Program 1838645056 XBEHoeQgFB PDF

World history since 1945
(Formerly known as World history since 1917)
J. Kent
IR1034, 2790034
2012
Undergraduate study in
Economics, Management,
Finance and the Social Sciences
This subject guide is for a 100 course offered as part of the University of London
International Programmes in Economics, Management, Finance and the Social Sciences.
This is equivalent to Level 4 within the Framework for Higher Education Qualifications in
England, Wales and Northern Ireland (FHEQ).
For more information about the University of London International Programmes
undergraduate study in Economics, Management, Finance and the Social Sciences, see:
www.londoninternational.ac.uk
This guide was prepared for the University of London International Programmes by:
Dr J. Kent, Department of International Relations, London School of Economics and
Political Science
This is one of a series of subject guides published by the University. We regret that due to
pressure of work the author is unable to enter into any correspondence relating to, or arising
from, the guide. If you have any comments on this subject guide, favourable or unfavourable,
please use the form at the back of this guide.
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© University of London 2012
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Contents
Contents
Chapter 1: Introduction........................................................................................... 1
Studying world history since 1945................................................................................... 1
Aims of the course.......................................................................................................... 1
Learning outcomes......................................................................................................... 2
Using this subject guide.................................................................................................. 2
Syllabus ......................................................................................................................... 3
Essential reading............................................................................................................ 4
Further reading............................................................................................................... 4
General advice on reading for this course........................................................................ 4
Online study resources.................................................................................................... 6
Essay writing.................................................................................................................. 7
Examination advice........................................................................................................ 9
Writing notes............................................................................................................... 10
Chapter 2: Post-war planning and
the breakdown of the Grand Alliance, 1943–46................................................... 13
Learning outcomes ...................................................................................................... 13
Essential reading ......................................................................................................... 13
Further reading............................................................................................................. 13
Introduction................................................................................................................. 13
British and Soviet post-war planning............................................................................. 14
US post-war planning................................................................................................... 15
The Yalta conference, 4–11 February 1945.................................................................... 16
From Yalta to Potsdam, February to July 1945................................................................ 17
Growing conflict, September 1945 to March 1946: from the London
Council of Foreign Ministers to the Iron Curtain speech................................................. 18
A reminder of your learning outcomes........................................................................... 20
Sample examination questions...................................................................................... 20
Chapter 3: The German question and the Marshall Plan:
preventing the spread of Communism, 1946–48.................................................. 21
Learning outcomes....................................................................................................... 21
Essential reading.......................................................................................................... 21
Further reading............................................................................................................. 21
Introduction................................................................................................................. 21
Dividing Germany in 1946............................................................................................ 22
The Marshall Plan and Europe’s economic difficulties, 1947........................................... 25
The origins of NATO, 1948............................................................................................ 26
Chapter 4: The onset of the Cold War: from containment to
rollback, 1948–53.................................................................................................. 29
Further reading............................................................................................................. 29
Origins of the ‘containment’ policy................................................................................ 29
Developments and problems in 1948 – the end of containment?................................... 30
i
34 World history since 1945
NSC 68........................................................................................................................ 30
Eisenhower and Solarium – the end of rollback?........................................................... 31
Chapter 5: Intelligence, propaganda and covert operations................................ 35
Further reading............................................................................................................. 35
Different forms of intelligence ...................................................................................... 35
Contrast between CIA and KGB.................................................................................... 36
US propaganda and covert operations.......................................................................... 37
Operational case studies – Berlin and Cuba ................................................................. 38
Chapter 6: Nuclear weapons and Cold War........................................................... 41
Further reading............................................................................................................. 41
The advent of the atomic bomb.................................................................................... 41
US and Soviet military ideas ......................................................................................... 41
The change with the hydrogen bomb ........................................................................... 42
The SIOP and the Gaither committee............................................................................. 43
The road to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks ............................................................. 44
Deterrence and operational issues................................................................................. 45
Chapter 7 The Sino–Soviet split............................................................................ 47
Learning outcomes ...................................................................................................... 47
Further reading............................................................................................................. 47
Introduction................................................................................................................. 47
General theories........................................................................................................... 47
The origins and causes of the split................................................................................ 48
The development of the split in the early 1950s............................................................ 48
The split after 1956 and Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin........................................ 49
The Sino–Soviet split in the 1960s................................................................................ 50
A reminder of your learning outcomes .......................................................................... 51
Chapter 8 Détente, 1969–79................................................................................. 53
Further reading............................................................................................................. 53
Introduction................................................................................................................. 53
The European origins of détente, 1969–71.................................................................... 54
Détente and Cold War in the changing international system.......................................... 54
Détente 1972–75: US and Soviet aims and expectations .............................................. 55
The collapse of détente, 1976–79................................................................................. 57
ii
Contents
Chapter 9: The Cold War in Asia – Korea............................................................... 59

Further reading............................................................................................................. 59
The domestic and international causes of the North Korean invasion ............................ 59
The US and UN response and the crossing of the
38th parallel................................................................................................................. 60
The Chinese intervention.............................................................................................. 60
The prisoner of war issue ............................................................................................ 62
Armistice and the Korean War as Cold War and hot war................................................ 62
Chapter 10: The Cold War in Asia – Vietnam......................................................... 65
Further reading............................................................................................................. 65
Introduction ................................................................................................................ 65
Eisenhower and the changing Vietnamese nationalist/communist unification
movement.................................................................................................................... 66
Kennedy, Diem and the increased US commitment to Vietnamisation and no US
combat troops.............................................................................................................. 67
Johnson and military escalation.................................................................................... 67
Johnson and the increasing failure of the political struggle............................................ 68
Nixon and Vietnamisation – no peace, no honour ......................................................... 69
Chapter 11: The Soviet Union and the Cold War in eastern Europe,
1947–62................................................................................................................. 73
Further reading ............................................................................................................ 73
The Soviet imposition of governments in eastern and central Europe, 1947 and 1948.... 73
The death of Stalin and the new regime........................................................................ 74
Problems in East Germany............................................................................................ 75
Khrushchev’s policy on Poland and Hungary.................................................................. 76
Khrushchev and the Berlin issue.................................................................................... 77
Chapter 12: The Cold War in Latin America – Guatemala and the
Cuban Revolution, 1950–63.................................................................................. 81
Further reading............................................................................................................. 81
The problems of Guatemala ......................................................................................... 81
The Arbenz reforms....................................................................................................... 82
The reasons for US concern........................................................................................... 82
The CIA-orchestrated overthrow of Arbenz.................................................................... 83
The emergence of Cuban reformist movements............................................................. 85
The Cuban Revolution.................................................................................................. 85
Initial US responses to the emergence of Castro .............................................................. 86
iii
Kennedy, the Alliance for Progress and its impact on Latin America................................ 87
The Bay of Pigs and US reactions to the Cuban Revolution ........................................... 88
Chapter 13: The Cold War in the Middle East – the Arab–Israeli Conflict,
1950–67................................................................................................................. 91
Further reading............................................................................................................. 91
The efforts to find a solution to the Arab–Israeli conflict................................................ 91
The British regional position in the Middle East, the Baghdad Pact and
the growing struggle for influence in the region............................................................ 92
The 1956 Suez–Sinai Campaign.................................................................................... 94
The 1967 Six-Day War.................................................................................................. 95
Chapter 14: The Cold War in the Middle East – the Israeli–Palestinian
Conflict, 1967–2000.............................................................................................. 99
Further reading............................................................................................................. 99
The War of Attrition...................................................................................................... 99
Sadat’s aims and his turn to the USA.......................................................................... 100
The 1973 Yom Kippur War and Soviet–US diplomacy................................................... 101
The rise of Likud and Camp David............................................................................... 102
The 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon.......................................................................... 103
The Intifada................................................................................................................ 104
A reminder of your learning outcomes......................................................................... 107
Sample examination questions.................................................................................... 107
Chapter 15: The Cold War in Africa – the Congo, the UN and Angola,
1959–76............................................................................................................... 109
Learning outcomes..................................................................................................... 109
Essential reading........................................................................................................ 109
Further reading........................................................................................................... 109
The Cold War and Belgian and Portuguese approaches to decolonisation in 1960........ 109
The developing crisis – Congo independence and the secession of Katanga ................ 110
The rebellion in Angola............................................................................................... 112
The UN and the US search for stability and the ending of the Katangan secession........ 113
The ending of secession and the disunity of a unified Congo....................................... 115
Portuguese resistance to self-determination and the Lisbon Coup................................ 116
Angolan independence and the increasing international involvement in a
Cold War conflict........................................................................................................ 117
Chapter 16: The end of the Cold War and the collapse of communism.............. 119
Further reading........................................................................................................... 119
Introduction............................................................................................................... 119
Gorbachev’s rise to power.......................................................................................... 120
iv
Contents
The problems with the Soviet economy....................................................................... 121

The retreat from Afghanistan...................................................................................... 122
The developing spread of the Soviet reformist movement............................................ 123
The impact of Poland and eastern Europe.................................................................... 124
Chapter 17: The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union....... 127
Learning outcomes .................................................................................................... 127
Further reading........................................................................................................... 127
Glasnost, perestroika and the international changes.................................................... 127
The importance of Gorbachev and ideology................................................................. 128
Reforms in eastern Europe.......................................................................................... 129
The rise of Yeltsin and the final days of the Soviet Union.............................................. 130
A new world order begins to emerge, 1990–91.......................................................... 132
A reminder of your learning outcomes ........................................................................ 132
Chapter 18: The USA and the War on Terror........................................................ 135
Further reading........................................................................................................... 135
Terrorism before 9/11................................................................................................. 135
9/11 and its impact.................................................................................................... 138
The problem of Pakistan............................................................................................. 140
Obama’s war.............................................................................................................. 141
Chapter 19: The rise of China.............................................................................. 143
Further reading........................................................................................................... 143
China at the end of the twentieth century................................................................... 143
Twenty-first-century rise – changes in China’s economic and military power................. 144
Economic growth and China’s role in international institutions.................................... 145
Regional influence: cooperation and integration?........................................................ 146
Global or international role – accepting or changing the status quo............................. 147
Chapter 20: The USA and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq............................... 149
Further reading........................................................................................................... 149
The rise of the neo-conservatives................................................................................ 149
The war in Afghanistan, phase 1................................................................................. 150
The build up to the attack on Iraq............................................................................... 151
No success like failure: Operation Iraqi Freedom.......................................................... 153
The invasion of Afghanistan, phase 2.......................................................................... 156
Appendix: Sample examination paper................................................................ 159
v
Notes
vi
Chapter 1: Introduction
Studying world history since 1945

The study of history is essentially about the study of human beings in time.
It therefore encompasses all aspects of human society, institutions and
organisations and the conflicts and disputes within and between them. As
such, it is an open-ended study and students and teachers of history will
always be able to add to their knowledge and interpretations of human
existence in all its aspects. This course aims to explore world history from
the perspective and predominance of international history and is firmly
linked to international relations. At many UK universities, international
history, international relations and international politics are part of the
same discipline within a single department that seeks to analyse and
explain world events within a global framework.
The focus will be on the period after the enormous destruction, and re-
ordering of the political and economic map of the world, brought about by
the Second World War and the rise of a Communist challenge to capitalist
society and to the democratic political system in the West. This challenge
took place when the rise in the economic and military power of the USA
made it the dominant global power after 1945. The aim of this subject is
to focus on the global impact of these key twentieth-century developments
and the impact of the international system becoming a Cold War system,
from the late 1940s until 1991, when the Cold War’s end was followed by
the collapse of the Soviet Union. Looking at the impact of the Cold War
on the different regions of the world provides an opportunity to examine
the relationship between internal and regional conflicts (such as the
Cuban revolution and the Arab–Israeli wars) on the ideological global
competition between the two rival blocs or systems. All the main regions
of the world will be examined, where internal conflicts that were always
connected to the Cold War occurred.
You should be prepared to develop a basic knowledge of the Cold War
history of one or more of the different areas and their contrasting
geographies, cultures and societies. This will be necessary for a better
understanding of the dynamics of Cold War conflict and its components in
different regions of the world.
Aims of the course

The purpose of this course is to develop:
• your ability to think logically and critically
• your knowledge of political and social systems and of the various
cultural influences on policy makers in different parts of the Cold War
world.
A key element is to approach the study of world history in a manageable
way to enable some in-depth knowledge to be developed. At the same
time, it will be necessary for you to understand some major global
features, in this case the Cold War, which influenced all areas of the world
for most of the period. This course is not aiming simply to provide parcels
of self-contained knowledge in a small number of key works or textbooks
but rather to enable connections to be made between places and events
across the world and to encourage understanding and analysis of their
implications. This is always a feature of the study of world history, given
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the size of the geographical area involved. To alleviate this difficulty, world
history courses are usually constructed around a number of themes and
topics which limit the extent of the courses’ coverage and make them more
manageable for students even if acquiring more in-depth knowledge is an
important aspect of historical learning.
Learning outcomes
Having completed this course, and the Essential reading and activities, you
should be able to:
• analyse the nature and significance of the Cold War international system
• explain how the Cold War originated and how and why it ended
• describe how Cold War international crises were perceived and
responded to, particularly by the USA, in various parts of the world
• relate local and regional aspects of particular conflicts to the broader
international aspects of the Cold War which influenced them
• analyse what influenced states and their rulers as they sought to expand
their power and influence and deal with threats to their interests
• become aware of the elements of the Cold War international system
that were connected to the post-Cold War era.
Using this subject guide

A vast subject like world history requires building up knowledge stage by
stage to enable students to make progress in terms of how they approach
their study, and to realise the different levels of understanding inherent
in a process of learning. In some chapters, the subject guide is designed
to provide an introductory framework to enable you to find a way to deal
with the general issues surrounding the topic and to go on to explore
regions and themes in more detail. On smaller topics it will essentially
provide you with information and the main details you need, in a form
which may not be so readily obtainable in a single text elsewhere. Most
topics will initially require the learning of basic knowledge before building
on it with more in-depth reading, so that you can eventually differentiate,
but link, in analytical terms, general analysis and specific interpretation.
The World history since 1945 syllabus outlined below covers a number
of different topics which vary according to region and in regards to their
importance to great power relations and international affairs. Some topics,
such as the origins and early development of the Cold War, are much larger
in terms of their chronological coverage and the amount of historical writing
that they have engendered, than, for example, the Congo crisis or the Cuban
revolution. The selected recommended reading is therefore of particular
value for each topic. With regard to the bigger topics, you will need to do
more reading in order to grasp all aspects of the subject which are introduced
in the guide. The history of the world since 1945 cannot be covered in one or
two essential books. Knowledge of one or two continents is not essential for
an understanding of the world, however significant the power and influence
of particular states might be. This subject guide is designed only to provide
an introduction and framework for you in order that you can eventually,
if you wish, focus your reading more effectively. The principles that are
important for historical learning remain the foundations for students to build
on by adding to previous study and not just seeing the world as collection of
self-contained, separate packages. This is the process to which this subject
guide contributes by laying an important basis upon which to build.
2
Be aware that the bigger topics may not be the most complex or the most
difficult to come to terms with, and you should bear in mind that the
examination is not guaranteed to contain a question on every chapter. In
addition, the smaller topics may well provide more demanding questions
which will require you to have developed a more detailed knowledge from
your reading. You will not, however, be required to write answers to very
broad chronological questions such as ‘Examine the changes in US foreign
policy between 1945 and 1979’.
Reading is always the key to the study of history and you will not do well
if you are not prepared to read widely. The subject guide is, however,
intended to make you think about important historical issues and, as with
many of the books on the reading list, is designed to encourage you to
think critically and to ask yourself questions rather than to provide you
with information or ready-made answers. For more details on reading and
taking notes, see below.
Syllabus
The syllabus focuses on four main themes:
• the breakdown of the Grand Alliance and the origins of the Cold War
• the nature of the Cold War conflict and its covert operations and
propaganda
• the impact of the Cold War in different regions of the world
• the end of the Cold War world and the emergence of new forces in the
post-Cold War world.
Students should concentrate on the nature, origins or end of the Cold War
and at least one region to understand the nature of the Cold War system.
Origins
• The breakdown of the Grand Alliance
• The German Question and the Marshall Plan
• Rollback and ‘containment’.
Nature
• Covert operations and propaganda
• Nuclear weapons
• Sino-Soviet split
• Détente.
Regions
• Europe
• Latin America
• Asia
• Africa
• The Middle East.
End
• The end of Communism and the collapse of the Soviet Union
• The post-Cold War world.
3
Essential reading
Westad, O.A. The global Cold War: third world interventions and the making of
our times. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007)
[ISBN 9780521703147].
Young, J.W. and J. Kent International relations since 1945: a global history.
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) [ISBN 9780198781646].
Chapters also contain more detailed Essential reading lists as it is
categorised by time period and topic. Detailed reading references in this
subject guide refer to the editions of the set textbooks listed above. New
editions of one or more of these textbooks may have been published by
the time you study this course. You can use a more recent edition of any
of the books; use the detailed chapter and section headings and the index
to identify relevant readings. Also check the virtual learning environment
(VLE) regularly for updated guidance on readings.
Further reading
Please note that as long as you read the Essential reading you are then
free to read around the subject area in any text, paper or online resource.
You will need to support your learning by reading as widely as possible. To
help you read extensively, you have free access to the VLE and University
of London Online Library (see below).
Other useful texts for this course include:
Leffler, M.P For the soul of mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union and the
Cold War. (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007) [ISBN 9780374531423].
Zubok, V.M A failed empire: the Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to
Gorbachev. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009)
[ISBN 9780807859582].
Again, chapters also contain more detailed Further reading lists.
General advice on reading for this course

A vast numbers of books are required for an in-depth understanding of
the world’s history, and we can’t pretend that a single textbook to explain
the world is possible or desirable. The aim is to advise you as to which
books are most useful in providing some important, but more limited,
ideas and knowledge in terms of what is covered. It will be useful for
you to try and achieve a general knowledge and some ideas and debates
on many of the topics can be found in Young and Kent on the Cold War
world. For more detailed reading you need to be selective in terms of the
number of books you read, and what you note about them. An important
part of your historical education means developing an ability to make
judgements about what you should and should not read on the basis of
what is important or relevant to your particular task, or in response to
assessing what particular questions require. An alternative approach is
to try and concentrate on detailed studies, and read until you feel that
you have a sound understanding of the major problems on any of the
themes or geographical areas, and are able to write a fair answer to any
essay question you have been asked.When reading the more detailed
books, do not simply read everything from cover-to-cover: some books are
worth reading as a whole but generally you should use books selectively,
looking only at sections that are relevant to your needs. You need to distil
4
from them their main arguments, to note down some factual illustrations
that enforce these arguments (dates, events, actions of key characters,
statistics, etc.) and sometimes to write out key quotes (but keep these to a
minimum, since they are difficult to remember in examinations).
It can be difficult to understand the main arguments of a large book at first
and the problem is always what exactly to note down (see also ‘Writing
notes’ below). To some extent this requires practice, but it is possible to
distil the main arguments from a book by reading either the introduction,
or the conclusion, or the introductions and conclusions to individual
chapters. At these points almost every book contains a summary of its
main ideas. The Young and Kent text has summaries/introductions to all
of its chronological sections. Once you are aware of the main arguments,
then any subsidiary arguments and any illustrations or good quotes should
also begin to stand out.
Some students believe in ‘skim-reading’: they simply read the first sentence
of each paragraph. In some books this may not be a bad idea but in
general it is a rather crude way of going about things. However, it can
be useful to skim-read a book at first in order to get the gist of what it is
saying – then go back and read it in greater detail.
Again, practice should enable you to keep notes on books to a minimum
(perhaps four to six sides on major works; but others should be shorter
or you’ll simply end up with too much). But initially you may find yourself
writing down more than the essential arguments and illustrations. You
must work at preventing this because otherwise you will not be making
the best use of your time.
There is no clearly defined daily or weekly time which you should
designate as reading time. In part this is because people read with
different degrees of speed and effectiveness. Also you should remember
that there are always new things to learn and discover, and the more you
read, the better your chances of doing well in the examination, provided
you can organise the ideas you have developed from your reading.
Reading without thinking about, and organising, the material will not form
an adequate basis for your learning experience. Remember that full-time
internal students have four history courses each year, with at least two
hours per week of lectures or tutorials for each course.
After reading several books you may be able to distinguish several
approaches to a question. It is then important to note down these
differences: it can be useful in essays to show that you understand
different schools of thought on an issue, the various arguments used to
back them up and any differing interpretations of evidence.
Once you have taken notes from all the above sources, we would advise
you to boil them down into a single, coherent, comprehensive set of
notes, suitable for quick revision. Some students prefer not to do this, but
others can become confused in examinations as they try to fuse together
ideas drawn from several sets of notes. A single set of notes will iron out
any discrepancies, knock out repetitions and expose any remaining gaps
in your knowledge. It will also force you to make final decisions on what
you think about a historical problem: what elements are most important,
where do you stand in any debate and why do you take this viewpoint?
Again, a single, well-structured set of notes will allow you to adapt quickly
in examinations to whatever question appears.
5
Online study resources

In addition to the subject guide and the Essential reading, it is crucial that
you take advantage of the study resources that are available online for this
course, including the VLE and the Online Library.
You can access the VLE, the Online Library and your University of London
email account via the Student Portal at:
http://my.londoninternational.ac.uk
You should have received your login details for the Student Portal with
your official offer, which was emailed to the address that you gave
on your application form. You have probably already logged in to the
Student Portal in order to register! As soon as you registered, you will
automatically have been granted access to the VLE, Online Library and
your fully functional University of London email account.
If you forget your login details at any point, please email uolia.support@
london.ac.uk quoting your student number.
The VLE
The VLE, which complements this subject guide, has been designed to
enhance your learning experience, providing additional support and a
sense of community. It forms an important part of your study experience
with the University of London and you should access it regularly.
The VLE provides a range of resources for EMFSS courses:
• Self-testing activities: Doing these allows you to test your own
understanding of subject material.
• Electronic study materials: The printed materials that you receive from
the University of London are available to download, including updated
reading lists and references.
• Past examination papers and Examiners’ commentaries: These provide
advice on how each examination question might best be answered.
• A student discussion forum: This is an open space for you to discuss
interests and experiences, seek support from your peers, work
collaboratively to solve problems and discuss subject material.
• Videos: There are recorded academic introductions to the subject,
interviews and debates and, for some courses, audio-visual tutorials
and conclusions.
• Recorded lectures: For some courses, where appropriate, the sessions
from previous years’ Study Weekends have been recorded and made
available.
• Study skills: Expert advice on preparing for examinations and
developing your digital literacy skills.
• Feedback forms.
Some of these resources are available for certain courses only, but we
are expanding our provision all the time and you should check the VLE
regularly for updates.
Making use of the Online Library

The Online Library contains a huge array of journal articles and other
resources to help you read widely and extensively.
To access the majority of resources via the Online Library you will either
need to use your University of London Student Portal login details, or you
6
will be required to register and use an Athens login:

http://tinyurl.com/ollathens
The easiest way to locate relevant content and journal articles in the
Online Library is to use the Summon search engine.
If you are having trouble finding an article listed in a reading list, try
removing any punctuation from the title, such as single quotation marks,
question marks and colons.
For further advice, please see the online help pages:
www.external.shl.lon.ac.uk/summon/about.php
Essay writing
History does not lend itself to ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ answers to questions, and
there is no single ‘correct’ approach to any important historical problem.
It is possible to write essays on the same question using different material
and reaching different conclusions which both gain the same good mark.
Students should be aware that it is not acquiring information that is
central to the higher education learning experience. It is the ability to
adapt that information and express it linguistically through arguments
that provide relevant answers to questions and to select the appropriate
evidence that supports particular arguments. Learning how to think is a
more important part of the learning experience than acquiring information
that simply describes how a particular author portrays historical events.
The following provides advice to those answering historical questions
in essay work and examinations, points out some pitfalls and suggests
possible approaches to major problems.
Notes for essay writing

After choosing the questions which you wish to answer, you will need to
amass a body of information and organise it into a coherent set of notes
(more on this below). As you read, note down not just information but
points to emphasise, investigate or question. Do not simply copy out
relevant passages (unless they merit direct quotation). Instead, try
to summarise or analyse them in your own words. Make sure you take
notes on the analysis of the facts rather than simply acquiring the factual
information (for more details on note taking, see below).
It is best to structure your notes in such a way that they can be used to
answer a wide range of essay questions on any given topic. This can be
achieved by subdividing notes thematically. For example, on the origins of
the Cold War, you might have subdivisions covering the origins between
1944 and 1946 and between 1946 and 1948, the ideological differences,
the economic aspects, the particular points of dispute, then on the 1948 to
1950 period with the establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency and
the growing importance of the Cold War and military rearmament. From
these notes, you will be able to answer a broad range of questions on the
early Cold War.
Answering the question

The greatest problem in writing a history essay is deciding exactly what
is required from a given question. Frequently students lose most marks
by failing to answer the question and only providing information on
the topic in general, so this weakness deserves close attention. It means
that selecting and interpreting the information most relevant to the
question is important and doing the reading that this requires is the
first stage.
7
Having read some of the material and become aware of the issues it
addresses and what might be important and gathered a comprehensive set
of notes you must be able to select the most relevant material and be able
to use it to ask as well as to answer questions.
• In its simplest form, failing to answer the question may simply mean
getting the subject wrong: asked to write an essay on the Truman
Doctrine you write one on the Eisenhower Doctrine. The only way to
avoid this is to read the question thoroughly and think carefully. But
such basic errors are very rare.
• Another problem is when only half of a question is answered. ‘Why,
and with what consequences, did the USA intervene in Guatemala?’
requires you to answer both parts. Too often this kind of question is
simply answered from the viewpoint of ‘Why?’; you also need to say
something about the results of US intervention. Far more common
is a failure to direct your answer specifically at the question. It
is very easy to slip into writing ‘all I know about’ a particular issue.
For example, when faced with the question: ‘How far was the USA
responsible for the onset of the Cold War?’ you might mistakenly either
write a general history of US foreign policy in the years after 1945 or
a general account of the early years of the Cold War. Obviously some
points about US foreign policy are needed here; details of the early
Cold War years are certainly needed. But you must direct yourself at
the question, looking at the USA’s role in the early Cold War years in
some detail, and then assessing (e.g. by looking at the role of the Soviet
Union) the significance of this in leading to conflict.
• Always think about exactly what the question requires in
order to answer it effectively and plan your essay accordingly.
This crucial operation should not be left until the end of your reading
but should go on continuously throughout. As your reading progresses,
decide on which books or articles are most relevant. Then plan the
stages of your argument in more detail. What specific points need to
be made? In what order and with what relative emphasis? Can they be
clarified by well-chosen examples or quotations? Planning your essay
will help you to avoid the pitfalls mentioned below.
• Answers can be unbalanced if too much time is spent on background
and not enough on the essence of the problem; too much can be
written on one theme when numerous issues need to be discussed.
• A particular problem with history questions is slipping into a purely
chronological narrative. It is very easy to produce a list of facts
and dates without argument or analysis. But factual material should be
used as a ‘skeleton’ around which an analysis is based. (The opposite
problem is a diatribe: all opinion and no evidence). An answer
needs analysis.
• You cannot get away with ‘yes’ or ‘no’ even if the question could be
answered in this way.
Structure
An essay needs to have a paragraph structure through which the argument
that is appropriate to answer the question is developed. Ideally, this
should include an introduction to ‘set the scene’ or to indicate how the
argument is going to develop; a number of paragraphs, each dedicated
to a particular element in an answer; and a conclusion, which draws
elements together, looks back to the original question and reaches sensible
and coherent conclusions about it.
8
When questions ask you to produce a ‘list’ of factors, e.g. ‘Why did the
Israelis win the 1967 war against the Arab states?’, the structure is fairly
easy: each paragraph can look at a particular factor. But questions which
ask you to ‘discuss’ an issue will need more thought. In such circumstances
your answer should show that you understand the question, and
for some questions it will be useful to be aware of different schools of
thought on a particular problem (the various ideas put by historians),
but that you have a case of your own, which you favour, and which
you develop in the essay from the analysis and information provided by
the readings. You are not required to be completely original and will need
to rely on the ideas of others. But, by being aware of the implications
of others’ ideas and being able to adapt them to what is required by the
question, you are constructing something linguistically that will form the
best answers but also constitute an element of originality.
Style
In general, your style should be crisp, precise and lucid: use clear,
understandable English to make your points. Don’t waffle (i.e. write for
the sake of writing). Don’t be repetitive. Don’t overwrite (i.e. with long,
overly-descriptive sentences).
There are various other things to avoid: bad spelling; colloquialisms
(everyday English doesn’t always sound good on paper); long or
convoluted sentences. The use of the first person (I think...’ and ‘In my
view ...’) should also be avoided.
Once you’ve finished an essay a good idea is to leave it overnight or even
longer before reading it over. It is easier to pick up on errors in this way.
Examination advice
Important: the information and advice given here are based on the
examination structure used at the time this guide was written. Please
note that subject guides may be used for several years. Because of this we
strongly advise you to always check both the current Regulations for relevant
information about the examination, and the VLE where you should be
advised of any forthcoming changes. You should also carefully check the
rubric/instructions on the paper you actually sit and follow those instructions.
Some additional advice for examinations:
• Read all the questions. Make sure that there are no supplementary pages,
or questions printed overleaf. You must give yourself the maximum choice.
• Follow the rubric, at the top of the page, on how many questions
to answer: there’s no point answering four questions if only three are
required. Also avoid answering three questions from Section A when
you should have answered one each from Sections A, B and C. In order
to maximise your mark it is vital to answer the required number
of questions. If you are only left with 20 minutes and are running
out of ideas you can at least hope to pick up some marks – whereas
writing nothing will get no marks at all.
• Choose the questions you answer carefully, making sure that you
have the necessary material facts and argument to provide an
adequate answer. It is at this point that having taken a full and well-
structured set of notes proves valuable.
• Once again, always answer the question. It is particularly easy to
stray from the point in exams.
9
• In exam conditions you should still seek to structure what you

write – ‘setting the scene’ in an introduction, tackling the problem in
separate paragraphs, and reaching a conclusion, with a good mix of
fact and analysis. It is important to be able to plan roughly the areas
that the answer needs to develop to construct the argument. In exams
you should never write ‘this essay will first state… and ‘secondly will
argue’... ‘Finally the essay will...’. You are simply wasting time by
writing this. The Examiners will know what the essay has done when
they have read it.
• Even though you will be rushed, write as neatly and legibly as
possible. Otherwise you may lose marks.
Remember, it is important to check the VLE for:
• up-to-date information on examination and assessment arrangements
for this course
• where available, past examination papers and Examiners’ commentaries
for the course which give advice on how each question might best be
answered.
Writing notes
In order to complete any course in Arts and Social Sciences it is vital to
produce a set of notes, taken from books and articles. These notes must
eventually provide you with the necessary arguments, ideas and facts with
which to answer essay questions, during the year and in examinations.
The purpose of this section is to give some general hints on how to go
about writing notes. As with essay-writing, it is impossible to make any
hard-and-fast rules about note making. Everyone will write different notes
on the same book or on the same article. Nevertheless, it is possible to lay
down certain guidelines and to emphasise what you should not be doing.
The first step is, of course, to decide which topics you wish to write notes
on. To an extent this should suit your own interests, but it will also be
dictated by the exercises you are intending to do during the year and by
the questions which appear on examination papers. Past examination
questions may help provide you with a focus for the various ideas which
appear in books as well as giving hints as to future questions.
Ultimately a set of notes, on each of the topics you have chosen to cover,
should be:
• short enough so that you can revise from them quickly, but
comprehensive enough to answer a range of questions on a given topic
or area
• easy to understand – usually by being divided into several major
headings, each of which may have a number of sub-headings, and with
a wide range of short, clear analytical points, if necessary, backed up
by some selected factual illustrations (dates and events, or statistics,
etc.). In any set of notes you should use a form of shorthand as far
as possible (e.g. B for Britain; Gov for government; WW2 for Second
World War; 20thc for twentieth century; cld for could, etc.). The more
abbreviations you can make without making the notes difficult to
decipher the better
10
• able to provide a clear introduction to the main elements under every

topic, or in an article or chapter of a book. Again, a balanced sub-
division of notes into major headings will enable you to use one set of
notes, with some quick re-structuring, to answer several questions
• a mixture of arguments and facts, but with the emphasis on argument
and analysis. This will ensure that the essays you write are based on
analysis first and foremost. Notes must avoid mere chronology and
the simple repetition of facts. Dates and events should illustrate an
argument, not become a substitute for it.
By the time of the examinations, you should aim to write a single set of
notes on each topic you have selected.
11
Notes
12
Chapter 2: Post-war planning and the breakdown of the Grand Alliance, 1943–46
Chapter 2: Post-war planning and

the breakdown of the Grand Alliance,
1943–46
Learning outcomes
By the end of this chapter, and having completed the Essential reading and
activities, you should be able to:
• explain what each of the Big Three allies sought to achieve from the
post-war settlement
• describe the different areas of disagreement that developed after Yalta
and before the London Council of Foreign Ministers
• discuss which agreements at Yalta were broken
• show an understanding of the different reasons for the increased
tensions that developed in the Grand Alliance by 1946.
Essential reading
Leffler, M.P. ‘The emergence of an American grand strategy, 1945–1952’ in
Leffler, M.P. and O.A. Westad (eds) The Cambridge history of the Cold War Vol
1. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010) [ISBN 9780521837194].
Pechtanov, V.O. ‘The Soviet Union and the world 1944–53’ in Leffler, M.P. and
O.A. Westad (eds) The Cambridge history of the Cold War Vol 1. (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2010) [ISBN 9780521837194].
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) [ISBN 9780198781646] Chapters
1A, 1B, 1C and 1D.
Further reading
Harbutt, F.J. Yalta 1945: Europe and America at the crossroads. (New York:
Leffler, M.P. and D.S. Painter (eds) Origins of the Cold War. (New York:
Routledge, 2005) [ISBN 9780415341103] Introduction.
Mark, E. ‘American policy towards Eastern Europe 1941–1946 and the origins
of the Cold War’, Journal of American History 68(2) 1981, pp.313–36.
Reynolds, D. From world war to Cold War: Churchill, Roosevelt and the
international history of the 1940s. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007)
[ISBN 9780199237616] Chapters 13–15.
Introduction
The planning by the Western allies for the post-war world began very early
on in the conflict. For the USA, official consideration of the type of world
order that was generally desirable and which would serve particular US
interests started before the attack on Pearl Harbour brought the USA into
the war. On both sides of the Atlantic the initial assumption was that the
European settlement and the problem of Germany would primarily be the
responsibility of Britain and the Soviet Union. For the Soviets, the overriding
concern was future German aggression and the means to ensure that they
would not have to deal with it alone. At the same time, early on in the war,
the British government was eager to deal with Stalin, culminating in the
1942 Anglo–Soviet treaty. 13
The Roosevelt administration was pledged to postpone firm post-war

arrangements until after the defeat of Germany, but the principles on
which the new post-war order would be based were open for discussion.
These were represented early on in the Atlantic Charter drawn up on an
Anglo–American basis, with its commitment to ensure that all peoples had
the right to choose the form of government under which they should live.
These principles were always at the forefront of US officials’ minds, as the
Atlantic Charter was geared to a political and economic order that would
enable US ideals and economic influence to predominate. Significantly, by
1943 the Allies knew that they would eventually win the war – the only
issue was when. However, all outcomes would be threatened if a separate
peace was made with Germany and its enemies, of which Stalin in
particular was highly suspicious. Churchill was unequivocally committed
to the alliance with communism as a means to defeat Hitler in the west,
but there was a minority on the right, in and around the Conservative
party, who saw the real enemy as Soviet communism which inevitably had
an impact on post-war planning.
British and Soviet post-war planning

By 1944 the British were becoming more concerned with the occupation
forces in Europe as the Soviet armies advanced westwards. They worried
that their Polish allies would be unwilling to accept the necessary reality
of cooperation with the victorious Soviets and that the latter would not
allow the Poles sufficient involvement in the political process after the
war. Western concern was intensified after Stalin’s refusal to permit the
Red Army to advance and thus prevent the Germans massacring those
Poles participating in the August 1944 Warsaw uprising. Overall, British
concerns for the European situation were a strange mix of conflicting
hopes and fears. On the one hand, Churchill was concerned that the
Soviets might not advance far enough westwards to ensure the defeat of
Germany, which would then be left to the British and the Americans. On
the other, he was worried that such an advance, particularly in the south,
would have adverse implications for Britain’s dominant position in the
eastern Mediterranean arena where Greece and Bulgaria were particularly
significant. The armistice and post-war planning committee, until the
intervention of the deputy prime minister Clement Attlee, was considering
the dispatch of British troops to Bulgaria.
The Soviets were looking for the kind of cooperation with Britain that
would increase the ability of the Soviet Union to exercise control over
eastern and central Europe in order to eliminate any revival of a German
threat and ensure control over those areas that had been traditional Soviet
enemies. European peace after the war would be based on this, as it was
assumed that the USA would not play an important role in any detailed
arrangements for Europe which would essentially depend on Britain and
the Soviet Union. The degree to which Stalin was prepared to concede a
role to Britain depended very much after 1942 on the successes which the
Red Army were having against the German Wehrmacht.
The main Soviet aims were to reinforce the gains made as a result of the
Nazi–Soviet Pact and to ensure that they had more control of the non-
ethnic Polish border areas which were at the centre of longstanding Russo–
Polish rivalry. The British were aware of obligations to the Poles because
of the contributions many of them were making to the war in the west
by fighting as members of the British armed services. However, security
for the Soviets implied control of those areas, particularly Poland and
14
Romania, which had produced conflict in the past, and an increased Soviet
influence in eastern Europe, which the inter-war incorporation of the
Baltic states into the Soviet Union, had represented. Containing Germany
was central to Soviet concerns about the future of Europe even if there
was a fine line between security and imperialism. The need to control
regions of eastern and central Europe was behind the agreement made by
Stalin with Churchill in October 1944 when 90 per cent of Romania was
deemed to come under Soviet influence and 10 per cent under British. In
return Greece would be 90 per cent under British influence and Bulgaria
and Hungary would be 75 per cent Soviet and 25 per cent British, all
of which indicated a joint Anglo–Soviet acceptance of the spheres of
influence principle for the post-war European order.
The British empire was the main reason why that principle of exclusive
influence embodied in spheres of influence for each of the great powers
was acceptable. Churchill, in particular, was adamant that he would
not be the prime minister to preside over the dissolution of the British
empire, however much the USA wanted to break the economic barrier
that imperial preference and the sterling area presented to US trade and
a more liberal multilateral economic order. The key imperial area in 1945
was no longer India but centred on the British position in the Middle
East in the form of colonies in the Gulf and the Mediterranean and those
territories which were nominally independent but in reality under effective
British domination. The most important was Egypt, as it contained the
largest military base in the world on the Suez Canal, although Iraq and the
mandate of Palestine were also noteworthy. This significant area of vital
interest bordered on the eastern Mediterranean and important European
countries to the north, such as Greece and Bulgaria, and thus there was
a potential clash between Soviet and British areas of influence. This was
made much worse by the long-expressed Soviet desire to have unfettered
access for their warships through the Straits of the Dardanelles – therefore
there would be a need to reconcile these vital British and Soviet concerns.
US post-war planning
The USA was primarily interested in defining the regulatory principles
and institutions which would govern the post-war international economic
order. Despite Sumner Welles (who along with Harry Hopkins was a key
policy-making confidante of Franklin Roosevelt) being forced to resign
from the government in late 1943, the US president continued to move
away from the idea of a purely great power peace after the war. The
position of the USA was enhanced more and more by its remarkable
economic growth and as it became the key supplier of armaments and
military equipment plus food stuffs and consumer goods for the domestic
market, more attention had to be given to ensuring that the post-war
world order could maintain that growth and there would be no threat
of a return to the Depression days. It thus made the idea of a world of
spheres of influence, originally favoured by Roosevelt on the basis of
the four major Allied powers acting as policeman each with a sphere of
influence, less significant. Despite the signing of the Atlantic Charter, with
its emphasis on lesser and newly emerging states, before 1944 the idea
was still that the initial post-war period should be dominated by the great
powers acting as four policemen.
It was also believed before the beginning of the war that an economic
order emphasising open access to primary produce and raw materials
would prevent the economic competition and conflict over future attempts
15
to control these markets and their produce. During the war institutions
such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
were set up at the 1944 Bretton Woods conference. A number of political
principles were now deemed necessary to be put in place and these were
embodied in a new international organisation of allied nations, which
came to be particularly favoured by the Roosevelt administration. All
nations would be represented, even if the great powers on the security
council had a veto over any actions that might be taken by the new United
Nations organisation. They reflected the principles of the Atlantic Charter
of democracy for all people, not just those who had escaped from Nazi
tyranny. On the other hand the commitment to a certain type of domestic
political systems as an international principle did not rule out spheres of
influence for the USA who had the regions of east Asia and the Pacific, and
Central and South America very much in mind as areas of predominant
US influence.
Activity
To what extent had the British and Soviets agreed on the post-war arrangements for
Europe by the end of 1944?
Important dates
1941 Atlantic Charter drawn up by Churchill and Roosevelt
1942 Anglo–Soviet treaty
1943 Tehran conference
1944 Tolstoy conference between Churchill and Stalin
1945 January USSR requests a US loan
The Yalta conference, 4–11 February 1945

Yalta has largely been dominated by mythology, including that it was the
conference that divided Europe. In reality it was the conference where
some key decisions on controversial issues for the future were postponed.
The British were delighted with what they regarded as Stalin’s conciliatory
tones. And, however self-interested these were, there can be no doubt that
all three leaders were more willing to consider compromises over how
to realise particular goals in early 1945. It was thus unfortunate that the
spirit of compromise in much of the conference, which had implications
for global principles versus the spheres of influence approaches, did
not last.
At Yalta, a ‘spheres of influence’ arrangement in Asia seemed to be added
to the European one made by Stalin and Churchill as Roosevelt and Stalin
agreed that southern Sakhalin should be taken from Japan and restored to
the Soviet Union along with the Kurile Islands, all without consulting the
wishes of the inhabitants about the form of government under which they
would live. At the same time the declarations on Poland and the European
territories liberated from the Nazis contained important principles to be
put into practice.
16
Yalta was a meeting that had the shadow of cooperation hovering over
it, as all three leaders made clear the importance of the settlement to
be produced and the enormous responsibility they had for the future
peace and prosperity of the whole world. There was a reluctance to
take disagreement into confrontation, helped by the fact that the areas
dealt with at Yalta were predominantly those in Europe so that only the
Soviets were likely to have really vital interests at stake there. Some areas
that were potentially confrontational like reparations and the Straits
convention were postponed or only partial agreement achieved with some
remaining details to be dealt with later.
For the full agreed Yalta protocols, see www.fordham.edu/halsall/
mod/1945YALTA.html
Activity
Identify which issues remained unsettled after Yalta.
From Yalta to Potsdam, February to July 1945

The key omission at Yalta, due to its importance for economic issues
and the political treatment of Germany, was the Polish–German border
that would depend on a frontier agreement that was reached on the
boundary line between Poland and the Soviet Union in the east. The
idea was essentially to constitute the old frontier, defined by the former
British foreign secretary Lord Curzon, with substantial concessions made
to compensate Poland in the north and west. Poland was, in effect, to
be shifted westwards but no agreement was reached on the boundary
with Germany as a result of this shift. In particular, the issue of whether
the frontier would follow the eastern Neisse or the western Neisse River
was not resolved, and it was left to the Soviets who were administering
the eastern zone of Germany to make a de facto decision for practical
purposes. The Soviets thus decided, for their own advantage, to use the
western Neisse, which incorporated more land into Poland, and meant
that the agricultural produce from the area would go to the Poles (or the
Soviets) and not to feed Germans in the two western zones of Germany.
The result was that the British had to import wheat for German industrial
workers in its zone. That was the reason why Britain had to introduce
bread rationing after the war and had implications for the already
agreed decision to administer Germany as a single economic unit that first
required agreement on the levels of German imports and exports.
The Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe, which stipulated that interim
governments would be formed from all democratic elements in the
population with a commitment to hold free elections at the earliest
possible moment in the areas liberated from the Germans, was not
complied with by the Soviets. Neither the pre-Yalta provisional Polish
Lublin government nor the government imposed in Romania after Yalta
met these criteria, which was a source of both US and British concern. The
visit by Harry Hopkins to Moscow to reach an agreement with Stalin on
the broadening of the Polish government to make it more representative
was actually successful but had little or no effect on the ability of the
Soviets to control the Lublin government. Concern was also developing
in London over Soviet ambitions to get a UN trusteeship over the Italian
colony of Tripolitania, in present day Libya, which threatened British
predominance in the Mediterranean.
17
Important dates
Soviets install puppet government in Romania in breach of the agreed Yalta
1945 February
Declaration on Liberated Europe
March Soviet claim on Turkey for their former provinces of Kars and Ardahan
April Death of Roosevelt
April Truman confronts Molotov over the failure to stick to all of the Yalta agreements
May Germany surrenders
May–June Hopkins mission to Moscow appears to solve the Polish issue
June UN Charter agreed at San Francisco
June Soviets inform Turkey of their desire for bases in the Straits
Potsdam Conference agreed protocols: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/
July–August
decade17.asp
Growing conflict, September 1945 to March 1946: from

the London Council of Foreign Ministers to the Iron
Curtain speech
The key role of Potsdam was to try and provide more substance to the
agreements already outlined at Yalta for the treatment of Germany, and to
formalise arrangements for the future Council of Foreign Ministers and the
peace treaties with Germany’s allies. The agreements related essentially to
the treatment of Germany, as no agreement was reached on Romania or the
issues of the disposal of the Italian colonies especially in the Mediterranean.
Economic arrangements for Germany and the temporary confirmation
of the Polish–German frontier until a final settlement was reached with
Germany were made. These agreements confirmed the treatment of
Germany as a single economic unit and complicated the reaching of
agreements on the levels of imports and exports from the three zones by
stipulating the reparations that were to be exacted from individual zones in
relation to the needs of Germany as a single economic unit. The principles
of demilitarisation and deindustrialisation were confirmed as part of
preventing a revival of the German threat but, as quickly became obvious,
industrial production was essential if the means of purchasing grain were to
be found for the industrial western zones, particularly the Ruhr area.
The London Council of Foreign Ministers marked a significant step in
the journey away from an acceptance on all sides of the need to consider
compromises, towards the increasing use of confrontation as a means of
securing important post-war aims. The procedural technicalities which
apparently produced the breakdown of the Council have to be seen against
the growing confrontation, not just over eastern and central Europe
and the Mediterranean, but also over the Pacific where the USA as the
occupying power in Japan was initially reluctant, at the London Council,
even to consider an Allied control commission as in the eastern European
territories. There was also the reluctance of the USA to place the use
and development of atomic power under international auspices. Byrnes,
Truman’s secretary of state, particularly hoped to use the US atomic
monopoly as a diplomatic weapon that would exert pressure to secure
acceptance of US principles in the post-war settlement.
With the breakup of the London Council, the British Foreign Office
considered whether an arrangement that recognised Soviet dominance
in eastern Europe in return for British dominance in the Middle East and
the Mediterranean should be attempted as a way of acknowledging the
18
vital interests of both parties. This was ruled out by the British foreign
secretary Ernest Bevin because of its impact on the position of the UK as
a great world power, but the USA remained willing to compromise over
the Romanian and Bulgarian governments. When the Council of Foreign
Ministers met in Moscow in December with just British, Soviet and US
representatives this gesture was made and was in effect the last real
attempt at concessions and compromise.
Domestically in the USA there was an increase in the public’s perception
that the post-war international order was not being designed in
accordance with US principles and ideals which were ostensibly to serve
the causes of peace and prosperity. In part, this was a result of the Yalta
deal on Soviet gains in the Pacific becoming public, but was also connected
to the evidence of Soviet controls in eastern Europe and the arguments
on procedure which had characterised the London Council of Foreign
Ministers. Whether a spheres of influence arrangement would have
prevented the moves towards an acceptance of confrontation is a moot
point. Yet growing confrontation was clearly beginning to characterise the
Grand Alliance – in February 1946 George Kennan from the US embassy in
Moscow sent a gloomy assessment of Soviet policy which was made into a
milestone in the development of the Cold War.
Activity
Explain which areas were the most important sources of disagreement at the Potsdam
conference.
Important dates
Atomic bombs dropped on Japan
1945 August Soviets enter the war against Japan
Japan ceases fighting
London Council of Foreign Ministers:
September–October
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/decade18.asp *
US public opinion poll indicated 54 per cent of US citizens
September
trust the Soviet Union to cooperate
Communists defeated in free Hungarian elections by the
November
Smallholders party
US public opinion poll indicates only 44 per cent of US
November
citizens trust the Soviet Union to cooperate
December Moscow Council of Foreign Ministers
Etheridge report concludes that to concede a Soviet sphere of

December
influence in eastern Europe would be to invite its extension
Iran complains to the UN about alleged Soviet interference in
1946 January
its internal affairs
January Truman tells Byrnes he is tired of babying the Soviets
Stalin’s speech calling for a five-year plan to prepare for the

1946 February
inevitable conflict between communism and capitalism
Soviets fail to withdraw troops from Iran in accordance with
March
agreement
March Churchill’s iron curtain speech at Fulton, Missouri
* This is a report by Secretary of State James Byrnes on the meetings not an official US
record of them.
19
A reminder of your learning outcomes

Having completed this chapter, and the Essential reading and activities,
you should be able to:
• explain what each of the Big Three Allies sought to achieve from the
post-war settlement
• describe the different areas of disagreement that developed after Yalta
and before the London Council of Foreign Ministers
• discuss which agreements at Yalta were broken
• show an understanding of the different reasons for the increased
tensions that developed in the Grand Alliance by 1946.
Sample examination questions

Write an essay in 45 minutes in answer to one of the following questions.
1. Why did the settlement with Germany become more significant
between Yalta and January 1946?
2. To what extent was Poland a key issue in producing Allied
disagreement in 1946?
3. Did the Cold War originate primarily from global or regional causes?
4. How important were disagreements between Britain and the Soviet
Union in producing the breakdown of the Grand Alliance?
20
Chapter 3: The German question and the Marshall Plan: preventing the spread of Communism, 1946–48
Chapter 3: The German question and the

Marshall Plan: preventing the spread of
Communism, 1946–48
Learning outcomes
• provide an explanation of the role of economic issues in the development
of the Cold War
• outline the way in which German policy was defined and implemented
by the Allies between 1946 and 1948
• identify the political and military issues in 1946 and 1947 which
produced NATO.
Essential reading
Leffler, M.P. ‘The emergence of an American grand strategy, 1945–1952’ in
Leffler, M.P. and O.A. Westad (eds) The Cambridge history of the Cold
War Vol 1. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010)
[ISBN 9780521837194].
Pechtanov, V.O. ‘The Soviet Union and the world 1944–53’ in Leffler, M.P. and
O.A. Westad (eds) The Cambridge history of the Cold War Vol 1. (New York:
1E, 2A, 2B, 2C and 2D.
Further reading
Cox, M. and C. Kennedy-Pipe ‘The tragedy of American diplomacy? Rethinking
the Marshall Plan’, Journal of Cold War Studies 7(1) 2005, and the debate
reproduced in the same journal.
Eisenberg, C. Drawing the line: the American decision to divide Germany
1944–1949. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998)
[ISBN 9780521627177].
Hogan, M.J. The Marshall plan. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989)
[ISBN 9780521378406].
Introduction
Following Kennan’s long telegram in February 1946, which is generally
regarded as the key formulation of the idea of ‘containment’, Allied
tensions were exacerbated in the spring of 1946 as the economic
arrangements agreed at Potsdam for Germany’s future were becoming
more difficult to implement. In part these had arisen out of the problems
resulting from the Yalta conference and the lack of any agreement on
the eastern frontier of Germany with the new Polish state that had been
moved westwards to compensate the Poles for the loss of Polish territory in
the east to the Soviets.
Germany was the most crucial European area, and the Soviets were
particularly concerned that a German revival, which could again threaten
the Soviet Union with invasion and enormous loss of life, would not be 21
allowed to re-occur. Consequently, contradictions developed between the

various requirements of the victorious powers for the future development
of Germany, particularly with regard to the use of its economic resources
for European recovery, as post-war rebuilding began.
Outside Europe the Iran crisis from January to May 1946 provided public
evidence of great power disagreement which was reinforced at the Paris
peace conference in June and July 1946. The problems with the disposal
of the Italian colonies continued to cause disagreements between the
foreign ministers in 1946. In east Asia, concerns grew about the economic
situation in Japan, which was similar to that in Germany and reflected
fears about the political impact of the failure of capitalism to provide the
means to sustain the populations in the defeated countries.
Important dates
1946 March Soviets fail to withdraw troops from Iran
April–May First Paris Council of Foreign Ministers
April Soviets agree to withdraw troops from Iran in May
June–July Second Paris Council of Foreign Ministers
July–October Paris Peace Conference (all Allied nations)
November–December New York Council of Foreign Ministers
Dividing Germany in 1946

As there was still no formal definitive agreement on Germany’s
future, the situation on the ground had to be dealt with, including
the area completely controlled by the Soviet Union, in accordance
with the wartime agreements defining the three occupation zones
of Germany. The Soviets were thus able effectively to ensure that
most of the agricultural resources and industrial capital equipment
were used in Poland and the Soviet Union and foodstuffs from the
eastern zone were not used for the western zones of Germany. The
three German occupation zones had become four in 1946 with the
French zone created out of the British and American zones. As 1946
ended the difficulties in reconciling specific economic demands
about Germany and east Asia transformed disagreements over
general interests into specific disputes. The exercise of hard power
internationally became entangled with the domestic economic and
political requirements of post-war recovery. Thus the Cold War
began to develop essentially as an ideological battle over which
socio-economic system would prevail by being seen as the most
successful.
Soviet policy
The overriding Soviet need, and the reason for their continued desire for
cooperation with the west, was for the prevention of German military
recovery by denying German industry the ability to produce war material.
The Potsdam agreements entitled them to receive some material from the
western zones without furnishing foodstuffs in return and to remove more
material in return for produce from the eastern zone under their control.
What the Soviet ultimate aim was remains a matter of controversy. One
priority was to acquire as many resources in capital equipment from the
more industrialised parts of Germany, both to assist a devastated Soviet
Union recover and to prevent the re-emergence of German industry.
Reparations were therefore crucial in achieving both aims.
22
British policy
The British were concerned that, having agreed at Potsdam to the
principles of reparations without any simultaneous agreement on the
levels of German industry, they were having to import food into their zone
and use precious dollars to purchase grain to feed the German population.
They therefore became the first of the Allied powers to have private
doubts about the desirability of a unified Germany. The disagreements
over Germany’s administration as a single economic unit with a combined
import/export programme therefore increased, and continued hardship
was more in evidence for ordinary Germans.
US policy
The USA, in the wake of trying to implement the Potsdam agreements,
also became concerned about the effect of the agreements on Germany.
There was an economic need to prevent social unrest arising from the
hardships and shortages experienced by the German population. Yet there
was also the political requirement to implement measures to prevent a
future German threat by limiting German economic growth that could be
used to produce armaments. Thus German recovery, by manufacturing and
exporting sufficient quantities of goods to enable their food to be imported
and paid for, was in conflict with the extraction of reparations and strict
limits on industrial production. Political fears accompanied the economic
concerns of the western Allies that the attraction of left wing ideas would
grow. Communist influence would increase with the hardship experienced
by the German population. Such fears were heightened by the failures to
agree on Germany and issues in the eastern and western Mediterranean,
and the USA began to favour the division of Germany if disarmament
measures were unsuccessful or if Germany could not be appropriately
administered as a single economic unit.
Activities
Why was the Potsdam agreement on Germany not implemented?
To what extent did Germany become the main source of growing Allied tensions in 1946?
Important dates
Level of industry plan is agreed
1946 March Soviets stall on the import–export programme, claiming it is a
zonal issue
The forced merger of the Social Democratic Party with the
April German Communist Party takes place, indicating a Soviet
attempt to extend political control of a unified Germany
Byrnes call for a Four Power Treaty guaranteeing the

April
disarmament of Germany for 25 years
General Clay suspends reparations deliveries from the Western

3 May
zones
Britain becomes more favourable to a permanent division of

May
Germany
Summer Soviets express a preference for uniting Germany

July The US favour a zonal merger of Germany
23
Byrnes makes Stuttgart speech arguing that zonal boundaries

should be regarded as defining areas of occupation for security
1946 September
purposes only and not seen as self-contained economic or
political units
The Kolpakov programme offers an extension of the levels of
October German industry and favours an introduction of a balanced
export–import programme
1947 January British keen to push ahead with the bi-zone
Byrnes completely abandons the idea of a united Germany,

January
fearing it would fall under Soviet control
Moscow Council begins, and for Marshall the Potsdam

March
agreement is no longer appropriate
Council of Foreign Ministers meets in London and the US

November State Department makes it clear that they will not accept the
unification of Germany on any terms
Western powers have a conference in London to discuss zonal
1948 February policy in Germany, including the control of the Ruhr
Soviets are excluded from this meeting
London conference leads to the proposal to incorporate West
Germany from the western zones
6 March
The proposals lead to the Soviet Control Council representative
walking out two weeks later
Stalin restricts the movement of Allied personal entering Berlin
1 April
by road and rail
Soviets walk out of the Kommandatura when it became clear a

June
new currency would be introduced in West Germany
The introduction of the new currency (in the western zones but
24 June not in Berlin) leads to the Soviets closing surface routes into
the city
Stalin offers to lift the ‘Berlin blockade’ if a Council of Foreign

August
Ministers meets to discuss the future of Germany
Stalin offers to lift the blockade if the establishment of a West

1949 January
German state is postponed
Berlin blockade is lifted

May
Airlifts to the city prove successful for the Allies
September The West German state is created
Activities
Explain whether economic or political divisions were primarily responsible for the division
of Germany.
Who was responsible for the breaching of agreements on the administration of Germany?
24
The Marshall Plan and Europe’s economic difficulties, 1947

Europe suffered from an extremely hard winter of 1946–47 which
paralysed economic life in Britain. It threatened to bring the kind of
hardship that communism might exploit in circumstances where capitalism
and the market were failing to provide basic necessities. A key problem
was that the European countries recovering from the war required dollars
for consumer goods which had largely been produced in the US during
the war. Thus for the west, action to avoid serious economic dislocation
had to be taken because such conditions by 1947 were deemed to be
fertile breeding grounds for communism and radical left wing ideas. At
the same time European recovery, which was dependent on the significant
re-establishment of German trade, was clearly necessary. Otherwise the
dramatic wartime expansion of the US economy could not be sustained.
As long as the lack of European dollars, to provide the purchasing power
for the consumer goods produced in the US, continued, there were risks to
European recovery and to continued US prosperity.
This was what lay behind the idea of the Marshall Plan, with the Truman
Doctrine emphasising the threat presented by Soviet communism in order
to justify spending US taxpayers’ money to assist European recovery. US
taxpayers would accept the need to enable western European societies,
especially the defeated ones in Germany and Italy, in the hopes of gaining
a prosperous capitalist and democratic future in recovering from the war.
Providing the resources to assist this was an important part of containment
in a non-military sense – independent of armed forces but centred on
ideology and the success of centre–right political systems in European
societies.
Activities
Explain the dollar gap.
To what extent was the Marshall Plan designed to save the US economy from recession?
Important dates
1947 January Rigged Polish elections
March Truman Doctrine speech
Moscow Council of Foreign Ministers on
March–April
Germany
June Launch of the Marshall Plan
August Rigged Hungarian elections
September Creation of the Cominform
November–December London Council of Foreign Ministers
1948 February Communist coup in Czechoslovakia
Creation of the Brussels pact by Britain,
March
France, Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg
25
Activities
Why did relations between the ‘Big Three’ powers become more difficult in 1946?
What role did economic factors play in the development of the Cold War?
The origins of NATO, 1948

Standard Cold War orthodoxy portrays NATO as being formed to protect
Europe against the threat of Soviet expansionism. The actual situation was
more complex than that. In the first place the threat to western Europe
in the form of a military attack by the Red Army must be distinguished
from the ideological threat presented by radical ideas – especially those
of communism – which had been strengthened by the role of the left in
resisting Nazi aggression during the war. The Soviets by 1948 had imposed
Stalinist regimes, effectively controlled by Moscow, on all those counties
in eastern Europe which were now clearly satellite states. The original
idea of containment was to ensure that communist ideology and the
organisation of coups and puppet governments were not allowed to spread
westwards and were therefore contained in those areas now under Soviet
control. The military defence of western Europe was not the issue, as the
immediate, as opposed to the medium-term, Soviet threat of an attack
on western Europe was not regarded as likely. When the first emergency
plans (plans to fight a war in the next 12 months with existing forces)
were formulated in London and Washington in 1948, in the unlikely event
that another major war should occur, the aim was to abandon western
Europe. This would replicate what had happened in 1940 when the war
had then ultimately been won. Reconciling these contradictory aims of
protection and abandonment and ensuring that stronger links were forged
between the countries of western Europe were central to the creation of
the political community that NATO became. Both the British and the US
military believed a ‘careful weighing of the various factors points to the
probability that the Soviet government is not now planning any deliberate
armed action calculated to involve the United States and is still seeking
to achieve its aims primarily by political means.’ NATO was primarily a
political response to this and the military dimensions of NATO were there
to provide a greater, if somewhat spurious, justification to gain support for
the political resistance to communist ideology.
Activities
To what extent were the dangers faced by western Europe after 1948 the result of the
spread of political ideology emanating from Moscow?
What role did the British play in the creation of NATO?
In what ways did the US military plan for the defence of western Europe?
Important dates
1947 March Treaty of Dunkirk signed by Britain and France
London Council of Foreign Ministers breaks up with no dates

December
agreed for future meetings
1948 February Soviet Union begins jamming Voice of America broadcasts

February Bloodless communist coup in Czechoslovakia
March Brussels Treaty signed
26
1948 March Military staff talks at the Pentagon with British and Canadians
British emergency plan ‘Doublequick’ produced for the
May evacuation of British and US forces from Europe in the event
of war
June Start of Berlin blockade
Washington talks on US support for Western Europe in the

July
form of a treaty
Washington talks adjourned with tentative agreement on

September
framework for a North Atlantic treaty
British chiefs of staff accept the idea of defending the Rhine
despite the political difficulties of losing much of West
September
Germany and note the resources for such a defence are
inadequate

• provide an explanation of the role of economic issues in the development
of the Cold War
• outline the way in which German policy was defined and implemented
by the Allies between 1946 and 1948
• identify the political and military issues in 1946 and 1947 which
produced NATO.

1. To what extent was the Marshall Plan designed to maintain US
prosperity?
2. Who or what produced the division of Germany?
3. ‘The Cold War was produced essentially by economic differences.’
Discuss.
27
Notes
28
Chapter 4: The onset of the Cold War: from containment to rollback, 1948–53
Chapter 4: The onset of the Cold War:

from containment to rollback, 1948–53
Learning outcomes
By the end of this chapter, and having completed the Essential reading,
• define the different views of those for and those against a more pro-
active US Cold War policy
• decide when and why rollback became US policy.
Essential reading
4A, 4B, 4D, 5B, 5C and 7A.
Further reading
Corke ,S. ‘Bridging the gap: containment, covert action and the search for the
missing link in American Cold War policy, 1948–1953’, Journal of Strategic
Studies 20(4) 1997.
Corke, S. ‘History, historians and the naming of foreign policy: a post-
modern reflection on American strategic thinking during the Truman
administration’, Intelligence and National Security 16(3) 2001.
Logevall, F. ‘A critique of containment’, Diplomatic History 28(4) 2004.
Lucas, S. and K. Mistry ‘Illusions of coherence: George F. Kennan, US strategy
and political warfare in the early Cold War, 1946–1950’, Diplomatic History
33(1) 2009.
Origins of the ‘containment’ policy

The main architect of the idea of containment was George Kennan in the
US embassy in Moscow. But it was not clear what exactly containment
involved, and it was subsequently adapted by some US policy makers and
western academics to suit Cold War interests. Containment was initially
envisaged as a non-military weapon using diplomacy and economic
incentives to bolster the social stability and political freedoms of the
west as a counter to totalitarian communism in the Soviet Union and its
satellite empire. However, when power political differences developed in
1945, with the failure to reconcile particularly important interests with
general principles (e.g. freedom) arising from the Second World War,
the importance of policies towards the Soviets increased and the rival
ideologies became more important. Thus the two opposing socio-economic
and political systems came to define the Cold War by 1948.
In a defensive mode containment was intended primarily to prevent
the spread of communism from the Soviet Union and the area it had
occupied in the process of defeating the Germans. The USA had not got
closely involved in the wartime planning for Europe and, much to George
Kennan’s disgust, had declined to spell out to the Soviets what was
unacceptable for them to do. The future basis of Allied co-existence was
therefore unclear at the beginning of 1945.
29
Developments and problems in 1948 – the end of

containment?
Once the power political divisions and disagreements of 1945 had
produced a growing determination on both sides to confront the other
with their own vital interests, perceptions began to change. Rather than
seeking the compromises that had been evident in the months leading up
to the end of the Potsdam conference, the key question now was how to
prevent the spread of communism or capitalism. What precisely would
be required now an atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion had been
engendered was not entirely clear.
Would the former giants of Japanese business be needed in east Asia? And
would former Nazis and their supporters be required in Europe? More
importantly, could communism be contained simply by preventing its spread?
If not, it would require action in the form of more offensive measures.
Whether these measures would also constitute containment is a key matter of
debate. At all events the policies of the USA towards the Soviet Union were
increasable defined by the newly created National Security Council (NSC). Yet
what the implementation of NSC policies might mean was subject to different
interpretations. These continued to be evident in different parts of the
Washington bureaucracy as the State Department and the Central Intelligence
Agency had different views stemming from the conflicting interpretations
within those organisations. Hence the idea of ‘containment’ as a single unified
policy is misleading – as is the use of the word for US policy after 1948 when
more offensive measures began to be proposed in policy papers.
Important dates
NSC 7 ‘The position of the USA with respect to Soviet
1948 March
dominated world communism’ produced
May Israel established

June Berlin blockade begins
US Office of Policy Coordination established to assume
August responsibility for operations, not involving military action, to
exploit Soviet vulnerabilities
NSC 20/4 ‘US objectives with respect to the Soviet Union’
November produced – the first comprehensive assessment of US Cold War
objectives
1949 April North Atlantic Treaty signed
August Soviets explode their first atomic bomb
September The Chinese People’s Republic proclaimed by Mao Tse Tung
NSC 68
In the wake of the Soviet explosion of an atomic bomb in 1949 and the
final success of the communists in unifying China – with the exception of
Taiwan (Formosa) – the international situation in military and ideological
terms was becoming less favourable to the west. In one sense, the focus of
what had always been a global Cold War was moving from Europe to Asia,
given that NATO had been established in 1949 along with the new West
German state and thus the recovery of western Europe was proceeding in
line with western expectations.
30
Yet there was a growing belief in the USA that pro-active, more offensive
measures would be needed, to undermine the Soviet satellites or, as some
argued, to weaken the Soviet Union itself. Thus the CIA’s programme of
covert action began, with failed attempts to drop agents into Albania to
bring about the first defection from the Soviet bloc. Closely connected
to growing US concerns about the continued existence of a rival bloc, or
alternative way of life, was the existence in 1949 of the Soviet atomic
bomb. It was no longer so credible to believe that in a hot war US nuclear
power would automatically prevent a Soviet attack on the west and the use
of its conventional arms in Europe. Moreover as the USA began to adopt
a more pro-active and assertive Cold War strategy to resist the ideology
of communism, the links of communist parties to the Soviet state also
had serious implications once that state could wield nuclear weapons.
It became clear to some in Washington that the USA now had to rely on
more conventional forces and be prepared to confront Soviet conventional
strength. There was a growing risk in using nuclear weapons if the
Soviets were to react militarily to the US Cold War efforts to undermine
their satellite system. Hence the need for rearmament when the USA
was embarking on Cold War policies designed to weaken or destroy the
Soviet state. Such aggressive policies could be interpreted as going beyond
‘containment’ and were more likely to produce a hot war response to any
Cold War losses experienced by Moscow. Hence NSC 68 and its advocacy
of greater conventional military strength. However, concerns about the
rearmament progamme’s costs if NSC 68 was implemented were troubling
President Truman, with the result that rearmament was not immediate. It
was only when North Korean aggression against the south occurred, and US
troops were sent to the peninsula, that significant US rearmament began.
Eisenhower and Solarium – the end of rollback?

The Truman administration was attempting to coordinate the
implementation of Cold War policies involving covert operations,
psychological warfare and propaganda. Covert operations involved activities
which needed ‘plausible deniability’ to prevent them being tied to the
policies of the US government but the disagreements on what policies were
justified or desirable continued. In 1951 a psychological strategy board was
established to provide the elements of coordination and control of covert
operations which a more aggressive pursuit of Cold War policies required.
The psychological strategy board, however, failed to resolve the different
interpretations of Cold War policies when they had to be implemented and
operationalised, and another round of bureaucratic in-fighting ensued.
The Truman administration was under attack politically in the 1951–2
presidential campaign for not fighting the Cold War vigorously enough in
the wake of what was seen by many on the US right as the ‘loss’ of China.
Therefore when the Eisenhower administration entered the White House
it contained some members who were keen to wage Cold War more
aggressively through covert actions and psychological warfare. The aim
was to ensure that the Soviet Union was weakened or destroyed, as
only one system or way of life was deemed able to survive. Ironically,
the Republicans and those favouring more assertive Cold War policies
had accused the Truman administration of weakness towards the Soviet
Union when it had actively, if somewhat confusingly, been implementing
more pro-active and assertive policies despite growing doubts about their
impact. One key concern was linked to the first explosion of the hydrogen
bomb by the USA in 1952 and the Soviet Union in 1953. A weapon which
was a thousand times more powerful than the atomic bomb would have
31
greater consequences for the future of civilization if the Cold War became
a hot war like Korea. There was a distinct connection between fighting
the Cold War aggressively, to undermine the other bloc’s political and
economic way of life, and the risk of hot war.
This was one reason why Eisenhower established project Solarium. The
project had three different teams examining possible ways forward from
different perspectives on the relationship between Cold War fighting and
hot war. One team examined the role of nuclear weapons in deterring hot
war and the other two concentrated on fighting the Cold War and rolling
back communism, rather than merely confining it to eastern Europe and
China. Team A was to examine means of pushing back the frontiers of
Soviet power and changing Soviet behaviour by peacefully co-existing with
the Soviets and minimising the risk of hot war. Team C was to emphasise
the importance of destroying the Soviet system with some risk of hot war
as, in the longer term, there could be no possibility of two such opposing
ways of life co-existing within a single international system and therefore
the destruction or alteration of Soviet communism was the priority. Team
B simply looked at the implications for the Cold War of nuclear weapons.
One question concerned the implications of perceptions in the west that
the Soviets intended to take over the world. If that was deemed likely, then
the logical conclusion would be that a destructive war would ultimately
have to be faced. The Eisenhower administration, not keen to plan hot war
in a nuclear age, thus began to move away from such an outcome towards
accepting a policy of co-existence with the Soviets while still conducting
some covert operations. These would be designed to enhance the US
position in the Cold War alongside diplomatic moves based on co-existence.
This was what lay behind Eisenhower’s initiatives in his speeches on ‘Atoms
for Peace’ and ‘Open Skies’ and other disarmament proposals. Even if no
concrete steps resulted from these, the Cold War advantage of showing
the US public that the administration was seriously seeking peace and the
avoidance of thermonuclear conflict would be considerable.
Important dates
1950 April NSC 68 completed
June Korean War begins
1951 April Psychological Strategy Board established
1952 November Eisenhower wins US presidential election
1953 April Eisenhower’s ‘Chance for Peace’ speech
May Project Solarium established
October New Look doctrine put to NSC

Having completed this chapter, and the Essential reading, you should be
able to:
• define the different views of those for and those against a more pro-
active US Cold War policy
• decide when and why rollback became US policy.
32

1. In what ways did NSC 68 influence US Cold War strategy?
2. Analyse the relationship of military preparations to the pursuit of Cold
War aims 1948–50.
3. Why did the three powers adopt more confrontational positions in
1946–48?
4. To what extent did the USA change its approach to fighting the Cold
War 1948–50?
33
Notes
34
Chapter 5: Intelligence, propaganda and covert operations
Chapter 5: Intelligence, propaganda and

covert operations
Learning outcomes
By the end of this chapter, and having completed the Essential reading
and activity, you should be able to:
• explain the different forms of intelligence and why Soviet intelligence
had different priorities to US intelligence
• analyse the reasons for the importance of intelligence activities in
Berlin and Cuba
• explain why propaganda was such an important feature of the Cold
War in the west.
Essential reading
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) [ISBN 9780198781646]
Chapter 7A.
Further reading
Aid, M.M. The secret sentry: the untold history of the National Security Agency.
(New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2010) [ISBN 9781608190966].
Andrew, C.M. and V. Mitrokhin The Mitrokhin archive: the KGB in Europe and
the West. (London: Allen Lane, 1999) [ISBN 9780713993585].
Osgood, K.A. Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s secret propaganda battle at
home and abroad. (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2008)
[ISBN 9780700615902].
Osgood, K.A. ‘Form before substance: Eisenhower’s commitment to
psychological warfare and negotiations with the enemy’, Diplomatic History
24(3) 2000.
Weiner, T. Legacy of ashes: the history of the CIA. (New York: Doubleday, 2007)
[ISBN 9780385514453].
Special issue of Intelligence and National Security ‘Secrets of signal intelligence
during the Cold War and beyond’, Vol 16 No 1 (2001).
Different forms of intelligence

The main categories of intelligence gathering are signals intelligence
(SIGINT), which is divided between electronic intelligence (ELINT)
and communications intelligence (COMINT), and human intelligence
(HUMINT), which relies on the work of human agents. COMINT is the
monitoring (i.e. interception) of signals, like radio waves, which carry
information on them. ELINT is the monitoring of signals which do not
carry information such as radar and is used, for example, to asses how
effective the radars of opponents are in intercepting intruders into their
air space.
35
Contrast between CIA and KGB

Intelligence agencies do more than simply gather information/intelligence
by spying. They engage in a number of other activities directed against
their domestic and foreign opponents and their apparent friends and allies.
They thus serve to further the interests of those groups who are the main,
but not the exclusive benefactors, of the social system sustained by state
institutions. This role and the prevention of external attacks on the state
are now referred to as ‘security’.
The Soviet state and its intelligence organisations, with their various
acronyms, were always been more concerned with the external threats to
the state than their US counterparts. These perceived external threats were
exploited by Stalin in particular as an excuse to clamp down on all forms
of domestic dissent and justify maintaining repressive policies to eliminate
any domestic opponents deemed to be ‘imperialist spies’. The other role
of Soviet intelligence was to overcome the USSR’s inferior technological
development, by comparison with the west, especially in military
technology, including the construction of nuclear weapons and their
delivery. Thus from the pre-war days onwards the policy was to recruit
agents in the west to glean information primarily about western tactics for
undermining the Soviet Union and to pass on knowledge about important
technologies. It was always much easier for Soviet agents to operate in
the west than it was for US agents to operate within Soviet borders or
to use dissidents to achieve similar goals from spying. Thus the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), operating in a free society with the benefit of
greater affluence, was always less concerned with domestic dissidents
and obtaining information on the Soviets through HUMINT than the KGB.
From the outset the CIA was more involved with covert operations in
eastern Europe, and then China, and with the use of radio broadcasts to
send propaganda to the Soviet satellite states, even if most of the financial
resources for propaganda were devoted to domestic audiences in the west.
From 1955 the USA was able to use U2 spy planes which until 1960 could
fly high enough to avoid being shot down when overflying Soviet air
space. From the mid-1950s the USA also began developing its first spy
satellite programme, although the Soviets were first to put a man-made
object into orbit in 1957, much to the consternation of the US government.
The space race followed and was very much linked to the provision of
intercontinental missiles which could be equipped with nuclear warheads.
Otherwise the space race represented the technological prowess of the two
opposing systems and served as useful propaganda in representing them
favourably to the outside world
However intelligence is acquired, its evaluation has always been a
problematic issue, as the amount of data received from intercepts and
satellites has vastly expanded. Thus the main challenge, as in recent times
with the 9/11 bombers, is how effectively this information can be analysed
and reduced to manageable proportions. In other words, even significant
amounts of raw intelligence are often not simply a copy of the original
decrypted information but what remains of that information after the raw
intelligence has been through a process of selection and evaluation. It is
only then likely to reach important policy makers.
Activity
Explain the advantages and disadvantages of the different ways of gathering and
processing intelligence.
36
US propaganda and covert operations

The first western covert operations designed to undermine the Soviet
empire arose from the wartime contacts of the British intelligence with the
Ukrainian guerrillas who had assassinated the head of the Odessa MGB
(the successor to the NKVD – the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs
incorporating state security). Stalin’s paranoia was not entirely imaginary
as covert operations providing support by the British secret intelligence
service, MI6, for anti-Soviet movements, notably in the Ukraine, had
begun by early 1946. At the same time the Soviet Union had at least 221
agents spying in the USA, many of whom were compromised by the code-
breaking success known as VENONA. The Central Intelligence Agency
after its creation in 1947 was preoccupied with the Cold War, and federal
US government money for propaganda was directed at western citizens.
The CIA was heavily involved in providing money to assist anti-communist
parties in the Italian elections of 1948. The Cold War was becoming more
a political and ideological battle to wield control and influence and less a
struggle over states’ ability to use hard power.
In early 1948 George Kennan, then head of the Policy Planning Staff in the
State Department, developed a plan for organised political warfare against
communism which went far beyond the idea of containment. Nevertheless
a unified policy of implementing a US Cold War strategy of containment
remained elusive, and allowed the competition for interpretation and
control over such a policy to dominate the bureaucracies of the State
Department and the CIA. Within this covert ideological landscape of Cold
War, different interpretations of this more offensive policy remained, and
uncoordinated policies, such as the infiltration of US agents, continued.
It was accompanied by the US propaganda emanating from Radio Free
Europe and the Voice of America which the Soviets attempted to jam.
Unmarked US aircraft were used to send food supplies, dollars and
gold into the Baltic States and the other eastern European satellites to
encourage resistance to Soviet oppression and to provide information on
the benefits of democratic capitalism.
Propaganda and covert operations form the basic elements of psychological
warfare that the west, and particularly the USA, saw as vital Cold War tools.
The Office of Policy Coordination, an offshoot of the CIA, and justified
after November 1948 by NSC 20/4, carried out an aggressive programme
of covert actions designed to destabilise the Soviet bloc. These ranged
from propaganda to direct action involving sabotage and demolition, and
assistance to underground resistance movements prepared to resist the
Soviet Union. Different agencies and their sections often had very different
views on the role of covert operations against the Soviet Union and its
satellite empire. In part this stemmed from the different interpretations of
what the National Security Council papers defined as the basic strategies for
resisting communism and its close connections to the Soviet state. Problems,
not least in the failures of sending agents into Albania, led Truman in 1951
to establish the Psychological Strategy Board in order to try and coordinate
all the elements of psychological warfare, given their importance for US
Cold War policy. Propaganda efforts in the form of Radio Liberty and
Radio Free Europe, established through the CIA, had been broadcasting
material to the Soviet Union and eastern Europe respectively, but the State
Department wanted all such activities to contribute to its overall direction
of US foreign policy in the Cold War. The psychological strategy board failed
to overcome the bureaucratic in-fighting within the US government, and in
1953 Eisenhower replaced it with the Operations Coordinating Board.
37
Operational case studies – Berlin and Cuba

With the Berlin airlift in response to the Soviets preventing ground access
through East Germany to Berlin, the city rapidly became a focal point and
symbol of Cold War tension. The position of Berlin as a western island in
the heart of the Soviet bloc also gave it a practical value for intelligence
operations. East Germany was a crucial emblem for the attractions of
communism, but as East German citizens began to flee to the west, the
East German borders were sealed in 1952. Thus the city of Berlin became
the only exit route for East Germans whose actions were making their
views on communism all too clear. The better material conditions and
prospects in the west soon began to increase the flow to the western
sectors of Berlin as the desire to escape communism increased after the
revolts in 1953 were suppressed. Long before this, in 1946, both the
Soviets and the British had noticed the possibilities for espionage that
Berlin offered in the form of wire taps, as telephone lines passed through
both zones. It was in Vienna that the British first engaged in tunnelling
under the Soviet sector from which tapping devices could be attached.
Digging, with the involvement of the USA, began in Berlin in early
1954 and the tunnel was operational one year later. The information
gleaned was vast and amounted to 50,000 reels of magnetic tape which
employed 350 people to process it. It was an early example of how sorting
the intercept material was much more difficult than acquiring it – an
intelligence problem which was only to get worse. The Soviets discovered
the tunnel in 1956 because of information provided by the double agent
George Blake. The Berlin tunnel was also important in highlighting the
competitive rivalry between the CIA and the National Security Agency
(NSA), the most secret US intelligence organisation dealing with intercepts
and the decryption of coded material.
Cuba, in orthodox Cold War language, has been seen as a key source of
Cold War tension, but nuclear weapons and the missile crisis were in
reality much more central to hot war than they were to the Cold War.
Ideology and intelligence gathering, and the propaganda they produced,
were also vital to the Cold War tensions made evident by the Cuban
Revolution and the missile crisis that the revolution helped produce. A
desire to prevent the Cuban development model being copied in other
areas of Central and South America was important for the fervent anti-
communist US president John F. Kennedy.
At the beginning of the 1960s, when the decolonisation of significant parts
of the less developed world was beginning, Kennedy believed that the Cold
War hinged on winning the people of the newly independent nations over
to the socio-economic system in the west and its political values. Along
with the Alliance for Progress, Kennedy, in situations outside Latin America
where subversion was seen as a threat, also established a second Special
Group to assist with covert operations designed to strengthen the west
in its opposition to communism in the less developed world. The Special
Group (Counter-Insurgency) was part of this strategy to prevent the spread
of communism in Latin America and elsewhere by the control of covert
counterinsurgency operations. The original Special Group, which had been
Eisenhower’s last attempt to coordinate covert operations, was originally
referred to as 5412 after the National Security Council memorandum of that
number and continued, along with the Special Group Counter Insurgency
(CI), to cause problems within Washington because of a lack of adequate
consultation with the State Department and the Department of Defense.
38
In addition Cuba received special attention from the President and

Robert Kennedy under Operation Mongoose, which was the covert
attempt to undermine Castro. Actions against Castro included several
unsuccessful assassination attempts, some of which allegedly involved the
Mafia. There was also the dropping of agents in four groups into several
different parts of Cuba in an attempt to stir up (bribe) those individuals
or groups opposed to the Cuban leader. All, apart from one, were totally
unsuccessful. The Kennedys had an unusual degree of animosity to Castro,
while for Khrushchev Cuba was the first communist success in an area not
contiguous with the Soviet Union and therefore a prize propaganda asset
in the Cold War. Hence Cuba was at the centre of the attempts to score
Cold War advantages which, in the form of the Cuban missile crisis, would
pose a greater than usual risk of leading to hot war.

Having completed this chapter, and the Essential reading and activity, you
should be able to:
• explain the different forms of intelligence and why Soviet intelligence
had different priorities to US intelligence
• analyse the reasons for the importance of intelligence activities in
Berlin and Cuba
• explain why propaganda was such an important feature of the Cold
War in the west.

1. To what extent have the west’s intelligence activities been directed to
influencing developments within the western world?
2. How successful were Soviet intelligence agencies in furthering the
interests of the Soviet state?
3. Critically evaluate the value of HUMINT.
39
Notes
40
Chapter 6: Nuclear weapons and Cold War
Learning outcomes
• explain the significance of the difference between atomic and hydrogen
bombs
• understand the theories of nuclear deterrence
• analyse the problems of implementing an operational military strategy
involving nuclear war
• describe the Cold War importance of nuclear disarmament proposals.
Essential reading
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) [ISBN 9780198781646] Chapter
5C, 12B and 15A.
Further reading
Freedman, L. The evolution of nuclear strategy. (London: Macmillan, 1981)
[ISBN 9780333345641].
Kaplan, F. The wizards of Armageddon. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983)
[ISBN 9780671424442].
Newhouse, J. The nuclear age. (London: Michael Joseph, 1989)
[ISBN 9780718132637].
The advent of the atomic bomb

The nuclear bombs which were first dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki
in 1945 had a significant impact on military and civilian thinking about
warfare. Some thought that the nuclear deterrent had introduced a new
era into military conflict which had fundamentally altered the nature of
warfare. Other leaders like General Curtis Le May, soon to be head of the
US Strategic Air Command which operated nuclear bombers, believed
that the superiority of conventional air power in the past had now been
enhanced. For Le May the atomic age meant that the same destructive
power of many squadrons of bombers could be achieved simply by one or
two aircraft. Civilians hoped that the sole possession of this new atomic
power would enable the US to exert diplomatic pressure on the Allies to
achieve the kind of post-war international order the USA desired.
US and Soviet military ideas

The Soviets devoted considerable efforts to acquiring the ability to build
their own atomic weapons and stand as equal to the USA, which they
achieved in 1949. The atomic bomb was not a weapon that could easily be
adapted to implement a post-war military strategy. Apart from the ethical
implications of its impact on the lives of civilians, all military strategists
only ever begin preparing for a future conflict on the basis of lessons
learnt from the last war. In the 1940s for the Soviets that meant learning
how best to absorb the initial German attacks on the Soviet Union, and
41
then organising ground and air forces to regain the lost territory The US,
like Britain, was caught between preparing for a future conflict involving
nuclear weapons and facing the growing importance of nuclear deterrence
as a strategy which had enormous military significance especially after
the Soviets had acquired the bomb. Thus in the post-war period of
transition, the Soviets and the western Allies endeavoured to bring
about the reconciliation of military strategy and foreign policy in a Cold
War framework that provided a role for nuclear deterrence. Under the
first Eisenhower administration, and following the death of Stalin, such
considerations became more significant.
The change with the hydrogen bomb

The massive increase in the destructive power of hydrogen, or
thermonuclear weapons, as compared to atomic bombs, cast the whole
theoretical and practical approach to preparations for a future war in a
new light. The same developments also made disarmament and avoiding
hot war more significant. They encouraged the Cold War Soviet move
under Khrushchev to accept peaceful co-existence as the guiding principle
for competition with the west. The USA came up with the New Look and
the idea of ‘massive retaliation’ to reconcile Cold War aims with a defence/
security strategy by placing more emphasis on nuclear weapons and
deterrence. The assumption in the west was that the Soviet Union was
only likely to attack westwards when it had recovered fully from the war,
but Eisenhower and NATO were concerned that the conventional force
requirements to meet such a threat could not be financially sustainable
by the USA and Europe without undermining their free societies. Thus
as nuclear weapons became less easy to use in a global conflict their
deterrent effect became more of a necessary requirement.
The New Look, with the prospect of a nuclear response to a conventional
attack, placed more emphasis on the use of nuclear weapons and less
emphasis on conventional forces which were more expensive. Known as
‘more bang for the buck’ the New Look proclaimed that the USA would
be prepared to respond to any communist aggression at a time and place
of its own choosing with the prospect of massive retaliation. Greater roles
were also envisaged for US allies and for US covert operations, such as
those carried out in Iran and Guatemala in 1953 and 1954.
Important dates
1945 August USA dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki
1949 August First Soviet atomic bomb tested
1952 November USA tests first hydrogen bomb
1953 April Eisenhower’s ‘Chance for Peace’ speech
August Soviets test first hydrogen bomb
October New Look doctrine outlined to NSC
December Eisenhower’s ‘Atoms for Peace’ speech
1954 January Dulles makes ‘Massive Retaliation’ speech
1955 January Malenkov speech on the necessity of peaceful coexistence
May West Germany joins NATO; creation of Warsaw Pact
July Eisenhower’s ‘Open Skies’ speech
42
1957 October First Soviet Sputnik launched

1958 January First US intercontinental missile launched
The SIOP and the Gaither committee

The New Look was an attempt to merge nuclear weapons, and their role
in deterring or planning for hot war, with the economic and political
requirements of Cold War. The difficulty was in organising an agreed
operational plan amongst the three US services, as the navy and army
were not happy at being excluded from an operational nuclear role.
Nuclear weapons were also producing an examination of home defence.
This became more pertinent once the Soviets had launched Sputnik
and put the first satellite into space, producing concern that Soviet
military equipment could be flying over the USA. The Gaither committee
considered home defence in a broad security context and was horrified to
discover that when a US nuclear alert was staged it took nearly six hours
for their nuclear bombs to be loaded. This was less than the warning time
provided if a Soviet bomber attack was detected.
In the 1950s the nuclear threat was becoming more dangerous as both the
USA and the Soviet Union’s medium-range missile development began to
bear fruit. By 1959 the USA had deployed Thor medium-range missiles in
Europe and tested its Jupiter system. Thus before the Cuban missile crisis
the USA was ahead of the Soviet Union in the nuclear arms race.
By the early 1960s the world was facing MAD (Mutually Assured
Destruction) due to the growing numbers of nuclear weapons and their
delivery systems. It was in 1962 that the US military finally agreed on
the targeting arrangements embodied in the first US Single Integrated
Operational Plan (SIOP). In 1960 and 1964 France and China joined
those states in the testing of nuclear weapons, and pressure mounted for a
Test Ban treaty. This was initially thwarted by the Soviet refusal to accept
inspections, but was eventually, if partially, resolved in 1963.
Activities
How important were nuclear weapons in the Cold War?
What was the impact of the hydrogen bomb on plans for hot war?
Important dates
1957 January First Thor missile test (unsuccessful)
May Gaither committee formed
1960 US U2 spy plane shot down over Soviet Union
US Atlas missiles deployed
First French nuclear test
Eisenhower’s farewell speech condemns military industrial

1961
complex
US Polaris missiles deployed

US Titan missiles deployed
Yuri Gagarin becomes first human being in space
43
1963 August Test Ban treaty signed

1964 October First Chinese nuclear test
1965 US Minuteman missile deployed and Atlas sites removed
1967 USA deploys anti-ballistic missile system
Chinese hydrogen bomb test
1968 July Non-proliferation treaty signed
The road to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

When US attempts were made in the early 1970s to reduce Cold War
tensions that still threatened to result in a cataclysmic hot war, a Test Ban
and non-proliferation treaty had already been signed. The need for nuclear
disarmament had increased due to the continued growth of nuclear
warheads and missiles. Both superpowers had reasons to try for a modified
Cold War system in which the dangers of hot war were lessened while
Cold War goals might still be pursued despite the reduction in tension. In
1969 when Nixon agreed to open disarmament talks, the Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks (SALT) process had significantly less obstacles in its way.
In essence by 1969 the Soviet Union had made significant progress
in achieving its aim of nuclear parity with the USA. As the USA was
distracted by the conflict in Vietnam, and its escalating cost, the Soviets
had reduced the gap between the size of its nuclear arsenal and the
nuclear weapons possessed by the USA. The numbers of Soviet missile
delivery systems were slightly greater than those possessed by the USA
while the number of its warheads was slightly fewer. In addition to the
Soviet attainment of rough parity, and the status that accompanied it,
there were the anti-ballistic missile defence systems, and their implications
for deterrence, to be dealt with. New technology had now developed
missiles that could be fitted with multiple warheads, which when
detached on their descent through the atmosphere, were then guided by
independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). The Soviets agreed to
talks in 1968, the year before Nixon did, but each side had good reasons
for reducing tensions other than nuclear concerns.
The SALT talks began in November 1969 with the venue changing
between Helsinki and Vienna. The US triad of land, sea and aircraft-based
systems, and the numbers of French and British missiles, made any precise
calculation of equality in numbers difficult. Back channel contacts with
the Soviets were established by Henry Kissinger which contributed to an
agreement in principle in May 1971, but the official US negotiators were
unhappy with the role of Kissinger. Details of the agreement had to be
finalised, but these were completed by the time of the Moscow summit
between Brezhnev and Nixon in May 1972.
The SALT I treaty was meant to be an interim agreement leading to a
second treaty within five years, which was produced as SALT II in 1979
but never ratified by the USA. SALT I had placed limits on missiles based
on land and submarines and on bombers but not on warheads or bombs
which allowed for the Soviet development of MIRVs. SALT II was beset by
ideas on limited nuclear war and the complications of European nuclear
weapons. Disarmament had still not had a significant effect on the ideas
associated with nuclear war and deterrence.
44
Deterrence and operational issues

SALT dealt with, or postponed, a number of new elements that had arisen
from technological developments and which had always influenced
deterrence theories. Deterrence theories remained impossible to
successfully incorporate into the operational role of thermo-nuclear
weapons in wartime. Nuclear strategy, while trying to do this, had
moved from the massive retaliation of the early 1950s through mutually
assured destruction into flexible response. By the late 1970s, ideas of
limited nuclear war were being discussed along with the neutron bomb’s
development which was designed to produce casualties by reducing the
amount of infrastructure damage. Flexible response involved responding
at whichever level was deemed appropriate – from conventional weapons
to battlefield, theatre, intermediate, medium range or intercontinental
nuclear weapons.
The issue was complicated by the question of whether nuclear strikes
should target cities and their populations (counter-value) or hardened
weapons’ silos and other military targets (counter-force). These could
involve an idea of ‘extended deterrence’ and the crippling of the
other side’s ability to launch major nuclear strikes without unleashing
Armageddon. Complications also arose from the deployment of new
weapons in the European theatre by the Soviets. The Soviet SS 20s that
were introduced in 1976 could reach all targets in Europe, but not the
USA, and were therefore medium-range or intermediate-range missiles
that gave the Soviets superiority within Europe. Some Europeans feared
this could lead to the USA not being prepared to respond to an all-out
Soviet strike on Europe, thereby de-coupling the US deterrent from the
European continent. The west decided to respond to the SS 20s with the
deployment of Cruise and Pershing missiles in 1979, which made it more
difficult for the superpowers to reach an agreement on nuclear equality
through strategic arms limitations under SALT II.

• explain the significance of the difference between atomic and hydrogen
bombs
• understand the theories of nuclear deterrence
• analyse the problems of implementing an operational military strategy
involving nuclear war
• describe the Cold War importance of nuclear disarmament proposals.

1. To what extent did the dropping of the atomic bomb change the nature
of warfare?
2. In what ways did the hydrogen bomb change the nature of US Cold
War strategy?
3. ‘Nuclear weapons were produced for reasons of prestige and status not
for military advantage.’ Discuss
4. What was new about the ‘New Look’?
45
Notes
46
Chapter 7 The Sino–Soviet split
Learning outcomes
• explain the motives behind Chinese foreign policy.
• outline both the importance of great power rivalries and ideology in
leading to the Sino–Soviet split.
• explain why the split widened in the 1960s and what effect it had on
international relations.
Essential reading
Luthi, L.M. The Sino–Soviet split: Cold War in the communist world. (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008) [ISBN 9780691135908].
Further reading
Chang, G. Friends and enemies: the United States, China and the Soviet Union,
1948–1972. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990)
[ISBN 9780804715652].
Ellison, H. (ed.) The Sino–Soviet conflict: a global perspective. (Seattle, WA:
University of Washington Press, 1982) [ISBN 9780295958545].
Nelsen, H.W. Power and insecurity: Beijing, Moscow and Washington,
1949–1988. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989)
[ISBN 9781555871628].
Quested, R. Sino–Russian relations: a short history. (London: Allen & Unwin,
1984) [ISBN 9780868612553].
Zubok, V. and C. Pleshakov Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: from Stalin to
Khrushchev. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996)
[ISBN 9780674455313].
Introduction
The Sino–Soviet split is one of the most difficult areas of twentieth-
century history to study, largely because historians have had little access
to documentary evidence and thus have been forced to rely on official
statements from the two protagonists. This situation is now beginning to
change and the books in the reading section reflect this.
The lack of clear evidence about the origins of the split have led to
a number of theories being developed to explain why it took place.
You should, however, be wary of any mono-causal explanation when
examining the causes of the Sino–Soviet split in the 1950s and how its
widening in the 1960s affected international relations.
General theories
Five ways in which the Sino–Soviet split can be perceived are:
1. as the inevitable result of Sino–Soviet rivalry in east Asia
2. as an ideological clash over the correct interpretation of Marxism–
Leninism
47
3. as part of a different tradition of Chinese opposition to imperialism

4. as the result of different policies towards the west in the Cold War
5. as a result of personal rivalries between Mao and Khrushchev.
Interpretations of the Sino–Soviet split can on the whole be divided between
those that see it as the result of a traditional clash of great power interests
and those that seek a more theoretical approach and look at factors such as
clashes over ideology and the nature of imperialism. The books produced in
the 1960s and 1970s tended to reflect the former view and were influenced
by the ‘realist’ theory of international relations. However, the increasing
availability of Chinese sources, including secret speeches by Mao, have
allowed historians to concentrate more on the importance of ideological
issues and the stress put by the Chinese on the struggle against imperialism.
The latter is important not just because it led to differences with the Soviet
Union over policy towards the USA and the newly independent states of Asia
and Africa, but also because the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) increasingly
accused the USSR of acting towards China in an imperialist manner.
Activity
Consider which of the above theories, if any, you think is most likely (you may even
support more than one of them). Explain your reasons.
The origins and causes of the split

It needs to be understood from the start that the relationship between
the Chinese Communist Party and the Soviet Union had been a troubled
one from as early as the late 1920s. The CCP believed that the advice it
received in its early years from the Comintern was primarily of benefit
to Soviet interests alone and that the Comintern did not understand
conditions within China. This led in the 1930s and 1940s to the CCP
becoming increasingly independent from Moscow and pursuing its own
path to revolution. This was an important influence on the development
of the Sino–Soviet relationship in the 1950s and 1960s. Once in power
the CCP drew nearer to the USSR in order to have protection against the
USA, and in February 1950 an alliance was signed. Shortly after, the Soviet
Union provided substantial aid for the Chinese war effort in Korea.
However, Mao still harboured resentment about the treatment accorded
him by Stalin. With the death of Stalin, the Chinese hoped that a new, more
equal relationship with the Soviets could be established, which would allow
China to pursue a more independent line in foreign and domestic policy.
To an extent Khrushchev’s speeches initially encouraged Mao to believe
this was possible. Mao also hoped that Soviet advances in science and
technology would allow the socialist bloc to increase its pressure on the
USA. From 1958, however, a series of disputes developed with the Soviet
leadership which led Mao to believe that the Soviet Union was not pursuing
the Cold War rigorously enough and that it was determined to curtail
China’s independence. On the Soviet side there was a concern that China
was too bellicose and that its behaviour might trigger a Third World War.
The development of the split in the early 1950s

The early tensions resulted from the inter-war distrust between Mao and
Stalin which was essentially produced by Stalin’s limited support for Mao
in his struggle against Chiang Kai Chek in the inter-war Chinese Civil War.
Immediately after the war the Sino–Soviet treaty of 1950 was produced
more by Mao’s fear of US imperialism than enthusiasm for the Soviet
48
Union. When Khrushchev emerged as the Soviet leader after Stalin’s death
in 1953 he was eager to change the emphasis of Soviet foreign policy and
begin a domestic reform programme, which meant removing important
elements that Stalin had developed after the revolution. This ideological
difference was increased by the different positions adopted in Beijing and
Moscow over the first Offshore Islands crisis in 1955. The issue was the
risk of war which Mao seemed to ignore just as Khrushchev was becoming
committed to the idea of peaceful co-existence with the west.
Important dates
February Sino–Soviet alliance signed
1950
October Chinese entry into Korean War
March Death of Stalin

1953
July End of Korean War
1954 April Opening of Geneva conference

1955 August Start of first Offshore Islands crisis
Khrushchev’s secret speech to the 20th Communist Party of the

1956 February
Soviet Union (CPSU) congress
May ‘Hundred Flowers’ movement in China

1957 October Soviet offer of prototype atomic bomb to China
November Mao’s ‘East wind is prevailing over the West wind’ speech
1958 August Start of second Offshore Islands crisis
August Soviets renege on offer of atomic bomb
1959 September Khrushchev–Eisenhower summit at Camp David
October Mao–Khrushchev summit in Peking
April ‘Long Live Leninism’ article appears in Chinese People’s Daily

1960
July Soviet withdrawal of aid and technicians from China
Activity
What were the main motives behind Chinese foreign policy in the 1950s and 1960s?
The split after 1956 and Khrushchev’s denunciation

of Stalin
After Khrushchev denounced Stalin at the 20th party conference in 1956,
the question of which ideological path world communism should follow
became an important Sino–Soviet issue. Which country should have
control over the definition and implementation of such a path became
entangled with the specific Asian power political issues to increase the
differences between Moscow and Beijing.
The ideological differences hinged on which form of Marxism–Leninism
was deemed to be the true ideological path for world communism to
follow. The relation between the ideology of communism and the practice
of foreign policy was epitomised in the differences over the second
Offshore Islands crisis and the way in which relations with the USA were
conducted. These were exacerbated by the Chinese refusing to inform
Khrushchev about their actions, which would be interpreted as threatening
an important ally by the USA. In addition Mao’s justification of the Great
Leap Forward reflected a key difference with the policies favoured by
Moscow. It was now also becoming clear that there were difficulties in the
49
personal relations between Mao and Khrushchev, but that whenever there
was a need for the two leaders to build domestic support from communist
party elites there were signs of the relationship improving.
Activities
Explain the relationship between the Offshore Islands crises and the development of the
Sino–Soviet split.
How important were domestic considerations as influences on Mao’s policy towards the
Soviet Union 1956–62?
The Sino–Soviet split in the 1960s

The general consensus is that the Sino–Soviet split became open in 1960
when there were a series of clashes between Chinese and Soviet delegates
at meetings in eastern Europe, and when Moscow cancelled aid and
withdrew its technicians from China. However, at this point there was
still hope on both sides that the divisions could be overcome. The split
became far more serious in 1962 as the result of the Cuban missile crisis
and Soviet neutrality in the Sino–Indian War. Confirmation of the growing
gulf came in 1963 with the Soviet signature of the Partial Test Ban Treaty
which was designed to put pressure on China to stop its atomic bomb
project, and in 1964 when the Chinese began to publish calls for the return
of territory that had been seized by Tsarist Russia. It was hoped by the
Soviet leadership that Khrushchev’s removal from power in 1964 would
open the way to reconciliation, but the Chinese refused to change their
stance. Increasingly the split led to competition in foreign policy between
the two states which added to the growing crisis in South-East Asia in
the early 1960s. The Cultural Revolution in China, which began in 1966,
saw the escalation of the polemical ideological battle between Peking and
Moscow and led to an increasing desire within the Soviet Union to tame
the Chinese. By 1969 the tensions were so high that a number of border
incidents took place in Manchuria and Sinkiang. China’s response to this
was to seek to preserve its independence by opening relations with the
USA, and thus the Sino–Soviet split helped to produce détente.
Activity
Which issues do you believe were most important in the Sino-Soviet split?
50
Important dates
Chinese walkout from 22nd Communist Party of the Soviet
1961 October
Union (CPSU) Congress
January Mao accuses Soviet leadership of revisionism

1962
October Cuban missile crisis and Sino–Indian War
1963 August Partial Test Ban Treaty signed in Moscow
February Chinese demand for return of territory from Soviet Union

1964
October Fall of Khrushchev
1965 September Publication of Lin Piao’s ‘Long Live the Victory of People’s War’
1966 July Launch of Cultural Revolution in China
August Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia

1968
September Promulgation of Brezhnev doctrine
March Sino–Soviet clashes along Ussuri river

1969 April 9th CCP Congress
October Kosygin–Chou en Lai meeting in Peking
July Kissinger visit to Peking

1971
September Death of Lin Piao
1972 February Nixon visit to China

1976 September Death of Mao

• explain the motives behind Chinese foreign policy.
• outline both the importance of great power rivalries and ideology in
leading to the Sino–Soviet split.
• explain why the split widened in the 1960s and what effect it had on
international relations.

1. ‘The Sino–Soviet split was produced by China’s desire for a more equal
relationship with the USSR.’ Discuss.
2. ‘Ideological differences were the key to the Sino–Soviet split.’ Discuss.
3. ‘The Sino–Soviet split began in 1958 with the second Offshore Islands
crisis.’ Discuss.
4. Why were the Cuban missile crisis and the Sino–Indian War so
damaging to Sino–Soviet relations?
51
Notes
52
Chapter 8 Détente, 1969–79
Learning outcomes
• explain the difference between the relaxation of superpower tensions,
and the continuing pursuit of Cold War aims.
• describe the major achievements and changes brought upon by détente.
• explain why détente failed to become firmly entrenched.
Essential reading
12A, 12B, 13D, 14A, 14D and 14E.
Further reading
Bowker, M. and P. Williams Superpower détente: a reappraisal. (London: Sage,
1988) [ISBN 9780803980426].
Gelman, H. The Brezhnev Politburo and the decline of détente. (New York: Cornell
University Press, 1984) [ISBN 9780801492808].
Hanhimaki, J.M. ‘Conservative goals, revolutionary outcomes: the paradox of
détente’, Cold War History 8(4) 2008.
Litwak, R.S. Détente and the Nixon doctrine. (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1986) [ISBN 9780521338349].
Loth, W. Overcoming the Cold War: a history of détente 1950–1991. (Basingstoke:
Macmillan, 2001) [ISBN 9780333971116].
Paterson, T.G. On every front: the making and unmaking of the Cold War. (London:
W.W. Norton, 1994) [ISBN 9780393964356].
Schwartz, T.A. ‘Legacies of détente: a three-way discussion’, Cold War History
8(4) 2008.
Stevenson, R.W. The rise and fall of détente: relaxations of tension in US–Soviet
relations, 1953–84. (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1985) [ISBN 9780333362839].
Suri, J. Henry Kissinger and the American century. (Cambridge MA: Harvard
Suri, J. ‘Détente and human rights: American and West European perspectives
on international change’, Cold War History 8(4) 2008.
Zubok, V. ‘The Soviet Union and détente of the 1970s’, Cold War History
8(4) 2008.
Introduction
During the 1970s the Cold War apparently gave way to a new era in
international relations. Détente, or relaxation of tensions, began to
characterise both east–west relations in general and Soviet–US relations
in particular. As east–west trade increased, Communist China was finally
recognised by the USA, and the Soviets and the USA signed their first
nuclear arms control treaties. It seemed hot war was increasingly unlikely.
The character of international relations appeared to have undergone a
fundamental change; some even argued that the Cold War had come
to an end. Yet by the late 1970s it was evident that a new period of
confrontation was under way, which signified more of an adaption of the
53
Cold War system. You should assess why such a zigzag movement took
place within one decade, and what were the prime motivators – economic,
political and ideological – behind the move to and from détente.
This chapter is essentially divided into three sections. The first deals with
the launching of détente during the late 1960s and early 1970s. The
second outlines the height of détente to approximately 1975. The last part
discusses the reasons why detente failed to take root and was, by the late
1970s, giving way to a new Cold War.
The European origins of détente, 1969–71

Ostpolitik, the term used to describe the attempts by West German
chancellor Willy Brandt to improve relations with East Germany and forge
closer links between the eastern and western blocs, was a significant factor
in the subsequent promotion of détente by the superpowers. European
leaders were all aware that conflict between the west and the Soviet Union
could result in the destruction of European civilisation. At the same time
replacing conflict with greater contacts through cooperation in trade and
diplomacy, for example, could be an effective way of reducing the closed
totalitarian system operating from Moscow. Suspicion and ignorance could
be reduced and the repressive communist system undermined peacefully.
The French leader Charles de Gaulle hoped that the influence of the two
superpowers would decline as Europe, led by France, emerged as a more
influential force. Brandt looked more to resolve a number of unsettled
issues concerning Germany that had not been agreed after the war. The
Harmel report, in late 1967, on NATO’s future role sought to produce
‘peace and stability’ in Europe by using NATO in the interest of détente.
When Brandt became West German chancellor in 1969 he immediately
signed the non-proliferation treaty and followed it up with the Moscow
treaty with the Soviets the following year. This contributed, in effect, to
the recognition of Germany’s division and the post-war status of Berlin
between 1970 and 1972.
Détente and Cold War in the changing international

system
The era of détente was in large part a reflection of the structural changes
that had taken place in international relations since the 1950s. Among
the major issues were the Sino–Soviet split, the USA’s failure in Vietnam,
the decline in US relative economic strength and the costly arms race
between the Soviets and the USA which had, by the late 1960s, resulted in
a situation of virtual parity between the USA and the USSR. In the climate
of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) and evident multipolarisation,
pressures to reduce tensions between the east and the west in general,
and the USA and the USSR in particular, increased. The new US president
Richard Nixon and his national security adviser Henry Kissinger thus
launched a policy of détente. The aim was to improve Soviet–US relations
and reduce the risk of hot war while preserving America’s advantages in
power and influence within the international system. An important step in
reducing tensions was taken in 1969 when the two countries commenced
the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). While Nixon and Kissinger did
not expect to end the Cold War, they hoped that by minimising Soviet–US
tension they could curb the USSR’s interest in aiding radical revolutions in
the less developed world. As a bonus, they hoped that the Soviets would
help bring about an end to the Vietnam War.
54
Activity
Summarise the SALT talks. What were the agreements?
Did détente preserve the Cold War while reducing the risk of hot war?
Important dates
1967 December Harmel Report presented to NATO
1969 January Nixon begins his presidency
March Sino–Soviet border clashes, continue until August
July Nixon Doctrine
November SALT talks begin
1970 March Four Power talks on Berlin begin
April US troops invade Cambodia
August Soviet–West German Treaty
September Syrian invasion of Jordan
December West German–Polish Treaty
1971 April ‘Ping-pong diplomacy’
May Honecker replaces Ulbricht in East Germany
June End of US trade embargo against China (since 1950)
July Kissinger’s secret visit to China
September Four Power agreement on Berlin signed
Détente 1972–75: US and Soviet aims and expectations

For the Americans, faced with the expense of the Vietnam War, détente
was in part an attempt to deal with the rising economic challenge of the
Europeans and the Japanese in the context of the Cold War. It was an
essentially conservative policy designed to preserve the status quo, based
on US dominance, by dealing with the new multipolar world in Europe
and Asia which was symbolised by the opening to China.
The main aim of the USA was to ensure that the Soviet Union did not
challenge the status quo in ideological terms or make further gains in
influence through its growing military and hard power. That meant that
Soviet influence in important regions like the Middle East should not be
allowed to increase.
In 1972 the Nixon–Kissinger détente appeared a huge success. First,
Kissinger had visited China in 1971 and opened up a relationship that
had been closed since 1949. Second, Nixon had met Brezhnev and other
Soviet leaders in 1972 in Moscow and signed the SALT I treaty – the first
agreement that put limits on nuclear arms. By early 1973 the Vietnam
War had ended, albeit without significant Soviet involvement. Thus, when
Nixon began his second term, relaxation of tensions appeared to be the
central theme in international relations. However, Nixon himself was soon
undone by the Watergate scandal and the SALT process stalled. Despite
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1975, détente
lost its support in the USA and was undermined by continued Soviet–US
confrontation in places like Angola and the Horn of Africa.
55
The Soviets hoped to secure access to the technological knowledge gained

by the west, but above all to gain recognition as an equal power to the
USA in the international system. This gain in status would be enhanced
by the reduction of the risk of hot war, while continued ideological gains
through left-wing revolutions in the developing world continued to
be supported.
Activity
What were the important achievements of détente?
Why did détente begin to lose support in the USA?
Important dates
1972 January EC enlargement (UK, Denmark, Ireland)
1972 February Sino–US meeting in Beijing
May Soviet–US summit in Moscow. SALT I
June Four power agreement on Berlin
July 3-year US–Soviet grain deal reached
September US–Soviet–British–French agreement on future of Berlin
November Nixon re-elected
West and East Germany sign Basic Treaty on relations between

December
East and West Germany
1973 January Paris Peace Accords end Vietnam War

April Watergate crisis intensifies
May Brezhnev visits West Germany
June Brezhnev–Nixon summit in the USA
MBFR talks begin in Vienna. Arab–Israeli War begins. Arab oil

October
embargo
1974 April Coup in Portugal
Willy Brandt resigns as West German chancellor. India joins the

May
nuclear powers
June–July Nixon–Brezhnev summit in Moscow

August Nixon resigns. Gerald Ford becomes president
November Vladivostok summit (Brezhnev–Ford)
Ford signs the Trade Reform Act. US–Soviet 1972 trade

1975 January
agreement cancelled
April South Vietnam surrenders to the communist North

July Joint US–Soviet space mission
July–August Helsinki Accords signed
56
The collapse of détente, 1976–79

During the late 1970s Soviet–US détente quickly evaporated. In part
this was the result of domestic opposition in the USA, where the Nixon–
Kissinger–Ford foreign policy was attacked from the left and the right
during the 1976 presidential election. During the Carter administration
relations with the Soviets worsened. Although the SALT II negotiations
were brought to a conclusion in 1979 they were never ratified. As the USA
began to try and restore its lost credibility in the less developed world after
the humiliation of Vietnam, it eventually ran into greater confrontation
with the Soviets. Much of this seemed to take place, however, in the
propaganda field and US–Soviet trade reached new heights in the late
1970s. Unfortunately, ideological rivalry, in the Horn of Africa and
Angola in particular, continued as socialist revolutions were becoming
internationally more significant.
By the end of the decade the Soviets had invaded Afghanistan, a move
which, along with the unfolding of the Iranian revolution, was challenging
the stability of the oil-rich Middle East. Explaining whether détente thus
collapsed due to differing general expectations of the outcomes of détente
or specific regional requirements and differences in Soviet–US approaches
to particular problems is key to understanding why tensions grew anew
in the late 1970s. The changing international system was also crucial in
its production of more revolutionary movements presenting ideological
challenges to US interests.
Important dates
1976 January SALT II talks in Moscow fail
March President Ford stops the public use of the term ‘détente’
September Mao dies
November Jimmy Carter wins US presidential race
1977 May NATO agrees defense spending increases
July Fighting breaks out between Ethiopia and Somalia
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
September
(CSCE) follow-up meeting in Belgrade begins
November Somalia ends 1974 friendship with USSR
December Cambodia breaks diplomatic relations with Vietnam
SALT II talks re-launched; Marxist regime takes over in

1978 April
Afghanistan
May Sino–Soviet border clashes

September Camp David Summit
December Vietnamese forces invade Cambodia
1979 January–February Den Xiaoping visits the USA
February China invades Vietnam
June SALT II signed in Vienna (not ratified)
November Hostage crisis begins in Iran
December Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
57

• explain the difference between the relaxation of superpower tensions,
and the continuing pursuit of Cold War aims.
• describe the major achievements and changes brought upon by détente.
• explain why détente failed to become firmly entrenched.

1. What factors were important in paving the road for détente?
2. Is there a difference between Soviet–US détente and east–west détente?
3. How significant was the role of China – and the 1972 ‘opening to
China’ by President Nixon – for détente?
4. What role did nuclear weapons play in the rise and fall of détente?
5. What were the international consequences of the US failure in Vietnam?
58
Chapter 9: The Cold War in Asia – Korea
Learning outcomes
• explain the nature of the Korean War and its significance for Cold War
tensions
• explain the difficulties in reaching an armistice agreement.
Essential reading
Young, J.W and J. Kent International relations since 1945: A global history.
4E.
Further reading
Goncharov, S., J.W. Lewis and X. Litai Uncertain partners: Stalin, Mao and
the Korean War. (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 1995) [ISBN
9780804725217].
Stueck, W. The Korean War: an international history. (Princeton: Princeton
Stueck, W. Rethinking the Korean War. (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2004) [ISBN 9780691118475].
Zhihua, S. ‘Sino–Soviet relations and the origins of the Korean War: Stalin’s
strategic goals in the Far East’, Journal of Cold War Studies 2(2) 2000.
The domestic and international causes of the North

Korean invasion
The Korean War was a conflict born out of the internal conditions on
the peninsula and the international arrangements for the division and
occupation of Korea. Its timing and development were influenced by the
international situation and the confrontation that had arisen out of the
Cold War which was complicated by the minor tensions and suspicions
between the two leading communist powers. After the war the USA
maintained Japanese bureaucratic structures in Korea with US personnel,
and little progress was made in establishing a unified country as factions
on both sides of the divide became increasingly hostile in attempting to
extend their influence in the guise of Korean unity.
By the end of 1949 the communist triumph in the Chinese civil war led the
US Secretary of State Dean Acheson, somewhat thoughtlessly, to define
a western Pacific defense perimeter on an international line through
Japan, the Philippines and the Ryukyu Islands, thus excluding the Korean
peninsula. In the same month Stalin began to respond more positively
to the North Korean leader Kim il Sung’s requests to support his plans to
invade South Korea, which had no tanks and virtually no military aircraft.
The belief that the USA would not respond to such an attack was an
important reason for Stalin’s decision to support the North Korean invasion
in March, although he did insist on securing Mao’s approval. Stalin was
also concerned that the defeat of the Chinese Nationalists, or Kuomintang,
would make it difficult to enforce the Yalta agreement on the victorious
Chinese communist party. Fellow communists could not be expected to
59
accept the Soviet control of Darien, which they had secured at Yalta where
the Chinese were not represented. The fact that a Sino–Soviet alliance had
been signed in February 1950 ensured that retaining Chinese territory was
no longer an option for Stalin. Getting control of the Korean peninsula as
a result of the North Korean invasion would give the Soviets access to a
warm water port that the return of Darien had deprived them of.
Activities
Why, and with what consequences, did Stalin approve Kim il Sung’s invasion of South
Korea?
Explain the extent of Sino–Soviet friendship in 1950.
The US and UN response and the crossing of the

38th parallel
The aggression by North Korea in June 1950 produced an immediate
response. As their army advanced southwards the United Nations
was facing an early test of its ability to resist aggression and maintain
international peace. With the Soviets absenting themselves from the
Security Council in protest at the Chinese UN seat being given to Taiwan,
a UN force of troops from 16 states under effective US command was
approved to repel the North Korean forces. The USA was acting to
maintain its credibility as the leader of the free world against communist
aggression. The UN/US force under General Douglas MacArthur landed at
Inchon behind the lines of the advancing North Korean forces and turned
the tide of the military conflict in September. Soviet pilots and equipment
became involved as the US forces advanced northwards.
The issue was whether they would continue their advance across the 38th
parallel and push back the North Korean troops. This would go beyond the
implementation of the UN resolution and such an action was to produce
opponents and firm advocates on both sides of the Atlantic. In the Cold
War battle against the Soviets and the forces of communism it appeared
to some as an ideal opportunity to roll back communist aggression. The
decision to approve the crossing proved to be a fatal one, at least for many
Koreans, as more damage was inflicted on North Korea than on Japan in
World War II.
The Chinese intervention

When the UN/US troops entered North Korea, without the approval of the
UN, and advanced towards the Yalu River that formed the Chinese border,
it aroused serious concern in Beijing. Chinese fears were based on their
recent historical experiences of western imperialism and the humiliating
occupation of some Chinese territory. Mao was particularly sensitive
about the recent past experiences of a divided China facing imperialist
forces, which influenced his 1950 decision to overcome his distrust of
Stalin and ally with the Soviets immediately after the communist victory
in the civil war. The fear of subordination to US imperialism, combined
with the support that Korean communists had given to the Chinese
communists in the civil war, led Mao to send Chinese units across the Yalu
on 19 October 1950. Contact was made with the South Korean forces the
following week and diplomatic warnings were given through the Indians.
Ignoring these signs, MacArthur decided on 29 October to order an
advance right to the Yalu. On 28 November a Chinese army engaged the
60
US-led forces with 200,000 troops. Almost immediately the US/UN troops
were in retreat back to the 38th parallel between the two Koreas. The
communists then again decided to advance into South Korea and repeated
their earlier successes. This time there was no Inchon landing to halt the
communists’ progress and it was not until January 1951, when General
Ridgeway’s forces were able to launch a successful counter attack from the
southernmost part of the peninsula, that the advance was halted. Once
more the Chinese and their Korean allies began another retreat, and the
US/UN troops again reached the 38th parallel but this time decided to halt
just north of that line. Armistice talks then began in July 1951.
Important dates
1945 August US and USSR agree on division of Korea along 38th parallel
1946 Joint Commission for Korea established
1947 September Korean problem given to the UN
1948 August South Korea established
December Soviet troops leave the peninsula

1949 June US troops withdraw from Korea
1950 January Acheson’s National Press Club speech
February Sino–Soviet treaty signed
Stalin approves Kim il Sung’s request to use military force

March
against the South
25 June Kim il Sung attacks South Korea
UN Security Council in the absence of USSR calls for

27 June
members to assist Korea
7 July US/UN command established under General MacArthur
15 September US/UN landing at Inchon
9 October US troops cross 38th parallel
Chinese make contact with US forces and retreat after

25 October
pushing South Koreans back from Yalu
MacArthur launches assault towards the Chinese border on

24 November
the Yalu
Chinese forces begin counter attack and push US troops

26 November
south
4 January Chinese capture Seoul
Mid-January US begin a counter-offensive
15 March Seoul recaptured as Chinese and North Koreans retreat
First meeting to discuss conditions for an armistice at

July
Kaesong
Talks deadlocked over the voluntary repatriation of

1952 May
prisoners
8 October Americans suspend armistice talks
61
UN General Assembly adopts the modified Indian plan for

1952 3 December
the release of prisoners
1953 26 April Armistice talks resume

27 August Armistice signed
Geneva Conference fails to reach agreement on Korean

April–June
reunification
Activities
Why did the US/UN forces decide to cross the 38th parallel and advance to the Yalu?
The prisoner of war issue

The most difficult issue in the talks was the question of the repatriation of
prisoners of war, and the talks lasted for two years. The normal procedure
under the Geneva Convention would be that all captured soldiers and
airmen would be exchanged, but the problem was that some Koreans did
not want to return to the North and some allegedly did not want to go
back to the South. For the USA the idea of returning men from the free
world to a political system where freedom was denied was abhorrent.
More importantly there were important Cold War propaganda points at
stake as each system desired to portray their values as the more attractive
and progressive ones. If it could be proved that prisoners did not want to
return to capitalism or to communism this was would be highly significant.
Thus efforts were made by both side to ‘persuade’ prisoners to make the
’right’ choice. The test would be who would adjudicate the validity of
these decisions and ensure they were made without threats or coercion.
Although this was never implemented entirely satisfactorily, the important
roles of the Indians and the United Nations enabled an agreement
eventually to be produced in December 1952.
Armistice and the Korean War as Cold War and hot war
The Korean War was the moment when the Cold War became firmly
connected to the emergence of hot war. In 1951 the British and US
military defined the Cold War as all forms of conflict, including civil war,
short of international armed conflict. By November 1950 the Korean War
could no longer be regarded as a civil war. The question was whether it
could remain an international conflict within Korea, or whether it would
develop into a regional conflict, as MacArthur was in favour of bombing
China. Truman, who eventually fired MacArthur, resisted this in line with
the wishes of the USA’s allies to limit the conflict. Neither side really
wished to extend the war but Stalin had an interest in keeping the Chinese
actively engaged in a military conflict with the USA, whereas Mao believed
the USA needed an armistice agreement more than the communist side
did. At the same time Stalin was extremely wary of engaging in an open
confrontation with the USA. Certainly in 1952, as the prisoner of war
arguments seemed to be unresolvable, the USA was hoping to apply
military pressure to induce the communist side to reach an agreement. It
has been suggested that the threat of atomic weapons and Stalin’s death
in March 1953 were significant reasons as to why an armistice agreement
was finally reached in August 1953.
62

• explain the nature of the Korean War and its significance for Cold War
tensions
• explain the difficulties in reaching an armistice agreement.

1. Why did the Korean War become an international armed conflict?
2. Explain why the Korean War was limited to the Korean peninsular.
3. What were the consequences of Chinese intervention for Sino–Soviet
relations?
4. Who lost most from the Korean conflict and in what ways?
63
Notes
64
Chapter 10: The Cold War in Asia – Vietnam
Learning outcomes
• account for the US decision to provide backing for South Vietnam
• explain the regional and prestige considerations behind US intervention
• account for the willingness of the USA to de-escalate the conflict from
1968 onwards.
Essential reading
10A, 10B, 10C and 10D.
Further reading
De Groot, G.J. A noble cause?: America and the Vietnam War. (Harlow:
Longman, 1999) [ISBN 9780582287174].
Kaiser, D. American tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson and the origins of the
Vietnam War. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000) [ISBN
9780674002258].
Logevall, F. Choosing war: the lost chance for peace and the escalation of
war in Vietnam. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001) [ISBN
9780520229198].
Olsen, J.S. and R. Roberts Where the domino fell: America and Vietnam, 1945–
1995. (Maiden, MA: Blackwell, 2008) [ISBN 9781405182225].
Special Vietnam edition, Diplomatic History 34(3) 2010.
Introduction
The Vietnam War is one of the most controversial subjects in the history
of US foreign policy and has inspired a massive literature with a vigorous
debate about the causes and consequences of US intervention. Central to
this debate are the reasons for the escalation of assistance to the South,
which was followed by the sending of military advisers and ultimately,
in 1965, by US combat troops, and also important to debate are the
reasons why the US lost. One of the most fundamental issues is whether
the intervention should be seen as the logical culmination of the policy
of global resistance to communism, or whether the decision to intervene
should be seen as the personal decision and responsibility of one of the
presidents in office between 1954 and 1965. Another important debate
has arisen over the nature of the intervention. This debate can be seen as
an attempt to understand why US strategy or tactics lost the war, and an
effort to discover if an alternative strategy might have worked better. Some
historians contend that if the USA had achieved a better understanding of
guerrilla warfare, or had been willing to escalate the war earlier into Laos
and Cambodia then victory might have been possible. Others contend that
as South Vietnam was never a viable state the USA was always fighting a
war that it would lose.
65
It is vital in analysing the Vietnam War to realise that it cannot be looked

at in isolation. A number of historians have attempted to illustrate the
importance of broader factors, and in particular the necessity of seeing US
intervention against the general background of the crisis within south-
east Asia. It is also important to see the ways in which North Vietnam
manipulated the Sino–Soviet split to its own advantage, playing off the
Chinese and the Soviets against each other.
Eisenhower and the changing Vietnamese nationalist/

communist unification movement
An indirect US commitment to Vietnam began in May 1950, before the
Korean War, with the provision of $10 million in military aid to assist the
French in their struggle against the Viet Minh. Unfortunately, after their
defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, the French withdrew from the Indo–
China region and agreed to the temporary partition of the country pending
elections intended to unify it. The nationalists, or Vietminh, under Ho Chi
Minh, who were effectively controlled by the communist party, were likely
to win the elections and the USA supported South Vietnam’s decision to
refuse to agree to elections to bring about reunification. From 1955 the
USA began a policy of large-scale support for Ngo Dinh Diem, a right-wing
Christian leader in a largely non-Christian country. The problem for Diem
was that he had to construct a South Vietnamese state from scratch when
he lacked any base of support beyond the Army and his fellow Catholics.
Diem therefore ruled through a mixture of corruption and heavy-handed
repression. The latter was particularly directed at those communists/
nationalists who remained in the south, with the result that by 1958 this
group began a campaign to assassinate Diem’s local government officials.
Between October 1958 and June 1959 the leadership in North Vietnam
began to support a change by the Vietminh from a political struggle
through propaganda to guerrilla attacks by the insurgents in the South. An
insurrection against Diem’s rule began with aid increasingly coming from
the North. This coincided with the beginning of a civil war in Laos and
these two events caused serious concern in Washington about the tide of
Cold War events in Asia, especially in Indo–China.
Important dates
1950 May Offer of US military aid to French in Indochina
1954 May Fall of Dien Bien Phu to Viet Minh
Geneva settlement which should mean elections to unify

July
Vietnam
September Formation of SEATO
South Vietnam refuses to agree to national reunification

1955 July
elections in 1956
November Ngo Dinh Diem becomes president of South Vietnam
North Vietnam approves policy of limited military resistance in

1958–59 October–July
South against Diem’s regime
1960 March Deployment of US special forces

Start of fighting in Laos
August
Formation of National Liberation Front for South Vietnam with
December
a military arm
66
1961 May Opening of Geneva Conference on Laos

November Kennedy increases number of US advisers to South Vietnam
1962 July Neutrality of Laos confirmed, unity government formed
1963 February Breakdown of coalition government in Laos
May Start of Buddhist protests against Diem’s rule
August Diem’s forces raid Buddhist pagodas
November Diem overthrown in a coup and killed
Kennedy, Diem and the increased US commitment to

Vietnamisation and no US combat troops
The Kennedy government was faced with a growing number of global
trouble spots and therefore increased military aid to South Vietnam. The
aim was to assist the South Vietnamese government in its battle against
the southern insurgents, who were aided by the north with Chinese
support, and the US aid included military ‘advisers’. However, this US
assistance failed to turn the course of the conflict and it was difficult for
Washington to pin point what was going wrong. Kennedy sent military
and civilian advisers to determine what was needed, but their reports
expressed a number of different views as to the effectiveness of US
assistance to the South Vietnamese army (ARVN). The fundamental
problem was the difficulty of applying US values to a basically rural
peasant society interested in land and an escape from oppressive landlords
which communism could easily offer. Many Vietnamese saw no great
advantages in the schools and hospitals that the USA was offering.
Kennedy was both a staunch anti-communist eager to wage the Cold War
and a fervent advocate of measures to prevent hot war in general and
a nuclear holocaust in particular. His increase in the number of military
advisers in Vietnam was matched by a willingness to negotiate over the
situation in Laos in 1961, despite the presence there of the CIA. For some
commentators his concessions in Laos proved that he was determined to
resist communist advances in Vietnam. Others have argued that if Kennedy
had not been assassinated in November 1963, US ground combat troops
would not have been deployed in Vietnam. On at least two occasions
Kennedy resisted calls from his military advisers for the deployment of
ground troops. On each occasion it was Kennedy alone who opposed the
sending of US troops to Vietnam when the civilian experts present also
argued that there was a need for US troops. As the situation in Vietnam
continued to deteriorate in 1963, Diem’s increasing unpopularity with the
general population led the USA in November to agree to Diem’s overthrow.
It was the start of a series of coups in South Vietnam that did not help the
progress of the war. When Kennedy was also assassinated in the same month
as Diem, he bequeathed to Johnson a legacy of 18,000 advisers to South
Vietnam but no combat troops
Johnson and military escalation

The decisive year in which White House officials and military leaders were
successful in persuading President Johnson to send US troops to Vietnam
was 1965. It followed the Gulf of Tonkin resolution the previous summer
which had led Congress to grant the president relatively unhindered war
67
powers because of alleged North Vietnamese attacks on a US destroyer, the

USS Maddox. It is now clear that only one of these attacks actually took
place when the US ship was conducting surveillance of North Vietnamese
coastal defences as part of US covert operations against North Vietnam.
There were a number of motives behind this escalation of the war,
including concern that a loss of political face in the struggle against
communism would have political consequences in the USA. Fears that
support for Johnson’s Great Society programme would be undermined
were also evident if the president were to agree to withdraw from
Vietnam, as recommended to Johnson by one of Kennedy’s key advisers,
George Ball.
The military strategy and the bombing that formed part of it had one
fundamental flaw. Winning, as defined by the US military in terms of body
counts, failed to consider the impact of the bombs on ordinary Vietnamese,
whose friends and relatives may have been killed. Resentment and dislike
of the USA added to the numbers of insurgents, and when the bombing
of North Vietnam began, its devastation did not significantly affect the
determination to expel the US invaders. The US problems in Vietnam
were part of a US failure to develop a political strategy for countering the
appeal of the Vietminh who were impossible to distinguish from non-
combatant Vietnamese. With regular North Vietnamese forces beginning to
support the insurgents, Johnson got no nearer to victory or to persuading
North Vietnam to cease its support for the rebels in the South. To make
matters worse Johnson tried to persuade the US public that the war was
being won by numerous statements to accompany the increasing despatch
of ground troops – eventually to a total of 540,000. US casualties were
over 50,000 but the Vietcong, as the Vietminh became known, at times lost
15 men for each US soldier.
Johnson and the increasing failure of the political

struggle
Johnson has been criticised by the right for not launching an all-out
war, including an invasion of North Vietnam. The president was fearful
of provoking, as in Korea, a massive retaliation from the Chinese. A key
turning point came in early 1968 with the Tet Offensive by the insurgents
and North Vietnamese forces. It led to the temporary seizure of several
important towns including Saigon. US prime time TV viewers saw
Vietcong soldiers swarming over the US embassy in Vietnam and exposing
Johnson’s untruths about the war. It was an enormous political triumph
for the North Vietnamese even though they suffered a significant military
defeat. With domestic opposition to the war producing demonstrations in
the USA, public opinion was turning against the president and Johnson
decided that with the war still going on he would not seek re-election in
1968.
Activity
How important was the situation in south-east Asia in influencing US policy in Vietnam
between 1961 and 1968?
68
Important dates
Start of US bombing of Ho Chi Minh Trial in Laos – the supply
1964 February
route from North Vietnam
August Gulf of Tonkin Incident
Pleiku incident leads USA to start bombing of the North –

1965 February
Rolling Thunder
March First US Marines arrive at Da Nang

April Johnson’s speech at Johns Hopkins University
Johnson’s decision to raise US troop ceiling above 100,000

July
men
1966 June Johnson escalates bombing of North Vietnam

1967 September Thieu elected president of South Vietnam
1968 January Tet Offensive
Johnson refuses call for more troops and declares

March
willingness for peace talks
May US–North Vietnam talks start in Paris
Johnson calls a temporary halt to the bombing of North

October
Vietnam to encourage peace talks
Activity
Explain why Johnson chose to send US combat troops to Vietnam.
Nixon and Vietnamisation – no peace, no honour

The arrival of Nixon as US President in 1969 led to a ‘new’ policy towards
Vietnam, ostensibly to obtain ‘Peace with Honour’. The official justification
for Nixon’s policy was that it was designed to de-escalate the US presence
– a virtual repeat of the Vietnamisation programme which had begun the
US involvement. At the same time, pressure on the North from even more
destructive bombing and an invasion of Cambodia (to deal with the North
Vietnamese sanctuaries there) was expected to force North Vietnam to
accept the existence of the regime in South Vietnam. Increased bombing
would work in tandem with diplomacy and a negotiated withdrawal. It
was hoped by the US government that the construction of détente with
China and the Soviet Union would facilitate this policy.
Unfortunately the North had little incentive to negotiate on terms
acceptable to the USA. If they could stay in the fight the rise of domestic
opposition in the US would help produce an eventual withdrawal. Nixon
and Kissinger essentially hoped to achieve ‘Peace with Honour’ by using
negotiation to buy enough time after withdrawal to avoid any blame
for the collapse of South Vietnam being incurred by the USA. The initial
objectors to that plan were President Thieu and the South Vietnamese
leaders who were well aware that without US troops their regime would
soon fall and Vietnam would be united under the communists. In the
69
peace negotiations the North Vietnamese tried to insist that the Thieu
regime should be removed as a condition of any settlement and, although
the peace that was finally signed by Nixon and Kissinger did not provide
for this, the unsuccessful US attempt to prevent forces from the North
remaining in the South was a more serious failure. With no ending of
North Vietnamese involvement in the South, Thieu’s regime was doomed
without a US military presence. All North Vietnamese troops were allowed
to remain in place and two years after a peace agreement was signed
Saigon fell, amidst embarrassing scenes of US helicopters desperately
trying to evacuate civilians from the capital. There was no decent interval
and the connection between US withdrawal and the success of the
communist insurgents was there for the world to see.
Important dates
1969 January Nixon’s inauguration
March Start of secret US bombing of Cambodia
June Nixon announces first withdrawal of US troops
1970 March Coup in Cambodia overthrows Prince Sihanouk
April US incursion into Cambodia
June Congress repeals Gulf of Tonkin Resolution
1971 February Failed raid on Ho Chi Minh trail
May Kissinger offers unilateral US withdrawal
June Publication of Pentagon Papers
1972 February Nixon visit to China
March North Vietnam unleashes ‘Easter Offensive’
April US bombs Hanoi and Haiphong
May Nixon visit to Moscow
October Thieu refuses to accept US-negotiated peace settlement
December US ‘Christmas Bombing’ of Hanoi
1973 January Peace Treaty signed
1974 August Nixon’s resignation
1975 March New North Vietnamese offensive
April Fall of Phnom Penh to Khmer Rouge
May Fall of Saigon to North Vietnam
Activity
Give your reasons for agreeing or disagreeing that Nixon’s ‘Peace with Honour’ was an
honourable peace.
70

• account for the US decision to provide backing for South Vietnam
• explain the regional and prestige considerations behind US intervention
• account for the willingness of the USA to de-escalate the conflict from
1968 onwards.

1. Why did the USA agree to the overthrow of President Diem in 1963?
2. To what extent was Johnson principally responsible for the US
intervention in Vietnam?
3. How far did the deteriorating situation in the rest of south-east Asia
influence Johnson’s Vietnam policy?
4. Why did Johnson decide to pursue the limited war option in Vietnam?
5. How significant was the Tet offensive in producing Johnson’s decision
to de-escalate the war?
71
Notes
72
Chapter 11: The Soviet Union and the Cold War in eastern Europe, 1947–62
Chapter 11: The Soviet Union and the

Cold War in eastern Europe, 1947–62
Learning outcomes
• explain the Soviet position on eastern Europe
• discuss the changes in Soviet policy towards eastern Europe after the
death of Stalin
• explain the different Soviet responses to the crises in Poland and Hungary
• examine the importance of Berlin and the problems of the DDR.
Essential reading
Harrison, H. Driving the Soviets up the Wall: Soviet–East German relations 1953–
1961. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005) [ISBN 9780691124285].
1B, 6A and 7B.
Further reading
Kramer, M. ‘The Soviet Union and the 1956 crises in Hungary and Poland:
reassessments and new findings’, Journal of Contemporary History 33(2) 1998.
Kramer, M. ‘The early post–Stalin secession struggle and upheavals in East–
Central Europe: internal–external linkages in Soviet policy making (Part I)’,
Journal of Cold War Studies 1(1) 1999.
Central Europe: internal–external linkages in Soviet policy making (Part II)’,
Central Europe: internal–external linkages in Soviet policy making (Part
III)’, Journal of Cold War Studies 1(3) 1999.
Mastny, V. The Cold War and Soviet insecurity: the Stalin years. (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1997) [ISBN 9780195106169].
Stykalin, A. ‘The Hungarian crisis of 1956: the Soviet role in the light of new
archival documents’, Cold War History 2(1) 2001.
Zubok, V. and C. Pleshakov Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: from Stalin to Khrushchev.
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996) [ISBN 9780674455313].
The Soviet imposition of governments in eastern and

central Europe, 1947 and 1948
The extension of full communist regimes in eastern and central Europe
that were subordinate to Moscow gathered pace from 1947 (before the
announcement of the Marshall Plan). Governments controlled by eastern
Europeans with a firm allegiance to Stalin and the Soviet economic
development model were imposed on more states, whether or not they
had fought on the side of the Germans. The process operated through
rigged elections in Poland and Hungary in 1947 and by a coup in
Czechoslovakia in 1948. The Soviets had extracted economic assets from
East Germany but soon began a long process of supporting their satellite
73
states with cheap products. The aim was to ensure that the rigid Soviet
system, with its lack of political freedom, enabled Stalin to maintain his
personal control. Its lack of economic development through individual
enterprise required the elimination of any opponents within the Soviet
Union and prevented any contact with the democratic capitalist west.
It is unlikely that Stalin and his excessive paranoia and caution aimed
to take over Europe, let alone the world. His aim with the imposition of
oppressive regimes in much of eastern and central Europe was to ensure
that such states in 1947 were controlled by communist parties. By so
doing he would prevent any influence from the west threatening the
USSR and its communist system. This could be done by having pro-Soviet
elements in the governments of eastern Europe countries and Stalin was
seeking to strengthen Moscow’s control there before the end of the war.
If cooperation with the west was to be maintained in order to prevent
further German aggression, which in 1945 was seen as the main danger by
Stalin, then complete control everywhere may not have been necessary. On
the other hand, Stalin may have eventually desired to achieve it as the best
way of protecting the USSR and his personal position within it.
The Berlin blockade was the final attempt to secure a German settlement
fundamentally in line with Soviet aims. And to try, in a crude and clumsy
fashion, to prevent the currency reform in Berlin which the west were
embarking on. The rebuilding of West Germany by the west was never in
Soviet interests and it may be (there is still not any comprehensive access
to Soviet archives) that influence or control over all eastern European
communist parties was always a vital aim for Stalin. The nature of that
control and influence may have had to be more complete in countries such
as Poland, where a significant element of the population was hostile to
the Soviet Union and had had well-developed historical animosities to the
Russian Empire. At all events Germany was to remain a key focus for the
Soviets and while West Germany was something that produced resentment
and suspicion in Stalin, East Germany was always regarded as the lynch
pin of the Soviet satellite empire.
The death of Stalin and the new regime

The death of Stalin in March 1953 resulted, albeit not instantaneously, in
significant changes to the Soviet system in eastern and central Europe. The
harsh nature of the Stalinist regime, with its commitment to the forced
development of heavy industry to meet the defence and armament needs
of the state, was modified over the next decade. And the nature of the
accompanying repression was also regarded as something in the past,
particularly after 1956. By then, at the XXth party congress, Nikita Khrushchev
was able to denounce Stalin and his crimes. One of the original triumvirate
with Malenkov and Beria, who stepped into Stalin’s shoes, Khrushchev was
able by 1955 to emerge as the sole leader. As he did so, a fresh approach to
international and domestic issues and to the relationship with the satellite
states began to emerge. In part this was a result of changing Stalin’s cult of
personality but there was also a reduction in the degree of repression of the
secret police. Not that this was automatically translated into similar attitudes
amongst eastern European leaders whose own position or ideology pointed
more to the need to maintain the fundamentals of the Stalinist system.
Activities
Locate in chronological order the imposition of Soviet-controlled regimes on the central
and eastern European states. What conclusions can be drawn about why the imposition
of Stalinist regimes was carried out?
74
Important dates
1947 January Polish elections rigged
March Moscow Council of Foreign Ministers on the future of Germany
August Hungarian elections rigged
London Council of Foreign Ministers on Germany breaks up

December
without agreement with no date set for a future meeting
1948 February Czech coup

June Berlin blockade begins
Yugoslavia expelled from the Cominform with the emergence

June
of the Tito–Stalin split
Establishment of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance

1949 January
(COMECON)
Problems in East Germany

Until 1952 the East German borders were open, but in May of that year
they were closed, allegedly in response to the agreement in the west on
the re-armament of West Germany. Henceforth the only access to the west
was through West Berlin and the Soviets, right until the 1960s, remained
opposed to the idea of closing it. Khrushchev believed that the best way to
fight western influence and to attract people to communism was to promote
better living conditions. This was at odds with the views of the leader of
East Germany (DDR), Walter Ulbricht, who began a programme of building
socialism in 1952 on Stalinist lines by forced collectivisation of agriculture
and the promotion of heavy industry. This produced a greater flow of
refugees to the west through Berlin and by the end of May, no doubt with
pressure from Moscow after Stalin’s death, the East German regime had to
recognise that the forced construction of socialism was a mistake.
Thus began a liberalisation process which started with the reduction of
political repression rather than the solution of the economic problems
that were being created. This only made the resentment spread more
rapidly and on 16 June protests erupted in 560 East German towns.
Now known to be much greater than first thought, these uprisings from
economic origins quickly developed a political dimension. East Germany
was the jewel in the communist crown and failure there would threaten
the communist movement in Europe and further afield. Hence the Soviets
intervened brutally to crush the revolt with tanks and troops.
Khrushchev was, however, ill at ease as his vision of communism was to
display the successes of communism on an increasingly global scale. East
Germany should be leading the way. There should be more consumer
goods, the cessation of mass unrest and the end of agricultural requisitions
but unfortunately such things were not to be realised in East Germany
where more people would begin to vote with their feet by leaving through
Berlin. The advantages of communism as compared to capitalism could
hardly be reconciled with an exodus of refugees seeking a better life in the
capitalist world.
Activities
Read these documents on the East German crisis: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/
NSAEBB/NSAEBB50/
75
Khrushchev’s policy on Poland and Hungary

The difficulties in Poland and Hungary, which also arose because of
popular protest against communist regimes, provoked different responses
from Moscow. In Poland the death of the communist party leader Bierut
in 1956 occurred when the process of de-Stalinisation, authorised by
Khrushchev at the XXth party congress, was getting underway. One of
Stalin’s many Polish victims, Wladislav Gomulka, was urged to return
helped by a wave of strikes. By August Gomulka had been rehabilitated
by the atmosphere of de-Stalinisation encouraged by Khrushchev. His
supporters were now attempting to bring him back to power with massed
rallies in October 1956. In response, a Soviet tank division moved towards
the Polish capital and on 19 October Khrushchev flew to Warsaw as
Gomulka was about to be elected as communist party leader. The tanks
were halted and after Gomulka had given assurances that Poland would
remain in the Warsaw Pact, the Soviets permitted his return to power.
Thus Poland had gained a more nationalist leader who was slightly less
constrained by the communist party’s straitjacket fitted by Moscow.
Hungary proved to be very different as more factory workers participated
in the strikes and demonstrations that began after Khrushchev’s
denunciation of Stalin. The focus was, unlike in Poland, not simply on
changes in the way the institutional structures of the communist party
operated, but on changes in Hungary’s politics and society. When the
student demonstrations on 23 October in Budapest were joined by the
workers, the unrest spread outside the capital. The combination of
demands for political reform and greater workers’ control of the factories
sounded alarm bells in Moscow and troops arrived in Budapest the
following day. Nevertheless as martial law was proclaimed and the deaths
at the hands of Soviet troops exceeded 100, some senior Soviet communist
party leaders, including Mikoyan and Suslov, began calling for compromise
rather than repression. On 28 October a decision was taken in Moscow to
withdraw Soviet troops from Budapest, an exodus which was completed
by 30 October with the aim of producing more equality between the
socialist countries of Europe.
However, on 31 October this decision to withdraw Soviet troops from
Budapest was reversed and their redeployment began. The reasons are
partly speculative but have been linked to the requirements of socialism
and the particular need to avoid further undermining the international
position of the Soviet bloc. On 29 October Israel attacked Egypt in
collusion with Britain and France and on the 31 October, following a
bizarre ultimatum to both sides, air strikes began on Cairo. Should the
Soviets be seen to be withdrawing from their Hungarian satellite when
the British were bombing Cairo in preparation for an invasion of Egypt?
Seen through Moscow’s Cold War eyes, this appeared as strengthening
the control of the western bloc over its empire while the actions of the
Soviets in their satellite empire could be interpreted as a loss of controlling
influence. Khrushchev claimed that such an action in Hungary would
inspire the imperialists. At all events, Soviet tanks and troops were
unleashed on the uprising and around 25,000 people were massacred in
Budapest.
76
Important dates
1952 May Closure of the East German border with the west
July Start of the Stalinist programme of building socialism
1953 2 June New course announced
16 June Strikes and demonstrations
Austria peace treaty signed
1955 May West Germany joins NATO
Creation of the Warsaw Pact
July Geneva summit conference
September West German chancellor Adenauer visits Moscow
1956 February XXth party congress where Khrushchev denounced Stalin
August Rehabilitation of Gomulka
October Polish crisis resolved
23 October Massive demonstration in Budapest
24 October Soviet troops begin arriving in Budapest
28 October Soviet troops begin withdrawing from Budapest
Activities
Explain the Soviet decisions on Poland and Hungary.
How significant for the Cold War were the changes in eastern Europe favoured by
Khrushchev?
Khrushchev and the Berlin issue

The Berlin crisis developed over a city made famous by its post-war
divisions and the airlift that the west maintained to supply the city when
the Soviets sealed off the land routes into Berlin through East Germany.
Berlin thus became a Cold War symbol as the former capital of what
remained an unresolved issue of control and influence central to the
future development of a divided Germany. Khrushchev was concerned
that the west would allow the Federal Republic of Germany (West
Germany) to control nuclear weapons and that the exodus from East
Germany was increasing. The departing East Germans spoke volumes
about the perceptions and experiences of communism in comparison
to democratic capitalism. Khrushchev’s domestic situation after 1956
increasingly required support from the higher echelons of the communist
party concerned about his ideological stance. This provided more pressure
to come up with a strategy to boost the Soviet position in Germany and
gain a Cold War success, however symbolic. Opposition within the Soviet
communist leadership to Khrushchev’s reformist tendencies over ideology
and the Soviet economy became significant by 1958.
77
Tensions rose in that year with Khruschev’s ultimatum on revising the

wartime zonal agreement on Berlin, but particularly in 1961 when the
Soviets were faced with having to do something which would enable the
DDR to stem the damaging flow of refugees from communism to West
Berlin. In essence Khrushchev was hoping that changing the position of
Berlin, as a step to achieving international recognition of the DDR in a
divided Germany, would provide a Cold War boost for the Soviets. Yet any
change in the status of Berlin or any enhancing of the international status
of the DDR would be damaging to US credibility in the Cold War and was
not acceptable to Washington. There was thus an initial stand off as what
the Soviets aimed to achieve the USA could not accept, even though the
British were more prepared to modify the status quo in Berlin.
In the run up to the building of the Berlin Wall both sides flexed their
military muscles, even though the Kennedy administration knew they did
not have the conventional forces that would stop the Soviets taking over
Berlin if they so desired. Hence the Wall came as something of a relief to
both sides, as there was no change in the status of the city which would
have entailed altering the arrangements in place since 1945.
Important dates – Berlin crisis

Eisenhower decides that maintaining the western position in Berlin is
important, even at the risk of a war
1954
The Soviets announce that the German Democratic Republic (DDR) is a
sovereign state
Konrad Adenauer fails to deny to the Soviet Ambassador that West Germany
1957
will become a nuclear power
Khrushchev announces that the Soviet Union will give its occupational rights in
East Berlin to the DDR so that the west will have to discuss all Berlin matters
with the East Germans
1958 10 November
Khrushchev also states that talks in Bonn will only continue if no nuclear
weapons were allowed in West Germany and only if the DDR was
acknowledged as a negotiating partner
Khrushchev sends a memo to Washington demanding that Berlin be

27 November transformed into a free, demilitarised city or else he will make his own
agreement with the DDR, giving it sovereignty over East Berlin
Khrushchev claims to Harold Macmillan that his memo was never an

1959 February
ultimatum
March Selwyn Lloyd hints UK willing to recognise the DDR

May–August Geneva Foreign Ministers’ Conference concerning the German question
September Khrushchev visits Eisenhower in the USA. Crisis seems to have been averted
1960 1960 200,000 people, many professionals, flee from East to West Berlin
Khrushchev tells the West German Ambassador that the problem of Berlin and
1961 January
of fleeing East German citizens must be solved within a year
The Soviets threaten to sign a separate treaty with East Germany if the
May
problem is not resolved by October
Vienna Summit between Kennedy and Khrushchev. Kennedy finds the Soviet
4 June
leader intimidating
8 June Soviet increase in military spending
78
Soviets make their ultimatum public

1961 10 June
In response Kennedy calls up the reserves and begins arms build up
13 June Pentagon demands increase in US defence expenditure
Ambassador Kohler suggests recognising East Germany in return for

17 June
guarantees on Berlin
US says Berlin not defensible except in nuclear war but conventional increases
ordered
Bundy tells Kennedy that contingency planning for Berlin is too rigid. Kennedy
July tells Adenauer and De Gaulle that the Western Alliance has to convince the
Soviet Union that it would meet its challenge over Berlin. The Alliance must
demonstrate measures to increase military preparations while accepting the
need for talks
31 July Kennedy admits that Khrushchev may have to stop refugees by building a wall
Kennedy sends 1,500 troops to Berlin. Soviets announce the resumption of

August
nuclear testing
13 August Berlin Wall built

September Rusk and Gromyko meet for talks
Soviet and US tanks face each other at Checkpoint Charlie in Berlin
October Khrushchev withdraws time limit for resolving the Berlin question and DDR
peace treaty
Activities
How important were Stalin’s policies towards eastern Europe in influencing western
assessments of the Cold War?
Why did Khrushchev challenge the west over Berlin?

• explain the Soviet position on eastern Europe
• discuss the changes in Soviet policy towards eastern Europe after the
death of Stalin
• explain the different Soviet responses to the crises in Poland and
Hungary
• examine the importance of Berlin and the problems of the DDR.

1. Why did the Soviet Union react differently to the crises in Poland and
Hungary?
2. To what extent were Krushchev’s demands on Berlin a bluff?
3. Did Krushchev desire to ‘liberalise’ East Germany or to increase Soviet
control over it between 1953 and 1957?
4. Why was the position of Berlin such an important issue for the West
between 1948 and 1961?
79
Notes
80
Chapter 12: The Cold War in Latin America – Guatemala and the Cuban Revolution, 1950–63
Chapter 12: The Cold War in Latin

America – Guatemala and the Cuban
Revolution, 1950–63
Learning outcomes
• explain the dilemmas facing US policy makers attempting to reform the
political and economic systems in Latin American states
• assess the economic impact of US policies in the region
• explain why the USA decided to intervene in Guatemala
• explain why US opposition to Castro developed
• identify why Cuba had economic difficulties before and after the
revolution
• analyse the consequences of US involvement in Cuban affairs.
Essential reading
Rabe, S.G. Eisenhower and Latin America: the foreign policy of anti-communism.
(Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2006) [ISBN
9780807842041].
6C.
Further reading
Gleijeses, P. Shattered hope: the Guatemalan Revolution and the United
States 1944–1954 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992) [ISBN
9780691025568].
Pérez-Stable, M. The Cuban Revolution: origins, course and legacy. (Oxford:
Rabe, S.G. ‘Controlling revolutions: Latin America, the Alliance for Progress
and Cold War anti-communism’ in Paterson, T.G. (ed.) Kennedy’s quest for
victory: American foreign policy 1961–1963. (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1992) [ISBN 9780195045840].
Szulc, T. Fidel: a critical portrait. (London: Hutchinson, 1986) [ISBN
9780091726027].
The problems of Guatemala

The geographical problems facing Guatemala affected the developmental
process in all Latin American counties and related to two key factors. One
was the differences between the tropical countries of central America
like Guatemala and the more temperate zones further south. Countries
with a more temperate climate such as Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay,
and to some extent Chile, had more stable economies. The world market
81
price of tropical produce has always been subject to greater fluctuations

than the price of temperate produce which has inevitably affected
production and the overall nature of the development process. The second
basic distinction is between those areas of high population density like
Guatemala and those with a low population density like Nicaragua. Excess
population as a handicap to economic and political development was
something that Guatemala, unlike Nicaragua, has always had to cope with
in the twentieth century. Hence the system of land holding and plantations
was accompanied by excess labour which tended to produce low wages
and greater inequality.
Immediately after the war the Truman administration was reluctant
to embark on any large-scale aid programme because of the post-war
economic difficulties of the western European nations and thus economic
problems remained largely unchanged. These problems, inherent in a large
population inhabiting a tropical climate with large agricultural estates, had
produced illiteracy, ignorance and poverty. Malnutrition was common and
in 1950 slavery was still legal in Guatemala. When Eisenhower entered the
White House, 2 per cent of the people in Guatemala owned 72 per cent of
the land. Beneath these wealthy groups and companies 50 per cent of the
population farmed 4 per cent of the land. Great inequality produces great
political instability, and immediately after the war Guatemala suffered
from coups and assassinations. Then in 1951 an election brought to power
the reformist government of Jacobo Arbenz.
The Arbenz reforms

The arrival in power of Jacobo Arbenz in 1951 produced an agrarian
reform movement which threatened the profits of the US United Fruit
Company. Arbenz in his campaign platform included a promise to help the
indigenous Indians and the poorer peasants through a programme of land
reform. Within two years of his election Arbenz had introduced labour laws,
eliminated feudal landed property and expropriated, with compensation,
some 234,000 acres of unused lands of the United Fruit Company. The
loss of uncultivated land on their large plantations was a blow to the
United Fruit Company because a certain amount of unused land was often
necessary to reduce production in order to maintain higher prices. The main
issue was that the compensation was based on the company’s own land
valuation for tax purposes; this was several thousand times less than the
compensation the company demanded from the Arbenz government. The
company valued its land for tax purposes at $675,500 but when Arbenz
expropriated it, it suddenly became worth $16 billion.
The reasons for US concern

The United Fruit Company had close ties with senior members of the
Eisenhower administration including Secretary of State John Foster Dulles
and his brother Allen, the head of the CIA, the latter of whom was on
its board. US officials were also concerned because Arbenz, although
not a communist, had links with the Guatemalan communists and could
therefore open the door to a communist revolution. In the words of a
former US ambassador to Guatemala:
82
Many times it is impossible to prove legally that a certain individual is a

communist, but for cases of this sort I recommend a practical method of
detection – the ‘duck test’. The duck test works this way: suppose you see
a bird walking around in a farmyard. This bird wears no label that says
‘duck’. But the bird certainly looks like a duck. Also he goes to the pond
and you notice he swims like a duck. Then he opens his beak and quacks
like a duck. Well by this time you have probably reached the conclusion
that the bird is a duck, whether he’s wearing a label or not.
It is important to be aware that the Cold War concerns of the USA were
not because Arbenz, like many other leaders in the less developed world,
was regarded as a communist but because he was seen to be a radical
left-wing leader. It was believed he would open the door to communism
as left-wing leaders would form popular fronts against the right and
inevitably, so it was argued, be taken over by communists as in some parts
of post-war eastern Europe.
The CIA-orchestrated overthrow of Arbenz

In June 1954 a small force of hired opponents of Arbenz was assembled
by Carlos Castillo Armas in Nicaragua and Honduras while the CIA
set up radio facilities to jam Guatemalan government broadcasts. As
Armas’s force marched towards the capital the pretext for their action
was provided by the Guatemalan government’s purchase of Czech arms.
CIA pilots flew missions dropping leaflets, grenades and bombs over
Guatemala City that were designed to create chaos and confusion and
create the impression that a large force was invading the country to
deal with the threat of Soviet communism, as portrayed in the messages
broadcast over the radio. Arbenz made the mistake of trying to arm a
civilian militia by distributing arms, which was frowned upon by military
leaders. With the army uncertain and the US government’s determination
to be rid of the president clear, Arbenz resigned in June 1954.
This covert action, designed to produce the overthrow of a legitimate
government, was precisely what was envisaged as a cheaper and
less politically costly adjunct to foreign policy by the Eisenhower
administration. A similar operation had already produced the overthrow
of Mossadeq in Iran in 1953. It was also part of the general US Cold
War strategy in the 1950s and often has to be evaluated as an influence
on policy makers with the economic pressures exerted by the lobbyists
working for large US corporations and specific business interests. The
administration in Washington had to manage the particular interests of US
companies while prioritising the overall requirements of the US economy.
The Cold War had by now become very much focused on maintaining
and justifying the application of western capitalism’s economic values in
contrast to the harsh realities of Soviet communism. And whatever the
social or political consequences of capitalism in those countries of the
less developed world where democracy had not been able to flourish, the
Cold War required that its contribution to the US way of life had to be
preserved.
Activity
To what extent was the fear of Arbenz being a communist, the fear of Arbenz falling prey
to Soviet communism or the fear of damage to the interests of the United Fruit Company
the main reason for the US intervention in Guatemala?
83
Important dates
1948 April Creation of Organisation of American States
1950 19 May NSC 56/2 authorises military aid to Latin America
1951 March Arbenz becomes president of Guatemala
Passage of Decree 900 empowering the Guatemalan government

1952 June
to expropriate uncultivated portions of large plantations
NSC 144/1 interprets inter-American affairs solely within the

1953 18 March
context of the global struggle against the Soviet Union
July US National Security Council decides to move against Arbenz

The merchant ship Alfelm arrives in Guatemala with Czech arms
USA begins stopping and searching ‘suspicious’ looking ships off
1954 May Guatemala
CIA black radio broadcasts claim Arbenz is planning to disband the
army and a major force is assembling
18 June Castillo Armas’s forces invade Guatemala
June CIA planes drop bombs and grenades on Guatemala
27 June Arbenz resigns, hoping the army will deal with crisis
1955 September Overthrow of Argentinian President Perón
Soviet leader Nicolai Bulganin offers to expand diplomatic relations
1956 January and technical assistance and to conclude trading arrangements
with Latin America
1958 January Overthrow of dictatorial Jiménez regime in Venezuela
May Nixon attacked in Caracas
NSC 5902/1 calling on the US to give special encouragement to

1959 February
representative governments
April Agreement to set up Inter-American Development Bank

November Panamanian demonstrations for return of Canal Zone
1960 July Announcement of the Social Progress Trust Fund
1961 25 January Military coup in El Salvador
13 March Launch of the Alliance for Progress
31 March Military coup in Guatemala
30 May Raphael Trujillo, president of the Dominican Republic killed
$20 million promised at Punta del Este conference under the

August
Alliance for Progress
1963 3 October Military coup in Honduras

1964 January Anti-USA riots in Panama
31 March Military coup in Brazil
1965 US marines land in the Dominican Republic
84
The emergence of Cuban reformist movements

The failure to achieve reform in Cuba after the war led to a military coup
in 1952 orchestrated by General Batista who now lacked the popular
support he had received in the inter-war years. Opposition to the coup
was led by a young lawyer by the name of Fidel Castro. Castro became
a leading proponent of armed insurrection to end Batista’s dictatorship
and on 26 July 1953 he and a group of followers attempted to seize the
Moncada Barracks and distribute arms to the population. The attempt
proved a fiasco and Castro was to spend two years in prison, but his
26 July movement was now distinct from other Cuban political parties.
With Batista’s refusal to relinquish power, Castro’s 26 July movement
established itself in the Sierra Maestra mountains from 1956 onwards.
By 1958 it was clear that the 26 July movement and its rebel army were
at the helm of the opposition to Batista who was no longer regarded
with favour by the Eisenhower administration in Washington. The 26
July movement was not a traditional Cuban reformist movement, even
though it embodied some of the reformers’ aims. More radical measures
were demanded by Castro relating to agrarian reform, profit sharing in
industry and active state intervention with the promotion of domestic
capital over foreign investment. To secure these goals Castro mobilised the
lower classes around the goals of national sovereignty (freedom from US
domination) and social justice.
The Cuban Revolution

The Cuban Revolution proved to be one of the most radical modern
revolutions, which survived despite severe external pressures. The
twentieth century development of Cuba’s economy and society, with its
unique dependence on sugar, was crucial to the events which brought
about the revolution. The dependency on sugar also contributed to Cuba’s
economic difficulties after Fidel Castro seized power. There was an initial
need for economic diversification perceived by industrialists and labour
organisations alike, given that by the 1930s most Cubans were urban
dwellers. Although by then Cubans controlled more than 50 per cent of
production in the sugar-dominated economy, the imposition of protective
tariffs to encourage domestic industries was not going to be welcomed by
the USA or by Cuban sugar producers and mill owners.
Opposition to the dictatorship of Batista was growing and Castro and
his 26 July movement were not solely responsible for the overthrow of
the Batista regime. As well as support from rural workers and the urban
working class, the success of the 26 July movement in forcing Batista to
flee on 31 December 1958 owed much to the broad base of its support
which encompassed middle-class groups and wealthy Cubans, including
some industrialists. Cuba’s more prosperous classes had no initial
grounds for concern when the new government proclaimed the need
for agrarian reform, sugar industry modernisation, import-substitution,
industrialisation and investments of state and domestic capital.
By February 1959, however, the revolutionary trials of Batista’s supporters
and Castro’s unequivocal assertion of workers’ rights were beginning to
alienate opinion in Cuba and the USA. Moreover, the alliance between
supporters of the 26 July movement and the Partido Socialista Popular
(PSP) or communist party within the labour unions was short lived. Strikes
were deemed to be inappropriate, yet at the same time Castro’s rebel army
intervened to settle disputes in favour of workers.
85
The initial reform programme was not as radical nor as revolutionary as

might have been expected. Agrarian reform allowed land holdings of up to
1,000 acres with special allotments of over three times that amount where
necessary. The provision for cooperatives and the strong role of the state
were, however, more significant than land redistribution. They were the
beginning of a process which led by the end of 1960 to the state being in
control of the major means of production, with no real political freedom.
In May 1960 it was announced that there would be no elections.
As 1959 progressed the liberals in the first revolutionary government were
replaced and in February 1960, following the Soviet Mikoyan’s visit to
Havana, a five-year trade agreement was signed with the Soviet Union. Raúl
Castro, Fidel’s brother, had established close contacts with Moscow before
the revolution developed. Fidel had tried to appeal to the USA for support
but by 1960 his rebuff and the desire of Khrushchev to support the revolution
was taking it along a more Marxist path. In March 1960 the Eisenhower
administration laid the first covert plans to undermine Castro’s regime.
During the first two years of the revolution the Cuban economy performed
well with high growth, increased output of sugar and even a balance of
payments surplus in 1960. However, as in other relatively undeveloped
countries, the strategy of rapid industrialisation failed by 1964.
Industrialisation and import-substitution depended on foreign exchange
earnings, which in the short term were dependent on the sugar industry.
However, the industry’s output per person was not growing and therefore it
was unable to finance more balanced development. This Catch 22 situation
was clearly linked to Cuba’s dependent position within the capitalist world
economy and also to the particular pressures placed on Cuba by the US
government who were keen to prevent a Marxist regime prospering.
Activity
Why did the alliance between the 26 July Movement and the PSP fail?
Initial US responses to the emergence of Castro

When Castro’s rebel force first landed in Oriente province in 1956, the
US government was supplying Batista’s regime with military assistance
and the CIA had close links with Batista’s brutal and much hated secret
police. At the same time there is evidence that some CIA agents began to
establish contacts with Castro’s forces perhaps in an attempt to keep a foot
on each side of the fence. What is certain is the key role of US citizens,
most notably members of the Mafia, in the running of the affluent clubs
and hotels of Havana, which were renowned flesh pots for US tourists,
including in 1957 Senator John F. Kennedy.
The first state department assessment of the emergence of Castro hoped that
Batista would hold elections to avert the threat by 1959, but in early 1958
the general US consensus was that priority should be given to preventing
Castro from gaining power. Unfortunately for the USA, the military
support provided by the US government actually only enabled the Cuban
government to kill other rebel leaders who were potential rivals to Castro.
The initial US opposition to Castro was based on the fact that violent acts of
rebellion endangered US economic interests, particularly those in the Cuban
sugar industry, and promoted instability. Should Castro gain power a greater
threat would occur through nationalisation. In addition, US officials correctly
identified Castro’s general opposition to what he regarded as US imperialism.
By 1959 the difficulties of finding an alternative to Castro considerably
increased when Castro’s movement triumphed in January of that year.
86
Activity
Why were the Cuban people hostile to the US domination of their economy?
What role did the USA play in the overthrow of Batista?
Why was there so little support for Batista?
Kennedy, the Alliance for Progress and its impact on

Latin America
The fact that the Cuban Revolution had taken place less than 100 miles
from the US coast was disturbing to most policy makers in Washington.
The Cuban Revolution offered a different path to development which, if
emulated in other areas of the less developed world, could be damaging
to US Cold War interests. Both the credibility of US power and influence
internationally and specific Latin American economic interests could
be threatened. Kennedy, as a virulent anti-communist, had important
reasons to try and remove Castro, but he also was keen to use the Alliance
for Progress and the federal money it offered to show Latin American
states what successful capitalist development could achieve. The means
to achieve this Cold War goal were thus different from the laissez-faire
policies of Eisenhower that relied on private enterprise to produce Latin
American development. By injecting millions of federal government dollars
through the Alliance for Progress the Kennedy administration hoped to
develop education, health and democracy and an emerging Latin American
middle class.
Unfortunately the Alliance did little to create stability or democracy and
military coups remained frequent occurrences. The economic benefits
from the cash injections took place within the same unequal social and
political structures. In Nicaragua these encouraged the large landowners to
produce more cash crops more effectively, often with less land being used
for subsistence production on which many rural dwellers depended for
food. Thus, although GDP in Nicaragua for example grew 6.2 per cent in
the 1960s the Alliance for Progress merely reinforced the existing unequal
social and economic structures in the region, which were never likely to
produce stability under democratic governments. Yet to change them meant
unleashing forces which the USA could not guarantee to control. In a Latin
American Cold War situation both Kennedy and Johnson were disinclined to
risk any left-wing reformist movement assuming control. Johnson even went
so far as to use US marines in the Dominican Republic in 1965 whereas
previous post-war presidents had relied on the direct or indirect intervention
of the CIA to bring about change. Johnson soon came to the conclusion that
the Alliance for Progress and its rhetoric should be abandoned.
When Nixon entered the White House in 1968 the priorities of the Alliance
for Progress were not in evidence. No longer was the emphasis on US-
inspired social and economic advance but on preserving political stability,
usually in the form of military dictatorships, which were regarded as
the necessary precursor of economic development. Thus measures were
taken to undermine Allende’s regime in Chile and by 1979 only Costa
Rica, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela had avoided military governments.
Beneath the surface, pressures for change and revolution were growing
throughout Latin America in the 1970s, and in Nicaragua in particular, due
to an increase in the landless poor. Many of these problems had their roots
in the changes brought about by the Alliance for Progress.
87
The Bay of Pigs and US reactions to the Cuban Revolution

After his visit to the USA in April 1959 when he was snubbed by
Eisenhower, Castro was denied US aid. By March 1960 the USA was
taking active measures to bring down Castro’s regime by working with
Cuban anti-Castro groups as Castro began to pursue policies which would
inevitably alienate the USA and strengthen links with Moscow. The US
measures to overthrow the Castro regime would inevitably force the
Cuban leader to seek support from left-wing regimes and encourage the
development of closer ties to the Soviet Union.
The Eisenhower administration also sought to use economic weapons
to force Castro to change his policies which threatened US economic
interests. In June 1960 when Texaco, Standard Oil and Shell refused
to refine Soviet crude oil, their holdings were confiscated by the Cuban
government. In August all US properties were nationalised and in October
1960 came the nationalisation of Cuban industry and commerce. When
Kennedy inherited the White House he also inherited Eisenhower’s covert
plans to bring down Castro through a CIA-sponsored landing of Cuban
exile forces in the fiasco of the Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961. The idea
was to spark an anti-Castro rising after the initial invasion was successfully
accomplished. The plan had numerous flaws and the rebels were soon
rounded up by Castro’s forces, much to the humiliation of the Kennedy
administration which declined to intervene with decisive US military force.
Whatever the threat to US interests, and whatever Castro’s attitude to
democracy, Cuba represented defiance of the USA. In April 1961 Castro
declared the Cuban Revolution to be socialist as opposed to its previously
proclaimed humanist character. In December he declared his acceptance of
Marxism–Leninism. Covert US plans to remove Castro continued to gather
pace under the auspices of Operation Mongoose as leading members of the
Kennedy administration had a vehement, almost personal dislike of Castro.
These plans included the landing of groups of exiles and CIA operatives in
Cuba to stir up armed resistance to Castro. They were partly responsible
for Khrushchev’s decision to install offensive nuclear missiles in Cuba as a
form of protection for the revolutionary regime. This in turn was to bring
the world closer to nuclear war.
Activity
Why did the Bay of Pigs invasion fail?
Why did the Cubans support Castro so fiercely? Was it more to do with Batista than the
US involvement in Cuba?
88
Important dates
Castro and his rebels’ attack on the Moncada army barracks in Santiago
1953 July
fails. Birth of the 26 July movement
1955 May The imprisoned Castro gains freedom under a general amnesty
Formation of Directorio Revolucionario (DR) by the student leader José

August
Echeverría
Castro and his Rebel Army land in Oriente province and take to the Sierra
1956 December
Maestra mountains
DR forces attack the presidential palace and temporarily seize Havana

1957 March
radio station
1958 November Fraudulent Cuban elections
National Security Council told that if Castro won, communists would

December
participate in the government
1959 January Batista flees from Cuba leading to the triumph of the 26 July movement
April Castro visits USA
May Agrarian Reform Law passed
1960 January Mikoyan visits Cuba
USA refuses Cuba credit

February
Trade agreement between Cuba and the Soviet Union signed
March CIA programme of covert action against Cuba, codenamed Pluto, launched
USA accuses Cuba before Organisation of American States (OAS) of

June
threatening the peace and stability of the hemisphere
July Eisenhower cancels balance of Cuban sugar quota

August Castro denounces OAS as a tool of US diplomacy
October Nationalisation of Cuban industry including the entire sugar industry
1961 January Eisenhower breaks diplomatic relations with Cuba
April Abortive US-backed Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba
December Castro embraces Marxism–Leninism
OAS Punta del Este conference votes to exclude Cuba from inter-American
1962 January
system
May Soviet decision to place missiles in Cuba
89

• explain the dilemmas facing US policy makers attempting to reform the
political and economic systems in Latin American states
• assess the economic impact of US policies in the region
• explain why the USA decided to intervene in Guatemala
• explain why US opposition to Castro developed
• identify why Cuba had economic difficulties before and after the
revolution
• analyse the consequences of US involvement in Cuban affairs.

1. Why did Castro win support in Cuba and survive the efforts of the
Eisenhower administration to prevent his success?
2. To what extent did the policies of the Eisenhower and Kennedy
administrations lead Castro to embrace Marxism–Leninism and seek
support from the Soviet Union?
3. To what extent were the Latin American policies of the Eisenhower
administration influenced by Cold War considerations?
4. ‘The Alliance for Progress produced greater instability in Latin America
without producing more democracy’. Discuss.
90
Chapter 13: The Cold War in the Middle East – the Arab–Israeli Conflict, 1950–67
Chapter 13: The Cold War in the Middle

East – the Arab–Israeli Conflict, 1950–67
Learning outcomes
• assess what prevented an Arab–Jewish settlement between 1950
and 1956
• explain why tensions rose between Israel and the Arab states in 1966
and 1967
• explain the changing relationship of the Cold War and the superpowers
to the Arab–Israeli conflict.
Essential reading
Shlaim, A. The iron wall: Israel and the Arab world. (London: Allen Lane, 2000)
[ISBN 9780713994100].
8C and 11D.
Further reading
Quandt, W. Peace process: American diplomacy and the Arab–Israeli conflict
since 1967. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005)
[ISBN 9780520246317].
Sayigh, Y. and A. Shlaim (eds) The Cold War and the Middle East. (Oxford:
Schulze, K.E. The Arab–Israeli conflict. (Harlow: Longman, 2008) second
edition [ISBN 9780582771895].
The efforts to find a solution to the Arab–Israeli conflict

There were key problems to be resolved in the Middle East after the
first Arab–Israeli war which had made an agreement on the division of
territory between the Palestinians and the Israelis more problematic. The
new state of Israel had received considerably more land than the United
Nations allocation of 1947. Given the desire of the Arab states to remove
the state of Israel from Palestinian land, could added security be provided
by additional territory and agreements on how much exactly was needed
before security was enhanced? Some Israelis argued that while Arab states
were committed to the destruction of Israel, any security could only be
obtained by the repeated demonstration of Israeli military superiority.
This superiority in hard power terms was seen as more decisive than any
soft power enshrined in agreements with the Arabs. Others looked more
to the soft power embodied in the support and agreements that could be
obtained internationally, and thus favoured what was acceptable to the
international community as best for ensuring Israel’s survival.
There was also the question of individual rights to the land, regardless of
how it was divided between states in the region. This problem was made
worse by the large number of refugees who had been forced or persuaded
91
to leave the former territory of Palestine. Did they have rights to live on land
they had long occupied, some individual plots of which were divided by
the new state boundaries? This would have to be addressed either through
some agreed right to return or by the provision of financial compensation.
Some of the Palestinian farmers who had lost their land began to organise
attempts to drive off the new Jewish occupiers and produced harsh Israeli
counter-measures. These actions became worse and more widespread after
February 1955 when Egypt began to organise raids inside Israel by fedayeen
(armed militia). This new dimension to the Arab–Jewish conflict made it
more urgent to bring about a settlement to the deteriorating situation.
In 1954 Britain and the USA began to outline the principles which offered
hope of achieving an acceptable solution. In early 1955 the work carried
out under State Department and Foreign Office officials resulted in a secret
agreement known as Plan Alpha to be put to the opposing parties. The
idea was to persuade Gamal Abdul Nasser, regarded as the most important
Arab leader, to sell it to the other Arab states. Then the Eisenhower
administration, which was, and has remained, the US administration
with the least bias towards Israel, would pressure the government in Tel
Aviv to accept it. Refugees would be given a choice between a controlled
and limited return to their land or the receipt of financial compensation,
some of which would be provided by Britain but most of which would
come from the US government. A territorial adjustment would involve
the Israelis giving up two triangles of land in the Negev, the apexes of
which would be joined by a bridge over which Arabs could cross from
Egypt to Jordan. Finally these new borders of Israel would have a security
guarantee provided for Israel by British and US forces if necessary.
The British regional position in the Middle East, the

Baghdad Pact and the growing struggle for influence in
the region
The main impetus for Plan Alpha, and what proved to be the main obstacle
to its acceptance, was a growing desire in Washington for a defence
arrangement for the Middle East. The signing of the Turko–Pakistani Pact in
1954 was the first step to forming a ring of pro-west countries around the
south-western borders of the Soviet Union through defence arrangements.
The next step in this encirclement was the creation of the Turko–Iraqi
Pact in February 1955. For the British, having just agreed to abandon a
peacetime military presence in the Suez Base, their presence and influence
in the region was considerably reduced in terms of the appearance of
contributing to the defence of the region. British hard power, and the
influence of soft power, had been in decline in the Middle East, particularly
after the Iranian oil nationalisation in 1953 and Britain was searching for
a way to arrest that decline. Interpreting the Cold War through military
confrontation and protection was a possible way to provide this. It would
be achieved through willing countries governed by pro-British monarchies,
such as Iraq or Jordan, providing bases for British military personnel and
equipment. Defence agreements would guarantee such arrangements and
after the USA had encouraged the Turko–Iraqi Pact, the British decided to
join it in April, making it into the Baghdad Pact.
This immediately produced two problems. Firstly, as had long been
recognised, regional defence arrangements ostensibly designed to protect
the Middle East from an outside Russian threat could not be fully effective
if the main threat was seen by the Arabs as coming from within the region
in the form of Israeli expansion. Hence this made producing an Arab–
92
Israeli settlement, through gaining acceptance of Plan Alpha, essential.

This produced the second problem in that Nasser was regarded as a key
figure in securing the plan’s acceptance in the Arab world. But Nasser was
facing a challenge by Iraq for leadership of the Arab world.
The rivalry was intensified by Iraq joining a pro-western defence pact,
just months after Nasser had gained kudos in the Arab world for getting
rid of British imperialism in the form of a British military presence in the
Suez Canal zone. These blatant conflicts between the needs of the defence
arrangements and the needs of Plan Alpha were what rapidly began to
weaken the Baghdad Pact, which Nasser was openly and aggressively hostile
to. His attempt to undermine Nuri Said, the prime minister of Iraq, and the
Baghdad Pact produced intense anti-British propaganda on Radio Cairo
and the personal resentment of the British prime minister, Anthony Eden.
Worse, the British secret intelligence service MI6 tried to paint Nasser to
Eisenhower, however bizarrely, as a communist stooge. Before King Hussein
dismissed the British head of the Jordanian Arab Legion in March 1956,
Eisenhower sent a personal emissary, Robert Anderson, to shuttle between
Cairo and Tel Aviv in order to gain acceptance of Plan Alpha. When Nasser
finally acknowledged in March that he would be unable to sell the plan to
the rest of the Arab world, Alpha was abandoned and replaced by the US
Plan Omega which followed the British idea of getting rid of Nasser. Omega
was designed to weaken Nasser’s regime internally by the reduction of
economic support, including the withdrawal of the commitment to finance
the Aswan Dam, and to isolate Nasser externally in the Arab world. That
was to be achieved by persuading the Saudi monarchy to cut its ties with
Nasser and carrying out a coup in Syria to remove the radical pro-Nasser
government in an operation codenamed Straggle.
Important dates
1954 April Turko–Pakistani Pact signed
Britain and Egypt sign heads of agreement on future of Suez base

July
Nuri Said visits Turkey to discuss possible northern tier defence pact
October Britain and Egypt finalise Suez base agreement
Detailed Anglo–American discussions on Arab–Israeli settlement –

1955 January
Plan Alpha
February Turko–Iraqi pact signed

28 February Gaza raid – large-scale Israeli attack on Egypt
Combined Anglo–American–Turkish study of defending northern

March
tier
April Baghdad Pact signed with Britain joining Turko–Iraqi Pact

September Egyptian–Czech arms deal
Egyptian–Saudi–Syrian defence pact signed

October
Dulles agrees to Iran joining Baghdad Pact
Templer mission to secure Jordanian accession to Baghdad Pact

December
fails
King Hussein dismisses General Glubb
Britain abandons the attempt to cooperate with Nassser
1956 March
Failure of Anderson mission brings the collapse of Alpha and the
adoption of Omega
93
Activity
In what ways did the Baghdad Pact reduce the security of the Arab countries in the
Middle East?
The 1956 Suez–Sinai Campaign

The second Arab–Israeli war was Israel’s Sinai invasion, a campaign which
was linked to the British–French military action against Egypt in response
to the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company in July 1956. This was
in turn linked to the withdrawal of western aid for the Aswan Dam as part
of Plan Omega to remove Nasser’s Egyptian regime. Tension in the region
had been particularly high after the 1955 Gaza raid carried out by Israel
as a reprisal for Palestinians infiltrating into Israel. These infiltrators were
primarily returning to their homes, seeing relatives or cultivating their
fields – but the reprisals produced significant loss of life. From February
onwards infiltrators were organised to carry out sabotage acts and
commando raids. The Gaza raid convinced Nasser that he had to acquire
arms to strengthen his own defenses and secure his political position in
Egypt. The quest for arms resulted in the Czech arms deal of September
1955. As the Baghdad Pact and Nasser’s support of the Algerian Revolution
alienated Britain and France, the British and Nasser were in effect battling
for the leadership of the Arab states in the Middle East.
When Nasser decided to nationalise the Suez Canal Company in July
1956, Britain and France started planning military action to restore the
pride that the nationalisation of the Canal company had dented and secure
the removal of the Eqyptian leader. Israel was quick to propose an attack
on Egypt by Israeli forces, whereupon Britain and France would occupy
the Canal zone ostensibly to separate the two combatants. On 29 October
1956, as agreed with Britain and France, Israel invaded the Sinai and the
Europeans issued an ultimatum for both sides to withdraw 30 miles from
the Canal. On 31 October Britain began bombing Egypt despite Israel not
having reached the Canal and Nasser being required to withdraw 30 miles
into Egyptian territory entirely. British paratroops began landing on 2 Nov
and advanced down the Canal.
The joint operation was quickly terminated under mounting international
pressure particularly from the USA. The latter had repeatedly warned
Eden that a military assault on Egypt would be inappropriate given that
Nasser had done nothing illegal, and it would have an adverse impact on
the west’s relations with the Arab world. A ceasefire was quickly agreed
to and the result was that Britain became a Middle East pariah and lost its
influence in the Middle East outside the Gulf. The USA became the leading
representative of the west in the Cold War in the Middle East. The real
winner, however, was Nasser whose leadership of the Arab world had been
re-enforced. France and Britain had to leave the Canal zone before the end
of the year and Israel eventually had to withdraw from the Sinai under US
pressure in 1957.
Activities
Why were Britain and France so hostile to Nasser?
What were the circumstances that led Britain and France to ‘collude’ with Israel in
attacking Egypt?
Why was there international pressure on Britain and France to terminate their campaign
against Nasser?
94
Important dates
1956 26 July Nasser nationalises Suez Canal Company
Britain draws up plan for invasion of Egypt – Operation

29 July
Muskateer
22–24 October Joint Anglo–French Israeli talks at Sevres

28 October Israel calls up reserves
29 October Israel invades Egypt
UN Security Council meets
30 October Britain and France veto US ceasefire proposal
USA begins exerting financial pressure to secure withdrawal
31 October British begin night bombing of Cairo
Emergency special UN General Assembly meets

1 November
Daylight bombing of Cairo
General Assembly passes ceasfire resolution and sets up

2 November
process of creating the first UN emergency force
5 November British paratroops land in Canal zone

6 November Eden announces ceasefire
22 December Anglo–French forces withdraw unconditionally
The 1967 Six-Day War

The Six-Day War was the third Arab–Israeli war in less than two decades.
There are directly contradictory views in Israel and the Arab world that
attempt to explain or justify the significant Israeli attacks on Egypt which
began it. The war was triggered by a growing hostility between Israel and
Syria in late 1966 and early 1967. Shelling from the Golan Heights in Syria
following the arrival in power in Damascus of a radical regime and Israeli–
Syrian air engagements increased tension and weakened the Syrian airforce.
After the end of the Israeli attack on Egypt in 1956 and the ceasefire, a UN
peace keeping force had been deployed in Sinai. The increasing rhetoric
including the threat by the Israelis to march on Damascus and the Syrian
threat to strike more targets in Israel meant that Nasser was under pressure
to exert leadership in the Arab world by rallying behind the Syrians. This
was made more necessary by false information from the Soviets that Israeli
troops were assembling on the Syrian border.
Nasser thus asked for the partial removal of the United Nations Emergency
Force (UNEF) and, however much this was designed to have more
rhetorical than real consequences, partial withdrawal was refused by the
UN. The choice was total withdrawal or no withdrawal and when the
latter was opted for by Nasser, Egyptian forces could move closer to Israel.
The Egyptian leader then closed the Straits of Tiran, which was a serious
threat to Israel’s economic lifeline. Rhetoric was now being replaced
by harsh reality. In response to this challenge and its potential threats,
the Israeli government led by Levi Eshkol then decided to opt for a pre-
emptive strike on 5 June 1967, destroying the Egyptian air force on the
ground. Having taken the West Bank of the River Jordan on 9 June the
Israelis then launched an attack on the Golan Heights. The land battle was
quickly over on 10 June as the Israelis were assisted by their domination of
the air and were generally militarily superior to the combined Arab forces.
95
As a direct consequence of the war Israel gained the West Bank from
Jordan, the Gaza Strip and Sinai from Egypt and the Golan Heights
from Syria. The Arab regimes were humiliated, which led to a period of
domestic challenges and to the growing disillusionment of the Palestinians.
The United Nations passed Resolution 242, emphasising the inadmissibility
of the acquisition of territory by force. The resolution was based on the
idea of ‘land for peace’ and Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied
in the recent conflict. The resolution is still a source of dispute but Israeli
occupation of the West Bank remains illegal under international law.
With the Six-Day War over, new dynamics in the fundamental nature of
the Arab–Israeli conflict started to emerge. What had essentially been
a confrontation between Israel and its neighbouring Arab states began
to develop into a confrontation between Israel and the Palestinians
themselves. The Palestinian leadership started to become more
independent, realising that it could no longer rely on the Arab states to
‘liberate’ Palestine for them. The Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO)
had been created as an umbrella organisation for different groups in 1964
and after 1967 began to take more initiatives, with some elements within
it beginning to organise guerrilla resistance to the Israeli occupation.
As a result of the war Israel had achieved strategic depth through the
added territories but in a limited way. The superpowers had begun to
supply significant arms to the region in the early 1960s and became more
involved with greater economic and military aid to states in the region as
the conflict escalated before and after 1967.
Activity
Why did tensions between Israel and the Arab states mount prior to the outbreak of war?
Important dates
1966 August Syrian and Israeli air and ground force engage in combat
Israel attacks Al-Samu Jordan and Palestinian raids into

November
Israel increase
1967 7 April Israel shoots down six Syrian planes

12 May Israel threatens attack on Damascus
Soviets announce (falsely) that Israeli troops amassing on

12 May
Syrian border
16 May UN forces leave Sinai

23 May Nasser closes Straits of Tiran
5 June Israeli air strike on Egypt leads to war
8 June Israel overruns West Bank
9 June Israel attacks Golan Heights
10 June Ceasefire agreed
96

• assess what prevented an Arab–Jewish settlement between 1950 and
1956
• explain why tensions rose between Israel and the Arab states in 1966
and 1967
• explain the changing relationship of the Cold War and the superpowers
to the Arab–Israeli conflict.

1. What impact has Nasser had on political developments in the Arab–
Israeli conflict?
2. To what extent did the creation of the PLO in 1964 change the balance
of power in the region?
97
Notes
98
Chapter 14: The Cold War in the Middle East – the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict, 1967–2000
Chapter 14: The Cold War in the Middle

East – the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict,
1967–2000
Learning outcomes
• explain the causes and consequences of the 1973 war
• analyse the impact of the Israeli invasion of the Lebanon
• assess the extent of the progress and the problems in the Israeli–
Palestinian peace talks.
Essential reading
Shlaim, A. The iron wall: Israel and the Arab world. (London: Allen Lane, 2000)
[ISBN 9780713994100].
13A, 14B, 17A and 17B.
Further reading
Freedman, R.O. The Intifada: its impact on Israel, the Arab world and the
superpowers. (Gainesville, FL, University Press of Florida, 1991) [ISBN
9780813010403].
Freedman, R.O. The Middle East and the peace process: the impact of the
Oslo accords. (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 1998) [ISBN
9780813015545].
Quandt, W. Camp David: peacemaking and politics. (Washington: Brookings
Institute, 1986) [ISBN 9780815772897].
Quandt, W. Peace process: American diplomacy and the Arab–Israeli conflict
since 1967. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005) [ISBN
9780520246317].
Sayigh, Y. Armed struggle and the search for the state: the Palestinian National
Movement, 1949–1993. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997) [ISBN
9780198296430].
Shlaim, A. Israel and Palestine. (London: Verso, 2009) [ISBN 9781844673667].
The War of Attrition

With the ceasefire in the 1967 war and the UN failure to enforce
Resolution 242 (essentially because of the US veto) or to make any
progress along the lines of ‘land for peace’, the conflict became a war of
attrition. The Suez Canal remained closed to international shipping and a
summit meeting of Arab states agreed not to negotiate with Israel. Another
250,000 Palestinians fled from the occupied West Bank into Jordan but
some of the richer Arab states now agreed to provide aid to Egypt and
Syria in return for the ending of the conflict in the Yemen which had
begun in 1962. As paramilitary groups developed their armed guerrilla
attacks, the largest of these groups, Al Fatah, inflicted significant casualties
on the Israelis at the Battle of Karameh. At the same time the PLO began
99
to develop a political front to unite the guerrilla groups. In 1970 they

succeeded in controlling the executive committee of the PLO which gave
greater influence to Al Fatah. Yet the increasing international recognition
afforded to the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian
people helped redefine it from a guerrilla organisation to a ‘government in
exile’. Increasing political recognition for the Palestinians forced Israel to
begin considering whether to deal directly with the PLO.
The two key states of Egypt and Israel, meanwhile, exchanged shelling
and bombing across the Suez Canal, and the War of Attrition was formally
declared by Nasser in March 1969. Faced with the added threat of
escalation, the US Secretary of State William Rogers launched the Rogers
Plan in December 1969 to bring about a ceasefire and provide the basis
of a ‘land for peace’ settlement. The Israelis rejected the plan and tried to
use their air superiority to inflict unacceptable losses on the Egyptians.
The Egyptians were supplied with better air defence equipment by the
Soviets and a ceasefire was agreed in August 1970 as Rogers put forward a
modified peace plan which was not welcomed by either side.
Thus by September 1970 nothing had been done to improve the
Palestinians’ situation in Jordan nor to reduce the danger they presented
to King Hussein and Jordan’s conservative regime. Conflict between
Hussein and radical Palestinians was exacerbated by the Popular Front for
the Liberation of Palestine hijacking four airlines and forcing them to fly to
Amman. It contributed to Hussein’s decision to confront the Palestinians
with military force in what amounted to a brief civil war. Despite the
Palestinians being assisted by Syrian tanks the conflict ended with their
defeat and became know as ‘Black September’ as the Russians put pressure
on the Syrians to back down. The defeat meant that the focal point of
Palestinian resistance moved to Lebanon as their position in Jordan was no
longer tenable.
Sadat’s aims and his turn to the USA

In the same month of September 1970 Gamal Abdul Nasser died and
was succeeded by Anwar Sadat, also a member of the Young Officers’
movement who had carried out the 1952 coup against the Egyptian King.
Sadat attached great importance to restoring some face to the Arab world
after another humiliating 1967 defeat at the hands of the Israelis. When
he realised that Egypt’s Soviet backers would not provide the advanced
weaponry which would be necessary to challenge Israel, Soviet advisers
were expelled from Egypt in July 1972.
Sadat’s strategy then changed to moving closer to the USA with the hope
that it would eventually have to take a more positive role in encouraging
the Israelis to reach a settlement with the Arab world. The Egyptian
leader was aware that only the USA could possibly force concessions from
Israel. His strategy had the added advantage of providing a means to get
economic aid from the USA, if Sadat followed their economic development
model at the expense of the Arab socialism Nasser had stood for. Thus in
October when Sadat and the Syrian leader President Hafez Assad launched
a surprise attack on Israel on the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur, the Jewish
Day of Atonement, in 1973, Sadat was focused on ensuring a more neutral
role for the USA in the general conflict between the Arabs and the Israelis.
As the USA increasingly became aware of the importance of ending that
long-running conflict, Sadat could use his increasing pro-western stance to
benefit from economic aid without completely ending links to the Soviets.
100
The 1973 Yom Kippur War and Soviet–US diplomacy

In the attack on Israel the Egyptians and the Syrians had the benefit
of surprise and were able to attack, although not decisively, the Israeli
air force. The USA did not begin a full-scale airlift of supplies to assist
Israel until one week after the war had started, although some supplies
were sent after three days as the Soviets began a similar programme of
aiding the Arabs. In essence the aim of the Soviets was to secure a more
comprehensive peace settlement in which they had a significant role. By
contrast Henry Kissinger, the US Secretary of State and National Security
Advisor, was primarily concerned to prevent the Soviets having any
influence in the region. When the military tide turned in Israel’s favour in
the second week of the war from 10 October, Kissinger had succeeded in
preventing any significant losses for Israel. Not only that but US military
supplies had assisted Israel to the extent that on 15–16 October they were
able to advance across part of the Suez Canal into Egypt and threaten to
cut off Egyptian forces still in Sinai.
As the Soviet leader Kosygin helped convince Sadat to accept a ceasefire,
the Israelis and Kissinger, while appearing to be in favour by accepting it
on 23 October, nevertheless allowed it to break down. Thus on 24 October
the Soviets, desperate for the USA to pressure the Israelis, threatened
to intervene militarily in the conflict. As they did so US nuclear forces
were placed on high level alert, although Kissinger informed the Soviet
ambassador Dobrynin that this was done for its domestic effect. Another
more effective ceasefire was agreed on 27 October so Israel had succeeded
in securing another victory out of an initial defeat which had nevertheless
allowed the Arabs to save some face.
In order to demonstrate his total control of the attempts to bring about
a more substantial disengagement and start a meaningful peace process,
Kissinger soon embarked on 6 November on an extensive round of shuttle
diplomacy between Cairo and Tel Aviv. His efforts to secure supplies for
the now beleaguered Egyptian 3rd army in Sinai were successful, as were
his attempts to secure a prisoner of war exchange, but a regional peace
conference in December, which nominally included the Soviets, came to
nothing. In fact, in 1976, Sadat cancelled his treaty of friendship with
Moscow but the Soviets did recognise the PLO, which Israel refused to do,
and also maintained their strong links with Syria. Suspicion was growing
between Egypt and Syria and radicalism had not been removed from the
region, but Soviet influence remained limited. Nevertheless by 1975, when
Gerald Ford was preparing for the presidential election the following year,
Nasser’s nationalisation measures had been reversed in Egypt. Moreover
the 1976 Egyptian–Israeli contacts through the Moroccan King prepared
the ground for a new peace agreement that Sadat and the Israeli Likud
party would achieve under the auspices of President Jimmy Carter.
Activities
Why did the 1973 Yom Kippur War take Israel by surprise?
Why did Egypt and Syria launch this war?
101
The rise of Likud and Camp David

The next, and what many regarded as a significant, step towards peace in
the Middle East owed much to Anwar Sadat and his new approach to the
Cold War and the dispute with Israel. With Rabin also accepting the idea
of direct talks this was followed by the coming to power in Tel Aviv of the
Likud party in 1977. An Israeli–Egyptian peace was facilitated by Jimmy
Carter at the meetings at Camp David in 1978 and 1979 but the main
actors were Israeli and Egyptian.
The outbreak of the civil war in Lebanon in 1975 had brought fresh
instability to the region, but the election victory of the centre-right Likud
party led by Menachem Begin enabled Israeli concessions to be made to
Sadat without arousing fears that Israeli interests were being sacrificed.
The fears in Israel would have been greater if concessions had been made
by the Labour party, as the right in Israel, and the new immigrants after
World War II, were more distrustful of Labour which had been in power
since Israel’s establishment. The historic visit of President Sadat to Israel
in 1977 when he addressed the Israeli parliament (the Knesset) on 19
November was another key factor in facilitating the progress to
a settlement.
It took almost another year before Carter, Sadat and Begin met at Camp
David, Maryland in September 1978. The result was an Israeli–Egyptian
peace treaty in which Sadat recognised Israel’s right to exist and Israel
would withdraw from Sinai within three years. The agreement at Camp
David was much vaguer on the Palestinian situation in the West Bank and
Gaza, and Begin refused any concessions that would halt the continuing
Jewish settlements in the West Bank or enhance the rights of Palestinians.
In effect the Palestinian issues were sacrificed to the political needs of the
Israeli and Egyptian states. Difficulties in implementing the agreement
would quickly pose problems, but a peace treaty was finally concluded in
March 1979, partly because of the threat posed by the Iranian Revolution.
Sadat had got the Sinai back, but solving the Palestinian problem without
Israeli concessions was made more problematic by the increase in Jewish
settlements in the illegally-occupied West Bank. Sadat was expelled from
the Arab League and paid a further price in that the deal with Israel
contributed to his assassination in 1981. The following year the problems
in the Lebanon, exacerbated by the Palestinian exodus from Jordan,
entered a new phase.
Important dates
1973 6 October Egyptian–Syrian surprise attack on Israel
11 October Israeli counter-offensive on the Golan front
13 October Attempts to negotiate a ceasefire
14 October All Egyptian advances halted
16 October Israelis advance across part of Suez Canal
22 October Disengagement of Israeli and Syrian forces
22 October UN-sponsored ceasefire
23 October Ceasefire breaks down in Sinai
102
1973 26 October US forces on nuclear alert

27 October Geneva Peace Conference
29 October War ends
11 November First Israeli–Egyptian disengagement agreement
1974 31 May Israeli–Syrian disengagement agreement
Second Israeli–Egyptian disengagement agreement

1975 1 September
enlarging UN buffer zone
1976 March Egypt ends treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union
1977 19 November Sadat addresses the Knesset
1978 17 September Camp David accords
1979 26 March Israeli–Egyptian peace agreement
The 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon

The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 was preceded by a phase of
Palestinian proto-state formation in southern Lebanon from 1971 onwards.
Combat forces were regularised and a new dimension to attacks on Israel
was provided through massive shelling and rockets. Syrian surface-to-air
missiles were installed in the Beka Valley as the Syrians continued to play
an important role. By 1981 the PLO had reached the point where it was
being regarded as an independent political actor and the Israelis were
considering an invasion of Lebanon.
The assassination in London of the Israeli ambassador was used as an
excuse to launch Operation Peace for Galilee in June 1982 and clear
Palestinians from southern Lebanon. With the Israelis reaching the
outskirts of Beirut in five days, their long-term goals were to remove the
Syrian presence from Lebanon and to create a Christian state that would
sign a peace agreement with Israel and redraw the Middle East’s political
map. The operation became a disastrous failure. Israel was unable to
evict the Syrians and the alliance with the Lebanese Christian Maronites
collapsed. Israel was thus unable to secure its northern border and Israeli
troops got embroiled in the Lebanese civil war until their pull out in 1985.
The Lebanese government remained a powerless force and the massacres
in the refugee camps of Sabra and Shatilla, which Israeli forces failed to
prevent, strengthened the solidarity among the widely spread Palestinians.
Although the PLO agreed to evacuate to Tunis, the politicisation of the
Palestinians increased and could not be reversed. Outrage over the
massacres under the noses of Israeli occupiers refocused Palestinian
resistance, ultimately resulting in the Intifada.
Activities
To what extent were Israel’s war aims realistic?
What prevented the 1982 invasion solving Israel’s security problem along the Lebanese
border?
What were the regional repercussions of the Israeli invasion?
103
Important dates
1975 Lebanese civil war breaks out
1976 Syrians intervene in Lebanon
1977 Likud comes to power in Israel
1978 Operation Litani – Israel establishes a security zone in Lebanon
1979 Israeli raids into South Lebanon
Two week PLO shelling of Galilee followed by PLO–Israeli

1981
ceasefire
1982 6 June Israel invades Lebanon with 90,000 troops
Israeli jets bomb Beirut and PLO strong points. Syrian–Israeli

7 June
dogfights
8 June Siege of Ayn al-Helwe camps begins
Israeli advance on Beirut and Lake Qaraoun. Israeli airforce

9 June
attacks on Syrian missile bases in Bekaa
14 June Iran sends Hezbollah fighters to Lebanon

22–24 June Battle for West Beirut
1 July Siege of Beirut begins
22 August PLO starts Beirut evacuation
Death of Bashir Gemayel followed by Sabra and Shatilla

15 September
massacres
September Multinational Force arrives

1985 January–June Israeli withdrawal to the security zone
The Intifada
The Palestinian uprising (Intifada) started on 9 December 1987 after
20 years of failing to make any progress on the Palestinian issue. It was
spontaneous in the sense that it had not been planned nor was it controlled
by the PLO leadership. It was an indigenous uprising of those Palestinians
actually under Israeli occupation who had suffered from Israeli military
rule and increasing Jewish settlement and who, after years of close contact,
knew Israel’s strengths and weaknesses. The Palestinians had finally taken
their future into their own hands. The uprising was characterised by general
strikes, the boycott of Israeli products and demonstrations.
The Intifada was successful in that it brought the Palestinian question back
to the top of the international agenda and led the Reagan administration
to renew its interest in settling the Israeli–Palestinian dispute in 1988. The
USA had refused to talk to the PLO since 1975 when Kissinger had declined
to engage them until they recognised Israel. In late 1988 Arafat, as leader of
the PLO, crucially recognised Israel’s right to exist and effectively renounced
terrorism at the UN. The following year a Palestinian government in exile,
for the territory of Gaza and the West Bank, was established.
Talks started in late 1988 and continued under George Bush Senior but the
Intifada lasted until the Madrid peace conference in 1991. Little progress
was initially made and ominously the Islamic Jihad, a movement which
had emerged in 1986, was becoming more influential over the Intifada.
104
Islamic Jihad rejected the idea of a Palestinian state as part of a two-state

solution. In January 1988 another extremist Muslim group, the Islamic
Resistance Movement (Hamas) emerged by combining religious faith
with Palestinian nationalism in another radical challenge to Israel. King
Hussein’s decision to relinquish Jordan’s claims to the West Bank during
the summer of 1988 had opened the door to a Palestinian state. Yet as
peace talks about the Palestinian question after Camp David continued
to get nowhere, it seemed the chance of talks on Palestinian statehood
producing a peaceful outcome was gradually being reduced.
Activities
Why did it take until 1987 for an uprising to start in the Occupied Territories?
What were Palestinian aims and to what extent could they be achieved through the
Intifada?
What were the problems with the Israeli response to the Intifada?
Important dates
1987 8 December Israeli truck hits car carrying Palestinian labourers
9 December Intifada breaks out
1988 January Hamas formed
1988 12 November Palestinian National Council in Algiers

15 November Palestinian Declaration of Independence
14 December Arafat renounces terrorism
The peace process and the Oslo accords

The USA had now decided to push for a regional peace conference in
order to settle the conflict. Under US pressure Israel, the PLO, Syria
and Jordan were invited to the negotiating table in Madrid in October
1991. The main obstacles now seemed to be the inflexible attitude of
the Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Shamir, a former member of the Stern
Gang – a terrorist group that had carried out assassinations against
British and UN officials in the 1940s. His reluctance to move towards a
settlement with the Palestinians through a territorial compromise (land
for peace) was reflected in his refusal to suspend the construction of new
Jewish settlements in the West Bank. The settlement programme with
its determination to make the ‘facts on the ground’ irreversible remained
an obstacle to peace, adding to the growing presence of Palestinians still
committed to violence against Israel. There also remained the insoluble
problem of Jerusalem and the Palestinian refugees and the difficulties of
Syrian resentment over the Golan Heights, the use of water from the River
Jordan and the situation in southern Lebanon to make progress difficult.
The Israeli elections in June 1992 changed the situation in Tel Aviv with the
defeat of Likud and the electoral triumph of a Labour government under
Yitzhak Rabin. Indeed, the Labour government was not only willing to talk
to the PLO but was also ready to compromise in response to the moderation
displayed at Madrid by the head of the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation,
Abdel Shafi. Several rounds of bilateral talks followed the Madrid summit
but still made little progress and violence from Palestinian radicals escalated
as many Hamas activists were deported. Rabin still refused to give formal
recognition to the PLO. Israeli hopes focused on a new economic role for
Israel in the broader regional context, as well as on increased security.
105
Palestinians hoped for control over their own affairs, ultimately leading to
a Palestinian state, and for financial support. In January 1993 there came
a breakthrough with the Israeli decision to deal directly with the PLO for
the first time in secret talks in Oslo. With the Palestinians now prepared to
consider interim arrangements for self-government, rather than prior Israeli
recognition of Palestinian national self-determination, this paved the way
for the Oslo accords in September 1993.
The agreement between Israel and Jordan in October 1994 raised peace
hopes again. But the prospects of agreement were dampened by a spate
of Hamas attacks inside Israel and Hezbollah attacks from South Lebanon.
Talks with the Palestinians on final status issues became deadlocked as
Rabin’s policy of expanding settlements, and the idea of a Palestinian state
in the West Bank and Gaza, became increasingly irreconcilable. The peace
process started to founder as the Israeli population faced a worsening
security situation and the Palestinians were facing economic crises as
a result of the Israeli closure of the borders of the territories. Finally in
November 1995 Yigal Amir assassinated Yizhak Rabin, claiming at his trial
that the killing was carried out in order to sabotage the peace process.
The election of Benyamin Netanyahu as Israel’s prime minister in May
1996 brought the peace process to a complete standstill. Hopes, however,
for an eventual resolution to the conflict were revived with the Hebron
Agreement of January 1997, the election of Ehud Barak in 1999 and
the Road Map for peace. Unfortunately, actions on the ground and the
fact that for some Israelis and Palestinians compromise is too much to
contemplate have prevented further progress in the 21st century. Despite
repeated Israeli–Syrian talks, the Israeli actions in Gaza in 2009 and the
significant international criticism have all contributed to preventing a
peace agreement being finalised.
Activities
What are the main problems in the Israeli–Palestinian negotiations?
Who has the most interest in making peace and why?
Important dates
1991 30 October Middle East Peace Conference in Madrid
Bilateral talks between Israel and the Arabs begin in

December
Washington
1992 April Norwegian offer to broker secret Israeli–Palestinian agreement

20 June Israeli–Palestinian–Norwegian meeting in Jerusalem 1992
23 June Labour wins the Israeli elections
13 July Rabin assumes power
9 September Norwegian Jan Egeland proposes backchannel
3 November Bill Clinton elected US president
16 November Peres holds talks in Egypt
4 December Secret channel discussed in London
Rabin announces expulsion of 415 Palestinians to South

17 December
Lebanon
106
1993 19 January Knesset repeals ban on contacts with the PLO

20–23 January First round of secret talks
12–14 February Second round of secret talks
20–21 March Third round of secret talks
Israel announces closures of occupied territories after a wave

30 March
of fatal stabbings of Israelis
14 April Rabin–Mubarak summit in Ismailiya

29 April Bilateral talks resume in Washington
Israel accepts Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-

13 September
Government arrangements
1994 18 October Israeli–Jordanian Agreement

1995 4 November Assassination of Yitzhak Rabin
1996 29 October Benyamin Netanyahu becomes prime minister

• explain the causes and consequences of the 1973 war
• analyse the impact of the Israeli invasion of the Lebanon
• assess the extent of the progress and the problems in the Israeli–
Palestinian peace talks.

1. Assess the strategic aims of the PLO before its renunciation of violence
in 1988.
2. To what extent have the dynamics of the Arab–Israeli conflict from
1967 to the present changed?
107
Notes
108
Chapter 15: The Cold War in Africa – the Congo, the UN and Angola, 1959–76
Chapter 15: The Cold War in Africa – the

Congo, the UN and Angola, 1959–76
Learning outcomes
• explain why the UN role in the Congo was so controversial
• explain how and why US policy towards the crisis was different to that
of Belgium and Britain
• explain the significance of the external attempts to affect the outcome
of the conflict in Angola.
Essential reading
Westad, O.A. The global Cold War: third world interventions and the making
of our times. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007) [ISBN
9780521703147].
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) [ISBN 9780198781646] Chapter 8B.
Further reading
Gleijeses, P. Conflicting missions: Havana, Washington and Africa 1959–1976.
(Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001) [ISBN
9780807826478].
Kalb, M.G. The Congo cables: the Cold War in Africa – from Eisenhower to
Kennedy. (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1982) [ISBN 9780025606203].
Kent, J. America, the UN and decolonization: Cold War conflict in the Congo.
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2010) [ISBN 9780415464147].
Mahoney, R.D. JFK: ordeal in Africa. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984)
[ISBN 9780195033410].
Rikhye, I.J. Military adviser to the Secretary-General: UN peacekeeping and the
Congo crisis. (London: Hurst & Co, 1993) [ISBN 9781850650850].
Weissman, S.R. American foreign policy in the Congo: 1960–64. (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1974) [ISBN 9780801408120].
The Cold War and Belgian and Portuguese approaches to

decolonisation in 1960
The Congo crisis revolved around a range of important conflicts that
reflected the difficulties of dealing with regional crises within a Cold
War framework. The internal instability in the Congo combined with
uncertainties about future developments in an African continent that was
in the process of transition from colonial rule to independence, and which
was affected by the efforts of the USA and the Soviet Union to extend or
maintain their influence.
The Congo itself contained a number of different ethnic groups whose
rivalries in some cases were well in evidence before independence. The
problems these different ethnic groups produced were not unique to the
Congo and had to be faced in most newly independent African states. For
109
the Congolese population loyalty to the extended family and identification

with the ethnic group were stronger than any sense of civic duty to the
new state. Similar circumstances prevailed in the army where all the
officers were white. However, the problems were exacerbated by the
nature and sudden end of Belgian colonial rule.
The Belgian administration in the Congo had never given representatives
of the indigenous people any role in the government or administration
of the territory and the masses had only been educated at the primary
and vocational levels. There were no experienced local administrators
and no educated elite (there were only a handful of Congolese graduates
at the time of independence) who could provide the backbone of a
trained civil service. After finally realising in the late 1950s that political
independence was inevitable at some point, the colonial administration
embarked on a limited development programme financed by borrowed
money, the repayment of which would come due after independence was
achieved. Thus the new government was expected to take over the debts
that the colonial government had incurred. The situation was therefore
highly unstable when the Congo achieved independence in June 1960 and
rebellions occurred almost immediately.
The neighbouring Portuguese territory of Angola was soon to replicate the
rebellions in the Congo. The difference in Angola was that these happened
in 1961, long before independence. The Fascist regime of Antonio
Salazzar was determined to hang on to Portugal’s overseas possessions.
The main reason was not simply the economic profitability of Angola but
the perceived political benefits of the Portuguese overseas territories to
Portugal’s international position – otherwise Portugal would increasingly
be seen as a fairly insignificant European power.
In Cold War terms, denying self-determination to Angola was anathema
to the Kennedy administration in Washington whose important Cold War
commitment was to make democratic capitalism more attractive than
totalitarian communism to the emerging states of Africa. The USA wanted
to ensure that European colonialism would no longer provide a Cold War
propaganda weapon to the Soviets by denying Portuguese colonial subjects
the freedom that was rapidly emerging in black Africa.
The developing crisis – Congo independence and the

secession of Katanga
The problems facing Patrice Lumumba, the leader of the Mouvement
National Conglais (MNC), who became the first prime minister of the
independent Congo state, after the 1960 elections in which his party won
the most seats, began within 10 days of independence. The mutiny of the
Congolese National Army was followed by the intervention of Belgian
troops, ostensibly to protect Europeans in the Congo, but also to support
the secessionist province of Katanga led by Moishe Tshombe.
Katanga contained important mineral reserves, mined by the Union
Minière du Haut Katanga, and the region’s future was a critical element
in the developing crisis. With the spectre of neo-colonialism raised by the
uninvited presence of Belgian troops, Lumumba appealed to the UN for
assistance which was quickly granted. However Dag Hammarskjöld, the
UN Secretary General, shared the US hostility to radical African leaders.
Like the USA he feared radical nationalists would impose regimes and
policies that would make states more susceptible to communist influence.
The key UN aim was to keep the Soviets and the Cold War out of Africa.
Unfortunately, despite three UN Security Council Resolutions in July and
110
August requiring the Belgians to withdraw their troops from the Congo,
Hammarskjöld failed to secure a Belgian withdrawal or to end Katanga’s
secession that the Belgian troops were supporting. It led Lumumba to
break with the UN and threaten to appeal to the Soviets for military aid
which made the Congo a more important Cold War battleground.
The Union Minière and Tanganyika Concessions, companies with
established roles in the Congo since the days of King Léopold’s private
fiefdom, had produced important profits for British and Belgian capital
after the Belgian colonial state had replaced Léopold’s operations. The
extraction of Katangan mineral wealth could continue on the same
favourable terms with the secession of Katanga, particularly with regard to
company access to foreign exchange. However, Lumumba could not only
claim democratic legitimacy in the whole of the Congo but the support of
the newly independent Afro-Asian nations in opposing all aspects of neo-
colonialism. This made it very difficult for the British and the Eisenhower
administration to oppose Lumumba or openly to support the pro-western
Tshombe. The Belgian defiance of the UN made things more difficult in
Cold War terms and led governments on both sides of the Atlantic, and
Hammarskjöld, to support the removal of Lumumba as the only way out of
the dilemma presented by his radical African nationalism.
After the CIA station chief had supported Mobutu’s coup in September
1960, and the resulting governance by a college of commissioners, Dag
Hammarskjöld was not as keen as the USA to prevent the return of
parliament with the Lumumba supporters it contained. Ensuring that a
viable pro-western regime emerged in the Congo required preventing the
Soviets or radical left-wing nationalists obtaining greater influence. If
this necessitated governing without a democratically elected parliament,
Hammarskjöld was less willing than the Eisenhower administration
in Washington to condone it. US/UN tensions over the desirability of
parliamentary government continued until the murder of Lumumba,
which was followed by the election of a new US administration under
John F. Kennedy. The new administration was able to influence, through
CIA bribes, the re-emergence of an acceptable parliamentary government
under Cyrille Adoula in the summer of 1961.
Activities
Outline the political careers of Lumumba and Tshombe. What were their beliefs and who
supported them?
Outline the basis of US and UN agreements over the Congo in 1960 and the effect on
them of the dismissal of Lumumba and the Mobutu coup in 1960?
Important dates
1960 30 June Congo becomes independent
9 July Mutiny of Congolese National Army
10 July Belgian troops intervene
Moishe Tshombe proclaims independence for the Congolese

11 July
province of Katanga
UN calls for withdrawal of Belgian troops and agrees to

14 July
provide military assistance
25 July Tshombe refuses to allow UN forces into Katanga
111
UN Security General decides that the entry of troops into

9 August Katanga is necessary but fails to secure it, and declares that
UN forces will not influence the outcome of internal conflicts
23 August Soviet aid arrives in the Congo
5 September President Kasavubu dismisses Lumumba
8 September Parliament votes for Lumumba’s reinstatement
Military intervention by Col Mobutu who sets up

12 September
commissioners to run the government
Lumumba arrested by government troops

2 December Gizenga establishes rival regime to Leopoldville
government in Stanleyville
1961 February Outbreak of the rebellion in North West Angola
13 February Lumumba’s death announced
The rebellion in Angola

North West Angola was inhabited by the Bakongo people who formed one
of the important ethnic groups in the south western Congo, from which
the president of the Congo, Joseph Kasavubu, originated. Although the
different ethnic groups in this part of Central Africa have played a role in
the post-colonial history of the region their significance for the cause of
the conflict has often been exaggerated.
The Angola revolt broke out in January and February 1961 in the cotton
growing area of Baixa de Cassanje in North West Angola and affected
some towns north of Luanda. It is a moot point as to whether the revolt
was primarily influenced by political demands and Roberto’s Union of
Angolan Peoples (UPA), or simply by the economic conditions and forced
labour for the colonial state. Led by Holden Roberto, an anti-communist
with strong links to the USA, this emerging nationalist movement
amongst the Bakongo people of North West Angola had clear links with
the ABAKO political party in the Congo’s independence movement. The
Kennedy administration saw the attaining of political freedom and self-
determination by African people as the most vital component of the
Cold War. Alternatively, the Angolan rebellion may have originated more
spontaneously from the socio-economic grievances than political demands.
Africans who saw opportunities in the production of cash crops, such as
coffee, but were forced to engage in road building instead of cultivating
their crops were increasingly dissatisfied.
Whatever its main cause, the rebellion broke out just two months after
the United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 1514 and 1542 of 1960
had declared the subjection of peoples to alien domination to be a denial
of fundamental human rights. The UN called for immediate steps to
transfer all powers to the peoples of colonial territories in accordance with
their freely expressed wishes, and international pressure on Portuguese
colonialism began to mount. In April 1961 the UN established a sub-
committee to enquire into the Portuguese failure to carry out the 1960
resolutions. The revolt in 1961 was to continue under Kennedy and
beyond without significant gains for the rebels in terms of controlling
territory, or without the Portuguese succeeding in totally suppressing it.
The pressure from Washington became so significant under Kennedy that
112
even the need to maintain US military rights in the Portuguese Azores base
did not significantly reduce the administration’s efforts to persuade the
Salazzar regime to accept the principle of self-determination and begin
reforming Portuguese colonial policy.
The rival to the UPA in 1961 was the Popular Movement for the Liberation
of Angola, (MPLA) dominated by mixed race (mesticos) Angolans and led
by Mario de Andrade and Viriato de Cruz until Agostinho Neto escaped
from prison in Portugal in December 1962 to head the movement. Earlier
in 1962, with the increasing number and complexity of Angolan political
parties, the UPA merged with the Democratic Party of Angola (PDA) to
become the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA).
The UN and the US search for stability and the ending of

the Katangan secession
Many inside and outside the Congo were outraged by Hammarskjöld’s
apparent failure to provide support and protection for Lumumba. His
death created ill-feeling about the neo-colonial regime in Katanga province
led by Moishe Tshombe, who was seen as a puppet of Belgium and the
main challenge to the emergence of a viable independent state in the
Congo. With the moderate Adoula in power in Leopoldville, the capital
of the legitimate government, the regime also faced challenges from
Antoine Gizenga and his rival government in Stanleyville. Yet Washington
saw ending Katanga’s secession as essential for the credibility of western
democracy and the creation of newly independent states committed to
western values in the Cold War.
The British were ardent supporters of a negotiated settlement, but
Tshombe was supported by an African gendarmerie led by white
mercenaries in defiance of the UN resolutions demanding the expulsion
of such mercenaries. After the UN attempt to enforce its resolutions in
late 1961 had produced fighting in Katanga, the British government
opposed any further pressure on Tshombe to end the secession that might
lead to disturbances in Katanga. With Tanganyika Concessions supplying
significant political funding for the Conservative party’s electoral finances,
the British government was adamantly opposed to any UN use of force
against Tshombe. London feared the adverse impact on Tanganyika
Concessions’ considerable investments, including Union Minière shares,
if reprisals against Union Minière’s Katangan installations, threatened by
Tshombe, were to occur. The British and Belgian governments retreated
behind concern for the safety and prosperity of the white community and
of course for their own investments, if law and order in Katanga collapsed.
To make matters worse, Sir Roy Welensky, the leader of the neighbouring
Central African Federation, still a British responsibility, was unable to
prevent arms being supplied by white settlers to Tshombe. Thus the threat
was of disorders in the Congo spreading to the Central African Federation,
where the attainment of independence was complicated by settler control
in Southern Rhodesia.
After fighting in Katanga in September and December 1961 involving
UN troops, under pressure from the USA, Tshombe and Adoula met at
Kitona in December and reached a general agreement on the principles of
reunification. Tshombe however declined to implement the Kitona accord,
and as he backtracked on the ending of secession, the USA looked for ways
in which he could be pressured to take irrevocable steps to re-integrate
Katanga into the Congo.
113
Divisions were evident within Washington over what pressures would

require, or risk, the use of armed force and the desirability of such actions.
The Belgians were more inclined than the British to accept the idea of
imposing customs posts on Katanga to ensure money from export and
import duties on goods leaving Katanga passed to the central government
in Leopoldville. Thus as 1962 passed and Tshombe played for time, as the
UN appeared unable to finance continued operations in the Congo after
the summer of 1963, heated discussions took place in Washington, London
and Brussels.
By late summer the US State Department had produced a plan for
reintegrating Katanga into the Congo, which then became a UN plan with
a few minor changes by U Thant (Hammarskjöld’s successor as Secretary
General). After his acceptance of the plan, a series of measures were to
be implemented in stages against Tshombe if he refused to implement
it. As tension mounted in Katanga, UN officials believed that Tshombe
would never voluntarily agree to end secession and some action would be
necessary.
Activities
How important were the economic factors in Angola and the Congo in influencing the
politics of the two African countries before 1962?
Outline the careers of Tshombe and Mobutu, and explain who their supporters were.
Important dates
1961 February Lumumba’s murder made public
27 July Congolese parliament elects Adoula as president
Fighting breaks out in Elisabethville between UN forces and the

13 September
Katangan gendarmerie
18 September Hammarskjöld killed in plane crash
UN authorises force to remove foreign military personnel from

24 November
the Congo
5 December Fighting breaks out again in Elisabethville
Talks at Kitona between Tshombe and Adoula with US and UN

21 December
produces agreement on reintegration of Katanga
1962 15 January Overthrow of Gizenga’s regime
UN Secretary General announces plan to end secession involving

20 August
an economic boycott and military sanctions
US mission to Congo under George McGhee to get Tshombe’s

September
acceptance of UN plan
20 December US announces despatch of military mission to Congo

28 December UN military offensive to end Katangan secession
1963 13 January Tshombe announces the end of secession
114
The ending of secession and the disunity of a unified

Congo
The Kennedy administration feared the collapse of Adoula’s government,
if the Katangan secession was not ended, and its replacement by more
radical forces which would be a serious Cold War blow. While the British
opposed any sanctions, and some of the retaliatory measures outlined
in the UN plan if it was not implemented voluntarily by Tshombe,
Kennedy and the CIA feared that the credibility of the UN and the USA
was threatened by the continuation of the Katangan regime. As time was
running out Kennedy was prepared to use US air forces if necessary to
support the UN military operations rather than just provide transport
planes. With tension mounting in Katanga, fighting again broke out
on 28 December 1962, which was essentially started by the Katangan
gendarmerie and its supporters. In a confused situation in Elisabethville,
and with little governmental control, the fighting led to UN forces, made
up of highly trained Indian troops, occupying key parts of Elisabethville.
The final military operations against Tshombe forced him to flee, and
while the USA was keen to end the fighting, UN forces, acting on the
advice of the military operational commander, advanced into the towns
of Kolwezi and Jadotville without any Union Minière installations being
damaged or destroyed. In three weeks the UN intervention had effectively
ended the Katangan secession.
Unfortunately, the problems of the internal Congolese divisions remained.
To add to these the economy was seriously weakened and corruption was
endemic with a political career being the most effective way to gain access
to wealth in the Congo. In 1963, although the UN troops were to remain
for an additional year, in reduced numbers, more rebellions occurred in the
eastern and western Congo. In 1963 Pierre Mulule, a former member of the
Lumumba government, who had recently returned from Beijing, organised
a revolt in Kwilu which failed to capture the important towns in the western
Congo region east of Leopoldville. The formation of the Conseil National de
Libération (CNL), under a group of radical nationalists, including another
former Lumumba politician Christophe Gbenye, also failed to develop an
effective rebel following outside the provinces of Kivu and Northern Katanga
in eastern Congo and Gizenga’s support base in Stanleyville.
Nevertheless US fears of radical successes in the Congo led the Johnson
administration in 1964 to provide aircraft piloted by Cuban exiles and paid
for with CIA money to deal with the rebels. In July 1964 the rebellions also
influenced the more right-wing African supporters of the USA, including
President Kasavubu, to see the advantages of bringing Tshombe and his
wealth back to the Congo and making him prime minister of a unified
regime. However, Tshombe, once installed as prime minister, failed to fully
suppress the rebellions, and with the Johnson administration embroiled
in the disastrous conflict in Vietnam, the USA paid less attention to the
Congo. At the same time, growing disillusionment with the international
effectiveness of the United Nations as a useful Cold War tool for the west
in the less developed world became evident in Washington. Thus amidst
growing economic dislocation and inequality, regional conflicts and political
divisions continued without the UN until General Mobutu’s military takeover
in 1965 finally removed democracy from the Congo.
115
Important dates
1963 October Kwilu revolt led by Pierre Mulele becomes serious
1964 January CNL moves to the Congo from Congo Brazzaville
30 June Withdrawal of UN forces from the Congo
10 July Tshombe returns as prime minister of united Congo
7 September Gbenye announces formation of breakaway regime in Stanleyville
24 September Belgian paratroops land in Stanleyville to rescue hostages
1965 13 October Tshombe resigns
Military coup by which General Mobutu becomes president and

25 November
strips parliament of much of its power
Portuguese resistance to self-determination and the

Lisbon Coup
Under Salazzar the Portuguese determination to retain its African colonies
led to revolts in Guinea–Bissau and Mozambique, as well as Angola, and
pressure came from the Kennedy administration for Portugal to accept
self-determination to put an end to them. The Johnson administration was
less concerned with the issue of colonial independence, and perceived the
colonial question as of less Cold War importance.
In Angola the demands for self-determination had produced three
important political parties by the mid-1960s. Central to their development
was the growing importance of the urban Marxist MPLA and its strength in
the Angolan capital of Luanda. The MPLA’s FLNA opponents were joined
after 1966 by UNITA, the party led by Jonas Savimbi. UNITA’s strength
came from the Ovimbundu people in the southern half of Angola, in
contrast to the Bakongo in the north west of Angola and the Mbundu who
concentrated their support on the MPLA around Luanda. More significant
was the increasing supply of foreign aid to the Angolan parties. No longer
did US resources alone dominate, as the Soviets began to provide support
to the MPLA, and from 1973 the Chinese also began providing support
for the FNLA. The nationalist groups who had begun armed resistance
in Mozambique and Guinea–Bissau provided extra pressure on the
Portuguese army’s ability to sustain an expanding series of colonial wars
which appeared largely unwinnable.
The deadlock was broken in April 1974 with a military coup in Portugal
against Salazzar’s successor Marcelo Caetano, influenced by the reduced
morale of the Portuguese army now sending large numbers of conscripts to
Africa. The coup was led by General Antonio Spinola but it was those on
the left in the new regime, including the leader of the socialist party Mario
Soares, who were influential in bringing about the independence of the
Portuguese colonies on 27 July 1974.
With the collapse of Portuguese governmental authority in Angola,
the key issue was which of the competing political parties the new
government in Lisbon would transfer power to. When the Portuguese flag
was ceremoniously lowered on 11 November 1975 there had been no
political resolution as to who the leading representatives of the Angolan
people were to be. Fighting had continued for much of the period after
the coup and the progress made towards resolving the transfer of power
116
had merely taken the form of an agreement at Alvor in January 1975. A

ceasefire eventually did allow for the November 1975 transfer of power to
take place – not to a political party but to the Angolan people as a whole.
Meanwhile the military struggle to control the capital Luanda intensified
in order that the reality on the ground would influence the actual transfer
of power. The situation did not bode well for the future.
Angolan independence and the increasing international

involvement in a Cold War conflict
Once it was agreed that power was to be transferred, the involvement
of outside powers immediately became more significant for an already
fraught internal situation in Angola. Increased arms for the FLNA had
already begun to arrive from the CIA and the Chinese. The Soviets had
become disillusioned with the divisions in the MPLA but had supported
Daniel Chipenda’s faction in the early 1970s. Chipenda had extended the
reach of the MPLA in the east of Angola but he broke with Neto after the
1974 Portuguese coup. The split led him and his followers in the ‘eastern
revolt’ to leave the MPLA for the FNLA. The Soviets concluded before the
final break between Neto and Chipenda that aid from Moscow should
largely be terminated, but then changed their position and renewed the
aid in 1974. External aid had an impact on the capacity of the military
forces available to the rival parties with the 10,000–20,000 men of the
FLNA easily outnumbering the forces of UNITA and the MPLA.
By 1975 the situation was further complicated not by the Soviets, or the
USA, or even General Mobutu in the Congo, but because of two new and
relatively independent actors who were not acting at the behest of the
superpowers or the Chinese. In Namibia the South Africans were facing
a threat from SWAPO fighters seeking the independence of Namibia,
which was still treated in Pretoria as a South African mandate. In order to
prevent SWAPO fighters seeking refuge across the border in Angola, the
South Africans were keen to support UNITA forces with 1975 incursions
across the border into Angola. On 22 August a major incursion to attack
SWAPO bases in southern Angola, Operation Sausage, was launched. This
was several weeks after the June decision of the US National Security
Council to support the FNLA rather than pursue diplomatic efforts to
reconcile the competing forces. Meanwhile the Cubans, receiving requests
from the MPLA in July, began sending advisers and support to Luanda
where an advance on the city by FNLA forces, now armed by the USA
more than by the Chinese, was imminent. By September, however, the
advance of the FNLA had been halted, with help from Cuba and its
military mission, and by October it was clear that Luanda was going to
remain in MPLA hands as the November independence day approached.
The South Africans, however, had been discussing Operation Savannah,
a full-scale invasion of Angola, since September. The fourth stage of that
operation was designed to capture Luanda, and in October the South
African interventions became more organised. Regular South African troops
(column Zulu) began a rapid advance into Angola on 14 October, reaching
Moçãmedes on 28 October. External intervention was now becoming the
major element of the Angolan conflict and was completed by Castro’s
decision in the first week of November to send Cuban troops to join the
conflict. With the help of Soviet rocket launchers the MPLA won the decisive
battle against the FLNA at Quifagondo in November, leaving the Cuban
troops to face the South Africans advancing from Lobito, south of Luanda.
117
The advance of regular South African troops by December could no longer

be concealed from the world, and the reality of white troops fighting to
remove black independence fighters caused significant difficulties for
Kissinger’s plans. In late December 1975 and January 1976 Congress
refused the money that was enabling US support for the anti-MPLA forces
to continue. This coincided with the South African failure to break through
the Cuban defences, blocking the final push on Luanda. Rather than risk
further international opprobrium, and unable to rely on US resources, the
South Africans decided to retreat. The tenuous alliance between the FNLA
and UNITA, deprived of significant external military and economic aid,
was unable to challenge the MPLA and their Cuban supporters, who could
now continue to rely on Soviet aid. The stage was set for a protracted
internal conflict in Angola as the MPLA sought to subdue the efforts of
UNITA and the FLNA to govern a united Angola.
Important dates
1974 Soviets restore significant aid to MPLA
July Portuguese coup in Lisbon
1975 January Alva independence accords
August Major South African incursions into Angola
October Regular South African troops invade Angola
November Defeat of FNLA at Quifagondo
December Congress cuts off funding of FNLA
Activities
Produce a map of Angola and include the important ethnic differences in the various regions.
Provide a brief biographical sketch of the various nationalist leaders in Angola and
comment on their political ideologies.

• explain why the UN role in the Congo was so controversial
• explain how and why US policy towards the crisis was different to that
of Belgium and Britain
• explain the significance of the external attempts to affect the outcome
of the conflict in Angola.

1. How successful was US policy in preserving stability in the Congo and
Angola 1960–63?
2. To what extent was US policy in the Congo driven by Cold War
considerations?
3. Why was no stable democratic government established in the Congo
from 1960–65?
4. Why were the South Africans and the USA unable to secure a victory
for the FLNA between 1975 and 1976?
118
Chapter 16: The end of the Cold War and the collapse of communism
Chapter 16: The end of the Cold War and

the collapse of communism
Learning outcomes
• assess the reasons why the Cold War, the Eastern bloc and eventually
the Soviet Union collapsed
• compare the importance of actors and systemic problems in influencing
the changes in the Soviet bloc.
Essential reading
Brown, A. Seven years that changed the world. (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2007) [ISBN 9780199282159].
Kramer, M. ‘The collapse of East European communism and the repercussions
within the Soviet Union (Part I)’, Journal of Cold War Studies 5(1) 2003.
within the Soviet Union (Part II)’, Journal of Cold War Studies 6(4) 2004.
within the Soviet Union (Part III)’, Journal of Cold War Studies 7(1) 2005.
Further reading
Connor, W.D. ‘Soviet society, public attitudes and the perils of Gorbachev’s
reforms: the social context of the end of the USSR’, Journal of Cold War
Studies 5(4) 2003.
Tuminez, A.S. ‘Nationalism ethnic pressures and the break-up of the Soviet
Union’, Journal of Cold War Studies 5(4) 2003.
Wallander, C.A. ‘Western policy and the demise of the Soviet Union’, Journal of
Cold War Studies 5 (4) 2003.
Introduction
During the 1980s international relations went through some radical twists
and turns. While Cold War tensions reached new heights in the early
1980s, they quickly evaporated and this eventually resulted in the sudden
collapse of the Eastern bloc and then of the Soviet Union itself. By the early
1990s the Cold War was all but forgotten as new local crises erupted in the
Balkans and the Middle East. To fully understand the reasons why the Cold
War ended so suddenly and why the Soviet Union collapsed, as well as to
assess the legacy of the Cold War, you need to go beyond the actual events
of the day and look at the many structural problems – internal and external,
political and economic – that had apparently rendered the USSR a non-
reformable state by the 1980s. The importance of those problems must be
compared to the role of individuals and agencies in the end of the Cold War
and the collapse of the Soviet Union. You should also consider whether the
collapse of one side meant the triumph of the other and whether the USA
and its allies, as well as the political and economic systems they stood for,
were the true ‘winners’ of the Cold War.
119
Gorbachev’s rise to power

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan marked a definite end to the era of
détente. In 1980 the SALT II treaty was withdrawn from the US Senate,
the USA and others boycotted the Moscow Olympics and, under the Carter
Doctrine, the USA pledged to help any states in the Persian Gulf region
under pressure from external powers. Carter’s new found assertiveness
was taken to further heights by his successor, Ronald Reagan, whose
rhetoric more than matched that of earlier Cold War presidents. US foreign
policy became more interventionist, the arms race heated up and the
Soviets and the western Europeans became alarmed by US rhetoric. This
dramatically changed in February 1984 when Reagan moved away from
calling the Soviets the ‘evil Empire’ and began to consider ways in which
relations could be improved and the risk of nuclear war reduced.
At the same time, following the death of Brezhnev in 1982, the USSR
was undergoing an internal power struggle, which was eventually won
by Mikhail Gorbachev, whose ascendancy in March 1985 coincided with
the reopening of the US–Soviet arms talks. He needed allies who would
share his new ideas and be prepared eventually to support his attempts
to reform the stagnant Soviet economic system that was failing to provide
the material benefits dominating the globalised late 20th century world.
His first goal was to establish himself as the most powerful figure in the
Soviet communist party, in order to effectively control the executive body
or Politburo.
Gorbachev, who was to become the key figure in changing the Soviet
Union and producing the end of the Cold War, was the first of a new
generation of Soviet leaders. By far the youngest General Secretary, he
provided a marked contrast to the senior figures, like his predecessor
Chernenko, who had dominated the leadership after the death of Stalin.
Gorbachev was an adept political operator who was well aware of the
constraints imposed by the communist party. The older, more conservative
elite were not well disposed to Gorbachev’s new thinking but he was
helped by being able to remove some senior military figures after Mathias
Rust flew a small plane into Red Square, avoiding Soviet air defences in
May 1987. Two years after assuming power Gorbachev had surrounded
himself with a significant number of advocates of his ‘new thinking’.
Activity
Explain the importance of the changes in Reagan’s thinking in 1984.
Why did Gorbachev emerge as Chernenko’s successor?
Important dates
Carter limits Soviet trade and suspends SALT II ratification
1981 January
The Carter Doctrine for the Persian Gulf announced
Carter launches expansion of nuclear arsenal

September Solidarity launched in Poland
Iraq invades Iran
1981 January Hostage crisis in Iran ends
March Soviet manoeuvers on Polish border
June First US arms sale to China
120
USA and USSR agree to start INF (Intermediary Nuclear Forces)

September
negotiations
October Reagan announces further build up of US military

November INF talks begin in Geneva
December Martial law in Poland
1982 February US rejects Soviet arms reduction proposals
May Reagan proposes START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) talk
November Brezhnev dies, replaced by Andropov
Reagan’s ‘evil empire’ speech

1983 March
Reagan announces ‘Star Wars’
July Martial law ends in Poland

September Korean Airliner (KAL 007) shot down by Soviets
November Soviets leave INF talks
START and MBFR (Mutually Balanced Force Reductions) talks

December
suspended
1984
February Andropov dies, replaced by Chernenko
March MBFR talks resumed

November Reagan reelected
1985 January Soviets and Americans agree to resume START and INF talks
March Chernenko dies and is replaced by Mikhail Gorbachev
The problems with the Soviet economy

The most important problems facing Gorbachev concerned the stagnant
Soviet economy whose inefficiencies Khrushchev had tried and failed to
reform. It provided Gorbachev with his key motivation for the changes he
wished to make to a state economy which for too long had been geared to
meeting the demands of the Soviet defence industry. The significant role
of defence spending meant that heavy industry, such as iron and steel,
took precedence over the production of consumer goods, and under Soviet
communism supply and demand were replaced by quotas and guaranteed
jobs. Alcoholism was rife and a burden on any attempt to increase
productivity. Unfortunately Gorbachev’s attempts to deal with it had no
beneficial effect and if anything made things worse.
Yet it was not the case that the Soviet economy was facing collapse, rather
that it had been stagnating, particularly since the Brezhnev era. Military
spending was a key element in this but the amount of resources devoted
to defence did not significantly change under Gorbachev. In other words
US re-armament under the first Reagan administration produced neither
an attempt by the Soviet Union to match it, nor did that competition play
a significant part in the end of the Cold War by bankrupting the Soviet
Union. Gorbachev’s attempts at reform became known as perestroika or
reconstruction but in fact it was his attempts at change and reconstruction
which began to make the economy significantly worse. Restructuring did not
simply apply to the economy but to the political dimensions of Soviet society.
121
Activity
Explain the difficulties facing the Soviet economy.
The retreat from Afghanistan

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was begun in order to stabilise a regime
constructed by Afghan communists, who had assumed power and aroused
opposition from religious and secular elements in Afghanistan. It was hoped
greater Soviet control would avoid further antagonising significant sections
of Afghan society that had occurred since the overthrow of the monarchy.
The Soviet Union itself, with a large Muslim population, was concerned
that instability on its borders might have a spillover effect. Moscow and the
communist regime in Kabul were facing threats of more instability following
the Iranian coup in December 1978. Armed Islamist groups were based just
across the Iranian and Pakistani borders and the Herat rebellion in March
1979 caused greater concern for Moscow.
Afghan society had a long history of division and local conflict between
fiercely independent groups or tribes that were hostile to control by others
outside their districts. The Soviets initially hoped to unite the factions of the
People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), the Marxist communist
party, under Noor Mohammed Taraki, the Khalq faction leader. However,
Taraki was assassinated in October 1979 after a rival group within the
Khalq faction had seized power under Hafizullah Amin. Despite historical
precedents, little Soviet consideration seemed to have been given to a
post-invasion conflict lasting more than a short time. When opposition to
Amin quickly formed, the failure of the Soviets to control large areas of
the countryside soon began to have significant consequences. The USA,
believing that the mujahedeen resistance fighters driven by their religious
beliefs were the natural and significant opponents of godless communism,
soon began providing military support to them, which eventually extended to
technologically advanced weaponry, notably the Stinger ground to air missile.
More importantly, the war, while not on the scale of Vietnam in terms of troop
numbers, had a disastrous impact on the image of the Red Army.
The Red Army had always been perceived in Moscow as the factor which
could be used to deal with the worst problems that the Soviet regime
might face. Whether military victory or out-and-out repression was
required, the Red Army had always acted as the cornerstone supporting
the communist regime. Its failure in Afghanistan tarnished its reputation as
the provider of the ultimate solution to political problems. The Red Army
had always been traditionally dependent on the wishes and orders of the
communist party and thus there had never been an independent military
line or ideology as in many states in the less developed world.
Gorbachev had concluded early on that the Soviets would need to
withdraw from Afghanistan but was faced with the reluctance of some
elements of the political leadership to accept this. He thus initially
increased the deployment of troops to provide the means for a final victory
or, as is now commonplace, to ensure that withdrawal could take place
without the same loss of face. As a result it was not until 1988 that the
withdrawal was finalised and implemented early in 1989.
Activity
Why did the Soviets invade Afghanistan?
In what ways was Afghanistan important when considering an explanation of the end of
the Cold War?
122
The developing spread of the Soviet reformist

movement
For Gorbachev the reformist initiatives he took were crucial in ending
the east–west ideological differences that had produced the tensions of
the Cold War. The importance of the ideological shift made by Gorbachev
was also significant for how the reformist movements throughout the
Soviet bloc developed. Glasnost or openness would be an important
accompaniment to perestroika in the changes that Gorbachev began
to embark on in earnest in the Soviet Union after 1987. The most
important year was 1988 as the initiatives taken by Gorbachev provided
encouragement for the reformist movements that emerged in eastern
Europe, particularly after the start of 1989.
In March 1988 Gorbachev spoke of the principles of equality and non-
interference and in December of that year he unilaterally announced
that the Soviets would reduce their forces in eastern Europe by 50,000
soldiers and 5,300 tanks. This had international significance, while at the
same time sending a message to those eastern Europeans that the use of
force for repression was now less significant. The advocates of unilateral
disarmament in the west had been heavily criticised for their naivety
in attempting to go beyond multilateral disarmament agreements but
Gorbachev embarked on a process of unilateral Soviet disarmament. The
unilateral disarmament gestures, if well received in the west, would enable
him to portray the west to Soviet hardliners as less of a threat.
The new thinking of Gorbachev meant that the Soviet leader was looking
to encourage those reformers in eastern Europe who were seeking change.
He expected that the momentum engendered by reform in eastern Europe
would be useful to the reformers in the Soviet communist party. He also
began undermining the communist party dominance of state institutions,
and aided that by introducing a limited number of elections with non-
communist party candidates. Most importantly, in 1989, it was Gorbachev
who was instrumental in persuading the Polish government that repressing
Solidarity would be counter-productive, thus enabling elections in Poland
to take place in 1989.
Important dates
1985 March US–Soviet arms talks reopen
July Shevardnadze becomes Soviet foreign minister
November Reagan–Gorbachev summit in Geneva
1986 April Chernobyl nuclear explosion
July Gorbachev announces first troop reductions in Afghanistan
October Reykjavik Reagan–Gorbachev summit
1987 April Gorbachev talks of a ‘common European home’
September INF talks in Washington
November INF treaty finalised
December Washington Reagan–Gorbachev summit
1988 May–June Moscow Reagan–Gorbachev summit
August Independence rallies in the Baltics
123
Sino–Soviet border disputes settled

1988 November
George Bush elected US president
1989 January Hungary legalises independent political parties

February Last Soviet troops leave Afghanistan
Tiananmen Square protests begin

April
Soviet troops begin to withdraw from eastern Europe
June Tiananmen Square protests crushed

August End of communist rule in Poland
Berlin Wall comes down

November
Chancellor Kohl announces plans for reunification of Germany
December Malta Gorbachev–Bush summit
The impact of Poland and eastern Europe

It was Gorbachev’s commitment to peaceful change which was particularly
significant, given the ideological shifts he was advocating. It opened a
series of doors which were used by a variety of opponents of communism,
with some emphasising the nationalist aspects of their opposition. For
others the importance of economics and the benefits of Western capitalism
were central, while still more looked to the political benefits of societies
where political freedom was more in evidence. The Polish elections
were particularly significant and built on the foundations of the original
Solidarity protest from 1981. This time Solidarity and its leader Lech
Walesa experienced no repression and, because of Gorbachev’s backing,
the Polish reformer triumphed in the crucial elections of 1989.
Other significant events occurred in 1989 in eastern Europe. It is
important to distinguish between those areas of eastern Europe which
formed part of the Soviet satellite empire and those areas of Europe
which were part of the Soviet Union itself. This distinction is necessary as
Gorbachev, while encouraging the reformers in Poland, did not want to
see the changes having serious consequences for the Soviet Union – least
of all those consequences that would result in its collapse. The events in
Tbilisi, Georgia constituted the only occasion that the Red Army was sent
to crackdown on disturbances – allegedly without Gorbachev’s knowledge.
In 1989 the Baltic states of the Soviet Union were demanding greater
freedoms and Lithuania was removing the constitutional provisions that
had made the communist party an integral part of the state. In the satellite
empire, Hungary in 1989 was experiencing a revolution which removed
the constraints on travel to the west and created a socialist party from
the abolition of the Hungarian communist party. New technologies were
enabling Soviet citizens and the inhabitants of eastern Europe to have
greater access to information from the west. They were thus becoming
more aware of the reality of life in the west, not least because of glasnost
and the relaxing of Soviet controls. By 1990, however, Gorbachev was
losing control of the forces of change he had been so eager to unleash.
124

• assess the reasons why the Cold War, the Eastern bloc and eventually
the Soviet Union collapsed
• compare the importance of actors and systemic problems in influencing
the changes in the Soviet bloc.

1. What accounts for the democratisation of eastern Europe?
2. Why and with what consequences did the Cold War end?
3. Did anyone ‘win’ the Cold War, and if so, why?
4. How significant was the role of Mikhail Gorbachev in the downfall of
the Soviet Union?
125
Notes
126
Chapter 17: The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union
Chapter 17: The end of the Cold War and

the collapse of the Soviet Union
Learning outcomes
By the end of this chapter, and having completed the Essential reading,
• explain what primarily produced the collapse of the Soviet Union and
the end of the Cold War
• compare the importance of agents and structures in producing the end
of the Cold War.
Essential reading
Brown, A. Seven years that changed the world. (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2007) [ISBN 9780199282159].
within the Soviet Union (Part I)’, Journal of Cold War Studies 5(1) 2003.
within the Soviet Union (Part II)’, Journal of Cold War Studies 6(4) 2004.
Further reading
Dunlop, J.B. ‘The August 1991 coup and its impact on Soviet politics’, Journal
of Cold War Studies 5(1) 2003.
Knight, A.W. ‘The KGB, perestroika and the collapse of the Soviet Union’,
Taylor, B.D. ‘The Soviet military and the disintegration of the USSR’, Journal of
Cold War Studies 5(1) 2003.
Zlotnik, M.D. ‘Yeltsin and Gorbachev: the politics of confrontation’, Journal of
Cold War Studies 5(1) 2003.
Glasnost, perestroika and the international changes

In many respects glasnost and perestroika were the other side of the Soviet
coin to the international changes which formed part of globalisation that
much of the world was undergoing in the final decades of the twentieth
century. As ideas and images travelled more rapidly into more and more
areas of the globe, their impact in the Soviet Union was all the more
significant because Gorbachev was supporting the creation of a more open
society. In part this was linked to his understanding of the greater consumer
benefits that western societies were able to offer. Gorbachev’s ideological shift
came in part from a belief that these western economic principles and their
political associations would offer benefits as communism was transformed
into democratic socialism. In that sense Gorbachev would gain from aligning
with western leaders in a more cooperative fashion, although he chose to
become closest to those leaders in power who were far from democratic
socialists. At the same time glasnost enabled ordinary Soviets to become more
aware of the social, as well as the economic, problems that were affecting
Soviet society. Thus the Cold War international system that Gorbachev sought
to change through unilateral gestures of disarmament was closely linked to
the domestic economy and politics in the Soviet Union – both of which he
wanted to alter, given the ideological transformation he embodied.
127
An alternative view of the end of the Cold War that some in the west have
been keen to put forward was that it essentially resulted from a competition
over hard power, and that the USA won that competition as a result of
Reagan’s commitment to rearmament. This commitment included his
proposed ‘Star Wars’ programme, whereby incoming Soviet missiles would
be intercepted by US-launched defensive ones before they had re-entered
the atmosphere. Whatever the feasibility of Star Wars, it is claimed that the
Soviet efforts to compete with the US weapons programme bankrupted the
communist regime. The problems with this interpretation are numerous
and include the difficulty of accommodating the shift in Reagan’s attitudes
towards cooperation with the Soviet Union after 1984, and the difficulties in
showing that there was a significant Soviet increase in defence expenditure
and that this shift had an impact on the Soviet economy. More importantly,
as has also been argued, it was the greater contact, including US–Soviet
summits, that actually improved these countries’ relations. And that the
greater the cooperation and understanding that occurred, the more east–
west relations underwent a fundamental transformation which competition
alone would have been incapable of bringing about.
The importance of Gorbachev and ideology

The key element which shook the Soviet regime to its foundations was the
ideological shift which Gorbachev made and which rejected the tenets of
Marxism–Leninism that had underwritten the Soviet Union since 1917.
The changes to such a system built on control imposed ruthlessly from the
top could not come from the masses below, with or without nationalism.
Change had to be instigated from the top, and Gorbachev and the
ideological shift he advocated were perhaps the most important elements
in bringing that about. Together they played a vital part in undermining
the position of the communist party as the sole arbiter of political and
economic developments in the Soviet Union, which was what primarily
produced the collapse of the communist system.
No longer was the Marxist way of interpreting the world deemed to be
the only acceptable way to do so. Class conflict, as the essential tenet
of Marxism–Leninism, was superseded for Gorbachev by the universal
needs of all humanity. The beliefs which had formed the principles on
which the communist party had operated and the assumptions Soviet
elites had made about the outside world could no longer be relied on.
Gorbachev was determined to place more emphasis on human values in a
European context and to move forward by giving socialism a human face.
The importance attached to these universal human values and the role of
one individual and his associates were particularly important for the new
thinking in the Soviet Union. And to make this new thinking into a reality
the two opposing blocs of the Cold War world needed to be dismantled,
and conflict and arms races replaced by diplomacy.
The flawed structure of the Soviet system did have a causal role in
the collapse of the Soviet Union but the system had existed for a long
time with similar problems. There was no reason why it could not have
continued to function in its inefficient way backed by the use of force to
resist change. Propaganda, or the lack of effective Soviet propaganda, was
what enabled the ideological shift to be effective, as propaganda can only
shape a Cold War ideology in the modern world if its lies and distortions
are credible enough to be believed by ordinary citizens. This was much
less the case in the Soviet Union than in the Western world, where myths
and distortions were more effective.
128
For Gorbachev, the system’s reforms had to provide for new ideas going
beyond the old communist assumptions and party structures. Pluralism
and independence would be central to Gorbachev’s new world order and
the way in which they threatened to destroy, as opposed to reform, Soviet
communism was grossly underestimated by the reformers, even without
the corrosive forces of nationalism emerging in the Soviet Union and its
European satellite empire.
Reforms in eastern Europe

Clearly the ideas and actions of Gorbachev spilled over into eastern Europe
and encouraged the belief that reform without repression was possible.
Initially, before 1989, the spillover effect was primarily from the Soviet
Union into the satellite states of eastern Europe. During 1989 it became
a two-way spillover in that Soviet reforms still had some influence on the
eastern European movements whose development in turn was starting to
encourage more reform within the Soviet Union.
There were particular parts of the Soviet Union which had closer links
with eastern European reformers than others. Solidarity in Poland was
able to link very effectively with the Lithuanians and the Ukrainians.
This was important in encouraging the rapid development of reformist
elements, whether primarily influenced by nationalism, ethnicity, western
ideas or greater consumer expectations.
Once significant developments took place in eastern Europe, inside and
outside the Soviet Union itself, many of the popular demonstrations
were now seen on Soviet media outlets. The more obvious it became,
particularly in 1990, that crackdowns by the authorities were less and
less in evidence, the more likely it was that local leaders would press for
radical changes designed to achieve greater local autonomy from the
centralised structures of the communist party. Paradoxically, the same
centralised structures that had facilitated the spread of oppression now
acted to the benefit of the reformers and the spread of new thinking within
the communist party. Regional diversity was made more likely, given the
reactions that were coming from the highest levels in the communist party
to the impetus for change.
Important dates
Gorbachev’s United Nations (UN) speech calling for the freedom of
1988 December
all countries and the human rights of all people
Gorbachev tells the UN he is willing to accept whatever results

1989 June from the people’s decisions in eastern Europe
Polish elections won by Solidarity
September Hungary permits the first exodus across the border to Austria
October Hungarian elections announced
Berlin Wall breached
Bulgarian coup ousts communist government
November
Czech communist government resigns – Velvet Revolution
Riots in the Romanian capital Bucharest
December President Ceauşescu deposed and executed
1990 January Lithuanian independence declared – attempted crackdown
February Gorbachev agrees in principle to German unification
129
German reunification talks begin

March First free elections in the Baltic republics, followed by more
declarations of independence
May Boris Yeltsin elected president of Russia
May–June Washington Gorbachev–Bush summit
July 28th Soviet Party Congress declares the abandonment of Stalinism
August Iraq invades Kuwait
September Helsinki Gorbachev–Bush summit
Germany unified
October
Lech Walesa elected president of Poland
December Shevardnadze resigns
Lithuanian independence accepted

1991 January
US-led coalition begins to attack Iraq
Warsaw Pact abolished

February
Iraq driven out of Kuwait
June Fighting begins in Slovenia and Croatia

July Gorbachev attends G-7 summit as observer
START signed in Moscow

August
Coup in Russia fails
Commonwealth of Independent States formed to replace the USSR;

December
Gorbachev resigns
The rise of Yeltsin and the final days of the Soviet Union
Boris Yeltsin first came to prominence as secretary of the Moscow
communist party, with a place on the central committee of the Soviet
communist party. In a break with the tradition of making the Moscow
secretary a full member of the Politburo, that privilege was not accorded
to Yeltsin and was the source of much resentment which coloured his
feelings towards Gorbachev. One of Gorbachev’s several failings was not
to understand the threat that Yeltsin posed as a personally ambitious
individual who would use the opportunities presented by the differing
political forces Gorbachev’s liberalisation had unleashed. It is ironic,
but significant, that when Yeltsin was ousted from the communist party
central committee for criticising Gorbachev’s reforms (‘half measures’)
in 1987, his political career would have been over within the old Soviet
communist system. He was only able to revive it because Gorbachev’s
reforms enabled him to do so by winning election to the revamped Soviet
Congress of People’s Deputies and the Russian parliament in 1989 and to
the presidency of the Russian Fedaration in 1991.
Yeltsin thus had a power base which could draw on support from Russian
nationalists who wanted to take Gorbachev’s economic and political
reforms much further. And Yeltsin could now claim with some credibility
that Russian law was above Soviet law, which naturally helped undermine
the Soviet Union and Gorbachev. Yeltsin did make some gestures to seek
a dialogue with Gorbachev on reforming the constitution of the Soviet
Union, which would have preserved the essentials of the Soviet state
130
within a reformed structure, and some discussions did take place in

March 1991. By then, however, it was far too late as referenda in some
republics had already occurred on the future of the Soviet Union, and at
the beginning of 1991 Gorbachev was under pressure from the hardliners
which made any reconciliation with Yeltsin more difficult.
It was in December 1990 that plotting for a coup against Gorbachev was
instigated by the chairman of the KGB, Vladimir Kryuchkov. There were
clear links between the coup and the attempted crackdown in Lithuania
earlier in January 1991, and the demands for increased power to be
given to the leaders of the republics, which were opposed by Kryuchkov.
In early August when Gorbachev had left Moscow for his summer
vacation, Kryuchkov met with General Grachev to plan the introduction
of emergency rule. By 17 August two more defence ministers had agreed
to move ahead with the introduction of emergency powers. Despite
suggestions to the contrary, it appears Gorbachev was allowing the coup to
go ahead, while declining to associate himself with it, as the coup would
have removed both Yeltsin and Landsbergis, the Lithuanian president.
Further mystery surrounds the attempts to arrest Yeltsin before he left
Archangel for Moscow and the failures to storm the Russian White House
where the leaders of the Russian government had taken refuge.
At all events the lack of a decisive leader contributed to the initial failure
to storm the White House and the resulting reluctance of the military to
support the KGB as their attempt to seize power failed. The consequences
of the failed coup were however immediately clear in the declarations
of independence and the loss of influence of the KGB. Gorbachev still
endeavoured to preserve a reformed communist party of the Soviet Union,
which Yeltsin was keen to dissolve, even if the latter was not eager for the
breakup of the Soviet Union as opposed to reducing the Soviet president to
a ceremonial figure.
The breakup of the KGB into three major agencies and the loss of important
military leaders meant neither organisation could provide serious opposition
to the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991. All had been
compromised by the failed coup. Paradoxically it was the peoples of the
Asian republics that were most supportive of the Union, and the more
significant advocates of the regime’s break up came from the European
republics. The decisive blow was provided by the Ukraine where a
referendum in 1991 finally produced a vote for independence in December.
At Belovezhskaya, Russia, Belorussia and the Ukraine announced the
creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Gorbachev himself
was forced to resign as the president of the Soviet Union.
Important dates
Yeltsin expelled from the communist party’s central committee for
1987
criticising Gorbachev
Yeltsin returns to politics in the revamped Soviet Congress of

1989 March
People’s Deputies
1990 Yeltsin elected chairman of Russian parliament

1991 February Warsaw Pact abolished
70 per cent of Ukrainians support a renewed federation for USSR

March
Yeltsin chosen as head of Russian Republic’s Supreme Soviet
June Yeltsin becomes the first elected president of Russia
131
Coup attempt against Gorbachev

Ukrainian parliament declares independence
August
Moldova, Georgia and the Baltic States declare independence
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan declare independence
Ukrainian votes for independence in second referendum and seals
Soviet Union’s fate
December Belovezhskaya Accords declare the Soviet Union dissolved and
Russia, Belorussia and Ukraine establish the Commonwealth of
Independent States
A new world order begins to emerge, 1990–91

The emerging new world order contained a united Germany but
unfortunately the federal state of Yugoslavia began to descend into a state
of prolonged conflict that pitted its various nationalities against each
other. On the other hand, an emerging order seemed to be represented by
the USA, at the head of an international coalition, launching a successful
counterattack on Iraq to liberate the oil-rich state of Kuwait. The Cold War
had come to an end and the idea, particularly in Washington, was that a
new world order would now replace it.
This world order would be based on international cooperation through
institutions like the United Nations and the IMF which gave form to the
values and practices of the west. In such a world it was assumed that
inter-state conflict would be eliminated through the spread of democratic
values. Economic difficulties, arising from the efforts of states to influence
economic development, which the Soviet Union had particularly suffered
from, would disappear under an imaginary protective blanket of ‘free
market’ forces with the dominance of the neo-liberal economic values that
was termed the Washington Consensus. This idea of peace and harmony
within a new world order proved as illusionary as the perfect economic
order that had been offered by utopian communism and which the ‘end of
history’ and ‘free markets’ were replacing.
The idea that deregulated markets could provide the economic stability for
humanity to reach a political consensus (the end of history) now appears
worse than naïve. The belief in global order under an international
cooperative framework was linked to the notion of political democracy
and to the USA’s values firmly embodied in capitalism. The idea was that
problems in the Middle East, Asia and Europe would be eased if only
democracy was welcomed and the worst consequences of capitalism
ignored in those places where its effects were less than beneficial for large
sections of humanity. After the financial crisis of 2007–08 the mythical
‘free market’ has yet to provide the means by which a new world order
after the end of the Cold War can effectively be established.

Having completed this chapter, and the Essential reading, you should be
able to:
• explain what primarily produced the collapse of the Soviet Union and
the end of the Cold War
• compare the importance of agents and structures in producing the end
of the Cold War.
132

1. What has replaced the Cold War?
2. To what extent could the Cold War have happened without the
influence of Mikhail Gorbachev?
133
Notes
134
Chapter 18: The USA and the War on Terror
Chapter 18: The USA and the War on

Terror
Learning outcomes
• explain the effect of 9/11 on the Bush administration’s approach to
domestic and foreign policy
• provide a critique of US policy towards al-Qaeda and radical Islamic
groups
• explain the nature and significance of Pakistan’s role in the war
against terror
• identify the changes produced by the Obama administration.
Essential reading
Anderson, T.H. Bush’s wars. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011)
[ISBN 9780199747528].
Further reading
Bergen, P.L. The longest war: America and Al-Qaeda since 9/11. (London:
Simon and Schuster, 2011) [ISBN 9780743278935].
Hersh, S.M. Chain of command: the road from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib. (New York:
Harper Collins, 2004) [ISBN 9780060195915].
Woodward, B. Obama’s wars: the inside story. (London: Simon and Schuster,
2011) [ISBN 9781849832205].
Terrorism before 9/11

Terrorist acts, including those of the IRA in Britain and those in the
Middle East, have long been a feature of the international system. Their
international dimensions in the 1970s and 1980s were strongly linked
to the hijacking of aeroplanes for political purposes. In other words, the
ultimate goals were political and force and intimidation were used as an
attempt to reach those ends. The advent of groups like al-Qaeda who used
terror and the taking of innocent lives as the end in itself came later, most
notably through suicide bombings.
From what has been gleaned from suicide bombers who survived
the detonations of their bombs, the motives for the destruction often
combined a dissatisfaction about elements of the material world, whose
conditions they were having to confront, with strong spiritual or religious
beliefs. The harsh conditions which they were usually experiencing in their
daily lives, whether or not as a direct result of political actions (such as the
illegal Israeli occupation of the West Bank) provided a contrast with the
benefits that sacrificing their lives would allegedly bring them in the next
world. The organisation of such terrorists, often in small cells, increased
the difficulty faced by counterterrorist forces seeking to penetrate the very
different cultures and societies in which these new terrorists operated.
Thus to acquire the necessary intelligence on their activities became more
and more important.
135
The situation was made worse for the USA following the end of the
Cold War, which had a dramatic and extremely adverse impact on the
effectiveness of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The lack of a
powerful and threatening adversary helped reduce the CIA to the kind
of bureaucratic inertia besetting any organisation preoccupied with the
avoidance of risk. The numbers of case officers stationed abroad were
reduced and the Directorate of Operations, responsible for covert actions
and the recruiting of foreign agents, played a less important role. A new
branch of the Agency, the Counter Terrorist Centre (CTC), was created
in 1986 in the wake of a glut of hijacking and bombing. The idea was
to bring all the relevant US agencies, including the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) and the Secret Services, into a fusion centre to
coordinate intelligence data on terrorism.
The CTC was thus thrown into the centre of inter-agency turf wars and
the reluctance to share information and intelligence which has always
characterised the work of US governments. Career intelligence officers
have described the malaise, and even though the CTC received more
money and manpower after the World Trade Center bombing of 1993,
paperwork and ‘procedure’ remained dominant, making intelligence
organisations particularly ill-equipped to deal with terrorism in the 21st
century. The CIA was not the only government agency handicapped
by paper pushing and was frequently engaged in turf wars with inter-
governmental rivals, especially the National Security Agency. The FBI had
similar weaknesses, which extended to failing to share data through its
software systems well before 9/11 fully exposed the problems.
Despite some glaring structural weaknesses, the Clinton administration
developed measures to deal with the terrorist threat that was identified as
emerging in the 1990s – including that from al-Qaeda. It was the World
Trade Center bombing in 1993 which produced the appointment of Richard
Clarke as the first coordinator for security and counterterrorism in order
to respond to the 40 groups identified by the State Department as terrorist
organisations. In the Middle East, all were then vehemently opposed to the
existence of Israel, including Black September, Muslim Jihad, Hamas and
Hezbollah. In 1995 terrorists bombed the Riyadh HQ of the US military
training mission and in 1998 al-Qaeda destroyed the US embassies in Kenya
and Tanzania killing 12 US citizens and several hundred local people.
Clinton also signed Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39 in 1995
instructing the CIA to conduct an aggressive programme of foreign
intelligence gathering and covert action. This could involve the capture
of terrorists, by force if necessary, in countries which might be harbouring
them with or without the permission of the host government. Three years
later Clinton signed a memorandum which changed the goal of capturing
the leader of al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, to one authorising his killing.
Al-Qaeda had no known associations with Iraq, which under Saddam
Hussein was essentially a secular state opposed to the Islamic
fundamentalism of Osama bin Laden. Islamic Shiites had indeed been
carried to power in Tehran in 1979, and Iran was moving towards a
religious state, but it was Iraq that was very much in the minds of policy
makers in the Clinton administration. Its acts of terror and genocide after
the 1991 Gulf War had been perpetuated against its own people, notably
members of the Kurdist minority who had separatist claims, and those
Shiite Muslims whose religious associations were with Iran. Shiite Muslims
had a fundamentally different interpretation of Islam, and assigned
different positions to Mohammad’s descendants than the Sunni Moslems
who wielded political power in Saddam Hussein’s more secular Iraq.
136
Clinton had authorised a cruise missile attack on the Mukhabarat (Iraqi

secret intelligence) HQ in Baghdad following an Iraqi attempt to kill
former President Bush on a visit to Kuwait in 1993. In addition the USA
was concerned about Saddam’s obstruction of the UN mission to inspect
and dismantle Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction after the 1991 war.
When Saddam finally suspended cooperation with the inspectors and
expelled the UN mission in 1998 Clinton retaliated with four days of air
strikes in Operation Desert Fox.
Clinton also told the Joint Chiefs of the US armed services in 1998 that
he wanted ground forces deployed in Afghanistan, where it was believed
al-Qaeda was operating from, in order to empty terrorist training camps
and eliminate bin Laden. Such an operation was opposed by the military
for more than the political reasons which had influenced President George
Bush senior’s decision not to follow up the military successes of the 1991
Gulf War by illegally producing a regime change in Baghdad through the
use of force. The military argument was that it was not possible yet to
locate bin Laden, and any operation would get no support from actual or
potential US allies while requiring tens of thousand of troops without a
suitable staging area. Al-Qaeda’s attack on the US guided missile destroyer,
the USS Cole in 2000 did not lead to further attempts to assassinate bin
Laden but to further warnings from Richard Clarke about the attacks being
planned by al-Qaeda.
Important dates
1986 Creation of the Counter Terrorist Centre (CTC) in the CIA
1990 August Iraqi invasion of Kuwait
Operation Desert Storm and the liberation of Kuwait by a US-

1991 January–March
led international force
1993 January Islamic terrorists bomb World Trade Centre and kill six
Iraqi plot to assassinate former President Bush in Kuwait
April Appointment of Richard Clarke as coordinator for security and
counterterrorism
1995 Terrorists kill five US citizens in Riyadh
Clinton PDD 39 authorising aggressive programme of measures

June
to capture terrorists wherever they are harboured
1998 August Al-Qaeda attacks on US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania

Clinton Presidential Daily Brief (PDB) warning of bin Laden’s
December preparation to hijack US aircraft
Operation Desert Fox – US/GB four-day bombing of Iraq
Clarke warns of between five and 15 bin Laden attacks being

1999 December
planned
2000 Al-Qaeda attack on USS Cole
Activities
Explain why terrorist concerns grew in the 1980s and 1990s.
Critically analyse why the receipt of warnings of al-Qaeda attacks on the USA did not
prevent the bombings of the Pentagon and the World Trade Center in September 2001.
137
9/11 and its impact

The first attack on the USA by an external enemy since the war of 1812
caused dismay and confusion among US policy makers. The world’s largest
and most sophisticated military forces had been unable to prevent the
deaths of nearly 3,000 people in what was truly asymmetrical warfare. The
quest for explanations and retribution immediately began in Washington.
Overnight the perspectives and priorities of many policymakers had
to readjust, and this process allowed the views of neo-conservatives
to dominate the War on Terror, as the steps to be taken by the Bush
administration in response to 9/11 were defined.
On 7 October a display of conventional US force was launched with a
successful invasion of Afghanistan, in which a limited number of US
allies participated. It was from Afghanistan, controlled by the Islamic
government of the Taliban since 1994, that Osama bin Laden and his
training camps were primarily operating. Unfortunately, the Taliban
regime and al-Qaeda were unconventional enemies. Dealing with a
dispersed enemy, with no respect for human life, presented new challenges
to be overcome, the most important of which was intelligence – or, in the
case of the USA in 2001, the relative lack of intelligence.
The attempts to overcome this had important consequences because the
necessary changes to the civilian and military organisational structures
needed were not put in place. Not only were divisions still present within
the US administration that produced more rivalry than cooperation, but
the ideological baggage brought by the neo-conservatives to the War on
Terror became increasingly damaging. Thus the war in Afghanistan began
to make less headway from the end of 2002, as planning for the war in
Iraq diverted resources into a conflict that increased the difficulties for
those whose priority was countering terrorism. This was not the only
problem in fighting the War on Terror, and although there are conflicting
views on this, the way the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were conducted
has not only increased the threat from terrorists but damaged the
international reputation of the USA.
If the need was to protect the USA, in whichever of the wars was being
fought, the most important requirement was good intelligence on non-state
terrorist actors. A detention centre for alleged terrorists was first established
at Guantanamo, the US enclave in Cuba, but as part of a process which
undermined the principles on which freedom under the rule of law was
based. From the end of 2001, extensive debates were conducted within
the Bush administration on the rights that suspects deemed to be guilty of
terrorism should receive. Lawyers for the White House, the Pentagon and
the Justice Department argued in a series of memoranda that ‘terrorist’
prisoners had no rights under federal law or the Geneva Convention.
Thus the way that prisoners were treated by their US captors and particularly
the interrogation methods used to extract the vital intelligence was subject
to no constraints. Although the USA had ratified the UN Convention Against
Torture in 1994, which barred cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment,
pictures of Iraqi prisoners receiving precisely that in the hands of US soldiers
at Abu Ghraib were released to the world in 2004. The US military and
civilian policy makers had known about the abuse since 2002, but no action
had been taken. In part this reflected the importance of extracting useful
information from prisoners to make Abu Ghraib an intelligence centre for
a successful global War on Terror. In part it reflected the eagerness of some
civilian policy makers in the Pentagon to replace the conservative military
138
culture with a no-holds-barred set of procedures, controlled through a

highly secretive Special Action Programme. And in part it resulted from
the administrative structure of US army prisons in Iraq, whereby the
military police, who were nominally in charge of prisoners, were effectively
allowing military intelligence to develop more unusual and humiliating
ways of extracting valuable information from prisoners under a rubric of
‘Do what you want’. Similar considerations lay behind the ‘anything goes’
approach in the War on Terror which produced the programme of rendition.
Under international law the forced return of any person, no matter what
their suspected crime, to a foreign location where they would be at risk of
mistreatment is illegal. Thus the War on Terror and the quest for human
intelligence in the war against Iraq have been instrumental in producing US
actions which go against the values that it claims to embody.
Activity
How effective was US intelligence before 9/11?
To what extent did the new administration of George W. Bush change Clinton’s policies
relating to al-Qaeda?
Important dates
Bush first refers to the ‘War on Terror’ in response to the attacks on
2001 September
the Twin Towers and the Pentagon
October Invasion of Afghanistan

2002 January Lashkar-e-Taiba attack on the Indian parliament
Capture of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM) one of the main
2003 March planners of the 9/11 attacks
Invasion of Iraq
Start of US drone attacks in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas

2004
(FATA)
2006 February Islamic republic of Waziristan declared

April Increased NATO deployment begins
Waziristan accord between Pakistani Taliban and the Musharraf

September
government
Musharraf suspends Supreme Court chief justice Ifitikhar

2007 March Mohammed Chaudhry
Red Mosque siege
November Pakistan state of emergency
December Assassination of Benazir Bhutto
2008 February Pakistani elections
November Lashkar-e-Taiba attacks in Mumbai
Brooking Institution (Washington-based think tank) report that
drone attacks were killing 10 civilians for every militant
2009 January
Pakistani offensive against Tehrik-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants
in the Swat valley
US drone attacks rise from 1 in 2004 to 38 in 2008 and 99 by
2010 2010
2010
139
The problem of Pakistan

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (see Chapter 20) have been firmly
associated with the War on Terror and the conflict in Afghanistan has been
closely influenced by the actions of Pakistan. The main problem for the USA
in the War on Terror has been deciding whether Pakistan is fulfilling an
essential requirement in the attempt to defeat the terrorists or whether its
actions constitute an element of the actual terrorist problem in the region.
The difficulty in determining what role is being played by Islamabad, at
which time, explains the oscillations of US policy to Pakistan. US policy to
Pakistan has ranged from an effusive supply of aid to be used in the fight
against the Taliban and al-Qaeda, to condemnation of its protection of the
militant groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan who are the perpetrators of
terrorist attacks in the region. The fact that Pakistan is an official ally of the
USA has only increased the dilemma for Washington.
When Pervez Musharraf seized power through a bloodless military coup
in 1999, Pakistan’s overriding priority was its power political rivalry with
India, reflected in the dispute over Kashmir and both countries’ possession
of nuclear weapons. Pakistan had been more than willing to use radical
Muslim groups to infiltrate Indian Kashmir and tie down large numbers of
Indian soldiers. The presence of radical Islamists in Pakistan enormously
increased with the US-led invasion of Afghanistan immediately after 9/11
when al-Qaeda and their Taliban allies simply moved across the border in the
winter of 2001–2. Initially, the preference for those fleeing from Afghanistan
was to seek refuge in Pakistan’s teeming cities rather than the remote and
lawless Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). For most Pakistani elites
– civilian or military – as the main external issue was the rivalry and open
conflict that had been simmering for decades with their Indian neighbours,
the role of US military and economic aid and assistance was always defined
through that lens. Worse, there were elements at the highest level within the
Pakistani government, notably the Inter-services Intelligence Agency (ISI),
that were known to have links with militant groups connected to al-Qaeda.
In the years between the end of 2002 and the end of 2006, when, because
of Iraq, Afghanistan had largely been under the radar, the Pakistani
authorities handed over to the USA nearly 400 suspected militants
for millions of dollars. The question of the extent to which Musharraf
was merely giving the impression of being a staunch US ally resumed
importance as the US role in Iraq reduced in significance. The series of
‘peace’ agreements with the Taliban, after the latter had moved to the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan in the border
region with Afghanistan, gave credence to the idea of Musharraf being a
master of rhetoric rather than an implementer of anti-terrorist policy. The
Pakistani army had conducted a number of unsuccessful counterinsurgency
campaigns in 2005 and 2006, the failure of which confirmed the build up of
Taliban forces from 2003 in the FATA and the North West Frontier Province.
In 2007 the bloody siege of an Islamabad mosque (the Red Mosque),
occupied by supporters of the radical imam Abdul Rashid Ghazi, caused
many of the militant jihadist groups in Pakistan to turn against the
government. As Musharraf tightened his authoritarian grip on power,
culminating in a declaration of emergency rule later in the year, the
Bush administration began to believe that the USA was being cheated
with the millions of dollars it had used to underwrite the regime, much
of which had gone to building up forces directed against India. In 2007
pressure from a US administration increasingly disillusioned with the
Pakistani contribution to the War on Terror and regional security helped
140
produce elections and the end of Musharraf’s dictatorial rule. The Muslim
opposition, an alliance known as the United Action Council (MAA) did
particularly badly in the elections, but Pakistan, with its ambiguous and
inconsistent response to Islamic militancy, was increasingly seen as the
crux of the regional security problem. The ISI continued to see the value
of a pro-Islamic Afghanistan as providing strength in depth against India,
thus avoiding a repeat of the dismemberment of Pakistan that the 1971
establishment of Bangladesh had produced.
Meanwhile Pakistan continued to serve as the main supply conduit for
the western forces in Afghanistan. In the second half of the decade after
9/11 the USA dramatically increased the numbers of guided cruise missile
attacks (drones) in the FATA, despite the civilian casualties they produced,
and the numbers of suicide bombings within Pakistan also dramatically
increased. The problems remained as the same failure to provide the
needed resources for the reconstruction of Afghanistan continued. The
nature of the terrain, the regional dynamics and the reluctance of the Bush
administration to face up to the problems of nation building, let alone pay
for it, handicapped the establishment of governmental authority on both
sides of the lawless Afghan–Pakistan border.
Obama’s war
The war in Afghanistan was rudderless and progress on the War on Terror
was going backwards when Obama was elected as president and faced with
defining a new approach in the wake of the improved, but far from stable,
situation in Iraq. Obama was eager to focus the objectives in Afghanistan
and Pakistan on the defeat of al-Qaeda. As with the campaign against the
Taliban the issue was how best to go about achieving progress towards
that goal through the use of the military. And what could eventually be
produced in the difficult socio–economic and political environments existing
in the region. The emphasis would be on improving the capability of
Afghan forces, despite the unfortunate analogy with Vietnamisation. Iraq
provided a more positive analogy given the apparent success of Petraeus’s
counterinsurgency there in 2008. Afghan society and culture was, however,
very different from that of Iraq and Vice-President Biden’s strategy did not
involve strengthening a central administration nor providing additional US
troops. The aim was to prevent the Taliban from controlling cities and to
deny training camps to al-Qaeda while using drone attacks to eliminate key
individuals. Biden’s strategy in the War on Terror attached more importance
to Pakistan and was based on the deployment of fewer US and NATO forces.
As the debate progressed in Washington the success of counterinsurgency
in Iraq ensured that Obama agreed to the extra troops desired by the
military commander General McChrystal. 30,000 extra troops were sent in
November 2009 with the caveat that their withdrawal would begin in 2011.
The impact of McChrystal’s ‘clear hold and build’ on the ground was that
Taliban forces were driven from the south of Afghanistan but established a
growing presence in the northern provinces of Kunduz and Faryab. Doubts
were being cast over the success of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan when
McChrystal was fired by Obama for insubordination in June 2010. The
one success of the War on Terror was Operation Neptune Spear, which
orchestrated the assassination of Osama bin Laden by US special forces on 2
May 2011 in a residential compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan. Nevertheless
a reconstituted Taliban remained in parts of Afghanistan with what
remnants of al-Qaeda were left and while the situation has not yet been
stabilised the intention is to withdraw troops by 2014.
141

• explain the effect of 9/11 on the Bush administration’s approach to
domestic and foreign policy
• provide a critique of US policy towards al-Qaeda and radical Islamic
groups
• explain the nature and significance of Pakistan’s role in the war
against terror
• identify the changes produced by the Obama administration.

1. ‘9/11 provided the rationale for the USA to begin the War on Terror but
no rational means of pursuing it.’ Discuss
2. Was Pakistan supportive of or opposed to US efforts to win the War on
Terror?
3. What impact did the rivalry between the CIA and the Pentagon have on
the war on terror?
4. Did the damage inflicted on groups carrying out terrorist attacks
exceed the damage done to the reputation of the USA?
142
Chapter 19: The rise of China
Learning outcomes
• outline the arguments for and against China being a revisionist or a
status quo power
• discuss and evaluate the relationship between economics and politics in
the dynamics of China’s role in regional cooperation.
Essential reading
Deng, Y. China’s struggle for status: the realignment of international relations.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) [ISBN 9780521714150].
Further reading
Fravel, M.T. ‘Power shifts and escalation: explaining China’s use of force in
territorial disputes’, International Security 32(3) 2007/08.
Kang, D.C. China rising: peace, power and order in East Asia. (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2010) [ISBN 9780231141895].
Ross, R.S. ‘Beijing as a conservative power’, Foreign Affairs 76(2) 1997.
Ross, R.S. ‘China’s naval nationalism: sources, prospects and the US responses’,
International Security 34(2) 2009.
Wang, J. ‘China’s search for stability with America’, Foreign Affairs 84(5) 2005.
Zheng, B. ‘China’s peaceful rise to great power status’, Foreign Affairs 84(5) 2005.
China at the end of the twentieth century

Since China, in the wake of Deng Xiaoping’s reforms, adopted the economic
changes to bring about an effective capitalist system, its role in the world
has been changing. With the state being used to encourage the initiatives of
private entrepreneurs, the Chinese economy began to grow and questions
of its involvement with the international system, both politically and
economically, have become more significant. These questions of soft power
and Chinese status have been viewed, inside China and externally, in the
historical context of the humiliation experienced by China at the hands
of the imperialist powers including the Japanese as well as the European
powers and the USA. Thus the elements of nationalism and territorial
sovereignty have been present at a number of levels amongst the Chinese
population. For Chinese elites at the end of the twentieth century economic
development and increasing access to wealth formed part of a bargain that
provided the legitimacy for the changing role of the government of China.
One key focus of nationalism and Chinese unity was, of course, the position
of Taiwan following the creation of two Chinas after the Chinese Civil War
(The People’s Republic of China and Formosa/Taiwan). Some commentators
in the last decade of the twentieth century have tended to ignore the hard
power issues and the importance of military strength, arguing that before
the new millennium China, in hard power terms, was an insignificant force.
In the new millennium this hard power argument is no longer so credible.
143
Twenty-first-century rise – changes in China’s economic

and military power
The increase in China’s military strength and its remarkable economic
growth in the twenty-first century have increased the intensity of
the debates on whether China’s military and economic power can be
reconciled with the existing international order, or whether significant
revisions of the latter will be required. One military element that has
been relatively constant since the days of Mao Tse Tung in the 1920s has
been the importance of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) which
includes all the branches of Chinese armed forces. It now has 1.7 million
troops but since the end of the Mao era in the 1970s, the PLA, as part
of the changes in the governmental process, has been subject to greater
civilian influence.
Technology has become a more influential component of military strength
and the Chinese have begun to make up the considerable technological
gap between their military equipment and the more advanced hardware
developed by the west and the USA in particular. For the air force the
Chinese began developing their own advanced fighter jet, the Jian-10, and
have now tested an even more advanced fighter, the J-11B with Stealth
capabilities. Their air force has been further strengthened by the purchase
of Russian SU-30MKKs – an all-weather multi-purpose fighter. Yet despite
China’s 2,600 combat aircraft, compared to Japan’s 350, most of that air
force is comprised of Korean War-era fighters and it has no long-range
strategic bombers. It still has no capacity for mid-air refuelling, but has
developed an AWACS-style radar plane based on a Russian model. In
other words, the ability to project air power on a global basis is still
severely limited.
China’s naval capabilities have been enhanced by the first Chinese aircraft
carrier, (the USA has 12) built from a former Soviet carrier which had its
first sea trials in August 2011. As with aircraft, the projection of Chinese
global naval power through a blue water (ocean-going) navy is subject
to considerable constraints. China does have 67 submarines, a number of
which are nuclear-powered vessels armed with ballistic missiles, and the
Xia class is armed with missiles with a range of 965 kilometres, even if the
submarines are unreliable and rarely venture out to sea. However, in 2004,
China launched a new class of nuclear submarine capable of carrying
intercontinental nuclear missiles with a range of nearly 10,000 kilometres.
The Chinese navy has also recently bought four Russian destroyers,
two of which are fitted with cruise missiles. In addition China has 149
surface combat ships compared to Indonesia’s 51, giving it regional naval
dominance within south east Asia. Questions have to be asked as to the
purpose of these developments, which are not sufficient to challenge
the global military power of the USA but which could have a significant
regional impact particularly in a future conflict with Taiwan.
Yet China’s recent increase in defence expenditure, which doubled
between 1985 and 2002, has not yet produced counter measures by most
other east and south east Asian nations, who seem to welcome a strong
China as a bringer of stability and prosperity. South Korea and Vietnam,
despite post-second-world-war hostilities with China, have both reduced
defence expenditure in the new millennium with no hint of any idea of
containing China. Even the Japanese have not matched China’s increases
in defence expenditure and in 2005 Japan reduced its defence budget.
144
Economically, China’s growth, relative to any of the world’s economic

giants, or the increased significance of the other BRIC powers (Brazil,
Russia and India), has been more substantial. Since the move away from
a centrally-planned system to an economy with an expanding private
sector, China’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has increased tenfold.
Collectivised agriculture has been phased out, a diversified banking system
put in place, stock markets developed and foreign investment has risen
dramatically. Most importantly, state enterprises have been given more
autonomy while the government has increased its support for important
state owned enterprises. In other words the economic changes have not
simply incorporated ‘free’ market reforms but have attempted to build
more effective links between the important public sector and an emerging
private one. The result has been that by 2008 China had overtaken Japan
as the world’s second largest economy. More specifically, since the changes
began to have an effect in 1978, over the following 26 years China’s GDP
has grown at an average 9.4 per cent per annum and from1 per cent of
world trade to 4 per cent. In absolute terms over the same period this
translates into $851 billion from just over $20 billion.
However, there are still some major challenges to be overcome inherent in
China’s population of 1.5 billion. These large numbers of people, many of
them rural dwellers, meant that China’s per capita income in the second
half of the first decade of the twenty-first century was $5,000 compared
with that of Japan at $28,000. China, if its economic growth is to continue
successfully, without producing the instability western research shows
to be associated with growing inequality, has to ensure that it does not
encourage xenophobic nationalism. There are other pitfalls arising from
the relative scarcity of crucial resources in China, most notably oil, gas
and water. China has only a quarter of the world’s average water resources
by country, and its percentage per capita average oil and gas resources is
only just into double figures. So far the Chinese have followed policies
which involved the peaceful acquisition of such resources from as far afield
as Africa and Australia. The concern is whether operating peacefully and
cooperatively within the existing capitalist system and its institutions will
remain the only acceptable way for China to act in the future.
Activity
To what extent is economic cooperation more significant than political cooperation and
strategic issues in assessing the peaceful nature of China’s rise?
Economic growth and China’s role in international

institutions
Those commentators and political scientists who believe China will
continue to rise peacefully point to its recent actions and commitment
to join both regional forums for economic cooperation and international
bodies of a global significance, such as the World Trade Organisation
(WTO) which China finally joined in 2001. Both China and states in the
developed western world stand to benefit from a common acceptance
of these international institutions and the values they embody. In other
words, the rejection of the opportunities provided by the international
capitalist system, which were deemed insufficient by Germany and Japan
in the inter-war years, is unlikely to occur in the immediate future. In the
twenty-first century, not just China but its regional and global partners
will retain their mutual commitment to international trade and stability
promoted by institutions such as the Association of South East Asian
145
Nations (ASEAN), with which China began formal contacts in 1991. The
most important argument in favour of China’s peaceful rise stems from
the economic benefits that China offers to trading partners as the world’s
largest market for some goods including cement, mobile phones and steel.
Important dates
1991 Beijing begins participating in international forums
China–Taiwan consensus accepting ‘one China’ peace accord – with

1992
different interpretations of what ‘one China’ is
1993 Committee on Security and Cooperation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP)

1995 ASEAN +1 (ASEAN and China) created
USA sends two aircraft carriers to Taiwan Strait after provocative Chinese
1996
missile launches
ASEAN +3 (ASEAN and China, Japan and South Korea) created

1997
Asian financial crisis
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea prohibiting

2002
use of force to settle Spratly Islands dispute
Asian bond fund established with China to respond to economic crises

2003
China signs treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South East Asia
Expansion of ASEAN to 10 countries

2005 China, Vietnam and the Philippines agree on joint approach to oil
exploration in South China Sea
Regional influence: cooperation and integration?

The recent positive Chinese engagement with other south east Asian
regional actors provides the basis for an analysis not just of the nature
of the Chinese commitment to economic growth and increased trade
links, but of China’s involvement in regional political cooperation and
the peaceful settlement of disputes. At the moment it seems evident that
most other south east Asian states continue to see China as a positive
influence on regional stability and an important actor to cooperate with.
Even Taiwan generally sees advantages in not antagonising China and
continuing to enjoy the benefits of closer economic cooperation. Since the
1990s China has been extending its membership of regional organisations
and developing formal links with others such as ASEAN. On the basis
of the recent evidence China is complying with international norms and
adapting to the requirements of institutions based on western values.
There has been little attempt to undermine them and China has moved
from favouring bilateral relations to accepting multilateral and cooperative
institutions like the ASEAN regional forum. Its formal links with ASEAN,
its establishment of the Asian bond fund and the signing of the treaty
of Amity and Cooperation indicate a growing commitment to regional
cooperation. Outside the east Asian region China joined the WTO in 2001
and the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in 1980, both
international institutions dominated by the USA.
146
Global or international role – accepting or changing the

status quo
Notwithstanding the evidence of the Chinese commitment to regional
cooperation, their apparent acceptance of the status quo has been
interpreted by some as a tactical ploy until China’s rise has incorporated
greater economic and military hard power. Once this is achieved it is
argued that China’s regional role will become more forceful and less
cooperative. Certainly there are those in the USA who are skeptical about
a peaceful rise for China and want a stronger US effort to balance Chinese
power in Asia. Others see the advantages for both countries in maintaining
economic cooperation on the basis that each needs the other.
The case for continued Chinese acceptance of the international status
quo, and a reluctance to become a revisionist power, can be seen in
China’s approach to territorial disputes. The most significant issue is the
position of Taiwan, which China regards as an internal matter, although
in actuality the question is whether Taiwan is or is not a nation state.
For the moment, both of the protagonists on either side of the Taiwan
Strait accept the practicalities arising from Taiwan not being formally
recognised as a nation state, but in practice behaving like one, and getting
the economic benefits from so doing. The majority of Taiwanese people,
especially from the business community, accept this compromise and the
increased economic contacts with the mainland which have recently been
established.
Tensions remain, however, even though Taiwan has no great strategic
significance and constitutes a question of identity and status rather than
power for both sides. In several other contentious issues China has made
concessions in order to reach agreement, notably with Burma, where
China accepted 18 per cent of the disputed territory. While the border
dispute with India remains, along with the unresolved Senkaku Islands
question with Japan, settlements have been reached with Afghanistan,
Mongolia, Pakistan and Russia among others. The conflict with some
ASEAN states over the Spratly Islands has been reduced by the Chinese
renouncing the use of force and the signing of an oil exploration
agreement that was welcomed by Beijing.
Overall, China’s present strategy seems more based on emphasising
cooperation with its east and south east Asian neighbours in order
to enhance the economic growth on which its domestic legitimacy is
increasingly based. For that a certain degree of acceptance of economic
cooperation with the USA is required, which in turn means an acceptance
of western norms and involvement with both the political and economic
institutions that constitute the present international status quo.

• outline the arguments for and against China being a revisionist or a
status quo power
• discuss and evaluate the relationship between economics and politics in
the dynamics of China’s role in regional cooperation.
147

1. To what extent are the Spratly Islands disputes likely to interrupt
regional cooperation within south east Asia?
2. Analyse the arguments in favour of a continued peaceful rise for China.
3. Will the economic interests uniting the USA and China overcome their
political differences?
148
Chapter 20: The USA and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq
Chapter 20: The USA and the wars in

Afghanistan and Iraq
Learning outcomes
• explain the connections between the rise of the neo-conservatives and
the causes of the Iraq War
• analyse the reasons why the War on Terror had successes and failures
• provide a critique of US strategy in the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Essential reading
Bird, T. and A. Marshall Afghanistan: how the west lost its way. (London: Yale
Woodward, B. Plan of attack: the road to war. (London: Simon and Schuster,
2004) [ISBN 9780743495455].
Further reading
Anderson, T.H. Bush’s wars. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011)
[ISBN 9780199747528].
Bergen, P.L. The longest war: the enduring conflict between America and al-
Qaeda. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2011) [ISBN 9780743278935].
The rise of the neo-conservatives

The origins of the group which become known as the neo-cons lay in
the Vietnam War and the un-American counterculture with which it was
associated. The roots of this neo-conservatism, paradoxically, were liberal
and emerged from the shock some liberals received from hippies and the
violence on US streets at the end of the 1960s. The Vietnam War translated
domestic concerns into foreign policy problems by suggesting that the
exercise of US power was being limited by the humiliation experienced
in Vietnam. Overcoming such negative outcomes of the Vietnam War
therefore became a key part of the neo-conservative agenda of those who
did not accept that the USA had overreached the limits of its power.
The Committee on the Present Danger in 1976 brought together leading
neo-conservatives, some of whom would have roles to play in the Ford
and Reagan governments and in opposing détente. Men such as Donald
Rumsfeld (President Ford›s secretary of defense), Paul Wolfowitz, Richard
Perle, William Kristol, James Woolsey and Elliot Abrams participated in the
Project for the New American Century established in 1997. They rebuked
the Clinton administration for ‹containing› Saddam Hussein rather than
removing him and they believed the latter goal should become the main
aim of US foreign policy.
The Bush administration entering the White House in 2001, with Rumsfeld
again as Secretary of Defense, was rapidly followed by 9/11, and together
they provided the neo-conservatives with not just greater influence over
policy but also with the opportunity to implement their ideas. The link
between the general re-assertion of US power, both in hard military
149
terms and in soft power through ideology and the politics of culture, was
provided by 9/11 and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. This despite the fact that
in the real world there was no causal connection between al-Qaeda and
Saddam Hussein, rather the reverse, and none of the 9/11 attackers came
from Iraq.
The war in Afghanistan, phase 1

The immediate US response to 9/11 was to demand that the primarily
Pashtun Taliban, who had formed the government of Afghanistan in
1994, after the 1989 Soviet withdrawal, surrender Osama bin Laden
and cease offering shelter to terrorists. Led by the cleric Mullah Omar,
the Taliban refused and on 27 September 2001 US special forces were
covertly inserted into Afghanistan to be followed on 7 October by US-led
air strikes and in November by more inter-service special forces and small
numbers of marines. It was not clear whether the operation was to remove
Osama bin Laden or the government of the country which was prepared
to tolerate his presence. Significantly, in the conduct of ground operations
the USA had the support of the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. Thus
overwhelming US air power could be used in a support role for the non-
Pashtun Northern Alliance, which avoided the need for large US ground
troops. The problem was that this saving of US casualties was achieved by
relying on tribal warlords from different ethnic groups (Tajiks, Uzbeks and
Hazaras) opposed to the Pashtuns.
As normal, large amounts of CIA money provided the means to try and
counter the impact of historically-based tribal allegiances, self-interest, and
ethnic nationalism that had long been evident within Afghanistan and the
adjacent regions of Pakistan. The Pentagon was thus able successfully to
transform US war fighting, from the US army’s reliance on overwhelming
force of numbers, into a more mobile strategy linked to fewer ground
forces and precision air strikes. Initially successful in Afghanistan it
enabled US forces, supported by UK and Australian troops, to secure
the surrender of what was left of Taliban fighters by the beginning of
December.
Yet by then Osama bin Laden was holed up in a labyrinth of caves and
tunnels in a remote mountainous region near the border with Pakistan
called Tora Bora. Relying on Afghan forces to attack the complex almost
certainly allowed the al-Qaeda leader to escape over the border into
Pakistan. As 2002 progressed Afghanistan assumed less importance as the
invasion of, and subsequent quagmire in, Iraq dominated US concerns,
and the relative indifference to Afghanistan between 2003–5 allowed the
ground to be prepared for the return of the Taliban, which was evident
by late 2005. In 2002 and 2003 only around 30 US soldiers had been
killed in Afghanistan but the numbers trebled in 2005. Yet the USA did
not seriously attempt to deal again with the Afghanistan problem until the
improvement began in Iraq in 2008, by which time Afghanistan was more
dangerous for US troops than Iraq.
Activities
Identify the neo-conservatives in the Bush administration and explain their ideas.
Explain the ethnic make up of Afghanistan and the reasons for the twentieth century
failures to modernise the state.
150
The build up to the attack on Iraq

The initial US response to the horrific use of civilian airliners to attack
New York and Washington involved the invasion of Afghanistan in
October to remove a radical Islamist regime sheltering al-Qaeda. Iraq
was governed by a repressive authoritarian, but secular, regime under
Saddam Hussein and his Ba’athist party who had nothing in common with
al-Qaeda and militant Islam. Nevertheless, during 2001 the neo-cons in
the administration, especially Rumsfeld and Vice-President Dick Cheney,
began preparing for an attack on Iraq, well before 9/11. At the same time
many experts within the government were pointing to the lack of any
evidence for Iraqi-sponsored terrorism directed against the USA. After the
9/11 attacks on the USA had occurred, all agencies and experts involved
with US intelligence agreed there was no cooperation between Iraq and
al-Qaeda. Nevertheless, at the end of November 2001, Bush instructed the
Pentagon to begin planning for a military operation against Iraq.
The attempt to portray Saddam as the source of the terror threat and
to shift the focus of danger from al-Qaeda to Baghdad was increased by
Bush’s state of the union address in January 2002, which was dubbed
the ‘Axis of Evil’ speech. Iraq, as part of the evil axis, had already been
identified in Washington as a state thought to have weapons of mass
destruction and a nuclear programme. If hard evidence was lacking,
the withdrawal of the United Nations weapons inspectors in 1998 (who
had entered Iraq as a result of the 1991 Iraqi Gulf War defeat) because
of the lack of cooperation by the Iraqi authorities, provided grounds for
suspecting something was being hidden.
In January 2002 the USA began withdrawing CIA agents and US special
forces from Afghanistan, allegedly to allow them to train for Iraq. The
plans were for regime change in Iraq now that the military campaign
in Afghanistan was about to succeed, and the justification would be not
allowing terrorist states, or states harbouring terrorists, that possessed, or
were on the verge of possessing, weapons of mass destruction to threaten
the USA. In 2002 a number of stories, that were all eventually proved to
be false, began to emerge that supposedly confirmed the threat from Iraq’s
weapons of mass destruction and nuclear programme. The Bush Doctrine,
with the element of preemptive war announced in June 2002, significantly
shifted the emphasis of US defence and security policy, a change which
was accompanied by the fundamentally new approaches to the conduct of
warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The decision to use force to produce regime change would be a breach
of international law unless done as a measure of self-defence or with
the authorisation of the United Nations. Having to obtain this would
go against the ideas of the neo-conservatives who were convinced that
US military power and the values the USA stood for, in stark contrast to
Islamic terrorists like al-Qaeda, provided both the rationale and sufficient
justification in themselves. In September 2001, after 9/11, the USA had
universal sympathy and many allies, 25 of whom provided support for the
invasion, and Secretary of State Colin Powell argued that allies would be
important in any future war. However, even the most ardent advocates of
the already-planned-for invasion of Iraq believed that the war would have
to be spun to the US public. Thus, the White House Iraq Group consisting
of Karl Rove (Bush’s long-time adviser), Condoleezza Rice (the National
Security Adviser), Andrew Card (the White House Chief of Staff) and
Lewis ‘Scooter’ Libby was established partly to do just that.
151
Possession of nuclear weapons by Saddam Hussein was central to spinning

the Iraqi threat – and going into the 2002 mid-term elections on a
platform of national security against terrorism was central to Karl Rove’s
all-conquering Republican political strategy. Maximising the extent of the
threat was one part of the public relations equation, but US allies would
need more convincing of the need for, or value of, exercising US power
to produce another regime change in Iraq when there appeared to be no
connection to al-Qaeda or 9/11. Crucial to international support for any
US attack on Iraq was the UN, as its weapons inspectors (UNSCOM) had
been sent to Iraq to assist the International Atomic Energy Authority in
dismantling Saddam’s chemical weapons stockpile and in preventing him
developing his nuclear programme.
UNSCOM was involved with weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) until
its departure from Iraq in 1998, but in September 2002 Saddam agreed
to its replacement with the United Nations Monitoring Verification and
Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) entering the country in November
2002, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1441. This
required the complete and accurate disclosure of Iraq’s nuclear, chemical
and biological weapons programme in order to facilitate the inspections.
Arguments developed in late 2002 as to whether Saddam was in breach
of Resolution 1441, but by January 2003 the Bush administration
had definitely decided to attack Iraq. On 6 December 2002 Rumsfeld
was presented with the first major deployment order and the military
deployments began in January as the plans required the attack to go ahead
before the end of March and the advent of the hot summer.
Despite full support being offered by the British government of Tony
Blair, opposition from France and Germany in particular was clear,
notwithstanding the efforts of Rove and the Iraq group, and the
heightened claims about the extent of the threat Iraq presented. Obtaining
a second UN Resolution before any military force was used would
undermine any opposition and remove doubts as to whether further UN
approval was required by 1441. Unfortunately, time for this desirable
justification of war was limited by the military plans.
To make matters worse, some opponents of an immediate war were
adamant that until UNMOVIC and its head Hans Blix had been given time
to confirm or disprove their initial finding that no nuclear weapons had
thus far been found, military action against Saddam could not be justified.
However, the USA was prepared to attempt to get a second Security
Council on immediate military action against Saddam Hussein on the basis
of him breaching past UN resolutions. In January 2003 Bush told Blair
that the USA would cooperate in the attempt to get a second resolution
but the military plans were not aborted. In February large demonstrations
opposing a possible war against Iraq appeared in many countries. At the
United Nations, once March began it was clear that the requisite number
of votes authorising war could not be obtained in the Security Council.
Thus on 20 March Operation Iraqi Freedom, the invasion of Iraq, began
– despite the fact that no links between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda
had been found and the evidence for Iraq’s possession of weapons of mass
destruction was at best inconclusive.
Activity
Analyse why US concern shifted from Afghanistan to Iraq.
152
Important dates
Bush enters the White House
Bush establishes the National Energy Policy Development Group
2001 January chaired by Dick Cheney
Clarke, Bush’s counterterrorism czar, warns of possible al-Qaeda
attacks on the USA
September Al-Qaeda attacks the Twin Towers and the Pentagon
October Operation Enduring Freedom – the invasion of Afghanistan begins
Bush instructs Pentagon to plan for a military operation against

November
Iraq
Fall of Kabul and surrender of the Taliban

December Hamid Karzai selected by USA as new leader of Afghan provisional
government
2002 January Bush’s ‘Axis of Evil’ speech
Formal end of operations in Afghanistan against the Taliban
March Cheney’s Middle Eastern tour finds no support for a war against
Iraq
Bush–Blair meeting at Crawford Texas where British PM pledges

April
support for Bush who had decided Saddam ‘needs to go’
Bush speech at West Point spells out preemptive war as an

June
element of the Bush Doctrine
July Bush privately takes the decision to attack Iraq

Bush declares Iraq to be 6 months away from developing a nuclear
weapon. The following day he informed the United Nations that if
September
Iraq acquired fissile material it could build a nuclear weapon in 12
months
Bush signs executive order proclaiming an ‘extraordinary
November
emergency’
Cheney links Saddam to al-Qaeda, despite being informed

December
otherwise
Major anti-war demonstrations

2003 February
Blix declared no nuclear weapons yet found in Iraq
No success like failure: Operation Iraqi Freedom

The Iraq War enabled the problems and challenges arising from the War
on Terror, weapons of mass destruction and US neo-conservative ideology
to be cobbled together in a potent but shambolic cocktail. It was to be
fought with minimum numbers of ground troops – far fewer than the
numbers desired by many army generals. The war would test Rumsfeld’s
commitment to a new military doctrine no longer involving overwhelming
force, and at first things appeared to be going smoothly. By 3 April 2003
the outskirts of Baghdad had been reached with a third of the troops used
in the 1991 invasion. Like a dog chasing a tank with no idea what to do
should it catch it, US post-war planning for when the city had been taken
was conspicuous by its absence. A national security directive from Bush in
153
January had established the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian

Assistance (ORHA) in the Pentagon to enable the Department of Defense
to take responsibility for rebuilding Iraq, instead of the State Department.
Headed by Lieutenant General Jay Garner, ORHA’s aim before the war was
to provide humanitarian assistance, reconstruction and civil administration
without any proper consideration of how this should be done or with what.
Very quickly, almost before celebrations in Baghdad over the fall of Saddam
Hussein had ended, Iraq began to disintegrate. In May Iraq’s electrical power
grid had 13 downed transmission towers but by September there were 623.
Looting became rife as the Iraqi police abandoned their posts and law and
order disappeared along with the pay of officials, while no reconstruction
could take place amidst violence and looting since the US failure to provide
basic services prevented any respect for the invading power developing.
Garner desperately tried to find Iraqis to help in reconstruction and the
Bush administration searched with equal desperation, and a similar lack
of success, for the weapons of mass destruction with which Saddam had
allegedly threatened the world. On 6 May General Garner was fired by
Rumsfeld and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was established
under L. Paul Bremer, a Yale graduate and ardent Christian Republican
who had no experience of reconstruction work, had never been to Iraq and
could not speak Arabic. His first act was to eliminate the Ba’athists in much
the same way as the Nazis had been removed in post-war Germany, and a
few days later he disbanded the Iraqi army. The CPA had made nearly half
a million men redundant almost overnight, and as the weeks went by the
liberation of Iraq was rapidly transformed into the occupation of Iraq.
The CPA lasted 14 months and in that time violent resistance to the
occupation grew along with tensions between Bremer and the military. The
chaos and anarchy which dominated life under the CPA was accompanied
by desperate attempts to control the different ethnic and religious groups,
some of whom were engaged in violence against the occupying forces
and their rivals within Iraq. Especially in 2004 armed groups and suicide
bombings provided opportunities for terrorists, including representatives
of al-Qaeda, to become established in Iraq. The reality was, that
notwithstanding US plans for elections and the re-establishment of Iraqi
governmental authority, a civil war, as one senior military commander
pointed out, was taking place in Iraq that was entirely of US making.
By mid-2005 a majority of US citizens believed the Bush administration
‘had intentionally misled’ the nation into war. Corruption was still endemic
in Iraq as reconstruction remained slow and Sunnis and Shiites continued
to kill each other. Sunni support for the insurgency rose from 14 per cent
in 2003 to 75 per cent in 2006. As neo-cons Paul Wolfewitz and Doug Feith
left the Pentagon in 2006 the opportunity for a change in military tactics
increased. Thus the counterinsurgency doctrine, as outlined by General
Petraeus and emphasising making the civilian population secure, began to
be implemented in 2007 through a surge in US troop numbers of 30,000.
Crucially the army patrols designed to kill the insurgents before returning
to large bases were reduced and replaced by smaller groups operating from
command posts eventually throughout Baghdad. Attention was given to
building up Iraqi security forces and working through more interpreters.
The initial effect of the surge, which lasted till June 2008, and the policy
change was to increase the attacks on US troops and the recreated Iraqi
forces, but security in Baghdad began to improve significantly in the
second half of 2007 and the Iraqi government began paying Shia men to
work in public service jobs. Yet the important issue now for the USA was
154
how to get out of the war, but with the significant reductions in the attacks
on US and Iraqi forces in late 2007 and 2008, businesses began to operate
normally and electricity supplies reached pre-war levels. By November that
year an agreement was signed stipulating US troops would withdraw from
Iraqi cities by June 2009 and all US forces would leave by the end of 2011.
Important dates
2003 April US forces reach outskirts of Baghdad
Bush declares major combat operations over
Rumsfeld fires General Garner and replaces ORHA with the
May
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) under L. Paul Bremer
Bremer dissolves Iraqi army and other Ba’athist institutions
June CPA transfers sovereignty to Iraqi Interim government
July Iraq Governing Council established under CPA
First car bombing of the occupation

August
Bombing of UN HQ in Baghdad kills top UN envoy
December Saddam Hussein captured

2004 March First battle of Fallujah
Violent clashes begin between coalition forces and followers of
April Muqtada al-Sadr
Abu Ghraib pictures made public
June Allawi interim government formed
August Battle of Najaf
December Second battle of Fallujah
2005 December Iraqi parliament elections
Attention refocuses on Afghanistan with NATO deployment

2006 April
although Iraq remains central for USA
Republicans suffer heavy defeat in US mid-term Congressional

November elections
Rumsfeld resigns
US troop surge in Iraq announced – failure of deploying small

2007 January
forces in Iraq accepted with new deployments in the surge
2008 June US commander in Afghanistan requests 30,000 more troops
Canada announces the withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan

September
by 2011
November US troop withdrawal from Iraq by 2011 announced

2009 France refuses to send more troops to Afghanistan
August Afghan elections marked by fraud
30,000 extra troops sent to Afghanistan as withdrawal by 2011

December
announced
2010 US combat operations in Iraq end

2011 May Osama bin Laden assassinated by US forces in Pakistan
155
The invasion of Afghanistan, phase 2

By the time the Taliban had returned in strength to Afghanistan in 2005,
decisions on greater NATO involvement – International Security and
Assistance Forces (ISAF) – had been taken. US forces were still very
much needed in Iraq and the idea was to differentiate between primarily
post-conflict and reconstruction forces and counterinsurgency US forces
operating under Enduring Freedom. The Afghan government of Hamid
Karzai was unsuitable for dealing with local problems and the British
troops in Helmand Province had little idea of the tribal dynamics there or
the connections to drug mafias and local militias. The small British force
had no choice but to work with the power realities but was ill-disposed to
do so. From 2006 to 2008 violence rose dramatically as the Taliban, now
composed of a range of elements not all Muslim jihadists, defied US and
NATO forces’ attempts at control, especially in the south. The linkage of
the ISI in Pakistan to militants in Afghanistan was becoming problematic,
and the US commander was requesting 30,000 additional troops to deal
with the Taliban. By the time Obama entered the White House in 2009 the
USA was looking for an exit strategy.
In December 2009 Obama’s first term did see the first month without
deaths of US soldiers in Iraq and the commitment to withdraw start being
implemented. However, a renewed focus on the conflict in Afghanistan
offered little or no prospect of a decisive outcome and continued to be a
drain on western lives and resources. By the end of 2009 the Taliban had
expanded its operations into all but one province and the deadly use of
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) had increased as the US use of drones
also rose dramatically.
The situation in Iraq is now slightly more positive, although many issues
arising from the internal divisions have yet to be faced. However, the price
paid to produce what is at best a tenuous outcome of seven years of war is
enormous. 4,400 US lives lost, over 100,000 Iraqi dead, 150,000 civilian
wounded, thousands more missing and 2 million refugees fleeing from
Iraq. In financial terms, along with the war in Afghanistan the cost already
is well over $1 trillion and during the Bush years US debt doubled from
$5.5 trillion to $11 trillion – a not inconsiderable contribution to the 2008
economic crisis.
Why this war was embarked upon remains unclear, despite the Senate
Report on pre-war intelligence on Iraq and the 9/11 Report. Reasons
relating to Bush’s personal convictions linked to faith and gut feelings,
faulty intelligence over the non-existent nuclear weapons, greater
control over Middle East oil or bringing about democratic change in the
Middle East through the exercise of US power all have to be considered.
Republican Senator Chuck Hagel described the hubris of the assumption of
an ability to bring about democracy, when linked to the changes it would
require to the course of the region’s religious history, as breathtaking.
Yet the general lack of knowledge on the Middle East within the Bush
administration, combined with the breadth of expertise it was not
prepared to consider, was equally breathtaking.
156
The consequences of the administration’s actions in Iraq are much clearer

and far more disturbing than the reasons for them. The lowering of
the morale of US armed forces, the imposition of draconian measures
threatening the rule of law which had been created out of centuries of US
history and the most damage ever inflicted on the USA’s reputation in the
world are more than evident. As predicted, Christian US troops invading
the Islamic Middle East would inspire terrorism, including for a time al-
Qaeda in Iraq, and would not prevent jihad and militant Islam. In the 12
months from 2004 terrorist attacks worldwide killed twice as many people
as the period before the attack on Iraq. That sums up the consequences of
the US-led wars in the region for the War on Terror.

• explain the connections between the rise of the neo-conservatives and
the causes of the Iraq War
• analyse the reasons why the War on Terror had successes and failures
• provide a critique of US strategy in the conflicts in Afghanistan and
Iraq.

1. What caused President Bush to attack Iraq?
2. Analyse the connections between the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and
al-Qaeda
3. In what ways were US counterinsurgency tactics effective in the wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan?
4. ‘The Iraq War contributed to the development of the terrorist threat to
the western world.’ Discuss.
157
Notes
158
Appendix: Sample examination paper
Appendix: Sample examination paper

Important note: This Sample examination paper reflects the
examination and assessment arrangements for this course in the academic
year 2012−2013. The format and structure of the examination may have
changed since the publication of this subject guide. You can find the most
recent examination papers on the VLE where all changes to the format of
the examination are posted.
Candidates should answer FOUR of the following FIFTEEN questions

from at least TWO sections, one of which must be Section C. All questions
carry equal marks.
Duration of examination: three hours.
Section A
1. Did competition for control of territory or ideology have more impact
on the growing tension in the Grand Alliance in 1945 and 1946?
2. To what extent was the division of Europe produced by the Marshall
Plan?
3. ‘The USA never had a policy of Containment except for public
consumption.’ Discuss.
Section B
4. Was propaganda a more important weapon than covert operations
under the Eisenhower administrations?
5. To what extent was the Sino–Soviet split produced by rivalry over
regional influence in Asia?
6. ‘The Soviet Union expected much but got very little from détente.’
Discuss.
Section C
7. To what extent did the Soviet Union gain from the Korean War?
8. What were the differences between Stalin’s and Khrushchev’s policies
towards eastern Europe?
9. ‘The Cold War in Latin America began with the Cuban Revolution.’
Discuss.
10. In what ways, if any, did the Arab–Israeli dispute keep the Cold War
out of the Middle East in the 1950s?
11. To what extent were the problems in Angola after 1961 produced by
international interference?
12. Why and with what consequences did the USA decide to send combat
ground forces to Vietnam in 1965?
Section D
13. ‘The Soviet Union collapsed because of the collapse of Marxist
ideology.’ Discuss.
14. To what extent was the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 the result of US
desires to win the War on Terror?
15. To what extent has China become a military threat in the twenty-first
century?
159
Notes
160
Notes
Notes
161
Notes
162

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World history since 1945

(Formerly known as World history since 1917)

University of London International Programmes

Published by: University of London

Chapter 9: The Cold War in Asia – Korea............................................................... 59

The problems with the Soviet economy....................................................................... 121

Studying world history since 1945

Aims of the course

Using this subject guide

General advice on reading for this course

Online study resources

Making use of the Online Library

will be required to register and use an Athens login:

Notes for essay writing

Answering the question

• In exam conditions you should still seek to structure what you

• able to provide a clear introduction to the main elements under every

Chapter 2: Post-war planning and

The Roosevelt administration was pledged to postpone firm post-war

British and Soviet post-war planning

The Yalta conference, 4–11 February 1945

From Yalta to Potsdam, February to July 1945

Growing conflict, September 1945 to March 1946: from

December Moscow Council of Foreign Ministers

Etheridge report concludes that to concede a Soviet sphere of

January Truman tells Byrnes he is tired of babying the Soviets

Stalin’s speech calling for a five-year plan to prepare for the

March Churchill’s iron curtain speech at Fulton, Missouri

A reminder of your learning outcomes

Sample examination questions

Chapter 3: The German question and the

allowed to re-occur. Consequently, contradictions developed between the

Dividing Germany in 1946

Byrnes call for a Four Power Treaty guaranteeing the

General Clay suspends reparations deliveries from the Western

Britain becomes more favourable to a permanent division of

Summer Soviets express a preference for uniting Germany

Byrnes makes Stuttgart speech arguing that zonal boundaries

Byrnes completely abandons the idea of a united Germany,

Moscow Council begins, and for Marshall the Potsdam

Council of Foreign Ministers meets in London and the US

Soviets walk out of the Kommandatura when it became clear a

Stalin offers to lift the ‘Berlin blockade’ if a Council of Foreign

Stalin offers to lift the blockade if the establishment of a West

Berlin blockade is lifted

September The West German state is created

The Marshall Plan and Europe’s economic difficulties, 1947

The origins of NATO, 1948

London Council of Foreign Ministers breaks up with no dates

1948 February Soviet Union begins jamming Voice of America broadcasts

Washington talks on US support for Western Europe in the

Washington talks adjourned with tentative agreement on

A reminder of your learning outcomes

Sample examination questions

Chapter 4: The onset of the Cold War:

Origins of the ‘containment’ policy

Developments and problems in 1948 – the end of

May Israel established

Eisenhower and Solarium – the end of rollback?

A reminder of your learning outcomes

Sample examination questions

Chapter 5: Intelligence, propaganda and

Different forms of intelligence