Alternative Dispute Resolution
Cases
1. Nena Solway vs. Ariel Pascasio
AM No. P-07-2327 – July 12, 2007
Facts:
1. This administrative matter pertains to a complaint filed
by Nena Solway against Ariel Pascasio, Michael
Uracay and Benjamin Tulio;
2. Nena Solway leased a building from Ely Palenzuela
where she established an inn and restaurant.
3. Prior to expiration of the contract parties agreed on a 5
year extension;
4. However, the owner suddenly increased the monthly
rental and shortened the period of lease to one year.
The parties failed to reach an agreement. Hence, the
matter was referred to the Office of the Lupong
Tagapamayapa.
5. Before the Lupon, the parties signed an Amicable
Settlement.
6. Subsequently, Palenzuela went to complainant’s
restaurant and produced a copy of a Notice of
Execution signed by Barangay Chairman, who turned
out to be Palenzuelas brother, and forced complainant
to sign the same. Complainant refused to do so.
7. The following day, Pascasio and Uclaray, with the
same copy of the Notice of Execution in tow, also
forced and threatened complainant to sign. Out of fear,
complainant relented and signed the Notice of
Execution.
8. Later, Respondents, returned to complainants
restaurant. They introduced themselves as sheriffs and
ordered complainant to take all her properties out of
the restaurant.
9. The latter refused, insisting that there was no court
order authorizing the execution and that an agreement
for the renewal of the lease contract had already been
reached. Later, on the same day, the barangay
chairman ordered respondents to take complainants
stuff out of the restaurant and into the street.
10. Respondents complied. Thereafter, respondents
padlocked all the rooms and ordered all customers to
get out of the establishment.
Issue:
Whether or not Respondents acted in grave abuse of
their authority
Whether or nor Respondents duty to enforce amicable
settlement
Held:
 The Amicable Settlement reached by the parties before
the Barangay Lupon is susceptible to legal
enforcement. However, the Local Government Code
mandates that it is the Lupon itself which is tasked to
enforce by execution the amicable settlement or
arbitration award within six (6) months from the date
of settlement. Upon the lapse of such time, the
settlement may only be enforced by filing an action
before the appropriate court.
SEC. 417. Execution.The amicable settlement or
arbitration award may be enforced by execution by
the Lupon within six (6) months from the date of the
settlement. After the lapse of such time, the
settlement may be enforced by action in the proper
city or municipal court. (Local Government Code)
 Clearly, the implementation of the Notice of
Execution was then outside the legitimate concern of
the MTCC, of any of its officers or of any other
judicial officer.
 The mere presence of a sheriff in a place of execution
where the court has no business is frowned upon.
 Nothing in this rule justifies their participation in the
implementation of the Notice of Execution. Clearly
respondent were no acting within their authority.
2. Proceso Quiros and Leonarda Villegas Vs Marcelo
Arjona
GR No. 158901 – March 9, 2004
Facts:
1. Petitioners filed with the office of the barangay captain, a
complaint for recovery of ownership and possession of a
parcel of land.
2. Petitioners sought to recover from their uncle
Marcelo Arjona, one of the respondents herein, their
lawful share of the inheritance from their late
grandmother Rosa Arjona Quiros alias Doza.
3. On January 5, 1997, an amicable settlement was
reached between the parties. By reason thereof,
respondent arjona executed a document named
“PAKNAAN”
4. Petitioners filed a complaint with the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court with prayer for the issuance of a
writ of execution of the compromise agreement which
was denied because the subject property cannot be
determined with certainty.
5. The Regional Trial Court reversed the decision of
the municipal court on appeal and ordered the issuance
of the writ of execution.
6. Respondent appealed with The Court of Appeals
which Reversed RTC decision Hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a valid and enforceable
amicable settlement between the parties and corollary
to this, a writ of execution may issue on the basis
thereof.
Held:
 Generally, the rule is that where no repudiation was
made during the 10-day period, the amicable
settlement attains the status of finality and it becomes
the ministerial duty of the court to implement and
enforce it.
 However, such rule is not inflexible for it admits of
certain exceptions. In Santos v. Judge Isidro, the Court
observed that special and exceptional circumstances,
the imperatives of substantial justice, or facts that may
have transpired after the finality of judgment which
 would render its execution unjust, may warrant the
suspension of execution of a decision that has become
final and executory.
 In the case at bar, the ends of justice would be
frustrated if a writ of execution is issued considering
the uncertainty of the object of the agreement. To do
so would open the possibility of error and future
litigations.
 Although parties agreed to transfer one-hectare real
property, they failed to include in the PAKNAAN a
sufficient description of the property to convey. This
error is not one for nullification but for reformation.
3. Rosario Lupitan Pang-et vs Catherine Manacnes-
Dao-As
GR No. 167261 – March 2, 2007
Facts:
1. Petitioner filed an Action for recovery of possession of
real property before the MCTC against the spouses
Leoncio and Florentina Manacnes, the predecessors-
in-interest of herein respondent.
2. During the course of the pre-trial, the parties, through
their respective counsels, agreed to refer the matter to
the Barangay Lupon (Lupon) for arbitration in
accordance with the provisions of the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law. Consequently, the proceedings
before the MCTC were suspended, and the case was
remanded to the Lupon for resolution.
3. Thereafter, the Lupon issued a Certification to File
Action due to the refusal of the Manacnes spouses to
enter into an Agreement for Arbitration and their
insistence that the case should go to court. The
Certification, as well as the records of the case, were
forwarded to the MCTC.
4. An Order was issued by the MCTC, once more
remanding the matter for conciliation by the Lupon
and ordering the Lupon to render an Arbitration
Award thereon. According to the MCTC, based on the
records of the case, an Agreement for Arbitration was
executed by the parties concerned; however, the
Lupon failed to issue an Arbitration Award as
provided under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law,
so that, the case must be returned to the Lupon until an
Arbitration Award is rendered.
5. In compliance with the MCTC Order, the Lupon
rendered an Arbitration Award ordering herein
petitioner to retrieve the land upon payment to the
spouses Manacnes for the improvements on the land.
6. Aggrieved, Leoncios widow, Florentina Manacnes,
repudiated the Arbitration Award but her repudiation
was rejected by the Lupon. Thereafter, the MCTC was
furnished with copies of the Arbitration Award.
Issue:
● Whether or not the proceedings before the Lupon
were valid.
Held:
What is compulsory under the Katarungang Pambarangay
Law is that there be a confrontation between the parties
before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and that a
certification be issued that no conciliation or settlement has
been reached, as attested to by the Lupon or Pangkat
Chairman, before a case falling within the authority of the
Lupon may be instituted in court or any other government
office for adjudication.
In other words, the only necessary pre-condition before any
case falling within the authority of the Lupon or the
Pangkat may be filed before a court is that there has been
personal confrontation between the parties but despite
earnest efforts to conciliate, there was a failure to amicably
settle the dispute.
It should be emphasized that while the spouses Manacnes
appeared before the Lupon during the initial hearing for the
conciliation proceedings, they refused to sign the
Agreement for Arbitration form, which would have
signified their consent to submit the case for arbitration.
Therefore, upon certification by the Lupon ng
Tagapamayapa that the confrontation before the Pangkat
failed because the spouses Manacnes refused to submit the
case for arbitration and insisted that the case should go to
court, the MCTC should have continued with the
proceedings in the case for recovery of possession which it
suspended in order to give way for the possible amicable
resolution of the case through arbitration before the Lupon
ng Tagapamayapa.
Case 4. FELICIDAD UY, petitioner, vs.
HON. MAXIMO C. CONTRERAS, Presiding Judge,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, Metro
Manila; HON. MAURO M. CASTRO, Provincial
Prosecutor of Pasig, Metro Manila; SUSANNA
ATAYDE and WINNIE JAVIER, respondents.
G.R. No. 111416 September 26, 1994
FACTS:
1. Felicidad Uy subleased from respondent Susanna
Atayde the other half of the second floor of a building
located at corner Reposo and Oliman Streets, Makati,
Metro Manila. She operated and maintained therein a
beauty parlor.
2. The sublease contract expired on 15 April 1993.
However, the petitioner was not able to remove all her
movable properties.
3. On 17 April 1993, an argument arose between the
Felicidad Uy and Atayde when the former sought to
withdraw from the subleased premises her remaining
movable properties. The argument degenerated into a
scuffle between the petitioner and Atayde and several
of Atayde's employees.
4. On 23 April 1993, the private respondents filed a
complaint with the barangay captain of Valenzuela,
Makati. The confrontation of the parties was scheduled
by the barangay captain for 28 April 1993. On the said
date, only the petitioner appeared.
5. The barangay captain then reset the confrontation to 26
May 1993. On 11 May 1993, the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal filed two informations
 for slight physical injuries against the petitioner with
the MTC of Makati. On 21 May 1993,
6. Public respondent Judge Contreras of Branch 61
ordered the petitioner to submit her counter-affidavit
and those of her witnesses. On 14 June 1993, the
petitioner submitted the required counter affidavits.
7. On 18 June 1993, the petitioner filed a motion to
dismiss Criminal Cases for non-compliance with the
requirement of P.D. No. 1508. On 2 July 1993, public
respondent Judge Contreras handed down an order
denying the motion to dismiss.
8. A motion to reconsider the above order was denied as
well. Hence this present special civil action for
certiorari.
ISSUE:
WON THE CASE FILED SHOULD BE DISMISSED
ON THE GROUND OF FAILURE TO COMPLY
WITH THE MANDATORY REQUIRMENT OF P.D.
NO. 1508, NOW EMBODIED IN SECTION 412 OF
THE LGC OF 1991.
HELD: Yes. The precise technical effect of failure to
comply with the requirement of P.D. 1508 where applicable
is much the same effect produced by non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies; the complaint becomes afflicted
with the vice of pre-maturity; the controversy there alleged
is not ripe for judicial determination. The complaint
becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss.
Parties to disputes cognizable by the lupon should, with
sincerity, exhaust the remedies provided by that law,
government prosecutors should exercise due diligence in
ascertaining compliance with it, and trial courts should not
hesitate to impose the appropriate sanctions for non-
compliance thereof.
Case 5. MORATA v. GO (1983)
FACTS:
1. Spouses Victor and Flora Go filed a complaint
against spouses Julius and Ma. Luisa Morata for recovery
of a sum of money plus damages amounting to P49,400.00
in CFI Cebu.
2. On the basis of the allegation in the complaint that the
parties-litigants are all residents of Cebu City, the Moratas
filed a motion to dismiss, citing as grounds therefor, the
failure of the complaint to allege prior availment by the
Go’s of the barangay conciliation process required by P.D.
1508, as well as the absence of a certification by the Lupon
or Pangkat Secretary that no conciliation or settlement had
been reached by the parties.
3. The motion was opposed by the Gos. The judge denied
the motion to dismiss, ruling that the provision of Sec 6 of
the law applies only to cases cognizable by the inferior
courts mentioned in Secs 11 and 12 of the law.
ISSUE:
WON the complaint should be dismissed for failure to
comply with PD 1508
HELD/RATIO: YES. The nature of the case at bar does
not fall under the exceptions cited in Sections 2 and 6 of
P.D. 1508. Since the law does not distinguish, this
case/dispute should have been first settled amicably by the
Lupon. Furthermore, there is no showing that that the
intention of the law is to restrict its coverage only to cases
cognizable by the inferior courts for it would not have
included the rule on venue provided in Section 3
(pertaining to land disputes which are traditionally
cognizable by CFIs/RTCs) thereof.
This is further supported by Circular No. 22 issued by then
CJ Fernando which gave notice to all CFIs to recognize the
Katarungang Pambarangay Law and desist from acting
upon cases falling within the authority of the Lupons. This
circular was noted by President Marcos.
Hence, the Court declared that the conciliation process at
the barangay level, prescribed by P.D. 1508 as a pre-
condition for filing a complaint in court, is compulsory not
only for cases falling under the exclusive competence of the
metropolitan and municipal trial courts, but for actions
cognizable by the regional trial courts as well.
Case 6 Leticia Agbayani vs. CA, DOJ and Loida
Genabe
G.R. No. 183623, June 25, 2012
FACTS:
1. Petitioner and private respondent are employees
of Branch 275, Las Pinas City working as Court
Stenographer and Legal Researcher II.
2. On December 29, 2006 Agbayani filed a
complaint for grave oral defamation against Genabe. City
Prosecutor of Las Pinas City found probable cause for
grave oral defamation, upon petition for review by Genabe,
DOJ Undersecretary Ernesto Piñeda found only for slight
oral defamation as it was uttered in the heat of anger.
3. DOJ also moved for dismissal of the complaint
for failure to comply with RA 7160, Sec. 408 and 409 (d).
Motion for Reconsideration of Agbayani was denied.
Petition for review on certiorari was filed with CA and
dismissed.
ISSUE:
WON barangay conciliation applicable to the case at bar?
RULING:
Yes, both Agbayani and Genabe are residents of Las Pinas
City and both work there. Pursuant to Sec. 408 and 409 of
RA 7160 the case is subject to barangay conciliation before
filing of court complaint unless it falls under the exception
stated in Sec. 412, RA 7160.
The compulsory process of arbitration is a pre-condition for
the filing of the complaint in court. Where the complainant
(a) did not state that it is one of the excepted cases. (b) it
did not allege prior availment of said conciliation process
or (c) did not have a certification that no conciliation had
been reached by the parties.
Case 7.Valencides Vercide vs Judge Priscilla
Hernandez
AM No. MTJ-00-1265 April 6, 2000

FACTS:

1. Judge Hernandez was charges for grave abuse of

authority and ignorance of the law for her dismissal of
a case which complainant Vericde filed against
Galleros for recovery of possession of land. The land
is located in Upper Centro, Tudela, Misamis
Occidental.
2. Defendant Galleros is a resident of the same
municipality while complainant are residents of
Dipolog City. Because of this fact, the case was filed
in court without prior referral to the Lupong
Tagapamayapa.
3. This matter was raised by the defendant in his answer
as affirmative defense.
4. Respondent judge ordered the dismissal of the case.
5. Vercide move for a motion for reconsideration but was
denied. Hence this appeal.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the lupon has jurisdiction in this case?
Ruling:
1. No, under Sec. 408 (f) of RA 7160: the lupon shall
have the authority to bring together the parties for amicable
settlement except: disputes involving parties who actually
reside in barangays of different municipalities, except such
barangay units adjoin each other and the parties agree to
submit their difference to amicable settle by an appropriate
lupon.