The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification.
Classification in law, as in the
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST VS PURISIMA
G.R. No. 166715             August 14, 2008
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (formerly AASJS) 1 OFFICERS/MEMBERS SAMSON S.
ALCANTARA, ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, ROMEO R. ROBISO, RENE B. GOROSPE and EDWIN R.
SANDOVAL, petitioners,
vs.
HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, HON. GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO,
JR., in his capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and HON. ALBERTO D. LINA, in
his Capacity as Commissioner of Bureau of Customs, respondents.
 
Facts:
Petitioners seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335. R.A. 9335
was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)
and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed
their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and
Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and
employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status.
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax
reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law “transforms the
officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters” as they will do their best
only in consideration of such rewards. Thus, the system of rewards and incentives invites corruption and
undermines the constitutionally mandated duty of these officials and employees to serve the people with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the system of rewards and incentives only to officials and
employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. There is no valid
basis for classification or distinction as to why such a system should not apply to officials and employees of all
other government agencies.
In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the President as it
lacks a sufficient standard on that matter. While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA 9335 provides that BIR and BOC
officials may be dismissed from the service if their revenue collections fall short of the target by at least 7.5%, the
law does not, however, fix the revenue targets to be achieved. Instead, the fixing of revenue targets has been
delegated to the President without sufficient standards. It will therefore be easy for the President to fix an
unrealistic and unattainable target in order to dismiss BIR or BOC personnel.
Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it violates the
doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative function is deemed accomplished and completed upon the
enactment and approval of the law, the creation of the congressional oversight committee permits legislative
participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law.
 
Issues:
1. Whether or not the scope of the system of rewards and incentives limitation to officials and employees
of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection.
2. Whether or not there was an unduly delegation of power to fix revenue targets to the President.
3. Whether or not the doctrine of separation of powers has been violated in the creation of a
congressional oversight committee.
Discussions:
1. The Court referred to the ruling of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union, which states that “the
guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all
citizens of the State.
other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree
with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of
classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner
determines the matter of constitutionality.
The Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. “
2. To determine the validity of delegation of legislative power, it needs the following: (1) the
completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy
to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate. It lays down a sufficient standard when it
provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority
and prevent the delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the
delegate’s authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be
implemented.
3. Based from the ruling under Macalintal v. Commission on Elections, it is clear that congressional
oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the
executive power to implement laws nor undermines the constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is
integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of government. It may in fact even
enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the over-accumulation of power in the executive branch.
Rulings:
1. The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a classification that has a
reasonable foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary.22 With respect to RA 9335, its expressed public
policy is the optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the
BOC.23 Since the subject of the law is the revenue- generation capability and collection of the BIR and the
BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law should logically pertain to the said agencies.
Moreover, the law concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they have the common distinct primary
function of generating revenues for the national government through the collection of taxes, customs duties,
fees and charges.
Both the BIR and the BOC principally perform the special function of being the instrumentalities through which
the State exercises one of its great inherent functions – taxation. Indubitably, such substantial distinction is
germane and intimately related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the classification and treatment accorded to the
BIR and the BOC under R.A. 9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal protection.
2. R.A. 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue targets
and the implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law under Sec 2 and 4 of the said Act.
Moreover, the Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards: “public interest,” “justice and
equity,” “public convenience and welfare” and “simplicity, economy and welfare.”33 In this case, the
declared policy of optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC
is infused with public interest.
3. The court declined jurisdiction on this case. The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335
was created for the purpose of approving the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) formulated by the
DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22, 2006, it approved the said IRR. From then on, it
became functus officio and ceased to exist. Hence, the issue of its alleged encroachment on the executive
function of implementing and enforcing the law may be considered moot and academic.
Belgica vs. Executive Secretary
* FACTS: 
HISTORY
In the Philippines, the “pork barrel” (a term of American-English origin) has been commonly referred to as lump-
sum, discretionary funds of Members of the Legislature (“Congressional Pork Barrel”). However, it has also come
to refer to certain funds to the Executive. The “Congressional Pork Barrel” can be traced from Act 3044 (Public
Works Act of 1922), the Support for Local Development Projects during the Marcos period, the Mindanao
Development Fund and Visayas Development Fund and later the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) under
the Corazon Aquino presidency, and the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) under the Joseph Estrada
administration, as continued by the Gloria-Macapagal Arroyo and the present Benigno Aquino III administrations.
SPECIAL PROVISIONS OF THE 2013 PDAF ARTICLE
2. Project Identification. Identification of projects and/or designation of beneficiaries shall conform to the priority
list, standard or design prepared by each implementing agency: PROVIDED, That preference shall be given to
projects located in the 4th to 6th class municipalities or indigents identified under the MHTS-PR by the DSWD.
For this purpose, the implementing agency shall submit to Congress said priority list, standard or design within
ninety (90) days from effectivity of this Act.
All programs/projects, except for assistance to indigent patients and scholarships, identified by a member of the
House of Representatives outside of his/her legislative district shall have the written concurrence of the member
of the House of Representatives of the recipient or beneficiary legislative district, endorsed by the Speaker of the
House of Representatives.
3. Legislator’s Allocation. The Total amount of projects to be identified by legislators shall be as follows:
a. For Congressional District or Party-List Representative: Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000) for soft programs
and projects listed under Item A and Forty Million Pesos (P40,000,000) for infrastructure projects listed under
Item B, the purposes of which are in the project menu of Special Provision No. 1; and
b. For Senators: One Hundred Million Pesos (P100,000,000) for soft programs and projects listed under Item A
and One Hundred Million Pesos (P100,000,000) for infrastructure projects listed under Item B, the purposes of
which are in the project menu of Special Provision No. 1.
Subject to the approved fiscal program for the year and applicable Special Provisions on the use and release of
fund, only fifty percent (50%) of the foregoing amounts may be released in the first semester and the remaining
fifty percent (50%) may be released in the second semester.
4. Realignment of Funds. Realignment under this Fund may only be allowed once. The Secretaries of Agriculture,
Education, Energy, Interior and Local Government, Labor and Employment, Public Works and Highways, Social
Welfare and Development and Trade and Industry are also authorized to approve realignment from one
project/scope to another within the allotment received from this Fund, subject to the following: (i) for
infrastructure projects, realignment is within the same implementing unit and same project category as the original
project; (ii) allotment released has not yet been obligated for the original project/scope of work; and (iii) request is
with the concurrence of the legislator concerned. The DBM must be informed in writing of any realignment
within five (5) calendar days from approval thereof: PROVIDED, That any realignment under this Fund shall be
limited within the same classification of soft or hard programs/projects listed under Special Provision 1 hereof:
PROVIDED, FURTHER, That in case of realignments, modifications and revisions of projects to be implemented
by LGUs, the LGU concerned shall certify that the cash has not yet been disbursed and the funds have been
deposited back to the BTr.
Any realignment, modification and revision of the project identification shall be submitted to the House
Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, for favorable endorsement to the DBM or
the implementing agency, as the case may be.
5. Release of Funds. All request for release of funds shall be supported by the documents prescribed under Special
Provision No. 1 and favorably endorsed by the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on
Finance, as the case may be. Funds shall be released to the implementing agencies subject to the conditions under
Special Provision No. 1 and the limits prescribed under Special Provision No. 3.
PRESIDENTIAL PORK BARREL
The “Presidential Pork Barrel” questioned by the petitioners include the Malampaya Fund and the Presidential
Social Fund. The Malampaya Fund was created as a special fund under Section 8, Presidential Decree (PD) 910
by then-President Ferdinand Marcos to help intensify, strengthen, and consolidate government efforts relating to
the exploration, exploitation, and development of indigenous energy resources vital to economic growth. The
Presidential Social Fund was created under Section 12, Title IV, PD 1869 (1983) or the Charter of the Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), as amended by PD 1993 issued in 1985. The Presidential
Social Fund has been described as a special funding facility managed and administered by the Presidential
Management Staff through which the President provides direct assistance to priority programs and projects not
funded under the regular budget. It is sourced from the share of the government in the aggregate gross earnings of
PAGCOR.
 
* ISSUES:
A. Procedural Issues
1.) Whether or not (WON) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and justiciable
controversy
2.) WON the issues raised in the consolidated petitions are matters of policy subject to judicial review
3.) WON petitioners have legal standing to sue
4.) WON the 1994 Decision of the Supreme Court (the Court) on Philippine Constitution Association v.
Enriquez (Philconsa) and the 2012 Decision of the Court on Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty v. Secretary
of Budget and Management (LAMP) bar the re-litigation of the issue of constitutionality of the “pork barrel
system” under the principles of res judicata and stare decisis
B. Substantive Issues on the “Congressional Pork Barrel”
WON the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar to it are unconstitutional
considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on…
1.) …separation of powers
2.) …non-delegability of legislative power
3.) …checks and balances
4.) …accountability
5.) …political dynasties
6.) …local autonomy
C. Substantive Issues on the “Presidential Pork Barrel”
WON the phrases:
(a) “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President” under Section 8 of PD 910 relating
to the Malampaya Funds, and
(b) “to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to finance the restoration of damaged or
destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the
Philippines” under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund,
are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of legislative power
* HELD AND RATIO:
A. Procedural Issues
No question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by
the Court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: (a) there must be
an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must
have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must
be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
1.) YES. There exists an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases. The requirement of contrariety of
legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties on the constitutionality of the
“Pork Barrel System.” Also, the questions in these consolidated cases are ripe for adjudication since the
challenged funds and the provisions allowing for their utilization – such as the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD
910 for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the Presidential Social Fund – are
currently existing and operational; hence, there exists an immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as a
result of the unconstitutional use of these public funds.
As for the PDAF, the Court dispelled the notion that the issues related thereto had been rendered moot and
academic by the reforms undertaken by respondents. A case becomes moot when there is no more actual
controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the
merits. The respondents’ proposed line-item budgeting scheme would not terminate the controversy nor
diminish the useful purpose for its resolution since said reform is geared towards the 2014 budget, and not the
2013 PDAF Article which, being a distinct subject matter, remains legally effective and existing. Neither will
the President’s declaration that he had already “abolished the PDAF” render the issues on PDAF moot precisely
because the Executive branch of government has no constitutional authority to nullify or annul its legal
existence.
Even on the assumption of mootness, nevertheless, jurisprudence dictates that “the ‘moot and academic’ principle
is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the Court in resolving a case.” The Court will decide
cases, otherwise moot, if:
i.) There is a grave violation of the Constitution: This is clear from the fundamental posture of petitioners –
they essentially allege grave violations of the Constitution with respect to the principles of separation
of powers, non-delegability of legislative power, checks and balances, accountability and local autonomy.
ii.) The exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved: This is also
apparent from the nature of the interests involved – the constitutionality of the very system within which
significant amounts of public funds have been and continue to be utilized and expended undoubtedly
presents a situation of exceptional character as well as a matter of paramount public interest. The present petitions,
in fact, have been lodged at a time when the system’s flaws have never before been magnified. To the Court’s
mind, the coalescence of the CoA Report, the accounts of numerous whistle-blowers, and the government’s
own recognition that reforms are needed “to address the reported abuses of the PDAF” demonstrates a
prima facie pattern of abuse which only underscores the importance of the matter.
It is also by this finding that the Court finds petitioners’ claims as not merely theorized, speculative or
hypothetical. Of note is the weight accorded by the Court to the findings made by the CoA which is the
constitutionally-mandated audit arm of the government. if only for the purpose of validating the existence of
an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases, the Court deems the findings under the CoA Report to be
sufficient.
iii.) When the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench,
the bar, and the public: This is  applicable largely due to the practical need for a definitive ruling on the
system’s constitutionality. There is a compelling need to formulate controlling principles relative to the issues
raised herein in order to guide the bench, the bar, and the public, not just for the expeditious resolution of the
anticipated disallowance cases, but more importantly, so that the government may be guided on how public funds
should be utilized in accordance with constitutional principles.
iv.) The case is capable of repetition yet evading review. This is called for by the recognition that the
preparation and passage of the national budget is, by constitutional imprimatur, an affair of annual
occurrence. The myriad of issues underlying the manner in which certain public funds are spent, if not resolved at
this most opportune time, are capable of repetition and hence, must not evade judicial review.
2.) YES. The intrinsic constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System” is not an issue dependent upon the
wisdom of the political branches of government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has
commanded the Court to act upon. Scrutinizing the contours of the system along constitutional lines is a task
that the political branches of government are incapable of rendering precisely because it is an exercise of judicial
power. More importantly, the present Constitution has not only vested the Judiciary the right to exercise judicial
power but essentially makes it a duty to proceed therewith (Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution).
3. YES. Petitioners have sufficient locus standi to file the instant cases. Petitioners have come before the Court in
their respective capacities as citizen-taxpayers and accordingly, assert that they “dutifully contribute to the coffers
of the National Treasury.” As taxpayers, they possess the requisite standing to question the validity of the
existing “Pork Barrel System” under which the taxes they pay have been and continue to be utilized.  They
are bound to suffer from the unconstitutional usage of public funds, if the Court so rules. Invariably, taxpayers
have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is
being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law, as in these cases.
Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the standing requirement given that the issues they have
raised may be classified as matters “of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society,
or of paramount public interest.” The CoA Chairperson’s statement during the Oral Arguments that the present
controversy involves “not [merely] a systems failure” but a “complete breakdown of controls” amplifies the
seriousness of the issues involved. Indeed, of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of
public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute.
4.) NO. On the one hand, res judicata states that a judgment on the merits in a previous case rendered by a court
of competent jurisdiction would bind a subsequent case if, between the first and second actions, there exists
an identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. This required identity is not attendant hereto
since Philconsa  and LAMP involved constitutional challenges against the 1994 CDF Article and 2004 PDAF
Article respectively. However, the cases at bar call for a broader constitutional scrutiny of the entire “Pork Barrel
System”. Also, the ruling in LAMP is essentially a dismissal based on a procedural technicality – and, thus, hardly
a judgment on the merits. Thus, res judicata cannot apply.
On the other hand, the doctrine of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to re-litigate where
the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a
previous case litigated and decided by a competent court. Absent any powerful countervailing considerations,
like cases ought to be decided alike. Philconsa was a limited response to a separation of powers problem,
specifically on the propriety of conferring post-enactment identification authority to Members of Congress. On
the contrary, the present cases call for a more holistic examination of (a) the inter-relation between the CDF
and PDAF Articles with each other, formative as they are of the entire “Pork Barrel System” as well as (b)
the intra-relation of post-enactment measures contained within a particular CDF or PDAF Article, including not
only those related to the area of project identification but also to the areas of fund release and realignment.
The complexity of the issues and the broader legal analyses herein warranted may be, therefore, considered as
a powerful countervailing reason against a wholesale application of the stare decisis principle.
In addition, the Court observes that the Philconsa ruling was actually riddled with inherent constitutional
inconsistencies which similarly countervail against a full resort to stare decisis. Since the Court now benefits
from hindsight and current findings (such as the CoA Report), it must partially abandon its previous ruling
in Philconsa insofar as it validated the post-enactment identification authority of Members of Congress on
the guise that the same was merely recommendatory.
Again, since LAMP was dismissed on a procedural technicality and, hence, has not set any controlling doctrine
susceptible of current application to the substantive issues in these cases, stare decisis would not apply.
B. Substantive Issues on the “Congressional Pork Barrel”
1.) YES. At its core, legislators have been consistently accorded post-enactment authority to identify the
projects they desire to be funded through various Congressional Pork Barrel allocations. Under the 2013 PDAF
Article, the statutory authority of legislators to identify projects post-GAA may be construed from Special
Provisions 1 to 3 and the second paragraph of Special Provision 4. Legislators have also been accorded post-
enactment authority in the areas of fund release (Special Provision 5 under the 2013 PDAF
Article) and realignment (Special Provision 4, paragraphs 1 and 2 under the 2013 PDAF Article).
Thus, legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in “the various operational
aspects of budgeting,” including “the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities” and the
“regulation and release of funds”, in violation of the separation of powers principle. That the said authority is
treated as merely recommendatory in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition covers
any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law. Towards this end, the Court must therefore abandon its
ruling in Philconsa. The Court also points out that respondents have failed to substantiate their position that the
identification authority of legislators is only of recommendatory import.
In addition to declaring the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly
allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the
budget, the Court also declared that informal practices, through which legislators have effectively intruded
into the proper phases of budget execution, must be deemed as acts of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the same unconstitutional
treatment.
2.) YES. The 2013 PDAF Article violates the principle of non-delegability since legislators are effectively
allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which, as settled in Philconsa, is lodged in
Congress. The power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation, pursuant to Section 29(1), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution which states: “No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of
an appropriation made by law.” The power of appropriation, as held by the Court in Bengzon v. Secretary of
Justice and Insular Auditor, involves (a) setting apart by law  a certain sum from the public revenue for (b)
a specified purpose. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum
fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project
or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. Since these two acts comprise the exercise of the power of
appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators
to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the
Constitution does not, however, allow.
3.) YES. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as a collective allocation
limit since the said amount would be further divided among individual legislators who would then
receive personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds
based on their own discretion. As these intermediate appropriations are made by legislators only after the
GAA is passed and hence, outside of the law, it means that the actual items of PDAF appropriation would
not have been written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without veto consideration.
This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a “budget
within a budget” which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and consequently impairs
the President’s power of item veto. As petitioners aptly point out, the President is forced to decide between (a)
accepting the entire P24. 79 Billion PDAF allocation without knowing the specific projects of the legislators,
which may or may not be consistent with his national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment
of all other legislators with legitimate projects.
Even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would remain
constitutionally flawed since the lump-sum amount of P24.79 Billion would be treated as a mere funding
source allotted for multiple purposes of spending (i.e. scholarships, medical missions, assistance to indigents,
preservation of historical materials, construction of roads, flood control, etc). This setup connotes that
the appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and purposes of the appropriation for further
determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a discernible item which may be subject to the
President’s power of item veto.
The same lump-sum budgeting scheme has, as the CoA Chairperson relays, “limit[ed] state auditors from
obtaining relevant data and information that would aid in more stringently auditing the utilization of said Funds.”
Accordingly, she recommends the adoption of a “line by line budget or amount per proposed program, activity or
project, and per implementing agency.”
4.) YES. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested
with post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they
themselves participate. Also, this very same concept of post-enactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that: “…[A Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives] shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or
where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.” Allowing legislators to intervene in the various
phases of project implementation renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.
However, the Court  cannot completely agree that the same post-enactment authority and/or the individual
legislator’s control of his PDAF  per se would allow him to perpetrate himself in office. This is a matter which
must be analyzed based on particular facts and on a case-to-case basis.
Also, while the Court accounts for the possibility that the close operational proximity between legislators and the
Executive department, through the former’s post-enactment participation, may affect the process of  impeachment,
this matter largely borders on the domain of politics and does not strictly concern the Pork Barrel System’s
intrinsic constitutionality. As such, it is an improper subject of judicial assessment.
5.) NO. Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution is considered as not self-executing due to the qualifying
phrase “as may be defined by law.” In this respect, said provision does not, by and of itself, provide a judicially
enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. Therefore,
since there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes the policy on political dynasties for enforcement, the
Court must defer from ruling on this issue.
In any event, the Court finds the above-stated argument on this score to be largely speculative since it has not
been properly demonstrated how the Pork Barrel System would be able to propagate political dynasties.
6.) YES.  The Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the system which actually belies the avowed intention
of “making equal the unequal” (Philconsa, 1994). The gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based
solely on the fact of office, without taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district
the legislator represents. As a result, a district representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis gets the same
amount of funding as a district representative of a far-flung rural province which would be relatively
“underdeveloped” compared to the former. To add, what rouses graver scrutiny is that even Senators and Party-
List Representatives – and in some years, even the Vice-President – who do not represent any locality, receive
funding from the Congressional Pork Barrel as well.
The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with the
functions of the various Local Development Councils (LDCs) which are already legally mandated to “assist the
corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction of economic and social development, and coordinating
development efforts within its territorial jurisdiction.” Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities whose
functions are essentially geared towards managing local affairs, their programs, policies and resolutions should
not be overridden nor duplicated by individual legislators, who are national officers that have no law-making
authority except only when acting as a body.
C. Substantive Issues on the “Presidential Pork Barrel”
YES. Regarding the Malampaya Fund: The phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by
the President” under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does
not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the President’s authority with
respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads, the said phrase gives the
President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him
to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law.
That the subject phrase may be confined only to “energy resource development and exploitation programs
and projects of the government” under the principle of ejusdem generis, meaning that the general word or
phrase is to be construed to include – or be restricted to – things akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class
as those specifically mentioned, is belied by three (3) reasons: first, the phrase “energy resource development
and exploitation programs and projects of the government” states a singular and general class and hence, cannot
be treated as a statutory reference of specific things from which the general phrase “for such other purposes” may
be limited; second, the said phrase also exhausts the class it represents, namely energy development programs
of the government; and, third, the Executive department has used the Malampaya Funds for non-energy
related purposes under the subject phrase, thereby contradicting respondents’ own position that it is limited
only to “energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government.”
However, the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use of the Malampaya Funds “to finance energy
resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government,” remains legally effective and
subsisting.
Regarding the Presidential Social Fund: Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, indicates that the
Presidential Social Fund may be used “to [first,] finance the priority infrastructure development projects and
[second,] to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed
and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines.”
The second indicated purpose adequately curtails the authority of the President to spend the Presidential Social
Fund only for restoration purposes which arise from calamities. The first indicated purpose, however, gives
him carte blanche authority to use the same fund for any infrastructure project he may so determine as a
“priority“. Verily, the law does not supply a definition of “priority infrastructure development
projects” and hence, leaves the President without any guideline to construe the same. To note, the delimitation of
a project as one of “infrastructure” is too broad of a classification since the said term could pertain to any
kind of facility. Thus, the phrase “to finance the priority infrastructure development projects” must be
stricken down as unconstitutional since – similar to Section 8 of PD 910 – it lies independently unfettered by
any sufficient standard of the delegating law. As they are severable, all other provisions of Section 12 of PD
1869, as amended by PD 1993, remains legally effective and subsisting.
Randolf S. David v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006 (and other consolidated
cases)
DECISION
 SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
I.      THE FACTS
On February 24, 2006, as the Filipino nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the  EDSA People
Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017, implemented by G.O. No. 5, declaring a state of national emergency,
thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section
18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: “The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . .
. may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .,” and in my capacity as their Commander-
in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the
Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to
enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon
my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National
Emergency.
In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that the
proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist
insurgents of the New People’s Army, and some members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or
assassinate President Arroyo. They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and take-over the reins
of government as a clear and present danger.
Petitioners David and Llamas were arrested without warrants on February 24, 2006 on their way to
EDSA. Meanwhile, the offices of the newspaper Daily Tribune, which was perceived to be anti-Arroyo, was
searched without warrant at about 1:00 A.M. on February 25, 2006. Seized from the premises – in the absence of
any official of the Daily Tribune except the security guard of the building – were several materials for publication.
The law enforcers, a composite team of PNP and AFP officers, cited as basis of the warrantless arrests and the
warrantless search and seizure was Presidential Proclamation 1017 issued by then President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo in the exercise of her constitutional power to call out the Armed Forces of the Philippines to prevent or
suppress lawless violence.
II.    THE ISSUE
1.    Were the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP 1017, valid?
2.    Was the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily Tribune’s offices conducted pursuant to PP 1017 valid?
III.   THE RULING
[The Court partially GRANTED the petitions.]
1.    NO, the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP 1017, were NOT
valid.
[S]earches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search
warrant or warrant of arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides [for the
following circumstances of valid warrantless arrests]:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a)   When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense.
(b)   When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
x x x.
Neither of the [provisions on in flagrante nor hot pursuit warrantless arrests] justifies petitioner
David’s warrantless arrest. During the inquest for the charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP 880, all
that the arresting officers could invoke was their observation that some rallyists were wearing t-shirts with the
invective “Oust Gloria Now” and their erroneous assumption that petitioner David was the leader of the
rally. Consequently, the Inquest Prosecutor ordered his immediate release on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence. He noted that petitioner David was not wearing the subject t-shirt and even if he was wearing it, such
fact is insufficient to charge him with inciting to sedition.
2.    NO, the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily Tribune’s offices conducted pursuant
to  PP 1017 was NOT valid.
[T]he search [and seizure in the Daily Tribune premises] is illegal. Rule 126 of The Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure lays down the steps in the conduct of search and seizure. Section 4 requires that a search
warrant be issued upon probable cause in connection with one specific offence to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Section 8
mandates that the search of a house, room, or any other premise be made in the presence of the lawful occupant
thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of
sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. And Section 9 states that the warrant must direct that it
be served in the daytime, unless the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case
a direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night. All these rules were violated by the
CIDG operatives.
Pelaez vs. Auditor General (G.R. No. L23825) - Digest
FACTS: 
During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines, purporting to act
pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126
to 129; creating thirty-three (33) municipalities enumerated in the margin. Soon after the date last mentioned, or
on November 10, 1964 petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer,
instituted the present special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor
General, to restrain him, as well as his representatives and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public
funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities.
Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said Section 68 has been
impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 effective January 1, 1960 and constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power. The third paragraph of 
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370, reads:
Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except under the provisions of this
Act or by Act of Congress.
Respondent herein relies upon Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of Binañgonan
ISSUE:  Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities above referred to. It is so ordered.
W/N the President, who under this new law cannot even create a barrio, can create a municipality which is
composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities
RULING:
On Cardona vs Municipality of Binangonan, such claim is untenable, for said case involved, not the creation of a
new municipality, but a mere transfer of territory — from an already existing municipality (Cardona) to another
municipality (Binañgonan), likewise, existing at the time of and prior to said transfer. It is obvious, however, that,
whereas the power to fix such common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between
adjoining municipalities, may partake of an administrative nature — involving, as it does, the adoption of means
and ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities — the authority to create municipal corporations
is essentially legislative in nature. In the language of other courts, it is “strictly a legislative function” or “solely
and exclusively the exercise of legislative power”
Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in the
execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of
separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed,
carried out or implemented by the delegate2 — and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently
determinate or determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. Indeed,
without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the
essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with
reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority. Hence, he could
thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only to make the law, but, also — and this is worse — to unmake it,
by adopting measures inconsistent with the end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the
principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances, and, consequently, undermining the very
foundation of our Republican system.
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled requirements for a valid
delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be
carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil
effects above referred to.
If the President could create a municipality, he could, in effect, remove any of its officials, by creating a new
municipality and including therein the barrio in which the official concerned resides, for his office would thereby
become vacant.6 Thus, by merely brandishing the power to create a new municipality (if he had it), without
actually creating it, he could compel local officials to submit to his dictation, thereby, in effect, exercising over
them the power of control denied to him by the Constitution.
Also, Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law ordains:
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision
over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
Basing from the above provision, Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not merely fail to comply
with the constitutional mandate above quoted. Instead of giving the President less power over local governments
than that vested in him over the executive departments, bureaus or offices, it reverses the process and does the
exact opposite, by conferring upon him more power over municipal corporations than that which he has over said
executive departments, bureaus or offices.
WHEREFORE, the Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio and the respondent
permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said Executive
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY v. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD
NOTE: This is a consolidated case with (Pimentel v. COMELEC) and (Atty. Laserna v. DDB and PDEA),
regarding the constitutionality of RA 9165(c), (d), (f) and (g); ComprehensiveDangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
FACTS:  In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of
candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and
private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with certain offenses, among other
personalities, is put in issue. As far as pertinent, the challenged section reads as follows:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing.—Authorized drug testing shall be done by any government forensic
laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories accredited and monitored by the DOH to safeguard the
quality of the test results.  x x x The drug testing shall employ, among others, two (2) testing methods, the
screening test which will determine the positive result as well as the type of drug used and the confirmatory test
which will confirm a positive screening test.  x x x  The following shall be subjected to undergo drug testing:
(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools.—Students of secondary and tertiary schools shall, pursuant to the
related rules and regulations as contained in the school’s student handbook and with notice to the parents, undergo
a random drug testing x x x;
(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices.—Officers and employees of public and private offices,
whether domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a random drug test as contained in the company’s
work rules and regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the workplace.  Any officer or employee
found positive for use of dangerous drugs shall be dealt with administratively which shall be a ground for
suspension or termination, subject to the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent provisions of
the Civil Service Law;
(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with a criminal offense having an imposable penalty of
imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo a mandatory drug test;
(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or local government shall
undergo a mandatory drug test.
(Pimentel v. COMELEC | G.R. No. 16158)
On Dec. 23, 2003, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules and regulations for the
mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office in connection with the May 2004 elections. Pimentel claims
that Sec. 36 (g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally impose an additional qualification on
candidates for senator. He points out that, subject to the provisions on nuisance candidates, a candidate for senator
needs only to meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2)
voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency.  Beyond these stated qualification requirements,
candidates for senator need not possess any other qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and elected as
member of the Senate. The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it
cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge the Constitution.
(SJS v. DDM & PDEA | G.R. 157870)
In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social Justice Society (SJS), a  registered political party,
seeks to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from
enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that they are constitutionally
infirm. For one, the provisions constitute undue delegation of legislative power when they give unbridled
discretion to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug testing.  For another, the provisions trench in
the equal protection clause inasmuch as they can be used to harass a student or an employee deemed
undesirable.  And for a third, a person’s constitutional right against unreasonable searches is also breached by said
provisions.
(Atty. Laserna v. DDB & PDEA | G.R. 158633)
Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and taxpayer, also seeks in his Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65 that Sec. 36(c), (d), (f), and (g) of RA 9165 be struck down as unconstitutional for
infringing on the constitutional right to privacy, the right against unreasonable search and seizure, and the right
against self-incrimination, and for being contrary to the due process and equal protection guarantees.
ISSUE/S:
1) Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional qualification for
candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator
in addition to those laid down by the Constitution?
2) Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional? Specifically, do these paragraphs
violate the right to privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and seizure, and the equal protection clause?
HELD:
1) YES, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional qualification for
candidates for senator. NO, Congress CANNOT enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator
in addition to those laid down by the Constitution.
2) The Court held that, paragraphs (c) and (d) are CONSTITUTIONAL; while paragraphs (f) and (g)
are UNCONSITUTIONAL. Only paragraphs (f) and (g) violate the right to privacy, the right against unreasonable
searches and seizure, and the equal protection clause.
RATIO:
1) Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges
the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution (refer to the aforementioned
facts). As couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be certified illegal-drug clean,
obviously as a pre-condition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a
condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as senator-elect. The COMELEC resolution
completes the chain with the proviso that “[n]o person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of
his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test.”  Viewed, therefore, in its proper context, Sec. 36(g) of RA
9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add another qualification layer to what the 1987 Constitution,
at the minimum, requires for membership in the Senate. Whether or not the drug-free bar set up under the
challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after election is really of no moment, as getting elected would be
of little value if one cannot assume office for non-compliance with the drug-testing requirement.
Congress’ inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are subject to certain limitations. As early as 1927,
in Government v. Springer, the Court has defined, in the abstract, the limits on legislative power in the following
wise: “Someone has said that the powers of the legislative department of the Government, like the boundaries of
the ocean, are unlimited. In constitutional governments, however, as well as governments acting under delegated
authority, the powers of each of the departments x x x are limited and confined within the four walls of the
constitution or the charter, and each department can only exercise such powers as are necessarily implied from the
given powers.  The Constitution is the shore of legislative authority against which the waves of legislative
enactment may dash, but over which it cannot leap.”
Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is subject to substantive and constitutional limitations
which circumscribe both the exercise of the power itself and the allowable subjects of legislation. The substantive
constitutional limitations are chiefly found in the Bill of Rights[12] and other provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI
of the Constitution prescribing the qualifications of candidates for senators.
In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or
promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for
senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet
such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the
democratic process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise
specified in the Constitution.
2) The Court is of the view and so holds that the provisions of RA 9165(c) requiring mandatory, random, and
suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of educational
institutions to require, as a condition for admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and
policies.  To be sure, the right to enroll is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable requirements.
A random drug testing of students in secondary and tertiary schools is not only acceptable, but may even be
necessary if the safety and interest of the student population, doubtless a legitimate concern of the
government, are to be promoted and protected.
Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, the mandatory but random drug test prescribed by Sec.
36 of RA 9165(d) for officers and employees of public and private offices is justifiable, albeit not exactly for the
same reason. The Court notes in this regard that petitioner SJS, other than saying that “subjecting almost
everybody to drug testing, without probable cause, is unreasonable, an unwarranted intrusion of the individual
right to privacy,” has failed to show how the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing under Sec. 36(c)
and (d) of RA 9165 violates the right to privacy and constitutes unlawful and/or unconsented search under Art. III,
Secs. 1 and 2 of the Constitution. Petitioner Laserna’s lament is just as simplistic, sweeping, and gratuitous and
does not merit serious consideration.
The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone. In context, the right to privacy means the right to be free from
unwarranted exploitation of one’s person or from intrusion into one’s private activities in such a way as to cause
humiliation to a person’s ordinary sensibilities; and while there has been general agreement as to the basic
function of the guarantee against unwarranted search, “translation of the abstract prohibition against ‘unreasonable
searches and seizures’ into workable broad guidelines for the decision of particular cases is a difficult task,” to
borrow from C. Camara v. Municipal Court. Authorities are agreed though that the right to privacy   yields to
certain paramount rights of the public and defers to the state’s exercise of police power.
As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched and as has been held, “reasonableness”
is the touchstone of the validity of a government search or intrusion. While every officer and employee in a
private establishment is under the law deemed forewarned that he or she may be a possible subject of a drug test,
nobody is really singled out in advance for drug testing. The goal is to discourage drug use by not telling in
advance anyone when and who is to be tested. And as may be observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165 itself prescribes
what, in Ople, is a narrowing ingredient by providing that the employees concerned shall be subjected to “random
drug test as contained in the company’s work rules and regulations x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the
work place.” It is to be noted the very reason RA 9165 was enacted is to safeguard the well-being of the citizens
from the deleterious effects of dangerous drugs.

Paragraph (f) of RA 9165 was declared unconstitutional by the Court. Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c)
and (d) of RA 9165, the Court finds no valid justification for mandatory drug testing for persons accused of
crimes. In the case of students, the constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug
testing for students emanates primarily  from the waiver by the students of their right to privacy when they seek
entry to the school, and from their voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental authority of school
authorities. In the case of private and public employees, the constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random,
and suspicionless drug testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement.
The Court finds the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the public prosecutor’s office
with criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day imprisonment.  The operative concepts in the
mandatory drug testing are “randomness” and “suspicionless.”  In the case of persons charged with a crime before
the prosecutor’s office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless.  The ideas of randomness
and being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint.  They are not
randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion.  When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged,
they are singled out and are impleaded against their will.  The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being
haled before the prosecutor’s office and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do
not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy. To impose mandatory drug testing
on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the
stated objectives of RA 9165.  Drug testing in this case would violate a persons’ right to privacy guaranteed under
Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.
Bagabuyo vs COMELEC (Plebiscite)
FACTS:
Cagayan de Oro only had one legislative district before. In 2006, CdO congressman Jaraula sponsored a bill to
have two legislative districts in CdO instead. The law was passed (RA 9371) hence two legislative districts were
created. Bagabuyo assailed the validity of the said law and he went immediately to the Supreme Court. He was
contending that the 2nd district was created without a plebiscite which was required by the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not a plebiscite was required in the case at bar.
HELD: No, a plebiscite is not required in the case at bar. RA 9371 merely increased the representation of
Cagayan de Oro City in the House of Representatives and Sangguniang Panglungsod pursuant to Section 5,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution; the criteria established under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
only apply when there is a creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of a
province, city, municipality, or barangay; in this case, no such creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of
boundaries of a local government unit took place; and R.A. No. 9371 did not bring about any change in Cagayan
de Oro’s territory, population and income classification; hence, no plebiscite is required.
Facts:
Cagayan de Oro used to have only one legislative district. But in 2006, CdO Congressman Constantino Jaraula
sponsored a bill to have two legislative districts in CdO instead. The law was passed (RA 9371) hence two
legislative districts were created. Rogelio Bagabuyo assailed the validity of the said law and he went immediately
to the Supreme Court to enjoin the COMELEC from enforcing the law in the upcoming elections. Bagabuyo
was contending that the 2nd district was created without a plebiscite which he averred was required by the
Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not a plebiscite was required in the case at bar.
Held:
No, a plebiscite is not required in the case at bar. RA 9371 merely increased the representation of Cagayan de Oro
City in the House of Representatives and Sangguniang Panglungsod pursuant to Section 5, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution; the criteria established under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution only apply when there is
a creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of a province, city, municipality, or
barangay; in this case, no such creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundaries of a local
government unit took place; and R.A. No. 9371 did not bring about any change in Cagayan de Oro’s territory,
population and income classification; hence, no plebiscite is required. What happened here was a reapportionment
of a single legislative district into two legislative districts. Reapportionment is the realignment or change in
legislative districts brought about by changes in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of
equality of representation. 
Before, Cagayan de Oro had only one congressman and 12 city council members citywide for its population of
approximately 500,000. By having two legislative districts, each of them with one congressman, Cagayan de Oro
now effectively has two congressmen, each one representing 250,000 of the city’s population.  This easily means
better access to their congressman since each one now services only 250,000 constituents as against the 500,000.
ATONG PAGLAUM, INC. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, (G)
G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013
FACTS:
The case constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by 52 party-list
groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
disqualifying them from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their petitions for
registration under the party-list system, or cancellation of their registration and accreditation as party-list
organizations.
Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9366 and
9531, approximately 280 groups and organizations registered and manifested their desire to participate in the 13
May 2013 party-list elections
December 5, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC Second Division’s resolution to grant
Partido ng Bayan ng Bida’s (PBB) registration and accreditation as a political party in the National Capital
Region. However, PBB was denied participation in the elections because PBB does not represent any
"marginalized and underrepresented" sector.
13 petitioners were not able to secure a mandatory injunction from the Court. The COMELEC, on 7 January 2013
issued Resolution No. 9604, and excluded the names of these 13 petitioners in the printing of the official.
Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc scheduled summary evidentiary
hearings to determine whether the groups and organizations that filed manifestations of intent to participate in the
elections have continually complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor
Party v. COMELEC (Ang Bagong Bayani).
39 petitioners were able to secure a mandatory injunction from the Court, directing the COMELEC to include the
names of these 39 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the elections.
Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. This
Court issued Status Quo Ante Orders in all petitions. 
ISSUE:
Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
disqualifying petitioners from participating in the elections.
HELD:
No, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing decisions in disqualifying
petitioners from participating in the coming elections. However, since the Court adopts new parameters in the
qualification of the party-list system, thereby abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by the COMELEC in
disqualifying petitioners, we remand to the COMELEC all the present petitions for the COMELEC to determine
who are qualified to register under the party-list system, and to participate in the coming elections, under the new
parameters prescribed in this Decision.
Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the first three consecutive terms
of Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, "one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the
religious sector." This provision clearly shows again that the party-list system is not exclusively for sectoral
parties for two obvious reasons.
First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would naturally be open to non-sectoral
party-list representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-list system is exclusively for sectoral parties
representing the "marginalized and underrepresented."
Second, the reservation of one-half of the party-list seats to sectoral parties applies only for the first "three
consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution," clearly making the party-list system fully open after
the end of the first three congressional terms. This means that, after this period, there will be no seats reserved for
any class or type of party that qualifies under the three groups constituting the party-list system.
Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1) and (2), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for sectoral parties only, but also for non-
sectoral parties.
R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and regional parties under the party-list system to represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" is to deprive and exclude, by judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented
parties from the party-list system. How will these ideology-based and cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in
legislative district elections, participate in the electoral process if they are excluded from the party-list system? To
exclude them from the party-list system is to prevent them from joining the parliamentary struggle, leaving as
their only option the armed struggle. To exclude them from the party-list system is, apart from being obviously
senseless, patently contrary to the clear intent and express wording of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941