In Re DIZON [1989] and acted upon in good faith, not from improper motives.

There is likewise no
Former Commissioner of Customs, Hon. Alexander A. Padilla charged Judge
Dizon, which the Sc found Dizon guilty in Resolution of Feb. 23, 1988. He
rendered a manifestly erroneous decision in Crim case # 86-10126-P entitled
PPL v LO CHI FAI through gross incompetence and gross ignorance of the law.
It was alleged that Dizon acquitted Lo Chi Fai of the crime of violation of
Central Bank Circular # 960 in spite of having been apprehended with
$355,349.57 worth of foreign currencies while boarding an airplane for
Hongkong, erroneously ruling that the State must first prove the criminal intent
to violate the law and benefit from the illegal act.
It was also alleged Dizon ordered the return of $3k out of the $355,349.57
seized on the grossly wrong interpretation that CBC #960 exempts this amount
from seizure and forfeiture proceedings.
question that he did not transgress the procedural requirements needed for the
rendition of a judgment in a crim case. The facts are all stated in the decision. It
was his egregiously erroneous interpretation of the law which led us to discipline
the respondent.
Dizon has sincerely evinced a humble repentance, the mfr is hereby granted .
the Feb Resolution is modified. Suspended without pay from Feb 23, 1988 to
the date this resolution is promulgated. He may therefore be reinstated to office
immediately.

WON Dizon committed these erroneous decisions in good faith

In offenses punished by special laws proof of malice or deliberate intent is not
necessary. The offenses are mala prohibita.
As respondent manifestly disregarded and failed to apply this plain and
fundamental legal principle, despite the fact that the record did not so clearly
bear out the 2nd charge-in-fact, it would now appear that the $3k was never
returned to Lo Chi Fai by order of the respondent or otherwise-SC considered
that “his actions in this case amounted to grave misconduct prejudicial to the
interest of sound and fair administration of justice” and ordered his dismissal
from the service.
The court took into account: Dizon’s 26 years of government service; no clear
indication from the records that his assailed decision was inspired by corrupt
motives or a reprehensible purpose to set the plainly guilt free. There is gross
misjudgment but not deliberate twisting of facts to justify his decision.
In a Feb 23, 1988 resolution, the court held that “ a JUDGE CAN’T BE HELD
TO ACCOUNT OR ANSWER criminally, civilly or administratively for an
erroneous decision rendered by him in good faith.” IT remains the law.
BUT this is not meant to exonerate the respondent from all blame nor to
completely overlook the erroneous judgment. His act remains unjustified. It does
not speak well of an officer who must “read study and ponder” and “personaify
learning and equanimity.” (Lopez v Fernandez). Former CJ Fernando in his
concurring opinion in Quizon v Baltazar stated “ it is a truism that the learning
process in law does not stop upon graduation from college and admission to the
bar. There should be, on the contrary, more sustained intellectual effort on the
part of the members of the legal profession. Crtainly, judges are not exempt
from this obligation. ?It is even more incumbent on them as they are thought as
the oracles of law. There is likely then to be a disillusionment in the judicial
process if, as did happen here, an occupant of the bench was found to be
woefully lacking in legal knowledge.”

It was resp’s mistaken belief that because the penalty for violation of CBC
was that provided for in the RPC, he belived that intent or malice was an
essential element of the offense of course deserves but scant consideration. But
BECAUSE SUCH BELIEF IS WRONG DOOOES NOT rule out its being held
CONSOLIDATED BANK & TRUST CORP. (SOLIDBANK), complainant, vs.
HON. DIONISIO M. CAPISTRANO, presiding Judge of the RTC Branch
CXVI, Pasay City, defendant [1988]
⇒ Nation’s Knitting Enterprises filed a case seeking an injunction to stop
Consolidated Bank from proceeding w/an extrajudicial foreclosure of a
mortgage on former’s properties.
⇒ Judge Romillo: issued a TRO
⇒ Consolidated: counterclaim for damages & alternate prayer for payment
obligation vs Knitting. It likewise prayed for attachment since Knitting’s
guilty of fraud in contracting obligations & no other security for payment is
available.
⇒ Romillo: issued an order of attachment but subsequently, upon motion of
Knitting, he issued an order to preserve the status quo & ordered sheriff
to desist from enforcing writ until further orders.
⇒ Consolidated’s counsel interpreted this as w/o prejudice to his client’s
continued possession of Knitting’s properties. Knitting then filed a separate
complaint for damages allegedly suffered due to counsel’s instructions.
Consolidated’s answer: motion to dismiss based on the ground that this
case should be litigated w/the first case pending w/Judge Romillo where
attachment has issued.
⇒ Case filed by Knitting was assigned to Capistrano who made the following
actions:
1. deferred resolution of Consolidated’s motions until after trial on merits
2. Bank’s subsequent MFR: considered not filed since ROC Rule 14, Sec.
4 prohibits an MFR of an order denying/deferring resolution of a motion
to dismiss and Rule 11 requires that the period for filing of answer must
be computed from notice of the order of denial or deferment
3. Bank’s motion for extension of 15 days counted from receipt of
resolution on the MFR: not entitled to any consideration
4. denied a motion to consolidate this case w/the case pending w/Romillo
5. on the motion of Knitting, he declared the Bank in default & directed
former to present evidence ex parte
6. rendered judgment by default ordering the Bank to pay Knitting, its
assistant manager, plant manager & driver actual damages
(P7,739,372.00 for Knitting, P250k for Apostol, P200k for Tarce, and
P50k for Ganal), moral damages (P100k for Apostol), exemplary
damages (P1M for all plaintiffs) attorneys fees (P50k). (see p. 52 for
breakdown of damages to be paid)
⇒ Intermediate Appellate Court: modified Capistrano’s decision by deleting
actual damages for Apostol, Tarce & Ganal and reduced moral damages to
P50k, P75k and P25k respectively. Exemplary damages reduced to P250k.
⇒ Bank filed an administrative charge against Capistrano for gross ignorance
of the law resulting in inefficiency, partiality, malice and/or serious
misconduct & knowingly rendering both an unjust interlocutory order & an
unjust judgment.
⇒ Capistrano’s defense:
1. Case may be litigated in a separate action since damages suffered by
reason of the attachment arose from acts done after the lifting of said
attachment.
2. Decided to declare Bank in default to be consistent w/his adverse
resolution on the 2 motions.
3. He did not admit Bank’s answer since it was already declared in default
prior to filing and no motion to lift the default and/or admit the answer
was/were filed. He waited in vain for the motion/s to be filed. He only
decided after hearing Knitting’s witnesses & receiving Bank’s evidence.
4. Administrative complaint is improper.
Issue: WON Capistrano’s decision was proper. – NO.
Ratio:
1. Legal basis – Rejuso vs. Estipona: a claim for damages arising from an
attachment must be litigated in the same action where such attachment
issued. A separate action must be dismissed or consolidated w/the first
case.
2. Action for damages (such as the one filed by Knitting) won’t lie since
attachment was proper and SC decisions affirming such barred Knitting’s
action by res judicata.
3. IAC’s and Capistrano’s decisions were completely unfair & unwarranted.
4. Capistrano should have considered Bank’s answer. His ff actions are
likewise erroneous:
a. taking cognizance of Knitting’s case for damages when it was w/in
Romillo’s jurisdiction
b. deferring resolution of motion to dismiss when he should have granted
the motion or allowed consolidation.
c. putting off resolving the motions incontinently & w/o valid reason. He
should not have refused hearing & considering the Bank’s motions.
d. Declaring Bank in default on the ground that the MFR was filed out of
time even if the motion for an extension to file answer has been filed
w/in a period that had not yet lapsed
e. Receiving Knitting’s evidence ex-parte when Bank’s answer was
already before him. He disregarded SC’s repeated admonition that
every litigated case must be tried on the merits as much as possible.
f. Rendering judgment by default premised on the assumption that the
order directing the sheriff to desist from enforcing the writ either lifted
the attachment or permitted Knitting to carry on its regular business
operation even if both assumptions were not supported by any other
evidence.
g. Awarding of actual & excessive damages in grossly excessive amounts
to Knitting w/o giving the defendants an opportunity to impugn such.
h. Awarding of damages in inordinate amounts to Kntiting’s assistant
manager, plant manager & driver when none of them could conceivably
have suffered any prejudice since they had not proprietary interest
whatsoever.
5. His defenses are not sufficient to overcome Bank’s accusations. He didn’t
explain:
a. Why he misinterpreted Romillo’s order
b. Why he disregarded Rejuso ruling
c. His unwonted rigor & inflexibility in dealing w/Bank’s motions and his
penchant for procedural technicalitites
d. Grant of fantastic sums in damages based solely on evidence received
ex parte and award of such to parties who held no rt/interest in the
business & property under attachment.
6. Good faith & absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper consideration
are sufficient defenses. But his actions & the attendant circumstances do
not show good faith or lack of malice, bias or partiality thereby constituting
serious misconduct.
Holding:
1. Capistrano guilty of serious misconduct affecting his integrity & efficiency.
2. Dismissed from the service w/prejudice to reinstatement and w/forfeiture of
benefits & privileges. Entitled to earned vacation & sick leave benefits.
PEOPLE vs. SALAS [1986] – (no one assigned)
ABAD vs. BLEZA [1986]
 Administrative Cases in the SC
 2 Admin Cases filed against Judge Ildefonso Bleza: (1) when he was
contemplating optional retirement due to poor health; and (2) after he had
filed his application. His entitlement to disability retirement benefits depends
on the resolution of these cases
First Administrative Case
 After a cockfight, Lt. Col. Gregorio Abad of the Phil. Constabulary had a
verbal tussle w/ Potenciano Ponce w/c culminated in Abad’s being shot in
the chest by Francisco Sabater, Ponce’s alleged bodyguard. Sabater was
charged w/ frustrated homicide & Ponce w/ attempted homicide before the
RTC where Judge Bleza presided
 Abad’s version is to the effect that after losing to the cock owned by Ponce,
a cocky remark by Ponce led to a heated argument. Abad went to the
carinderia but he was followed by Ponce holding a gun aimed at Abad.
Abad got a glass and hurled it at Ponce who was hit at the head & thus fell.
Then Sabater got Ponce’s gun. Local officials advised him to leave but once
outside, he got into a fistfight w/ the other body guards & then Sabater fired
the gun at him. He was hit and they sent him to the Cavite Medical Center
 Ponce’s version is to the effect that after Abad’s loss, he was muttering
obscenities. When Ponce approached Abad to ask for an explanation, Abad
hit him on the forehead with a bottle of beer causing him to fall
unconscious. Upon regaining consciousness, he was brought to the Cavite
Medical Center.
 Sabater claims that it was when Ponce fell down unconscious that Sabater
got Ponce’s gun & since Abad refused to be pacified, He went out & fired
the gun 5x upwards to call the attention of authorities. When Abad
approached him, holding a broken bottle of beer & tried to stab him w/ it, he
fired gun at Abad in self-defense
 The respondent judge acquitted Ponce for insufficiency of evidence and
found Sabater guilty of frustrated homicide. Thus, Abad charged Bleza w/
rendering a decision w/ malice, ignorance of the law, grave abuse of
discretion, & misconduct as a judge.
 Case was referred to IAC for investigation & recommendation & the
Investigating Judge stated that “it appears inescapable that respondent has
not committed any wrongdoing to evoke disciplinary action in acquitting
Ponce of attempted homicide…And even if he made an error in his
perception of the facts as he saw them, it cannot be justly presumed that he
did it in bad faith or w/ malicious intent. For not every error or mistake of a
judge in the performance of his duties makes him liable therefore…
Respondent, however, was in error in appreciating as an mitigating
circumstance ‘lack of intention to kill the victim’ in fixing the penalty imposed
on Sabater…the same was done w/o malice or deliberate intent to
perpetrate an injustice. But in any case, there was negligence for w/c he
should be reprimanded.”
WON Bleza rendered a decision w/ malice, ignorance of the law, grave
abuse of discretion, & misconduct as a judge
 NO. As a matter of public policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or
corruption, that acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to
disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous.
 But, while judges shouldn’t be disciplined for inefficiency merely on account
of occasional mistakes or errors of judgment, it is highly imperative that they
should be conversant w/ basic legal principles
 Although a judge is nearing retirement, he should not relax in his study of
the law & court decisions. Service in the judiciary means a continuous study
& research on the law from beginning to end
 The records fail to show malice, ill-will or even bias on the part of
respondent judge. His decision pointed out, one by one, the glaring
inconsistencies in the prosecution’s evidence w/c led to the exculpation of
defendant Ponce.

Second Administrative Case

 Pacifico Ocampo filed an action for damages against herein complainant
Crisanto P. Cruz. In that action for damages, Ocampo alleged that he filed
an admin complaint against a certain Ricardo Ortiz. Cruz persuaded him to
withdraw the complaint otherwise Cruz will cause his dismissal from the
Fire & Rescue Div. of the MIAA. When he did not accede, Cruz filed an
admin case against him for inefficiency & serious neglect of duty,
insubordination, absenteeism & habitual tardiness. Due to this baseless
complaint, Ocampo alleged he suffered embarrassment, mental shock,
anxiety, sleepless nights & loss of appetite.
 Cruz denied knowledge of Ocampo’s admin case averring that the
Ocampo’s inefficiency, absenteeism & tardiness are substantiated
 Bleza ruled in favor of OCampo, hence Cruz filed an admin complaint
alleging that Bleza disregarded Cruz’s incontrovertible evidence and
knowingly rendered a wrong judgment against him
 In his comment, Bleza alleged that the decision, subject matter of this case,
is pending appeal in the IAC.

WON SC may take action on this complaint

 NO. Any action that the SC may take would be premature. For only after the
appellate court holds in final judgment that a trial judge’s alleged errors
were committed deliberately and in bad faith may a charge of knowingly
rendering an unjust decision be leveled against him. In the meantime, the
presumption is that official duty was regularly performed.

Holding: Administrative cases, DISMISSED. Recommendation of Court

Administator that Judge Bleza be retired from office is APPROVED.
 IN RE AGUAS [1901]
FACTS:
 The following took place during a trial in the CFI at Bacolor, Pampanga:
 While a witness was being examined by the judge, the judge had to
caution him not to look at the attorney for the defendant (Atty.
Marcelino Aguas), but to fix his attention on the judge
 Witness did not heed this warning
 Judge rose from his seat, approached the witness, seized him by the
shoulders and either shook him (accdg. to attorney for defendant) or
only turned him about (judge and others)
 This brought Aguas to his feet, protesting against the judge’s action
 He demanded that the occurrence be put on record, and further
hearing be postponed
 Two days after, the Clerk of Court entered the occurrence in his record, as
well as:
1. That prior to and in other occasions, Aguas had been wanting in
respect to the court
2. made use of “improper phrases”
3. interrupted opposing counsel in their examination of witnesses
4. rose on his feet in a “menacing attitude,” and “with a voice and body
trembling” protested the action of the judge as coercive of the witness

 Because of this, he was adjudged by the court on record (CFI of

Pampanga) to be in contempt and suspended him from practice of his
profession for 20 days
 Aguas appealed to the SC

SC holding
 Action of the judge was unwarranted and an interference with the freedom
from unlawful personal violence to which every witness is entitled while
giving testimony in a court of justice
 Aguas had the right to protest and demand that the incident be made a
matter of record.
 What he did would not be contempt if he did so respectfully and regardful of
the court’s dignity
 In this case, although the judge finds his attitude as “menacing,” there is
nothing on record that tends to show that he was disrespectful or unmindful
of the dignity of the court
 Judge’s opinion, in the absence of facts from which such is deduced, is
valueless to support a judgment of contempt. The specific act from which
the menace was inferred should have been testified to by the witnesses and
found by the court. Failing that, the record does not justify a conclusion that
he was in contempt

reversed
 IN RE SOTTO [1949]
Facts:
♦ Atty. Vicente Sotto issued a written statement 1in connection with the
decision of this Court in In re Angel Parazo the statement was
published in the Manila Times and other daily newspapers of the
locality. The court required Atty. Sotto to show cause why he should
not be charged with contempt of court.
♦ Atty. Sotto does not deny having published the statement but he
contends that under section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, which
confers upon this Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, "this Court has no power
to impose correctional penalties upon the citizens, and that the
Supreme Court can only impose fines and imprisonment by virtue of a
law, and has to be promulgated by Congress with the approval of the
Chief Executive." And he also alleges in his answer that "in the
exercise of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution, the
respondent made his statement in the press with the utmost good faith
and with no intention of offending any of the majority of the honorable
members of this high Tribunal, who, in his opinion, erroneously decided
the Parazo case; but he has not attacked, or intended to attack the
honesty or integrity of any one.' The other arguments set forth by the
respondent in his defenses observe no consideration.
Issue: WON Atty. Sotto can be punished for contempt of court? Yes
Ratio:
♦ Rules 64 of the rules promulgated by this court does not punish as
for contempt of court an act which was not punishable as such
under the law and the inherent powers of the court to punish for
contempt
♦ That the power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts of
superior statue, is a doctrine or principle uniformly accepted and
applied by the courts of last resort in the United States, which is
applicable in this jurisdiction since our Constitution and courts of
justice are patterned after those of that country.
1
As author of the Press Freedom Law (Republic Act No. 53.) interpreted by the Supreme Court in the case of Angel
Parazo, reporter of a local daily, who now has to suffer 30 days imprisonment, for his refusal to divulge the source of a
news published in his paper, I regret to say that our High Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but that
it is once more putting in evidence the incompetency of narrow mindedness o the majority of its members, In the wake of
so many mindedness of the majority deliberately committed during these last years, I believe that the only remedy to put
an end to so much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme Court. To his effect, I announce that one of the first
measures, which as its objects the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. As it is now constituted, a constant
peril to liberty and democracy. It need be said loudly, very loudly, so that even the deaf may hear: the Supreme Court
very of today is a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of Justice of those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano,
Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary.
♦ Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness,
soundness or unsoundness of the decision of the court in a
pending case made in good faith may be tolerated; because if well
founded it may enlighten the court and contribute to the correction
of an error if committed; but if it is not well taken and obviously
erroneous, it should, in no way, influence the court in reversing or
modifying its decision.
♦ Atty. Sotto does not merely criticize or comment on the decision of
the Parazo case, which was then and still is pending
reconsideration by this Court upon petition of Angel Parazo. He not
only intends to intimidate the members of this Court with the
presentation of a bill in the next Congress, of which he is one of
the members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the
members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the
members of Justices from eleven to seven, so as to change the
members of this Court which decided the Parazo case, who
according to his statement, are incompetent and narrow minded, in
order to influence the final decision of said case by this Court, and
thus embarrass or obstruct the administration of justice.
♦ As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente
Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and
authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the
oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in
the administration of justice. An attorney as an officer of the court
is under special obligation to be respectful in his conduct and
communication to the courts, he may be removed from office or
stricken from the roll of attorneys as being guilty of flagrant
misconduct.
Decision: Atty. Sotto guilty of contempt. Fine of 1,000 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. He is also required to show cause why he
should not be disbarred.
J. Perfecto concurring
♦ Atty. Sotto has not presented any evidence or offered any to support
his slanderous imputations, and no single word can be found in his
answer showing that he ever believed that the imputations are based
on fact. He does not to deny his intimidating announcement to
introduce in the coming sessions of Congress, among the first
measures, one for the change of the members of the Supreme Court
and for the latter's complete reorganization. He has not explained or
justified why he has to intimidate the members of the Supreme Court
with change and reorganization.
♦ Sotto claims that his statement was made with utmost good faith with
no intention of offending any of the majority of the honorable members
 of the High Tribunal. This argument lacks sincerity in view of his
commens that the majority of the members of the Supreme Court have
committed many blunders and injustices deliberately.
♦ Sotto’s statement goes much further than mere criticism of our decision
and the majority members of this Court. The statement is an attempt to
interfere with the administration of justice, to miscarry and defeat
justice, by trammelling the freedom of action of the members of the
Supreme Court, by bullying them with the menace of change,
reorganization, and removal, upon the false accusation that they have
been committing "blunders and injustices deliberately," and the
menacing action constitutes a flagrant violation of the Constitution.
Such a thing is not covered by the freedom of the press or by the
freedom to criticize judges and court proceedings, as no one in his
senses has ever conceived that such freedom include any form of
expressed gangterism, whether oral or written.

DELGA vs. GONZALES [1971]
In CFI Davao, crim case #8666 PPL v Suarez where the accused is tried for
attempted robbery with physical injuries.
On the witness chair Pascual Kudera, an offended party is being cross-
examined by Amado Ceniza. When Ceniza asked the witness a question, Fiscal
Delgra objected to the translation. Ceniza asked another question premised on
the witness’ answer, the interpretation of which is being objected to by Delgra.
However his objection was overruled by the judge who directed the witness to
answer. But he continued to argue. He asked the judge for a reconsideration of
the ruling. The judge did not grant the mfr. Delgra reacted because he has not
yet stated the grounds for the mfr when the judge denied it. The judge ordered
the bailiff to bring out Delgra from the courtroom for defying the authority of the
court.
Fiscal Delgra , however was not brought directly to jail by the bailiff as ordered
by the court. Upon request of the fiscal, they first went to the fiscal’s office.
There, the bailiff was prevailed upon by Delgra and other fiscals not to do the
judge’s order pending a request for the judge to reconsider his stand.
On the same day, the judge learned of the bailiff’s failure to carry out his
instructions, he immediately wrote out an order finding Delgra guilty of direct
contempt, directing the Chief of Police of Davao City or any of his policemen to
arrest the said fiscal and to commit him to the Municipal jail for 24 hours until
further order or notice from court ordering his release, and commanding the
“bailiff assigned to Sala II to serve a copy of this order to the Chief of Police
immediately upon receipt of the same.”
WON the judge committed a GADALEJ in issuing his order declaring the fiscal
in contempt of court and committing him to prison “for 24 hours until further
notice for release. YES
The root of the controversy between the two sprang from an alleged
misinterpretation into English from the Cebuano dialect of the witness’
statement. The official translation was “I called their names”. Fiscal Delgra’s
objection to the translation and having called the attention of the court to the fact
that the witness said “I called Angel and they answered ‘NANG’”, should have
deserved the court’s attention. The unfortunate incident could have been
obviated had respondent judge listened with care to the fiscal’s observation
following defense counsel’s next question premised on the wrong translation of
of the witness’ answer, thus: “Do you mean to say that you called the names of
the 2 accused?” Which drew from the fiscal the statement that “there is a need
for the correction of the interpretation because while the interpreter said as a
supposed translation that- ‘I called their names’ but she only said – ‘angel?’ she
called the name ‘angel?’
The prosecuting atty’s remarks should have not escaped the notice of the judge.
That was the 2nd time that this alleged mistake in translation was drawn to his
attention. The judge could have ruled on the objection to that translation instead
of directing the witness to answer the next question of the defense. The judge
ruled on the objection immediately, had he not been to quick in cutting the fiscal
short, the incident now in question would not have transpired.
Assertion is made and it is not disputed that the judge did not have a working
knowledge of Cebuano. He first inquired his ninterpreter of the correctness of
translation. If he was not satisfied, he could have sought the aid of other people
present who spoke Cebuano. The judge thought by allowing the witness to
answer the next question, it would be clarified. But what escaped him was that,
with the question so suggestively framed “ Do you mean to say that you called
the names of the two accused”, the witness could alter her answer.
The fiscal pressed his bid for the correction, the fiscal while bowing to authority,
sought permission to speak his wise: “may we say something you honor”. This
drew the court’s warning that “There is already a ruling of the court.” The picture
from there on is hazy. The spoken words of both weren’t transcribed. What is
indubitably clear, however is that the judge refused the fiscal to speak fully. The
fiscal tried to explain with “yes, your Honor, but can we…” the judge exhibited
UNDISGUISED IMPATIENCE with ominous statement: “Get ready bailiff I have
to do something…. There is already a decision objection overruled, witness may
answer.”
At one point, the fiscal merely sought clarification of the interpretation, followed
by a desire to reason out, but the judge stopped him with “Enough the witness
may answer the question.” That is when the mfr being denied happened before
the grounds can be stated. There is thus reason for belief that the fiscal could
have felt that his right to state his position, was being throttled by the judge’s
seemingly arbitrary attitude.
CONTEMPT OF CHARGE WILL NOT PROPER IN THE ABSENCE OF A
CONTUMACIOUS ATTITUDE:
WON Delgra defied the court in a threatening manner constituting
contempt. NO
Credible evidence-the language in the transcript of the proceedings-points to the
contrary. What is truly significant is that the situation would not have reached
grave proportions if the judge only listened carefully to the pleas of the fiscal and
patiently allowed the fiscal to make his manifestation-to set the record aright-
which the judge did not.
§1, Rule 71 of the RoC which punished direct contempt, thus:
“A person guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court or judge as
to obstruct, or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect
toward the court or judge …may be summarily adjudged in contempt by such
court or judge and punished by fine not exceeding 200 pesos or imprisonment
not exceeding 10 days or both, if iot be a superior court, or a judge thereof, or by
fine not exceeding 10 pesos or imprisonment not exceeding 1 day or both, if it
be an inferior court.”
THE EVIDENCE NEGATING CONTUMACIOUS ATTITUDE IN THE CASE
No statement of the fiscal rises to the level of contumacy. Nothing
affront to dignity of the court. The transcript may not be complete but even the
judge has not pointed any word or phrases as such. The judge could do no
better than saying, the fiscal acted with provoking gesture” and exhibited a
“threatening attitude.” The fiscal was alleged to be defiant with his “offensive
expressions” and aggressive gestures.” But these are at best generalities and
conclusions of law.
True the fiscal’s acts bogged down the proceedings opf the judge wanting the
witness to continue testifying but the witness could not because the fiscal
insisted insisted in that a ruling on the translation of the testimony be made. But
this was the fiscal’s right. Such was not an undue imposition upon the court. The
inaccuracy was matyerial and substantial and might be misleading. Defiance
was unlikely, viewing the fiscal’s personal record. Prior to his appointment as
asst. fiscal, he had been active in law for 8 years. He served as such fiscal in
the sala of Judge Vicente Cusi for 7 years. Standing unrebutted on record is that
the fiscal’s claim his conduct was never questioned.
THE POWER OF CONTEMPT SHOULD BE EXERCISED ON THE
PRESERVATIVE NOT VINDICTIVE PRINCIPLE.
Holding fast to the principles that contempt proceedings are criminal in nature :
that “the power to punish for contempt should be exercised on the presrvative,
not vindictive prinsiple”, that a judge should always bear in mind that the power
of the court to punish for contempt should be exercised for puposes that are
impersonal, because the power is intended as a safeguard for the judges as
persons but for the functions they exercise” and that such “power to punish for
contempt, being drasticand extraordinary in its nature, should not be resorted to
unless necessary in the interest of justice”. THE FISCAL DID NOT
MI?S?BEHAVE as to obstruct or interrupt the court proceedings. He should not
have been incarcerated in so directing, respondent judge abused his discretion
such as to call for the exrcise of the supervisory powers of the court. Certiorari
lies.

ROLE OF JUDGE IN RELATION TO THE PRACTITIONERS IN COURT:

Canon 1 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics informs ud that “the assumption of the
office of judge casts uponj the incumbent duties in respect to his personal
conduct which concern his relation to”, among others, the practitioners of law in
his court”.
Judges should be temperate and patient and courteous to counsel. They should
avoic interrupting advocates in their arguments, and shy away from a
controversial tone in addressing them.
In conversations between judge and counsel, the judge should be studious to
avoid controversises. Well it is to recall tha:” Patience and gravity of hearing is
an essential part of justice; an overspeaking judge is no well-tuned cymbal. It is
no grace to a judge.. to show quickness in conceit in cutting off… counsel too
short.”
We have said and we repeat that we prefer to think that restraint still is a trait
desirable in those who dispense justice.”

Certiorari granted, order of direct contempt null and void.

Santiago AQUINO, Terencio Yumang, & Fulgencio Icaro, petitioners, vs.
Hon. Guillermo LUNTOK, presiding Judge, RTC Branch XXIX, Libmanan,
Camarines Sur and Ludovico Peralta, respondents [1990]
⇒ Petitioners are Auditor, State Auditor I and State Examiner of Camarines
Sur. They audited Peralta’s accounts as municipal treasurer of Libmanan,
Camarines Sur. They found a cash shortage or P274,011.17. They seized
his cash, books, papers & accounts and Peralta was suspended from office,
as per BP 337, Sec. 157.
⇒ Peralta requested for a reinvestigation by the Commission on Audit. He
likewise filed a petition for prohibition w/injunction & w/a prayer for a
restraining order & damages vs petitioners. Case was assigned to Luntok.
⇒ Petitioners seek the annulment of the following orders of Luntok in the case
Peralta vs. Ranola:
1. issued a TRO valid for 20 days prohibiting Aquino, et al. from
proceeding/taking action against Peralta
2. TRO extended for another 20 days (petitioners were ordered to return
Peralta’s cash, books & other papers they had seized)
3. TRO extended for an uncertain period
4. Grant of a writ of preliminary injunction
5. approved Peralta’s final bond
6. issued the writ of preliminary injunction
⇒ CA: dismissed petition for mootness since writ was already issued
Issues & Ratio:
1. WON action is already moot. – YES, but only WRT orders 1-3.
2. WON Peralta failed to exhaust all administrative remedies. – NO.
The rule requiring exhaustion of all administrative remedies available is not
a hard & fast rule. The judge, using his own discretion, may take cognizance of
a case even w/o satisfying said rule if he sees the urgency of judicial
intervention, i.e., there is a substantial controversy between parties & one of
them is committing an act/threatening the immediate commission of an act that
will cause irreparable injury/destroy staus quo before case is heard fully on its
merits. There is no better judge than the trial court itself.
3. WON the writ of preliminary injunction is valid. – YES.
⇒ A TRO, although it is a species of an injunction, is distinguished therefrom.
The court issues a TRO to restrain the defendant and preserve the status
quo until the court deems it proper to grant a prelim injunction. When the
determination of the propriety of granting the writ is made, the TRO ceases
by its own limitations & becomes functus officio since it has already served
its purpose. Thus, issue WRT the TROs issued by Luntok are already moot
since they have ceased to exist and have been substituted by the writ of
prelim injunction.
⇒ ROC Rule 58, Sec. 5 as amended by BP 224: A TRO is only effective for 20
days from date of issuance. W/in this period, Judge must require defendant
to show cause why the injunction should not be granted. Judge must
likewise determine WON the prelim injunction should be granted. If
application for prelim injunction is denied, the TRO is deemed automatically
vacated. Period is non-extendible and TRO automatically terminated at the
end of the period w/o need of any judicial declaration. Thus, extensions are
usually disallowed. But defects brought about by the extension of its
enforceability (such as in this case where Luntok extended the period
thrice), is cured by the grant of the injunction.
⇒ Provision should not be taken to mean that a writ issued beyond the 20-day
period is an absolute nullity as long as the grounds for its issuance and the
other requirements prescribed by the rules are present. (Requirements:
hearing & posting of bond). It simply directs the judge to act
w/corresponding dispatch on the application for prelim injunction w/in the
20-day period if a TRO has been issued w/a proscription against an ex
parte proceeding so as not to deprive parties of their rt to be heard. BP 224
was adopted as a reaction against ex parte proceedings. In this case, the
protection of such bond has been required. Both parties were likewise given
an opportunity to be heard in a hearing conducted by the trial court.
⇒ In effect, the provision allows the judge to extend the 20-day period w/c is
ordinarily non-extendible. A judge merely has to issue a writ or prelim
injunction to cure this defect. The law has to be amended if it aims to nullify
a writ of prelim injunction issued beyond the 20-day period.
4. WON the judge promptly disposed of the case – NO.
⇒ Writ was granted after a protracted delay, punctuated by dubious orders
issued in the interim.
⇒ He failed to observe:
a. Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3, Rule 3.01 a judge must be faithful
to the law & maintain professional competence
b. Rule 3.05: admonishes all judges to dispose of the court’s business
promptly & decide cases w/in the required periods.
Holding:
1. Petition dismissed.
2. Grant of writ of prelim injunction sustained.
3. Lower court directed to expediently hear & decide case on merits w/in 30
days from the finality of this judgment.
4. Luntok reprimanded w/stern warning that a repetition of same/similar acts
shall be more severely dealt w/by the Court.
LONGBOAN vs. POLIG [1990]
 Administrative Matter in the SC. Gross negligence of duty
 Complainant Felixberto Longboan obtained a favorable judgment in Civil
Case No. 641—a dispute for collection of a sum of money between him
(plaintiff) & one Arsenio Cunanden (defendant)
 After the appeal thereto had been perfected, Respondent Judge Emilio
Polig was transferred to the RTC, Br. 14 at Lagawe Ifugao while in
possession of the records of CC No. 641.
 Thus, complainant was informed by respondent’s successor, RTC Judge
Nicasio Baguilat (& such info was also certified by Baguilat’s clerk of court)
that CC No. 641 was among the cases retained by Polig & no decision
therein had been received from the said judge
 Complainant dent 5 registered letters inquiring about the status of CC No.
641. There was no reply, hence Office of the Court Administrator sent Polig
3 tracers. Still, Polig made no reply
 SC ordered Polig to (a) show cause why no disciplinary/admin action
should be taken against him, (b) comply w/ the inquiry w/in 10 days from
notice thereof w/ a warning that failure to do so would be dealt w/
accordingly
 SC then suspended judge for his willful disobedience & disregard of the
previous resolution
 Then, SC dispatched an audit team, headed by Deputy Court Administrator
Juanito Bernad, to conduct a physical inventory of the cases pending in the
Polig’s sala.
 Polig sent a manifestation w/ a prayer for lifting of suspension reinstatement
stating that:
o record of CC No. 641 was mislaid on account of his
transfer;
o while he was locating the records, the SC suspended him;
o he finally found them mixed up w/ disposed & archived cases;
o upon discovery, he immediately sent them to Judge Baguilat’s sala for
disposition since he was under suspension;
o CC No. 641 had already been decided by RTC of Bontoc
o He failed to ask for an extension of the show-cause resolution due to
awful shock and anxiety and took him a long time to plead for lifting his
suspension but when he realized he had children to support, he
deemed his 2-year suspension as enough punishment for his omission,
thus, resumption of his judicial functions should be ordered
 Then, Bernad reported that all of the cases inventoried were accounted for
except 4 criminal cases where the accused are not under detention & 4 civil
cases w/c remained missing.
 SC referred the case for investigation & recommendation to Assoc. Justice
Jesus Elibinias of the CA who recommended the lifting of Polig’s
suspension & the resumption of his official duties with fine. And as to the
missing cases, he stated that the decision of WON to require Polig to
account for them lies with the SC or OCA.
WON Polig is guilty of grave & serious misconduct
 YES. Court is convinced that Polig’s continued silence as to the status of
CC No. 641 despite repeated written queries from one of the parties, his
failure to reply to the tracers of the OCA, & his willful disobedience &
disregard to our show-cause resolutions constituted grave & serious
misconduct affecting his fitness and the worthiness of the honor & integrity
attached to his office
 The Judge is a visible representation of the law of justice. From him, the
people draw their will & awareness to obey the law. How can Polig expect
others to respect the law when he himself cannot obey orders as simple as
the show-cause resolution.
 Besides, what is important is WON in the course of the judicial process,
judicial norms have been maintained. Canon 3, Rule 3.08 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct provides that: A judge should diligently discharge
administrative responsibilities, maintain professional competence in court
mgt & facilitate the performance of the administrative functions of other
judges & court personnel.
 In the instant, Polig even impeded the speedy disposition of cases. This fact
reflects an inefficient & disorderly system in the recording of cases assigned
to his sala.
 W/ respect to the missing cases, the Court found no justification for the
failure to present them to the Deputy Court Admin when required & their
absence from the place where court records are stored. A judge is expected
to ensure that the records of cases assigned to his sala are intact.
 There is no justification for missing records save fortuitous events. The loss
of not one but 8 records is indicative of gross misconduct & inexcusable
negligence unbecoming of a judge.
 Lastly, the report on the physical inventory of the records of the cases in
RTC Br. 14 w/c was Polig’s last assignment before his suspension revealed
that a total of 35 cases submitted for decision have remained unresolved
beyond the 90-day reglementary period. Failure to decide a case w/in the
required period is not excusable & constitutes gross inefficiency.
Holding: Polig found guilty of inexcusable negligence, gross inefficiency &
grave & serious misconduct in the discharge of his functions. Polig thus
dismissed from the service w/ forfeiture of all his accrued retirement benefits,
leave & other privileges if any & with prejudice to re-employment in any
branch, agency or instrumentality of the gov’t, including GOCCs
 NIDUA vs. LAZARO
FACTS:
 Mamerta Nidua, is the defendant in a case for estafa
 Judge Cornelio Lazaro he was the presiding judge in the case, in the MTC
of Iloilo City
 He was promoted to the RTC
 Nidua is accusing him of acting prejudicial to her rights as an accused due
to:
1. delay in the administration of justice
2. neglect of duty for failing to decide the case against her despite its
having been submitted for decision as early as Sept. 8, 1980 (this
complaint was filed 5 years later, on Sept. 25, 1985)
 While resolution of the complaint is pending, Judge Simplicia Medina sent a
letter to the SC inquiring whether only those cases left undecided but
submitted for decision, or all pending cases, in the Branch vacated by
Judge Lazaro should be raffled among the 4 MTCC
 This prompted the SC to ask the Clerk of Court why she failed to mention in
her April 30, 1987 Report that an additional 201 cases had been submitted
for decision while Lazaro was still the MTC judge
 In his defense, Judge Lazaro says that:
1. he had already prepared the decision, but it was not promulgated
Re: delayed decision
because the promulgating subpoena was returned unserved by the
process server, who is an INP officer of Kalibo, Aklan (complainant
says this is no justification for the 5-year delay because her address
on record is in Madalag not Kalibo, Aklan
2. oversight is due to the reshuffling of City Court personnel, followed
by reorganization of the Courts, which resulted in the disorderly
keeping of records
3. the decision has been promulgated on Oct. 14, 1985
4. there were undecided cases left by his immediate predecessor at
Undecided cases
Branch 2
5. most of the employees were not civil service eligible, and have not
been trained in handling cases and only had their day-to-day work
experience, which was insufficient
6. morale of workers were suffering due to low salaries
7. there have been successive changes in the position of Clerk of Court
8. problem does not involved graft, only mismanagement
9. he accepts accountability under the principle of command
responsibility
 Clerk of Court, in her own defense, says:
1. records were voluminous and already disorganized when she
assumed responsibility
2. number of cases accumulated during the term of Judge Lazaro’s
predecessor
3. she brought the matter to the Lazaro’s attention, his reply is always
that parties had not submitted their memoranda, etc., and promised
that he would soon dispose of the cases
4. she signed the inaccurate report and “covered up” for Judge Lazaro
because of her difficult situation, where she could not go against his
instructions
SC’s Decision
I. There was unreasonable delay in the administration of justice and
neglect of duty on the Part of Judge Lazaro
 Judge ought to know the cases submitted to him for decision,
particularly those pending for more than 90 days
 He is expected to keep his own record
 It is incumbent upon him to devise an efficient recording and filing
system in his court so that no disorderliness can affect the flow of
cases and their speedy disposition
 He cannot take refuge in the inefficiency and mismanagement by Court
personnel because it is his own direct responsibility, which is one of his
official functions.
 It is not enough that he had penned the decision, it is also his
responsibility to see that it is promulgated
II. Clerk of Court is also guilty of neglect when she failed to include
201 cases which have been submitted for decision and for
“covering up” for him on his promise to act on those cases
 Clerks of Court has functions that are just as vital to the prompt
administration of justice
 They are charged with the efficient record-keeping, filing and management
of court records; as well as administrative supervision
 Their personal loyalty to the Presiding judge ends where truthful adherence
to their duties begins.
Penalty:
 Court Administrator recommended fine equivalent to 3 months salary for the
Judge
o Too light
o One case involved 30 cases but judge was imposed a fine equivalent
to 1-year salary
o Comparatively speaking, a higher fine should be imposable
o However, because of mitigating circumstances (re-organization, re-
shuffling), fine equivalent to 1 year’s salary is deemed sufficient for
his gross neglect of duty
 Court Administrator recommended a reprimand against the Clerk of Court
o Also not commensurate
o There was neglect as well as deliberate suppression of accurate
information
Thus, fine equivalent to 1 month’s salary
 People vs. Obngayan
Facts:
• March 10, 1967 – Pedro Bagay was shot. His wife, Alingan Bagay,
turned around towards the direction where the sound emanated and
she saw Apolinarion Obngayan standing on an open field less than 30
meters away holding a gun.
• Pedro Bagay was brought to the clinic of Dr. Bobila. In the clinic,
Investor Agustin questioned him regarding the incident. Bagay pointed
to Obngayan as the person who shot him.
• March 11, 1967 – Pedro Bagay died.
• A criminal complaint was filed against Obngayan, Taberdo and Padaoil.
They pleaded not guilty and waived their right to present their
evidence. Generally, the defense of the accused was that of an alibi
• In the decision of the trial court Obngayan was convicted but acquitting
Taberdo and Padaoil.
Issue: WON the unusual zeal of the Trial Court judge is cross-examining
Obngayan and in propoundind questions favorable to the prosecution showed
his partiality to the prosecution? NO
Ratio:
• Record shows that there is no basis for the Obngayan’s contention that
the trial judge asked improper questions which manifest a patent
partiality in favor of the prosecution to the prejudice of the defense.
The questions that were asked by the judge merely indicated his
concern to ascertain the truth.
• Rights inherent to the trier of facts includes the right to question a
witness with a view of satisfying his mind upon a material point which
presents itself during the trial as to the credibility of such witness.
• In cross-examining an accused and his witnesses the judge merely
makes use of this inherent right, and this actuation, if exercised within
reasonable bounds, does not amount to a denial of the fundamental
right of the accused to a fair and impartial trial guaranteed by the due
process clause of the Constitution.
• Reminder: such power should be exercised exercised sparingly and
judiciously, in order to obviate any criticism on the part of counsel, and
in such manner as not to detract from the norm of conduct compatible
with the public faith and trust, of the citizenry in the impartiality and
sense of responsibility of those entrusted with the solemn duty of
administering to them justice.
PEOPLE of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Alejandro Sr. (Loring),
Alejandro, Jr. (Instik), Alejandro II (Boy), and Alejandro III (tito) IBASAN,
defendants-appellants [1984]
⇒ Prosecution version: While Leoncio Balolong & his cousin Alberto were
walking, the Ibasans attacked them one by one. Alberto was able to run
away but Leoncio was dragged to the Ibasan’s yard where the defendants
continued hitting him.
⇒ Defense: Leoncio w/his counsel Alberto came to the Ibasans’ house asking
Loring to come out in a loud voice. He had a balisong tucked on his right
waist. When told that Loring was asleep, he told Etring: “Vulva of your
mother.” Etring then picked up a stone while Leoncio drew his balisong.
Etring then got hold of an empty bottle & hit Leoncio on the center forehead
as a result of w/c blood oozed from his head. Loring then came out of the
house & told his son to kill Leoncio since he might kill them if he survives.
Loring likewise got a 2 x 2 (dos por dos) piece of wood & hit Leoncio. Police
arrived & brought Leoncio to the hospital. Etring voluntarily & willingly went
along w/the police & admitted that he killed Leoncio. Crime was a result of
self-defense. Intsik claimed he was attending a novena & mass w/his wife.
Boy & Tito alleged that they were in their uncle Juan’s house feeding &
watching poultry and that they did not leave the premises.
⇒ 1st info: charged defendants w/homicide for killing Leoncio Balolong.
Amended to accommodate following changes: Cases against Demetrio
“Etring” Ibasan and Juan “John” Ibasan were suspended. The former due to
death and the latter due to his mental unfitness.
⇒ Before arraignment, a motion to amend charges to murder was granted.
Fiscal conducted a reinvestigation.
⇒ Pending investigation, Instik filed a motion to be arraigned ahead of other
defendants since he had to leave for employment abroad as a seaman for
10 mos. He assured court that he didn’t intend to avoid the case. He made
a manifestation of his willigness to w/draw his plea in homicide & enter a
plea of not guilty to the charge of murder, it the charge will be amended. He
likewise manifested that he was waiving his defense of double jeopardy w/c
will otherwise be available to him in case the charge is amended to murder.
Surprsingly, the court granted his motion.
⇒ Info was amended charging defendants w/muder.
⇒ Upon Intsik’s return, he moved to quash the info on the ground of double
jeopardy claiming that he was already arraigned & he pleaded not guilty
under the 1st info. He claims case was dismissed w/o his consent when new
info was filed for the graver offense of murder. He claims he can’t waive
jeopardy w/c had not yet attached. Motion was denied since his
manifestation was an express consent to the amendment of the original
info.
⇒ Lower court convicted defendants of murder.
Issues & Ratio: (Leg Prof related: #s 4-6)
1. WON fiscal & lower court’s acts of allowing Instik to leave the country
& to be arraigned pending investigation were proper. – NO. They
should be more prudent & cautious in performing their duties.
⇒ He could’ve jumped bail while abroad and not return to answer the charges
against him.
⇒ He should have been arraigned for murder thus making it possible for him
to be convicted either of homicide/murder.
2. WON the case vs Instik should be dismissed on the ground of double
jeopardy. – NO.
⇒ Requisite of double jeopardy: conviction/acquittal or dismissal/termination of
case w/o express consent of the accused.
⇒ Jeopardy attaches upon valid indictment before a competent court after
arraignment and plea.
⇒ Since all of these were not yet present when Intsik waived his defense of
double jeopardy, such waiver was premature. There can be no valid waiver
for there was nothing to waive yet. Thus, there is no double jeopardy in this
case.
3. WON Intsik should be convicted of murder. – NO. Only Homicide.
⇒ His arraignment and plea of not guilty was under the 1st info. He was never
arraigned for murder. Thus, charge WRT him was only for homicide.
Treachery may only be considered as an aggravating & not a qualifying
circumstance.
4. WON the lower court actively participated in the examination of
witnesses as though it were the prosecution. – NO.
⇒ Questions did not amount to interference as to make a case for the
prosecution & deprive the accused of their defense. The questions were
mere clarifications.
⇒ The no. of times a judge intervenes is not necessarily an indication of bias.
It can’t be taken against judge his clarificatory questions reveal certain
truths w/c tend to destroy the theory of one party.
⇒ Ventura vs. Yatco: a judge is like a referee in a boxing bout who’s expected
to have as much interest as the counsel in the orderly & expeditious
presentation of evidence, calling counsel’s attention to points at issue that
are overlooked. He should direct counsels to ask questions that would elicit
the facts on the issues involved, clarifying ambiguous remarks by
witnesses.
⇒ Judge may properly intervene in the trial of a case to promote expedition &
avoid unnecessary waste of time/clear up some obscurity.
⇒ Judges are reminded that undue interference, impatience or participation in
the examination of witnesses or a severe attitude on the part of the court
towards the witnesses, especially those who are excited/terrified w/trial may
prevent the proper presentation of the truth.
⇒ Judge should exercise more care & patience. His right to intervene must be
used sparingly. He should bear in mind that witnesses may be easily
intimidated by an overly inquisitive judge, especially in criminal cases.
5. WON the lower court deprived the defense from presenting other
material witnesses. – NO.
⇒ Defendants intended to present Attys. Gubatan & Esteves as witnesses.
However, Judge refused saying Esteves was a persona non-grata in his
court since he filed a case against him in Lingayen and he doesn’t want to
see atty’s face forever. Judge also said that as far as he’s concerned, the
two atty’s are already buried a long time ago.
⇒ Judge should avoid displaying shortness of temper or other unbecoming
behavior. He should not show that he can be moved by pride, prejudice,
passion or pettiness in performing his official functions. He should be
careful about his conduct & in the measures he takes to uphold the court’s
authority & dignity.
⇒ But judge’s impatience did not prevent defendants from presenting their
case. Decision was not based on any matters improperly elicited by the trial
Judge during his examination of the witness nor was it based on his remark
re attys. Defendants were given the opportunity to present their evidence.
Other remedies were available in such situation where judge denied
presentation of material witnesses. Besides, judge subsequently expressed
that he was amenable to the presentation of the 2 witnesses but the
defense no longer found the need for their testimonies.
6. WON judge gave false hopes of acquittal to the defendants. – NO.
⇒ Defendants claim they didn’t take all the necessary steps they should have
taken because the judge impressed upon them that the prosecution was
weak & that he will eventually acquit them. This is based on judge’s
statement that trial will continue every Mondays & Tuesdays of the week so
that innocent will be set free & guilty will be put to jail.
⇒ No indication whatsoever of eventual acquittal. No basis for false hopes.
Judge was merely expressing the need for speedy trial.
⇒ Besides, any remark of the judge should not preclude a lawyer from giving
his entire devotion to his client’s cause/interest.
7. Court properly appreciated the facts of the case & the testimony of
witnesses. Minor inconsistencies in the testimony & relationship of
witnesses do not affect credibility. Inconsistencies in the affidavit &
testimony in open court are common since former is almost always
incomplete & inaccurate due to haste in its preparation. Greater weight is
accorded to the latter.
8. Suspension of case WRT John was likewise proper due to his insanity.
WON he was insane before, during & after the commission of the crime w/c
would be an exemption from criminal liability should be determined in a
fullblown trial.
9. Rule 114, Sec. 4: After conviction by the CFI, the defendant may be granted
bail at the court’s discretion. Thus, SC will not disturb lower court decision
denying bail to accused on appeal.
10. Defendants are national prisoners thus, they are properly detained at the
Bilibid pending resolution of their appeal.
11. Case can no longer be transferred after judgment in the lower court. Appeal
is the adequate remedy.

Holding: Affirmed w/modifications.
1. Tito & Boy to pay P30k indemnity to the heirs of the victim.
2. Intsik guilty of homicide & ordered to indemnify heirs of victim jointly &
solidarily w/other accused.
3. Demetrio: civilly liable to indemnify heirs w/other accused.
PAREDES vs. ABAD [1974]
⇒ Consolidation of 3 cases of election protests denied by 3 judges in 3
different provinces.
⇒ Petitioners are provincial & municipal candidates who lost in the Nov. 8,
1971 elections. They filed protests with the Court of First Instance against
their adversaries who were proclaimed elected & had assumed their
respective positions.
⇒ Judges dismissed the cases on the basis of Sec. 9, Art. 17, of the transitory
provisions of the New Consti2. Judges claim that the protests were moot &
academic since private respondents are now holding their positions under a
new term. They claim that the original four-year term expired upon the
ratification of the 1973 Consti & has now been extended indefinitely.
⇒ Paredes, et al. likewise seek the disqualification of Judge Abad in hearing
the election protests for Gov & Vice-Gov since they previously opposed his
nomination to his present position before the Commission on Appointments
and that they previously filed criminal charges vs him before the COMELEC
for violating the Election Code, which are still pending. They likewise allege
that judge was recommended to his position by his co-respondent and
petitioners’ adversary, Gualberto Lumauig, whose brother is a
congressman.
⇒ Abad’s defense: Petitioners are moved by personal motives w/c are devoid
of merits. Their complaint is based on bias & bias and they’re still itchy to
resuscitate a long cremated issue. Proof of this: Commission on
Appointments confirmed his appointment.
Issues & Ratio: (relevant: issue #3)
1. WON judges’ dismissals of the election protests are proper. – NO.
⇒ 4-year term expired on Dec. 31, 1975.
⇒ Provision only refers to those duly elected officials who should continue in
office until otherwise provided by law or decreed by the incumbent
president.
⇒ Term: period during w/c an elected officer/appointee is entitled to hold
office, perform its functions & enjoy its privileges & emoluments.
⇒ Right to hold office is the just & legal claim to hold & enjoy the powers &
responsibilities of the office.
2
All officials & employees in the existing Government of the Republic of the Philippines shall continue
in office until otherwise provided by law or decreed by the incumbent President of the Philippines, but
all officials whose appointments are by this Constitution vested in the Prime Minister shall vacate their
respective offices upon the appointment & qualification of their successors.
⇒ Extension of term did not preclude any challenge of the right of these
officials to continue holding office in their respective offices.
⇒ Right arose from their having been proclaimed elected. Thus, if in fact & in
law, they were not duly elected to their respective positions, then they have
no right to hold the same & they should not be allowed to enjoy the
indefinite term of office given to them.
⇒ Officials are not yet under a new term. Term did not expire since it was only
made indefinite. It will only expire when appointing power (president)
decides to put an end to the services of the incumbent.
⇒ Consti did not intend to protect unduly elected officials.
2. WON the CFI has jurisdiction over the case. – YES.
⇒ New Consti placed election protests of provincial & city officials under the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC. However, when the elections questioned in
this case were held, jurisdiction was still under the CFI. Protests concerning
that election must have been filed already w/the CFI prior to the enactment
of the new Consti. Thus, jurisdiction remains w/the CFI, as per Sec. 8, Art.
17 of the New Consti w/c provides that all courts shall continue to exercise
their jurisdiction until otherwise provided by law in accordance w/the Consti
& all cases pending in said courts shall be heard, tried & determined under
the laws then in force.
3. WON Judge Abad should be disqualified from hearing the election
protest. – YES, for the strict observance of the rule of due process.
⇒ Pimentel vs. Salanga: SC can’t order the disqualification of a judge in
hearing a case based on unjustified assumptions or speculative approach.
SC can’t legally prohibit a judge from sitting in litigation. No proof that judge
has crossed the line dividing partiality & impartiality. No showing of
arbitrariness or prejudice. Prejudice is not to be presumed. But when there
are suggestions that a judge might be induced to act in favor of one party or
w/bias against a litigant out or circumstance reasonably capable of inciting
such state of mind, judge should conduct a careful self-examination. He
should exercise his discretion in a way that the people’s faith in the courts
of justice is not impaired. To disqualify himself is a matter of conscience on
the part of the judge. He could in good grace inhibit himself where another
judge could hear the case & where no appreciable prejudice would be
occasioned on other involved therein.
⇒ In this case, the Court considered the existence of a strained relationship
between the judge & Paredes et al. Even Paredes’ political supporters
might not have full faith, trust & confidence on the impartiality of Abad.
⇒ Luque vs. Kayanan: Judge & counsel have a shared responsibility of
maintaining & not destroying the high esteem & regard for courts. This is
crucial in the administration of justice. They have to restrain pride from
taking the better part of their system. All parties are entitled to the conld
neutrality of an independent, wholly free, disinterested & impartial tribunal.
Next in importance to the duty of rendering a righteous judgment, is doing
such w/o begetting suspicion of the fairness & integrity of the judge.
(disqualified)
⇒ Mateo vs. Villaluz: offensive remarks against judge may affect him as well
as his sense of fairness w/c might impair the due process element.
(disqualified)
Holding:
1. Orders dismissing the election protests set aside and CFI ordered to
continue w/the trial.
2. Abad disqualified & ordered to desist from continuing w/the hearing.
PEOPLE vs. MACEDA
 When authorities conducted an investigation regarding the gunning down of
late ex-Gov of Antique, Evelio Javier, a complaint against John Paloy &
Vicente Vegafria was filed w/ the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor.
 During the preliminary investigation, private respondent Avelino T. Javellana
appeared as counsel for Paloy & Vegafria, until Federico Carluto, Jr.,
Evelyn Magare & Fritz Xavier implicated Javellana in the killing of the late
Evelio Javier.
 Then Senior State Prosecutor Tirso D.C. Velasco filed 6 sep. infos charging
Javellana, Paloy, Vegafria, Eduardo Iran, Rudolfo Pacificador, Arturo F.
Pacificador & several John Does, w/ the crime of murder, frustrated murder
& for 4 counts of attempted murder
 Meanwhile, Romeo Nagales & Jose Delumen executed their respective
sworn statements, admitting their participation in the kiling of Javier, &
implicating other persons in the crime. Hence, the infos were amended
including therein as accused Nagales, Delumen, Ramon Hortillano, Henry
Salaber, Eleazar Edemne, Arleen Limoso, Rolando Bernardino, Jose De
Lumen, & Oscar Tianzon. Crim. cases were consolidated in Br. 12, RTC,
Antique, presided over by respondent Judge Maceda
 Of the 19 accused, only 6 had been apprehended &/or surrendered. The
rest were at large, including Javellana. Hence, trial proceeded only as
against the said 6 accused.
 Prosecution moved to discharge Delumen & Nagales, claiming their
testimonies were absolutely necessary against accused Bernardino as well
as the others, including Javellana who was then at-large.
 RTC granted motion to discharge Nagales but denied it as regards
Delumen, the latter having admitted a prior conviction for crime of robbery.
But, despite Nagales’ discharge, prosecution rested its case w/o presenting
him his state witness & reserved its right to present him as a witness
against the other accused still at-large.
 Then, Javellana was arrested by the Constabulary Security Group (CSG).
IBP, Iloilo Chapter, through its Pres., Atty. J.T. Barrera, entered its
appearance as counsel for Javellana w/a motion that the IBP, Iloilo Chapter
be allowed to as assume custody of the Javellana as his jailer &/or in the
alternative, to confine him at the Military Stockade at Camp Delgado &/or at
the Iloilo Provincial Jail.
 When Javellana was brought before the TC court, Asst. Provincial
Prosecutor John Turalba opposed the motion of Atty. J.T. Barrera that his
motion that the IBP Iloilo Chapter be allowed to as assume custody of
Javellana. Then after a heated argument, Javellana pleaded that he be
allowed to approach the bench together with all the counsel, w/c Maceda
reluctantly granted. Javellana then informed the court that there exists a
real & grave danger to his life if he were to be confined in the Antique
Provincial Jail. He then narrated an incident when he was still counsel for
Paloy & Vegafria where 1 of the jail guards pointed an armalite at him. After
hearing the narration, Turalba withdrew his objection.
 Thus, Maceda ordered Javellana confined at PC, Stockade, Bugante Point
San Jose, Antique in PC/INP Provincial Commander’s custody
 After Prov. Commander, Col. Teodulo Abayata requested Maceda to issue
for him an order to be able to comply w/ the instructions from his superior
officers, Maceda ordered Javellana to be confined as a detention prisoner
at the Binirayan Rehabilitation Center, San Jose, Antique, subject to the
conditions set forth therein.
 Javellana filed an urgent ex-parte MFR. Such motion was called for hearing
& Maceda required Turalba’s presence who reiterated the earlier objection
of the Senior State Prosecutor to Javellana’s confinement in any place
other than the Provincial Jail of Antique. After the hearing, Maceda directed
that Javellana be committed to the Angel Salazar Memorial Hospital in the
meantime & subjected to a physical check-up at Javellana’s expense.
 Head of hospital issued certification that everything is w/in normal limits but
recommended that blood chemistry exam. is necessary, something w/c they
don’t have the necessary chemicals for.
 Thus, Javellana filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion that he be allowed further
medical exam. at the Iloilo Mission Hospital under at least 2 police escorts.
Maceda granted Javellana’s motion, in view of the fact that the exam.
conducted on movant’s heart is incomplete & thus the court will not leave to
chance the condition of the heart of movant who stands charged of a
serious crime in these cases
 Then due to an unforeseen emergency necessitating the “response of all
personnel of his Command” Station Commander of San Jose, Antique
requested that Maceda recall the police escorts. Maceda was constrained
to issue and order (Aug. 3, ’89) granting the request of the Commander
and directed the Prov. Prob. Officer of Antique to take Javellana’s custody.
 Attys. Amelia K. del Rosario, Arturo Alinio and J.T. Barrera entered their
appearance as counsel for private respondent, & argued that the custody of
Javellana be entrusted to the IBP, Iloilo Chapter.
 Maceda then issued an order (Aug. 7, ’89) terminated Provincial Probation
Officer’s custody & gave Javellana’s custody to his lawyers, as officers of
the court. He then issued another order, deputizing Javellana’s lawyers &
ordered Javellana’s confinement at the San Jose residence of Atty.
Deogracias del Rosario, RTC, Antique Clerk of Court.
 Then he issued an order (Aug. 8, ’89) terminating deputization of
Javellana’s lawyers & had them turn over custody Atty. Deogracias del
Rosario and keep him in his residence.
 Meanwhile, Atty. J.T. Barrera filed a motion for admission to bail on
Javellana’s behalf to w/c Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio Trampe filed his
opposition, alleging that Javellana was charged w/ the crime of murder,
frustrated murder & attempted murders & that evidence of guilt is strong;
 thus, he’s not entitled to bail as a matter of right. Javellana was arraigned &
Trampe filed a motion to discharge accused Oscar Tianzon to be
utilized as a state witness. Hearing of the motion was set but was
cancelled & reset.
 At the hearing, prosecution adduced its evidence in support of the motion;
but Maceda deferred the resolution of the motion. Prosecution moved
that the presentation of its evidence in opposition to Javellana’s petition for
bail, be likewise deferred.
 Petitioner filed the instant petition for CERTIORARI, to annul & set aside
the orders dated 3, 7 & 8 Aug. ‘89, claiming said orders were issued w/
grave abuse of discretion & PROHIBITION to enjoin the Maceda from
hearing Javellana's petition for bail ‘til he has resolved motion to discharge
accused Tianzon, & praying that a writ of prelim. injunction &/or temp.
restraining order be issued. Prayer was granted. Later, Maceda advised the
parties that the motion to discharge accused Tianzon was denied (Sep. 1
’89) stating that: “The court searched the records for evidence to
corroborate the material points in the aforesaid testimony of Tianzon
against Javellana but found none to corroborate his statement pointing to
Javellana as the gun supplier & the plotter…The court finds no absolute
necessity to date of Tianzon's testimony because the court earlier on May
11, 1989 discharged accused Nagales on motion of the Prosecutor to be
utilized as a state witness…But neither did the prosecutor use state witness
Nagales against accused Bernardino nor did the prosecution use his
testimony against Jose Delumen & Jesus Garcia…”
 Thus, Prosecution through Trampe, immediately filed a motion to inhibit
Maceda on the ground of manifest partiality to Javellana. They set hearing
but prosecution moved to defer the presentation of its evidence in
opposition to Javellana’s petition for bail. Despite the opposition, Maceda
reset the hearing. Prosecution filed MFR of the order denying motion to
discharge Tianzon. Senior State Prosecutor also filed a motion to reset the
hearings on the petition for bail, on the grounds that the motion to inhibit
should first be resolved & also because of the pendency of the aforesaid
MFR.
 At the hearing (Sep. 14, ’89), Turalba appeared for prosection & stated that
he was appearing only to reiterate Senior State Prosecutor’s motion for
deferment of the scheduled hearings on private respondent’s petition for
bail. Maceda denied motion & directed prosecution to present its evidence
in opposition to the Javellana’s petition for bail. Turalba moved for recon,
claiming his position is subservient to that of the Senior State Prosecutor
who is the duly designated principal prosecutor & as a matter of conviction,
he can’t proceed w/ the trial as well as w/ the subsequent trials, & that,
moreover, to proceed would render moot & academic the petition for
certiorari before the SC. Maceda denied MFR & again, directed prosecution
to present its evidence.
 At this juncture, the Turalbamanifested that he was not participating in the
proceedings & begged to be allowed to leave the courtroom, w/c Maceda
refused. Still, Turalba walked out &, while walking towards the door,
Maceda ordered the Sheriff to arrest him. Maceda issued an order finding
Turalba in contempt of court; declaring the prosecution to have waived its
right to present evidence in opposition to Javellana’s petition for bail;
considering said petition for bail submitted for resolution; & imposing on
Turalba the penalty of 10 days imprisonment.
 Hence, petitioner filed with SC a Supplemental Petition to annul & set aside
the orders of Sep. 1, ’89, Sep. 14, ‘89; & to inhibit Maceda from further
taking cognizance of the crim. cases; & praying that a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction be issued directing Maceda to promptly order the
release Turalba from custody on the cognizance of the Provincial
Prosecutor.
 Court issued writ of preliminary mandatory injunction but by the time
Maceda got it, Turalba had already served his sentence.
 Petitioner contends that Maceda committed a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he insisted on continuously
hearing Javellana’s petition for bail & in ordering Turalba’s
arrest&commitment in Provincial Jail&in issuing:
o Order of 3 Aug ‘89, placing custody of Javellana with the Antique Provincial
Probation Officer;
o Order of 7 Aug ‘89, transferring Javellana’s custody to his own lawyers;
o Order of 8 Aug ‘89, entrusting Javellana’s custody w/ the Clerk of Court &
ex-oficio Prov. Sheriff, Deogracias del Rosario; &
o Order of 1 Sep ‘89, which denied the prosecution's motion to discharge
Oscar Tianzon to be utilized as a state witness.
WON Maceda committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction
 There is grave abuse of discretion justifying the issuance of a writ of
certiorari where there is a capricious & whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction
 Respondent Judge, however, has, to the Court’s opinion, sufficiently
explained in the order of Aug. 7, ‘89 the reasons behind the issuance of the
aforesaid orders:
o Court had difficulty in securing the safety of accused Javellana.
o It is the perception of the court that there are movements going ground, by
whom is unknown yet to the court, to compel the incarceration of Javellana
in the Provincial Jail.
o This perception of the court is premised on what appears to be a
subversion of the order of the court placing custody of accused Javellana
with the Provincial Commander of Antique.
o There may be truth to the Prosecutor's contention that there will be nothing
to prevent the other accused from following suit in asking that their custody
likewise shall be transferred to their respective lawyers. But, such is only to
request. The grant or denial thereof is a matter altogether different.
o In the present incident it is the finding of the court that indeed the life of
Javellana will be imperilled if confined elsewhere other than the place
above directed.
 Considering the foregoing, the Court finds and so holds that respondent his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent
Judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion, i.e., that he did not act of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the records.
"arbitrarily", "capriciously" or "despotically" amounting to lack or excess of A judge, may in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself
jurisdiction in issuing the questioned orders of 3, 7 and 8 August 1989. from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those
 Coming now to the Sep. 1, ‘89 order, the Court reiterates the rule that, for a mentioned above.
writ of certiorari to issue, it must not only be shown that the board, tribunal  In the case at bar, the reason relied upon for the inhibition or disqualification
or officer acted w/o jurisdiction, or w/ grave abuse of discretion, but also of respondent Judge, i.e. manifest partiality to Javellana, is not based on
that there is no appeal or other plain, speedy & adequate remedy in the any of the grounds enumerated in the first paragraph of Sec. 1, Rule 137
ordinary course of law. which per se disqualifies a judge from sitting in a case, but on the second
 In the case at bar, petitioner had filed MFR of the Sep. 1, ‘89 order w/c is paragraph thereof.
still pending resolution by Maceda. Petition for certiorari may not be granted  Maceda has not as yet decided WON he will inhibit himself from further
where there’s an appeal or other adequate remedy, like a MFR, still pending hearing Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355 in the face of the prosecution's
in the court below, as in the present case. motion to disqualify or inhibit him. It would be premature for the Court at this
 Court, however, holds that Maceda committed grave abuse of discretion stage to rule on the matter.
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he insisted in continuously
hearing Javellana’s petition for bail &in ordering the arrest &commitment of Holding: petition for certiorari is GRANTED insofar as the order of 14 Sep. ‘89
Turalba is concerned, & said order is hereby ANNULLED & SET ASIDE.
 In the restraining order, SC ordered Maceda to cease & desist from
continuing the hearing on Javellana’s petition for bail until after he had
resolved the motion for discharge of Oscar Tianzon as state witness.
Although the motion had already been denied in Sep. 1, prosecution had
filed MFR of said order is still pending resolution. Hence, the said motion
has not yet been resolved with finality. Thus, he acted in violation of SC’s
restraining order.
 Further, contempt of court presupposes a contumacious attitude, a flouting
or arrogant belligerence, a defiance of the court. &, while courts are
inherently empowered to punish for contempt to the end that they may
enforce their authority, preserve their integrity, maintain their dignity, &
insure the effectiveness of the administration of justice, nevertheless, such
power should be exercised on the preservative & not on the vindictive
principle, for the power to punish for contempt, being drastic & extraordinary
in its nature, should not be resorted to unless necessary in the interest of
justice
 Turalba had not made any statement that could be considered as
"contumacious" or an affront to the dignity of the court. And, while the “walk-
out” does not meet SC’s approval — as he should have stayed after the
respondent Judge had denied his motion for permission to leave the
courtroom — yet, Maceda, in ordering Turalba’s incarceration, acted
beyond the permissible limits of his power to punish for contempt.
 And now to the question on WON Maceda should be disqualified from
further hearing the crim. cases, Sec. 1, Rule 137, ROC:
SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges.— No judge or judicial officer
shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily
interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related
to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to
counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the
civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian,
trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when
MASADAO vs. ELIZOGA [1987] (photocopy)
 APARICIO vs. ANDAL [1989]
Facts:
• Atty. Aparicio filed a motion for inhibition against Judge Andal.
• Motion for inhibition was denied.
• Argument of Atty. Aparicio
o Atty. Aparicio maintains that there an existing state of hostility
between them which was sparked off by the filing by him of
petitions for certiorari and administrative cases against Judge
Andal before the SC, prior to the filing of the Motion for
Inhibition.
o Motion for Inhibition did not explicitly state on its face the valid
grounds relied upon to support his motion, such grounds were
known to Judge Andal.
o He theorizes that the Judge in refusing to inhibit himself from
the cases subject of the Motion for Inhibition and in all the
other cases pending before him in which he is acting either as
counsel or a party litigant, Judge Andal violated his
constitutional rights to due process, equal protection of the
law, access to the court and speedy disposition of cases,
making Judge Andal civilly liable under Art. 32 of the new Civil
Code. He asserts that because of Judge Andal's refusal to
inhibit himself, he and his family suffered mental anguish and
incurred expenses for which they must be compensated
• Argument of Judge Andal
o Motion for inhibition did not cite any valid ground to justify his
inhibition
o He stresses that he has nothing personal against Atty.
Aparicio
desired disqualification, or demand the immediate inhibition of the
judge on the basis alone of his being so charged, many cases would
have to be kept pending or perhaps there would not be enough judges
to handle all the cases pending in all the courts. The Court has to be
shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or
prejudice before the latter can be branded the stigma of being biased
or partial, and on this regard Atty. Aparicio failed.
WON Atty Aparicio should be reprimanded? Yes
• Petitioner's audacious propensity of filing certiorari and administrative
cases against the respondent judge based on flimsy and unfounded
charges he can conceive. Thus, it behooves us to remind the petitioner
of his basic duty "to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts
of justice and judicial officers to conduct himself with "all good fidelity to
the courts;" to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for
the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the
maintenance of its supreme importance that his duty to render
respectful civility, without fawning, to the courts is indeed essential to
the orderly administration of justice. Thus, he should be courteous, fair,
and circumspect, not petulant, combative, or bellicose in his dealings
with the courts; and finally, that the use of disrespectful, intemperate,
manifestly baseless, and malicious statements by an attorney in his
pleading or motion is not only a violation of the lawyer's oath and a
transgression of the cannons of professional ethics, but also
constitutes direct contempt of court for which a lawyer may be
disciplined

Issue: WON Judge Andal acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction when he denied the motion for inhibition? NO

Ratio:
• Motion for inhibition filed did not cite any valid ground for the inhibition
of Judge Andal. The denial of the motion was not whimsical or
capricious nor was the denial intended to spite the petitioner as the
petitioner would want this court to believe. It was done in the valid and
judicious exercise of his function and duty as judge.
• State of hostility is purely imaginary
• The mere pendency of a special civil action for certiorari commenced in
relation to a case pending before the lower court, does not interrupt the
course of the latter when there is no writ of injunction restraining it.
Likewise, "the mere filing of an administrative case against respondent
judge is not a ground for disqualifying him from hearing the case, for if
on every occasion the party apparently aggrieved would be allowed to
either stop the proceedings in order to await the final decision on the
FACUNDO vs. BERJAMEN [1989] - photocopy
Froilan GANDIONCO, petitioner, vs. Hon. Senen PEÑARANDA, Presiding
Judge, Misamis Oriental RTC Branch 18, Cagayan de oro City, and Teresita
Gandionco, respondents [1987]
⇒ Teresita, legal wife of Froilan, filed a complaint against her husband for
legal separation on the ground of concubinage w/ a petition for support &
payment of damages. Case was assigned to Penaranda. She subsequently
requested for support pendente lite, pending a decision in this case. Judge
ordered payment of support pendente lite.
⇒ She likewise filed a complaint for concubinage.
⇒ Froilan:
1. Filed for a motion to suspend hearings in the leg sep case since leg
sep proceedings & its incidents (such as support pendente lite) should
be suspended in view of the concubinage case as per Art. 111, Sec. 3
of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure3. He claims that since the leg
sep was on the ground of concubinage, the civil action in this case is
tied to the criminal action for concubinage and thus, civil case must be
suspended to await the decision in the criminal case. He likewise
invoked Jerusalem vs. Zurbano w/c applied this provision.
2. Filed a motion to inhibit Penaranda from hearing & trying the case
since Froilan alleges that the judge’s decisions/orders disregard
applicable laws & existing doctrines and he manifests partiality to
Teresita.
3. Both motions were denied. He now prays for the annulment of Judge’s
orders denying his motions.
Issues & Ratio: (relevant #3)
1. WON leg sep proceedings should be suspended pending the
concubinage case. – NO.
⇒ Jerusalem is not controlling. It may be invoked if an allegation of
concubinage is made. This case was decided based on ROC Sec. 1, Rule
107 w/c provides:
a. criminal action instituted, civil action for recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense charged is impliedly instituted w/crim’l axn unless the
offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his rt to
institute it separately
b. criminal and civil actions arising from the safe offense may be instituted
separately, but after the criminal axn has been commenced, the civil
axn can’t be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the
crim’l axn.
c. After a criminal axn has been commenced no civil action arising from
the same offense can be prosecuted; same shall be suspended in
3
Civil action to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense should observe the following rules: after
a criminal action has been commenced, the pending civil action arising from the same offense shall be
suspended, in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been
rendered.
whatever stage it may be found until final judgment in the criminal
proceeding has been rendered.
⇒ Rule now: Sec. 3, Rule 111, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedures. This
provides clearly that criminal & civil action to enforce the civil liability arising
from the same offense cannot be tried simultaneously. The civil action is
suspended in lieu of the criminal case proceedings. In this case, a civil
action for leg sep based on concubinage may proceed ahead of or
simultaneously w/the criminal action for concubinage because the civil
action is not one to enforce the civil liability arising from the same
offense even if they arise from or are related to the same offense.
(Prohibited: civil action for the recovery of civil liability incurred from the
criminal offense. Okay if the civil action is an independent action w/c does
not seek the enforcement of civil liability.) Leg sep case is an independent
civil action w/c seeks to obtain the rt to live separately & its legal
consequences, dissolution of CPG, custody of children, support &
disqualification from inheriting from innocent spouse, etc.
⇒ Thus, conviction for concubinage is not a prerequisite for a legal separation
case on the ground of concubinage. Leg Sep, being a civil action may be
decided on mere preponderance of evidence. No criminal proceeding or
conviction is necessary. The old rule requiring final judgment in a criminal
action has been abandoned.
2. WON the decision granting support pendente lite was erroneous. – NO.
⇒ It’s a remedy that can be availed of in an axn for leg sep & granted at the
discretion of the judge. If he finds it too onerous, Froilan can file a motion to
modify/reduce such.
3. WON judge should be disqualified. – NO.
⇒ Different opinions between a judge hearing a case and a party’s counsel as
to applicable laws & jurisprudence is not a sufficient ground of bias &
manifest partiality. More so because judge’s disposition of Froilan’s motions
is sound & well-taken.
HOLDING: Petition dismissed.
UMALE vs. VILLALUZ [1973]
 Petitioner Leon Umale is the complainant in the robbery case against 16
accused including 6 herein private respondents. Case was filed by the
acting state prosecutor. Respondent judge Onofre Villaluz issue several
orders for the arrest of the accused, fixing their bail bonds, allowing an
accused to post cash or surety bond for his provisional liberty, for their
arraignment or commitment to the provincial jail, as well as issued
subpoena duces tecum & contempt citations against certain police officers
who failed to appear on the days set for hearing
 However, w/o any party moving for his disqualification or inhibition, Villaluz
voluntarily inhibited himself from trying the case on the ground that before
the crim. Case was filed in his court, he already had personal knowledge of
 the same; he then directed the immediate forwarding of the records of the  It is best that, after some reflection, Villaluz, on his own initiative disqualified
case to Exec Judge of the CFI Pasig, Rizal for proper disposition himself from hearing the robbery case and thereby render himself available
 Petitioner’s MFR was denied and so was his motion for the deferment of as witness to any of the parties & therefore may be subject to cross-
the raffling and the motion for the return of the case to the Circuit Crim examination.
Court. After raffling, case was assigned to Br, VIII, CFI Rizal presided by  Villaluz should be commended for heeding SC’s ruling in Geotina
Judge Benjamin Aquino. v.Gonzales that “a judge, sitting on a case must at all times be fully free.
 SC Resolution required respondent to answer, authorized issuance of a writ Disinterested, impartial & independent…A judge has both the duty of
of prelim injunction upon posting of bond by petitioner. Writ was issued rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely
enjoining Aquino from taking cognizance of case free from suspicion as to his fairness and as to his integrity.
 1 of private respondents filed an Answer, then 2 of the private respondents
prayed for the modification of the prelim. injuction so as to allow Aquino to Whether, after having acquired jurisdiction over the case, the Circuit
act on their motion for bail Crim Courtcan transfer hearing of same to regular CFI
 SC required petitioner to comment, but petitioner failed to. Court resolved to  Having thus inhibited himself from trying the crim. Case, Villaluz likewise
defer action until the case is considered on the merits. Petitioner filed his has the discretion to transfer the case to the regular CFIs in Pasig where he
memorandum holds court, since the regular CFI has concurrent jurisdiction with the Circuit
Crim. Court over this case for robbery (Sec. 1, R.A. 5179)
 This transfer is all the more justified because there is no other judge sitting
WON Villaluz can voluntarily inhibit himself w/o any motion therefore in the Circuit Crim Court of Rizal or in the 7 th Judicial District as there is only
by the arties, on the ground of his personal knowledge of the case one circuit crim. court for each of the 16 judicial districts of the court (Sec. 1,
even before the same was filed. R.A. 5179)
 YES. Personal knowledge of the case pending before him is not 1 of the  & under Sec. 3, RA 5179, “provisions of all laws & ROC relative to the
causes for the disqualification o a judge under 1st par of Sec. 1 of Rule 137, judges of the CFI & the trial, disposition & appeal of crim cases therein shall
ROC w/c took effect on Jan. 1, 1964. But par. 2 of said Sec authorizes the be applicable to the circuit judges & the cases cognizable by them insofar
judge, “in the exercise of his sound discretion, to disqualify himself from as they are not inconsistent with its provisions. Such is also not prohibited
sitting in a case, for just &valid reason other than those mentioned in by the Judiciary Act or ROC.
paragraph 1.
 Before rule was amended in 1964, a judge couldn’t voluntarily inhibit Holding: Villaluz committed no abuse of discretion, petition dismissed
himself on a lot of ground such as extreme delicacy, or prejudice, or bias, or
hostility, etc.
 But the Court allowed inhibition in the following cases:
o [1961] on the ground that the opinion he expressed in a letter
addressed by him as counsel might in some way/another influence his
decision in the case at bar & expressed his fear of not being able to
render a truly impartial judgment (Guitierrez v. Santos)
o 1962, by reason of his being related to a counsel w/in the 4th civil
degree (now expressly part of Rule 137) as Rule 126 (old rule) “does
not include nor preclude cases and circumstances for voluntary
inhibition w/c depends upon the discretion of the officers concerned
o 1967, on ground other than those mentioned in par. 1 of Sec. 1 of Rule
137, as amended
 Villaluz therefore harkened to the injunction announced in Pimentel v.
Salanga that when a Judge “might be induced to act in favor of one party or
w/ bias or prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstances
reasonable capably of inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a
careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in such a way
that the people’s faith in the courts of justice is not impaired.
LORENZO vs. MARQUEZ [1988]
Page 24A
ROSELLO vs. CA [1988]
Facts:
G.R. No. L-46274
• December 21, 1957 – judgment declaring null and void the public
auction of 6 parcels of land belonging to the intestate estate of Joaquin
Ortega in favor Camilo Rosello. Rosello appealed the decision but it
was affirmed by the CA.
• October 1972 – a complaint for quieting of title to and reconveyance of
parcels of land in Leyte was filed by Calixtra Yap and her children by
Joaquin Ortega. The complaint was amended twice to include the
entire estate already adjudicate to Emilia Ybanez and her children.
• April 25, 1973 – Calixtra Yap opposed the motion filed by the heirs of
the late Joaquin Ortega for execution of the final judgment in Civil Case
No. R-399. Even with the opposition, the lower court issued on April 28,
1973 a writ of execution commanding the sheriff to place then
administrator of the estate Jesus Laurente in possession of the
disputed lands.
• June 4, 1973 - Calixtra Yap instituted in the same CFI of Leyte against
Camilo and Dorotea Rosello for the annulment and/or reformation of a
deed of sale over a parcel of land containing an area of 45 hectares
located in Barrio Cangag, Isabel, Leyte, claiming that what she sold to
the spouses Rosello's was only a five-hectare portion thereof and not
the entire 45 hectares as stated in said deed of sale.
• June 1973 – hearing was set for the survey’s approval but the parties
wished to add 3 adjacent parcels of land that was in the name of
Rosello. The court ordered the survey for the 3 parcels of land.
Engineer Besavilla submitted his report and survey plan and this was
subsequently approved by the court.
• October 6, 1973 – the administrator filed before the trial court a motion
for the issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution, alleging that while on
April 29, 1973, he was placed in possession of certain parcels of land
pursuant to the writ of execution, the ocular inspection conducted by
Engineer Besavilla revealed that not all of the parcels of land and
improvements thereon due the Estate were turned over to him.
• Rosellos filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for injunction to
enjoin the lower court from issuing an alias writ of execution, to declare
the Commissioner's Report and Survey Plan null and without force and
effect and to compel respondent judge to hold or conduct a separate
trial.
• February 24, 1974 – judgment was rendered declaring Calixtra Yap
Ortega as the surviving spouse of Joaquin Ortega and as the exclusive
owner of the land in Sta. Cruz, Isabel, Leyte, with right to the ½ share
of all other parcels of land found by the court to be the conjugal
properties of Calixtra Yap and Joaquin Ortega, and adjudicating the
other half to all other plaintiffs in equal proportion. Administrator of the
Estate Jesus Laurente was ordered to deliver the land to Calixtra Yap
upon termination of Special Proceedings.
G.R. No. L-46549
• Calixtra Yap filed on May 31, 1976 a petition for receivership which was
unverified and unsupported by affidavits. The petition was granted by
Judge Estenzo. Mr. Manuel was appointed as the receiver of the
properties in litigation.
• Rosellos twice moved for a reconsideration of this order, but to no
avail. They filed on September 23, 1976 a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and injunction with preliminary injunction before the Court of
Appeals, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent
judge in issuing the order of receivership. An administrative complaint
against respondent judge was also filed.
L-46274
WON the writ of execution issued by the TC conforms to the judgment? YES
• Nothing in the record to show that the Commissioner's Report and
Survey Plan submitted by Engineer Besavilla were tainted with fraud or
mistake. The Court of Appeals found said report and survey plan to be
valid, and petitioners to have been duly informed of the
Commissioner's appointment and survey. Decision of the Court of
Appeals had attained finality by failure of petitioners to further appeal
the same.
• Findings of Engineer Besavilla that Lot No. 4, is Identical to parcel no.
2 of the Sheriff s Return which could not be turned over and delivered
to the administrator because the same is owned and possessed by the
Mendoza spouses under OCT No. 2151. It appears that the same land
was transferred to Bienvenido Rosello and later to Bayani Rosello. As
these persons were not parties in any of the three (3) civil cases, there
is merit in petitioners' contention that to include Lot No. 4 in the writ of
execution would amount to a deprivation of their property without due
process of law.
WON Calixtra Yap is a real party in interest to file the motion for execution
pending appeal? YES
• Ortega vs. CA – it was held that the declaration of heirs made by Judge
Estenzo in an Action for Quieting of Title, Declaration of Nullity of Sale
and Annulment of Tax Declaration for a Parcel of Land is void, said
matter having been resolved with finality in the probate court.
• Case was instituted for the purpose of Calixtra Yap declared owner of a
parcel of land in Leyte, asserting her title against Joaquin Ortega. The
subject matter is beyond the jurisdiction of the CFI of Cebu sitting as a
 probate court. It is fitting and proper that the issue of ownership be
resolved at the CFI of Leyte Branch V.
Page 24-B
• Calixtra Yap has a judgment already in her favor.

L-46549 (relevant issue)

WON Judge Estenzo should be disqualified from further hearing the case
considering that an administrative complaint was filed against him? NO
• To disqualify or not to disqualify is a matter of conscience and is
addressed primarily to the sense of fairness and justice of the judge
concerned. Thus, the mere filing of an administrative case against
respondent Judge is not a ground for disqualifying him from hearing the
case, for if on every occasion the party apparently aggrieved would be
allowed to either stop the proceedings in order to await the final
decision on the desired disqualification, or demand the immediate
inhibition of the Judge on the basis alone of his being so charged,
many cases would have to be kept pending or perhaps there would not
be enough judges to handle all the cases pending in all the courts. This
Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of
arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be branded the stigma of
being biased or partial.
• Court of Appeals did not find any act or conduct of the judge indicating
arbitrariness sufficient to disqualify him from further taking cognizance
of the case. At most, the Court of Appeals found respondent judge to
have been unduly strict in the reception of evidence by adhering
religiously to the requirements of his pre-trial orders.
Page 24C
SALUD vs. ALUMBRES [2003]
Facts:
This is an administrative case filed by Pastor Salud against Hon. Florentino
Alumbres, presiding judge of RTC Las Pinas City for undue delay to resolve the
civil case LP96-300 Sps. Eduardo and Josefina Laurito v Sps. Pastor and
Marcosa Salud.
The original case started when sps. Ricardo and Cynthis Forneza’s sold
their house and lot TCT T-5251-A, first to Ferdinand Jimenez (deed of sale)
and four days later to the Saluds(contract to sell). Jimenez was successful in
transferring the house and lot to his name and then sold it to the Lauritos, who
secured a new title in their names.
When the Lauritos visited the property, the Saluds were already occupying
it, and they refused to vacate. The Lauritos filed a suit for unlawful detainer
against them in the MTC Las Pinas.
Even if the Saluds posed the defense of buyers in good faith, MTC deiced
against them for failure to show documents showing ownership.
Saluds appealed and filed a memorandum pursuant to §7, Rule 70 of the
Revised Rules of Crim Procedure4. It(LP 96-300) was raffled to Las Pinas City
presided by Hon. Alumbres, who issued an Alias Writ of Execution stating that
the judgment is final and executory, even if the appeal was pending.
Saluds petitioned for certiorari in the CA, praying for a TRO on the Writ.
Lauritos filed in the CA a Motion to Declare TRO Vacated and for the early
resolution. Later they also filed an Alias Writ of Execution Pending Appeal.
FINALLY, Pastor Salud filed a Letter Complaint to the OFFICE OF COURT
ADMINISTRATOR (OCA) praying that Alumbres be administratively liable for
DELAY in rendering judgment in Civil case # LP 96-300. The Saluds claim
that the RTC had the period from May-August 1997 to decide the case but
had not resolved it They also point out another case where the litigants had
been waiting at least 6 months for the court’s judgment, and asked the OCA to
look for more cases like these.
Despite Salud’s opposition, Alumbres issued an Alias Writ of Execution(10-19-
98), against his own earlier statement not to act on the case in respecting
the CA to maintain the status quo. He had said this while the Saluds were
4
SEC. 7. Procedure in the Regional Trial Court. –
(a) Upon receipt of the complete record or the record on appeal, the clerk of court of the
Regional Trial Court shall notify the parties of such fact.
(b) Within fifteen (15) days from such notice, it shall be the duty of the appellant to submit a
memorandum which shall briefly discuss the errors imputed to the lower court, a copy of
which shall be furnished by him to the adverse party. Within fifteen (15) days from receipt
of the appellant’s memorandum, the appellee may file his memorandum. Failure of the
appellant to file a memorandum shall be a ground for dismissal of the appeal.
(c) Upon the filing of the memorandum of the appellee, or the expiration of the period to do
so, the case shall be considered submitted for decision. The Regional Trial Court shall
decide the case on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of
origin and such memoranda as are filed.
then still praying for a judgment on their unlawful detainer case. RTC, 15
MONTHS AFTER SUBMISSION affirmed the MTC.
BACK TO THE ADMIN CASE: in Alumbres’ comment he does not deny the
delay but blames the Saluds. Alleging that the Saluds filed numerous pleadings
in the RTC and CA(ex. Contempt of court against Alumbres) to thwart his
decision of Writ of Execution Pending Appeal. His time was used up in
answering baseless and unwarranted pleadings. He also adds that despite
pending admin case against him, he was able to render judgment even if
delayed by 16 months. He should be exempted of liability. Also since 1
year has already passed, the case is not in his jurisdiction anymore hence
he can’t be ordered to explain something not within his jurisdiction and
competence. THIS CASE HE SAYS is a CLASSIC EXAMPLE OF ONE FILED
BY A DISGRUNTLED LITIGANT.
OCA recommends that Alumbres be suspended without pay and benefits for 2
months because he has already been previously admonished for deciding a
case beyond the reglemantary period.
WON Alumbres is liable. YES
16 months for a decision is clearly against the Constitution (Art. 8 §15(1))
stating that decisions must be rendered in 24 months by SC, 12 months for
lower collegiate courts and 3 months for LOWER COURTS. The CJC(Canon 3
Rule 3.05) also mandates that judges must render justice without delay to
observe the periods prescribed. This is to minimize congestion and delay
plaguing the courts.
Courts quoted the MAXIM: justice delayed is justice DENIED. Thus any delay
may deprive a litigant of his rights to speedy disposition of the case. THIS WILL
AFFECT THE IMAGE OF THE JUDICIARY.
SO FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE CONSTI AND CJC CONSTITUTES
SERIOUS MISCONDUCT DETRIMENTAL TO THE HONOR AND INTEGRITY
OF THE JUDICIAL OFFICE. Inability to decide a case in the ample prescribed
time is inexcusable, constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants administrative
sanction of the defaulting judge.
Delay will diminish people’s faith in the judicial system.
IN cases where time is needed, extensions can be obtained to avoid admin
sanctions. The court allows a degree of latitude to judges and grants them
reasonable extensions on MERITORIOUS GROUNDS.
Alumbres should have asked for extension and apprised the litigants of the
status of the case and reason for delay. IT will show his mindfulness of
deadlines.
UNDUE DELAY constitutes a less serious charge under §4 Rule 140 of
RoC(other exemples page 418). If found guilty, the judge will be suspended from
office without salary and benefits for not less than 1 month or more than 3
months; or imposed a fine of more than P10k but not more than P20k, §10 Rule
140.
 BUT in this case it is noted that the Saluds contributed to the delay from
harassment tactics against Alumbres and overburdening the court with
unnecessary motions and related paperwork. THUS MITIGATING THE
LIABILITY of Alumbres.

SC IS IN AGREEMENT WITH OCA, this is not Alumbres’ 1st , he was already

admonished for delay(‘96), fined for gross partiality to a party( 92) and
reprimanded(99). Even if he has retired in 2001, The OCA recommended that a
fine be imposed is in order.

EVEN IF A JUDGE HAS RETIRED, HE IS STILL LIABLE FOR LAPSES AND

OFFENSES COMMITTED DURING HIS INCUMBENCY, EVEN IF HE MAY NO
LONGER BE DISMISSED AND SUSPENDED. FINES CAN STILL BE METED
OUT FROM HIS RETIREMENT BENEFITS.

Judgment: FINED P5K TO BE DEDUCTED FROM HIS RETIREMENT

BENEFITS.
 IN RE: RODOLFO MANZANO
FACTS:
• Petitioner: Judge Rodolfo Manzano, Executive Judge, RTC, Bangui,
Ilocos Norte, Branch 19.
• On July 4, 1988, petitioner sent a letter to the SC saying that he was
designated as a member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on
Justice created pursuant to EO 856 as amended by EO 326. He is
requesting that before he may accept the appointment & discharge his
duties, an issuance be made by the SC of a Resolution that: 1)
authorizes him to accept the appointment & assume & discharge the
powers & duties attached to the said position; 2) considers his
membership in the Committee as neither violative of the Independence
of the Judiciary nor a violation of Sec 12, Art VIII, of the 2nd par. of Sec
7, IX-B, of the Consti & will not in any way amount to an abandonment
of his present position as Exec Judge; and 3) considers his
membership in the said Committee as part of the primary functions of
an Executive Judge.
ISSUE:
WON petitioner’s membership in the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on
Justice violates the Constitution. YES
RATIO:
• EO 856 reveals that the Provincial/City Committees on Justice are
created to insure the speedy disposition of cases of detainees,
particularly those involving the poor & indigent ones, thus alleviating jail
congestion & improving local jail conditions.
• Committee’s functions are : 3.3 (EO 856): “Receive complaints against
any apprehending officer, jail warden, fiscal or judge who may be found
to have committed abuses in the discharge of his duties & refer the
same to proper authority for appropriate action”; 3.5: “Recommend
revision of any law or regulation w/c is believed prejudicial to the proper
administration of crim justice.”
• It is evident that such Committee perform administrative functions,
defined as “Those w/c involve the regulation & control over the conduct
& affairs of individuals for their own welfare & the promulgation of rules
& regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as
are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its
existence.
• EO 326 (amending EO 856): Sec 6: “Supervision. The Prov’l/City
Committees on Justice shall be under the supervision of the Sec of
Justice. Quarterly accomplishment reports shall be submitted to the
Office of the Sec of Justice.”
• Under the Consti, members of the SC & other courts established by
law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-
judicial or administrative functions (Sec 12, VIII, Consti)
• Petitioner’s membership in the Ilocos Norte Prov’l Committee on
Justice, w/c discharges administrative functions, will be in violation of
the Consti.
• Garcia v. Macaraig: While the doctrine of sep of powers is a relative
theory not to be enforced w/ pedantic rigor, the practical demands of
govt precluding its doctrinaire application, it can’t justify a member of
the judiciary being required to assume a position or perform a duty
non-judicial in character. The essence of the trust reposed in him is to
decide. He is not a subordinate of an executive or legislative official,
however eminent. It is indispensable that there be no exception to the
rigidity of such a norm if he is, s expected, to be confined to the task of
adjudication.
OMPOC vs. TORRES
 A civil case for ejectment entitled Marcos Escobar v. Deco Sales was raffled
and assigned to respondent judge Norito Torres. While the case was being
tried on merits, complainant, counsel for defendant was invited by Torres to
see him at his residence w/ his client, Charlie Taguiam (proprietor of Deco
Sales). The meeting turned out to be an out-of-chambers discussion of the
civil case where Torres advised them on the steps to be undertaken in order
to win the case & at the same time, requested Taguiam to have a new air-
con on his Toyota Hi-Ace installed. Subsequently, Torres borrowed from
Taguiam a total of P8K on different dates
 The complaint was referred to Exec. Jusge Juanito Bernad, RTC, Cebu for
investigation, report and recommendation
 His report was essentially the same, although it added that in the end, Mr.
Taguiam lost in the Civil Case because he refused to listen to Toress’ advice
to settle the case amicablt by paying Plaintiff Marcos Escobar the amt of
P200K allegedly representing back rentals. It also states that Judge’s
janitor, Paterno Rafols was made several times to go to Taguiam to receive
the money.
 Taguiam gave it to Rafols as checks w/c he encashed and the proceeds
thereof delivered to Torres. Apparently, Torres was unaware of the
existence of those checks received & indorsed by his janitor. These were
confirmed by both the Janitor & Taguiam.
 Taguiam further testified that those amounts were loans requested by
Torres during the pendancy of the case but were not receipted by the
respondent & were never paid.
 Torres tried to account for the checks that were submitted in evidence
through a strange involved story concerning an alleged entrepreneurial
effort on the part of some of his townmates to raise money. Investigating
Judge found the stories as unworthy of credence. From the evidence
submitted to him, Investigating Judge found the charges against Torres to
 have been proven. However, he refrained from making a recommendation
on the appropriate admin penalty for Torres.

WON Judge committed the acts w/ w/c he was charged

 YES. In receiving a total of P8K from a party to a litigation before him, as
loans w/c he never apid back & w/c to all appearances he never intended to
pay back, & in refusing or failing to pay for an air-con installed in his wife’s
automobile by a shop owned by a party litigant before him, Torres is guilty
of serious misconduct in office & of acts unbecoming a member of the
judiciary. This court cannot too strongly deplore & denounce the gross
misconduct of Torres. Members of the judiciary should display not only the
highest integrity but must at all times conduct themselves in such manner
as to be beyond reproach & suspicion (Cabrera v. Pajares)

Holding: Torres dismissed from the service, w/ forfeiture of all his accrued
retirement benefits, leave & other privileges, if any, & w/ prejudice to re-
employment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the government,
including GOCCs. Torres also required to show-cause why he should not be
disbarred. For gross professional misconduct & violation of attorney’s oath,
consisting of the same acts of w/c he has here been founf to be guilty.
OCA vs. LANSANG [1990]
 LONGBOAN vs. POLIG [1990], SUPRA
REYES vs. FADERAN [1990]
Facts:
These administrative complaints were filed against Judge Ernesto Faderan,
formerly the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of
Paoay-Currimao, Ilocos Norte until he was transferred to his present station, the
MCTC of Piddig-Carasi-Solsona, Ilocos Norte.
IN AM. NO. R-581-MTJ : Atty. Victor Reyes, Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Ilocos
Norte, charged the respondent with inefficiency and violation of Republic Act
No. 3019. The respondent who wasn’t on an LOA failed to attend scheduled
hearings of criminal cases without prior notice to the parties.
IN AM. NO. R-674-MTJ :Romeo C. Acdal, a detention prisoner since March
1986, charged the respondent with incompetence. The complainant alleged
that Criminal Case No. 1981-P was filed against him in the respondent's court
but from March to June, 1986, the respondent had not conducted a preliminary
investigation as mandated by Sec. 3 (d) and Sec. 4, first paragraph of Rule 112
of the New Rules on Criminal Procedure which is in violation of his constitutional
rights under the provisional Constitution and Sec. 3 (e), (f) of Republic Act 3019.
IN AM. NO. R-675-MTJ: Eishenhower (sic) Adaza, barrio captain of Paoay,
Ilocos Norte, charged the respondent with ignorance of the law and
incompetence. The respondent has not conducted the necessary preliminary
investigation on the revolver confiscated by Adaza from a Joventino Tolentino as
mandated by Sec. 3 (d) and Sec. 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.
IN AM. NO. R-292-MTJ: Lourdes Clemente Santos, charged the respondent
with gross ignorance of the law, oppression, neglect of duty, and serious
misconduct. This was for the charge of theft against Pacifico Clemente, who
the judge issued a warrant of arrest without prelim investigation and clarificatory
questions and determining of sufficient evidence on Pacifico and his witnesses.
Judge allegedly knowingly omitted the express requirement to furnish the
complainant with copies of the criminal complaint and the supporting affidavits
and did not bother to direct her to submit her counter-affidavit as mandated by
the Judiciary Reorganization Act (Batas Pambansa Blg. 129).
IN AM. NO. MTJ-86-49: Leonora M. Pascua, charged the respondent with
dereliction of duty for failure to resolve within the 90-day period Civil Case No.
242-P for damages which, according to the complainant, had been submitted for
decision some three years ago. She sought the assistance of the Executive
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte, who allegedly issued
an order directing the respondent to decide the case in question.
IN AM. NO. MTJ-88-206:Vicente Gregorio, charged the respondent with grave
abuse of authority and ignorance of law. Allegedly, the respondent Judge
stated that at the mediation and conciliation conference, his court mediated
between the parties. This was denied by the complainant who claimed that he
was not given any opportunity to be heard thereat. In the same order, the
respondent Judge directed Gregorio to desist from molesting the priority rights
of Amador Madamba over the residential land in question, which, according to
the complainant has been in his possession since 1974. Supposedly, the
respondent Judge has no jurisdiction to issue the assailed order and argued that
pursuant to PD No. 1508, the Barangay Lupon should be the one to conduct the
mediation and conciliation proceedings before any action could be formally filed
in court, as in this case.
In the resolutions dated June 17, 1986 and July 29, 1986, the Court, acting on
the complaints in AM No. R-581-MTJ, AM No. R-674-MTJ, and AM No. 675-
MTJ, ordered the respondent to comment. He didn’t, so in Oct. 8, 1987, Court
suspended respondent from service for his failure and required him again to
comment. He didn’t comment in the 3 other cases, but he continued on
conducting trials, deciding cases, and submitting the monthly reports IN
DEFIANCE OF HIS SUSPENSION.
And so, the court resolved in Feb. 8, 1990 ordered Faderan to cease
discharging his functions and to show cause why he shouldn’t be dismissed
from his willful and continued defiance.
The investigation report prepared by the Deputy Court Administrator after
interviewing the respondent in Paoay, Ilocos Norte provided Faderan’s side. HiS
REASONS were: His wife left him in 1985, making him depressed and
emotionally disturbed, not in proper disposition to comment. In fact he took an
LOA from Dec 1986-Jan 1987 to maintain his sanity and composure. And his
transfer from reappointment rendered the admin cases moot and academic. On
the matter of the continuous discharge of his functions despite the order of
suspension, the respondent with no one to substitute(because he didn’t tell the
exec judge of his suspension) for him states that there were many pending
warrants of arrest issued by him before the order of suspension. So if he leaves
then people may be unlawfully detained. People from his municipality go all the
way to his residence in Paoay to ask him to act on their legal problems. He
opens his court sala to attend to litigants and people involved in legal
controversies because he wants everything to look normal to avoid shame, and
his need to support his 8 children.
WON Faderan can be made liable. Yes
He was made to comment in 86-88, not 85 when his wife left him.He had
ample time to recover from the depression caused by his wife's sudden
departure. Depression is never a reason for a public officer's non-compliance
with simple duties, he should go on leave or resign.
Even if he believed in good faith that the admin cases were moot and acad,
his receipt of the resolution dated October 8, 1987 in November 1987 would
have notified him that these cases were not rendered moot and academic. This
shows a deliberate disregard and inexcusable flaunting of the Court's orders.
 On his continued discharge of duties, his reasons were negated by the
recklessly imprudent attitude of the respondent towards his work. From the
facts, it is flimsy and unbelievable that, the respondent continued with his duties
as a Judge only to avoid the humiliation of the suspension. The respondent
deliberately disobeyed an order of suspension.
He says that he didn’t conduct hearing after his suspension but the clerk of
court wouldn’t get his salary if he doesn’t sign the report, so he did so.
UNMERITOTIOUS, the judge should know never to falsify record for anybody’s
sake., It is gross negligence on his part.
On his contention against the fiscal that if he did not show up at the hearing,
the parties and lawyers should have complained too. THE COURT accepted the
certification of the clerk of court of his absence during one of the scheduled
hearings. The others had no evidence on record.
As to Acdal, he said that he forwarded Acdal’s info to the Prov. Fiscal Pobre
together with his recommendation. Pobre however didn’t consider his
recommendation, but motu propio dismissed the case. He admits that Acdal is a
detention prisoner whose consti rights he should have respected moreso being
a judge. He shouldn’t have subjected those rights to any misunderstanding
between him and the fiscal.
As to AM. No. R-675-MTJ, the respondent contends that the person from
whom the gun was confiscated was not a Joventino Tolentino but one Joventino
Francisco according to the complaint filed by the police. HE issued several
warrants but they weren’t served, he believed in utmost good faith that the Court
had not acquired jurisdiction over the case, the respondent archived the said
case.
The court didn’t find support for the allegations in the records, but the other
proven charges are enough to warrant Faderan’s liability.
As to Faderan’s defense that these charges were caused by his
misunderstanding with the fiscal is not proven.
As to AM No. R-292-MTJ, the respondent contends that he conducted
personal examination of the complainant and his witnesses based on the
affidavits submitted by them. It wasn’t in writing because the affidavits
themselves were taken in as comments. Then he ordered counteraffidavits.
Although the finding of probable cause depends on the judgment of the judge,
he should have followed procedures in issuing warrants. (I don’t know why the
court said this: In this case, the witnesses were 66 and 55 when the offense was
committed, facts and circumstances should have been considered in the
personal examination. Aren’t old people credible too?)
In AM. No. MTJ-86-49, the respondent claims that were it not for his leave
and his transfer to another sala, he would have immediately acted on the said
case. The respondent admits that the case was already submitted for decision
before he took his leave but no exact date on record. But the judge practically
admits that he failed to act on time.
In AM. No. MTJ-88-206, the respondent avers that he was not acting in his
official capacity but as a friend trying to help the parties settle. A mental lapse
made him issue the questioned order instead of a document embodying the
parties intention and agreement. No intent to usurp the function of a barangay
court but it is common practice in a community that when they want to settle
their differences, they go to a judge. THE COURT SAID: An order issued by a
judge is accorded great weight and respect by the people in a community.
Therefore, such orders should be issued with great care and discretion. Mental
lapse is rejected as an excuse.
The above facts show that he is negligent in the use of his authority as a Judge,
and found to have acted with great disobedience of the court’s orders.
The facts show guilt beyond reasonable doubt, it is sufficient to stress that
Judge Emesto A. Faderan has violated the following provisions of the Code of
Judicial Conduct:
Rule 1.0l. — A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and
independence.
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 2.0l. — A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 2.03. — A judge shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to
influence judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be
used or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor convey or permit
others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence
the judge.
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 3.0l. — A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional
competence.
Rule 3.02. — In every case, a judge shall endeavor diligently to ascertain the
facts and the applicable law unswayed by partisan interests, public opinion or
fear of criticism.
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 3.05. — A judge shall dispose of the court's business promptly and decide
cases within the required periods.
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 3.08. — A judge should diligently discharge administrative responsibilities,
maintain professional competence in court management, and facilitate the
performance of the administrative functions of other judges and court personnel.
Rule 3.09. — A judge should organize and supervise the court personnel to
ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business, and require at all times the
observance of high standards of public service and fidelity.
The acts of the respondent show that he is totally unfit and undeserving to
be a member of the Judiciary.
DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all salaries, benefits and leave
credits to which he may be entitled and with prejudice to re-employment in the
Government service, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
The Court stresses that this action is without prejudice to any criminal or civil
liability which may have arisen from the acts complained of in these cases.
 BABATIO vs. TAN [1988]
Facts: Holding: modified to suspension
• November 26, 1981 - Judge Jose Z. Tan was ordered separated from
the service for serious misconduct with forfeiture of all retirement
benefits and pay and with prejudice to reinstatement to any position in
the national or local government including government-owned or
controlled corporations, agencies or instrumentalities.
• January 14, 1982 – MFR was filed. Deputy Court Administrator Buena
took a modified stand as regards the penalty imposed upon respondent
judge, and accordingly submitted a recommendation to this effect to
the court. No copy of said recommendation can be found in the records
of the case, but such recommendation is reflected in the internal
resolution of this Court dated January 13, 1983, which reads:
"Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration for the decision and
the Office of the Court Administrator submitted its recommendation to
modify the dismissal to a lesser penalty but no vote was taken thereon
for lack of material time for the Court to deliberate thereon."
• Without reference to the recommendation the MFR was denied.
• Judge applied for executive clemency and the Office of the President
indorsed this letter to the SC.

Issue: WON the penalty of dismissal should be modified? YES

• In Re Horilleno defines serious misconduct: The adjective is "serious"
that is, important, weighty, momentous and not trifling. The noun is
"misconduct"; that is, a transgression of some established and definite
rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence
by the public officer. The word "misconduct" implies a wrongful
intention and not mere error of judgment. For serious misconduct to
exist, there must be reliable evidence showing that the judicial acts
complained of were corrupt, or inspired by an intention to violate the
law, or were in persistent disregard of well known legal rules.
• Salcedo v. Inting: To warrant disciplinary action, the act of the judge
must have a direct relation to the performance of his official duties. It is
necessary to separate the character of the man from the character of
the officer
• The acts complained of did not have such a direct relation to the
performance of respondent judge's official duties as to justify the
extreme penalty of dismissal with all the painful stigma and
consequences attaching thereto. On the contrary, the charges, as
correctly labelled by respondent judge were politically-motivated. Thus,
the administrative complaint was instituted by the Municipal Mayor of
Motiong, Samar, instead of the aggrieved parties; one of the charges
[Charge No. 3] had to do with alleged partisan politics engaged in by
respondent-judge in the election of barangay heads, and still another
charge [Charge No. 4] involved his act of calling the municipal janitor a
"tuta" of the mayor and the mayor as an animal like his master Marcos.
GENOBLAZO vs. CA