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Tactieal Troop Reconnaissance
by Mr. Michael J. Dueweke
1. The cornerstone of Soviet military ac-
tions is an aggressive, fast-moving, and
hard-hitting offense. In order to attain
these types of actions, Soviet military
operations are carefully planned and or-
chestrated at all levels. Reconnaissance
is essential to the planning and conduct of
successful operations. Reconnaissance
troops are the initial elements US and
NATO forces would encounter from a
Soviet main force in the event of hos-
tilities in the European theater.
2. At the tactical level (division
and
below), reconnaissance is conducted by
many organizations with a variety of
equipment and techniques. The most
probable type to be encountered by
Soviet opponents is troop reconnaissance,
which provides commanders with bat-
tlefield iniormation about the enemy that
can be used to influence the outcome of
the battle. Troop reconnaissance (voys-
kovaya ranedka) is reconnaissance con-
ducted by troops of dedicated reconnais-
sance forces as well as by maneuver unit
forces. Since there are no dedicated
recomaissance elements below regiment,
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battalion and company commanders util-
ize subordinate elements to conduct local
reconnaissance and security missions.
The important aspect of troop reconnais-
sance is its responsiveness to the needs of
the commander.
3. Regimental reconnaissance is
provided by a reconnaissance company
(see figure 1) with two rèiõffiñce
plg!99!q,_Thesepffily
b""ggq4]Lgr!, and are tasked to perform
reconnaissance across the regimental
front (see figure 2). The reconnaissance Þ,v
company will normally operate 25 to30 u&ö
.kilometers (kms) forward of the regimen-
main body, but may operate out to a ùi-51;i
-Lal
maximum distance of 50 kms. These
patrols, normally consisting of L to 3 ß:":ü,
vehicles, are the eyes and ears of the com-
mander. Their purpose is to provide in- fruþ'*'
formation about the enemy location, com-
position, and formations. These patrols
stress reconnaissance, and will avoid
detection and engagement by the enemy
if possible. Patrols can fight, however.
Personal and vehicular armament provide
sufficient firepower for these recon ele-
ments to protect and disengage themsel-
ves when necessary.
 ACV, BMP M 1976 2 tt tfra" ¿ y' ldu Åtttçã
AICV, BMP/BMP-1
ASC, BRDM/BRDM-2
3
4 ew {& e''
ATGL, RPG-16 4
LMG, RPK 3

Figure 1. Regimental Reconnaissance Company

HQ AND
SERVICES
COMPANY

(ueer)
ACV, BRDM/ BRDM-2 1

ACV, BTR-60 PA 2
,. ACV, BMP M 1976 3
AICV, BMP/ BMP-1 12

,h¡a Zy's ffi't'{t /

MEDIUM TANK 6
ASC, BRDM/ BRDM-2 12
ATGL, RPG-16 13
LMG, RPK-74 19 fn¿ ,¿¿/ø (t¿.¿f (aæ\
Figure 3. Divisional Reconnaissance Battalion

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'BRtc"f'be ?a¡Ñçtuøf
10
 4. Division reconnaissance assets provide
a broad spectrum of coverage. These
units are organized to provide the com-
mander ground, air defense, chemical, en-
gineer, electronic, and signal reconnais-
sance, as well as target acquisition. These
assets are located throughout the division,
especially in artillery and rocket units.
For troop reconnaissance, the division
has an organic reconnaissance battalion
(see fi - forces, and locate high priority targets in
¡é
laissance companie!, u.
AgggñãÑiõ_
@),andothertech-
nical reconnaissance assets.
5. The two division reconnaissance com-
panies will normally provide coverage
front, operating be-
across the division
tween the regimental reconnaissance com-
pany and the RAC. These companies
tvoicallv oerform close reconnaissance
missions for the division commander
with a primary mission of reconnaissance
rather than combat. These companies
will, ideally, locate high priority targets,
such as headquarters and command, con-
trol, and communications facilities, as
well as unit deployments and movements.
These units will normally operate as small
patrols of.¡vo to thlee vehicles with
troops mounted. Troops will dismount to
perform foot patrols or ambushes to
gather information. However, their
vehicles will not be far away.
6. The Reconnaissance Assault Company
(also called the Airborne Reconnaissance
Company or the I-ong-Range Reconnais-
sance Company) performs division long-
range reconnaissance and provides the
division commander with a deep-look
capability out to 100 kms. Small teams of
five to six men from this company can be
inserted by a variety of means (such as
parachute, helicopter, vehicle, or foot) to
collect informationwithin the enemy rear
area. These teams will move primarily by
foot, avoiding engagements with enemy
the enemy division rear and corps for-
ward areas. While the primary mission of
these troops is reconnaissance, they may
also have secondary missions to conduct
disruptive operations in the enemy rear,
such as ambushes, prisoner snatches, traf-
fic diversions, disruption of LOCs, and
limited attacks against important targets
of opportunity. When not operating in
the enemy real area, this company is
capable of providing additional reconnais-
sance patrols mounted in their organic
vehicles within the division area.
7. While all Soviet commanders are
responsible for conducting reconnais-
sance, _regiment and division commanders
have i..- 52
tasked to plan and coordinate reconnais-
sance efforts. The COR is the staff intel-
ligence officer who works directly for the
Chief of Staff. Working from the
commander's guidance, the COR tasks
subordinate and organic assets to collect
specific information. The COR will also
receive tasking from higher commands,
which he will likely include in his tasking
11
 DIV RECON BN. OPERATES
OUTTO 1OO KMS

RECON
co(x2)

,+.'-$ RGT RECON OPERATËS

OUT TO 50 KMS

| =anov

|TI =ave

Note: Div reconm co includes

6 tanks per company

Figure 2. Employment of Reconnaissance Elements

12
to his subordinate elements. Additional-
ly, the COR will request information and
coordinate attached technical reconnais-
sance assets from higher commands to as-
sist in coverage of his area of interest.
This is important because dedicated troop
reconnaissance forces cannot provide ade-
quate coverage in width and depth of
zone aI" the same time. This weakness is
offset, however, by technical reconnais-
sance assets available at division level and
above which can provide depth of
coverage across the division front.
8. Troop reconnaissance plays a sig-
nificant part in the overall intelligence
gathering system. It can provide confir-
mation of other collection means. It
often provides initial information that can
be confirmed by other means such as
electronic or signal reconnaissance.
Troop reconnaissance is responsive to the
commander's needs and can provide him
timely information on which to base com-
mand decisions. The division and regi-
ment reconnaissance efforts are carefully
REFERENCES
Donnelly, C. N. "Operations in the Enemy Rear: Soviet Doct¡ine and Tactics." l-ondon: International Defense Review, January
Sverdlov, Col. Fedor Davydovich.
planned, coordinated, and supervised by
the COR, while battalion and lower com-
manders must accomplish this task them-
selves.
9. Current reconnaissance organizations
lack the distinctive vehicle signature of
previous elements; however, reconnais-
sance patrols from the division reconnais-
sance companies and the regiment recon-
naissance company can be distinguished
by their small size and determination to
avoid decisive engagements. Historical
and current writings indicate the extreme
importance reconnaissance forces play in
tactics, and are most likely the first forces
that would be encountered by US and
NATO forces on a European battlefield.
X X
M¡. Michael J. Dueweke, a-@gjJ!@!gae!!çg, is an
Intelligence Research Specialist for the United States Army
Intelligence and Threat Anaþis Center, Washington, DC. His
areas of research include reconnaissance and tactics under
Soffi
soecial conditions fo¡
L* ,h/ ofi* &^ner &P! /a*" z
1980.
Moscow: Yoyçnizdal, 17 November 1982.
13
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13
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15
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