UNISOURCE COMMERCIAL AND DEV’T. CORP. V. JOSEPH CHUNG ET AL.

G.R. No. 173252 July 17, 2009

Facts:

Petitioner, Unisource, is the registered owner of a parcel of land, covered by a TCT,

containing a memorandum of encumbrance of a voluntary easement, which has been carried
over from the original certificate of title of Encarnacion Sandico.

As Sandico’s property was transferred to several owners, the memorandum of

encumbrance of a voluntary easement in favor of Francisco M. Hidalgo was consistently
annotated at the back of every title covering Sandico’s property until TCT No. 176253 was
issued in petitioner’s favor. On the other hand, Hidalgo’s property was eventually transferred to
respondents Joseph Chung, Kiat Chung and Cleto Chung under TCT No. 121488.

The petitioner filed a Petition to Cancel the Encumbrance of Voluntary Easement of

Right of way on the ground that the dominant estate has an adequate access to a public road
which is Matienza Street. The trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that it is a land
registration case. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, hence, trial court conducted an ocular
inspection of the property and made the following observations:

1. The dominant estate is a property enclosed with a concrete fence with no less
than three (3) doors in it, opening to an alley belonging to the servient estate
owned by the petitioner. The alley is leading to Matienza St.;

2. The dominant estate has a house built thereon and said house has a very
wide door accessible to Matienza St. without any obstruction. Said street is
perpendicular to J.P. Laurel St.

It is therefore found that the dominant estate has an egress to Matienza St. and
does not have to use the servient estate.

The trial court ordered the cancellation of the encumbrance of voluntary easement of
right of way in favor of the dominant estate owned by the respondents. It found that dominant
estate has no more use for the easement since it has another adequate outlet to a public road,
which is Matienza Street.

Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the decision of the trial
court and dismissed the petition to cancel the encumbrance of voluntary easement of right of
way. The appellate court also held that the trial court erred in canceling the encumbrance of
voluntary easement of right of way. The appellate court ruled that Article 631(3) of the Civil
Code, which was cited by the trial court, is inapplicable since the presence of an adequate
outlet to a highway extinguishes only legal or compulsory easements but not voluntary
easements like in the instant case. There having been an agreement between the original
parties for the provision of an easement of right of way in favor of the dominant estate, the
same can be extinguished only by mutual agreement or by renunciation of the owner of the
dominant estate.

Petitioner contends that the fact that Sandico and Hidalgo resorted to judicial
intervention only shows that they contested the existence of the requisite factors establishing a
legal easement. Besides, the annotation itself provides that the easement is exclusively
confined to the parties mentioned therein, i.e., Sandico and Hidalgo. It was not meant to bind
their heirs or assigns; otherwise, they would have expressly provided for it. Petitioner also
avers that to say that the easement has attached to Hidalgo’s property is erroneous since such
property no longer exists after it has been subdivided and registered in respondents’ respective
names. Petitioner further argues that even if it is bound by the easement, the same can be
cancelled or revoked since the dominant estate has an adequate outlet without having to pass
through the servient estate.

Issues:
1. Whether or not a voluntary easement exists in favor of the respondents.

2. Whether or not the easement is personal only to Hidalgo.

3. Whether or not respondents’ act of subdividing the property extinguishes the easement.

Ruling:

1. Yes, the petitioner itself admitted that a voluntary easement of right of way exists in favor of
respondents. It was voluntarily constituted in favor of a certain Francisco Hidalgo y
Magnifico, the owner of [the lot] described as Lot No. 2, Block 2650. In its memorandum,
the petitioner also reiterated that the annotation found at the back of Unisource’s TCT is a
voluntary easement. Having made such an admission, petitioner cannot now claim that
what exists is a legal easement and that the same should be cancelled since the dominant
estate is not an enclosed estate as it has an adequate access to a public road which is
Callejon Matienza Street.

2. No. Neither can petitioner claim that the easement is personal only to Hidalgo since the
annotation merely mentioned Sandico and Hidalgo without equally binding their heirs or
assigns. That the heirs or assigns of the parties were not mentioned in the annotation does
not mean that it is not binding on them. A voluntary easement of right of way, like any other
contract, is generally effective between the parties, their heirs and assigns, except in case
where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their
nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law.

3. No. The mere fact that respondents subdivided the property does not extinguish the
easement. Article 618 30 of the Civil Code provides that if the dominant estate is divided
between two or more persons, each of them may use the easement in its entirety, without
changing the place of its use, or making it more burdensome in any other way.

Notes:

An easement is a real right on another’s property, corporeal and immovable, whereby

the owner of the latter must refrain from doing or allowing somebody else to do or something
to be done on his property, for the benefit of another person or tenement. Easements are
established either by law or by the will of the owner. The former are called legal, and the latter,
voluntary easements.