2 The Afghan Dilemma

Pakistan’s Strategic Confusion in the Western Theatre

The 10 years long American war in Afghanistan is taking a turn similar to the one the Soviets fought
some 30 years ago. Just like the Soviets, tactical victories by US/NATO forces in Afghanistan soon
turned into the strategic encirclement of the allied forces by Afghan resistance groups, which have
adopted an immensely dif-ficult to counter ‘strategy of void’ denying any target for allied forces to hit
at. US/NATO forces are fighting against an enemy that is totally elusive but equally ruthless. This
strategy has been frustrating the US/NATO forces since the last 9 years but now this frustration has
transformed into fear, which is creeping in the file and rank of the invading forces that find themselves
encircled by an unseen and unforgiving adversary. This fear of the unseen enemy is now dictating the
US/NATO forces’ tactics in Afghanistan. There is complete chaos in the US camp now as they have
failed to secure any strategic goal in Afghanistan. In fear, the US military is taking desperate measures
by turning counterinsurgency ops into an ethnic cleansing campaign, which is also going to blow on
their faces.

On this side of the Durand Line, Pakistan has been caught in a vicious circle due to the prolonged Afghan
conflict and complete indecision by the political and military establishment about conclusion of this war. Pa-
kistan has suffered more fatalities in so-called War on terror than the ones faced by the US and NATO forces
combined in Afghanistan during the last 9 years. Islamabad’s current Afghan policy is an amalgamation of
confusion and chaos which has been undermining Pakistan’s national security in the Western theatre since
the last decade. Officially, Pakistan is a frontline ally of the US/NATO but ironically, every high level
official of the US and NATO countries criticize the Pakistani intelligence agencies for being the biggest
accomplice of the Afghan Taliban against the Allies. Recent accusation made by Admiral Michael Mullen
about ISI aiding Haqqani network endorses this assertion further. The professional ties between Langley and
Islamabad have turned utterly sour in aftermath of recent defiance shown by CIA against the Pakistani
demands of putting an end to drone strategy. On the other hand, the Afghan taliban consider Pakistan to be a
US/NATO ally and are annoyed at the former’s Afghan policy. This situation is a strategic nightmare for
Islamabad and Pakistan is losing her diplomatic clout in Afghan affairs after adopting a ‘made in USA’
Afghan policy!

It seems as if in the whole Afghan equation, the Afghan Taliban and other resistance elements are the
only
stakeholders who are not confused over this nerve-breaking cliffhanger. In fact they are getting of
more focused inside Afghanistan and are hitting the allied forces with more lethality at a higher the
frequency. The death toll of the foreign forces in Afghanistan is increasing with every passing tra
year. diti
ona
For Pakistan, the current situation demands an incisive re-evaluation of the decade old Afghan l
policy. This reassessment must be based on the emerging threats to Pakistan’s national security, thi
particularly on the Western borders due to the presence of foreign forces in Afghanistan instead nki
ng of remaining in the US camp at any cost. Indeed the Indo-US strategic relations in the 21st
century and their impact on Pakistan and regional stability would also be a critical consideration
during any policy review and Islamabad would not like to further deteriorate its already troubled

The Afghan Dilemma

relations with Washington. But the national and re-gional security related events that have
transpired during the last 10 years as well as the emergence of China as a major global player,
necessitate a comprehensive overhauling of Islamabad’s strategic thinking and the Afghan
policy.

In the current phase of the Afghan conflict,

Paki-stan has the leverage to take some
strategic strides in order to protect its own
sovereignty and bring durable peace in
Afghanistan. The recent announce-ment 18
about pulling army out of North Waziristan
has taken the probability of a full-scale
operation there out of the equation. But
how much this stra-tegic maneuvering
would do in securing Pakistani interest of
unwind the enraged tribesmen who have
announced to avenge the deaths of 47
elders killed in a drone attack carried out
hours after the release of CIA mercenary
Raymond Davis. Certainly, the
announcement of not conducting a military
opera-tion is not going to help the
Pakistani cause espe-cially in a restive
milieu where CIA just has stepped up her
drone attacks.

These are the US war tactics that have botched her in Afghanistan and not some isolated armed
tribesmen who cross into Afghanistan to seek revenge for the deaths of their dear ones killed in
the relentless US drone attacks. No part of Pakistani territory has played any role in creating the
grim state of affairs faced by the US forces in Afghanistan today. However, it is highly
unfortunate that Pakistan has failed miserably in presenting its case in a forceful manner.

After realizing the bitter fact that the coalition cannot win in Afghanistan, now the US/NATO
have unleashed hell on the Afghan civilians in order to break the resistance by using the scorch
earth strategy. Their aim is to break the low and mid level fighting elements of the Afghan
resistance physiologically by destroying their dwellings and oppressing their spouses. There are
the complex dynamics of the Afghan society which the US forces had completely ignored in
their war against the Taliban. The US is desperately trying to win a war using its military
strategy alone and this is something that has never worked in the past and is now going to fail in
Afghanistan as well.
Tacks
Brass
 Why the US can’t win in Afghanistan?
Policy Papers

Pressure on the US forces is so intense that it is being felt in Washington as well. President
Obama had to sack the US forces’ commander in Afghanistan twice within the first thirteen
months of his administration in the White House. Obama is desperate for securing some sort
of military victory in Afghanistan before the 2012 presidential elections. However, this goal
remains elusive as the US forces are losing the critical battle of win-ning the hearts and minds
19 of the common Afghan people due to the following factors:

1. The US army is now profiling the Afghan population, particularly in Khandahar and
Helmand prov-inces in the South, using biometrics –finger printers and iris pattern-scanning
for keeping the individual’s unique biological record for later use. But these tactics are only
good for guarding installations and prem-ises; they cannot save the US/NATO soldiers from
the IDE’s blasts or ambushes.

2. The Taliban are elusive targets and ruthless hidden predators. Their battle strategy has
forced the US forces to execute an inhuman annihilation strategy in the villages of
Afghanistan. The US Special Forces are using the scorch earth tactics in order to break the
resistance but but it is certainly going to enrage the Afghans.

In one such operation, Tarok Kolache, a small settlement in Kandahar, was wiped off from
the face of the planet by the US forces after being met with stiff resistance put up by the
Taliban fighters. The Taliban had planted IDE’s and mines in the nearby orchards
adopting a very complex deployment pattern. After two failed attempts by the US forces
to enter the village, the commander of the ground forces called in an airstrike to pulverize
the whole village. The USAF’s A-10 and B-57 bombers delivered some 49,000 lbs of
ordinance and “accomplished that mission”.

Such operations are breeding a sense of vindictive ferocity among the civilian populace
against the ISAF presence on the Afghan soil. These operations are part of Petreaus’s
policy to break the Taliban strong-holds in Southern Afghanistan. Petreaus is hoping for
surrender from the Taliban to gain an advanta-geous position prior to the Obama
administration’s initiation of talks with them. On the other hand, the
 The Afghan Dilemma
20

The Petreaus solution -- A Pashtun village -- Before and after!

Taliban have made it clear that no negotiations are possible unless the US/NATO forces have withdrawn
completely. For the first time, the Taliban are facing a real threat and challenge from such operations.

The reliance on military strategy alone in Afghanistan has failed the US/NATO; their political
strategy is on the backseat while Washington’s military complex is calling the shots in the Afghan
war. So it would be safe to assume that more ops like Tarok Kolache are in the making.

3. Military operations in Southern Afghanistan are more of revenge than counterinsurgency

operations. The US Forces are challenging the centuries old social order of Afghan society, which
the Afghans guard jealously.

The US forces have enraged the conservative Afghan society, particularly the Pushtuns, by
disrespecting their social norms during their search operations in Southern Afghanistan. Body-
searching women, enter-ing into houses and killing civilians in raids–as revealed in wikileaks –are
creating more hatred against the US/NATO forces than any goodwill.

4. Majority of Pushtun population has no representation in the Afghan government and Afghan
National Army (ANA). The Current strength of ANA is around 150,000, which would be increased
to a total strength of 260,000 by the year 2014, with only 3-4% presentation of Pushtuns from
Southern Afghani-stan.

5. Karzai is Pushtun but has been isolated after he expressed his disappointment over the removal of
General Mc Crystal, and due to the growing civilian casualties as a result of the allied forces’
attacks. The Pushtuns also consider him as a US puppet in Kabul. Presently, the US has no
replacement for Karzai.

6. The US forces are fighting an aimless war creating nuisance among fighting units. There is no
enemy in sight but there is certainly one in the battlefield. Taliban tactics have infused a sense of
void, silence, isolation and non-engagement with others in the minds of the US/NATO forces. This
is intolerable for invading forces who want to engage Taliban in frontal battles. On the other hand,
pushing their strategy
to the next level, Taliban often deliver
BrassTacks Policy Papers

painful side attacks and pinprick bites by

attacking moving columns of the
US/NATO forces.

7. The US forces have no standardized

report-ing system, metric or narrative so
that a complete broader picture of the
whole battlefield can be drawn in order to
take important decisions and devise any
new strategy. The previous system used by
the US/NATO forces cannot cater to the
21 important local factors like ethnicity,
linguistics, tribal allegiance and political
ties. This fact proves that the Afghan war is
many times more complex than the one in
Iraq.

8. The US/NATO is forced to turn a blind

eye to the massive corruption going on in the
Afghan
government. Karzai and Northern Alliance are the only supporters of the ISAF forces in
Afghanistan.

Americans are banking their hopes on Petreaus to pull off another Iraq like success in Afghanistan
(Success in Iraq by Petreaus itself remains a debatable issue as that country is still facing ethnic and
sectarian chaos) but it seem this success would be a mere tactical win once again. No war can be
won without mass support and this is something the US/NATO forces don’t have now and would
never have in future!

Future Dynamics of the Afghan Conflict and Pakistan:

Pakistan has emerged as the net loser in the Afghan conflict due to the mismanagement of its foreign
policy priorities. There is a complete confusion in Islamabad about the future dynamics of the
Afghan conflict, par-ticularly in the post withdrawal scenario.

1. Right now, all the parties in the Afghan conflict are angry at Pakistan. The US feels that
Pakistan is supporting the Afghan Taliban; the Afghan Taliban perceive Pakistan as the
US/NATO ally because the NATO supplies pass through Pakistan and are keeping the US war
alive in Afghanistan. The Northern Alliance feels that Pakistan is supporting the Afghan
Pashtuns and Taliban. On the other hand, Pakistan has reasons to believe that the
US/NATO/Afghan armies and Indian RAW are supporting the TTP in-surgency inside Pakistan
using the Afghan soil.
 ians are exploiting the growing mistrust between the US/NATO and Pakistan. They are also
2. trying to take advantage of the Northern Alliance’s discontentment with Pakistan in the ensuing
T confu-sion in order to cultivate gains for themselves. Here the primary Indian objective is to
h keep Pakistan out of the Afghan affairs by creating an impression that Pakistan is the real cause
e behind the failure of the US/ NATO forces in Afghanistan. India is using its media as well as its
strong political lobby in Washington to achieve this goal.
I
n 3. The Indian media has taken over the Afghan cities and countryside. Indian dramas are
d becoming
blockbuster hits in Kabul homes. On the Pak
other hand, Pakistan does not even have a ista
single TV or cable network showing n
Pakistani content. Pakistan also does not arm
broadcast in Dari, Uzbek or Farsi, y
practically abandoning the non-Pashtu can
speakers to the Indian propa-ganda not
machine. affo
rd
4. The US would now be expanding the to
war inside Pakistan through Baluchistan. mo
The US/ NATO supply line passing ve
through Pakistan is the only reason why the mor
US has not started its drone attacks in e
Baluchistan, though CIA drones have unit
recently flown over Chaman area in s
Baluchistan. Any aggression in Baluchistan fro
by the CIA can stir up retaliatory action m
from Islamabad, threatening their supplies its
routes Eas
to Afghanistan. tern
bor
5. The Pakistan army is also faced with ever-mounting pressure from Washington to launch a der
military operation in North Waziristan Agency against the elements of the Haqqani network, a into
tribal militia that is part of the Afghan resistance against the occupying forces. Despite the FA
assistance of the Haqqani net-work, majority of the resistance forces comprise of Afghan Pushtuns TA
and nationalistic elements from certain other ethnic groups. Pakistan army is already spread too giv
thin across the entire swath of FATA and NWFP including the North Waziristan Agency (NWA). en
the
A common misperception is that Pakistan army has no presence in NWA but this is far from reality.
curr
The Pa-kistan military has been conducting small-scale ops in the region since 2005. More than 700
ent
terrorists and 300 Pakistani army men have been killed in NWA during the last 5 years. A military
sce
operation in North Waziristan is necessary from Pakistan’s own security point of view, as this territory
nari
has become a safe haven for various criminal and terrorist groups from all over Pakistan. But as
o.
already stated, the Pakistan army is suffering from severe operational and logistical constraints as its
strength is being stretched along the entire swath of FATA and parts of NWFP. The US is not making
timely payments to Pakistan army as part of the coalition support fund, making the matters worse. The
Apart from its operational feasibility, there are some other factors due to which the Pakistan army
cannot launch a full scale military operation inside NWA right now. The military had signed peace
agreements with two important militant factions in 2006, Gul Bahadur and Molvi Nazeer, in order to

The Afghan Dilemma

establish its footprint in the area in a peaceful manner. It is not clear what impact a new military
operation would have on these peace treaties. Any hasty decision to conduct a comprehensive
operation can push Pakistan army into a hornet’s nest, with the most important question looming
ominously: How will the Pakistan army ensure that no further demands would be made for conducting
military operations in South Punjab and Quetta as well?

The window of opportunity for Pakistan in the Afghan theatre is closing. If Pakistan doesn’t play a
decisive

22
role in Afghanistan today it would lose that country forever. In the simplest terms, Pakistan’s
BrassTacks Policy Papers

Western border will turn into a hostile one as well and remain that way for a very long time to come.
It is high time that Paki-stan should cater to the Pushtun sentiment against the US occupation of
Afghanistan.

Weighing Pakistan’s Options:

Right now, Pakistan has three options for formulating its national security policy in the Western
theatre given the current geopolitical milieu:

1. Pakistan can continue with the current flawed policy, adopted by the Musharraf regime
back in 2001, and keep facing problems like terrorism, insurgencies, chaos and anarchy
23 within Paki-stani precincts along with unchecked foreign meddling into its political
matters.

Due to this flawed policy, Pakistan army has been conducting the counterinsurgency operations
across FATA and Malakand since 2003 but there is no permanent solution in sight due to the fact
that back in 2001, Pakistan became the US ally in WoT unconditionally and accepted the role set by
Washington and is now paying the penalty. Pakistan cannot survive with this policy in the future due
to the following factors:

♦♦ There would be no end to terrorism, chaos and insurgencies, while other shreds of 4GW
would keep haunting Pakistan.

♦♦ TTP’s safe havens, sponsored by Indian RAW, would remain protected by CIA inside
Afghanistan.

♦♦ The façade of WoT would keep providing cover for the surrogate wars waged by the
hostile agen-cies and elements against Pakistan.

♦♦ CIA would expand its footprint in the other areas of the country. Their presence on
Pakistani soil is already undermining Pakistan’s national security.
 de more opportunities to India to use its political clout in the Western capitals to get Pakistan
♦
declared a failed and terrorist state.
♦
♦♦ The Afghan resistance would be under greater pressure than ever before due to the extreme
I tactics used by the US/NATO forces. Right now, the Afghan resistance does not perceive
n Pakistan as a hostile entity but is monitoring Pakistan’s Afghan policy suspiciously. The
t prevailing situation can lead to hos-tile relations between Afghan resistance and Pakistan. This
e will be suicidal, keeping in mind the fact that Northern Alliance elements are already
r antagonistic towards Pakistan.
n ♦♦ Continuation of the current Afghan policy would encourage the US/NATO forces to step
a up the ethnic cleansing of Pushtun population inside Afghanistan. This would create violent
l exasperation among the Pakistani Pushtuns and the Pakistani state and nation will become
c victims of more violence from within.
h
a Pakistan’s current Afghan policy has not only devastated the national security profile but its
o catastrophic im-pact has torn apart the social cohesion within the country as well. Continuation of
s this policy is the gravest

a
n
d

a
n
a
r
c
h
y

w
o
u
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d

p
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 The Afghan Dilemma
24

national security threat as it is the reason behind the vicious cycle of terrorism and chaos. It must be
revamped radically and that too in the shortest possible time.

2. Pakistan can declare impartiality in Afghan conflict

This approach is also impractical and would not warranty any stability in the current chaotic situation
prevail-ing in the Pakistani society. It is time to take sides decisively and promptly.

3.Pakistan must decide to play a decisive role in Afghanistan and bring the American war on
terror to its end and force a withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan. Pakistan will have
to renegotiate its terms of engagement with the US on all the regional issues particularly
Pakistan’s role in the Afghan peace process.

Pakistan must go for a complete overhaul of its national security and foreign policy vis-à-vis
Afghanistan. But this strategic paradigm shift demands a radical change in the strategic thinking of
Pakistani political and mili-tary establishment regarding the whole Afghan conflict, the various
dynamics of this conflict and post with-drawal scenario in Afghanistan and its regional implications as
well. To bring about this change in Islamabad’s approach towards Afghanistan, Pakistan will have to
send a strong and clear signal to the Afghan resistance that Pakistan is not an ally of the US in this war
on terror. The following can be effective points to start with in this regard:

♦♦ Putting a break to drone war has become the most critical imperative right now for military estab-
lishment. It is not only provoking tribesmen to pick arm against the state but recent drone attacks
after the drop scene of Ryamand Davis episode have put a big question mark on the credibility of
Pakistan army among Pakistanis who are now looking towards GHQ to take some decisive step. But
GHQ is in complete catch-22 desprately finding a way to

♦♦ Islamabad must ask the US to announce a decisive cutoff date of WOT and the beginning of its
withdrawal from Afghanistan. Apart from that, Pakistan can force the US to act on this option by
announcing its own date of shutting off the NATO supply line going through Pakistani lands.

♦♦ Activate old channels and links in order to bring all warring factions in Afghanistan on a single
point agenda of forming national cohesion and stabilization.

♦♦ Eliminating India’s intimidating role towards Pakistan is also very critical. Indian support to
TTP and BLA has been proved in recent counterinsurgency operation in FATA. It can only be
achieved if Pa-kistan ends the Indian role and presence in Afghanistan.

♦♦ Apart from India, Iran is another country having stakes in Afghanistan. A close collaboration be-
tween Pakistan and Iran is necessary in order to forge a common front against US presence in
Afghanistan and to bring about sectarian stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pakistan FO must
take the initiative to engage Iran for a collaborative political solution to the Afghas bnistan
situation.

♦♦ This will also help Pakistan to have a friendly/ non-hostile government in Kabul, an
indispensable choice for Pakistan in order to keep its Western border secure and safe. Pakistan will
not get a friendly government in Kabul if it does not help create one.

Pakistan is at the crossroads over the Afghan conflict and its own policy adopted a decade ago after
9/11. Pakistan has an open border with Afghanistan which automatically demands for an assertive
role in Afghani-stan to ensure regional stability. Stabilizing Afghanistan is critically imperative for
bringing the ongoing wave of terror and anarchy in the country to an absolute end. But unfortunately,
right now, Pakistan’s political and military establishment is in complete confusion in this regard and
frustration among the masses is rising par-ticularly in FATA. It is crucial time to bring about a radical
transformation in Islamabad’s foreign policy and to reassess the strategic importance of Pak-US
relations in the 21st century at a time when alternate global power centers, with converging interests
are emerging in the region i.e China.