A.

Settlement of Estate of a deceased (Rules 73-89)

1. Palaganas vs. Palaganas, Jan. 26, 2011;

Facts:
On November 8, 2001 Ruperta C. Palaganas, a Filipino who became a naturalized
United States citizen, died single and childless. In the last will and testament she
executed in California, she designated her brother, Sergio C. Palaganas, as the
executor of her will for she had left properties in the Philippines and in the US.
 
On May 19, 2003 respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas, another brother of Ruperta,
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the probate
of Ruperta’s will and for his appointment as special administrator of her estate. On
October 15, 2003, however, petitioners Manuel Miguel Palaganas and Benjamin
Gregorio Palaganas, nephews of Ruperta, opposed the petition on the ground that
Ruperta’s will should not be probated in the Philippines but in the U.S. where she
executed it. Manuel and Benjamin added that, assuming Ruperta’s will could be
probated in the Philippines, it is invalid nonetheless for having been executed
under duress and without the testator’s full understanding of the consequences of
such act. Ernesto, they claimed, is also not qualified to act as administrator of the
estate.
 
Meantime, since Ruperta’s foreign-based siblings, Gloria Villaluz and Sergio, were
on separate occasions in the Philippines for a short visit, respondent Ernesto filed a
motion with the RTC for leave to take their deposition, which it granted. On April,
13, 2004 the RTC directed the parties to submit their memorandum on the issue of
whether or not Ruperta’s U.S. will may be probated in and allowed by a court in
the Philippines.
 
On June 17, 2004 the RTC issued an order: (a) admitting to probate Ruperta’s last
will; (b) appointing respondent Ernesto as special administrator at the request of
Sergio, the U.S.-based executor designated in the will; and (c) issuing the Letters
of Special Administration to Ernesto.
 
Aggrieved by the RTC’s order, petitioner nephews Manuel and Benjamin appealed
to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that an unprobated will executed by an
American citizen in the U.S. cannot be probated for the first time in the
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Philippines.
 
On July 29, 2005 the CA rendered a decision, affirming the assailed order of the
RTC, holding that the RTC properly allowed the probate of the will, subject to
respondent Ernesto’s submission of the authenticated copies of the documents
specified in the order and his posting of required bond. The CA pointed out that
Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court does not require prior probate and
allowance of the will in the country of its execution, before it can be probated in
the Philippines. The present case, said the CA, is different from reprobate, which
refers to a will already probated and allowed abroad. Reprobate is governed by
different rules or procedures. Unsatisfied with the decision, Manuel and Benjamin
came to this Court.
 

Issue: Whether or not there a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated
in the Philippines although it has not been previously probated and allowed in the
country where is was executed, YES

Ruling:
Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad
although the same have not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of
their execution. A foreign will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction.
Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is abroad produces
effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with the formalities prescribed by
the law of the place where he resides, or according to the formalities observed in
his country.
 
In insisting that Ruperta’s will should have been first probated and allowed by the
court of California, petitioners Manuel and Benjamin obviously have in mind the
procedure for the reprobate of will before admitting it here. But, reprobate or re-
authentication of a will already probated and allowed in a foreign country is
different from that probate where the will is presented for the first time before a
competent court. Reprobate is specifically governed by Rule 77 of the Rules of
Court. Contrary to petitioners’ stance, since this latter rule applies only to
reprobate of a will, it cannot be made to apply to the present case. In reprobate, the
local court acknowledges as binding the findings of the foreign probate court

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provided its jurisdiction over the matter can be established.

2. Romero vs. CA, GR No. 188921, Apr. 18, 2012;

Facts:

Upon the death of Judge Dante Romero, his wife, Aurora, was appointed as legal
guardian who held several real and personal properties in trust for her children and
continues to be the administrator of the properties, businesses, and investments
comprising the estate of the decedent. Petitioners, sons of the decedent, discovered
that several Deeds of Sale were registered in the name of their brother, Vittorio.
Petitioners allege that through fraud, misrepresentation and duress, Vittorio
succeeded in registering the properties in his name, thus, filed a Complaint for
Annulment of Sale, Nullification of Title and Conveyance of Title with the
Regional Trial Court. Private respondents, Aurora and Vittorio, in their Answer,
alleged that the lots in question were paraphernal properties of Aurora which she
mortgaged, and it was Vittorio who redeemed them.

The trial court dismissed petitioner’s complaint holding that the Special
Proceedings case remains pending, thus the claims of the parties could not be
passed upon by it without first getting a definitive pronouncement from the
intestate court as to the share of each of the heirs of the decedent in his estate.
Alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in rendering the
said Order, petitioners filed for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals.

The Appellate Court dismissed the Petition, ruling that the properties involved
in the case are part of the estate left to the heirs of the decedent, the partition of
which is already subject of an intestate proceeding. Petitioners elevated the case to
the Supreme Court arguing that the probate court may rule on issues pertaining to
title over property only in a provisional capacity.

Issue: Whether or not the probate court have jurisdiction to determine the issues in
the present case, Yes.

Ruling:

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The probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or testate proceeding
the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property
without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action. Although
generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, yet if the
interested parties are all heirs, or the question is one of collation or advancement,
or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the
rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to
decide the question of ownership. The Supreme Court held that instant case may be
treated as an exception to the general rule that questions of title should be
ventilated in a separate action.

While it is true that a probate court’s determination of ownership over

properties which may form part of the estate is not final or ultimate in nature, this
rule is applicable only as between the representatives of the estate and strangers
thereto.

Petitioners are questioning the validity of the sales made by the

administrator, an issue that can only be properly threshed out by the probate court.
The validity of the sales made by Aurora, allegedly orchestrated by Vittorio, can
only be determined by the probate court which is empowered to identify the nature
of the property, and that has jurisdiction over Aurora’s actions and disposition as
administrator.

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 3. Coca vs. Borromeo, 171 Phil. 246

Facts:

The spouses Pangilinan died intestate in 1943 and 1948. They possessed a
homestead land composing of two parcels in Misamis Occidental. According to
Pizarra’s, a third parcel adjoining said lots was also part of the estate of the
Pangilinan.

The Pangilinan spouses were survived by the following heirs:

(1) Prima Pangilinan,
(2) Children of Concepcion Pangilinan Yamuta: Maria, Eusebio and Apolinar
(3) Children of Francisco Pangilinan, Francis, Algerian, Benjamin, Perla and
Francisco, Jr., all surnamed Pangilinan, and widow, Guadalupe Pizarras.

Settlement of the estate of the spouses Pangilinan were instituted in the the CFI
Misamis Occidental. The administrator of presented a project partition:
1. Crispin Borromeo as payment of Attorney’s fees – 3 hectares
2. Heirs of Francisco Pangilinan –  5.33 hectares
3. Prima Pangilinan – 6.33 hectares
4. Heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan – the remainder
5. the debt of the of the estate to Concepcion should be divided equally among
each set of heirs and Prima and Francisca’s heirs pay the amount to
Concepcion.

The heirs of Francisco Pangilinan (Guadalupe Pizarras, et al.) opposed that project
of partition. They contended that the partition contravened the lower court's order
which recognized the right of the heirs of Francisco to a twelve-hectare portion;
that Prima, who sold her share to Francisco, should be excluded from the partition;
that the total share of the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan in Lot No. 1112 is 12.6720
hectares, while that of the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan is 6.3360 hectares, and
that the claim of the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan for P5,088.50 had not been
properly allowed.

Lower court ordered administrator to pay the debt owed to Concepcion Heirs
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and deferred action on the project partition until ownership of the 12ha was
resolved.

But after noting that no separate action had been filed to determine the ownership
of the twelve hectares, lower court issued an order approving the project of
partition but excluding the twelve hectares claimed by the heirs of Francisco
Pangilinan but did not bother to decide how the remainder should be partitioned
and whether Prima Pangilinan had a share in that remainder.

Issue: Whether or not the lower court acting as a probate court can decide an issue
of ownership, NO, but with exceptions.

Ruling:

It should be clarified that whether a particular matter should be resolved by the

Court of First Instance in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited
probate jurisdiction is in reality not a jurisdictional question. In essence, it is a
procedural question involving a mode of practice "which may be waived"

As a General Rule, the question as to title to property should not be passed upon in
the estate or intestate proceeding. A probate court may not decide a question of
title or ownership. That question should be ventilated in a separate action.

This has qualifications or exceptions justified by expediency and convenience

namely:
(1) if the interested parties are all heirs or the question is one of collation or
advancement,
(2) or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court
and
(3) the rights of 'third parties are not impaired

thus, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate proceeding the
question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property
without prejudice to its final determination in separate action.

The instant case may be treated as an exception. Here, the probate court had
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already received evidence on the ownership of the twelve-hectare portion during
the hearing of the motion for its exclusion from the title inventory. The only
interested parties are the heirs who have all appeared of the twelve-hectare portion.

The appellees belong to the poor stratum of society. They should not be forced to
incur additional expenses (such as filing fees) by bringing a separate action to
determine the ownership of the twelve-hectare portion.
The just, expeditious and inexpensive solution is to require the heirs of Francisco
Pangilinan to the intestate proceeding, a motion in the form of a complaint,
wherein, they should set forth their claim for the twelve hectares in question,
stating the ultimate facts in support of their claim, such as the partition made by
Juan C. Pangilinan, their acquisition of the share of Prima Pangilinan and the
usufructuary rights of their parents, their ling possession of the said portion, their
claim for the produce of the land, the expenses incurred by them in Civil Case No.
560, Labaria vs. Pangilinan, and their contention that Lot No. 1920 forms part of
the estate of the Pangilinan spouses.

Copies of the motion should be served upon the administrator, the Prima and
Concepcion Heirs. After the issues have been joined and in case no amicable
settlement has been reached, the probate court should receive evidence or, as
indicated by the Court of Appeals in Atay vs. Catolico, a full dress hearing should
be held.

Crispin Borromeo may set forth also his claim for the three hectare but only for the
purpose of deciding what portion of the esate should be given to him in satisfaction
of his share.

4. Acebedo vs. Abesamis, 217 SCRA 186;

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Facts:
Herodotus Acebedo and 7 others were left an estate consisting of real properties in
Quezon City and Caloocan City. Acebedo became the administrator pending
partition. In the meantime, the property is owned in common by the heirs.

The case pended for 16 years with the court. Miguel Acebedo et al (respondents)
then filed a Motion for Approval of Sale for them to sell their shares from the
estate. The court approved the motion. Respondents were able to find a buyer in
the person of Yu Hwa Ping who agreed to buy the properties for P12 Million. He
paid P6 million as earnest money.

Acebedo assailed the approval of the sale claiming that the price is quite low. The
court ordered Miguel et al to find a higher bidder within a specified time frame
which was later extended to 7 months but still no other buyer could provide better
terms.

Finally, it was agreed by the parties that respondents sell their share to the price
already agreed upon with Ping and that Acebedo can negotiate his price with Ping.
But Acebedo still filed a Supplemental Opposition against the approval of the
conditional sale.

The court affirmed the approval of the sale and ordered Acebedo to sell his share
at the same rate that the other heirs sold their share to Ping.

Issue: Whether or not the other heirs can sell their shares of the estate prior to
adjudication, Yes.

Ruling:

An heir can sell his share without final adjudication. An heir is a co-owner of the
property (estate) before adjudication.

Although the Rules of Court do not specifically state that the sale of an immovable
property belonging to an estate of a decedent, in a special proceeding, should be
made with the approval of the court, this authority is necessarily included in its
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capacity as a probate court. Therefore, it is clear that the probate court in the case
at bar, acted within its jurisdiction in issuing the Order approving the Deed of
Conditional Sale.

The right of an heir to dispose of the decedent’s property, even if the same is under
administration, is based on the Civil Code provision stating that the possession of
hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the heir without interruption and from
the moment of the death of the decedent, in case the inheritance is accepted. Where
there are however, two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its
partition, owned in common by such heirs.

5. Marcos vs. CA, 393 Phil. 253;

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Facts:

Following the death of former President Marcos in 1989, a Special Tax Audit
Team was created on June 27, 1990 to conduct investigations and examinations of
tax liabilities of the late president, his family, associates and cronies. The
investigation disclosed that the Marcoses failed to file a written notice of death of
the decedent estate tax return and income tax returns for the years 1982 to 1986, all
in violation of the Tax Code. Criminal charges were field against Mrs. Marcos for
violation of Secs. 82, 83 and 84, NIRC.

The CIR thereby caused the preparation of the estate tax return for the estate
of the late president, the income returns of the Marcos spouses for 1985 and 1986
and the income tax returns of petitioner Marcos II for 1982 to 1985. On July 26,
1991, the BIR issued deficiency estate tax assessments and the corresponding
deficiency income tax assessments. Copies of deficiency estate and income tax
assessments were served personally and constructively on August 26, 1991 and
September 12, 1991 upon Mrs. Marcos. Likewise, copies of the deficiency income
tax assessments against petitioner Marcos were personally and constructively
served. Formal assessment notices were served upon Mrs. Marcos on October 20,
1992.

The deficiency tax assessments were not administratively protested by the

Marcoses within 30 days from service thereof. Subsequently, the CIR issued a total
of 30 notices to levy on real property against certain parcels of land and other real
property owned by Marcoses.

Notices of sale at public auction were duly posted at the Tacloban City Hall and
the public auction for the sale of 11 parcels of land took place on July 5, 1993.
There being no bidder, the lots were declared forfeited in favor of the government.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with an application for
TRO before the CA to annul and set aside the notices of levy as well as the notice
of sale and to enjoin the BIR from proceeding with the auction. The CA dismissed
the petition ruling that the deficiency assessments for the estate and income taxes
have already become final and unappealable and may thus be enforced by
summary remedy of levying upon the real property.
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Issue: Whether or not the proper avenue of assessment and collection was taken by
respondent bureau

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that, from the foregoing, it is discernible that the approval
of the court, sitting in probate, or as a settlement tribunal over the deceased is not a
mandatory requirement in the collection of estate taxes. It cannot therefore be
argued that the Tax Bureau erred in proceeding with the levying and sale of the
properties allegedly owned by the late President, on the ground that it was required
to seek first the probate court's sanction. There is nothing in the Tax Code, and in
the pertinent remedial laws that implies the necessity of the probate or estate
settlement court's approval of the state's claim for estate taxes, before the same can
be enforced and collected.

The deficiency income tax assessments and estate tax assessment are already final
and unappealable -and-the subsequent levy of real properties is a tax remedy
resorted to by the government, sanctioned by Section 213 and 218 of the National
Internal Revenue Code. This summary tax remedy is distinct and separate from the
other tax remedies (such as Judicial Civil actions and Criminal actions), and is not
affected or precluded by the pendency of any other tax remedies instituted by the
government.
 
On the issue of prescription, the omission to file an estate tax return, and the
subsequent failure to contest or appeal the assessment made by the BIR is fatal to
the petitioner's cause, as under Sec.223 of the NIRC, in case of failure to file a
return, the tax may be assessed at anytime within 10 years after the omission, and
any tax so assessed may be collected by levy upon real property within 3 years
(now 5 years) following the assessment of the tax. Since the estate tax assessment
had become final and unappealable by the petitioner's default as regards protesting
the validity of the said assessment, there is no reason why the BIR cannot continue
with the collection of the said tax.

6. Baltazar vs. Laxa, GR No. 174489, April 11, 2012;

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Facts:

Paciencia, childless and has no siblings, was a 78 year old spinster. She made her
last will and testament in favor of her nephew Lorenzo Laxa (respondent) and his
wife and two children. She treated Lorenzo as her own son. The said will was
executed in the house of a retired judge, Limpin, and was read twice to Paciencia.
Present on the execution of the will were three witnesses and one of which is Dra.
Limpin, the daughter of Judge Limpin. The formalities of signing the will by the
testator and the witnesses were fulfilled. The will remained with Judge Limpin
until Lorenzo, four years after the death of Paciencia, filed a petition for the
probate of the will and for the issuance of the letter of administration. Petitioner
Baltazar filed an opposition to Lorenzo’s petition averring that the properties
subject to the will belongs to his predecessor in interest, Mangalindahan. Later on,
Baltazar was joined with several other petitioners contending that Paciencia’s will
was null and void because ownership of the properties had not been transferred.
Few more reasons raised by the petitioners were that the will was not executed in
accordance with the requirements of the law, and that Paciencia was mentally
incapable to make a will at the time of the execution.

RTC ruled that Paciencia was of unsound mind during the execution of the
will.

The CA reversed such decision and granted the probate of the will of Pacencia.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but such was dismissed. Hence, this petition
for review on certiorari.

Issue:
(1) Whether or not the authenticity and due execution of the notarial Will was
sufficiently established to warrant its allowance for probate.

(2) Whether or not the court of appeals gravely erred in ruling that petitioners
failed to prove that Paciencia was not of sound mind at the time the will was
allegedly executed.

Ruling:

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 1) Due execution of the will or its extrinsic validity pertains to whether the
testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with
the formalities prescribed by law. These formalities are enshrined in Articles
805 and 806 of the New Civil Code, to wit:

Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at
the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by
some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested
and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the
testator and of one another.

Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the
testator and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a
copy of the will, or file another with the Office of the Clerk of Court.

The signatures of the testatrix, Paciencia, her instrumental witnesses and the
notary public, are all present and evident on the Will. Further, the attestation
clause explicitly states the critical requirement that the testatrix and her
instrumental witnesses signed the Will in the presence of one another and
that the witnesses attested and subscribed to the Will in the presence of the
testator and of one another.

2) The burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the
execution of the will lies on the shoulders of the petitioners.

The appellate court agree with the position of the CA that the state of being
forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally unsound so as to
render him unfit to execute a Will. Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being
of unsound mind.

Art. 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full
possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly
unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or other cause. It
shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to
know the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his
bounty, and the character of the testamentary act.
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 Art. 800. The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the
absence of proof to the contrary.

The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of
making his dispositions is on the person who opposes the probate of the will.

It is worth stressing that bare arguments, no matter how forceful, if not based
on concrete and substantial evidence cannot suffice to move the Court to
uphold said allegations.

"The very existence of [the Will] is in itself prima facie proof that the
supposed [testatrix] has willed that [her] estate be distributed in the manner
therein provided, and it is incumbent upon the state that, if legally tenable,
such desire be given full effect independent of the attitude of the parties
affected thereby." This, coupled with Lorenzo’s established relationship with
Paciencia, the evidence and the testimonies of disinterested witnesses, as
opposed to the total lack of evidence presented by petitioners apart from
their self-serving testimonies, constrain us to tilt the balance in favor of the
authenticity of the Will and its allowance for probate.

7. Pastor vs. CA, 207 Phil. 758;

Facts:
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Spouses Alvaro Pastor, Sr. and Sofia Bossio were survived by their two legitimate
children Alvaro Pastor, Jr. (Pastor Jr.) and Sofia Pastor (Sofia), and an illegitimate
child, Lewellyn Quemada. Quemada filed a petition for the probate and allowance
of an alleged holographic will of Pastor Sr. with the CFI which contained only one
testamentary disposition: a legacy in favor of Quemada consisting of 30% of
Pastor Sr.’s 42% share in the operation by ATLAS. Thereafter, the probate court
appointed Quemada as special administrator of the entire estate of Pastor Sr.
whether or not covered or affected by the holographic will. Consequently,
Quemada instituted against Pastor Jr., and his wife an action for reconveyance of
alleged properties of estate which included the properties subject of the legacy
which were in the names of spouses Pastor Sr. and Ma. Elena, who claimed to be
the owners in their own rights, and not by inheritance. The probate court issued
an order allowing the will to probate.

The order was affirmed by CA and on petition for review, the SC dismissed the
petition and remanded the same to the probate court after denying reconsideration.
For two years after remand of the case to the probate court, all pleadings of both
parties remained unacted upon. Not long after, the probate court set the hearing on
the intrinsic validity of the will but upon objection of Pastor Jr. and Sofia on the
ground of pendency of the reconveyance suit, no hearing was held. Instead, the
probate court required the parties to submit their respective position papers.

While the reconveyance suit was still pending in another court, the probate court
issued Order of Execution and Garnishment, resolving the question of ownership
of the royalties payable by ATLAS and ruling in effect that the legacy to Quemada
was not inofficious. Pursuant to said order, ATLAS was directed to remit directly
to Quemada the 42% royalties due to decedent’s estate, of which Quemada was
authorized to retain 75% for himself as legatee. Further, the 33% share of Pastor Jr.
and/or his assignees was ordered garnished to answer for the accumulated legacy
of Quemada. Being “immediately executory”, Quemada succeeded in obtaining a
Writ of Execution and Garnishment. The oppositors sought reconsideration thereof
but in the meantime, the probate court ordered suspension of payment of all
royalties due Pastor Jr. and/or his assignees until after resolution of oppositor’s
motion for reconsideration. Pending motion, Pastor Jr. and his wife filed with the
CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for writ of preliminary
injunction assailing the writ of execution and garnishment issued by the probate
court. However, said petition was denied as well as their motion for

15
reconsideration. Hence, this petition for review by certiorari with prayer for a writ
of preliminary injunction.

Issue: Whether or not the Probate Order resolved with finality the questions of
ownership and intrinsic validity.

Ruling:

In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by and large is restricted
to the extrinsic validity of the will. As a rule, the question of ownership is an
extraneous matter which the Probate Court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for
the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be
included in the inventory of estate properties, the Probate Court may pass upon the
title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to
the final decision in a separate action to resolve title. The Order sought to be
executed by the assailed Order of execution is the Probate Order allegedly resolved
the question of ownership of the disputed mining properties. However, nowhere in
the dispositive portion is there a declaration of ownership of specific properties. On
the contrary, it is manifested therein that ownership was not resolved. For it
confined itself to the question of extrinsic validity of the will, and the need for and
propriety of appointing a special administrator. Thus it allowed and approved the
holographic will “with respect to its extrinsic validity, the same having been duly
authenticated pursuant to the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law.” It
declared that the intestate estate administration aspect must proceed subject to the
outcome of the suit for reconveyance of ownership and possession of real and
personal properties.

The Probate Court did not resolve the question of ownership of the properties listed
in the estate inventory, considering that the issue of ownership was the very subject
of controversy in the reconveyance suit that was still pending. It was, therefore,
error for the assailed implementing Orders to conclude that the Probate Order
adjudged with finality the question of ownership of the mining properties and
royalties, and that, premised on this conclusion, the dispositive portion of the said
Probate Order directed special administrator to pay the legacy in dispute.

8. Garcia Fule vs. CA, GR NO. L-40502, Nov. 25, 1976;

Facts:

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Virginia Garcia Fule (petitioner) filed before CFI of Calamba, Laguna a Petition
for letters of administration of the estate of Amado G. Garcia. She moved ex parte
for her appointment as special administratrix of the estate. This was granted.

Preciosa Garcia filed for a motion for reconsideration contending that the order
appointing Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix was issued without
jurisdiction
 There was no notice of the petition for letters of administration has been
served upon all persons interested in the estate;
 She contends that she should be preferred in the appointment of a special
administratrix, being the surviving spouse of Amado; and,
 Virginia is not an heir but a debtor of the estate of Amado G. Garcia.

While the Motion for Reconsideration is pending, Preciosa filed a motion to

remove Virginia as administrator.

During the hearings for the case, Virginia presented that: Amado resided in
Quezon City 3 years before his death, therefore CFI Calamba has no jurisdiction
over the case. CFI DENIED the two petitions of Preciosa, because of lack of
jurisidction

CA reversed the decision. It vacated the decision made by the CFI. It held that
CFI Calamba, Laguna does not have jurisdiction over the case.

Issue: Whether or not the venue is improperly laid, YES.

Ruling:
JURISDICTION is the power and authority of the court over the subject matter.
Jurisdiction of all probate cases is within the Court of First Instance which is
different from the place of residence of the deceased.
 It cannot be changed by procedure and be stipulated by the parties.
VENUE is the place of the hearing. Since there are many Court of First Instance,
the venue can be fixed.
 The rules provides that the venue is the place of residence of deceased or the
province.

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Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: “If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien,
his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled,
in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his
death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of
any province in which he had estate.

SC ruled that the last place of residence of the deceased should be the venue of the
court. IN HERE, the decedent died in Quezon City as provided by the death
certificate.“Resides” should be seen as the personal, actual or physical habitation
of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a
place and actual stay thereat. The term means merely residence, that is, personal
residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily
presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence
in that place and also an intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular length
of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than
temporary.

The discretion to appoint a special administrator or not lies in the probate court.
That, however, is no authority for the judge to become partial, or to make his
personal likes and dislikes prevail over, or his passions to rule, his judgment.
Exercise of that discretion must be based on reason, equity, justice and legal
principle. There is no reason why the same fundamental and legal principles
governing the choice of a regular administrator should not be taken into account in
the appointment of a special administrator. Nothing is wrong for the judge to
consider the order of preference in the appointment of a regular administrator in
appointing a special administrator. After all, the consideration that overrides all
others in this respect is the beneficial interest of the appointee in the estate of the
decedent. Under the law, the widow would have the right of succession over a
portion of the exclusive property of the decedent, besides her share in the conjugal
partnership. For such reason, she would have as such, if not more, interest in
administering the entire estate correctly than any other next of kin. The good or
bad administration of a property may affect rather the fruits than the naked
ownership of a property.
9. Cuenco vs. Court of Appeals, GR No. L- 24742, Oct. 26, 1972;
18
Facts:
Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila. He was survived by his widow and
two minor sons, residing in Quezon City, and children of the first marriage,
residing in Cebu. Lourdes, one of the children from the first marriage, filed a
Petition for Letters of Administration with the Court of First Instance (CFI) Cebu,
alleging that the senator died intestate in Manila but a resident of Cebu with
properties in Cebu and Quezon City.

The petition still pending with CFI Cebu, Rosa Cayetano Cuenco, the second wife
(widow), filed a petition with CFI Rizal (Quezon City) for the probate of the last
will and testament, where she was named executrix. Rosa also filed an opposition
and motion to dismiss in CFI Cebu but the said court held in abeyance resolution
over the opposition until CFI Quezon City shall have acted on the probate
proceedings. CFI Cebu, in effect deferred to the probate proceedings in the Quezon
City court.

Lourdes filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Quezon City, on

ground of lack of jurisdiction and/or improper venue, considering that CFI
Cebu already acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the case.

The opposition and motion to dismiss were denied. Lourdes filed special civil
action of certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction with
respondent CA. CA favored Lourdes holding that CFI Cebu had first
acquired jurisdiction.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the CA is wrong in issuing the writ pf prohibition against
Quezon City court ordering it to refrain from proceeding with the testate
proceedings, YES
2. Whether or not CFI Quezon City acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion in taking cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the
probate proceedings, NO

Ruling:
19
The Supreme Court found that CA erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition
against the Quezon City court from proceeding with the testate proceedings and
annulling and setting aside all its orders and actions, particularly its admission to
probate of the last will and testament of the deceased and appointing petitioner-
widow as executrix thereof without bond pursuant to the deceased testator's wish.

Under Rule 73, the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The residence
of the decent or the location of his estate is not an element of jurisdiction over the
subject matter but merely of venue. Conversely, such court, may upon learning
that a petition for probate of the decedent's last will has been presented in
another court where the decedent obviously had his conjugal domicile and resided
with his surviving widow and their minor children, and that the allegation of the
intestate petition before it stating that the decedent died intestate may be actually
false, may decline to take cognizance of the petition and hold the petition
before it in abeyance, and instead defer to the second court which has before it
the petition for probate of the decedent's alleged last will.

Implicit in the Cebu court's order was that if the will was duly admitted to probate,
by the Quezon City court, then it would definitely decline to take cognizance of
Lourdes' intestate petition which would thereby be shown to be false and improper,
and leave the exercise of jurisdiction to the Quezon City court, to the exclusion of
all other courts.

Under the facts, the Cebu court could not be held to have acted without jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of jurisdiction in declining to take cognizance of the intestate
petition and deferring to the Quezon City court. Necessarily, neither could the
Quezon City court be deemed to have acted without jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of and acting on the probate petition since under Rule 73, section 1, the
Cebu court must first take cognizance over the estate of the decedent and must
exercise jurisdiction to exclude all other courts, which the Cebu court declined to
do. Furthermore, as is undisputed, said rule only lays down a rule of venue and the
Quezon City court undisputably had at least equal and coordinate jurisdiction over
the estate.

20
Opposition to jurisdiction of trial court in settlement proceedings should be by
appeal: Under Rule 73, section 1 itself, the Quezon City court's assumption of
jurisdiction over the decedent's estate on the basis of the will duly presented for
probate by petitioner-widow and finding that Quezon City was the first choice of
residence of the decedent, who had his conjugal home and domicile therein — with
the deference in comity duly given by the Cebu court — could not be contested
except by appeal from said court in the original case except when want of
jurisdiction appears on the record.

When proceedings for settlement of estate will not be annulled even if court had
improper venue: the mischievous effect in the administration of justice" of
considering the question of residence as affecting the jurisdiction of the trial court
and annulling the whole proceedings only to start all over again the same
proceedings before another court of the same rank in another province is too
obvious to require comment. It would be an unfair imposition upon petitioner as
the one named and entitled to be executrix of the decedent's last will and settle his
estate in accordance therewith, and a disregard of her rights under the rule on
venue and the law on jurisdiction to require her to spend much more time, money
and effort to have to go from Quezon City to the Cebu court every time she has an
important matter of the estate to take up with the probate court.

10. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum vs. Dumlao, GR No. 44888, Feb. 7, 1992;

21
Facts:
Ricardo Gonzales, District Manager of Shell Philippines for Mindanao, filed a
petition entitled, “In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of the Deceased
ReginoiCanonoy, Petition for Letters of Administration, Ricardo M. Gonzales,
Petitioner” with the RTC of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City, praying that he be
appointed as judicial administrator of the estate of the deceased ReginoCanonoy.

Judge Echavez Jr. issued an order setting the hearing on the petition and directing
the hearing on the petition and directing that said order be published and copies of
the same be sent by registered mail or personal delivery to each of all known heirs
of the deceased.

The heirs of the deceased opposed the issuance of letters of administration filed by
Gonzales based on the following grounds:
1. Gonzales is a “complete stranger to the intestate estate” of the deceased;
2. He is not even a creditor of the estate but a mere employee of an alleged
creditor (Shell Philippines, Inc.) and so “he would not be able to properly
and effectively protect the interest of the estate in case of conflicts”; and
3. He is a resident of Davao City, and thus if appointed as administrator of the
estate, the bulk of which is located in Butuan City, “he would not be able to
perform his duties efficiently”.

The heirs instead propose and pray that Bonifacio Canonoy, one of the deceased’s
sons, be appointed administrator of the said intestate estate and that the
corresponding letters of administration be issued in his favour. The trial court, after
due hearing, appointed BonifacioCanonoy as administrator of the estate of the
deceased.

Petitioner Shell filed its claim against the estate of the deceased. Upon joinder
of the issues on the said claim, the trial court set the pre-trial. The
administrator filed a Motion to Dismiss the claim alleging that the court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and nature thereof because the
petitioner therein, Mr. Gonzales, is not the “interested person” as contemplated by
Rule 79, Section 2 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner Shell countered the motion,

22
contending that the interest of Mr. Gonzales in the estate is not a jurisdictional fact
that needs to be alleged in the petition.

Respondent Judge granted the motion and dismissed the case.

Issue: Whether or not the jurisdictional facts that need to be stated in a petition for
letter of administration under Rule 79, Section 2 of the Rules of Court include the
specific assertion that the petitioner therein is an “interested person”, No.

Ruling:
Rule 79, Section 2 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 2. Contents of petition of letters of administration – A petition for letters of

administration must be files by an interested person and must show, so far as
known to the petitioner:

a) The jurisdictional facts;

b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and residences
of the creditors, of the decedent;
c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;
d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed.

But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of
administration.

The jurisdictional facts alluded to are: the death of the testator, his residence at the
time of his death in the province where the probate court is sitting or, if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, his having left his estate in such province. These
facts are amply enumerated in the petition filed by Mr. Gonzales.

Clearly, the allegation that a petitioner seeking letters of administration is an

interested person does not fall within the enumeration of jurisdictional facts. A
Motion to Dismiss may lie not on the basis of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
court, but rather on the ground of lack of legal capacity to institute the proceedings.

23
In Saguinsin vs. Lindayag, the Court defined an “interested party” as one who
would be benefitted by the estate, such as an heir or one who has a claim against
the estate, such as a creditor; this interest must be material and direct, not merely
indirect or contingent. As an exemption, an objection to a petition for letters of
administration on that ground may be barred by waiver or estoppel.

Private respondents’ failure to move for a dismissal amounted to a waiver of the

abovementioned ground. Rule 15, Section 8 of the Rules of Court provides that:

“A motion attacking a pleading or a proceeding shall include all objections then

available, and all objections not so included shall be deemed waived.”

By proposing that BonifacioCanonoy be appointed as administrator instead of Mr.

Gonzales, private respondents have in fact approved or ratified the filing of the
petition by the latter. There can be no dispute that the trial court had acquired
jurisdiction over the case.

11. Nuguid vs. Nuguid, GR No. L- 23445, June 23, 1966;

24
Facts:
Rosario Nuguid, a resident of Quezon City, died on December 30, 1962, single,
without descendants Surviving her were her legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid and
Paz Salonga Nuguid, and six (6) brothers and sisters, namely: Alfredo, Federico,
Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto, all surnamed Nuguid.

Petitioner Remedios Nuguid (sister) filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a
holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid about 11 years before her
demise. Petitioner prayed that said will be admitted to probate and that letters of
administration with the will annexed be issued to her.

Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, concededly the legitimate father and
mother of the deceased Rosario Nuguid, entered their opposition to the probate of
her will. Ground therefor, inter alia, is that by the institution of petitioner
Remedios Nuguid as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors — who are
compulsory heirs of the deceased in the direct ascending line — were illegally
preterited and that in consequence the institution is void.

CFI, held that "the will in question is a complete nullity and will perforce
create intestacy of the estate of the deceased Rosario Nuguid" and dismissed
the petition without costs.

Petitioner’s motion to reconsider thwarted hence this appeal

Issue: Whether or not the will should be considered invalid due to preterition, Yes.

Ruling:

ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs
in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born
after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and
legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. ...

Petitioner contends that what we have is a case of disinheritance rather than

preterition. This is not meritorious, as this argument fails to appreciate the
distinction between preterition and disinheritance. Preterition is the omission in the
25
testator’s will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either by not mentioning
them, or although mentioned they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly
disinherited. Disinheritance is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory
heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law. The will does not
explicitly disinherit the parents. It simply omits their names altogether. Said will
rather than being labeled ineffective disinheritance is clearly one in which the
forced heir suffers from preterition.
The effects of preterition are totally different from disinheri- tance. Preterition
annuls the institution of heirs, except devises and legacies insofar as the latter are
not inofficious. In disinheri- tance the nullity is limited to that portion of the estate
of which the disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived. Considering, however
that the will before us solely provides for the institution of the petitioner as
universal heir and nothing more, the result is the same. The entire will is void.

12. Silverio Sr. vs. CA, GR No. 109979, March 11, 1999;

Facts:
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the
26
reversal of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (Special Seventh Division)[2]
dated January 20, 1993 in CA GR SP No. 29038 On November 12, 1990, or more
than three (3) years from the death of the deceased, Edgardo Silverio filed a
Petition for Letters of Administration with Branch 57, of the Regional Trial
Court in Makati City.

On November 28, 1990, he filed an Urgent Petition for Appointment of

Special Administrator, alleging that during her marriage with Ricardo Silverio, the
deceased acquired real and personal properties in the Philippines and outside the
country, the character, identity and aggregate value of which are still undetermined
and not known to petitioner... except the personal properties estimated to be worth
P1,000,000.00; that during the lifetime of the late Beatriz Silverio, the surviving
spouse has not made any settlement, judicial or extrajudicial, of the properties of
the deceased; that their surviving son, Ricardo Silverio, Jr., has taken control and
management of the properties left by the deceased for his own benefit and
advantage; that petitioner, one of the legal heirs of the deceased, is competent and
willing to act as administrator.

On December 4, 1990, the respondent judge issued an Order to the following

effect: "WHEREFORE, notice is hereby given that said Petition is set for hearing
on January 24, 1991 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning, at which date and time, all
interested parties are hereby cited to appear and show cause if any they have, why
said Petition should not be... granted.
Let this Order be published at the expense of the Petitioner, once a week for three
(3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation, the publication of
which is to be assigned to the newspaper chosen after the raffle conducted by the
Executive Judge of this Court. Likewise, let this Order and the Petition be posted at
least two (2) weeks before hearing by the Branch Sheriff at petitioner's expense in
the Bulletin Board of the Clerk of Court of Makati, Metro Manila, Municipal
Building and Public Market of Makati, Metro Manila. Let copies of this Order be
sent by registered mail to all the surviving heirs of the late BEATRIZ SILVERIO
mentioned above."
On December 17, 1990, respondent Judge Francisco X. Velez of Branch 57,
Regional Trial Court, Makati City, issued the following Order appointing Edgardo
Silverio as Special Administrator Ricardo Silverio, Sr. interposed his Opposition to
the Petition for Letter of Administration
27
The reception of evidence for petitioner was scheduled on October 25 and 28,
1991. However, on October 22, 1991, the petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to
Transfer the Hearing to any day during the last week of November or first week of
December 1991 because he had a settlement.

On October 29, 1991, the respondent judge, of the Court of Appeals appointed
the private respondent as regular administrator in an Order. On November 19,
1991, the Oppositor presented an Omnibus Motion to transfer the hearing set on
June 4, 1992 on the ground that oppositor movant was preoccupied with a) post-
election matters and b) preparation for his assumption of office as Congressman
for the Third District of Bulacan, but the said motion was denied on June 4, 1992,
respondent Judge ruling, as follows:

 On September 23, 1992, Ricardo C. Silverio Sr. filed a Petition for Certiorari
with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, Prohibition and/or
Restraining Order with the Court of Appeals
 On January 20, 1993, the respondent court dismissed for lack of merit the
petition for certiorari, pursuant to Section 2(c), Rule 6 of the Revised
Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals

On April 27, 1993, respondent court denied the motion for reconsideration of its
Decision dated February 8, 1993.

Issues: Whether not the CA is not correct in its interpretation of Section 6, Rule 78

Ruling:
The mere perfection of an appeal from an Order appointing a regular administrator
does not deprive the intestate court of jurisdiction to entertain application for
removal of an... administrator pursuant to Section 2, Rule 82 of the Rules of Court.
An appeal from said Order does not stay the implementation thereof, especially
where administrator appointed has taken his oath and commenced to discharge the
duties of his office as such. Hence, the original... record of the case remains with
the intestate court, so that the intestate court may deal with other matters related to
the administration of the estate of the deceased.

28
In any event, there is nothing on record to show that petitioner was indeed
preoccupied with his alleged legal struggle in the U.S. over the administration of
the estate of the deceased in the United States.
xxx But this imaginary business acumen of the petitioner is not enough to warrant
his appointment as administrator of the estate of his deceased spouse, for it is also
of public knowledge that petitioner built his business empire during the time his
crony, Ferdinand Marcos, was
President of the Philippines. As well, it is also of public knowledge that petitioner
succeeded in managing his companies into bankruptcy, so much so that none of the
alleged businesses built by petitioner is presently operating.

More significantly, the private respondent has demonstrated his competence and
fitness as administrator of the intestate estate of the late Beatriz Silverio. Just
recently, the private respondent has obtained a judgment in Civil Case No. 17467
of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, entitled "Edgardo S. Silverio
etc. vs. Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr., et al.," whereby the defendants were ordered to
reconvey the three (3) real properties placed by petitioner in the names of his
illegitimate children to the conjugal partnership of... petitioner and the late Beatriz
S. Silverio. Petitioner received a copy of said decision, through the counsel, on 31
August, 1993, and no appeal has been taken therefrom by petitioner
notwithstanding the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal.

"The deceased left a widow and a minor child. A person named as executor in a
will which was not probated because not executed according to law was appointed
administrator. the widow appealed on the ground that such administrator should
not have been appointed... without her consent. HELD: If the administrator was
appointed by the trial court for the estate in accordance with Rule 79, section 6 of
the Rules of Court, the trial court had discretion to issue the letters of
administration to any of the persons mentioned in said... section, and unless there
has been an abuse of discretion, which does not appear to have been committed in
the present case, appointment shall not be revoked on appeal."

Villamor vs. Court of Appeals, 162 SCRA 578, 579

"We do not consider as `intriguing' the observation of the lower court and
concurred in by the Court of Appeals that in both Special Proceedings in question,
the administrators appointed were complete strangers to the decedents. There is
29
nothing repulsive in this nor... is this an indicium of fraud and collusion as found
by the courts. Section 642 of the Code of Civil Procedure enumerates the persons
who can act as executors and administrators. It provides that in case the persons
who have the preferential right to be appointed are not... competent or are
unwilling to serve, administration may be granted to such other person as the court
may appoint."

"The appointment of a special administrator in a probate case lies in the sound

discretion of the court, and he may be removed without reference to section 653 of
the Code of Civil Procedure."
Testamentary Proceedings, Estate of the Deceased Juan Pimentel. Tecla Arganda
v. Velez et al.

"Under the title "Sale of Estate" in Chapter XXXVI of the Code of Civil
Procedure, and the provisions which it comprises, from Section 714 to 724, the
Court treats of and designates the powers of the Court of First Instance in
testamentary and intestate proceedings,... in connection with the sale of property
belonging to the Estate. By virtue of the authority conferred by sections 714 to
724, the court may grant permission or authority for the sale of said property upon
previous petition of the executor or administrator, provided the legal...
requirements are complied with, and the grounds required by the law in each case
provided for in the above-mentioned sections are shown. The executor or
administrator must comply with the rules established by section 722 of the Code.
Of course in exercising its powers, when the... court is convinced that a sufficient
valid reason exists, it may order the executor or administrator to request permission
or authority to sell property; but it cannot directly order its sale, because that would
be neglecting to comply with the rules which must be observed... before granting
the said permission or authority. Section 722 requires that satisfactory proof be
adduced and that the rules established in the first paragraph be complied with,
before granting the permission or authority to the executor or administrator.
Besides, the existence of any legal contest between petitioner and his... son,
Ricardo S. Silverio, Jr. in the United States, is not a legal impediment to the filing
of the proper petition for letters of administration over the estate of the deceased
spouse in the proper courts of the Philippines.

30
 13. Ozaeta vs. Pecson, 93 Phil. 416;

Facts:
Carlos Palanca died leaving a will, appointing petitioner Ozaeta, being a former
associate justice of SC,a close friend of his wife and sponsor to their marriage, as
his executor should Gen. Roxas fails to qualify Since Gen. Roxas already died,
Ozaeta petition the court for the probate of the will of Carlos and pray he be
31
appointed as special administrator. The will was allowed, but some of the heirs
opposed. Thus pending appeal, the court appointed Phil. Trust Bank as special
administrator but later on it withdrew on ground of incompatibility of
interest.

Petitioner Ozaeta reiterate his appointment as special administrator but the court
refused and instead appoint 1 of the heirs and the BPI. Petitioner then filed the
present petition.

Issue: Whether or not the probate court committed grave abuse of discretion when
it appointed special administrator other than the name executor, NO.

Ruling:
While the rule grant discretion to the probate court to appoint or not a special
administrator and the choice of person lies within its power, SUCH DISCRETION
should not be whimsical and partial but one that is reasonable, logical and in
accordance with the fundamental legal principle of justice. A probate court cannot
make a personal likes and dislikes prevail over his judgment
1. Since the choice of executor is a precious prerogative of testator according
to his desire to appoint 1 of his confidence who can he trust 2 carry out his
wishes, the appointment and issuance of letters must be made as soon as
practicable
2. In the case at bar, since will has already been admitted to probate and the
only reason for suspending petitioner’s appointment as executor and instead
appoint special administrator is a technical one, unreasonable and would
further delay the disposition causing unnecessary expense.

14. Anderson vs. Perkins, GR No. L-15388, Jan. 31, 1961;

Facts:
Dora Perkin Anderson filed a petition for the probate of the supposed last will and
testament of the late Eugene Arthur Perkins. On the same date of the filing of the
aforesaid petition, petitioner Dora Perkins Anderson also filed a urgent petition for

32
the appointment of Alfonso Ponce Enrile as special administrator of the estate, and
on the same day, the court issued an order appointing Alfonso Ponce Enrile as such
special administrator upon his posting of a bond. Idonah Slade Perkins, surviving
spouse of the deceased entered an opposition to the probate of the will presented
by petitioner Dora Perkins Anderson. The special administrator submitted an
inventory of all the assets which have come to his knowledge as belonging to the
deceased Eugene Arthur Perkins at the time of his death.

About two years later, special administrator submitted to the court a petition
seeking authority to sell, or give away to some charitable or educational institution
or institutions, certain personal effects left by the deceased, such as clothes, books,
gadgets, electrical appliances, etc., which were allegedly deteriorating both
physically and in value, in order to avoid their further deterioration and to save
whatever value migh be obtained in their disposition. When the motion was heard,
court required the administrator to submit a specification of the properties sought
to be sold, and in compliance therewith, the special administrator submitted to the
court, in place of a specification, a copy of the inventory of the personal properties
belonging to the estate with the items sought to be sold marked with a check in red
pencil, with the statement that said items were too voluminous to enumerate.

Idonah Slade Perkins filed an opposition to the proposed sale reasoning that (1)
most of the properties sought to be sold were conjugal properties of herself and her
deceased husband; and (2) that unauthorized removal of fine pieces of furniture
belonging to the estate had been made.

Lower court approved the proposed sale, authorizing the Sheriff of Manila to
conduct the same. Idonah Slade Perkins moved to reconsider this order on the
grounds (1) that said order in effect authorized the special administrator to sell the
entire personal estate of the deceased, contrary to Rule 81, section 2 of Rules of
Court; (2) that said order was issued without a showing that the goods and chattels
sought to be sold were perishable, pursuant to Rule 81, section 2, Rules of Court;
(3) that the personalty sought to be sold represented the lifetime savings and
collections of oppositor; (4) that there is evidence on record showing unauthorized
withdrawals from the properties of the estate, and the sale of the inventoried lot
would prevent identification and recovery of the articles removed; and (5) that
there is also evidence showing oppositor's separate rights to a substantial part of
33
the personal estate.

Lower court denied the Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, this appeal.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the personal properties sought to be sold not being perishable,
the special administrator has no legal authority to sell them, No.
2. Whether or not the opposition of the surviving spouse of the deceased that she is
entitled to a large portion of the personal properties in question should be
entertained, Yes.
3. Whether or not the oppositor-appellant should have indicated the alleged "fine
furniture" which she did not want sold and that her refusal to do so is an indication
of her unmeritorious claim, No.

Ruling:
1. Section 2, Rule 81, of the Rules of Court, specifically provides that the special
administrator "may sell such perishable and other property as the court orders
sold", which shows that the special administrator's power to sell is not limited to
"perishable" property only.

It is true that the function of a special administrator is only to collect and preserve
the property of the deceased until a regular administrator is appointed. But it is not
alone the specific property of the estate which is to be preserved, but its value as
well, as shown by the legal provision for the sale by a special administrator of
perishable property. It is in line with this general power of the special administrator
to preserve not only the property of the estate but also its value, that section 2, Rule
81, also empowers such administrator to sell "other property as the court ordered
sold"
2. Indeed the records show that up to the time the propose sale was asked for and
judicially approved, no proceeding had as yet been taken, or even started, to
segregate the alleged exclusive property of the oppositor-appellant from the mass
of the estate supposedly left by the deceased or to liquidate the conjugal
partnership property of the oppositor-appellant and the deceased. Until, therefore
the issue of the ownership of the properties sought to be sold is heard and decided,
and the conjugal partnership liquidated; or, at least, an agreement be reached with a
appellant as to which properties of the conjugal partnership she would not mind
34
being sold to preserve their value the proposed sale is clearly premature. After all,
most of the items sought to be sold — pieces of furniture, kitchen and dinner ware,
electrical appliances, various gadget and books — can easily be protected and
preserved with proper care and storage measures in either or both of two residential
houses (in Manila and in Baguio City) left by the deceased, so that no reasons of
extreme urgency justify the proposed sale at this time over the strong opposition
and objection of oppositor-appellant who may later be adjudged owner of a
substantial portion of the personal estate in question.

3. It does not appear that appellant was given a reasonable opportunity to point out
which items in the inventory she did not want sold. In fact, her opposition to the
proposed sale and later her motion for reconsideration to the order approving the
same were overruled by the court without so much as stating reasons why the
grounds for her opposition were not well-founded; the records do not even show
that an inquiry was made as to the validity of the grounds of her opposition.

The lower court's order authorizing the special administrator to sell certain
personal properties of the estate is set aside, with costs against the special
administrator Alfonso Ponce Enrile and petition-appellee Dora Perkins Anderson.

15. Sanchez vs. CA, GR No. 108947, Sept. 29, 1997;

Facts:
Rosalia Lugod is the only child of Juan Sanchez and Maria Villafranca. Her father
had illegitimate children, herein petitioners. When Maria Villafranca died, Rosalia
petitioned for letters of administration over the estate of her mother and father.
Before the proceedings could be closed, Juan Sanchez died. His illegitimate
children filed a petition for letters of administration of Sanchez’s properties , which
35
was opposed by Rosalia. On October 30, 1969, Rosalia and the illegitimate
children of her father executed a compromise agreement, assisted by their
counsels, wherein they agreed to divide the properties. They did so after four
drafts.

On February 28, 1980, the [trial] court issued an order directing [herein
private respondent] Rosalia to submit a new inventory of properties under her
administration and an accounting of the fruits thereof, which prompted
[herein private respondent] Rosalia to file a rejoinder on March 31, 1980

On May 12, 1980, [herein petitioners], thru new counsel, filed a motion to change
administratrix (Annex "L", Petition) to which [herein private respondent] Rosalia
filed an opposition (Annex "M", Ibid). The parties were subsequently ordered to
submit their respective position papers, which they did (Annexes "N" and "O",
Petition). On September 14, 1989, former counsel of (herein petitioners) entered
his re-appearance as counsel for (herein petitioners).

However, on January 19, 1970, petitioners required Rosalia to deliver a deficiency

of 24 hectares and/or to set aside the compromise agreement. They contended that
the agreement was invalid because it had not been approved by the court. Later, on
April 13, 1970, the parties entered into a memorandum of agreement.

Thereafter, private respondents elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via
a petition for certiorari and contended:

The [trial court] has no authority to disturb the compromise agreement.

The [trial court] has arbitrarily faulted [herein private respondent] Rosalia S.
Lugod for alleged failure to render an accounting which was impossible.

The [trial court] acted without jurisdiction in derogation of the constitutional rights
of [herein private respondents] Arturo S. Lugod, Evelyn L. Ranises and Roberto S.
Lugod when [the trial court] decided to annul the deed of sale between the said
[herein private respondents] and Juan C. Sanchez without affording them their day
in court. [The trial court judge] defied without rhyme or reason well-
established and entrenched jurisprudence when he determined facts sans any
evidence thereon.

36
Issue: Whether or not the compromise agreement is valid even without the
approval of the court, Yes.

Ruling:
In the case before us, it is ineludible that the parties knowingly and freely entered
into a valid compromise agreement. Adequately assisted by their respective
counsels, they each negotiated its terms and provisions for four months; in fact,
said agreement was executed only after the fourth draft. As noted by the trial court
itself, the first and second drafts were prepared successively in July, 1969; the third
draft on September 25, 1969; and the fourth draft, which was finally signed by the
parties on October 30, 1969, followed. Since this compromise agreement was the
result of a long drawn out process, with all the parties ably striving to protect their
respective interests and to come out with the best they could, there can be no doubt
that the parties entered into it freely and voluntarily. Accordingly, they should be
bound thereby. To be valid, it is merely required under the law to be based on real
claims and actually agreed upon in good faith by the parties thereto. 

Indeed, compromise is a form of amicable settlement that is not only allowed but
also encouraged in civil cases. Article 2029 of the Civil Code mandates that a
"court shall endeavor to persuade the litigants in a civil case to agree upon some
fair compromise." A compromise agreement is defined by Article 2028 of the Civil
Code as a contract whereby the parties avoid litigation or end one that has already
been commenced by making reciprocal concessions. Since it is a consensual
contract, it is perfected upon the meeting of the minds of the parties, and judicial
approval is not needed for its perfection. The parties clearly knowingly entered into
the contract, it having been signed only after four drafts. In addition, they even
entered into a memorandum of agreement that amended the compromise
agreement when they realized there were errors in the latter. This clearly shows
that they entered into the contract voluntarily.

16. Heirs of Pedro Scanlar vs. CA, GR No. 119777, Oct. 23, 1997;

Facts:
Spouses Nombre and Cari-an died without a child. Nombre’s heirs include his
nephews and grandnephews. Two parcels of land formed part of the estate of
Nombre and Cari-an. The Private Respondents, heirs of Cari-an executed a Deed
of Sale in favor of petitioners Escanlar and Holgado. Petitioners paid P50,000.00

37
as a form of downpayment, but was unable to pay the remaining balance (paid only
12 installments). Being former lessees, petitioners continued in possession of the
said lots, and continued to pay rent. Private Respondent later sold the said lots to
the Chua spouses. Private Respondent then filed an action for cancellation of sale
against petitioners, for failure to pay the balance. Petitioners however, sold their
rights and interests over the said lots to Jayme, and turned over possession.

The Regional Trial Court ruled that the Sale to petitioners was nullified since all
the properties of the estate had been transferred and titled to in the name of the
Chua spouses.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed, questioned deed of sale (one with
petitioners) is a contract to sell because it shall become effective only upon
approval by the probate court and upon full payment of the purchase price.

Issue: Whether or not the sale was a contract to sell and therefore, private
respondents may rescind the contract the moment the buyer fails to pay, Yes

Ruling:
The sale of rights, interests and participation as to 1/2 portion pro indiviso of the
two subject lots is a contract of sale for the following reasons:
First, private respondents as sellers did not reserve unto themselves the ownership
of the property until full payment of the unpaid balance of P225,000.00.

Second, there is no stipulation giving the sellers the right to unilaterally rescind the
contract the moment the buyer fails to pay within the fixed period. Prior to the sale,
petitioners were already in possession of the subject property as lessees. Upon sale
to them of the rights, interests and participation as to the 1/2 portion pro indiviso,
they remained in possession, not in concept of lessees anymore but as owners
through symbolic delivery known as traditio brevi manu.

Under Article 1477 of the Civil Code, the ownership of the thing sold is acquired
by the vendee upon actual or constructive delivery thereof. In a contract of sale, the
non-payment of the price is a resolutory condition which extinguishes the
transaction that, for a time, existed and discharges the obligations created
thereunder. The remedy of an unpaid seller in a contract of sale is to seek either
38
specific performance or rescission.

In contracts to sell, ownership is retained by the seller and is not to pass until the
full payment of the price. Such payment is a positive suspensive condition, the
failure of which is not a breach of contract but simply an event that prevented the
obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring binding force. To illustrate,
although a deed of conditional sale is denominated as such, absent a proviso that
title to the property sold is reserved in the vendor until full payment of the
purchase price nor a stipulation giving the vendor the right to unilaterally rescind
the contract the moment the vendee fails to pay within a fixed period, by its nature,
it shall be declared a deed of absolute sale.

17.Vera vs. Navarro, GR No. L- 27745, Oct. 18, 1977;

Facts:
This is a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus and Injunction filed by
herein petitioner Michael Vera, in his capacity as Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, against Honorable Judge Pedro Navarro, in his capacity as Judge of
Court of First Instance (CFI).

39
It appears that Elsie Gaches died without a child. The deceased left a last will and
testament in which she made relevant disposition of her estate. To pay the taxes in
question, Atty. Medina prayed in her offer of that she be authorized to make use of
the funds of the estate on deposit. Atty. Medina filed with this Court manifestation
stating that she received a demand letter from the Commissioner for the payment
of the estate tax.

On November 23, 1967, the Solicitor General filed with this court a manifestation
expressing his conformity, in behalf of the Commissioner, to the offer of
compromise dated September 9, 1967 made by Atty. Medina, subject to certain
conditions, such as, that the cash in the banks of the estate as well as the proceeds
to be realized from the sale of the shares of stock should be turned over to the
Commissioner for the payment of the taxes due against the estate and the heirs
thereof. This manifestation was first opposed by the Acting Commissioner of
Internal Revenue on the ground that the Commissioner (who was then abroad) had
actually requested the Solicitor General not to agree to the mentioned offer of
compromise; however, the Solicitor General subsequently said that the
Commissioner's conformity was given to him orally.

On December 5, 1967, Atty. Medina filed with this Court a petition to declare
the Overseas Bank of Manila in contempt for allowing the renewal, without
court authority, of the time deposit of P700,000.00 with the said bank for another
year. In a supplemental motion filed on December 8, 1967, Atty. Medina also
prayed that the said bank and those responsible for extending the maturity date of
said time deposit be held liable for the payment of whatever surcharges, interest
and penalties may be imposed as a consequence of the late payment of the balance
of the estate tax assessed against the estate. It appears that the time deposit in
question was held by the said bank under two certificates, one for P100,000.00 to
mature on May 12, 1967, and the other, for P600,000.00 to mature on June 16,
1967. Judge Tan, however, extended the maturity date of said time deposits to May
12, 1968. The certificates of time deposit covering the said funds had been
endorsed in favor of the Commissioner in payment of the unpaid balance of the
estate then December 7, 1967) amounted to P700,000.00.

Issue: Whether or not the probate court may allow the sale of the lot in question,
No

40
Ruling:

On the matter of the authority of a probate court to allow distribution of an estate

prior to the complete Nuidation of the inheritance tax, the Tax Code apparently
lacks any provision substantially Identical to the mentioned Section 103 thereof.
There are provisions of the Tax Code, e.g., Section 104, which makes it the duty of
registers of deeds not to register the transfer to any new owner of a hereditary
estate unless payment of the death taxes sham be shown; Section 106, which
imposes a similar obligation on business establishments; and Section 107, which
penalizes the executor who delivers to an heir or devise, and the officers and
employees of business establishments who transfer in their books to any new
owner, any property forming part of a hereditary estate without the payment of the
death taxes first being shown; but those provisions by themselves do not clearly
establish that the purchase and object of the statute is to make the payment of the
inheritance tax a pre-condition to an order for the distribution and delivery of the
decedent's estate to the lawful heirs there. The cloud of vagueness in the statute,
however, is not entirely unreachable. Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court
erases this hiatus in the statute by providing thus:1

Section 1. When order for distribution of residue made. — When the debts, funeral
charges, and expenses of administration, the allowance to the widow, and
inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance with law, have been
paid, the court, on the application of the executor or administrator, or of a person
interested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of
the estate to the persons entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions, or
parts, to which each is entitled, and such persons may demand and recover their
respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any person having the
same in his possession. If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the
lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each
person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be beard and decided as in
ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above
mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them,
give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said
obligations within such time as the court directs.

41
Under the provisions Of the aforequoted Rule, the distribution of a decedent's
assets may only be ordered under any of the following three circumstances,
namely, (1) when the inheritance tax, among others, is paid; (2) who bond a
suffered bond is given to meet the payment of the tax and all the other options of
the nature enumerated in the above-cited provision; or (3) when the payment of the
said tax and at the other obligations mentioned in the said Rule has been provided
for one of these thru camar as the satisfaction of the when tax due from the festate
is were present when the question orders were issued in the case at bar. Although
the respondent Judo did make a condition in its order of June 5, 1967 that the
distribution of the estate of Elsie M. Gaches (except the cash deposits of more than
P2 million) shall be trusted to Atty. Medina for the payment of whatever taxes may
be due to the government from the estate and the heirs them to, this Court cannot
subscribe to the proposition that the payment of the tax due was thereby adequately
provided for. In the first place, the order of June 5, l967 was, for all intents and , a
complete distribution of the estate to the heirs for, the executor who is supposed to
take care of the estate was absolutely discharged the attorney's fees for the of a
lawyer who presumably acted as legal counsel for the estate in the court below
were ordered paid as were also the fees for the executor's the cash funds of the
estate were red paid to the cash and the non-cash (real property and shares of
stock) properties were likewise ordered delivered to Atty. Medina whose
participation in the said proceedings was in the capacity of an attorney-in-fact of
the herein respondent Eribal and Abanto. In short, the probate court virtually
withdrew its custodial jurisdiction over the estate which is the subject of settlement
before it. In the second place the respondent Judge, in the distribution of the
properties of the estate in question, relief solely upon the mere manifestation of the
counsel for the heirs Eribal and Abanto that them were affiant of the estate with
which to pay the taxes due to the government. There is no evidence on record that
would show that the probate court ever made a serious attempt to de what the
values of the different assets the correctness of that such properties shall be
preserved for the satisfaction of those case In the third place that main of pesos
taxes were being called by the Bureau of Inc. Revenue, the least reasonable thing
that the probate court should have done was to require the heirs to deposit the
amount of inheritance tax being claimed in a suitable institution or to authorize the
sale of non-cash assets under the court's control and supervision.

42
The record is likewise bereft of any evidence to show that sufficient bond has been
filed to meet this particular outstanding obligation.

18. Francisco vs. CA, GR No. L-57438, Jan. 31, 1984;

Facts:
Feliciano Francisco was the duly appointed guardian of Estefania San Pedro
(ward). While Pelagio Francisco (respondent) claimed to be a first cousin of the

43
ward and on August 30 1974, he petitioned for the removal of Fransisco as
guardian on the basis of the latter’s failure to submit an inventory of the estate of
the ward and to render an accounting. He subsequently submitted an inventory but
it was alleged that when Francisco sold a land belonging to the ward for 14K, only
12K was reported in the inventory.

An order was made relieving Francisco as guardian. Subsequently, this order was
reconsidered. Nevertheless, the judge ordered the retirement of Francisco as
guardian, on the ground of old age (72 years old).

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that he was only 72

years of age and still fit to continue with the management of the estate of his
ward as he had done with zeal for the past twelve years. In an order dated
November 13, 1980 the court denied his motion.

The court a quo appointed respondent Pelagio Francisco as the new guardian of

the person and property of the incompetent Estefania San Pedro.

On March 13, 1981, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari challenging the validity of the order of the trial court granting the
execution pending appeal of its decision and appointing respondent Pelagio
Francisco as the new guardian despite the fact that respondent is five (5) years
older than petitioner.

CA dismissed the petition and held that “in the case at bar, the retirement of
petitioner was ordered on the ground of old age. When this ground is considered in
relation to the delay of the petitioner in the making of an accounting and the
submission of an inventory, the order amounts to a finding that petitioner,
considering his "rather advanced age," was no longer capable of managing the
estate of his ward. (Rule 97, Sec. 2). Given this finding, it is clear that petitioner's
continuance in office would not be in the best interest of the ward.

Issues:
1. Whether “old age” as a ground for removing a guardian constitutes a good
ground for the execution of the decision pending appeal, Yes.

44
 2. Whether the court a quo abuse its discretion in appointing respondent as
guardian despite the fact that private respondent is five (5) years older than
petitioner, Yes.

Ruling:
A guardianship is a trust relation of the most sacred character, in which one person,
called a "guardian" acts for another called the "ward" whom the law regards as
incapable of managing his own affairs. A guardianship is designed to further the
ward's well-being, not that of the guardian, It is intended to preserve the ward's
property, as wen as to render any assistance that the ward may personally require.
It has been stated that while custody involves immediate care and control,
guardianship indicates not only those responsibilities, but those of one in loco
parentis as well.

Having in mind that guardianship proceeding is instituted for the benefit and
welfare of the ward, the selection of a guardian must, therefore, suit this very
purpose. Thus, in determining the selection of a guardian, the court may consider
the financial situation, the physical condition, the sound judgment, prudence and
trustworthiness, the morals, character and conduct, and the present and past history
of a prospective appointee, as wen as the probability of his, being able to exercise
the powers and duties of guardian for the full period during which guardianship
will be necessary. 

A guardian is or becomes incompetent to serve the trust if he is so disqualified by

mental incapacity, conviction of crime, moral delinquency or physical disability as
to be prevented from properly discharging the duties of his office. A guardian,
once appointed may be removed in case he becomes insane or otherwise incapable
of discharging his trust or unsuitable therefor, or has wasted or mismanaged the
estate, or failed for thirty (30) days after it is due to render an account or make a
return.

We agree with the trial court and the appellate court that there is need for petitioner
Feliciano Francisco to be retired from the guardianship over the person and
property of incompetent Estefania San Pedro. The conclusion reached by the trial
court about the "rather advanced age" of petitioner at 72 years old (petitioner is
now 76 years old) finding him unfit to continue the trust cannot be disturbed. As
45
correctly pointed out by the appellate court, this finds direct support in the delay of
the accounting and inventory made by petitioner. To sustain petitioner as guardian
would, therefore, be detrimental to the ward. While age alone is not a control
criterion in determining a person's fitness or qualification to be appointed or be
retained as guardian, it may be a factor for consideration.

Upon urgent and compelling reasons, execution pending appeal is a matter of

sound discretion on the part of the trial court and the appellate court will not
interfere, control or inquire into the exercise of this discretion unless there has been
an abuse thereof. As aptly stated by the lower court, there was need for execution
for “an indefinite discontinuance in office (guardianship) would defeat the intent
and purpose of the order relieving the present guardian.

In determining the selection of a guardian, the ff may be taken into consideration

by the court: Financial situation, physical condition, sound judgment, prudence and
trustworthiness, morals, character and conduct, present and past history, as well as
the probability of his being able to exercise the powers and duties of a guardian for
the full period during which guardianship will be necessary.

A guardian becomes incompetent to serve the trust if he is so disqualified by

mental incapacity, conviction of crime, moral delinquency or physical disability as
to be prevented from properly discharging the duties of his office.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the assailed decision and

resolution of the respondent court dated April 27, 1981 and June 26, 1981,
respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. 
SO ORDERED.

19. Lopez vs. Teodoro, 86 Phil. 499;

Facts:
Eulalio Lopez Sr., an incapacitated under the judicial guardianship of Eulalio
Lopez Jr. was the exclusive and absolute owner of a 100-hectare land in Silay,
Negros Occidental. Acting upon the motions filed in the proceedings for
46
guardianship, the court ordered the guardian to pay the movants the loans properly
authorized by the court for the support and maintenance of the incapacitated.

In pursuance of this authority, the guardian sold the only property of the
incapacitated to Jesus Jalbuena. However, in authorizing the said sale, the court did
not follow the requirement of Sec. 2 of Rule 96 that the court shall direct the next
of kin of the ward, and all persons interested in the estate, to appear at a reasonable
time and place to show cause why the prayer for the sale should not be granted.

Although Lopez Jr. was the judicial guardian, the incapacitated was and is under
the actual care and custody of his sister, Salvacion Lopez. Believing the sale is
prejudicial to her brother’s interest, Salvacion filed a petition for
certiorari/mandamus praying that the sale be revoked after the motion for recon
was denied.

Issue: Whether the sale of the property should be declared null and void, Yes.

Ruling:
The guardianship court where the proceeding was pending had the jurisdiction to
order the questioned sale. It was also undisputed that the outstanding indebtedness
of the guardianship was property and legally incurred for the support and
maintenance of the incapacitated.

Petitioner has no legal interest in the complaint. The incapacitated has children, all
of age, one of whom is the judicial guardian, while the petitioner is only the ward’s
sister. Not being the ward’s forced heir, she was not prejudiced by the sale she
seeks to impugn. Petitioner is wrong in asserting that she is “next of kin”. “Next of
Kin” within the meaning of Rule 96 are relatives whose relationship is such that
they are entitled to share in the estate as distributes.

20. Parco vs. CA, GR No. L-33152, Jan. 30, 1982;

Facts:
This case stems from a previous Special proceedings for the guardianship of
incompetent Soriaya Rodriguez. The guardianship proceeding originally pertained
to Branch 1, CFI of Quezon. Subsequently, it was transferred to Branch IV-
47
Calauag, CFI of Quezon, where respondent judge Kayanan took cognizance of the
case.

The private respondent, Francisco Rodriguez Jr. was the appointed guardian.
Respondent judge approved the conveyance of three (3) parcels of land belonging
to the ward to the petitioners, the spouses Parco. 

Almost two years after the guardianship court's approval of the 'sale', the private
respondent filed an urgent petition for the examination of the subject conveyance
of the lots to the petitioners, by virtue of the transfer of title to third parties.   He
argued that the conveyance was actually a loan agreement with a right to recover
while the spouses alleged that there was an absolute sale of the lands in dispute.  

Issue: Whether or not a guardianship court has jurisdiction to order the

reconveyance of the properties to the ward, No.

Ruling:
Unlike in previous court decision, the facts of this case is not in all fours as there is
a cloud over the titles of the properties in question. A reconveyance would require
the determination of the ownership or title of the subject three parcels of land,
which is beyond the jurisdiction of the guardianship court, and thus must be
threshed out in a separate and ordinary civil action.

In previous decisions, the court approved the reconveyance to the ward of

properties embezzled, concealed or conveyed when there is not question as to the
ward's title and ownership to the property. Herein, it is premature to say based only
on the pleadings that the ward has clear and undisputable title to the properties.

21.Republic vs. CA, GR No. 100835, Oct. 26, 1993;

Facts:
On March 29, 2001, Alan B. Alegro filed a petition in the Regional Trial Courtbfor
the declaration of presumptive death of his wife, Rosalia “Lea” A. Julaton.

At the hearing, Alan adduced evidence that he and Lea were married on January
48
20, 1995 in Catbalogan, Samar. He testified that, on February 6, 1995, Lea arrived
home late in the evening and he berated her for being always out of their house. He
told her that if she enjoyed the life of a single person, it would be better for her to
go back to her parents. Lea did not reply. Alan narrated that, when he reported for
work the following day, Lea was still in the house, but when he arrived home later
in the day, Lea was nowhere to be found. Alan thought that Lea merely went to her
parents’ house in Bliss, Sto. Niño, Catbalogan, Samar. However, Lea did not return
to their house anymore.

Alan further testified that, he inquired Lea’s whereabouts but to no avail.

Sometime in June 1995, he decided to go to Manila to look for Lea, but his mother
asked him to leave after the town fiesta of Catbalogan, hoping that Lea may come
home for the fiesta. Alan agreed. However, Lea did not show up. Alan then left for
Manila on August 27, 1995. He went to a house in Navotas where Janeth, Lea’s
friend, was staying. When asked where Lea was, Janeth told him that she had not
seen her. He failed to find out Lea’s whereabouts despite his repeated talks with
Janeth. Alan decided to work as a part-time taxi driver. On his free time, he would
look for Lea in the malls but still to no avail. He returned to Catbalogan in 1997
and again looked for his wife but failed.

On June 20, 2001, Alan reported Lea’s disappearance to the local police station.
The police authorities issued an Alarm Notice on July 4, 2001. Alan also reported
Lea’s disappearance to the National Bureau of Investigation on July 9, 2001.On
January 8, 2002, the court rendered judgment granting the petition.The OSG
appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which rendered judgment on August
4, 2003, affirming the decision of the trial court.

Issue: Whether or not the declaration of presumptive death of the wife is valid, No.

Ruling:
No. In view of the summary nature of proceedings under Article 41 of the Family
Code for the declaration of presumptive death of one’s spouse, the degree of due
diligence set by the Court in locating the whereabouts of a missing spouse must be
strictly complied with. It is the policy of the State to protect and strengthen the
family as a basic social institution. Marriage is the foundation of the family. Since
marriage is an inviolable social institution that the 1987 Constitution seeks to
49
protect from dissolution at the whim of the parties. For respondent’s failure to
prove that he had a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead and that he
exerted the required amount of diligence in searching for his missing wife, the
petition for declaration of presumptive death should have been denied by the trial
court and the Honorable Court of Appeals. For the purpose of contracting the
subsequent marriage, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as
provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee,
without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. The spouse
present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that he has a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the present
spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. The law does not define what is meant
by a well-grounded belief. Cuello Callon writes that “es menester que su creencia
sea firme se funde en motivos racionales.” The Court finds and so holds that the
respondent failed to prove that he had a well-founded belief, before he filed his
petition in the trial court, that his spouse Rosalia “Lea” Julaton was already dead.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside.

22.Republic vs. Toledano, GR No. 94147, June 8, 1994;

Facts:
A verified petition was filed before the RTC of Iba, Zambales by spouses Alvin A.
Clouse and Evelyn A. Clouse, both aliens, seeking to adopt the minor, Solomon
Joseph Alcala, the younger brother of Evelyn who has been under their care and
custody for quite a time.
Alvin is a natural born US citizen. He married Evelyn, a Filipino, who thereafter
became a naturalized citizen of the US in Guam. They are physically, mentally,
50
morally, and financially capable of adopting Solomon, a twelve (12) year old
minor.

Solomon gave his consent to the adoption, and so did his mother Nery Alcala, a
widow, due to poverty and inability to support and educate her son.
Mrs. Nila Corazon Pronda, the social worker assigned to conduct the Home and
Child Study, favorably recommended the granting of the petition for adoption.

Consequently, respondent judge rendered a decision granting the petition for

adoption and decreeing that said minor be considered as their child by adoption. To
this effect, the Court gives the minor the rights and duties as the legitimate child of
the petitioners. Also, it dissolves parental authority bestowed upon his natural
parents and vests parental authority to the spouses and makes him their legal heir.

Petitioner, through the OSG appealed for relief via a Petition for review on
certiorari of the decision  of the lower court, contending that it erred in granting the
petition for adoption because spouses Clouse are not qualified to adopt under
Philippine law.

Both spouses are American citizens at the time of the filing of petition for
adoption.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the spouses, both aliens, have the right or are qualified to adopt
under Philippine law.
2. Whether or not joint adoption by spouses is mandatory.

Ruling:
Under Articles 184 and 185 of E.O. No. 209, otherwise known as “The Family
Code of the Philippines”, spouses Clouse are clearly barred from adopting
Solomon.
Article 184, paragraph (3) of E.O. No. 209 expressly enumerates the persons who
are not qualified to adopt, viz.:
(3) An alien, except:
(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by
consanguinity;
51
 (b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino
spouse; or
(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly
with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter.

Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in
accordance with the rules on inter-country adoption as may be provided by law.

There can be no question that Alvin is not qualified to adopt Solomon under any of
the exceptional cases in the aforequoted provision. Firstly, he is not a former
Filipino citizen but a natural born US citizen . Secondly, Solomon is neither his
relative by consanguinity nor the legitimate child of his spouse. Lastly, when
spouses Clouse jointly filed the petition to adopt Solomon, Evelyn was no longer a
Filipino citizen. She lost her Filipino citizenship when she was naturalized as a US
citizen.

Evelyn on the other hand, may appear to qualify pursuant to paragraph 3(a) of
Article 184 of E.O. 209. She was a former Filipino citizen. She sought to adopt her
younger brother. Unfortunately, the petition for adoption cannot be granted in her
favor alone without violating Article 185 which mandates a joint adoption by the
husband and wife. It reads:
Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases:

(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.
Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a condition that
must be read along together with Article 184.
Today, this case is applicable only insofar as the mandatory nature of a joint
adoption by husband and wife is concerned. As to the qualification or non-
qualification of an alien adopter, RA 8552 (enacted on February 25, 1998) is
applicable.
23.Brehm vs. Republic, GR No. L- 18566, Sept, 30, 1963;

Facts:
Gilbert R. Brehm is an American citizen, serving the U.S. Navy with temporary
assignment at Subic Bay. He married Ester Mira, a Filipino citizen, who had a
52
daughter Elizabeth. The spouses filed a Joint Petition with the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court for the adoption of the minor Elizabeth. The Juvenile &
Domestic Relations Court adjudged minor Elizabeth is freed from all obligations to
her natural father and the child of the petitioners Gilbert R. Brehm and Ester Mira
Brehm, on the ground that Elizabeth has always been under the care and support of
Gilbert and his declared intention of permanently residing herein. The Solicitor
General claimed that it was error for the Court in adjudging Elizabeth. On appeal
however, the court finds otherwise.

Issue: Whether or not Brehm is qualified to adopt Elizabeth, No.

Ruling:
Brehm is disqualified to adopt Elizabeth According to Art. 335, it clearly states
that non-resident aliens cannot adopt. It is therefore, mandatory, because it
contains words of positive prohibition and is couched in the negative terms
importing that the act required shall not be done otherwise than designated. On the
other hand, Art. 338, can only be given operation if the same does not conflict with
the mandatory provisions of Art. 335.
In the instant case Brehm is clearly a non-resident alien by his own testimony.
Therefore, he is disqualified to adopt Elizabeth.

Article 338 should be construed in connection with Article 335. Article 33G
clearly states that "The following cannot adopt ... (4) non-resident aliens." It is
therefore mandatory because it contains words of positive prohibition and is
couched in negative terms, importing that the act required shall not be done
otherwise than designated (50 Am. JUl'. 51). On the other hand, Article 338
provides that "the following may be adopted: (3) step-child by the step-father or
step-mother." This provision is merely directory and can only be given operation if
the same does not conflict with the mandatory provisions of Article 335,
Moreover, it is Article 335 that confers jurisdiction to the court over the case and
before Article 338 may or can be availed of, such jurisdiction must first be
established. There is no question that petitioner Brehm is a non-resident. By his
own testimony, he supplied the conclusive proof of his status, and no amount of
reasoning will overcome the same. For this reason he cannot adopt.

The decision appealed from is hereby reversed, and Brehm’s Petition to adopt the
53
child EIizabeth Mira, denied. Without costs.

24. Espiritu vs. CA, GR No. 115640, March 15, 1995;

Facts:
Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding first met in Iligan
City where Reynaldo was employed by the National Steel Corporation and Teresita
was employed as a nurse in a local hospital. Teresita left for Los Angeles,
California to work as a nurse. Reynaldo was sent by his employer, the National
54
Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania as its liaison officer and Reynaldo
and Teresita then began to maintain a common law relationship of husband and
wife. On 1986, their daughter, Rosalind Therese, was born. While they were on a
brief vacation in the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married, and upon
their return to the United States, their second child, a son, this time, and given the
name Reginald Vince, was born on 1988. 

The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to separate. Instead
of giving their marriage a second chance as allegedly pleaded by Reynaldo,
Teresita left Reynaldo and the children and went back to California. Reynaldo
brought his children home to the Philippines, but because his assignment in
Pittsburgh was not yet completed, he was sent back by his company to Pittsburgh.
He had to leave his children with his sister, Guillerma Layug and her family. 

Teresita, meanwhile, decided to return to the Philippines and filed the petition for a
writ of habeas corpus against herein two petitioners to gain custody over the
children, thus starting the whole proceedings now reaching this Court. The trial
court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus. It suspended Teresita's parental
authority over Rosalind and Reginald and declared Reynaldo to have sole parental
authority over them but with rights of visitation to be agreed upon by the parties
and to be approved by the Court. 

Issue: Whether or not the petition for a writ of habeas corpus to gain custody over
the children be granted, No.

Ruling:
Supreme Court dismissed the writ of habeas corpus petition by the mother and
retain the custody of the children to the father. The illicit or immoral activities of
the mother had already caused emotional disturbances, personality conflicts, and
exposure to conflicting moral values against the children. 

The children are now both over seven years old. Their choice of the parent with
whom they prefer to stay is clear from the record. From all indications, Reynaldo is
a fit person. The children understand the unfortunate shortcomings of their mother
and have been affected in their emotional growth by her behavior.

55
In cases of care, custody, education and property of children, the latter’s welfare
shall be the paramount concern and that even a child under 7 years of age may be
ordered to be separated from the mother for compelling reasons.  The presumption
that the mother is the best custodian for a child under seven years of age is strong
but not conclusive.  At the time the judgment was rendered, the 2 children were
both over 7 years of age.  The choice of the child to whom she preferred to stay
must be considered.  It is evident in the records submitted that Rosalind chose to
stay with his father/aunt.  She was found of suffering from emotional shock caused
by her mother’s infidelity.  Furthermore, there was nothing in the records to show
that Reynaldo is unfit well in fact he has been trying his best to give the children
the kind of attention and care which their mother is not in the position to extend. 
On the other hand, the mother’s conviction for the crime of bigamy and her illicit
relationship had already caused emotional disturbances and personality conflicts at
least with the daughter.    

25. Orda vs. CA, GR No. 92625, Dec. 26, 1990;

Facts:
Private Respondent Gil Galang (Gil) filed a case with the Trial court of San Pablo
City in order to regain custody of his minor daughter who was staying with her
maternal grandparents, petitioner’s herein. Her mother had already died when the
case was initiated. The Trial Court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction
because the petitioners, Orda, had moved to Bataan, hence the court lost
jurisdiction. Subsequently, Gil commenced an original action for habeas
56
corpus with the Court of Appeals over his minor daughter. The Court of Appeals,
finding that based of the arguments presented by both parties, a full blown
trial is required, accordingly, the CA issued the assailed order remanding the
case to the RTC of San Pablo City. The Court of appeals later clarified the order
as a “referral” of the case to the RTC because it was an original case submitted to
it.

At the outset, it is necessary to point out that this Court entertained this petition for
Habeas Corpus in the exercise of its original jurisdiction over such case. Said
petition is in no way connected with the one dismissed by the lower court in SP-
719.

In their Motion for Clarification, [petitioners] appear to be confused by this Court's

directive remanding the case to the lower court.
It should be noted that when this Court ordered the same, it did not mean the
remanding of the records, but (the) referring (of) the case to the court a quo for
appropriate action, it enjoying original and concurrent jurisdiction with this Court
over habeas corpus cases (B.P. 129).

Judge Napoleon Flojo also appears to be mixed up as he issued an Order dated

January 27, 1989, which inter alia require the Chief, Archives Section of this Court
"to transmit" to the Regional Trial Court "the original record of case AC-G.R. No.
13912 immediately upon receipt of this order." (p. 106, Rollo) (sic) But no records
can be transmitted back to the lower court simply because no records were elevated
in that, as aforesaid, the case was filed here as an original action.

The [petitioners] have manifested in their motion that they were not given an
opportunity to answer or at least comment on the petition. Now the same is in the
lower court as directed in the decision sought to be clarified. Indeed, issues cannot
be joined if the lower court will deprive the [petitioners] (of) their right to respond
to the petition.

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals may refer a petition for habeas corpus
originally filed with it to the Regional Trial Court for a full-blown trial due to
conflicting facts presented by the parties.

57
Ruling:
While the case requires a full-blown trial of the facts, the same should be done in
the context of the special proceedings for custody of minors under Rule 99 of the
Rules of Court, and not a remand or referral of the original action for a writ of
habeas corpus filed with the respondent court. Parenthetically, the proper venue in
this action is the place where the petitioner therein resides.

Essentially, petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals has no power to issue the
decision remanding the proceedings to the trial court and the two subsequent
resolutions clarifying the same.
The assailed decision and the two resolutions of the Court of Appeals are not
supported by law and the Rules of Court. The provisions of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act (B.P. Blg. 129) cited by the respondent Court of Appeals in its
resolution dated 13 March 1990 are not in point. Sections 9(1) and 21 thereof
merely provide that the Court of Appeals and Regional Trial Courts, respectively,
exercise original jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus, among others. While
recognizing the concurrent original jurisdiction of both courts over habeas corpus
cases as special proceedings, these provisions are not authority for remanding or
referring to the latter original actions filed with the former.

On the contrary, the Court of Appeals is specifically given the power to receive
evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in
cases falling within its original jurisdiction. 11 Furthermore, under the Supreme
Court Resolution dated 11 February 1983 implementing B.P. Blg. 129 pending the
corresponding thorough revision of the Rules of Court, the Court of Appeals is
authorized to conduct a trial or hearing to receive evidence and for the purpose
shall observe the procedure prescribed for the trial courts. 12 Clearly, the Court of
Appeals should not have remanded or referred the petition for a writ of habeas
corpus to the trial court.
Finally, the questioned decision and resolutions go against the Revised Internal
Rules of the Court of Appeals. 13 Under Rule 6, Section 2(c) (5) thereof, the
proper procedure is as follows:

Attention is also directed to the fact that the foregoing provision is silent as to
whether or not the hearing may be delegated, unlike that of the provision on
annulment of judgments, Section 1(c)(3) of the same Rule, where, on motion of the
58
parties, referral of any of the issues to a Commissioner is allowed in accordance
with Rule 33 of the Rules of Court.

Under the foregoing disquisition, the Court of Appeals was in error in ordering the
remand and later on the referral of the original petition for habeas corpus filed with
it to the Regional Trial Court. What respondent court should have done was to
conduct the reception of evidence and pass upon the merits of the conflicting
allegations of the parties insofar as the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is
concerned.

While We agree with the conclusion reached by respondent court that the case
requires a full-blown trial of the facts, the same should be done in the context of
the special proceedings for custody of minors under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court,
and not a remand or referral of the original action for a writ of habeas corpus filed
with the respondent court. Parenthetically, the proper venue in this action is the
place where the petitioner therein resides. 14 Petitioners' third assigned error is
disposed of accordingly.

26. David vs. CA, GR No. 111180, Nov. 16, 1995;

Facts:
Petitioner Daisie T. David, secretary of private respondent had a relationship
Ramon R. Villar, a married businessman in Angeles City with four children.
Christopher J., was born on March 9, 1985 to them. Christopher J. was followed by
two more children, both girls, namely Christine, born on June 9, 1986, and Cathy
Mae on April 24, 1988. The relationship became known to private respondent's
wife when Daisie took Christopher J, to Villar's house at Villa Teresa in Angeles
City sometime in 1986 and introduced him to Villar's legal wife. After this, the
59
children of Daisie were freely brought by Villar to his house as they were
eventually accepted by his legal family. In the summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie
to allow Christopher J., then six years of age, to go with his family to Boracay.
Daisie agreed, but after the trip, Villar refused to give back the child. Villar said he
had enrolled Christopher J. at the Holy Family Academy for the next school year.
On July 30, 1991, Daisie filed a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of
Christopher J.

Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of Petitioner and gave Christopher J.’s
custody to her.

Court of Appeals reversed the Regional Trial Court ruling and stated that it is
for the best interest of Christopher J that he should temporarily remain under the
custody of respondent-appellant until the issue on custody and support shall have
been determined in a proper case.
Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner should have custody, Yes.

Ruling:
Rule 102, §1 of the Rules of Court provides that "the writ of habeas corpus shall
extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is
deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld
from the person entitled thereto." It is indeed true, as the Court of Appeals
observed, that the determination of the right to the custody of minor children is
relevant in cases where the parents, who are married to each other, are for some
reason separated from each other. It does not follow, however, that it cannot arise
in any other situation. For example, in the case of Salvaña v. Gaela,  it was held
that the writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy to enable parents to regain the
custody of a minor daughter even though the latter be in the custody of a third
person of her free will because the parents were compelling her to marry a man
against her will.

In the case at bar, Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at the time of his
conception, his father, private respondent Ramon R. Villar, was married to another
woman other than the child's mother. As such, pursuant to Art. 176 of the Family
60
Code, Christopher J. is under the parental authority of his mother, the herein
petitioner, who, as a consequence of such authority, is entitled to have custody of
him.  Since, admittedly, petitioner has been deprived of her rightful custody of her
child by private respondent, she is entitled to issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.

The fact that private respondent has recognized the minor child may be a ground
for ordering him to give support to the latter, but not for giving him custody of the
child. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, "no child under seven years of age shall
be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise." 

Nor is the fact that private respondent is well-off a reason for depriving petitioner
of the custody of her children, especially considering that she has been able to rear
and support them on her own since they were born. Petitioner is a market vendor
and a secretary at the Computer System Specialist, Inc. earning a monthly income
of P4,500.00. She has an arrangement with her employer so that she can personally
attend to her children. She works up to 8:00 o'clock in the evening to make up for
time lost during the day. That she receives help from her parents and sister for the
support of the three children is not a point against her. Cooperation, compassion,
love and concern for every member of the family are characteristics of the close
family ties that bind the Filipino family and have made it what it is.

Daisie and her children may not be enjoying a life of affluence that private
respondent promises if the child lives with him. It is enough, however, that
petitioner is earning a decent living and is able to support her children according to
her means.

In the case at bar, as has already been pointed out, Christopher J., being less than
seven years of age at least at the time the case was decided by the RTC, cannot be
taken from the mother's custody. Even now that the child is over seven years of
age, the mother's custody over him will have to be upheld because the child
categorically expressed preference to live with his mother. Under Art. 213 of
the Family Code, courts must respect the "choice of the child over seven years of
age, unless the parent chosen is unfit" and here it has not been shown that the
mother is in any way unfit to have custody of her child. Indeed, if private
respondent loves his child, he should not condition the grant of support for him on
61
the award of his custody to him (private respondent).

27.Zacarias vs. Cruz, GR No. L- 25899, Nov. 29, 1969;

Facts:
This is a case wherein, Petitioner Lourdes Zacarias seeks, by present petition for
habeas corpus, to nullify respondent judge’s order of arrest issued against her in a
criminal case filed before the CFI of Rizal. Her ground is that the respondent judge
issued the same without personally examining under oath or affirmation the
complainant and the witnesses in said case that violated a Constitutional provision.

62
Concededly, the order of arrest issued on January 24, 1966 by respondent judge
was upon a criminal information for estafa filed in court against petitioner
following a preliminary investigation conducted by respondent fiscal.

If only for the reasons that follow, the petition should be dismissed. She is at
liberty upon a P10,000-bail bond. She has heretofore pleaded to the information.

Issue: Whether or not the petition for the writ of habeas corpus should be denied,
Yes.

Ruling:

Posting of a bail bond constitutes waiver of any irregularity attending the arrest of
a person, estops him from discussing the validity of his arrest. In the recent case
of Luna vs. Plaza (1968), 26 SCRA 310, 321-322, our ruling is that where
petitioner has filed an application for bail and waived the preliminary investigation
proper, "he had waived his objection to whatever defect, if any, in the preliminary
examination conducted . . . prior to the issuance of the warrant of arrest." It makes
eminent sense to say that an accused in a criminal case who is at liberty on bail and
who had thus secured by judicial decree release which the high prerogative writ
of habeas corpus is intended to afford, may no longer avail of that remedy.

And then, nothing in the record suggests that petitioner herein ever moved to quash
the information upon the ground that by the defective arrest the court acquired no
jurisdiction over her person. And again, she is deemed to have waived lack of
jurisdiction over her person.4

There is the other fact that petitioner has already entered a plea of not guilty to the
information charging her with estafa. She is deemed to have foregone her right to
preliminary investigation and to have abandoned her right to question any
irregularity that surrounds it. By now, this is settled law.5

To be underscored here is that the absence of a preliminary investigation does not

impair the validity of a criminal information, does not otherwise render it
defective, does not affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case.6

WHEREFORE, the petition for the writ of habeas corpus is denied; the respondent
judge's order of arrest here complained of is hereby affirmed; and petitioner's
prayer to restrain respondents judge and fiscal from further proceeding with

63
Criminal Case C-1320 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Caloocan Branch,
entitled "People of the Philippines, Plaintiff, versus Lourdes F. Zacarias, Accused,"
is likewise denied.

28. Ong Huan Tin vs. Republic, GR No. 20997, April. 27, 1967;

Facts:
This is a case wherein the petitioner filed to change the name of Ong Huan Tin to
Teresita Tan (Special Proceeding 03521, Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court).
Due publication was had. The petition was set for hearing. But, before the petition
could be heard on the merits, the court, motu proprio, in its order of November 6,
1962 expressed the opinion "that an alien cannot avail himself of the provisions of

64
our Rules of Court relating to change of name" and thereupon denied the petition.
A move to reconsider was rejected in the court's order of November 24, 1962.
Offshoot is the present appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner alien, can petition for a change of name, No.

Ruling:
At issue is whether an alien may petition for a change of name. Primarily, this
question hinges on the proper interpretation of the word person as it is employed in
Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. This problem, by all means, is not new.

In a recent judicial test (In the Petition for the Change of Name of JOSELITO YU,
G.R. L-20874, May 25, 1966)* We held that Philippine citizenship of the applicant
is not a prerequisite for a petition to change name; and, that, accordingly, an alien
may petition for a change of name. There, this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice
Makalintal, declared:

Rule 103 does not say that only citizens of the Philippines may petition for a
change of name. [Neither does Public Act No. 1386 of the Philippine Commission
(enacted September 1, 1905) from which the Rule has been adopted.] Section 1
provides that "a person desiring to change his name shall present the petition to the
Court of First Instance of the province in which he resides, or, in the City of
Manila, to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court." Here the word "person" is
a generic term which is not limited to Filipino citizens, but embraces all natural
persons. The rule does not even require that the citizenship of the petitioner be
stated in his petition. It is enough that the petition be verified, signed by the
petitioner or some other person in his behalf, and set forth (a) that the petitioner
has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is filed for at least
three (3) years prior to the date of filing; (b) the cause for which the change of
name is sought; and (c) the name asked for (Section 2). The rule is clear and
affords no room for interpretation. It sets forth all the requirements, and Filipino
citizenship is not one of them.

The court a quo ruled that since the use of surnames is based on family rights, and
since under Article 15 of the Civil Code laws relating to family rights and duties,
or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of
65
the Philippines even though living abroad, the converse of the principle must be
recognized, that is to say, the same matters in respect of are alien must be governed
by the laws of his own country. The major premise of the proposition may be true
in a general sense: one's surname is usually that by which not only one as an
individual but one's family as well is known. Thus Title XIII of the Civil Code
(Articles 364 to 373) contains provision for the use of surnames by legitimate,
legitimated, illegitimate, and adopted children, as well as by women who are
married, widowed or legally separated from their husbands. But a change of name
as authorized under Rule 103 does not by itself define, or effect a change in, one's
existing family relations, or in the rights and duties flowing therefrom; nor does it
create new family rights and duties where none before were existing. It does not
alter one's legal capacity, civil status or citizenship. What is altered is only the
name, which in that word or combination of words by which a person is
distinguished from others and which he bears as the label or appellation for the
convenience of the world at large in addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing
with him (38 Am. Jur. 595). The situation is no different whether the person whose
name is changed be a citizen or an alien. To be sure, there could be instances
where the change applied for maybe open to objection by parties who already bear
the surname desired by the applicant, not because he would thereby acquire certain
family ties with them but because the existence of such ties might be erroneously
impressed on the public mind. But this is precisely the purpose of the judicial
application — to determine whether there is proper and reasonable cause for the
change of name. As held by this Court are several cases, in which pertinently
enough the petitioners were aliens, the change is not a matter of right but of
judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the
consequences that will likely follow (Ong Peng Oan vs. Republic, L-8035, Nov.
1957; Tan vs. Republic, L-16384, April 26, 1962; Ong Te vs. Republic, L-15549,
June 30, 1962; Moore vs. Republic, L-18407, June 26, 1963). In not one of those
cases, however, has it been ruled that an alien is not entitled to file a petition at
all."

2. Nonetheless, we pause to consider whether every alien in this country may

petition for a change of name.

Change of name — under our own law — is a special proceeding to establish the
status of a person involving his relations with others, that is, his legal position in,
66
or with regard to, the rest of the community. The petition therefor is directed
against all. It is in rem. So it is, that under Section 3 of Rule 103, publication of the
petition is required.

The broad general doctrine is that the status of an alien individual is governed and
controlled by the lex domicilii. Implicit in this precept is that an alien may be
allowed to change his name here only if he be domiciled in the Philippines. And
"domicile" means "permanent home, the place to which, whenever absent for
business or pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and
circumstances, in the sense that they disclose intent."

An alien who temporarily stays in the Philippines may not there avail of the right
to change his name. For, what good will that be if, after all, his stay will be for a
short period of time? It would not be of much benefit to him; court proceedings for
the purpose could yet be a useless ceremony; that salutary effects flowing from a
change of his social relation and condition may not thus be achieved. And then,
stock should be taken of the fact that in a change of name, third persons and the
State are concerned. Correct, then, it is to say that change of name is not temporary
in nature; the new name may not be shunted aside at will. We, accordingly, lay
down the rule that only alien domiciled in the Philippines may apply for change of
name in the courts thereof. Considering that the petition herein complies with the
requisites set forth in the Rules of Court, we vote to set aside the orders of the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of November 6, 1962 and November 24,
1962; and to direct said Court to proceed with the hearing and determination of
Special Proceeding 03521, entitled "In the Matter of the Petition to Change Name
of Ong Huan Tin to Teresita Tan."

29.Basas vs. Republic, GR No. 23595, Feb. 20, 1968;

Facts:
Appeal from a decision of the Court of Juvenile and Domestic Relations
dismissing the petition of Virginia Basas — hereinafter referred to as appellant —
for a change of names of the minors Antonio Ang Gui, Alberto Basas Ang, Ernesto
Basas Ang and Evelyn Basas Ang.

67
In her petition, appellant alleges that said minors are her children, born out of
wedlock, on August 23, 1953, July 4, 1956, December 17, 1958 and May 22, 1960,
respectively; that, although the children had been registered, in the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar of Manila, under the names aforementioned, they were
baptized as Antonio Chua, Jr., Alberto Chua, Jose Ernesto Chua y Basas, and
Evelyn Chua, respectively; and that these discrepancies, between their names as
registered in the aforementioned office and as entered in the records of the parish
churches in which they were, respectively, baptized, are "very confusing and may
mislead the people and the authorities of their true identities." Appellant prayed,
therefore, that the names of said minors be changed to Antonio Basas, Alberto
Basas, Ernesto Basas and Evelyn Basas.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can apply for change of name, NO.

Ruling:

This Court has previously ruled that aliens cannot avail themselves of Rule 103
(Sp. Proc. No. 03252, Sim Chi Tat, Petitioner), and that it will not entertain a
petition for a change of name when petitioner's citizenship is either controverted
or doubtful (Sp. Proc. No. 02915, Chua Mah Tuan, Petitioner). In a recent case
(Lim v. De la Rosa, L-17790, March 31, 1964) a statement made by the trial court
in a change of name proceedings to the effect that petitioner was a Filipino was
deemed by the Supreme Court to be an indication that petitioner was indeed a
Filipino. The ruling confirms the advisability of this court's denying a change of
name where a petitioner's claim of Filipino citizenship is open to doubt. Justice
J.B.L. Reyes, in Board vs. Domingo, G.R. No. L-21274, July 31, 1963, has said:

It is highly desirable that courts should at all times be keenly aware that certain
aliens are apt to resort to desperate means in order to obtain the benefits of Filipino
citizenship, and that they should ever endeavor to bar the possibility that judicial
proceedings should not be utilized to circumvent the policy of our Constitution and
statutes, even temporarily.

In the case at bar, the children involved would be Chinese citizens if they are
natural children, or if their parents are legally married. The Court has grave doubts
in respect of the allegation made in their behalf that they are illegitimate. Of late,
there has been a trend for claims of illegitimacy being made by children of Chinese

68
fathers and Filipino mothers with the obvious aim of obtaining judicial recognition,
however, indirect, that they are entitled to be considered Filipino citizens. The
Court has refunded to give due course to petitions based on such claim. Thus, the
following statements, among others, have been made:

The Chinese community, within the last few years has realized that there is an
advantage in alleging that Chinese nationals are not married to their Filipino wives,
to enable their children to claim Philippine citizenship without going through
naturalization proceedings. Oftentimes, the non-marriage or illegitimate status of
the children, is sought to be established indirectly through petitions for change of
surnames. Many instances have already come before this Court.

Lastly, the court believes that its discretion should be exercised against the instant
petition for the reason that it appears that the minors involved herein have been
baptized under a different family name. It can be presumed that Chinese children
from abroad have been brought, and are being brought, into this country, either
openly or surreptitiously, to assume the identity of children locally born. In most
instances, discrepancies are bound to appear. This Court would not like to confirm
that a child born under one name with an indicated father, and a child baptized
with another name, and with another indicated father, is one and the same person,
for the court might unwittingly give practical legality to a substitution of identity.

Considering that appellant's petition is based upon the premise that the persons
recorded in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila as Antonio Ang Gui,
Alberto Basas Ang, Ernesto Basas Ang and Evelyn Ang are the very same persons
baptized as Antonio Chua, Jr., Alberto Chua, Jose Ernesto Chua Basas and Evelyn
Chua, respectively; that the main evidence on the identity of the persons to whom
these two (2) sets of names correspond is appellant's own testimony, which the trial
Judge — who, having observed appellant's demeanor during the trial, was in a far
better position than we are, to gauge her truthfulness — found it hardly
convincing; that it has not been satisfactorily explained why the aforementioned
minors were allegedly baptized with a surname different from that appearing in
their respective birth certificates, as well as from that of their alleged mother and
alleged father; that the relief prayed for by appellant herein is predicated upon an
allegation of fact which cannot be determined without passing upon the filiation of
said minors, in relation to a man who is not a party in this proceedings, without
69
inquiring into the question whether he is guilty or not of concubinage, and without
affecting, not only their civil status, but, also, their nationality; and that the
question whether or not a change of name should be authorized is primarily
addressed, to the judgment, as well as to the discretion of the Court, 1 we do not see
how any interference on our part, on the action complained of the lower court can
be legally justified.

30. Go vs. Republic, GR No. L- 31760, May 25, 1977;

Facts:
This is a special proceeding for change of name. A summary of petitioner's
evidence is as follows: 

Gil Go was born in Tacloban City on September 1, 1942. His name in the civil
register is Gil Co. He was registered as the legitimate son of Co Beng Chiong and
70
Ong Sun Ti (mother) During liberation (Commonwealth, according to petitioner's
counsel), Co Beng Chiong, following a Chinese custom, allegedly adopted the
surname Yao of his godfather and changed his name to Yao Ka Sin. No
documentary evidence was presented on this point.

When Gil Go was baptized, he was allegedly given the name Gil Yao Eng Hua.
His baptismal certificate was not presented in evidence. Gil Go testified that since
childhood, he has been known as Henry Yao among his relatives, friends and
business associates, but in his business and government transactions, he used the
name Gil Co. No third person collaborated his testimony. He did not present any
documentary evidence to prove that he is known in the community as Henry Yao.

In his alien registration certificate (ACR), which was marked as Exhibit G but is
not found in the record (he withdrew it and did not present later the photostatic
copy which his counsel promised to offer as a substitute), he is registered as Gil Go
due to an alleged error of an immigration clerk. Because of the confusion
generated by those names, he wants legal authorization for the use of the name
Henry Yao.

On March 9, 1965 Gil Go filed the instant petition in the Court of First Instance of
Leyte. He prayed that his name be changed to Henry Yao. During the hearing, the
city fiscal opposed the petition. The lower court granted it (Special Proceeding No.
1042). The city fiscal appealed

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner should be allowed to change his name, No.

Ruling:
It was not indicated in the title or caption of Gil Go's petition that he desired to
change his name to Henry Yao. The published order setting his petition for hearing
reproduced that defective title. Nor was it indicated in his petition that his
registered name is Gil Co, a name which he allegedly used in his official
transactions (19 tsn). In his petition, he used the name Gil Go.

The proceeding for a change of name is a proceeding in rem. Jurisdiction to hear

and determine the petition for change of name is acquired after due Publication of
the order, setting it for hearing, which order should contain certain data, among
71
which is the name sought to be adopted, a matter which should be indicated in the
title of the petition (Pabellar vs. Republic, L27298, March 4, 1976, 70 SCRA 16).

The reason for that rule is that the ordinary reader only glances fleetingly at the
caption of the published order or the title of the petition in a special proceeding.
Only if the caption or the title strikes him does he proceed to read the contents of
the order. And the probability is great that he does not at all notice the other names
or aliases of the applicant if these are mentioned only in the body of the order or
petition. The non-inclusion of all the names or aliases of the applicant in the
caption of the order or in the title of the petition defeats the very purpose of the
required publication (Republic vs. Tanada, L- 31563, November 29, 1971, 42
SCRA 419).

Inasmuch as the title of the petition in this case and the order setting it for hearing
were deficient, the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over the proceeding
(Llerena Telmo vs. Republic, L-28549, September 23, 1976, 73 0. G. 39, 43).

On this score alone, the trial court's order granting the petition should be reversed.

2. Another ground for the reversal of the trial court's order is that the reasons
adduced by Gil Go and his evidence are insufficient to justify his change of name.

Change of name is a matter of public interest. It is a privilege and not a matter of

right. The court should weigh carefully the consequences of the change of name
and deny the same unless weighty reasons are shown. The State has an interest in
the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of Identification. (Ong
Peng Oan vs. Republic, 102 Phil. 468). Change of name may entail serious
consequences and cause some complications. It should be authorized only for
compelling reasons.

Gil Go (Gil Co's) assertion that he has used the name Henry Yao was not solidly
substantiated by any documentary evidence or by the testimony of other persons.
His uncorroborated evidence consisted only of his testimony and his birth
certificate where his surname is Co, not Go.

On the witness stand, he contradicted the allegation in paragraph 3 of his petition

72
(which he had verified) that he was "christened Gil Go". He testified that he was
christened Gil Yao Eng Hua.

He failed to prove the allegation in his petition that the change of his name to
Henry Yao is justified by "convenience and business reasons". As already
observed, he did not offer indubitable proof that he used the name Henry Yao, or
that his father was known as Yao Ka Sin. He used the name Gil Co in his school
records (13 tsn).

31.Republic vs. Hernandez, GR No. 117209, Feb. 9, 1996;

Facts:
That on March 10, 1994, herein private respondent spouses, Van Munson y
Navarro and Regina Munson y Andrade, filed a p petition to adopt the minor Kevin
Earl Bartolome Moran, duly alleging therein the jurisdictional facts required by
Rule 99 of the Rules of Court for adoption, their qualifications as and fitness to be
73
adoptive parents, as well as the circumstances under and by reason of which the
adoption of the aforenamed minor was sought. In the very same petition, private
respondents prayed for the change of the first name or said minor adoptee to Aaron
Joseph, the same being the name with which he was baptized in keeping with
religious tradition and by which he has been called by his adoptive family,
relatives and friends since May 6, 1993 when he arrived at private respondents'
residence.  At the hearing on April 18, 1994, petitioner opposed the inclusion of
the relief for change of name in the same petition for adoption. In its formal
opposition dated May 3, 1995, petitioner reiterated its objection to the joinder of
the petition for adoption and the petitions for change of name in a single
proceeding, arguing that these petition should be conducted and pursued as two
separate proceedings. After considering the evidence and arguments of the
contending parties, the trial court ruled in favor of herein private respondents.

Issue: Whether or not there is lawful ground for the change of name, Yes.

Ruling:

Clearly, the law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to bear the
surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption. It is the change of
the adoptee's surname to follow that of the adopter which is the natural and
necessary consequence of a grant of adoption and must specifically be contained in
the order of the court, in fact, even if not prayed for by petitioner. However,
the given or proper name, also known as the first or Christian name, of the
adoptee must remain as it was originally registered in the civil register. The
creation of an adoptive relationship does not confer upon the adopter a license to
change the adoptee's registered Christian or first name. The automatic change
thereof, premised solely upon the adoption thus granted, is beyond the purview of a
decree of adoption. Neither is it a mere incident in nor an adjunct of an adoption
proceeding, such that a prayer therefor furtively inserted in a petition for adoption,
as in this case, cannot properly be granted. The name of the adoptee as recorded in
the civil register should be used in the adoption proceedings in order to vest the
court with jurisdiction to hear and determine the same, 17 and shall continue to be
so used until the court orders otherwise. Changing the given or proper name of a
person as recorded in the civil register is a substantial change in one's official or
legal name and cannot be authorized without a judicial order. The purpose of the
statutory procedure authorizing a change of name is simply to have, wherever

74
possible, a record of the change, and in keeping with the object of the statute, a
court to which the application is made should normally make its decree recording
such change.  The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil
register is the name appearing therein. If a change in one's name is desired, this can
only be done by filing and strictly complying with the substantive and procedural
requirements for a special proceeding for change of name under Rule 103 of the
Rules of Court, wherein the sufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor can be
threshed out and accordingly determined. Under Rule 103, a petition for change of
name shall be filed in the regional trial court of the province where the person
desiring to change his name resides. It shall be signed and verified by the person
desiring his name to be changed or by some other person in his behalf and shall
state that the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the
petition is filed for at least three years prior to such filing, the cause for which the
change of name is sought, and the name asked for. An order for the date and place
of hearing shall be made and published, with the Solicitor General or the proper
provincial or city prosecutor appearing for the Government at such hearing. It is
only upon satisfactory proof of the veracity of the allegations in the petition and
the reasonableness of the causes for the change of name that the court may adjudge
that the name be changed as prayed for in the petition, and shall furnish a copy of
said judgment to the civil registrar of the municipality concerned who shall
forthwith enter the same in the civil register. A petition for change of name being a
proceeding in rem, strict compliance with all the requirements therefor is
indispensable in order to vest the court with jurisdiction for its adjudication. It is an
independent and discrete special proceeding, in and by itself, governed by its own
set of rules. A fortiori, it cannot be granted by means of any other proceeding. To
consider it as a mere incident or an offshoot of another special proceeding would
be to denigrate its role and significance as the appropriate remedy available under
our remedial law system.

32.Yasin vs. Sharia District Court, GR No. 94986, Feb. 23, 1995;

Facts:
On 5 May 1990, Hatima C. Yasin filed in the Shari'a District Court in Zamboanga
City a "Petition to resume the use of maiden name.” The respondent court ordered

75
amendments to the petition as it was not sufficient in form and substance in
accordance Rule 103, Rules of Court, regarding the residence of petitioner and the
name sought to be adopted is not properly indicated in the title thereof which
should include all the names by which the petitioner has been known. Hatima filed
a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order alleging that the petition filed is
not covered by Rule 103 of the Rules of Court but is merely a petition to resume
the use of her maiden name and surname after the dissolution of her marriage by
divorce under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, and after
marriage of her former husband to another woman. The respondent court denied
the motion since compliance to rule 103 is necessary if the petition is to be granted,
as it would result in the resumption of the use of petitioner’s maiden name and
surname.

Issue: Whether or not in the case of annulment of marriage, or divorce under the
Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, and the husband is married
again to another woman and the former desires to resume her maiden name or
surname, is she required to file a petition for change of name and comply with the
formal requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, No.

Ruling:
When a woman marries a man, she need not apply and/or seek judicial authority to
use her husband's name by prefixing the word "Mrs." before her husband's full
name or by adding her husband's surname to her maiden first name. The law grants
her such right (Art. 370, Civil Code). Similarly, when the marriage ties or
vinculum no longer exists as in the case of death of the husband or divorce as
authorized by the Muslim Code, the widow or divorcee need not seek judicial
confirmation of the change in her civil status in order to revert to her maiden name
as the use of her former husband's name is optional and not obligatory for her.
When petitioner married her husband, she did not change her name but only her
civil status. Neither was she required to secure judicial authority to use the
surname of her husband after the marriage, as no law requires it. The use of the
husband's surname during the marriage, after annulment of the marriage and after
the death of the husband is permissive and not obligatory except in case of legal
separation.

The court finds the petition to resume the use of maiden name filed by petitioner
76
before the respondent court a superfluity and unnecessary proceeding since the law
requires her to do so as her former husband is already married to another woman
after obtaining a decree of divorce from her in accordance with Muslim laws.

33. Republic vs. CA, GR No. 88202, Dec. 14, 1998;

Facts:
The petitioner was born at Capitol Medical Center in Quezon City on January 19,
1971 to parents Pablo Castro Vicencio and Fe Esperanza de Vega Leabres. On
77
January 10, 1927, after a marital disagreement, Vicencio left their Meycauayan
Bulacan conjugal property and never returned nor gave support to his family.
Leabres found an ally in Ernesto Yu who would later end up as her husband. On
June 29, 1976, Leabres filed a petition , known as Civil case number E-02009
with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court for the dissolution of her conjugal
partnership with Vicencio. In a decision given by Hon Regina C. Ordoñez Benitez
dated July 11, 1977, the petition was granted. The petitioner’s mother filed another
petition in 1983 to drop the surname of her husband therefrom and this, known as
Special Proclamation 8316346 was again approved in a decision rendered by Hon.
Emeterio C. Cui of Branch XXV. Yet again, under Special Proclamation number
84-22605, Leabres filed a petition to declare Pablo Vicencio an absentee. Hon.
Corona Ibay- Somera decided in favour of the petitioner’s mother on April 26,
1984. The positive results of these petitions paved the way for the marriage of the
petitioner’s mother and Ernesto Yu on April 15, 1986.

Evidence was established that the petitioner had not remembered much her real
father, Pablo Vicencio, and that in his absence, it was Ernesto Yu who had taken
Vicencio’s place. Although petitioner uses the surname Vicencio in her school and
other related activities, she contends that in such situations, confusion arose as to
her parentage leading to inquiries as to why she is using Vicencio as surname;
causing much embarrassment on her part. In two occasions when she ran as a
beauty contestant for Lion’s Club Affair and Manila Red Cross, her name was
registered as Cynthia L. Yu. His stepfather had given his consent thereto upon
prior consultation with him.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), having participated in the cross
examination of Cynthia Vicencio and her witnesses, manifested opposition over
the petition. The court argued that there was no valid cause for the denial of the
petition and that taking into account the fact that the court cannot compel the
stepfather of the petitioner to consider adoption, failure to observe the process
should not be a cause for disallowing petitioner to legally change her name, in
addition to the opportunity of the respondent to improve her personality and
welfare under a socially recognized surname, that of her stepfather. On August 31,
1987, the Manila Regional Trial Court Branch 52 granted private respondent
Cynthia Vicencio’s petition for change of surname from Vicencio to Yu. The same
was affirmed by the decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 28, 1989.
78
Issue: whether or not the respondent should be granted change of surname,
No.

Ruling:
Recognized inter alia in Republic vs. Hernandez, the following are sufficient
grounds to warrant a change in name ; a) when the name is ridiculous,
dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce , b) when the change is a
legal consequence of legitimation or adoption , c. ) when the change will avoid
confusion , d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by
a Filipino name and was unaware of an alien parentage, e) when the change is
based on sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase sign of former alienage,
in good faith without prejudice to anybody and f) when the surname causes
embarrassment and there is no showing that desired change of name was far a
fraudulent purpose or would prejudice public interest.
Private respondent asserts that she falls under one of the justifiable grounds,
specifically under avoidance of confusion since she has been recognized by society
as the daughter of Ernesto Yu although she admits to having used Vicencio in
beauty pageants and in her debut.

In the argument of the Solicitor General, it argues that change in surname might
give rise to legal complications since her stepfather has two other children with her
mother and such complications may affect even the issue of inheritance should the
stepfather die. The OSG further argues that change of name would be easy through
adoption which Ernesto Yu did not opt for.

The court contends that though confusion may arise with regard to parentage more
confusion with grave legal consequences could arise if private respondent is to use
his stepfather’s surname even if she is not legally adopted by him. Legal
constraints lead the court to reject private respondent’s desire to use her step-
father’s surname and no assurance exists that the end result would not be even
more detrimental to her person, as it may trigger deeper inquiries regarding her
parentage. It is also noteworthy that as a result of Republic Act 6809, the private
respondent although already 18 when the appellate court rendered its decision, was
still considered a minor.

79
The court reversed and set aside the appealed decision to allow private
respondent’s change of name from Vicencio to Yu and granted the instant petition
to retain surname due to lack of legally justifiable cause for allowing such change.

34. Haw Liong vs. Republic, GR No. 21194, April 24, 1966;

Facts: Haw Liong filed a petition in the CFI of Leyte to change his name to
Alfonso Lantin. He testified that he is 47 years old, married, and an employee of
the Leyte Asia Trading Company; that he has been a resident of Tacloban City for
more than 20 years; that he wants to change his name to Alfonso Lantin because he
is called by his Filipino friends as Alfonso and the name of his father is Placido
80
Lantin; that he wants to have a Filipino friends have been calling him Alfonso; that
there is no pending case against him as Haw Liong; and that in the event a case
will arise against him as Haw Liong he is willing to appear and answer the same.

CFI allowed petitioner to change his name but the government appealed.

Issue: Whether the petitioner has shown any proper and compelling reason that
may justify the request for a change of name?

Ruling: No
Before a person can be authorized to change the name given him either in his
certificate of birth or civil registry he must show proper or reasonable cause or any
compelling reason, which may justify such change. Otherwise, the request should
be denied. The following may be considered, among others, as proper or
reasonable causes that may warrant the grant of a petition for change of name: (1)
when the name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or is extremely difficult to
write or pronounce; (2) when the request for change is a consequence of a change
of status, such as when a natural child is acknowledged or legitimated; and (3)
when the change is necessary to avoid confusion.

The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals for purposes of
identification and that a change of name is a privilege and not a matter of right. So
that before a person can be authorized to change the name given him either in his
certificate of birth or civil registry he must show proper or reasonable cause or any
compelling reason which may justify such change. Otherwise, the request should
be denied. The following may be considered, among others, as proper or
reasonable cause that may warrant the grant of a petition for change of name; (1)
when the name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or is extremely difficult to
write or pronounce; (2) when the request for change is a consequence of a change
of status such as when a natural child is acknowledged or legitimated; and (3)
when the change is necessary to avoid confusion.

Petitioner has not shown any proper or compelling reason that may justify the
request for a change of name other than his desire to adopt the name Alfonso for
the reason that he has always been known by that name by his Filipino friends and
associates because that is the family name of his father which he desires to follow
81
to conform with the customs and traditions in the Philippines. But this claim,
which is merely supported by his own testimony, cannot overcome the fact that the
name given him from the very beginning is Haw Liong as in fact this is the name
that appears in his landing certificate. If he really is the son of one Placido Lantin,
a Filipino, it is strange that the name that was given him upon birth is Haw Liong
and he had to file a petition for naturalization to become a Filipino citizen. This
indirectly belies his claim that the name that should be given him is Alfonso Lantin
because that is the family name of his father "to conform with the customs and
traditions and also for sentimental reason."

35. Republic vs. IAC, GR No. L- 70513, Oct. 13, 1986;

Facts:

Claiming that they acquired the property by virtue of a document which they
alleged to be a Spanish title originally issued in the name of Bernardo Merchan, the
private respondents filed a complaint against petitioner Republic of the Philippines
for quieting of title over said property located in Quezon (1,660,000 sqm or 166
hectares).

82
The petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the trial court
had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case because the land is part of a
forest reserve established by Proclamation No. 42 and by Proclamation No. 716
which declared the area as part of the "Mts. Banahaw-San Cristobal National
Park." The motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court.

The private respondents filed a motion to declare the petitioner in default for
failure to file its answer within the reglementary period and for the appointment of
a Commissioner to receive their evidence, which was granted.

The petitioner filed a motion to lift the order of default which was denied by the
trial court. The petitioner filed MR of the aforesaid denial.

Meanwhile, Judge Manolo L. Maddela rendered a decision on December 18, 1975,

declaring the private respondents as owners of the land subject of the litigation.

On April 21, 1976, the trial court, presided over by Judge Delia P. Medina, issued
an order declaring as moot and academic petitioner's motion for reconsideration of
the order denying the motion to lift the order of default in view of this Court's
resolution declaring null and void all judicial acts, decisions, orders and resolutions
performed, promulgated and issued after January 2, 1976, by then Judge Manolo L.
Maddela. In the same order, Judge Medina required the petitioner to file a reply to
the private respondents' opposition to its motion to set aside the decision of
December 18, 1975. The petitioner filed its reply on May 10, 1976.

Petitioner's motion to set aside the decision dated December 18, 1975 of the trial
court which rendered judgment in private respondents' favor was granted by the
court on July 23, 1976, thereby vacating and setting aside the questioned decision
and the order of default. In the same order, the petitioner was required to file its
answer to the complaint which it did.

Private respondents filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction against Judge Medina. IAC issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining respondent judge from further proceeding
with the case. Meanwhile, the private respondents six months after the effectivity
of P.D. No. 892, filed an application for the registration of the parcel of land. This
was docketed as Land Registration Case No. N-1055. IAC denied the aforesaid
petition for certiorari and lifted the restraining order. Case remanded to RTC.

83
The trial court, this time presided by Judge Benigno M. Puno, issued an order
setting the case for pre-trial. For failure of petitioner's counsel to attend the
scheduled hearing, the trial court issued an order declaring the said failure as a
waiver to present evidence and to cross-examine the private respondents' witnesses
and declared the case submitted for decision.

RTC rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant.

The petitioner appealed to the then IAC which affirmed the judgment of the
trial court.

Issue: W/N the subject parcel of land which was declared a part of the forest
reserve in 1921 and later a national park in 1941 may be subject of private
appropriation and registration.

Ruling:

It is already a settled rule that forest lands or forest reserves are not capable of
private appropriation, and possession thereof, however long, cannot convert them
into private property unless such lands are reclassified and considered disposable
and alienable by the Director of Forestry (now DENR).

In this case, there is no proof of reclassification by the Director of Forestry that the
land in question is disposable or alienable. Furthermore, with the passage of
Presidential Decree No. 892, effective February 16, 1976, Spanish Titles can no
longer be used as evidence of land ownership. Under the same decree, lands not
under the Torrens System shall be considered as unregistered.

36. Padilla vs. Republic, No. L- 28274, April 30, 1982;

Facts:
This is an appeal by the State from the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga perfected before the effectivity of Republic Act No. 5440 — granting
the petition of Dolores Gemora for change of surname of her minor children:
Michael, Abigail, Rafael, Gabriel and Annabelle, from "Copuaco" or "Co" to
"Padilla."

Dolores Gemora and Vincent Co, a Chinese national, were married on May 5,

84
1954. This matrimonial union begot five children, namely: Michael Copuaco,
Abigail Copuaco, Rafael Copuaco, Gabriel Copuaco, and Annabelle Co.

Sometime in November 1960, Vincent Co left the conjugal abode in Caloocan City
and has since never returned to, or even visited, his family. It is alleged that he was
a fugitive from justice, having been charged with several offenses of estafa before
the Court of First Instance of Manila 1 and the City Court of Caloocan City.

Because of his continuous absence, the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, on

petition of Dolores Gemora, issued an order dated December 29, 1964 in Sp. Proc.
No. 1776, declaring Vincent Co as an absentee.

On October 30, 1965, Dolores Gemora contracted a second marriage with Sgt.
Edward Padilla, an American serviceman stationed at Clark Air Base, Angeles
City. The five minor children, who had been living with said spouses, were
generously supported by Padilla and were treated by him with affection as if they
were his own children.

Issue: Whether petition for change of the minors’ surname from Copuaco or Co to
Padilla should be granted.

Ruling:
Our laws do not authorize legitimate children to adopt the surname of a person
who is not their father. Article 364 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that
"legitimate children . . . shall principally use the surname of their father.’’

To allow said minors to adopt the surname of their mother’s second husband, who
is not their father, could result in confusion in their paternity. It could also create
the suspicion that said minors, who were born during the coverture of their mother
with her first husband, were in fact sired by her second husband, thus bringing
their legitimate status into discredit.

The instant action taken by petitioner in behalf of her minor children is premature.
Indeed, the matter of change of their surname should be left to the judgment and
discretion of the children themselves when they reach the age of maturity. If in

85
their adulthood they want to change their surname, then they themselves or any of
them may take such appropriate action as the law may permit.

37. Calderon vs. Republic, GR No. 18127, April 5, 1967;

Facts:

This is an appeal by the Solicitor General from the order of the Court of First
Instance of Davao granting the petition of petitioner-appellee, Gertrudes Josefina
del Prado, for a change of name.

On July 23, 1959, Gertrudes Josefina del Prado, a minor, through her mother and
natural guardian, Corazon Adolfo Calderdon, filed a petition in the Court of First
Instance of Davao, praying that her name "Gertrudes Josefina del Prado" be

86
changed to "Getrudes Josefina Calderon." It is alleged in the petition that the
petitioner is an illegitimate child, born on March 17, 1956, out of a bigamous
marriage contracted by Manuel del Prado with Corazon Adolfo; that the surname
"Del Prado" which the petitioner carries is a stigma of illegitimacy, by reason of
which she has become the subject of unfair comments; that the surname which the
petitioner carries would constitute a handicap in her life in later years, and would
give cause for constant irritation in her social relations with other people; that
petitioner is living with her mother who is now married to Engineer Romeo C.
Calderon; and that it is the desire of the petitioner to have her surname changed
from "Del Prado" to "Calderon "which is the surname of her foster father, the
husband of her mother.

The publication of the order for the hearing of the petition was duly made.

On July 11, 1960, the Provincial Fiscal of Davao, representing the Solicitor
General, filed an opposition to the petition upon the ground that the change of
surname of the petition is unwarranted, considering that said petitioner was born
out of a bigamous marriage and as such she has the status of an acknowledged
natural child by legal fiction and under the law she should bear the surname of her
father Manuel del Prado; and that the change of the surname of the petitioner
would be prejudicial to the rights and interest which she has by virtue of the
judgment in Civil Case No. 2272 of the Court of First Instance of Davao, annulling
the marriage of her mother, Corazon Adolfo, to Manuel del Prado, and would also
be prejudicial to her rights as conferred upon her by law. Counsel for the petitioner
filed in reply to the opposition, the provincial fiscal filed a supplemental
opposition, and counsel for the petitioner filed a reply to the supplemental
opposition.1äwphï1.ñët

After hearing the court a quo issued an order, under date of July 28, 1960, granting
the petition and ordering the change of the name of the petitioner from "Gertrudes
Josefina, del Prado," to "Gertrudes Josefina Calderon." The dispositive portion of
the order of the court further states: "This order, however, shall not operate to
deprive the petitioner of her status, rights and obligations as recognized by law."

From the above-mentioned order the provincial fiscal, representing the Solicitor
General, appealed to this Court.

87
In this appeal the Solicitor General contends (1) that the lower court erred in
finding as proper and reasonable ground for the change of the surname of the
petitioner the reason that petitioner's present surname carries the stigma of
illegitimacy, and (2) that the lower court erred in declaring "that although the law
is specific that petitioner shall principally use the surname of the father yet it does
not follow that petitioner is prohibited from using other surnames when justified."1

Issue: Whether the lower court's order granting the petition is, based upon "proper
and reasonable cause" as required by Section 5 of Rule 103 of the new Rules of
Court.

Ruling:

The lower court found that petitioner Gertrudes Josefina del Prado was born on
March 17, 1956, an illegitimate child of Manuel del Prado and Corazon Adolfo as
a result of their bigamous marriage which was annulled on July 18, 1957, after a
judgment of conviction of said Manuel del Prado on the complaint for bigamy on
December 5, 1956; that subsequently, on December 26, 1957, Corazon Adolfo,
mother of the petitioner, got married to Romeo C. Calderon; that the petitioner is
living with her mother and her foster father; and that Romeo C. Calderon declared
in open court his consent to the petitioner's adopting his surname, especially so
because he is the one supporting her. The lower court says, "In the opinion of the
Court the reasons adduced by the petitioner are valid and will redound to the best
interests of said minor who after all is not at fault to have come to this world as an
illegitimate child."

We agree with the court a quo. A petition to change the name of an infant, as in
this case, should be granted only where to do so is clearly for the best interest of
the child. When the mother of the petitioner filed the instant petition she had in
mind what she believed was for the best interest of her child considering that her
husband Romeo C. Calderon is the one supporting the child and that he is
agreeable to the child's using his surname. The mother had considered the generous
attitude of her husband as an opportunity for her to promote the personality, and
enhance the dignity, of her daughter, by eliminating what constitutes a stigma of
illegitimacy which her child would continue to bear if her surname is that of her
illegitimate father.

88
The Solicitor General, in his brief, avers that the evident purpose of petitioner in
seeking a change of her surname is to conceal her status as an illegitimate child and
that any attempt to conceal illegitimacy cannot be motivated by good faith and an
honest purpose. The Solicitor General further alleges that to authorize the change
of the name of the petitioner would be to sanction a misrepresentation because the
petitioner wants to appear as if she is the daughter of Romeo C. Calderon. We
cannot agree with the view of the Solicitor General. The Solicitor General seems to
support the idea that since the petitioner has the misfortune of being born
illegitimate she must bear that stigma of illegitimacy as long as she lives. That idea
should not be countenanced. Justice dictates that every person be allowed to avail
of any opportunity to improve his social standing as long as in so doing he does not
cause prejudice or injury to the interests of the State or of other people.

The Solicitor General also contends that the status of the petitioner is that of a
natural child by legal fiction and under Article 367 of the Civil Code she shall
principally enjoy the surname of the father. We agree with the lower court when it
said that "While it is true that the Code provides that a natural child by legal fiction
as the petitioner herein shall principally enjoy the surname of the father, yet, this
does not mean that such child is prohibited by law, from taking another surname
with the latters consent and for justifiable reasons." If under the law a legitimate
child may secure a change of his name through judicial proceedings, upon a
showing of a "proper and reasonable cause", We do not see any reason why a
natural child cannot do the same. The purpose of the law in allowing a change of
name, as contemplated by the provisions of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, is to
give a person an opportunity to improve his personality and to promote his
interests. We are satisfied that the facts and circumstances as borne out by the
record amply justify the change of the surname of the petitioner, as ordered by the
lower court . We have held that the matter whether to grant or deny a petition for a
change of name is left to the sound discretion of the court, 2 and in the present case
We believe that the court a quo has exercised its discretion in a judicious way
when it granted the petition.

The Solicitor General expresses an apprehension that because the petitioner here is
of tender age, who cannot as yet understand and appreciate the value of the change
of her name, may be prejudiced in her rights under the law. This apprehension is

89
dispelled by the pronouncement of this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice
Makalintal, as follow:

... But a change of name as authorized under Rule 103 does not by itself
define, or affect a change in, one's existing family relations, or in the rights
and duties flowing therefrom; nor does it create new family rights and duties
where none before was existing. It does not alter one's legal capacity, civil
status, or citizenship. What is altered is only the name, which is that word or
combination of words by which a person is distinguished from others and
which he bears as a label or appellation for the convenience of the world at
large in addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him (38 Am. Jur.
596). (In Re Petition for Change of Name of Joselito Yu, Juan S. Barrera vs.
Republic of the Philippines, L-20874, May 25, 1966)

In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is affirmed, without

pronouncement as to the costs. It is so ordered.

38. Naldoza vs. Republic, GR No. L- 55538, March 15, 1982;

Facts:
Zosima Naldoza and Dionesio Divinagracia were married. They begot two
children. After a quarrel between the spouses, Dionesio left the conjugal home and
never returned. He allegedly swindled Congressman Maglana and other persons.

90
The classmates of the two children were allegedly teased about their father being a
swindler. Two criminal cases for estafa were filed in court against the father.

Zosima, on August 10, 1978, filed in the CFI of Bohol a petition wherein she
prayed that the surname of her two children be changed from Divinagracia to
Naldoza, her surname. The trial court dismissed the petition.
Zosima appealed to this Court.

Issue: Whether the children should be allowed to drop the surname of their father
and be allowed to use the mother’s surname?

Ruling:
No. We hold that the trial court did not err in denying the petition for change of
name. To allow the change of surname would cause confusion as to the minors'
parentage and might create the impression that the minors are illegitimate since
they would carry the maternal surname only. That would be inconsistent with their
legitimate status as indicated in their birth records.

As was said in that In re Epstein 200 N.Y.S. 897, "the child should, and in the
course of time must, know of his parentage. " If, when he fully appreciates the
circumstances and is capable of selecting a name for himself, he wants to use his
mother's surname only and to avoid using his father's surname, then he should be
the one to apply for a change of surname

39. Reyes vs. Alejandro, No. L- 32026, Jan. 16, 1986;

Facts:

This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Cavite dismissing
the petition filed by petitioner-appellant Erlinda Reynoso Reyes to have her
husband Roberto Reyes declared an absentee.

91
In a petition filed on October 25, 1969 Erlinda Reynoso prayed for the declaration
of the absence of her husband Roberto L. Reyes alleging that her husband had been
absent from their conjugal dwelling since April 1962 and since then had not been
heard from and his whereabouts unknown. The petition further alleged that her
husband left no will nor any property in his name nor any debts.

The evidence presented by petitioner in support of her petition established that she
and Roberto L. Reyes were married on March 20, 1960; that sometime in April
1962 her husband left the conjugal home due to some misunderstanding over
personal matters; that since then petitioner has not received any news about the
whereabouts of her husband; that they have not acquired any properties during
their marriage and that they have no outstanding obligation in favor of anyone; that
her only purpose in filing the petition is to establish the absence of her husband,
invoking the provisions of Rule 107 of the New Rules of Court and Article 384 of
the Civil Code.

After hearing the Court a quo dismissed the petition on the ground that since
Roberto L. Reyes left no properties there was no necessity to declare him judicially
an absentee.

The same observation and commentary can be said of the corresponding

complimenting provisions of Rule 107 of the Rules of Court, particularly Sections
6 and 7 thereof which make it mandatory upon the Court to appoint a
representative, trustee or administrator who shall safeguard the rights and interest
of the absentee.

Considering that neither the petition alleges, nor the evidence shows, that Roberto
L. Reyes has any rights, interest or property in the Philippines, there is no point in
judicially declaring him an absentee.

Issue: Whether the lower court committed reversible error in its decision

Ruling:

We affirm the order of the lower Court dismissing the petition. As this Court said
in Jones vs. Hortiguela, 64 Phil. 197: For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it
is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee. The

92
declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code
has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the necessary precautions for the
administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage,
however, the law only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven
consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does
not know his or her former spouse to he living, that such former spouse is
generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at the time of the
celebration of the marriage (section III, paragraph 2, General Orders, No. 68). (On
page 183).

The need to have a person judicially declared an absentee is when he has properties
which have to be taken cared of or administered by a representative appointed by
the Court (Article 384, Civil Code); the spouse of the absentee is asking for
separation of property (Article 191, Civil Code) or his wife is asking the Court that
the administration of an classes of property in the marriage be transferred to her
(Article 196, Civil Code). The petition to declare the husband an absentee and the
petition to place the management of the conjugal properties in the hands of the
wife may be combined and adjudicated in the same proceedings, Peyer vs.
Martinez, 88 Phil. 72, 80).

40. Republic vs. Valencia, No. L- 32181, March 5, 1986;

Facts:

93
Leonor Valencia in behalf of her minor children Bernardo and Jessica Go filed a
petition for the cancellation and/or correction of entries of their birth in the Civil
Registry in the City of Cebu. The Trial Court issued an order directing the
publication of the petition and the date of hearing in a newspaper of general
circulation in the city and province of Cebu once a week for three consecutive
weeks and notice was duly served on the SolGen, the Local Civil Registrar and Go
Eng. The petition seeks to change the nationality or citizenship of Bernardo and
Jessica from Chinese to Filipino and their status from Legitimate to Illegitimate
and changing also the status of the mother from married to single. The Local Civil
Registrar avers that the corrections sought are not merely clerical but substantial,
involving as they do the citizenship and status of the minors and the status of the
mother.

The Trial Court granted the petition.

Issue: Whether the proceedings that took place could be regarded as proper suit or
appropriate action for cancellation and/or correction of entries in the civil register.

Ruling:
Yes. The persons who must be made parties to a proceeding concerning the
cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register are-(1) the civil registrar,
and (2) all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected
thereby. Upon the filing of the petition, it becomes the duty of the court to-(l) issue
an order fixing the time and place for the hearing of the petition, and (2) cause the
order for hearing to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province. The following are likewise
entitled to oppose the petition: (I) the civil registrar, and (2) any person having or
claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought.

If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for correction
and/or cancellation of entries in the record of birth even if filed and conducted
under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court can no longer be described as
"summary". There can be no doubt that when an opposition to the petition is filed
either by the Civil Registrar or any person having or claiming any interest in the
entries sought to be cancelled and/or corrected and the opposition is actively
prosecuted, the proceedings thereon become adversary proceedings.
94
The decision of the TC was affirmed by the SC.

41. Modequilla vs. Breva, GR No. 86355, May 31, 1990;

Facts:

95
Petitioners Jose Modequillo and Benito Malubay were ordered to pay jointly and
severally to plaintiff- apellants pertaining to damages arising from a vehicular
accident killing Audie Salinas and injuring Renato Culan.

On July 7, 1988, the sheriff levied a parcel of residential land located at Poblacion
Malalag Surigao Del Sur registered in the name of Jose Modequillo.

A Motion to quash and/or to set aside the levy of execution was filed by
Modequillo alleging therein that the residential land is where their family home is
built since 1969 prior to the commencement of this case and as such is exempt
from execution, forced sale or attachment under Articles 152 and 153 of the
Family Code except for the liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof and that the
judgement debt sought to be enforced against the family home of Modequillo is not
one of those enumerated under Article 155 of the Family Code.

Respondents on the other hand say that the said house and lot only became a
family home in 1988 when the Family Code took effect. They say that under the
Civil Code, the house and lot did not qualify as a family home since the Family
Code provision on family homes do not retroact.

RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners.

CA affirmed the RTC.

Issue: Whether or not the Family Code provisions on family homes have a
retroactive application

Ruling:
No. The house and lot became a family home upon the effectivity of the Family
Code in August 3, 1988 but it does not mean that all family residences not
considered as family homes prior to the Family Code would be retroactively
deemed as family homes at the time of their occupation. Since the debt which arose
from the time of the vehicular accident (March 16, 1976) and the judgement was
before the effectivity of the Family Code (August 3, 1988), it is not exempt from
execution.
*not a family home when the debt was incurred = not exempt*
96
 42. Manacop vs. CA, GR No. 10485, Nov. 13, 1992;

Facts:

97
Florante Manacop and his wife Euaceli purchased on March 1972, a residential lot
with a bungalow located in Quezon City.  The petitioner failed to pay the sub-
contract cost pursuant to a deed of assignment signed between petitioner’s
corporation and private respondent herein (FF Cruz & Co).  The latter filed a
complaint for the recovery for the sum of money with a prayer for preliminary
attachment against the former.  Consequently, the corresponding writ for the
provisional remedy was issued which triggered the attachment of a parcel of land
in Quezon City owned by the Manacop Construction President, the petitioner.  The
latter insists that the attached property is a family home having been occupied by
him and his family since 1972 and is therefore exempt from attachment.

Issue: Whether the subject property is indeed exempted from attachment.

Ruling:

The residential house and lot of petitioner became a family home by operation of
law under Article 153 of the Family Code.  Such provision does not mean that said
article has a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences, petitioner’s
included, are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their
occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and henceforth, are exempt
from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988.  Since petitioner incurred debt in 1987, it
preceded the effectivity of the Code and his property is therefore not exempt form
attachment.

The petition was dismissed by SC

43. Taneo, Jr. vs. CA GR No. 108532, March 9, 1999;

Facts:
98
As a result of a judgment in Civil Case for recovery of property in favor of private
respondent, two (2) petitioner's properties were levied to satisfy the judgment
amount of about P5,000.00: one was a parcel of land located in Barrio Igpit,
Municipality of Opol, Misamis Oriental with an area of about five (5) hectares, and
the other was the family home also located at Igpit, Opol, Misamis Oriental.
To forestall such conveyance, petitioners filed an action to declare the deed of
conveyance void and to quiet title over the land with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction. In their complaint, it was alleged that petitioners are the
children and heirs of Pablo Taneo and Narcisa Valaceras who died on February 12,
1977 and September 12, 1984, respectively.

Petitioners further alleged that they were in continuous, open and peaceful
possession of the land and that on February 9, 1968, Deputy Provincial Sheriff Jose
V. Yasay issued a Sheriffs Deed of Conveyance in favor of the private respondent
over the subject property including their family home which was extrajudicially
constituted in accordance with law. As a result of the alleged illegal deed of
conveyance, private respondent was able to obtain in his name Tax Declaration
No. 851920 over the land, thus casting a cloud of doubt over the title and
ownership of petitioners over said property.
In its decision of March 27, 1989, the RTC dismissed the complaint. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC.

Issue: Whether the property was illegally conveyed because it was part of the
petitioners’ family home

Ruling:
No. A family home is the dwelling place of a person and his family. It is said,
however, that the family home is a real right, which is gratuitous, inalienable and
free from attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and the land on which it
is situated, which confers upon a particular family the right to enjoy such
properties, which must remain with the person constituting it and his heirs. It
cannot be seized by creditors except in certain special cases.

While Article 153 of the Family Code provides that the family home is deemed
constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence, it
does not mean that said article has a retroactive effect such that all existing family
99
residences, petitioners included, are deemed to have been constituted as family
homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code
and henceforth, are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred
before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 (Modequillo vs.
Breva, 185 SCRA 766). Neither does Article 162 of said Code state that the
provisions of Chapter 2, Title V thereof have retroactive effect. It simply means
that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code
are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded
to a family home under the Family Code (Modequillo vs. Breva, supra). Since
petitioners debt was incurred as early as November 25, 1987, it preceded the
effectivity of the Family Code. His property is therefore not exempt from
attachment (Annex O, Plaintiffs Position Paper and Memorandum of Authorities,
p. 78). (pp. 5-6, Decision; pp. 64-65, Rollo) (underscoring ours)
The applicable law, therefore, in the case at bar is still the Civil Code where
registration of the declaration of a family home is a prerequisite. Nonetheless, the
law provides certain instances where the family home is not exempted from
execution, forced sale or attachment.

The trial court found that on March 7, 1964, Pablo Taneo constituted the house in
question, erected on the land of Plutarco Vacalares, as the family home. The
instrument constituting the family home was registered only on January 24, 1966.
The money judgment against Pablo Taneo was rendered on January 24, 1964.
Thus, at that time when the debt was incurred, the family home was not yet
constituted or even registered. Clearly, petitioners alleged family home, as
constituted by their father is not exempt as it falls under the exception of Article
243(2).

44. Heirs of Ypon vs. Ricaforte, GR No. 198680, July 8, 2013;

Facts:

100
On July 29, 2010, petitioners, together with some of their cousins, [4] filed a
complaint for Cancellation of Title and Reconveyance with Damages (subject
complaint) against respondent Gaudioso Ponteras Ricaforte a.k.a. "Gaudioso E.
Ypon" (Gaudioso), docketed as Civil Case No. T-2246.[5] In their complaint, they
alleged that Magdaleno Ypon (Magdaleno) died intestate and childless on June 28,
1968, leaving behind Lot Nos. 2-AA, 2-C, 2-F, and 2-J which were then covered
by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-44 and T-77-A. [6] Claiming to be the
sole heir of Magdaleno, Gaudioso executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and
caused the cancellation of the aforementioned certificates of title, leading to their
subsequent transfer in his name under TCT Nos. T-2637 and T-2638, [7] to the
prejudice of petitioners who are Magdaleno's collateral relatives and successors-in-
interest.

In his Answer, Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful son of Magdaleno as

evidenced by: (a) his certificate of Live Birth; (b) two (2) letters from Polytechnic
School; and (c) a certified true copy of his passport. [9] Further, by way of
affirmative defense, he claimed that: (a) petitioners have no cause of action against
him; (b) the complaint fails to state a cause of action; and (c) the case is not
prosecuted by the real parties-in-interest, as there is no showing that the petitioners
have been judicially declared as Magdaleno's lawful heirs

The RTC Ruling

On July 27, 2011, the RTC issued the assailed July 27, 2011 Order, [11] finding that
the subject complaint failed to state a cause of action against Gaudioso.  It
observed that while the plaintiffs therein had established their relationship with
Magdaleno in a previous special proceeding for the issuance of letters of
administration,[12] this did not mean that they could already be considered as the
decedent's compulsory heirs. Quite the contrary, Gaudioso satisfactorily
established the fact that he is Magdaleno's son and hence, his compulsory heir
through the documentary evidence he submitted which consisted of: (a) a marriage
contract between Magdaleno and Epegenia Evangelista; (b) a Certificate of Live
Birth; (c) a Letter dated February 19, 1960; and (d) a passport

The plaintiffs therein filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however,

101
denied on August 31, 2011 due to the counsel's failure to state the date on which
his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certificate of Compliance was issued

Issue: Whether or not the RTC's dismissal of the case on the ground that the
subject complaint failed to state a cause of action was proper.

Ruling:

Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right
of another. It is well-settled that the existence of a cause of action is determined by
the allegations in the complaint.[17] In this relation, a complaint is said to assert a
sufficient cause of action if, admitting what appears solely on its face to be correct,
the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief prayed for. [18]Accordingly, if the
allegations furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the
same should not be dismissed, regardless of the defenses that may be averred by
the defendants

As stated in the subject complaint, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs
therein, alleged that they are the lawful heirs of Magdaleno and based on the same,
prayed that the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Gaudioso be declared
null and void and that the transfer certificates of title issued in the latter's favor be
cancelled. While the foregoing allegations, if admitted to be true, would
consequently warrant the reliefs sought for in the said complaint, the rule that the
determination of a decedent's lawful heirs should be made in the corresponding
special proceeding[20] precludes the RTC, in an ordinary action for cancellation of
title and reconveyance, from granting the same. In the case of Heirs of Teofilo
Gabatan v. CA,[21] the Court, citing several other precedents, held that the
determination of who are the decedent's lawful heirs must be made in the proper
special proceeding for such purpose, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of
ownership and/or possession, as in this case:

Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the
deceased must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in
an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of property. This
must take precedence over the action for recovery of possession and ownership.
The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of
102
heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be
made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules
of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while
a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a
right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship
can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are
seeking the establishment of a status or right.

In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera, this Court ruled that the declaration of
heirship must be made in a special proceeding, and not in an independent civil
action. This doctrine was reiterated in Solivio v. Court of Appeals x x x:

In the more recent case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes, the Court
reiterated its ruling that matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship
must be ventilated in the proper probate court in a special proceeding
instituted precisely for the purpose of determining such rights. Citing the case
of Agapay v. Palang, this Court held that the status of an illegitimate child who
claimed to be an heir to a decedent's estate could not be adjudicated in an ordinary
civil action which, as in this case, was for the recovery of property. [22] (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for the
determination of heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as
when the parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial
court and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the
RTC had consequently rendered judgment thereon,[23] or when a special proceeding
had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, and hence, cannot
be re-opened.[24]

In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar nature, appear to
exist. Hence, there lies the need to institute the proper special proceeding in order
to determine the heirship of the parties involved, ultimately resulting to the
dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246.

Verily, while a court usually focuses on the complaint in determining whether the
103
same fails to state a cause of action, a court cannot disregard decisions material to
the proper appreciation of the questions before it. [25] Thus, concordant with
applicable jurisprudence, since a determination of heirship cannot be made in an
ordinary action for recovery of ownership and/or possession, the dismissal of Civil
Case No. T-2246 was altogether proper. In this light, it must be pointed out that the
RTC erred in ruling on Gaudioso's heirship which should, as herein discussed, be
threshed out and determined in the proper special proceeding. As such, the
foregoing pronouncement should therefore be devoid of any legal effect.

45.Pacioles Jr. vs. Chuatoco Ching, GR No. 127920, Aug. 9, 2005;

Facts:

On March 13, 1992, Miguelita died intestate, leaving real properties with an
estimated value of ₱10.5 million, stock investments worth ₱518,783.00, bank

104
deposits amounting to ₱6.54 million, and interests in certain businesses. She was
survived by her husband, petitioner herein, and their two minor children.

Consequently, on August 20, 1992, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified
petition4 for the settlement of Miguelita’s estate. He prayed that (a) letters of
administration be issued in his name, and (b) that the net residue of the estate be
divided among the compulsory heirs.

Miguelita’s mother, Miguela Chuatoco-Ching, herein respondent, filed an

opposition, specifically to petitioner’s prayer for the issuance of letters of
administration on the grounds that (a) petitioner is incompetent and unfit to
exercise the duties of an administrator; and (b) the bulk of Miguelita’s estate is
composed of "paraphernal properties." Respondent prayed that the letters of
administration be issued to her instead.5 Afterwards, she also filed a motion for her
appointment as special administratrix.6

Petitioner moved to strike out respondent’s opposition, alleging that the latter has
no direct and material interest in the estate, she not being a compulsory heir, and
that he, being the surviving spouse, has the preferential right to be appointed as
administrator under the law.7

Respondent countered that she has direct and material interest in the estate because
she gave half of her inherited properties to Miguelita on condition that both of
them "would undertake whatever business endeavor they decided to, in the
capacity of business partners."8

In her omnibus motion9 dated April 23, 1993, respondent nominated her

son Emmanuel Ching to act as special administrator.

On April 20, 1994, the intestate court issued an order appointing petitioner and
Emmanuel as joint regular administrators of the estate.10 Both were issued letters of
administration after taking their oath and posting the requisite bond.

Consequently, Notice to Creditors was published in the issues of the Manila

Standard on September 12, 19, and 26, 1994. However, no claims were filed
against the estate within the period set by the Revised Rules of Court.

Thereafter, petitioner submitted to the intestate court an inventory of Miguelita’s

estate.11 Emmanuel did not submit an inventory.

105
On May 17, 1995, the intestate court declared petitioner and his two minor children
as the only compulsory heirs of Miguelita.12

On July 21, 1995, petitioner filed with the intestate court an omnibus
motion13 praying, among others, that an Order be issued directing the: 1) payment
of estate taxes; 2) partition and distribution of the estate among the declared
heirs; and 3) payment of attorney’s fees.

Respondent opposed petitioner’s motion on the ground that the partition and
distribution of the estate is "premature and precipitate," considering that there is
yet no determination "whether the properties specified in the inventory are
conjugal, paraphernal or owned in a joint venture."14 Respondent claimed that she
owns the bulk of Miguelita’s estate as an "heir and co-owner." Thus, she
prayed that a hearing be scheduled.

On January 17, 1996, the intestate court allowed the payment of the estate taxes
and attorney’s fees but denied petitioner’s prayer for partition and distribution of
the estate, holding that it is indeed "premature." The intestate court ratiocinated as
follows:

"On the partition and distribution of the deceased’s properties, among the declared
heirs, the Court finds the prayer of petitioner in this regard to be premature. Thus, a
hearing on oppositor’s claim as indicated in her opposition to the instant petition is
necessary to determine ‘whether the properties listed in the amended complaint
filed by petitioner are entirely conjugal or the paraphernal properties of the
deceased, or a co-ownership between the oppositor and the petitioner in their
partnership venture.’"

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in the Resolution
dated May 7, 1996.

Forthwith, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition

for certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the intestate court’s Order dated
January 17, 1996 and Resolution dated May 7, 1996 which denied petitioner’s
prayer for partition and distribution of the estate for being premature, indicating
that it (intestate court) will first resolve respondent’s claim of ownership.

106
The Appellate Court dismissed the petition for certiorari, holding that in issuing
the challenged Order and Resolution, the intestate court did not commit grave
abuse of discretion.

The Appellate Court ruled:

"Regarding the second issue raised, respondent judge did not commit grave abuse
of discretion in entertaining private respondent’s unsupported claim of ownership
against the estate. In fact, there is no indication that the probate court has already
made a finding of title or ownership. It is inevitable that in probate proceedings,
questions of collation or of advancement are involved for these are matters which
can be passed upon in the course of the proceedings. The probate court in
exercising its prerogative to schedule a hearing, to inquire into the propriety of
private respondent’s claim, is being extremely cautious in determining the
composition of the estate. This act is not tainted with an iota of grave abuse of
discretion."

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration but it was likewise denied. Hence, this
petition for review on certiorari anchored on the following assignments of error:

Issue: May a trial court, acting as an intestate court, hear and pass upon questions
of ownership involving properties claimed to be part of the decedent's estate?

Ruling:

The intestate court is not the appropriate forum for the resolution of her adverse
claim of ownership over properties ostensibly belonging to Miguelita's estate.

It bears stressing that the bulk of Miguelita's estate, as stated in petitioner's...

inventory, comprises real estates covered by the Torrens System which are
registered either in the name of Miguelita alone or with petitioner. As such, they
are considered the owners of the properties until their title is nullified or modified
in an appropriate ordinary... action.

In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold that if a property

covered by Torrens Title is involved, the presumptive conclusiveness of such title
should be given due weight, and in the absence of strong compelling evidence to
the contrary, the... holder thereof should be considered as the owner of the property
in controversy until his title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary

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action, particularly, when as in the case at bar, possession of the property itself is
in the persons named in the title

In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold that if a property

covered by Torrens Title is involved, the presumptive conclusiveness of such title
should be given due weight, and in the absence of strong compelling evidence to
the contrary, the... holder thereof should be considered as the owner of the property
in controversy until his title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary
action, particularly, when as in the case at bar, possession of the property itself is
in the persons named in the title.

B. Habeas Corpus
Purpose
46. Sombong vs. CA, GR No. 111876, Jan. 31, 1996;

Facts:

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Petitioner is the mother of Arabella O. Sombong who was born on April 23, 1987
in Signal Village, Taguig, Metro Manila. Some time in November, 1987, Arabella,
then only six months old, was brought to the Sir John Clinic, located at 121 First
Avenue, Kaloocan City, for relief of coughing fits and for treatment of colds.
Petitioner did not have enough money to pay the hospital bill in the amount of
P300.00. Arabella could not be discharged, then, because of the petitioner's failure
to pay the bill.

Petitioner surprisingly gave testimony to the effect that she allegedly paid the
private respondents by installments in the total amount of P1,700.00, knowing for a
fact that the sum payable was only P300.00. Despite such alleged payments, the
owners of the clinic, Dra. Carmen Ty and her husband, Mr. Vicente Ty, allegedly
refused to turn over Arabella to her. Petitioner claims that the reason for such a
refusal was that she refused to go out on a date with Mr. Ty, who had been
courting her. This allegedly gave Dra. Ty a reason to be jealous of her, making it
difficult for everyone all around.

On the other hand and in contrast to her foregoing allegations, petitioner testified
that she visited Arabella at the clinic only after two years, i.e., in 1989. This time,
she did not go beyond berating the spouses Ty for their refusal to give Arabella to
her. Three years thereafter, i.e., in 1992, petitioner again resurfaced to lay claim to
her child. Her pleas allegedly fell on deaf ears.

Consequently, on May 21, 1992, petitioner filed a petition with the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus against the
spouses Ty. She alleged therein that Arabella was being unlawfully detained and
imprisoned at No. 121, First Avenue, Grace Park, Kalookan City. .

Petitioner, thereafter, filed a criminal complaint 7 with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Kalookan City against the spouses Ty.

Dr. Ty, in her counter-affidavit, admitted that petitioner's child, Arabella, had for
some time been in her custody. Arabella was discharged from the clinic in April,
1989, and was, in the presence of her clinic staff, turned over to someone who was
properly identified to be the child's guardian.

In the face of the refusal of the spouses Ty to turn over Arabella to her, she had
sought the help of Barangay Captains Alfonso and Bautista of Kalookan City,

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Mayor Asistio of the same city, and even Congresswoman Hortensia L. Starke of
Negros Occidental. Their efforts to help availed her nothing.

On September 4, 1992, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Kalookan City, on the
basis of petitioner's complaint, filed an information8 against the spouses Ty for
Kidnapping and Illegal Detention of a Minor before the Regional Trial Court of
Kalookan City.9 On September 16, 1992, an order for the arrest of the spouses Ty
was issued in the criminal case.

Facing arrest, Dra. Ty disclosed the possibility that the child, Arabella, may be
found at No. 23 Jesus Street, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City. The agents
of the National Bureau of Investigation went to said address and there found a
female child who answered to the name of Cristina Grace Neri. Quite
significantly, the evidence disclosed that the child, Cristina, had been living with
respondent Marietta Neri Alviar since 1988.

When she was just a baby, Cristina was abandoned by her parents at the Sir John
Clinic. On April 18, 1988, Dr. Fe Mallonga, a dentist at the Sir John Clinic and
niece of both Dra. Ty and respondent Alviar, called the latter up to discuss the
possibility of turning over to her care one of the several abandoned babies at the
said clinic. Respondent Alviar was told that this baby whose name was unknown
had long been abandoned by her parents and appeared to be very small, very thin,
and full of scabies. Taking pity on the baby, respondent Alviar and her mother,
Maura Salacup Neri, decided to take care of her. This baby was baptized at the
Good Samaritan Church on April 30, 1988. Her Certificate of Baptism 10 indicates
her name to be Cristina Grace S. Neri; her birthday to be April 30, 1987; her
birthplace to be Quezon City; and her foster father and foster mother to be Cicero
Neri and Maura Salacup, respectively.

Respondent Alviar was invited by the National Bureau of Investigation for

questioning on September 22, 1992 in the presence of Dra. Ty and petitioner.
Cristina was also brought along by said respondent. At that confrontation, Dra. Ty
could not be sure that Cristina was indeed petitioner's child, Arabella. Neither
could petitioner with all certainty say that Cristina was her long lost daughter.

Issue: Whether a petition for habeas corpus in the present case should be granted.

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Ruling:
No. While we sympathize with the plight of petitioner who has been separated
from her daughter for more than eight years, we cannot grant her the relief she is
seeking, because the evidence in this case does not support a finding that the child,
Cristina, is in truth and in fact her child, Arabella; neither is there sufficient
evidence to support the finding that private respondents' custody of Cristina is so
illegal as to warrant the grant of a Writ of Habeas Corpus.

The grant of the writ in the instant case will all depend on the concurrence of the
following requisites: (1) that the petitioner has the right of custody over the minor;
(2) that the rightful custody of the minor is being withheld from the petitioner by
the respondent; and (3) that it is to the best interest of the minor concerned to be in
the custody of petitioner and not that of the respondent.

Not all of these requisites exist in this case. The dismissal of this petition is thus
warranted.

47. Velasco vs. CA, GR No. 118644, July 7, 1995;

Facts:
In this petition for review, the petitioners want us to set aside and reverse the
decision of February1, 1995 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 36273,  a

111
petition for habeas corpus and certiorari with a prayer for a temporary restraining
order, ordering the herein petitioners to immediately release Lawrence A. Larkins
from their custody and declaring moot the alternative relief of certiorari.

On September 16 1993, a warrant of arrest was issued by Judge Manuel Padolina

of Branch 162 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig, Metro Manila, against
accused Lawrence Larkins.

On November 20, 1994, a certain Desiree Alinea executed and filed before the NBI
a complaint-affidavit accusing Larkins of the crime of RAPE allegedly committed
against her on November 19, 1994, acting on the basis of the complaint of Alinea,
petitioners Special Investigators Flor L. Resurreccion and Antonio M. Erum, Jr.
proceeded to the office of Larkins in Makati, Metro Manila, and arrested the latter,
who was thereupon positively identified by Alinea as her rapist. Larkins was then
detained at the Detention Cell of the NBI,Taft Avenue, Manila.

On Nov. 22, 1994, Larkins posted his bail of P4, 000 in Criminal Cases Nos.
101189-92. Judge Padolina forthwith issued an order recalling and setting aside the
warrant of arrest issued on September 16, 1993 and directing the Jail Warden of
the NBI Detention Cell to release Larkins from confinement unless otherwise
detained for some other cause but the Investigators Resurreccion and Erum refused
to release Larkins because he was still detained for another cause, specifically for
the crime of rape for which he would be held for examination.

Larkins, through his counsel Ulep, filed an Urgent Motion for Bail  wherein he
alleged, that the evidence of guilt against him for rape is not strong; that he is
entitled as a matter of right to bail; and that he has no intention of going out of the
country or hiding away from the law. Larkins, through his new counsel, Atty.
Theodore Te, filed in an Urgent Omnibus Motion for the Dismissal of the
Complaint and for Immediate Release, principally based on the alleged illegality of
his warrantless arrest, but the said motion was denied by the trial court. Larkins'
common-law wife, Felicitas S. Cuyag, filed before the Court of Appeals a petition
for habeas corpus with certiorari. Impleaded as respondents were the herein
petitioners and Judge Felix S. Caballes. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals
issued a resolution ordering the respondents therein to appear and produce
Larkins before the court on January 31, 1995 at 10:30 a.m. and to show cause
why Larkins' liberty is being restrained. On the said date, Special

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Investigators Resurreccion and Erum appeared and produced Larkins at the
hearing. Atty. Orlando Dizon of the NBI acted as their counsel. The Office of
the Solicitor General representing the People of the Philippines made no
appearance. On the other hand, the petitioner, Felicitas S. Cuyag, appeared with
her counsel, who manifested that should the court order the release of Larkins the
alternative prayer for certiorari would be deemed abandoned. After hearing the
arguments the Court of Appeal resolve to order the immediate release of Larkins
from his present confinement on the ground that the complaint presented to the
NBI by complainant Desiree Alinea on the basis of which Larkins was detained
without a warrant of arrest for rape did not meet the legal requirements provided
for in Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.

Issue: Whether the petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus will still be granted due to
Larkins’ illegal arrest and confinement.

Ruling:
Constitution states that; privilege of the writ of habeas corpus cannot be suspended
except in cases of invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it. Pursuant
to Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, it extends, except as otherwise
provided by law, to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any
person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is
withheld from the person entitled thereto.

Hence, even granting that Larkins was illegally arrested, still the petition for a writ
of habeas corpus will not prosper because his detention has become legal by virtue
of the filing before the trial court of the complaint against him and by the issuance
of the January 5, 1995 order.

Even as we thus decide in favor of the petitioners, we are, nevertheless, disturbed

by certain incidents relative to the warrantless arrest of Larkins. Firstly, assuming
that it was lawful, the facts before us disclose that the arresting officers failed to
strictly comply with (1) the last paragraph of Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court requiring that the person lawfully arrested without a warrant shall forthwith
be delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in
accordance with Section 7, Rule 112 and (2) Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, providing that he be delivered to the proper judicial authorities
within 36 hours, the crime with which Larkins was charged being punishable by an

113
afflictive penalty. Although the arrest was made in Makati where there is a police
station and a city jail, Larkins was brought to the NBI Detention Cell at Taft
Avenue, Manila, and though the complaint of the offended party was executed on
November 23, 1994, it was not until December 2, 1994 that the said complaint was
actually filed in court. Unless satisfactorily explained, the non-compliance by the
arresting officers with the said provisions merits nothing but disapproval from the
Court. In the performance of their duty and in their commendable pursuit to stamp
out crimes and bring criminals to the bar of justice, law enforcement authorities
should make no shortcuts, but must comply with all procedures to safeguard the
constitutional and statutory rights of accused persons.

We also note that the trial court did not conduct a hearing of the urgent motion for
bail, as required under Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. The grant or
denial of bail must be based upon the court's determination as to whether or not the
evidence of guilt is strong. This discretion may only be exercised after evidence is
submitted at the hearing conducted for that
purpose.  The court's order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the
evidence for the prosecution followed by its conclusion whether or not the
evidence of guilt is strong; otherwise, the order would be defective and
voidable.  In fact, even if the prosecutor refuses to adduce evidence in opposition
to the application to grant and fix bail, the court may ask the prosecution such
questions as would ascertain the strength of the State's evidence or judge the
adequacy of the amount of bail.  It was thus incumbent upon the trial court to
receive the evidence for the prosecution on the urgent motion for bail. For this
procedural shortcoming, Larkins should also be partly blamed. He did not press for
a hearing after the scheduled hearing on Decenber 5, 1994 was cancelled because,
as he claimed, the presiding Judge was out of the country. 

48.Ampatuan vs. Macaraig, GR No. 182497,

Facts: Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the COMELEC Legal Department, was
killed at the corner of M. H. Del Pilar and Pedro Gil Streets, Ermita, Manila.
Investigation conducted by the Manila Police District Homicide Section yielded

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the identity of the male perpetrator as PO1 Ampatuan. Consequently, PO1
Ampatuan was commanded to the MPD District Director for proper disposition.
Likewise, inquest proceedings were conducted by the Manila Prosecutor’s Office.

On 18 April 2008, Police Senior Superintendent Guinto, rendered his Pre-Charge

Evaluation Report against PO1 Ampatuan, finding probable cause to charge PO1
Ampatuan with Grave Misconduct (Murder) and recommending that said PO1
Ampatuan be subjected to summary hearing.

Meanwhile, on 21 April 2008, the City Prosecutor of Manila recommended that the
case against PO1 Ampatuan be set for further investigation and that the latter be
released from custody unless he is being held for other charges/legal grounds.

Armed with the 21 April 2008 recommendation of the Manila City’s Prosecution
Office, petitioner, who is the wife of PO1 Ampatuan, filed a Petition for the
Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus before the RTC of Manila on 22 April 2008.

On 24 April 2008, RTC ordered the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus

commanding therein respondents to produce the body of PO1 Ampatuan and
directing said respondents to show cause why they are withholding or
restraining the liberty of PO1 Ampatuan.

Seeking the reversal of RTC, the respondents averred that the filing of the
administrative case against PO1 Ampatuan is a process done by the PNP and this
Court has no authority to order the release of the subject police officer. The
petitioner countered that the letter resignation of PO1 Ampatuan has rendered the
administrative case moot and academic. Respondent however stressed that the
resignation has not been acted by the appropriate police officials of the PNP, and
that the administrative case was filed while PO1 Ampatuan is still in the active
status of the PNP. The Court of Appeals reversed and dismissed the petition.

Issue: Whether the respondent court gravely abused its discretion when it failed to
consider that the arrest and detention of PO1 Ampatuan was made without any
warrant and therefore, illegal.

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Ruling: The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or
detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be
inquired into is the legality of a person's detention as of, at the earliest, the
filing of the application for the writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention
is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as
the instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the
time of the filing of the application

In this case, PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under Restrictive Custody. Republic
Act No. 6975 (also known as the Department of Interior and Local Government
Act of 1990), as amended by Republic Act No. 8551 (also known as the Philippine
National Police Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998), clearly provides that
members of the police force are subject to the administrative disciplinary
machinery of the PNP.

Given that PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under restrictive custody, such
constitutes a valid argument for his continued detention. This Court has held that a
restrictive custody and monitoring of movements or whereabouts of police officers
under investigation by their superiors is not a form of illegal detention or restraint
of liberty.

Restrictive custody is, at best, nominal restraint which is beyond the ambit of
habeas corpus. It is neither actual nor effective restraint that would call for
the grant of the remedy prayed for. It is a permissible precautionary measure
to assure the PNP authorities that the police officers concerned are always
accounted for. In sum, petitioner is unable to discharge the burden of showing that
she is entitled to the issuance of the writ prayed for in behalf of her husband, PO1
Ampatuan. The petition fails to show on its face that the latter is unlawfully
deprived of his liberty guaranteed and enshrined in the Constitution.

49. Adonis vs. Tesoro, GR No. 182855, June 5, 2013

Facts:
Alexander “Lex” Adonis was convicted of Libel. He started serving his sentence
on February 20, 2007. While detained at the Davao Prisons and Penal Farm,
another libel case was filed against Adonis by Jeanette L. Leuterio. Adonis’
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discharge on parole was released by the Board of Pardons and Parole on December
11, 2007. City Parole and Probation Office of Davao received the document on
May 2, 2008. This court issued the Administrative Circular No. 08-2008 or the
Guidelines in the Observance of a Rule of Preference in the Imposition of Penalties
in Libel Cases on January 25, 2008.

Adonis filed a Motion to Reopen Case (with leave of court) under the RTC Branch
17, for his immediate release, alteration of his sentence to payment in line with the
newly released Circular. Adonis moved for his provisional release from Criminal
Case no. 48719-2001 (RTC Branch 14) and was granted by the honourable court.
He was also allowed to post bail (P5,000) on May 26, 2008. While filing his cash
bond and undertaking, the court also issued a release order, directing the Chief of
Davao Penal Colony. The order was served to him on the same date but Adonis
was not released. Adonis filed a Writ of Habeas Corpus on May 30, 2008 alleging
that his freedom was stalled without any reason. Respondent filed his Comment,
and then Adonis filed on October 27, 2008 an Urgent Motion to Resolve,
November 7, 2008 a Manifestation and Motion restating all the prayers. The court
then after, received a letter from the respondent which stated that Adonis had been
released after accommodating all the conditions in his parole and was ordered to
appear at his parole and probation officer. (February 11, 2009)

Issue: Whether or not Adonis should be restrained despite order from the court of
his Provisional Release.

Ruling:
Yes he should be restrained. The Writ of Habeas Corpus is a speedy remedy for
those who are illegally confined or imprisoned with insufficient legal basis but not
applicable to those who are imprisoned with sufficient basis and he/she is facing a
judicial process. According to Section 4, Rule 102 of the Revised Penal Code The
writ is not allowed if there is an informality of defect in the process and it cannot
be applied to those who are confined due to a conviction. Adonis was convicted
for libel by the RTC Branch 17, in Criminal Case No. 48679-2001. Although he
was able to serve his minimum sentence, his other case is a good enough basis for
his disqualification of Parole. He was granted parole for the forst case, but his
second case was still pending. All the benefits from the newly released
Administrative Circular cannot be applied to Criminal Case no. 48719-
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2001because he was already serving his sentence for this case. He was finally
released on December 23, 2008 after accepting his parole conditions.

Nature
50.Ching vs. Insular Coll. of Customs, GR No. L-10972, Jan. 28, 1916;

Facts:

The board finds that Lee Ching is a Chinese alien who entered the Philippine
Islands at Zamboanga unlawfully and in violation of the Acts of Congress of the
United States, about two months ago. He admits that he is a Chinese laborer, that

118
he came to the Philippine Islands through the port of Zamboanga in a Moro vinta,
and was not examined by any immigration inspector or board of special inquiry as
required by law.

The case was taken to the Insular Collector of Customs who, after due
consideration, affirmed the decision of the board and ordered the appellant held for
deportation to China. Appellant thereupon made application to the Court of First
Instance of Manila for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that he was illegally
detained. A hearing on the application was had before the court, which modified
the decision of the Insular Collector of Customs and directed that the petitioner be
deported to Sandakan, North Borneo, at the expense of the Philippine Government.
This appeal was taken from that judgment.

Issue: Whether the trial court erred in ordering the deportation of the accused
upon a proceeding in habeas corpus or in making any other disposition or finding
than that the detention of the plaintiff was legal or illegal and ordering his release
or remanding him to custody of the detaining official.

Ruling:

This assignment states in effect the position of the appellant. It is, in substance,
that the only matter for investigation in proceedings for a writ of habeas
corpus is the legality or illegality of the detention; and that the court in such
cases has no authority to pronounce a judgment of its own on the merits of the
case but must either release the petitioner or remand him into the custody of
the official who held him when the proceedings were begun. Arguing from this
basis it is claimed that the court erred when it ordered the deportation of appellant
to Sandakan, thereby modifying the order of the Insular Collector of Customs
requiring his deportation to China.

We are inclined to agree with appellant in his contention. Proceedings in habeas

corpus are separate and distinct from the main case from which the proceedings
spring. They rarely, if ever, touch the merits of the case and require no
pronouncement with respect thereto. They deal simply with the detention of the
prisoner and stop with the authority by virtue of which he is detained. As necessary
consequence, that part of the judgment of the Court of First Instance which orders
the deportation of appellant to Sandakan, North Borneo, is without authority and
must be set aside. It was held long ago in the case of Ex parte Bollman (4 Cranch,

119
75, 101), that "the question whether the individual shall be imprisoned is always
distinct from the question whether he shall be convicted or acquitted of the charge
on which he is tried, and therefore these question are separate, and may be decided
in different courts.

If the Court of First Instance found on the law and the facts that the prisoner was
unlawfully detained, he should have ordered his release or, if the error which
rendered the detention illegal was merely technical and, therefore, curable, he
should have remanded him with the proper instructions for the correction of the
error; if, on the other hand, it was found that his imprisonment was legal, the
application for the writ should have been dismissed.

The court evidently found that the detention was legal but that the Collector of
Customs had ordered the deportation of petitioner to the wrong country; and,
accordingly, pronounced a judgment of deportation of its own. We are of the
opinion that the court erred in both of these particulars. If the Collector ordered the
petitioner to be deported to the wrong country, the detention for that purpose was
so far illegal as to give the petitioner the right to correct it by habeas corpus. While
it is beyond question that the person detained had no right to enter the Philippine
Islands, and it was, therefore, the duty of the customs officials to detain him to
prevent his landing, that did not authorized the Collector to deport him in a manner
or to a place not sanctioned by the law. If the Collector ordered the petitioner to be
deported to China when, under the law, he should have been deported to Sandakan,
North Borneo, he exceeded his authority and the detention of the petitioner was to
that extent illegal. But, even if the court correctly found that the petitioner should
have been deported to Sandakan instead of China, it should not itself have
pronounced a judgment of deportation to Sandakan but should have declared the
detention for the purpose of deportation to China illegal and, thereupon, should
have remanded the petitioner to the custody of the Collector of Customs with
instructions to deport him in accordance with the finding of the court. The court
has no authority to deport in this class of case (immigration); that power rests
exclusively with the customs authorities. The power of the court is limited to
determining the legality or illegality of the detention.

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 51. Caballes vs. CA, GR No. 163108, Feb. 23, 2005

Facts:
Caballes was charged with rape. During the trial, he was denied bail, the judge
inhibited himself, and the trial suffered from numerous delays. As a result,
invoking his right to speedy trial, he filed a “petition for habeas corpus and/or
certiorari” to appeal.

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The CA and SC both dismissed the case. Habeas corpus is not the proper remedy.
Its only purpose is to inquire into the propriety of detention, not to impute error on
the part of a court.

Glenn Caballes was charged with rape of a minor in the RTC of Malabon City.
Because the petitioner was charged with a non-bailable offense, he was detained.
He was arraigned on February 7, 2002 and pleaded not guilty to the offense
charged. 

Trial ensued. On April 28, 2003, the petitioner filed a petition for bail. The trial
was marred with many postponements for various reasons, most prominently the
continued failure of Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez to appear as a witness.

Caballes then filed a motion seeking an earlier trial date, invoking his right to
speedy trial under the Speedy Trial Act of 1998, as well as a motion for the urgent
resolution of his petition for bail.

The court issued an Order[declaring that the petition for bail was submitted for its
resolution and denying the motion for an earlier trial date.  It then issued another
order denying the petition for bail, on its finding that the evidence of guilt against
the petitioner was strong. MR denied.

Caballes then filed an MTD invoking his right to speedy trial, claiming that the
trial now lasted close to 400 days, far longer than the 180 day reglementary period.

Denied. The judge then inhibited himself. Caballes thus filed a “Petition
for Habeas Corpus and/or Certiorari and Prohibition.”

The CA required him to inform the court of his choice of remedy. In

compliance therewith, he filed a manifestation that he had chosen his petition to be
treated as a petition for habeas corpus without prejudice “to the concomitant
application of certiorari if the court considered the same necessary or appropriate
to give effect to the writ of habeas corpus.” CA dismissed the petition for habeas
corpus for being the wrong remedy.

Hence this SCA for certiorari.

Issues:
1. WON the decision had already become final and executory (Yes)
2. WON a petition for habeas corpus is the proper remedy. (No)

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 3. WON the writ should issue. (No)

Ruling:
1. Section 39 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides that the period for appeal
from the judgment of any court in habeas corpus cases shall be 48 hours
from notice of the judgment appealed from.  While that provision was not
incorporated in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Administrative Matter
No. 01-1-03-SC amending Section 3, Rule 41of the said Rules, provides that
appeal in habeas corpus cases shall be taken within forty-eight (48) hours
from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from.

Thus, Caballes should have appealed from the CA’s denial of his petition rather
than filing a petition for certiorari. Certiorari cannot co-exist with an appeal or any
other adequate remedy.  The existence and availability of the right to appeal are
antithetical to the availment of the special civil action for certiorari.  These two
remedies are mutually exclusive.  An appeal in this case would still have been a
speedy and adequate remedy. Consequently, when the petitioner filed his petition
in this Court, the decision of the CA was already final and executory.

2. A writ of habeas corpus is not the proper remedy to assail the trial court’s
denial of the MTD, the denial of the petition for bail, as well as the voluntary
inhibition of Judge Laurea.

A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special proceeding

governed by Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, as amended.  In Ex Parte Billings, it
was held that habeas corpus is that of a civil proceeding in character.  It seeks the
enforcement of civil rights.  Resorting to the writ is not to inquire into the criminal
act of which the complaint is made, but into the right of liberty, even if the act and
the immediate purpose to be served is relief from illegal restraint.  The rule applies
even when instituted to arrest a criminal prosecution and secure freedom. 

Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor intended as substitute for
the trial court’s function. It cannot take the place of appeal, certiorari or writ of
error. The writ cannot be used to investigate and consider questions of error that
might be raised relating to procedure or on the merits.  Moreover, habeas
corpus should not be granted in advance of trial. The orderly course of trial must

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be pursued and the usual remedies exhausted before resorting to the writ where
exceptional circumstances are extant. 
Habeas corpus is a summary remedy.  It is analogous to a proceeding in
rem when instituted for the sole purpose of having the person of restraint presented
before the judge in order that the cause of his detention may be inquired into and
his statements final. The only parties before the court are the petitioner (prisoner)
and the person holding the petitioner in custody, and the only question to be
resolved is whether the custodian has authority to deprive the petitioner of his
liberty. The writ may be denied if the petitioner fails to show facts that he is
entitled theretoex merito justicias.

A writ of habeas corpus, which is regarded as a “palladium of liberty” is a

prerogative writ which does not issue as a matter of right but in the sound
discretion of the court or judge.  It, is, however, a writ of right on proper
formalities being made by proof. Resort to the writ is to inquire into the criminal
act of which a complaint is made but unto the right of liberty, notwithstanding the
act, and the immediate purpose to be served is relief from illegal restraint. The
primary, if not the only object of the writ of habeas corpus ad subjuciendum is to
determine the legality of the restraint under which a person is held.
`
What is involved here is a “petition for habeas corpus or, in the alternative, a
petition for a writ of certiorari.” However, petition for a writ of habeas
corpus cannot be joined with the special civil action for certiorari because the two
remedies are governed by a different set of rules.  Joinder of causes of action shall
not include special actions or actions governed by special rules, thus proscribing
the joinder of a special proceeding with a special civil action.

Further, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is a remedy different from the
special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended. 
The writ of habeas corpus is a collateral attack on the processes, orders, or
judgment of the trial court, while certiorari is a direct attack of said processes,
orders, or judgment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. 

A writ of certiorari reaches only jurisdictional errors.  It has no other use, except to
bring before the court a record material to be considered in exercising jurisdiction. 
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A writ of certiorari reaches the record.  On the other hand, a writ of habeas
corpus reaches the body but not the record; it also reaches jurisdictional matters
but does not reach the record.  However, when jurisdiction is obtained by the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, to bring the body of the person whose liberty
is involved into court, and if it is necessary, to provide the record upon which the
detention is based, that may be accomplished by using a writ of certiorari as an
ancillary proceeding.

3. Caballes failed to establish his right to the writ of habeas corpus. He was
charged with rape punishable by reclusion perpetua and was detained based
on the said charge. He failed to establish that his incarceration pendente
lite was illegal, and likewise failed to establish exceptional circumstances
warranting the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.

A petition for habeas corpus is not the proper remedy to assail the denial of bail; a
petition for certiorari is. That is also the correct remedy from the voluntary
inhibition of a judge.

Finally, as to a violation of the right of the accused to a speedy trial is violated by

the prosecution, the remedy lies in the procedure provided for under Republic Act
No. 8493, as implemented by Rule 119.  Section 8 of the said Rule provides that a
private counsel, the public attorney, or a prosecutor, who allows the case to be set
for trial without disclosing that a necessary witness would be unavailable for trial,
files a motion solely for delay which he knows is totally frivolous and without
merit, makes a statement for the purpose of obtaining continuance which he knows
to be false and which is material to the granting of a continuance; or willfully fails
to proceed to trial without justification is to be punished with a fine not exceeding
P20,000, and denying him the right to practice before the court trying the case for a
period not exceeding 30 days. Thus, habeas corpus is not the proper remedy. Once
more, certiorari is.

While a petition for habeas corpus may be filed if one is deprived of his right to a
speedy disposition of the case under Article IV, Section 16 of the 1987
Constitution and of his right to due process, first of all, the delays in this case were
not the fault of the prosecution, and secondly, Caballes only invoked this right in
his petition for habeas corpus before the CA.

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Availability of the Writ
52.Chavez vs. CA, GR No. L- 29169, Aug. 19, 1968;

Facts:
Accused were the following: Petitioner herein, Roger Chavez, Ricardo
Sumilang alias "Romeo Vasquez", Edgardo P. Pascual alias "Ging" Pascual, Pedro
Rebullo alias "Pita", Luis Asistio alias "Baby" Asistio, Lorenzo
Meneses alias"Lory" Meneses, Peter Doe, Charlie Doe and Paul Doe.

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An information was filed that on or about the 14th day of November, 1962, in
Quezon City, the accused conspired, with intent of gain, abuse of confidence and
without the consent of the owner thereof, Dy Sun Hiok y Lim, in asporting the
motor vehicle above-described. Upon arraignment, all the accused, except the three
Does who have not been identified nor apprehended, pleaded not guilty.

Trial Court: On July 23, 1963, trial commenced before the judge presiding
Branch IX of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Quezon City
During the trial, the Fiscal Grecia (prosecution) asked Roger Chavez to be the first
witness. Counsel of the accused opposed. Fiscal Grecia contends that the accused
(Chavez) will only be an ordinary witness not an state witness. Counsel of accused
answer that it will only incriminate his client. But the jugde ruled in favor of the
fiscal on the grounds that (1) the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to act as
witness on the witness stand including the accused (2) If there should be any
question that is incriminating then that is the time for counsel to interpose his
objection and the court will sustain him if and when the court feels that the answer
of this witness to the question would incriminate him. (3) Counsel has all the
assurance that the court will not require the witness to answer questions which
would incriminate him.

Version of the prosecution of what happened:

Chavez saw Lee driving the thunderbird (car) and asked if it is for sale. Lee
answered yes. On November 12, Chavez met Sumilang and informed about the car.
The two went to Asistio and made a plan to capitalize on Romeo Vasquez'
reputation as a wealthy movie star, introduce him as a buyer to someone who was
selling a car and, after the deed of sale is signed, by trickery to run away with the
car. Asistio would then register it, sell it to a third person for a profit. Chavez
known to be a car agent was included in the plan. He furnished the name of
Johnson Lee who was selling his Thunderbird.
Chavez arranged the meeting with Lee on November 14. They agreed on the price
and went to Binondo to meet Dy Sun Hiok Lim which is the registered owner of
the car. Deed of sale was drawn and signed by Sumilang. At Eugene's, a man
approached Sumilang with a note which stated that the money was ready at the
Dalisay Theater. Sumilang then wrote on the same note that the money should be

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brought to the restaurant. At the same time he requested Lee to exhibit the deed of
sale of the car to the note bearer.
The two Chinese were left alone in the restaurant. The two Chinese could not
locate Sumilang and Chavez. They went out to the place where the Thunderbird
was parked, found that it was gone. They then immediately reported its loss to the
police. Much later, the NBI recovered the already repainted car and impounded it.
Chavez, Sumilang and Asistio converged that same day at Barrio Fiesta, a
restaurant at Highway 54 near the Balintawak monument in Caloocan. There,
Asistio handed to Sumilang P1,000.00 cash and a golf set worth P800.00 as the
latter's share in the transaction. On the 14th of November, the registration of the
car was transferred in the name of Sumilang in Cavite City, and three days later, in
the name of Asistio in Caloocan.

Version of Romeo Sumilang:

In the last week of September, 1962, Sumilang saw Roger Chavez at a gas station.
The latter informed him that there was a Thunderbird from Clark Field for sale for
a price between P20,000.00 and P22,000.00. Chavez said that it could be held for
him with a down payment of P10,000.00.
On November 14, Chavez appeared at Sumilang's house with the news that the car
was ready if Sumilang was ready with the rest of the money. So Sumilang got
P9,000.00 from his mother and another P4,000.00 from his aparador. He
immediately gave P6,000.00 to Chavez, intending to pay out the balance upon the
car's delivery. It was then that Chavez told Sumilang that the car was already
bought by a Chinese who would be the vendor.
At Eugene's, Chavez asked Sumilang for the balance. Sumilang accommodated.
There, Sumilang, also saw a friend, "Ging" Pascual who warned that Chavez was a
"smart" agent and advised that Sumilang should have a receipt for his money. A
certain Bimbo, a friend of Pascual, offered to make out a receipt for Chavez to
sign. After Sumilang returned from posing for some photographs with some of his
fans, Bimbo showed him the receipt already signed by Chavez and also by Pascual
and Bimbo to sign the receipt as witnesses. This receipt was offered as an exhibit
by the prosecution and by Sumilang. Johnson Lee turned over to Sumilang the
deed of sale, the registration papers and the keys to the car.
Two or three days afterwards, Sumilang dropped by the Barrio Fiesta on his way to
a film shooting he saw Asistio who liked his Thunderbird parked outside. Asistio

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offered to buy it from him for P22,500.00 and Sumilang consented to the sale.
Asistio tendered a down payment of P1,000.00; the balance he promised to pay the
next day after negotiating with some financing company. Before said balance
could be paid, the car was impounded.

Ruling of the trial court and CA:

The trial court gave evidence to Sumilang's averment, he was thus cleared. So was
Asistio whom the trial court believed to be a mere buyer of the car. And so, the
prosecution's theory of conspiracy was discounted. As to the other accused, the
court found no case against Pedro Rebullo alias "Pita" and Lorenzo Meneses alias
"Lory". The accused "Ging" Pascual was also acquitted for in the first place he was
not identified by Johnson Lee in court.
As to Roger Chavez, however, the court had this to say: "Roger Chavez does not
offer any defense. As a matter of fact, his testimony as witness for the prosecution
establishes his guilt beyond reasonable doubt." The trial court branded him "a self-
confessed culprit"
Chavez filed an appeal. The counsel of Chavez Atty. Marquez was ordered to file
brief but she failed. Instead she sent filed a written detailed information and also
stating that if she were allowed to file appellant's brief she would go along with the
factual findings of the court below but will show however that its conclusion is
erroneous. CA dismissed said appeal. On June 21, 1968, the Court of Appeals,
directed the City Warden of Manila where Chavez is confined by virtue of the
warrant of arrest issued by the Court of Appeals, to turn him over to Muntinlupa
Bilibid Prisons pending execution of the judgment below, and ordered remand of
the case to the Quezon City court for execution of judgment.
Hence the petition for habeas corpus.

Issue:
I. Whether the constitutional right of the accused against self-
incrimination was violated.
II. Whether the petition for habeas corpus is the right recourse of the
accused

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Ruling:
I. Petitioner claims that there was a violation of his constitutional right against self-
incrimination. He asks that the hand of this Court be made to bear down upon his
conviction; that he be relieved of the effects thereof. He asks us to consider the
constitutional injunction that "No person shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself, fully echoed in Section 1, Rule 115, Rules of Court where, in all criminal
prosecutions, the defendant shall be entitled: "(e) To be exempt from being a
witness against himself.
The Court held that such right is "not merely a formal technical rule the
enforcement of which is left to the discretion of the court"; it is mandatory; it
secures to every defendant a valuable and substantive right. Therefore, the court
may not extract from a defendant's own lips and against his will an admission of
his guilt. Nor may a court as much as resort to compulsory disclosure, directly or
indirectly, of facts usable against him as a confession of the crime or the tendency
of which is to prove the commission of a crime. Because, it is his right to forego
testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand — with
undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free, genuine will. Compulsion as it is
understood here does not necessarily connote the use of violence; it may be the
product of unintentional statements. Pressure which operates to overbear his will,
disable him from making a free and rational choice, or impair his capacity for
rational judgment would in our opinion be sufficient. So is moral coercion "tending
to force testimony from the unwilling lips of the defendant.
In the case, petitioner was called by the prosecution as the first witness in that case
to testify for the People during the first day of trial thereof. Petitioner objected and
invoked the privilege of self-incrimination. This he broadened by the clear cut
statement that he will not testify. But petitioner's protestations were met with the
judge's emphatic statement that it "is the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to
act as witness on the witness stand including the accused," and that defense
counsel "could not object to have the accused called on the witness stand." The
cumulative impact of all these is that accused-petitioner had to take the stand. He
was thus peremptorily asked to create evidence against himself. For, in reality, the
purpose of calling an accused as a witness for the People would be to incriminate
him. 
With all these, we have no hesitancy in saying that petitioner was forced to testify
to incriminate himself, in full breach of his constitutional right to remain silent. It

130
cannot be said now that he has waived his right. He did not volunteer to take the
stand and in his own defense; he did not offer himself as a witness; on the contrary,
he claimed the right upon being called to testify. If petitioner nevertheless
answered the questions inspite of his fear of being accused of perjury or being put
under contempt, this circumstance cannot be counted against him. His testimony is
not of his own choice. To him it was a case of compelled submission. He was a
cowed participant in proceedings before a judge who possessed the power to put
him under contempt had he chosen to remain silent. Nor could he escape testifying.
The court made it abundantly clear that his testimony at least on direct examination
would be taken right then and thereon the first day of the trial.
There is no waiver of the privilege. "To be effective, a waiver must be certain and
unequivocal, and intelligently, understandably, and willingly made; such waiver
following only where liberty of choice has been fully accorded. After a claim a
witness cannot properly be held to have waived his privilege on vague and
uncertain evidence

II. The course which petitioner takes is correct. Habeas corpus is a high

prerogative writ.  It is traditionally considered as an exceptional remedy to release
a person whose liberty is illegally restrained such as when the accused's
constitutional rights are disregarded. Such defect results in the absence or loss of
jurisdiction and therefore invalidates the trial and the consequent conviction of the
accused whose fundamental right was violated. That void judgment of conviction
may be challenged by collateral attack, which precisely is the function of habeas
corpus. This writ may issue even if another remedy which is less effective may be
availed of by the defendant. Thus, failure by the accused to perfect his appeal
before the Court of Appeals does not preclude a recourse to the writ.  The writ may
be granted upon a judgment already final.
Under our own Rules of Court, to grant the remedy to the accused Roger Chavez
whose case presents a clear picture of disregard of a constitutional right is
absolutely proper. Section 1 of Rule 102 extends the writ, unless otherwise
expressly provided by law, "to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by
which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any
person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.
The Court stated that: "A void judgment is in legal effect no judgment. By it no
rights are divested. From it no rights can be obtained. Being worthless in itself, all

131
proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars any
one. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void. The
parties attempting to enforce it may be responsible as trespassers. ... "

Petition granted. The Court rendered judgment directing the respondent Warden of
the City Jail of Manila or the Director of Prisons or any other officer or person in
custody of petitioner to discharge him from custody.

53. Calauag vs. Pecson, GR No. L-1403, Oct. 29, 1948;

Facts: On August 10, 1937, Alejo filed a complaint against Caluag and Garcia for
the redemption of one-half pro indiviso of a parcel of land in Guiguinto, Bulacan.
After trial, the CFI Bulacan rendered judgment ordering petitioners to execute a

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deed of sale in favor of Fortunato Alejo, upon payment by plaintiff, as purchase
price, of the amount of P2,551. Petitioners filed an appeal to the CA but it was
denied. Consequently, Alejo filed a Motion for Execution.

When the petitioners opposed, Alejo filed before CFI a petition for contempt and it
was granted by the respondent. A petition for certiorari was filed against the
respondent judge, allegedly acted without or in excess of the jurisdiction of the
court in rendering the resolution which declares the petitioners guilty of contempt
of court for not complying or performing its prior order requiring the petitioners to
execute a deed of sale in favor of plaintiff over one-half of the land pro indiviso in
question. The petitioners in support of the present petition for certiorari, alleged
other 2 grounds, to wit: (1) that plaintiff's action abated or was extinguished upon
the death of the plaintiff Fortunato Alejo, because his right of legal redemption was
a personal one, and therefore not transferable to his successors in interest; and (2)
that, even assuming that it is a personal one and therefore transferable, his
successors in interest have failed to secure the substitution of said deceased by his
legal representative under section 17, Rule 3.

Issue: Whether respondent Judge Angel Mojica acted without jurisdiction in

proceeding against and declaring the petitioners guilty of contempt.

Ruling:
It is well settled that jurisdiction of the subject matter of a particular case is
something more than the general power conferred by law upon a court to take
cognizance of cases of the general class to which the particular case belongs. The
respondent Judge Mojica acted not only without jurisdiction in proceeding against
and declaring the petitioners guilty of contempt, but also in excess of jurisdiction
in ordering the confinement of the petitioners, because it had no power to impose
such punishment upon the latter. The respondent judge has no power under the
law to order the confinement of the petitioners until they have compiled with the
order of the court.

A wrong decision made within the limits of the court's authority is erroneous and
may be corrected on appeal or other direct review, but a wrong, or for that matter a
correct, decision is void, and may be set aside either directly or collaterally, where
the court exceeds its jurisdiction and power in rendering it. Hence though the court
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has acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter and the particular case has been
submitted properly to it for hearing and decision, it will overstep its jurisdiction if
it renders a judgment which it has no power under the law to render.

54.Celeste vs CA, GR No. L-31435, Jan. 30, 1970;

Facts:
Petitioner Amalia B. Celeste, under confinement in the jail of the City of Manila,
invoking the protection that habeas corpus affords, would seek the restoration of
her liberty, alleging the nullity of a decision of the Court of Appeals of March 2,
1966, now final and executory, convicting her of the crime of estafa, the only thing
lacking being the reading of the sentence by respondent Judge Ruperto Kapunan.
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She would support such a plea on her being acquitted by an earlier Court of
Appeals decision on what she alleged to be essentially the same transaction, the
sale of jewelry on commission, considered in such decision as giving rise at most
to a civil liability. There were different cases filed apparently as there was more
than one offended party.

There is no specific claim that thereby there was a denial of constitutional right,
but it was more than hinted at in her petition, which would characterize the
circumstances under which she was deprived of liberty as "utterly illegal and
[unchristian] if not inhuman." Apparently not unaware that her petition could have
been more strongly buttressed in the law, she would likewise invoke "humanity,
justice and equity" to regain her freedom. This Court, however, feels that even with
all the sympathy that her plight evokes, there is no legal justification that would
entitle her to the writ prayed for.

In the Court of Appeals decision where she was convicted for estafa, while it was
apparent that the transaction did occur at about the same time, the complainant was
a certain Eden Patdo, who entrusted the jewelry to her. It was the holding of the
Court of Appeals in this case that the agreement being clear to the effect that if she
were not successful in selling the same she was under obligation to return them and
there being a failure on her part to do so resulting from her entrusting them to a
third party, who apparently was another sub-agent, she would be held liable for
estafa.

Petitioner alleged that she never knew about its existence as her previous lawyer
did not notify her. It thus became final but no reading could be had in the
meanwhile as she was out on liberty under bond. It was only on December 13,
1969 that she was arrested and lodged in jail pending the reading of the sentence
which she would, in her original petition, postpone indefinitely while this Court
was passing on the question on whether or not its nullity could be decreed
considering the above circumstances. This proceeding was filed on January 5,
1970, Thereafter, on January 8, 1970 she sought to convert it into a petition
for habeas corpus, based on the same facts but insisting on the illegality of her
detention, not to mention what she considered its unchristian if not inhuman
character.

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Issue: Whether the petition for Habeas Corpus is the proper remedy if detention
involves deprivation of constitutional right notwithstanding, said detention is
pursuant to a judgment.

Ruling:
The writ of habeas corpus may still be invoked though if the process, judgment or
sentence proceeded from a court or tribunal the jurisdiction of which may be
assailed. Even if it had authority to act at the outset, it is now the prevailing
doctrine that a deprivation of constitutional right, if shown to exist, would oust it of
jurisdiction. In such a case, habeas corpus could be relied upon to regain one’s
liberty.

The moment the detention or confinement is the result of a process issued by the
court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or sentence, a different question arises.
The writ ordinarily cannot be availed of.

The function of the writ of habeas corpus has been to provide a prompt and
efficacious remedy for whatever society deems to be intolerable restraints. Its root
principle is that in a civilized society, government must always be accountable to
the judiciary for a man’s imprisonment

So it was affirmed in one of the truly outstanding opinions of Justice

Malcolm, Villavicencio v. Lukban 3 As was there stated: "The writ
of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to
relieve persons from unlawful freedom." 4 It cannot be denied, to follow the
language of a leading American Supreme Court decision, that while the writ
"is simply a mode of procedure, its history is inextricably intertwined with
the growth of fundamental rights of personal liberty. For its function has
been to provide a prompt and efficacious remedy for whatever society deems
to be intolerable restraints. Its root principle is that in a civilized society,
government must always be accountable to the judiciary for a man’s
imprisonment . . ."

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When not available
55. Enrile vs. Salazar, GR No. 92163, June 5, 1990;

Facts: February 27, 1990 – Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was
arrested by law enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the National
Bureau of Investigation on the strength of a warrant issued by Judge Salazar of the
RTC-Quezon City.

137
Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan
were charged with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murders allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup attempt from
November 29 to December 10, 1990.

Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft
Avenue, Manila, without bail, none having been recommended in the information
and none fixed in the arrest warrant. The following morning, February 28, 1990, he
was brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in Quezon City where he was given over to
the custody of the Superintendent of the Northern Police District, Brig. Gen.
Edgardo Dula Torres.

On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the
petition for habeas corpus.
Issue: Whether the petitioner has committed a complex crime arising from an
offense being a necessary means to commit another, referred in the Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code? (NO)

Ruling: NO. Enrile and the Panlilio spouses should only be charged with simple
rebellion following the Hernandez doctrine:

Murder and arson are crimes inherent when rebellion is taking place. In the RPC,
rebellion is just a single crime (Article 134) and there is no reason to complex it
with other crimes inherent in its commission. Thus, Article 48 applies only when
there are two crimes committed and not when there is only one such as in this
case.

The OSG contends that this case does not fall within the Hernandez ruling because
the information in Hernandez charged murders and other common
crimes committed as a necessary means for the commission of rebellion,
whereas the information against Sen. Enrile et al. charged murder and frustrated
murder committed on the occasion, but not in furtherance, of rebellion. 

Stated otherwise, the Solicitor General would distinguish between the complex
crime (“delito complejo”) arising from an offense being a necessary means for
committing another, which is referred to in the second clause of Article 48 and is
the subject of the Hernandez ruling, and the compound crime (“delito compuesto”)

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arising from a single act constituting two or more grave or less grave offenses
referred to in the first clause of the same paragraph, with which Hernandez was not
concerned and to which, therefore, it should not apply.

The court does not agree. If rebellion will be punished separately, Enrile could be
charged with (1) crime of rebellion, fine not exceeding PhP 20,000 and Prision
Mayor, and depending on the circumstances, up to but not exceeding 12 years of
Prision Mayor; (2) crime of murder, punishable Reclusion Temporal in its
maximum period to death, depending on the circumstances.

In the absence of aggravating circumstances, the maximum penalty cannot be

imposed on Enrile. However, Article 48 states that an accused can be punished the
MAXIMUM PENALTY even without a single AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCES. This is contrary to the principle that penal statutes
should be decided liberally in favor of the accused and strictly against the
state.

Article 48 was enacted to favor the accused, not of sentencing him/her to a

penalty more severe than what is proper when the acts were punished
separately.

The spirit of Article 48 is that if there are two or more acts which constitute a
single act, the single act should be the one punished for if the punishments were
combined for the constitutive acts, it impose a graver penalty than what is proper
which is unfavorable to the accused.

56.Sotto vs. Dir. of Prisons, GR, No. L-18871, May 30, 1962;

Facts: Together with Rocindo Brillantes, Eligio Iturralde and Alfredo Valencia,
petitioner Eduardo Sotto was convicted upon a plea of guilty, by the CFI of
Zamboanga, for the crime of robbery, and sentenced to serve an imprisonment of
from 12 years and 1 day to 18 years, 2 months and 21 days of reclusion temporal;
to return the articles robbed or pay the corresponding value of P465.60 to the

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offended party Leona Kuan Tan, with the accessories of the law and to pay 1/4 of
the costs (CFI-Crim. Case No. 1873, Zamboanga City). He started serving his
sentence on December 17, 1953, and up to the date of his petition for habeas
corpus, filed on December 8, 1958, he has already served an aggregate term of 4
years, 11 months and 21 days, excluding good conduct time allowance, earned
under article 97 of the Revised Penal Code. He alleged in his petition that the
penalty imposed is excessive and not in accordance with law, as the proper penalty
imposable, for the offense charged in the information should be that of Article 302,
and not article 299 of the Revised Penal Code; that at the time of conviction,
petitioner was a minor, 16 years old, and as such he was entitled to a penalty next
lower than the one prescribed for the crime committed, to wit, arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correcional in its minimum period, or from 4 months
and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months, and that having served sentence for a period of
4 years, 11 months and 21 days, he should already be ordered released from
custody and control of the Respondent Director of Prisons or his representative and
that he has no other adequate, legal and speedy remedy in law except the present
proceeding. He, therefore, prayed that the respondent be ordered to release him.
Respondent, answering, alleged in his special defense that admitting, but not
granting that the sentence is not in accordance with law, the petition for habeas
corpus, is not the proper remedy.

The trial court issued an Order the dispositive portion of which runs

Issue: Whether Judge Hon. Pablo Villalobos who imposed the sentence in criminal
case No. 1873, was right; and therefore, this case of habeas corpus will not lie and
same is here denied.

Ruling:
This Court has repeatedly held that a writ of habeas corpus is not a writ of error, or
a writ for the purpose of review, we stated that

'With reference to persons in custody pursuant to a final judgment, the rule is that
the writ of habeas corpus can issue only for want of jurisdiction of the sentencing
court, and cannot function as a writ of error. Hence, the writ will not lie to correct
mere mistake of fact or of law which do not nullify the proceedings taken by a
court in the exercise of its functions, if the court has jurisdiction over the crime and
over the person of the defendant.'

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The second error, on the other hand, attacks the Municipal Court's appreciation of
the number of appellant's previous convictions for theft. Again, this is merely an
error of judgment by said court, which did not in any way affect its jurisdiction, or
could nullify its proceedings, but was correctable only by a seasonal appeal.

'But the writ of habeas corpus is not a remedy provided for the correction of such
errors. Courts cannot, in habeas corpus proceedings, review the record in a
criminal case after a judgment of conviction has been rendered, and the defendants
have entered on the execution of the sentence imposed), to ascertain whether the
facts found by the trial court were in accordance with the evidence disclosed by the
record, or in order to pass upon the correctness of the conclusions of law by the
trial court based on the facts thus found. Under the statute, a commitment in due
form based on a final judgment convicting and sentencing a defendant in a criminal
case is conclusive of the legality of his detention under such commitment, unless it
appears that the court exceeded its jurisdiction in imposing the penalty. Mere errors
of law or of fact, which did not have the effect of depriving the trial court of its
jurisdiction over the cause and the person of the defendant, if corrected at all, must
be corrected on appeal in the form and manner prescribed by law.'

Reliance is placed on our ruling in the cases of Cruz vs. Director" of Prisons (17

Phil. 269) and Caluag vs. Pecson, (82 Phil. 8), but these cases are not in point, for
they involved penalties not provided by law and, therefore, beyond the power or
jurisdiction of the trial court to impose. Thus, in the Pomeroy case, supra, we said:

'While this Court has ruled that an excessive sentence or penalty imposed by final
judgment may be corrected by habeas corpus, the cases where such ruling was
applied involved penalties that could not be imposed under any circumstances for
the crime for which the prisoner was convicted: (subsidiary imprisonment for
violation of special acts, in Cruz vs. Director of Prisons, 17 Phil. 269;
imprisonment for contempt by refusal to execute a conveyance instead of having
the conveyance executed as provided by Sec. 10 of Rule 39, in Caluag vs. Pecson,
82 Phil. 8). * * *

In the case at bar, the trial court undoubtedly had jurisdiction over the cause, over
the person of the accused, and to impose the penalty provided for by law. What is
here questioned is only the correctness of the exercise of that jurisdiction. The
mistake committed by the trial court, if any, refers to the appreciation of the facts

141
and/or in the appreciation of the law, which, in the light of the authorities
heretofore cited, cannot be corrected by habeas corpus.

57. Illusorio vs. Bildner, GR No. 139808, May 12, 2000

Facts: Erlinda filed with the CA a petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of
her husband Potenciano alleging that respondents refused petitioner’s demands to
see and visit her husband.

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The CA allowed visitation rights to Erlinda for humanitarian consideration  but
denied the petition for habeas corpus for lack of unlawful restraint or detention of
the subject of the petition.

Erlinda seeks to reverse the CA decision dismissing the application for habeas
corpus to have the custody of her husband and enforce consortium as the wife.

Potenciano seeks to annul that portion of the CA decision giving Erlinda visitation
rights.

Issue: May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live
with her in their conjugal dwelling.

Ruling: No. Marital rights including coverture and living in conjugal dwelling

may not be enforced by the extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus.
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or
by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld  from the one entitled thereto.
It is available where a person continuous unlawfully denied of one or more of his
constitutional freedom. It is devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve
persons from unlawful restrainment, as the best and only sufficient defense of
personal freedom. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is
to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint and to relieve a person therefrom
if such restraint is illegal. A person with full mental capacity coupled with the right
choice may not be the subject of visitation rights against free choice. The CA
exceeded its authority when it awarded visitation rights in a petition for habeas
corpus where Erlinda never even prayed for such right.

No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his

wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus
carried out by the sheriffs or by any other means process.

Restrictive Custody
58.Ampatuan vs. Macaraeg, supra

Facts:

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Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the COMELEC Legal Department, was killed at
the corner of M. H. Del Pilar and Pedro Gil Streets, Ermita, Manila. Investigation
conducted by the Manila Police District Homicide Section yielded the identity of
the male perpetrator as PO1 Ampatuan. Consequently, PO1 Ampatuan was
commanded to the MPD District Director for proper disposition. Likewise, inquest
proceedings were conducted by the Manila Prosecutor’s Office.

On 18 April 2008, Police Senior Superintendent Guinto, rendered his Pre-Charge

Evaluation Report against PO1 Ampatuan, finding probable cause to charge PO1
Ampatuan with Grave Misconduct (Murder) and recommending that said PO1
Ampatuan be subjected to summary hearing.

Meanwhile, on 21 April 2008, the City Prosecutor of Manila recommended that the
case against PO1 Ampatuan be set for further investigation and that the latter be
released from custody unless he is being held for other charges/legal grounds.

Armed with the 21 April 2008 recommendation of the Manila City’s Prosecution
Office, petitioner, who is the wife of PO1 Ampatuan, filed a Petition for the
Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus before the RTC of Manila on 22 April 2008.

On 24 April 2008, RTC ordered the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus

commanding therein respondents to produce the body of PO1 Ampatuan and
directing said respondents to show cause why they are withholding or
restraining the liberty of PO1 Ampatuan.

Seeking the reversal of RTC, the respondents averred that the filing of the
administrative case against PO1 Ampatuan is a process done by the PNP and this
Court has no authority to order the release of the subject police officer. The
petitioner countered that the letter resignation of PO1 Ampatuan has rendered the
administrative case moot and academic. Respondent however stressed that the
resignation has not been acted by the appropriate police officials of the PNP, and
that the administrative case was filed while PO1 Ampatuan is still in the active
status of the PNP. The Court of Appeals reversed and dismissed the petition.

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Issue: Whether the respondent court gravely abused its discretion when it failed to
consider that the arrest and detention of PO1 Ampatuan was made without any
warrant and therefore, illegal.

Ruling: The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or

detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be
inquired into is the legality of a person's detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of
the application for the writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its
inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the
instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the
filing of the application. In this case, PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under
Restrictive Custody. Republic Act No. 6975 (also known as the Department of
Interior and Local Government Act of 1990), as amended by Republic Act No.
8551 (also known as the Philippine National Police Reform and Reorganization
Act of 1998), clearly provides that members of the police force are subject to the
administrative disciplinary machinery of the PNP. Given that PO1 Ampatuan has
been placed under restrictive custody, such constitutes a valid argument for his
continued detention. This Court has held that a restrictive custody and monitoring
of movements or whereabouts of police officers under investigation by their
superiors is not a form of illegal detention or restraint of liberty.

Restrictive custody is, at best, nominal restraint which is beyond the ambit of
habeas corpus. It is neither actual nor effective restraint that would call for
the grant of the remedy prayed for. It is a permissible precautionary measure
to assure the PNP authorities that the police officers concerned are always
accounted for.

In sum, petitioner is unable to discharge the burden of showing that she is entitled
to the issuance of the writ prayed for in behalf of her husband, PO1 Ampatuan. The
petition fails to show on its face that the latter is unlawfully deprived of his liberty
guaranteed and enshrined in the Constitution.

Effect if filing of charges in court

59.Barredo vs. Vinarao, GR No. 168728, Aug. 2, 2007;

Facts:
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This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Two criminal cases
rendered to petitioner Samuel Barredo y Golani guilty for carnapping and for
illegal possession of firearms in Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and
committed to the custody of the Quezon City Jail as detention prisoner. After
conviction he was transferred to and confined at the maximum security compound
of the New Bilibid in Prison in Muntinlupa on July 23, 1994 where he is now still
detained.

Petitioner prays for his release on the ground that he already served the sentence
imposed on him that as of October 9, 2001, where the Board of Pardons and Parole
passed a resolution recommending the commutation of his sentence to a period of
from 15 to 20 years. He further points out that, based on the Bureau of Corrections
revised computation table for determining the time to be credited prisoners for
good conduct while serving sentence, he should only serve 14 years, 9 months and
18 days. He also posits that as of August 2, 2004, he already served a total of 18
years. Thus, this petition.

Issue: Whether the petitioner entitled to writ of habeas corpus

Ruling:
No, Petitioner is not entitled to the writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner is detained
pursuant to a final judgment of the Quezon City RTC for the crimes of carnapping
and illegal possession of firearms..
As a rule, if a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in custody of an
officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order
of a court of record the writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed.Thus, Section 4,
Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. If it appears that the
person alleged to brestrained of his liberty is in the custody of an
officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a
judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had
jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the
writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is
allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or
defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be
held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an
146
 offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under
lawful judgment.

Even petitioner already served 18 years, he has not yet served the minimum
penalty in the illegal possession of firearms case. Commutation of sentence is a
prerogative of the Chief Executive.  Hence, even if petitioners claim were true, the
recommendation of the Bureau of Pardons and Parole was just that, a mere
recommendation. Until and unless approved by the President, there is no
commutation to speak of.

60. Kiani vs. BID, GR No. 160922, Feb. 27, 2006;

Facts:

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On June 19, 2002, Javed Kiani, a British national but a Pakistani by birth 2 reported
to the Rodriguez, Rizal Police Station that his friends, Iqbal Singh and Balbir
Singh, had been forcibly taken by four (4) armed men from their residence at
Balita, Rodriguez, Rizal.3 A couple of days later, then Commissioner Andrea D.
Domingo of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) issued Mission
Order No. ADD-02-203 based on Executive Order No. 287 of former President
Joseph Estrada. In said Order, appropriate officers of the Bureau were directed to
conduct verification/validation of the admission status and activities of Javed
Kiani, and, if found to have violated the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as
amended, to immediately place him under arrest. 4 Per records of the BID, Javed
Kiani was married to a Filipina, Jeany-Vi Kiani, on July 27, 1988. He was
admitted as an immigrant and was issued a permanent resident visa on March 17,
1993.5

A week later, on June 27, 2002, Javed Kiani was arrested at Felicidad Village,
Montalban, Rizal. The arresting officers, Eduardo Cabrera, Eliseo Exconde and
Jose Vale, Jr., operatives of the Bureau of Intelligence of the BID, relied on
information from Iqbal and Balbir Singh, who pointed to Javed Kiani as the one
who had furnished them with fake Alien Certificate Registration (ACR) and
Immigrant Certificate Registration (ICR). Apparently, the forms used were not
official BID forms.6

On July 1, 2002, the BID Prosecutor filed a Charge Sheet 7 against "Javed Kiani
alias Ahmad Singh" before the Board of Special Inquiry (BSI) for violation of the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, particularly Section 37(a)(7) and
Section 45 thereof. The case was docketed as D.C. No. ADD-02-080. The Charge
Sheet reads:

Records show that the above-named subject was arrested.

Records also show that subject national was positively identified by Indian
nationals Balbir Singh and Iqbal Singh when they were arrested by the same
operatives on June 18, 2002 as the person who gave them spurious immigration
documents and as their protector evidenced by copies of the ACRs and ICRs of
Balbir and Iqbal Singh, which were certified by Mr. Reynaldo Joson as "fake."

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On the same day, July 1, 2002, the Board of Commissioners (BOC) conducted a
summary proceeding and issued a Summary Deportation Order revoking the visa
issued to Javed Kiani. The Order reads in part:

Considering the seriousness of the charge/s and the evidence in support thereof,
respondent, whose Temporary Residence Visa is hereby ordered cancelled and
revoked, is hereby ordered summarily deported to his country of origin, subject to
PNP, Court and NBI clearances and payment of an administrative fine in the
amount of ₱50,000.00.9

The next day, July 2, 2002, Javed Kiani’s wife, Jeany-Vi, filed a Petition for a Writ
of Habeas Corpus10 for and in behalf of her husband before the RTC of Manila,
naming the BID and its intelligence officers as Respondents. She prayed that the
court issue a writ of habeas corpus directing respondents to produce the person of
Javed Kiani before it "in the soonest time possible and to show the cause or legal
justification for the latter’s detention and imprisonment, if any; and for such other
or further reliefs as may be deemed just and equitable under the premises." She
further alleged that her husband had intervened in the arrest of Iqbal and Balbir
Singh, and that the arresting officers resented such intervention. She insisted that
the arrest and detention of her husband were bereft of factual and legal basis, since
at the time, no deportation order had yet been issued against him. Citing the ruling
of this Court in Board of Commissioners v. Dela Rosa, 11 she alleged that the
Mission Order issued by the Immigration Commissioner was void. The case was
docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 02-103935.12 Javed Kiani had been detained at the BID
Detention Center, Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig, Metro Manila since July 3, 2002.13

On October 28, 2002, the RTC issued an Order 17 granting the motion and setting
aside its July 18, 2002 Order. In dismissing the petition, it ruled that Jeany-Vi was
barred from questioning the legality of the arrest and detention of her husband,
following the filing of the Charge Sheet with the BSI; as such, there was no
justification for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. It declared that, as gleaned
from the return of the writ filed by the respondents, Javed Kiani was lawfully
charged with violation of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended;
hence, the Summary Deportation Order issued by the BOC was valid.

The RTC also ruled that the proper remedy of Javed Kiani from the
Summary Deportation Order of the BOC was to file a petition for review with

149
the CA under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court (and not a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus before it), as it had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and
reverse the Summary Deportation Order issued by the BOC.

The CA declared that a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus can no longer be
allowed since the party sought to be released had been charged before the
BSI. Assuming that Javed Kiani’s detention or his arrest was illegal, any
incipient infirmity thereon was cured by the filing of the Charge Sheet against
him. The appellate court cited the ruling of this Court in Velasco v. Court of
Appeals.20 It likewise affirmed the ruling of the RTC that it had no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of and reverse the Summary Deportation
Order of the BOC, that the remedy of petitioner from the Summary
Deportation Order of the BOC was to file a petition for review with the CA
under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and that her failure to do
so rendered said Order final and executory.

Issue: Whether the CA erred in (a) holding that the Petition for a Writ of Habeas
Corpus before the RTC was not the proper remedy of petitioner; (b) upholding the
validity of the Summary Deportation Order issued by the BOC; and (c) declaring
that such Order had become final and executory

Ruling: On the first issue, we agree with the contention of the OSG that the
petitioner indulged in forum shopping. Forum shopping is the institution of two or
more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that
one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. Section 6, Rule 43 of
the Revised Rules of Court provides that a petition for review on certiorari must
contain a sworn certification against forum shopping as provided in the last
paragraph of Section 2, Rule 42 of said Rules, to wit:

The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a certification under oath
that he has not theretofore commenced any other action involving the same issues
in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any
other tribunal or agency; if there is such other action or proceeding, he must state
the status of the same; and if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or
proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he

150
undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid courts and other tribunal or agency
thereof within five (5) days therefrom.lawphil.net

Under Section 5, Rule 45 of said Rules, the failure of the petitioner to comply with
any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of
the petition.

In Balite v. Court of Appeals, 30 the Court held that there is forum shopping when a
party seeks to obtain remedies in an action in one court, which had already been
solicited, and in other courts and other proceedings in other tribunals. While a
party may avail of the remedies prescribed by the Rules of Court, such party is not
free to resort to them simultaneously or at his/her pleasure or caprice. A party
should not be allowed to present simultaneous remedies in two different forums,
for it degrades and wreaks havoc to the rule on orderly procedure. A party must
follow the sequence and hierarchical order in availing such remedies and not resort
to shortcuts in procedure or playing fast and loose with the said rules. Forum
shopping, an act of malpractice, is considered as trifling with the courts and
abusing their processes. It is improper conduct and degrades the administration of
justice.

In this case, petitioner seeks not only the reversal of the Order of the RTC
dismissing her Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus filed in behalf of her husband
(where it was also declared that he had been legally deported), as well as the
decision of the CA affirming the RTC’s Order; she also prays that the Court render
judgment nullifying the Summary Deportation Order of the BOC and order her
husband’s release from detention. However, Javed Kiani himself, during the
pendency of this case, filed an Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam with the BID,
seeking the same reliefs, which his wife prayed for in this case. By filing said
motion, Javed Kiani sought to preempt the decision of this Court. Petitioner and
her husband even failed to inform the Court of the filing of such motion, and did so
only after the OSG had already informed the Court of such petition, and after
petitioner had been ordered to reply to the Comment of the OSG.

Petitioner and her husband were represented by the same law firm, the Cruz Cruz
and Neria Law Offices. The instant petition and said motion were signed by the
same lawyer, Atty. Marlon Alexandre C. Cruz. That the instant petition was filed
by Jeany-Vi Kiani while the Omnibus Motion was filed by Javed Kiani himself is

151
of no moment; after all, the petition was filed for and in behalf of the latter, who is
the real party-in-interest.31 In effect, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus was
filed by him, as the beneficiary, through his wife as his representative. Worse, the
Immigration Commissioner took cognizance of and granted the same, despite the
pendency of the instant petition, thereby preempting the ruling of this Court.

The Immigration Commissioner and Atty. Marlon Alexandre C. Cruz ought to be

reprimanded for their acts.

On the merits of the petition, we find and so rule that the CA acted in accord with
jurisprudence when it affirmed the assailed Order of the RTC dismissing the
Petition for Habeas Corpus. As the Court held in Caballes v. Court of Appeals,32

Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor intended as substitute for
the trial court’s function. It cannot take the place of appeal, certiorari or writ of
error. The writ cannot be used to investigate and consider questions of error that
might be raised relating to procedure or on the merits. The inquiry in a habeas
corpus proceeding is addressed to the question of whether the proceedings and the
assailed order are, for any reason, null and void. The writ is not ordinarily granted
where the law

provides for other remedies in the regular course, and in the absence of exceptional
circumstances. Moreover, habeas corpus should not be granted in advance of trial.
The orderly course of trial must be pursued and the usual remedies exhausted
before resorting to the writ where exceptional circumstances are extant. In another
case, it was held that habeas corpus cannot be issued as a writ of error or as a
means of reviewing errors of law and irregularities not involving the questions of
jurisdiction occurring during the course of the trial, subject to the caveat that
constitutional safeguards of human life and liberty must be preserved, and not
destroyed. It has also been held that where restraint is under legal process, mere
errors and irregularities, which do not render the proceedings void, are not grounds
for relief by habeas corpus because in such cases, the restraint is not illegal.33

In this case, when petitioner filed her Petition for Habeas Corpus with the RTC in
behalf of her husband, a Charge Sheet had already been filed against him for
violation of Section 37(a)(7) and Section 45 of the Philippine Immigration Act of
1940, as amended. The filing of the Charge Sheet before the BSI cured whatever
irregularities or infirmities were attendant to his arrest. The remedy of petitioner

152
was to file a motion for the dismissal of the Charge Sheet and the Mission Order of
the Immigration Commissioner, not a petition for a writ of habeas corpus before
the RTC. The RTC had no authority to nullify the Mission Order issued by the
Immigration Commissioner, much less set aside the arrest of Javed Kiani. As held
by this Court in Commissioner Rodriguez v. Judge Bonifacio:34

Be that as it may, there was a valid judicial process justifying Ma Jing’s detention
even before respondent judge rendered his decision as shown by the Return of the
Writ which averred, among others, that a Charge Sheet was filed against Ma Jing.
Even granting that the arrest of Ma Jing was initially illegal, the filing of the
Charge Sheet cured whatever incipient infirmity there was in her arrest.
Respondent judge therefore had no authority to release the party who was thus
committed. Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides:

The writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed after the party sought to be
released had been charged before any court. The term "court" includes quasi-
judicial bodies like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration.35

The CA acted in accord with jurisprudence when it affirmed the ruling of the RTC
declaring that it had no jurisdiction over petitioner’s plea to set aside the Summary
Deportation Order issued by the BOC against her husband Javed Kiani. Under
Section 8, Chapter 3, Title I, Book III of Executive Order No. 292, the power to
deport aliens is vested on the President of the Philippines, subject to the
requirements of due process. The Immigration Commissioner is vested with
authority to deport aliens under Section 37 of the Philippine Immigration Act of
1940, as amended. Thus, a party aggrieved by a Deportation Order issued by the
BOC is proscribed from assailing said Order in the RTC even via a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus. Conformably with ruling of the Court in Domingo v.
Scheer,36 such party may file a motion for the reconsideration thereof before the
BOC. The Court ruled therein that "there is no law or rule which provides that a
Summary Deportation Order issued by the BOC in the exercise of its authority
becomes final after one year from its issuance, or that the aggrieved party is barred
from filing a motion for a reconsideration of any order or decision of the BOC."
The Court, likewise, declared that in deportation proceedings, the Rules of Court
may be applied in a suppletory manner and that the aggrieved party may file a
motion for reconsideration of a decision or final order under Rule 37 of said
Rules.37

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 In case such motion for reconsideration is denied by the BOC, the aggrieved
party may appeal to the Secretary of Justice 38 and, if the latter denies the
appeal, to the Office of the President of the Philippines. The party may also
choose to file a petition for certiorari with the CA under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, on the ground that the Secretary of Justice acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in dismissing the
appeal, the remedy of appeal not being adequate and speedy remedy.39 In
case the Secretary of Justice dismisses the appeal, the aggrieved party may
resort to filing a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, as
amended

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 61. Wong vs. Wong, GR No. 180364;

Facts: This case is about a Chinese citizen who immigrated to the Philippines in
1975 and subsequently acquired a permanent resident status in 1982. As the
records would show, he studied, married, and continued to reside in the country,
and even owned a company called Happy Sun Travel and Tours.

On September 12, 2000, respondent Kenny Wong (respondent), owner and

proprietor of San Andres Construction Supply, filed a Complaint-Affidavit 5 against
petitioner before the Bureau of Immigration (BOI), alleging that the latter had
misrepresented, in his driver’s license application, that he was a Filipino citizen.

Finding probable cause, the Special Prosecutor filed with the BOI the applicable
deportation charges9against petitioner, the BOI Board of Commissioners ordered
the deportation of petitioner on the grounds of: (a) illegal use of alias, i.e., Joseph
Wong, which was the name appearing in his driver’s license application; and (b)
misrepresenting himself as a Filipino citizen in the same application. However,
Aside from pointing out the misrepresentations made by petitioner, the BOI took
judicial notice of the fact that driver’s license applications require the personal
appearance of the applicant in order to prevent fraud. Thus, by allowing someone
to apply for him, he actively involved himself in the preparation and issuance of a
fraudulent driver’s license. By the same account, he cannot then aver that he was
without any participation in the entry of his supposed Philippine citizenship in his
driver’s license. Motion for reconsideration was denied As such, petitioner filed an
appeal before the Secretary of Justice which was then affirmed the decision of the
BOI, on appeal to the CA, it was denied, because petitioner chose the wrong
remedy considering that the decisions of the BOI Board of Commissioners are
directly appealable to the CA under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.

Issue:  Whether or not the CA correctly denied petitioner’s petition

for certiorari.

Ruling: The petition is denied. Petitioner’s certiorari petition before the CA

basically revolves on his denial of the acts of misrepresentation imputed against
him, claiming that the same do not warrant his deportation. However, the
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commission of said acts involves factual matters that have already been established
during the proceedings before the BOI Board of Commissioners. In this regard, it
is crucial to point out that “[t]he Bureau is the agency that can best determine
whether petitioner violated certain provisions of the Philippine Immigration
Act of 1940, as amended. In this jurisdiction, courts will not interfere in
matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies
entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical
knowledge and training of such agencies. By reason of the special knowledge
and expertise of administrative departments over matters falling within their
jurisdiction, they are in a better position to pass judgment thereon and their
findings of fact in that regard are generally accorded respect, if not finality, by the
courts.”58 As petitioner has not sufficiently demonstrated any cogent reason to
deviate from the BOI Board of Commissioners’ findings, courts are wont to defer
to its judgment.

The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative

evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The presumption, however,
prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Every
reasonable intendment will be made in support of the presumption and in case of
doubt as to an officer’s act being lawful or unlawful; construction should be in
favor of its lawfulness.

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 62. Larranaga vs. CA, GR NO.130644, March 13, 1998

Facts:
Petitioner Larranaga was charged with two counts of kidnapping and serious
illegaldetention before the RTC of Cebu City. He was arrested and was detained
withoutthe filing of the necessary Information and warrant of arrest. The petitioner
allegedthat he must be released and be subject to a preliminary investigation.
However, pending the resolution of the Court for the petition for certiorari,
prohibitionand mandamus with writs of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory
injunction filedby the petitioner, RTC judge issued a warrant of arrest directed to
the petitioner.

Issue:
1.Whether petitioner is entitled to a regular preliminary investigation

2.Whether writ of habeas corpus should be granted in favor of petitioner.

Ruling:
1.Yes. Our ruling is not altered by the fact that petitioner has been arraigned
onOctober 14, 1997. The rule is that the right to preliminary investigation iswaived
when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering aplea at
arraignment. Petitioner, in this case, has been actively andconsistently demanding a
regular preliminary investigation even before hewas charged in court. Also,
petitioner refused to enter a plea during thearraignment because there was a
pending case in this Court regarding hisright to avail of a regular preliminary
investigation. Clearly, the acts of petitioner and his counsel are inconsistent with a
waiver. Preliminaryinvestigation is part of procedural due process. It cannot be
waived unlessthe waiver appears to be clear and informed.
2.No. The filing of charges and the issuance of the warrant of arrest against
aperson invalidly detained will cure the defect of that detention or at least deny
him the right to be released because of such defect.The originalwarrantless arrest
of the petitioner was doubtless illegal. Nevertheless, theRegional Trial Court
lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person of thepetitioner by virtue of the
warrant of arrest it issued on August 26, 1993 against him and the other accused in
connection with the rape-slay cases. Itwas belated, to be sure, but it was

157
nonetheless legal. Hence, the issuance of writ of habeas corpus may not apply in
the case as there is no illegal confinement to speak of.

As post conviction remedy

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 63.Go vs. Dimagiba, GR No. 151876, June 21, 2005;

Facts: Fernando Dimagiba issued to Susan Go thirteen checks which, when

presented to the drawee bank for encashment or payment on the due dates, were
dishonored for the reason “account closed.” Subqequently, Dimagiba was
prosecuted for 13 counts of violation of BP 22 (An Act Penalizing the Making or
Drawing and Issuance of a Check Without Sufficient Funds or Credit and for Other
Purposes, approved on April 3, 1979). He was found guilty by the MTCC, was
sentenced three months imprisonment, and was ordered to pay the offended party
the amount he owed plus interest. On February 27, 2001, Dimagiba filed a Motion
for Reconsideration and a Motion for the Partial Quashal of the Writ of Execution,
praying for the recall of the Order of Arrest and the modification of the final
decision. Citing SC-AC No. 12-2000, he pointed out that the penalty of fine only,
instead of imprisonment also, should have been imposed on him. The MTCC
denied the motion for reconsideration; Dimagiba was arrested and imprisoned for
the service of his sentence. On October 9, 2001, Dimagiba filed with the RTC of
Baguio city a petition for writ of habeas corpus which was granted by the said
court after hearing the case.

Issues:
Whether or not the petition for writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy.
Whether or not SC-AC No. 12-2000 can be given retroactive application.
Ruling:
1. No. The respondent had previously sought the modification of his sentence in a
Motion for Reconsideration and in a Motion for the Partial Quashal of the Writ of
Execution. The remedy should have been an appeal of the MTCC Order denying
these motions. His petition for writ of habeas corpus was clearly an attempt to
reopen a case that had already become final and executory, an action deplorably
amounting to forum shopping.

2. No. The rule on retroactivity states that criminal laws may be applied
retroactively if favorable to the accused. SC-AC No. 12-2000 cannot be given
retroactive application for it is not a law that deletes the penalty of imprisonment.
It is merely a rule of preference as to which penalty should be imposed under the
peculiar circumstances of the case.

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 64. Chavez vs. CA, GR No. L- 29169, Aug. 19, 1968;

Facts: Accused were the following: Petitioner herein, Roger Chavez, Ricardo
Sumilang alias "Romeo Vasquez", Edgardo P. Pascual alias "Ging" Pascual, Pedro
160
Rebullo alias "Pita", Luis Asistio alias "Baby" Asistio, Lorenzo
Meneses alias"Lory" Meneses, Peter Doe, Charlie Doe and Paul Doe.

An information was filed that on or about the 14th day of November, 1962, in
Quezon City, the accused conspired, with intent of gain, abuse of confidence and
without the consent of the owner thereof, Dy Sun Hiok y Lim, in asporting the
motor vehicle above-described. Upon arraignment, all the accused, except the three
Does who have not been identified nor apprehended, pleaded not guilty.

Trial Court: On July 23, 1963, trial commenced before the judge presiding
Branch IX of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Quezon City
During the trial, the Fiscal Grecia (prosecution) asked Roger Chavez to be the first
witness. Counsel of the accused opposed. Fiscal Grecia contends that the accused
(Chavez) will only be an ordinary witness not an state witness. Counsel of accused
answer that it will only incriminate his client. But the jugde ruled in favor of the
fiscal on the grounds that (1) the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to act as
witness on the witness stand including the accused (2) If there should be any
question that is incriminating then that is the time for counsel to interpose his
objection and the court will sustain him if and when the court feels that the answer
of this witness to the question would incriminate him. (3) Counsel has all the
assurance that the court will not require the witness to answer questions which
would incriminate him.

Version of the prosecution of what happened:

Chavez saw Lee driving the thunderbird (car) and asked if it is for sale. Lee
answered yes. On November 12, Chavez met Sumilang and informed about the car.
The two went to Asistio and made a plan to capitalize on Romeo Vasquez'
reputation as a wealthy movie star, introduce him as a buyer to someone who was
selling a car and, after the deed of sale is signed, by trickery to run away with the
car. Asistio would then register it, sell it to a third person for a profit. Chavez
known to be a car agent was included in the plan. He furnished the name of
Johnson Lee who was selling his Thunderbird.
Chavez arranged the meeting with Lee on November 14. They agreed on the price
and went to Binondo to meet Dy Sun Hiok Lim which is the registered owner of
the car. Deed of sale was drawn and signed by Sumilang. At Eugene's, a man

161
approached Sumilang with a note which stated that the money was ready at the
Dalisay Theater. Sumilang then wrote on the same note that the money should be
brought to the restaurant. At the same time he requested Lee to exhibit the deed of
sale of the car to the note bearer.
The two Chinese were left alone in the restaurant. The two Chinese could not
locate Sumilang and Chavez. They went out to the place where the Thunderbird
was parked, found that it was gone. They then immediately reported its loss to the
police. Much later, the NBI recovered the already repainted car and impounded it.
Chavez, Sumilang and Asistio converged that same day at Barrio Fiesta, a
restaurant at Highway 54 near the Balintawak monument in Caloocan. There,
Asistio handed to Sumilang P1,000.00 cash and a golf set worth P800.00 as the
latter's share in the transaction. On the 14th of November, the registration of the
car was transferred in the name of Sumilang in Cavite City, and three days later, in
the name of Asistio in Caloocan.

Version of Romeo Sumilang:

In the last week of September, 1962, Sumilang saw Roger Chavez at a gas station.
The latter informed him that there was a Thunderbird from Clark Field for sale for
a price between P20,000.00 and P22,000.00. Chavez said that it could be held for
him with a down payment of P10,000.00.
On November 14, Chavez appeared at Sumilang's house with the news that the car
was ready if Sumilang was ready with the rest of the money. So Sumilang got
P9,000.00 from his mother and another P4,000.00 from his aparador. He
immediately gave P6,000.00 to Chavez, intending to pay out the balance upon the
car's delivery. It was then that Chavez told Sumilang that the car was already
bought by a Chinese who would be the vendor.
At Eugene's, Chavez asked Sumilang for the balance. Sumilang accommodated.
There, Sumilang, also saw a friend, "Ging" Pascual who warned that Chavez was a
"smart" agent and advised that Sumilang should have a receipt for his money. A
certain Bimbo, a friend of Pascual, offered to make out a receipt for Chavez to
sign. After Sumilang returned from posing for some photographs with some of his
fans, Bimbo showed him the receipt already signed by Chavez and also by Pascual
and Bimbo to sign the receipt as witnesses. This receipt was offered as an exhibit
by the prosecution and by Sumilang. Johnson Lee turned over to Sumilang the
deed of sale, the registration papers and the keys to the car.

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Two or three days afterwards, Sumilang dropped by the Barrio Fiesta on his way to
a film shooting he saw Asistio who liked his Thunderbird parked outside. Asistio
offered to buy it from him for P22,500.00 and Sumilang consented to the sale.
Asistio tendered a down payment of P1,000.00; the balance he promised to pay the
next day after negotiating with some financing company. Before said balance
could be paid, the car was impounded.

Ruling of the trial court and CA:

The trial court gave evidence to Sumilang's averment, he was thus cleared. So was
Asistio whom the trial court believed to be a mere buyer of the car. And so, the
prosecution's theory of conspiracy was discounted. As to the other accused, the
court found no case against Pedro Rebullo alias "Pita" and Lorenzo Meneses alias
"Lory". The accused "Ging" Pascual was also acquitted for in the first place he was
not identified by Johnson Lee in court.
As to Roger Chavez, however, the court had this to say: "Roger Chavez does not
offer any defense. As a matter of fact, his testimony as witness for the prosecution
establishes his guilt beyond reasonable doubt." The trial court branded him "a self-
confessed culprit"
Chavez filed an appeal. The counsel of Chavez Atty. Marquez was ordered to file
brief but she failed. Instead she sent filed a written detailed information and also
stating that if she were allowed to file appellant's brief she would go along with the
factual findings of the court below but will show however that its conclusion is
erroneous. CA dismissed said appeal. On June 21, 1968, the Court of Appeals,
directed the City Warden of Manila where Chavez is confined by virtue of the
warrant of arrest issued by the Court of Appeals, to turn him over to Muntinlupa
Bilibid Prisons pending execution of the judgment below, and ordered remand of
the case to the Quezon City court for execution of judgment.
Hence the petition for habeas corpus.

Issue:
I. Whether the constitutional right of the accused against self-
incrimination was violated.
II. Whether the petition for habeas corpus is the right recourse of the
accused

163
Ruling:
I. Petitioner claims that there was a violation of his constitutional right against self-
incrimination. He asks that the hand of this Court be made to bear down upon his
conviction; that he be relieved of the effects thereof. He asks us to consider the
constitutional injunction that "No person shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself, fully echoed in Section 1, Rule 115, Rules of Court where, in all criminal
prosecutions, the defendant shall be entitled: "(e) To be exempt from being a
witness against himself.
The Court held that such right is "not merely a formal technical rule the
enforcement of which is left to the discretion of the court"; it is mandatory; it
secures to every defendant a valuable and substantive right. Therefore, the court
may not extract from a defendant's own lips and against his will an admission of
his guilt. Nor may a court as much as resort to compulsory disclosure, directly or
indirectly, of facts usable against him as a confession of the crime or the tendency
of which is to prove the commission of a crime. Because, it is his right to forego
testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand — with
undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free, genuine will. Compulsion as it is
understood here does not necessarily connote the use of violence; it may be the
product of unintentional statements. Pressure which operates to overbear his will,
disable him from making a free and rational choice, or impair his capacity for
rational judgment would in our opinion be sufficient. So is moral coercion "tending
to force testimony from the unwilling lips of the defendant.
In the case, petitioner was called by the prosecution as the first witness in that case
to testify for the People during the first day of trial thereof. Petitioner objected and
invoked the privilege of self-incrimination. This he broadened by the clear cut
statement that he will not testify. But petitioner's protestations were met with the
judge's emphatic statement that it "is the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to
act as witness on the witness stand including the accused," and that defense
counsel "could not object to have the accused called on the witness stand." The
cumulative impact of all these is that accused-petitioner had to take the stand. He
was thus peremptorily asked to create evidence against himself. For, in reality, the
purpose of calling an accused as a witness for the People would be to incriminate
him. 
With all these, we have no hesitancy in saying that petitioner was forced to testify
to incriminate himself, in full breach of his constitutional right to remain silent. It

164
cannot be said now that he has waived his right. He did not volunteer to take the
stand and in his own defense; he did not offer himself as a witness; on the contrary,
he claimed the right upon being called to testify. If petitioner nevertheless
answered the questions inspite of his fear of being accused of perjury or being put
under contempt, this circumstance cannot be counted against him. His testimony is
not of his own choice. To him it was a case of compelled submission. He was a
cowed participant in proceedings before a judge who possessed the power to put
him under contempt had he chosen to remain silent. Nor could he escape testifying.
The court made it abundantly clear that his testimony at least on direct examination
would be taken right then and thereon the first day of the trial.
There is no waiver of the privilege. "To be effective, a waiver must be certain and
unequivocal, and intelligently, understandably, and willingly made; such waiver
following only where liberty of choice has been fully accorded. After a claim a
witness cannot properly be held to have waived his privilege on vague and
uncertain evidence

II. The course which petitioner takes is correct. Habeas corpus is a high

prerogative writ.  It is traditionally considered as an exceptional remedy to release
a person whose liberty is illegally restrained such as when the accused's
constitutional rights are disregarded. Such defect results in the absence or loss of
jurisdiction and therefore invalidates the trial and the consequent conviction of the
accused whose fundamental right was violated. That void judgment of conviction
may be challenged by collateral attack, which precisely is the function of habeas
corpus. This writ may issue even if another remedy which is less effective may be
availed of by the defendant. Thus, failure by the accused to perfect his appeal
before the Court of Appeals does not preclude a recourse to the writ.  The writ may
be granted upon a judgment already final.
Under our own Rules of Court, to grant the remedy to the accused Roger Chavez
whose case presents a clear picture of disregard of a constitutional right is
absolutely proper. Section 1 of Rule 102 extends the writ, unless otherwise
expressly provided by law, "to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by
which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any
person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.
The Court stated that: "A void judgment is in legal effect no judgment. By it no
rights are divested. From it no rights can be obtained. Being worthless in itself, all

165
proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars any
one. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void. The
parties attempting to enforce it may be responsible as trespassers. ... "

Petition granted. The Court rendered judgment directing the respondent Warden of
the City Jail of Manila or the Director of Prisons or any other officer or person in
custody of petitioner to discharge him from custody.

65. People vs. Caco, GR No. 94994-95

Facts: In our decision promulgated on 24 May 1993, we affirmed in toto the

decision of Branch 172 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila,

166
in Criminal Case No. 10108-V-90 finding accused-appellant Lilibeth Caco y
Palmario guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the violation of Section 4, Article II of
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425), as amended, and sentencing
her to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00.

In a motion filed on 17 November 1995, the appellant, through the Public

Attorney's Office, filed a "Motion for Modification of Sentence Pursuant to R.A.
7659." She alleged therein that she has been detained since 23 February 1990 and
is presently serving her sentence at the Correctional Institution for Women at
Mandaluyong City; that the marijuana involved in this case is "ten (10) sticks, . . .
costing P20.00 only which is less than 200 grams"; and that pursuant to People
v. Simon (234 SCRA 555 [1994]) and People v. De Lara (236 SCRA 291 [1994]),
the penalty imposable therefor under R.A. No. 7659 is prision correccional whose
duration is from six months and one day to six years. She then prayed that the
decision of 14 May 1993 be reconsidered and the life imprisonment meted upon
her be reduced accordingly.

We required the Office of the Solicitor General to comment on the motion. On 17

January 1997, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation in Lieu of
Comment wherein it agreed with the appellant that she is entitled to the application
of the decisions in People v. Simon and People v. De Lara. It did not refute the
allegations of the appellant that the marijuana involved in this case is less than 200
grams and that she has been in detention since 23 February 1990. It then concluded
that the appellant deserves to be released from prison.

Amplifying People v. Simon, we ruled in People v. De Lara:

If the marijuana involved is from 500 to 749 grams, the penalty to be

imposed is reclusion temporal. If the marijuana involved is from 250
to 499 grams, the penalty to be imposed is prision mayor, and if the
weight of the marijuana involved is below 250 grams, the penalty to
be imposed is prision correccional.

Since the weight of the marijuana involved in the instant case is below 250
grams, the penalty imposable pursuant to R.A. No. 7659, as interpreted
in People v. Simon and in People v. De Lara, is prision correccional, whose
duration is from six months and one day to six years. We declared in People

167
 v. Simon that provisions of R.A. No. 7659 which are favorable to the
accused should be given retroactive effect.

Issue: Whether petition for Habeas Corpus is the proper remedy?

Ruling: Yes.

It is settled that where the decision is already final, the appropriate remedy of an
accused to secure release from prison in view of the retroactive effect of a
favorable law is to file a petition for habeas corpus. Nonetheless, although the
remedy availed of by the appellant is a motion for modification of sentence, it may
be treated as a substantial compliance with the rules on habeas corpus. This is an
approach we recognized in Angeles v. Director of the New Bilibid Prison (240
SCRA 49 [1995]), People v. Agustin (248 SCRA 44 [1995]), and People
v. Labriaga (250 SCRA 763 [1995]). We treat the motion in question as one
for habeas corpus.

Habeas Corpus and Certiorari

66.Galvez vs. CA, GR No. 114046, Oct. 24, 1994

168
Facts:
On November 12, 1993, petitioners Honorato Galvez and Godofredo Diego were
charged in three separate information’s with homicide and two counts of frustrated
homicide. The said petitioners posted their bail bonds and in effect, were released
from detention. On November 15, 1993, in order for him to review the evidence on
record, Bulacan Provincial Prosecutor Liberator L. Reyes filed a Motion to Defer
Arraignment. Pursuant to a DOJ Department Order, respondent Prosecutor Dennis
Villa-Ignacio was designated Acting Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan with the
instructions to conduct a re-investigation of the aforementioned criminal cases.
Thereafter, the proceedings were again suspended by Judge Villajuan until after
the prosecution’s request for change of venue shall have been resolved by the
Supreme Court and the termination of the preliminary investigation. On December
15, 1993 before petitioners could be arrainged for the respective cases, respondent
prosecutor filed an Ex parte Motion to Withdraw Informations, which was granted
by Judge Villajuan. On the same day, the prosecutor filed four new information’s
against
herein petitioners for murder, two counts of frustrated murder, and for illegal
possession of firearms, which were raffled to Judge Victoria Pornillos. No bail
having been recommended by the said Judge, the arraignment of the accused was
issued for December 27, 1993. On December 27, 1993, the arraignment was reset
due to the absence of the respondent prosecutor. On the same date, petitioners filed
a Motion for Reconsideration of the order granting the withdrawal of the original
information’s. In addition, a Motion to Quash the new information’s for lack of
jurisdiction was filed by petitioners. Judge Pornillos thereafter denied said motion
and directed that a plea of not guilty be entered for petitioners when the latter
refused to enter their plea. In the meantime, on January 20, 1994, Judge Villajuan
granted the motion for reconsideration by petitioners and thus reinstating the
previous criminal cases. However, the corresponding arraignment was suspended
and, in the meanwhile, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with respondent Court of Appeals which denied petitioner’s motion to
quash. Respondent court dismissed this petition, hence the case at hand.

Issue:
Whether the ex parte motion to withdraw the original information’s is null and
void
169
on the ground that (a) there was no notice and hearing as required by Sections 4, 5,
and 6, Rule 15 of Rule of Courts; and (b) the appropriate remedy which should
have been adopted by the prosecution was to amend the information by charging
the proper offenses pursuat to Section 14 of Rule 110

Ruling:
No. Petitioner’s assert that the failure of the prosecution to serve them a copy of
the
motion to withdraw the original information’s and to set said motion for hearing
constitutes a violation of their right to be informed of the proceedings against
them. Furthermore, the ex parte motion should be considered null and void because
Judge Villajuan had no authority to act on it.
The Court stresses that once a complaint or information is filed in court, any
disposition of the case, whether as to its dismissal or the conviction or the acquittal
of the accused, rests in the sound discretion of the court. As explained in Crespo
vs. Mogul, “A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to
the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same.” It cannot therefore be
claimed that the prosecutor exceeded his authority in withdrawing those
information’s because the same bore the imprimatur of the court.

As regards the correctness of the court’s decision in dismissing the original

information’s rather than ordering the amendment thereof, the Court asserts that
there has been no grave abuse of discretion considering that the motion to
withdraw was filed and granted before the petitioners were arraigned. Hence, the
risk of double jeopardy is nonexistent. Even if a substitution was made at such
stage, petitioners cannot claim double jeopardy, which is precisely the evil sought
to be prevented under the rule on substitution, for the simple reason that no first
jeopardy has as yet attached. Petitioner’s right to speedy trial was never violated
since the new information were filed immediately after the motion to withdraw the
original information’s was granted. Thus, the petitions for certiorari, mandamus

Habeas Corpus in Custody Cases

67. Salientes vs. Abanilla
170
Facts:
Private respondent Loran S.D. Abanilla and petitioner Marie Antonette Abigail C.
Salientes are the parents of the minor Lorenzo Emmanuel S. Abanilla. They lived
with Marie Antonette's parents, petitioners Orlando B. Salientes and Rosario C.
Salientes. Due to inlaws problems, private respondent suggested to his wife that
they transfer to their own house, but Marie Antonette refused. So, he alone left the
house of the Salientes. Thereafter, he was prevented from seeing his son.

ARGUMENTS AND ISSUES AT THE TRIAL COURT:

Loran S.D. Abanilla, as the representative of his son, filed a Petition for Habeas
Corpus and Custody at the RTC of Muntinlupa City.

The RTC decided, “Upon verified Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by
Petitioners, the Respondents Marie Antonette Abigail C. Salientes, Orlando B.
Salientes and Rosario C. Salientes are hereby directed to produce and bring before
this Court the body of minor Lorenzo Emmanuel Salientes Abanilla on January 31,
2003 at 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon and to show cause why the said child should
not be discharged from restraint. Let this Writ be served by the Sheriff or any
authorized representative of this Court, who is directed to immediately make a
return. SO ORDERED.”

ARGUMENTS AND ISSUES AT THE COURT OF APPEALS:

Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, but the same
was dismissed on November 10, 2003. The appellate court affirmed the February
24, 2003 Order of the trial court holding that its January 23, 2003 Order did not
award the custody of the 2-year-old child to any one but was simply the standard
order issued for the production of restrained persons. The appellate court held that
the trial
court was still about to conduct a full inquiry, in a summary proceeding, on the
cause of the minor's detention and the matter of his custody. The Court of Appeals
ruled thus: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

ARGUMENTS AND ISSUES AT THE SUPREME COURT:

Petitioners interposed this appeal by certiorari anchored on the following grounds:
171
1. The Court of Appeals erred in not pronouncing the respondent judge gravely
abused his discretion, amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing an
order for the petitioner-mother to first show cause why her own three-year old
child in her custody should not be discharged from a so-called "restraint" despite
no evidence at all of restraint and no evidence of compelling reasons of maternal
unfitness to deprive the petitioner-mother of her minor son of tender years. The
assailed orders, resolutions and decisions of the lower court and the Court of
Appeals are clearly void;
2. The Court of Appeals erred in not pronouncing that the respondent judge
gravely abused his discretion in issuing a writ of habeas corpus which clearly is not
warranted considering that there is no unlawful restraint by the mother and
considering further that the law presumes the fitness of the mother, thereby
negating any notion of such mother illegally restraining or confining her very own
son of tender years. The petition is not even sufficient in substance to warrant the
writ. The assailed orders are clearly void;
3. Contrary to the Court of Appeals decision, the "Sombong vs. CA" case supports
rather than negates the position of the petitioners.
4. Contrary to the Court of Appeals decision, summary proceeding does violence
to the tender-years-rule;
5. The Court of Appeals failed to consider that the private respondent failed to
present prima facie proof of any compelling reason of the unfitness of the
petitioner-mother;
6. The Court of Appeals failed to see that the New Rules on Custody SUFFICES
AS REMEDY.

Private respondent counters that petitioners' argument based on Article 213 of the
Family Code applies only to the second part of his petition regarding the custody
of his son. It does not address the first part, which pertains to his right as the father
to see his son. He asserts that the writ of habeas corpus is available against any
person who restrains the minor's right to see his father and vice versa. He avers that
the instant petition is merely filed for delay, for had petitioners really intended to
bring the child before the court in accordance with the new rules on custody of
minors, they would have done so on the dates specified in the January 23, 2003 and
the February 24, 2003 orders of the trial court.

172
Under Rule 41, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, an interlocutory order is not
appealable but the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special action under
Rule 65. The aggrieved party must show that the court gravely abused its
discretion in issuing the interlocutory order. In the present case, it is incumbent
upon petitioners to show that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in issuing
the order.
Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody is withheld from
a person entitled thereto. Under Article 211 of the Family Code, respondent Loran
and petitioner Marie Antonette have joint parental authority over their son and
consequently joint custody. Further, although the couple is separated de facto, the
issue of custody has yet to be adjudicated by the court. In the absence of a judicial
grant of custody to one parent, both parents are still entitled to the custody of their
child. In the present case, private respondent's cause of action is the deprivation of
his right to see his child as alleged in his petition. Hence, the remedy of habeas
corpus is available to him.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 10, 2003
and the Resolution dated March 19, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 75680 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

68. Demaisip vs. Cabcaban, Jan. 13, 2014;

Facts:
173
Petitioner Shirly Vingson (Shirly) alleged that Shang Ko Vingson Yu (Shang Ko),
her 14-year-old daughter, ran away from home on September 23, 2011. On
November 2, 2011 Shirly went to the police station in Bacolod City upon receipt of
information that Shang Ko was in the custody of respondent Jovy Cabcaban
(Cabcaban), a police officer in that station. Since Cabcaban refused to release
Shang Ko to her, Shirly sought the help of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) to rescue her child. An NBI agent, Arnel Pura (Pura), informed Shirly that
Shang Ko was no longer with Cabcaban but was staying with a private
organization called Calvary Kids. Pura told her, however, that the child was fine
and had been attending school.

ARGUMENTS AND ISSUES AT THE COURT OF APPEALS:

This prompted petitioner Shirly to file a petition for habeas corpus against
respondent Cabcaban and the unnamed officers of Calvary Kids before the Court
of
Appeals (CA) rather than the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City citing as reason
several threats against her life in that city.

The CA resolved in CA-G.R. SP 07261 to deny the petition for its failure to clearly
allege who has custody of Shang Ko. According to the CA, habeas corpus may not
be used as a means of obtaining evidence on the whereabouts of a person or as a
means of finding out who has specifically abducted or caused the disappearance of
such person. The CA denied petitioner Shirly's motion for reconsideration on
January 8, 2013, hence, this petition for review.

ARGUMENTS AND ISSUES AT THE SUPREME COURT:

Under Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus is
available, not only in cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any
person is deprived of his liberty, but also in cases involving the rightful custody
over a minor. The general rule is that parents should have custody over their minor
children. But the State has the right to intervene where the parents, rather than care
for such children, treat them cruelly and abusively, impairing their growth and
well-being and leaving them emotional scars that they carry throughout their lives
unless they are liberated from such parents and properly counseled.

174
Since this case presents factual issues and since the parties are all residents of
Bacolod City, it would be best that such issues be resolved by a Family Court in
that city.
Meantime, considering the presumption that the police authorities acted regularly
in placing Shang Ko in the custody of Calvary Kids, the Court believes that she
should remain there pending hearing and adjudication of this custody case.
Besides, she herself has expressed preference to stay in that place.

WHEREFORE, the Court SETS ASIDE the Court of Appeals Resolutions in CA-
G.R. SP 07261 dated December 18, 2012 and January 8, 2013 and ORDERS this
custody case forwarded to the Family Court of Bacolod City for hearing and
adjudication as the evidence warrants. Meantime, until such court orders otherwise,
let the minor Shang Ko Vingson remain in the custody of Calvary Kids of Bacolod
City.

69. Hernandez vs. San Juan-Santos, Aug. 7, 2009;

Facts:
175
Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez (or Lulu) was born on February 14, 1947 to
the spouses Felix Hernandez and Maria San Juan Hernandez. Unfortunately, the
latter died due to complications during childbirth. After Maria's death, Felix left
Lulu in the care of her maternal uncle, Sotero C. San Juan.
On December 16, 1951, Felix married Natividad Cruz. The union produced three
children, petitioners Cecilio C. Hernandez, Ma. Victoria C. Hernandez-Sagun and
Teresa C. Hernandez-Villa Abrille.
Meanwhile, as the only child of Maria and the sole testate heir of Sotero, Lulu
inherited valuable real properties from the San Juan family (conservatively
estimated at P50 million in 1997). Sometime in 1957, Lulu went to live with her
father and his new family. She was then 10 years old and studying at La
Consolacion College. However, due to her "violent personality", Lulu stopped
schooling when she reached Grade 5.
In 1968, upon reaching the age of majority, Lulu was given full control of her
estate. Nevertheless, because Lulu did not even finish her elementary education,
Felix continued to exercise actual administration of Lulu's properties. Upon Felix's
death in 1993, petitioners took over the task of administering Lulu's properties.

Respondent was appalled as Lulu was severely overweight, unkempt and smelled
of urine. She later found out that Lulu was occupying a cramped room lit by a
single fluorescent lamp without running water. Since she had not been given a
proper toilet,
Lulu urinated and defecated in the garden. Due to Lulu's poor hygiene, respondent
brought her to several physicians for medical examination. Lulu was found to be
afflicted with tuberculosis, rheumatism and diabetes from which she was suffering
several complications.

ARGUMENTS AND ISSUES AT THE TRIAL COURT:

Respondent filed a petition for guardianship in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 76. She alleged that Lulu was incapable of taking care of
herself and managing her estate because she was of weak mind.
In a decision dated September 25, 2001, the RTC concluded that, due to her weak
physical and mental condition, there was a need to appoint a legal guardian over
the person and property of Lulu. Thus, it declared Lulu an incompetent and
appointed respondent as guardian over the person and property of Lulu on a P1
million bond.
176
ARGUMENTS AND ISSUES AT THE COURT OF APPEALS:
The CA issued a decision affirming the September 25, 2001 decision of the RTC
(in the petition for guardianship) in toto.

It held that respondent presented sufficient evidence to prove that Lulu, because of
her illnesses and low educational attainment, needed assistance in taking care of
herself and managing her affairs considering the extent of her estate. With regard
to the respondent's appointment as the legal guardian, the CA found that, since
Lulu did not trust petitioners, none of them was qualified to be her legal guardian.
Because
guardianship was a trust relationship, the RTC was bound to appoint someone Lulu
clearly trusted.

Petitioners now assail the December 29, 2004 decision of the CA in this Court in a
petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 166470.

ARGUMENTS AND ISSUES AT THE SUPREME COURT:

Petitioners claim that the opinions of Lulu's attending physicians regarding her
mental state were inadmissible in evidence as they were not experts in psychiatry.
Respondent therefore failed to prove that Lulu's illnesses rendered her an
incompetent. She should have been presumed to be of sound mind and/or in full
possession of her mental capacity. For this reason, Lulu should be allowed to live
with them since under Articles 194 to 196 of the Family Code, legitimate brothers
and sisters, whether half-blood or full-blood are required to support each other
fully.

Respondent, on the other hand, reiterated her arguments before the courts a quo.
She disclosed that Lulu had been confined in Recovery.com, a psychosocial
rehabilitation center and convalescent home care facility in Quezon City, since
2004 due to violent and destructive behavior. She also had delusions of being
physically and sexually abused by "Boy Negro" and imaginary pets she called
"Michael" and "Madonna". The November 21, 2005 medical report stated Lulu had
unspecified mental retardation with psychosis but claimed significant
improvements in her behavior.

177
We find the petition to be without merit.

Under Section 50, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, an ordinary witness may give
his opinion on the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently
acquainted. Lulu's attending physicians spoke and interacted with her. Such
occasions allowed them to thoroughly observe her behavior and conclude that her
intelligence level was
below average and her mental stage below normal. Their opinions were admissible
in evidence.

Furthermore, where the sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion is not

necessary. The observations of the trial judge coupled with evidence establishing
the person's state of mental sanity will suffice. Here, the trial judge was given
ample opportunity to observe Lulu personally when she testified before the RTC.

Under Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court, 31 persons who, though of sound
mind but by reason of age, disease, weak mind or other similar causes are
incapable of taking care of themselves and their property without outside aid, are
considered as incompetents who may properly be placed under guardianship. The
RTC and the CA both found that Lulu was incapable of taking care of herself and
her properties without outside aid due to her ailments and weak mind. Thus, since
determining whether or not Lulu is in fact an incompetent would require a
reexamination of the evidence presented in the courts a quo, it undoubtedly
involves questions of fact.

A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention or

by which the rightful custody of person is withheld from the one entitled thereto.
Respondent, as the judicial guardian of Lulu, was duty-bound to care for and
protect her ward. For her to perform her obligation, respondent must have custody
of Lulu. Thus, she was entitled to a writ of habeas corpus after she was unduly
deprived of the custody of her ward.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DENIED.

178
 AM NO. 03-04-04 - SC, April 22, 2003
Enforceability of the Writ
70.Militante vs. Cada, GR No. 210636, July 28, 2014

Facts:
On March 24, 2011, respondent Raquel M. Cada-Deapera filed before the RTC
Caloocan a verified petition for writ of habeas corpus, docketed as Special Civil
Action Case No. C-4344. In the said petition, respondent demanded the immediate
issuance of the special writ, directing petitioner Ma. Hazelina Tujan-Militante to
produce before the court respondent's biological daughter, minor Criselda M. Cada
(Criselda), and to return to her the custody over the child. Additionally, respondent
indicated that petitioner has three (3) known addresses where she can be served
with summons and other court processes, to wit: (1) 24 Bangkal St., Amparo
Village, Novaliches, Caloocan City; (2) 118B K9 Street, Kamias, Quezon City;
and (3) her office at the Ombudsman-Office of the Special Prosecutor, 5th Floor,
Sandiganbayan, Centennial Building, Commonwealth Avenue cor. Batasan Road,
Quezon City.

The next day, on March 25, 2011, the RTC-Caloocan issued a writ of habeas
corpus, ordering petitioner to bring the child to court on March 28, 2011. Despite
diligent efforts and several attempts, however, the Sheriff was unsuccessful in
personally serving petitioner copies of the habeas corpus petition and of the writ.
Instead, on March 29, 2011, the Sheriff left copies of the court processes at
petitioner's Caloocan residence, as witnessed by respondent's counsel and barangay
officials. Nevertheless, petitioner failed to appear at the scheduled hearings before
the RTC-Caloocan.

ARGUMENTS AND ISSUES AT THE TRIAL COURT:

Petitioner filed a Petition for Guardianship over the person of Criselda before the
RTC, Branch 89 in Quezon City (RTC-Quezon City).

Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition for guardianship on the ground
of litis pendentia, among others. Thereafter, or on June 3, 2011, respondent filed a
criminal case for kidnapping before the Office of the City Prosecutor — Quezon
City against petitioner and her counsel. On July 12, 2011, the RTC-Quezon City

179
granted respondent's motion and dismissed the guardianship case due to the
pendency of the habeas corpus petition before RTC Caloocan.

The fallo of the Order reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the subject motion is hereby GRANTED.
Accordingly, the case is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

ARGUMENTS AND ISSUES AT THE COURT OF APPEALS:

Over a year later, the CA, in the challenged Decision dated May 17, 2013,
dismissed the petition for certiorari in the following wise: WHEREFORE, the
instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Regional Trial Court,
Branch 130 of Caloocan City is DIRECTED to proceed with due dispatch in Spec.
Proc. Case No. C-4344 for Habeas Corpus, giving utmost consideration to the best
interest of the now nearly 14-year old child.
SO ORDERED.

In so ruling, the CA held that jurisdiction was properly laid when respondent filed
the habeas corpus petition before the designated Family Court in Caloocan City. It
also relied on the certification issued by the punong barangay of Brgy. 179,
Caloocan City, stating that petitioner is a bona fide resident thereof, as well as the
medical certificate issued by Criselda's doctor on April 1, 2011, indicating that her
address is "Amparo Village, KC." Anent the RTC-Caloocan's jurisdiction, the
appellate court ruled that service of summons is not required under Section 20 of
A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, otherwise known as the Rules on Custody of Minors and
Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors.

According to the CA, the rules on summons contemplated in ordinary civil actions
have no place in petitions for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, it being a
special proceeding.

Petitioner sought reconsideration of the above Decision but the same was denied
by
the CA in its December 27, 2013 Resolution.

ARGUMENTS AND ISSUES AT THE SUPREME COURT:

180
At the core of this controversy is the issue of whether or not the RTC-Caloocan has
jurisdiction over the habeas corpus petition filed by respondent and, assuming
arguendo it does, whether or not it validly acquired jurisdiction over petitioner and
the person of Criselda. Likewise pivotal is the enforceability of the writ issued by
RTC-Caloocan in Quezon City where petitioner was served a copy thereof.

The petition lacks merit. The RTC-Caloocan correctly took cognizance of the
habeas
corpus petition. Subsequently, it acquired jurisdiction over petitioner when the
latter was served with a copy of the writ in Quezon City.

Arguing that the RTC-Caloocan lacked jurisdiction over the case, petitioner relies
on Section 3 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC and maintains that the habeas corpus
petition should have been filed before the family court that has jurisdiction over
her place of residence or that of the minor or wherever the minor may be found. 18
As to respondent, she asserts, among others, that the applicable rule is not Section
3 but Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-04- 04-SC.

We find for respondent. In the case at bar, what respondent filed was a petition for
the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC
and Rule 102 of the Rules of Court.

Considering that the writ is made enforceable within a judicial region, petitions for
the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, whether they be filed under Rule 102 of
the Rules of Court or pursuant to Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, may
therefore be filed with any of the proper RTCs within the judicial region where
enforcement thereof is sought. On this point, Section 13 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129 (BP 129), otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, finds
relevance.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision

dated May 17, 2013 and its Resolution dated December 27, 2013 are AFFIRMED.

181
 71.Thornton vs. Thornton, GR No. 154598, Aug. 16, 2004

Facts:
Petitioner, an American, and respondent, a Filipino, were married on August 28,
1998 in the Catholic Evangelical Church at United Nations Avenue, Manila. A
year later, respondent gave birth to a baby girl whom they named Sequeira Jennifer
Delle Francisco Thornton.

However, after three years, respondent grew restless and bored as a plain
housewife. She wanted to return to her old job as a "guest relations officer" in a
nightclub, with the freedom to go out with her friends. In fact, whenever petitioner
was out of the country, respondent was also often out with her friends, leaving her
daughter in the care of the house help.

Petitioner admonished respondent about her irresponsibility but she continued her
carefree ways. On December 7, 2001, respondent left the family home with her
daughter Sequiera without notifying her husband. She told the servants that she
was bringing Sequiera to Purok Marikit, Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan Province.

ARGUMENTS AND ISSUES AT THE TRIAL COURT:

Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in the designated Family Court in
Makati
City but this was dismissed, presumably because of the allegation that the child
was in Basilan.

ARGUMENTS AND ISSUES AT THE COURT OF APPEALS:

Petitioner then ffiled another petition for habeas corpus, this time in the Court of
Appeals which could issue a writ of habeas corpus enforceable in the entire
country.
However, the petition was denied by the Court of Appeals on the ground that it did
not have jurisdiction over the case. It ruled that since RA 8369 (The Family Courts
Act of 1997) gave family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for
habeas corpus, it impliedly repealed RA 7902 (An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction
of the Court of Appeals) and Batas Pambansa 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980):

182
Under Sec. 9(1), BP 129 (1981) the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of
Appeals) has jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus whether or not in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction. This conferment of jurisdiction was re-stated in Sec. 1,
RA 7902 (1995), an act expanding the jurisdiction of this Court. This jurisdiction
finds its procedural expression in Sec. 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court. In 1997,
RA 8369 otherwise known as Family Courts Act was enacted. It provides: Sec. 5.
Jurisdiction of Family Court. — The Family Courts shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases: xxx xxx xxx b. Petition for
guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus in relation to the latter.

The vital question is, did RA 8369 impliedly repeal BP 129 and RA 7902 insofar
as the jurisdiction of this Court to issue writ of habeas corpus in custody of minor
cases is concerned? The simple answer is, yes, it did, because there is no other
meaning of the word "exclusive" than to constitute the Family Court as the sole
court which can issue said writ. If a court other than the Family Court also
possesses the same competence, then the jurisdiction of the former is not exclusive
but concurrent — and such an interpretation is contrary to the simple and clear
wording of RA 8369.

Petitioner argues that unless this Court assumes jurisdiction over a petition for
habeas corpus involving custody of minors, a respondent can easily evade the
service of a writ of habeas corpus on him or her by just moving out of the region
over which the Regional Trial Court issuing the writ has territorial jurisdiction.
That may be so but then jurisdiction is conferred by law. In the absence of a law
conferring such jurisdiction in this Court, it cannot exercise it even if it is
demanded by expediency or necessity.

Whether RA 8369 is a good or unwise law is not within the authority of this Court
— or any court for that matter — to determine. The enactment of a law on
jurisdiction is within the exclusive domain of the legislature. When there is a
perceived defect in the law, the remedy is not to be sought from the courts but only
from the legislature.

ARGUMENTS AND ISSUES AT THE SUPREME COURT:

The only issue before us therefore is whether the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction
to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases involving custody of minors in the light of
183
the provision in RA 8369 giving family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over
such petitions.

The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since there is nothing in
RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the
custody of minors.

The Court of Appeals opines that RA 8369 impliedly repealed RA 7902 and BP
129 since, by giving family courts exclusive jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases,
the lawmakers intended it to be the sole court which can issue writs of habeas
corpus. To the court a quo, the word "exclusive" apparently cannot be construed
any other way.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The petition for habeas corpus
in CAG. R.-SP-No. 70501 is hereby REINSTATED and REMANDED to the
Court of Appeals, Sixteenth Division.

184
 72. Madriñan vs. Madriñan, GR No. 159374, July 12, 2007

Facts:

Petitioner Felipe N. Madriñan and respondent Francisca R. Madriñan were married

on July 7, 1993 in Parañaque City. They resided in San Agustin Village, Brgy.
Moonwalk, Parañaque City.

Their union was blessed with three sons and a daughter: Ronnick, born on January
30, 1994; Phillip, born on November 19, 1996; Francis Angelo, born on May 12,
1998 and Krizia Ann, born on December 12, 2000.

After a bitter quarrel on May 18, 2002, petitioner allegedly left their conjugal
abode
and took their three sons with him to Ligao City, Albay and subsequently to Sta.
Rosa, Laguna. Respondent sought the help of her parents and parents-in-law to
patch things up between her and petitioner to no avail. She then brought the matter
to the Lupong Tagapamayapa in their barangay but this too proved futile.

ARGUMENTS AND ISSUES AT THE COURT OF APPEALS:

Thus respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus of Ronnick, Phillip and Francis
Angelo in the Court of Appeals, alleging that petitioner's act of leaving the
conjugal
dwelling and going to Albay and then to Laguna disrupted the education of their
children and deprived them of their mother's care. She prayed that petitioner be
ordered to appear and produce their sons before the court and to explain why they
should not be returned to her custody.

On October 21, 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision asserting its
authority to take cognizance of the petition and ruling that, under Article 213 of the
Family Code, respondent was entitled to the custody of Phillip and Francis Angelo
who were at that time aged six and four, respectively, subject to the visitation
rights of petitioner. With respect to Ronnick who was then eight years old, the
court ruled that his custody should be determined by the proper family court in a
special proceeding on custody of minors under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.

185
ARGUMENTS AND ISSUES AT THE SUPREME COURT:
Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the petition for
habeas corpus and insists that jurisdiction over the case is lodged in the family
courts
under RA 8369. He invokes Section 5 (b) of RA 8369: Section 5. Jurisdiction of
Family Courts. — The Family Courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to
hear and decide the following cases:
b) Petitions for guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus in relation to the
latter;

Petitioner is wrong.

In Thornton v. Thornton, this Court resolved the issue of the Court of Appeals'
jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases involving custody of minors in
the light of the provision in RA 8369 giving family courts exclusive original
jurisdiction over such petitions.

The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over petitions for habeas corpus was
further
affirmed by A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC (April 22, 2004) in Re: Rule on Custody of
Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors.

The rule therefore is: when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial
officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into
effect may be employed by such court or officer. Once a court acquires jurisdiction
over the subject matter of a case, it does so to the exclusion of all other courts,
including related incidents and ancillary matters.

Accordingly, the petition is hereby DENIED.

Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

186
C. Writ of Amparo
Nature
73.De Lima vs. Gatdula, GR No. 204528, Feb. 19, 2013

Facts:
Magtanggol B. Gatdula filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo in the
Regional Trial Court of Manila. This case was docketed as In the Matter of the
Petition for Issuance of Writ of Amparo of Atty. Magtanggol B. Gatdula, SP No.
12-127405. It was raffled to the sala of Judge Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr. on the same
day. The Amparo was directed against petitioners Justice Secretary Leila M. De
Lima, Director Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda of
the National Bureau of Investigation (DE LIMA, ET AL. for brevity). Gatdula
wanted De Lima, et al. "to cease and desist from framing up Petitioner [Gatdula]
for the fake ambush incident by filing bogus charges of Frustrated Murder against
Petitioner [Gatdula] in relation to the alleged ambush incident."

ARGUMENTS AND ISSUES AT THE TRIAL COURT:

Instead of deciding on whether to issue a Writ of Amparo, the judge issued
summons and ordered De Lima, et al. to file an Answer.

The RTC rendered a "Decision" granting the issuance of the Writ of Amparo. The
RTC also granted the interim reliefs prayed for, namely: temporary protection,
production and inspection orders. The production and inspection orders were in
relation to the evidence and reports involving an on-going investigation of the
attempted assassination of Deputy Director Esmeralda. It is not clear from the
records how these pieces of evidence may be related to the alleged threat to the
life, liberty or security of the respondent Gatdula.

ARGUMENTS AND ISSUES AT THE SUPREME COURT:

Petitioners Sec. De Lima, et al. thus came to this Court assailing the RTC
"Decision" dated 20 March 2012 through a Petition for Review on Certiorari (With
Very Urgent Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order/Writ
of Preliminary Injunction) via Rule 45, as enunciated in Section 19 of the Rule on
187
the Writ of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, 25 September 2007), viz.:
SEC. 19. Appeal. — Any party may appeal from the final judgment or order to the
Supreme Court under Rule 45. The appeal may raise questions of fact or law or
both. . . . (Emphasis supplied).

It is the Court's view that the "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 granting the writ of
Amparo is not the judgment or final order contemplated under this rule. Hence, a
Petition for Review under Rule 45 may not yet be the proper remedy at this time.

This "Decision" pertained to the issuance of the writ under Section 6 of the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo, not the judgment under Section 18. The "Decision" is thus an
interlocutory order, as suggested by the fact that temporary protection, production
and inspection orders were given together with the decision. The temporary
protection, production and inspection orders are interim reliefs that may be granted
by the court upon filing of the petition but before final judgment is rendered.

The privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be distinguished from the actual order
called the Writ of Amparo. The privilege includes availment of the entire
procedure
outlined in A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. After
examining the petition and its attached affidavits, the Return and the evidence
presented in the summary hearing, the judgment should detail the required acts
from the respondents that will mitigate, if not totally eradicate, the violation of or
the threat to the petitioner's life, liberty or security.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice, as a prophylactic to the irregularities
committed by the trial court judge, and by virtue of its powers under Article VIII,
Section 5 of the Constitution, the Court RESOLVES to:
(1) NULLIFY all orders that are subject of this Resolution issued by Judge Silvino
T. Pampilo, Jr. after respondent Gatdula filed the Petition for the Issuance of a Writ
of Amparo;
(2) DIRECT Judge Pampilo to determine within forty-eight (48) hours from his
receipt of this Resolution whether the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is proper on
the basis of the petition and its attached affidavits.
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to cause the personal service of this Resolution
on Judge Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr. of Branch 26 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila for his proper guidance together with a WARNING that further deviation
188
or improvisation from the procedure set in A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC shall be meted
with severe consequences.
74.Caram vs. Segui, GR No. 193652, Aug. 5, 2014

Facts:
Petitioner Ma. Christina Yusay Caram (Christina) had an amorous relationship
with
Marcelino Gicano Constantino III (Marcelino) and eventually became pregnant
with the latter's child without the benefit of marriage. After getting pregnant,
Christina mislead Marcelino into believing that she had an abortion when in fact
she proceeded to complete the term of her pregnancy. During this time, she
intended to have the child adopted through Sun and Moon Home for Children (Sun
and Moon) in Parañaque City to avoid placing her family in a potentially
embarrassing situation for having a second illegitimate son.

On July 26, 2009, Christina gave birth to Baby Julian at Amang Rodriguez
Memorial
Medical Center, Marikina City. Sun and Moon shouldered all the hospital and
medical expenses. On August 13, 2009, Christina voluntarily surrendered Baby
Julian by way of a Deed of Voluntary Commitment to the DSWD.

On November 26, 2009, Marcelino suffered a heart attack and died without
knowing about the birth of his son. Thereafter, during the wake, Christina
disclosed to Marcelino's family that she and the deceased had a son that she gave
up for adoption due to financial distress and initial embarrassment. Marcelino's
family was taken aback by the revelation and sympathized with Christina. After the
emotional revelation, they vowed to help her recover and raise the baby.

ARGUMENTS AND ISSUES AT THE TRIAL COURT:

Christina filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo before the RTC of
Quezon City seeking to obtain custody of Baby Julian from Atty. Segui, Atty.
Escutin, Assistant Secretary Cabrera and Acting Secretary Celia C. Yangco, all of
the DSWD.

In her petition, Christina accused respondents of "blackmailing" her into

surrendering custody of her child to the DSWD utilizing what she claims to be an
189
invalid certificate of availability for adoption which respondents allegedly used as
basis to misrepresent that all legal requisites for adoption of the minor child had
been complied with.

On August 17, 2010, the RTC dismissed the petition for issuance of a writ of
amparo
without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate action in court. The RTC held that
Christina availed of the wrong remedy to regain custody of her child Baby Julian.

The RTC further stated that Christina should have filed a civil case for custody of
her child as laid down in the Family Code and the Rule on Custody of Minors and
Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors. If there is extreme
urgency to secure custody of a minor who has been illegally detained by another, a
petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus may be availed of, either as a
principal or ancillary remedy, pursuant to the Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ
of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors.

ARGUMENTS AND ISSUES AT THE SUPREME COURT:

Christina directly elevated the case before this Court, via a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, in
relation to Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. In her petition, Christina
prayed that the Court (1) set aside the August 17, 2010 and September 6, 2010
Orders of the RTC, (2) declare R.A. No. 9523 unconstitutional for being contrary
to A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC, which was promulgated by the Supreme Court, and for
violating the doctrine of separation of powers, (3) declare the "enforced separation"
between her and Baby Julian as violative of her rights to life, liberty and security,
and (4) grant her the privilege of availing the benefits of a writ of amparo so she
could be reunited with her son.

The only relevant issue presented before the Court worthy of attention is whether a
petition for a writ of amparo is the proper recourse for obtaining parental authority
and custody of a minor child.

The Court rejects petitioner's contentions and denies the petition. Section 1 of the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides as follows: SECTION 1. Petition. — The
petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to
190
life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act
or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.

Christina's directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from her
child and placing the latter up for adoption, supposedly without complying with the
necessary legal requisites to qualify the child for adoption, clearly indicates that
she is not searching for a lost child but asserting her parental authority over the
child and contesting custody over him.

Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is involved is the issue of child
custody and the exercise of parental rights over a child, who, for all intents and
purposes, has been legally considered a ward of the State, the Amparo rule cannot
be properly applied.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The August 17, 2010 and September 6,
2010 Orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 106, Quezon City in Sp. Proc.
Case No. Q-10-67604 are AFFIRMED without prejudice to petitioner's right to
avail of proper legal remedies afforded to her by law and related rules.

No costs.

191
 75.Sec. of Nat'l. Defense vs. Manalo, GR No. 180906, Oct. 7, 2008

FACTS:
Raymond Manalo recounted that about one or two weeks before February 14,
2006, several uniformed and armed soldiers and members of the CAFGU
summoned to a meeting all the residents of their barangay in San Idelfonso,
Bulacan. Respondents were not able to attend as they were not informed of the
gathering, but Raymond saw some of the soldiers when he passed by the barangay
hall. On February 14, 2006, Raymond was sleeping in their house in Buhol na
Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. At past noon, several armed soldiers wearing
white shirts, fatigue pants and army boots, entered their house and roused him.
They asked him if he was Bestre, but his mother, Ester Manalo, replied that he was
Raymond, not Bestre. The armed soldier slapped him on both cheeks and nudged
him in the stomach. He was then handcuffed, brought to the rear of his house, and
forced to the ground face down.

He was kicked on the hip, ordered to stand and face up to the light, then forcibly
brought near the road. He told his mother to follow him, but three soldiers stopped
her and told her to stay.

Among the men who came to take him, Raymond recognized brothers Michael de
la Cruz, Madning de la Cruz, "Puti" de la Cruz, and "Pula" de la Cruz, who all
acted as lookout. They were all members of the CAFGU and residing in Manuzon,
San Ildefonso, Bulacan. He also recognized brothers Randy Mendoza and Rudy
Mendoza, also members of the CAFGU. While he was being forcibly taken, he
also saw outside of his house two barangay councilors, Pablo Cunanan and
Bernardo Lingasa, with some soldiers and armed men.

The men forced Raymond into a white L300 van. Once inside, he was blindfolded.
Before being blindfolded, he saw the faces of the soldiers who took him. Later, in
his 18 months of captivity, he learned their names. The one who drove the van was
Rizal Hilario alias Rollie Castillo, whom he estimated was about 40 years of age or
older. The leader of the team who entered his house and abducted him was
"Ganata". He was tall, thin, curly-haired and a bit old. Another one of his abductors
192
was "George" who was tall, thin, white-skinned and about 30 years old.

ARGUMENTS AND ISSUES AT THE COURT OF APPEALS:

On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of
therein petitioners (herein respondents), the dispositive portion of which reads,
viz.:
ACCORDINGLY, the PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF AMPARO is GRANTED.
The respondents SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE and AFP CHIEF OF
STAFF are hereby REQUIRED:
1. To furnish to the petitioners and to this Court within five days from notice of
this decision all official and unofficial reports of the investigation undertaken in
connection with their case, except those already on file herein;
2. To confirm in writing the present places of official assignment of M/Sgt Hilario
aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas within five days from notice of this
decision.
3. To cause to be produced to this Court all medical reports, records and charts,
reports of any treatment given or recommended and medicines prescribed, if any,
to the petitioners, to include a list of medical and (sic) personnel (military and
civilian) who attended to them from February 14, 2006 until August 12, 2007
within five days from notice of this decision.

The compliance with this decision shall be made under the signature and oath of
respondent AFP Chief of Staff or his duly authorized deputy, the latter's authority
to be express and made apparent on the face of the sworn compliance with this
directive. SO ORDERED.

ARGUMENTS AND ISSUES AT THE SUPREME COURT:

This is an appeal via Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in
relation to Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, seeking to reverse and
set
aside on both questions of fact and law, the Decision promulgated by the Court of
Appeals.

Finally, we come to the reliefs granted by the Court of Appeals, which petitioners
question. First, that petitioners furnish respondents all official and unofficial
reports
193
of the investigation undertaken in connection with their case, except those already
in file with the court. Second, that petitioners confirm in writing the present places
of official assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas.
Third, that petitioners cause to be produced to the Court of Appeals all medical
reports, records and charts, and reports of any treatment given or recommended
and medicines prescribed, if any, to the Manalo brothers, to include a list of
medical personnel (military and civilian) who attended to them from February 14,
2006 until August 12, 2007.

With respect to the first and second reliefs, petitioners argue that the production
order sought by respondents partakes of the characteristics of a search warrant.
Thus, they claim that the requisites for the issuance of a search warrant must be
complied with prior to the grant of the production order, namely: (1) the
application must be under oath or affirmation; (2) the search warrant must
particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized; (3) there
exists probable cause with one specific offense; and (4) the probable cause must be
personally determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. In the case at bar, however,
petitioners point out that other than the bare, self-serving and vague allegations
made by respondent Raymond Manalo in his unverified declaration and affidavit,
the documents respondents seek to be produced are only mentioned generally by
name, with no other supporting details. They also argue that the relevancy of the
documents to be produced must be apparent, but this is not true in the present case
as the involvement of petitioners in the abduction has not been shown.

In blatant violation of our hard-won guarantees to life, liberty and security, these
rights are snuffed out from victims of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances. The writ of amparo is a tool that gives voice to preys of silent guns
and prisoners behind secret walls.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision of

the Court of Appeals dated December 26, 2007 is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.

194
 76.Rubrico vs. Arroyo, GR No. 183871, Feb. 18, 2010

Facts:
On April 3, 2007, armed men belonging to the 301st Air Intelligence and Security
Squadron (AISS, for short) based in Fernando Air Base in Lipa City abducted
Lourdes D. Rubrico (Lourdes), then attending a Lenten pabasa in Bagong Bayan,
Dasmariñas, Cavite, and brought to, and detained at, the air base without charges.
Following a week of relentless interrogation — conducted alternately by hooded
individuals — and what amounts to verbal abuse and mental harassment, Lourdes,
chair of the Ugnayan ng Maralita para sa Gawa Adhikan, was released at
Dasmariñas, Cavite, her hometown, but only after being made to sign a statement
that she would be a military asset.

After Lourdes' release, the harassment, coming in the form of being tailed on at
least two occasions at different places, i.e., Dasmariñas, Cavite and Baclaran in
Pasay City, by motorcycle-riding men in bonnets, continued.

During the time Lourdes was missing, P/Sr. Insp. Arsenio Gomez (P/Insp. Gomez),
then sub-station commander of Bagong Bayan, Dasmariñas, Cavite, kept sending
text messages to Lourdes' daughter, Mary Joy R. Carbonel (Mary Joy), bringing
her to beaches and asking her questions about Karapatan, an alliance of human
rights organizations. He, however, failed to make an investigation even after
Lourdes' disappearance had been made known to him.

ARGUMENTS AND ISSUES AT THE COURT OF APPEALS:

Before the CA, respondents President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Gen.
Hermogenes Esperon, then Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff,
Police Director-General (P/Dir. Gen.) Avelino Razon, then Philippine National
Police (PNP) Chief, Police Superintendent (P/Supt.) Roquero of the Cavite Police
Provincial Office, Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Gomez, now retired, and the OMB
(answering respondents, collectively) filed, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), a joint return on the writ specifically denying the material
195
inculpatory averments against them. The OSG also denied the allegations against
the following impleaded persons, namely: Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana, Jonathan,
and Sy/Reyes, for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to
the allegations' truth. And by way of general affirmative defenses, answering
respondents interposed the following defenses: (1) the President may not be sued
during her incumbency; and (2) the petition is incomplete, as it fails to indicate the
matters required by Sec. 5 (d) and (e) of the Amparo Rule.

After due proceedings, the CA rendered, on July 31, 2008, its partial judgment,
subject of this review, disposing of the petition but only insofar as the answering
respondents were concerned. The fallo of the CA decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, partial judgment is hereby rendered
DISMISSING the instant petition with respect to respondent Gen. Hermogenes
Esperon, P/Dir. Gen. Avelino Razon, Supt. Edgar B. Roquero, P/Sr. Insp. Arsenio
C. Gomez (ret.) and the Office of the Ombudsman.

Nevertheless, in order that petitioners' complaint will not end up as another

unsolved case, the heads of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine
National Police are directed to ensure that the investigations already commenced
are diligently pursued to bring the perpetrators to justice. The Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and P/Dir. Gen. Avelino Razon are directed to
regularly update petitioners and this Court on the status of their investigation.
SO ORDERED.

ARGUMENTS AND ISSUES AT THE SUPREME COURT:

In this recourse, petitioners formulate the issue for resolution in the following wise:
WHETHER OR NOT the [CA] committed reversible error in dismissing [their]
Petition and dropping President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as party respondent.
Petitioners first take issue on the President's purported lack of immunity from suit
during her term of office. The 1987 Constitution, so they claim, has removed such
immunity heretofore enjoyed by the chief executive under the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions.

Petitioners are mistaken. The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved
under our system of government, albeit not expressly reserved in the present
constitution. Addressing a concern of his co-members in the 1986 Constitutional
196
Commission on the absence of an express provision on the matter, Fr. Joaquin
Bernas, S.J. observed that it was already understood in jurisprudence that the
President may not be sued during his or her tenure. The Court subsequently made it
abundantly clear in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, a case likewise resolved under the
umbrella of the 1987 Constitution, that indeed the President enjoys immunity
during her incumbency, and why this must be so.

WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS this petition for review and
makes a decision:

(1) Affirming the dropping of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo from the

petition for a writ of amparo;

(2) Affirming the dismissal of the amparo case as against Gen. Hermogenes
Esperon, and P/Dir. Gen. Avelino Razon, insofar as it tended, under the command
responsibility principle, to attach accountability and responsibility to them, as then
AFP Chief of Staff and then PNP Chief, for the alleged enforced disappearance of
Lourdes and the ensuing harassments allegedly committed against petitioners. The
dismissal of the petition with respect to the OMB is also affirmed for failure of the
petition to allege ultimate facts as to make out a case against that body for the
enforced disappearance of Lourdes and the threats and harassment that followed;
and

(3) Directing the incumbent Chief of Staff, AFP, or his successor, and the
incumbent Director-General of the PNP, or his successor, to ensure that the
investigations already commenced by their respective units on the alleged
abduction of Lourdes Rubrico and the alleged harassments and threats she and her
daughters were made to endure are pursued with extraordinary diligence as
required by Sec. 17 of the Amparo Rule.

Subject to the foregoing modifications, the Court AFFIRMS the partial judgment
dated July 31, 2008 of the CA.
SO ORDERED.

197
 77.Rodriguez vs. Arroyo, GR No. 191805, Nov. 15, 2011

Facts:
Rodriguez claims that the military tagged KMP as an enemy of the State under the
Oplan Bantay Laya, making its members targets of extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances.

On 6 September 2009, at 5:00 p.m., Rodriguez had just reached Barangay Tapel,
Cagayan onboard a tricycle driven by Hermie Antonio Carlos (Carlos), when four
men forcibly took him and forced him into a car. Inside the vehicle were several
men in civilian clothes, one of whom was holding a .45 caliber pistol.
Subsequently, three more persons arrived, and one of them carried a gun at his
side. Two men boarded the car, while the others rode on the tricycle.

The men tied the hands of Rodriguez, ordered him to lie on his stomach, sat on his
back and started punching him. The car travelled towards the direction of Sta.
Teresita-Mission and moved around the area until about 2:00 a.m. During the
drive, the men forced Rodriguez to confess to being a member of the New People's
Army (NPA), but he remained silent. The car then entered a place that appeared to
be a military camp. There were soldiers all over the area, and there was a banner
with the word "Bravo" written on it. Rodriguez later on learned that the camp
belonged to the 17th Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army.
Rodriguez was brought to a canteen, where six men confronted him, ordering him
to confess to his membership in the NPA. Due to his exhaustion, he unintentionally
fell
asleep. As a result, the men hit him on the head to wake him up. After the
interrogation, two of the men guarded him, but did not allow him to sleep.

ARGUMENTS AND ISSUES AT THE COURT OF APPEALS:

WHEREFORE, the petition for writ of amparo and writ of habeas data is
GRANTED.
Respondents Gen. Victor S. Ibrado, Lt. Gen. Delfin Bangit, Maj. Gen. Nestor Z.
Ochoa, PCSupt. Ameto G. Tolentino, PSSupt. Jude W. Santos, Col. Remigio M.
De Vera, Lt. Col. Laurence E. Mina and 1Lt. Ryan S. Matutina, or their
replacements in their official posts if they have already vacated the same, are
198
ORDERED to furnish this Court within five (5) days from notice of this decision,
official or unofficial reports pertaining to petitioner — covering but not limited to
intelligence reports, operation reports and provost marshal reports prior to, during
and subsequent to September 6, 2009 — made by the 5th Infantry Division,
Philippine Army, its branches and subsidiaries, including the 17th Infantry
Battalion, Philippine Army.

The above-named respondents are also DIRECTED to refrain from using the said
reports in any transaction or operation of the military. Necessarily, the afore-named
respondents are ORDERED to expunge from the records of the military all
documents having any reference to petitioner. Likewise, the afore-named
respondents, as well as respondents Police Director General Jesus Ame Versoza,
Antonio Cruz, Aldwin Pasicolan and Vicent Callagan are DIRECTED to ensure
that no further violation of petitioner's rights to life, liberty and security is
committed against the latter or any member of his family.

The petition is DISMISSED with respect to President Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo

on account of her presidential immunity from suit. Similarly, the petition is
DISMISSED with respect to respondents Calog and George Palacpac or Harry for
lack of merit.

Petitioner's prayer for issuance of a temporary protection order and inspection

order is DENIED.

ARGUMENTS AND ISSUES AT THE SUPREME COURT:

Nevertheless, it must be clarified that Rodriguez was unable to establish any
responsibility or accountability on the part of respondents P/CSupt. Tolentino,
P/SSupt. Santos, Calog and Palacpac. Respondent P/CSupt. Tolentino had already
retired when the abduction and torture of Rodriguez was perpetrated, while
P/SSupt. Santos had already been reassigned and transferred to the National
Capital Regional Police Office six months before the subject incident occurred.
Meanwhile, no sufficient allegations were maintained against respondents Calog
and Palacpac.

From all the foregoing, we rule that Rodriguez was successful in proving through
substantial evidence that respondents Gen. Ibrado, PDG. Verzosa, Lt. Gen. Bangit,
199
Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Brig. Gen. De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina, and Lt. Col. Mina were
responsible and accountable for the violation of Rodriguez's rights to life, liberty
and security on the basis of (a) his abduction, detention and torture from 6
September to 17 September 2009, and (b) the lack of any fair and effective official
investigation as to his allegations. Thus, the privilege of the writs of amparo and
habeas data must be granted in his favor. As a result, there is no longer any need to
issue a temporary protection order, as the privilege of these writs already has the
effect of enjoining respondents in G.R. No. 191805 from violating his rights to life,
liberty and security.

It is also clear from the above discussion that despite (a) maintaining former
President Arroyo in the list of respondents in G.R. No. 191805, and (b) allowing
the
application of the command responsibility doctrine to amparo and habeas data
proceedings, Rodriguez failed to prove through substantial evidence that former
President Arroyo was responsible or accountable for the violation of his rights to
life, liberty and property. He likewise failed to prove through substantial evidence
the accountability or responsibility of respondents Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Cruz,
Pasicolan and Callagan. WHEREFORE, we resolve to GRANT the Petition for
Partial Review in G.R. No. 191805 and DENY the Petition for Review in G.R. No.
193160. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION.

200
Coverage of the Writ
78.Castillo vs. Cruz, GR No. 182165, Nov. 25, 2009;

Facts:
Respondent Amanda Cruz (Amanda) who, along with her husband Francisco G.
Cruz (Spouses Cruz), leased a parcel of land situated at Barrio Guinhawa, Malolos
(the property), refused to vacate the property, despite demands by the lessor
Provincial Government of Bulacan (the Province) which intended to utilize it for
local projects. The Province thus filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the
Spouses Cruz before the then Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Bulacan, Bulacan.

ARGUMENTS AND ISSUES AT THE TRIAL COURT:

The finality of the decision in the ejectment case notwithstanding, the spouses Cruz
refused to vacate the property. They thereupon filed cases against the Province and
the judges who presided over the case. 3 Those cases were dismissed except their
petition for annulment of judgment lodged before Branch 18 of the RTC of
Malolos, and a civil case for injunction 833-M-2004 lodged before Branch 10 of
the same RTC Malolos.

The Spouses Cruz sought in the case for injunction the issuance of a permanent
writ of injunction to prevent the execution of the final and executory judgment
against them.

By Order of July 19, 2005, the RTC, finding merit in the Spouses Cruzes'
allegation that subsequent events changed the situation of the parties to justify a
suspension of the execution of the final and executory judgment, issued a
permanent writ of injunction, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the Order
dated August 10, 2004 is hereby GRANTED. Order dated August 10, 2004 is
hereby RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. Further, the verified petition dated
November 05, 2002 are hereby REINSTATED and MADE PERMANENT until
the MTC-Bulacan, Bulacan finally resolves the pending motions of petitioners with
the same determines the metes and bounds of 400 sq. meters leased premises
subject matter of this case with immediate dispatch. Accordingly, REMAND the
201
determination of the issues raised by the petitioners on the issued writ of
demolition to the MTC of Bulacan, Bulacan.

ARGUMENTS AND ISSUES AT THE SUPREME COURT:

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari, pursuant to Section 19 of The
Rule on the Writ of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC), which is essentially
reproduced in the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data (A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC).

The petition is impressed with merit.

The Court is, under the Constitution, empowered to promulgate rules for the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. In view of the heightening
prevalence of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo was issued and took effect on October 24, 2007 which coincided
with the celebration of United Nations Day and affirmed the Court's commitment
towards internationalization of human rights. More than three months later or on
February 2, 2008, the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data was promulgated.

From the above-quoted provisions, the coverage of the writs is limited to the
protection of rights to life, liberty and security. And the writs cover not only actual
but also threats of unlawful acts or omissions.

AT ALL EVENTS, respondents' filing of the petitions for writs of amparo and
habeas data should have been barred, for criminal proceedings against them had
commenced after they were arrested in flagrante delicto and proceeded against in
accordance with Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Validity of the arrest or
the proceedings conducted thereafter is a defense that may be set up by
respondents
during trial and not before a petition for writs of amparo and habeas data. The
reliefs
afforded by the writs may, however, be made available to the aggrieved party by
motion in the criminal proceedings.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged March 4, 2008 Order

of
Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos is DECLARED NULL AND
202
VOID, and its March 28, 2008 Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Special
Civil Action No. 53-M- 2008 is DISMISSED.

79.Navia vs. Pardico, GR No. 184467, June 19, 2012

Facts:
On March 31, 2008, at around 8:30 p.m., a vehicle of Asian Land Strategies
Corporation (Asian Land) arrived at the house of Lolita M. Lapore (Lolita) located
at 7A Lot 9, Block 54, Grand Royale Subdivision, Barangay Lugam, Malolos City.
The arrival of the vehicle awakened Lolita's son, Enrique Lapore (Bong), and
Benhur Pardico (Ben), who were then both staying in her house. When Lolita went
out to investigate, she saw two uniformed guards disembarking from the vehicle.
One of them immediately asked Lolita where they could find her son Bong. Before
Lolita could answer, the guard saw Bong and told him that he and Ben should go
with them to the security office of Asian Land because a complaint was lodged
against them for theft of electric wires and lamps in the subdivision.

Shortly thereafter, Bong, Lolita and Ben were in the office of the security
department
of Asian Land also located in Grand Royale Subdivision. The supervisor of the
security guards, petitioner Edgardo Navia (Navia), also arrived thereat. As to what
transpired next, the parties' respective versions diverge.

ARGUMENTS AND ISSUES AT THE TRIAL COURT:

Exasperated with the mysterious disappearance of her husband, Virginia filed a
Petition for Writ of Amparo before the RTC of Malolos City. Finding the petition
sufficient in form and substance, the amparo court issued an Order dated June 26,
2008 directing, among others, the issuance of a writ of amparo and the production
of the body of Ben before it on June 30, 2008. Thus:
On July 24, 2008, the trial court issued the challenged Decision 35 granting the
petition. It disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby grants the privilege of the writ of amparo, and
deems it proper and appropriate, as follows:
(a) To hereby direct the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to immediately
conduct a deep and thorough investigation of the [petitioners] Edgardo Navia,
Ruben Dio and Andrew Buising in connection with the circumstances surrounding
203
the disappearance of [Benhur] Pardico, utilizing in the process, as part of the
investigation, the documents forming part of the records of this case;
(b) To hereby direct the NBI to extend to the family of [Benhur] Pardico and the
witnesses who testified in this case protection as it may deem necessary to secure
their safety and security; and
(c) To hereby direct the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan to
investigate the circumstances concerning the legality of the arrest of [Benhur]
Pardico by the [petitioners] in this case, utilizing in the process, as part of said
investigation, the pertinent documents and admissions forming part of the record of
this case, and take whatever course/s of action as may be warranted.

Furnish immediately copies of this decision to the NBI, through the Office of
Director Nestor Mantaring, and to the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan.

SO ORDERED.

ARGUMENTS AND ISSUES AT THE SUPREME COURT:

Virginia's Petition for Writ of Amparo is fatally defective and must perforce be
dismissed, but not for the reasons adverted to by the petitioners. A.M. No. 07-9-12-
SC or The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was promulgated to arrest the rampant
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances in the country. Its purpose is to
provide an expeditious and effective relief "to any person whose right to life,
liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity."

The pivotal question now that confronts us is whether Ben's disappearance as

alleged in Virginia's petition and proved during the summary proceedings
conducted before the court a quo, falls within the ambit of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC
and relevant laws.

It does not.
While Section 1 provides A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC's coverage, said Rules does not,
however, define extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. This omission
was
intentional as the Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court which drafted A.M.
No. 07-9-12-SC chose to allow it to evolve through time and jurisprudence and
204
through substantive laws as may be promulgated by Congress.

We are aware that under Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC a writ of amparo may
lie against a private individual or entity. But even if the person sought to be held
accountable or responsible in an amparo petition is a private individual or entity,
still, government involvement in the disappearance remains an indispensable
element. Here, petitioners are mere security guards at Grand Royale Subdivision in
Brgy. Lugam, Malolos City and their principal, the Asian Land, is a private entity.
They do not work for the government and nothing has been presented that would
link or connect them to some covert police, military or governmental operation. As
discussed above, to fall within the ambit of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in relation to RA
No. 9851, the disappearance must be attended by some governmental involvement.
This hallmark of State participation differentiates an enforced disappearance case
from an ordinary case of a missing person.

WHEREFORE, the July 24, 2008 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20,
Malolos City, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Petition for Writ of Amparo
filed by Virginia Pardico is hereby DISMISSED.

205
 80.Canlas vs. Napico Homeowners Association
GR No. 182795
June 5, 2008

FACTS:
It appears that petitioners are settlers in a certain parcel of land situated in
Barangay Manggahan, Pasig City. Their dwellings/houses have either been
demolished as of the time of filing of the petition, or is about to be demolished
pursuant to a court judgment.

ARGUMENTS AND ISSUES AT THE SUPREME COURT:

The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of a final judgment of the court,
which in this case was affirmed with finality by this Court in G.R. Nos. 177448,
180768, 177701, 177038, is not included among the enumeration of rights as stated
in the above-quoted Section 1 for which the remedy of a writ of amparo is made
available.

Their claim to their dwelling, assuming they still have any despite the final and
executory judgment adverse to them, does not constitute right to life, liberty and
security. There is, therefore, no legal basis for the issuance of the writ of amparo.

Besides, the factual and legal basis for petitioners' claim to the land in question is
not alleged in the petition at all. The Court can only surmise that these rights and
interest had already been threshed out and settled in the four cases cited above. No
writ of amparo may be issued unless there is a clear allegation of the supposed
factual
and legal basis of the right sought to be protected.

Considering that there is no legal basis for its issuance, as in this case, the writ will
not be issued and the petition will be dismissed outright. This new remedy of writ
of amparo which is made available by this Court is intended for the protection of
the highest possible rights of any person, which is his or her right to life, liberty
and security. The Court will not spare any time or effort on its part in order to give
priority to petitions of this nature. However, the Court will also not waste its
206
precious time and effort on matters not covered by the writ.

81.Pador vs. Arcayan, GR No. 183460, March 12, 2013

Facts:
Petitioners alleged that in February 2008, rumors circulated that petitioner Nerio
Pador was a marijuana planter in Barangay Tabunan, Cebu City. On 17 March
2008,
respondents Alberto Alivio, Carmelo Revales and Roberto Alimorin raided their
ampalaya farm to search for marijuana plants, but found none. After the raid,
petitioners Nerio and Rey Pador received invitation letters for a conference from
respondent Barangay Captain Arcayan. They referred the invitation letters to their
counsel, who advised them not to attend and, instead, send a letter-reply to
Barangay Captain Arcayan. When the latter received the letter-reply, he allegedly
read its contents, got one copy, and refused to sign a receipt of the document.
Petitioners then concluded that the conduct of the raid, the sending of the invitation
letters, the refusal of respondent barangay captain to receive their letter-reply — as
well as the possibility of more harassment cases, false accusations, and possible
violence from respondents — gravely threatened their right to life, liberty and
security and necessitated the issuance of a writ of amparo.

ARGUMENTS AND ISSUES AT THE TRIAL COURT:

The RTC then heard the Petition. On 3 July 2008, it issued the assailed Resolution
finding that petitioners' claims were based merely on hearsay, speculations,
surmises and conjectures, and that respondents had sufficiently explained the
reason behind the issuance of the letters of invitation. It thereafter proceeded to
deny petitioners the privilege of the writ of amparo.

ARGUMENTS AND ISSUES AT THE SUPREME COURT:

We uphold the RTC's Resolution and deny the instant Petition. Section 1 of the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for the grounds that may be relied upon in a
petition therefor, as follows:
SEC. 1. Petition. — The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any
person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced
207
disappearances or threats thereof.

Thus, to be entitled to the privilege of the writ, petitioners must prove by

substantial evidence that their rights to life, liberty and security are being violated
or threatened by an unlawful act or omission.

On a final note, we reiterate that the privilege of the writ of amparo is an

extraordinary remedy adopted to address the special concerns of extra-legal
killings
and enforced disappearances. "Accordingly, the remedy ought to be resorted to and
granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted and
undermined by the indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions for purposes less than
the desire to secure amparo reliefs and protection and/or on the basis of
unsubstantiated allegations."

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is DENIED.

The 3 July 2008 Resolution of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Cebu City, in
Spec. Proc. No. 16061-CEB is AFFIRMED.

208
 82.Reyes vs. Gonzales, GR No. 182161, Dec. 3, 2009;

Facts:
Petitioner was among those arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege on
November 30, 2007. In the morning of November 30, 2007, petitioner together
with fifty (50) others, were brought to Camp Crame to await inquest proceedings.
In the evening of the same day, the Department of Justice (DOJ) Panel of
Prosecutors, composed of Emmanuel Y. Velasco, Phillip L. dela Cruz and Aristotle
M. Reyes, conducted inquest proceedings to ascertain whether or not there was
probable cause to hold petitioner and the others for trial on charges of Rebellion
and/or Inciting to Rebellion. On December 1, 2007, upon the request of the
Department of Interior and
Local Government (DILG), respondent DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzales issued Hold
Departure Order (HDO) No. 45 ordering respondent Commissioner of Immigration
to include in the Hold Departure List of the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation (BID) the name of petitioner and 49 others relative to the
aforementioned case in the interest of national security and public safety.

ARGUMENTS AND ISSUES AT THE COURT OF APPEALS:

The petition for a writ of amparo is anchored on the ground that respondents
violated petitioner's constitutional right to travel. Petitioner argues that the DOJ
Secretary has no power to issue a Hold Departure Order (HDO) and the subject
HDO No. 45 has no legal basis since Criminal Case No. 07-3126 has already been
dismissed.

On February 4, 2008, the CA rendered the assailed Decision dismissing the

petition and denying the privilege of the writ of amparo. Petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration 5 thereon was also denied in the assailed Resolution 6 dated
March 25, 2008.

ARGUMENTS AND ISSUES AT THE SUPREME COURT:

Hence, the present petition which is based on the following grounds:
I. THE DOJ SECRETARY'S ARROGATION OF POWER AND USURPATION
OF AUTHORITY TO ISSUE A HOLD DEPARTURE ORDER CANNOT BE
209
JUSTIFIED THROUGH A RATIONALE THAT IT HAS SUPPOSEDLY BEEN
"REGULARLY EXERCISED IN THE PAST" OR HAS NEVER BEEN
QUESTIONED (IN THE PAST).
II. THE DOJ HAS CLAIMED A POWER TO ISSUE AN HDO INDEPENDENT
OF THAT OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, HENCE, PETITIONER
CANNOT MERELY RELY ON THE RESIDUAL POWER OF THE RTC
MAKATI IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 07-3126 TO ASSAIL SUCH CLAIMED
POWER.
III. THE UTMOST EXIGENCY OF THE PETITION IS EXEMPLIFIED BY THE
CONTINUING ACTUAL RESTRAINT ON PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO
TRAVEL THROUGH THE MAINTENANCE OF HIS NAME IN THE HDO
LIST AND DOES NOT SIMPLY HINGE ON THE QUESTION OF WHETHER
OR NOT PETITIONER WAS ABLE TO TRAVEL DESPITE SUCH A
RESTRAINT.
IV. DOJ CIRCULAR 17 SERIES OF 1998 PROVIDES NO STATUTORY BASIS
FOR THE DOJ SECRETARY'S CLAIMED POWER TO ISSUE AN HDO FOR
IT IS NOT A STATUTE. THE CIRCULAR ITSELF APPEARS NOT TO BE
BASED ON ANY STATUTE, HENCE, IT DOES NOT HAVE THE FORCE OF
LAW AND NEED NOT BE ATTACKED IN A DIRECT PROCEEDING.
Petitioner maintains that the writ of amparo does not only exclusively apply to
situations of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances but encompasses
the
whole gamut of liberties protected by the Constitution. Petitioner argues that
"[liberty] includes the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal
restraint or servitude and includes the right of the citizens to be free to use his
faculties in all lawful ways". Part of the right to liberty guaranteed by the
Constitution is the right of a person to travel.

Additionally, petitioner is seeking the extraordinary writ of amparo due to his

apprehension that the DOJ may deny his motion to lift the HDO. Petitioner's
apprehension is at best merely speculative. Thus, he has failed to show any clear
threat to his right to liberty actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo. The
absence of an actual controversy also renders it unnecessary for us on this occasion
to pass upon the constitutionality of DOJ Circular No. 17, Series of 1998
(Prescribing Rules and Regulations Governing the Issuance of Hold Departure
Orders); and Circular No. 18, Series of 2007 (Prescribing Rules and Regulations
210
Governing the Issuance and Implementation of Watchlist Orders and for Other
Purposes).

83.Caram vs. Segui (Supra).

Differences between, Writ of Amparo and Search Warrant

84.See Sec. of DND vs. Manalo (Supra);

85.Balao vs. Arroyo, GR No. 186050, Dec. 13, 2011

Facts:
On October 8, 2008, Arthur Balao, Winston Balao, Nonette Balao and Jonilyn
Balao-Strugar, siblings of James Balao, and Beverly Longid (petitioners), filed
with the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Amparo in favor of James Balao who was abducted by unidentified armed men on
September 17, 2008 in Tomay, La Trinidad, Benguet. Named respondents in the
petition were then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Executive Secretary
Eduardo R. Ermita, Defense Secretary Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr., Interior and Local
Government Secretary Ronaldo V. Puno, National Security Adviser (NSA)
Norberto B. Gonzales, Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Gen.
Alexander B. Yano, Philippine National Police (PNP) Police Director General
Jesus A. Verzosa, Philippine Army (PA) Chief Brig. Gen. Reynaldo B. Mapagu,
PNP Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG) Chief Lt. P/Dir.
Edgardo Doromal, Northern Luzon Command (NOLCOM) Commander Maj. Gen.
Isagani C. Cachuela, PNP-Cordillera Administrative Region Regional Director
Police Senior Supt. Eugene Gabriel Martin, the Commanding Officer of the AFP
Intelligence Service Unit (AFP-ISU) based in Baguio City and several John Does.

ARGUMENTS AND ISSUES AT THE TRIAL COURT:

On January 19, 2009, the RTC issued the assailed judgment, disposing as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered:
ISSUE a Writ of Amparo Ordering the respondents to (a) disclose where James
Balao is detained or confined, (b) to release James Balao considering his unlawful
211
detention since his abduction and (c) to cease and desist from further inflicting
harm upon his person; and DENY the issuance of INSPECTION ORDER,
PRODUCTION ORDER and WITNESS PROTECTION ORDER for failure of
herein Petitioners to comply with the stringent provisions on the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo and substantiate the same.

ARGUMENTS AND ISSUES AT THE SUPREME COURT:

Petitioners, in G.R. No. 186050, question the RTC's denial of the interim reliefs.
Respondents, on the other hand, assail in their petition in G.R. No. 186059, the
issuance of the writ of amparo. They raise the following arguments:
I
THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT ORDERING RESPONDENT-
PETITIONERS TO: (A) DISCLOSE WHERE JAMES BALAO IS DETAINED
AND CONFINED; (B) TO RELEASE JAMES BALAO CONSIDERING HIS
UNLAWFUL DETENTION SINCE HIS "ABDUCTION" AND (C) TO CEASE
AND DESIST FROM FURTHER INFLICTING HARM UPON HIS PERSON IS
BASED PURELY ON CONJECTURES, SURMISES AND HEARSAY
EVIDENCE; HENCE, IT MUST BE SET ASIDE.
II
RESPONDENT-PETITIONERS HAD PROVEN THAT THEY OBSERVED
EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE AS REQUIRED BY APPLICABLE LAWS,
RULES AND REGULATIONS IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THEIR
OFFICIAL DUTIES.
III
THE FACTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES AND THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED IN
THE MANALO CASE ARE TOTALLY DIFFERENT FROM THE CASE AT
BAR; HENCE, THE TRIAL COURT GROSSLY ERRED IN APPLYING THE
RULING THEREIN TO THE CASE AT BAR.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED PETITIONER-RESPONDENTS'
PRAYER FOR THE ISSUANCE OF AN INSPECTION ORDER, PRODUCTION
ORDER AND A WITNESS PROTECTION ORDER.

The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was promulgated on October 24, 2007 amidst
rising incidence of "extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances." It was
formulated in the exercise of this Court's expanded rule-making power for the
212
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights enshrined in the 1987
Constitution, albeit limited to these two situations. "Extralegal killings" refer to
killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or
judicial proceedings.

On the other hand, "enforced disappearances" are attended by the following

characteristics: an arrest, detention, or abduction of a person by a government
official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect
acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or
whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation
of
liberty which places such person outside the protection of law.

WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 186050 and 186059 are PARTLY
GRANTED. The Judgment dated January 19, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of
La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 63, in Special Proceeding No. 08-AMP-0001 is
MODIFIED as follows:
1) REVERSING the grant of the privilege of the writ of amparo;
2) AFFIRMING the denial of the prayer for inspection and production orders,
without prejudice to the subsequent grant thereof, in the course of hearing and
other developments in the investigations by the Philippine National
Police/Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and Detection Group and
the Armed Forces of the Philippines;
3) ORDERING the incumbent Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, or his successor, and the incumbent Director General of the Philippine
National Police, or his successor, to CONTINUE the investigations and actions
already commenced by the Philippine National Police Regional Office-Cordillera,
Baguio City Police, Northern Luzon Command, Philippine National
Police/Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and Detection Group,
Philippine Army-Intelligence Service Unit and other concerned units, and
specifically take and continue to take the necessary steps:
(a) to identify the persons described in the cartographic sketches submitted by Task
Force Balao;
(b) to locate and search the vehicles bearing the plate numbers submitted by the
petitioners and which James Balao had reported to be conducting surveillance on
his person prior to his abduction on September 17, 2008, and investigate the
213
registered owners or whoever the previous and present possessors/transferees
thereof; and to pursue any other leads relevant to the abduction of James Balao;

The incumbent Armed Forces of the Philippines Chief of Staff, Philippine National
Police Director General, or their successors, shall ensure that the investigations and
actions of their respective units on the abduction of James Balao are pursued with
extraordinary diligence as required by Sec. 17 of the Amparo Rule.

This case is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad,

Benguet, Branch 63 for continuation of proceedings in Special Proceeding No. 08-
AMP-0001 for the purposes of monitoring compliance with the above directives
and
determining whether, in the light of any recent reports or recommendations, there
would already be sufficient evidence to hold any of the public respondents
responsible, or, at least, accountable. After making such determination, the trial
court shall submit its own report and recommendation to this Court for final action.
The trial court will continue to have jurisdiction over this case in order to
accomplish its tasks under this decision;

Accordingly, the public respondents shall remain personally impleaded in this

petition to answer for any responsibilities and/or accountabilities they may have
incurred during their incumbencies.

No pronouncement as to costs.

214
Burden of Proof
86. Roxas vs. Arroyo, GR No. 189155, Sept. 7, 2010

Facts:
Petitioner is an American citizen of Filipino descent. While in the United States,
petitioner enrolled in an exposure program to the Philippines with the group
Bagong
Alyansang Makabayan-United States of America (BAYAN-USA) of which she is
a
member. During the course of her immersion, petitioner toured various provinces
and towns of Central Luzon and, in April of 2009, she volunteered to join members
of BAYAN-Tarlac in conducting an initial health survey in La Paz, Tarlac for a
future medical mission.

In pursuit of her volunteer work, petitioner brought her passport, wallet with
Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) in cash, journal, digital camera with memory
card, laptop computer, external hard disk, IPOD, wristwatch, sphygmomanometer,
stethoscope and medicines.

After doing survey work on 19 May 2009, petitioner and her companions, Juanito
Carabeo (Carabeo) and John Edward Jandoc (Jandoc), decided to rest in the house
of one Mr. Jesus Paolo (Mr. Paolo) in Sitio Bagong Sikat, Barangay Kapanikian,
La Paz, Tarlac. At around 1:30 in the afternoon, however, petitioner, her
companions and Mr. Paolo were startled by the loud sounds of someone banging at
the front door and a voice demanding that they open up.

Suddenly, fifteen (15) heavily armed men forcibly opened the door, barged inside
and ordered petitioner and her companions to lie on the ground face down. The
armed men were all in civilian clothes and, with the exception of their leader, were
also wearing bonnets to conceal their faces.

ARGUMENTS AND ISSUES AT THE COURT OF APPEALS:

In its Decision, the Court of Appeals gave due weight and consideration to the
215
petitioner's version that she was indeed abducted and then subjected to torture for
five (5) straight days. The appellate court noted the sincerity and resolve by which
the petitioner affirmed the contents of her affidavits in open court, and was thereby
convinced that the latter was telling the truth. On the other hand, the Court of
Appeals disregarded the argument of the public respondents that the abduction of
the petitioner was "stage managed," as it is merely based on an unfounded
speculation that only the latter and her companions knew where they were staying
at the time they were forcibly taken. The Court of Appeals further stressed that the
Medical Certificate of the petitioner can only affirm the existence of a true
abduction, as its findings are reflective of the very injuries the latter claims to have
sustained during her harrowing ordeal, particularly when she was handcuffed and
then dragged by her abductors onto their van.

In its decision, the Court of Appeals extended to the petitioner, Melissa C. Roxas,
the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data but denied the latter's prayers
for an inspection order, production order and return of specified personal
belongings. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY MERITORIOUS. This Court hereby
grants Petitioner the privilege of the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data.
Accordingly, Respondents are enjoined to refrain from distributing or causing the
distribution to the public of any records in whatever form, reports, documents or
similar papers relative to Petitioner's Melissa C. Roxas, and/or Melissa Roxas;
alleged ties to the CPP-NPA or pertinently related to the complained incident.
Petitioner's prayers for an inspection order, production order and for the return of
the specified personal belongings are denied for lack of merit. Although there is no
evidence that Respondents are responsible for the abduction, detention or torture of
the Petitioner, said Respondents pursuant to their legally mandated duties are,
nonetheless, ordered to continue/complete the investigation of this incident with
the end in view of prosecuting those who are responsible. Respondents are also
ordered to provide protection to the Petitioner and her family while in the
Philippines against any and all forms of harassment, intimidation and coercion as
may be relevant to the grant of these reliefs. We begin with the petitioner's
allegations.

ARGUMENTS AND ISSUES AT THE SUPREME COURT:

Petitioner first contends that the Court of Appeals erred in absolving the public
216
respondents from any responsibility in her abduction and torture. Corollary to this,
petitioner also finds fault on the part of Court of Appeals in denying her prayer for
the return of her personal belongings.

Petitioner insists that the manner by which her abduction and torture was carried
out, as well as the sounds of construction, gunfire and airplanes that she heard
while in detention, as these were detailed in her two affidavits and affirmed by her
in open court, are already sufficient evidence to prove government involvement.

Proceeding from such assumption, petitioner invokes the doctrine of command

responsibility to implicate the high-ranking civilian and military authorities she
impleaded as respondents in her amparo petition. Thus, petitioner seeks from this
Court a pronouncement holding the respondents as complicit in her abduction and
torture, as well as liable for the return of her belongings.

Command Responsibility in Amparo Proceedings

It must be stated at the outset that the use by the petitioner of the doctrine of
command responsibility as the justification in impleading the public respondents in
her amparo petition, is legally inaccurate, if not incorrect. The doctrine of
command
responsibility is a rule of substantive law that establishes liability and, by this
account, cannot be a proper legal basis to implead a party-respondent in an amparo
petition.

The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief

consisting of the appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be crafted
by the court, in order to address specific violations or threats of violation of the
constitutional rights to life, liberty or security. While the principal objective of
its proceedings is the initial determination of whether an enforced disappearance,
extralegal killing or threats thereof had transpired — the writ does not, by so
doing, fix liability for such disappearance, killing or threats, whether that may be
criminal, civil or administrative under the applicable substantive law.

HABEAS DATA
As earlier intimated, the Court of Appeals granted to the petitioner the privilege of
the writ of habeas data, by enjoining the public respondents from "distributing or
217
causing the distribution to the public any records in whatever form, reports,
documents or similar papers" relative to the petitioner's "alleged ties with the CPP-
NPA or pertinently related to her abduction and torture." Though not raised as an
issue in this appeal, this Court is constrained to pass upon and review this
particular ruling of the Court of Appeals in order to rectify, what appears to Us, an
error infecting the grant.

Accordingly, this case must be referred back to the Court of Appeals, for the
purposes of monitoring compliance with the above directives and determining
whether, in light of any recent reports or recommendations, there would already be
sufficient evidence to hold any of the public respondents responsible or, at least,
accountable. After making such determination, the Court of Appeals shall submit
its own report with recommendation to this Court for final action. The Court of
Appeals will continue to have jurisdiction over this case in order to accomplish its
tasks under this decision.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY MERITORIOUS. We hereby

render a decision:
1.) AFFIRMING the denial of the petitioner's prayer for the return of her personal
belongings;
2.) AFFIRMING the denial of the petitioner's prayer for an inspection of the
detention areas of Fort Magsaysay.
3.) REVERSING the grant of the privilege of habeas data, without prejudice,
however, to any modification that this Court may make on the basis of the
investigation reports and recommendations submitted to it under this decision.
4.) MODIFYING the directive that further investigation must be undertaken, as
follows — a. APPOINTING the Commission on Human Rights as the lead agency
tasked with conducting further investigation regarding the abduction and torture of
the petitioner. Accordingly, the Commission on Human Rights shall, under the
norm of extraordinary diligence, take or continue to take the necessary steps: (a) to
identify the persons described in the cartographic sketches submitted by the
petitioner, as well as their whereabouts; and (b) to pursue any other leads relevant
to petitioner's abduction and torture. b. DIRECTING the incumbent Chief of the
Philippine National Police, or his successor, and the incumbent Chief of Staff of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or his successor, to extend assistance to the
ongoing investigation of the Commission on Human Rights, including but not
218
limited to furnishing the latter a copy of its personnel records circa the time of the
petitioner's abduction and torture, subject to reasonable regulations consistent with
the Constitution and existing laws. c. Further DIRECTING the incumbent Chief of
the Philippine National Police, or his successor, to furnish to this Court, the Court
of Appeals, and the petitioner or her representative, a copy of the reports of its
investigations and their recommendations, other than those that are already part of
the records of this case, within ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision. d.
Further DIRECTING the Commission on Human Rights (a) to furnish to the Court
of Appeals within ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision, a copy of the
reports on its investigation and its corresponding recommendations; and (b) to
provide or continue to provide protection to the petitioner during her stay or visit to
the Philippines, until such time as may hereinafter be determined by this Court.

Accordingly, the public respondents shall remain personally impleaded in this

petition to answer for any responsibilities and/or accountabilities they may have
incurred during their incumbencies. Other findings of the Court of Appeals in its
Decision dated 26 August 2009 in CA-G.R. SP No. 00036-WRA that are not
contrary to this decision are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

219
D. Writ of Habeas Data (AM NO. 08-1-16-SC)

Nature
87.Rodriguez vs. Arroyo, GR No. 191805, Nov. 15, 2011;

88.Vivares vs. St. Theresas College, GR No. 202666, Sept. 29, 2014

Facts:
Nenita Julia V. Daluz (Julia) and Julienne Vida Suzara (Julienne), both minors,
were,
during the period material, graduating high school students at St. Theresa's College
(STC), Cebu City. Sometime in January 2012, while changing into their swimsuits
for a beach party they were about to attend, Julia and Julienne, along with several
others, took digital pictures of themselves clad only in their undergarments. These
pictures were then uploaded by Angela Lindsay Tan (Angela) on her Facebook
profile. Back at the school, Mylene Rheza T. Escudero (Escudero), a computer
teacher at STC's high school department, learned from her students that some
seniors at STC posted pictures online, depicting themselves from the waist up,
dressed only in brassieres. Escudero then asked her students if they knew who the
girls in the photos are. In turn, they readily identified Julia, Julienne, and Chloe
Lourdes Taboada (Chloe), among others. Using STC's computers, Escudero's
students logged in to their respective personal Facebook accounts and showed her
photos of the identified students, which include: (a) Julia and Julienne drinking
hard liquor and smoking cigarettes inside a bar; and (b) Julia and Julienne along
the streets of Cebu wearing articles of clothing that show virtually the entirety of
their black brassieres. What is more, Escudero's students claimed that there were
times when access to or the availability of the identified students' photos was not
confined to the girls' Facebook friends, but were, in fact, viewable by any
Facebook user.

Upon discovery, Escudero reported the matter and, through one of her student's
Facebook page, showed the photos to Kristine Rose Tigol (Tigol), STC's
Discipline-in-Charge, for appropriate action. Thereafter, following an
investigation, STC found the identified students to have deported themselves in a
220
manner proscribed by the school's Student Handbook, to wit:
1. Possession of alcoholic drinks outside the school campus;
2. Engaging in immoral, indecent, obscene or lewd acts;
3. Smoking and drinking alcoholic beverages in public places;
4. Apparel that exposes the underwear;
5. Clothing that advocates unhealthy behaviour; depicts obscenity; contains
sexually suggestive messages, language or symbols; and
6. Posing and uploading pictures on the Internet that entail ample body exposure.

ARGUMENTS AND ISSUES AT THE TRIAL COURT:

The dispositive portion of the Decision pertinently states: WHEREFORE, in view
of the foregoing premises, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
The parties and media must observe the aforestated confidentiality.
xxx xxx xxx
SO ORDERED.

To the trial court, petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual or threatened
violation of the minors' right to privacy, one of the preconditions for the issuance
of the writ of habeas data. Moreover, the court a quo held that the photos, having
been uploaded on Facebook without restrictions as to who may view them, lost
their privacy in some way. Besides, the RTC noted, STC gathered the photographs
through legal means and for a legal purpose, that is, the implementation of the
school's policies and rules on discipline.

Not satisfied with the outcome, petitioners now come before this Court pursuant to
Section 19 of the Rule on Habeas Data.

ARGUMENTS AND ISSUES AT THE SUPREME COURT:

The main issue to be threshed out in this case is whether or not a writ of habeas
data should be issued given the factual milieu. Crucial in resolving the controversy,
however, is the pivotal point of whether or not there was indeed an actual or
threatened violation of the right to privacy in the life, liberty, or security of the
minors involved in this case.

We find no merit in the petition.

221
Procedural issues concerning the availability of the Writ of Habeas Data: The writ
of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life,
liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a
public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party. It is an independent and summary remedy
designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of
information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one's right to the
truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person's right to control
information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such information
is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.

In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an individual's
right
to informational privacy, among others. A comparative law scholar has, in fact,
defined habeas data as "a procedure designed to safeguard individual freedom from
abuse in the information age." The writ, however, will not issue on the basis
merely of an alleged unauthorized access to information about a person. Availment
of the writ requires the existence of a nexus between the right to privacy on the one
hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other. Thus, the existence of a
person's right to informational privacy and a showing, at least by substantial
evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty
or security of the victim are indispensable before the privilege of the writ may be
extended.

In finding that respondent STC and its officials did not violate the minors' privacy
rights, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and case disposition of the
court a quo.

In light of the foregoing, the Court need not belabor the other assigned errors.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The
Decision
dated July 27, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City in SP.
Proc. No. 19251-CEB is hereby AFFIRMED.

222
Limitation
89.Gamboa vs. Chan, GR No. 193636, July 24, 2012

Facts:
At the time the present Petition was filed, petitioner Marynette R. Gamboa
(Gamboa) was the Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos Norte. Meanwhile, respondent Police
Senior Superintendent (P/SSUPT.) Marlou C. Chan was the Officer-in-Charge, and
respondent Police Superintendent (P/SUPT.) William O. Fang was the Chief of the
Provincial Investigation and Detective Management Branch, both of the Ilocos
Norte
Police Provincial Office.

On 8 December 2009, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued

Administrative Order No. 275 (A.O. 275), "Creating an Independent Commission
to
Address the Alleged Existence of Private Armies in the Country." The body, which
was later on referred to as the Zeñarosa Commission, 8 was formed to investigate
the existence of private army groups (PAGs) in the country with a view to
eliminating them before the 10 May 2010 elections and dismantling them
permanently in the future.

Upon the conclusion of its investigation, the Zeñarosa Commission released and
submitted to the Office of the President a confidential report entitled "A Journey
Towards H.O.P.E.: The Independent Commission Against Private Armies' Report
to the President" (the Report).

Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNP-Ilocos
Norte) conducted a series of surveillance operations against her and her aides, and
classiffied her as someone who keeps a PAG. Purportedly without the benefit of
data verification, PNP-Ilocos Norte forwarded the information gathered on her to
the Zeñarosa Commission, thereby causing her inclusion in the Report's
223
enumeration of individuals maintaining PAGs.

ARGUMENTS AND ISSUES AT THE TRIAL COURT:

RTC Br. 13, in its assailed Decision dated 9 September 2010, dismissed the
Petition. The trial court categorically ruled that the inclusion of Gamboa in the list
of persons maintaining PAGs, as published in the Report, constituted a violation of
her right to privacy, to wit:

In this light, it cannot also be disputed that by her inclusion in the list of persons
maintaining PAGs, [Gamboa]'s right to privacy indubitably has been violated. The
violation understandably affects her life, liberty and security enormously. The
untold misery that comes with the tag of having a PAG could even be
insurmountable. As she essentially alleged in her petition, she fears for her security
that at any time of the day the unlimited powers of respondents may likely be
exercised to further malign and destroy her reputation and to transgress her right to
life.

By her inclusion in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, it is likewise undisputed

that there was certainly intrusion into [Gamboa]'s activities. It cannot be denied
that information was gathered as basis therefor. After all, under Administrative
Order No. 275, the Zeñarosa Commission was tasked to investigate the existence
of private armies in the country, with all the powers of an investigative body under
Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987.

ARGUMENTS AND ISSUES AT THE SUPREME COURT:

The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect
the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an
individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one's right to the truth and to
informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person's right to control information
regarding oneself,
particularly in instances in which such information is being collected through
unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. It must be emphasized that in
order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus between
the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the
other. Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data reads: Habeas data. — The
224
writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in
life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data information regarding the person, family,
home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.

In this case, respondents admitted the existence of the Report, but emphasized its
con􀀻dential nature. That it was leaked to third parties and the media was
regrettable, even warranting reproach. But it must be stressed that Gamboa failed
to establish that respondents were responsible for this unintended disclosure. In
any event, there are other reliefs available to her to address the purported damage
to her reputation, making a resort to the extraordinary remedy of the writ of habeas
data unnecessary and improper.

Finally, this Court rules that Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial
evidence that her inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining PAGs made her
and her supporters susceptible to harassment and to increased police surveillance.
In this
regard, respondents sufficiently explained that the investigations conducted against
her were in relation to the criminal cases in which she was implicated. As public
officials, they enjoy the presumption of regularity, which she failed to overcome.

It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the state interest of dismantling PAGs
far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa, especially when
the collection and forwarding by the PNP of information against her was pursuant
to a lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the writ of habeas data must be
denied.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed Decision
in
Special Proc. No. 14979 dated 9 September 2010 of the Regional Trial Court,
Laoag
City, Br. 13, insofar as it denies Gamboa the privilege of the writ of habeas data, is
AFFIRMED.

225
Applicability
90.Castillo vs. Cruz, GR No. 182165, Nov. 25, 2009;

91.Manila Electric Co. vs. Lim, GR No. 184769, Oct. 5, 2010;

Facts:
Rosario G. Lim (respondent), also known as Cherry Lim, is an administrative clerk
at the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO). On June 4, 2008, an anonymous
letter was posted at the door of the Metering Office of the Administration building
of MERALCO Plaridel, Bulacan Sector, at which respondent is assigned,
denouncing respondent. The letter reads:
Cherry Lim: MATAPOS MONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG BIYAYA NG
MERALCO, NGAYON NAMAN AY GUSTO MONG PALAMON ANG
BUONG KUMPANYA SA MGA BUWAYA NG GOBYERNO. KAPAL NG
MUKHA MO, LUMAYAS KA RITO, WALANG UTANG NA LOOB…
Copies of the letter were also inserted in the lockers of MERALCO linesmen.
Informed about it, respondent reported the matter on June 5, 2008 to the Plaridel
Station of the Philippine National Police.

ARGUMENTS AND ISSUES AT THE TRIAL COURT:

By respondent's allegation, petitioners' unlawful act and omission consisting of
their continued failure and refusal to provide her with details or information about
the alleged report which MERALCO purportedly received concerning threats to
her safety and security amount to a violation of her right to privacy in life, liberty
and security, correctible by habeas data. Respondent thus prayed for the issuance
of a writ commanding petitioners to file a written return containing the following:
a) a full disclosure of the data or information about respondent in relation to the
226
report purportedly received by petitioners on the alleged threat to her safety and
security; the nature of such data and the purpose for its collection;
b) the measures taken by petitioners to ensure the confidentiality of such data or
information; and
c) the currency and accuracy of such data or information obtained.

By Order 6 of August 29, 2008, Branch 7 of the Bulacan RTC directed petitioners
to file their verified written return. And by Order of September 5, 2008, the trial
court granted respondent's application for a TRO.

ARGUMENTS AND ISSUES AT THE SUPREME COURT:

Petitioners go on to point out that the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data directs the
issuance of the writ only against public officials or employees, or private
individuals or entities engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding an aggrieved party's person, family or home; and that
MERALCO (or its officers) is clearly not engaged in such activities.

The petition is impressed with merit.

Respondent's plea that she be spared from complying with MERALCO's
Memorandum directing her reassignment to the Alabang Sector, under the guise of
a quest for information or data allegedly in possession of petitioners, does not fall
within the province of a writ of habeas data.

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:

Section 1. Habeas Data. — The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any
person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by
an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or of a private
individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the
aggrieved party.
In another vein, there is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners
committed any unjustifiable or unlawful violation of respondent's right to privacy
vis-a-vis the right to life, liberty or security. To argue that petitioners' refusal to
disclose the contents of reports allegedly received on the threats to respondent's
safety amounts to a violation of her right to privacy is at best speculative.
Respondent in fact trivializes these threats and accusations from unknown
227
individuals in her earlier-quoted portion of her July 10, 2008 letter as "highly
suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if they existed at all." 18 And she even
suspects that her transfer to another place of work "betray[s] the real intent of
management" and could be a "punitive move." Her posture unwittingly concedes
that the issue is labor-related.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed September 22, 2008
Decision of the Bulacan RTC, Branch 7 in SP. Proc. No. 213-M-2008 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. SP. Proc. No. 213-M-2008 is, accordingly,
DISMISSED.
92. Tapuz vs. Rosario, GR No. 182484, June 17, 2008

Facts:
The private respondents spouses Gregorio Sanson and Ma. Lourdes T. Sanson (the
"private respondents"), filed with the Fifth Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Buruanga-Malay, Aklan (the "MCTC" ) a complaint 3 dated 24 April 2006 for
forcible entry and damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction against the petitioners Daniel Masangkay Tapuz, Aurora
Tapuz-Madriaga, Liberty M. Asuncion, Ladylyn Bamos Madriaga, Everly Tapuz
Madriaga, Excel Tapuz, Ivan Tapuz and Marian Timbas (the "petitioners") and
other John Does numbering about 120. The private respondents alleged in their
complaint that: (1) they are the registered owners under TCT No. 35813 of a
1.0093-hectare parcel of land located at Sitio Pinaungon, Balabag, Boracay, Malay,
Aklan (the "disputed land"); (2) they were the disputed land's prior possessors
when the petitioners — armed with bolos and carrying suspected 􀁃rearms and
together with unidentified persons numbering 120 — entered the disputed land by
force and intimidation, without the private respondents' permission and against the
objections of the private respondents' security men, and built thereon a nipa and
bamboo structure.

ARGUMENTS AND ISSUES AT THE METROPOLITAN CIRCUIT TRIAL

COURT:
The MCTC, after due proceedings, rendered on 2 January 2007 a decision in the
private respondents' favor. It found prior possession — the key issue in forcible
entry
cases — in the private respondents' favor, thus: "The key that could unravel the
answer to this question lies in the Amended Commissioner's Report and Sketch
228
found on pages 245 to 248 of the records and the evidence the parties have
submitted. It is shown in the Amended Commissioner's Report and Sketch that the
land in question is enclosed by a concrete and cyclone wire perimeter fence in pink
and green highlighter as shown in the Sketch Plan (p. 248). Said perimeter fence
was constructed by the plaintiffs 14 years ago. The foregoing findings of the
Commissioner in his report and sketch collaborated the claim of the plaintiffs that
after they acquired the land in question on May 27, 1993 through a Deed of Sale
(Annex 'A', Affidavit of Gregorio Sanson, p. 276, rec.), they caused the
construction of the perimeter fence sometime in 1993 (A􀀼davit of Gregorio
Sanson, pp. 271-275,
rec.).

ARGUMENTS AND ISSUES AT THE COURT OF APPEALS:

The petitioners thereafter filed on 2 August 2007 with the Court of Appeals, Cebu
City, a Petition for Review 11 (under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure) of the Permanent Mandatory Injunction and Order of Demolition of the
RTC of Kalibo, Br. 6 in Civil Case No. 7990.

ARGUMENTS AND ISSUES AT THE SUPREME COURT:

We find the petitions for certiorari and issuance of a writ of habeas data fatally
defective, both in substance and in form. The petition for the issuance of the writ of
amparo, on the other hand, is fatally defective with respect to content and
substance.

We conclude, based on the outlined material antecedents that led to the petition,
that the petition for certiorari to nullify the assailed RTC orders has been filed out
of time. It is not lost on us that the petitioners have a pending petition with the
Court of Appeals (the "CA petition" ) for the review of the same RTC orders now
assailed in the present petition, although the petitioners never disclosedin the body
of the present petition the exact status of their pending CA petition. The CA
petition, however, was filed with the Court of Appeals on 2 August 2007, which
indicates to us that the assailed orders (or at the very least, the latest of the
interrelated assailed orders) were received on 1 August 2007 at the latest. The
present petition, on the other hand, was filed on April 29, 2008 or more than eight
months from the time the CA petition was filed. Thus, the present petition is
separated in point of time from the assumed receipt of the assailed RTC orders by
229
at least eight (8) months, i.e., beyond the reglementary period of sixty (60) days 15
from receipt of the assailed order or orders or from notice of the denial of a
seasonably filed motion for reconsideration.

These allegations obviously lack what the Rule on Writ of Habeas Data requires as
a minimum, thus rendering the petition fatally deficient. Specifically, we see no
concrete allegations of unjustified or unlawful violation of the right to privacy
related to the right to life, liberty or security. The petition likewise has not alleged,
much less demonstrated, any need for information under the control of police
authorities other than those it has already set forth as integral annexes. The
necessity or justification for the issuance of the writ, based on the insu􀀼ciency of
previous efforts made to secure information, has not also been shown. In sum, the
prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas data is nothing more than the "fishing
expedition" that this Court — in the course of drafting the Rule on habeas data —
had in mind in defining what the purpose of a writ of habeas data is not. In these
lights, the outright denial of the petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data
is fully in order.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DISMISS the present petition

OUTRIGHT for deficiencies of form and substance patent from its body and
attachments.

230
Evidence Required
93.Roxas vs. Arroyo, (Supra);

94.Lee vs. Ilagan, GR No. 203254, Oct. 8, 2014;

Facts:
In his Petition for Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Data dated June 22, 2012, Ilagan
alleged that he and petitioner Dr. Joy Margate Lee (Lee) were former common law
partners. Sometime in July 2011, he visited Lee at the latter's condominium, rested
for a while and thereafter, proceeded to his office. Upon arrival, Ilagan noticed that
his digital camera was missing. On August 23, 2011, Lee confronted Ilagan at the
latter's office regarding a purported sex video (subject video) she discovered from
the aforesaid camera involving Ilagan and another woman. Ilagan denied the video
and demanded Lee to return the camera, but to no avail. During the confrontation,
Ilagan allegedly slammed Lee's head against a wall inside his office and walked
away. Subsequently, Lee utilized the said video as evidence in filing various
complaints against Ilagan, namely: (a) a criminal complaint for violation of
Republic Act No. 9262 otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women
and Their Children Act of 2004," before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Makati; and (b ) an administrative complaint for grave misconduct before the
National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM). Ilagan claimed that Lee's acts of
reproducing the subject video and threatening to distribute the same to the upper
echelons of the NAPOLCOM and uploading it to the Internet violated not only his
right to life, liberty, security, and privacy but also that of the other woman, and
thus, the issuance of a writ of habeas data in his favor is warranted.

ARGUMENTS AND ISSUES AT THE TRIAL COURT:

231
Finding the petition prima facie meritorious, the RTC issued a Writ of Habeas Data
dated June 25, 2012, directing Lee to appear before the court a quo, and to produce
Ilagan's digital camera, as well as the negative and/or original of the subject video
and copies thereof, and to file a verified written return within five (5) working days
from date of receipt thereof.

In a Decision dated August 30, 2012, the RTC granted the privilege of the writ of
habeas data in Ilagan's favor, and accordingly, ordered the implementing officer to
turnover copies of the subject video to him, and enjoined Lee from further
reproducing the same.

The RTC did not give credence to Lee's defense that she is not engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data regarding the person of Ilagan, finding that
her acts of reproducing the subject video and showing it to other people, i.e., the
NAPOLCOM officers, violated the latter's right to privacy in life and caused him
to suffer humiliation and mental anguish. In this relation, the RTC opined that
Lee's use of the subject video as evidence in the various cases she filed against
Ilagan is not enough justification for its reproduction. Nevertheless, the RTC
clarified that it is only ruling on the return of the aforesaid video and not on its
admissibility before other tribunals.

Dissatisfied, Lee filed this petition.

ARGUMENTS AND ISSUES AT THE SUPREME COURT:

The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the RTC correctly
extended the privilege of the writ of habeas data in favor of Ilagan.

The petition is meritorious.

A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, or the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data (Habeas Data Rule),
was conceived as a response, given the lack of effective and available remedies, to
address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced
disappearances. It was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right to
privacy, most especially the right to informational privacy of individuals, which is
defined as "the right to control the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination
of data about oneself."

232
In fact, even discounting the insufficiency of the allegations, the petition would
equally be dismissible due to the inadequacy of the evidence presented. As the
records show, all that Ilagan submitted in support of his petition was his sell-
serving testimony which hardly meets the substantial evidence requirement as
prescribed by the Habeas Data Rule. This is because nothing therein would
indicate that Lee actually proceeded to commit any overt act towards the end of
violating Ilagan's right to privacy in life, liberty or security. Nor would anything on
record even lead a reasonable mind to conclude that Lee was going to use the
subject video in order to achieve unlawful ends — say for instance, to spread it to
the public so as to ruin Ilagan's reputation. Contrastingly, Lee even made it clear in
her testimony that the only reason why she reproduced the subject video was to
legitimately utilize the same as evidence in the criminal and administrative cases
that she filed against Ilagan. Hence, due to the insufficiency of the allegations as
well as the glaring absence of substantial evidence, the Court finds it proper to
reverse the RTC Decision and dismiss the habeas data petition.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 30, 2012 of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224 in SP No. 12-71527 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Petition for Issuance of the
Writ of Habeas Data filed by respondent P/Supt. Neri A. Ilagan is DISMISSED for
lack of merit.

233
 95. Saez vs. Arroyo, GR No. 183533, Sept. 25, 2012

Facts:
On March 6, 2008, the petitioner filed with the Court a petition to be granted the
privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data with prayers for temporary
protection order, inspection of place and production of documents. In the petition,
he expressed his fear of being abducted and killed; hence, he sought that he be
placed in a sanctuary appointed by the Court. He likewise prayed for the military to
cease from further conducting surveillance and monitoring of his activities and for
his name to be excluded from the order of battle and other government records
connecting him to the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP).

Without necessarily giving due course to the petition, the Court issued the writ of
amparo commanding the respondents to make a verified return and referred the
case to the Court of Appeals (CA) for hearing and decision. The case before the
CA was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 00024 WOA.

ARGUMENTS AND ISSUES AT THE COURT OF APPEALS:

The CA conducted hearings with an intent to clarify what actually transpired and to
determine specific acts which threatened the petitioner's right to life, liberty or
security. During the hearings, the petitioner narrated that starting April 16, 2007,
he noticed that he was always being followed by a certain "Joel," a former
colleague at Bayan Muna. "Joel" pretended peddling pandesal in the vicinity of the
petitioner's store. Three days before the petitioner was apprehended, "Joel"
approached and informed him of his marital status and current job as a baker in
Calapan, Mindoro Oriental. "Joel" inquired if the petitioner was still involved with
ANAKPAWIS. When asked by the CA justices during the hearing if the petitioner
had gone home to Calapan after having filed the petition, he answered in the
negative explaining that he was afraid of Pvt. Osio who was always at the pier.

234
On July 9, 2008, the CA rendered its Decision, 7 denying on formal and substantial
grounds the reliefs prayed for in the petition and dropping former President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo as a respondent.

ARGUMENTS AND ISSUES AT THE SUPREME COURT:

Contrary to the CA's 􀀻ndings, it had been shown by substantial evidence and even
by the respondents' own admissions that the petitioner's life, liberty and security
were threatened. Military personnel, whom the petitioner had named and
described, knew where to get him and they can do so with ease. He also became a
military asset, but under duress, as the respondents had documents allegedly
linking him to the CPP and including him in the order of battle. The petitioner
claims that the foregoing circumstances were not denied by the respondents.

While the issuance of the writs sought by the petitioner cannot be granted, the
Court
nevertheless finds ample grounds to modify the Resolution dated August 31, 2010.

The petition conforms to the requirements of the Rules on the Writs of Amparo
and Habeas Data
Section 5 17 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC (Rule on the Writ of Amparo) and Section 6
18 of A.M. 08-1-16-SC (Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data) provide for what the
said petitions should contain.

In the present case, the Court notes that the petition for the issuance of the
privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data is sufficient as to its contents. The
petitioner made specific allegations relative to his personal circumstances and
those of the respondents. The petitioner likewise indicated particular acts, which
are allegedly violative of his rights and the participation of some of the respondents
in their commission. As to the pre-requisite conduct and result of an investigation
prior to the filing of the petition, it was explained that the petitioner expected no
relief from the military, which he perceived as his oppressors, hence, his request
for assistance from a human rights organization, then a direct resort to the court.
Anent the documents sought to be the subject of the writ of habeas data prayed for,
the Court finds the requirement of specificity to have been satisfied. The
documents subject of the petition include the order of battle, those linking the
petitioner to the CPP and those he signed involuntarily, and military intelligence
235
reports making references to him. Although the exact locations and the custodians
of the documents were not identified, this does not render the petition insufficient.
Section 6 (d) of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data is clear that the requirement
of specificity arises only when the exact locations and identities of the custodians
are known. The Amparo Rule was not promulgated with the intent to make it a
token gesture of concern for constitutional rights. Thus, despite the lack of certain
contents, which the Rules on the Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data generally
require, for as long as their absence under exceptional circumstances can be
reasonably justified, a petition should not be susceptible to outright dismissal.

From the foregoing, the Court holds that the allegations stated in the petition for
the
privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data filed conform to the rules.
However, they are mere allegations, which the Court cannot accept "hook, line and
sinker", so to speak, and whether substantial evidence exist to warrant the granting
of the petition is a different matter altogether.

To conclude, compliance with technical rules of procedure is ideal but it cannot be

accorded primacy. In the proceedings before the CA, the petitioner himself
testified to prove the veracity of his allegations which he stated in the petition.
Hence, the defect in the verification attached to the petition. Hence, the defect in
the verification attached to the petition was deemed cured.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitioner's motion for reconsideration is
DENIED WITH FINALITY.

236
E. Writ of Kalikasan (AM NO. 09-6-08-SC)
Locus Standing to file Action
96.Most Reverend Pedro Arigo vs. Scott S. swift, GR No. 206510, Sept. 16,
2014;
Facts:
The name "Tubbataha" came from the Samal (seafaring people of southern
Philippines) language which means "long reef exposed at low tide." Tubbataha is
composed of two huge coral atolls — the north atoll and the south atoll — and the
Jessie Beazley Reef, a smaller coral structure about 20 kilometers north of the
atolls. The reefs of Tubbataha and Jessie Beazley are considered part of
Cagayancillo, a remote island municipality of Palawan. In 1988, Tubbataha was
declared a National Marine Park by virtue of Proclamation No. 306 issued by
President Corazon C. Aquino on August 11, 1988. Located in the middle of
Central Sulu Sea, 150 kilometers southeast of Puerto Princesa City, Tubbataha lies
at the heart of the Coral Triangle, the global center of marine biodiversity.

In 1993, Tubbataha was inscribed by the United Nations Educational Scienti􀁀c

and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) as a World Heritage Site. It was recognized as
one of the Philippines' oldest ecosystems, containing excellent examples of pristine
reefs and a high diversity of marine life. The 97,030-hectare protected marine park
is also an important habitat for internationally threatened and endangered marine
species. UNESCO cited Tubbataha's outstanding universal value as an important
and significant natural habitat for in situ conservation of biological diversity; an
example representing significant on-going ecological and biological processes; and
an area of exceptional natural beauty and aesthetic importance. On April 6, 2010,
Congress passed Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10067, otherwise known as the
"Tubbataha Reefs Natural Park (TRNP) Act of 2009" "to ensure the protection and
conservation of the globally significant economic, biological, sociocultural,
educational and scientific values of the Tubbataha Reefs into perpetuity for the
enjoyment of present and future generations." Under the "no-take" policy, entry
237
into the waters of TRNP is strictly regulated and many human activities are
prohibited and penalized or fined, including fishing, gathering, destroying and
disturbing the resources within the TRNP. The law likewise created the Tubbataha
Protected Area Management Board (TPAMB) which shall be the sole
policymaking and permit-granting body of the TRNP.

ARGUMENTS AND ISSUES AT THE SUPREME COURT:

Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the
USS Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental damage of such
magnitude as to affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo,
Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and
Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their constitutional rights to a balanced and
healthful ecology. They also seek a directive from this Court for the institution of
civil, administrative and criminal suits for acts committed in violation of
environmental laws and regulations in connection with the grounding incident.
Specifically, petitioners cite the following violations committed by US respondents
under R.A. No. 10067: unauthorized entry (Section 19); non-payment of
conservation fees (Section 21); obstruction of law enforcement officer (Section
30); damages to the reef (Section 20); and destroying and disturbing resources
(Section 26 [g]). Furthermore, petitioners assail certain provisions of the Visiting
Forces Agreement (VFA) which they want this Court to nullify for being
unconstitutional.

As a preliminary matter, there is no dispute on the legal standing of petitioners to

file the present petition. Locus standi is "a right of appearance in a court of justice
on a given question." Specifically, it is "a party's personal and substantial interest
in a case where he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result" of the act
being challenged, and "calls for more than just a generalized grievance." However,
the rule on standing is a procedural matter which this Court has relaxed for non-
traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the
public interest so requires, such as when the subject matter of the controversy is of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of
paramount public interest.

As held in BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) v. Exec. Sec. Zamora, the

VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has been recognized as a
238
treaty by the United States as attested and certified by the duly authorized
representative of the United States government. The VFA being a valid and
binding agreement, the parties are required as a matter of international law to abide
by its terms and provisions. The present petition under the Rules is not the proper
remedy to assail the constitutionality of its provisions. WHEREFORE, the petition
for the issuance of the privilege of the Writ of Kalikasan is hereby DENIED.

97.Resident Marine Mamals of the Protected Seascape Tanon Strait vs.

Sec. Angelo Reyes, GR No. 180771, April 21, 2015

Facts:
Petitioners in G.R. No. 180771, collectively referred to as the "Resident Marine
Mammals" in the petition, are the toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other
cetacean species, which inhabit the waters in and around the Tañon Strait. They are
joined by Gloria Estenzo Ramos (Ramos) and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio (Eisma-
Osorio) as their legal guardians and as friends (to be collectively known as "the
Stewards") who allegedly empathize with, and seek the protection of, the
aforementioned marine species. Also impleaded as an unwilling co-petitioner is
former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, for her express declaration and
undertaking in the ASEAN Charter to protect the Tañon Strait, among others.

Petitioners in G.R. No. 181527 are the Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development
Center (FIDEC), a non-stock, non-profit, non-governmental organization,
established for the welfare of the marginal fisherfolk in Region VII; and Cerilo D.
Engarcial (Engarcial), Ramon Yanong (Yanong) and Francisco Labid (Labid), in
their personal capacities and as representatives of the subsistence fisherfolk of the
municipalities of Aloguinsan and Pinamungajan, Cebu.

Named as respondents in both petitions are the late Angelo T. Reyes, as then
Secretary of the Department of Energy (DOE); Jose L. Atienza, as then Secretary
of the DENR; Leonardo R. Sibbaluca, as then DENR-Regional Director for Region
VII and Chairman of the Tañon Strait Protected Seascape Management Board;
Japan Petroleum Exploration Co., Ltd. (JAPEX), a company organized and
existing under the laws of Japan with a Philippine branch office; and Supply
Oilfield Services, Inc. (SOS), as the alleged Philippine agent of JAPEX.

239
ARGUMENTS AND ISSUES AT THE SUPREME COURT:
The following are the issues posited by petitioners Resident Marine Mammals
and Stewards in G.R. No. 180771:
I. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS HAVE LOCUS STANDI TO FILE THE
INSTANT PETITION;
II. WHETHER OR NOT SERVICE CONTRACT NO. 46 IS VIOLAT[IVE] OF
THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES;
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE ON-GOING EXPLORATION AND PROPOSED
EXPLOITATION FOR OIL AND NATURAL GAS AT, AROUND, AND
UNDERNEATH THE MARINE WATERS OF THE TAÑON STRAIT
PROTECTED SEASCAPE IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE PHILIPPINE
COMMITMENTS TO INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS AND
INSTRUMENTS; AND
IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE ISSUANCE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL
COMPLIANCE CERTIFICATE (ECC) IN ENVIRONMENTALLY CRITICAL
AREAS AND HABITATS OF MARINE WILDLIFE AND ENDANGERED
SPECIES IS LEGAL AND PROPER.

At the outset, this Court makes clear that the "'moot and academic principle' is not
a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case."
Courts have decided cases otherwise moot and academic under the following
exceptions:
1) There is a grave violation of the Constitution;
2) The exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is
involved;
3) The constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to
guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and
4) The case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

In this case, despite the termination of SC-46, this Court deems it necessary to
resolve these consolidated petitions as almost all of the foregoing exceptions are
present in this case. Both petitioners allege that SC-46 is violative of the
Constitution, the environmental and livelihood issues raised undoubtedly affect the
public's interest, and the respondents' contested actions are capable of repetition.

Moreover, SC-46 was not executed for the mere purpose of gathering information
240
on the possible energy resources in the Tañon Strait as it also provides for the
parties' rights and obligations relating to extraction and petroleum production
should oil in commercial quantities be found to exist in the area. While Presidential
Decree No. 87 may serve as the general law upon which a service contract for
petroleum exploration and extraction may be authorized, the exploitation and
utilization of this energy resource in the present case may be allowed only through
a law passed by Congress, since the Tañon Strait is a NIPAS area .

Since there is no such law specifically allowing oil exploration and/or extraction in
the Tañon Strait, no energy resource exploitation and utilization may be done in
said protected seascape. In view of the foregoing premises and conclusions, it is no
longer necessary to discuss the other issues raised in these consolidated petitions.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions in G.R. Nos. 180771 and 181527 are GRANTED,
Service Contract No. 46 is hereby declared NULL AND VOID for violating the
1987
Constitution, Republic Act No. 7586, and Presidential Decree No. 1586.

241
F. Adoption (Rules 99-100, REPEALED)

98. Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia - GR No. L- 148311, March 31, 2005;

Facts:
This is a case wherein that in Aug. 2000, Catindig filed a petition to adopt his
minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He prayed that
Stephanie’s middle name Astorga be changed to “Garcia” (her mother’s surname),
and that her surname Garcia to “Catindig” (his surname). In Mar. 2001, the trial
court granted his petition, thereby freeing Stephanie from all obligations of
obedience and maintenance with respect to her natural mother, and for civil
purposes, shall henceforth be the petitioner’s legitimate child and legal heir. 
Pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code, the minor shall be known as
“Stephanie Nathy Catindig”. That in April 2001, the petitioner filed a motion for
clarification and/or reconsideration, praying that Stephanie should be allowed to
use the surname of her natural mother “Garcia” as her middle name. In May 2001,
the trial court denied the motion on the ground that there is no law allowing an
adopted child to use the surname of her biological mother as her middle name.

Issue: Whether or not an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father,
may use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name, Yes.

Ruling:

Yes, since there is no law also prohibiting Stephanie, being an illegitimate child
adopted by her natural father, to use her mother’s name, the Court finds no reason
why she should not be allowed to do so.  The child should be permitted to use
“Garcia” as her middle name for the following reasons:

Use of surname is fixed by law – Art. 364-380 of the Civil Code provides the
substantive rules which regulate the use of surname of an individual whatever may
242
be his status in life (legitimate, illegitimate, adopted, married, previously married
or a widow; Law is silent as to the use of middle name – There is no law regulating
the use of a middle name, even the Art. 176 of the FC (as amended by RA 9255). 
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use. 
But as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the framers of the FC recognized the
Filipino custom of adding the surname of the child’s mother as his middle name as
recorded in the Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law
Committees. The underlying intent of adoption is in favor of the adopted child –
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, Stephanie is entitled to all the
rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind,
including the right to bear the surname of her father and mother. Liberal
construction of adoption statues in favor of adoption – It is a settled rule that
adoption statues should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes
of adoption.  The interests and welfare of the adopted child are primary and
paramount consideration, hence, every reasonable intendment should be sustained
to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.  The
Art. 10 of the CC provides a necessary scale in favor of right and justice when the
law is doubtful or obscure.

Hence, the Court grants the petition and partly modifies the assailed decision,
allowing Stephanie to use her mother’s surname “Garcia” as her middle name.

243
 99. Teotico vs. Del Val, GR No. L- 18753, March 26, 1965;
Facts:
This is a case wherein Maria Mortera died on July 1955 leaving properties worth
600,000. She then executed a will written in Spanish, affixed therefrom is her
signature and acknowledged before Notary Public by her along with the witnesses
required. That among the legacies made in the will was the 20,000 for Rene
Teotico who was married to the testatrix’s niece, Josefina Mortera.

The probate court admitted the probate of the will rendered its decision on
November 10, 1960 admitting the will to probate but declaring the disposition
made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico void with the statement that the portion to be
vacated by the annulment should pass to the testatrix’s heirs by way of intestes
succession.

The usufruct of Maria’s interest in the Calvo Building were left to the said spouses
and the ownership thereof was left in equal parts to her grandchildren, the
legitimate children of said spouses. Josefina was likewise instituted, as sole and
universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed by will.
Vicente Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will was opposed by Ana del
Val Chan, claiming that she was an adopted child of Francisca (deceased sister of
Maria) and an acknowledged natural child of Jose (deceased brother of Maria), that
said will was not executed as required by law and that Maria as physically and
mentally incapable to execute the will at the time of its execution and was executed
under duress, threat, or influence of fear.

Issue: Whether or not the defendant has the right to intervene in this
proceedings, No.

Ruling:
According to the Supreme Court, it is a well-settled rule that in order that a person
may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding is that he must have an
interest in the estate, will or in the property to be affected by either as executor or
244
as a claimant of the estate and be benefited by such as an heir or one who has a
claim against it as creditor. That under the terms of the will, defendant has nor ight
to intervene because she has no such interest in the estate either as heir, executor or
administrator because it did not appear therein any provision designating her as
heir/legatee in any portion of the estate. she could have acquired such right if she
was a legal heir of the deceased but she is not under the Civil Code. Even if her
allegations were true, the law does not give her any right to succeed the estate of
the deceased sister of both Jose and Francisca because being an illegitimate child
she is prohibited by law from succeeding to the legitimate relatives of her natural
father and that relationship established by adoption is limited sole to the adopted
and adopted and does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents except
only as expressly provided by law. As a consequence, she is an heir of the adopter
but not of the relatives of the adopter.

Hence, defendant has no right to intervene either as testamentary or as legal heir in

the probate proceeding.

245
 100. Republic vs. CA, GR No. 97906, May 21, 1992

Facts:
This is a case wherein Maximo Wong is the legitimate son of Maximo Alcala Sr.,
and Segundina Y. Alcala. That when he was two and a half years old and then
known as Maximo Alcala Jr., and his sister Margaret Alcala, was then nine years
old, with the consent of their natural parents and by order of the court in Special
Case No. 593, adopted by spouses naturalized Filipnos. Hoong Wong, now
deceased, was in insurance agent while Concepcion Ty Wong was a high school
teacher. They decided to adopt the children as the remained childless after fifteen
years of marriage. The couple showered their adopted children with parental love
and reared them as their own children.

That upon reaching the age of twenty two, respondent, by then married and a
junior Engineering student at Notre Dame University, Cotabato City, filed a
petition to change his name to Maximo Alcala Jr. He averred that the use of
surname Wong embarrassed and isolated him from his relatives and friends, as the
same suggests a Chinese ancestry when in truth and in fact he is a Muslim Filipino
residing in a Muslim community, and he wants to erase any implication
whatsoever of alien nationality; that he is being ridiculed for carrying a Chinese
surname, thus hampering his business and social life; and that his adoptive mother
does not oppose his desire to revert to his former surname.

The Regional Trial Court granted his petition and the Court of Appeals affirmed
the same.

Issue: Whether or not the given by the private respondent in his petition for change
of name are valid, sufficient and proper to warrant the granting of his petition, Yes

Whether or not this will affect his status as an adopted child, No.

Ruling:

246
In order to justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only
some proper or compelling reason therefor but also that he will be prejudiced by
the use of his true and official name. Among the grounds for change of name
which have been valid are:

a. When the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or

pronounce;
b. When the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation;
c. When the change will avoid confusion;
d. Having continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino
name, unaware of her alien parentage;
e. Sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all
in good faith and without prejudicing anybody;
f. When the surname causes embarrassment and there is no chowing that the
desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of
name would prejudice public interest.

247
NATURE OF ADOPTION

101. Republic vs. Elepano, GR No. L- 92542, October 15, 1991;

Facts:
This is a case wherein the private respondent Corazon Santos Punsalan filed a
verified petition for adoption of the minors Pinky Gonzales Punsalan, the daughter
of her full blood brother, and Ellyn Mae Punsalan Urbano, the daughter of her full
blood sister, be declared her daughters. However, she received an urgent call from
the United Nations Office in Geneva, Switzerland requiring her to report for work,
so much so that she will not be able to testify at the hearing of her petition that has
yet to be scheduled. The respondent judge ordered that notice of the taking of the
deposition be furnished to the Office of the Solicitor General.

However, the Office of the Solicitor General subsequently filed an opposition

averring that the jurisdictional requirement of publication has not been complied
with. That the Regional Trial Court, has yet to acquire jurisdiction over the
defendant, which the judge denied the said opposition and granted the petition for
adoption. The Court of Appeals, affirmed the decision of the lower court.

Issue: Whether or not the jurisdictional requirement of publication should be

complied first to allow the deposition taking in adoption proceedings, No.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held in the negative, the petition has no merit. While it is true
that in an action in personam, personal service of summons within the forum or
voluntary appearance in the case is essential for the court to acquire jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant, in an adoption case which involved the status of a
person of the defendant is a non-essential condition for the taking of a deposition
for the jurisdiction of the court is based on its power over the res, to render
judgment with respect to such “thing” (or status, as in this case) so as to bar
indifferently all who might be minded to make an objection against the right so
established. Publication of the scheduled hearing for the petition for adoption is
necessary for the validity of a decree of adoption but not for the purpose merely of
taking a deposition.
248
No abuse of discretion was committed by the respondent judge in allowing the
takin of private respondent’s deposition. Due to urgent and compelling reasons
beyond her control, private respondent could not be present to testify at the trial of
main case for adoption. The Office of the Solicitor General was notified of the
scheduled taking of the deposition, as well as of all the hearings of the petition for
adoption, but the Office of the Solicitation General chose not to attend all the said
hearings, without explanation. The Office of the Solicitor General, therefore, has
no reason to invoke lack of procedural due process.

Finally, it must not be forgotten that the philosophy behind adoption is to promote
the welfare of the child and every reasonable intendment should be sustained to
promote that objective.

249
 102. Ellis vs. Republic. GR No. L- 16922, April 30, 1963.
Facts:
This is a case wherein Petitioner Marvin G. Ellis, a native of San Francisco,
California, is 28 years of age, that on September 1949, he married Gloria C. Ellis
in Banger, Maine, United States. That both of them are citizens of the United
States.

That Baby Rose was born on September 26, 1959 at the Caloocan Maternity
Hospital. That four to five days later, the mother of Baby Rose left her with the
Heart of Mary Villa an institution for unwed mother and their babies, stating that
as the mother of Rose, she could not take care of her without bringing disgrace
upon her family.

That being without issue, on November of the same year, Spouses Ellis filed a
petition with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga for the adoption of the
aforementioned baby. At the time of the hearing of the petition on January
14,1960, petitioner Marvin G. Ellis and his wife had been in the Philippines for
three (3) years, he being assigned thereto as staff sergeant in the United States Air
Force Base, in Angeles, Pampanga where both lived at that time. They had been in
the Philippines before, or, to exact, in 1953. The petition was denied by the
court.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners are qualified to adopt here in the
Philippines, No.

Ruling:
This legal provisions is too clear to require interpretation. No matter how much we
sympathize with the plight of Baby Rose and with the good intentions of
petitioners herein, the law leaves us no choice but to apply its explicit terms, which
unqualified deny to petitioners the power to adopt anybody in the Philippines.

In this connection, it should be noted that this is a proceedings in rem, which no

court may entertain unless it has jurisdiction, not only over the subject matter of
the case and over the parties, but also over the res, which is the personal status of
Baby Rose as well as that of petitioners herein. Our Civil Code (Art. 15) adheres to
the theory that jurisdiction over the status of a natural person is determined by the
250
latters' nationality. Pursuant to this theory, we have jurisdiction over the status of
Baby Rose, she being a citizen of the Philippines, but not over the status of the
petitioners, who are foreigners. Under our political law, which is patterned after the
Anglo-American legal system, we have, likewise, adopted the latter's view to the
effect that personal status, in general, is determined by and/or subject to the
jurisdiction of the domiciliary law (Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws, p.
86; The Conflict of Laws by Beale, Vol. I, p. 305, Vol. II, pp. 713-714). This,
perhaps, is the reason why our Civil Code does not permit adoption by non-
resident aliens, and we have consistently refused to recognize the validity of
foreign decrees of divorce — regardless of the grounds upon which the same are
based — involving citizens of the Philippines who are not bona fide residents of
the forum, even when our laws authorized absolute divorce in the Philippines
(Ramirez v. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855; Gonayeb v. Hashim, 30 Phil. 22; Cousine Hix v.
Fleumer, 55 Phil. 851; Barretto Gonzales v. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 67; Recto v.
Harden, L-6897, Nov. 29, 1955)".

Inasmuch as petitioners herein are not domiciled in the Philippines — and, hence,
non-resident aliens - we cannot assume and exercise jurisdiction over the status,
under either the nationality theory or the domiciliary theory. In any event, whether
the above — quoted provision of said Art. 335 is predicated upon lack of
jurisdiction over the res or merely affects the cause of action, we have no authority
to grant the relief prayed for by petitioners herein, and it has been so held in
Caraballo v. Republic, L-15080 (April 25, 1962) and Katansik v. Republic L-
15472 (June 30, 1962).

251
PURPOSE OF ADOPTION.

103. Daoang vs. Mun. Judge of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, GR NO. L-
34568, March 28, 1988;
Facts:
This is a case wherein Spouses Agonoy filed for the adoption of Bonilla and
Marcos. That while the court heard the petition, minors Daoang together with their
father, filed an opposition arguing that the Spouses Agonoy cannot adopt because
they had a daughter, which is the oppositor’s mother. However, the mother is dead
now, but they contend that they are Spouses Agonoy’s grandchildren. The
petitioners thereon banked their petition on Article 335 of the Civil Code which
enumerated the entities who cannot adopt and one of which are “those who have
legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children by legal
fiction.”

Issue: Whether or not the Spouses Agonoy can adopt, Yes.

Ruling:
They can adopt because the law does not include grandchildren as one of the
prohibitions of adopting. Again, the law provides that entities who cannot adopt
are “those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or
children by legal fiction.” The Agonoys having no living children, can adopt
Borillia and Marcos. That the petitioners are grandchildren of the Agonoys is
undisputed. However, the Agonoys having a grandchild does not prohibit them
from adopting children. Hence, the Agonoy’s are entitled to adopt. It should be
noted however that the Spanish Civil Code, from which PH Civil Code was
adopted, disqualified persons who have legitimate/d descendants from adopting
which would have been favorable to the opposition. In its adoption in the Civil
Code, the framers dropped “descendants” and inserted “children”. Relevant law is
clear that having grandchildren is not included in the list of entities who cannot
adopt. As per statutory construction, what needs to be remembered for this case are
the following: “A statute clear and unambiguous on its face need not be
interpreted; stated otherwise, the rule is that only statutes with an ambiguous or
doubtful meaning may be the subject of statutory construction.” In so far as Art.
335 is clear, the courts need not inquire further to its meaning.
252
 104. Republic vs. Vergara, GR No. L- 95551, March 20, 1977;
Facts:
This is a case wherein spouses Samuel R. Dye, Jr. and Rosalina Due Dye filed a
petition before the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City to adopt Maricel R. Due
and Alvin R. Due, ages 13 and 12 years old, younger siblings of Rosalina. Samuel
R. Dye, Jr, a member of the United States Air Force, is an American citizen who
resided at the Clark Air Base in Pampanga. His wife Rosalina is a former Filipino
who became a naturalized American.

Issue: Whether or not the spouses Dye may legally adopt Maricel and Alvin Due.
No.

Ruling:
As a general rule, aliens cannot adopt Filipino citizens as this is proscribed under
Article 184 of the Family Code. The law here does not provide for an alien who is
married to a former Filipino citizen seeking to adopt jointly with his or her spouse
a relative by consanguinity, as an exception to the general rule that aliens may not
adopt. Rosalina Dye cannot adopt her brother and sister for the law mandates joint
adoption by husband and wife under Article 185 of the Family Code.

253
 105. Cang vs. CA, GR No. L- 105308, September 25, 1998;
Facts:
This is a case wherein petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano were
married and begot three children, namely: Keith, born on July 3, 1973; Charmaine,
born on January 23, 1977, and Joseph Anthony, born on January 3, 1981. Anna
Marie filed a petition for legal separation before the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Cebu, upon learning of her husband’s extramarital affairs
Wilma Soco, a family friend of the Clavanos, which the trial court approved.
Petitioner sought a divorce from Anna Marie before the Second Judicial District
Court of the State of Nevada which issued the divorce decree that also granted sole
custody of the three minor children to Anna Marie, reserving rights of visitation at
all reasonable times and places to petitioner.
Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara Diago Clavano, the brother and sister-in-law
of Anna Marie, filed Special Proceedings for the adoption of the three minor Cang
children before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. Anna Marie likewise filed an
affidavit of consent alleging that her husband had evaded his legal obligation to
support his children and that because she would be going to the United States to
attend to a family business, leaving the children would be a problem
Petitioner contest the adoption, alleging that, although were financially capable of
supporting the children while his finances were too meager compared to theirs, he
could not in conscience, allow anybody to strip him of his parental authority over
his beloved children.
The petition was granted by the lower court which the Court of Appeals affirmed
stating Article 188 of the Family Code which requires the written consent of the
natural parents of the child to be adopted. It has been held however that the consent
of the parent who has abandoned the child is not necessary
Herbert elevated the case to the Court on the ground that

Issue: Whether or not petitioner has abandoned his children and the latter be
legally adopted without his written consent, No.

Ruling:

The petitioner has not abandoned his children and the latter cannot be legally
adopted without his written consent.

254
The act of abandonment imports any conduct of the parent which evinces a settled
purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the
child. It means neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of
care and support which parents owe their children
In this case, however, petitioner did not manifest any conduct that would forego his
parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to, constitute
abandonment. Physical abandonment alone, without financial and moral desertion,
is not tantamount to abandonment. While petitioner was physically absent, he was
not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and support for his
children. The Court find pieces of documentary evidence that petitioner maintained
regular communications with his wife and children through letters and telephone,
and send them packages catered to their whims.

SIMULATION OF CHILD BIRTH VS. ADOPTION.

255
 106. Badua vs. CA, GR No. L- 105625, January 24, 1994;

Facts:
Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian were owners of various properties
located in Laguna.  Isabel died in 1982 while his husband died in 1989.  Vicente’s
sister and nephew filed a complaint for the issuance of letters of administration of
Vicente’s estate in favor of the nephew, herein private respondent.  The petitioner,
Marissa Benitez-Badua, was raised and cared by the deceased spouses since
childhood, though not related to them by blood, nor legally adopted.  The latter to
prove that she is the only legitimate child of the spouses submitted documents such
as her certificate of live birth where the spouses name were reflected as her
parents.  She even testified that said spouses continuously treated her as their
legitimate daughter.  On the other hand, the relatives of Vicente declared that said
spouses were unable to physically procreate hence the petitioner cannot be the
biological child.  Trial court decided in favor of the petitioner as the legitimate
daughter and sole heir of the spouses. 

Issue: Whether or not petitioner’s certificate of live birth will suffice to establish

her legitimacy.

Ruling:
The Court dismissed the case for lack of merit.  The mere registration of a child in
his or her birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid
adoption.  It does not confer upon the child the status of an adopted child and her
legal rights.  Such act amounts to simulation of the child's birth or falsification of
his or her birth certificate, which is a public document. It is worthy to note that
Vicente and brother of the deceased wife executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial
Settlement of the Estate of the latter.  In the notarized document, they stated that
they were the sole heirs of the deceased because “she died without descendants and
ascendants”.  In executing such deed, Vicente effectively repudiated the Certificate
of Live Birth of the petitioner where it appeared thathe was the petitioner’s father.

JOINT ADOPTION; MANDATORY; EXCEPTION.

107. Castro vs. Gregorio, GR No. 188801, October 15, 2014

256
Facts: 
Atty. Castro was allegedly married to Rosario Castro (Petitioner). Unfortunately,
they separated later on due to their incompatibilities and Jose’s alleged homosexual
tendencies. Their marriage bore two daughters: Rose Marie, who succumbed to
death after nine days from birth due to congenital heart disease, and Joanne
Benedicta Charissima Castro (Petitioner).

On August 2000, A petition for adoption of Jose Maria Jed Gregorio (Jed) and Ana
Maria Regina Gregorio (Regina) was instituted by Atty. Jose Castro. Atty. Castro
alleged that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate children with Lilibeth Gregorio
(Rosario’s housekeeper). After a Home Study Report conducted by the Social
Welfare Officer of the TC, the petition was granted.

Regional Trial Court approved the adoption, having ruled that "[n]o opposition
had been received by this Court from any person including the government which
was represented by the Office of the Solicitor General. A certificate of
finality20 was issued on February 9, 2006

A disbarment complaint was filed against Atty. Castro by Rosario. She alleged that
Jose had been remiss in providing support to his daughter Joanne for the past 36
year; that she single-handedly raised and provided financial support to Joanne
while Jose had been showering gifts to his driver and allege lover, Larry, and even
went to the extent of adopting Larry’s two children, Jed and Regina, without her
and Joanne knowledge and consent. Atty. Castro denied the allegation that he had
remiss his fatherly duties to Joanne. He alleged that he always offered help but it
was often declined. He also alleged that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate
children that’s why he adopted them.  Later on Atty. Castro died.

Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for annulment of judgment seeking to annul the
decision of the TC approving Jed and Regina’s adoption.

Petitioner’s Argument: that Rosario’s consent was not obtained and the
document purporting as Rosario’s affidavit of consent was fraudulent. Petitioner
also allege that Jed and Regina’s birth certificates shows disparity. One set shows
that the father to is Jose, while another set of NSO certificates shows the father to
be Larry.  Petitioner further alleged that Jed and Regina are not actually Jose’s

257
illegitimate children but the legitimate children of Lilibeth and Larry who were
married at the time of their birth. CA denied the petition.

Court of Appeals held that while no notice was given by the TC to Rosario and
Joanne of the adoption, it ruled that there is “no explicit provision in the rules that
spouses and legitimate child of the adopter. . . should be personally notified of the
hearing.”

Court of Appeals also ruled that the alleged fraudulent information contained in
the different sets of birth certificates required the determination of the identities of
the persons stated therein and was, therefore, beyond the scope of the action for
annulment of judgment. The alleged fraud could not be classified as extrinsic
fraud, which is required in an action for annulment of judgment.

Issues: Whether extrinsic fraud exist in the instant case?

Whether consent of the spouse and legitimate children 10 years or over of
the adopter is required?

Ruling: The grant of adoption over R should be annulled as the trial court did not
validly acquire jurisdiction over the proceedings, and the favorable decision was
obtained through extrinsic fraud.

When fraud is employed by a party precisely to prevent the participation of any

other interested party, as in this case, then the fraud is extrinsic, regardless of
whether the fraud was committed through the use of forged documents or perjured
testimony during the trial.

Jose’s actions prevented Rosario and Joanne from having a reasonable opportunity
to contest the adoption. Had Rosario and Joanne been allowed to participate, the
trial court would have hesitated to grant Jose’s petition since he failed to fulfill the
necessary requirements under the law. There can be no other conclusion than that
because of Jose’s acts, the trial court granted the decree of adoption under
fraudulent circumstances.

RA 8552 requires that the adoption by the father of a child born out of wedlock
obtain not only the consent of his wife but also the consent of his legitimate
children. (Art. III, Sec. 7, RA 8552)

258
As a rule, the husband and wife must file a joint petition for adoption. The law,
however, provides for several exceptions to the general rule, as in a situation where
a spouse seeks to adopt his or her own children born out of wedlock. In this
instance, joint adoption is not necessary. But, the spouse seeking to adopt must
first obtain the consent of his or her spouse.

In the absence of any decree of legal separation or annulment, Jose and Rosario
remained legally married despite their de facto separation. For Jose to be eligible to
adopt Jed and Regina, Rosario must first signify her consent to the adoption. Since
her consent was not obtained, Jose was ineligible to adopt.

The law also requires the written consent of the adopter’s children if they are 10
years old or older (ART. III, Sec. 9, RA 8552).

For the adoption to be valid, petitioners’ consent was required by Republic Act No.
8552. Personal service of summons should have been effected on the spouse and
all legitimate children to ensure that their substantive rights are protected. It is not
enough to rely on constructive notice as in this case. Surreptitious use of
procedural technicalities cannot be privileged over substantive statutory rights.

Since the trial court failed to personally serve notice on Rosario and Joanne of the
proceedings, it never validly acquired jurisdiction.

108. Castro vs. Garcia ( Supra ).

CONSENT AND NOTICE TO BIOLOGICAL PARENTS.

109. Landiguin vs. Republic, GR No. L- 164948, June 27, 2006.

259
Facts: Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US citizen of Filipino parentage filed a petition
for the adoption of 3 minors, natural children of Manuel Ramos, the former’s
brother, and Amelia Ramos. She alleged in her petition that when her brother died,
the children were left to their paternal grandmother for their biological mother
went to Italy, re-married there and now has 2 children by her second marriage and
no longer communicates from the time she left up to the institution of the adoption.
After the paternal grandmother passed away, the minors were being supported by
the petitioner and her children abroad and gave their written consent for their
adoption.
A Social Worker of the DSWD submitted a Report recommending for the adoption
and narrated that Amelia, the biological mother was consulted with the adoption
plan and after weighing the benefits of adoption to her children, she voluntarily
consented.
However, petitioner failed to present the said social worker as witness and offer in
evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption. Petitioner also
failed to present any documentary evidence to prove that Amelia assent to the
adoption.

Regional Trial Court, finding merit in the petition for adoption, rendered a
decision granting said petition. Ordered that, minors Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma
Dizon Ramos, Eugene Dizon Ramos be freed from all legal obligations obedience
and maintenance from their natural parents and that they be declared for all legal
intents and purposes the children of Diwata Ramos Landingin. Trial custody is
dispensed with considering that parent-children relationship has long been
established between the children and the adoptive parents. Let the surnames of the
children be changed from "Dizon-Ramos" to "Ramos-Landingin.

Court of Appeals rendered a decision reversing the ruling of the RTC. It held that
petitioner failed to adduce in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos, the
children’s natural mother. Moreover, the affidavit of consent of the petitioner’s
children could not also be admitted in evidence as the same was executed in Guam,
USA and was not authenticated or acknowledged before a Philippine consular
office, and although petitioner has a job, she was not stable enough to support the
children.

Issue: Whether a petition for adoption be granted without the written consent of
the adoptee’s biological mother.

260
Ruling:  No. Section 9, par (b) of RA 8552, provides that the consent of the
biological parent(s) of the child, if known is necessary to the adoption. The written
consent of the legal guardian will suffice if the written consent of the biological
parents cannot be obtained.
The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to
protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by
interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child
in the manner of the proposed adoption.
The written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of the
decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his
consent must be obtained before his parental rights and duties may be terminated
and re-establish in adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the
written consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption.
Moreover, abandonment means neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal
obligations of love and support. Merely permitting the child to remain for a time
undisturbed in the care of others is not such abandonment. To dispense with the
requirements of consent, the abandonment must be shown to have existed at the
time of adoption.

EFFECTS OF ADOPTION.

110. Stephanie case ( Supra );

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Facts: In 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition to adopt his
minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein,
among others, that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994;  that her mother
is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has been using her mother’s middle
name and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting
parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name Astorga be changed to “Garcia,”
her mother’s surname, and that her surname “Garcia” be changed to “Catindig,”
his surname.

Trial Court rendered the assailed Decision granting the adoption. Petitioner filed a
motion for clarification and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie should be
allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name.

Trial Court denied petitioner’s MR holding that there is no law or jurisprudence

allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his
middle name.

Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), agrees with petitioner that Stephanie
should be permitted to use, as her middle name, the surname of her natural mother.

Issue: Whether an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, may use
the surname of her natural mother as her middle name? (YES)

Ruling: USE OF SURNAME IS FIXED BY LAW: The name of an individual

has two parts: (1) the given or proper name and (2) the surname or family name.
The given or proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth or at
baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The surname or family name is
that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent
to child. The given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child, but
the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.

Thus, Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code provides the substantive rules which
regulate the use of surname of an individual whatever may be his status in life, i.e.,
whether he may be legitimate or illegitimate, an adopted child, a married woman or
a previously married woman, or a widow.

LAW IS SILENT AS TO THE USE OF MIDDLE NAME: As correctly

submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating the use of a middle name.

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Even Article 176  of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255, otherwise known
as “An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father,”
is silent as to what middle name a child may use.

The middle name or the mother’s surname is only considered in Article 375, in
case there is identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants,
in which case, the middle name or the mother’s surname shall be added.

Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may
use. Article 365 of the Civil Code merely provides that “an adopted child shall bear
the surname of the adopter.”

Also, Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is
likewise silent on the matter, thus:

(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child

of the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations
arising from the relationship of parent and child, including the right of the
adopted to use the surname of the adopters.

However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the members of the Civil Code and
Family Law Committees that drafted the Family Code recognized the Filipino
custom of adding the surname of the child’s mother as his middle name. In the
Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees, the
members approved the suggestion that the initial or surname of the mother should
immediately precede the surname of the father.

In the case of an adopted child, the law provides that “the adopted shall bear the
surname of the adopters.” Again, it is silent whether he can use a middle name.
What it only expressly allows, as a matter of right and obligation, is for the adoptee
to bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption.

THE UNDERLYING INTENT OF ADOPTION IS IN FAVOR OF THE

ADOPTED CHILD:
Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not to the
adopter, possess in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child. The modern
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trend is to consider adoption not merely as an act to establish a relationship of
paternity and filiation, but also as an act which endows the child with a legitimate
status. This was, indeed, confirmed in 1989, when the Philippines, as a State Party
to the Convention of the Rights of the Child initiated by the United Nations,
accepted the principle that adoption is impressed with social and moral
responsibility, and that its underlying intent is geared to favor the adopted child.
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child
of the adopter for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article 189 of the Family
Code and Section 17 Article V of RA 8552. Being a legitimate child by virtue of
her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law
to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear
the surname of her father and her mother.

This is consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil Code and Family
Law Committees. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the
mother should immediately precede the surname of the father.

Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanie’s continued use of her

mother’s surname (Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her maternal lineage.
It is to be noted that Article 189(3) of the Family Code and Section 18, Article V
of RA 8552 provide that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological
parent. Hence, Stephanie can well assert or claim her hereditary rights from her
natural mother in the future.

LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION OF ADOPTION STATUTES IN FAVOR OF

ADOPTION: It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary,
should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption. The
interests and welfare of the adopted child are of primary and paramount
consideration, hence, every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote
and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.

111. Michelle P. Lim, GR Nos. L- 168992-93, May 21, 2009.

Facts: Petitioner is an optometrist by profession. On 23 June 1974, she married

Primo Lim (Lim). They were childless. Minor children, whose parents were
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unknown, were entrusted to them by a certain Lucia Ayuban (Ayuban). Being so
eager to have a child of their own, petitioner and Lim registered the children to
make it appear that they were the children’s parents. The children were named
Michelle P. Lim (Michelle) and Michael Jude P. Lim (Michael). Michelle was
barely eleven days old when brought to the clinic of petitioner. She was born on 15
March 1977. Michael was 11 days old when Ayuban brought him to petitioner’s
clinic. His date of birth is 1 August 1983.

The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own. They sent
the children to exclusive schools. They used the surname "Lim" in all their school
records and documents. Unfortunately, on 28 November 1998, Lim died. On 27
December 2000, petitioner married Angel Olario (Olario), an American citizen.

Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the

amnesty5 given under Republic Act No. 8552 (RA 8552) to those individuals who
simulated the birth of a child. Thus, on 24 April 2002, petitioner filed separate
petitions for the adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court docketed
as SPL PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259, respectively. At the time of the filing of
the petitions for adoption, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while
Michael was 18 years and seven months old.

Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the adoption as evidenced by their
Affidavits of Consent. Michael also gave his consent to his adoption as shown in
his Affidavit of Consent. Petitioner’s husband Olario likewise executed an
Affidavit of Consent for the adoption of Michelle and Michael.

In the Certification issued by the Department of Social Welfare and Development

(DSWD), Michelle was considered as an abandoned child and the whereabouts of
her natural parents were unknown. The DSWD issued a similar Certification for
Michael.

Regional Trial Court rendered judgment dismissing the petitions. The trial court
ruled that since petitioner had remarried, petitioner should have filed the petition
jointly with her new husband. The trial court ruled that joint adoption by the
husband and the wife is mandatory citing Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552 and
Article 185 of the Family Code.

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Petitioner’s contention: that the rule on joint adoption must be relaxed because it
is the duty of the court and the State to protect the paramount interest and welfare
of the child to be adopted. Petitioner argues that the legal maxim "dura lex sed lex"
is not applicable to adoption cases. She argues that joint parental authority is not
necessary in this case since, at the time the petitions were filed, Michelle was 25
years old and already married, while Michael was already 18 years of age. Parental
authority is not anymore necessary since they have been emancipated having
attained the age of majority.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt.

Ruling: It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed,
petitioner had already remarried. She filed the petitions by herself, without being
joined by her husband Olario. We have no other recourse but to affirm the trial
court’s decision denying the petitions for adoption. Dura lex sed lex. The law is
explicit. Section 7, Article III of RA 8552 reads:

SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - Husband and wife shall jointly adopt.

In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate
son/daughter of the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses.
(Emphasis supplied)

The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried at
the time the petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the
petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining her
husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in denying the petitions for adoption on
this ground.

Effects of Adoption

Petitioner contends that joint parental authority is not anymore necessary since the
children have been emancipated having reached the age of majority. This is
untenable.

Parental authority includes caring for and rearing the children for civic
consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and
physical character and well-being.13 The father and the mother shall jointly
exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children.14 Even the

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remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the parental authority over the
children, unless the court appoints another person to be the guardian of the person
or property of the children.15

It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation — that is, when he
attains the age of majority or 18 years of age 16 — emancipation terminates parental
authority over the person and property of the child, who shall then be qualified and
responsible for all acts of civil life.17 However, parental authority is merely just one
of the effects of legal adoption. Article V of RA 8552 enumerates the effects of
adoption, thus:

ARTICLE V
EFFECTS OF ADOPTION

SEC. 16. Parental Authority. - Except in cases where the biological parent is the
spouse of the adopter, all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the
adoptee shall be severed and the same shall then be vested on the adopter(s).

SEC. 17. Legitimacy. - The adoptee shall be considered the legitimate son/daughter

of the adopter(s) for all intents and purposes and as such is entitled to all the rights
and obligations provided by law to legitimate sons/daughters born to them without
discrimination of any kind. To this end, the adoptee is entitled to love, guidance,
and support in keeping with the means of the family.

SEC. 18. Succession. - In legal and intestate succession, the adopter(s) and the
adoptee shall have reciprocal rights of succession without distinction from
legitimate filiation. However, if the adoptee and his/her biological parent(s) had
left a will, the law on testamentary succession shall govern.

Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (1) sever all legal ties between the
biological parent(s) and the adoptee, except when the biological parent is the
spouse of the adopter; (2) deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the adopter;
and (3) give adopter and adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the
relationship of parent and child, including but not limited to: (i) the right of the
adopter to choose the name the child is to be known; and (ii) the right of the
adopter and adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs of each other.  Therefore,
even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still considered a
legitimate child of the adopter with all the rights  of a legitimate child such as: (1)

267
to bear the surname of the father and the mother; (2) to receive support from their
parents; and (3) to be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights.
Conversely, the adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all
the benefits to which biological parents are entitled such as support21 and
successional rights.

We are mindful of the fact that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold
the interests and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration. They are
designed to provide homes, parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or
orphaned children and give them the protection of society and family, as well as to
allow childless couples or persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give
them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their
natural parental instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to
promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law. But, as we
have ruled in Republic v. Vergara:

We are not unmindful of the main purpose of adoption statutes, which is the
promotion of the welfare of the children. Accordingly, the law should be construed
liberally, in a manner that will sustain rather than defeat said purpose. The law
must also be applied with compassion, understanding and less severity in view of
the fact that it is intended to provide homes, love, care and education for less
fortunate children. Regrettably, the Court is not in a position to affirm the trial
court’s decision favoring adoption in the case at bar, for the law is clear and it
cannot be modified without violating the proscription against judicial
legislation. Until such time however, that the law on the matter is amended, we
cannot sustain the respondent-spouses’ petition for adoption.

PETITION FOR ADOPTION WITH PRAYER FOR CHANGE OF NAME.

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 112. Republic vs. Hernandez, GR No. L- 117209, Feb. 9, 1996.

Facts: The RTC granted the petition for adoption of Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran
and simultaneously granted the prayer therein for the change of the first name of
said adoptee to Aaron Joseph, to complement the surname Munson y Andrade
which he acquired consequent to his adoption.
Petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of name in the same
petition for adoption objecting to the joinder of the petition for adoption and the
petitions for the change of name in a single proceeding, arguing that these petition
should be conducted and pursued as two separate proceedings.
Petitioner’s argument: that a petition for adoption and a petition for change of
name are two special proceedings which, in substance and purpose, are different
from and are not related to each other, being respectively governed by distinct sets
of law and rules. Petitioner further contends that what the law allows is the change
of the surname of the adoptee, as a matter of right, to conform with that of the
adopter and as a natural consequence of the adoption thus granted. If what is
sought is the change of the registered given or proper name, and since this would
involve a substantial change of one’s legal name, a petition for change of name
under Rule 103 should accordingly be instituted, with the substantive and adjective
requisites therefor being conformably satisfied.
Private respondents’ argument: on the contrary, admittedly filed the petition for
adoption with a prayer for change of name predicated upon Section 5, Rule 2
which allows permissive joinder of causes of action in order to avoid multiplicity
of suits and in line with the policy of discouraging protracted and vexatious
litigations. It is argued that there is no prohibition in the Rules against the joinder
of adoption and change of name being pleaded as two separate but related causes
of action in a single petition.
Issue: Whether respondent judge erred in granting prayer for the change of the
given or proper name if the adoptee in a petition for adoption.
Ruling: No. Par (1), Art. 189 of the Family Code provides one of the legal effect
of adoption:
(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the
adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from
the relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the
surname of the adopters;
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The law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to bear the surname
of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption. It is the change of the
adoptee’s surname to follow that of the adopter which is the natural and necessary
consequence of a grant of adoption and must specifically be contained in the order
of the court, in fact, even if not prayed for by petitioner.
However, the given or proper name, also known as the first or Christian name, of
the adoptee must remain as it was originally registered in the civil register. The
creation of an adoptive relationship does not confer upon the adopter a license to
change the adoptee’s registered Christian or first name. The automatic change
thereof, premised solely upon the adoption thus granted, is beyond the purview of a
decree of adoption. Neither is it a mere incident in nor an adjunct of an adoption
proceeding, such that a prayer therefor furtively inserted in a petition for adoption,
as in this case, cannot properly be granted.
The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register is the
name appearing therein. If a change in one’s name is desired, this can only be done
by filing and strictly complying with the substantive and procedural requirements
for a special proceeding for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court,
wherein the sufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor can be threshed out and
accordingly determined.
A petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict compliance with all
the requirements therefor is indispensable in order to vest the court with
jurisdiction for its adjudication. It is an independent and discrete special
proceeding, in and by itself, governed by its own set of rules. A fortiori, it cannot
be granted by means of any other proceeding. To consider it as a mere incident or
an offshoot of another special proceeding would be to denigrate its role and
significance as the appropriate remedy available under our remedial law system.

DECREE OF ADOPTION.

113. Reyes vs. Sotero, GR No. L- 167405, Feb. 16, 2006.

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Facts: Respondent Chichioco filed a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration and settlement of estate of the late Elena Lising claiming that she
was the niece and heir of Lising who died intestate. Respondent claims that real
and personal properties were allegedly in the possession of petitioner Ana Joyce S.
Reyes, a grandniece of the deceased.
Petitioner Reyes filed an Opposition to the petition, claiming that she was an
adopted child of Lising and the latter’s husband and asserting that the petition be
dismissed since she was the only heir of Lising who passed away without leaving
any debts.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Supplement to the Opposition attaching thereto the
certification of her adoption from the local civil registrar’s office that the adoption
decree was registered therein and also a copy of a Judicial Form and a certification
issued by the clerk of court that the decree was on file in the General Docket of the
RTC-Tarlac.

Regional Trial Court issued a resolution and state that the Oppositor Ana Joyce
Reyes is hereby enjoined from conducting business activity in any of the properties
left by the decedent. The Special Administrator is also empowered to take control
and possession of the listed personal and real properties of the decedent and those
that may be found to be owned or registered in the name of the same.

Respondents filed a Comment to the opposition stating that reasonable doubts have
been cast on Petitioner’s claim that she was legally adopted due allegedly to certain
“badges of fraud.”
Court of Appeals refused to dismiss the proceeding because it was incumbent
upon the petitioner to prove before the trial court that she was indeed adopted by
the Delos Santos spouse since, “imputations of irregularities permeating the
adoption decree render its authenticity under a cloud of doubt.”
Issue: Whether petitioner had to prove the validity of her adoption due to
imputations of irregularities.
Ruling: No. Petitioner need not prove her legal adoption by any evidence other
than those which she had already presented before the trial court.
An adoption decree is a public document required by law to be entered into public
records, the official repository of which, as well as all other judicial

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pronouncements affecting the status of individuals, is the local civil registrar’s
office as well as the court which rendered the judgment.
Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a
duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. As
such, the certifications issued by the local civil registrar and the clerk of court
regarding details of petitioner’s adoption which are entered in the records kept
under their official custody, are prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein.
These certifications suffice as proof of the fact of petitioner’s adoption by the
Delos Santos spouses until contradicted or overcome by sufficient evidence. Mere
“imputations of irregularities” will not cast a “cloud of doubt” on the adoption
decree since the certifications and its contents are presumed valid until proof to the
contrary is offered.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ADOPTED AND ADOPTEE.

114. Teotico vs. Del Val ( Supra );

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Facts: Maria Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. de Aguirre died on July 14, 1955 in the
City of Manila with no ascendants or descendants. She left properties worth
P600,000.00 and  a will written in Spanish which she executed at her residence at
No. 2 Legarda St., Quiapo, Manila. She affixed her signature at the bottom of the
will and on the left margin of each and every page thereof in the presence of three
witnesses who in turn affixed their signatures below the attestation clause and on
the left margin of each and every page of the will in the presence of the testatrix
and of each other. Said will was acknowledged before a Notary Public by the
testatrix and her witnesses.
In said will Maria stated among others that she was possessed of the full use of her
mental faculties; that she was free from illegal pressure or influence of any kind
from the beneficiaries of the will and from any influence of fear or threat and that
she freely and spontaneously executed said will.
She left P20,000.00 to Rene A. Teotico, married to her  niece named Josefina
Mortera; and the usufruct of her interest in the Calvo building to the said spouses.
However,  the naked ownership of the building was left in equal parts to the
legitimate children of said spouses. She also instituted Josefina Mortera as her sole
and universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed of
in the will.
Thereafter,  Vicente B. Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will before the
Court of First Instance of Manila. However, Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an
adopted child of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of the testatrix, as well as an
acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the same
testatrix.
Issues: Whether the oppositor Ana del Val Chan the right to intervene in this
proceeding?;
Whether the will in question been duly admitted to probate?;
Whether the probate court commit an error in passing on the intrinsic validity of
the provisions of the will and in determining who should inherit the portion to be
vacated by the nullification of the legacy made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico?
Ruling:
First issue, under the terms of the will, oppositor has no right to intervene because
she has no interest in the estate either as heir, executor, or administrator, nor does
she have any claim to any property affected by the will, because nowhere in the
will was any provision designating her as heir, legatee or devisee of any portion of
273
the estate. She has also no interest in the will either as administratrix or executrix.
Neither has she any claim against any portion of the estate because she is not a co-
owner thereof.
Additionally, if the will is denied probate, she would not acquire any interest in
any portion of the estate left by the testatrix. She would acquire such right only if
she were a legal heir of the deceased, but she is not under our Civil Code. It is true
that she  claims to be an acknowledged natural child of Jose  and also an adopted
daughter of Francisca. But the law does not give her any right to succeed to the
estate of Maria because being an illegitimate child she is prohibited by law from
succeeding to the legitimate relatives of her natural father. Thus, Article 992 of our
Civil Code provides: “An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from
the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; … .”
It thus appears that the oppositor has no right to intervene either as testamentary or
as legal heir in this probate proceeding contrary to the ruling of the court a quo.
Second issue, the claim that the will was not properly attested to is contradicted by
the evidence of record. The will was duly executed because it was signed by the
testatrix and her instrumental witnesses and the notary public in the manner
provided for by law.
The claim that the will was procured by improper pressure and influence is also
belied by the evidence.
Moreover, the mere claim that Josefina and her husband Rene had the opportunity
to exert pressure on the testatrix simply because she lived in their house several
years prior to the execution of the will and that she was old and suffering from
hypertension in that she was virtually isolated from her friends for several years
prior to her death is insufficient to disprove what the instrumental witnesses had
testified in court.  The exercise of improper pressure and undue influence must be
supported by substantial evidence and must be of a kind that would overpower and
subjugate the mind of the testatrix as to destroy her free agency and make her
express the will of another rather than her own
Third issue, the question of whether the probate court could determine the
intrinsic validity of the provisions of a will has been decided by this Court in a
long line of decisions. In Castañeda v. Alemany, the Court had stated, thus:
To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all, the facts that a will
was executed with the formalities required by law and that the testator was in a
condition to make a will, is the only purpose of the proceedings under the new
code for the probate of a will.  The judgment in such proceedings determines and
274
can determine nothing more. In them the court has no power to pass upon the
validity of any provisions made in the will. It can not decide, for example, that a
certain legacy is void and another one is valid.
Pursuant to the foregoing precedents the pronouncement made by the court a quo
declaring invalid the legacy made to Dr. Rene Teotico in the will Exhibit A must
be set aside as having been made in excess of its jurisdiction. Another reason why
said pronouncement should be set aside is that the legatee was not given an
opportunity to defend the validity of the legacy for he was not allowed to intervene
in this proceeding. As a corollary, the other pronouncements touching on the
disposition of the estate in favor of some relatives of the deceased should also be
set aside for the same reason.

115. Republic vs. Valencia, GR No. L- 32181, March 5, 1986.

Facts: Court of First Instance of Cebu a petition for the cancellation and/or
correction of entries of birth of Bernardo Go and Jessica Go in the Civil Registry
of the City of Cebu. The case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 3043-R.

Solicitor General filed an opposition to the petition alleging that the petition for
correction of entry in the Civil Registry, contemplates a summary proceeding and

275
correction of mere clerical errors, those harmless and innocuous changes such as
the correction of a name that is merely mispelled, occupation of parents, etc., and
not changes or corrections involving civil status, nationality, or citizenship which
are substantial and controversial.

Respondent Leonor Valencia, filed her reply to the opposition wherein she
admitted that the present petition seeks substantial changes involving the civil
status and nationality or citizenship of respondents, but alleged that substantial
changes in the civil registry records involving the civil status of parents, their
nationality or citizenship may be allowed if- (1) the proper suit is filed, and (2)
evidence is submitted, either to support the allegations of the petition or to
disprove the same; that respondents have complied with these requirements by
filing the present special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the
civil registry pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court and that they have
caused reasonable notice to be given to the persons named in the petition and have
also caused the order for the hearings of their petition to be published for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.

Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
since the petition seeks to change the nationality or citizenship of Bernardo Go and
Jessica Go from “Chinese” to “Filipino” and their status from “Legitimate” to
Illegitimate”, and changing also the status of the mother from “married” to “single”
the corrections sought are not merely clerical but substantial, involving as they do
the citizenship and status of the petitioning minors and the status of their mother.

Issue: May a change in the record of birth in a civil registry, involving the
nationality or citizenship of a person, be granted in a summary procedure?

Ruling: The Supreme Court likewise held that corrections involving the
nationality or citizenship of a person were substantial and could not be effected
except in adversarial proceedings.

It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the correction
of clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature, but one involving the
nationality or citizenship, which is undisputably substantial as well as
controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted in a proceeding summary in
nature. However, it is also true that a right in law may be enforced and a wrong
may be remedied as long as the appropriate remedy is used. The SC adheres to the
276
principle that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the
true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves
of the appropriate adversary proceedings.

Rule 108 of the Revise Rules of Court now provides for such a procedure which
should be limited solely to the implementation of Article 412, the substantive law
on the matter of correcting entries in the civil register. Rule 108, lay all the other
provisions of the Rules of Court, was promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant
to its rule- making authority under Sec. 13 of Art. VIII of the Constitution, which
directs that such rules of court ‘shall not diminish or increase or modify substantive
rights.’ If Rule 108 were to be extended beyond innocuous or harmless changes or
corrections of errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding,
so as to comprehend substantial and controversial alterations concerning
citizenship, legitimacy or paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, said Rule
108 would thereby become unconstitutional for it would be increasing or
modifying substantive rights, which changes are not authorized under Article 412
of the New Civil Code.

Thus, Valencia requires that a petition for substantial correction or change of

entries in the civil registry should have as respondents the civil registrar, as well as
all other persons who have or claim any interest that would be affected thereby. It
further mandates that a full hearing, not merely a summary proceeding, be
conducted.

It would be a denial of substantive justice if two children proved by the facts to be

Philippine citizens, and whose five sisters and brother born of the same mother and
father enjoy all the rights of citizens, are denied the same rights on the simple
argument that the "correct procedure" not specified or even intimated has not been
followed.

RESCISSION OF ADOPTION.

116. Lahom vs. Sibulo, GR No. L- 143939, July 14, 2003.

Facts: A childless couple adopted the wife's nephew and brought him up as their
own. In 1972, the trial court granted the petition for adoption, and ordered the Civil
Registrar to change the name Jose Melvin Sibulo to Jose Melvin Lahom. Mrs.
Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption, in which she
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averred, that, despite the her pleas and that of her husband, their adopted son
refused to use their surname Lahom and continue to use Sibulo in all his dealing
and activities.  Prior to the institution of the case, in 1998, RA No. 8552 went into
effect. The new statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a
decree of adoption (Section 19 of Article VI).
These turn of events revealing Jose's callous indifference, ingratitude and lack of
care and concern prompted Lahom to file a petition in Court in December 1999 to
rescind the decree of adoption previously issued way back on May 5, 1972. When
Lahom filed said petition there was already a new law on adoption, specifically
R.A. 8552 also known as the Domestic Adoption Act passed on March 22,1998,
wherein it was provided that: "Adoption, being in the interest of the child, shall not
be subject to rescission by the adopter(s). However the adopter(s) may disinherit
the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code" (Section 19).

Issue: Whether the subject adoption still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter

after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552, and if in the affirmative, whether or not the
adopter’s action prescribed.

Ruling: Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of
the commencement of the action. The controversy should be resolved in the light
of the law governing at the time the petition was filed. In this case, it was months
after the affectivity of RA 8552 that Lahom filed an action to revoke the decree of
adoption granted in 1972. By then the new law had already abrogated and repealed
the right of the adopter under the Civil Code and the family Code to rescind a
decree of adoption. So the rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated
by Lahom after RA 8552 had come into force, could no longer be pursued.
Besides, even before the passage of RA8552, an action to set aside the adoption is
subject to the five year bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that the
adopter would lose the right to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that
period. The exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a condition that
could not fulfill the requirements of a vested right entitled to protection. Rights are
considered vested when the right to the enjoyment is a present interest, absolute,
unconditional and perfect or fixed and irrefutable. The concept of a "vested right"
is a consequence of the constitutional guarantee of due process that expresses a
present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is protected against
arbitrary state action. While adoption has often been referred to in the context of a
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"right", it is not naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right merely created by
statute. It is more of a privilege that is governed by the state's determination on
what it may deem to be for the best interest and welfare of the child. Matters
relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of the adopter to nullify
the adoption decree, are subject to State regulation. Concomitantly, a right of
action given by a statute may be taken away at any time before it has been
exercised.
But an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always
for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an
undeserving child, like denying him his legitime, and by will and testament, may
expressly exclude him from having a share in the disposable portion of his estate.

GUARDIANSHIP.

117. Oropesa vs. Oropesa, GR No. L- 184528, April 25, 2012;

Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Decision

rendered by the CA affirming the Order of the RTC in a Special Proceedings
which dismissed Nilo Oropesa’s petition for guardianship over the properties of his
father, respondent, Cirilo Oropesa.
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Petitioner filed with the RTC of Parañaque City, a petition for him and a certain
Ms. Louie Ginez to be appointed as guardians over the property of his father,
respondent, Cirilo Oropesa.

Petitioner’s argument: that respondent has been afflicted with several maladies
and has been sickly for over 10 years already having suffered a stroke, that his
judgment and memory were impaired and such has been evident after his
hospitalization. That due to his age and medical condition, he cannot, without
outside aid, manage his property wisely, and has become easy prey for deceit and
exploitation by people around him, particularly his girlfriend, Ms. Luisa Agamata.

In an Order dated January 29, 2004, the presiding judge of the court a quo set the
case for hearing, and directed the court social worker to conduct a social case study
and submit a report thereon.

Pursuant to the abovementioned order, the Court Social Worker conducted her
social case study, interviewing the (petitioner) and his witnesses. The Court Social
Worker subsequently submitted her report but without any finding on the
(respondent) who refused to see and talk to the social worker.

Respondent filed his Opposition to the petition for guardianship filed by his (ever
caring and loving) son.

During trial, petitioner presented his evidence which consists of his, his sister, and
respondent’s former nurse’s testimony. After presenting evidence, petitioner rested
his case but failed to file his written formal offer of evidence.

Respondent, thereafter, filed his Omnibus Motion to declare that petitioner has
waived the presentation of his Offer of Exhibits and Evidence since they were not
formally offered; To expunge the documents of the petitioner from records; and to
grant leave to the Oppositor to file Demurrer to Evid. A subsequent Demurrer was
filed and was granted.

Regional Trial Court: WHEREFORE, considering that the Court record shows
that petitioner-movant has failed to provide sufficient documentary and testimonial
evidence to establish that Gen. Cirilo Oropesa is incompetent to run his personal

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affairs and to administer his properties, the Court hereby affirms its earlier Order
dated 27 September 2006.

Court of Appeals: WHEREFORE, premises considered the instant appeal is

DISMISSED. The assailed orders of the court a quo dated September 27, 2006 and
November 14, 2006 are AFFIRMED.

Motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner and appealed the case to CA;
failed, now to the SC.

Issue: Whether respondent is considered incompetent as per the Rules who should

be placed under guardianship?

Ruling: No. The only medical document on record is the Report of

Neuropsychological Screening. Said report, was ambivalent at best, although had
negative findings regarding memory lapses on the part of respondent, it also
contained finding that supported the view that respondent on the average was
indeed competent. The Rules provide that, in a guardianship proceeding, a court
may appoint a qualified guardian if the prospective ward is proven to be a minor or
an incompetent. A finding that a person is incompetent should be anchored on
clear, positive and definite evidence. Here, Oropesa’s incompetency was not
proven by clear, positive and definite evidence; hence, petition for guardianship
shall fail.

Francisco v. Court of Appeals, A guardianship is a trust relation of the most

sacred character, in which one person, called a "guardian" acts for another called
the "ward" whom the law regards as incapable of managing his own affairs. A
guardianship is designed to further the ward’s well-being, not that of the guardian.
It is intended to preserve the ward’s property, as well as to render any assistance
that the ward may personally require. It has been stated that while custody involves
immediate care and control, guardianship indicates not only those responsibilities,
but those of one in loco parentis as well.11

In a guardianship proceeding, a court may appoint a qualified guardian if the

prospective ward is proven to be a minor or an incompetent.

A reading of Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court tells us that persons who,
though of sound mind but by reason of age, disease, weak mind or other similar

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causes, are incapable of taking care of themselves and their property without
outside aid are considered as incompetents who may properly be placed under
guardianship. The full text of the said provision reads:

Sec. 2. Meaning of the word "incompetent." – Under this rule, the word
"incompetent" includes persons suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or who
are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable to read and write,
those who are of unsound mind, even though they have lucid intervals, and persons
not being of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and other
similar causes, cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves and manage
their property, becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and exploitation.

We have held in the past that a "finding that a person is incompetent should be
anchored on clear, positive and definite evidence." We consider that evidentiary
standard unchanged and, thus, must be applied in the case at bar.

118. Francisco vs. CA, GR No. L- 57438, January 3, 1984;

Facts:
Feliciano Francisco was the duly appointed guardian of Estefania San Pedro
(ward). While Pelagio Francisco (respondent) claimed to be a first cousin of the
ward and on August 30 1974, he petitioned for the removal of Fransisco as
guardian on the basis of the latter’s failure to submit an inventory of the estate of
the ward and to render an accounting. He subsequently submitted an inventory but

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it was alleged that when Francisco sold a land belonging to the ward for 14K, only
12K was reported in the inventory.

An order was made relieving Francisco as guardian. Subsequently, this order was
reconsidered. Nevertheless, the judge ordered the retirement of Francisco as
guardian, on the ground of old age (72 years old).

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that he was only 72

years of age and still fit to continue with the management of the estate of his
ward as he had done with zeal for the past twelve years. In an order dated
November 13, 1980 the court denied his motion.

The court a quo appointed respondent Pelagio Francisco as the new guardian of

the person and property of the incompetent Estefania San Pedro.

On March 13, 1981, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari challenging the validity of the order of the trial court granting the
execution pending appeal of its decision and appointing respondent Pelagio
Francisco as the new guardian despite the fact that respondent is five (5) years
older than petitioner.

CA dismissed the petition and held that “in the case at bar, the retirement of
petitioner was ordered on the ground of old age. When this ground is considered in
relation to the delay of the petitioner in the making of an accounting and the
submission of an inventory, the order amounts to a finding that petitioner,
considering his "rather advanced age," was no longer capable of managing the
estate of his ward. (Rule 97, Sec. 2). Given this finding, it is clear that petitioner's
continuance in office would not be in the best interest of the ward.

Issues:
1. Whether “old age” as a ground for removing a guardian constitutes a good
ground for the execution of the decision pending appeal, Yes.

2. Whether the court a quo abuse its discretion in appointing respondent as

guardian despite the fact that private respondent is five (5) years older than
petitioner, Yes.
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Ruling:
A guardianship is a trust relation of the most sacred character, in which one person,
called a "guardian" acts for another called the "ward" whom the law regards as
incapable of managing his own affairs. A guardianship is designed to further the
ward's well-being, not that of the guardian, It is intended to preserve the ward's
property, as wen as to render any assistance that the ward may personally require.
It has been stated that while custody involves immediate care and control,
guardianship indicates not only those responsibilities, but those of one in loco
parentis as well.

Having in mind that guardianship proceeding is instituted for the benefit and
welfare of the ward, the selection of a guardian must, therefore, suit this very
purpose. Thus, in determining the selection of a guardian, the court may consider
the financial situation, the physical condition, the sound judgment, prudence and
trustworthiness, the morals, character and conduct, and the present and past history
of a prospective appointee, as wen as the probability of his, being able to exercise
the powers and duties of guardian for the full period during which guardianship
will be necessary. 

A guardian is or becomes incompetent to serve the trust if he is so disqualified by

mental incapacity, conviction of crime, moral delinquency or physical disability as
to be prevented from properly discharging the duties of his office. A guardian,
once appointed may be removed in case he becomes insane or otherwise incapable
of discharging his trust or unsuitable therefor, or has wasted or mismanaged the
estate, or failed for thirty (30) days after it is due to render an account or make a
return.

We agree with the trial court and the appellate court that there is need for petitioner
Feliciano Francisco to be retired from the guardianship over the person and
property of incompetent Estefania San Pedro. The conclusion reached by the trial
court about the "rather advanced age" of petitioner at 72 years old (petitioner is
now 76 years old) finding him unfit to continue the trust cannot be disturbed. As
correctly pointed out by the appellate court, this finds direct support in the delay of
the accounting and inventory made by petitioner. To sustain petitioner as guardian
would, therefore, be detrimental to the ward. While age alone is not a control
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criterion in determining a person's fitness or qualification to be appointed or be
retained as guardian, it may be a factor for consideration.

Upon urgent and compelling reasons, execution pending appeal is a matter of

sound discretion on the part of the trial court and the appellate court will not
interfere, control or inquire into the exercise of this discretion unless there has been
an abuse thereof. As aptly stated by the lower court, there was need for execution
for “an indefinite discontinuance in office (guardianship) would defeat the intent
and purpose of the order relieving the present guardian.

In determining the selection of a guardian, the ff may be taken into consideration

by the court: Financial situation, physical condition, sound judgment, prudence and
trustworthiness, morals, character and conduct, present and past history, as well as
the probability of his being able to exercise the powers and duties of a guardian for
the full period during which guardianship will be necessary.

A guardian becomes incompetent to serve the trust if he is so disqualified by

mental incapacity, conviction of crime, moral delinquency or physical disability as
to be prevented from properly discharging the duties of his office.

119. Rivero vs. CA, GR No. L- 141273, May 17, 2005;

Facts:
This is a case wherein in behalf of her minor child, Benedick Arevalo, her mother
filed a complaint against defendants for compulsory recognition as the illegitimate
child of their father. During trial, Mary Jane Dy-Chiao De Guzman, one of the
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sister entered a compromised agreement with plaintiff whereby she is
acknowledging the petitioner as the illegitimate son of her father and agrees to pay
the petitioner his share of six million from the estate of their deceased father. The
Regional Trial Court granted the compromised agreement. Meanwhile, the Dy
Chiao Brothers represented by their uncle filed for the annulment of judgment and
temporary restraining order for writ of execution of judgment and motion to
dismiss. The Court of Appeals directed Mary Jane on the other hand to file a
comment on the opposition of her uncle. In her reply, she questioned the
decision of the RTC since the illegitimate filiation of Benedick could not be the
subject of a compromise agreement. She further alleged that the parties thereunder
did not recognize the validity of the compromise agreement, as in fact she and the
petitioners were exploring the possibility of modifying their extrajudicial
settlement. Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the defendants.

Issue: Whether or not the compromise regarding filiation is valid, No

Ruling:
The ruling of the RTC based on the compromised agreement executed by Mary
Jane is null and void. Article 2035(1) of the New Civil Code provides that no
compromise upon the civil status of persons shall be valid. As such, paternity and
filiation, or the lack of the same, is a relationship that must be judicially
established, and it is for the court to determine its existence or absence. It cannot
be left to the woll or agreement of the parties. Such recognition by Mary Jane,
however, is ineffectual because under the law, the recognition must be made
personally by the putative parent and not by another brother, sister or relative.

120. Nery vs. Lorenzo, GR No. 23096, April 27, 1972 ( Notice to minor
is jurisdictional )

Facts:
This is a case wherein a parcel of land was sold to vendee spouses Nery by the
widow of the deceased Leoncio Lorenzo. The vendor was Bienvenida (widow),
guardian of the decedent's minor children. Two (2) of whom later assailed the
validity of the said transaction. The latter contended that despite the order of the
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guardianship court authorizing the sale of the lot, they were not informed of the
move. Further, they contended that the guardianship proceeding was conducted
without notifying the two older siblings although they were already more than 14
years of age at that time. The heirs of Silveria Ferrer who allegedly owned 1/4 of
the property likewise intervened in the action. The lower court adjudged them the
owners of the 1/4 portion and it likewise declared the sale to be null and void. The
spouses Nery appealed to the Court of Appeals which declared the deed of sale to
the spouses (as to the 3/4 portion) by the guardian is valid, without prejudice to the
children demanding from their mother their participation in the proceeds. Not
being satisfied with the appellate court's decision, the spouses Nery, the children of
the deceased and Bienvenida filed these petitions.

Issue: Whether or not the probate court could have validly authorize the sale of the
property

Ruling:
No, the juridictional infirmity is clear. The Court of Appeals failed to give due
weight to the jurisdictional defect that the minors over 14 years age were not
notified. The probate court is therefore correct in not have authorized the sale due
to this clear jurisdictional infirmity. The rights of the young should never be
ignored and it does not matter if their guardian is their mother, as even in some
cases, the interest of the mother is opposed to that of the children.

Finally, when minors are involve, the state being the parens patriae has the duty to
protect the rights of persons or individuals who because of age or incapacity are in
an unfavorable position.
121. Guerrero vs. Tejan, GR No. L- 4898, March 19, 1909 ( Bond of
guardians );

Facts:
On the 18th day of March, 1908, the plaintiff commenced an action against the
defendant to recover the sum of P4,129.56 and costs. This amount was claimed by
the plaintiff from the defendant upon the theory that the defendant had been the
administrator of the estate of Antonio Sanchez Muñoz from the 1st day of
September, 1901, until the 22d day of October, 1906. After hearing the evidence
adduced during the trial of the cause, the lower court found that the evidence that
287
the defendant, as administrator of the estate of Antonio Sanchez Muñoz, or that
part of the said estate belonging to the plaintiff, owed the plaintiff the sum of
P3,447.46, with interest at 6 per cent until the same amount should be fully paid.

Issue: Whether or not the defendant as guardian responsible for the payment of the
liabilities

Ruling:
First. That the defendant, Leopoldo Teran, was the duly appointed and recognized
representative of the minors Maria Manuela and Maria del Carmen Sanchez
Muñoz in the administration of their interests in the estate of the said Antonio
Sanchez Muñoz from the 17th day of September, 1901, until the 18th day of
March, 1902.
Second. That the said Doña Maria Muñoz y Gomez was the duly appointed
representative of the said minors in the administration of their interests in the estate
of the said Antonio Sanchez Muñoz from the 18th day of March, 1902, until the
6th day of October, 1906.
Third. That the Leopoldo Teran was responsible to the plaintiff (the said minors)
for the fruits and profits resulting from their interests in the estate of the said
Antonio Sanchez Muñoz from the said 17th day of September, 1901, to the 18th
day of March, 1902.

122. Delfin Narion vs. Phil Am Life, GR No. L- 22796, June 26, 1967
( guardianship bond by parents );

FACTS:
Mrs. Alejandra Santos-Mario was, upon application, issued, on June 12, 1959, by
the Philippine American Life Insurance Co., a life insurance policy under a 20-year
endowment plan, with a face value of P5,000.00. She designated thereon her
husband, Delfin Nario, and their unemancipated minor son, Ernesto Nario, as her
irrevocable beneficiaries. About the middle of June, 1963, She then applied for a
loan on the above policy with PHILAMLIFE w/c she is entitled to as policy holder,
after the policy has been in force for 3 years. The purpose of such loan was for the
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school expenses of Ernesto.The application bore the written signature and consent
of Delfin Nario in two capacities first, as one of the irrevocable beneficiaries of the
policy; and the other, as the father-guardian of said minor son and irrevocable
beneficiary, Ernesto Nario, and as the legal administrator of the minor’s properties,
pursuant to Article 320 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. PHILAMLIFE denied
the loan application contending that written consent of the minor son must not only
be given by his father as legal guardian but it must also be authorized by the court
in a competent guardianship proceeding. Mrs. Nario then signified her decision to
surrender her policy and demand its cash value which then amounted to P 520. The
Insurance Company also denied the surrender of the policy on the same ground as
that given in disapproving the loan application. Mrs. Nario sued PHILAMLIFE
praying that the latter grant their loan application and/or accept the surrender of
said policy in exchange for its cash value. On September 10, 1963, Mrs. Nario and
her husband, Delfin, sued PHILAMLIFE praying that the latter grant their loan
application and/or accept the surrender of said policy in exchange for its cash
value. Defendant PHILAMLIFE contends that the loan application and the
surrender of the policy involved acts of disposition and alienation of the property
rights of the minor, said acts are not within the power of administrator granted
under Art. 320 in relation to art. 326 CC, hence, mere written consent given by the
father-guardian, for and in behalf of the minor son, without any court authority
therefor, was not a sufficient compliance of the law. The lower court ruled
agreeing with defendant’s contention, sustained defendant’s affirmative defense,
and rendered, on January 28, 1964, its decision dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint.
Unable to secure reconsideration of the trial Court’s ruling, petitioner appealed
directly to this Court, contending that the minor’s interest amounted to only one-
half of the policy’s cash surrender value of P520.00; that under Rule 96, Section 2
of the Revised Rules of Court, payment of the ward’s debts is within the powers of
the guardian, where no realty is involved; hence, there is no reason why the father
may not validly agree to the proposed transaction on behalf of the minor without
need of court authority.

ISSUE:
Whether or not PHILAMLIFE was justified in refusing to grant the loan
application and the surrender of the policy.
HELD:

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YES. The decision appealed from is affirmed. Costs against appellants Nario. The
appeal is unmeritorious.
SC agreed with the lower court that the vested interest or right of the beneficiaries
in the policy should be measured on its full face value and not on its cash surrender
value, for in case of death of the insured, said beneficiaries are paid on the basis of
its face value and in case the insured should discontinue paying premiums, the
beneficiaries may continue paying it and are entitled to automatic extended term or
paid-up insurance options, etc. and that said vested right under the policy cannot be
divisible at any given time. SC likewise agreed with the conclusion of the lower
court that the proposed transactions in question constitute acts of disposition or
alienation of property rights and not merely of management or administration
because they involve the incurring or termination of contractual obligations. The
full face value of the policy is P5,000.00 and the minor’s vested interest therein, as
one of the two (2) irrevocable beneficiaries, consists of one-half (½) of said
amount or P2,500.00. Applying laws (CC and rules of Court),the father a must file
a petition for guardianship and post a guardianship bond.
In the case at bar, the father did not file any petition for guardianship nor post a
guardianship bond, and as such cannot possibly exercise the powers vested on him
as legal administrator of the minor’s property. The consent gives for and in behalf
of the son without prior court authorization to the loan application and the
surrender was insufficient and ineffective and PHILAMLIFE was justified in
disapproving the said applications. Assuming that the property of the ward was less
than P2,000, the effect would be the same, since the parents would only be
exempted from filing a bond and judicial authorization, but their acts as legal
administrators are only limited to acts of management or administration and not to
acts of encumbrance or disposition

123. Francisco vs. CA ( Supra ); qualifications of guardians;

124. Vancil vs. Belmes, GR No. L- 132223, June 19, 2001 ( guardian to
be appointed should be within the court's jurisdiction ); Guerrero vs.
Tejan ( Supra ).

TRUSTESS.

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 125. Araneta vs. Perez, GR Nos. L- 16185-86, May 31, 1962
( distinction bet. executor and administrator;
126. Salinas vs. Tuazon, GR No. L- 33626, March 2, 1931 ( acquisition
of trust by prescription).

291