BUENAVENTURA vs.
METROBANK
G.R. No. 167082; August 3, 2016
Q: Should the promissory notes should be
strictly construed against the respondent as
they were contracts of adhesion because the
petitioner’s only participation in their
execution was affixing her signature?
A: No. Even assuming that the promissory
notes were contracts of adhesion, such
circumstance alone did not necessarily
entitle her to bar their literal enforcement
against her if their terms were unequivocal.
It is preposterous on her part to disparage
the promissory notes for being contracts of
adhesion, for she thereby seems to forget
that the validity and enforceability of
contracts of adhesion were the same as
those of other valid contracts.
As a rule, indeed, the contract of
adhesion is no different from any other
contract. Its interpretation still aligns with
the literal meaning of its terms and
conditions absent any ambiguity, or with
the intention of the parties. The terms and
conditions of the promissory notes involved
herein, being clear and beyond doubt,
should then be enforced accordingly.
BUENAVENTURA vs. METROBANK
G.R. No. 167082; August 3, 2016
Q: Can the promissory note act a guaranty
to secure payment of checks by the issuer?
A: No. A guaranty is not presumed; it must
be expressed and in writing to be
enforceable. The promissory notes provide,
in clear language, that appellant is primarily
liable thereunder. It being clear that the
promissory notes were entirely silent about
the supposed guaranty, the promissory
notes must be read literally due to the
absence of any ambiguities about their
language and meaning. In other words, the
petitioner could not validly insist on the
guaranty.
REPUBLIC vs. BAUTISTA, JR.
G.R. No. 166890; June 28, 2016
Q: Can the applicant be confirmed of
his imperfect title to the subject land?
A: No. Considering that the possession
and occupation of the property in question
by Apolonio, Jr. and his predecessors-in-
interest were not shown in the records to
have been "since June 12, 1945, or earlier,"
the application must be rejected.
The applicant for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title must trace
his possession of the subject land to June 12,
1945, or earlier. Any length of possession
that does not comply with the requirement
cannot support the application, which must
be then dismissed for failure to comply with
Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land
Act) and Presidential Decree No. 1529
(Property Registration Decree).
Sps. MERCADER vs. Sps. BARDILAS
G.R. No. 163157; June 27, 2016
Q: May the owners of Lot A extend
their house on a portion of said easement,
claiming that they are entitled to its use as
much as the owners of Lot B.
A: No. Easement or servitude,
according to Valdez v. Tabisula, is "a real
right constituted on another's property,
corporeal and immovable, by virtue of
which the owner of the same has to abstain
from doing or to allow somebody else to do
something on his property for the benefit of
another thing or person." "It exists only
when the servient and dominant estates
belong to two different owners. It gives the
holder of the easement an incorporeal
interest on the land but grants no title
thereto. Therefore, an acknowledgment of
the easement is an admission that the
property belongs to another.
With the right of way rightfully
belonging to them as the owners of the
burdened property, the Spouses Bardilas
(Lot B) remained entitled to avail
themselves of all the attributes of ownership
under the Civil Code, specifically: jus
utendi, jus fruendi, jus abutendi, jus
disponendi and jus vindicandi. Article 428
of the Civil Code recognizes that the owner
has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing,
without other limitations than those
established by law.
 As owners of the 3 square meter
wide road in dispute, the Bardilas Spouses
(owners of Lot B) may rightfully compel the
(Mercader Spouses) to pay them the value
of the land upon which a portion of their
house encroaches, and in case the
petitioners fail to pay, the appellants may
remove or demolish the encroaching
portion of the (Mercader Spouses)’ house.
Sps. PEN vs. Sps. JULIAN
G.R. No. 160408; January 11, 2016
Article 2088 of the Civil Code
prohibits the creditor from appropriating
the things given by way of pledge or
mortgage, or from disposing of them; any
stipulation to the contrary is null and void.
The elements for pactum commissorium to
exist are as follows: 1) that there should be a
pledge or mortgage wherein property is
pledged or mortgaged by way of security
for the payment of the principal obligation
and b) that there should be a stipulation for
an automatic appropriation by the creditor
of the thing pledged or mortgaged in the
event of non-payment of the principal
obligation within the stipulated period. The
first element was present considering that
the property of the respondents was
mortgaged by Linda in favor of Adelaida as
security for the former's indebtedness. As to
the second, the authorization for Adelaida
to appropriate the property subject of the
mortgage upon Linda's default was implied
from Linda's having singed the blank deed
of sale simultaneously with her signing of
the real estate mortgage. The haste with
which the transfer of property was made
upon the default by Linda on her obligation
and the eventual transfer of the property in
a manner not in the form of a valid dacion
en pago ultimately confirmed the nature of
the transaction as a pactum commissorium.
MACTAN CEBU INTERNATIONAL
AIRPORT AUTHORITY vs. HEIRS OF
GAVINA IJORDANON
G.R. No. 173140; January 11, 2016
Q: Is the sale of jointly owned real
property by a co-owner without the express
authority of the others valid?
A: The sale of jointly owned real
property by a co-owner without the express
authority of the others is unenforceable
against the latter, but valid and enforceable
against the seller.
The Deed was void as far as the
respondents' shares in the subject lot were
concerned, but valid as to Julian's share.
The conveyance by a co-owner of the entire
property pursuant to the Deed did not bind
the respondents for lack of their consent
and authority in his favor. As such, the
Deed had no legal effect as to their shares in
the property, but the sale is valid as against
the vendor’s share.
ASB REALTY CORP. vs. ORTIGAS & CO.
LTD.
G.R. No. 202947; December 9, 2015
Q: Can respondent validly rescind the Deed
of Sale due to the failure of the assignor and
its assignee (petitioner) to fulfil the
covenants under the Deed of Sale?
A: No. The petitioner is vested with the
ownership of the parcel of land “free from
any lien or encumbrance except those that
are duly annotated on the title” from the
time of the execution of the Deed of
Assignment in Liquidation.
Respondent recognized without any
reservation the issuance of the new certificate
of title in the name of the assignor and the
subsequent transfer of the assignor by
assignment to the petitioner that resulted in
the issuance of the new certificate of title
under the name of the petitioner. As such,
Ortigas was estopped from assailing the
petitioner’s acquisition and ownership of
the property.
The application of estoppel was
appropriate. The doctrine of estoppel was
based on public policy, fair dealing, good
faith and justice, and its purpose was to
forbid a party to speak against his own act
or omission, representation, or commitment
to the injury of another to whom the act,
omission, representation, or commitment
was directed and who reasonably relied
thereon. The doctrine sprang from equitable
principles and the equities in the case, and
was designed to aid the law in the
administration of justice where without its
aid injustice would result.
ASB REALTY CORP. vs. ORTIGAS & CO.
LTD.
G.R. No. 202947; December 9, 2015
Q: Do the covenants annotated on the
transfer certificate of title (TCT) bound the
petitioner (assignee) to the performance of
the obligations assumed by assignor under
the Deed of Sale.
A: Yes, the annotations on the TCT bound
the petitioner but not to the extent that
rendered the petitioner liable for the non-
performance of the covenants stipulated in
the Deed of Sale.
By acquiring the parcel of land with notice
of the covenants contained in the Deed of
Sale between the vendor and the vendee, the
petitioner bound itself to acknowledge and
respect the encumbrance. Even so, the
petitioner did not step into the shoes of
vendee as a party in the Deed of Sale. Thus,
the annotation of the covenants contained in
the Deed of Sale did not give rise to a liability
on the part of the petitioner as the
purchaser/successor-in-interest without its
express assumption of the duties or
obligations subject of the annotation.
MEGAWORLD PROPERTIES AND
HOLDINGS, INC., et al., vs. MAJESTIC
FINANCE AND INVESTMENT CO.,
INC., et al.
G.R. No. 169694; December 09, 2015
Q: Are petitioners obligated to perform
their obligations under the JVA despite
respondents' failure or refusal to
acknowledge, or perform their reciprocal
obligations?
A: The obligations of the parties under
the JVA were unquestionably reciprocal.
Reciprocal obligations are those that arise
from the same cause, and in which each
party is a debtor and a creditor of the other
at the same time, such that the obligations
of one are dependent upon the obligations
of the other. They are to be performed
simultaneously, so that the performance by
one is conditioned upon the simultaneous
fulfillment by the other. In reciprocal
obligations, before a party can demand the
performance of the obligation of the other,
the former must also perform its own
obligation. Should either party cease to
perform a continuous obligation, the other's
subsequent activity obligation would not
accrue.
Under the JVA , being reciprocal in
nature, their respective obligations as the
owner and the developer were dependent
upon the performance by the other of its
obligations; hence, any claim of delay or
non-performance against the other could
prosper only if the complaining party had
faithfully complied with its own correlative
obligation.
The owner did not perform its correlative
obligation under the JVA as to place itself in
the position to demand that the developer
should already perform its obligation of
providing the round-the-clock security on
the property, thus the owner had no right to
demand from the developer the round-the-
clock security over the 215 hectares of land.
RURAL BANK OF MALASIQUI, INC., vs.
CERALDE, et al.
G.R. No. 162032; November 25, 2015
Q: Expropriation proceedings were
commenced on parcels of land. The lands
were subsequently mortgaged by the
registered owners, then foreclosed and
acquired by mortgagee bank. Who is
entitled to payment of the just
compensation, the mortgagee-bank or the
registered owners-mortgagors?
A: The registered owners (mortgagors).
Section 80 of R.A. 3844 provides that the
Land Bank of the Philippines would pay the
landowners the net value of the land minus
the outstanding balance of the obligations in
favor of the lending institutions in the event
of an existing lien or encumbrance on the
land in favor of private parties or
institutions.
RURAL BANK OF MALASIQUI, INC., vs.
CERALDE, et al.
G.R. No. 162032; November 25, 2015
Q: What is the prescriptive period for
bringing an action to annul the foreclosure
of a mortgage?
A: Ten years from the time the right of
action accrues.
The petitioner is correct about the
erroneous reliance on Article 1142 of the
Civil Code, a legal provision on prescription
that states: “A mortgage action prescribes after
ten years.” The phrase mortgage action used
in Article 1142 refers to an action to
foreclose a mortgage, and has nothing to do
with an action to annul the foreclosure of
the mortgage, like this one.
This action to annul the foreclosure
of the mortgage was not yet barred by
prescription because the applicable period
of prescription was 10 years from the time
the right of action accrued by virtue of the
action being upon a written contract.
Indeed, the reckoning of the period of
prescription should start from July 12, 1983,
when the foreclosure of the mortgage was
made, indicating that this action, being
commenced on July 12, 1993, was not
barred by prescription.
ASSET POOL A (SPV-AMC), INC., vs.
CLARK DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 205915; November 10, 2015
A compromise agreement is a
contract whereby the parties, by making
reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or
put an end to one already commenced.
According to Article 2029 of the Civil Code,
the court shall endeavor to persuade the
parties in a civil case to agree upon some
fair compromise. The contracting parties
may establish such stipulations, clauses,
terms and conditions as they may deem
convenient, provided such stipulations,
clauses, terms and conditions are not
contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order, or public policy. Once the
parties have entered into a compromise,
their agreement has the effect and authority
of res judicata, but there shall be no
execution except in compliance with a
judicial compromise. Such means of dispute
settlement is an accepted, even desirable
and encouraged, practice in courts of law
and administrative tribunals.
BPI vs. Sps. YUJUICO
G.R. No. 175796; July 22, 2015
Q: Is an action to recover the deficiency
after extrajudicial foreclosure of a real
property mortgage a personal action
because it does not affect title to or
possession of real property, or any interest
therein?
A: Yes. An action to recover the
deficiency after the extrajudicial foreclosure
of the real property mortgage is a personal
action, for it does not affect title to or
possession of real property, or any interest
therein. The venue of a personal action is
the place where the plaintiff or any of the
principal plaintiffs resides, or where the
defendant or any of the principal
defendants resides, or in the case of a non-
resident defendant where he may be found,
at the election of the plaintiff.
Assuming that the venue had been
improperly laid, considering that the
respondents had not raised such ground in
their Motion to Dismiss, they did so
belatedly. Venue is procedural, not
jurisdictional, and may be waived by the
defendant if not seasonably raised either in
a motion to dismiss or in the answer.
REPUBLIC vs. MANCAO
G.R. No. 174185; July 22, 2015
Q: Can a petition for the judicial
reconstitution of a Torrens title that does
not strictly adhere to the requirements of
Republic Act No. 26 be granted?
A: No petition for the judicial reconstitution
of a Torrens title that does not strictly
adhere to the requirements of Republic Act
No. 26, albeit unopposed, should be granted
even on the pretext that the reconstitution
would not affect the ownership or
possession of the property.
 REPUBLIC vs. MANCAO
G.R. No. 174185; July 22, 2015
Q: Can petitioner validly establish his
interest in the property by purely
testimonial evidence?
A: No. It is essential that the person
initiating the petition for reconstitution
must have an interest in the property and
such interest must be adequately
established by the petitioner. The evidence
of the petitioner to establish this fact is
solely testimonial as he did not present any
documentary evidence to support his oral
declarations. He failed to present evidence
as to how he became one of the owners of
the subject lot. His testimony as regards this
fact was sketchy, leaving so much room for
speculation. His testimonial evidence does
not satisfactorily establish his interest in the
property.
Sps. BAYSA vs. Sps. PLANTILLA
G.R. No. 159271; July 13, 2015
Q: Can the extrajudicial foreclosure be
valid despite the lack of provision in the
mortgage deed granting special power to
sell to the mortgagee?
A: No. Section 1 of Act No. 3135
provides: When a sale is made under a
special power inserted in or attached to any
real estate mortgage hereafter made as
security for the payment of money or the
fulfillment of any other obligation, the
provisions of the following section shall
govern as to the manner in which the sale
and redemption shall be effected, whether
or not provision for the same is made in the
power.
Accordingly, to enable the extra
judicial foreclosure of the REM of the
petitioners, the special power to sell should
have been either inserted in the REM itself or
embodied in a separate instrument attached to
the REM. The omission of the special power
to sell the property subject of the mortgage
was fatal to the validity and efficacy of the
extrajudicial foreclosure, and warranted the
invalidation of the entire proceedings
conducted by the sheriff.
Sps. BAYSA vs. Sps. PLANTILLA
G.R. No. 159271; July 13, 2015
Q: The extrajudicial foreclosure of the
REM is void, does the right of the
mortgagor to redeem be considered
expired?
A: Having found and declared the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the REM and the
foreclosure sale of the mortgaged property
of the petitioner void for want of the special
power to sell, we deem it unnecessary to
consider and determine the final issue on
whether or not the petitioners had lost their
right to redeem. In other words, there is no
right of redemption to speak of if the foreclosure
was void.
Sps. BAYSA vs. Sps. PLANTILLA
G.R. No. 159271; July 13, 2015
Q: Is the 2.5% monthly interest (30%
per annum) illegal and usurious,
considering that the 8% interest was already
declared as invalid and unwarranted?
A: The petitioners are now estopped
from assailing the validity of the monthly
interest payments made. They expressly
consented to be liable to pay 2.5%/month on the
principal loan of P2.3 Million, and actually
made several payments of interest at that rate.
Secondly, they did not assail the rate of
2.5%/month as interest in the lower courts,
doing so only in this appeal.
CALUZOR vs. LLANILLO, et al.
G.R. No. 155580; July 1, 2015
The remedies of appeal and
certiorari were mutually exclusive, for the
special civil action for certiorari, being an
extraordinary remedy, is available only if
there is no appeal, or other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. In certiorari, only errors of
jurisdiction are to be addressed by the
higher court, such that a review of the facts
and evidence is not done; but in appeal, the
superior court corrects errors of judgment,
and in so doing, reviews issues of fact and
law to cure errors in the appreciation and
evaluation of the evidence. Based on such
distinctions, certiorari cannot be a substitute
for a lost appeal. It is clear that the Court of
Appeals promulgated the assailed decision
in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction to
review and pass upon the DARAB’s
adjudication of the petitioner’s appeal of the
PARAD’s ruling. As such, his only proper
recourse from such decision of the CA was
to further appeal to the court by petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. Despite his allegation of
grave abuse of discretion against the CA, he
could not come to the Court by special civil
action for certiorari.
ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION vs.
YUJUICO
G.R. No. 163116; June 29, 2015
Q: Whether or not respondent Yujuico
is a surety.
A: Yes, Yujuico is a surety.
A surety is distinguished from a
guaranty in that a guarantor is the insurer
of the solvency of the debtor and thus binds
himself to pay if the principal is unable to
pay while surety is the insurer of the debt,
and he obligates himself to pay if the
principal does not pay.  unjust enrichment, by means of a cross-
With the stipulations in the
continuing guaranties indicating that he
was the surety of the credit line extended to
YLTC, Jesus was solidarily liable to
Genbank for the indebtedness of YLTC. In
other words, he thereby rendered himself
"directly and primarily responsible" with
YLTC, "without reference to the solvency of
the principal”. This is so even if the first
part of the continuing guaranties showed
that Jesus as the signatory had agreed to be
bound "either as guarantor or otherwise".
The usage of term guaranty or guarantee in
the caption of the documents, or of the
word guarantor in the contents of the
documents did not conclusively
characterize the nature of the obligations
assumed therein.
METRO MANILA TRANSIT CORP. vs.
REYNALDO CUEVAS et al.,
GR No. 167797; June 15, 2015
Q: Whether or not the MMTC was
liable for the injuries sustained by the
respondents despite the provision in the
agreement to sell that shielded it from
liability.
A: Yes. This is because of the
registered-owner rule, whereby the
registered owner of the motor vehicle
involved in a vehicular accident could be
held liable for the consequences. The
registered owner rule has remained good
law in this jurisdiction considering its
impeccable and timeless rationale as
enunciated in subsequent cases. Indeed,
MMTC could not evade liability by passing
the buck to Mina’s Transit. The stipulation
in the agreement to sell did not bind third
parties like the Cuevases, who were
expected to simply rely on the data
contained in the registration certificate of
the erring bus.
Although the registered-owner rule
might seem to be unjust towards MMTC,
the law did not leave it without any remedy
or recourse. MMTC could recover from
Mina's Transit, the actual employer of the
negligent driver, under the principle of
claim seeking reimbursement of all the
amounts that it could be required to pay as
damages arising from the driver's
negligence. Thus, when MMTC set up its
cross-claim against Mina's Transit, it is
precisely to ensure that Mina's Transit
would reimburse whatever liability would
be adjudged against MMTC.
KALAW vs. FERNANDEZ
G.R. No. 166357; January 14, 2015
Q: Valerio filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage against his
spouse, Elena. He reasoned that his wife
was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage. He presented the
testimonies of two supposed expert
witnesses who concluded that his wife was
suffering from a psychological incapacity in
the form of NPD (Narcissistic Personality
Disorder). The conclusions of the witnesses
were premised on respondents’ constant
mah-jong sessions wherein she would even
bring along her children. Would this
constitute psychological incapacity?
A: Yes. The determinant should be her
obvious failure to fully appreciate the duties
and responsibilities of parenthood at the
time she made her marital vows. Had she
fully appreciated such duties and
responsibilities, she would have known that
bringing along her children of very tender
ages to her mah-jong sessions would expose
them to a culture of gambling and other
vices that would erode moral fibre.
KALAW vs. FERNANDEZ
G.R. No. 166357; January 14, 2015
Q: In a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage based on psychological
incapacity filed by the husband against his
wife, may the wife refute the charge and
instead prove in the same action that it is
the husband who is incapacitated?
A: Yes. The Courts are justified in
declaring a marriage null and void under
Article 36 of the Family Code regardless of
whether it is the petitioner or the
respondent who imputes the psychological
incapacity to the other as long as the
imputation is fully substantiated with
proof. Indeed Psychological incapacity may
exist in one party alone or in both of them,
and if psychological incapacity of either or
both is established, the marriage has to be
deemed null and void.
SAINT MARY CRUSADE vs. RIEL
G.R. No. 176508; January 12, 2015
A petition for the judicial
reconstitution of a Torren's Title must
strictly comply with the requirements
prescribed in Republic Act No. 26,
otherwise, the petition should be dismissed.
Strict compliance with the requirements of
the law aims to thwart dishonest parties
from abusing reconstitution proceedings as
a means of illegally obtaining properties
otherwise already owned by other parties.
Jurisprudence is to the effect settled that in
petitions for reconstitution of titles, actual
owners and possessors of the land involved
must be duly served with actual and
personal notice of the petition.
YINLU BICOL MINING Corp. vs TRANS-
ASIA OIL & DEVELOPMENT Corp.
G.R. No. 207942; January 12, 2015
Q: Can mining rights previously
granted by law be impaired by a
subsequent law?
A: No. In Republic v. Court of Appeals,
we stated that mining rights acquired under
the Philippine Bill of 1902 and prior to the
effectivity of the 1935 Constitution were
vested rights that could not be impaired
even by the Government. Indeed, the
mining patents of Yinlu were issued
pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and
were subsisting prior to the effectivity of the
1935 Constitution. Consequently, Yinlu and
its predecessors-in-interest had acquired
vested rights in the disputed mineral lands
that could not and should not be impaired
even in light of their past failure to comply
with the requirement of registration and
annual work obligations.
LAVADIA vs. HEIRS OF LUNA
G.R. No. 171914; July 23, 2014
ISSUE: Whether the divorce between
Atty. Luna and Eugenia had validly
dissolved the first marriage.
RULING: From the time of the
celebration of the first marriage on
September 10, 1947 until the present,
absolute divorce between Filipino spouses
has not been recognized in the Philippines.
The non-recognition of absolute divorce
between Filipinos has remained even under
the Family Code, even if either or both of
the spouses are residing abroad. Indeed, the
only two types of defective marital unions
under our laws have been the void and the
voidable marriages. As such, the remedies
against such defective marriages have been
limited to the declaration of nullity of the
marriage and the annulment of the
marriage. Conformably with the nationality
rule, however, the divorce, even if
voluntarily obtained abroad, did not
dissolve the marriage between Atty. Luna
and Eugenia, which subsisted up to the time
of his death on July 12, 1997. The non-
recognition of absolute divorce in the
Philippines is a manifestation of the respect
for the sanctity of the marital union
especially among Filipino citizens. For as
long as this public policy on marriage
between Filipinos exists, no divorce decree
dissolving the marriage between them can
ever be given legal or judicial recognition
and enforcement in this jurisdiction.
UY vs. FULE et al.,
G.R. No. 164961; June 30, 2014
Q: To be a purchase in good faith, when
is the degree of proof of good faith
sufficient?
A: The standard is that for one to be a
purchaser in good faith in the eyes of the
law, he should buy the property of another
without notice that some other person has a
right to, or interest in, such property, and
should pay a full and fair price for the same
at the time of such purchase, or before he
has notice of the claim or interest of some
other persons in the property. He buys the
property with the belief that the person
from whom he receives the property was
the owner and could convey title to the
property. Indeed, a purchaser cannot close
his eyes to facts that should put a
reasonable man on his guard and still claim
he acted in good faith. Such degree of proof
of good faith, however, is sufficient only
when the following conditions concur: first,
the seller is the registered owner of the land;
second, the latter is in possession thereof;
and third, at the time of the sale, the buyer
was not aware of any claim or interest of
some other person in the property, or of any
defect or restriction in the title of the seller
or in his capacity to convey title to the
property. Absent one or two of the
foregoing conditions, then the law itself
puts the buyer on notice and obliges the
latter to exercise a higher degree of
diligence by scrutinizing the certificate of
title and examining all factual
circumstances in order to determine the
seller’s title and capacity to transfer any
interest in the property.
AZNAR BROTHERS REALTY vs. SPS.
YBAŇEZ
G.R. No. 161380; April 21, 2014
The settled rule is that a free patent
issued over a private land is null and void,
and produces no legal effects whatsoever.
Private ownership of land – as when there is
a prima facie proof of ownership like a duly
registered possessory information or a clear
showing of open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession, by present or
previous occupants – is not affected by the
issuance of a free patent over the same land,
because the Public Land Law applies only
to lands of the public domain. The Director
of Lands has no authority to grant free
patent to lands that have ceased to be public
in character and have passed to private
ownership. Consequently, a certificate of
title issued pursuant to a homestead patent
partakes of the nature of a certificate issued
in a judicial proceeding only if the land
covered by it is really a part of the
disposable land of the public domain.
PASCUAL vs. DAQUIOAG
G.R. No. 162063; March 31, 2014
Doctrine: The writ of execution issued
upon a final judgment adjudicating the
ownership of land to a party may authorize
putting her in possession although the judgment
does not specifically direct such act.
Citing Perez v. Evite: Considering that
herein plaintiff-appellants have no other
claim to possession of the property apart
from their claim of ownership which was
rejected by the lower court and,
consequently, has no right to remain
thereon after such ownership was adjudged
to defendant-appellees, the delivery of
possession of the land should be considered
included in the decision. Indeed, it would
be defeating the ends of justice should we
require that for herein appellees to obtain
possession of the property duly adjudged to
be theirs, from those who have no right to
remain therein, they must submit to court
litigations anew.
BJDC CONSTRUCTION vs. LANUZO
Q: Is failure to place illuminated
warning signs on the site amounts to
negligence that cause the death of Balbino?
A: Negligence cannot be fairly ascribed
to the company considering that it has
shown its installation of the necessary
warning signs and lights in the project site.
In that context, the fatal accident was not
caused by any instrumentality within the
exclusive control of the company. In
contrast, Balbino had the exclusive control
of how he operated and managed his
motorcycle. The records disclose that he
himself did not take the necessary
precautions. Balbino overtook another
motorcycle rider at a fast speed, and in the
process could not avoid hitting a barricade
at the site, causing him to be thrown off his
motorcycle onto the newly cemented road.
REPUBLIC vs. ZURBARAN REALTY
G.R. No. 164408; March 24, 2014
An application for original registration of
land of the public domain under Section
14(2) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529
must show not only that the land has
previously been declared alienable and
disposable, but also that the land has been
declared patrimonial property of the State
at the onset of the 30-year or 10-year period
of possession and occupation required
under the law on acquisitive
prescription. Article 422 of the Civil Code
states that property of public dominion,
when no longer intended for public use or
for public service, shall form part of the
patrimonial property of the State. It is this
provision that controls how public
dominion property may be converted into
patrimonial property susceptible to
acquisition by prescription. After all, Article
420 (2) makes clear that those property
"which belong to the State, without being
for public use, and are intended for some
public service or for the development of the
national wealth" are public dominion
property. For as long as the property
belongs to the State, although already
classified as alienable or disposable, it
remains property of the public dominion if
when it is intended for some public service
or for the development of the national
wealth. Accordingly, there must be an
express declaration by the State that the
public dominion property is no longer
intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth or that
the property has been converted into
patrimonial. Without such express
declaration, the property, even if classified
as alienable or disposable, remains property
of the public dominion, pursuant to Article
420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by
prescription. It is only when such alienable
and disposable lands are expressly declared
by the State to be no longer intended for
public service or for the development of the
national wealth that the period of
acquisitive prescription can begin to run.
Such declaration shall be in the form of a
law duly enacted by Congress or a
Presidential Proclamation in cases where
the President is duly authorized by law.
REPUBLIC vs. DE JOSON
G.R. No. 163767; March 10, 2014
Q: Who can apply for the judicial
confirmation of imperfect title?
A: Those who by themselves or
through their predecessors in interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title, except
when prevented by war or force majeure.
These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential
to a Government grant and shall be entitled
to a certificate of title under the provisions
of this chapter.
A mere showing of possession and
occupation for 30 years or more is not
sufficient. Under Section 14(1) of PD 1529,
it must be proved that: (1) the land formed
part of the alienable and disposable land of
the public domain; and (2) she, by herself or
through her predecessors–in–interest, had
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the
subject land under a bona fide claim of
ownership from June 12, 1945, or earlier.
SOLIDUM vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 192123; March 10, 2014
Doctrine: Applicability of the Doctrine of Res
Ipsa Loquitur
Res ipsa loquitur is literally translated
as "the thing or the transaction speaks for
itself."
The doctrine res ipsa loquitur means
that "where the thing which causes injury is
shown to be under the management of the
defendant, and the accident is such as in the
ordinary course of things does not happen if
those who have the management use proper care,
it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of
an explanation by the defendant, that the
accident arose from want of care." It is simply
"a recognition of the postulate that, as a
matter of common knowledge and
experience, the very nature of certain types
of occurrences may justify an inference of
negligence on the part of the person who
controls the instrumentality causing the
injury in the absence of some explanation
by the defendant who is charged with
negligence. It is grounded in the superior
logic of ordinary human experience and on
the basis of such experience or common
knowledge, negligence may be deduced
from the mere occurrence of the accident
itself.
Hence, res ipsa loquitur is applied in
conjunction with the doctrine of common
knowledge. Jarcia, Jr. v. People  has
underscored that the doctrine is not a rule
of substantive law, but merely a mode of
proof or a mere procedural convenience.
The doctrine, when applicable to the facts
and circumstances of a given case, is not
meant to and does not dispense with the
requirement of proof of culpable negligence
against the party charged. It merely
determines and regulates what shall be
prima facie evidence thereof, and helps the
plaintiff in proving a breach of the duty.
The doctrine can be invoked when and only
when, under the circumstances involved,
direct evidence is absent and not readily
available.
PNB vs. Sps. MANALO
G.R. No. 174433; February 24, 2014
Q: The Spouses Manalo entered into
All-Purpose Credit Facility with the PNB
for P1,000,000.00, the interest rate to be
"determined by the Bank to be its prime rate
plus applicable spread, prevailing at the
current month." Is the stipulation valid?
A: No. The unilateral determination
and imposition of the increased rates is
violative of the principle of mutuality of
contracts under Article 1308 of the Civil
Code, which provides that the contract
must bind both contracting parties; its
validity or compliance cannot be left to the
will of one of them.’ A perusal of the
Promissory Note will readily show that the
increase or decrease of interest rates hinges
solely on the discretion of petitioner. It does
not require the conformity of the maker
before a new interest rate could be enforced.
Any contract which appears to be heavily
weighed in favor of one of the parties so as
to lead to an unconscionable result, thus
partaking of the nature of a contract of
adhesion, is void. Any stipulation regarding
the validity or compliance of the contract
left solely to the will of one of the parties is
likewise invalid.
GONZALO vs. TARNATE
G.R. No. 160600; January 15, 2014
Pursuant to Section 6 of PD 1594,
every contractor is prohibited from
subcontracting with or assigning to another
person any contract or project that he has
with the DPWH unless the DPWH Secretary
has approved the subcontracting or
assignment. Gonzalo, who was the sole
contractor of the project in question,
subcontracted the implementation of the
project to Tarnate in violation of the
statutory prohibition. The subcontract being
illegal, as it does not bear the approval of
DPWH Secretary, the Deed of Assignment
was also illegal as it sprung from the illegal
subcontract.
Under the doctrine of In Pari
Delicto, the guilty parties to an illegal
contract cannot recover from one another
and are not entitled to an affirmative relief
because they are in pari delicto or in equal
fault. An accepted exception, however,
arises when its application contravenes
well-established public policy. Public Policy
is that principle of the law which holds that
no subject or citizen can lawfully do that
which has a tendency to be injurious to the
public or against the public good. The
prevention of unjust enrichment is a
recognized public policy of the State since
Article 22 of the Civil Code provides that
"every person, who through an act of
performance by another, or any other
means, acquires or comes into possession of
something at the expense of the latter,
without just or legal ground, shall return
the same to him.
FIRST UNITED CONSTRUCTORS Corp.,
vs. BAYANIHAN AUTOMOTIVE
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 164985; January 15, 2014
Q: What is recoupment?
A: Recoupment (reconvencion) is the
act of rebating or recouping a part of a claim
upon which one is sued by means of a legal
or equitable right resulting from a
counterclaim arising out of the same
transaction.7 It is the setting up of a demand
arising from the same transaction as the
plaintiff’s claim, to abate or reduce that
claim.
The legal basis for recoupment by
the buyer is the first paragraph of Article
1599 of the Civil Code, viz: Article 1599.
Where there is a breach of warranty by the
seller, the buyer may, at his election:
1. Accept or keep the goods
and set up against the seller,
the breach of warranty by
way of recoupment in
diminution or extinction of
the price;
2. Accept or keep the goods
and maintain an action
against the seller for
damages for the breach of
warranty;
3. Refuse to accept the goods,
and maintain an action
against the seller for
damages for the breach of
warranty;
4. Rescind the contract of sale
and refuse to receive the
goods or if the goods have
already been received, return
them or offer to return them
to the seller and recover the
price or any part thereof
which has been paid.
When the buyer has claimed and
been granted a remedy in anyone of these
ways, no other remedy can thereafter be
granted, without prejudice to the provisions
of the second paragraph of Article 1191.
FIRST UNITED CONSTRUCTORS Corp.,
vs. BAYANIHAN AUTOMOTIVE Corp.
G.R. No. 164985; January 15, 2014
Q: What is legal compensation, and
when it is permissible?
A: Legal compensation takes place
when the requirements set forth in Article
1278 and Article 1279 of the Civil Code are
present, to wit: Compensation shall take
place when two persons, in their own right,
are creditors and debtors of each other.
Article 1279. In order that
compensation may be proper, it is
necessary:
(1) That each of the obligors be
bound principally, and that he be at
the same time a principal creditor of
the other;
(2) That both debts consists in a sum
of money, or if the things due are
consumable, they be of the same
kind, and also of the same quality if
the latter has been stated;
(3) That the two debts be due;
(4) That they be liquidated and
demandable;
(5) That over neither of them there
be any retention or controversy,
 commenced by third persons and
communicated in due time to the
debtor.
As to whether petitioners could avail
themselves of compensation, both the RTC
and CA ruled that they could not because
the claims of petitioners against respondent
were not liquidated and demandable.
DBP vs. GUARIŇA AGRICULTURAL and
REALTY
GR No. 160758; January 15, 2014
The agreement between DBP and
Guariña was a loan. Under the law, a loan
requires the delivery of money or any other
consumable object by one party to another
who acquires ownership thereof, on the
condition that the same amount or quality
shall be paid. Loan is a reciprocal
obligation, as it arises from the same cause
where one party is the creditor and the
other is the debtor. The obligation of one
party in a reciprocal obligation is dependent
upon the obligation of the other, and the
performance should ideally be
simultaneous. This means that in a loan, the
creditor should release the full amount and
the debtor repays it when it becomes due
and demandable. Moreover, a loan may be
secured by a mortgage constituted on real
or personal property to protect the
creditor's interest in case of the default of
the debtor. Naturally, a mortgage remains
an accessory contract dependent on the
principal obligation, such that enforcement
of the mortgage contract will depend on
whether or not there has been a violation of
the principal obligation. While a creditor
and debtor could regulate the order in
which they should comply with their
reciprocal obligations, it is presupposed that
in a loan, the lender should perform its
obligation - the release of full amount -
before it could demand that the borrower
repay the loaned amount. Thus,
Corporation would not incur in delay
before DBP fully performed its reciprocal
obligation.
DAVID vs. DAVID
G.R. No. 162365; January 15, 2014
Q: Did Eduardo validly exercise his
right to repurchase?
A: Yes. Eduardo had complied with
the conditions stipulated in the deed of sale
and those prescribed by Article 1616 of the
Civil Code, to wit:
The vendor given the right to
repurchase may exercise his right of
redemption by paying the buyer: (a) the
price of the sale, (b) the expenses of the
contract, (c) legitimate payments made by
reason of the sale, and (d) the necessary and
useful expenses made on the thing sold.
In the present case, Eduardo paid
the repurchase price to Roberto by
depositing the proceeds of the sale of the
Baguio City lot in the latter's account. Such
payment was an effective exercise of the
right to repurchase.
DAVID vs. DAVID
G.R. No. 162365; January 15, 2014
Q: Is the MOA executed had
extinguished the obligations established
under the deed of sale by novation?
A: No.
In sales with the right to repurchase,
the title and ownership of the property sold
are immediately vested in the vendee,
subject to the resolutory condition of
repurchase by the vendor within the
stipulated period. Accordingly, the
ownership of the affected properties
reverted to Eduardo once he complied with
the condition for the repurchase, thereby
entitling him to the possession of the other
motor vehicle with trailer.
UCPB vs. LUMBO
G.R. No. 162757; December 11, 2013
Q: Can an injunctive writ be granted to
enjoin the implementation of writ of
possession?
A: No. The implementation of a writ of
possession issued pursuant to Act No. 3135
at the instance of the purchaser at the
foreclosure sale of the mortgaged property
in whose name the title has been meanwhile
consolidated cannot be prevented by the
injunctive writ.
In the instant case, the property was
sold at the public auction with UCPB as the
highest bidder. By virtue of the non-
redemption by the respondents within the
period of redemption, UCPB consolidated
the title over the property in its name.
UCPB is the registered owner of the
property and is unquestionably entitled to
the full implementation of the writ of
possession.
As with all equitable remedies,
injunction must be issued only at the
instance of a party who possesses sufficient
interest in or title to the right or the
property sought to be protected. It is only
proper when the applicant appears to be
entitled to the relief demanded in the
complaint. The respondents made no such
showing of their holding a right in esse.
They could not do so simply because their
non-redemption within the period of
redemption had lost for them any right in
the property, including its possession.
Sps. DICO vs. VIZCAYA
MANAGEMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 161211; July 17, 2013
Q: A husband was the registered owner
of Lot 486 of the Cadiz Cadastre and
resided therein since 1958. On May 30, 1964,
the wife filed an application for free patent
covering Lot 29-B, adjoining Lot 486, and
the husband filed a same application for Lot
1412, also adjoining Lot 486. On November
10, 1956, respondent was able to secure a
TCT covering Lot 29-B. On May 12, 1986,
the spouses filed an action for reconveyance
of the property. Are the spouses entitled to
recover Lot 29-B?
A: No. Under Article 1456 of the Civil
Code, the person obtaining property
through mistake or fraud is considered by
force of law a trustee of an implied trust for
the benefit of the person from whom the
property comes. Under Article 1144, Civil
Code, an action upon an obligation created
by law must be brought within 10 years
from the time the right of action accrues.
Consequently, an action for reconveyance
based on implied or constructive trust
prescribes in 10 years.
Here, the CA observed that even
granting that fraud intervened in the
issuance of the transfer certificates of title,
and even assuming that the Dicos had the
personality to demand the reconveyance of
the affected property on the basis of implied
or constructive trust, the filing of their
complaint for that purpose only on May 12,
1986 proved too late for them.
Verily, the reckoning point for
purposes of the Dicos’ demand of
reconveyance based on fraud was their
discovery of the fraud. Such discovery was
properly pegged on the date of the
registration of the transfer certificates of title
in the adverse parties’ names, because
registration was a constructive notice to the
whole world. The long period of 29 years
that had meanwhile lapsed from the
issuance of the pertinent transfer certificate
of title on November 10, 1956 was way
beyond the prescriptive period of 10 years.
VECTOR SHIPPING Corp. vs.
AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE Co.
G.R. No. 159213; July 3, 2013
Q: What is subrogation?
A: Subrogation is the “substitution of
another person in the place of the creditor,
to whose rights he succeeds in relation to
the debt;” and is “independent of any mere
contractual relations between the parties to
be affected by it, and is broad enough to
cover every instance in which one party is
required to pay a debt for which another is
primarily answerable, and which in equity
and conscience ought to be discharged by
the latter.”
VECTOR SHIPPING Corp. vs.
AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE Co.
G.R. No. 159213; July 3, 2013
Q: When does subrogation take place in
contract of insurance?
A: If the insured property is destroyed
or damaged through the fault or negligence
of a party other than the assured, then the
insurer, upon payment to the assured, will
be subrogated to the rights of the assured to
recover from the wrongdoer to the extent
that the insurer has been obligated to pay.
Payment by the insurer to the assured
operates as an equitable assignment to the
former of all remedies which the latter may
have against the third party whose
negligence or wrongful act caused the loss.
The right of subrogation is not dependent
upon, nor does it grow out of, any privity of
contract or upon written assignment of
claim. It accrues simply upon payment of
the insurance claim by the insurer
INTERNATIONAL HOTEL
CORPORATION vs. JOAQUIN, JR
G.R. No. 1583611; April 10, 2013
Q: What is the Principle of Quantum
Meruit?
A: Considering the absence of an
agreement, and in view of respondents’
constructive fulfillment of their obligation,
the Court has to apply the principle of
quantum meruit in determining how much
was still due and owing to respondents.
Under the principle of quantum meruit, a
contractor is allowed to recover the
reasonable value of the services rendered
despite the lack of a written contract. The
measure of recovery under the principle
should relate to the reasonable value of the
services performed. The principle prevents
undue enrichment based on the equitable
postulate that it is unjust for a person to
retain any benefit without paying for it.
Being predicated on equity, the principle
should only be applied if no express
contract was entered into, and no specific
statutory provision was applicable.
Sps. CUSI vs. DOMINGO
G.R. No. 195825; February 27, 2013
Q: What is the Curtain Principle?
A: One of the guiding tenets
underlying the Torrens system is the curtain
principle, in that one does not need to go
behind the certificate of title because it
contains all the information about the title
of its holder. This principle dispenses with
the need of proving ownership by long
complicated documents kept by the
registered owner, which may be necessary
under a private conveyancing system, and
assures that all the necessary information
regarding ownership is on the certificate of
title
Sps. CUSI vs. DOMINGO
G.R. No. 195825; February 27, 2013
Q: Who is a Purchaser in good faith?
A: Good faith is the honest intention to
abstain from taking unconscientious
advantage of another. It means the
“freedom from knowledge and
circumstances which ought to put a person
on inquiry.” Given this notion of good faith,
therefore, a purchaser in good faith is one
who buys the property of another without
notice that some other person has a right to,
or interest in, such property and pays full
and fair price for the same. As an
examination of the records shows, the
petitioners were not innocent purchasers in
good faith and for value. Their failure to
investigate Sy's title despite the nearly
simultaneous transactions on the property
that ought to have put them on inquiry
manifested their awareness of the flaw in
Sy's title. That they did not also appear to
have paid the full price for their share of the
property evinced their not having paid true
value.
Sps. DELA CRUZ vs. PLANTERS
PRODUCTS, INC.
G.R. No. 158649; February 18, 2013
ISSUE: Whether the two transaction
documents signed by Gloria expressed the
intent of the parties to establish a creditor-
debtor relationship between them.
RULING: Gloria signed the application
for credit facilities on March 23, 1978,
indicating that a trust receipt would serve
as collateral for the credit line. On August 4,
1978, Gloria, as "dealer," signed together
with Quirino the list of their assets having a
total value of ₱260,000.00 (consisting of a
residential house and lot, 10-hectare
agricultural lands in Aliaga and Talavera,
and two residential lots) that they tendered
to PPI "to support our credit application in
connection with our participation to your
Special Credit Scheme." Gloria further
signed the Trust Receipt/SCS documents
defining her obligations under the
agreement, and also the invoices pursuant
to the agreement with PPI, indicating her
having received PPI products on various
dates.
These established circumstances
comprised by the contemporaneous and
subsequent acts of Gloria and Quirino that
manifested their intention to enter into the
creditor-debtor relationship with PPI show
that the CA properly held the petitioners
fully liable to PPI. The law of contracts
provides that in determining the intention
of the parties, their contemporaneous and
subsequent acts shall be principally
considered. Consequently, the written terms
of their contract with PPI, being clear upon
the intention of the contracting parties,
should be literally applied.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
HEIRS OF SORIANO
G.R. No. 178312; January 30, 2013
Q: Certain parcels of land belonging to
respondents was sought to be expropriated
by the Government. The parties could not
agree as to the valuation. The RTC ordered
the LBP to pay P1,227,571.10 as just
compensation. The CA affirmed the RTC
valuation. LBP appealed to the Supreme
Court. What is the effect a compromise
agreement re-evaluating the costs of the
parcels of land entered into by the parties
during the pendency of the appeal?
A: The Agreement was a compromise
that the parties freely and voluntarily
entered into for the purpose of finally
settling their dispute in this case. Under Art.
2028 of the Civil Code, a compromise is a
contract whereby the parties, by making
reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or
put an end to one already commenced.
Accordingly, a compromise is either
judicial, if the objective is to put an end to a
pending litigation, or extrajudicial, if the
objective is to avoid a litigation.
As a contract, a compromise is
perfected by mutual consent. However, a
judicial compromise, while immediately
binding between the parties upon its
execution, is not executory until it is
approved by the court and reduced to a
judgment. The validity of a compromise is
dependent upon its compliance with the
requisites and principles of contracts
dictated by law.
REPUBLIC vs. SANTOS
G.R. No. 160453; November 12, 2012
Respondents as the applicants for
land registration carried the burden of proof
to establish the merits of their application
by a preponderance of evidence, by which
is meant such evidence that is of greater
weight or more convincing than that offered
in opposition to it. They would be held
entitled to claim the property as their own
and apply for its registration under the
Torrens System only if they established that,
indeed, the property was an accretion to
their land. Accretion is the process whereby
the soil is deposited along the banks of
rivers. The deposit of soil, to be considered
accretion, must be: 1) gradual and
imperceptible; 2) made through the effects
of the current water; and 3) taking place on
land adjacent to the banks of rivers.
ABOBON vs. ABOBON
G.R. No. 155830; August 15, 2012
A fundamental principle in land
registration under the Torrens system is
that a certificate of title serves as evidence of
an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to
the property in favor of the person whose
name appears therein. The certificate of title
thus becomes the best proof of ownership of
a parcel of land; hence, anyone who deals
with property registered under the Torrens
system may rely on the title and need not go
beyond the title.
We rule for the respondents on the
issue of the preferential right to the
possession of the land in question. Their
having preferential right conformed to the
age-old rule that whoever held a Torrens
title in his name is entitled to the possession
of the land covered by the title. Indeed,
possession, which is the holding of a thing
or the enjoyment of a right, was but an
attribute of their registered ownership.
MAKATI-SHANGRI-LA vs. HARPER
G.R. No. 189998; August 29, 2012
Q: Can the management of a hotel be liable
for negligence for murder of a guest even
though the respondents failed to prove its
negligence?
A: Yes. When one registers as a guest of a
hotel, he makes the establishment the
guardian of his life and his personal
belongings during his stay. It is a standard
procedure of the management of the hotel
to screen visitors who call on their guests at
their rooms. The murder of Harper could
have been avoided had the security guards
of the hotel dutifully observed this standard
procedure.
The hotel business is imbued with
public interest. Catering to the public,
hotelkeepers are bound to provide not only
lodging for their guests but also security to
the persons and belongings of their guests.
The twin duty constitutes the essence of the
business. Applying by analogy Article 2000,
Article 2001 and Article 2002 of the Civil
Code (all of which concerned the
hotelkeepers’ degree of care and
responsibility as to the personal effects of
their guests), the Court hold that there is
much greater reason to apply the same if
not greater degree of care and responsibility
when the lives and personal safety of their
guests are involved.
SPS. PEREŇA vs. SPS. ZARATE, et al.
G.R. No. 157917; August 29, 2012
The defense of the petitioners that
they exercised the diligence of a good father
of the family in the selection and
supervision of the van driver, by seeing to it
that he had a driver’s license and that he
had not been involved in any vehicular
accident prior to the fatal collision with the
train is not tenable.
The common carrier’s standard of
care and vigilance as to the safety of the
passengers is defined by law. Given the
nature of the business and for reasons of
public policy, the common carrier is bound
“to observe extraordinary diligence in the
vigilance over the goods and for the safety
of the passengers transported by them,
according to all the circumstances of each
case.” To successfully fend off liability in an
action upon the death or injury to a
passenger, the common carrier must prove
his or its observance of that extraordinary
diligence; otherwise, the legal presumption
that he or it was at fault or acted negligently
would stand.
The common carrier is liable for the
death despite the fact that their driver might
have acted beyond the scope of his
authority or even in violation of the orders
of the common carrier.
SPS. PEREŇA vs. SPS. ZARATE, et al.
G.R. No. 157917; August 29, 2012
Q: Is the indemnity of loss of earning
capacity of a minor who was only a high
school student at the time of his death
proper?
A: Yes.
The loss of the earning capacity of
the deceased shall be the liability of the
guilty party in favor of the heirs of the
deceased, and shall in every case be
assessed and awarded by the court “unless
the deceased on account of permanent
physical disability not caused by the
defendant, had no earning capacity at the
time of his death.” Accordingly, the Court
emphatically hold in favor of the
indemnification for the deceased’s loss of
earning capacity despite him having been
unemployed, because compensation of this
nature is awarded not for loss of time or
earnings but for loss of the deceased’s
power or ability to earn money.
In the instant case, the basis for the
computation of deceased’s earning capacity
was not what he would have become or
what he would have wanted to be if not for
his untimely death, but the minimum wage
in effect at the time of his death. Moreover,
computation of the deceased’s life
expectancy rate was not reckoned from his
age of 15 years at the time of his death, but
on 21 years, his age when he would have
graduated from college.
HEIRS OF SERVANDO FRANCO vs. SPS.
GONZALES
G.R. No. 159709; June 27, 2012
Q: Was there a novation of the August 23,
1986 promissory note when respondent
issued the February 5, 1992 receipt?
A: No. Novation did not transpire because
no irreconcilable incompatibility existed
between the promissory note and the
receipt.
Novation is not presumed. The
parties to a contract should expressly agree
to abrogate the old contract in favor of a
new one. In the absence of the express
agreement, the old and the new obligations
must be incompatible on every point. There
is incompatibility when the two obligations
cannot stand together, each one having its
independent existence. If the two
obligations cannot stand together, the latter
obligation novates the first.
In light of the foregoing, the
issuance of the receipt created no new
obligation. The receipt dated February 5,
1992 was only the proof of payment of
obligation. It did not establish any novation
agreement of the parties.
LBP vs. NABLE
G.R. 176692; June 27, 2012
Q: What must be considered in
determining just compensation?
A: Any determination of just
compensation should consider the
following factors, namely: (a) the cost of the
acquisition of the land; (b) the current value
of like properties; (c) the nature, actual use
and income of the land; (d) the sworn
valuation by the owner; (e) the tax
declarations; (f) the assessment made by
government assessors; (g) the social and
economic benefits contributed to the
property by the farmers and farmworkers
and by the Government; and (h) the fact of
the non-payment of any taxes or loans
secured from any government financing
institution on the land.
PRIETO vs. CA
G.R. No. 158597; June 18, 2012
Under Article 1898 of the Civil Code,
the acts of an agent done beyond the scope
of his authority do not bind the principal
unless the latter expressly or impliedly
ratifies the same.
In agency, ratification is the adoption or con
firmation by one person of an act performed
on his behalf by another without authority.
The substance of ratification is the
confirmation after the act, amounting to a
substitute for a prior authority. Here, there
was such ratification by Marcos, as borne
out by his execution of the letter of
acknowledgement on September 2, 1996.
SPS. RABAT vs. PNB
G.R. No. 158755; June 18, 2012
Q: Is the inadequacy of the bid price
invalidated the forced sale of the
properties?
A: No. The inadequacy of the bid price at a
forced sale, unlike that in an ordinary sale,
is immaterial and does not nullify the sale;
in fact, in a forced sale, a low price is
considered more beneficial to the mortgage
debtor because it makes redemption of the
property easier.
SPS. RABAT vs. PNB
G.R. No. 158755; June 18, 2012
Q: In an extrajudicial foreclosure of
mortgage, is a mortgagee entitled to recover
any deficiency amount from the mortgagor?
A: Yes. It is settled that if the proceeds of the
sale are insufficient to cover the debt in an
extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage,
the mortgagee is entitled to claim the
deficiency from the debtor. For when the
legislature intends to deny the right of a
creditor to sue for any deficiency resulting
from foreclosure of security given to
guarantee an obligation it expressly
provides as in the case of pledges and in
chattel mortgages of a thing sold on
installment basis. Act No. 3135, which
governs the extrajudicial foreclosure of
mortgages, while silent as to the mortgagees
right to recover, does not, on the other
hand, prohibit recovery of deficiency.
Accordingly, it has been held that a
deficiency claim arising from the
extrajudicial foreclosure is allowed.
CALILAP-ASMERON vs. DBP
G.R. No. 157330; November 23, 2011
Q: Petitioner and Respondent entered
into a deed of conditional sale, wherein
petitioner sought to repurchase 2 parcels of
land which she mortgaged to and was
foreclosed by the respondent. May
respondent bank rescind the deed of
conditional sale if petitioner fails to pay the
agreed quarterly amortizations?
A: Yes. A contract is the law between
the parties. Absent any allegation and proof
that the contract is contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy,
it should be complied with in good faith.
As such, the petitioner, being one of the
parties in the deed of conditional sale, could
not be allowed to conveniently renounce the
stipulations that she had knowingly and
freely agreed to.
PAZ vs. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 157367; November 23, 2011
Q: When is the proceeding for the
amendment and alteration of a certificate of
title is applicable.
A:   Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529
provides seven instances or situations,
namely:
a. when registered interests of any
description, whether vested,
contingent, expectant, or
inchoate, have terminated and
ceased;
b. when new interests have arisen
or been created which do not
appear upon the certificate;
c. when any error, omission or
mistake was made in entering a
certificate or any memorandum
thereon or on any duplicate
certificate;
d. when the name of any person on
the certificate has been changed;
e. when the registered owner has
been married, or, registered as
married, the marriage has been
terminated and no right or
interest of heirs or creditors will
thereby be affected;
f. when a corporation, which
owned registered land and has
been dissolved, has not
conveyed the same within three
years after its dissolution; and
g. when there is reasonable ground
for the amendment or alteration
of title.
PHILIPPINE EXPORT AND FOREIGN
LOAN GUARANTEE Corp. vs.
AMALGAMATED MANAGEMENT AND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 177729; September 28, 2011
Q: Petitioner insists that Cuevas and
Saddul (Guarantors) were liable on the
deficiency claim despite the lack of notice to
them about the extension of the guaranty.
A: Yes.
The letters granting the requests for
extension of the guaranty period bore the
approval and signatures of Cuevas and
Saddul as President and Vice-President,
respectively, of AMDC. Having thus
admitted their letters on the extension of the
guaranty period, Cuevas and Saddul could
not anymore feign ignorance of the
guaranty extension.
Moreover, the deed of undertaking
specifically stated that the grant of the extension
of the guaranty period did not extinguish or
diminish the obligation of Cuevas and Saddul
under the guaranty. Hence, whether or not the
guaranty period was extended, and whether or
not they were notified of the extension, Cuevas
and Saddul remained liable under the guaranty.
The stipulation, which was not illegal or
immoral, necessarily bound Cuevas and
Saddul. It is worth noting, too, that a
solidary obligation existed among AMDC,
Cuevas and Saddul because they had
assented to be jointly and severally liable to
the petitioner for whatever damages or
liabilities that it might incur by virtue of the
guaranty. In a solidary obligation, each debtor
was liable for the entire obligation. The
petitioner could compel any of the solidary
obligors to perform the entire obligation.
ANGELES vs. PASCUAL, et al.
G.R. No. 157150; September 21, 2011
Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court explicitly states that the petition for
review on certiorari “shall raise only
questions of law, which must be distinctly
set forth.” In appeal by certiorari, therefore,
only questions of law may be raised because
the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and
does not normally undertake the re-
examination of the evidence presented by
the contending parties during the trial. The
resolution of factual issues is the function of
lower courts, whose findings thereon are
received with respect and are binding on
the Supreme Court subject to certain
exceptions. A question, to be one of law,
must not involve an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented
by the litigants or any of them. There is a
question of law in a given case when the
doubt or difference arises as to what the law
is on certain state of facts; there is a question
of fact when the doubt of difference arises
as to the truth or falsehood of alleged facts.
MAGLANA RICE AND CORN MILL, INC
vs. TAN
G.R. No. 159051; September 21, 2011
Q: What are the purposes of imposing
treble costs?
A: The imposition of treble costs of suit
on the petitioners is meant to remind them
and their attorney that the extent that an
attorney’s exercise of his professional
responsibility for their benefit as his clients
submits to reasonable limits beyond which
he ought to go no further, and that his
failure to recognize such limits will not be
allowed to go unsanctioned by the Court.
Thus, the Court has not hesitated to impose
treble costs of suit:
1. To stress its dislike for any
scheme to prolong litigation or
for an unwarranted effort to
avoid the implementation of a
judgment painstakingly arrived
at;
2. To sanction an appeal that was
obviously interposed for the sole
purpose of delay;
3. To disapprove of the party’s lack
of good and honest intentions, as
well as the evasive manner by
which it was able to frustrate
(the adverse party’s) claim for a
decade;
4. To stifle a party’s deplorable
propensity to go to extreme
lengths to evade complying with
their duties under the law and
the orders of this Court and
thereby to cause and the case to
drag for far too long with
practically no end sight
5. To condemn the counsels frantic
search for any ground to
resuscitate his client’s lost cause
6. To reiterate, that a litigant,
although his right to initiate an
action in court is fully respected,
is not permitted to initiate
similar suits once his case has
been adjudicated by a competent
court in a valid final judgment,
in hope of securing a favourable
ruling for this will result to
endless litigations detrimental to
the administration of justice.
THE HEIRS OF GO vs. Go, et al.,
G.R. No. 157537; September 7, 2011
It is clear that conjugal partnership
of gains established before and after the
effectivity of the Family Code are governed
by the rules found in Chapter 4 (Conjugal
Partnership of Gains) of Title IV (Property
Relations Between Husband and Wife) of
the Family Code. Hence, any disposition of
the conjugal property after the dissolution
of the conjugal partnership must be made
only after the liquidation; otherwise, the
disposition is void.
CASIMIRO DEVELOPMENT Corp. vs.
MATEO
G.R. No. 175485; July 27, 2011
One who deals with property
registered under the Torrens System need
not go beyond the certificate of title but only
has to rely on the certificate of title. He is
charged with notice only of such burdens
and claims as are annotated on the title. The
pertinent law on the matter of burdens and
claims is Section 44 of the Property
Registration Decree. The vendee’s notice of
a defect or flaw in the title of the vendor, in
order for it to amount to bad faith, should
encompass facts and circumstances that
would impel a reasonably cautious person
to make further inquiry into the vendor’s
title, or facts and circumstances that would
induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire
into the status of the title of the property in
litigation. In other words, the presence of
anything that excites or arouses suspicion
should then prompt the vendee to look
beyond the certificate of title and investigate
the title of the vendor appearing on the face
of said certificate.
PEŇA vs. Sps. TOLENTINO
G.R. No. 155227-28; February 9, 2011
ISSUE: Whether or not each of the
petitioners could be ejected on the ground
that the verbal contract of lease had expired.
RULING: Under Section 5 (f) of B.P.
Blg. 877, the expiration of the period of the
lease is among the grounds for judicial
ejectment of a lessee. In this case, because
no definite period was agreed upon by the
parties, their contracts of lease being oral,
the leases were deemed to be for a definite
period, considering that the rents agreed
upon were being paid monthly, and
terminated at the end of every month,
pursuant to Article 1687.  In addition, the
fact that the petitioners were notified of the
expiration of the leases effective September
15, 1995 brought their right to stay in their
premises to a definite end as of that date.
Sps. AGGABAO vs. PARULAN
G.R. No; September 1, 2010
Q: Who is a purchaser in good faith?
A: A purchaser in good faith is one
who buys the property of another, without
notice that some other person has a right to,
or interest in, such property, and pays the
full and fair price for it at the time of such
purchase or before he has notice of the
claim or interest of some other persons in
the property.  He buys the property with
the belief that the person from whom he
receives the thing was the owner and could
convey title to the property.  He cannot
close his eyes to facts that should put a
reasonable man on his guard and still claim
he acted in good faith. The status of a buyer
in good faith is never presumed but must be
proven by the person invoking it.
Sps. AGGABAO vs. PARULAN
G.R. No; September 1, 2010
Q: What are the requisites required
from a buyer of a conjugal property?
A: The buyers of conjugal property
must observe two kinds of requisite
diligence, namely:
(a) the diligence in verifying the
validity of the title covering the
property; and (b) the diligence in
inquiring into the authority of the
transacting spouse to sell conjugal
property in behalf of the other
spouse.
Which between Article 173 of the Civil
Code and Article 124 of the Family Code
should apply to the sale of the conjugal
property executed without the consent of
Dionisio?
The sale was made on March 18, 1991,
or after Au-gust 3, 1988, the effectivity of
the Family Code. The proper law to apply
is, therefore, Article 124 of the Family Code,
for it is settled that any alienation or
encumbrance of conjugal property made
during the effectivity of the Family Code is
governed by Article 124 of the Family Code.
According to Article 256 of the Family
Code, the pro-visions of the Family Code
may apply retroactively provided no vested
rights are impaired. In Tumlos v.
Fernandez, 330 SCRA 718 (2000), the Court
rejected the petitioner’s argument that the
Family Code did not apply because the
acquisition of the contested property had
occurred prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code, and pointed out that Article
256 pro-vided that the Family Code could
apply retroactively if the application would
not prejudice vested or ac-quired rights
existing before the effectivity of the Family
Code. Herein, however, the petitioners did
not show any vested right in the property
acquired prior to August 3, 1988 that
exempted their situation from the
retroactive application of the Family Code
HEIRS OF JOSE REYES, JR., vs. REYES
G.R. No. 158377; August 13, 2010
Facts: On July 19, 1955, Leoncia and her
sons A, B, and C sold to Benedicto a parcel
of land for P500 under a pacto de retro sale.
The sellers failed to pay the re-purchase
price. The property however remained in
the possession of Leoncia and her sons, and
Benedicto never declared the property for
taxation under his name.
Q: Is this a pacto de retro sale?
A: No. It is an equitable mortgage.
There was no dispute that the purported
vendors had continued in the possession of
the property even after the execution of the
agreement; and that the property had
remained declared for taxation purposes
under Leoncias name, with the realty taxes
due being paid by Leoncia, despite the
execution of the agreement. Such
established circumstances are among the
badges of an equitable mortgage
enumerated in Article 1602, paragraphs 2
and 5 of the Civil Code.
The existence of any one of the
conditions enumerated under Article 1602
of the Civil Code, not a concurrence of all or
of a majority thereof, suffices to give rise to
the presumption that the contract is an
equitable mortgage. Consequently, the
contract between the vendors and vendees
(Byer) was an equitable mortgage.
HEIRS OF JOSE REYES, JR., vs. REYES
G.R. No. 158377; August 13, 2010
Q: 15 years after the purported pacto de
retro sale and while his father was still
alive, G, son of A and Leoncia’s grandson
repaid the purchase price and had the old
tax declaration cancelled with a new one
issued in his name. Are Leoncia’s heirs now
barred from claiming that the transaction
was an equitable mortgage and not a pacto
de retro sale, since it is a written contract
and 10 years have already elapsed?
A: No. The acceptance of the payments
even beyond the 10year period of
redemption estopped the mortgagees heirs
from insisting that the period to redeem the
property had already expired.
Sps. TUMBOKON vs. LEGASPI
G.R. No. 154746; August 4, 2010
Q: The tug of war between petitioners
and respondents for the ownership of a
parcel of land led to herein petitioner filing
a criminal case for qualified theft of
coconuts from the subject land, against
respondents. The RTC rejected
respondents’ defense of ownership over the
land and declared them guilty as charged.
Petitioners then filed a civil case for
recovery of ownership and possession of
real property against respondents. The
petition was granted by the RTC but was
then reversed by the CA. Petitioner argues
that the RTC ruling in the criminal case
constituted res judicata on the issue of
ownership of the land involved in the civil
case. Is petitioner correct?
A: No. The doctrine of res judicata has
two aspects: the first, known as bar by prior
judgment, or estoppel by verdict, is the
effect of a judgment as a bar to the
prosecution of a second action upon the
same claim, demand, or cause of action; the
second, known as conclusiveness of
judgment, also known as the rule of auter
action pendant, ordains that issues actually
and directly resolved in a former suit
cannot again be raised in any future case
between the same parties involving a
different cause of action and has the effect
of preclusion of issues only.
Based on the foregoing standards,
this action is not barred by the doctrine of
res judicata.
First of all, bar by prior judgment, the first
aspect of the doctrine, is not applicable,
because the causes of action in the civil and
the criminal actions were different and
distinct from each other. The civil action is
for the recovery of ownership of the land
filed by the petitioners, while the criminal
action was to determine whether the act of
the respondents of taking the coconut fruits
from the trees growing within the disputed
land constituted the crime of qualified theft.
In the former, the main issue is the legal
ownership of the land, but in the latter, the
legal ownership of the land was not the
main issue. The issue of guilt or innocence
was not dependent on the ownership of the
land, inasmuch as a person could be guilty
of theft of the growing fruits even if he were
the owner of the land.
IN RE: LIM
G.R. No. 156797; July 6, 2010
The RTC denied the application of
the petitioner for issuance of new TCT
because the said petitioner is guilty of
forum shopping by filing the case through
Administrative Reconstitution of Title and
subsequently by filing to the Court of such
case (for Judicial Reconstitution).
RULING: The petitioner is not guilty of
forum shopping as to warrant RTC’s
dismissal of the application for new TCT.
When he applied for the
administrative reconstitution in the LRA on
July 21,1988, he still had his co-owners
duplicate copies of the TCTs in his
possession, but by the time the LRA
resolved his application on November 3,
1998, allowing the relief prayed for, his co-
owners duplicate copies of the TCTs had
meanwhile been destroyed by fire on
February 24, 1998, a fact that he had duly
reported in an affidavit dated May 29, 1998
presented on June 1, 1998 to the Office of
the Register of Deeds for Quezon City.
Thus, the intervening loss of the owners
duplicate copies that left the favorable ruling of
the LRA no longer implementable gave rise to
his need to apply for judicial reconstitution in
the RTC pursuant to Section 12 of Republic Act
No. 26.
The RTC should have easily
discerned that forum shopping did not
characterize the petitioners resort to judicial
reconstitution despite the previous
proceeding for administrative
reconstitution. Although the bases for the
administrative reconstitution were the
owners duplicate copies of TCT No. 303168
and TCT No. 303169, those for judicial
reconstitution would be other documents
that in the judgment of the court, are
sufficient and proper basis for
reconstituting the lost or destroyed
certificate of title.[16] The RTC should have
also noted soon enough that his resort to
judicial reconstitution was not because his
earlier resort to administrative
reconstitution had been denied (in fact, the
LRA had resolved in his favor), but because
the intervening loss to fire of the only
permissible basis for administrative
reconstitution of the TCTs mandated his
resort to the RTC.
Thus, the petition for the judicial
reconstitution of the petitioners Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 303168 and Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 303169 of the Registry of
Deeds for Quezon City, and for the issuance of
the owners duplicate copies thereof, is
reinstated.
DAR vs. BERENGUER
G.R. No. 154094; March 9, 2010
ISSUE: Whether the landholding is
exempt from the coverage of the CARP and
presumed to be non-agricultural.
RULING: Yes.
The presumption assumed by the
appellate court that a parcel of land which is
located in a poblacion is not necessarily
devoted to residential purposes is wrong. It
should be the other way around. A lot
inside the poblacion should be presumed
residential, or commercial, or non-
agricultural unless there is a clearly
preponderant evidence to show that it is
agricultural.
"Agricultural lands" are only those
lands which are "arable and suitable
agricultural lands" and "do not include
commercial, industrial and residential lands.
DAR vs. BERENGUER
G.R. No. 154094; March 9, 2010
ISSUE: Whether the selection and
designation of Baribag is beneficiaries is
valid?
RULING: No.
In designating Baribag, the DAR did
not show how its choice of Baribag as
beneficiary, to the exclusion of the actual
workers, could have accorded with Section
22 of the CARL, which provides:
Section 22.Qualified Beneficiaries. --
The lands covered by the CARP shall be
distributed as much as possible to landless
residents of the same barangay, or in the
absence thereof, landless residents of the
same municipality in the following order of
priority:
(a) agricultural lessees and share
tenants;
(b) regular farmworkers;
(c) seasonal farmworkers;
(d) other farmworkers;
(e) actual tillers or occupants of
public lands;
(f) collectives or cooperatives of the
above beneficiaries; and
(g) others directly working on the
land.
Provided, however, that the children
of landowners who are qualified under
Section 6 of this Act shall be given
preference in the distribution of the land of
their parents: and provided, further, that
actual tenant-tillers in the landholdings
shall not be ejected or removed therefrom.
DAR vs. BERENGUER
G.R. No. 154094; March 9, 2010
ISSUE: Whether the presence of
cattle in the area makes the landholdings
devoted to cattle raising and therefore
exempt for CARP.
RULING: Yes.
Nonetheless, the CA also correctly
clarified that the respondents' landholdings,
even if they were not devoted to cattle
raising, would still be excluded from the
coverage of the CARL, because the DAR
failed to establish that the landholdings
were agricultural.
OŇO vs. LIM
G.R. No. 154270; March 9, 2010
An action or proceeding is deemed
an attack on a title when its objective is to
nullify the title, thereby challenging the
judgment pursuant to which the title was
decreed. The attack is direct when the
objective is to annul or set aside such
judgment or enjoin its enforcement. On the
other hand, the attack is indirect or
collateral when, in an action to obtain a
different relief, an attack on the judgment is
nevertheless made an incident thereof.
MMDA vs. TRACKWORKS RAIL
TRANSIT ADVERTISING
G.R. No. 179554; December 16, 2009
Q: MRTC had an existing BLT contract
with the government for the building of
MRT3, under which MRTC would build
and own MRT3 for 25 years, upon
expiration of which the ownership would
transfer to the Government. MRTC then
entered into a contract with Trackworks for
advertising services. The latter installed
commercial billboards, signages and other
advertising media in the different parts of
MRT3. May the MMDA remove the
billboards and signages pursuant to an
MMDA regulation prohibiting the
installation of any kind of billboards, signs
and posters in any part of the road,
sidewalk, or center island?
A: No. Trackworks derived its right to
install its billboards, signages and other
advertizing media in the MRT3 from
MRTCs authority under the BLT agreement
to develop commercial premises in the
MRT3 structure or to obtain advertising
income therefrom is no longer debatable.
Under the BLT agreement, indeed, MRTC
owned the MRT3 for 25 years, upon the
expiration of which MRTC would transfer
ownership of the MRT3 to the Government.
The prohibition against posting,
installation and display of billboards,
signages and other advertising media
applied only to public areas, but MRT3,
being private property pursuant to the BLT
agreement between the Government and
MRTC, was not one of the areas as to which
the prohibition applied.
constitutional provision guaranteeing
housing and a decent quality of life for
every Filipino. The ownership of land by
the landless is the primary objective of the
ZIP.
The following requisites must
concur for one to be considered an absentee
structure owner: one, the person must own
a structure or dwelling unit within the ZIP
zone; and two, the person has not occupied
the structure or dwelling unit prior to the
official closure of the census. The petitioner
did not meet the second requisite because it
was the respondents, not her, who were
living in or occupying Structure No. 86-313
at the time of the official ZIP census and
until they vacated the premises on
November 17, 1996.

Sps. DADIZON vs. CA

G.R. No. 159116; September 30, 2009
Doctrine: The transaction affecting
unregistered lands covered by an unrecorded
contract, if legal, might be valid and binding on
the parties themselves, but not on third parties.
In the case of third parties, it was necessary
for the contract to be registered. Sec. 113 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, also known as
the Property Registration Decree,
provides, viz:
 Section 113. Recording of instruments relating
to unregistered lands.-  No deed, conveyance,
mortgage, lease, or other voluntary
instrument affecting land not registered
under the Torrens system shall be valid,
except as between the parties thereto, unless
such instrument shall have been recorded in
the manner herein prescribed in the office of
the Register of Deeds for the province or
city where the land lies.

BLAS vs. Sps. GALAPON

G.R. No. 159710; September 30, 2009
Q: What is the absentee structure
owner?

A: The Zonal Improvement Program

(ZIP) is designed to upgrade the legal,
environmental, social and economic
conditions of slum residents within Metro
Manila, in line with the spirit of the