Vent Dispersion Study for Qatar CNG Stations

PROJECT/CONTRACT NO: 4091/GC18104500
CONTRACT TITLE:
EPIC FOR CNG STATIONS IN RLIC and MIC
DOCUMENT TITLE:
VENT DISPERSION AND RADIATION STUDY
CONTRACTOR: ENGINEERING CONSULTANT: SUB-CONSULTANT:
P.O.BOX 12714, BROOQ BUILDING BLACK CAT CONSULTING &

Arcadis Consulting
3rd Floor, Bin Mahmoud, DOHA, ENGINEERING SERVICES W.L.L.
QATAR Middle East Ltd.
Tel: +974-4428-0333 (Board) Consultant Reg.#: 3911
Fax: +974-4442-9899 Office Reg. #: M/223 - CR#: 59555 P.O. Box 1854
Website: www.blackcat.com.qa Tel.: (+974) 44280374 (Board) Doha – Qatar
Fax: (+974) 44280303 Tel: +974 4424 5000
Email: docc-eng@bcces.com.qa Fax: +974 4424 5001
Address: P.O.Box 206142 Doha, Qatar Website: www.arcadis.com
Website: www.bcces.com.qa
26/05/2019 1 Issued For Approval MS NAK/FFK BGS/MS

01/04/2019 0 Issued For Comments MS MBP/FFK BGS/MS
Date Rev Description Prepared Checked Approved Appd. Q.P.
Document No. 4091-MGDTY-3-17-0003 Page: 1 of 38

Qatar Petroleum
EPIC for CNG Stations in RLIC and
MIC
VENT DISPERSION AND

RADIATION STUDY
Prepared for: Black Cat Consulting & Engineering
Services W.L.L.
P.O. Box 206142
Doha – Qatar
Prepared by: Arcadis Consulting Middle East Ltd.

P.O. Box 1854
Doha – Qatar
Arcadis Report No: BLCK-10029664-R03
Revision: 1
Date: 23 May 2019
DOC. NO.: 4091-MGDTY-3-17-0003 Rev. 1 Page 2 of 38

Qatar Petroleum
EPIC for CNG Stations in RLIC and MIC
Report Approval and Revision Record

Qatar Petroleum
Project
Document Title Vent Dispersion and Radiation Study
Client Black Cat Consulting & Engineering Services W.L.L.
Document Number BLCK-10029664-R03
Rev Date Issue Prepared by Reviewed by Approved by
Issued for Manish Manish

0 31 Mar. 2019 Lisa Meline
Review Saroha Saroha
Issued for Manish Manish

1 23 May 2019 Lisa Meline
Approval Saroha Saroha
23 May 2019
Arcadis Report Number: BLCK-10029664-R03
Revision: 1 Page 2 of 37
Qatar Petroleum
Table of Contents
Report Approval and Revision Record ....................................................................... 2
Table of Contents ...................................................................................................... 3
Definitions ................................................................................................................. 5
Executive Summary ................................................................................................. 6

Conclusions ............................................................................................................... 6
Recommendations..................................................................................................... 6
1.0 General ........................................................................................................... 7

1.1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 7
1.2 Background.................................................................................................... 7
1.3 PROPOSED FACILITIES............................................................................... 7
1.4 Project Objectives ........................................................................................ 11
1.5 Document Objective ..................................................................................... 11
2.0 Methodology Overview ............................................................................... 12
3.0 Hazard Consequence Modelling ................................................................ 13

3.1 Hazard Identification Process....................................................................... 13
3.2 Scope of Work ............................................................................................. 13
3.3 Major Assumptions ...................................................................................... 13
3.4 Impact Criteria ............................................................................................. 16
3.5 Consequence Model .................................................................................... 16
4.0 HCM Results and Analysis ......................................................................... 18

4.1 Results......................................................................................................... 18
4.2 Conclusions ................................................................................................. 19
5.0 Recommendations ...................................................................................... 22

5.1 Recommendations ....................................................................................... 22
6.0 References ................................................................................................... 23
Appendix A HCM Graphs ....................................................................................... 24
Appendix B Radiation Contours ........................................................................... 31
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List of Tables
Table 3-1 – Gas Composition.............................................................................................. 14
Table 3-2 – Parameters at the Vent Tip............................................................................... 15
Table 3-3 – Weather Conditions .......................................................................................... 15
Table 3-4 – Thermal Radiation Harm Criteria ...................................................................... 16
Table 4-1 – Consequence Modelling Results ...................................................................... 18
Table 4-2 – Consequence Results Analysis for RLIC CNG Refueling Station ..................... 19
Table 4-3 – Consequence Results Analysis for MIC CNG Refueling Station ....................... 20
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Definitions
Use of Language
Will Is used normally for an action by QP
Is used where alternatives are equally
May
acceptable
Should Is used where a provision is preferred
Shall Is used where a provision is mandatory
Is used only where a provision is a statutory
Must
requirement
Abbreviations
American Conference of Governmental
ACGIH
Industrial Hygienists
API American Petroleum Institute
CNG Compressed Natural Gas
DNV Det Norske Veritas
Engineering Procurement Installation
EPIC
Construction
H2S Hydrogen Sulphide
HCM Hazardous Consequence Modelling
HSE Health Safety Environment
LFL Lower Flammability Limit
MIC Mesaieed Industrial City
National Institute for Occupational Safety and
NIOSH
Health
OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration
ppm Parts per Million
QP Qatar Petroleum
RLIC Ras Laffan Industrial City
SOW Scope of Work
TLV Threshold Limit Value
VCE Vapor Cloud Ignition
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Executive Summary
Qatar Petroleum has awarded the contract GC18104500, EPIC for CNG Stations in
RLIC and MIC, to Black Cat Engineering & Construction W.L.L (BCEC), which has in-
turn subcontracted the detailed engineering services for the project to Black Cat
Consulting and Engineering Services W.L.L. (BCCES).
BCCES has awarded the safety studies for the Project to Arcadis Consulting Middle
East Ltd. This report presents the Vent Dispersion and Radiation Study conducted for
the cold vents proposed at CNG Refueling Stations at RLIC and MIC.
Conclusions
1. During depressurisation, once released, the flammable gas plume is expected to
move upwards. The plume is not envisaged to sink below the vent tip height.
2. HCM results, as per Results
3. Table 4-1, indicate that 20%LFL or higher concentration of flammable gases will
not disperse to 2m effect height for any of the cold vent depressurisation cases at
the Refueling Stations.
4. No potential source of ignition is identified adjacent to the vents at 4m above grade
level. Hence, 4m vent height from the grade level is deemed to meet the safety
criteria for flammable gas dispersion as per QP Philosophy for HSE Risk
Management Ref. QP-PHL-S-100 Rev 1.
5. For a jet fire at a vent tip, the thermal effect of 1.58 kW/m2 can reach up to 16m.
The HCM results show that applicable Radiation Limit Criteria can be met by
orienting the vent release towards the Plant East.
6. Accidental ignition of vented gases during casing depressurisation is highly unlikely
as there is no potential source of ignition in the flammable gas plume zone depicted
by flammable gas dispersion results. The vent stack is grounded to prevent static
charge build-up. Further, ignition due to lightening is unlikely as maintenance
operations are avoided during adverse weather conditions.
Recommendations
Based on the HCM Results and Analysis, Section 4.0, it is recommended that:
1. Vents at the CNG Refueling Stations at RLIC and MIC should be oriented towards
Plant East direction.
2. The Relief Vents on Compressors and Operational Vents on Dispensers shall be
designed and configured as per Shell DEP for CNG Vehicle Fuelling Installations
(30.06.10.31-Gen).
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1.0 General
1.1 Introduction
Qatar Petroleum has awarded the contract GC18104500, EPIC for CNG Stations in
RLIC and MIC, to Black Cat Engineering & Construction W.L.L (BCEC), which has in-
turn subcontracted the detailed engineering services for the project to Black Cat
Consulting and Engineering Services W.L.L. (BCCES).
1.2 Background
The project is raised for developing Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) as an alternate
fuel especially in public transportation and fleet applications in the State of Qatar.
State of Qatar intends to implement CNG as fuel in transportation sector by 2021.
Qatar Petroleum is leading the initiative by implementing CNG facilities to meet fuel
demand of the buses required for FIFA 2022 as short-term strategy. As long-term
strategy, the project will be implemented in future based on ‘’Mother-Daughter’’
concept to cater for the CNG fuel requirement of public and private sector vehicles.
Prior to commencing on the implementation of CNG facilities for FIFA event, Qatar
Petroleum intends to build two CNG stations on fast track basis for the purpose of
technology demonstration by specialized CNG vendor packages.
1.3 PROPOSED FACILITIES

1.3.1 Overview
It is proposed to provide two (2) CNG refueling facilities, one located at Ras Laffan
industrial City (RLIC) and the other one at Mesaieed industrial City (MIC) based on
fast-fill dispensing concept.
1. Gas Supply to CNG station RLIC, shall be from Station A4
2. Gas Supply to CNG station MIC, shall be from Station S.
More details of proposed facilities are provided in the following sections:
1.3.2 Station A4 Modifications
Below are the proposed facilities/modifications at Station A4:
1. One (1) 12” Tie in for Sweet gas supply on existing 24” HP header at Station A4
2. Two (2) Gas Filters, 1 duty / 1 standby configuration
3. One (1) Pressure Reducing and monitoring skid (PRMS) comprising of:
a. Two pressure reduction trains each rated for 6,300Sm3/hr
b. Provision to install third pressure reduction train (also rated for
6,300Sm3/hr)
c. Each pressure reduction train is consisting of:
i. One (1) self-sensing slam shut valve
ii. Three (3) Pressure transmitters
iii. Two (2) self-actuated Pressure control Regulators (One Monitor
PCV and One Active PCV per train)
iv. Creep Relief Valve
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v. Flow switch installed downstream of creep relief valve

vi. Piping and isolation valves.
4. Custody Metering skid, consisting of Ultrasonic flow meters, 2nos configured in “Z”
configuration complete with supporting skid, piping, instrumentation, junction
boxes, cabling as identified in the minimum requirements shown on the project
P&IDs. Custody system / skid comprises of:
a. Ultrasonic Meters (2nos) in Z-configuration
b. One (1) Flow metering Panel consisting of 2nos Flow computers in a
redundant configuration, where on flow computer serves both meter runs
c. Supervisory Computer (SVC) and printer
d. Gas Chromatograph, (for metering, including CO2 and H2S measurement)
e. Separate H2S Gas Analyser.
5. One (1) Odorization Package comprising of one odorant storage vessel and two
(2) odorant injection pumps {One (1) working + One (1) Standby}
6. Provisions for mobile pigging facilities
7. One (1) battery limit Emergency Shutdown Valve (Fail Closed)
8. New tie-in for vent header and purge gas connection on existing 16" sweet flare
header
9. New tie-in for Instrument air for proposed facilities
10. One (1) Safety Shower situated near odorant package
11. F&G detectors for new facilities
12. Existing SCADA/ ESD/F&G System modifications to cover the new facilities
13. Tie-ins to existing UPS / LV distribution boards for new facilities.
1.3.3 Station S Modifications
1. Two (2) Tie-ins for gas supply from existing 36" gas header (downstream of gas
filters SS026A/B) and to 30" gas header (downstream gas metering facility) inside
Station S
2. One (1) Pressure Reducing and monitoring skid (PRMS) comprising of:
a. Two pressure reduction trains each rated for 6,300Sm3/hr
b. Provision to install third pressure reduction train (Also rated for 6,300Sm3/hr)
c. Each pressure reduction train is consisting of
i. One (1) self-sensing slam shut valve
ii. Three (3) Pressure transmitters
iii. Two (2) self-actuated Pressure control Regulators. (One Monitor PCV
and One Active PCV per train)
iv. Creep Relief Valve
v. Flow switch installed downstream of creep relief valve
vi. Piping and isolation valves.
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3. Custody Metering skid, consisting of Ultrasonic flow meters, 2nos configured in “Z”
configuration complete with supporting skid, piping, instrumentation, junction
boxes, cabling as identified in the minimum requirements shown on the project
P&IDs. Custody system/skid comprises of:
a. Ultrasonic Meters (2nos) in Z-configuration
b. One (1) Flow metering Panel consisting of 2nos Flow computers in a redundant
configuration, where on flow computer serves both meter runs
c. Supervisory Computer (SVC) and printer
d. Gas Chromatograph (for metering, including CO2 and H2S measurement)
e. Separate H2S Gas Analyser.
4. One (1) Odorization Package comprising of one odorant storage vessel and two
(2) odorant injection pumps {One (1) working + One (1) Standby}
5. Provisions for mobile pigging facilities
6. One (1) battery limit Emergency Shutdown Valve (Fail Closed)
7. New tie-in for vent header and purge gas connection on existing 20" sour flare
header
8. New tie-in for Instrument air for proposed facilities
9. One (1) Safety Shower situated near odorant package
10. F&G detectors for new facilities
11. Existing SCADA/ESD/F&G System modifications to cover the new facilities
12. Tie-ins to existing UPS / LV distribution boards for new facilities.
1.3.4 Gas Supply Pipelines
The following are the proposed gas supply pipelines to the proposed CNG stations:
1. 8" buried and bunded gas supply pipeline (approximate length 7km) from Station
A4 to RLIC CNG station including but not limited to cathodic protection, leak
detection system, and redundant fiber optic cables connectivity. In Sabkha region,
the pipeline shall be installed above grade and bunded, in accordance with the
requirements of Sabkha regions
2. 8" buried and bunded gas supply pipeline (approximate length 6.5 km) from Station
S to MIC CNG station including but not limited to cathodic protection, leak detection
system and redundant fiber optic cables connectivity. In Sabkha region, the
pipeline shall be installed above grade and bunded, in accordance with
requirements of Sabkha regions.
1.3.5 CNG Stations at RLIC and MIC
Each CNG station consists of the following major items:
Station Gas Receiving Facilities
1. Battery limit emergency shutdown valve (Fail Closed)
2. Provision for mobile pigging facilities
3. All required pipeline isolation valves and instrumentation.
CNG Compressor Package
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1. One (1) Non-regenerative Gas Dryer Package. Rated 6,600Sm3/hr (1 duty/1

standby Configuration)
2. Three (3) CNG Compressors, each rated 2000Sm3/hr, with discharge pressure of
250barg. Each with its own standalone Soft starter/PLC (SIL2 rated) control panel
3. One Priority Panel (common to all compressors), along with HP/MP/LP storage
banks (Each Bank is designed in accordance with ASME VIII (U stamped) and
having water volume of 1300ltr each). Total 3,900ltr is the capacity of the storage
bank
4. One station Master Controller PLC for coordinating the start/stop of compressors
5. Fire wall for Compressor package compound.
Fast Fill Dispensing Area
1. Four (4) dual hose type CNG dispensers (both hoses suitable for-NGV 1-Type
nozzle), including flow meter metrology certified with provision for connection of
POS
2. Supervisory flow computer to collate all Dispenser information
3. Branded Canopy over the dispensing area.
Electrical Substation and Local Equipment Room Building (S/S LER)
This building houses the facility’s power distribution, control systems, telecom, and
other related systems. The following are the rooms part of the building:
1. Transformer Room (11kV/415V)
2. Medium Voltage Room (Ring Main Unit room)
3. LV Room
4. Instrument /Telecom Room
5. Store Room.
Office and Services Building (OSB)
This building is utilized for facility personnel office and supervisor along with supporting
services rooms/and facilities as follows:
1. Public Toilets
2. Staff Toilets
3. Lobby, and waiting area
4. Locker Room, Pantry
5. Electrical Room
6. TER Room
7. Supervisor Room
8. Prayer/Ablution Room (applicable in RLIC only).
Provisions for Future Facilities
1. Future space shall be provided on the plot for Three (3) CNG compressor packages
including their Priority panel, Storage cylinders, and such accessories.
2. Future space for Four (4) Dual hose dispensers in the filling area.
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Utilities
1. Instrument air package
2. LER-Substation Building
3. Office Services Building
4. Potable water system network
5. Drains/sewage network for Buildings
6. Respective tie-ins to Potable water/Sewage networks (applicable in RLIC only).
1.4 Project Objectives

The project objective is to build two (2) new CNG Refueling Stations, one located at
Ras Laffan Industrial City (RLIC) and other one at Mesaieed Industrial City (MIC)
based on fast-fill dispensing concept. Gas to RLIC CNG station will be supplied by new
8” pipeline from Station A4, and gas to MIC CNG station will be supplied by new 8”
pipeline from Station S.
1.5 Document Objective

The primary objectives of the Vent Dispersion and Radiation Study are to:
o Identify and assess the fire and toxic gas hazards at the CNG Refueling
Stations due to cold venting; and
o Ensure that the cold vent location and height eliminate the potential for
escalation as far as reasonably practicable.
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2.0 Methodology Overview

In summary, the Vent Dispersion and Radiation study involves the following key steps:
o Identification of the fire and toxic hazards due to flammable/toxic gas venting
i.e. jet fire, flash fire, and H2S dispersion (H2S dispersion is not applicable based
on the CNG composition)
o Estimation of the process parameters and inventory for the gas release from
the vent during depressurisation/PRV release
o Defining the location and height of the vents along with angle of release
o Performing consequence modelling using DNV PHAST 8.0 Software for the fire
and flammable gas hazards identified
o Reviewing the impact of fire and flammable gas events on adjacent facilities
o Remodelling the consequence scenarios for sensitivity analysis
o Reviewing the existing protection measures and identifying the
recommendations to reduce the impact due to gas release through the vents.
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3.0 Hazard Consequence Modelling

3.1 Hazard Identification Process
During the Project documents review, the release of CNG through cold vents at the
Refueling Stations was identified as a potential source of flammable hazard. The
maximum concentration of H2S in the CNG stream is 3ppm for a normal operating case
and 9ppm for a process upset case. Hence, H2S exposure is not identified as a major
hazard.
3.2 Scope of Work

The scope of the Vent Dispersion and Radiation Study includes various controlled
depressurization and fire case PRV release scenarios. These cases are noted below
and are applicable to both the CNG Refueling Stations at RLIC and MIC.
1. Piping Section Vent – Uncontrolled/controlled depressurisation for
maintenance (Note 1);
2. CNG Compressor Vents – PRV;
3. Dryer Package Vent – Fire-case PRV;
4. Priority Panel – Fire-case PRV;
5. Storage Banks – Fire-case PRV; and
6. Storage Banks – Controlled depressurisation for maintenance.
Note 1: 8” pipeline from Source Station (GDS) to CNG Refueling Station will be
depressurised to flare at the GDS and not to atmosphere at the Refueling Station.
The following vents are excluded from the study scope:
o Pipeline Main Vent to Flare at Station A4 and Station S; and
o Operational Vents on CNG Dispensers (Note 2).
Note 2: Operational vent on a CNG Dispenser will release approximately 0.4 litre of
CNG after every refuelling cycle. This quantity is less than the minimum volume limit
(100 litre) set in DNV Phast for dispersion calculations.
3.3 Major Assumptions

This section presents the main assumptions made during the development of the
study.
3.3.1 Stream Composition
The selected CNG compositions are presented in table below. AKG composition for
Rich Case was used during consequence modelling to represent a worst-case
scenario – higher mol weight and calorific value.
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Table 3-1 – Gas Composition
3.3.2 Release Direction

The release from the vent is modelled as a release directed upwards at an angle of 45
degrees from the horizontal.
3.3.3 Release Height
The vent tip at a height of 4m from the grade level is considered for dispersion/radiation
simulations.
3.3.4 Surface Roughness
Surface roughness of 1m, representing regular large obstacles coverage (suburb), is
used to represent the topography of and around the Refueling Stations.
3.3.5 Impact Height
The impact of a hazardous event is assessed at an effect height of 2m, representing
the height of a person or equipment and in compliance with Shell DEP for Design of
Vent systems.
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3.3.6 Depressurisation Parameter

The depressurisation parameters such as gas temperature and velocity at the vent tip
are briefed in Table 3-2, below. These parameters are referred from the
Depressurisation Study Report. Significant difference in the parameters at the manual
depressurisation valve/PRV and the vent tip is not envisaged because of the small
length of the vent piping.
Table 3-2 – Parameters at the Vent Tip
Dryer Priorit
Piping Compress
Vent Packag y Storage Bank
Section or Package
e Panel
Maintenance Relief Maintenanc
Type of Fire Fire Fire
(Uncontrolle (Blocked e
Venting Relief Relief Relief
d) Discharge) (Controlled)
Mass Flow
398.3 114 1,400 467 1,400 345*
(kg/hr)
Temperatur
e at Vent
23.11 23.67 5.51 -17.11 -17.11 -17.11
Stack
Outlet (oC)
Vent
Diameter 49.3 73.7 49.3 34 49 49
(mm)
Velocity 163.4 234.5
77.33 9.91 255.49 234.56
(m/s) 8 6
*Note – Mass flow rate for storage bank depressurisation for maintenance is calculated
by assuming controlled depressurisation by a trained operator at a rate of 5bar/min.
3.3.7 Weather Conditions and Meteorological Data
Consequence modelling is carried out for 2/F, 5/D, and 10/C weather categories:
o 2/F – a low wind speed (2m/s) associated with the stable atmospheric
conditions (Pasquill F), this represents typical worst-case dispersion conditions
during evening time;
o 5/D – a typical wind speed (5m/s) associated with the neutral stability conditions
(Pasquill D), typical of overcast days; and
o 10/C – a high wind speed (10m/s) associated with the slightly unstable
atmospheric conditions (Pasquill C), this represents typical worst-case thermal
impact condition.
The following atmospheric conditions in Table 2-3 are used for the consequence
analysis.
Table 3-3 – Weather Conditions
Description Value
Atmospheric Temperature (max. day average) 43oC
Relative Humidity 62%
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3.4 Impact Criteria

3.4.1 Flammable Gas Dispersion
For flammable gas dispersion, QP criteria [2] require that consequence distances are
estimated for the following:
o 100% LFL for Flammable Gas – 100% fatality
o 50% LFL for Flammable Gas – 1% fatality
o 20% LFL for Flammable Gas
3.4.2 Thermal Radiation
The impact criteria for thermal radiation (jet fire) are based on Shell DEP Criteria for
Design of Pressure Relief, Flare and Vent System [4]. As guided by the Specification,
solar radiation was not included in the thermal impact calculations. The consequence
distances for thermal radiation are estimated as per the table below.
Table 3-4 – Thermal Radiation Harm Criteria
Radiation Level
Impact Description
(kW/m2)
Public, continuous exposure (including start-up and shut-down
1.58
but excluding emergency and upset events)
3.15 At the property limit fence line
Short-term exposure to radiant heat intensity in areas (lasting
4.73 between 2 and 3 minutes) where there are large numbers of
people exposed or activities that cannot by stopped in a timely
manner (e.g., turnaround activities)
5.00 Maximum exposure at escape routes
12.5 to 22.1 Metal equipment
3.5 Consequence Model

User Defined Source Model in DNV PHAST 8.0 is used to model the consequence
impact of vent dispersion scenarios at the CNG Refueling Stations.
In accordance with the QP Guidelines, the consequence modelling parameters are
selected for:
o Meteorological Data
o Flammable End Points
o Incident Radiation End Points
o Topography – Surface Roughness Criteria
o Direction of Release
o Duration of Release
o Flammable Weighted Average Time.
The following consequence models are used in the Vent Dispersion Analysis:
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o Dispersion models used to determine the spread of the flammable gases

released from the vent
o Jet fire model to determine the heat flux levels.
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4.0 HCM Results and Analysis

4.1 Results
Table 4-1 – Consequence Modelling Results
Weather Impact Distance (m) at 2m Effect Height

S. No. Vent Case
Condition 20%LFL 1.58kW/m 3.15kW/m2 4.73kW/m2 5.00kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 Flame Length
2
At MIC CNG Refueling Station

Maintenance 2/F NR 9.3 NR NR NR NR 7.6
1. Piping Section (Uncontrolled 5/D NR 10.2 7.1 5.9 5.7 NR 5.9
Release) 10/C NR 10.7 8.6 7.5 7.4 4.9 5.3
2/F NR NR NR NR NR NR 5.6
2. Dryer Package Fire Relief 5/D NR 6.0 4.0 NR NR NR 4.3
10/C NR 6.5 5.1 4.0 3.8 NR 3.9
Relief 2/F NR 15.3 11.1 NR NR NR 10.8
Compressor
3. (Blocked 5/D NR 15.7 11.1 9.4 9.2 NR 8.4
Package
Discharge) 10/C NR 16.2 13.1 11.3 11.2 7.4 7.5
2/F NR 9.3 5.2 NR NR NR 7.2
4. Priority Panel Fire Relief 5/D NR 9.8 6.8 5.5 5.3 NR 5.6
10/C NR 10.5 8.5 7.4 7.3 4.8 5.0
2/F NR 15.4 11.2 NR NR NR 10.9
5. Storage Bank Fire Relief 5/D NR 15.8 11.3 9.5 9.3 NR 8.5
10/C NR 16.3 13.1 11.4 11.2 7.5 7.6
Maintenance 2/F NR 7.4 NR NR NR NR 5.9
6. Storage Bank (Controlled 5/D NR 7.8 5.3 3.8 3.1 NR 4.6
Release) 10/C NR 8.4 6.6 5.7 5.5 NR 4.1
NR – Not Reached
The consequence graphs are presented in Appendix A.
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4.2 Conclusions
Table 4-2 – Consequence Results Analysis for RLIC CNG Refueling Station
Conclusion (Criteria Met/Not Met)
Radiation Limit
S. Flammable
Vent Case Short-term Escape
No. Dispersion Public Limit Fence Equipment
Exposure Route
20%LFL 1.58kW/m2 3.15kW/m2 4.73kW/m2 5.00kW/m2 12.5kW/m2
Piping Practically Met* Met
1. Maintenance Met Met Met Met
Section (Note-3) (Note-4)
Dryer Not Applicable Met
2. Fire Relief Met Met Met Met
Package (Note-2) (Note-4)
Relief
Compressor Not Applicable Met
3. (Blocked Met Met Met Met
Discharge)
Priority Not Applicable Met
Panel (Note-2) (Note-4)
Storage Not Applicable Met Not Met
5. Fire Relief Met Met Met
Bank (Note-2) (Note-4) (Note-1 and 3)
Storage Met
6. Maintenance Met Met Met Met Met
Bank (Note-4)
*Practically Met: Radiation contour just reaches the public road, and impact only a very small section of it.
Note-1: Accidental ignition of released flammable gases from Storage Bank Vent during a PSV release scenario may impact the
adjacent compressor unit (only the nearest compressor). However, PSV pop-up is a fire case scenario, which implies that there is
already a jet fire in the area, which would impact both the Storage Bank and the Compressor. Hence, thermal criteria/radiation limit
may not be applied for fire relief vent releases.
Note-2: Criterium is not applicable for emergency or upset releases [4].
Note-3: Radiation Limit Criteria can be met by orienting the vent release towards the Plant East, refer Consequence Contours
Figure B-8.
Note-4: Emergency Gate is not impacted by the radiation contour.
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Table 4-3 – Consequence Results Analysis for MIC CNG Refueling Station
Conclusion (Criteria Met/Not Met)
Radiation Limit
S. Flammable
Vent Case Short-term Escape
No. Dispersion Public Limit Fence Equipment
Exposure Route
20%LFL 1.58kW/m2 3.15kW/m 2
4.73kW/m2 5.00kW/m2 12.5kW/m2
Piping Practically Met* Met
1. Maintenance Met Met Met Met
Section (Note-3) (Note-4)
Dryer Not Applicable Met
Relief
Compressor Not Applicable Met
3. (Blocked Met Met Met Met
Discharge)
Priority Not Applicable Met
Panel (Note-2) (Note-4)
Storage Not Applicable Not Met Met Not Met
5. Fire Relief Met Practically Met*
Bank (Note-2) (Note-3) (Note-4) (Note-1 and 3)
Storage Met
6. Maintenance Met Met Met Met Met
Bank (Note-4)
*Practically Met: Radiation contour just reaches the public road, and impact only a very small section of it.
Note-1: Accidental ignition of released flammable gases from Storage Bank Vent during a PSV release scenario may impact the
adjacent compressor unit (only the nearest compressor). However, PSV pop-up is a fire case scenario, which implies that there is
already a jet fire in the area, which would impact both the Storage Bank and the Compressor. Hence, thermal criteria/radiation limit
may not be applied for fire relief vent releases.
Note-2: Criterium is not applicable for emergency or upset releases [4].
Note-3: Radiation Limit Criteria can be met by orienting the vent release towards the Plant East. Refer Consequence Contours Figure
B-10.
Note-4: Emergency Gate is not impacted by the radiation contour.
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4.2.1 Flash Fire – Analysis

The gas release, if not immediately ignited will form a flammable gas cloud that is
dispersed by the initial momentum of the release, turbulence around obstructions, and
wind. Delayed ignition of the flammable gas in an unconfined or open area would result
in a flash fire of the dimension of the cloud dimension. The cloud is typically ignited on
its edge, remote from the release source. The duration of the flash fire is relatively
short, but it may stabilise as a continuing jet fire at the release source i.e. vent tip.
During depressurisation, once released, the flammable gas plume is expected to move
upwards. The plume is not envisaged to sink below the vent tip height. HCM results,
as per Results
Table 4-1 above, indicate that 20%LFL or higher concentration of flammable gases will
not disperse to 2m effect height for any of the cold vent depressurisation cases at the
Refueling Stations.
No potential source of ignition is identified adjacent to the vents at 4m above grade
level. Hence, 4m vent height from the grade level is deemed to meet the safety criteria
for flammable gas dispersion as per QP Philosophy for HSE Risk Management Ref.
QP-PHL-S-100 Rev 1.
4.2.2 Jet Fire – Analysis
High velocity release of the flammable gas from the vent during depressurisation, if
ignited, will result in a vertically angled jet fire at the vent tip. A resultant jet fire at a
vent tip, the thermal effect of 1.58 kW/m2 can reach up to 16m for relief from
Compressor Package and Storage Bank.
The HCM results show that applicable Radiation Limit Criteria can be met by orienting
the vent release towards the Plant East. Accidental ignition of vented gases during
casing depressurisation is highly unlikely as there is no potential source of ignition in
the flammable gas plume zone depicted by flammable gas dispersion results. The vent
stack is grounded to prevent static charge build-up. Further, ignition due to lightening
is unlikely as maintenance operations are avoided during adverse weather conditions.
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5.0 Recommendations
The primary objective of this study is to identify and assess the fire hazards at the CNG
Refueling Stations due to cold venting, and to ensure that the vent height and location
eliminate the potential for escalation as far as reasonably practicable.
5.1 Recommendations
Based on the HCM Results and Analysis, Section 4.0, it is recommended that:
1. Vents at the CNG Refueling Stations at RLIC and MIC should be oriented towards
Plant East direction.
2. The Relief Vents on Compressors and Operational Vents on Dispensers shall be
designed and configured as per Shell DEP for CNG Vehicle Fuelling Installations
(30.06.10.31-Gen).
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6.0 References
1. QP Guideline for QRA, Doc. No. QP-GDL-S-032, Rev 1;
2. QP Philosophy for HSE Risk Management Ref., Doc. No. QP-PHL-S-100 Rev 1;
3. QP Corporate Philosophy for Fire and Safety, Doc. No. QP-PHL-S-001 Rev. 2;
4. Shell DEP Specification for Design of Pressure Relief, Flare and Vent Systems
(Amendments/Supplements to API RP 520 Part II and API STD 521 Chapter 5),
Doc No. DEP 80.45,10.10-Gen;
5. Shell DEP Specification for CNG Vehicle Fuelling Installations, Doc. No. DEP
30.06.10.31-Gen;
6. Plot Plan for CNG Station at Ras Laffan, Doc. No. CNGRLS1-5-50-0002;
7. Plot Plan for CNG Station at MIC, Doc. No. CNGMS1-5-50-0002; and
8. Depressurisation Study Report for EPIC for CNG Stations in RLIC and MIC, Doc.
No. 4091-MGDTY-6-17-0003.
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Appendix A
HCM Graphs
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Figure A-1 – Flammable Gas Dispersion (20%LFL) – Piping Section Vent at Refueling Stations
Figure A-2 – Radiation – Piping Section Vent at Refueling Stations
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Figure A-3 – Flammable Gas Dispersion (20%LFL) – Dryer Package Vent at Refueling Stations
Figure A-4 – Radiation – Dryer Package Vent at Refueling Stations
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Figure A-5 – Flammable Gas Dispersion (20%LFL) – Compressor Package Vent at Refueling
Stations
Figure A-6 – Radiation – Compressor Package Vent at Refueling Stations
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Figure A-7 – Flammable Gas Dispersion (20%LFL) – Priority Panel Vent at Refueling Stations
Figure A-8 – Radiation – Priority Panel Vent at Refueling Stations
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Figure A-9 – Flammable Gas Dispersion (20%LFL) – Storage Banks Vent at Refueling Stations
Figure A-10 – Radiation – Storage Banks Vent at Refueling Stations
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Figure A-11 – Flammable Gas Dispersion (20%LFL) – Storage Banks Vent at Refueling Stations
– Controlled Release for Maintenance
Figure A-12 – Radiation – Storage Banks Vent at Refueling Stations – Controlled Release for
Maintenance
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Appendix B
Radiation Contours
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Figure B-1 – Radiation – Piping Section Vent at RLIC Refueling Station

0.000 0.004 0.008
km
Figure B-2 – Radiation – Piping Section Vent at MIC Refueling Station

0.000 0.006
km
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Figure B-3 – Radiation – Dryer Package Vent at RLIC Refueling Station

0.000 0.004 0.008
km
Figure B-4 – Radiation – Dryer Package Vent at MIC Refueling Station

0.000 0.004 0.008
km
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Figure B-5 – Radiation – Priority Panel Vent at RLIC Refueling Station

0.000 0.004 0.008
km
Figure B-6 – Radiation – Priority Panel Vent at MIC Refueling Station

0.000 0.004 0.008
km
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Figure B-7 – Radiation – Storage Banks Vent at RLIC Refueling Station – Fire Relief
0.000 0.006 0.012
km
Note: The radiation impact distances for Storage Banks and Compressor Package vents are
similar. The impact criteria for Compressor Package vents are deemed to be met as the
Compressors are farther from the public facilities than the Storage Banks.
Figure B-8 – Radiation – Storage Banks Vent at RLIC Refueling Station (Directed towards Plant
East) – Fire Relief
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Figure B-9 – Radiation – Storage Banks Vent at MIC Refueling Station – Fire Relief
0.000 0.006 0.012
km
Note: The radiation impact distances for Storage Banks and Compressor Package vents are
similar. The impact criteria for Compressor Package vents are deemed to be met as the
Compressors are farther from the public facilities than the Storage Banks.
Figure B-10 – Radiation – Storage Banks Vent at RLIC Refueling Station (Directed towards
Plant East) – Fire Relief
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Figure B-11 – Radiation – Storage Banks Vent at RLIC Refueling Station – Controlled Release
for Maintenance
Figure B-12 – Radiation – Storage Banks Vent at MIC Refueling Station – Controlled Release
for Maintenance
23 May 2019

Vent Dispersion Study for Qatar CNG Stations

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Vent Dispersion Study for Qatar CNG Stations

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PROJECT/CONTRACT NO: 4091/GC18104500

EPIC FOR CNG STATIONS IN RLIC and MIC

VENT DISPERSION AND RADIATION STUDY

CONTRACTOR: ENGINEERING CONSULTANT: SUB-CONSULTANT:

P.O.BOX 12714, BROOQ BUILDING BLACK CAT CONSULTING &

26/05/2019 1 Issued For Approval MS NAK/FFK BGS/MS

Document No. 4091-MGDTY-3-17-0003 Page: 1 of 38

VENT DISPERSION AND

Prepared by: Arcadis Consulting Middle East Ltd.

Arcadis Report No: BLCK-10029664-R03

Date: 23 May 2019

DOC. NO.: 4091-MGDTY-3-17-0003 Rev. 1 Page 2 of 38

Report Approval and Revision Record

Document Title Vent Dispersion and Radiation Study

Client Black Cat Consulting & Engineering Services W.L.L.

Document Number BLCK-10029664-R03

Rev Date Issue Prepared by Reviewed by Approved by

Issued for Manish Manish

Issued for Manish Manish

Executive Summary ................................................................................................. 6

1.0 General ........................................................................................................... 7

2.0 Methodology Overview ............................................................................... 12

3.0 Hazard Consequence Modelling ................................................................ 13

4.0 HCM Results and Analysis ......................................................................... 18

5.0 Recommendations ...................................................................................... 22

6.0 References ................................................................................................... 23

Appendix A HCM Graphs ....................................................................................... 24

Appendix B Radiation Contours ........................................................................... 31

1.3 PROPOSED FACILITIES

v. Flow switch installed downstream of creep relief valve

1. One (1) Non-regenerative Gas Dryer Package. Rated 6,600Sm3/hr (1 duty/1

1.4 Project Objectives

1.5 Document Objective

2.0 Methodology Overview

3.0 Hazard Consequence Modelling

3.2 Scope of Work

3.3 Major Assumptions

Table 3-1 – Gas Composition

3.3.2 Release Direction

3.3.6 Depressurisation Parameter

3.4 Impact Criteria

3.5 Consequence Model

o Dispersion models used to determine the spread of the flammable gases

4.0 HCM Results and Analysis

Weather Impact Distance (m) at 2m Effect Height

At MIC CNG Refueling Station

4.2.1 Flash Fire – Analysis

Figure A-2 – Radiation – Piping Section Vent at Refueling Stations

Figure A-4 – Radiation – Dryer Package Vent at Refueling Stations

Figure A-6 – Radiation – Compressor Package Vent at Refueling Stations

Figure A-8 – Radiation – Priority Panel Vent at Refueling Stations

Figure A-10 – Radiation – Storage Banks Vent at Refueling Stations

Figure B-1 – Radiation – Piping Section Vent at RLIC Refueling Station

Figure B-2 – Radiation – Piping Section Vent at MIC Refueling Station

Figure B-3 – Radiation – Dryer Package Vent at RLIC Refueling Station

Figure B-4 – Radiation – Dryer Package Vent at MIC Refueling Station

Figure B-5 – Radiation – Priority Panel Vent at RLIC Refueling Station

Figure B-6 – Radiation – Priority Panel Vent at MIC Refueling Station

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