Section 25- Parental and filial privilege

Art. 215, FC
78. Lee v. CA, GR 177861, July 13, 2010, Abad, J., Second Division. (Claiming to be a Stepmother)
FACTS:
Sps. Lee and Keh entered PH as immigrants from China in 1930. They had 11 children (Lee-Keh children). In 1948, Lee brought from China a young woman named
Tiu supposedly as housemaid. Respondent Lee-Keh children believe that Tiu left the Lee-Keh household and lived into another property of Lee nearby and had a
relation with him. The Lee-Keh children learned that Tiu’s children with Lee (Lee-Tiu children) were claiming that they, too, were the children of Lee and Keh. Lee-
Keh children filed a petition in RTC for deletion from the certificate of live birth of petitioner Emma Lee, one of the supposed Lee-Tiu children, the name of Keh and
replace it with Tiu.

Lee-Keh children filed with the RTC a request for issuance of subpoena ad testificandum to compel Tiu, Emma’s presumed mother, to testify in the case. RTC issued
then quashed the subpoena for being unreasonable and oppressive. CA reversed. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Contention: Tiu claims that she has the right not to testify against her stepdaughter petitioner Emma Lee under R130, S25.
HELD:
1) The ground to quash subpoena on the ground that it is unreasonable and oppressive applies only for subpoena duces tecum as provided under R21, S4.

2) R130, S25 is an adaptation from a similar provision in Article 315 of the Civil Code that applies only in criminal cases. But those who revised the Rules of Civil
Procedure chose to extend the prohibition to all kinds of actions, whether civil, criminal, or administrative, filed against parents and other direct ascendants or
descendants.

But here Tiu, who invokes the filial privilege, claims that she is the stepmother of petitioner Emma Lee. The privilege cannot apply to them because the rule applies
only to "direct" ascendants and descendants, a family tie connected by a common ancestry . A stepdaughter has no common ancestry by her stepmother. Article
965 thus provides:

Art. 965. The direct line is either descending or ascending. The former unites the head of the family with those who descend from him. The latter binds a
person with those from whom he descends.
Consequently, Tiu can be compelled to testify against petitioner Emma Lee.

79. People v. Invencion y Soriano, GR 131636, March 05, 2003, Davide, Jr., CJ., En Banc. (Son can voluntarily testify against father in criminal case and
waive filial PRIVILEGE)
FACTS:
Accused Artemio Invencion was charged in RTC with 13 counts of rape. The witnesses for the prosecution were, among others, Elven Invencion, 8yo. Elven testified
that he is the half brother of Cynthia and son of Artemio with his second common-law wife. Sometime in 1996, he was awakened by Cynthia’s loud cries. When he
looked, he saw his father on top of Cynthia, doing a pumping motion. After 2 minutes, his father put on his short pants.

RTC convicted Artemio for 1 count of rape. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether Elven, son of accused Artemio, can testify against his father despite the filial privilege rule if Elven desires to do so.
HELD: YES.
As to the competency of Elven to testify, we rule that such is not affected R130, S25 of the Rules of Court, otherwise known as the rule on "filial privilege." This rule
is not strictly a rule on disqualification because a descendant is not incompetent or disqualified to testify against an ascendant. The rule refers to a PRIVILEGE not
to testify, which can be invoked or waived like other privileges. As correctly observed by the lower court, Elven was not compelled to testify against his father; he
chose to waive that filial privilege when he voluntarily testified against Artemio. Elven declared that he was testifying as a witness against his father of his own
accord and only "to tell the truth."

3. Admissions and Confessions

Sec. 26. Admissions of a Party
80. Sanvicente v. People, GR 132081, November 26, 2002, Ynares-Santiago, J., First Division.
(See case 72 on admission vs confession of the lawyer’s letter to the police)

81. People v. Omictin y Singco, GR 188130, July 26, 2010, Velasco, Jr., J., First Division.
FACTS:
Primo Guevarra, private complaint, arrived in PH after his employment contract in Libya expired. He was referred to Omictin who was supposed to be a recruiter for
overseas employment. Omictin met Guevarra along with Anthony Ambrosio and Elisa Dotimas. The three agreed to pay Omictin P40k each for their deployment to
London as caregivers. All three gave Omictin P10k as initial payment. Omictin assured them that they would leave for London within 60-90days. Guevarra also had a
medical examination, during which he paid Omictin an additional P10k. Later, Guevarra completed his payment by giving the balance of P20k to Omictin. Omictin
told Gueverra that she would schedule a contract signing at a later date. But this never happened. Later, Guevarra was able to meet with Omictin who promised to
return the money but she never did. Ambrosio was able to pay only P16k and was also not deployed.

All 4 private complainants (including another Roy) filed complaints against Omictin in NBI. Omictin was arrested after an entrapment operation. Omictin was
charged with illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa.

RTC convicted Omictin. CA affirmed. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE:
Contention: The testimony of Ambrosio that he gave Omictin P16k is unsubstantiated by any proof any is self serving. The testimony of Primo shows that he was not
the one who paid Omictin. His testimony that the check was issued by a certain Elisa and was paid by the bank is hearsay and thus inadmissible.
HELD:
1) Petitioner fails to take into account the distinction between self-serving statements and testimonies made in court. Self-serving statements are those made by a
party out of court advocating his own interest; they do not include a party's testimony as a witness in court. Self-serving statements are inadmissible because the
adverse party is not given the opportunity for cross-examination, and their admission would encourage fabrication of testimony. This cannot be said of a party's
testimony in court made under oath, with full opportunity on the part of the opposing party for cross-examination.

2) Assuming that the testimonies of Guevarra and Ambrosio are unsubstantiated and self-serving, still Omictin ADMITTED during trial the substance of their
testimonies. Omictin testified before RTC:
 Q So how much did each of the four complainants paid (sic) you for the processing of their visa?
A Arvin [Guevarra] and Roy [Mago], P40,000.00 each.
Q How about this Anthony Ambrosio?
A P16,000.00
Thus, Omictin admitted that she was paid by Guevarra of P40k and Ambrosio of P16k. SC affirmed CA.

82. Heirs of Clemeña v. Heirs of Bien, GR 155508, September 11, 2006, Corona, J., Second Division. (Judicial admission in the answer of the substituting
defendant’s predecessor binds the substituting defendants)
FACTS:
A land covered by Tax Dec (TD) 5299 was one of 3 lots involved in 2 cases for recovery of possession and ownership filed in the 1940s by Irene Bien, respondents’
predecessor, against Pedro Clemeña y Zurbano, petitioners’ predecessor. Irene alleged in her complaint that she owns the land but Pedro Clemeña Zurbano occupied
and usurped possession thereof. In his answer, Pedro Zurzano alleged that the land was his and that it was in his exclusive possession.

Irene died and was substituted by respondents. Pedro Clemeña Zurbano died and was substituted by petitioners. RTC ruled that both parties failed to prove their
claims of ownership and thus the land still belonged to its original owner, the estate of the late Pedro Clemeña y Conde. CA reversed, awarding P118k damages to
respondents for having been deprived of possession of the land. CA ruled that respondents owned the land. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Contention: Petitioners no longer dispute respondents’ ownership but claim that they are not liable to respondents because they never took possession of the land in
TD 5299. The Gregorio Clemeña’s testimony was also self-serving.
HELD:
1) Petitioners’ predecessor Pedro Zurbano alleged in his answer that the land in TD 5299 was in his exclusive possession. This statement is a judicial admission
under R129, S4. A judicial admission conslusively binds the party making it. As substituting defendants, they were bound by the admission of Pedro Clemeña y
Zurbano, their predecessor in the litigation. Without any showing that the admission was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made,
petitioners cannot now contradict it.

2) "Self-serving evidence" is not to be taken literally to mean any evidence that serves its proponent's interest. The term, if used with any legal sense, refers only to
acts or declarations made by a party in his own interest at some place and time out of court, and it does not include testimony that he gives as a witness in court.
Evidence of this sort is excluded on the same ground as any hearsay evidence, that is, lack of opportunity for cross-examination by the adverse party and on the
consideration that its admission would open the door to fraud and fabrication. In contrast, a party's testimony in court is sworn and subject to cross-examination by the
other party, and therefore, not susceptible to an objection on the ground that it is self- serving.

Section. 27. Offer of compromise not admissible

83. People v. Magdadaro y Gerona, GR 89370-72, May 15, 1991, Melencio-Herrera, J., Second Division. (Asking for forgiveness, offering to pay damages)
FACTS:
Paulino Magdadaro, a 54-yo farmer and married, is accused of 3 counts of rape. Complainant Beverlinda Abrasado is a 16yo country girl, Grade IV student, daughter
of Leonardo. Beverlinda narrated that while gathering guyabano near Magdadaro’s house, Magdadaro suddenly appeared, held her by the hand, and pulled her
towards the cornfield nearby. He boxed her in the stomach, making her lose consciousness. When she regained her senses, Magdadaro was already on top of her,
taking advantage of her womanhood.

On Aug. 21, 1988, Beverlinda was tethering a carabao in a grassy area. Magdadaro, from out of the bushes, appeared and chased her, and caught her by the hand.
Beverlinda shouted for help. He boxed her in the stomach. She lost consciousness. Regaining her senses, Magdadaro was already having carnal knowledge of her.
Leonardo, Beverlinda’s father, heard the shouts and went to their direction. He saw Magdadaro abusing his daughter. Enraged, he unsheathed his bolo and chased
Magdadaro. But Magdadaro was quick on his feet and ran away naked, leaving his pants, underwear, and hat.

He was later found in the bushes with no pants. The brgy. Captain asked Magdadaro, “why did you do it?” But Magdadaro did not respond. He was then arrested.

Leonardo testified that on his way to city hall on Aug. 22, 1988 with Sgt. Romero, his wife, and Magdadaro, Magdadaro asked for forgiveness twice and offered to
pay damages but Leonardo refused. Again, during the investigation at the fiscal’s office, Magdadaro asked for settlement of the case, but Leonardo did not answer.

RTC convicted Magdadaro. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether there was admission by silence.
Whether the offers to pay damages are admissible against Magdadaro.
HELD: YES.
1) His silence when asked by the Barangay Captain "why he had done it?" is likewise significant. "Silence is assent as well as consent, and may, where a direct and
specific accusation of crime is made, be regarded under some circumstances as a quasi- confession. An innocent person will at once naturally and emphatically repel
an accusation of crime, as a matter of self-preservation and self-defense, and as a precaution against prejudicing himself. A person's silence, therefore, particularly
when it is persistent, will justify an inference that he is not innocent"

2) Magdadaro’s offers to settle the case in exchange for money or land, which were all rejected by Beverlinda's father, were correctly appreciated by the RTC as
evidence of his culpability. An offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt.

CIVIL CASES
84. Smith Bell and Company (Philippines), Inc. v. CA, GR 56294, May 20, 1991, Feliciano, J., En Banc.
FACTS:
At 3:50AM of May 3, 1970, a collision took place between MV Don Carlos, an inter-island vessel owned by respondent Carlos Go Thong, and MS Yotai Maru, a
merchant vessel of Japanese registry. Don Carlos was sailing south bound leaving the port of Manila for Cebu, while Yotai Maru was approaching the port of Manila,
coming in from Kobe, Japan. Don Carlos rammed the left side of Yotai Maru inflicting a 3cm hole thru which seawater rushed into Hatch No. 3 thereof, damaging all
cargo therein. The cargo consignees were paid by their insurance companies who, in turn, filed actions against Go thong for damages in CFI.

Smith Bell Company, Inc., Sumitomo Marine and Fire Insurance Company, Ltd., and Tokyo Marine and Fire Insurance Company, Inc. filed 2 cases in CFI against Go
Thong.

CFI ruled in the 2 cases that Go Thong was liable. CA affirmed in one case, but held in the other case that it was Yotai Maru that was at fault and not Don Carlos and
dismissed the complaint. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Contention: CA Justice Sison erred in accepting Go Thong’s defense that the question of fault on the part of the "Yotai Maru" had been settled by the compromise
agreement between the owner of the "Yotai Maru" and Go Thong as owner of the "Don Carlos;"
HELD:
Contention: Go Thong argues that a compromise agreement entered into between Sanyo Shipping Company as owner of the "Yotai Maru" and Go Thong as owner of
the "Don Carlos," under which Sanyo paid P268,000.00 to Go Thong effectively settled that the "Yotai Maru" had been at fault. This argument is wanting in both
factual basis and legal substance.
Held:
True it is that by virtue of the compromise agreement, the owner of the "Yotai Maru" paid a sum of money to the owner of the "Don Carlos." Nowhere, however, in
the compromise agreement did the owner of the "Yotai Maru" admit or concede that the "Yotai Maru" had been at fault in the collision. An offer of compromise is
not an admission that anything is due, and is not admissible in evidence against the person making the offer.

A compromise is an agreement between two (2) or more persons who, in order to forestall or put an end to a law suit, adjust their differences by mutual consent, an
adjustment which everyone of them prefers to the hope of gaining more, balanced by the danger of losing more. An offer to compromise does NOT involve an
admission on the part of a defendant that he is legally liable, nor on the part of a plaintiff that his claim or demand is groundless or even doubtful, since the
compromise is arrived at precisely with a view to avoiding further controversy and saving the expenses of litigation. It is of the very nature of an offer of compromise
that it is made tentatively, hypothetically and in contemplation of mutual concessions. The above rule on compromises is anchored on public policy of the most
insistent and basic kind; that the incidence of litigation should be reduced and its duration shortened to the maximum extent feasible.

85. Tan v. Rodil Enterprises, GR 168071, December 18, 2006, Chico-Nazario, J., First Division. (Offer of compromise with judicial admission)
FACTS:
Rodil Enterprises is leasing the Ides O Racca Building from the Republic. It subleased various units of the property to members of the Ides O Racca Building Tenants
Association, Inc. A space thereof, known as Botica Divisoria, was subleased to petitioner Luciano Tan. Rodil Enterprises filed a complaint for unlawful detainer
against Luciano Tan, alleging that Tan bound himself to pay under a Contract of Sublease a monthly rental of P13,750. But Tan refused to pay the rentals from
September 1997 up to the filing of the complaint despite demand.

In 2000, MeTC issued an order, recognizing an agreement entered into in open court by Tan and Rodil:
On second call, the parties and counsel agreed in principle in open court to the following terms to put an end to this civil case for ejectment between
them:
1.) that [Luciano Tan] will pay P440,000.00 representing rentals from September, 1997 up to the present, which is the outstanding obligation of [Luciano
Tan] as of June, 2000, on or before June 30, 2000; and
2.) [Luciano Tan] will pay the monthly rentals computed at P13,750.00 on or before the 5th day of each month after June 30, 2000.
Tan moved to be allowed to deposit rentals amounting to P467k in arrears and the subsequent rentals, that the rentals in arrears from September 1997 amounted
to P467.5k, and thus he would like to deposit said amount. But MeTC denied the motion, realizing that Tan’s prayer to deposit the amount with the City Treasurer of
Manila contravenes R70, S19 of RoC.

MeTC then ruled for Rodil RTC reversed, holding that MeTC erred in stating that Tan’s offer to compromise was an admission of fact, this being contrary to R130,
S27. CA reversed RTC and reinstated the MeTC decision. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the agreement between Tan and Rodil for compromise is admissible in evidence against Tan for containing an admission.
HELD: YES.
The general rule is an offer of compromise in a civil case is not an admission of liability. It is not admissible in evidence against the offeror. But this rule is not
ironclad. To determine the admissibility or non-admissibility of an offer to compromise, the circumstances of the case and the intent of the party making the offer
should be considered. Thus, if a party denies the existence of a debt but offers to pay the same for the purpose of buying peace and avoiding litigation , the offer
of settlement is inadmissible. If in the course thereof, the party making the offer ADMITS the existence of an indebtedness combined with a proposal to settle the
claim amicably, then, the admission is admissible to prove such indebtedness.

Here, MeTC found that tan did not contest the existence of the sublease and his counsel made frank representations as to Tan’s liability. The existence of the contract
was not denied by Tan. There is a categorical admission by Tan, not only as to his liability, but also, as to the amount of indebtedness in the form of rentals due. The
Order of the MeTC dated 27 June 2000 was clear that the petitioner agreed in open court to pay the amount of P440,000.00, representing petitioner's unpaid rentals
from September 1997 to June 2000; and that petitioner will pay the monthly rentals computed at P13,750.00 on or before the 5th day of each month after 30 June
2000. The petitioner's judicial admission in open court finds particular significance when viewed together with his Motion to Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals,
wherein petitioner stated that the rentals due on the premises in question from September 1997 up to the present amounted to P467,500.00, as of the date of
filing the Motion. Petitioner cannot now be allowed to reject the same. An admission made in the pleading cannot be controverted by the party making such
admission and are conclusive as to him, and that all proofs submitted by him contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith should be ignored whether objection is
interposed by a party or not.

86. Servicewide Specialists, Inc. v. CA, GR 117728, June 26, 1996, Puno, J., Second Division. (Compromise not admission of liability, more so as against third
person)
FACTS:
Sps. Tolosa purchased from Biñan motors one jeepney for P48k to be paid in 24 monthly installments. The spouses executed a promissory note and deed of chattel
mortgage over the vehicle in favor of Biñan. Servicewide later acquired the rights over said note and mortgage. Sps. Tolosa failed to pay the installments despite
demands. Petitioner Servicewide filed a complaint for replevin and sum of money in CFI against respondents Sps. Tolosa, Servicewide later amended its complaint by
adding Eduardo Garcia as defendant, alleging that Sps. Tolosa executed a deed of sale with assumption of mortgage over the jeep in favor of Garcia.

Sps. Tolosa filed a third party complaint, impleading as third party defendants Biñan Motors and Garcia. The sheriff seized the vehicle from the possession of one
Lourdes Bartina. Bartina then filed a Third party claim and motion for release, alleging ownership of the jeepney, claiming that she purchased the vehicle from Biñan
Motors.

RTC ordered the release of the jeep to Bartina on a bond of P34k. Despite this order, the jeep was not released to Bartina. Later, Bartina and Garcia and Biñan Motors
moved to dismiss complaint in intervention, alleging that they had arrived at an amicable settlement of their claims. This was granted.

RTC ruled in favor of Servicewide, granting it the right to foreclose the mortgage on the vehicle or to demand from defendants P34k. Garcia moved for
reconsideration, claiming that he was not one of the defendants in the principal case. RTC denied. CA relieved Garcia from liability. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the compromise between Bartina, Garcia, and Biñan Motors is an admission that Garcia is also liable for Servicewide’s claim.
HELD: NO.
We also hold that the compromise between Bartina and Garcia and Biñan Motors cannot be taken as an admission of Garcia's liability. In civil cases, an offer of
compromise is not an admission of any liability. With more reason, a compromise agreement should not be treated as an admission of liability on the part of the
parties vis-a-vis a third person. The compromise settlement of a claim or cause of action is not an admission that the claim is valid, but merely admits that there is a
dispute, and that an amount is paid to be rid of the controversy, nor is a compromise with one person an admission of any liability to someone else. The policy of the
law should be, and is, to encourage compromises. When they are made, the rights of third parties are not in any way affected thereby.

SC thus held that Garcia’s liability solidarily with Sps. Tolosa was not proven.

87. Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. PAL Employees Savings & Loan Association, Inc., GR 201073, February 10, 2016, Perez, J., Third Division. (Offer of
compromise without expressed or implied denial of liability and with assurance of payment)
FACTS:
Respondent PESALA is authorized to operate as a savings and loan association under RA 3779. PAL sanctions and supports the operations of PESALA and allows it
to implement an arrangement whereby PESALA collects loan repayments and deposits from its members by payroll deduction thru the facilities of PAL.

On July 11, 1997, PESALA received a letter from PAL informing it that PAL will implement a maximum 40% salary deduction on all its PH based employees by
Aug. 1, 1997. Foreseeing difficulties, PESALA estimated that if the 40% ceiling will be implemented, “"then only around 8% (P19,200,000.00) of the total monthly
payroll of P240,000,000.00 due to PESALA will be collected by PAL. The balance of around P48,000,000.00 will have to be collected directly by plaintiff PESALA
from its members who number around 13,000 and who have different offices nationwide."

PESALA filed a complaint for specific performance in RTC against PAL, praying that PAL be prohibited from implementing the 40% limitation on salary deductions.
RTC issued a TRO. Later, RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction on the implementation of the 40% limit. PAL failed to comply with the TRO and injunction.
Thus, RTC ordered PAL to remit to PESALA P44M for the pay period from September 1997 to February 15, 1998.

During the hearing on Dec. 4, 1998, PAL’s counsel Attys. Pena and Blanco assured the court that PAL will regularly remit to PESALA the full amount per pay
period and that it will remit the balance of P44M previously unremitted. But PAL failed to make good on its word.

RTC made the writ of preliminary injunction that it issued earlier as permanent, enjoining the implementation of the 40% maximum on deductions. CA affirmed.
Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the assurances of PAL’s counsels that they will regularly remit the full amount required to be remitted to PESALA, if viewed as an offer of compromise, is
admissible in evidence.
HELD: YES.
In open court, during the hearing held on December 4, 1998, Atty. Pena and Atty. Blanco assured that: (1) PAL will regularly remit to PESALA the full amount per
pay period that is due to the latter; and (2) PAL will likewise pay PESALA the balance of the previously undeducted amount of P44,488,716.41 by January 1999.

Even if viewed as an offer of compromise, which is generally inadmissible in evidence against the offeror in civil cases, PAL's acknowledgment of its liability to
PESALA in the amount of P44,488,716.41 falls under one of the exceptions to the rule of exclusion of compromise negotiations.

In Tan v. Rodil, we held that if there is neither an expressed nor implied denial of liability, but during the course of negotiations the defendant expressed a
willingness to pay the plaintiff, then such offer of the defendant can be taken in evidence against him.

In the case at bar, PAL admitted the amount of P44,488,716.41 without an expressed nor implied denial of liability. This admission, coupled with an assurance of
payment, binds PAL.

Thus, SC held that PAL is liable to remit the P44M with 6% interest per annum.

CRIMINAL CASES
88. People v. De Joya y Cruz, GR 75028, November 08, 1991, Feliciano, J., First Division.
FACTS:
Sps. Arnedo and Herminia Valencia, with their 10yo son Alvin and Herminia’s 88yo mother Eulalia are residents of Bulacan. Herminia left for school to teach. Eulalia
was then sitting at their sofa watching TV. When Alvin later reached home, he saw his grandmother Eulalia lying down prostrate and drenched with her own blood.
He ran to her, held her hands, and asked what happened. Eulalia held his hand and after which said: “Si Paqui.” After saying these words, she died. The two gold rings
and right earring worn by Eulalia were missing.

Pioquinto De Joya was charged with robbery with homicide. He pleaded not guilty. RTC convicted De Joya, taking into consideration the dying statement of Eulalia,
“Si Paqui,” among others. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether the dying declaration of “Si Paqui” is admissible.
Whether De Joya had offered to compromise the criminal charge where he had made the son-in-law of the victim talk to his lawyer about a possible settlement where
he himself did not say anything.
HELD: NO.
1) A dying declaration, to be admissible, must be complete in itself. To be complete in itself does not mean that the declarant must recite everything that constituted
the res gestae of the subject of his statement, but that his statement of any given fact should be a full expression of all that he intended to say as conveying his
meaning in respect of such fact. It is immaterial how much of the whole affair of the death is related, provided the statement includes all that the declarant wished or
intended to include in it. Thus, if an interruption (by death or by an intruder) cuts short a statement which thus remains clearly less than that which the dying person
wished to make, the fragmentary statement is not receivable, because the intended whole is not there, and the whole might be of a very different effect from that of
the fragment; yet if the dying person finishes the statement he wishes to make, it is no objection that he has told only a portion of what he might have been able to
tell."

The reason why incomplete declarations are generally excluded or, if admitted, accorded little to no weight, is that since declarant was prevented by death or other
circumstance from saying all he wished to say, what he did say might have been qualified by the statements which he was prevented from making.

Here, RTC simply assumed that by uttering the words "Si Paqui", the deceased had intended to name the person who had thrust some sharp instrument through and
through her neck just below her ears. But Eulalia herself did not say so and we cannot speculate what the rest of her communication might have been had death not
interrupted her.

2) Arnedo Valencia, Eulalia’s son-in-law, testified that before the release of accused from the municipal jail, he had a conversation with his counsel thus:
 Q What was this conversation about?
A He called for me and took me to his counsel Atty. Aguilar and according to him if only Atty. Aguilar can talk with me, everything will be settled.
Q What did you and Atty. Aguilar discuss when you finally was able to see Atty. Aguilar?
A When I went there, I was introduced to Atty. Aguilar and Atty. Aguilar asked me as to what I liked to happen.
Q What did you say?
A I said if it will be settled, well and good.
Q Anything else that transpired?
A He even told me if I might be able to convince both my wife and her sisters.
Q Did he tell you he can settle this?
A He was very certain that he can settle this, the very reason why he told me because I was very certain as to what happened.
Q Was the accused Pioquinto de Joya present when you were discussing this with his lawyer?
AYes,sir.
Q He heard who this lawyer was telling you?
A It is possible because he is only one or two meters distance away.
Q Did the accused say anything?
A None, sir."

SC held that the above testimony is impalpable and inconclusive as to the supposed attempt of De Joya thru his counsel to offer a compromise on the criminal
charge. We are aware of R130, S24. But we do not feel justified in concluding from the above testimony from a member of the (extended) family of the deceased
victim that "an offer of compromise" had been made "by the accused" nor that "an implied admission of guilt" on the part of the appellant may be reasonably inferred
in the instant case. RTC itself made no mention of any attempt on the part of appellant to settle the criminal case amicably through the defense counsel; we must
assume that the trial court either did not believe that appellant had tried to compromise the criminal case or considered that appellant could not fairly be deemed to
have impliedly admitted that he had indeed robbed and killed Eulalia Diamse. A much higher level of explicitness and specific detail is necessary to justify a
conclusion that an accused had impliedly admitted his guilt of a crime as serious as robbery with homicide.

SC thus acquitted De Joya.

89. People v. Mejia y Villafania, GR 118940-41, July 07, 1997, Davide, Jr., J., En Banc. (Parents of accused approaching victim, offering to compromise
without authority from accused)
FACTS:
Several persons on board a jeepney driven by Landingin attacked the latter and a passenger, Catugas, thereby inflicting upon them multiple stab wounds. Landingin
was dumped on the shoulder of the road. One of the attackers took the wheel of the jeepney and drove away. Catugas was thrown out to the middle of the road.
Landingin died. Catugas survived. 9 were held to account for the acts, but only accused Mejia, Benito, Paraan, and Fabito were taken into police custody and charged
with 3 separate criminal complaints for murder, frustrated murder, and violation of RA 6539, Anti Carnapping Act of 1992. Later, they were charged with such crimes
in RTC.

They were convicted by the lower courts based on the testimony of Catugas.

Catugas had admitted that he had demanded P80k from the parents of accused as settlement. The prosecution, trying to cushion the impact of Catugas’ demand for
P80k, wanted to prove that it was the parents of the accused-appellants that were the ones who proposed. But the testimony of Conrado Benito (parent of Benito),
which the prosecution failed to satisfactorily rebut, is that the parents went to see him to verify whether their children had indeed committed the crimes; but Catugas
replied that since the appellants were the ones apprehended, he would just pinpoint them so that he could recover what he had spent. He then demanded P80,000,
which he equally apportioned among the parents of the four appellants or P20k each. But the parents could not afford the P20k.

ISSUE:
Whether the parents of accused, in approaching the victim, offered to compromise and thus there is an implied admission of guilt on the part of the accused, their
children.
HELD: NO.
The lower court took the incident as offer of compromise which is an implied admission of guilt. But this is a misapplication of R130, S27. There is no evidence
whatsoever that any of the appellants AUTHORIZED his parents to approach Catugas or knew the matter of payment of P80,000. Moreover, if one were to believe
the explanation of Catugas that the amount of P80,000 represented the expenses he incurred for his hospitalization and medical bills, then the offer to reimburse it is
not admissible in evidence as proof of criminal liability pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 27 of Rule 130.

SC thus acquitted the accused since their guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.

90. San Miguel Corporation v. Kalalo, GR 185522, June 13, 2012, Sereno, J., Second Division. (Offer of compromise made prior to filing of criminal
complaint)
FACTS:
Kalalo had been a dealer of beer products since 1998. She had a credit overdraft arrangement with SMC whereby prior to delivery of beer products, she would be
required to issue 2 checks to SMC- a blank check and check to be filled up with an amount corresponding to the gross value of the goods delivered. At the end of the
week, Kalalo and an SMC agent would compute the amount due to SMC by deducting the value of the returned empty beer bottles from the gross value of the goods
delivered. Once they succeed in determining the actual amount owed to SMC, that amount would be written on the blank check, and Kalalo would fund her account
accordingly.

Kalalo’s business grew and the beer products delivered to her increased from 200 to 4000 cases a week. It became difficult for her to keep track of transactions. She
thus requested regular statements of account from SMC, but SMC failed to comply.

In 2000, SMC’s agent required Kalalo to issue several postdated checks to cope with the probable increase in orders during the Christmas season. She complied. But
after several cash payments and returning a number of empty beer bottles, she still owed SMC a substantial amount. She insisted that SMC give her a statement of
account, but SMC failed to do so. Thus, she ordered her bank to stop payment on the last 7 checks issued to SMC worth P921k.

SMC sent her a demand letter for the 7 checks. Kalalo’s consel wrote a letter (“Offer of Compromise”):
My client, Ms. HELEN T. KALALO of No. 1055-A Dagupan Street, Tondo, Manila, hereby acknowledges the receipt of the Statement of Account
demanding the payment of the sum of P816,689.00 representing her unpaid accounts.
She is respectfully submitting her proposal by way of "Compromise Agreement" to settle the said obligation:
Advance payment for the empties: P11,500.00
Installment of P10,000.00 per month for the principal, then later on for the interest due.

SMC did not accept the proposal. It filed a complaint for violation of BP 22.
During trial, SMC finally updated her account. The statement of account showed that Kalalo owed only P71k. MeTC dismissed the BP22 charge but ordered Kalalo to
pay SMC P71k. Appealing the civil aspect, SMC claims that it is entitled to P921k.

RTC affirmed MeTC. CA affirmed. Hence this R45 petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the “Offer of compromise” is admissible in the criminal case against Kalalo with MeTC.
HELD: NO.
1) The letter does not contain an express acknowledgment of liability

2) SMC argues that the offer of compromise may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt under R130, S27. But the offer of compromise dated Dec.
05, 2000 was made PRIOR to the FILING of the CRIMINAL COMPLAINT against her on March 09, 2001 for violation of BP22. The Offer of Compromise
was clearly not made in the context of a criminal proceeding and, therefore, cannot be considered as an implied admission of guilt.

SC held that SMC failed to prove that Kalalo is indebted in the amount of P921k. SC affirmed CA.

91. People v. Erguiza, GR 171348, November 26, 2008, Austria-Martinez, J., Third Division. (Parents of accused offered to compromise without authority
from accused and not in the accused’s presence)
FACTS:
Prosecution’s version:
AAA, 13yo first yr high school student, together with her friends, went to the mango orchard at the back of ZZZ Elementary School to gather fallen mangoes. When
they were bound home at 5pm, AAA’s short pants got hooked on the fence. Joy and Ricky ran away and left her. While trying to unhook her short pants, accused
Larry Erguiza suddenly grabbed and pulled her and threatened to hurt her if she made noise. He dragged AAA towards a place where thorny plants grow. Larry then
raped AAA. AAA felt something sticky in her private part after Larry made push and pull movements. AAA did not tell her mother BBB and grandmother XXX about
the incident due to Larry’s threat to kill her family if she did so. On April 2000, 3 months later, BBB brought AAA to XXX, a hilot, to consult her on the unusualy
palpitation on the middle of AAA’s throat and the absence of her monthly period. XXX told BBB that AAA was pregnant. AAA then revealed that Larry raped her.

CCC, AAA’s father, testified that on May 2, 2000, the family of accused-appellant Larry Erguiza went to their house and initially offered P50k and later P150k.
In the defense’s version, Joy testified that she never left AAA.

RTC convicted accused. CA affirmed. Hence this appeal.

Albina Erguiza, mother of Larry, testified that CCC and BBB were demanding P1M and that they later reduced it to P250k. Albina said that she offered P5k to BBB
and CCC only to preserve their relationship as in-laws and for peace. BBB testified that Albina was the one who offered the settlement. Testifying on this, Larry said:
Q Before the filing of this case with this Honorable Court, your parents and you were pleading to the parents of AAA not to continue anymore the case, is
it not?
A Yes, sir, so that the case will not be 􏰌led and our relationship will not be destroyed, sir.
Q In fact you asked your parents to do so, is it not?
A No, sir. They were the ones who went to the house of AAA, sir.

ISSUE:
Whether the offer of compromise of the parents of accused who were not authorized by the accused to so offer such compromise is an implied admission of guilt in a
criminal case.
HELD: NO.
Larry testified that he did not ask his parents to settle the case. moreover, Larry was NOT PRESENT when the offer to settle was allegedly made. An offer of
compromise from an UNAUTHORIZED person cannot amount to an admission of the party himself. Although the Court has held in some cases that an attempt of
the parents of the accused to settle the case is an implied admission of guilt, we believe that the better rule is that for a compromise to amount to an implied admission
of guilt, the accused should have been present or at least authorized the proposed compromise.

Eventually, SC said that the testimonies of Albina and BBB and CCC have little weight since they are related to each other and because the testimonies are
contradicting.

SC acquitted Erguiza because his alibi was corroborated by a witness.

Section. 28. Admission by third-party/ Res inter alios acta, Part One
92. People v. Raquel, GR 119005, December 02, 1996, Regalado, J., Second Division. (Out of court declaration of a person pointing to two others as his co-
perpetrators of a crime)
FACTS:
Sps. Juliet and Agapito Gambalan’s peaceful lives were visited by tragedy on July 4, 1986 at midnight. Thinking of a neighbor in need, Agapito attended to the person
knocking at the backdoor of their kitchen. Much to his surprise, heavily armed men emerged at the door, declared a hold-up and fired their guns at him. Juliet went out
of their room and saw her husband’s lifeless body while a man took her husband’s gun and left hurriedly. She shouted for help at their window and saw a man, Amado
Ponce, fall beside their water pump while 2 other men ran away. The police came and found Amado wounded and lying about 8m from the victim’s house. He was
treated at a clinic then brought to the police station. He revealed to P/Sgt. Pangato that accused Sabas and Valeriano Raquel were the perpetrators of the crime.

Sabas and Valeriano Raquel and Amado Ponce were charged with robbery with homicide. Amado escaped from jail before he could testify in court.

RTC convicted all accused Sabas and Valeriano Raquel, brothers, and Amado Ponce. Hence this appeal by the Raquel brothers appealed.

ISSUE:
Whether the extrajudicial statement of Amado Ponce that the other 2 perpetrators of the crime who were with him were Sabas and Valeriano Raquel is admissible
against the Sabas and Valeriano.
HELD: NO.
The identification of the Raquel brothers as culprits was based chiefly on the EJ statement of accused Amado Ponce pointing to them as his co-perpetrators of the
crime.

1) The extrajudicial statements of an accused implicating a co-accused may not be utilized against the latter, unless these are repeated in open court. If the accused
never had the opportunity to cross-examine his co-accused on the latter's extrajudicial statements, the same are hearsay as against said accused. A distinction
should be made between extrajudicial and judicial confessions. The former deprives the other accused of the opportunity to cross-examine the confessant, while in
the latter his confession is thrown wide open for cross-examination and rebuttal.
The res inter alios rule ordains that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. An extrajudicial confession is binding
only upon the confessant and is not admissible against his co-accused. The reason for the rule is that, on a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man's
own acts are binding upon himself, and are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also
manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers,
neither ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him.

Although the above rule has exceptions, these do not apply here.

SC also said that Amado’s EJ statement was made in violation of his constitutional rights during custodial investigation since Amado was not assisted by counsel and
was not informed of his constitutional rights. Thus, Sabas and Valeriano were acquitted.

93. Tamargo v. Awingan, GR 177727, January 19, 2010, Corona, J., Third Division. (Affidavit of an accused implicating the 3 other perpetrators of the
crime he committed, resulting in their being charged in court with murder)
FACTS:
Atty. Franklin V. Tamargo and his 8yo daughter, Gail Franzielle, were shot and killed at around 5:15 p.m. of August 15, 2003 along Nueva Street corner Escolta
Street, Binondo, Manila. The police had no leads on the perpetrators of the crime until a certain Reynaldo Geron surfaced and executed an affidavit dated September
12, 2003. He stated that a certain Lucio Columna told him during a drinking spree that Atty. Tamargo was ordered killed by respondent Lloyd Antiporda and that he
(Columna) was one of those who killed Atty. Tamargo. After preliminary investigation, the investigating prosecutor issued a resolution finding probable cause against
Columna and 3 John Does. The informations for murder were filed against them in RTC.

Columna executed an affidavit wherein he admitted his participation as look out during the shooting and implicated respondent Romulo Awingan as gunman. He
tagged as masterminds respondent Licerio Antiporda Jr. and his son respondent Lloyd Antiporda . The former was the ex-mayor and the latter the mayor of
Buguey, Cagayan at that time. When the killing took place, Licerio Antiporda was in detention for a kidnapping case in which Atty. Tamargo was acting as private
prosecutor. Thus, petitioner Harold Tamargo, brother of Atty. Tamargo, filed a complaint against those implicated by Columna with the City prosecutor of Manila.

The three implicated were eventually charged with murder in RTC. RTC denied the motion to withdraw informations filed by the trial prosecutor. Awingan and the
Antipordas filed R65 certioraris with CA. CA reversed. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether Columna’s extrajudicial confession is admissible against Awingan, Licerio and Lloyd Antiporda.
HELD: NO.
Columna’s EJ confession in his affidavit was not admissible as evidence against respondents in view of the rule on res inter alios acta. An exception to res inter alios
acta is an admission by a conspirator under R130, S30. In order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is
necessary that (a) the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself (b) the admission relates to the common object and (c) it has been
made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. Otherwise, it cannot be used against the alleged co-conspirators without violating their
constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against them and to cross-examine them.

Here, aside from the extrajudicial confession, which was later on recanted, no other piece of evidence was presented to prove the alleged conspiracy. There was no
other prosecution evidence, direct or circumstantial, which the extrajudicial confession could corroborate. Therefore, the recanted confession of Columna, which was
the sole evidence against respondents, had no probative value and was inadmissible as evidence against them.

Thus, SC held that there was no probable cause. The informations for murder should not have been filed against respondents.

94. FGU Insurance Corporation v. GP Sarmiento Trucking Corporation, GR 141910, August 6, 2002, Vitug, J. (Contract cannot favor or prejudice a third
person)
FACTS:
Respondent GPS undertook to deliver 30 units of Condura SD white refrigerators on one of its Isuzu trucks driven by respondent Lambert Eroles from the plant site of
Concepcion Industries Inc. along South Superhighway in Alabang to the Cnetral Luzon Appliances in Dagupan. While the truck was traversing McArthur highway in
Tarlac, it collided with an unidentified truck, causing it to fall into a deep canal, resulting in damage to the cargoes.

FGU, insurer of the shipment, paid Concepcion Industries the value of cargoes of P204k. FGU, as subrogee, sought reimbursement of the amount it paid Concepcion
from GPS. FGU filed a complaint for damages and breach of contract of carriage against GPS and Lambert in RTC. GPS claimed that it was the exclusive hauler of
Concepcion since 1988 and not engaged in business as common carrier.

RTC granted the motion to dismiss, ruling that there is no evidence that GPS is a common carrier. Thus, there is no presumption of negligence. CA ruled for GPS.
Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the driver Lambert is liable for the loss.
HELD: NO.
Lambert, respondent driver ,without proof of his negligence or fault, may not be ordered to pay FGU. The driver, not being a party to the contract of carriage
between Concepcion and GPS, may not be held liable under the agreement a contract binds only the parties who have entered into it or their successors. Res inter
alios acta aliis neque nocet prodest, such contract can neither favor nor prejudice a third person . FGU’s action against the driver can only be based on culpa
aquiliana which, unlike culpa contractual, requires the claimant to prove negligence.

95. Reyes v. Ombudsman, GR 212593-94, March 15, 2016, Perlas-Bernabe, J., En Banc. (Whistleblower testimonies can be used to determine probable cause
during preliminary investigation)
FACTS:
Petitioners are all charged as co-conspirators for their respective participations in the PDAF scam involving, as reported by whistleblowers Benhur Luy, Marina Sula,
and Merlina Suñas, the illegal pillaging of public funds sourced from the PDAF of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile for 2004-2010 totalling P172M. Among those charged
are Reyes as chief of staff of Sen. Enrile, and Napoles siblings, as high ranking officers of the JLN Corporation who divert the sums from Enrile’s PDAF to Janet
Napoles’ control thru falsification/forgery of the signatures of the supposed recipiencts on the certificates of acceptance and the documents submitted in liquidating
PDAF funds and handling of PDAF proceeds after being deposited in the accounts of the JLN-controlled NGOs.

As alleged, the systemic pillaging of Enrile’s PDAF starts with Janet meeting with a legislator, here Enrile or thru his chief of staff Reyes. Janet would offer to acquire
his PDAF in exchange for a rebate amounting to a certain percentage of the PDAF.
Contention: Napoles siblings opposed their inclusion by the charge filed by the Field Investigation Office of the Ombudsman (FIO) for plunder and violation of RA
3019, S3(e), claiming, among others, that the statements of the whistleblowers are nothing more than mere hearsay and self-serving declarations and thus inadmissible
in evidence against them.

The ombudsman issued a 144-page resolution, finding probable cause against, among others, the Napoles siblings for 15 counts of violation of RA 3019, S3(e).
Petitioners’ motions for reconsideration of the resolution were denied. Hence these petitions, assailing the finding of probable cause and the denial of the MR.

Informations were filed in ombudsman against, among others, Napoles siblings for 15 counts of RA 3019, S3(e).

ISSUE:
Whether the whistleblowers’ statements against Napoles siblings can be considered in determining probable cause against them.
HELD: YES.
Neither can the Napoles siblings discount the testimonies of the whistleblowers based on their invocation of the res inter alios acta rule under R130, S28 of the Rules
on Evidence, which states that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another, unless the admission is by a conspirator under
the parameters of S30. To be sure, the foregoing rule constitutes a technical rule on evidence which should not be rigidly applied in the course of preliminary
investigation proceedings. In Estrada, the Court sanctioned the Ombudsman's appreciation of hearsay evidence, which would otherwise be inadmissible under
technical rules on evidence, during the preliminary investigation "as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay." This is because "such
investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties." Applying the same logic, and with the similar observation that
there lies SUBSTANTIAL BASIS for crediting the testimonies of the whistleblowers herein, the objection interposed by the Napoles siblings under the evidentiary
res inter alios acta rule should falter. Ultimately, as case law edifies, "[t]he technical rules on evidence are not binding on the fiscal who has jurisdiction and control
over the conduct of a preliminary investigation," as in this case.

Thus, Ombudsman did not commit gadalej in finding probable cause against Napoles siblings for 15 counts of RA 3019, S3(e).

Section 29. Admission by co-partner or agent

96. Naguiat v. CA, GR 118375, October 03, 2003, Tinga, J., Second Division. (Agent by estoppel)
FACTS:
Queaño loaned from Naguiat P200k. To secure the loan, Quaño executed a deed of REM in favor of Naguiat and surrendered to the latter the owner’s duplicates of
titles of the mortgaged properties. Queaño issued a Security Bank and Trust Company check postdated September 11, 1980 for P200k payable to Naguiat. But this
check was dishonored for insufficiency of funds. Queaño received a letter from Naguiat’s lawyer demanding settlement of the loan. Shortly thereafter, Queaño and
one Ruby Ruebenfeldt met with Naguiat. At the meeting, Queano told Naguiat that she did not receive the proceeds of the loan, saying that the checks were retained
by Ruebenfeldt, who was purportedly Naguiat’s agent.

Naguiat applied for EJ foreclosure of the mortgage. RTC declared the deed of REM as void and ordered Naguiat to return to Queano the owner’s duplicates of her
titles to the mortgaged lots. CA affirmed. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Contention: Naguiat questions the admissibility of the various written representations made by Ruebenfeldt on the ground that they could not bind her following the
res inter alia acta alteri nocere non debet rule. Naguiat insists that Ruebenfeldt was not her agent.
HELD:
Suffice to say, however, the existence of an agency relationship between Naguiat and Ruebenfeldt is supported by ample evidence. Ruebenfeldt was not a stranger or
an unauthorized person. Naguiat instructed Ruebenfeldt to withhold from Queaño the checks she issued or indorsed to Queaño, pending delivery by the latter
of additional collateral. Ruebenfeldt served as agent of Naguiat on the loan application of Queaño's friend, Marilou Farralese, and it was in connection with
that transaction that Queaño came to know Naguiat. It was also Ruebenfeldt who accompanied Queaño in her meeting with Naguiat and on that occasion, on her
own and without Queaño asking for it, Ruebenfeldt actually drew a check for the sum of P220,000.00 payable to Naguiat, to cover for Queaño's alleged liability
to Naguiat under the loan agreement

There is an agency by estoppel under Art. 1873 of NCC. As a consequence of the interaction between Naguiat and Ruebenfeldt, Queaño got the impression that
Ruebenfeldt was the agent of Naguiat, but Naguiat did nothing to correct Queaño's impression. One who clothes another with apparent authority as his agent, and
holds him out to the public as such, cannot be permitted to deny the authority of such person to act as his agent, to the prejudice of innocent third parties dealing with
such person in good faith, and in the honest belief that he is what he appears to be.

Thus, SC affirmed CA and ruled against Naguiat.

97. Estrada v. Desierto, GR 146710-15, April 03, 2001, Puno, J., En Banc. (Statements of an agent in his diary about the statements of the principal bind the
principal; independently relevant statements)
FACTS: (From March 02, 2001 decision)
Estrada was exposed by Governor of Ilocos Sur Luis Chavit Singson to have received millions of pesos from jueteng lords. This resulted in calls for Estrada’s
resignation. During the impeachment trial at the senate, the senate voted 11-10 against the opening of an envelope which allegedly contained evidence of a secret bank
account of Estrada containing P3.3B. This resulted in public outrage. There were various rallies in EDSA. Erap’s cabinet secretaries and AFP chief of staff defected
against him. On January 20 at 12:20AM, negotiations for the peaceful transfer of power to respondent vice president GMA started. At about 12NN, CJ Davide
administered the oath to GMA as president of PH. At 230PM, Erap and his family hurriedly left Malacanang palace.

On January 22, 2001, GMA immediately discharged her powers and duties as president. She appointed cabinet members and ambassadors. Foreign governments
recognized GMA’s government. GMA, on Feb. 06, nominated Senator Teofisto Guingona as her VP. The senate and HoR approved the nomination. Senator
Guingona took his oath as VP. Survey results show that 61% of Filipinos nationwide accepted GMA’s replacement of Erap as president.

Several cases previously filed in the ombudsman against Erap were set in motion. Thus, Erap filed with SC a petition for prohibition to enjoin Ombudsman Desierto
from conducting any further proceedings until the term of the president is over. He also filed a petition for quo warranto, praying that he be confirmed as the lawful
and incumbent president of PH.

SC ruled in the March 02, 2001 decision that Erap had resigned. In supporting its decision, SC cited entries in the diary of Erap’s Executive Secretary Angara, such as
Erap’s statement of, “Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na, masyado nang masakit.” The Angara diary also detailed the negotiations on how Erap could gracefully and
resign.

ISSUE:
Contention: In Erap’s MR, he argues that the use of the Angara Diary against him violated the rule on res inter alios acta.
HELD:
1) One exception of the res inter alios acta rule is R130, S29 as to admissions by a co-partner or agent.
Executive Secretary Angara as such was an alter ego of the petitioner. He was the Little President. Indeed, he was authorized by the petitioner to act for him in the
critical hours and days before he abandoned Malacañang Palace. Thus, according to the Angara Diary, the petitioner told Secretary Angara: "Mula umpisa pa lang ng
kampanya, Ed, ikaw na lang pinakikinggan ko. At hanggang sa huli, ikaw pa rin." This statement of full trust was made by the petitioner after Secretary Angara
briefed him about the progress of the first negotiation. True to this trust, the petitioner had to ask Secretary Angara if he would already leave Malacañang after taking
their final lunch on January 20, 2001 at about 1:00 p.m. The Angara Diary quotes the petitioner as saying to Secretary Angara: "Ed, kailangan ko na bang umalis? (Do
I have to leave now?)" Secretary Angara told him to go and he did. Petitioner cannot deny that Secretary Angara headed his team of negotiators that met with the team
of the respondent Arroyo to discuss the peaceful and orderly transfer of power after his relinquishment of the powers of the presidency. Secretary Angara acted for
and in behalf of the petitioner in the crucial days before respondent Arroyo took her oath as President. Consequently, petitioner is bound by the acts and
declarations of Secretary Angara.

Admissions of an agent (Secretary Angara) are binding on the principal (petitioner). What is done, by agent, is done by the principal through him, as through a
mere instrument. So, whatever is said by an agent, either in making a contract for his principal, or at the time and accompanying the performance of any act within
the scope of his authority, having relation to, and connected with, and in the course of the particular contract or transaction in which he is then engaged, or in the
language of the old writers, dum fervet opus is, in legal effect, said by his principal and admissible in evidence against such principal."

2) Also, the ban on hearsay evidence does not cover independently relevant statements, or statements which are relevant independently of whether they are true or
not. They belong to 2 classes: 1) those statements which are the very facts in issue, and 2) those statements which are circumstantial evidence of the facts in issue.

The second class includes:

a. Statements of a person showing his state of mind, that is, his mental condition, knowledge, belief, intention, ill will and other emotions;
b. Statements of a person which show his physical condition, as illness and the like;
c. Statements of a person from which an inference may be made as to the state of mind of another, that is, the knowledge, belief, motive, good or bad
faith, etc. of the latter;
d. Statements which may identify the date, place and person in question; and
e. Statements showing the lack of credibility of a witness.

Jones tells us why these independently relevant statements are not covered by the prohibition against hearsay: Where any mental state or condition is in issue, such as
motive, malice, knowledge, intent, assent or dissent, unless direct testimony of the particular person is to be taken as conclusive of his state of mind, the only method
of proof available is testimony of others to the acts or statements of such person.

Here, the Angara diary contains statements of petitioner Erap which reflect his state of mind and are circumstantial evidence of his intent to resign. It also
contains statements of ES Angara from which we can deduce Erap’s intent to resign.

98. Narra Nickel Mining and Development Corp. v. Redmont Consolidated Mines Corp., GR 195580, April 21, 2014, Velasco, Jr., J., Third Division. (Joint
ventures entered into by corporations to circumvent the prohibition against corporations entering into partnerships are also treated as partnerships under
R130, S29, partnership exception to res inter alios acta rule)
FACTS:
In 2006, Redmont, a domestic corporation, took interest in mining certain areas in Palawan. It found out that the areas it wanted to mine were already covered by
Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) applications of petitioners Narra Mining, Tesoro Mining, and McArthur Mining. Redmont filed before the DENR
Panel of Arbitrators (POA)petitions for denial of petitioners’ applications for MPSA, alleging that at least 60% of the capital stock of petitioners are owned and
controlled by MBMI Resources Inc., a 100% Canadian Corporation.

The POA issued a resolution disqualifying petitioners from gaining MPSAs and considered petitioners as foreign corporations since they are effectively controlled by
MBMI, a 100% Canadian company. The Mines Adjudication Board (MAB), on appeal, reversed POA. CA reversed MAB and upheld the findings of POA. Hence this
petition for review.

Among the assignments of error of pteitioners is CA’s application of the exception to res inter alios acta rule, particularly the exceptions on statements of partners.

ISSUE:
Whether the res inter alios acta exception under R130, S29 applies to joint ventures.
HELD: YES.
SC, in ruling that petitioners are foreign corporations, looked at MBMI’s Summary of Significant Accounting Policies which explained the reason behind the intricate
corporate layering that MBMI immersed itself in:
(b) Alpha Group
The Philippine companies holding the Alpha Property, and the ownership interests therein, are as follows:
Alpha- Philippines (the "Alpha Group")
Patricia Louise Mining Development Inc. ("Patricia") — 34.0%
Narra Nickel Mining & Development Corporation (Narra) — 60.4%
Under a joint venture agreement the Company holds directly and indirectly an effective equity interest in the Alpha Property of 60.4%. Pursuant to a
shareholders' agreement, the Company exercises joint control over the companies in the Alpha Group.
Contention: Petitioners question CA’s use of the exception of the exception of the res inter alios acta or the "admission by co-partner or agent" rule and "admission by
privies" under the Rules of Court in the instant case, by pointing out that statements made by MBMI should not be admitted in this case since it is not a party to the
case and that it is not a "partner" of petitioners. There is also no partnership in this case. since the capital involved was more than P3k, the partnership should have
been formally reduced into writing. Since there is no such written agreement to form a partnership between petitioners and MBMI, no partnership was created.
Held:
R130, S29 and 31 (privies) provide xxx. Though some claim that partnerships and joint ventures are totally different animals, there are very few rules that differentiate
one from the other; thus, joint ventures are deemed "akin" or similar to a partnership. In fact, in joint venture agreements, rules and legal incidents governing
partnerships are applied.

Thus, it can be assumed that the relationships entered between and among petitioners and MBMI are no simple "joint venture agreements." As a rule, corporations are
prohibited from entering into partnership agreements; consequently, corporations enter into joint venture agreements with other corporations or partnerships for
certain transactions in order to form "pseudo partnerships." Obviously, as the intricate web of "ventures" entered into by and among petitioners and MBMI was
executed to circumvent the legal prohibition against corporations entering into partnerships, then the relationship created should be deemed as
"partnerships," and the laws on partnership should be applied. Thus, a joint venture agreement between and among corporations may be seen as similar to
partnerships since the elements of partnership are present. Thus, R130, S29 applies.

99. The Learning Child, Inc. v. Ayala Alabang Village Association, GR 134269, July 07, 2010, Leonardo-de Castro, J., First Division.
FACTS:
Subdivision developer Ayala Land, Inc. (ALI) sold a parcel of land to Sps. Yuson, who sold the land to Sps. Alfonso. A deed of restrictions was annotated to the title
issued to Sps. Alfonso as required by ALI. The restrictions indicated:
2.2 USE AND OCCUPANCY — The property shall be used exclusively for the establishment and maintenance thereon of a preparatory ( nursery and
kindergarten) school, which may include such installations as an office for school administration, playground and garage for school vehicles.
ALI turned over the right and power to enforce the restrictions on the properties in the Ayala Alabang Village, including the restrictions, to the Ayala
Alabang Village Association (AAVA).

In 1989, Sps. Alfonso opened The Learning Child Center (TLC). In 1991, TLC expanded to include a grade school program. AAVA wrote several letters to TLC and
Sps. Alfonso, protesting TLC’s and Sps. Alfonso’s violation of the deed of restrictions and requesting them to comply with the same.

AAVA filed with RTC an action for injunction against TLC and Sps. Alfonso, alleging breach of contract. RTC ruled in favor of AAVA. In petitioners’ MR, they
allege that with the passage of Muntinlupa Zoning Ordinance 91-39, reclassifying the property as “institutional”, there ceased to be legal basis for RTC to uphold the
deed of restrictions on the title of Sps. Alfonso. RTC agreed and thus reconsidered its decision. RTC dismissed the complaint of AAVA.

CA reversed. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Contention: TLC and Sps. Alfonso argues that the Deed of Restrictions on the property can no longer be enforced because AAVA had abrogated the restrictions by its
own acts:
3. ALI itself requested the reclassification of the subject property as institutional, as allegedly proven by the testimony of then Municipal Planning and
Development Officer Engineer Hector S. Baltazar, who said: xxx.
4. ALI assented to the reclassification of the subject property to institutional, as shown by its letter dated July 24, 1991
These acts of Ali bind AAVA.
HELD:
AAVA claims that these acts of ALI cannot be considered against it under res inter alios acta rule as ALI is not a party to the case (R130, S28).

But ALI’s statements, if damaging to AAVA, would be binding on the latter. The general Ayala Alabang Village "Deed Restrictions," which was attached to the Deed
of Restrictions on the title of the subject property, expressly state that:
"2. Compliance with the said restrictions, reservation, easements and conditions may be enjoined and/or enforced by Court action by Ayala Corporation
and/or the Ayala Alabang Village Association, their respective successors and assigns, or by any member of the Ayala Alabang Village Association."
As such, it appears that Ayala Corporation is JOINTLY INTERESTED with AAVA in an action to enforce the Deed of Restrictions, and is therefore covered under
the following exception to the res inter alios acta rule:
Sec. 29. Admission by copartner or agent. — The act or declaration of a partner or agent of the party within the scope of his authority and during the
existence of the partnership or agency, may be given in evidence against such party after the partnership or agency is shown by evidence other than such
act or declaration. The same rule applies to the act or declaration of a joint owner, joint debtor, or other person jointly interested with the party.
But SC said nonetheless that ALI’s acts are not damaging to the position of AAVA. Thus, it affirmed the CA decision. SC ordered TLC to cease from operating
beyond nursery and kindergarten classes.

Section. 30 – Admission by conspirator

100. People v. Palijon y Urhina, GR 123545, October 18, 2000, Quisumbing, J., Second Division. (Res inter alios acta prohibition does not apply a
conspirator’s testimonies against his co-conspirators during trial or on the witness stand as this is a judicial admission)
FACTS:
At 2AM of Aug. 27, 1993, Palijon, Decena, and Mercene entered the yard of the house of Sps. Reyes, elderly balikbayans, in San Pablo City. Decena and Mercene
positioned themselves near the couple’s bedroom door and waited for someone to open it so they could take cash and jewelry from the bedroom. Palijon remained
outside the house as look out. At 4AM, Mrs. Reyes came out the bedroom to go to the bathroom. Decena followed her and boxed her. Mrs. Reyes shouted for help
before fainting. Mr. Reyes rushed to her. Decena struck Mr. Reyes with a steel-edged stool. Mr. Reyes fell prostrate on the floor. The robbers ransacked the house
then escaped. Mr. Reyes died.

An information was filed charging Palijon, Mercene, Decena, and Pria with robbery and homicide. Decena and Mercene pleaded guilty to the lesser charge of
homicide and convicted.

Trial proceeded against Palijon and Pria. Mercene gave evidence against said co-accused. Mercene testified that it was Pria who informed them of the arrival of Sps.
Reyes from abroad, told them that the balikbayans had a lot of money, and told them how to enter the house. RTC convicted Palijon and Pria.

ISSUE:
Contention: RTC erred in convicting Palijon based on the testimonies of his alleged conspirators under res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet, R130, S28 and 30.
HELD: Judicial admissions admissible against co-conspirators.
In ruling upon Palijon's arguments, we must make a distinction between EXTRAJUDICIAL and JUDICIAL confessions. An extrajudicial confession may be
given in evidence against the confessant but not against his co-accused as they are deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine him. A judicial confession is
admissible against the declarant's co-accused since the latter are afforded opportunity to cross-examine the former . R130, S30 applies only to extrajudicial
acts or admissions and not to testimony at trial where the party adversely affected has the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Here, Mercene's admission
implicating his co-accused was given on the witness stand. It is admissible in evidence against appellant Palijon. Moreover, where several accused are tried together
for the same offense, the testimony of a co-accused implicating his co-accused is competent evidence against the latter.

SC affirmed the conviction.

101. People v. Bokingco, GR 187536, August 10, 2011, Perez, J., Second Division. (Conspiracy was not proved by other evidence than by declarations of
accused, thus R130, S30 cannot apply)
FACTS:
Noli Pasion, the victim, and his wife Elsa were residing in a house in Angeles City. Pasion owned a pawnshop which formed part of his house. He had 2 rows of
apartment units at the back of his house. Accused Bokingco and Col were staying in Apartment No. 3 and were among the 13 construction workers employed by
Pasion.

On Feb. 29, 2000, Vitalicio was drying his clothes inside his apartment when Pasion came from the front door and went out the back door. A few minutes later, he
heard a commotion from Apartment No. 3. He peeped thru a screen door and saw Bokingco hitting something on the floor. Seeing Vitalicio, Bokingco pushed open
the screen door and attacked him with a hammer. Vitalicio pushed Bokingco away and went to his house. He went back later to Apartment No. 3 and saw Pasion’s
body on the kitchen floor.

Elsa, wife of Pasion, testified that when she heard banging sounds and her husband’s moans, she got off the bed and went down. Col blocked her way, sprayed her
eyes with tear gas, and poked a sharp object under her chin. Col then instructed her to open the vault of the pawnshop but Elsa said that she does not know the
combination lock. Col dragged her towards the back door by holding her neck. Before they reached the door, Elsa saw Bokingco open the screen door and tell Col,
“tara, patay na siya.” Col then let Elsa go and ran away with Bokingco. She then saw her husband lying on the floor, bathed in his own blood, in Apartment No. 3.

Bokingco and Col were charged with murder. RTC convicted them. CA affirmed. Hence this petition.

During the preliminary investigation, Bokingco made an extrajudicial confession admitting that he and Col planned the killing of Pasion. But when he testified in
court, he said that he was only provoked in hitting Pasion back when Pasion hit him in the head.

ISSUE:
Whether
HELD:
Contention: Col was charged as co-conspirator. He claims that under R130, S30, Bokingco’s uncounseled testimony that they both planned to kill Pasion has no
relevance since there was no other evidence to prove the conspiracy.
Held:
1) No conspiracy proven- SC found that the fact of conspiracy was not proven. From the acts of Col as testified by Elsa (that she was blocked by Col when she went to
Pasion, that she sprayed teargas and pointed a sharp object under her chin), it cannot be logically inferred that Col conspired with Bokingco in killing Pasion. Col’s
actuations, at most, can be equated to attempted robbery.

Elsa testified that Bokingco called out to Col that Pasion is already dead and that they had to leave the place. But this does not prove that they acted in concert. It only
proves that there were two crimes committed simultaneously and they were united in their efforts to escape from the crimes they separately committed.

Their acts did not reveal unity of purpose. Bokingco had already killed Pasion even before he sought Col. Their moves were not coordinated.

2) In as much as Bokingco's extrajudicial confession is inadmissible against him, it is likewise inadmissible against Col, specifically where he implicated the latter as a
cohort. Under R130, S28 of the Rules of Court, the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration or omission of another. Res inter alios acta alteri
nocere non debet. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant, is not admissible against his or her co-accused, and is considered
as hearsay against them.

An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator. R130, S30 of the Rules of Court provides that the act or declaration of the
conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator provided that the conspiracy is shown by
evidence other than by such act or declaration. In order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that 1)
the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself; 2) the admission relates to the common object; and 3) it has been made while the
declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. Here, there is no proven conspiracy. Therefore, the extrajudicial confession has no probative value and is
inadmissible in evidence against Col.

102. People v. Cachuela, GR 191752, June 10, 2013, Brion, J., Second Division. (No proof of conspiracy other than the declaration of the extrajudicial
confessor [Nabilgas in this case])
FACTS:
On July 23, 2004, Ibañez went to WSC and inquired from Henessy about the schedule and rates of WSC’s firing range and amount of membership fee of its gun club.
On July 26, 2004, Henessy, Weapons System Corporation (WSC) Secretary and Sales representative, arrived at the WSC and rang the doorbell. No one opened the
door. She went to the back of the office where the firing range was located and called Zaldy, another employee. Zaldy replied that he could not open the door as his
hands were tied. After one hour, police arrived. They opened the gate at the back using acetylene. When they entered, they saw that Zaldy had been handcuffed to the
vault. Zaldy informed police that the company’s gunsmith, Rex, was inside the firing range. In the firing range, the police saw the dead body of Rex. He had gunshot
wounds on the head.

NBI received information that the group of Cachuela was involved in the robbery of WSC and in killing Rex and that Cachuela was looking for prospective buyers of
firearms. NBI formed an entrapment team and went to Cavite. Upon their arrival, Nabilgas approached them and told them that he was sent by Cachuela and Ibañez.
The police introduced themselves. Nabilgas surrendered to the police and gave the names of the other persons involved in the crime.

The asset then contacted Cachuela and told him that Nabilgas already talked to the buyers. Cachuela set up a meeting with the buyers. Cahuela then brought the
supposed buyers, NBI investigator Lino and agent Abiera and the asset, inside his house and showed them several firearms. The NBI agents arrested Cachuela. They
also conducted an operation on and arrested Ibañez.

An information for robbery with homicide was filed in RTC against Cachuela and Ibañez. RTC convicted them. CA affirmed. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether the extrajudicial confession of Nabilgas implicating Zaldy, Cachuela, and Ibanez is admissible in evidence where there is no other proof of the conspiracy
between them other than said confession.
HELD: NO.
1) Nabilgas executed an extrajudicial confession at the NBI main office where he implicated Cachuela, Ibanez, and Zaldy . He later repudiated this confession.
SC held that this confession is inadmissible for being made while under custodial investigation but without the assistance of counsel.

2) At any rate, Nabilgas' extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence against the appellants in view of the res inter alios acta rule. This rule provides that the
rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant and is
not admissible against his or her co-accused because it is considered as hearsay against them.

An exception to the res inter alias acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator under R130, S30. In order that the admission of a conspirator may be received
against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that: (a) the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself; (b) the admission relates to the
common object; and (c) it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy.

Here, there was no other piece of evidence presented, aside from the extrajudicial confession, to prove that Nabilgas conspired with the appellants in
committing the crime charged. Conspiracy cannot be presumed and must be shown as distinctly and conclusively as the crime itself. Nabilgas, in fact, was acquitted
by the trial court due to insufficiency of evidence to prove his participation in the crime.

103. People v. Constancio y Bacungay, GR 206226, April 04, 2016, Del Castillo, J., Second Division. ( Extrajudicial confession is admissible against a co-
accused when there are other circumstantial evidence which, taken together with the confession, establishes guilt)
FACTS:
On March 10, 2001, AAA went to Alabang Town Center with her friends Dacanay and Golez. After parting ways with them, AAA was about to board her car when
she found herself confronted by Berry then armed with a knife, who was then in the company of Constancio, Pagkalinawan, Darden and alias "Burog." These five
forcibly seized "AAA's" car and drove her to Constancio' house where she was raped and killed.

In an interview with ABSCBS reporter Amparo, Berry revealed that while AAA’s car was parked in Constancio' garage, the said car was moving and shaking with
"AAA" inside. When the door of the car was opened, he (Berry) saw that "AAA" was without her underwear; and that Constancio then uttered the words, "wala na,"
indicating that "AAA" was already dead. AAA’s body was then placed inside the trunk of her car. Adarna, a tricycle driver, saw Berry, Constancio, and their other
companions throw AAA’s body over a bridge. Berry and Constancio were later arrested.

During custodial investigation, Atty. Suarez advised Berry of his rights. Berry executed an extrajudicial confession which was embodied in a sinumpaang salaysay.
Berry also confessed to Amparo during an interview that he took part in the execution of the crime. But at the trial later, Berry denounced the sinumpaang salay.

Constancio, Berry, Pagkalinawan, Darden, and Burog were charged with the crime of rape with homicide against AAA. RTC convicted Berry and Constancio but
acquitted Pagkalinawan. CA affirmed and gave credence to the sinumpaang salaysay, which also tended to establish the guilt of his co-accused and counsin
Constancio. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether Berry’s extrajudicial confession is admissible against his co-accused Constancio where there are other circumstantial evidence showing Constancio’s guilt.
HELD: YES.
1) SC found that Berry’s extrajudicial confession/sinumpaang salaysay is admissible because Atty. Suarez assisted him in its execution and informed him of his rights.
His extrajudicial confession to Amparo is also admissible since this was made spontaneously by a suspect to a news reporter and is thus voluntary, and it was not
made to police authority. Berry was thus found as a co-conspirator since he threw the body of AAA over a bridge with Constancio, helping the latter dispose of
AAA’s body.

2) Contention: Constancio argues that Berry’s confession is inadmissible against him under res inter alios acta under R130, S28.
Held:
The general rule is that an extra-judicial confession is binding only on the confessant and is inadmissible in evidence against his co-accused since it is considered
hearsay against them. However, as an exception to this rule, the Court has held that an extra-judicial confession is admissible against a co-accused when it is used
as circumstantial evidence to show the probability of participation of said co- accused in the crime.

In People v. Aquino, this Court held that in order that an extra-judicial confession may be used against a co-accused of the confessant, "there must be a finding of
OTHER CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE which when taken together with the confession would establish the guilt of a co-accused beyond reasonable
doubt." Applying the rule to Constancio's case, SC found that the prosecution was able to show circumstantial evidence to implicate him in the crime.

Constancio was positively identified as among those who threw the body of "AAA" over a bridge. It is significant to note that eyewitness Adarna also attests that
Constancio was riding in the very same car where "AAA" was raped and killed. This fact leaves this Court without a doubt that Constancio is guilty of the crime
charged as the same qualifies as circumstantial evidence showing his participation in the execution of the crime.

104. People v. Comiling, GR 140405, March 04, 2004, Corona, J., En Banc. (Res inter alios acta rule does not apply to testimony given on the witness stand
where adverse party has opportunity to cross-examine the witness)
FACTS:
Ysiong Chua, owner of Masterline Grocery, and his helper Mario, were about to close the store when someone knocked on the door to buy some cigarettes. Someone
knocked on the door to buy some cigarettes. When Mario opened the door, 3 masked armed men barged into the store and announced a hold-up. One of the robbers
threatened to kill Ysiong if he did not give them his earnings. Ysiong retorted that he only had a small amount which remark irked the robber who then hit Ysiong’s
thumb with the butt of his gun with a simultaneous kick. Ysiong fell down in pain. The robbers then ransacked his drawers. Ysiong recovered and ran to the police
station. PO3 Pastor and other officers rushed to the crime scene. They heard 3 gunshots from inside the store. PO3 Pastor ran and hid behind a concrete marker, then
moved westward as if to return to the police headquarters. PO3 Pastor was shot in the face and died. Ysiong lost 3 gold necklaces and cash of P81k.

Bothered by her conscience, prosecution witness Naty Panimbaan revealed to police authorities what she knew about the case. She testified at the trial that she
was present in all 4 meetings in which the plan to rob Masterline Grocery was hatched. She implicated, among others, Comiling, Galingan, and Mendoza.

Maj. Comiling, Galingan, and Mendoza were charged with robbery with homicide and physical injuries. RTC convicted them. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether the testimony of Naty against his co-conspirators Comiling, Galingan, and Mendoza are admissible against them.
HELD: YES.
SC found that Naty was credible.

Contention: Comiling contends that Naty’s testimony is inadmissible against him to prove conspiracy under res inter alios acta under R130, S30. Here, there is no
independent proof of conspiracy except the testimony of Naty.
Held:
But the res inter alios acta rule refers only to EXTRAJUDICIAL declarations or admissions and not to testimony given on the witness stand where the party
adversely affected has the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. In the present case, Naty's admission implicating appellant Comiling was made in open
court and therefore may be taken in evidence against him.

105. People v. Janjalani, GR 188314, January 10, 2011, Sereno, J., Third Division. (An extrajudicial confession repeated in court becomes a judicial
confession and is thus admissible in evidence against co-conspirators due to the opportunity to cross examine)
FACTS:
An RRCG bus was plying its usual southbound route from its Navotas bus terminal towards its Alabang bus terminal via EDSA. Two men were running after the bus
and insisted on getting on the bus. The conductor Andales obliged and let them in. Andales became wary of the two men as they sat away from each other, one behind
the driver and the other at the back of the bus. The eyes of one were also reddish. When he asked each of them if they were going to pay for 2 passengers, each said
that they were going to pay for 2. Andales became certain that the two were up to no good. Both men kept asking if the bus was going to stop at Ayala Avenue. The
man behind the bus appeared to be tinkering something.

When the bus reached the corner of Ayala Avenue and EDSA, the two men insisted on getting off the bus. They got off and ran towards Ayala Avenue. Moments
later, Andales felt an explosion. Fire engulfed the bus. He ran out of the bus.

Shortly before the explosion, the spokesperson of the Abu Sayyaf group, Abu Solaiman, announced over DZBB that the group had a valentine’s day gift for former
president GMA.
Later, accused Asali gave a TV interview, confessing that he had supplied the explosive devices for the Feb. 14, 2005 bombing. Accused Trinidad and Baharan also
confessed in interviews with ABSCBN. The bus conductor identified Trinidad and Baharan as the two men who entered the RRCG bus.

Members of the Abu Sayyaf Group Janjalani, Baharan, Trinidad, Asali, and Rohmat, among others, were charged with multiple murder and multiple frustrated
murder. Only Baharan, Trinidad, Asali and Rohmat were arrested. Asali was discharged as state witness, testifying that he was trained by Rohmat how to make
explosives. On Dec. 2004, Trinidad asked him for 4kg of TNT, which were placed on buses but did not explode. On the night before the valentine’s day bombing,
Trinidad and Baharan got another 2kg of TNT from him. The next day, Rohmat called Asali and said, “Sa wakas nag success din yung tinuro ko sayo.”

Trinidad and Baharan pleaded guilty to the murder and multiple frustrated murder charges.

ISSUE:
Contention: The testimony of Asali is inadmissible under R130, S30, or admission by a co-conspirator.
HELD: Admissible.
SC convicted Baharan, Trinidad, and Rohmat, finding conspiracy between them.

It is true that under the rule, statements made by a conspirator against a co-conspirator are admissible only when made during the existence of the conspiracy.
However, if the declarant repeats the statement in court, his extrajudicial confession becomes a judicial admission, making the testimony admissible as to both
conspirators. We held in People v. Palijon:
An extrajudicial confession may be given in evidence against the confessant but not against his co-accused as they are deprived of the opportunity to
cross-examine him. A judicial confession is admissible against the declarant's co-accused since the latter are afforded opportunity to cross-examine the
former. Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court applies only to extrajudicial acts or admissions and not to testimony at trial where the party adversely
affected has the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.

106. Santos y Ramirez v. Sandiganbayan, GR 71523-25, December 08, 2000, Buena, J., En Banc.
FACTS:
In the pilferage scheme of accused herein, current accounts would be opened with a provincial bank, BPI, Laoag branch, and a city bank like the Citibank-Greenhills,
Manila. A BPI check deposited with Citibank would then be forwarded to the Central Bank clearing house where members of the syndicate, who were employed
there, would pilfer the check and alter the Central Bank manifest and the entries in the clearing bank statements. The pilferage was intended to provide opportunity for
the syndicate to blot out entries referring to the pilfered check. Consequently, BPI-Laoag would not know that a check drawn on it had been deposited with Citibank.
After the lapse of the 5d clearing period, the syndicate would withdraw the amount deposited from Citibank simply because said bank would have considered the
check cleared and funded, as no protest or notice of dishonor could be received from BPI-Laoag. In utilizing this scheme the syndicated netted P9M.

Upon learning that somebody from NBI was looking for him, Estacio went to the NBI. Agent Ranin did not allow him to call a lawyer and investigated him from 530-
730PM of Feb. 17, 1982. This lasted a week. Ranin promised Estacio that he would not be harmed if he cooperates and admits the charges against him and that he
would be freed once he becomes a state witness. But Agent Ranin hit him with a newspaper and poked his gun at him. Estacio then signed a statement. On March 22,
1982, Ranin took his second statement which was a continuation of the first. Estacio claims that his statements in NBI are not true and he only signed the documents
as he was afraid of Agent Ranin.

Tanodbayan filed with Sandiganbayan 3 informations for estafa thru falsification of public documents against Salamanca et al. Estacio was first discharged to be
utilized as state witness, but he moved for re-inclusion in the information as an accused allegedly for the safety of his family. This was granted. Valentino was later
discharged as state witness. Sandiganbayan convicted Estacio, Desiderio, Santos, and Fajardo. Hence these petitions for review on certiorari.

The accused are: Salamanca was the mastermind of the syndicate. Valentino was a bookkeeper at the Clearing office of Central Bank. Estacio is a janitor at the
Central Bank. Santos, Fajardo, and Desiderio are private individuals.

ISSUE:
Whether the extrajudicial confessions of Estacio and Valentino are admissible in evidence against their other co-accused.
HELD: YES.
1) SC held that the extrajudicial confessions of Estacio and Valentino during custodial investigation are admissible even without assistance of counsel since the
confessions were made under the 1973 Constitutions.

2) As to admissibility of the EJ confessions of Valentino and Estacio against their co-accused, SC declared that although an extrajudicial confession is admissible only
against the confessant, jurisprudence makes it admissible as CORROBORATIVE EVIDENCE of other facts that tend to establish the guilt of his co-accused.
Where the confession is used as circumstantial evidence to show the probability of participation by the co-conspirator, that confession is receivable as evidence
against a co-accused.

"It is also to be noted that APPELLANTS' extrajudicial confessions were INDEPENDENTLY made without collusion, are identical with each other in their material
respects and confirmatory of the other. They are, therefore, also admissible as circumstantial evidence against their co-accused implicated therein to show the
probability of the latter's actual participation in the commission of the crime. They are also admissible as corroborative evidence against the others, it being clear
from other facts and circumstances presented that persons other than the declarants themselves participated in the commission of the crime charged and proved. They
are what is commonly known as interlocking confession and constitute an exception to the general rule that extrajudicial confessions/admissions are admissible in
evidence only against the declarants thereof."

2.1) No collusion- Estacio claims that, to his surprise, he found Valentino at the NBI. Valentino told him to say whatever he (Valentino) would say. But this alone
cannot be considered as indicative of collusion between them as their sworn statements both contain facts showing their deep involvement in the scheme to
defraud a bank. Human experience dictates that no one would volunteer to demonstrate one's culpability unless it was the truth. It may thus be safely presumed that
in telling petitioner Estacio to say whatever he would say, Valentino was merely cautioning petitioner Estacio to tell the truth. Nevertheless, even without the
extrajudicial confessions of petitioner Estacio and Valentino, evidence on record is sufficient to sustain a finding of culpability.

Section. 31. Admission by privies

107. Republic v. Sandiganbayan, GR 152154, July 15, 2003, Corona, J., En Banc.
FACTS:
Republic, thru PCGG, represented by OSG, filed a petition for forfeiture before Sandiganbayan. It sought the declaration of US$356M, now estimated to be
US$658M, deposited in escrow in PNB, as ill-gotten wealth. The funds were previously held by 5 account groups using various foreign foundations in certain Swiss
banks. Respondents then filed their answer. Before the case was set for pre-trial, a General Agreement and the Supplemental Agreements were executed by the
Marcos children and PCGG Chairman for a global settlement of the assets of the Marcos family. Respondents Marcos children filed a motion for approval of the
agreements. Respondent Ferdinand Jr. was presented as witness to establish the partial implementation of said agreements. Mrs. Marcos filed a manifestation
claiming that she was not a party to the motion for approval of compromise agreement and that she owned 90% of the funds with the remaining 10% belonging to the
Marcos estate.

The case was set for trial. After several resettings, petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment pertaining to the forfeiture of the US$356M, arguing that
respondents’ admission during pre-trial that they do not have any ownership over the funds subject of the action for forfeiture tenders no genuine issue as to any
material fact. Sandiganbayan granted the motion for summary judgment and ruled that the Swiss deposits which were transmitted and now held in escrow in PNB are
deemed to be ill-gotten wealth.

But upon MR of respondents, Sandiganbayan reversed itself, denying petitioner’s motion for summary judgment. Hence this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether respondents have admitted their ownership over the Swiss funds.
HELD: YES.
SC held that respondents failed to raise any genuine issue of fact in their pleadings. Thus, summary judgment should take place as a matter of right. Respondents’
answer merely denied most of the paragraphs of the complaint for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations,
claiming that they were not privy to the transactions described in the complaint or that respondents cannot remember. SC said that “such a general, self-serving claim
of ignorance of the facts alleged in the petition for forfeiture was insufficient to raise an issue” due to the serious and specific allegations against them.

1) No specific denial- Republic alleged in paragraph 23 of the petition alleged that respondents “clandestinely stashed away the country’s wealth to Switzerland and
hid the same under layers upon layers of foundations xxx to prevent its detection. Xxx with balances amounting to about $US356M xxx.” Respondents’ lame denial
thereof is thus:
22. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 23 insofar as it alleges that Respondents clandestinely stashed the country’s wealth in Switzerland and hid
the same under layers and layers of foundations and corporate entities for being false, the truth being that Respondents’ aforesaid properties were
lawfully acquired.
SC said that this is a negative pregnant and in effect an admission that the Swiss bank deposits existed and that the estimated sum thereof was US$356M as of Dec.
1990.

SC said that the form of denial of lack of knowledge must be availed of with sincerity and in GF, and not for the purpose of confusing the adverse party as to what
allegations of the petition are really being challenged, nor should it be made for the purpose of delay.

2) Contention: Respondents claim that petitioner failed to prove that they own the Swiss funds.
Held:
2.1) Respondents made admissions in their pleadings and documents that the money deposited with the Swiss banks belonged to them. In par. 22 above, respondents
stated that “respondents’aforesaid properties were lawfully acquired.” Respondents thus unwittingly admitted ownership of the Swiss bank deposits by qualifying
their acquisition thereof.

2.2) The General and Supplemental Agreements also stated:

WHEREAS, the FIRST PARTY has obtained a judgment from the Swiss Federal Tribunal on December 21, 1990, that the $356 million belongs in
principle to the Republic of the Philippines provided certain conditionalities are met, but even after 7 years, the FIRST PARTY has not been able to
procure a final judgment of conviction against the PRIVATE PARTY.
The Supplemental Agreement warranted that:
In consideration of the foregoing, the parties hereby agree that the PRIVATE PARTY shall be entitled to the equivalent of 25% of the amount that may
be eventually withdrawn from said $356 million Swiss deposits.
Respondents’ willingness to agree to an amicable settlement with Republic only affirmed their ownership of the Swiss deposits for the simple reason that no person
would acquiesce to any concession over such huge dollar deposits if he did not in fact own them.

2.2.1) Admission in void documents- Contention: SC had held that the General and Supplemental Agreements were void. Thus, respondents contend that those
agreements cannot be used in evidence against them as they stood on the same ground as an unaccepted offer under R130, S27, which provides that “in civil cases, an
offer of compromise is not an admission of any liability and is not admissible in evidence against the offeror.”
Held:
However, the declaration of nullity of these agreements were based on constitutional and statutory infirmities, such as “the government’s undertaking to cause
dismissal of all cases filed against the Marcoses pending before Sandiganbayan and othercourts encroached on the powers of the judiciary.” The reasons relied upon
never touched on the truthfulness of respondents’ admissions as to the ownership of the Swiss funds.

Having made certain admissions in those agreements, respondents cannot now deny to admitting ownership of the Swiss funds. A written statement is
nonetheless competent as an admission even if it is contained in a document which is not itself effective for the purpose for which it is made, either by reason of
illegality, or incompetency of a party thereto, or by reason of not being signed, executed or delivered. Accordingly, contracts have been held as competent evidence of
admissions, although they may be unenforceable.

2.3) Bongbong’s testimony- The testimony of Ferdinand Marcos Jr. during the hearing on the motion for approval of compromise agreement also admitted ownership.
His testimony that the Marcos family agreed to negotiate with the PH government in the hope of finally putting an end to the problems besetting the Marcos family
regarding the Swiss accounts is an acknowledgment of ownership on their part.

2.4) Imelda’s manifestation- Respondent Imelda Marcos also, in her manifestation, stated that she owns 90% of the subject matter of the case, while only 10% thereof
belongs to the estate of the late President Marcos.

2.5) Constantia- In Imelda’s Constancia, she prayed for the approval of the compromise agreement and release of the US$150M to the rightful owner:
2. The Republic's cause of action over the full amount is its forfeiture in favor of the government if found to be ill-gotten. On the other hand, the
Marcoses defend that it is a legitimate asset.
This is again an admission of the Marcoses’ ownership of the Swiss deposits.

3) An admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making such admission since such are judicial admissions under R129, S4. Respondents’
judicial admission of ownership of the Swiss deposits is binding on them.

3.1) Respondents are privies- The individual and separate admissions of each respondent bind all of them pursuant to R130, S29 and 31 (Admission by co-partner or
agent, Admission by privies). The declarations of a person are admissible against a party whenever a "privity of estate" exists between the declarant and the
party, the term "privity of estate" generally denoting a succession in rights. Consequently, an admission of one in privity with a party to the record is competent.
Without doubt, privity exists among the respondents in this case. And where several co-parties to the record are jointly interested in the subject matter of the
controversy, the admission of one is competent against all.
108. Bordalba v. CA, GR 112443, January 25, 2002, Ynares-Santiago, J., First Division. (See case 63 for facts)
HELD:
Anent the issue of identity, the disparity in the boundaries of Lot No. 1242 (799-C) vis-à-vis the boundaries of the lot referred to in the 1947 Deed of Extra-judicial
Partition can be explained by the fact that Lot No. 1242 (799-C) is only a portion of the entire parcel of land described in the Deed, a 1/3 pro-indiviso portion of which
was adjudicated each to, first, petitioner's mother, second, to the predecessors-in-interest of private respondents, and third, to an unidentified party. Logically
therefore, their boundaries will not be similar. As admitted further by both parties, Lot No. 1242 (799-C) was part of the land allotted to their predecessors-in-interest
in the 1947 Deed of Extra-judicial Partition. Moreover, petitioner's mother acknowledged in her application for registration of Lot No. 1242 that the Deed of
Extra-judicial Partition was the source of her claim over the lot sought to be registered. She further admitted that the lot now known as Lot No. 1242 (799-C)
was part of the parcel of land inherited by her and her co-heirs, to the extent of 1/3 share each. Under R130, S31, where one derives title to property from
another, the act, declaration, or omission of the latter, while holding the title, in relation to the property, is evidence against the former.

109. Gevero v. IAC, GR 77029, August 30, 1990, Paras, J., Second Division. (Admission by previous owner respecting the property when he was no longer an
owner of the property)
FACTS:
Lot 2476 was acquired by purchase from the late Luis Lancero in 1964 as per deed of absolute sale in favor of Del Monte Development Corporation (DELCOR). Luis
in turn acquired the same land from Ricardo Gevero in 1952 per deed of sale covering Lot 2476 in the names of Teodorica Babangha- ½ share; and her children
Maria, Restituto, Elena, Ricardo, Eustaquio, Ursula Gevero- ½ share. Babangha died before world war II. Her children aforementioned executed an EJ settlement and
partition of her estate, among them Lot 2476. Thus, Lot 2476-A to Lot 2476-I was approved by the Land Registration Commission, with Lot 2476-D adjudicated to
Ricardo.

DELCOR filed an action in CFI to quiet title and annul the partition made by Babangha’s heirs.

CFI ruled that DELCOR is the true owner of Lot 2476-D. Petitioners, heirs of Ricardo Gevero, appealed to IAC, which affirmed. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the 1952 deed of sale to Lancero already included the share of Ricardo in Babangha’s estate.
Contention: Petitioners claim that Lancero recognized the fatal defect of the 1952 deed of sale to him when he signed the “Settlement to Avoid the Litigation” in 1968.
HELD: YES.
But the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. This particular rule is embodied in the maxim `res inter alias acta alteri '
non debet.' Under Section 31, Rule 130, Rules of Court "where one derives title to property from another, the act, declaration, or omission of the latter, while holding
the title, in relation to the property is evidence against the former." However, the admission of the former owner of a property must have been made while he was the
owner thereof in order that such admission may be binding upon the present owner. Hence, Lanceros' declaration or acts of executing the 1968 document have no
binding effect on DELCOR, the ownership of the land having passed to DELCOR in 1964.

Babangha died long before WWII, thus the rights to the succession were transmitted from the moment of her death. Thus, when Ricardo sold his share over lot 2476,
the share he inherited from Babangha was also included.