Академический Документы
Профессиональный Документы
Культура Документы
DEFENCE NOTES
Background
Anti-ship missiles have come to play a pivotal role in deciding the outcome of a naval battle. Let’s
take a look at the past. In 1971 war, Pakistan Navy suffered due to SS-N-2 Styx anti-ship missiles.
The minesweeper PNS (Pakistan Naval Ship) Muhafiz and PNS Khyber were sunk by Styx anti-ship
missiles fired from Missile Boats of Indian Navy.
In 1967, the Egyptian Navy used these Styx missiles to sink the Israeli destroyer Eliat.
In the Falklands War in 1982, Argentinean Exocet missiles hit three British ships and in Iran-Iraq
war throughout the mid-1980s, Iraqi missiles sank at least five Iranian vessels. In May 1987, two
AM-39 Exocets fired from an Iraqi Mirage severely damaged the USS Stark. All these conflicts
show the awesome prowess of the modern anti-ship missiles, especially the air-launched ones. The
unequivocal demonstration of the Exocet’s effectiveness made it a ubiquitous weapon system. Thus,
it has been proved time and again that anti-ship missile is a potent maritime strike weapon. Due to
the long-range advantage of the anti-ship missiles, they shall be more instrumental in sinking the
ships than torpedoes in a naval war.
Club missiles, Kh-35 Uran, Sea Eagle and P-20 are the main anti-ship missiles (AShMs) of Indian
Navy.
AM-39 and SM-39 Exocets, R/UGM-84 Harpoons, HY-1s and C-802s are the anti-ship missiles of
Pakistan Navy.
Warships
Before discussing the anti-ship missiles, lets first discuss their target, the ship. In the Navies of the
world, there are many types of warships like aircraft carriers, helicopter carriers, battleships,
cruisers, destroyers, frigates, corvettes and missile boats. Aircraft carriers are the largest surface
vessels that can accommodate up to 80-90 aircraft. Helicopter carrier is smaller than aircraft
carrier. Battleship is a category that was at its peak in WW2. Large battleships like the Iowa class
of USN, German Bismarck and Japanese Yamato had 16, 15 and 18-inch guns respectively. They are
now obsolete, although USN Iowa class battleships are occasionally used to support shore landings
of US Marine Corps. Cruiser is a class of traditional warship, second in size only to battleships; so
called because they were built for high speed and long “cruising” distances.
Destroyer is a warship smaller than a cruiser but bigger than a frigate, able to operate
independently or as an escort for larger naval vessels and convoys. Frigate is a warship usually
smaller than the destroyer, capable of independent operations (or with others) in countering
submarine, air and surface threats. Corvettes and missile boats are other smaller vessels.
1 of 6 06/24/2020 09:04 PM
Defence Notes http://www.defencejournal.com/2003/feb/anti-sh...
2 of 6 06/24/2020 09:04 PM
Defence Notes http://www.defencejournal.com/2003/feb/anti-sh...
frigates with a self-defence missile system to efficiently handle the sea skimming missiles. These
frigates must have a layered defence against the AShMs. The first priority should be to destroy all
the fighters that carry these missiles before they can reach the launch range of their anti-ship
missiles. This necessitates dedicated maritime surveillance aircraft like Atlantic and P-3C Orion to
inform friendly fighters and ships of any enemy activity in time. The fighters always form the
outermost defensive layer of naval ships. Fighters will be needed to combat the Indian maritime
strike Jaguars that are equipped with Sea Eagle AShMs.
The next layer of defence is the anti-aircraft missile and gun systems on the ships. But anti-aircraft
defences may not play a major role keeping in view the long ranges of modern anti-ship missiles,
which are nowadays powered by small jet engines giving them a longer range than air defence
missiles fitted on the ships. As a result, the ship will have to fight the missile that is coming at
wave-top level.
Radar receivers or ESM (Electronic Support Measures) system can warn a ship of the incoming
anti-ship missile when that missile gets a lock on that ship. Kh-35 locks on its target at a distance of
15-20kms. Thus the ship will be warned when the missile is just 15kms away. In this short time all
self-defence systems should be tried. It will be better to try more than one countermeasure at the
same time like firing decoys and anti-missile missile at the same time. The last defence against a
missile that is almost a kilometre away is the CIWS along with full decoy firing and manoeuvring
the ship at the same time. Some AShMs switch on their terminal guidance radar close to the target
at about 10km to give less warning to the ship and leave little time for defences. To get ample
warning of AShMs, the best solution is some form of AEW (Airborne Early Warning) system.
Before locking on the target ship, most anti-ship missiles fly at cruising altitudes and it is easy to
intercept them at that height. After radar or seeker lock, the missiles descend to very low-level,
which makes the detection and defence very difficult. If an AEW aircraft gives warning about the
launch of AshM, which is flying at low-level even before getting a radar-lock, then we know that
every anti-ship missile with active radar seeker is programmed to go to some height to get a
radar-lock of the target. This takes place usually at 15-20 km from target. This is the point to
intercept them with a quick-reaction SAM system. Here the AEW platform shall inform the ship
defences about the range, bearing and heading of the incoming missile with a real-time data link
and when the AshM pulls up for radar lock, it will become visible on the radar screen of the ship
and thus intercepted quickly.
The ship’s electronic system should be able to discriminate between the radar lock of a fighter jet
and that of an anti-ship missile. An anti-ship missile can be launched from aircraft, another ship or
submarine. All of these three launch platforms usually fire the missile after detecting and locking
on the enemy ship. Thus the target ship is warned of the impending disaster. All information about
the range and bearing of the target ship is transferred to the missile computer and then missile is
fired. On this occasion the single blip on the radar screen of the ship or AEW platform will change
to double blips indicating the missile launch.
After this launch, the ship should follow a course at about 90 degrees to the original direction and
cruise on its maximum speed because the AShM searches the target in the area provided by the
radar of its launching platform. This will make it difficult for the terminal radar seeker of the AshM
to detect and hence lock on the ship. This method can be effective if the AshM receives no
mid-course updates from its launch platform, which is the usual method. But if some AShM gets
updates, then even after the missile launch, it must be tried to shoot down that fighter or at least
force him to bug out to break its radar lock of the ship. But if they get a radar-lock from the missile,
then the ship and its staff should be ready for the final battle.
But here the slow speed of the ships may not allow them to go too far to escape the radar seeker of
AShM. We assume that an AShM gets radar lock at a distance of 10km from its target ship. If the
ship is cruising at 35knots (64.85km/h) and missile at 600km/h, then the missile will take less than
a minute to reach the ship and the ship will have gone away only 1km. The above technique can be
more useful for fast attack boats against anti-ship cruise missiles and totally useless against
supersonic rocket-powered AShMs.
The Sea Eagle is very efficient in the job of searching the ship in the ‘Ambit’ mode and its radar
scans more area as it nears the target location in a way that the area of the radar coverage
increases but centre of the area under scan remains the same as supplied by launch aircraft.
All above discussion is about active-radar guided AshMs. This is not the only seeker for anti-ship
missiles. These also have IR (Infra Red) and IIR (Imaging Infra Red) seekers, which are passive
seekers and give no warning to the target ship. The ship will have to look for these sea-skimming
threats.
The missile-based terminal defence system should be able to destroy both the radar-guided and
IR-guided AShMs like the RIM-116 RAM (Rolling Airframe Missile). It has a dual mode seeker in
which IR-seeker is coupled to two RF antennas. The RF receiver locks on to the active radar seeker
of the AShM. When sufficient IR signal is received, guidance control is shifted to IR-seeker, which
homes in on the incoming missile’s heat emissions. During tests RAM successfully intercepted
MM40 Exocet. Once launched, the RAM needs no support from the mother ship, thus enabling
multiple-target engagements. Its maximum range is 10km and a manoeuvring capability of 20g.
3 of 6 06/24/2020 09:04 PM
Defence Notes http://www.defencejournal.com/2003/feb/anti-sh...
4 of 6 06/24/2020 09:04 PM
Defence Notes http://www.defencejournal.com/2003/feb/anti-sh...
0.6. NSM has the ability to navigate through complex coastal topography and thus also attack land
targets.
Another very important feature of anti-ship missiles is their programming and “Intelligence”. The
chaff, which is used by ship to present false target to the incoming missile, is usually tailored for a
specific frequency range before launching. If the missile is intelligent, then it can be programmed
to jump to another frequency when it detects another target (in fact chaff) after its first lock on the
target ship. This will render chaff useless and missile shall re-lock its true target. This feature is
available with missiles having frequency-agile radar seekers like in the Swedish Saab RBS-15 Mk3.
RBS-15 Mk3 is an intelligent and quite capable AShM having a flight range of 200+ km. It features
GPS mid-course navigation updates, frequency-agile radar seeker, a 200kg warhead, versatile
trajectory and extremely low-level sea-skimming flight with sea-state adaptation. It can support a
large number of waypoints and has sophisticated target discrimination and selection system. The
Missile Engagement Planning System of RBS-15 allows several missiles to attack the ship from
different directions with coordinated time of arrival at the target.
The newer missiles also do not need to maintain a continuous lock-on of the target as was needed
with older missiles. The missile needs to operate its radar seeker only at intervals to update the
target position. This is logical because the ship can be considered stationary when compared to the
speed of an AShM. This is a great jump in missile improvement, since the jamming task shall be
more difficult now.
Another ECCM (Electronic Counter Counter Measure) feature is the use of LPI (Low Probability of
Intercept) radar seekers in anti-ship missiles. LPI technology combines frequency-agility and power
management in a way that its emissions are taken as background noise and ESM system of ship is
deceived. Another good option is the use of Laser Range Finders and Laser Target Illuminators,
which is difficult to detect (due to lack of laser warning receivers) and counter by the ship.
Chaff rockets are fired after the missile gets its radar lock of the ship. An intelligent missile can be
programmed to reject the second radar echo near to the first one and continue attack on the first
one. Alternatively, typical RCS ranges of different ships (Carrier, cruiser, destroyer, frigate, corvette
etc) can be stored in the missile’s computer. During attack the RCS of a known ship type should be
compared with one the radar is seeing, thus rejecting the chaff (which usually creates a much
larger RCS).
Almost all of the new generation anti-ship missiles have the capability to attack land targets. If an
AShM is of long range, it now has the facility of mid-course updates.
PAF and PN should also acquire such a long-range intelligent AShM. It should feature
frequency-agile radar seeker, versatile trajectories, capability to attack land targets, and possibly
stealth features.
Strike against the Carrier
It would be really a feat in the history of maritime warfare if the PAF succeeds in sinking or
seriously damaging the Indian aircraft carrier INS Viraat and a possible mission should be planned
for it. But this mission against the carrier is almost impossible without anti-radar and BVR air-to-air
missiles, because the sequence of attack may look like the following.
For this we assume that PAF has acquired the French Rafale fighters. It is also an advantage that
fleet defenders of Viraat, i.e., Sea Harriers are not equipped with BVR AAMs but on SOS call, the
IAF may come to help.
First, with BVR AAMs, a formation of two Rafales shall shoot down most of the airborne fleet
defenders patrolling at about 150-100km from the carrier and then patrol at the same range at
high-altitude to deal with more scrambles from the carrier or any interception effort of IAF. A
second formation of two Rafales, shall shoot down the defending fighters at a range of 100-50km
from the carrier, mostly the newly launched and then launch at least six powered decoys towards
the carrier to simulate the fighters. The decoys shall cause a reduction in the ship’s stockpile of
SAMs. A third formation of two Rafales, shall launch eight ARMs (Anti-Radar Missiles) against
various surveillance and engagement radars to disable the air defences of the carrier and its
escorting destroyers. The ARMs should be launched seconds after the decoys. Thus the ARMs will
be able to destroy radars before the SAM launchers and CIWS guns are re-loaded.
At the time of ARM attack, the four Mirages in the fourth formation shall launch their four Exocet
missiles at a range of not less than 50km. The distance between the third and fourth formations
may be kept up to 5km but the Mirages should fire their Exocets at the time of Rafales launch of
anti-radar missiles, because the Mirages will be at a more distance from carrier battle group than
Rafales and AShMs shall reach their targets seconds after the ARM strike. Rafales of third
formation should return from the attack sequence at a range of 40km from the carrier and also the
Mirages of fourth formation at a range of almost 40km. Rafales with their more sophisticated EW
suite can defend themselves against any long-range SAMs fired against them.
A fifth formation of F-16s or F-7s should be kept ready to escort the returning strike package, if the
Indian fighters are pursuing them. After the Indian acquisition of carrier Admiral Groshkov, the
battle shall become tougher if the Mig-29Ks are deployed aboard the carrier.
This attack should be supplemented by two Agosta-90B submarines firing a mix of two sea
skimming SM-39 Exocets and two diving Block1A UGM-84 Harpoons, thus complicating the job of
missile defence. The submarine attack should be launched simultaneously with Mirages attack,
5 of 6 06/24/2020 09:04 PM
Defence Notes http://www.defencejournal.com/2003/feb/anti-sh...
thus saturating the ship defences. Thus this attack would involve four AM-39s, two SM-39s and two
Harpoons, sufficient to sink the INS Viraat. Any anti-submarine effort by ASW (Anti-Submarine
Warfare) Sea Kings of INS Viraat should be foiled by the attack formations because every fighter
will be equipped with air-to-air missiles and guns. The Agosta subs will also face the threat of IN
subs defending the carrier battle group.
All AShMs should be carefully targeted against the carrier because in the terminal phase, they shall
lock on any ship that their radar seeker detects. In this regard, the direction from which the missile
is launched becomes important. The direction should be chosen such that when the missile
switches its radar, it should see the carrier. But if the facility of programmable waypoints is there in
the missile, then a bit complex path can be followed. The location of escorting ships should be
known before the strike, updated to the last minute before the strike package takes off.
References
1Air Power in the Nuclear Age, by M.J.Arimtage and R.A.Mason.
2Asian Defence Journal, November 1997.
3Jane’s Strategic Weapons, 2001-2002.
4Dictionary of Military Science, published by Facts on File Inc.
5Military Technology, Issue 6, 1997.
6World Aircraft Information Files, File 300.3
7Fire Power, Issue 5, 1990.
8Asian Military Review, January 2001.
6 of 6 06/24/2020 09:04 PM