingcio was nice and
amiable to her.
- One night, may ganap! Alma was sleeping when
she felt someone caressing her – Kakingcio.
Eventually, he raped her after threatening her with
an 8-inch…..knife. She lost consciousness in the
process and woke up with a bloody vagina. She
cried.
- Another evening, Alma was awakened when she
felt her pants being pulled down. She resisted then
ran to Ka Caring (a neighbor) and revealed that
272
 emedial Law Review
Digests
her uncle raped her and that he was about to rape
her again. Caring adviced Alma not to return to
their house. Alma slept in the house of Caring.
Alma returned to their house the next day.
- Alma told Alejandra. Alejandra quarreled with
Kakingcio then the latter left. Then, Alejandra
accompanied Alma to the barangay captain and
complained against Kakingcio. The Barangay
Captain wrote a letter to the local police authorities
requesting assistance to Alejandra and Alma. A
Municipal Health Officer examined Alma, which
showed that she had lacerations.
- An information for rape was charged against
Kakingcio. He eaded not guilty.
- His defense was an alibi. RTC: guilty with a penalty
of death.
- Hence, this petition. It is the contention of the
accused that the prosecution had a difficulty
proving that the appellant raped the private
complainant in light of her testimony that when the
appellant mounted her, he still had his short pants
on. When the prosecution tried to elicit from the
offended party how appellant’s penis could have
been inserted into her vagina with his pants still on
and the appellant’s counsel objected to the
question, the presiding judge himself took the
cudgels for the prosecution and propounded
questions on the private complainant. Worse, the
presiding judge posed leading questions to the
private complainant. He contends that the
presiding judge was biased and partial to the
prosecution.
ISSUE: W/N the presiding judge is allowed to
propound questions (leading) on a witness to elicit
info. – YES.
HELD/RATIO: A presiding judge enjoys a great deal of
latitude in examining witnesses within the course of
evidentiary rules. The presiding judge should see to it
that a testimony should not be incomplete or obscure.
The trial judge must be accorded a reasonable leeway
in putting such questions to witnesses as may be
essential to elicit relevant facts to make the record
speak the truth. Trial judges in this jurisdiction are
judges of both the law and the facts, and they would
be negligent in the performance of their duties if they
permitted a miscarriage of justice as a result of a
failure to propound a proper question to a witness
which might develop some material bearing upon the
outcome. In the exercise of sound discretion, he may
put such question to the witness as will enable him to
formulate a sound opinion as to the ability or the
willingness of the witness to tell the truth. A judge may
examine or cross-examine a witness. He may
propound clarificatory questions to test the credibility
of the witness and to extract the truth. He may seek to
draw out relevant and material testimony though that
testimony may tend to support or rebut the position
taken by one or the other party. It cannot be taken
against him if the clarificatory questions he propounds
Evidence
happen to reveal certain truths which tend to destroy
the theory of one party.
Parenthetically, under Sections 19 to 21
of the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness,
child witnesses may testify in a narrative form
and leading questions may be allowed by the
trial court in all stages of the examination if the
same will further the interest of justice.
Objections to questions should be couched in a
manner so as not to mislead, confuse, frighten
and intimidate the child:
Sec. 19. Mode of questioning. – The court
shall exercise control over the questioning
of children so as to (1) facilitate the
ascertainment of the truth, (2) ensure
that questions are stated in a form
appropriate to the developmental level of
the child, (3) protect children from
harassment or undue embarrassment, and
(4) avoid waste of time.
The court may allow the child witness to testify
in a narrative form.
K. PRIVILEGE
1. Government Privilege
ROMULO NERI V. SENATE COMMITTEE ON
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND
INVESTIGATIONS
*sorry mahabang digest
Facts: On April 21, 2007, the DOTC entered into a
contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications
Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and
services for the National Broadband Network (NBN)
Project for approximately P16 Billion Pesos. The
Project was to be financed by the People’s Republic
of China.
In connection with this, various Resolutions
were introduced in the Senate: 1) P.S. Res. No. 127,
directing the Blue Ribbon Committee and Committee
on Trade and Industry to Investigate, in aid of
legislation, the approval of the broadband contract; 2)
P.S. Res. No. 144, urging Pres. Arroyo to cancel the
ZTE contract; 3) P.S. Res. No. 129, directing the
Committee on National Defense and Security to
conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, into the
national security implications of awarding the contract
to ZTE; and 4) P.S. Res. No. 136, directing the
proper Senate Committed to conduct an inquiry, in aid
of legislation, on the legal and economic justification of
the NBN project. The investigations were claimed to be
relevant to the consideration of 3 pending bills in the
Senate.
Respondent Committees initiated the
investigation by sending invitations to certain
personalities and cabinet officials involved
in the NBN Project. Neri (NEDA Director General at that
273
 emedial Law Review
Digests
time) was among those invited. He was summoned to
appear and testify on September 18, 20, and 26
and October 25, 2007. However, he attended only
the September 26 hearing, claiming he was “out of
town” during the other dates.
In the September 18 hearing, businessman
Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive
officials and power brokers were using their influence
to push the approval of the NBN Project by the
NEDA. The Project was initially approved as a Build-
Operate-Transfer project but, the NEDA acquiesced to
convert it into a government-to-government project, to
be financed through a loan from the Chinese
Government. On September 26, Neri testified before
respondent Committees for 11 hours. He disclosed
that then COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered
him P200 Million in exchange for his approval of the
NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed
President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that
she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However,
when probed further on what they discussed about the
NBN Project, Neri refused to answer, invoking
“executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to
answer the questions on: 1. W/N President Arroyo
followed up the NBN Project, 2. W/N she directed him
to prioritize it, and 3. W/N she directed him to
approve.
Respondent Committees issued a Subpoena Ad
Testificandum to Neri, requiring him to appear and
testify on November 20. However, in the
Letter dated November 15, 2007, Executive Secretary
Ermita requested respondent Committees to dispense
with Neri’s testimony on the ground
of executive privilege – the privilege was claimed on
the ground “that the information sought to be
disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as
economic relations with the People’s Republic
of China. Given the confidential nature in which these
information were conveyed to the President, Neri could
not provide the Committee any further details of these
conversations, without disclosing the very thing the
privilege is designed to protect.” Thus on November
20, Neri did not appear before respondent
Committees.
The Committees later issued the show
cause Letter requiring him to explain why he should
not be cited in contempt. Neri replied that it was not
his intention to ignore the Senate hearing and that he
thought the only remaining questions were those he
claimed to be covered by executive privilege. He
submitted a letter prepared by his counsel, stating,
among others that: (1) his non-appearance was upon
the order of the President; and (2) his conversation
with President Arroyo dealt with delicate and sensitive
national security and diplomatic matters relating to the
impact of the bribery scandal involving high
government officials and the possible loss of
confidence of foreign investors and lenders in the
Philippines. The letter ended with a reiteration of
Neri’s request that he “be furnished in advance” as to
Evidence
what else he needs to clarify so that he may
adequately prepare for the hearing.
In the interim, Neri filed with the SC the
present petition for certiorari assailing the show
cause Letter of the Committees. Respondent
Committees found Neri’s explanations
unsatisfactory. Without responding to his request, they
issued the Order, citing him in contempt and ordering
his arrest and detention at the Office of the Senate
Sergeant-At-Arms until such time that he would
appear and give his testimony. On the same date, Neri
moved for the reconsideration of the Order. In view of
the contempt Order, Neri filed a Supplemental Petition
for Certiorari (With Urgent Application for
TRO/Preliminary Injunction), seeking to restrain the
implementation of the said contempt Order. SC issued
a Status Quo Ante Order.
On March 6, 2008, President Arroyo
issued Memorandum Circular No. 151, revoking EO No.
464 and Memorandum Circular No. 108. She
advised executive officials and employees to follow and
abide by the Constitution, existing laws and
jurisprudence, including, among others, the case
of Senate v. Ermita when they are invited to legislative
inquiries in aid of legislation.
Issue: Are the communications elicited by the subject
3 questions covered by executive privilege (Rule 30,
Sec. 24(e) of the Rules of Court), despite the
revocation of EO No. 464? Yes, the questions are
covered by executive privilege.
Held and Ratio: The revocation of E.O. 464 does not
in any way diminish our concept of executive privilege.
This is because this concept has Constitutional
underpinnings. Unlike the US which has further
accorded the concept with statutory status by enacting
the Freedom of Information Act and the Federal
Advisory Committee Act, the Philippines has retained
its constitutional origination, occasionally interpreted
only by this Court in various cases. The most recent of
these is the case of Senate v. Ermita where this Court
declared unconstitutional substantial portions of E.O.
464. In this regard, it is worthy to note that Executive
Ermita’s Letter limits its bases for the claim of
executive privilege to Senate v. Ermita, Almonte v.
Vasquez and Chavez v. PEA. There was never a
mention of E.O. 464.
While these cases, especially Senate v. Ermita,
have comprehensively discussed the concept of
executive privilege, the Court in this case went on to
clearly define the communications covered by
executive privilege.
In US v. Nixon, the U.S. Court recognized a
great public interest in preserving “the
confidentiality of conversations that take place in
the President’s performance of his official
duties.” It considered presidential communications as
“presumptively privileged.” The presumption is
founded on the “President’s generalized interest in
confidentiality.” The privilege is said to be necessary
274
 emedial Law Review
Digests
to guarantee the candor of presidential advisors and to
provide “the President and those who assist him…
with freedom to explore alternatives in the
process of shaping policies and making decisions
and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to
express except privately.”
In In Re: Sealed Case, the U.S. Court of
Appeals ruled that there are 2 kinds of executive
privilege; one is
the presidential communications privilege and,
the other is the deliberative process privilege. The
former pertains to “communications, documents or
other materials that reflect presidential decision-
making and deliberations and that the President
believes should remain confidential.” The latter
includes ‘advisory opinions, recommendations and
deliberations comprising part of a process by
which governmental decisions and policies are
formulated.”
Presidential communications
privilege applies to decision-making of the
President while, the deliberative process privilege,
to decision-making
of executive officials. The first is rooted in the
constitutional principle of separation of power and the
President’s unique constitutional
role; the second on common law privilege. Unlike the
deliberative process privilege, the presidential
communications privilege applies to documents in
their entirety, and covers final and post-
decisional materials as well as pre-deliberative
ones. As a consequence, congressional or judicial
negation of the presidential communications
privilege is always subject to greater scrutiny than
denial of the deliberative process privilege.
The In Re: Sealed Case confines
the presidential communications privilege, only to
White House Staff that has “operational proximity” to
direct presidential decision-making. The privilege is
meant to encompass only those functions that form
the core of presidential authority, involving what the
court characterized as “quintessential and non-
delegable Presidential power,” such as commander-
in-chief power, appointment and removal power, the
power to grant pardons and reprieves, the sole-
authority to receive ambassadors and other public
officers, the power to negotiate treaties, etc.
In older cases, Courts ruled that the Executive
has a right to withhold documents that might
reveal military or state secrets, identity of
government informers in some
circumstances, and information related to
pending investigations. An area where the privilege
is highly revered is in foreign relations. In US v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp, the U.S. Court,
pronounced: “The nature of foreign negotiations
requires caution, and their success must often depend
on secrecy, and even when brought to a conclusion, a
full disclosure of all the measures, demands, or
eventual concessions which may have been proposed
or contemplated would be extremely impolitic, for this
Evidence
might have a pernicious influence on future
negotiations or produce immediate inconveniences,
perhaps danger and mischief, in relation to other
powers. The necessity of such caution and secrecy was
one cogent reason for vesting the power of making
treaties in the President, with the advice and consent
of the Senate, the principle on which the body was
formed confining it to a small number of members. To
admit, then, a right in the House of Representatives to
demand and to have as a matter of course all the
papers respecting a negotiation with a foreign
power would be to establish a dangerous precedent.”
The above cases, especially, Nixon, In Re
Sealed Case and Judicial Watch, somehow provide the
elements of presidential communications
privilege, to wit: “1) The protected communication
must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable
presidential power”; 2) The communication must be
authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor
of the President or the President himself. The judicial
test is that an advisor must be in “operational
proximity” with the President; 3) The presidential
communications privilege remains a qualified
privilege that may be overcome by a showing of
adequate need, such that the information sought
“likely contains important evidence” and by the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an
appropriate investigating authority.”
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita
premised his claim of executive privilege on the ground
that the communications elicited by the 3
questions “fall under conversation and correspondence
between the President and public officials” necessary in
“her executive and policy decision-making
process” and, that “the information sought to be
disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as
economic relations with the People’s Republic of
China.” Simply put, the bases are presidential
communications privilege and executive privilege
on matters relating to diplomacy or foreign
relations.
Using the above elements, we are convinced
that, indeed, the communications elicited by the 3
questions are covered by the presidential
communications privilege. First, the
communications relate to a “quintessential and non-
delegable power” of the President, i.e. the power to
enter into an executive agreement with other
countries. This authority of the President to enter
into executive agreements without the concurrence of
the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in
Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications
are “received” by a close advisor of the President.
Under the “operational proximity” test, petitioner can
be considered a close advisor, being a member of
President Arroyo’s cabinet. And third, there is no
adequate showing of a compelling need that would
justify the limitation of the privilege and of
the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an
appropriate investigating authority.
275
 emedial Law Review
Digests
US v. Nixon held that a claim of executive
privilege is subject to balancing against other
interest. In other words, confidentiality in executive
privilege is not absolutely protected by the
Constitution. The U.S. Court held: “[N]either the
doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for
confidentiality of high-level communications, without
more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential
privilege of immunity from judicial process under all
circumstances.” Nixon v. Sirica held that presidential
communications are presumptively privileged and
that the presumption can be overcome only by
mere showing of public need by the branch
seeking access to conversations. The courts are
enjoined to resolve the competing interests of the
political branches of the government “in the manner
that preserves the essential functions of each
Branch.” Here, the record is bereft of any categorical
explanation from respondent Committees to show a
compelling or critical need for the answers to the 3
questions in the enactment of a law. Instead, the
questions veer more towards the exercise of the
legislative oversight function under Section 22 (power
to conduct question hour – oversight function) of
Article VI rather than Section 21(power to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation – legislative function) of
the same Article. Senate v.
Ermita ruled that the “the oversight function of
Congress may be facilitated by compulsory
process only to the extent that it is performed
in pursuit of legislation.”
Respondent Committees argue that a claim of
executive privilege does not guard against a possible
disclosure of a crime or wrongdoing. We see no
dispute on this. US v. Nixon has held
that “demonstrated, specific need for evidence
in pending criminal trial” outweighs the President’s
“generalized interest in confidentiality.” However, the
present case’s distinction with the Nixon case is very
evident.
In Nixon, there is a pending criminal proce
eding where the information is requested and it is
the demands of due process of law and the fair
administration of criminal justice that the
information be disclosed. This is the reason why
the U.S. Court was quick to “limit the scope of its
decision.” It stressed that it is “not concerned here
with the balance between the President’s
generalized interest in confidentiality x x x and
congressional demands for information.” Unlike
in Nixon, the information here is elicited, not in a
criminal proceeding, but in a legislative
inquiry. In this regard, Senate v. Ermita stressed that
the validity of the claim of executive privilege depends
not only on the ground invoked but, also, on
the procedural setting or the context in which the
claim is made. Furthermore, in Nixon, the President
did not interpose any claim of need to protect
military, diplomatic or sensitive national security
secrets. In the present case, Executive Secretary
Ermita categorically claims executive privilege on the
Evidence
grounds of presidential communications
privilege in relation to her executive and policy
decision-making process and diplomatic secrets.
It is true, of course, that the Executive cannot,
any more than the other branches of government,
invoke a general confidentiality privilege to shield its
officials and employees from investigations by the
proper governmental institutions into possible criminal
wrongdoing. But under Nixon v. Sirica, the showing
required to overcome the presumption favoring
confidentiality turned, not on the nature of the
presidential conduct that the subpoenaed material
might reveal, but, instead, on the nature and
appropriateness of the function in the
performance of which the material was sought,
and the degree to which the material was
necessary to its fulfillment. Here also our task
requires and our decision implies no judgment
whatever concerning possible presidential
involvement in culpable activity. On the contrary,
we think the sufficiency of the Committee's
showing must depend solely on whether the
subpoenaed evidence is demonstrably critical to
the responsible fulfillment of the Committee's
functions...The sufficiency of the Committee's
showing of need has come to depend, therefore,
entirely on whether the subpoenaed materials are
critical to the performance of its legislative
functions. There is a clear difference between
Congress' legislative tasks and the responsibility of a
grand jury, or any institution engaged in like
functions. While fact-finding by a legislative
committee is undeniably a part of its task,
legislative judgments normally depend more on
the predicted consequences of proposed
legislative actions and their political
acceptability, than on precise reconstruction of
past events; Congress frequently legislates on the
basis of conflicting information provided in its hearings.
In contrast, the responsibility of the grand jury turns
entirely on its ability to determine whether there is
probable cause to believe that certain named
individuals did or did not commit specific crimes.”
*On the claim that the grant of petitioner’s claim of
executive privilege will violate the constitutional
provisions on the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern: SC might have agreed with
such contention if petitioner did not appear before
them at all. But petitioner made himself available to
them during the September 26 hearing, where he was
questioned for 11 hours. Not only that, he expressly
manifested his willingness to answer more
questions from the Senators, with the exception only
of those covered by his claim of executive privilege.
The right to public information (Article III, Sec.
7 of the Constitution), like any other right, is subject to
limitation. The provision itself expressly provides the
limitation, i.e. as may be provided by law. Some of
these laws are Section 7 of RA No. 6713, Article 229 of
the RPC, Section 3 (k) of R.A. No. 3019, and Section
276
 emedial Law Review
Digests
24(e) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. These
are in addition to what our body of jurisprudence
classifies as confidential and what our Constitution
considers as belonging to the larger concept of
executive privilege. Clearly, there is a recognized
public interest in the confidentiality of certain
information. We find the information subject of this
case belonging to such kind.
Moreover, the right of Congress or any of its
Committees to obtain information in aid of
legislation cannot be equated with the people’s right to
public information. The former cannot claim that
every legislative inquiry is an exercise of the people’s
right to information. The distinction between such
rights is laid down in Senate v. Ermita:“There are,
clear distinctions between the right of Congress to
information which underlies the power of inquiry and
the right of people to information on matters of public
concern. For one, the demand of a citizen for the
production of documents pursuant to his right to
information does not have the same obligatory force as
a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress. Neither
does the right to information grant a citizen the power
to exact testimony from government officials. These
powers belong only to Congress, not to an individual
citizen. Thus, while Congress is composed of
representatives elected by the people, it does not
follow, except in a highly qualified sense, that in
every exercise of its power of inquiry, the people
are exercising their right to information.” The
members of respondent Committees should not invoke
as justification in their exercise of power a right
properly belonging to the people in general. This is
because when they discharge their power, they do so
as public officials and members of Congress. Be that
as it may, the right to information must be balanced
with and should give way, in appropriate cases, to
constitutional precepts particularly those pertaining to
delicate interplay of executive-legislative powers and
privileges which is the subject of careful review by
numerous decided cases.
*On whether the claim is properly invoked:
Jurisprudence teaches that for the claim to be properly
invoked, there must be a formal claim of privilege,
lodged by the head of the department which has
control over the matter.” A formal and proper claim of
executive privilege requires a “precise and certain
reason” for preserving their confidentiality. The Letter
dated November 17, 2007 of Executive Secretary
Ermita satisfies the requirement. It serves as the
formal claim of privilege. There, he expressly states
that “this Office is constrained to invoke the
settled doctrine of executive privilege as refined
in Senate v. Ermita, and has advised Secretary
Neri accordingly.” Obviously, he is referring to the
Office of the President. That is more than enough
compliance. In Senate v. Ermita, a less categorical
letter was even adjudged to be sufficient.
The find the grounds relied upon by Executive
Secretary Ermita are specific enough so as not “to
Evidence
leave respondent Committees in the dark on how the
requested information could be classified as
privileged.” The case of Senate v. Ermita only requires
that an allegation be made “whether the information
demanded involves military or diplomatic secrets,
closed-door Cabinet meetings, etc.” The particular
ground must only be specified. The enumeration is not
even intended to be comprehensive.” At any rate, as
held further in Senate v. Ermita, the Congress must
not require the executive to state the reasons for the
claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of
the information which the privilege is meant to
protect. This is a matter of respect to a coordinate and
co-equal department.
2. Judicial Privilege
Per Curiam Decision of the SC in connection with
the Letter of the House Prosecution Panel to
Subpoena Justices of the SC
Facts: (Corona Impeachment) Congressman Emilio
Abaya, the Impeachment Prosecution Panel Manager,
in behalf of the prosecution; wrote several letters
dated January 19, and 25, 2012, requesting that the
prosecution be allowed to examine the rollo of several
impeachment related cases. These included FASAP v.
PAL, Navarro v. Ermita, Gutierrez v. House and League
of Cities v. Comelec. He even asked for certified true
copies of the Agenda and Minutes of Deliberation of
the FASAP case.
Meanwhile the Senate Impeachment Court
directed the Clerk of Court(CoC) and the Asst. Clerk of
Court via a subpoena ad testificandum et duces tecum
to appear and produce certain documents of the FASAP
case. These included the records of the raffle of the
case and four letters written by Atty. Estrelito Mendoza
addressed to the CoC
Another subpoeana ad testificandum was
issued ordering the CoC to bring with her certain
documents related to the TRO issued in relation to
Gloria Arroyo’s leaving the country. Also required were
the records of Corona’s appointment to the SC and
Corona’s appointment as CJ.
Around Jan. 27, 2012, the Prosecution
manifested in a COMPLIANCE that it would present
about 100 witnesses and almost a thousand
documents, to be secured from both private and public
offices. The list of proposed witnesses included Justices
of the SC, and Court officials and employees who will
testify on matters, many of which are, internal to the
Court. Save for League of Cities and Gutierrez, the
cases were still pending with the SC.
On Feb. 7 and 8, the prosecution again asked
for subpoenas for the production of records of cases,
and the attendance of Justices, officials and employees
of the Supreme Court, to testify on the records and on
the various cases mentioned above
Instead of issuing the subpoenas, Senator Judge Enrile
issued an Order denying the request for subpoena ad
277
 emedial Law Review
Digests
testificandum to JJ. Villarama, Sereno, Reyes and
Velasco. Thus, the attendance of SC Justices under
compulsory process became moot and academic.
Issue: Whether or not the requests of the letters can
be granted.
Held: It depends. The SC said the rollo of the cases,
whether decided or pending, are privileged. Certified
true copies of orders, decisions, resolutions, being
matters of public record can be provided. The parties’
pleadings may be examined as well. The Court can
also give copies of Mendoza’s letters.
However, it can’t release documents related to
the FASAP case as it is still pending. The Court cannot
as well waive the privileges attendant to the proposed
testimony of CoC Vidal and of the other Court officials
and employees on matters covered by privilege and
confidentiality. The witness can only testify on the
documents or records allowed under the listing.
Ratio: Philippine law, rules and jurisprudence prohibit
the disclosure of confidential or privileged information
under well-defined rules. At the most basic level and
subject to the principle of comity, Members of the
Court, and Court officials and employees may not be
compelled to testify on matters that are part of the
internal deliberations and actions of the Court in the
exercise of their adjudicatory functions and duties,
while testimony on matters external to their
adjudicatory functions and duties may be compelled by
compulsory processes.
To summarize these rules, the following are
privileged documents or communications, and are not
subject to disclosure:
(1) Court actions such as the result of the raffle of
cases and the actions taken by the Court on each case
included in the agenda of the Court’s session on acts
done material to pending cases, except where a party
litigant requests information on the result of the raffle
of the case, pursuant to Rule 7, Section 3 of the IRSC;
Rule 7, Section 3 of the IRSC declares that the
results of the raffle of cases shall only be available to
the parties and their counsels, unless the cases involve
bar matters, administrative cases and criminal cases
involving the penalty of life imprisonment, which are
treated with strict confidentiality and where the raffle
results are not disclosed even to the parties
themselves.
(2) Court deliberations or the deliberations of the
Members in court sessions on cases and matters
pending before the Court;
Rule 10, Section 2 of the IRSC provides that
the actions taken in each case in the Court’s agenda,
which are noted by the Chief Justice or the Division
Chairman, are also to be treated with strict
confidentiality.
Evidence
Only after the official release of the resolution
embodying the Court action may that action be made
available to the public.
A resolution is considered officially released
once the envelope containing its final copy, addressed
to the parties, has been transmitted to the process
server for personal service or to the mailing section of
the Judicial Records Office.
IRSC provides:
Section 2. Confidentiality of court sessions. – Court
sessions are executive in character, with only the
Members of the Court present. Court deliberations
are confidential and shall not be disclosed to outside
parties, except as may be provided herein or as
authorized by the Court.
Justice Abad discussed the rationale for the
rule in his concurring opinion to the Court Resolution in
Arroyo v. De Lima(TRO on Watch List Order case): the
rules on confidentiality will enable the Members of the
Court to “freely discuss the issues without fear of
criticism for holding unpopular positions” or fear of
humiliation for one’s comments. The privilege against
disclosure of these kinds of information/communication
is known as deliberative process privilege,
involving as it does the deliberative process of
reaching a decision. “Written advice from a variety of
individuals is an important element of the
government’s decision-making process and that the
interchange of advice could be stifled if courts forced
the government to disclose those
recommendations;”the privilege is intended “to
prevent the ‘chilling’ of deliberative communications.”
(3) Court records which are “predecisional” and
“deliberative” in nature, in particular, documents and
other communications which are part of or related to
the deliberative process, i.e., notes, drafts, research
papers, internal discussions, internal memoranda,
records of internal deliberations, and similar papers.
Court deliberations are traditionally recognized
as privileged communication. Section 2, Rule 10 of the
While Section 2, Rule 10 of the IRSC speaks
only of the confidentiality of court deliberations, it is
understood that the rule extends to documents and
other communications which are part of or are related
to the deliberative process. The deliberative process
privilege protects from disclosure documents reflecting
advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations
that are component parts of the process for
formulating governmental decisions and policies.
Obviously, the privilege may also be claimed by other
court officials and employees when asked to act on
these documents and other communications.
To qualify for protection under the deliberative
process privilege, the agency must show that the
document is both (1) predecisional and (2)
deliberative.
A document is “predecisional” under the
deliberative process privilege if it precedes, in temporal
sequence, the decision to which it relates.In other
278
 emedial Law Review
Digests
words, communications are considered predecisional if
they were made in the attempt to reach a final
conclusion.
A material is “deliberative,” on the other hand,
if it reflects the give and take of the consultative
process. The key question in determining whether the
material is deliberative in nature is whether disclosure
of the information would discourage candid discussion
within the agency.
If the disclosure of the information would
expose the government’s decision making process in a
way that discourages candid discussion among the
decision-makers (thereby undermining the courts’
ability to perform their functions), the information is
deemed privileged.
(4) Confidential Information secured by justices,
judges, court officials and employees in the course of
their official functions, mentioned in (2) and (3) above,
are privileged even after their term of office.
(5) Records of cases that are still pending for decision
are privileged materials that cannot be disclosed,
except only for pleadings, orders and resolutions that
have been made available by the court to the general
public.
(6) The principle of comity or inter-departmental
courtesy demands that the highest officials of each
department be exempt from the compulsory processes
of the other departments.
(7) These privileges belong to the Supreme Court as
an institution, not to any justice or judge in his or her
individual capacity. Since the Court is higher than the
individual justices or judges, no sitting or retired
justice or judge, not even the Chief Justice, may claim
exception without the consent of the Court
Note: Read this case in the original. It said so many
things and cited many laws related to judicial privilege.
3. Privilege Communication
MERCADO VS. VITRIOLO
FACTS: Rosa Mercado is Senior Education Specialist of
the Standards Development Division, Office of
Programs and Standards. Atty. Julito Vitriolo, on the
other hand, is a Deputy Executive Director IV of the
Commission on Higher Education (CHED).
Rosa’s husband filed for an annulment of their
marriage before the RTC of Pasig City. The latter
dismissed the annulment case and the dismissal
became final and executory.
In August 1992, Atty. Anastasio de Leon,
counsel of Rosa, died. On February 7, 1994, Atty.
Vitriolo entered his appearance before the RTC as
collaborating counsel for Rosa.
On April 13, 1999, Atty. Vitriolo filed a criminal
complaint against Rosa for Falsification of Public
Evidence
Document, alleging that Rosa made false entries in the
Certificates of Live Birth of her children and for
indicating that she is married to a certain Ferdinand
Fernandez when in truth, she is legally married to
Ruben Mercado.
Rosa filed an administrative complaint against
Atty. Vitriolo, seeking his disbarment from the bar. She
claimed that in filing the criminal case for falsification,
Atty. Vitriolo is guilty of breaching their privileged and
confidential lawyer-client relationship, and should be
dibarred.
On June 21, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors
found Atty. Vitriolo guilty of violating the rule on
privileged communication between attorney and client,
and recommended his suspension from the practice of
law for 1 year.
ISSUE: WON Atty. Vitriolo violated the rule on
privileged communication between attorney and client
when he filed a criminal case for falsification of public
document against Rosa? NO
RULING: In engaging the services of an attorney, the
client reposes on him special powers of trust and
confidence. Their relationship is strictly personal and
highly confidential and fiduciary. The relation is of
such delicate, exacting and confidential nature that is
required by necessity and public interest. Only by such
confidentiality and protection will a person be
encouraged to repose his confidence in an attorney.
The hypothesis is that abstinence from seeking legal
advice in a good cause is an evil which is fatal to the
administration of justice. Thus, the preservation and
protection of that relation will encourage a client to
entrust his legal problems to an attorney, which is of
paramount importance to the administration of
justice. One rule adopted to serve this purpose is the
attorney-client privilege: an attorney is to keep
inviolate his client’s secrets or confidence and not to
abuse them. Thus, the duty of a lawyer to preserve his
client’s secrets and confidence outlasts the termination
of the attorney-client relationship, and continues even
after the client’s death. It is the glory of the legal
profession that its fidelity to its client can be depended
on, and that a man may safely go to a lawyer and
converse with him upon his rights or supposed rights
in any litigation with absolute assurance that the
lawyer’s tongue is tied from ever disclosing it. With full
disclosure of the facts of the case by the client to his
attorney, adequate legal representation will result in
the ascertainment and enforcement of rights or the
prosecution or defense of the client’s cause.
In fine, the factors are as follows:
(1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or
a prospective attorney-client relationship, and
it is by reason of this relationship that the
client made the communication.
Matters disclosed by a prospective
client to a lawyer are protected by the rule on
privileged communication even if the
prospective client does not thereafter retain
279
 emedial Law Review
Digests
the lawyer or the latter declines the
employment. The reason for this is to make
the prospective client free to discuss whatever
he wishes with the lawyer without fear that
what he tells the lawyer will be divulged or
used against him, and for the lawyer to be
equally free to obtain information from the
prospective client.
On the other hand, a communication
from a (prospective) client to a lawyer for
some purpose other than on account of the
(prospective) attorney-client relation is not
privileged. Instructive is the case of Pfleider v.
Palanca, where the client and his wife leased to
their attorney a 1,328-hectare agricultural land
for a period of ten years. In their contract, the
parties agreed, among others, that a specified
portion of the lease rentals would be paid to
the client-lessors, and the remainder would be
delivered by counsel-lessee to client's listed
creditors. The client alleged that the list of
creditors which he had “confidentially” supplied
counsel for the purpose of carrying out the
terms of payment contained in the lease
contract was disclosed by counsel, in violation
of their lawyer-client relation, to parties whose
interests are adverse to those of the client. As
the client himself, however, states, in the
execution of the terms of the aforesaid lease
contract between the parties, he furnished
counsel with the “confidential” list of his
creditors. We ruled that this indicates that
client delivered the list of his creditors to
counsel not because of the professional
relation then existing between them, but on
account of the lease agreement. We then held
that a violation of the confidence that
accompanied the delivery of that list would
partake more of a private and civil wrong than
of a breach of the fidelity owing from a lawyer
to his client.
(2) The client made the communication in
confidence.
The mere relation of attorney and
client does not raise a presumption of
confidentiality. The client must intend the
communication to be confidential.
A confidential communication refers to
information transmitted by voluntary act of
disclosure between attorney and client in
confidence and by means which, so far as the
client is aware, discloses the information to no
third person other than one reasonably
necessary for the transmission of the
information or the accomplishment of the
purpose for which it was given.
Our jurisprudence on the matter rests on
quiescent ground. Thus, a compromise agreement
prepared by a lawyer pursuant to the instruction of
his client and delivered to the opposing party, an
offer and counter-offer for settlement, or a
Evidence
document given by a client to his counsel not in his
professional capacity, are not privileged
communications, the element of confidentiality not
being present.
(3) The legal advice must be sought from the
attorney in his professional capacity.
The communication made by a client to
his attorney must not be intended for mere
information, but for the purpose of seeking
legal advice from his attorney as to his rights
or obligations. The communication must have
been transmitted by a client to his attorney for
the purpose of seeking legal advice.
If the client seeks an accounting
service, or business or personal
assistance, and not legal advice, the privilege
does not attach to a communication disclosed
for such purpose.
Applying all these rules to the case at
bar, the SC held that the evidence on record
fails to substantiate Rosa’s allegations. It
noted that Rosa did not even specify the
alleged communication in confidence disclosed
by respondent. All her claims were couched in
general terms and lacked specificity. She
contends that Atty. Vitriolo violated the rule on
privileged communication when he instituted a
criminal action against her for falsification of
public documents because the criminal
complaint disclosed facts relating to the civil
case for annulment then handled by Atty.
Vitriolo. She did not, however, spell out these
facts which will determine the merit of her
complaint. The SC cannot be involved in a
guessing game as to the existence of facts
which Rosa must prove.
Indeed, Rosa failed to attend the
hearings at the IBP. Without any testimony
from Rosa as to the specific confidential
information allegedly divulged by Atty. Vitriolo
without her consent, it is difficult, if not
impossible to determine if there was any
violation of the rule on privileged
communication. Such confidential information
is a crucial link in establishing a breach of the
rule on privileged communication between
attorney and client. It is not enough to merely
assert the attorney-client privilege. The burden
of proving that the privilege applies is placed
upon the party asserting the privilege.
4. Filial Privilege
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. ARTEMIO
INVENCION
Facts: Artemio Invencion was charged before the
Regional Trial Court of Tarlac with thirteen counts of
rape committed against his 16-year-old daughter,
Cynthia (his daughter with his first common-law-wife,
Gloria Pagala).
280
 emedial Law Review
Digests
During trial, the witnesses presented by the
prosecution in its evidence in chief included Elven
Invencion, the son of Artemio with his second
common-law wife. Elven testified that that sometime
before the end of the school year in 1996, while he
was sleeping in one room with his father, Cynthia, and
two other younger brothers, he was awakened by
Cynthia’s loud cries. Looking towards her, he saw his
father on top of Cynthia, doing a pumping motion.
After about two minutes, his father put on his short
pants. Elven further testified that Artemio was a very
strict and cruel father and a drunkard. He angrily
prohibited Cynthia from entertaining any of her
suitors. .
The trial court convicted Artemio for one count
of rape. Artemio challenges the competency and
credibility of Elven as a witness. He argues that Elven,
as his son, should have been disqualified as a witness
against him under pursuant to the rule on filial
privilege.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not Elven Invencion should be
disqualified as a witness pursuant to the rule on filial
privilege. – NO.
RATIO: There is no cogent reason to overturn the
findings of the trial court on the culpability of Artemio.
The competency of Elven to testify is not affected by
Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, otherwise
known as the rule on “filial privilege.” This rule is not
strictly a rule on disqualification because a descendant
is not incompetent or disqualified to testify against an
ascendant. The rule refers to a privilege not to testify,
which can be invoked or waived like other privileges.
As correctly observed by the lower court, Elven was
not compelled to testify against his father; he chose to
waive that filial privilege when he voluntarily testified
against Artemio. Elven declared that he was testifying
as a witness against his father of his own accord and
only “to tell the truth.” Hence, his testimony is entitled
to full credence.
L. EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSIONS/CONFESSION
PEOPLE VS. MILLANO MUIT
FACTS: Muit, Pancho, Dequillo, Romeo, Hermano and
Ferraer were charged with kidnapping for ransom
with homicide and carnapping in two
separate informations. The kidnapping for ransom with
homicide and the carnapping were established by the
direct testimony of Ferraer, Seraspe and
Chavez. Ferraer testified on how the group approached
and convinced him to let them use his house to keep
the victim they planned to kidnap (Ong). They planned
the crime in Ferraer’s house and waited for the call
from Romeo to inform them when the victim would be
at the construction site. The group received a call from
Romeo on 2 December 1997 informing them that the
victim was already at the construction site, and so they
went there to carry out their plan. At the construction
Evidence
site, as testified to by Seraspe and Chavez, Muit and
the other members of the group pointed their guns at
the victim and his companion and ordered them to lie
prostrate on the ground. After getting the keys to
the Pajero from Seraspe, they forced the victim to
board the vehicle with Muit driving it. They
immediately reported the kidnapping of the victim to
the police and the kidnappers were intercepted by the
group led by Supt. Mission. Supt. Mission testified that
the kidnappers refused to surrender and engaged the
police in a shoot out in which the victim was among
the casualties. Muit was one of the two persons who
survived the shoot out, but was apprehended by the
police. Pancho, Jr. returned to the house
of Ferraer alone when the group did not arrive at their
meeting place. Ferraer, Pancho, Jr., andPancho, Sr.
learned from the news that the group engaged the
police in a shoot out and most of them were killed, and
that Muit was arrested by the police. After
investigation, the police were able to apprehend
Pancho, Jr., Romeo, and Dequillo who all took part in
the botched criminal conspiracy to kidnap the victim.
During the investigation, Pancho, Jr., Dequillo,
and Muit, with the assistance of their counsels and
family members, executed extra judical confessions
divulging their respective roles in the planning and
execution of the crimes. RTC found Muit, Pancho, Jr.,
Dequillo and Romeo guilty. The RTC held that mere
denials and alibis of appellants cannot prevail over the
positive declarations of the prosecution’s witnesses. CA
affirmed.
Issue: WON the lower court erred in giving credence to
the extra-judicial confessions of Pancho, Jr.
and Dequillo, and to the sworn statement and
testimony of Ferraer in convicting them –NO!
Ratio: (i only included the relevant issue which is on
extra judicial confessions)
The extra judicial confessions of Pancho,
Jr., Dequillo, and Muit strengthened the case against
them. There is nothing on record to support
appellants’ claim that they were coerced and tortured
into executing their extra judicial confessions. One of
the indicia of voluntariness in the execution of
appellants’ extra judicial statements is that each
contains many details and facts which the
investigating officers could not have known and could
not have supplied, without the knowledge and
information given by appellants. Moreover, the
appellants were assisted by their lawyers when they
executed their statements. Atty. Mallare testified that
Pancho, Jr. and Dequillo executed their statements
voluntarily and affixed their signatures after he talked
with them alone and informed them of their
constitutional rights. Muit, on the other hand, was
assisted by counsels in each instance when he
executed his two extra judicial confessions; his
second statement was even witnessed by his
uncle, Bonifacio, and his
brother, Dominador.Muit cannot just conveniently
281
 emedial Law Review
Digests
disclaim any knowledge of the contents of his extra
judicial confession. Nevertheless, in Muit’s case, he
was also positively identified by Seraspe and Chavez
as the one who pointed a gun at them during the
kidnapping and ordered them to lay prostrate on the
ground.
Appellants’ claims of torture are not supported
by medical certificates from the physical examinations
done on them. These claims of torture were mere
afterthoughts as they were raised for the first time
during trial; appellants did not even inform their
family members who visited them while they were
imprisoned about the alleged tortures. Dequillo, for
his part, also had the opportunity to complain of the
alleged torture done to him to the Department of
Justice when he was brought there. Claims of torture
are easily concocted, and cannot be given credence
unless substantiated by competent and independent
corroborating evidence.
The extra judicial confessions of Pancho, Jr., Dequillo,
and Muit also strengthened the prosecution’s case
against Romeo. The rule that an extra judicial
confession is evidence only against the person making
it recognizes various exceptions. One such exception is
where several extra judicial statements had been made
by several persons charged with an offense and there
could have been no collusion with reference to said
several confessions, the fact that the statements are in
all material respects identical is confirmatory of the
confession of the co-defendants and is admissible
against other persons implicated therein. They are also
admissible as circumstantial evidence against the
person implicated therein to show the probability of the
latter’s actual participation in the commission of the
crime and may likewise serve as corroborative
evidence if it is clear from other facts and circums
tances that other persons had participated in the
perpetration of the crime charged and proved. These
are known as “interlocking confessions.”
Nonetheless, the RTC, in convicting Romeo,
relied not only on the aforesaid extra judicial
statements but also on Ferraer’s testimony that Romeo
was introduced to him in his house as the informant
when they were planning the kidnapping.
PEOPLE VS SATORRE
Facts: Herminiano Satorre was charged with the
Murder of Romero Pantilgan. Wife of victim testified
that while she was asleep, she was awakened by a
gunshot. When she went out to the porch, she found
her dead husband lying on the ground with a gunshot
wound on his head.
Rufino Abayata, a baranggay kagawad,
testified that they went they went to the Pantilgan
residence to verify a report regarding a dead person.
Rufino testified that Abraham Satorre, the accused’s
father, admitted that it was his son who shot
Pantilgan.
Evidence
Flavio Gelle narrated that he accompanied
Satorre and his father to the barangay captain. There,
Satorre allegedly admitted killing Pantilgan. Cynthia
Castanares, the Baranggay captain, corroborated
Flavio’s story. She testified that Satorre admitted that
he killed Pantilgan because the latter struck him with a
piece of wood.
Satorre denies the charges and alleges that he
was asleep at his home at the time of hte incident. He
also denied his confession. The father corroborated his
son’s story and denied accompanying him to the
baranggay captain.
Note that these alleged confessions were not in
writing.
Issue: Whether Satorre was proven guilty beyond
reasonable doubt? NO
Held: Rules of Court defines an admission as an “act,
declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant
fact.” A confession, on the other hand is the
“declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of
the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily
included therein.”
Evidently, Satorre’s alleged declaration owning
up to the killing before the Barangay Captain was a
confession. Since the declaration was not put in
writing and made out of court, it is an oral extrajudicial
confession. There is no question as to the admissibility
of appellant’s alleged oral extrajudicial confession. The
Rules of Court makes no distinction whether the
confession is judicial or extrajudicial.
The rationale for the admissibility of a
confession is that if it is made freely and voluntarily, a
confession constitutes evidence of a high order since it
is supported by the strong presumption that no sane
person or one of normal mind will deliberately and
knowingly confess himself to be the perpetrator of a
crime, unless prompted by truth and conscience.
Accordingly, the basic test for the validity of a
confession is – was it voluntarily and freely made.
Plainly, the admissibility of a confession in evidence
hinges on its voluntariness.
The problem with appraising voluntariness
occurs when the confession is an oral extrajudicial
confession because the proof of voluntariness cannot
be inferred from the testimony of a witness who
allegedly heard the confessant since there is no written
proof that such confession was voluntarily
made. Neither can the confessant be appraised by the
court since it was made outside the judicial
proceeding.
On the question of whether a confession is
made voluntarily, the age, character, and
circumstances prevailing at the time it was made must
be considered. The intelligence of the accused or want
of it must also be taken into account. It must be
shown that the defendant realized the import of his
act. In this case, Satorre was a 19yr old farmer who
did not even finish 1st grade. Even if he did confess to
the baranggay captain, he may not have realized the
282
 emedial Law Review
Digests
full import of his confession and its consequences. Of
course it’s entirely possible that he did admit to the
act, but the problem is that the voluntariness of such
oral confession is not definitively appraised or
evaluated. At any rate, an extrajudicial confession
forms only a prima facia case. They are not conclusive
proof.
A confession is not required to be in any
particular form. It may be oral or written, formal or
informal in character. It may be recorded on video
tape, sound motion pictures, or tape. However, while
not required to be in writing to be admissible in
evidence, it is advisable, if not otherwise recorded by
video tape or other means, to reduce the confession to
writing. This adds weight to the confession and helps
convince the court that it was freely and voluntarily
made.
Indeed, an extrajudicial confession will not
support a conviction where it is uncorroborated. There
must be such corroboration that, when considered in
connection with confession, will show the guilt of
accused beyond a reasonable doubt. Circumstantial
evidence may be sufficient corroboration of a
confession.
On the whole, it appears that the trial court
simply based Satorre’s conviction on the testimonial
evidence of prosecution witnesses. SC cannot affirm
the conviction on mere testimonial evidence,
considering that the voluntariness of said confession
cannot be conclusively established because of Satorre’s
personal circumstances and the failure of the police to
reduce the alleged oral confession into writing. [note:
testimony of prosec witnesses had some discrepancies
with regard to the establish facts of the case ie.
Location of gunshot wound...etc)
M. POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION
PEOPLE V VILLACORTA GIL
FACTS: Gil was convicted of the crime of Destructive
Arson with Homicide. On March 1, 1998, Gil set fire the
residential house owned by Angge Arguelles and that
the same resulted into the burning of other adjacent
houses causing damage and the death of a certain
Rodolfo Cabrera.
The circumstantial evidence of the prosecution
consisted of the following:
the testimony of Kagawad Rodolfo Lorenzo about
the behavior and remarks of Gil at the time she
caused a public disturbance and threatened to
cause chaos and arson and to drag her neighbors
into this turmoil, two days prior to the
conflagration;
the testimony of Ronnie Gallardo that, when he
saw the burning mattress in the room of the Gil,
the latter said to him in the vernacular: "Pabayaan
mo na iyan. Damay-damay na tayo.";
the testimony of Kagawad Rodolfo Lorenzo that, at
the time he tried to chase the Gil during the fire
incident, he again heard her utter a nonchalant
Evidence
remark: "Damay-damay na tayo diyan, huwag
ninyo nang patayin ang sunog."; and
the testimony of Kagawad William Lim that the Gil
approached and admitted to him immediately after
the incident that she was the person responsible
for the conflagration.
On the other hand, the Gil relied on her lone
testimony in her defense. While she admitted the
authenticity of her written confession (the one made
before William Lim), she denied on the witness stand
that she voluntarily wrote the confession. According to
Gil, the fire resulted from her defective gas stove
which suddenly caught fire while she was boiling
water. When the stove caught fire, she got flustered
and poured water on the stove. To her surprise, the
fire got bigger. Ronnie, who was also renting a room
next to her with his mother, came and they helped
each other to put off the fire. When their efforts
seemed unsuccessful, she told Ronnie: "xxx hindi na
natin kayang patayin ang apoy, baba na lang po kami
para humingi ng tulong". When they went out, people
were already helping each other to contain the fire.
She then left the place passing through an alley.
According to her, it was William Lim who took custody
of him for reasons unknown to her. Thereafter, they
gave her a paper with something written on it and they
instructed her to copy the same in another paper.
Confused, she did what was told of her because they
told her that it would be good for her.
ISSUE:
1. WON the CA erred in finding Gil guilty based on
circumstantial evidence – NO [WON Gil was positively
identified by the circumstantial evidence presented by
the prosecution – YES]
2. WON the CA erred in considering as evidence the
alleged extrajudicial confession Gil made before
William Lim - NO
HELD: Gil contends that the circumstantial evidence of
the prosecution failed to produce the required quantum
of proof to hold her criminally liable for the charge.
She explained that prosecution witness Ronnie
Gallardo saw her mattress already on fire but never
saw her deliberately burn her mattress. Ronnie
Gallardo neither saw nor identified any overt act which
would suggest that the she intentionally put her
mattress on fire. She claimed that Ronnie Gallardo
might have gotten anxious after he saw the raging fire
and misunderstood her remark "pabayaan mo na yan,
damay-damay na tayo" when what she meant to say
after all was "pabayaan mo na yan, madadamay
tayo." She would not have pulled out Ronnie Gallardo
from the burning house had her intention been to
cause injury to others. She also disputed the TC’s
reliance on the testimony of Kagawad Rodolfo Lorenzo
that she intentionally burned her residential house
because of personal problems. She rhetorically
questioned the credibility of the said prosecution
witness when, as a person in authority, he failed to
report to the police his supposed knowledge of what
283
 emedial Law Review
Digests
she was planning to do two days prior to the fire that
occurred in their neighborhood.
The she also argues that her written confession
is inadmissible in evidence. She claims that she was
not assisted by counsel at the time she executed the
same; and that she was merely led to believe, without
apprising her of its legal significance, that it would help
her.
1. NO. [YES] This court agrees with the CA that the
RTC has passed upon enough circumstantial evidence
to hold Gil guilty. As cited, People v. Gallarde,
provides: Positive identification pertains essentially to
proof of identity and not per se to that of being an
eyewitness to the very act of commission of the
crime. There are two types of positive
identification. A witness may identify a suspect
or accused in a criminal case as the perpetrator
of the crime as an eyewitness to the very act of
the commission of the crime. This constitutes
direct evidence. There may, however, be
instances where, although a witness may not
have actually seen the very act of commission of
a crime, he may still be able to positively identify
a suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a
crime as for instance when the latter is the
person or one of the persons last seen with the
victim immediately before and right after the
commission of the crime. This is the second type
of positive identification, which forms part of
circumstantial evidence, which, when taken
together with other pieces of evidence
constituting an unbroken chain, leads to the only
fair and reasonable conclusion, which is that the
accused is the author of the crime to the
exclusion of all others. If the actual eyewitness are
the only ones allowed to possibly positively identify a
suspect or accused to the exclusion of others, then
nobody can ever be convicted unless there is an
eyewitness, because it is basic and elementary that
there can be no conviction until and unless an accused
is positively identified. Such a proposition is absolutely
absurd, because it is settled that direct evidence of the
commission of a crime is not the only matrix
wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and
finding of guilt. If resort to circumstantial evidence
would not be allowed to prove identity of the
accused on the absence of direct evidence, then
felons would go free and the community would
be denied proper protection. [Emphasis supplied]
The aforementioned circumstantial evidence
would constitute positive identification of Gil as the
perpetrator of the crime charged, to the exclusion of
others. She was the person who had the motive to
commit the crime, and the series of events following
her threat to cause chaos and arson in her
neighborhood -- the fire that started in her room, and
her actuations and remarks during, as well as
immediately before and after the fire-- sufficiently
points to the accused-appellant as the author of the
said crime.
Evidence
We are not persuaded by the bare and
uncorroborated allegation of the Gil that the fire was
accidental, and that she was arrested and forced
by Kagawad William Lim to copy the contents of her
written confession from a piece of paper handed to her
by the said barangay official.
To quote a well-entrenched legal precept, the
"factual findings of the trial court, its calibration of the
testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of
their probative weight are given high respect, if not
conclusive effect, unless it ignored, misconstrued,
misunderstood or misinterpreted cogent facts and
circumstances of substance, which, if considered, will
alter the outcome of the case" and the said trial court
"is in the best position to ascertain and measure the
sincerity and spontaneity of witnesses through its
actual observation of the witnesses' manner of
testifying, demeanor and behavior while in the witness
box."
The Gil failed to show any "misconstrued,
misunderstood or misinterpreted cogent facts and
circumstances of substance" that could alter the
outcome of the case. She also did not show any
credible motive why the prosecution witnesses testified
against her. Thus, this Court finds conclusive the
findings and observation of the TC that the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses were candid and
trustworthy, and that the testimony of the accused-
appellant was not impressed with candor and honesty.
2. No. Regarding her extrajudicial confession, Gil made
the confessions not only toKagawad William Lim but
also to Kagawad Rodolfo Lorenzo while the fire was in
progress. Moreover, as correctly held by the CA, even
if the written extra-judicial confession is disregarded,
the evidence presented by the prosecution is more
than sufficient to prove the guilt of the Gil beyond
reasonable doubt.
N. DOCUMENTED ALIBI
LEJANO V. PEOPLE
Facts: Estrellita, Carmela, and Jennifer Vizconde were
murdered in their home in BF Homes, Paranaque.
Among the accused in this case is Hubert Webb. He
was convicted by the trial court and the appellate court
based on the testimony of a “star witness”, Jessica
Alfaro.
In her testimony, Alfaro stated that she was
there when Webb and his companions raped and killed
Carmela Vizconde. Her testimony also matched the
physical evidence found the next day (such as the
unscrewed lightbulb, the broken glass at the front
door, the scattered contents of the bag, etc…)
In his defense of an alibi, Webb presented
evidence (photocopies of his passport, letters to a
friend, US certification of immigration, printout of his
arrival and departure, etc…) to show that he was in the
US when the crime was committed.
284
 emedial Law Review
Digests
The trial court and CA ruled against Webb
stating that Webb was actually in Parañaque when the
Vizconde killings took place. They stated that he was
not in the U.S. and if he did leave, he actually
returned, committed the crime, erased the fact of his
return to the Philippines from the records of the U.S.
and Philippine Immigrations, smuggled himself out of
the Philippines and into the U.S., and returned the
normal way.
They also stated that Webb’s alibi cannot stand
against Alfaro’s positive identification of him as the
rapist and killer of Carmela and, apparently, the killer
as well of her mother and younger sister.
Issue: Did Webb have a valid alibi? YES.
Decision: To establish alibi, the accused must prove
by positive, clear, and satisfactory evidence that (a) he
was present at another place at the time of the
perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was
physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the
crime.
The lower courts were wrong in theorizing that
Webb used his influence in fixing such records. This is
pure speculation since there had been no indication
that such arrangement was made. Besides, how could
Webb fix a foreign airlines’ passenger manifest,
officially filed in the Philippines and at the airport in the
U.S. that had his name on them? How could Webb fix
with the U.S. Immigration’s record system those two
dates in its record of his travels as well as the dates
when he supposedly departed in secret from the U.S.
to commit the crime in the Philippines and then return
there?
Webb’s documents were also authenticated by
various departments (such as the DFA, and the US
Immigration). Lastly, if the SC were to subscribe to the
lower courts’ extremely skeptical view, it might as well
tear the rules of evidence out of the law books and
regard suspicions, surmises, or speculations as reasons
for impeaching evidence. It is not that official records,
which carry the presumption of truth of what they
state, are immune to attack. They are not. That
presumption can be overcome by evidence. Here,
however, the prosecution did not bother to present
evidence to impeach the entries in Webb’s passport
and the certifications of the Philippine and U.S.’
immigration services regarding his travel to the U.S.
and back.
As for Alfaro, she was not a credible witness. A
positive declaration from a witness that he saw the
accused commit the crime should not automatically
cancel out the accused’s claim that he did not do it. A
lying witness can make as positive an identification as
a truthful witness can. The lying witness can also say
as forthrightly and unequivocally, "He did it!" without
blinking an eye.
The positive identification must meet at least
two criteria: First, the positive identification of the
offender must come from a credible witness. She is
credible who can be trusted to tell the truth, usually
Evidence
based on past experiences with her. Her word has, to
one who knows her, its weight in gold.
And second, the witness’ story of what she
personally saw must be believable, not inherently
contrived. A witness who testifies about something she
never saw runs into inconsistencies and makes
bewildering claims.
Alfaro’s statements fail because she had prior
access to the details that the investigators knew of the
case. She did not show up at the NBI as a spontaneous
witness bothered by her conscience. She had been
hanging around that agency for some time as a stool
pigeon, one paid for mixing up with criminals and
squealing on them.
As such, she took advantage of her familiarity
with these details to include in her testimony the
clearly incompatible act of Webb hurling a stone at the
front door glass frames even when they were trying to
slip away quietly—just so she can accommodate this
crime scene feature. This also applied to the other
physical evidence found at the scene of the crime
(such as the bag, the light bulb, etc…) She also failed
to corroborate facts on the “sweetheart theory”
between Webb and Vizconde.
Thus, Webb and the others were acquitted.
O. OFFER OF COMPROMISE
PEOPLE v. ERGUIZA
FACTS: Erguiza was found guilty of 1 count of rape,
with a 13-y.o. minor as victim. At the back of a public
school in Pangasinan, Erugiza, armed with a kitchen
knife, forced AAA, a 1st year high school student, to
have sexual intercourse with him. Erguiza ordered AAA
to not tell anyone, otherwise he’d kill all her family.
The mother of the victim, BBB, had her
daughter examined when she missed her period. It
was only at this time that the mother discovered the
rape incident, after prodding her daughter to confess.
The mother and the victim then filed the criminal case.
CCC, the vicitm’s father, testified that the
family of Erguiza went to their house after the case
was filed, and offered 50k, later increased to 150k.
Albina, the mother of the accused admitted that she
did talk with BBB and CCC, but according to her, it was
the spouses who asked for 1M, later reduced to 250k,
to settle the case. She said her counter-offer was 5k
only.
Issue: Can the offer of compromise given by the
mother of the accused be used as evidence of his
guilt? – No.
Ruling: The alleged offer of the parents of accused to
settle the case cannot be used against him as evidence
of his guilt. Accused testified that he never asked his
parents to settle the case. It was his parents’ initiative
because they and the parents of the victim are actually
in-laws and they did not want their relations to turn
285
 emedial Law Review
Digests
sour. Moreover, accused was not present when the
offer to settle was allegedly made.
An offer of compromise from an
unauthorized person cannot amount to an
admission of the party himself. Although the Court
has held in some cases that an attempt of the parents
of the accused to settle the case is an implied
admission of guilt, we believe that the better rule is
that for a compromise to amount to an implied
admission of guilt, the accused should have been
present or at least authorized the proposed
compromise.
Moreover, it has been held in other decisions of
the court that where the accused was not present
at the time the offer for monetary consideration
was made, such offer of compromise would not
save the day for the prosecution.
Accused acquitted, no proof beyond reasonable
doubt (also on other grounds).
P. ADMISSION BY CONSPIRATOR
TAMARGO V. AWIGAN
Facts: Atty. Franklin V. Tamargo and his eight-year-old
daughter, Gail Franzielle, were shot and killed. The
police had no leads on the perpetrators of the crime
until a certain Reynaldo Geron surfaced and executed
an affidavit dated September 12, 2003. He stated that
a certain Lucio Columna told him during a drinking
spree that Atty. Tamargo was ordered killed by
respondent Lloyd Antiporda and that he (Columna)
was one of those who killed Atty. Tamargo. He added
that he told the Tamargo family what he knew and that
the sketch of the suspect closely resembled Columna.
Eventually Columna was arrested. Apart from him,
there were other respondents.
On March 8, 2004, Columna executed an
affidavit wherein he admitted his participation as
"look out" during the shooting and implicated
respondent Romulo Awingan (alias "Mumoy") as
the gunman and one Richard Mecate. He also
tagged as masterminds respondent Licerio
Antiporda, Jr. and his son, respondent Lloyd
Antiporda. The former was the ex-mayor and the
latter the mayor of Buguey, Cagayan at that time.
When the killing took place, Licerio Antiporda was in
detention for a kidnapping case in which Atty. Tamargo
was acting as private prosecutor. Respondents denied
any involvement in the killings.
During the preliminary investigation,
respondent Licerio presented Columna’s unsolicited
handwritten letter dated to respondent Lloyd, sent
from Columna’s jail cell in Manila. In the letter,
Columna disowned the contents of his March 8, 2004
affidavit and narrated how he had been tortured until
he signed the extrajudicial confession. He stated that
those he implicated had no participation in the killings.
Respondent Licerio also submitted an affidavit of
Columna dated May 25, 2004 wherein the latter
Evidence
essentially repeated the statements in his handwritten
letter.
Due to the submission of Columna’s letter and
affidavit, the investigating prosecutor set a clarificatory
hearing, to enable Columna to clarify his contradictory
affidavits and his unsolicited letter. During the hearing
held on October 22, 2004, Columna categorically
admitted the authorship and voluntariness of the
unsolicited letter. He affirmed the May 25, 2004
affidavit and denied that any violence had been
employed to obtain or extract the affidavit from him.
Thus, on November 10, 2004, the investigating
prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the charges.
This was approved by the city prosecutor.
Meanwhile, in another handwritten letter
addressed to City Prosecutor Ramon Garcia dated
October 29, 2004, Columna said that he was only
forced to withdraw all his statements against
respondents during the October 22, 2004 clarificatory
hearing because of the threats to his life inside the jail.
He requested that he be transferred to another
detention center.
Aggrieved by the dismissal of the charges,
petitioner filed an appeal to the Department of Justice
(DOJ). On May 30, 2005, the DOJ, through then
Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez, reversed the dismissal
and ordered the filing of the Informations for murder.
He opined that the March 8, 2004 extrajudicial
confession was not effectively impeached by the
subsequent recantation and that there was enough
evidence to prove the probable guilt of respondents.
Later on Gonzalez reversed this finding and declared
this extrajudicial confession inadmissible.
ISSUE: W/N there was probable cause against the
other respondents given the rule on res inter alios
acta? NO.
HELD: The lower court judge was wrong when it found
probable cause against the othe respondents.
We agree with the CA that Judge Daguna
limited herself only to the following: (1) Columna’s
affidavit dated March 8, 2004 wherein he implicated
the respondents in the murders; (2) his affirmation of
this affidavit during the April 19, 2004 clarificatory
hearing; (3) his letter dated October 29, 2004 and (4)
the May 30, 2005 DOJ resolution upholding the
prosecutor’s recommendation to file the murder
charges.
She completely ignored other relevant pieces
of evidence such as: (1) Columna’s May 3, 2004 letter
to respondent Lloyd Antiporda narrating the torture he
suffered to force him to admit his participation in the
crimes and to implicate the respondents; (2) his May
25, 2004 affidavit where he stated that neither he nor
the respondents had any involvement in the murders
and (3) his testimony during the October 22, 2004
clarificatory hearing wherein he categorically affirmed
his May 3, 2004 letter and May 25, 2004 affidavit.
Moreover, Judge Daguna failed to
consider that Columna’s extrajudicial confession
286
 emedial Law Review
Digests
in his March 8, 2004 affidavit was not admissible
as evidence against respondents in view of the
rule on res inter alios acta.
The rule on res inter alios acta provides that
the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another. Consequently, an
extrajudicial confession is binding only on the
confessant, is not admissible against his or her co-
accused and is considered as hearsay against them.
The reason for this rule is that:
on a principle of good faith and mutual
convenience, a man’s own acts are
binding upon himself, and are evidence
against him. So are his conduct and
declarations. Yet it would not only be
rightly inconvenient, but also
manifestly unjust, that a man should
be bound by the acts of mere
unauthorized strangers; and if a party
ought not to be bound by the acts of
strangers, neither ought their acts or
conduct be used as evidence against
him.
An exception to the res inter alios acta
rule is an admission made by a conspirator
under Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court:
Admission by conspirator. — The act or
declaration of a conspirator relating to
the conspiracy and during its
existence, may be given in evidence
against the co-conspirator after the
conspiracy is shown by evidence other
than such act or declaration.
This rule prescribes that the act or declaration
of the conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during
its existence may be given in evidence against co-
conspirators provided that the conspiracy is shown by
independent evidence aside from the extrajudicial
confession. Thus, in order that the admission of a
conspirator may be received against his or her co-
conspirators, it is necessary that (a) the conspiracy be
first proved by evidence other than the admission itself
(b) the admission relates to the common object and
(c) it has been made while the declarant was engaged
in carrying out the conspiracy. Otherwise, it cannot be
used against the alleged co-conspirators without
violating their constitutional right to be confronted with
the witnesses against them and to cross-examine
them.
Here, aside from the extrajudicial
confession, which was later on recanted, no
other piece of evidence was presented to prove
the alleged conspiracy. There was no other
prosecution evidence, direct or circumstantial,
which the extrajudicial confession could
corroborate. Therefore, the recanted confession
of Columna, which was the sole evidence against
respondents, had no probative value and was
inadmissible as evidence against them.
Considering the paucity and inadmissibility of the
Evidence
evidence presented against the respondents, it
would be unfair to hold them for trial. Once it is
ascertained that no probable cause exists to form
a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused,
they should be relieved from the pain of going
through a full blown court case. When, at the
outset, the evidence offered during the preliminary
investigation is nothing more than an uncorroborated
extrajudicial confession of an alleged conspirator, the
criminal complaint should not prosper so that the
system would be spared from the unnecessary
expense of such useless and expensive litigation.
Q. SIMILAR CONDUCT
BOSTON BANK (FORMERLY BANK OF COMMERCE)
V. PERLA MANALO AND CARLOS MANALO.
Facts: Xavierville Estate, Inc. (XEI) sold to The
Overseas Bank of Manila (OBM) some residential lots in
Xavierville subdivision. Nevertheless, XEI continued
selling the residential lots in the subdivision as agent
of OBM. Carlos Manalo, Jr. proposed to XEI, through its
President Emerito Ramos, to purchase two lots in the
Xavierville subdivision and offered as part of the
downpayment the P34,887.66 Ramos owed him. XEI,
through Ramos, agreed. In a letter dated August 22,
1972 to Perla Manalo, Ramos confirmed the
reservation of the lots. In the letter he also pegged the
price of the lots at P348,060 with a 20% downpayment
of the purchase price amounting to P69,612.00 (less
the P34,887.66 owing from Ramos), payable as soon
as XEI resumes its selling operations; the
corresponding Contract of Conditional Sale would then
be signed on or before the same date. Perla Manalo
conformed to the letter agreement. Thereafter, the
spouses constructed a house on the property. The
spouses were notified of XEI’s resumption of selling
operations. However, they did not pay the balance of
the downpayment because XEI failed to prepare a
contract of conditional sale and transmit the same to
them. XEI also billed them for unpaid interests which
they also refused to pay.
XEI turned over its selling operations to OBM.
Subsequently, Commercial Bank of Manila (CBM)
acquired the Xavierville Estate from OBM. CBM
requested Perla Manalo to stop any on-going
construction on the property since it (CBM) was the
owner of the lot and she had no permission for such
construction.
Perla informed them that her husband had a
contract with OBM, through XEI, to purchase the
property. She promised to send CBM the documents.
However, she failed to do so. Thus, CBM filed a
complaint for unlawful detainer against the spouses.
But later on, CBM moved to withdraw its complaint
because of theissues raised. In the meantime, CBM
was renamed the Boston Bank of the Philippines.
Then, the spouses filed a complaint for specific
performance and damages against the bank before the
RTC. The spouses alleged that they had always been
287
 emedial Law Review
Digests
ready and willing to pay the installments on the lots
sold to them but no contract was forthcoming. The
spouses further alleged that upon their partial payment
of the downpayment, they were entitled to the
execution and delivery of a Deed of Absolute Sale
covering the subject lots. During the trial, the spouses
adduced in evidence the separate Contracts
of Conditional Sale executed between XEI and 3 other
buyers to prove that XEI continued selling residential
lots in the subdivision as agent of OBM after the latter
had acquired the said lots.
The trial court ordered the petitioner to
execute a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the
spouses upon the payment of the spouses of the
balance of the purchase price. It ruled that under the
August 22,1972 letter agreement of XEI and the
spouses, the parties had a "complete contract to sell"
over the lots, and that they had already partially
consummated the same.
The Court of Appeals sustained the ruling
of the RTC, but declared that the balance of the
purchase price of the property was payable in fixed
amounts on a monthly basis for 120 months, based on
the deeds of conditional sale executed by XEI in favor
of other lot buyers. Boston Bank filed a Motion for the
Reconsideration of the decision alleging that there was
no perfected contract to sell the two lots, as there was
no agreement between XEI and the respondents on the
manner of payment as well as the other terms and
conditions of the sale. Boston Bank also asserts that
there is no factual basis for the CA ruling that the
terms and conditions relating to the payment of
thebalance of the purchase price of the property (as
agreed upon by XEI and other lot buyers in the same
subdivision) were also applicable to the contract
entered into between the petitioner and the
respondents.
CA denied the MR.
ISSUES: Whether or not the CA correctly held that the
terms of the deeds of conditional sale executed by XEI
in favor of the other lot buyers in the subdivision,
which contained uniform terms of 120 equal monthly
installments, constitute evidence that XEI also agreed
to give the Manalo spouses the same mode and
timeline of payment. (Evidence, Disputable
Presumptions, Habits and Customs Rule 130, Section
34) – NO.
HELD: The bare fact that other lot buyers were allowed
to pay the balance of the purchase price of lots
purchased by them in 120 or 180 monthly installments
does not constitute evidence that XEI also agreed to
give the respondents the same mode and timeline of
payment.
Under Section 34, Rule 130 of the Revised
Rules of Court, evidence that one did a certain thing at
one time is not admissible to prove that he did the
same or similar thing at another time, although such
evidence may be received to prove habit, usage,
pattern of conduct or the intent of the parties. Habit,
Evidence
custom, usage or pattern of conduct must be proved
like any other facts. The offering party must establish
the degree of specificity and frequency of uniform
response that ensures more than a mere tendency to
act in a given manner but rather, conduct that is semi-
automatic in nature. The offering party must allege
and prove specific, repetitive conduct that might
constitute evidence of habit. The examples offered in
evidence to prove habit, or pattern of evidence must
be numerous enough to base on inference of
systematic conduct. Mere similarity of contracts does
not present the kind of sufficiently similar
circumstances to outweigh the danger of prejudice and
confusion. In determining whether the examples are
numerous enough, and sufficiently regular, the key
criteria are adequacy of sampling and uniformity of
response. It is only when examples offered to establish
pattern of conduct or habit are numerous enough to
lose an inference of systematic conduct that examples
are admissible.
Respondents failed to allege and prove that, as
a matter of business usage, habit or pattern
of conduct, XEI granted all lot buyers the right to pay
the balance of the purchase price in installments
of 120 months of fixed amounts with pre-computed
interests, and that XEI and the respondents had
intended to adopt such terms of payment relative to
the sale of the two lots in question. Indeed,
respondents adduced in evidence the three contracts
of conditional sale executed by XEI and other lot
buyers merely to prove that XEI continued to sell lots
in the subdivision as sales agent of OBM after it
acquired said lots, not to prove usage, habit or pattern
of conduct on the part of XEI to require all lot buyers
in the subdivision to pay the balance of the purchase
price of said lots in 120 months.
R. DYING DECLARATION
PEOPLE V TABARNERO
FACTS: The accused in this case are Gary Tabarnero
and Alberto Tabarnero, father and son respectively.
They were charged and convicted by the RTC and CA
of the crime of murder for the death of Ernesto
Canatoy.
Gary and Ernesto’s step daughter Mary Jane
were lovers and living together in Ernesto’s place.
When Ernesto knew of their relationship, he got mad
and tried to separate them together. Gary claims that
while he pleaded to Ernesto to let them continue their
relationship, the latter suddenly attacked the former
and when Gary felt that Ernesto had a bladed weapon
tucked in his waist, Gary immediately grabbed it and
stabbed Ernesto by way of self defense. Alberto, on the
other hand denied having participated in the crime and
claimed that when he went looking for his son Gary,
the latter told him that he may have killed Ernesto,
both fled in different directions until Gary surrendered,
followed by Alberto.
288
 emedial Law Review
Digests
SPO2 Morales testified that he was on duty on
the night of the incident and that a housemate of
Ernesto came to report the incident. He then went to
the hospital where Ernesto was brought and asked him
questions regarding the assailants. Ernesto allegedly
confirmed that Alberto and Gary were the culprits.
However, Ernesto was not able to sign the Sinumpaang
Salaysay because he could no longer answer the
succeeding questions. Then he died.
RTC and CA convicted both accused of the
crime of murder.
ISSUE: Whether or not both courts a quo are correct in
finding that Gary and Alberto conspired to kill Ernesto
– YES
HELD: The participation of Alberto as co-conspirator
and therefore principal by direct participation was
established by the dying declaration of Ernesto. As an
exception to hearsay evidence, it must be shown that
a dying declaration was made under a realization by
the decedent that his demise or at least, its imminence
-- not so much the rapid eventuation of death -- is at
hand. This may be proven by the statement of the
deceased himself or it may be inferred from the nature
and extent of the decedent's wounds, or other relevant
circumstances.
In the case at bar, Ernesto had nine stab
wounds which caused his death within the next 48
hours. At the time he uttered his statement accusing
Gary and Alberto of stabbing him, his body was
already very rapidly deteriorating, as shown by his
inability to speak and write towards the end of the
questioning.
We have considered that a dying declaration is
entitled to the highest credence, for no person who
knows of his impending death would make a careless
or false accusation. When a person is at the point of
death, every motive of falsehood is silenced and the
mind is induced by the most powerful consideration to
speak the truth. It is hard to fathom that Ernesto, very
weak as he was and with his body already manifesting
an impending demise, would summon every remaining
strength he had just to lie about his true assailants,
whom he obviously would want to bring to justice.
S. RES GESTAE
MARTURILLAS vs. PEOPLE
Facts: Marturillas was found guilty of homicide for the
death of Artemio Pantinople. According to the
prosecution witnesses, Artemio was eater dinner in the
house of Lito Santos, his neighbor. After eating,
Artemio went outside and sat on a bench in front of his
store. While Lito was eating, he heard a gunshot and
then moments later, he saw Artemio staggering
backwards towards his [Lito’s] kitchen (the kitchen
was open). Artemio shouted to Lito, “Help me, Pre, I
was shot by the captain!” The other witnesses for the
prosecution, including Artemio’s wife, also testified that
Evidence
they heard Artemio shout the same thing. Moreover,
Artemio’s wife also made this statement, “Captain,
why did you shoot my husband?” It was likewise
testified that Marturillas was seen fleeing the scene (it
rhymes) after Artemio was shot. The trial court
considered the statement made by Artemio as either
his dying declaration or as part of res gestae. The CA
agreed, affirming the conviction of Marturillas.
Issue: W/N the statement made by Artemio is part of
res gestae? YES! SC affirmed the conviction.
Held/Ratio:
First of all, was it a dying declaration? Yes! It complied
with the requisites.
To be admissible, a dying declaration must 1)
refer to the cause and circumstances surrounding the
declarant’s death; 2) be made under the consciousness
of an impending death; 3) be made freely and
voluntarily without coercion or suggestions of improper
influence; 4) be offered in a criminal case, in which the
death of the declarant is the subject of inquiry; and 5)
have been made by a declarant competent to testify as
a witness, had that person been called upon to testify.
Just because it falls under dying declaration doesn’t
preclude it from being admitted as part of res gestae
The fact that the victim’s statement constituted
a dying declaration does not preclude it from being
admitted as part of the res gestae, if the elements of
both are present.
Section 42 of Rule 130
Part of the res gestae. -- Statements made by
a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or
immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect
to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence
as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements
accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue,
and giving it a legal significance, may be received as
part of the res gestae.
What is Res Gestae?
Res gestae refers to statements made by the
participants or the victims of, or the spectators to, a
crime immediately before, during, or after its
commission. These statements are a spontaneous
reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the
occasion, without any opportunity for the declarant to
fabricate a false statement. An important consideration
is whether there intervened, between the occurrence
and the statement, any circumstance calculated to
divert the mind and thus restore the mental balance of
the declarant; and afford an opportunity for
deliberation.
Requisites for res gestae
1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a
startling occurrence; 2) the statements were made
before the declarant had time to contrive or devise;
289
 emedial Law Review
Digests
and 3) the statements concerned the occurrence in
question and its immediately attending circumstances.
All these requisites are present in this case.
The principal act, the shooting, was a startling
occurrence. Immediately after, while he was still under
the exciting influence of the startling occurrence, the
victim made the declaration without any prior
opportunity to contrive a story implicating petitioner.
Also, the declaration concerned the one who shot the
victim. Thus, the latter’s statement was correctly
appreciated as part of the res gestae.
Aside from the victim’s statement, which is part of the
res gestae, that of his wife -- "Captain, why did you
shoot my husband?" -- may be considered to be in the
same category. Her statement was about the same
startling occurrence; it was uttered spontaneously,
right after the shooting, while she had no opportunity
to concoct a story against petitioner; and it related to
the circumstances of the shooting.
T. ENTRIES IN THE REGULAR COURSE OF
BUSINESS
SECURITY BANK V GAN
FACTS: Eric Gan opened a current account with
Security Bank. Mr. Qui, branch manager, allegedly
allowed Gan a special arrangement to transfer funds
from his account to another person’s account. Gan
availed himself of this several times by depositing
checks in his account, and even before they cleared,
he withdrew the proceeds thereof and transferred
them to the other account. These transactions were
covered by what were known as "debit memos" since
Gan had no sufficient funds to cover the amounts he
transferred. Later on, Gan purportedly incurred an
overdraft or negative balance in his account. The
overdraft balance came up to P154k. According to
Security Bank, Gan refused to heed its repeated
demands for payment. The payable ballooned to
P300k, with interests applied. Security Bank filed a
sum of money case; Gan claimed that the alleged
overdraft resulted from transactions done without his
knowledge and consent. Lower courts dismissed the
case: no proof of money owed.
Issue: Did the ledger cards and the testimony of Mr.
Patricio Mercado constitute the best evidence of the
transactions made by Security Bank relative to Gan’s
account? No.
Held: Under Rule 45, only questions of law, not of
fact, may be raised before the SC Here, both the trial
court and the CA found that the bank failed to
substantiate its claim that Gan knowingly incurred an
overdraft against his account. No reason to disturb this
finding.
To prove its claim, Security Bank presented
Patricio Mercado, the bookkeeper who handled Gan’s
account and recorded his transactions in a ledger.
Based on this ledger, Gan allegedly had a negative
Evidence
balance of P154k. This resulted from transfers of funds
from Gan’s current account to another person’s
account. These transfers were made under the
authority of Mr. Qui, the branch manager. Gan
categorically denied that he ever authorized these
"funds transfers."
The entries in the ledger, as testified to by
Mercado, were not competent evidence to prove that
Gan consented to the transfers of funds. These entries
merely showed that the transfers were indeed made
and that Qui approved them. Security Bank’s claim
that Gan availed of a special arrangement to transfer
funds from his account to another person’s account
was a bare allegation that was never substantiated.
Admittedly, Mercado had no personal knowledge of this
arrangement. In fact, when asked about the details of
the alleged consent given by respondent to the
transfers, he stated that he could not remember
because respondent talked to Qui and not to
him. Security Bank could have presented Qui whom
they alleged allowed the special arrangement with
Gan. But it did not.
Neither can we accept the bank’s argument
that the entries made by Mercado in the ledger were
competent evidence to prove how and when the
negative balance was incurred. The bank invokes
Section 43 of Rule 130:
Entries in the course of business. – Entries
made at, or near the time of the transactions to which
they refer, by a person deceased, or unable to testify,
who was in a position to know the facts therein stated,
may be received as prima facie evidence, if such
person made the entries in his professional capacity or
in the performance of duty and in the ordinary or
regular course of business or duty.
Under this exception to the hearsay rule, the
admission in evidence of entries in corporate books
required the satisfaction of the following conditions:
1. the person who made the entry must be
dead, or unable to testify;
2. the entries were made at or near the time of
the transactions to which they refer;
3. the entrant was in a position to know the
facts stated in the entries;
4. the entries were made in his professional
capacity or in the performance of a duty,
whether legal, contractual, moral or religious;
and
5. the entries were made in the ordinary or
regular course of business or duty.
The ledger entries did not meet the first and
third requisites. Mercado, petitioner’s bookkeeper who
prepared the entries, was presented to testify on the
transactions pertaining to the account of respondent. It
was in the course of his testimony that the ledger
entries were presented. There was, therefore, neither
justification nor necessity for the presentation of the
entries as the person who made them was available to
testify in court.
Moreover, Mercado had no personal knowledge
of the facts constituting the entries, particularly those
290
 emedial Law Review
Digests
entries which resulted in the negative balance. He had
no knowledge of the truth or falsity of these entries.
The bank submits that the ledger cards constituted the
best evidence of the transactions made by Gan with
the bank relative to his account, pursuant to Section
43 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. There
is no question that the entries in the ledgers were
made by one whose duty it was to record transactions
in the ordinary or regular course of the business. But
for the entries to be prima facie evidence of the facts
recorded, the Rule interpose[s] a very important
condition, one which we think is truly indispensable to
the probative worth of the entries as an exception to
the hearsay rule, and that is that the entrant must be
"in a position to know the facts therein stated."
Undeniably, Mr. Mercado was in a position to know the
facts of the check deposits and withdrawals. But the
transfers of funds through the debit memos in
question?
Let us be clear, at the outset, what the
transactions covered by the debit memos are. They
are, at bottom, credit accommodations said to have
been granted by the bank’s branch manager Mr. [Q]ui
to Gan, and they are, therefore loans, to prove which
competent testimonial or documentary evidence must
be presented. In the fac[e] of the denial by the
defendant of the existence of any such agreement, and
the absence of any document reflecting it, the
testimony of a party to the transaction, i.e., Mr. [Q]ui,
or of any witness to the same, would be necessary.
The plaintiff failed to explain why it did not or could not
present any party or witness to the transactions, but
even if it had a reason why it could not, it is clear that
the existence of the agreements cannot be established
through the testimony of Mr. Mercado, for he was [not
in] a position to [know] those facts. As a subordinate,
he could not have done more than record what was
reported to him by his superior the branch manager,
and unless he was allowed to be privy to the latter’s
dealings with the defendant, the information that he
received and entered in the ledgers was incapable of
being confirmed by him.
There is good reason why evidence of this
nature is incorrigibly hearsay. Entries in business
records which spring from the duty of other employees
to communicate facts occurring in the ordinary course
of business are prima facie admissible, the duty to
communicate being itself a badge of trustworthiness of
the entries, but not when they purport to record what
were independent agreements arrived at by some bank
officials and a client. In this case, the entries become
mere casual or voluntary reports of the official
concerned. To permit the ledgers, prepared by the
bank at its own instance, to substitute the contract as
proof of the agreements with third parties, is to set a
dangerous precedent. Business entries are allowed as
an exception to the hearsay rule only under certain
conditions specified in Section 43, which must be
scrupulously observed to prevent them from being
used as a source of undue advantage for the party
preparing them.
Evidence
Thus, petitioner did not prove that respondent
had incurred a negative balance in his account.
Consequently, there was nothing to show that
respondent was indebted to it in the amount claimed.
U. COMMERCIAL LIST
MERALCO V. QUISUMBING (Sec. of Labor) and
Meralco Employees and Workers Assoc. (MEWA)
(2000)
FACTS: In the 1999 labor case decided by the SC
involving the same parties, the issue of the validity of
the Sec. of Labor’s resolution regarding a wage award
was put in issue. The SC ruled in the 1999 case that in
determining the amount of such award, the focal point
in the consideration is the projected net income of
Meralco for 1996. Based on financial reports of its
actual performance, MERALCO projected that the net
operating income for 1996 was 4.171 Billion. On the
other hand, the Union, by relying heavily on a
newspaper report citing an all Asia capital
financial analyst (All Asia Capital Report), placed
the 1996 net operating income at 5.795 Billion.
The Court ruled that the Sec. of Labor gravely abused
its discretion in relying solely on the evidence
presented by MEWA, namely the All Asia Capital
Report, in fixing the wage award at P2,200. The SC
further stated that the All-Asia Capital Report was
nothing more than a newspaper report that did not
show any specific breakdown or computations, and
that the Sec. of Labor should have given more weight
on the evidence presented by Meralco. Dissatisfied
with the SC decision, the Union filed a MR.
ISSUE: W/N the All Asia Capital Report can be an
accurate basis and conclusive determinant of the
rate of wage increase?
HELD/RATIO: NO.
Section 45 of Rule 130 Rules of Evidence provides:
Commercial lists and the like. — Evidence of
statements of matters of interest to persons
engaged in an occupation contained in a list,
register, periodical, or other published
compilation is admissible as tending to prove
the truth of any relevant matter so stated if
that compilation is published for use by
persons engaged in that occupation and is
generally used and relied upon by them
therein.
Under this rule, statement of matters
contained in a periodical, may be admitted only
"if that compilation is published for use by
persons engaged in that occupation and is
generally used and relied upon by them therein."
As correctly held in the 1999 Decision, the cited report
is a mere newspaper account and not even a
commercial list. At most, it is but an analysis or
291
 emedial Law Review
Digests
opinion which carries no persuasive weight for
purposes of this case as no sufficient figures to support
it were presented. Neither did anybody testify to its
accuracy. It cannot be said that businessmen generally
rely on news items such as this in their occupation.
Besides, no evidence was presented that the
publication was regularly prepared by a person in
touch with the market and that it is generally regarded
as trustworthy and reliable. Absent extrinsic proof of
their accuracy, these reports are not admissible. In the
same manner, newspapers containing stock quotations
are not admissible in evidence when the source of the
reports is available. With more reason, mere analyses
or projections of such reports cannot be admitted. In
particular, the source of the report in this case can be
easily made available considering that the same is
necessary for compliance with certain governmental
requirements.
V. OPINION RULE
TURADIO DOMINGO V. DOMINGO FAMILY AND
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS
FACTS: Petitioner and the four private respondents are
siblings. Petitioner is the eldest child. The family
quarrel arose over the validity of a sale of the house of
their father to the 4 respondents.
Bruno Domingo (hereinafter called “Father
Domingo” – he’s not a priest) in the 70s needed
money for his medical expenses. So what he did was
to sell the subject land to the respondents. New TCT
was issued in the name of Respondents. Petitioner only
learned of the deed of sale in 1981 when an ejectment
suit was filed against him by the respondents.
Petitioner went to the PNP crime lab to have
the signature of Father Domingo examined. The PNP
came out with a report that the signature on the Deed
was not Father Domingo’s. This report was confirmed
by another PNP report.
Petitioner field a criminal complaint for
falsification but the prosecutor dismissed the case on
the basis NBI report that the signature was genuine.
Now, Petitioner filed a complaint for the
declaration of Nullity of the Deed of Sale. Petitioner’s
contention is that the signature of Father Domingo was
forged. Respondents rely on the findings of the NBI
that the signature was authentic.
RTC dismissed the case and disregarded the
PNP and NBI conflicting reports. CA affirmed RTC.
ISSUE: Is the Signature forged? NO. SC affirms CA.
Case dismissed.
HELD: Under the Rules of Court, the genuineness of a
handwriting may be proved by the following:
(1) A witness who actually saw the person
writing the instrument;
(2) A witness familiar with such handwriting
and who can give his opinion thereon,
Evidence
such opinion being an exception to the
opinion rule;
(3) A comparison by the court of the
questioned handwriting and admitted
genuine specimen thereof; and
(4) Expert evidence.
The law makes no preference in the manner of
proving the handwriting of a person. And the Court is
not mandated to give probative weight or evidentiary
value to the opinion of handwriting experts since resort
to experts is not mandatory.
The lower courts correctly disregarded the PNP
report since the comparison was made between
documents written eight years apart. The passage of
time and a person’s increase in age may have decisive
influence in his handwriting characteristics. Thus, in
order to bring about an accurate comparison and
analysis, the standards of comparison must be as close
as possible in point of time to the suspected signature.
Here the testimony of three respondents to the
effect that they saw Father Domingo sign the Deed is
unrebutted. Genuineness of a handwriting may be
proven, under Rule 132, Section 22, by anyone who
actually saw the person write or affix his signature on
a document.
Moreover, the Deed is a notarized document
and as such is prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated unless contradicted by clear evidence, which
petitioner failed to show.
W. CHARACTER EVIDENCE
PEOPLE v. NOEL LEE
Facts: At the time of the commission of the crime,
Herminia Marquez and her son, Joseph, were in the
living room of their house watching a basketball game
on the television. The living room was brightly lit.
Herminia was seated on an armchair and across her
Joseph sat on a sofa, which against the wall and
window of their house, the television was to his
right. Herminia looked away from the game and
casually glanced at her son. To her complete surprise,
she saw a hand holding a gun coming out of the open
window behind Joseph. She looked up and saw Lee
peering through the window and holding the gun
aimed at Joseph. Before she could warn him, Joseph
turned his body towards the window, and
simultaneously, Lee fired his gun hitting Joseph’s head.
Joseph slumped on the sofa. Herminia stood up but
could not move as Lee fired a second shot at Joseph
and 3 shots more— two hit the sofa and one the
cement floor. When no more shots were fired,
Herminia ran to the window and saw Lee, in a
blue sando, flee towards the direction of his house.
With the aid of her neighbor and kumpare, Herminia
brought Joseph to the MCU Hospital where he later
died.
Herminia filed a complaint for murder against
Lee. The complaint was dismissed for insufficiency of
evidence. Herminia appealed to the Secretary of
292
 emedial Law Review
Digests
Justice. Secretary of Justice Bello III set aside the
Resolution and ordered the City Prosecutor of Caloocan
to file the information for murder against Lee.
Lee is a well-known figure in their
neighborhood and has several criminal cases pending
against him in Caloocan City. He was charged with
frustrated homicide in 1984 (dismissed due to victim’s
desistance) and attempted murder in 1989 (real
assailant appeared and admitted the crime). He denies
the killing of Joseph Marquez (claims that was in house
at the time of the crime and was having some drinks
with his neighbour, Bermudez, and his driver,
Columba). Lee had known the victim since childhood
and their houses are only two blocks apart.
Joseph had a bad reputation in their
neighborhood as a thief and drug addict. Six days
before his death, Lee caught Joseph inside his car
trying to steal his car stereo. Joseph scampered away.
As proof of the victim’s bad reputation, Lee presented
a letter handwritten by Herminia, addressed to Mayor
Malonzo of Caloocan City. In the letter, Herminia was
surrendering her son to the Mayor for rehabilitation
because he was hooked on shabu and was a thief.
Herminia was scared that eventually Joseph might not
just steal but kill her and everyone in their household
because of his drug habit.
RTC convicted Lee of murder and sentenced
him to the penalty of death. Case went up to SC on
automatic review.
Issue: W/N Joseph’s bad reputation is admissible as
character evidence (Rule 130, sec.8, par. a.3) to
establish Lee’s innocence? No, character of offended
party immaterial.
Held and Ratio: Lee alleges that the Joseph’s drug
habit led him to commit other crimes and he may have
been shot by any of the persons from whom he had
stolen. As proof of Joseph’s bad character, Lee
presented Herminia’s letter to Mayor Malonzo. On
rebuttal, Herminia admitted that she wrote such letter
to Mayor Malonzo but denied anything about her son’s
thievery.
Character evidence is governed by Section 51,
Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. Character
is defined to be the possession by a person of certain
qualities of mind and morals, distinguishing him from
others. It is the opinion generally entertained of a
person derived from the common report of the people
who are acquainted with him; his reputation. “Good
moral character” includes all the elements essential to
make up such a character; among these are common
honesty and veracity, especially in all professional
intercourse; a character that measures up as good
among people of the community in which the person
lives, or that is up to the standard of the average
citizen; that status which attaches to a man of good
behavior and upright conduct.
The rule is that the character or reputation of a
party is regarded as legally irrelevant in determining a
controversy, so that evidence relating thereto is not
Evidence
admissible. Ordinarily, if the issues in the case were
allowed to be influenced by evidence of the character
or reputation of the parties, the trial would be apt to
have the aspects of a popularity contest rather than a
factual inquiry into the merits of the case. After all, the
business of the court is to try the case, and not the
man; and a very bad man may have a righteous
cause. There are exceptions to this rule however and
Section 51, Rule 130 gives the exceptions in both
criminal and civil cases.
In criminal cases, sub-paragraph 1 of Section
51 of Rule 130 provides that the accused may prove
his good moral character which is pertinent to the
moral trait involved in the offense charged. When the
accused presents proof of his good moral character,
this strengthens the presumption of innocence, and
where good character and reputation are established,
an inference arises that the accused did not commit
the crime charged. This view proceeds from the theory
that a person of good character and high reputation is
not likely to have committed the act charged against
him. Sub-paragraph 2 provides that the prosecution
may not prove the bad moral character of the accused
except only in rebuttal and when such evidence is
pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense
charged. This is intended to avoid unfair prejudice to
the accused who might otherwise be convicted not
because he is guilty but because he is a person of bad
character. The offering of character evidence on his
behalf is a privilege of the defendant, and the
prosecution cannot comment on the failure of the
defendant to produce such evidence. Once the
defendant raises the issue of his good character, the
prosecution may, in rebuttal, offer evidence of the
defendant’s bad character. Otherwise, a defendant,
secure from refutation, would have a license to
unscrupulously impose a false character upon the
tribunal.
Both sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) of Section 51
of Rule 130 refer to character evidence of
the accused. And this evidence must be “pertinent to
the moral trait involved in the offense charged,”
meaning, that the character evidence must be relevant
and germane to the kind of the act charged, e.g., on a
charge of rape, character for chastity; on a charge of
assault, character for peacefulness or violence; on a
charge for embezzlement, character for honesty and
integrity. Sub-paragraph (3) of Section 51 of the said
Rule refers to the character of the offended
party. Character evidence, whether good or bad, of
the offended party may be proved “if it tends to
establish in any reasonable degree the probability or
improbability of the offense charged.” Such evidence is
most commonly offered to support a claim of self-
defense in an assault or homicide case or a claim of
consent in a rape case.
In homicide cases, a pertinent character trait
of the victim is admissible in two situations: (1) as
evidence of the deceased’s aggression; and (2) as
evidence of the state of mind of the accused. The
pugnacious, quarrelsome or trouble-seeking character
293
 emedial Law Review
Digests
of the deceased or his calmness, gentleness and
peaceful nature, as the case may be, is relevant in
determining whether the deceased or the accused was
the aggressor. When the evidence tends to prove self-
defense, the known violent character of the deceased
is also admissible to show that it produced a
reasonable belief of imminent danger in the mind of
the accused and a justifiable conviction that a prompt
defensive action was necessary.
In the instant case, proof of the bad moral
character of the victim is irrelevant to determine the
probability or improbability of his killing. Lee has not
alleged that the victim was the aggressor or that the
killing was made in self-defense. There is no
connection between the deceased’s drug addiction and
thievery with his violent death in the hands of accused-
appellant. In light of the positive eyewitness
testimony, the claim that because of the victim’s bad
character he could have been killed by any one of
those from whom he had stolen is pure and simple
speculation.
Moreover, proof of the victim’s bad moral
character is not necessary in cases of murder
committed with treachery and premeditation. In People
v. Soliman, the Supreme Court held: “x x x While
good or bad moral character may be availed of as
an aid to determine the probability or
improbability of the commission of an offense
(Section 15, Rule 123), such is not necessary in
the crime of murder where the killing is
committed through treachery or premeditation.
The proof of such character may only be allowed
in homicide cases to show “that it has produced
a reasonable belief of imminent danger in the
mind of the accused and a justifiable conviction
that a prompt defensive action was necessary
(Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1952
ed., Vol. 3, p. 126). This rule does not apply to
cases of murder.”
In the case at bar, accused-appellant is
charged with murder committed through treachery and
evident premeditation. Following the ruling in People
v. Soliman, where the killing of the victim was
attended by treachery, proof of the victim’s bad
character is not necessary. The presence of this
aggravating circumstance negates the necessity of
proving the victim’s bad character to establish the
probability or improbability of the offense charged and,
at the same time, qualifies the killing of Joseph
Marquez to murder.
X. BURDEN OF PROOF
MANONGSONG V. ESTIMO
Facts:
Spouses Agatona Guevarra and Ciraoco Lopez had
6 children including petitioner Manongsong (and
his wife) and the respondents.
Petitioners filed a Complaint alleging that
Manongsong and respondents are the owners pro
Evidence
indiviso of a parcel of land in Las Pinas. Invoking
Art. 494 of the Civil Code, petitioners prayed for
the partition and award to them of 1/5 of the land.
They alleged that Agatona was the original owner
and upon her death, her children inherited the
land. Respondents have been in possession of the
land for as long as they can remember and
petitioners were the only descendants not
occupying any portion of the property.
Most respondents entered into a compromise
agreement with petitioners. Under the Agreement,
trhey agreed that each group of heirs would
receive an equal share in the property.
The remaining respondents did not sign the
Agreement and one group (Jumaquio sisters)
actively opposed petitioners’ claim. They alleged
that Navarro (the mother of Agatona) sold the
property to their mother (Enriquita Lopez-
Jumaquio). The Jumaquio sisters presented
provincial Tax Declaration No. 911 for the year
1949 in the sole name of Navarro. In addition, the
Tax Declarations stated that the houses of Agatona
and Enriquita stood on the property as
improvements. The sisters also presented a
notarized Kasulatan (Deed of Sale) dated October
11, 1957 in favor of Enriquita and signed by
Navarro. The Clerk of Court of RTC Manila certified
that the Kasulatan was notarized by the notary
public for the City of Manila Atty. Andrada on
October 11, 1957 and entered in his Notarial
Register. Because they were in peaceful possession
of their portion of the property for more than 30
years, they also invoked the defense of acquisitive
prescription against petitioners and charged the
petitioners of laches.
RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. It held that the
Kasulata was void, even absent evidence attacking
its validity. Thus even if there was no
countervailing proof adduced to impugn the
document’s validity, it was null and void because
the property was conjugal property and no
evidence was produced to prove that it was solely
a paraphernal property. Respondents appealed.
CA reversed the RTC. Petitioners in their appellee’s
brief presented for the first time a supposed
photocopy of Agatona’s death certificate showing
that her mother was a certain Juliana Gallardo.
They also attached an affidavit from Benjamin de
la Cruz, Sr. stating that he only knew Navarro by
name and never met her personally. On the basis
of these documents, petitioners assailed the
genuineness and authenticity of the Kasulatan. The
CA refused to take cognizance of the death
certificate and affidavit on the ground that they
never formally offered the documents in evidence.
The CA also held that they were bound by their
admission that Navarro was the original of the
Property. The CA further held that the RTC erred in
294
 emedial Law Review
Digests
assuming that the property was conjugal in nature
2
when Navarro sold it.
Issue: Whether petitioners were able to prove, by the
requisite quantum of evidence, that Manongsong is a
co-owner of the Property and therefore entitled to
demand for its partition? No.
Held: Petition denied.
We review the factual and legal issues of this
case in light of the general rules of evidence and the
burden of proof in civil cases, as explained by this
Court in Jison v. Court of Appeals :
“Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of the
issue has the burden of proof, and upon the plaintiff in
a civil case, the burden of proof never parts. However,
in the course of trial in a civil case, once plaintiff
makes out a prima facie case in his favor, the duty or
the burden of evidence shifts to defendant to
controvert plaintiff's prima facie case, otherwise, a
verdict must be returned in favor of plaintiff. Moreover,
in civil cases, the party having the burden of proof
must produce a preponderance of evidence thereon,
with plaintiff having to rely on the strength of his own
evidence and not upon the weakness of the
defendant’s. The concept of ‘preponderance of
evidence’ refers to evidence which is of greater weight,
or more convincing, that which is offered in opposition
to it; at bottom, it means probability of truth.”
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming
the validity of the Kasulatan sa Bilihan ng Lupa
Petitioners anchor their action for partition on
the claim that Manongsong is a co-owner or co-heir of
the Property by inheritance, more specifically, as the
heir of her father, Vicente Lopez. Petitioners likewise
allege that the Property originally belonged to
Guevarra, and that Vicente Lopez inherited from
Guevarra a 1/5 interest in the Property. As the
parties claiming the affirmative of these issues,
petitioners had the burden of proof to establish
their case by preponderance of evidence.
To trace the ownership of the Property, both
contending parties presented tax declarations and the
testimonies of witnesses. However, the Jumaquio
sisters also presented a notarized KASULATAN SA
BILIHAN NG LUPA which controverted petitioners’
claim of co-ownership. The Kasulatan, being a
document acknowledged before a notary public,
is a public document and prima facie evidence of
its authenticity and due execution. To assail the
authenticity and due execution of a notarized
2 Navarro did not own the Property. Petitioners
It is a settled rule that the party who invokes the
presumption that all property of marriage belongs to the
conjugal partnership, must first prove that the property was
acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the
coveture is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the
presumption in favor of conjugal ownership.
In this case, not a single iota of evidence was submitted to
prove that the subject property was acquired by Justina
Navarro during her marriage.
Evidence
document, the evidence must be clear,
convincing and more than merely preponderant.
Otherwise the authenticity and due execution of the
document should be upheld. The trial court itself held
that “(n)o countervailing proof was adduced by
plaintiffs to overcome or impugn the document’s
legality or its validity.”[
Even if the Kasulatan was not notarized, it
would be deemed an ancient document and thus still
presumed to be authentic. The Kasulatan is: (1) more
than 30 years old, (2) found in the proper custody, and
(3) unblemished by any alteration or by any
circumstance of suspicion. It appears, on its face, to
be genuine.
The trial court’s conclusion that the Property
was conjugal was not based on evidence, but rather on
a misapprehension of Article 160 of the Civil Code. The
presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code applies
only when there is proof that the property was
acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition
during the marriage is an essential condition for the
operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal
partnership. There was no evidence presented to
establish that Navarro acquired the Property during her
marriage. There is no basis for applying the
presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code to the
present case. On the contrary, Tax Declaration No.
911 showed that, as far back as in 1949, the Property
was declared solely in Navarro’s name. This tends to
support the argument that the Property was not
conjugal.
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not
admitting the documents presented by
petitioners for the first time on appeal
The CA was correct in refusing to give any
probative value to the alleged death certificate of
Guevarra and the affidavit of dela Cruz. Petitioners
belatedly attached these documents to their appellee’s
brief. Petitioners could easily have offered these
documents during the proceedings before the trial
court. Instead, petitioners presented these documents
for the first time on appeal without any explanation.
For reasons of their own, petitioners did not formally
offer in evidence these documents before the trial
court as required by Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court. To admit these documents now is contrary to
due process, as it deprives respondents of the
opportunity to examine and controvert them.
Moreover, even if these documents were
admitted, they would not controvert Navarro’s
ownership of the Property. These documents do not
prove that Guevarra owned the Property or that
admitted before the trial court that Navarro was the
mother of Guevarra. However, petitioners denied
before the Court of Appeals that Navarro was the
mother of Guevarra. We agree with the appellate
court that this constitutes an impermissible change of
theory. When a party adopts a certain theory in the
court below, he cannot change his theory on
295
 emedial Law Review
Digests
appeal. To allow him to do so is not only unfair to the
other party, it is also offensive to the basic rules of fair
play, justice and due process.
Since the notarized Kasulatan is evidence
of greater weight which petitioners failed to
refute by clear and convincing evidence, this
Court holds that petitioners were not able to
prove by preponderance of evidence that the
Property belonged to Guevarra’s estate. There is
therefore no legal basis for petitioners’ complaint
for partition of the Property.
Y. CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTION
DATALIFT MOVERS v. BELGRAVIA REALTY
Facts: PNR owned a lot which it leased out to
Sampaguita Borkerage, Inc. Sampaguita thereafter
entered into a special arrangement with its sister
company, Belgravia Realty & Development Corp.
whereby Belgravia would put up on the lot a
warehouse for its own use. Belgarvia did put up a
warehouse. However, instead of using the said
warehouse for its own use, Belgravia sublet it to
petitioner Datalift Movers for a period of 1 year. By the
terms of lease, Datalift shall pay Belgravia a monthly
rental of P40,000.00 payable on or before the 15th day
of each month, provided an advance rental for two (2)
months is paid upon execution of the contract.
After the expiration of the contract, Datalift
continued to occupy the property, evidently
by acquiesance of lessor Belgravia or by verbal
understanding of the parties.
Subsequently, Belgravia unilaterally increased the
monthly rental to P60,000.00. Monthly rental was
again increased fromP60,000.00 to P130,000.00.
Because of the rental increase made by Belgravia,
Datalift stopped paying its monthly rental for the
warehouse.
Thereafter, Sampaguita addressed demand
letters to Datalift asking the latter to pay its rental in
arrears in the amount of P4,120,000.00 and to vacate
and surrender the warehouse in dispute. Since Datalift
failed to pay, Belgravia and/or Sampaguita filed a
complaint for ejectment with MeTC against Datalift
and/or its controlling stockholder, Jaime Aquino.
MeTC ruled in favor of Belgravia. It
also rejected the defendants’ challenge
against Belgravia’s title over the PNR lot occupied by
the subject warehouse. In their appeal, Datalift and
Aquino questioned the MeTC’s finding that there was
an implied new lease between PNR and Sampaquita on
the lot on which the warehouse in question stands, and
accordingly fault the same court for ordering them to
vacate the same warehouse and to pay rentals as well
as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. RTC and CA
affirmed MeTC’s ruling.
Issue: Whether Datalift can question Belgravia’s
ownership over the property – NO.
Evidence
Held: The Rules of Court already sufficiently shields
respondent Belgravia, as lessor, from being questioned
by the petitioners as lessees, regarding its title or
better right of possession as lessor because having
admitted the existence of a lessor-lessee relationship,
the petitioners are barred from
assailing Belgravia's title of better right of possession
as their lessor.
Section 2, Rule 131, of the Rules of Court
provides:
SEC. 2. Conclusive presumptions. --
The following are instances of conclusive
presumptions:
xxx
(b) The tenant is not
permitted to deny the title of his landlord
at the time of the commencement of the
relation of landlord and tenant between
them.
Conclusive presumptions have been defined as
“inferences which the law makes so peremptory that it
will not allow them to be overturned by any contrary
proof however strong.” As long as the lessor-lessee
relationship between the petitioners and Belgravia
exists as in this case, the former, as lessees, cannot by
any proof, however strong, overturn the conclusive
presumption that Belgravia has valid title to or better
right of possession to the subject leased premises than
they have.
Side note: The Court found that it was superfluous on
the part of the MeTC to rule on the source or validity
ofBelgravia's title or right of possession over the leased
premises as against the petitioners as lessees in this
case. If at all, Belgravia's title or right of possession
should only be taken cognizance of in a proper case
between PNR and Belgravia, but not in the present
case (which is between Belgravia and Datalift).
Z. ADVERSE PARTY WITNESS
CHUA GAW V SUY BEN CHUA AND FELISA CHUA
Ratio: that the witness is the adverse party does not
necessarily mean that the calling party will not be
bound by the former’s testimony. The fact remains
that it was at his instance that his adversary was put
on the witness stand. Unlike an ordinary witness, the
calling party may impeach an adverse witness in all
respects as if he had been called by the adverse party,
except by evidence of his bad character. Under the
rule permitting the impeachment of an adverse
witness, although the calling party does not vouch for
the witness’ veracity, he is nonetheless bound by his
testimony if it is not contradicted or remains
unrebutted.
FACTS: Spouses Chua Chin and Chan Chi were the
founders of three business enterprises namely:
Hagonoy Lumber, Capitol Sawmill Corporation, and
Columbia Wood Industries. The couple had 7 children:
296
 emedial Law Review
Digests
Santos chua, Suy Ben Chua, Chua Suy Phen; Chua
Sioc Huan; Chua Suy Lu; and Julita Chua. When Chua
Chin died, he left his wife Chan Chi and his 7 children
as his only surviving heirs. At the time of his death,
the net worth of Hagonoy Lumber was 415,487.20. On
December 8, 1986, his surviving heirs executed a
Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and Renunciation of
Hereditary rights in Favor of a Co-Heir (Deed of
Partition), wherein the heirs settled their interest in
Hagonoy Lumber. In the said document, Chan Chi and
the six children likewise agreed to voluntarily renounce
and waive their shares over Hagonoy Lumber in favor
of their co-heir Chua Sioc Huan.
In May 1988, petitioner Concepcion Chua Gaw
and her husband, Antonio Gaw (Spouses Gaw), asked
respondent Suy Ben Chua, to lend them P 200,000 to
be used for the construction of their house in Marilao,
Bulacan. The parties agreed that the loan will be
payable within six (6) months without interest. Suy
Ben issued a check in the amount of P200,000.00 to
the couple. The spouses defaulted for which, Suy Ben
filed a Complaint for a Sum of Money before the RTC.
During trial, the spouses Gaw called Suy Ben
to testify as adverse witness under Rule 132 Section
10. On direct examination, Suy Ben testified that
Hagonoy Lumber was the conjugal property of his
parents Chua Chin and Chan Chi, who were both
Chinese citizens. He said that, initially, his father
leased the lots where Hagonoy Lumber is presently
located from his godfather, Lu Pieng, and that his
father constructed the two-storey concrete building
standing thereon. According to Suy Bien, when he was
in highschool, it was his father who managed the
business but he and his other siblings were helping
him. Later, his sister, Sioc Huan, managed Hagonoy
Lumber together with their other brothers and sisters.
He stated that he also managed Hagonoy when he was
in high school, but he stopped when he got married
and found another job. He said that he now owns the
lots where Hagonoy Lumber is operating.
On cross-examination, Concepcion explained
that he ceased to be a stockholder of Capitol Sawmill
when he sold shares of stock to other Stockholders on
Jan 1, 1991. He further testified that Sioc Huan
acquired Hagonoy Lumber by virtue of a Deed of
Partition, executed by the heirs of Chua Chin. He in
turn became the owner of Hagonoy Lumber when he
bought the same from Sioc Huan through a Deed of
Sale dated August 1, 1990. On re-direct examination,
Concepcion stated that he sold shares of stock in
Capitol Sawmill for P254,000.00, which payment he
received in cash. He also paid the purchase price of
225,000.00 for Hagonoy Lumber in cash, which
payment was not covered by a separate receipt as he
merely delivered the same to Sioc Huan at her house
in Paso de Blas Valenzuela. Although he maintains
several accounts at Planters Bank, Paluwagan ng
Bayan, and China Bank, the amount he paid to Sioc
Huan was not taken from any of them. He kept the
amount in the house because he was engaged in
rediscounting checks of people from the public market.
Evidence
Prior to the RTC Decision, Antonio Gaw died die
to cardio vascular and respiratory failure. RTC then
ruled in favor of Suy Ben stating that the latter is
entitled to the payment of 200,000 pesos with interest.
Concepcion appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed. MR
filed but denied as well.
Concepcion contends in the present petition for
review on certiorari that her case was unduly
prejudiced by the RTC’s treatment of the Suy Ben’s
testimony as adverse witness during cross-
examination by his own counsel as part of her
evidence. Concepcion argues that the adverse witess’
testimony elicted during cross-examination should not
be considered as evidence of the calling party.
Issue: Whether or not the adverse witness’ testimony
elicited during cross-examination should be considered
as evidence of the calling party. – NO.
Held: A party who calls his adversary as a witness is,
therefore, not bound by the latter's testimony only in
the sense that he may contradict him by introducing
other evidence to prove a state of facts contrary to
what the witness testifies on. A rule that provides that
the party calling an adverse witness shall not be bound
by his testimony does not mean that such testimony
may not be given its proper weight, but merely that
the calling party shall not be precluded from rebutting
his testimony or from impeaching him. This, petitioner
Concepcion failed to do.
In the present case, the petitioner, by her own
testimony, failed to discredit the respondent's
testimony on how Hagonoy Lumber became his sole
property. The petitioner admitted having signed the
Deed of Partition but she insisted that the transfer of
the property to Chua Siok Huan was only temporary.
On cross-examination, she confessed that no other
document was executed to indicate that the transfer of
the business to Chua Siok Huan was a temporary
arrangement. She declared that, after their mother
died in 1993, she did not initiate any action concerning
Hagonoy Lumber, and it was only in her counterclaim
in the instant that, for the first time, she raised a claim
over the business.
Due process requires that in reaching a
decision, a tribunal must consider the entire evidence
presented. All the parties to the case, therefore, are
considered bound by the favorable or unfavorable
effects resulting from the evidence. As already
mentioned, in arriving at a decision, the entirety of the
evidence presented will be considered, regardless of
the party who offered them in evidence. In this light,
the more vital consideration is not whether a piece of
evidence was properly attributed to one party, but
whether it was accorded the apposite probative weight
by the court. The testimony of an adverse witness is
evidence in the case and should be given its proper
weight, and such evidence becomes weightier if the
other party fails to impeach the witness or contradict
his testimony.
297
 emedial Law Review
Digests
AA. PUBLIC DOCUMENTS
SUERTE-FELIPE V PEOPLE PUBLIC DOCUMENTS
(also has testimonial evidence -omitted)
FACTS: RTC found Felipe guilty of homicide after
having shot to death Ariate. The prosecution’s
witnesses consisted of Alumbres, William Ariate and
Bgy Chairman Arce who all saw the shooting, Edgardo
Ariate who ordered his autopsy and Dr. Lagat who
performed the autopsy on Ariate who sustained 3
gunshot wounds.
In Felipe’s version Ariate allegedly repeatedly stabbed
him which was why he had to defend himself and
accidentally shot him. He also presented a street
vendor to corroborate his story.
The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Felipe filed a
petition for review questioning the rulings on two
basis: the physical evidence and the testimonial
evidence.
Physical Evidence
1. W/N it was Ariate’s body which was autopsied
by Dr. Lagat? YES
2. Assuming it was, W/N the slug recovered from
the fatal wound caused his death? YES, 2nd
and 3rd wounds were both fatal (he was
arguing that he caused 2nd wound)
3. Assuming it did, W/N the slug came from
Felipe’s firearm? YES but the evidence was not
conclusive but found that the bullet came from
a .45mm and he was the only one carrying
that weapon the circumstantial evidence
presented with the other evidence was
sufficient to prove that the slug came from
him.
Whether the autopsied body was that of
Godofredo Ariate
Felipe claims that Dr. Lagat’s testimony failed
to prove that the body autopsied was that of Ariate
since the request for autopsy and the Cert of
Identification of Dead body was only referred to him,
they didnt personally know the deceased and no
relative was around to identify the body during
autopsy.
CA said that the records clearly show that it
was Ariate since the body was identified by
Godofredo’s son, Edgardo. Also the pictures of
Godofredo’s body taken during the autopsy, likewise
establish the identity of the victim. Moreover, the
entries found in the assailed Autopsy Report should be
deemed prima facieevidence of the facts stated
therein, as there had been no proof of any intent on
the part of Dr. Lagat to falsely testify on the identity of
the victim’s body.
SC: Affirm CA’s findings. The presentation in
evidence of the Certificate of Identification of Dead
Body being a public record made in the performance of
a duty of officers in the Medico-Legal Office of the
National Bureau of Investigation, is governed by Rule
Evidence
132, Sections 19 and 23 of the Rules of Court, which
provides:
SEC. 19. Classes of documents.—For the purpose of
their presentation in evidence, documents are either
public or private.
Public documents are: (c) Public records, kept in
the Philippines, of private documents required by
law to be entered therein.
xxxx
SEC. 23. Public documents as evidence.—Documents
consisting of entries in public records made in
the performance of a duty by a public officer
are prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated. All other public documents are evidence, even
against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to
their execution and of the date of the latter.
So the entries in the Certificate of
Identification of Dead Body are deemed prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein, i.e., that a body
has been properly identified as that of Godofredo
Ariate. There was no indication of any impropriety or
irregularity committed by Dr. Lagat. His duty was to
perform the autopsy and not to obsessively investigate
the authenticity of the signature appearing on all
requests presented to him. So Dr. Lagat, as a medico-
legal officer, enjoys the presumption of regularity in
the performance of his duties.
BB. FORMAL OFFER OF EVIDENCE
ATLAS CONSOLIDATED MINING AND DEV’T CORP.
VS CIR.
FACTS: ATLAS filed a VAT return for the first quarter
of 1993 and subsequently, applied with the BIR for the
issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund for such
VAT paid.
CTA: Denied the application for tax credit or
refund for insufficiency of evidence as ATLAS did not
comply with the submission of the necessary
documents as mandated by RR 3-88.
CA: Denied. ATLAS’ failure to submit necessary
documents in accordance to RR 3-88 is fatal to the
application for tax credit or refund, for, without these
documents, Atlas’ VAT export sales indicated in its
amended VAT return and the creditable or refundable
input VAT could not be ascertained.
ISSUE: W/N ATLAS has sufficiently proven entitlement
to a tax credit or refund. – NO.
RATIO: Sec. 34 of Rule 132, Revised Rules on
Evidence, is clear that no evidence which has not
been formally offered shall be considered. ATLAS
has failed to meet the burden of proof required in
order to establish the factual basis of its claim for a tax
credit or refund. Where the receipts and the export
documents purportedly showing the VAT paid
by Atlas were not submitted, the court could not
determine the authenticity of the input VAT Atlas has
298
 emedial Law Review
Digests
paid. The most competent evidence must be adduced
and presented to prove the allegations in a complaint,
petition, or protest before a judicial court. And where
the best evidence cannot be submitted, secondary
evidence may be presented. In this case, the pertinent
documents which are the best pieces of evidence were
not presented.
In addition, the summary presented
by Atlas does not replace the pertinent documents as
competent evidence to prove the fact of refundable or
creditable input VAT. These documents are the best
and competent pieces of evidence required to
substantiate Atlas’ claim for tax credit or refund.
As tax refunds are in the nature of tax
exemptions and construed strictly against the
taxpayer, it is improper to allow ATLAS to simply
prevail and compel a tax credit or refund in the
amount it claims without proving the amount of its
claim.
DIZON V CTA
Facts: Jose P. Fernandez (Jose) died. Thereafter, a
petition for the probate was filed with the RTC. The
probate court then appointed retired SC Justice Dizon
and petitioner, Atty. Rafael Arsenio P. Dizon
(petitioner) as Special and Assistant Special
Administrator, respectively, of the Estate of Jose
(Estate). Justice Dizon informed respondent
Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)
of the special proceedings for the Estate.
Justice Dizon authorized Atty. Jesus M.
Gonzales (Atty. Gonzales) to sign and file on behalf of
the Estate the required estate tax return. Atty.
Gonzales filed the estate tax return with the BIR
Regional Office, showing therein a NIL (ZERO) estate
tax liability.
However, the Assistant Commissioner for
Collection of the BIR, Montalban, issued Estate Tax
Assessment Notice, demanding the payment of
P66,973,985.40 as deficiency estate tax.
Atty. Gonzales moved for the reconsideration
of the said estate tax assessment. However, in her
letter, the BIR Commissioner denied the request and
reiterated that the estate is liable for the payment of
P66,973,985.40 as deficiency estate tax. Dizon filed a
petition for review before the CTA.
During the trial before the CTA, the BIR’s
counsel presented one witness in the person of Alberto
Enriquez, who was one of the revenue examiners who
conducted the investigation on the estate tax case of
the late Jose P. Fernandez. In the course of the direct
examination of the witness, he identified a number of
documentary evidence.
Dizon contends that the evidence should not
have been admitted because there was no formal offer
of evidence.
The CTA, relying on the case of Vda. de Oñate,
ruled that the evidence was admissible despite lack of
a formal offer stating:
Evidence
Although the above-mentioned
documents were not formally offered
as evidence for respondent,
considering that respondent has been
declared to have waived the
presentation thereof during the hearing
on March 20, 1996, still they could be
considered as evidence for respondent
since they were properly identified
during the presentation of respondent's
witness, whose testimony was duly
recorded as part of the records of this
case. Besides, the documents marked
as respondent's exhibits formed part of
the BIR records of the case.
Issue (Only REM issue discussed. The rest are
Tax issues): Is a formal offer of evidence
required? -YES
Ratio:
The CTA and the CA rely solely on the case of
Vda. de Oñate, which reiterated this Court's
previous rulings in People v. Napat-a and
People v. Mate on the admission and
consideration of exhibits which were not
formally offered during the trial.
In Vda. de Oñate, it was held that from
the foregoing provision, it is clear that for
evidence to be considered, the same must be
formally offered. Corollarily, the mere fact that
a particular document is identified and marked
as an exhibit does not mean that it has already
been offered as part of the evidence of a party.
However, in People v. Napat-a citing People v.
Mate, the forgoing rule was relaxed and
evidence not formally offered was allowed
to be admitted and considered by the trial
court provided the following requirements
were present, viz.: first, the same must
have been duly identified by testimony
duly recorded and, second, the same must
have been incorporated in the records of
the case.
This exception may be applied only
when there is strict compliance with the
requisites mentioned therein; otherwise, the
general rule in Section 34 of Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court should prevail.
In this case, these requirements have
not been satisfied. The assailed pieces of
evidence were presented and marked during
the trial particularly when Alberto took the
witness stand. Alberto identified these pieces
of evidence in his direct testimony. He was
also subjected to cross-examination and re-
cross examination by petitioner. But Alberto’s
account and the exchanges between Alberto
and Dizon did not sufficiently describe the
contents of the said pieces of evidence
presented by the BIR. In fact, Dizon sought
299
 emedial Law Review
Digests
that the lead examiner, one Ma. Anabella A.
Abuloc, be summoned to testify, inasmuch as
Alberto was incompetent to answer questions
relative to the working papers. The lead
examiner never testified. Moreover, while
Alberto's testimony identifying the BIR's
evidence was duly recorded, the BIR
documents themselves were not incorporated
in the records of the case.
Furthermore, The Court in Constantino
v. Court of Appeals ruled that the formal
offer of one's evidence is deemed waived
after failing to submit it within a
considerable period of time. It explained
that the court cannot admit an offer of
evidence made after a lapse of three (3)
months because to do so would "condone
an inexcusable laxity if not non-
compliance with a court order which, in
effect, would encourage needless delays
and derail the speedy administration of
justice."
In this case, the BIR failed to appear at
several hearings. It also failed to file its
respective memorandum. In all of these
proceedings, BIR was duly notified. It can be
said that the BIR has waived presentation of
its evidence.
CC. TENDER OF EXCLUDED EVIDENCE
CRUZ-AREVALO V. QUERUBIN-LAYOSA
Facts: Josefina Cruz-Arevalo filed an administrative
complaint against Judge Querubin-Layosa (judge) for
manifest bias and partiality and ignorance of the law
relative to a civil case entitled Cruz-Arevalo and
Conrado Cruz v. Home Development Mutual Fund.
Conrado Cruz executed an authorization letter
and SPA in her favor to represent him in the said civil
case while Conrado undergoes a medical treatment in
the USA. Notwithstanding the presentation of said
letter and SPA, the judge declared Cruz non-suited due
to his absence during pre-trial. The judge also
excluded several paragraphs in the Affidavit which was
adopted as the direct testimony of her witness without
giving her counsel a chance to comment on the
objections raised by Cruz-Arevalo. Moreover, she
refused to issue a written order excluding certain
paragraphs thus depriving Cruz-Arevalo the
opportunity to file certiorari proceedings. Cruz-Arevalo
prays for the re-raffling of the case to ensure
impartiality. The judge inhibited herself from trying the
case.
The judge explained that the letter presented
by Cruz-Arevalo is defective because it was not
notarized and authenticated. The SPA is also defective
because it gave Cruz-Arevalo the authority to receive
Cruz’s contribution to the PAG-IBIG fund and not to
represent him in the case. As regards the exclusion of
several paragraphs in the Affidavit constituting as the
Evidence
direct testimony of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr., the
judge points out that she gave the other party the
chance to go over the affidavit and make objections
thereto like any direct testimonial evidence. She
claims that no written order is necessary as demanded
by complainant’s counsel because her rulings were
made in open court during the course of trial and are
already reflected in the transcript of the stenographic
notes.
Office of the Court Administrator found the
accusations unmeritorious and recommended the
dismissal of the administrative case for lack of merit.
Issue: W/N Judge Querubin-Layosa should be
administratively liable. - NO.
Held: While non-appearance of a party may be
excused if a duly authorized representative shall
appear in his behalf, however Cruz failed to validly
constitute complainant because his authorization letter
and SPA were not respectively authenticated and
specific as to its purpose. Without any authorized
representative, the failure of Cruz to appear at the
pre-trial made him non-suited. Respondent judge thus
correctly dismissed the complaint in so far as he is
concerned.
As regards the exclusion of certain
paragraphs in the affidavit of complainant’s
witness, the rule is that evidence formally
offered by a party may be admitted or excluded
by the court. If a party’s offered documentary or
object evidence is excluded, he may move or
request that it be attached to form part of the
record of the case. If the excluded evidence is
oral, he may state for the record the name and
other personal circumstances of the witness and
the substance of the proposed testimony. These
procedures are known as offer of proof or tender
of excluded evidence and are made for purposes
of appeal. If an adverse judgment is eventually
rendered against the offeror, he may in his appeal
assign as error the rejection of the excluded evidence.
The appellate court will better understand and
appreciate the assignment of error if the evidence
involved is included in the record of the case.
On the other hand, the ruling on an objection
must be given immediately after an objection is made,
as what respondent judge did, unless the court desires
to take a reasonable time to inform itself on the
question presented; but the ruling shall always be
made during the trial and at such time as will give the
party against whom it is made an opportunity to meet
the situations presented by the ruling. Respondent
judge correctly ordered the striking out of portions in
Atty. Arevalo’s affidavit which are incompetent,
irrelevant, or otherwise improper. Objections based on
irrelevancy and immateriality need no specification or
explanation. Relevancy or materiality of evidence is a
matter of logic, since it is determined simply by
ascertaining its logical connection to a fact in issue in
the case.
300
 emedial Law Review
Digests
Finally, complainant failed to present evidence
to show the alleged bias of respondent judge; mere
suspicion that a judge was partial is not enough.
DD. PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE
RAYMUNDO et al. (debtors) v. LUNARIA et al.
(creditors/ commission agent)
FACTS: There are two agreements to remember in
this case: (1) the written Exclusive Authority to Sell in
favor of Lunaria et al.; and (2) a Subsequent Verbal
Agreement.
Petitioners approached respondent Lunaria to
help them find a buyer for their property. Respondent
Lunaria was promised a 5% agent's commission in the
event that he finds a buyer. Eventually, respondents
found a buyer and a Deed of Absolute Sale was
executed. Later on, Ceferino G. Raymundo, one of the
co-owners, advised respondents to go to the bank to
receive partial payment of their total commission.
Version of respondent-creditors: Pursuant to
the written Exclusive Authority to Sell, respondents
(Lunaria et al.) went to the bank to claim their full
commission. However, they were told that the check
covering the balance of their commission was already
given by the bank manager to Lourdes R. Raymundo,
the representative of the petitioners. Respondents
tried to get the check from the petitioners, however,
they were told that there is nothing more due them by
way of commission as they have already divided and
distributed the balance of the commissions among
their nephews and nieces.
Version of petitioner-debtors: For their part,
petitioners counter that there was a subsequent
verbal agreement entered into by the parties after
the execution of the written agreement, and hence
there is no more balance due to respondent Lunaria.
Said verbal agreement provides that the 5% agent's
commission shall be divided as follows: 2/5 for the
agents, 2/5 for Lourdes Raymundo, and 1/5 for the
buyer, Hipolito. The share given to Lourdes Raymundo
shall be in consideration for the help she would extend
in the processing of documents of sale of the property,
the payment of the capital gains tax to the Bureau of
Internal Revenue and in securing an order from the
court. The 1/5 commission given to Hipolito, on the
other hand, will be used by him for the payment of
realty taxes. [Note: the latter part of the case would
show that the lower court rendered a decision against
the petitioner-debtors herein allegedly because they
failed to prove this subsequent verbal agreement by
means of “more than a mere preponderance of
evidence”. Petitioner Raymundos argue that this is
plainly contrary to law, which merely requires
preponderance of evidence in civil cases].
Now, for failure of the respondents to receive
the balance of their agent's commission, they filed an
action for the collection of a sum of money.
Evidence
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in
requiring the petitioners to establish the verbal
agreement modifying the earlier written agreement
(the exclusive authority to sell) by more than a
preponderance of evidence. (NO. Petitioners’ claim
is without merit)
HELD: As to the second issue, petitioners contend
that the appellate court erred in requiring them to
prove the existence of the subsequent verbal
agreement by more than a mere preponderance of
evidence since no rule of evidence requires them to do
so. In support of this allegation, petitioners presented
petitioner Lourdes Raymundo who testified that she
was given 2/5 share of the commission pursuant to the
verbal sharing scheme because she took care of the
payment of the capital gains tax, the preparation of
the documents of sale and of securing an authority
from the court to sell the property.
For their part, respondents counter that the
appellate court did not require petitioners to prove the
existence of the subsequent oral agreement by more
than a mere preponderance of evidence. What the
appellate court said is that the petitioners failed to
prove and establish the alleged subsequent verbal
agreement even by mere preponderance of evidence.
Petitioners' abovecited allegation has no
merit. By preponderance of evidence is meant that the
evidence as a whole adduced by one side is superior to
that of the other. It refers to the weight, credit and
value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is
usually considered to be synonymous with the term
"greater weight of evidence" or "greater weight of the
credible evidence". It is evidence which is more
convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that
which is offered in opposition thereto.
Both the appellate court and trial court ruled
that the evidence presented by the petitioners is not
sufficient to support their allegation that a subsequent
verbal agreement was entered into by the parties. In
fact, both courts correctly observed that if Lourdes
Raymundo was in reality offered the 2/5 share of the
agent's commission for the purpose of assisting
respondent Lunaria in the documentation requirement,
then why did the petitioners not present any written
court order on her authority, tax receipt or sales
document to support her self-serving testimony?
Moreover, even the worksheet allegedly reflecting the
commission sharing was unilaterally prepared by
petitioner Lourdes Raymundo without any showing that
respondents participated in the preparation thereof or
gave their assent thereto. Even the alleged payment of
1/5 of the commission to the buyer to be used in the
payment of the realty taxes cannot be given credence
since the payment of realty taxes is the obligation of
the owners, and not the buyer. Lastly, if the said
sharing agreement was entered into pursuant to the
wishes of the buyer, then he should have been
presented as witness to corroborate the claim of the
petitioners. However, he was not.
301
 emedial Law Review
Digests
EE. CORPUS DELICTI
RIMORIN V. PEOPLE
(Corpus delicti in its legal sense refers to the fact of
the commission of the crime, not to the physical body
of the deceased or to the ashes of a burned building or
-- as in the present case -- to the smuggled cigarettes.
The corpus delicti may be proven by the credible
testimony of a sole witness, not necessarily by physical
evidence such as those aforementioned.)
FACTS:
- Col. Panfilo Lacson received information that
certain syndicated groups were engaged in
smuggling activities somewhere in Port Area,
Manila. He fielded three surveillance stake-out
teams the following night along Roxas Boulevard
and Bonifacio Drive near Del Pan Bridge, whereby
they were to watch out for a cargo truck bound for
Malabon. Nothing came out of it. On the basis of
his investigation, it was discovered that the truck
was registered in the name of Teresita Estacio of
Pasay City.
- Col. Lacson and his men returned to the same
area, with Col. Lacson posting himself at the
immediate vicinity of the 2nd COSAC Detachment
in Port Area, Manila, because as per information
given to him, the said cargo truck will come out
from the premises of the 2nd COSAC Detachment
in said place. No truck came.
- The next morning, a green cargo truck came out
from the 2nd COSAC Detachment followed and
escorted closely by a light brown Toyota Corona
car with 4 men on board. At that time, Lt. Col.
Panfilo Lacson had no information whatsoever
about the car, so he gave an order by radio to his
men to intercept only the cargo truck. The cargo
truck was intercepted. Col. Lacson noticed that
the Toyota car following the cargo truck suddenly
made a sharp U-turn towards the North, unlike the
cargo truck which was going south. Almost by
impulse, Col. Lacson’s car also made a U-turn and
gave chase to the speeding Toyota car. The chase
lasted for less than 5 minutes, until said car made
a stop along Bonifacio Drive, at the foot of Del Pan
Bridge. Col. Lacson and his men searched the car
and they found several firearms.
- When the cargo truck was searched, 305 cases of
blue seal or untaxed cigarettes were found inside
said truck in possession of Rimorin.
- RTC convicted petitioner of smuggling. CA
affirmed. The CA, however, found no sufficient
evidence against the other co-accused who, unlike
petitioner, were not found to be in possession of
any blue seal cigarettes. Hence, this Petition.
- Petitioner argues that he cannot be convicted of
smuggling under the Tariff and Customs Code,
because respondent failed to present the seized
contraband cigarettes in court. Equating the actual
physical evidence -- the 305 cases of blue seal
cigarettes -- with the corpus delicti, he urges this
Evidence
Court to rule that the failure to present it was fatal
to respondent’s cause.
ISSUE: W/N it was necessary to present the seized
goods to prove the corpus delicti. – NO.
HELD/RATIO: Corpus delicti refers to the fact of the
commission of the crime charged or to the body or
substance of the crime. In its legal sense, it does not
refer to the ransom money in the crime of kidnapping
for ransom or to the body of the person murdered.
Hence, to prove the corpus delicti, it is sufficient for
the prosecution to be able show that (1) a certain fact
has been proven -- say, a person has died or a
building has been burned; and (2) a particular person
is criminally responsible for the act.
Since the corpus delicti is the fact of the
commission of the crime, the Court has ruled that even
a single witness’ uncorroborated testimony, if credible,
may suffice to prove it and warrant a conviction
therefor. Corpus delicti may even be established by
circumstantial evidence.
Both the RTC and the CA ruled that the corpus
delicti had been competently established by
respondent’s evidence, which consisted of the
testimonies of credible witnesses and the Custody
Receipt issued by the Bureau of Customs for the
confiscated goods.
Col. Panfilo Lacson’s testimony on the
apprehension of petitioner and on the seizure of the
blue seal cigarettes was clear and straightforward.
Moreover, it is well-settled that findings of fact
of lower courts are binding on this Court, absent any
showing that they overlooked or misinterpreted facts
or circumstances of weight and substance. This
doctrine applies particularly to this case in which the
RTC’s findings, as far as petitioner is concerned, were
affirmed by the appellate court.
FF. CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
PEOPLE V. QUIZON
FACTS: Conchita Pasquin was found dead in her office
at Suarez Travel Services. The trial court found Johnny
Quizon guilty beyond reasonable doubt for robbery
with homicide with a penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The testimony of the prosecution’s witnesses showed
that at around 1pm to 2pm of Sept. 5, 1997, Rowena
Abril, a secretary of the adjacent office, heard loud
noises coming from Conchita’s office. 25 minutes after,
she saw a Quizon walking hurriedly who came from
Conchita’s office. At 4:30pm, she went to see Conchita
but the main door was closed and since nobody
opened the door, she decided to leave.
At lunch time that day, Myla Miclat together
with her live-in partner Roel Sicangco went to see
Conchita to hand over 17,000 pesos in payment for
Myla’s round trip plane fare. While they were inside
Conchita’s office, Johnny Quizon,
whom Conchita introduced as her nephew, came in.
302
 emedial Law Review
Digests
Conchita told Myla that her nephew was a former drug
addict, and that she was helping him mend his
ways. Quizon was present when Myla gave the money
to Conchita. Conchita told Myla that she was going to
purchase the ticket and instructed her to return later
that day to pick it up. When Myla returned at 7pm, she
knocked at the door but nobody answered. The
following day around 5:30am, Myla returned
to Conchita’s office. Again, nobody was in
sight. Myla went to the agency’s neighbor to inquire if
there was someone inside the office. The neighbor
climbed, peeped inside and saw a body covered with a
blanket. The policemen forced open the door and
found the body of Conchita wrapped with a white
blanket. Conchita’s jewelry box and the money paid
by Myla were missing.
Quizon was not found and he never showed up
in the wake and did not attend the burial.
The trial court held that based on
circumstantial evidence, Quizon is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. The circumstances clearly made an
unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion which points to the accused, to the
exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator of the crime.
The accused appealed. The OSG averred that the
existence of every bit of circumstantial evidence was
not satisfactorily established.
ISSUE: Whether or not the circumstantial evidence
found by the trial court could produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt – NO!
Evidence
observed that Conchita’s jewelry and money were
never found, no evidence was introduced that Quizon
had them, or that he had them in his possession at
anytime after Conchita’s death. The fact that Quizon
did not attend Conchita’s wake is not an indication of
either flight or guilt. He was warned against going to
the wake after he earned the ire of their relatives who
had suspected him to be the killer. Significantly, no ill-
motive was ascribed on Quizon to either kill or rob his
own aunt.
The circumstances recited by the trial court
might be enough to create some kind of suspicion on
the part of the trial court of appellant’s involvement,
but suspicion is not enough to warrant conviction. A
finding of guilt based on conjecture, even if likely,
cannot satisfy the need for evidence required for a
pronouncement of guilt, i.e., proof beyond reasonable
doubt of the complicity in the crime. No matter how
weak the defense is, it is still imperative for the
prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. An accused has the right to be
presumed innocent, and this presumption prevails until
and unless it is overturned by competent and credible
evidence proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In
case of any reservation against the guilt of accused,
the Court should entertain no other alternative but to
acquit him.
Therefore, Quizon is acquitted.

RATIO: Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on

Criminal Procedure provides that for circumstantial
evidence to be sufficient for conviction, it must be
shown that (a) that there is more than one
circumstance and the facts from which the inferences
are derived have been firmly established and (b) that
the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
The foregoing elements must all be obtaining
in order to aptly warrant the conviction of an accused.
The circumstances proved must be congruous with
each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the
accused is guilty and inconsistent with any other
hypothesis except that of guilt.
A judgment of conviction based on
circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the
circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain
which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion
pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others,
as the guilty person.
In this case, the circumstances recited by the
trial court would be insufficient to create in the mind of
the Court a moral certainty that appellant was the one
responsible for the commission of the crime. Quizon’s
mere presence at the locus criminis would be
inadequate to implicate him in the commission of the
crime. No evidence was adduced that Quizon was the
last person to see or talk to the victim before she was
killed. Furthermore, even while the trial court had

303