Perez v dela Cruz
March 28, 1969
Facts:
The complaint was filed to
prevent the Vice Mayor Perez
from voting twice in the
selection of Secretary in the
proceedings of the Sanggunian
as she had stated she will in
different occasions. The first
vote is to create a tie, the
second is to break the tie as
presiding officer. The LC judge
granted a preliminary injunction.
Perez filed for certiorari to the
CA which granted a TRO but
later dissolved it and dismissed
Perez’ petition.
Held:
Remarkably, the charter of Naga
City did not at all provide for the
position of vice-mayor; indeed,
it explicitly provided that "the
City Treasurer shall perform the
duties of the Mayor" "in the
event of sickness, absence or
other temporary incapacity of
the Mayor." On June 19, 1959
upon approval of Republic Act
2259 making elective the offices
of mayor, vice-mayor and
councilors in chartered cities,
the position of vice-mayor,
among others was created.
There is absolutely nothing in
Republic Act 305, also known as
the charter of the City of Naga,
which provides that the vice-
mayor of the said city is a
member of the municipal board
thereof. For sooth, the position
of vice-mayor was not even
provided for, as the "acting
mayor" designated to take over
in case of sickness, absence or
other temporary incapacity of
the Mayor was the "City
Treasurer."
True it is that upon the passage
of Republic Act 2259, the
position of vice-mayor in Naga
City, and in all other chartered
cities whose corporate charters
did not provide for the position
of vice-mayor, was created, but
section 3 thereof simply
provides that "the Vice-Mayor
shall be the presiding officer of
the City Council or Municipal
Board in all chartered cities." It
does not decree that the vice-
mayor is a member of the city
council or municipal board.
Section 3 of Rep. Act 2259
simply installs the vice-mayor as
the presiding officer of the
board in all chartered cities. It
does not install the vice-mayor
as a member thereof. This is
especially true in the case of
Naga where the position of vice-
mayor (whether appointive or
elective) was originally not even
provided for in its charter — the
official next-in-rank to the
mayor being the city treasurer.
In no manner does the law,
either in its original form under
Rep. Act 305, or in its
amendatory shape under Rep.
Act 2259, constitute the vice-
mayor as a member of the
municipal board. It simply says
that "the vice-mayor shall be
presiding officer of the City
Council or Municipal Board."
Nothing more.

The mere fact, therefore, that
the vice-mayor was made the
"presiding officer" of the board
did not ipso jure make him a
member thereof; and even if he
"is an integral part of the
Municipal Board" such fact does
not necessarily confer on him
"either the status of a regular
member of its municipal board
or the powers and attributes of
a municipal councilor." In sum,
the vice-mayor of Naga
possesses in the municipal
board of Naga no more than the
prerogatives and authority of a
"presiding officer" as such, and
no more.
Hebron v. Reyes
July 28, 1958
Facts:
Hebron was elected mayor of
Carmona for a term of 4 years.
Later, he received a letter from
the Office of the President which
stated that the President has
directly assumed the
investigation regarding the
administrative charges leveled
against him. He was
immediately suspended until
the end of the admin
proceedings against him. The
issue remained pending with the
OP. The term of the petitioner
was about to expire so he filed
an action for quo warranto that
Reyes was illegally holding the
office of mayor. (at time of
decision, the term did expire)
Held:
The President has no power to
remove or suspend local
elective officials. There is
neither statutory nor
constitutional provision granting
the President sweeping
authority to remove municipal
officials. The President’s
supervisory authority over
municipal affairs is even
qualified by the proviso “as may
be provided by law”, a clear
indication of constitutional
intention that the provisions was
not to be self-executing but
requires legislative
implementation. Even in sec
64(b) of the Revised
Administrative Code, conferring
on the Chief Executive power to
remove specifically enjoins that
the said power should be
exercised conformably to law,
which means that removals
must be accomplished only for
any of the causes and in the
fashion prescribed by law and
the said procedure.
Sections 2188 to 2191 of the
RAC outline the procedure for
the suspension and removal of
municipal officers. Said sections
expressly vest on the Provincial
Governor and the Provincial
Board the exclusive jurisdication
to conduct investigation so
fcomplaints against municipal
officers for neglect of duty,
oppression, corruption or other
form of maladministration of
office, and conviction by final
judgment of any crime involving
moral turpitude. It also provides
for the periods of suspension
allowable pending the
investigation and hearing of the
admin charges.
Mendova v. Afable
December 4, 2002
Facts:
Mendova charged Judge
Crisanto B. Afable with
ignorance of the law relative to
a case filed by him for slight
physical injuries. Mendova
alleged that on February 18,
1998 he filed with the Office of
the Barangay Chairman a
complaint for slight physical
injuries against Palada. The
Barangay Chairman, in his
Certification dated April 19,
1999,confirmed such fact.
Pangkat Chairman also certified
in an undated "Minutes In
Settling Disputes" that the case
was set for hearing on March 16,
22 and 29, 1998, but the parties
failed to reach an amicable
settlement. May 4, 1998:
complainant filed with the McTC
a complaint for slight physical
injuries against Palada,
November 3, 1998: respondent
judge rendered his Decision
dismissing the case on the
ground of prescription. Mendova
then filed with the OCA an
administrative complaint
against respondent judge. He
alleged that in dismissing the
case, respondent judge showed
his ignorance of the law when
he did not apply the provisions
of Section 410(c) of Republic Act
No. 7160 which provides the
procedure for amicable
settlement.
Held:
Robert Palada committed the
crime of slight physical injuries
on February 15, 1998. On
February 18, 1998, complainant
filed his complaint with the
Office of the Barangay
Chairman. Pursuant to the
provisions of Section 410(c) of
The Local Government Code of
1991, quoted earlier, such filing
interrupted the prescriptive
period and started to run again
upon receipt by the complainant
of the Certification to File Action
issued by the Pangkat Secretary.
Here, records fail to show when
complainant received the
Barangay Certification to File
Action. The undated certification
he submitted merely states that
the case was set for hearing
before the barangay on March
16, 22 and 29, 1998, but the
parties failed to reach an
amicable settlement. When he
filed on May 4, 1998 Criminal
Case No. 2198-98 for slight
physical injuries with
respondent's court, until the
dismissal of the case on
November 3, 1998, he still failed
to present proof of his receipt of
the Barangay Certification to File
Action. Clearly, he cannot now
fault respondent judge for
dismissing the case on the
ground of prescription.
While respondent admitted his
mistake, the same may not be
considered ignorance of the law.
If at all, it can only be an error of
judgment.
Finally, we noted that the
complaint does not allege any
bad faith or malice on the part
of respondent judge when he
dismissed the criminal case.
MMDA v. Bel Air
March 27, 2000
Facts:
MMDA, without any ordinance
from Makati, ordered Bel-Air
Village Assoc to open Neptune
Street to traffic, pursuant to its
alleged police power.
Held:
Local government units exercise
police power through their
respective legislative bodies.
The MMDA is not a local
government unit and there is
nothing in the law that grants
MMDA police and legislative
powers. The MMDA is a mere
development authority. Neither
does the governing board of the
MMDA, the Metro Manila
Council, exercise police or
legislative powers. The powers
of the MMDA are limited to:
formulation, coordination,
regulation, implementation,
preparation, management,
monitaoring and setting of
policies, installation of a system
and administration.
The MMDA is not the “special
metropolitan political
subdivision” mentioned in Sec
11, Art X of the Constitution
because the creation of the
MMDA was not submitted in a
plebiscite nor is the Chair of the
MMDA elected by the
inhabitants of Metro Manila.
Caasi v. CA
November 8, 1990
Facts:
These are consolidated petitions
for the disqualification of Merlito
Miguel, who was elected mayor
of Bolinao, Pangasinan in 1998.
Petitioners here allege that
Miguel is a green card holder,
and thus, is a permanent
resident of the US and not the
Philippines. COMELEC
dismissed petition, and in the
case Caasi filed, the CA
dismissed the quo warranto
petition.
Held:
Miguel's immigration to the
United States in 1984
constituted an abandonment of
his domicile and residence in
the Philippines. For he did not go
to the United States merely to
visit his children or his doctor
there; he entered the limited
States with the intention to have
there permanently as evidenced
by his application for an
immigrant's (not a visitor's or
tourist's) visa. Based on that
application of his, he was issued
by the U.S. Government the
requisite green card or authority
to reside there permanently.
He also did not, by returning to
the Philippines in November
1987 and presenting himself as
a candidate for mayor of Bolinao
in the January 18,1988 local
elections, waive his status as a
permanent resident or
immigrant of the United States
To be "qualified to run for
elective office" in the
Philippines, the law requires that
the candidate who is a green
card holder must have "waived
his status as a permanent
resident or immigrant of a
foreign country." Therefore, his
act of filing a certificate of
candidacy for elective office in
the Philippines, did not of itself
constitute a waiver of his status
as a permanent resident or
immigrant of the United States.
The waiver of his green card
should be manifested by some
act or acts independent of and
done prior to filing his candidacy
for elective office in this country.
Without such prior waiver, he
was "disqualified to run for any
elective office" (Sec. 68,
Omnibus Election Code).
Borja v. COMELEC
September 3, 1998
Facts:
Capco became vice-mayor of
Pateros in 1989 by virtue of
Mayor Borja’s death. He ran
again in 1992 and 1995, and
won both times. He filed for
candidacy again in 1998 but
Borja, Jr. who is running against
him filed a disqualification in
that he had already served 3
terms.
Held:
Indeed a fundamental tenet of
representative democracy is
that the people should be
allowed to choose those whom
they please to govern them. To
bar the election of a local official
because he has already served
three terms, although the first
as a result of succession by
operation of law rather than
election, would therefore be to
violate this principle.
Not only historical examination
but textual analysis as well
supports the ruling of the
COMELEC that Art. X, §8
contemplates service by local
officials for three consecutive
terms as a result of election. The
first sentence speaks of "the
term of office of elective local
officials" and bars "such
official[s]" from serving for more
than three consecutive terms.
The second sentence, in
explaining when an elective
local official may be deemed to
have served his full term of
office, states that "voluntary
renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in
the continuity of his service for
the full term for which he was
elected." The term served must
therefore be one "for which [the
official concerned] was elected."
The purpose of this provision is
to prevent a circumvention of
the limitation on the number of
terms an elective local official
may serve. Conversely, if he is
not serving a term for which he
was elected because he is
simply continuing the service of
the official he succeeds, such
official cannot be considered to
have fully served the term
notwithstanding his voluntary
renunciation of office prior to its
expiration.
To recapitulate, the term limit
for elective local officials must
be taken to refer to the right to
be elected as well as the right
to serve in the same elective
position. Consequently, it is not
enough that an individual has
served three consecutive terms
in an elective local office, he
must also have been elected to
the same position for the same
number of times before the
disqualification can apply.
David v. COMELEC
April 8, 1997
Facts:
These are two consolidated the
cases. The first is a petition for
prohibition filed by Alex David,
president of Liga ng mga Brgy
sa Pilipinas and Brgy Chair of
Brgy 77, Kalookan. The second
is by Petitioner Liga ng mga
Barangay Quezon City Chapter
represented by its president
Bonifacio M. Rillon. Essentially,
the two petitions raise a
common question: How long is
the term of office of barangay
chairmen and other barangay
officials who were elected to
their respective offices on the
second Monday of May 1994? Is
it three years, as provided by RA
7160 (the Local Government
Code) or five years, as
contained in RA 6679?
Contending that their term is
five years, petitioners ask this
Court to order the cancellation
of the scheduled barangay
election this coming May 12,
1997 and to reset it to the
second Monday of May, 1999.
Held: The intent and design of
the legislature to limit the term
of barangay officials to only
three (3) years as provided
under the Local Government
Code emerges as bright as the
sunlight. The cardinal rule in the
interpretation of all laws is to
ascertain and give effect to the
intent of the law. And three
years is the obvious intent.
First. RA 7160, the Local
Government Code, was enacted
later than RA 6679. It is basic
that in case of an irreconciliable
conflict between two laws of
different vintages, the later
enactment prevails. Legis
posteriores priores contrarias
abrogant. Second. The Local
Autonomy Code mandates a
direct vote on the barangay
chairman by the entire barangay
electorate, separately from the
seven kagawads.
Third. During the barangay
elections held on May 9, 1994
(second Monday), the voters
actually and directly elected one
punong barangay and seven
kagawads. Fourth. In enacting
the general appropriations act of
1997,Congress appropriated the
amount of P400 million to cover
expenses for the holding of
barangay elections
Fifth. In Paras vs. Comelec, this
Court said that "the next regular
election involving the barangay
office concerned is barely seven
(7) months away, the same
having been scheduled in May,
1997." Sixth. RA. 7160 is a
codified set of laws that
specifically applies to local
government units. It specifically
and definitively provides in its
Sec. 43-c that "the term of office
of barangay officials . . . shall be
for three years."
Undoubtedly, the Constitution
did not expressly prohibit
Congress from fixing any term of
office for barangay officials. It
merely left the determination of
such term to the lawmaking
body, without any specific
limitation or prohibition, thereby
leaving to the lawmakers full
discretion to fix such term in
accordance with the exigencies
of public service. It must be
remembered that every law has
in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality. For a law to be
nullified, it must be shown that
there is a clear and unequivocal
(not just implied) breach of the
Constitution. 39 To strike down a
law as unconstitutional, there
must be a clear and unequivocal
showing that what the
fundamental law prohibits, the
statute permits. The petitioners
have miserably failed to
discharge this burden and to
show clearly the
unconstitutionality they aver.
Reyes v. COMELEC and De
Castro (1996)
FACTS: Reyes was the
incumbent mayor of the
municipality of Bongabong,
Oriental Mindoro, having been
elected to that office on May 11,
1992. On October 26, 1994, an
administrative complaint was
filed against him with the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan
alleging several acts of
appropriation to himself of
public funds. The Sanggunian
found Reyes guilty of the
charges and ordered his
removal from office on February
6, 1995. On March 23, an order
was issued for Reyes to vacate
the position of mayor and
peacefully turn over the office to
the incumbent vice mayor. But
service upon Reyes was refused.
Earlier, on March 20, Reyes filed
a certificate of candidacy (COC)
with the Office of the Election
Officer of the COMELEC in
Bongabong. On March 24, De
Castro, as registered voter of
Bongabong, sought the
disqualification of Reyes as
candidate for mayor.
Nonetheless, because of the
lack of any contrary order from
the COMELEC, Reyes was voted
for in the elections of May 8,
1995. On May 8, COMELEC
issued a resolution on De
Castro’s petition disqualifying
Reyes from running for public
office. Reyes’ COC is then
cancelled. A day later, or on May
9, 1995, the Municipal Board of
Canvassers, apparently unaware
of the disqualification resolution,
proclaimed Reyes as duly
elected mayor. On July 3, Reyes
filed an MR of the COMELEC
disqualification resolution but
the latter denied said petition.
ISSUE: WON charges against
Reyes have become moot and
academic by expiration of the
term during which acts
complained of had been
committed;
HELD: NO. Although Reyes
brought an action to question
the decision in the
administrative case, the TRO
issued in the action he brought
lapsed, with the result that the
decision served on him and it
thereafter became final on April
3, 1995. Reyes failed to appeal
to the Office of the President. He
was thus validly removed from
office and pursuant to Sec.
40(b) of the LGC, he was
disqualified from running for
reelection.
Malonzo v. COMELEC
March 11, 1997
Facts:
Malonzo was elected as mayor
of Caloocan (May 8, 1995). July
1996, 1057 Punong Barangays
and SB Members as well as SK
Charis, constituting a majority of
the members of the Preparatory
Recall Assembly of the City of
Caloocan, met and upon
deliberation and election, voted
for the approval of the
resolution expressing loss of
confidence in Mayor Malonzo
and calling for the initiation of
recall proceedings. Malonzo
filed a petition with COMELEC
opposing the recall. This was
denied by COMELEC which set
the election recall for Dec 14,
2006.
Held:
The Liga ng mga Barangay is
undoubtedly an entity distinct
from the Preparatory Recall
Assembly. It just so happens
that the personalities
representing the barangays in
the Liga are the very members
of the PRA, the majority of
whom met on July 7, 1996, and
voted in favor of the resolution
call for recall, after deliberation
reported in the record in
accordance with existing law.
Thus, the Punong Barangays
and SB members convened as
voted as members of the PRA,
and not as members of the Liga.
The law on recall did not
prescribe an elaborate
proceeding. Neither did it
demand a specific procedure.
What is fundamental is
compliance with the provision
that:
1. There should be a session
called for the purpose of
initiating recall
proceedings
2. Attended by a majority of
all member of the PRA
3. In a public place, and
4. The resolution resulting
from such assembly be
adopted by a majority of
all members of the PRA.
Rivera v. Municipality of
Malolos
October 31, 1957
Facts:
In 1949, the municipality of
Malolos called for bids for
furnishing and delivering
materials to be used in the
maintenance and repair of
barrio roads, which Rivera won.
The contract was then signed by
Rivera and Maclang in his
capacity and municipal mayor.
Rivera then delivered the
materials but after repeated
demands was not paid. The
appellant then sought the
intervention of the Presidential
Complaint and Action
Commission, which referred the
matter to the General Auditing
Office which turned down the
claim.
Held:
Before a contract may be
entered into validly by a
municipality, the law requires
that there should be an
appropriation of municipal funds
to meet the obligation validly
passed by the municipal council
and approved by the municipal
mayor. If the law requires that
before a contract involving the
expenditure of P2,000 or more
may be entered into or
authorized, the municipal
treasurer must certify to the
officer entering into such
contracts that funds have been
duly appropriated for such
purpose and that the amount
necessary to cover the proposed
contract-is available for
expenditure on account thereof;
and that purported contract
entered into contrary to the
requirements just stated is
wholly void, the petitioner's
claim that there is no longer any
question as to the validity of the
contract entered into by and
between the petitioner and the
municipal mayor of Malolos is
not correct.
Likewise, if the law provides that
the provincial auditor or his
representative must check up
the deliveries made by a
contractor pursuant to a
contract lawfully and validly
entered into, and there was no
such check up, the petitioner's
claim that there is no longer an
issue as to whether the road
construction materials have
been actually delivered by the
petitioner and received by the
respondent is groundless. The
Auditor General is not in duty
bound to pass and allow in audit
the sum claimed by the
petitioner if he or his authorized
representative did not check up
the delivery of the crushed
adobe stone and gravel. To say
that the purpose and aim of this
checking requirement is to
forestall fraud and collusion is to
state what is obvious.
The petitioner enlisted the aid of
the Presidential Complaints and
Action Committee to request the
Auditor General to pass in audit
and authorize the payment of
the petitioner's claim. The
Auditor General had no
alternative but to comply with
the provisions of the law and as
the contract entered into by the
municipal mayor of Malolos,
Bulacan, was not in accordance
with law, the Auditor General
was correct in denying the
petitioner's claim.

Abella v. Municipality of
Naga

Facts:
The Municipality of Naga, by
resolution, ordered the closing
of part of a municipal street
which ran between the public
market and Abella’s property
and used the closed
thoroughfare to expand the
market. Abella claims that
permanent, semi-permanent as
well as temporary constructions
were allowed by the
municipality of Naga along the
sidewalk of her property
depriving her of access to
streets and retarding her
reconstruction.

Held:
The municipality was not
charged with any unlawful act,
or with acting without authority,
or with invasion of plaintiff’s
property rights; the basis of the
lower court’s decision to award
damages to Abella is Section
2246 of the RAC which provides
that no municiapal street, etc. or
any part thereof “shall be closed
without indemnifying any
person prejudiced thereby.” It
was admitted in the lower court
that Abella was economically
damaged and therefore the
municipality is liable to pay.