SETTLEMENT 301

the bakufu given countenance to such a policy publicly in its dealings

with the court. Backing it up, the senior bakufu officials in Kyoto,
including Keiki, formally warned the court in a joint memorial that if
Japan provoked hostilities over this issue, "we should have not the
least hope of victory. "49
Faced with this unanimity, the court gave way. The emperor gave
his consent to the treaties, commenting that "unsatisfactory provi-
sions" in them needed to be revised.'0 He refused to authorize any
action regarding Hyogo and Osaka, though the bakufu, in communi-
cating with the foreign representatives, assumed this to mean that they
could be opened in accordance with the London Protocol. There was
to be further disagreement on this subject in 1867, when the court
became aware of what had been said. No statement was made about
tariffs, which had at no time been mentioned in the Japanese discus-
sions. The fact reflects a characteristic of the treaty port system that
was common to both China and Japan at this stage: Whereas the West
saw the system in terms of commercial advantage, both Chinese and
Japanese were preoccupied with the political disabilities it imposed on
them. They made economic concessions almost without thought.
This is borne out by the bakufu's subsequent behavior. Because it
had not met all the West's demands, it accepted the necessity of
paying the whole of the Shimonoseki indemnity. Moreover, it agreed
to negotiate a revision of tariffs. When talks about this began in Janu-
ary 1866, Parkes, who took the lead in the matter on behalf of the
powers, promptly expanded them to include arrangements concerning
currency, which was still causing difficulties; the establishment of
navigation aids, such as lighthouses; and the removal of all those
restrictions on trade to which reference had been made in the London
Protocol. He refused to contemplate any further delay in the indem-
nity payments until a satisfactory agreement had been reached on
these points. This was not to be until June 25, 1866, when a conven-
tion was at last signed by Britain, France, Holland, and the United
States, to come into force at Yokohama on July 1 and a month later at
Hakodate and Nagasaki.
The convention was in effect an addendum to the 1858 treaties,
spelling out free-trade doctrine as it applied to Japanese conditions.
Goods imported into and exported from Japan were to be subject to
customs dues calculated at a general level of 5 percent, either in the
form of specified amounts or ad valorem. Some items, such as books,
49 Ibid., p. 301, memorial of November 22,1865.
50 Ibid., p. 304, court decision of November 22,1865.

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