Title: Ramos v. Sps.

Dizon
Citation: G.R. No. 137247
Prepared by: VILLAVICENCIO, Salve

Facts:
Ramos alleged that Sps. Dizon were the owners of an undivided one-half portion of a
parcel of land with an area of about 89.35 square meters located in Tondo, Manila, as
evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 172510 of the Registry of Deeds of
Manila. Sp. Domingo Dizon executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) authorizing
Elpidio Domingo to sell one-half portion of said parcel of land. Domingo failed to
redeem or repurchase the disputed land within the five-month period provided for under
the Deed of Sale under Pacto de Retro, thus, ownership over the subject land was
consolidated in for petitioner Ramos, buyer.

Sps. Dizon filed an Answer/Opposition to the Petition alleging that the SPA was executed
for the purpose of enabling Elpidio Domingo to secure a loan of P150,000.00 by using
Domingo’s share in the land covered by TCT No. 172510 as security. The proceeds of
the loan was supposed to be used for the construction of a duplex residential house to be
supervised by Elpidio. However, Elpidio obtained a loan of P350,000.00 and used a
substantial portion thereof for his personal advantage and benefit. As Elpidio had
exceeded his authority, Sps. Dizon claimed that he revoked the SPA through several
letters and by a formal notice of revocation sent by his counsel. As for the pacto de
retro  sale, Sps. Dizon maintains that the same was simulated as Elpidio had already
obtained a loan totaling P350,000.00 from Ramos as evidenced by a Real Estate
Mortgage executed by the two of them. In any case, he claims that the pacto de retro sale
should be treated as an equitable mortgage which cannot be enforced through a petition
for consolidation of ownership.

During the trial of the case, Ramos herself took the witness stand and testified Elpidio
sold to her, with a right to repurchase, one-half of a parcel of land which was owned by
Sps. Domingo. Ramos presented Elpidio as her second witness and he essentially
reiterated what Ramos had stated in her testimony. After the conclusion of Elpidio’s
testimony, Ramos offered into evidence Exhibits "A," or the TCT "B," or the SPA and
"C,” or the Deed of Sale under Pacto de Retro all of which were admitted by the trial
court. RTC decided in favor of Sps. Dizon.

Sps. Dizon’s counsel manifested before the trial court that he was no longer presenting
testimonial evidence; instead, he requested that the following documents be marked in
evidence: Exhibits "6" - Decision dated March 20, 1992, "6-A" - Dispositive portion
thereto, "7" - TCT No. 172510 – entry thereon, and "7-A" - Registered owners. Also, Sps.
Dizon’s counsel was given ten days to submit his formal offer of evidence in writing and
Ramoswas given the same period of time to file her comment or opposition thereto after
which the case would be submitted for resolution. The trial court, however, prior to the
submission of Sps. Dizon’s formal offer of evidence, rendered a holding that the contract
between Ramos and Elpidio was actually one of equitable mortgage and not a pacto de
retro sale. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Issue/s:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in applying the rule enunciated in the case of Vda.
De Oñate v. Court of Appeals pertaining to the admission and consideration of evidence
not formally offered. No.

Decision of the Court:

Ramos argues that it is axiomatic that the court shall not consider evidence which has not
been formally offered. In this regard, they argue that Exhibits "1" to "7," inclusive of sub-
markings, should not have been considered by the trial court in its Decision considering
that the same were not formally offered in evidence. 

The applicable provision of the Rules of Court on this matter is Sec. 34, Rule 132. It
reads: SEC. 34. Offer of evidence. – The court shall consider no evidence which has not
been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.

The case of Vda. De Oñate, which was relied upon by the Court of Appeals, reiterated
our previous rulings in People v. Napat-a and People v. Mate relative to the admission
and consideration of exhibits which were not formally offered during the trial. We
declared in Vda. De Oñate that – From the foregoing provision, it is clear that for
evidence to be considered, the same must be formally offered. Corollarily, the mere fact
that a particular document to identified and marked as an exhibit does not mean that is
has already been offered as part of the evidence of a party. In Interpacific Transit, Inc. v.
Aviles [186 SCRA 385], we had the occasion to make a distinction between identification
of documentary evidence and its formal offer as an exhibit. We said that the first is done
in the course of the trial and is accompanied by the marking of the evidence as an exhibit
while the second is done only when the party rests its case and not before. A party,
therefore, may opt to formally offer his evidence if he believes that it will advance his
cause or not to do so at all. In the event he chooses to do the latter, the trial court is not
authorized by the Rules to consider the same.

However, in People v. Napat-a citing People v. Mate we relaxed the foregoing rule and
allowed evidence not formally offered to be admitted and considered by the trial
court provided the following requirements are present, viz: first, the same must have been
duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, the same must have been
incorporated in the records of the case.

In this case, we find and so rule that these requirements have been satisfied. The exhibits
in question were presented and marked during the pre-trial of the case thus, they have
been incorporated into the records. Further, Elpidio himself explained the contents of
these exhibits when he was interrogated by Sps. Dizon’s counsel.

To our mind, this exchange between Elpidio and Sps. Dizon’s counsel sufficiently
described the contents of the above-mentioned exhibits presented by Sps. Dizon
particularly the promissory notes and Deed of Real Estate Mortgage. Nor can Ramos be
heard to complain now that she was deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine
Elpidio. It bears stressing that Sps. Dizon’s Exhibits were presented during Elpidio’s
cross-examination and in the presence of Ramos’ counsel. 

But what further defeats Ramos’ cause on this issue is that Sps. Dizon’s exhibits were
marked and admitted during the pre-trial stage as shown by the Pre-Trial Order quoted
earlier. On this point, Section 2, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
"Section 2. Judicial Admissions. - Admission made by the parties in the pleadings, or in
the course of the trial or other proceedings do not require proof and cannot be
contradicted unless previously shown to have been made through palpable mistake."
Therefore, notwithstanding the fact that Sps. Dizon’s exhibits were not formally offered
prior to the rendition of the Decision in Civil Case No. 93-66439 by the court a quo, the
trial court judge committed no error when he admitted and considered them in the
resolution of the case. After all, the pre-trial forms part of the proceedings and matters
dealt with therein may not be brushed aside in the process of decision-making.
Otherwise, the real essence of compulsory pre-trial would be inconsequential and
worthless.