Toleration and The Skeptical

Canadian Journal of Philosophy
Toleration and the Skeptical Inquirer in Locke

Author(s): Sam Black
Source: Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Dec., 1998), pp. 473-504
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CANADIANJOURNALOFPHILOSOPHY 473
Volume28, Number4, December1998,pp. 473-504
andtheSkeptical
Toleration
in Locke1
Inquirer
SAMBLACK
SimonFraserUniversity
Burnaby,BC
Canada V5A 1S6
It is a noteworthyachievementof Westernliberaldemocraciesthatthey
have largely relinquishedthe use of force against citizens whose life-
styles offend theirmembers'sensibilities,or alternativelywhich violate
theirmembers'sense of truth.Tolerationhas become a centralvirtue in
our public institutions.Powerfulmajoritiesare given over to restraint.
They do not, by and large,expect the state to crush eccentrics,noncon-
formists,and otheruncongenialminoritiesin theirmidst. Whatprecipi-
tated this remarkableevolution in our politicalculture?
The roadto tolerationoriginatesin the debatesprovokedby religious
dissent in the early modern period. This road was paved in part by a
grudging appreciationof the necessity for pragmaticaccommodation.
The wars of religion that had devastated the Continenteducated the
politicalclassesaboutthe costs of persecution.A policy of state-imposed
religiousintolerancewas widely understoodto be imprudent.
In the early modern period there occurs, however, a shift in the
argumentsadduced in support of the duty of toleration.The argument
1 I wish to thank Roger Woolhouse,Ed Hundert,Sue James,Phil Hanson, Bjorn

Ramberg,and KarenPilkingtonforreadingand commentingon an earlyversionof
this essay. Thanks are also extended to Steve Davis and Colin Macleod for
conversationon some of the topics covered.Two anonymousreviewersfrom this
journal offered tremendously helpful comments which led to numerous
modificationsin the essay. Partof this essay was writtenwhile I was a LiberalArts
Fellow at HarvardLaw School.I would like to extend warm thanksto professor
LewisSargentichin this connection.

474 Sam Black
from prudence gets supplemented with the idea that tolerationis a

reasonable standardfor the state to uphold. It is reasonablein the sense
thatthe tolerationof religiousdiversitycoheres,first,with notionsabout
the limits of knowledge, and second, with an emerging conceptionof
individual freedom.In Locke,and it is mainly Lockewhom I shall be
discussing in this essay, assumptions about ethics and epistemology
featurecriticallyin the justificationfor tolerationin politics.
My principalaim involves explicatingthis lastclaimmorefully.Inthis
vein, I investigatewhat may be usefully be termedthe epistemichypothe-
sis. It holds that thereis a basic relationshipbetween the groundsof state
actionand the limits of knowledge.This relationshipis straightforward
in Locke'scase.Thegroundsof stateaction- by which I mean the goals
or ends to which the state can legitimatelyappeal when using coercive
force against its citizens - conform to the boundaries of moral and
religious knowledge. This implies, first,that the state is duty-boundto
secure through coercive measures fundamental moral and religious
truths.Second,the state is forbiddento pursue throughforce practical
goals whose truth is inaccessible,at the expense of its citizens' basic
interests.Accordingto the epistemichypothesis,one importantreason
why Lockeadvocatestolerationis becauseLockeis a skepticabout most
religious claims. It is a consequence of his mitigated skepticism that
Lockeadvocatesa duty of religioustoleration.
Doubts over the availabilityof moralknowledge in the earlymodern
period lay the foundationfor a recognizablyliberalpolitical tradition.
So much is uncontroversial.2There is, however, serious disagreement
over the sourcesforthis skepticism.A view, widespreadamongphiloso-
phers,is thatearlymodernmoralskepticismreflectsthe influenceof the
New Sciences.3The opposing view holds that the sources of moral and
religiousskepticismare to be found in classicalantiquity.On this latter
interpretation,the penetrationof moral and religious skepticism has
2 Butsee footnote#36fordiscussionof somecommentatorswho rejecttheconnection

betweenliberalismand skepticismin Locke.
3 Theimpactof metaphysicalnaturalismon ethicsis what HilaryPutnammistakenly

refersto as the classicalor traditionalsourceof moralskepticism.See his Realism
WithA HumanFace(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress1990)chap.9; and
TheManyFacesof Realism(LaSalle,IL:Open Court 1987)chap. 1. CompareJohn
McDowell,'Virtueand Reason/ TheMonist62, 3 (1979)331-50(346for the impact
of 'Philistine'scienceon ethics);and CharlesTaylor,Philosophical
Arguments(Cam-
bridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress1995),38;see also his TheSourcesof theSelf
(Cambridge,MA and London:HarvardUniversityPress 1989),56-8.Formore on
Taylorand his criticssee my review of PhilosophicalArgumentsand my Philosophy
in the Age of Pluralism, ThePhilosophicalReview106, 3 (1997) 455-61.

Tolerationand the SkepticalInquirerin Locke 475
little to do with the 'Galileanworldview/ scientificnaturalism,or the

problemof finding a place for values in a world of nonteleologicalfacts.
Earlymodern moral skepticism owes more to revival than to innova-
tion.4
I believe that this second interpretationof events is almost certainly
correct:the originsof the liberaltraditionareclosely connectedwith the
revival of philosophical skepticism in the early modern period. The
relevant forms of skepticism owe little to anxieties induced by meta-
physical naturalism.More specifically,I shall argue that Locke is in-
debted for his ideas to the revival of New Academy skepticism.
Protestantdivines influencedby this classicaltraditionare of fargreater
significancewhere Locke'sreligious and politicalviews are concerned
than the philosophicalimpactof the New Science.
Finally, while the epistemic thesis holds that the grounds for state
actionreflectthe limits of knowledge,it does not yet explainor account
for that fit. Pragmaticconsiderationscertainlyplay a part in the expla-
nation in Locke'scase. It would often be self-defeating,Lockebelieves,
to pursue religiousends throughcoercivemeasures.ButLockealso has
distinctively ethicalreasons for favoring toleration. He reckons that
human beings should, as a general rule, enjoy freedom of the under-
-
standing.In theirprivateaffairs- where state actionis not involved
they should respectone another'sfreedomof inquiryon falliblematters.
Tolerationis a virtue of private life. Tolerationis also a public virtue
becausethe state has a duty to respectfreedomof the understandingon
mattersof religion.
Takenjointly,then, Locke'sepistemologyand his ethics contributeto
what I call the ideal of the skepticalinquirer.They fit together in the
following way. Locke's epistemology establishes strict limits on the
4 Therearesome antecedentsforunderstandingLockeas being influencedby classi-

cal skepticism.RogerWoolhousemaintainsthatthereareimportantlinksbetween
thePyrrhonianskepticaltraditionandLocke'sphilosophyas a whole,whileplacing
Lockein the traditionof constructiveskepticism.See his Locke(Brighton:Harvester
Press 1983), 11-14. For a discussion of Locke'sethics as an attempt to combat
Pyrrhonianskepticism see J.B. Schneewind, 'Locke'sMoral Philosophy/ in V.
Chappelled., TheCambridge Companion toLocke(Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity
Press1994)199-225.1believethatPyrrhonismexertedgreaterinfluenceoverHobbes
thanLockeforreasonsrecountedin sectionIII.Formoreon Hobbessee my 'Science
andSkepticismin Hobbes,'Canadian JournalofPhilosophy 27 (1997)173-207.M.Jamie
Ferreiraargues (correctly)that Lockerepresentsa departurefromthe traditionof
constructiveskepticism,but proceedsto discountthe crucialrolewhich epistemic
skepticismdoes continueto play in Locke'sphilosophy,and his ethicaltheoryin
particular.See his ScepticismandReasonableDoubt(Oxford:ClarendonPress1986)
chap. 1.

476 Sam Black
scope of moral and religious knowledge. It recommends a form of

religious fallibilism. Locke's commitment to freedom of the under-
standingleads him to arguethatindividualconscienceshould prevailin
religiousmatterswhere the truthis inaccessible.This ideal of skeptical
inquiryunderpinshis particularaccountof the state'sduty of toleration.
Or so I will argue.
The essay is organized in the following way. In section I, I describe
Locke's views about the limits of knowledge. In section II, I turn to
Locke'sdiscussionof the limitsof stateactionand arguethattheselimits
reflecthis skepticalviews about the scope of knowledge. In this vein, I
place Lockewithin the traditionof Academicskepticism(sectionIII).In
the finalsection,I describehow Locke'sviews on tolerationaregrounded
in an ideal of personsas skepticsengaged in autonomousinquiry.
I The Modest Theory Of Knowledge
The first edition of the Essay ConcerningHuman Understanding was

published in the same year as A Letter
Concerning Toleration Since
(1689).
it is likely that Lockewould have been revising these works simultane-
ously, it is naturalto read the Letterin the light of the Essay.Thereare
two aspects of Locke'sepistemologywhich are indispensablefor inter-
pretinghis politicalphilosophy, and especiallyhis views on toleration.
Theseare,first,the very sharpdistinctionhe drawsbetween knowledge
and opinion; and second, the extremely modest limits which Locke
places on the availabilityof knowledge.
Accordingto Locke,thereis a significantgap which separatesknowl-
edge from opinion. These two classes of belief do not occupy a single
continuum,or shadeinto one another.Theyremaindiscontinuous.Their
differenceturnsin the firstinstanceupon the certaintywith which these
attitudesareheld. In the case of knowledge,an individualis able to hold
up two conceptsfor discreetcomparisonin orderto verify theiridentity
or disagreement.This abilityto compareideas accordingto a primitive
faculty - one which Locke likens to the faculty of vision - is what
accountsfor the certaintyof knowledge. Wheremattersof opinion are
concerned,by contrast,the comparisonof ideas remainsinconclusive.5
5 An Essay ConcerningHuman Understanding,P.H. Nidditch, ed. (Oxford: Clarendon

Press 1975), FV.2.14,537f. All subsequent references to the Essay are to this edition.
Locke also makes finer discriminations between three different grades of certainty.
The most certain propositions are those in which two representations can be directly
compared for their agreement. An example is the belief that black is not white. Locke
calls this intuitive knowledge. Next comes the certainty which attaches to proposi-

The certaintyof a belief is what marksoff knowledge from opinion.

How, then, does Lockeexplainor account for the limits he imposes on
certainty?RogerWoolhousehas argued,correctlyI think,thatfor Locke
the boundarybetween knowledge and opinionis determinedaccording
to whether well-situated inquirershave access to the real essence of a
substance,or alternatively,apprehendonly its nominal essence.6Real
essences are the features of an objectwhich necessarilydetermine its
properties.Nominal essences are the categoriesthat we use to classify
objectsinto species. To borrow a favorite illustrationfrom Locke,we
possess mathematicalknowledgebecausewe can clearlyapprehendthe
real essence of mathematicalobjects.A triangle,for example,is a closed
body comprisingthreelines with threeinteriorangles.Fromthis essence
we can apprehendthat certainideas are necessarilyconnected to this
particulartype of body:such as the factthatthe sum of its interiorangles
is equal to two right angles.7
Locke's views about the relative accessibilityof different types of
essencesleads him to rejectin nearcategoricalfashionthe availabilityof
a posterioriknowledge. This rejectionencompassesthe naturalsciences.
ForLockereasonsthatnothingfollows in a necessaryway fromthe ideas
that we possess of corporealsubstances.We associatethe ideas yellow,
heavy, and fusible,he explains,with the substancegold. One may also
hypothesize and confirm through experimentationthat the substance
possessingthese propertiesis malleable.Butthereis nothingin the ideas
of yellow, heavy, and fusible which necessarily implies that gold is
malleable.We may discover other substances,which possess the same
properties,but which lackmalleability.Inorderto know what properties
are necessarilyconjoinedin gold, we would need to possess clearideas
about its corpuscularstructure.Yet this access to the real essences of
corporeal substance is denied to human beings, and their primitive
tions thatareinferredthroughvalid rules.Locketermsthis demonstrativeknowl-

edge. Theleastcertainformof knowledgeis whathe callssensibleknowledge.This
is the knowledgethatthe objectswhich causeour ideas or perceptionactuallyexist
in the world.Accordingto Locke,we know thatthese objectsexistover time when
we perceive them in a continuousand unbrokenmanner.We cannot,however,
know anythingabouttheirnatures.Propositionswhichdo not fallintotheseclasses
are only known to a probability.Theycomprisewhat Lockecalls faithor opinion.
The contrastgets qualifiedlaterwhen Lockesuggests thatcertainmattersof faith
arebeyond bothcertaintyand probability.See Essay,IV.17.23,687.
442-53.
6 See his Locke,88-90;125;129.See, further,Essay,III.6.6-26,
7 Essay,IV.2.2,532

478 Sam Black
sciences.Forthe presentand foreseeablefuture,knowledgeof an object's

corpuscularstructureis reservedfor its maker.8
Lockefurthermorerefuses to classify as knowledge even those ordi-
nary commonplaceson which all persons rely in their daily affairs.In
this vein, he claims that even if all Englishmennoted that it froze in
England last winter or that there were swallows in the summer, this
would still amountmerelyto a very probabletruth.He goes so faras to
emphasize that in cases where all persons at all times and places have
concurredin theirviews aboutthe world, and where thereis no conflict-
ing evidence,theseopinionsstill failto constituteinstancesof knowledge
proper.The only empiricalknowledge we possess is with respectto the
existenceof objectswhich are given immediatelyto our senses. We can
know that these objectsexist and are self-identicalover time provided
that our perceptionof them remainsunbroken.9
The steadinessof Locke'srefusalto creditscience and garden-variety
a posterioriclaims with the title of knowledge should serve notice that
Locketakesvery seriouslythe projectof surveying,marking,and polic-
ing the boundarieswhich divide knowledge fromopinion.Mathematics
anda posteriori truthsprovideLockewith polarinstancesof beliefswhich
fall on eitherside of this divide. Thelatteraremostly unknowable;while
many mathematicaltruthsare known, and nothing blocks the acquisi-
tion of furthertruthsin that domain.Religiousand ethicalpropositions
give him moretrouble.ForLockereckonsthatknowledgeis availablein
both of these domains, but subjectto two importantcaveats. First,he
maintainsthat the amount of knowledge that is currentlyavailablein
these areasis strictlylimited. Second,he believes that the prospectsfor
enlargingthis stock of truthsare thoroughlypessimistic.
The case of religion is perhaps the more straightforwardof the two.
Accordingto Locke,our knowledge of God is a demonstrablecertainty,
and consequentlyon a par with mathematicalknowledge. Lockeoffers
several proofs for God's existence at different times, but I shall only
describethe one presented in the Essay.This proof takes our intuitive
knowledge of our own being or existenceas its startingpremise.Locke
then argues that it is a furtherconceptualtruth,known intuitively,that
somethingmust have producedourbeing. Appealingto the conjunction
8 Essay, IV.3.23-5, 554-6; IV.12.9-10, 644-5. For more discussion see Michael Ayers,
Locke:Epistemologyand Ontology (London and New York: Routledge 1991) Vol. II,
58f.
9 For examples of Locke's departures from the common-sense view of knowledge,

see Essay, IV.11.9, 635; IV.15.5-6, 656-7; IV.16.6-8, 661-2. For instances of empirical
knowledge, see IV.3.21, 553 and IV.11.9, 635.

Toleration and the Skeptical Inquirer in Locke 479
of these intuited truths,Lockeclaims that we can infer that God exists.

Forhe supposes that our capacitiesfor thoughtcannotbe accountedfor
otherthanby postulatingthe existenceof a God who createdthem.10
Settingaside questionsaboutthe cogencyof this proof,forourpresent
purposes the main point is that Lockebelieves that naturalreason -
reason unaided by revelation - can discover certain basic truths of
religion. In the Essaythese truths consist of the following six proposi-
tions:
(i) thereis a God;(ii)God is omnipotent,omniscientand providential;(iii)thisGod

shouldbe worshiped;(iv) and obeyed;(v) God has given us a law of nature;(vi) the
contentof God's law is centrallyconnectedwith respectforpropertyrights.
I shallreferto theseconvictionscollectivelyas theultra-minimal

creed.The
ultra-minimalcreed constitutes the sum of religious beliefs that are
currentlyknown exclusivelythroughthe operationof naturalreason:that
is to say, independently from revelation.If individuals were suitably
reflective- or tookseriouslytheirresponsibilityof aimingat truebeliefs
- then they would grasp these propositions.As we shall see, Locke
personallysubscribes to more religiousopinions than are incorporatedin
the ultra-minimalcreed. But he insists that these additional,revealed
truthspossess an epistemicstatus which is inferiorto knowledge.11
10 Essay,IV.10.1-19,619-30
11 On (ii) God's attributes,Essay,IV.10.4,620 and IV.10.12,625. On (iii) the duty of

worship, 'Everyone that hath a true Ideaof Godand Worship,will assent to this
Proposition,ThatGODis to be worshiped....And everyrationalMan,thathathnot
thoughton it to day, may be readyto assentto this Propositiontomorrow'(1.4.19,
96). On (iv) obedienceto God, 'having the Ideaof GOD and my self, of Fearand
Obedience,I cannotbut be sure thatGODis to be fearedand obeyedby me: And
this Propositionwill be certainconcerningManin general'(IV.11.13,638;see also
IV.13.3,651. So (ii) and (iii) follow from (i) the idea of God, provided that the
followingpremisesareadded:that(a) people have the requisiteconceptsof 'Fear,'
'Man,''Obedience,'etc., and (b) make logicalinferencesfromtheirbeliefs.On (v)
God having given us a law of nature,'ThatGod has given a Rule wherebyMen
shouldgovernthemselves,I thinkthereis no body so brutishto deny' (II.28.8,352).
Ontheknowablecharacterof thatlawby naturalreason,'Ithinktheyequallyforsake
the Truth,who runninginto the contraryextreams,eitheraffirman innateLaw,or
deny that thereis a Law, knowableby the light of Nature;i.e. without the help of
positive Revelation'(1.3.13,75). The fact that people affirmthe law of nature is
consequentlymorethana contingentfeatureof humanpsychology,or the product
of merehabitand tradition.No one is so brutishto deny thatthereis a law of nature
because thatpropositionis trueand demonstrable.Itis 'knowable'by all agentswho
make logical inferencesfrom propositionsthat are self-evidentlytrue. On the
dependenceof themorallaw andtheknowledgeof Godmoregenerally,see IV.10.7,

480 Sam Black
If naturalreason can genuinely grasp the ultra-minimalcreed then

why, it may be wondered, is there need for revelationor Christ'smis-
sion? Locke'sanswer to these questions is illuminating.He deals with
them by appealing to the infirmity of human reason. Human agents
could in principleacquiremany revealedtruthsby simply using natural
reason.Butin practicereasonoften falls short.In this vein, Lockecites a
variety of factors which obstruct reason's operation in the sphere of
religion.Partof the problemlay originallyin the balefulinfluenceof the
Pagan Priests.The Priestswere responsiblefor seducing the credulous
masses with false doctrines.They also intimidatedthe diffident philo-
sophical elite from articulatingthe truths of religion which they had
discovered.12But even when pagan intimidationis broughtunder con-
trol,revelationstill has an indispensablerole to play in humanaffairs.It
sets moralphilosophersoff in the properdirectionfor reasonedinquiry.
Christ'smission is equallyessentialfor the 'vulgar,'who cannothope to
keep proofs for the ultra-minimalcreed clear in their minds. In short,
naturalreason can penetratethe ultra-minimalcreed - but only with
tremendousdifficulty.13
622. WilliamSpellmandescribesthe 'minimalcreed' that was affirmedby many

broadchurchmenwith whom Lockewas close. Accordingto Spellman,this canon
was set out by LordHerbertof Cherbury,in his De Veritatae(1627).Locke'sviews
differslightly,however,fromHerbert'sin theircontent.Itshouldalsobe notedthat
Lockeexplicitly rejectsHerbert'sargumentfor the innate characterof religious
knowledge(1.3.15-27,77f.).SeeW.M.Spellman,JohnLockeandtheProblem ofDeprav-
ity (Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress 1988),82, 129. On the minimalistaspect of
Locke'screed compareMichaelAyers, Locke:Epistemology and Ontology(London
and New York:Routledge1991)Vol. 1,120-1.
12 "Throughthe worksof nature,in every partof them,sufficientlyevidencea Deity;

yet the world made so littleuse of theirreason,thatthey saw him not, where,even
by impressionof himself,he was easy to be found....In this stateof darknessand
ignoranceof the trueGod,vice andsuperstitionheld the world.Nor couldany help
be had or hopedforfromreason;whichcouldnot be heard,andwas judgedto have
nothingto do in the case;the priests,every where, to securetheirempire,having
excludedreasonfromhavingany thingto do in religion.And in thecrowdof wrong
notions,andinventedrites,the worldhad almostlost the sightof theonly trueGod.
The rationaland thinkingpartof mankind,it is true,when they sought afterhim,
they found the one supreme,invisibleGod;but if they acknowledgedand wor-
shippedhim, it was only in theirown minds....Hencewe see, thatreason,speaking
ever so clearlyto the wise and virtuous,had never authorityenough to prevailon
the multitude...' (TheReasonablenessof Christianity,in CollectedWorks(Aaken: Scien-
tiaVerlag1963)Vol.VII,135.All subsequentreferencesto the CollectedWorksand
TheReasonablenessof Christianityrefer to this edition.
13 'Butnaturalreligion,in its full extent,was nowhere,thatI know, takencareof, by

This throws light on Locke'sotherwise surprisingthesis - put for-

ward in The Reasonablenessof Christianity- that even the Heathens of
antiquity,who were ignorantof Christ,and denied access to the pro-
phetictraditionof the Jewswhich foretoldhis coming,could arriveat all
the beliefsthatwere requiredfortheirsalvation.Itwas possibleforthese
Heathensto secure theirsalvationbecause reasonactingalone canpro-
vide access to the ultra-minimalcreed. It is, in turn, the ultra-minimal
aspect of the Lockeancreed which contributesto his otherwisesurpris-
ing assertionthat even Heathens should be tolerated.They should be
toleratedbecause reason and devotion are all that is strictlynecessary
for satisfyingduties to God. (Thisis a point I returnto in section II.)14It
is importantto emphasizethatin TheReasonableness ofChristianity,Locke
reaffirmsthe Essay'scontentionthat reason alone can furnishreligious
knowledge.
Turningfrom religion to moral or ethical knowledge we meet with
furthercomplications.Lockeis unequivocalthat truemorallaws, or the
laws of nature,areGod'slaw. Theirontologicalstatusis clearin his mind.
WhereLockedoes equivocateis with respectto the mode of epistemic
access to that law. He believes that revelationcan furnishsome insight
into our moral duties. Indeed, it is on account of the shortcomingsof
human reasonin pursuingethicalknowledge thatGod has equippedus
with the simplemessageof Scripture.(Itis consequentlyan anachronism
to marka strongdistinctionbetween religiousand ethicalduties where
Lockeis concerned.)Butrevelations,to reiterate,are epistemicallycom-
promised.Lockewill not appealto them as a sourceof ethicalknowledge.
Lockebelieves that thereare two routesavailableto naturalreasonin
its effortto establishthe contentof naturallaw. The minor tributaryto
moral knowledge proceedsby the analysis of fundamentalmoral con-
the forceof naturalreason.It should seem,by the littlethathas hithertobeen done

in it, that it is too hard a task for unassistedreasonto establishmoralityin all its
parts,upon its truefoundation,with a clearand convincinglight.And it is at least
a surerand shorterway, to the apprehensionof the vulgar,and mass of mankind,
that one manifestlysent fromGod ... should ... tell them theirduties, and require
theirobedience,than to leave it to the long and sometimesintricatedeductionsof
reason, to be made out to them' {TheReasonablenessof Christianity, 139).
14 On these Heathens,Lockewrites that:'The same sparkof the divine natureand

knowledgein man, which makinghim a man, shewed him the law he was under
as a man;shewed him also the way of atoningthe merciful,kind, compassionate
Authorand Fatherof him and his being, when he had transgressedthatlaw' (The
Reasonableness , 133).As Woolhousenotes, the CambridgePlatonists,
of Christianity
includingWhichcote,More,andCudworth,alsodid notbelievethatrevelationwas
essentialfor salvation.See his Locke,144.

482 Sam Black
cepts taken in isolation.Lockegives as examples the propositionsthat

'wherethereis no propertythereis no injustice/ or that 'no government
can allow absoluteliberty/ Graspingthe essence of the idea of 'govern-
ment' is supposed to producefruitfuladvancesin ethicalinquiry,in the
same way that graspingthe essence of a trianglecan be made to reveal
certainnecessarypropertiesabout, for example, the sum of its interior
angles.15
Locke,however, does not get very far with this method of deriving
ethicaltruthsfrom the meaning of ethicalconcepts.The problemis not
that he blunders into a version of Moore's open question argument.
Matters don't progress that far. First, Locke does not offer to define
concepts such as 'government'or 'property.'He has only elucidated
some of the properties with which these concepts are inconsistent.
Second,thismethoddoes not permithim to broachan analysisof general
ethicalnotions, such as 'good,' of the sort which Moorebelieved could
not be defined.
The second and indispensableroute to moral knowledge therefore
involves inferringthe contentof ethicsfromGod'srelationshipto human
agents. According to this method, an analysis of the idea of God, in
conjunctionwith certaininterveningassumptions,furnishesthebasisfor
moralknowledge.Theprincipalimage which informsthis secondmode
of analysisis the notionthathumanbeings areGod'sworkmanship.The
connectionbetween this workmanshiprelationand the content of our
moralduties is given its most felicitousexpressionin TheSecondTreatise
Of Government (1688)- although Lockeappeals to the same image in
the Essay:
forMenbeingall the Workmanshipof one Omnipotent,and infinitelywise Maker;

All theServantsof one sovereignMaster,sentintothisworldby his order,andabout
his business;they are his Property,whose Workmanshipthey are, made to last
duringhis, not one another'spleasure....Everyone, as he is boundtopreserve
himself,
andnot to quithis stationwilfully,so by the likereason,when his own preservation
comesnot in competition,oughthe, as muchas he can,topreserve therestofMankind,
and may not, unless it be to do justiceon an offender,takeaway, or impairthe life,
or what tendsto the preservationof the Life,the Liberty,Health,Limb,or Goodsof
another.16
15 Essay,IV.3.18,549-50.For more on essences in ethics and mathematics,IV.4.7-9,

565-7.
16 Second Treatiseof Government,in Two Treatisesof Government,P. Laslett, ed. (Cam-

bridge:CambridgeUniversityPress 1990),chap.2, #6, 271.Subsequentreferences
to this work areto this edition.CompareEssay,IV.3.18,549.

This odd mix of metaphors is the centerpiece of Locke's account of

naturallaw. The image serves firstlyto explain why we oweGod obedi-
ence.On the one hand, we are an artifactcreatedby God, and belong to
God in the way that any artifactoriginallybelongs to its maker.On the
otherhand, we are not simply artifacts,but are also God's servants.We
are consequentlyrequiredto make appropriateuse of our physical and
intellectualfaculties on God's behalf, just like any legally indentured
servant.Here Lockeattemptsto bridge the gap between the descriptive
fact that God has createdus and a statementof our moral duties. The
separationbetween facts and values is bridged by investing the divine
relationshipbetween man and God with the normativeintuitionsthat
surroundthe terrestrialinstitutionsof propertyand servitude.
Second,the workmanshipmetaphoroffers insight into the contentof
naturallaw. This argumentalso trades on intuitions derived from the
concept of ownership.On the one hand, we are duty-boundto refrain
from harming the other human artifactswhich God has created since
they are God's property.On the otherhand,becausewe are indentured
to God as servants,we are obliged to use our powers to enhance his
property:in this case the lives of these otherhumanbeings.We therefore
owe to God both negative duties to forbearfromharminghis property,
as well as positive duties of intelligentcooperationin punishing those
who wrongly tamperwith that property.
The sort of argumenton which Locke relies has an undeniablyodd
ring for us. In a society where parentsare sued by their children,and
childrencan file for divorce from their parents,the evidence of work-
manshipin the creationof a humanbeing seems (nearly)to have reverted
to being one naturalfact among many. Needless to say, the remaining
notions of human servitudeto which Lockeappealshave also lost their
magicalresonance.Butfroman exegeticalstandpoint,the workmanship
metaphoris essential.It revealswhy Lockebelieves thatnaturalreason
can discover the core of naturallaw unaided. The contentof these laws
can be inferred,he supposes, fromthe assumptionthatGod is responsi-
ble for our being, and that we are God's property.
Locke was initially optimistic about reason's ability to discover a
comprehensivemoralcode. In an early unpublishedwork Essayson the
Lawsof Nature(1660),he alleges that a relativelylarge list of duties are
discoverableby naturalreason operatingindependently.17He later re-
17 Thesedutiesinclude(i) respectingrightsof propertysuchthattheftand murderare

always proscribed,as is cheatinga man out of his property;(ii) holding certain
sentiments,includingreverenceand fearof the Deity, tenderaffectionfor parents,
love of one's neighbor,etc.;(iii)imperfectdutiesincludingthe showingof outward

484 Sam Black
frains from making these bold claims. Locke never settles on a final
accountregardinghow farreasoncould go in discoveringethicaltruths.
Thisambiguitynotwithstanding,even at thatlate point in his life, when
Lockecomposedthe ThirdLetterOnToleration, he continuesto insist that
naturalreason has discovered portions of the law of nature.18He also
never abandonsthe claim- particularlyprominentin TheSecondTrea-
tise of Governmentand taken up again in The First Letter Concerning
Toleration- that naturallaw provides for individualpropertyrights.19
In sum, the boundariesbetween knowledge and opinion for religious
and ethicalbeliefs lack the crispnesswhich separatesmathematicaland
a posteriori
truths.Butthe maincontoursof Locke'sviews arenonetheless
clear:religious knowledge is more or less limited to the ultra-minimal
creed.The creed prescribesconformitywith naturallaw; while natural
law is narrowin scope, being restrictedprimarilyto respectfor rightsof
property.
II The State and Its Limits
Thereis, for Locke,a basic relationshipbetween the limits of knowledge

and the limits of state action.The relationshipholds, roughly, that the
state is only entitled to use force when force promotes goals of the
ultra-minimalcreed. What this means is that unreasonablepeople can
be remonstratedwith for deficienciesin theirunderstanding.Butunless
theirunreasonablenessalsoleads them into conflictwith a knownmoral
or religious truth, they are immune from legitimate coercive interfer-
ence. The province of religious toleration begins, as it were, where
practicalknowledgegives out. I call this explanationof the limitsof state
actionthe epistemichypothesis. In assessing the epistemichypothesis,we
can considerLocke'stheory of the state under two headings:what the
state can do, and what it cannotdo.
worship for the deity, the feeding of the hungry,reliefof personsin distress;(iv)
abstainingfromsayingthingsthatwill harmanother'sreputation(EssaysontheLaws
ofNature,W. von Leyden,ed. [Oxford:ClarendonPress1954],195).
18 'Indeed,they [mankind]all agreed in the duties of naturalreligion,and we find
them by commonconsentowning that piety and virtue,clean hands, and a pure
heart,not pollutedwith the breachesof the law of nature,was the best worshipof
the gods. Reasondiscoveredto themthata good life was the most acceptablething
to the Deity; this the common light of nature put past doubt' (ThirdLetterOn
Toleration,in CollectedWorks,Vol. 6, 156-7).
19 A First LetterConcerningToleration,Works,Vol. VI, 10 & 42-4

Startingwith the former,the state'spositive authorityis connectedto

furtheringthe administrationof the law of nature. As we saw in the
passage reproducedfrom the SecondTreatisein section I, the contentof
the law of naturerelatesprimarilyto the preservationof property.Inthat
same Treatise, Locke famously describes how title over property is
insecurein the stateof nature.Hie principalcauseof thisjeopardyis that
individuals differ in their judgment over how to settle conflicts of
ownership.Theirdisagreementsare exacerbatedby the fact that when
individuals are judges in their own case, they are prone to bias. The
appropriateremedy for this insecurityof tenureis an impartialumpire.
Lockearguesin consequencethateachindividualhas a reasonto transfer
her responsibilityfor administeringthe law of nature to an impartial
agency. The authority of particularstates is alleged to originate in
consent.20
Considerthe matterfurther.In orderto establishthat any given state
has authorityto administerthe law of nature,it must be shown that the
relevantcommunityhas consentedto the state'screation.How can it be
known, however, that a given communityhas given its consent to the
creationof a state?One possibility is that the claim is verified through
an examination of the historical record. But appeal to the historical
record would seem to be in tension with Locke's dismissive attitude
towards a posterioriclaims. Significantly,Locke makes no attempt to
show that the membersof any particularcommunityhave consentedto
the introductionof a state at some point in their history.21How then is
the authorityof particularstatesjustified?
Locke'sargumentseems to have this basic form.Given some generic
featuresof humanpsychology- chieflythebias thatariseswhen people
arejudges in theirown case - certainoutcomescan be inferredregard-
ing life in the state of nature. One such conclusion is that property is
unstablein our naturalcondition.If we then make the furtherassump-
tions that people are instrumentallyrational,and that all personsdesire
the securityof property,we caninferthattheywill consentto the creation
of a state. In other words, given various assumptions about human
psychology and interactionin the presenceof property,the conclusion
that individualsconsent to the creationof a state can be deduced.
Does this conclusion then share the same epistemic status as the
remainderof the ultra-minimalcreed? This raises some obscure and
interestingquestionsregardingthe scope of a prioriknowledge as it was
20 See generally, TheSecondTreatiseof Government,chaps. 5-7.
21 TheSecondTreatiseof Government,chap. 9, #123-7, 350-2

486 Sam Black
understood in the seventeenth century. Grotius,for example, was in-

clined to label his argumentfor the law of naturean a prioriproof.This
was on the groundsthat the contentof that law, includingthe authority
of a statelimitedby law, could be shown to follow (he thought)fromthe
generic human desires for self-preservationand membershipin soci-
ety.22Startingfromsimilarpsychologicalpremises,Hobbesclaimedthat
the authorityof an absolutesovereignhas the status of a demonstrable
truth.Thepropositionis knowna priori,but is once againknown relative
to a set of psychologicalassumptionsthat are presumed true. So there
were ample precedentsat the time when Lockewas writing for treating
claims that are true in relationto certainpsychologicalgeneralizations
as being demonstrablea priori.23 It is then natural to read Locke as
supposing thatthe propositionholding that'Existingstatesacquiretheir
originalauthority the basis of transferfromindividuals'is knowable
on
a priori.The claim is thereforeconsistentwith the epistemichypothesis.
We can thenisolatethe two principleson which Locke'saccountof the
state'sauthorityinitiallyrests:
(1) The Principleof TransferredAuthority:The state possesses no

naturalauthority,but has acquiredits authorityby transferfrom
its citizensin exchangefor promotingtheirknown vital interests.
(2) The Priorityof PropertyRights:It is an articleof knowledge that

each individual has a vital interestin their property,including
theirperson,outwardpossessions and liberty.
So farso good. People'sstakein the system of propertyrightsis a known

truthof naturallaw;while the principleof transferseems very much like
an a prioritruthto Locke.Thecorollaryof theseprinciplesis thatthe state
cannotunjustlydepriveindividualsof theirholdings.Forno reasonable
personcanbe presumedto invest the statewith the authorityto trample
over propertyrights.This duty of respectfor propertyrightsplaces one
limit on the scope of state action.
Thesecondsignificantlimitationon state actionpertainsto the duty of
religious toleration.The Lockeanstate is obliged to refrainfrom physi-
cally coercingindividualson the grounds that theirreligiousviews and
22 TheLawof WarandPeace,F.W.Kelsey,trans.(London:Hyperion1993),1.1.12,42
23 Comparethe aforementionedpassages from TheEssay,IV.11.13,638 and IV.13.3,

651, where Lockerefersto the generic attitudeof Tear' in his derivationof the
ultra-minimalcreed.I thankColinMacleodforpressingme on this point.

ritualsaremistaken.Itis this secondlimitationon stateaction- the duty

of toleration- over which the account of Locke's epistemology de-
scribedin section I sheds light.
Locke's argument for the duty of toleration is set out in A Letter
Concerning Toleration, and elaboratedin subsequentlettersorpamphlets.
In the FirstLetter,as I shall call it, Lockestartsout by reaffirming(1) the
principleof transferredauthorityin conjunctionwith (2) the priorityof
property interests.24The burden of the argumentis then to show that
citizenshave no reasonwhatsoeverfor giving the state coercivepowers
-
going beyond the protectionof property and especiallyover matters
of religion.
The two argumentswhich Lockeinitiallyintroducesin TheFirstLetter
in supportof that verdict go as follows:
(3) TheArgumentFromConviction:worshiponly pleasesGodwhen

it is genuine.
(4) The ArgumentFromGovernmentFallibility:magistratesare un-

reliablejudges of the true faith.25
In puttingforward(3),the argumentfromconviction,Lockerehearses
the prerequisitesfor pleasing God. In this vein, he asserts that God
desiresgenuine inwardpersuasionfromthose who worship God. Force
cannotcompel conviction.The employmentof forceis thereforeineffec-
tual for promoting salvation. This argument then supports a duty of
tolerationbecauseit explainswhy individualdissentershave no practi-
cal incentiveto transferthe rightof religiouscoercionto the magistrate.
Giving the state powers of coercion would help them to worship no
better.It also explainswhy would-be persecutors,who claim genuinely
to careaboutreligion,also have no reasonto allot this coercivepower to
the magistrate.
Thefollowingargument(4)pertainsto the discoveryof reliableguides
for religious truth. Locke claims that even if the magistrate'scoercive
powers could compel belief, thereis no reasonto expect that the Prince
would be a more reliableguide to salvationthan each individual exer-
cising his or her own judgmenton mattersof faith.Thisargumentis also
cast in a pragmaticmold. Lockefrequentlymakes the observationthat
the Princesof Europeand elsewherehave endorsedall kinds of bizarre
24 For references to property rights in TheLetter,see note # 19.
25 Letter,on conviction, 11, 29-39, 40; on Princely fallibility, 12, 25.

488 Sam Black
faiths in the past. He goes on to claim that given the mercurialunreli-

abilityof Princelytheology, and the susceptibilityof Princesto corrup-
tion, a devout individual has nothing to gain in conferringpowers of
religiouscoercionon the Prince.
Bothof these argumentsthereforeconcentrateon practicalbarriersas
grounds for limiting the magistrate'sauthority:if coercioncould alter
beliefs or alternatively,if Princeswere reliabletheologians,then in those
possible worlds, therewould be no compellingargumentfor toleration.
Butthe relianceon contingent,practicalobstaclesin (3) and (4)creates
an obvious tension.ForLocke'sconclusionsabout the duty of religious
tolerationare presentedas universaltruths,while his supportingargu-
ments invoke a number of contingent premises. Indeed, this tension
attractedthe attentionof JonasProastsoon afterthe FirstLetter'spubli-
cation.Theargumentfrom(4)Governmentfallibilityfails,Proastasserts,
because it does not apply in just those cases where the magistratedoes
in fact possess knowledge of the true religion.Proastobjectsto (3) the
argumentfromconvictionon the groundsthateven if the Princecannot
create genuine convictionby force,pain and fear can usefully concen-
tratethe mind on the true faith,so that dissentersmay eventuallycome
to affirmthat faithfor themselves.26
In subsequent letters, Locke makes two very different kinds of re-
sponses to these criticisms:althoughthese responsesareentirelyconsis-
tent with one another.First,he re-emphasizes,in the vein of the First
Letter,thatProast'ssuggestionsarepragmaticallyunappealing.Portions
of the argumentfor tolerationdo not hold good in a world where the
governmentis enlightened,concedesLocke.Buthe notes thatthis world
of enlightened Princes is not our world. And he adds that in practice
Proast'sscheme is unworkablebecause we can have no assurancethat
our particularmagistratewill, in fact,prove a reliableguide to religion.27
RegardingProast'sobjectionto the argument from conviction, Locke
replies that force conceivably may lead people to contemplate their
religious duties. But once again the scheme is practicallyunworkable
until we are given principledguidelines regardingpreciselyhow much
force the Princeis entitled to employ, as well as the occasionswhen he
is entitledto use it. Lockemaintainsthat any such guidelines would be
26 Proast'sobjectionsare rehearsedat considerablelengthby Lockein the Secondand

ThirdLetterson Tolerationin his CollectedWorks,Vol. VI. On the Augustinian tradition
fromwhich Proastdrawsin advocatingreligiousintolerancesee MarkGoldie,"The
Theoryof ReligiousIntolerancein RestorationEngland/ in O.P.Grell,et al, eds.,
FromPersecutionto Toleration
(Oxford:ClarendonPress1991)331-68,esp. 362.
27 SecondLetter,Works,Vol. VI, 70, 74-7

unacceptablyimpreciseand arbitrary.Thereis consequentlyno accept-

ableway to use forceas a tool to focus peoples's minds on the truefaith.28
Lockebelieves thereforethat the design of political institutionscan
legitimatelyreflectcontingentobstaclesto good government.Ifwe could
be certain that preciselaws by a theologically trustworthymagistrate
would be promulgatedthen conceivably,under those particularcondi-
tions,the statewould have the rightto persecutereligiousdeviants.Part
of Locke'sargumentis that these conditionsare unlikelyto be achieved.
This is an undeniablyshaky ground for the duty of toleration.For if
mattersended there, that duty would only be as secure in any given
contextas the convictionthatthe relevantconditionsdo not obtain.There
is, however, a separateargumentwhich LockemarshalsagainstProast.
This reply appeals explicitly to a skepticismabout knowledge of the
Christianreligion.Lockeintroducesit at the beginningof the ThirdLetter
by saying that, 'to you and me the Christianreligionis the true [one]/
He continuesin the following way:
Now do you or I know this?I do not askwith what assurancewe believeit, forthat
in the highestdegreenot being knowledge,is not what we now inquireafter....For
whateveris not capableof demonstration,as such remotemattersof factarenot, is
not, unless it be self-evident,capableto produceknowledge,[no matter]how well
groundedand greatsoeverthe assuranceof faithmay be wherewithit is received;
butfaith it is still, and not knowledge;persuasion,and not certainty.This is the highest
the natureof the thing will permitus to go in mattersof revealedreligion,which
arethereforecalledmattersof faith:persuasionof our own minds,shortof knowl-
edge, is the last result that determinesin us such truths....If thereforeit be the
magistrate'sduty to use forceto bringmen to the truereligion,it canonlybeto that
religionwhich he believesto be true....29
Locke signals to his opponent that the Christianfaith is a reasonable

faith- and is consequentlya body of doctrinewhich commends itself
both to Proast and to Locke. But for Locke, as we know, not all
reasonablebeliefs are candidatesfor knowledge. Empiricalbeliefs are
more or less reasonableaccordingto how well they are corroborated
by evidence, but they are not knowable. Locke is affirminga similar
28 SecondLetter,102-11
29 ThirdLetter,Works,Vol.VI,144-5(myemphasis).Lockerearticulatesthisskepticism
Tor whatgreateradvantagecanbe giventhem[theskeptics],
laterin theThirdLetter:
thanto teach,thatone may know the truereligion?therebyputtingintotheirhands
a rightto demandit to be demonstratedto them,thatthe Christianreligionis true,
andbringingon the professorsof its a necessityof doing it' (415).Note Locke'scare
to make explicit that the Christianreligion, and not the ultra-minimalcreed, is
undemonstrable.

490 Sam Black
skepticismregardingthe epistemic status of merely reasonablefaiths.

The limited skepticism about religion articulated in this passage is
entirely consistentwith the views expressed in the Essay.For Lockeis
careful to indicate that this skepticism about religion refers to the
Christianreligion. It does not relate to the ultra-minimalcreed:whose
demonstrablestatus Locke was preparedto defend in both TheEssay
and The Reasonablenessof Christianity. Having reiterated his mitigated
skepticismabout religionin the debate on toleration,Lockeinsists that
where knowledge is absent the magistratelacks authorityto coercehis
subjects. The magistrate'sauthority ought to be consistent with the
limits of knowledge.
The evidence that Locke was a mitigated skeptic about religion is
thereforesubstantial,being reiteratedin both the Essayand the Third
Letteron Toleration.This skepticism lends preliminarysupport to the
epistemichypothesis.It now remainsto ask how well the limitsof moral
and religious knowledge coincide with the limits of state action where
Lockeis concerned.
The fit is a tight one. As we have alreadyseen, the Lockeanstate must
protect personal property. It is significant that respect for property
forms part of the ultra-minimalcreed. The further proposition that
existing states are entitledto enforcethe law of nature- while not part
of the ultra-minimalcreed- is knowablea priori.Turnnext to the class
of individuals who merit tolerationaccordingto Locke.Lockedefends
the rightsof Jewsand Muslimsto practicetheirreligionswithout moles-
tation by the state. He also insists that the duty of tolerationembraces
those Heathenswho rejectthe authorityof both Testaments.This is not
surprising.Fordevout practitionersof these faithsaffirmthebasictenets
of the ultra-minimalcreed.As we saw earlier,theirindifferencetowards
or ignoranceof Christ'steachingsposes no obstacleto theirsalvation.So
while Lockeopines thathe personallyregardstheirviews as being 'false
and absurd,'he is not preparedto have these minoritiesbrokenby force.
Individualswho conform to the ultra-minimalcreed are merely com-
pelled to grapplewith their unreasonablenessin rejectingChristianity.
The state only has a duty to proselytize to them and not a right to
persecutethem.30
The epistemic hypothesis also predicts that there are two classes of
individuals for which there is no duty of religious toleration.The first
consistsof those personswhose religiouspracticesconflictwith the laws
of nature.Accordingly,Lockepoints out that a hypotheticalsect which
30 Letter,11, 23

advocatedthe sacrificeof childrenwould enjoyno immunityfromstate

action.Here the conflictwith naturallaw is direct.Lockeargues further
that immunitiesdo not extend to RomanCatholics:for Papistspose an
indirectthreatto the securityof the state. At a time when memoriesof
Bloody Queen Mary, the Armada,and the GunpowderPlot were still
freshin the minds of Englishmen,this restrictionis less surprisingthan
it may now appear. But the grounds for persecutionare connected in
these cases to the eliminationof threatsto the preservationof property
rightsand politicalstability.Thebasis for persecutiondoes not restwith
the goal of advancingreligioustruth,exceptin so faras the law of nature
is God's law.
The epistemicthesis also predicts,and Lockemaintains,that there is
no duty to tolerateatheists.The rationalethat he gives for this claim in
the Letteris that absent the fear of God, no atheist can be expected to
fulfillhis oaths and civil obligations.31 Thisparticularreasonfor exclud-
ing atheistsfrom toleration is not strictlythe groundswe would expect.
Foratheismdoes violate the ultra-minimalcreed.And we should there-
foreanticipateLocketo objectto atheistson the groundsthattheyneglect
a known religiousduty. However,this anomalycanbe accountedfor.In
the Letter,Lockeis writing a semi-populartractfor the politicalclasses.
He is at pains to make his argumentsself-contained.This explainswhy
Lockeomits all mention of a mitigatedskepticismabout religionin The
FirstLetter,despite affirmingthis skepticismvery clearly in the Third
Letter.He is evidentlynot puttingforwardall of the relevantopinionshe
holds abouthis subjectin TheFirstLetter- a claimthatwould be farless
plausible if it were made about a systematictreatisesuch as the Essay.
One should not thenexpectLocketo makeultrafine-graineddistinctions
about the precise reasons for denying tolerationto atheistsin TheFirst
Letter.Forthat would compel him to introduceepistemologicaldistinc-
tions which mightblunt the forceof his argumentfortoleration.In other
contexts,however, Locke'sviews are unequivocal:'atheismbeing ... a
crime,which for its madness as well as guilt, ought to shut a man out of
all sober and civil society.'32Significantly,he harborsno comparable
31 Letter,47
32 John Locke, A Vindicationof the Reasonablenessof Christianity,Works,Vol. VII, 161.

Compare:'And for the tolerationof corruptmanners,and the debaucheriesof life,
neitherourauthor[Proast]norI do pleadforit;butsay it is properlythemagistrate's
businessby punishmentsto restrainand suppressthem. I do not thereforeblame
yourzeal againstatheismand Epicurism...'(ThirdLetter,Works, Vol.VI,416).Locke
plainlybelievesthatatheisminvolvessome sortof objectivefailingthatfarexceeds
the failingsof othersectarians.

492 Sam Black
vehemence towards Muslims, Jews, or Heathens.33There can be little

doubtthatLocke'sobjectionto atheismdoes not arisefromthe nebulous
threatwhich godless individualspose to civil order.It arisesbecausehe
despises atheistsfor denying theirknown religiousduties.
The epistemic thesis does a good job of predictingthe limits which
Lockeactuallyimposes on state action.Priorto investigatingthe origins
Locke's skepticism it may be worth pausing, however, in order to
forestallcertainmisunderstandings.34
The epistemichypothesis maintainsthat the limits of legitimatestate
action are determinedby the limits of knowledge. It should in the first
instancebe clear that 'knowledge' in this case refers to Locke'sbeliefs
about the limits of knowledge.The doxasticstates of the magistrateare
irrelevant.To illustrate,the ruler of the Papal Sea may believe that he
possesses infalliblereligiousknowledge.Butit clearlywould not follow
for Lockethat in Romeit is permissibleto persecuteall Protestants.The
epistemic hypothesis should not be confused with the relativistthesis
holding that for Lockethe limits of state action are to be determinedin
relationto the convictionsof each Prince.35
Second, the epistemic hypothesis maintainsthat the groundsor ends
for state action must be consistentwith the limits of knowledge. But it
makes no claims about the beliefs upon which the state can rely in
pursuingthe meansto those ends. To illustrate,suppose thatan informer
revealed that some faction had conspired to blow up Parliament.The
informationlinking those individualsto the crimeof conspiracywould
not satisfy Locke'srequirementfor knowledge. For we may not have
caught the conspiratorsred-handed,or if we did, the continuityin our
perceptions of the culprits may be broken thereafter.(If they were
permitted to enter a bathroom unescorted that would suffice.) If all
beliefs relied on by the state and its agents were restrictedto known
truths,then virtuallyevery courtroomproceedingwould grindto a halt.
The epistemic hypothesis does not, however, imply this problematic
outcome.It holds merely that the ends which ground the legitimateuse
of coercive force must be known precepts of naturallaw. Putting this
point anotherway, if the question is posed, 'Whatjustificationis there
for having various laws on the books?' the answer must be that these
33 Letter,52
34 I am gratefulto an anonymousrefereefromthisjournalforbringingthe following

threepotentialmisunderstandingsto my attention.
35 Thus,in the case where the Princeneglectsrightsof propertyLockeis preparedto

advocateactiveresistance(SecondTreatiseof Government,chap. 18,#202,400-1).

laws promoteknownmoralends. Butin the administrationof these laws,

the state can rely on beliefs held with a probability.
Finally, while knowledge governs the ends of state action, the
epistemic hypothesis does not imply that the state's behavior is fully
determinedby those ends. Thereareconceivablya varietyof aimswhich
the state may legitimatelypursue, and which are not requiredby the
laws of natureor the duty of toleration.A decision to impose taxes for
the building of a highway, for example, can fall into this discretionary
category.Itis moreaccurateto say, therefore,thatthe epistemichypothe-
sis relatesto what the state is strictlyrequiredto do or refrainfromdoing.
Within those general boundaries, there are a range of choices which
remaindiscretionary.Whenthe stateis framingthesediscretionaryends
it is at libertyto pursue policies whose value is not establishedknowl-
edge.
Whensuitablyinterpretedthe epistemichypothesissheds a good deal
of light on Locke'spolitical philosophy. It is thereforesurprisingthat
many recentcommentatorshave insisted that philosophicalskepticism
plays no role in Locke'sviews on toleration.36 One way to supporttheir
interpretation is as follows. If Locke was so obsessed by the limits of
knowledge when forming his views on toleration,then we should expect
him to have made those particulargrounds for religious toleration
explicit in the First Letter,rather than waiting for the Third.Yet he
36 In rejectingthe importanceof skepticismfor Locke'sviews on toleration,Jeremy

Waldronwrites:'norwas it [the argumentfor toleration]based on any suspicion,
however slight, that at the last trumpthe sects thathe proposedto toleratemight
turnout to havebeenrightallalong.'Thisbetraysa generalmisunderstanding. Over
many questionsof doctrine,Lockebelieved that neitherthe sects nor anyoneelse
would ultimatelyprove to be 'right,'since these disputes lie beyond the scope of
knowledge. (Waldronindicates,however, that he is familiarwith the skeptical
passage cited from the ThirdLetter.)See Waldron's'Locke:Tolerationand the
Rationalityof Persecution,'reprintedin J.Hortonand S. Menduseds.,JohnLocke: A
LetterConcerning TolerationinFocus(LondonandNew York:Routledge1991)98-124,
at 106.In his wonderfullycomprehensiveaccountof Locke'stheologyand theory
of politics,JohnMarshalsignalsthathe endorsesWaldron'santi-skepticalreading
of Lockeon toleration(at360,n. 44).YetMarshalsimultaneouslywritesthat:'when
Lockewrote the Epistolahe was separatelyand contemporaneouslycommittedto
the necessaryfallibilityof almost all men in many religiousissues' (364).So for
Marshal,Lockeis a qualifiedskeptic regardingreligiousmatters.It is, therefore,
unclearwhy Marshalsubscribesto Waldron'sview. ThemerefactthatLockedoes
notappealdirectlyto this skepticismin the Epistolascarcelysettles the issue. Why
Lockewould remain'separatelyand contemporaneouslycommitted'to a religious
fallibilismwhile not allowing this skepticismto influencehis argumentsfor relig-
ious tolerationis somethingof a mystery.See JohnMarshal,JohnLocke: Resistance,
Religion,andResponsibility (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress1994).

494 Sam Black
studiously avoids appealingto skepticismin the FirstLetter.Therefore,

the epistemicthesis is mistaken.
An adequatereplyto this objectionwould beginby reiteratingthatthe
First Letterwas meant to influence wide public debate. It is equally
importantthat Lockedoes not believe that a mitigated skepticismfur-
nishes the only grounds for religious toleration.He is persuaded that
there are very good pragmaticreasons - pertainingthe fallibilityof
magistrates,the difficultyof framinglaws thatarenot overlybroad,and
the uncertainconnectionbetween coercion and genuine conviction-
forendorsingtoleration.It is to be anticipatedthatLockewould initially
focus his arguments for toleration on pragmatic grounds. For these
prudential arguments are calculated to appeal to the concerns of an
audiencenot otherwise disposed to sharehis brandof religiousskepti-
cism, or indeed, even to understandit.
We must furtherremindourselvesthatLocke'sworkon boththe Letter
and revisionsforthe Firsteditionof the Essaywere carriedout at approxi-
matelythe same time. It would simply be extraordinaryif Lockewere to
have constructedhis argumentsfor tolerationin the FirstLetterwhile
overlookingthe distinctionsbetween knowledge and religiousopinion
whichhe painstakinglyerectedin the Essay.Itis justas incrediblethatthe
mitigated skepticismabout religion,which Lockedefends in the Third
Letter,simply occurredto him as an adventitiousafterthoughtduringhis
exchangewith Proast.Locke,devout Christian,foremostepistemologist
of his time, inveterateclassifierof varietiesof knowledge, writing in an
age obsessed with religious controversy,did not casually arriveat the
realizationthatthe centraltenetsof the Christianfaithwere unknowable
while writing a reply to a minor political pamphlet late in his life. The
mitigatedskepticismof the EssaysaturatesLocke'sthinkingon the ques-
tion of toleration.The interestingquestion is not whether Lockewas a
skeptic,but exactlywhat sortof skepticwas he.
Ill Historical Interlude
Many believe that moral and religious skepticism arose in the early
modern period in response to the New Science. In Locke's case, this
clearlygets things backwards.The classes of real essences - including
mathematical,ethical,and divine essences - are all immaterialkinds.
By contrast,materialessences are deemed by Locketo be unknowable.
In general,the moralskepticismwhich held influenceover earlyenlight-
enment theoristshad virtuallyno connectionwith scientificnaturalism
or materialism.Many advocatesof religious tolerationwere influenced
at this time by the doctrinesof the New Academy.The hallmarkof this
venerableskepticaltraditionlies in its proponents'sdenial of all claims

to certainty.Academicskepticsmaintainthatpropositionscanbe known
only to a probabilityor with 'moralcertainty/ Locke'sviews, in particu-
lar, are substantially indebted to the revival of the New Academy
doctrines.
The teachings of the New Academy were resurrectedduring the
Reformationperiod by Protestantswho took exception to the political
and doctrinalrigidity of Calvinism.In this vein, Calvin complainedof
an influentialexpatriatecommunityof Italianhumanistsliving in Swit-
zerland:a communitywhich he describedas 'AcademicSkeptics/37The
accuracyof his description is borne out in the TheSatanicStratagems
(1565),the masterpieceof JacopoAcontius (c. 1500-1567),an important
member of this Italiancircle who would later resurfacein England.38
Acontiusbegins that work by assertingthe fundamentalprinciplethat,
'no one whatsoever being but a man ought to be so confident that he
cannot err/ adding that this fallibilismis especially compelling where
mattersof religiousdoctrineareconcerned.39 Having espoused a univer-
salfallibilismon religious matters,Acontius proceeds to argue for free-
dom of religious inquiry.Both the churchand the state should permit
individualsto pursuetheirsalvationwithout coerciveinterference.40 His
argument for this tolerant attitude rests principally upon a host of
pragmatic considerations. is
Religiouspersecution self-defeating because
37 Historianssometimesreferto this anti-Calvinist,humanistmovementunder the

genericrubricof Socinianism.But the termSocinianismcan be misleadingin this
context.Not all importantProtestantanti-Calvinistswere affiliatedwith Laelius
Socinus(1525-1562).(Socinuswas a formerSieneseliving in Switzerland.Socinus's
followers eventually migrated to Poland, following Socinus'snephew Faustus,
before making their way to the Netherlandsin the 1660s.)What unites these
anti-Calvinistsis not an endorsementof the Sociniancreed,but a skepticismover
claimsto religiousinfallibility.On the 'broadSocinian'tradition,see the masterful
discussionby Hugh Trevor-Roper in his Catholics,
AnglicansandPuritans(Chicago:
Universityof ChicagoPress1988)chaps.2, 4. Forthe developmentof Socinianism
duringtheearlymodernperiod,see AndrewC. Fix,Prophecy andReason(Princeton,
NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress1991);and EarlW. Wilbur,A Historyof Unitarianism
(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress 1946).On the Dutch Armenians,see
NicholasTyacke,Anti-Calvinists (Oxford:Clarendon1987),82, 245.
38 See the classic study by W.K. Jordan, The Developmentof Religious Tolerationin
England,Vol. 1 (Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversity Press 1932), 306. Jordan
reportsthat many of the works of the Italianskepticsin Acontius'scirclearenow
lost or in privatehands (n. on 309).Calvin'sremarkis reportedby Jordan,306.
39 Jacopo Acontius, Satanae Stratagememata,translated as Satan's Stratagemsby D.

O'Malley(SanFrancisco:CaliforniaStateLibrary1940),19-20.Compare88.
40 Ibid.,61-9

496 Sam Black
it driveshereticalactivityunderground;it makespastorslazy since they

no longerhave to preachagainstmistakenviews, magistratescan erron
religiousdoctrine,and so forth.41 Acontiusdoes not, however,challenge
the authorityof the state or the importanceof maintainingpublic order.
Thisbasic triadof concepts,linking epistemicskepticismto religious
tolerationbounded by the necessityof maintainingpublic order,was to
become a commonplace in seventeenth century England. Acontius's
Stratagemswere reprinted in 1631 by ChristopherPotter, Provost of
Queen's College, Oxford and close friend of William Chillingworth.
Chillingworth,in his hugely popularapology for a mild formof Protes-
tantism, A Safe Way of Salvation(1638), recapitulatesthe three main
precepts of this particularskepticaltradition.Chillingworthcontends,
first,that even gardenvariety truths,such as the propositionthat there
was a QueenElizabeth,areknownwith moralas opposed to mathemati-
cal certainty.42LikeAcontius,whom he cites, Chillingworthalso main-
tains that there is no reliablecriterionfor distinguishingbetween true
and false religious beliefs.43Second, Chillingworthis even more reluc-
tant than Acontius to be pinned down on what (if any) articles are
essential for a true Christianto hold. He simply recommendsthat the
bearersof conflictingopinionsbe instructedto meditateupon the Bible.
In this vein, Chillingworthregardsreligious persecutionby either the
Churchor the State as being completely illegitimate.44 Third,Chilling-
worth is a political conservative.His commitmentto public order led
him to supportthe Royalistsduringthe CivilWar,and he was ultimately
to perish in the hands of his Puritanjailers.45
Here is not the place to fill in this sketch of the Academic skeptical
traditionas it unfolds in the early modernperiod.It sufficesto add that
the basic triadof commitmentswhich informthis tradition- a general
fallibilismabout religion,advocacyof religioustoleration,and commit-
ment to public order- were subscribedto by a host of otherinfluential
figures at the time: including the political philosopher Hugo Grotius,
41 Ibid., 64-9
42 William Chillingworth, The Religionof the Protestants:A Safe Way of Salvation (Lon-
don: The Religious Tract Society 1839) Book IV, 87
43 On Chillingworth's fallibilism, Book I, 3, 36, 122-4, 385-6, 390
44 Ibid., Book IV, 34, 59
45 As related by Clarendon, along with a description of Chillingworth's extreme

skepticism on matters of Christian faith. See The Life of EdwardEarl of Clarendon
WrittenBy Himself (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1828), Vol. 1, 62-5.

and the ChurchmenJeremyTaylor,and Henry Hammond.46Any stu-

dent or lecturerat Oxfordduring this periodwould have readChilling-
worth,whose book went throughsix editionsin Locke'slifetime.47 It can
scarcely be doubted that Locke was intimately acquainted with the
writingsof these anti-Calvinistdivines and theirfollowers.It was Philip
van Limborch,a prominentleaderof the anti-Calvinist,DutchArmenian
Churchand a close friendof TheFirstLetter'stranslator,WilliamPopple,
who repeatedlyencouragedLocketo write on the questionof toleration
during Locke'sself-imposedexile in the Netherlands.48
The influence of the Academic traditionis most clearly manifest in
Locke'streatmentof religious belief. Pyrrhonians,such as Montaigne,
had contendedthatthereareno bonafidegroundsfor religiousor ethical
belief.Individualsshould simply suspendjudgmentover these matters.
(A theme thatHobbeswould exploit.)Likethe Academics,and in sharp
contrastto the Pyrrhonians,Lockedoes not recommendthe totalsuspen-
sion of religious judgment. Locke claims that people have a duty to
believe reasonably.Butin the light of the necessarilyfalliblecharacterof
these religiousbeliefs,he urges people to toleratediversity.
Locke is not, however, simply a captive to the Academic skeptic
tradition.It is merely one intellectualstrand- albeit an importantone
- in his thinking. His most significantdeparturefrom the Academic
tradition is that Locke's skepticism about religion is mitigated. The
ultra-minimalcreed is known with certainty- and not mere moral
certainty.Crucially,this slackeningin Locke'sskepticismthen ramifies
throughouthis politicalphilosophy.The maintenanceof politicalorder
is not simply one reasonableconvictionamong others.It is an aspect of
God's law, and is knowablethroughnaturalreason. Politicalargument
properlyunderstooddoes not then reflecta balancingof rival probable
truths- as the Academicskepticsappearto imply - but an extracting
46 For Taylor's fallibilism and its connection to his arguments for religious toleration
within the bounds of civil order, see Jeremy Taylor, TheWholeWorks(London: 1859)
Vol. V, 516-31, on maintaining civil peace, 590. For Hammond, see his Of the
Reasonablenessof Christianity, in The Works of Dr Hammond (London: 1684) on
fallibilism, 138, on submission to the state and the good of peace, 144. For Grotius,
On the Truthof Christianity,S. Madan, trans. (London: 1814; 1639) on his fallibilism
regarding religion, 79-80; on the acceptance of religious diversity, 60, 69.
47 William Spellman, TheLatitudinariansand the Churchin England 1660-1700 (Athens:

The University of Georgia Press 1993), 150-2 draws attention to Locke's familiarity
with Chillingworth and this skeptical tradition.
48 See Mario Montuori, On Tolerationand The Unity of God (Amsterdam: J.C. Gieben
Publishers 1983), 125-6.

498 Sam Black
of the practicalconsequencesof the distinctionbetween knowledge and

opinion. The laws of nature are part of the ultra-minimalcreed. The
limits which this law places on the legitimateuse of state power are by
extensiona matterof knowledge.
The mitigatedcharacterof Locke'sskepticismaboutreligionplays an
importantpart in his liberaloutlook. For one importantfeatureof the
liberaltradition,as it unfolds duringthe earlymodernperiod,lies in the
priorityit accordsto individual rights.The protagonistsfor this emerg-
ing ideology assert that these rights are more basic than the pursuit of
otherpoliticalobjectives.Forthem the right is priorto the good. Proto-
liberals,such as Grotiusand Hobbes,attemptedto justifythis priorityin
a principledfashion.Theymaintainedthatthe privilegedplaceaccorded
to the rightsthey call naturalis demonstrablea priori.Lockesharestheir
commitment to an a prioristicmoral science, and also takes up the
language of naturalrights. He differs from Grotiusand Hobbes, how-
ever, in supposingthata demonstrationof these rightsinvolves arriving
at an understandingof God's purposes for man. This detour to natural
rights,throughknowledge of God's intentions,held no appeal for Hob-
bes or Grotius.49
Locke'sethicaltheory thereforerepresentsa synthesis of two impor-
tant intellectualtraditionsof the early enlightenment.His outlook on
religion is closely allied to the skepticalfallibilismrevived by the anti-
CalvinistProtestants.This skepticismpaves the way for Locke'sviews
on tolerationby establishinglimits on religiousknowledge. Butthe fact
thatLocke'sskepticismis mitigatedis equallyimportant.Forhe is eager
to assimilatethe novel theory of naturalrights, developed by Grotius
and Hobbes to his politicalphilosophy.He incorporatesthose rightsby
treatingrespectforthemas a duty of naturalreligion.Lockefinds a place
for these rightsin his philosophybecausehis skepticismdoes not pene-
tratethroughto the ultra-minimalcreed.
49 Grotiuswas a fallibalistaboutall religiousknowledge,but claimedthatnaturallaw

andnaturalrightwerenonethelessdemonstrablea priori.As he famouslyremarked,
even personswho deniedtheexistenceof Godwould be led to convergencein ethics
providedthey are rational.See TheLawof WarandPeacePrologemena,#11, 13.See
furthermy 'Scienceand Skepticismin Hobbes/

IV The Skeptical Inquirer
Returningto the thread of the argument, Locke holds that the state
should not interferewith peoples's religious practices- provided that
agents conform to the ultra-minimalcreed. Locke's conclusion is not
entailed, however, by a skepticism about religion. In fact, religious
fallibalismmay undermine the argument for toleration.For with the
endorsementof fallibilism,Locke'soften reiteratedcomplaintaboutthe
unreliabilityof the Prince'stheology,seems beside the point. Forneither
citizens, nor the state can now be presumed to be reliabletrackersof
religious truth.The weight of the argumentfor tolerationmay then be
thoughtto appealto the notionthatcompulsioncannotgenerategenuine
conviction. Yet this ground is assailable.For even if it is conceded to
Locke that coercion fails to benefit the persecuted, force can at least
preventthem fromendangering the souls of others.
Locke'sposition can thus be made to seem incoherent.Significantly,
Hobbes provided a powerful precedent for denying any connection
between skepticismand toleration.Hobbes,it should be noted, was not
skepticalabout God's existence.He maintainedthis truthwas demon-
strable.50He believed, however, thatGod's naturewas wholly inscruta-
ble - dispensingwith even the ultra-minimalcreed.ButHobbesdid not
go on to argue that this skepticism about religion implies a right of
conscience.He rejectedany such right.
Letus callthis the skepticaltoleranceproblem.Theproblemholds that
a commitment to skepticism about religion need not entail a right of
conscience.The problemarisesbecausea policy of intolerancecan have
certainpositive social consequences.How is Lockethen led from skep-
ticism to the right of conscience?The brief explanationis that Locke
subscribes to an ideal of personal autonomy. He believes that each
individualhas a duty to inquireaboutethicaland religiousmatters.Ideal
Lockeanagents are skeptical inquirers.They have a responsibilityto
pursue religious and ethical understanding:despite the inherentlyun-
knowable characterof (most) truths in these domains. This ideal of
autonomous skeptical inquiry held no appeal for Hobbes. It is what
ultimatelyexplains theirdifferenceon the questionof toleration.
Locke'scommitmentto the ideal of skepticalinquiryis articulatedin
an importantpassage from the Essay:
50 ThomasHobbes,Leviathan, R. Tucked. (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress

1991),chaps.11-12(74,77).

500 Sam Black
Sincethereforeit is unavoidableto thegreatestpartof Men,if not all,to haveseveral

Opinions,without certainand indubitableProofsof theirTruths....It would, me-
thinks,become all Men to maintainPeace,and the commonOfficesof Humanity,
and Friendship,in the diversity of Opinions, since we cannot reasonably expect, that
any one should readilyand obsequiouslyquit his own Opinion,and embracewith
a blindresignationto anAuthority,whichtheUnderstandingof Manacknowledges
not. Forhoweverit may often mistake,it can own no otherGuidebut Reason,nor
blindlysubmitto the Willand Dictatesof another....We shoulddo well to commis-
erateour mutualIgnorance,and endeavourto removeit in all the gentle and fair
ways of Information....At least those, who have not thoroughlyexaminedto the
bottomall theirown Tenets,mustconfess,they areunfitto prescribeto others;and
areunreasonablein imposingthatas a Truthon otherMen'sBelief.51
In this passage,Lockeis not examiningrelationsbetween citizensand

the state.He is consideringrelationsbetween privatecitizensor persons
in general.His basic contentionis thaton importantmattersover which
knowledge is lacking, we should tolerate diversity. On these fallible
matters,we should fostera climateof freeinquiry- pursuing'thegentle
and fairways of information'- instead of bringingthat explorationto
a close. In short,tolerationis an importantpersonalvirtue.
In making the case for the private virtue of toleration,Locke runs
togethertwo differentconsiderations.One argumentis pragmatic.Peo-
ple have a psychologicalpropensity,Lockebelieves,to resistthe imposition
of ill-foundedbeliefs.Theyresentbeing controlledby individualswhose
understandingdoes not exceed their own. Attemptsto controlpersons
thereforetend to be counterproductive.They breed resistance,because
no man can 'obsequiouslyquit his own opinions/ and 'blindly submit
to the will and dictates of another/ This psychological generalization
explains why an attitude of intoleranceis self-defeatingin our private
lives.
As we have seen, Locke is not above appealing to pragmatic or
instrumentalconsiderationswhen making the case for toleration.But
there is a second argument for the private virtue of toleration put
forwardin the precedingpassage.It emphasizesthatthereis something
objectivelywrongwith attemptsto impose ill-foundedbeliefs on others.
Individualswho harborthis ambitionare accused of being 'unreason-
able/ 'unfit to prescribe/ and 'obstinate'(the term Locke employs in
parts of the passage I have omitted). The behavior of the intolerant
individual is not simply imprudent.It is alsomorallycontemptible.
The moralcontemptwhich Lockereservesfor the intolerantis related
to his fundamentalthesis that autonomousor independentinquiryhas
51 Essay, IV.16.4, 659-60

intrinsicvalue. His perspectiveon the issue is well illustratedin a work

entitled On the Conductof the Understanding. There Locke defends the
right of individuals to read representative authorsof the severalsects of
philosophy and religion. He writes in this connection:
Let him exercise the freedom of his reason and understanding in such latitude as
this, and his mind will be strengthened, his capacity enlarged, his faculties im-
proved ... [this being the only way] to give the understanding its due improvement
to the full extent of its capacity.52
Thus, setting prudentialconsiderationsaside, one reasonwhy we owe

tolerationto others is because exposure to controversialopinions con-
tributesto each individual'scapacityfor autonomousinquiry.
But why regard this cultivation of the understandingas a morally
importantobjective?Locke'sviews about the importanceof a free un-
derstanding are complex. He seems to view freedom of the under-
standing as a process good. It is a good thing for individuals to engage
in independentinquiry- even if these inquiriescannotbe expected to
lead to good outcomesin the form of truebeliefs.
To elaborate,as we have seen, Lockemaintainsthattruthis inaccessi-
ble in the domain of naturalphilosophy, and is pessimistic about the
prospects for its achievement in ethics and religion. Nonetheless, he
maintains that we are duty-bound to mount appropriateinquiries in
these areas.In the case of naturalphilosophy,Lockeconcedes that only
the virtuosi will make progress.In consequence,he concedes that not
everyone is under a duty to study nature. But in ethics and religion
mattersare different.Eachindividual is responsiblefor makingproper
use of theircapacitiesfor inquiry.In both cases, the duty of inquiryis a
duty owed to God.53
Locke's position sounds like perfectionism- and for taxonomic
purposesit is indeed a species of perfectionism.It is greatlymistakento
suppose, however, that Lockeis simply attemptingto revive the tradi-
tion of classical eudaimonism. Locke is no less hostile to Aristotelian
perfectionismthan his greatskepticalpredecessorThomasHobbes:
52 On the Conductof the Understanding,Works,Vol. VHI, 213
53 Tor 'tis rational to conclude, that our proper Imployment lies in those Enquiries,
and in that sort of Knowledge, which is most suited to our natural Capacities, and
carries in it our greatest interest, i.e. the Condition of our eternal Estate. Hence, I
think I may conclude that Morality is the properScience,and Business of Mankind in
general; (who are both concerned, and fitted to search out their Summum Bonum)'
(Essay, Book IV.12.11, 646).

502 Sam Black
it was, I think, that the Philosophers of old did in vain inquire, whether Summum
bonum consisted in Riches, or bodily Delights, or Virtue, or Contemplation: And
they might have as reasonably disputed, whether the best Relish were to be found
in Apples, Plumbs, or Nuts; and have divided themselves in to Sects upon it. For as
pleasant Tastes depend not on the things themselves, but their agreeableness to this
or that particular Palate, wherein there is great variety: So the greatest Happiness
consists, in having those things, which produce the greatest Pleasure; and in the
absence of those, which cause any disturbance, any pain.... Men chuse different
things, and yet all chuse right.54
Locke is a subjectivistabout the actual contentsof the good life. The

content of the good life is given accordingto the desires or choices of
individualagents- subjectto the proviso that these choicesare consis-
tent with the ultra-minimalcreed.
A subjectivismabout the good life can generallybe reconciledwith
assigningimportanceto freeinquiry.Formost subjectivistsareprepared
to concede that certain cognitive shortcomings can cause people to
misidentifythe natureof theirgood. A personmay have falsebeliefs.Or
they may fail to appreciatethe consequencesof their choices, or other-
wise lack the ability to assess their decisions. Given these obstaclesto
choice many subjectivistsbelieve that people have a stake in ensuring
that the cognitive processes,which help to generatetheirdesires,are in
good working order. By extension, participationin free inquiry can
contributeto the end of makingpersonsbetterchoosers.Theexplanation
forwhy a subjectivistaboutvalue canrecommendfreeinquiryis reason-
ably straightforward.
WhereLockediffersfromordinarysubjectivistsis in holding that the
aim of keeping our capacitiesfor inquiry in good working order is a
stringent duty. Each person is bound, he believes, to the Creatorto
strugglewith theirchoices.Locke'ssubjectivismis not ordinarybecause
it is coupled with this deontologicalaccount of our epistemic duties.55
Locke'sposition is also self-consciouslydifferentfrom classicaleudai-
monism.
54 Essay, 11.21.55,269-70. 1 disagree with Nicholas Wolterstorff's assertion that Locke

is 'better thought of as standing in the long classical tradition of eudaimonism/ See
his JohnLockeand the Ethicsof Belief(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996),
135.
55 For contemporary examples of ordinary or non-deontological subjectivism about

nonmoral value, see R.B. Brandt, A Theory of the Good and the Right (Oxford:
Clarendon Press 1979), chaps. 6-7; and Peter Railton, Tacts and Values/ Philosophical
Topics14, 2 (1986) 5-31.

How does this particularconceptionof value then lend coherenceto

Locke'sviews on toleration?The skepticaltolerationquestion arises,it
will be recalled,because a skepticismabout religion or ethics needn't
imply a commitmentto the duty of toleration.Skepticismis compatible
with the outright rejectionof a right of conscience- as Hobbes had
shown. But reason is on the side of toleration,accordingto Locke,for
two reasons.First,tolerationmakespragmaticsense.Inthe case of public
life, Lockeputs forwardthese pragmaticargumentsin the FirstLetter.
With regardto private life, the pragmaticargumentis presentedin the
Essay.Second, reason is on the side of tolerationbecause people are
misused when they are punished for theirconvictions(barringcases of
nonconformitywith the ultra-minimalcreed).They are wronged in the
sense that each individual is presumed to have a basic interestin the
cultivationand exerciseof their powers for inquiry.For they are duty-
bound to their Creatorto struggle with their ethical and religious con-
victions. In orderto dischargethis duty, it is importantthat they be left
at libertyto pursue the religionof theirchoosing.56
An adequate presentationof the Lockean argument for toleration
would then have to supplementthe precedingfourpremisesas follows:
(5) MitigatedSkepticismover Religious and EthicalDoctrines:The

known truthsof religionare confinedto the ultra-minimalcreed.
The remainderbeliefs about the good life are mattersof opinion.
(6) The MoralValue of a FreeUnderstanding:Individualsare duty-

bound to assess forthemselvesthe importantpracticalissues over
which humanbeings are fallible.
56 Here I take issue with Richard Tuck. Tuck claims that Locke's views on toleration
can be ascribed to exclusively pragmatic concerns: chiefly, the maintenance of public
order. Tuck argues that this pragmatic emphasis is itself a response to skepticism.
This is at most half of the story where Locke is concerned. It contains two important
omissions. First, while Locke does believe that the maintenance of public order is
important, he traces its value to the law of nature, and the protection of property.
The law of nature is a known moral truth rather than the outcome of pragmatic
accommodation. Second, Locke's emphasis on the moral value of the freedom of
the understanding cannot be accounted for in terms of the pragmatic goal of
maintaining political stability. See Richard Tuck, 'Scepticism and Toleration in the
Seventeenth Century,' in S. Mendus, ed., Justifying Toleration(Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press 1988) 21-35 (esp. 35). Tuck's account of the Lockean argu-
ment makes it resemble what Bernard Williams calls the argument for toleration
from a 'Hobbesian equilibrium.' See his Toleration: An Impossible Virtue,' in D.
Heyd, ed., Toleration(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1996).

504 Sam Black
Theseadditionalpremisessupportthe conclusionthatthereis a duty of

toleration.From (5) it follows that a policy of intolerancetowards per-
sons who conformto the ultra-minimalcreedservesno legitimatemoral
purpose. From (6), it can be inferredthat intolerancewould frustrate
certainbasichumaninterests.Put anotherway, whateversocialbenefits
may be alleged to follow from persecution,these benefits are trumped
by the good of furtheringskepticalinquiry.
Hobbes and Locke hold much in common. Each is devoted to a
contractualtest for legitimategovernment.Eachis led to contractarian-
ism following a brush with the revival of classical skepticism.Where
Lockediffersfrom Hobbes initiallyis in his commitmentto an ideal of
personalautonomy.It is noteworthythatwhile Hobbesendorses(5),he
rejects(6).This differenceleads Hobbesto favora formof absolutismto
which Lockeis resolutelyopposed. Whatthis shows, I believe,is thatthe
foundations for a recognizablyliberal political culture are laid when
certainformsof skepticismaresupplementedwith the recognitionof the
intrinsicvalue of independentinquiry.A commitmentto some form of
autonomy is indispensablefor giving a full justificationfor the public
institutionswhich define our way of life.
Received:May, 1997
Revised:September,1997
Revised:March, 1998


Toleration and The Skeptical

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Canadian Journal of Philosophy

Toleration and the Skeptical Inquirer in Locke

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1 I wish to thank Roger Woolhouse,Ed Hundert,Sue James,Phil Hanson, Bjorn

This content downloaded from 62.122.79.31 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 01:10:57 AM

from prudence gets supplemented with the idea that tolerationis a

2 Butsee footnote#36fordiscussionof somecommentatorswho rejecttheconnection

3 Theimpactof metaphysicalnaturalismon ethicsis what HilaryPutnammistakenly

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little to do with the 'Galileanworldview/ scientificnaturalism,or the

4 Therearesome antecedentsforunderstandingLockeas being influencedby classi-

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scope of moral and religious knowledge. It recommends a form of

I The Modest Theory Of Knowledge

The first edition of the Essay ConcerningHuman Understanding was

5 An Essay ConcerningHuman Understanding,P.H. Nidditch, ed. (Oxford: Clarendon

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The certaintyof a belief is what marksoff knowledge from opinion.

tions thatareinferredthroughvalid rules.Locketermsthis demonstrativeknowl-

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sciences.Forthe presentand foreseeablefuture,knowledgeof an object's

9 For examples of Locke's departures from the common-sense view of knowledge,

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of these intuited truths,Lockeclaims that we can infer that God exists.

(i) thereis a God;(ii)God is omnipotent,omniscientand providential;(iii)thisGod

I shallreferto theseconvictionscollectivelyas theultra-minimal

11 On (ii) God's attributes,Essay,IV.10.4,620 and IV.10.12,625. On (iii) the duty of

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If naturalreason can genuinely grasp the ultra-minimalcreed then

622. WilliamSpellmandescribesthe 'minimalcreed' that was affirmedby many

12 "Throughthe worksof nature,in every partof them,sufficientlyevidencea Deity;

13 'Butnaturalreligion,in its full extent,was nowhere,thatI know, takencareof, by

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This throws light on Locke'sotherwise surprisingthesis - put for-

the forceof naturalreason.It should seem,by the littlethathas hithertobeen done

14 On these Heathens,Lockewrites that:'The same sparkof the divine natureand

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cepts taken in isolation.Lockegives as examples the propositionsthat

forMenbeingall the Workmanshipof one Omnipotent,and infinitelywise Maker;

15 Essay,IV.3.18,549-50.For more on essences in ethics and mathematics,IV.4.7-9,

16 Second Treatiseof Government,in Two Treatisesof Government,P. Laslett, ed. (Cam-

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This odd mix of metaphors is the centerpiece of Locke's account of

17 Thesedutiesinclude(i) respectingrightsof propertysuchthattheftand murderare

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II The State and Its Limits

Thereis, for Locke,a basic relationshipbetween the limits of knowledge

19 A First LetterConcerningToleration,Works,Vol. VI, 10 & 42-4

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Startingwith the former,the state'spositive authorityis connectedto

20 See generally, TheSecondTreatiseof Government,chaps. 5-7.

21 TheSecondTreatiseof Government,chap. 9, #123-7, 350-2

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understood in the seventeenth century. Grotius,for example, was in-

(1) The Principleof TransferredAuthority:The state possesses no

(2) The Priorityof PropertyRights:It is an articleof knowledge that

So farso good. People'sstakein the system of propertyrightsis a known

23 Comparethe aforementionedpassages from TheEssay,IV.11.13,638 and IV.13.3,

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ritualsaremistaken.Itis this secondlimitationon stateaction- the duty

(3) TheArgumentFromConviction:worshiponly pleasesGodwhen

(4) The ArgumentFromGovernmentFallibility:magistratesare un-

24 For references to property rights in TheLetter,see note # 19.