Rule 128

3D
EVID-LTT Atty. Señga

(Evidence and Legal and Trial Techniques) AY 2017-2018
RULE 128. GENERAL PROVISIONS

No. Case Title Pages Page
Quantum of Evidence
1 Tan, Jr. v. Hosana 9 2
2 Tolentino v. Mendoza 9 11
3 People v. Caranguian 7 20
Sec. 3. Admissibility of Evidence
4 People v. Del Monte y Gapay 8 27
5 BSB Group, Inc. v. Go 10 35
6 De Jesus v. Sanchez-Malit 8 45
7 People v. Samontañez 17 53
8 Navarro v. Court of Appeals 12 70
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 190846. February 3, 2016.]
TOMAS P. TAN, JR. , petitioner, vs. JOSE G. HOSANA , respondent.
DECISION
BRION , J : p
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari 1 challenging the August 28, 2009
decision 2 and November 17, 2009 resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 88645.
The Facts
The respondent Jose G. Hosana (Jose) married Milagros C. Hosana (Milagros)
on January 14, 1979. 4 During their marriage, Jose and Milagros bought a house and lot
located at Tinago, Naga City, which lot was covered by Transfer Certi cate of Title
(TCT) No. 21229. 5
On January 13, 1998, Milagros sold to the petitioner Tomas P. Tan, Jr. (Tomas)
the subject property, as evidenced by a deed of sale executed by Milagros herself and
as attorney-in-fact of Jose, by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed by
Jose in her favor. 6 The Deed of Sale stated that the purchase price for the lot was
P200,000.00. 7 After the sale, TCT No. 21229 was cancelled and TCT No. 32568 was
issued in the name of Tomas. 8
On October 19, 2001, Jose led a Complaint for Annulment of Sale/Cancellation
of Title/Reconveyance and Damages against Milagros, Tomas, and the Register of
Deeds of Naga City. 9 The complaint was led before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 62, Naga City. In the complaint, Jose averred that while he was working in
Japan, Milagros, without his consent and knowledge, conspired with Tomas to execute
the SPA by forging Jose's signature making it appear that Jose had authorized
Milagros to sell the subject property to Tomas. 10
In his Answer, Tomas maintained that he was a buyer in good faith and for value.
11 Before he paid the full consideration of the sale, Tomas claimed he sought advice
from his lawyer-friend who told him that the title of the subject lot was authentic and in
order. 12 Furthermore, he alleged that the SPA authorizing Milagros to sell the property
was annotated at the back of the title. 13
Tomas led a cross-claim against Milagros and claimed compensatory and
moral damages, attorney's fees, and expenses for litigation, in the event that judgment
be rendered in favor of Jose. 14 ScHADI
The RTC declared Milagros in default for her failure to le her answer to Jose's
complaint and Tomas' cross-claim. 15 On the other hand, it dismissed Tomas'
complaint against the Register of Deeds since it was only a nominal party. 16
After the pre-trial conference, trial on the merits ensued. 17
Jose presented his brother, Bonifacio Hosana (Bonifacio), as sole witness.
Bonifacio testi ed that he learned of the sale of the subject property from Milagros'
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son. 18 When Bonifacio confronted Milagros that Jose would get angry because of the
sale, Milagros retorted that she sold the property because she needed the money.
Bonifacio immediately informed Jose, who was then in Japan, of the sale. 19
Jose was furious when he learned of the sale and went back to the Philippines.
Jose and Bonifacio veri ed with the Register of Deeds and discovered that the title
covering the disputed property had been transferred to Tomas. 20
Bonifacio further testi ed that Jose's signature in the SPA was forged. 21
Bonifacio presented documents containing the signature of Jose for comparison:
Philippine passport, complaint-af davit, duplicate original of SPA dated 16 February
2002, notice of lis pendens, community tax certi cate, voter's af davit, specimen
signatures, and a handwritten letter. 22
On the other hand, Tomas submitted his own account of events as corroborated
by Rosana Robles (Rosana), his goddaughter. Sometime in December 1997, Tomas
directed Rosana to go to the house of Milagros to con rm if Jose knew about the sale
transaction. Through a phone call by Milagros to Jose, Rosana was able to talk to Jose
who con rmed that he was aware of the sale and had given his wife authority to
proceed with the sale. Rosana informed Tomas of Jose's confirmation. 23
With the assurance that all the documents were in order, Tomas made a partial
payment of P350,000.00 and another P350,000.00 upon the execution of the Deed of
Absolute Sale (Deed of Sale). Tomas noticed that the consideration written by Milagros
on the Deed of Sale was only P200,000.00; he inquired why the written consideration
was lower than the actual consideration paid. Milagros explained that it was done to
save on taxes. Tomas also learned from Milagros that she needed money badly and
had to sell the house because Jose had stopped sending her money. 24
The RTC Ruling
In its decision dated December 27, 2006, 25 the RTC decided in favor of Jose and
nulli ed the sale of the subject property to Tomas. The RTC held that the SPA dated
June 10, 1996, wherein Jose supposedly appointed Milagros as his attorney-in-fact,
was actually null and void.
Tomas and Milagros were ordered to jointly and severally indemnify Jose the
amount of P20,000.00 as temperate damages. 26
The CA Ruling
Tomas appealed the RTC's ruling to the CA.
In a decision dated August 28, 2009, 27 the CA af rmed the RTC ruling that the
deed of sale and the SPA were void. However, the CA modi ed the judgment of the
RTC: first, by deleting the award of temperate damages; and second, by directing Jose
and Milagros to reimburse Tomas the purchase price of P200,000.00, with interest,
under the principle of unjust enrichment. Despite Tomas' allegation that he paid
P700,000.00 for the subject lot, the CA found that there was no convincing evidence
that established this claim. 28
Tomas led a motion for the reconsideration of the CA decision on the ground
that the amount of P200,000.00 as reimbursement for the purchase price of the house
and lot was insuf cient and not supported by the evidence formally offered before and
admitted by the RTC. Tomas contended that the actual amount he paid as
consideration for the sale was P700,000.00, as supported by his testimony before the
RTC. 29
The CA denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit in a resolution
dated November 17, 2009. 30
The Petition
Tomas led the present petition for review on certiorari to challenge the CA
ruling which ordered the reimbursement of P200,000.00 only, instead of the actual
purchase price he paid in the amount of P700,000.00. 31
Tomas argues that, first, all matters contained in the deed of sale, including the
consideration stated, cannot be used as evidence since it was declared null and void;
second, the deed of sale was not speci cally offered to prove the actual consideration
of the sale; 32 third, his testimony establishing the actual purchase price of
P700,000.00 paid was uncontroverted; 33 and, fourth, Jose must return the full amount
actually paid under the principle of solutio indebiti. 34
Jose, on the other hand, argues that first, Jose is estopped from questioning the
purchase price indicated in the deed of sale for failing to immediately raise this
question; and second, the terms of an agreement reduced into writing are deemed to
include all the terms agreed upon and no other evidence can be admitted other than the
terms of the agreement itself. 35
The Issues
The core issues are (1) whether the deed of sale can be used as the basis for the
amount of consideration paid; and (2) whether the testimony of Tomas is suf cient to
establish the actual purchase price of the sale.
OUR RULING
We affirm the CA ruling and deny the petition.
Whether Tomas paid the purchase price of P700,000.00 is a question of fact not
proper in a petition for review on certiorari. Appreciation of evidence and inquiry on the
correctness of the appellate court's factual ndings are not the functions of this Court,
as we are not a trier of facts. 36 aICcHA
This Court does not address questions of fact which require us to rule on "the
truth or falsehood of alleged facts," 37 except in the following cases:
(1) when the ndings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or
impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment
is based on misappreciation of facts; (5) when the ndings of fact are
con icting; (6) when in making its ndings, the same are contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to
those of the trial court; (8) when the ndings are conclusions without citation of
speci c evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the
petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by
the respondent; and (10) when the ndings of fact are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. 38
The present case does not fall under any of these exceptions.
Whether Tomas suf ciently proved that he paid P700,000.00 for the subject
property is a factual question that the CA had already resolved in the negative. 39 The
CA found Tomas' claim of paying P700,000.00 for the subject property to be
unsubstantiated as he failed to tender any convincing evidence to establish his claim.
We uphold the CA's finding.
In civil cases, the basic rule is that the party making allegations has the burden of
proving them by a preponderance of evidence. 40 Moreover, the parties must rely on the
strength of their own evidence, not upon the weakness of the defense offered by their
opponent. 41
Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate
evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term
"greater weight of the evidence" or "greater weight of the credible evidence." 42
Preponderance of evidence is a phrase that, in the last analysis, means probability of
the truth. It is evidence that is more convincing to the court as it is worthier of belief
than that which is offered in opposition thereto. 43
We agree with the CA that Tomas' bare allegation that he paid Milagros the sum
of P700,000.00 cannot be considered as proof of payment, without any other
convincing evidence to establish this claim. Tomas' bare allegation, while
uncontroverted, does not automatically entitle it to be given weight and credence.
It is settled in jurisprudence that one who pleads payment has the burden of
proving it; 44 the burden rests on the defendant to prove payment, rather than on the
plaintiff to prove non-payment. 45 A mere allegation is not evidence, 46 and the person
who alleges has the burden of proving his or her allegation with the requisite quantum
of evidence, which in civil cases is preponderance of evidence.
The force and effect of a void
contract is distinguished from
its admissibility as evidence.
The next question to be resolved is whether the CA correctly ordered the
reimbursement of P200,000.00, which is the consideration stated in the Deed of Sale,
based on the principle of unjust enrichment.
The petitioner argues that the CA erred in relying on the consideration stated in
the deed of sale as basis for the reimbursable amount because a null and void
document cannot be used as evidence.
We find no merit in the petitioner's argument.
A void or inexistent contract has no force and effect from the very beginning. 47
This rule applies to contracts that are declared void by positive provision of law, as in
the case of a sale of conjugal property without the other spouse's written consent. 48 A
void contract is equivalent to nothing and is absolutely wanting in civil effects. 49 It
cannot be validated either by rati cation or prescription. 50 When, however, any of the
terms of a void contract have been performed, an action to declare its inexistence is
necessary to allow restitution of what has been given under it. 51
It is basic that if a void contract has already "been performed, the restoration of
what has been given is in order." 52 This principle springs from Article 22 of the New
Civil Code which states that "every person who through an act of performance by
another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the
expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same." Hence, the
restitution of what each party has given is a consequence of a void and inexistent
contract.
While the terms and provisions of a void contract cannot be enforced since it is
deemed inexistent, it does not preclude the admissibility of the contract as evidence to
prove matters that occurred in the course of executing the contract, i.e., what each
party has given in the execution of the contract.
Evidence is the means of ascertaining in a judicial proceeding the truth
respecting a matter of fact, sanctioned by the Rules of Court. 53 The purpose of
introducing documentary evidence is to ascertain the truthfulness of a matter at issue,
which can be the entire content or a specific provision/term in the document.
The deed of sale as documentary evidence may be used as a means to ascertain
the truthfulness of the consideration stated and its actual payment. The purpose of
introducing the deed of sale as evidence is not to enforce the terms written in the
contract, which is an obligatory force and effect of a valid contract. The deed of sale,
rather, is used as a means to determine matters that occurred in the execution of such
contract, i.e., the determination of what each party has given under the void contract to
allow restitution and prevent unjust enrichment. EHaASD
Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by

the law of these rules. 54 There is no provision in the Rules of Evidence which excludes
the admissibility of a void document. The Rules only require that the evidence is
relevant and not excluded by the Rules for its admissibility. 55
Hence, a void document is admissible as evidence because the purpose of
introducing it as evidence is to ascertain the truth respecting a matter of fact, not to
enforce the terms of the document itself.
It is also settled in jurisprudence that with respect to evidence which appears to
be of doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or admissibility, the safer policy is to be liberal
and not reject them on doubtful or technical grounds, but admit them unless plainly
irrelevant, immaterial, or incompetent; for the reason that their rejection places them
beyond the consideration of the court, if they are thereafter found relevant or
competent. On the other hand, their admission, if they turn out later to be irrelevant or
incompetent, can easily be remedied by completely discarding them or ignoring them.
56
In the present case, the deed of sale was declared null and void by positive
provision of the law prohibiting the sale of conjugal property without the spouse's
consent. It does not, however, preclude the possibility that Tomas paid the
consideration stated therein. The admission of the deed of sale as evidence is
consistent with the liberal policy of the court to admit the evidence which appears to be
relevant in resolving an issue before the courts.
An offer to prove the regular
execution of the deed of sale
is basis for the court to
determine the presence of
the essential elements of
the sale, including the
consideration paid.
Tomas argues that the Deed of Sale was not speci cally offered to prove the
actual consideration of the sale and, hence, cannot be considered by the court. Tomas
is incorrect.
The deed of sale in the present case was formally offered by both parties as
evidence. 57 Tomas, in fact, formally offered it for the purpose of proving its execution
and the regularity of the sale. 58
The offer of the deed of sale to prove its regularity necessarily allowed the lower
courts to consider the terms written therein to determine whether all the essential
elements 59 for a valid contract of sale are present, including the consideration of the
sale. The fact that the sale was declared null and void does not prevent the court from
relying on consideration stated in the deed of sale to determine the actual amount paid
by the petitioner for the purpose of preventing unjust enrichment.
Hence, the speci c offer of the Deed of Sale to prove the actual consideration of
the sale is not necessary since it is necessarily included in determining the regular
execution of the sale.
The consideration stated in the
notarized Deed of Sale is prima
facie evidence of the amount
paid by the petitioner.
The notarized deed of sale is a public document and is prima facie evidence of
the truth of the facts stated therein. 60
Prima facie evidence is de ned as evidence good and suf cient on its face. Such
evidence as, in the judgment of the law, is suf cient to establish a given fact, or the
group or chain of facts constituting the party's claim or defense and which if not
rebutted or contradicted, will remain sufficient. 61
In the present case, the consideration stated in the deed of sale constitutes
prima facie evidence of the amount paid by Tomas for the transfer of the property to
his name. Tomas failed to adduce satisfactory evidence to rebut or contradict the
consideration stated as the actual consideration and amount paid to Milagros and
Jose.
The deed of sale was declared null and void by a positive provision of law
requiring the consent of both spouses for the sale of conjugal property. There is,
however, no question on the presence of the consideration of the sale, except with
respect to the actual amount paid. While the deed of sale has no force and effect as a
contract, it remains prima facie evidence of the actual consideration paid.
As earlier discussed, Tomas failed to substantiate his claim that he paid to
Milagros the amount of P700,000.00, instead of the amount of P200,000.00 stated in
the deed of sale. No documentary or testimonial evidence to prove payment of the
higher amount was presented, apart from Tomas' sole testimony. Tomas' sole
testimony of payment is self-serving and insuf cient to unequivocally prove that
Milagros received P700,000.00 for the subject property.
Hence, the consideration stated in the deed of sale remains suf cient evidence
of the actual amount the petitioner paid and the same amount which should be returned
under the principle of unjust enrichment.
DaIAcC
Unjust enrichment exists "when a person unjustly retains a bene t at the loss of
another, or when a person retains money or property of another against the
fundamental principles of justice, equity, and good conscience." 62 The prevention of
unjust enrichment is a recognized public policy of the State and is based on Article 22
of the Civil Code. 63
The principle of unjust enrichment requires Jose to return what he or Milagros
received under the void contract which presumably bene tted their conjugal
partnership.
Accordingly, the CA correctly ordered Jose to return the amount of P200,000.00
since this the consideration stated in the Deed of Sale and given credence by the lower
court. Indeed, even Jose expressly stated in his comment that Tomas is entitled to
recover the money paid by him in the amount of P200,000.00 as appearing in the
contract.
WHEREFORE , we hereby DENY the petition for review on certiorari. The decision
dated August 28, 2009 and the resolution dated November 17, 2009, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88645 is AFFIRMED . Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Del Castillo and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Leonen, * J., is on leave.
Footnotes
* On Leave.
1. Rollo, pp. 4-20.
2. Id. at 26-36. Penned by CA Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao and concurred in by

Associate Justices Bienvenido L. Reyes (now with the Supreme Court) and Antonio L.
Villamor.
3. Id. at 46-47.
4. Id. at 27.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 29.
8. Id. at 27.
9. Id. at 27-28. Docketed as Civil Case No. 2001-0341.
10. Id. at 28.

11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 21.
19. Id. at 28-29.

20. Id. at 29.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 22.
23. Id. at 29.
24. Id. at 29-30.
25. Id. at 21-24.

26. Id. at 24.
27. Id. at 26-36.
28. Id. at 35.
29. Id. at 37-44.
30. Id. at 46-47.

31. Id. at 9.
32. Id. at 11.
33. Id. at 13-15.
34. Id. at 15-17.

35. Id. at 105-109.
36. Bognot v. RRI Lending Corporation , G.R. No. 180144, September 24, 2014, 736 SCRA 357,
366.
37. First Dominion Resources Corporation v. Peñaranda , G.R. No. 166616, January 27, 2006,
480 SCRA 504.
38. New City Builders, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission , G.R. No. 149281, June 15,
2005, 460 SCRA 220, 221, 227.
39. Rollo, p. 35.
40. Ramos v. Obispo, G.R. No. 193804, February 27, 2013, 692 SCRA 240, 248.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 249.
43. Id.
44. Supra note 36, at 367.
45. Id.
47. Fuentes v. Roca, G.R. No. 178902, April 21, 2010, 618 SCRA 702, 711.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 712.
52. Nool v. Court of Appeals, 342 Phil. 106, 110 (1997).

53. Section 1, Rule 128 of the Rules of Court.
54. Section 3 of Rule 128.
55. Id.
56. Geronimo v. Sps. Calderon, G.R. No. 201781, December 10, 2014.
57. Rollo, pp. 49, 52.
58. Id. at 52.
59. Article 1318 in relation to Article 1458 of the Civil Code.
The essential elements of a contract of sale are the following:
a) Consent or meeting of the minds, that is, consent to transfer ownership in exchange
for the price;
b) Determinate subject matter; and

c) Price certain in money or its equivalent.
60. Sps. Santos v. Sps. Lumbao, G.R. No. 169129, March 28, 2007, 519 SCRA 408, 426.
61. Wa-acon v. People, G.R. No. 164575, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 429, 438.
62. Gonzalo v. Tarnate, Jr., G.R. No. 160600, January 15, 2014, 713 SCRA 224.
63. Id.

EN BANC
[A.C. No. 5151. October 19, 2004.]
PEDRO G. TOLENTINO, ROMEO M. LAYGO, SOLOMON M.

LUMALANG, SR., MELITON D. EVANGELISTA, SR., and NELSON B.
MELGAR , complainants, vs . ATTY. NORBERTO M. MENDOZA ,
respondent.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ , J : p
Before us is a complaint filed by Pedro G. Tolentino, Romeo M. Laygo, Solomon M.

Lumalang, Sr., Meliton D. Evangelista, Sr., and Nelson B. Melgar against Atty. Norberto M.
Mendoza for Grossly Immoral Conduct and Gross Misconduct.
Complainants allege in their Affidavit-Complaint that respondent, a former Municipal Trial
Court Judge, abandoned his legal wife, Felicitas V. Valderia in favor of his paramour,
Marilyn dela Fuente, who is, in turn, married to one Ramon G. Marcos; respondent and
Marilyn dela Fuente have been cohabiting openly and publicly as husband and wife in Brgy.
Estrella, Naujan, Oriental Mindoro; respondent had fathered two children by his paramour
Marilyn dela Fuente; respondent and Marilyn dela Fuente declared in the birth certificates
of their two daughters that they were married on May 12, 1986, making it appear that their
two children are legitimate, while in respondent's Certificate of Candidacy filed with the
COMELEC during the 1995 elections, respondent declared that his wife is Felicitas V.
Valderia; in respondent's certificate of candidacy for the 1998 elections, he declared his
civil status as separated; such declarations in the birth certificates of his children and in
his certificate of candidacy are acts constituting falsification of public documents; and
respondent's acts betray his lack of good moral character and constitute grounds for his
removal as a member of the bar.
Respondent filed his Comment wherein he states that complainants, who are his political
opponents in Naujan, Oriental Mindoro, are merely filing this case to exact revenge on him
for his filing of criminal charges against them; complainants illegally procured copies of
the birth certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna
Normina dela Fuente Mendoza, in violation of Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of
1993, thus, such documents are inadmissible in evidence; respondent did not participate in
the preparation and submission with the local civil registry of subject birth certificates;
respondent never declared that he had two wives, as he has always declared that he is
separated in fact from his wife, Felicitas V. Valderia; and complainants have used this
issue against him during elections and yet, the people of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro still
elected him as Mayor, hence, respondent has not offended the public's sense of morality.
The administrative case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereinafter
IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. Thereafter, the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the IBP conducted hearings.
Witnesses for complainants, Nelson B. Melgar and Romeo M. Laygo, submitted their
affidavits as their direct testimony and were subjected to cross-examination by
respondent's counsel. IcTEaC
Witness Nelson B. Melgar declares in his affidavit as follows: He knows respondent for
they both reside in Naujan, Oriental Mindoro. Respondent is known as a practicing lawyer
and a former Municipal Trial Court Judge. Respondent has been cohabiting openly and
publicly with Marilyn dela Fuente, representing themselves to be husband and wife, and
from their cohabitation, they produced two children, namely, Mara Khrisna Charmina dela
Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza. Sometime in 1995, he
(witness Melgar) received a letter from a concerned citizen, informing him that respondent
was married to Felicitas Valderia of San Rafael, Bulacan, on January 16, 1980, but
respondent abandoned his wife to cohabit with Marilyn dela Fuente. Attached to the letter
was a photocopy of a Certification issued by the Civil Register attesting to the marriage
between respondent and Felicitas Valderia. He also received information from concerned
citizens that Marilyn dela Fuente is also legally married to one Ramon G. Marcos, as
evidenced by a Certification from the Office of the Civil Register. Respondent stated in his
Certificate of Candidacy filed with the COMELEC in 1995 that he is still legally married to
Felicitas Valderia. In respondent's Certificate of Candidacy filed with the COMELEC in
1998, he declared his civil status as separated. Respondent has represented to all that he
is married to Marilyn dela Fuente. In the Naujanews, a local newspaper where respondent
holds the position of Chairman of the Board of the Editorial Staff, respondent was
reported by said newspaper as husband to Marilyn dela Fuente and the father of Mara
Khrisna Charmina and Myrra Khrisna Normina.
On cross-examination, witness Melgar testified as follows: He was the former mayor of
Naujan and he and respondent belong to warring political parties. It was not respondent
who told him about the alleged immoral conduct subject of the present case. Although he
received the letter of a concerned citizen regarding the immoral conduct of respondent as
far back as 1995, he did not immediately file a case for disbarment against respondent. It
was only after respondent filed a criminal case for falsification against him that he decided
to file an administrative case against respondent. 1
On re-direct examination, witness Melgar testified that there were people who were
against the open relationship between respondent and Marilyn dela Fuente as respondent
had been publicly introducing the latter as his wife despite the fact that they are both still
legally married to other persons, and so someone unknown to him just handed to their
maid copies of the birth certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina and Myrra Khrisna Normina.
2
The affidavit of Mr. Romeo M. Laygo, which was adopted as his direct testimony, is
practically identical to that of witness Melgar. On cross-examination, witness Laygo
testified that he was not the one who procured the certified true copies of the birth
certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina
dela Fuente Mendoza, as somebody just gave said documents to Nelson Melgar. He was a
municipal councilor in 1995 when the letter of a concerned citizen regarding respondent's
immorality was sent to Melgar, but he did not take any action against respondent at that
time. 3
Complainants then formally offered documentary evidence consisting of photocopies
which were admitted by respondent's counsel to be faithful reproductions of the originals
or certified true copies thereof, to wit: a letter of one Luis Bermudez informing Nelson
Melgar of respondent's immoral acts, 4 the Certification of the Local Civil Registrar of San
Rafael, Bulacan, attesting to the celebration of the marriage between respondent and one
Felicitas Valderia, 5 the Birth Certificate of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza, 6
the Birth Certificate of Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza, 7 the Certificate of
Candidacy of respondent dated March 9, 1995, 8 the Certificate of Candidacy of
respondent dated March 25, 1998, 9 Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Naujan,
Oriental Mindoro dated October 27, 1998, attesting to the marriage celebrated between
Marilyn dela Fuente and Ramon Marcos, 1 0 and the editorial page of the Naujanews
(February–March 1999 issue), 1 1 wherein it was stated that respondent has two daughters
with his wife, Marilyn dela Fuente.
Respondent, on the other hand, opted not to present any evidence and merely submitted a
memorandum expounding on his arguments that the testimonies of complainants'
witnesses are mere hearsay, thus, said testimonies and their documentary evidence have
no probative weight.
On February 27, 2004, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed Resolution No. XVI-2004-
123, reading as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED,
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable
laws and rules, and considering respondent's violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, Atty. Norberto M. Mendoza is hereby SUSPENDED
INDEFINITELY from the practice of law until he submits satisfactory proof that he
is no longer cohabiting with a woman who is not his wife and has abandoned
such immoral course of conduct.
Portions of the report and recommendation of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, upon
which the above-quoted Resolution was based, read as follows:
FINDINGS:
The evidence of complainants to support their charge of immorality consists in a)

the testimonies of Nelson Melgar and Romeo Laygo given by way of affidavits
executed under oath and affirmed before the Commission and b) their
documentary evidence consisting of their Exhibits "A" to "H".
Respondent filed his comment through counsel and did not formally present or
offer any evidence. Respondent opted not to present his evidence anymore
because according to him "there is none to rebut vis-à-vis the evidence presented
by the private complainants." Respondent instead submitted a memorandum
through counsel to argue his position. As can be seen from the comment and
memorandum submitted, respondent's counsel argues that the complaint is
politically motivated since complainants are political rivals of respondent and
that the birth certificates Exhibits "D" and "D-1" which were offered to show that
respondent sired the children namely Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente
Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza out of his
cohabitation with Marilyn dela Fuente are inadmissible because they were
allegedly secured in violation of Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1993. The
rest of the exhibits are either hearsay or self-serving according to respondent.
TDcHCa
The witnesses who are also two of the complainants herein, on the other hand,
categorically state in their affidavits [Exhibits "A" and `B"] particularly in
paragraph 2 that "Respondent has been cohabiting openly and publicly with
Marilyn de la Fuente, representing themselves to be husband and wife." In
paragraph 10 of said affidavits the witnesses also categorically state that
"respondent has even represented to all and sundry that Marilyn de la Fuente is
his wife." These categorical statements made under oath by complainants are not
hearsay and remain un-rebutted. Respondent chose not to rebut them.
Exhibit "E," the Certificate of Candidacy executed by respondent shows that
respondent is married to one, Felicitas V. Valderia. As shown by Exhibit "H", a
marriage certificate, Marilyn de la Fuente is married to one, Ramon G. Marcos.
Duly certified true copies of said exhibits have been presented by complainants.
With respect to Exhibits "D" and "D-1", we believe that they are competent and
relevant evidence and admissible in this proceedings. The exclusionary rule which
bars admission of illegally obtained evidence applies more appropriately to
evidence obtained as a result of illegal searches and seizures. The instant case
cannot be analogous to an illegal search or seizure. A person who violates Rule
24 of Administrative Order No. 1 Series of 1993 as cited by respondent risks the
penalty of imprisonment or payment of a fine but it does not make the document
so issued inadmissible as evidence specially in proceedings like the present case.
Exhibits "D" and "D-1" which are duly certified birth certificates are therefore
competent evidence to show paternity of said children by respondent in the
absence of any evidence to the contrary.
By and large the evidence of complainants consisting of the testimonies of

witnesses Nelson Melgar and Romeo Laygo, and corroborated by the
documentary exhibits will show that indeed respondent has been cohabiting
publicly with a certain Marilyn de la Fuente who is not his wife and that out of
said cohabitation respondent sired two children. These facts we repeat have not
been denied by respondent under oath since he chose to just argue on the basis
of the improper motivations and the inadmissibility, hearsay and self-serving
nature of the documents presented. Complainants have presented evidence
sufficient enough to convince us that indeed respondent has been cohabiting
publicly with a person who is not his wife. The evidence taken together will
support the fact that respondent is not of good moral character. That respondent
chose not to deny under oath the grave and serious allegations made against him
is to our mind his undoing and his silence has not helped his position before the
Commission. As between the documents and positive statements of
complainants, made under oath and the arguments and comments of respondent
submitted through his lawyers, which were not verified under oath by respondent
himself, we are inclined and so give weight to the evidence of complainants. The
direct and forthright testimonies and statements of Nelson Melgar and Romeo
Laygo that respondent was openly cohabiting with Marilyn de la Fuente is not
hearsay. The witnesses may have admitted that respondent Mendoza did not tell
them that a certain Marilyn de la Fuente was his paramour (for why would
respondent admit that to complainants) but the witnesses did state clearly in their
affidavits under oath that respondent was cohabiting with Marilyn de la Fuente
who is not respondent's wife. Again their categorical statements taken together
with the other documents, are enough to convince us and conclude that
respondent is not of good moral character.
Members of the Bar have been repeatedly reminded that possession of good
moral character is a continuing condition for membership in the Bar in good
standing. The continued possession of good moral character is a requisite
condition for remaining in the practice of law [Mortel vs. Aspiras 100 Phil. 586
(1956); Cordova vs. Cordova 179 SCRA 680 (1989); People vs. Tuanda 181 SCRA
682 (1990)]. The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the
bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted
moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes "mockery
of the inviolable social institution of marriage" [Mijares vs. Villaluz 274 SCRA 1
(1997)].
In the instant case respondent has disregarded and made a mockery of the
fundamental institution of marriage. Respondent in fact even so stated in Exhibit
"F" that he is separated from his wife. This fact and statement without any further
explanation from respondent only contributes to the blot in his moral character
which good moral character we repeat is a continuing condition for a member to
remain in good standing. Under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. Respondent has violated this rule against engaging in immoral
conduct.
We agree, as cited by the respondent, with the pronouncement made in Santos vs.
Dischoso, 84 SCRA 622 (1978) that courts should not be used by private persons
particularly disgruntled opponents to vent their rancor on members of the Bar
through unjust and unfounded accusations. However, in the instant case the
charges can hardly be considered as unfounded or unjust based on the evidence
presented. The evidence presented shows that respondent no longer possess (sic)
that good moral character necessary as a condition for him to remain a member
of the Bar in good standing. He is therefore not entitled to continue to engage in
the practice of law.
We find such report and recommendation of the IBP to be fully supported by the pleadings
and evidence on record, and, hence, approve and adopt the same. CSDAIa
The evidence presented by complainants reach that quantum of evidence required in

administrative proceedings which is only substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conviction. 1 2
Witness Melgar's testimony that respondent had been publicly introducing Marilyn dela
Fuente as his wife is corroborated by the contents of an article in the Naujanews,
introducing respondent as one of Naujan's public servants, and stating therein that
respondent has been blessed with two beautiful children with his wife, Marilyn dela Fuente.
1 3 It should be noted that said publication is under the control of respondent, he being the
Chairman of the Board thereof. Thus, it could be reasonably concluded that if he contested
the truth of the contents of subject article in the Naujanews, or if he did not wish to publicly
present Marilyn dela Fuente as his wife, he could have easily ordered that the damning
portions of said article to be edited out.
With regard to respondent's argument that the credibility of witnesses for the
complainants is tainted by the fact that they are motivated by revenge for respondent's
filing of criminal cases against them, we opine that even if witnesses Melgar and Laygo are
so motivated, the credibility of their testimonies cannot be discounted as they are fully
supported and corroborated by documentary evidence which speak for themselves. The
birth certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna
Normina dela Fuente Mendoza born on June 16, 1988 and May 22, 1990, respectively, to
Norberto M. Mendoza and Marilyn Dela Fuente; and the Certification from the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar of Bulacan attesting to the existence in its records of an entry of a
marriage between respondent and one Felicitas Valderia celebrated on January 16, 1980,
are public documents and are prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein, as
provided for under Article 410 1 4 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Respondent mistakenly argues that the birth certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela
Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza born on June 16, 1988
and May 22, 1990, respectively, to Norberto M. Mendoza and Marilyn Dela Fuente, are
inadmissible in evidence for having been obtained in violation of Rule 24, Administrative
Order No. 1, series of 1993, which provides as follows:
Rule 24. Non-Disclosure of Birth Records. —
(1) The records of a person's birth shall be kept strictly confidential and no
information relating thereto shall be issued except on the request of any of the
following:
a. the concerned person himself, or any person authorized by him;
b. the court or proper public official whenever absolutely necessary in
administrative, judicial or other official proceedings to determine the
identity of the child's parents or other circumstances surrounding his birth;
and
c. in case of the person's death, the nearest of kin.

(2) Any person violating the prohibition shall suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of at least two months or a fine in an amount not exceeding five
hundred pesos, or both in the discretion of the court. (Article 7, P.D. 603)
Section 3, Rule 128 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides that "evidence is admissible
when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules." There could
be no dispute that the subject birth certificates are relevant to the issue. The only question,
therefore, is whether the law or the rules provide for the inadmissibility of said birth
certificates allegedly for having been obtained in violation of Rule 24, Administrative Order
No. 1, series of 1993.
Note that Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 only provides for sanctions
against persons violating the rule on confidentiality of birth records, but nowhere does it
state that procurement of birth records in violation of said rule would render said records
inadmissible in evidence. On the other hand, the Revised Rules of Evidence only provides
for the exclusion of evidence if it is obtained as a result of illegal searches and seizures. It
should be emphasized, however, that said rule against unreasonable searches and seizures
is meant only to protect a person from interference by the government or the state. 1 5 In
People vs. Hipol, 1 6 we explained that:
The Constitutional proscription enshrined in the Bill of Rights does not concern
itself with the relation between a private individual and another individual. It
governs the relationship between the individual and the State and its agents. The
Bill of Rights only tempers governmental power and protects the individual
against any aggression and unwarranted interference by any department of
government and its agencies. Accordingly, it cannot be extended to the acts
complained of in this case. The alleged "warrantless search" made by Roque, a
co-employee of appellant at the treasurer's office, can hardly fall within the ambit
of the constitutional proscription on unwarranted searches and seizures. CDAHIT
Consequently, in this case where complainants, as private individuals, obtained the

subject birth records as evidence against respondent, the protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures does not apply.
Since both Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 and the Revised Rules on
Evidence do not provide for the exclusion from evidence of the birth certificates in
question, said public documents are, therefore, admissible and should be properly taken
into consideration in the resolution of this administrative case against respondent.
Verily, the facts stated in the birth certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente
Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza and respondent's Certificate of
Candidacy dated March 9, 1995 wherein respondent himself declared he was married to
Felicitas Valderia, were never denied nor rebutted by respondent. Hence, said public
documents sufficiently prove that he fathered two children by Marilyn dela Fuente despite
the fact that he was still legally married to Felicitas Valderia at that time.
In Bar Matter No. 1154, 1 7 good moral character was defined thus:
. . . good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good
reputation or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which
he is held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral character is not a
subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality. The standard of
personal and professional integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely
enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal law.
In Zaguirre vs. Castillo, 1 8 we reiterated the definition of immoral conduct, to wit:

. . . that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference
to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. Furthermore,
such conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be
so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible
to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances
as to shock the common sense of decency.
In the above-quoted case, we pointed out that a member of the Bar and of cer of the
court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of
mistresses but must also behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by
creating the belief that he is outing those moral standards and, thus, ruled that siring a
child with a woman other than his wife is a conduct way below the standards of
morality required of every lawyer. 1 9
We must rule in the same wise in this case before us. The fact that respondent continues
to publicly and openly cohabit with a woman who is not his legal wife, thus, siring children
by her, shows his lack of good moral character. Respondent should keep in mind that the
requirement of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the
Philippine Bar but is also a continuing requirement to maintain one's good standing in the
legal profession. 2 0 In Aldovino vs. Pujalte, Jr., 2 1 we emphasized that:
This Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral character
of members of the Bar. They are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might
lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and
integrity of the legal profession. Membership in the legal profession is a privilege.
And whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the
trust and confidence of the public, it becomes not only the right but also the duty
of this Court, which made him one of its officers and gave him the privilege of
ministering within its Bar, to withdraw the privilege.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Norberto M. Mendoza is hereby found GUILTY of

immorality, in violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY from the practice of law until he submits satisfactory proof
that he has abandoned his immoral course of conduct.
Let a copy of this resolution be served personally on respondent at his last known address
and entered in his record as attorney. Let the IBP, the Bar Confidant, and the Court
Administrator be furnished also a copy of this resolution for their information and
guidance as well as for circularization to all courts in the country. SDECAI
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C .J ., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Tinga, Chico-Nazario and Garcia, JJ ., concur.
Azcuna, J ., is on leave.
Footnotes
1. TSN of June 10, 2002, pp. 4–14.

2. Id. at pp. 15–16.
3. TSN of August 12, 2002, pp. 16–20.
4. Exhibits "C" to "C-2," Rollo, pp. 34–36.

5. Exhibit "C-3," Rollo, p. 37.
6. Exhibit "D," Rollo, p. 7.
7. Exhibit "D-1," Rollo, p. 8.
8. Exhibit "E," Rollo, p. 38.

9. Exhibit "F," Rollo, p. 39.
10. Exhibit "H," Rollo, p. 41.
11. Exhibit "G," Rollo, p. 40.
12. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Morante, A.M. No. P-02-1555, April 16, 2004.
13. The pertinent portion of the article written in the vernacular is reproduced as follows:
Sapagkat ang kanyang hangarin na maglingkod sa bayan ng Naujan ay wagas at
dalisay kung kaya't siya ay pinalad na manalo bilang punumbayan noong halalan nang
1998.
Si Mayor Bert Mendoza ay naninirahan sa Barangay Estrella at biniyayaan ng
dalawang magagandang anak na sina Cham-Cham at Chin-Chin sa kaniyang may-
bahay na si Marilyn Dela Fuente.
14. Art. 410. The books making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto
shall be considered public documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts
therein contained.
15. Villanueva vs. Querubin, 48 SCRA 345, 350 (1972).
16. 407 SCRA 179, 185 (2003).
17. In The Matter Of The Disqualification Of Bar Examinee Haron S. Meling In The 2002
Bar Examinations And For Disciplinary Action As Member Of The Philippine Shari'a Bar,
June 8, 2004.
18. 398 SCRA 658, 662 (2003), citing Narag vs. Narag, 291 SCRA 451, 464 (1998).
19. Id. at p. 663.
20. In Re: Suspension From The Practice Of Law In The Territory Of Guam Of Atty. Leon G.
Maquera, Bar Matter No. 793, July 30, 2004.
21. A.C. No. 5082, February 17, 2004.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 124514. July 6, 2000.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , plaintiff-appellee, vs . VICTORIANO

GARCIA 1 and BERNARDINO CARANGUIAN y PINAPIN , accused.
BERNARDINO CARANGUIAN y PINAPIN , accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
SYNOPSIS
In an information filed before the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao, Cagayan, herein
appellant, together with Victoriano Garcia, was charged with the crime of murder for the
killing of Ben Lumboy. They were also charged with frustrated murder for the wounding of
William Capili. Only appellant Caranguian was arrested. Co-accused Garcia remained at
large. Upon arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. Trial ensued. After trial on
the merits, appellant was acquitted for frustrated murder but convicted of murder.
Appellant was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and was ordered to
pay the costs of suit. Aggrieved, herein appellant appealed, questioning the decision of the
trial court.
The Supreme Court found the appeal meritorious. The Court ruled that the prosecution
failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that it was appellant who perpetrated the killing.
While it is accepted that the testimony of a sole eyewitness, if positive and credible, is
sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction, it bears stressing that such testimony must
be clear, positive and credible. Hence, an identification of the appellant as the gunman
based on hearsay does not suffice for conviction. Furthermore, it did not appear that
appellant had a motive for killing the victim. While generally, the motive of the accused in a
criminal case is immaterial and does not have to be proven, proof of the same becomes
relevant and essential when, as in this case, the identity of the assailant is in question. A
finding of guilt must rest on the prosecutions' own evidence, not on the weakness or even
absence of evidence for the defense. Accordingly, the assailed decision was reversed and
set aside. Appellant was acquitted for lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt that he
committed the crime charged.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; QUANTUM OF PROOF; PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE

DOUBT; EXPLAINED. — The quantum of evidence required in criminal cases is proof
beyond reasonable doubt. Section 2 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that "
[p]roof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such degree of proof as, excluding
possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that
degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind." The task of the
prosecution is two-fold: first, to prove that a crime was committed, and second, that
accused is the person responsible. Thus, the prosecution must be able to overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence beyond reasonable doubt to justify the conviction
of the accused. The reason for requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt is simply this —
"In a criminal prosecution, the State is arrayed against the subject; it enters the contest
with a prior inculpatory finding in its hands; with unlimited command of means; with
counsel usually of authority and capacity, who are regarded as public officers, and
therefore speaking semi-judicially, and with an attitude of tranquil majesty often in striking
contrast to that of defendant engaged in a perturbed and distracting struggle for liberty if
not for life. These inequalities of position the law strives to meet by the rule that there is to
be no conviction when there is a reasonable doubt of guilt."
2. ID.; ID.; HEARSAY RULE; MULTIPLE HEARSAY IS NO MORE COMPETENT THAN
SINGLE HEARSAY. — The information given by either Lumboy or Palos to PO3 Birung as to
the identity of appellant is hearsay. The hearsay rule bars the testimony of a witness who
merely recites what someone else has told him, whether orally or in writing. Section 36 of
Rule 130 provides that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his
personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as
otherwise provided in the rules. In fact, PO3 Birung's testimony is even double or multiple
hearsay, since it is based upon "third-hand" information related to the witness by someone
who heard it from others. Multiple hearsay is no more competent than single hearsay.
3. ID.; ID.; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; IDENTIFICATION OF THE GUNMAN BASED ON
HEARSAY DOES NOT SUFFICE FOR CONVICTION. — While it is accepted that the testimony
of a sole eyewitness, if positive and credible, is sufficient to sustain a judgment of
conviction, it bears stressing that such testimony must be clear, positive, and credible.
Hence, an identification of the appellant as the gunman based on hearsay does not suffice
for conviction. ETAICc
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; MOTIVE; APPRECIATED IN CASE AT BAR. — It does not appear appellant
has a motive for killing the victim. While generally, the motive of the accused in a criminal
case is immaterial and does not have to be proven, proof of the same becomes relevant
and essential when, as in this case, the identity of the assailant is in question. A finding of
guilt must rest on the prosecution's own evidence, not on the weakness or even absence
of evidence for the defense. It is precisely when the prosecution's case is weak, as in this
instance, that the defense of alibi assumes importance and becomes crucial in negating
criminal liability. Under our criminal justice system, the overriding consideration is not
whether the court doubts the innocence of the accused but whether it entertains a
reasonable doubt as to his guilt. Here, doubt as to the identification of appellant as the
guilty person has not been overcome.
DECISION
QUISUMBING , J : p
On appeal is the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao, Cagayan, Branch 2, in
Criminal Case No. 2022, convicting appellant of the crime of murder, sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to pay the costs.
The facts, based on the records, are as follows:

On August 1, 1991, at around 7:30 A.M., Civilian Volunteer Organization (CVO) members
Ben Lumboy and William Capili informed PO3 Edwin Birung, Detachment Commander at
Barangay La Suerte, that they sighted two (2) former Civilian Armed Forces Geographical
Unit (CAFGU) agents at nearby Barangay Catarauan, in Amulung, Cagayan. Acting on the
information, PO3 Birung formed a team to track down the two former CAFGUs. LexLib
Composed of PO3 Birung, Lumboy, Capili, Cesar de los Santos, Carlito Ramirez, Guillermo
Mauricio, and Reynaldo Agpalza, the team proceeded to Barangay Catarauan. In single file,
with Capili and Lumboy in the lead, they crossed an improvised wooden bridge over a
creek. Suddenly, Capili and Lumboy came under gunfire. The team members immediately
returned fire. An exchange of gunfire ensued. After about thirty (30) minutes, the firing
ceased. The gunmen withdrew in the direction of Barangay Baccring.
PO3 Birung ordered his men to rescue Lumboy and Capili. Capili was still alive and was
rushed to the Cagayan Provincial Hospital at Tuguegarao, Cagayan for treatment.
Unfortunately, Lumboy was already dead. His body was brought to his house. The
following day, a civilian informer named Palos informed PO3 Birung that the two former
CAFGUs the CVOs sighted were Bernardino Caranguian and Victoriano Garcia, herein
appellant and co-accused. 2
After preliminary investigation, 3 both Caranguian and Garcia were charged with the crime
of murder in Criminal Case No. 2022, for the killing of Lumboy. They were also charged
with frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 2008, for the wounding of Capili. Appellant
was acquitted of frustrated murder but convicted of murder. Only the murder case is now
before us. Cdpr
The Information for murder states: 4

"I N F O R M A T I O N
"The undersigned Provincial Prosecutor accuses Victoriano Garcia and
Bernardino Caranguian of the crime of Murder, defined and penalized under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about August 1, 1991, in the Municipality of Amulung, Province of

Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
Victoriano Garcia and Bernardino Caranguian y Pinapin, both armed with guns,
conspiring together and helping each other, with intent to kill, with evident
premeditation and with treachery did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot one, Ben Lumboy inflicting upon him
gunshot wounds on his body which caused his death.
Contrary to law.
Tuguegarao, Cagayan, February 5, 1992."
Only appellant, Caranguian, was arrested. Co-accused Garcia remains at-large to date.
Upon arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. 5 Trial ensued. 6
During trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) Dr. Cirilo Pintucan,
resident physician at the Cagayan Valley Regional Hospital, who treated the gunshot
wound of Capili; (2) Dra. Dulce Donato-Baculi, retired Municipal Health Officer of Amulung,
Cagayan, who conducted the autopsy on the exhumed body of Lumboy; and (3) PO3 Edwin
Birung, eyewitness to the shooting incident.

Dr. Pintucan testified that Capili sustained a gunshot wound on the right side of the
abdomen, the point of entry of which was 0.5 cm and the point of exit 4 cm. Without
immediate medical treatment, this tangent wound would have caused a tetanus infection
which could lead to death. 7
Dra. Donato-Baculi conducted a post-mortem examination on the exhumed cadaver of
Lumboy on September 2, 1991, a month after the incident. She testified that the cause of
death was 'shock due to massive hemorrhage secondary to gunshot wounds.' 8 LibLex
For his defense, appellant invoked denial and alibi. He testified that he was a CAFGU
member assigned in Tabang, Sto. Niño, Cagayan. To prove his membership in the CAFGU,
he presented the memorandum receipt issued for his gun. He claims that on the day of the
shooting incident, he was at his post the whole day. He knows accused Garcia as a fellow
CAFGU, but they were not together on the day of the incident. He was surprised to find
himself arrested on February 1, 1992, for the shooting incident. 9
On August 11, 1995, the trial court rendered its decision, 1 0 the pertinent dispositive
portion of which states:
"2. Sentencing Bernardino Caranguian in Criminal Case No. 2022 for Murder
to a prison term of reclusion perpetua.
3. Ordering said accused to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED."
Hence, the present appeal.

In his brief, appellant raises the sole issue that the lower court gravely erred in convicting
him of the crime of murder in connection with the death of Ben Lumboy. 1 1 He claims that
the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He assails the credibility
of prosecution witness Birung since the latter did not even know the names of appellant
and co-accused at the time of the incident. Further, the testimony of Birung lacks
corroboration. Lastly, appellant claims an alibi, that it was physically impossible for him to
be at the locus criminis since he was about 15 kilometers away at the time of the shooting
incident.
For the State, the Solicitor General contends that the sole eyewitness testified in clear and
unequivocal terms as to the identity of the assailants. It is well-settled that between a
positive and categorical testimony and a denial, the former should. Hence, appellant's bare
denials and alibi cannot prevail over his positive identification, according to the Solicitor
General. prLL
The crucial issue in this appeal pertains to the sufficiency of evidence to convict appellant.
More particularly, we have to inquire whether there has been sufficient identification of the
appellant as the perpetrator of the offense.
The quantum of evidence required in criminal cases is proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Section 2 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that "[p]roof beyond reasonable doubt
does not mean such degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute
certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces
conviction in an unprejudiced mind." The task of the prosecution is two-fold: first, to prove
that a crime was committed, and second, that accused is the person responsible. Thus, the
prosecution must be able to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence
beyond reasonable doubt to justify the conviction of the accused. 1 2 The reason for
requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt is simply this —
"In a criminal prosecution, the State is arrayed against the subject; it enters the
contest with a prior inculpatory finding in its hands; with unlimited command of
means; with counsel usually of authority and capacity, who are regarded as
public officers, and therefore speaking semi-judicially, and with an attitude of
tranquil majesty often in striking contrast to that of defendant engaged in a
perturbed and distracting struggle for liberty if not for life. These inequalities of
position the law strives to meet by the rule that there is to be no conviction when
there is a reasonable doubt of guilt." 1 3
In the case before us, the prosecution presented proof that Lumboy was killed during the
shooting incident on August 1, 1991. However, we find that the prosecution failed to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that it was appellant who perpetrated the killing. cdtai
On direct examination, PO3 Birung testified that Lumboy and Capili informed him that they
sighted two former CAFGUs in Catarauan. 1 4 On cross-examination, PO3 Birung testified,
however, that Lumboy did not actually see the two former CAFGUs but merely heard the
news from his place. 1 5 Further, Lumboy did not categorically tell PO3 Birung that the two
persons sighted were former CAFGUs, only that said persons were armed. 1 6 PO3 Birung
testified that he merely heard from the people of Barangay Catarauan that there were two
dismissed CAFGUs in the vicinity. 1 7 Further, PO3 Birung testified that he was not even
authorized by the army to catch the dismissed CAFGUs, and that Catarauan was not part
of his jurisdiction. 1 8 PO3 Birung testified that the day after the incident, a civilian informer
named Palos told him the names of the appellant and accused. 1 9 But Palos did not even
witness the shooting incident. He merely executed an affidavit during preliminary
investigation but did not testify in court. Hence, his affidavit is hearsay and has no
probative value. 2 0
Clearly, the information given by either Lumboy or Palos to PO3 Birung as to the identity of
appellant is hearsay. The hearsay rule bars the testimony of a witness who merely recites
what someone else has told him, whether orally or in writing. 2 1 Section 36 of Rule 130 2 2
provides that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal
knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise
provided in the rules. In fact, PO3 Birung's testimony is even double or multiple hearsay,
since it is based upon "third-hand" information related to the witness by someone who
heard it from others. Multiple hearsay is no more competent than single hearsay. 2 3
PO3 Birung insists that he saw the appellant and accused "walking" during the incident. 2 4
After the initial shots rang out, however, the team members immediately sought cover.
Thus, it is highly unlikely that PO3 Birung was able to sufficiently recognize the gunmen.
Further, the other members of the team, including the injured Capili, did not testify as to the
identity of the appellant. The trial court even observed in its decision that Capili
"deliberately chose not to appear in court for 18 times when cited to appear during the
hearing."
While it is accepted that the testimony of a sole eyewitness, if positive and credible, is
sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction, 2 5 it bears stressing that such testimony
must be clear, positive, and credible. Hence, an identification of the appellant as the
gunman based on hearsay does not suffice for conviction.

Further, it does not appear appellant has a motive for killing the victim. While generally, the
motive of the accused in a criminal case is immaterial and does not have to be proven,
proof of the same becomes relevant and essential when, as in this case, the identity of the
assailant is in question. 2 6 A finding of guilt must rest on the prosecution's own evidence,
not on the weakness or even absence of evidence for the defense. 2 7 It is precisely when
the prosecution's case is weak, as in this instance, that the defense of alibi assumes
importance and becomes crucial in negating criminal liability. 2 8 Under our criminal justice
system, the overriding consideration is not whether the court doubts the innocence of the
accused but whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. 2 9 Here, doubt as to
the identification of appellant as the guilty person has not been overcome. LLpr
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant
BERNARDINO Y PINAPIN CARANGUIAN is ACQUITTED for lack of proof beyond
reasonable doubt that he committed the crime of murder. The Director of Prisons is
hereby directed to cause forthwith the release of appellant unless he is being lawfully held
for another cause, and to inform the Court accordingly within ten (10) days from notice. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. The records did not indicate his middle name or initial.

2. TSN, August 26, 1993, pp. 3-22.
3. Records, p. 23.
4. Id., at 33.
5. Id., at 54.
6. Id., at 89.
7. TSN, August 2, 1993, pp. 4-7.
8. TSN, August 4, 1993, pp. 3-5; Exhibit "B", "B-1", Records, p. 8.
9. TSN, May 24, 1994, pp. 3-7, December 7, 1994, pp. 2-8.
10. Records, pp. 209-219.
11. Rollo, p. 53.
12. People v. Vasquez, 280 SCRA 160, 178 (1997).
13. 1 Wharton's Criminal Evidence, 11th ed. Section 1.
14. TSN, August 26, 1993, p. 3.
15. Id., at 14.
16. Id., at 15-16.
\17. Id., at 17.
18. Id., at 18.
19. Id., at 15.
20. People v. Obello, 284 SCRA 79, 91 (1998); People v. Balderas, 276 SCRA 470, 487
(1997).
21. Francisco, R., Basic Evidence, p. 212.

22. SEC. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. —
A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that
is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these
rules.
23. Citing State v. Evans, 169 N.W. 2d 200, 205-206.
24. Supra, see note 19.
25. People v. Lotoc, 307 SCRA 471, 482 (1999).
26. People v. Bautista, G.R. No. 117685, June 21, 1999, p. 21.
27. People v. Diaz, G.R. No. 130652, June 21, 1999, p. 31; People v. Paguntalan, 242 SCRA
753, 779 (1995).
28. People v. Diaz, G.R. No. 130652, June 21, 1999, p. 31; People v. Adofina, 239 SCRA 67,
81 (1994).
29. People v. Vasquez, 280 SCRA 160, 164 (1997).

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 179940. April 23, 2008.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , plaintiff-appellee, vs . NORBERTO DEL

MONTE y GAPAY @ OBET , accused-appellant.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO , J : p
Assailed before Us is the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.

No. 02070 dated 28 May 2007 which a rmed with modi cation the Decision 2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 78, in Criminal Case No. 3437-M-
02, nding accused-appellant Norberto del Monte, a.k.a. Obet, guilty of violation of
Section 5, 3 Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as "Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."
On 11 December 2002, accused-appellant was charged with Violation of Section
5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002. The accusatory portion of the information reads:
That on or about the 10th day of December 2002, in the municipality of
Baliuag, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without authority of law and legal
justi cation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, trade,
deliver, give away, dispatch in transit and transport dangerous drug consisting
of one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet of Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride weighing 0.290 gram. 4
The case was ra ed to Branch 78 of the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan and docketed
as Criminal Case No. 3437-M-02.
When arraigned on 20 January 2003, appellant, assisted by counsel de o cio,
pleaded "Not Guilty" to the charge. 5 On 17 February 2003, the pre-trial conference was
concluded. 6 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. cTECHI
The prosecution presented as its lone witness PO1 Gaudencio M. Tolentino, Jr.,
the poseur-buyer in the buy-bust operation conducted against appellant, and a member
of the Philippine National Police (PNP) assigned with the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA) Regional O ce 3/Special Enforcement Unit (SEU) stationed at the Field
Office, Barangay Tarcan, Baliuag, Bulacan.
The version of the prosecution is as follows:
On 10 December 2002, at around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, a con dential
informant went to the o ce of the PDEA SEU in Barangay Tarcan, Baliuag, Bulacan and
reported that appellant was selling shabu. Upon receipt of said information, a brie ng
on a buy-bust operation against appellant was conducted. The team was composed of
SPO2 Hashim S. Maung, as team leader, PO1 Gaudencio Tolentino, Jr. as the poseur-
buyer, and PO1 Antonio Barreras as back-up operative. After the brie ng, the team,
together with the con dential informant, proceeded to Poblacion Dike for the execution
of the buy-bust operation.
When the team arrived at appellant's place, they saw the appellant standing alone
in front of the gate. The informant and PO1 Tolentino approached appellant. The
informant introduced PO1 Tolentino to appellant as his friend, saying "Barkada ko,
user." PO1 Tolentino gave appellant P300.00 consisting of three marked P100 bills. 7
The bills were marked with "GT JR", PO1 Tolentino's initials. Upon receiving the
P300.00, appellant took out a plastic sachet from his pocket and handed it over to PO1
Tolentino. As a pre-arranged signal, PO1 Tolentino lit a cigarette signifying that the sale
had been consummated. PO1 Barreras arrived, arrested appellant and recovered from
the latter the marked money.
The white crystalline substance 8 in the plastic sachet which was sold to PO1
Tolentino was forwarded to PNP Regional Crime Laboratory O ce 3, Malolos, Bulacan,
for laboratory examination to determine the presence of the any dangerous drug. The
request for laboratory examination was signed by SPO2 Maung. 9 Per Chemistry Report
No. D-728-2002, 1 0 the substance bought from appellant was positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
The testimony of Nellson Cruz Sta. Maria, Forensic Chemical O cer who
examined the substance bought from appellant, was dispensed after both prosecution
and defense stipulated that the witness will merely testify on the fact that the drugs
subject matter of this case was forwarded to their o ce for laboratory examination
and that laboratory examination was indeed conducted and the result was positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride. 1 1
For the defense, the appellant took the witness stand, together with his common-
law wife, Amelia Mendoza; and nephew, Alejandro Lim.
From their collective testimonies, the defense version goes like this: CTAIDE
On 10 December 2002, appellant was sleeping in his sister's house in Poblacion

Dike when a commotion woke him up. His nephew, Alejandro Lim, was shouting
because the latter, together with appellant's common-law wife, Amelia Mendoza, and a
niece, was being punched and kicked by several police o cers. When appellant tried to
pacify the policemen and ask them why they were beating up his common-law wife and
other relatives, the policemen arrested him, mauled him, punched him on the chest,
slapped him and hit him with a palo-palo. He sustained swollen face, lips and tooth. His
common-law wife was likewise hit on the chest with the palo-palo.
The policemen then took appellant and his common-law wife to a house located
in the middle of a eld where the former demanded P15,000.00 for their liberty. The
next day, appellant was brought to the police station.
Amelia Mendoza identi ed PO1 Tolentino and PO1 Barreras as the police
o cers who manhandled them and who demanded P15,000.00 so that she and
appellant could go home. The following day at 6:00 a.m., she said her child and cousin
arrived with the P15,000.00. She was released but appellant was detained. She does
not know why the police o cers led this case against appellant. What she knows is
that they were asking money from them.
Alejandro Lim merely corroborated the testimonies of appellant and Amelia
Mendoza.
On 8 March 2004, the trial court rendered its decision convicting appellant of
Violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, and sentenced him to life
imprisonment and to pay a ne of P5,000,000.00. The dispostive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, this Court hereby nds accused Norberto
del Monte y Gapay @ Obet GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of
Violation of Section 5, Art. II of R.A. 9165 and sentences him to suffer the penalty
of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and a fine of P5,000,000.00. With cost.
The drugs subject matter of this case is hereby ordered forfeited in favor of the
government. The Branch of this Court is directed to turn over the same to the
Dangerous Drugs Board within ten (10) days from receipt hereof for proper
disposal thereof. 1 2
The trial court found the lone testimony of PO1 Gaudencio M. Tolentino, Jr. to be
credible and straightforward. It established the fact that appellant was caught selling
shabu during an entrapment operation conducted on 10 December 2002. Appellant
was identi ed as the person from whom PO1 Tolentino bought P300.00 worth of
shabu as con rmed by Chemistry Report No. D-728-2002. On the other hand, the trial
court was not convinced by appellant's defense of frame-up and denial. Appellant failed
to substantiate his claims that he was merely sleeping and was awakened by the
screams of his relatives who were being mauled by the police officers. DTaAHS
Appellant led a Notice of Appeal on 10 March 2004. 1 3 With the ling thereof,
the trial court directed the immediate transmittal of the entire records of the case to us.
1 4 However, pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo, 1 5 the case was remanded to the
Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition. 1 6
On 28 May 2007, the Court of Appeals a rmed the trial court's decision but
reduced the ne imposed on appellant to P500,000.00. It disposed of the case as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the decision dated March 8, 2004 of
the RTC, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in Criminal Case No. 3437-M-02, nding
accused-appellant Norberto del Monte guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Violation of Section 5, Article II, Republic Act No. 9165, and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
that the amount of ne imposed upon him is reduced from P5,000,000.00 to
P500,000.00. 1 7
A Notice of Appeal having been timely led by appellant, the Court of Appeals
forwarded the records of the case to us for further review. 1 8
In our Resolution 1 9 dated 10 December 2007, the parties were noti ed that they
may le their respective supplemental briefs, if they so desired, within 30 days from
notice. Both appellant and appellee opted not to le a supplemental brief on the ground
they had exhaustively argued all the relevant issues in their respective briefs and the
ling of a supplemental brief would only contain a repetition of the arguments already
discussed therein.
Appellant makes a lone assignment of error:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
GUILTY OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED DESPITE THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE
EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM FOR FAILURE OF THE ARRESTING OFFICERS TO
COMPLY WITH SECTION 21 OF R.A. 9165. 2 0
Appellant anchors his appeal on the arresting policemen's failure to strictly

comply with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. He claims that pictures of him
together with the alleged con scated shabu were not taken immediately upon his
arrest as shown by the testimony of the lone prosecution witness. He adds that PO1
Tolentino and PO1 Antonio Barreras, the police o cers who had initial custody of the
drug allegedly seized and con scated, did not conduct a physical inventory of the same
in his presence as shown by their joint a davit of arrest. Their failure to abide by said
section casts doubt on both his arrest and the admissibility of the evidence adduced
against him. CEDScA
At the outset, it must be stated that appellant raised the police o cers' alleged
non-compliance with Section 21 2 1 of Republic Act No. 9165 for the rst time on
appeal. This, he cannot do. It is too late in the day for him to do so. In People v. Sta.
Maria 2 2 in which the very same issue was raised, we ruled:
The law excuses non-compliance under justi able grounds. However,
whatever justi able grounds may excuse the police o cers involved in the buy-
bust operation in this case from complying with Section 21 will remain
unknown, because appellant did not question during trial the safekeeping of the
items seized from him. Indeed, the police o cers' alleged violations of
Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 were not raised before the trial
court but were instead raised for the rst time on appeal. In no
instance did appellant least intimate at the trial court that there were
lapses in the safekeeping of seized items that affected their integrity
and evidentiary value. Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the
rst time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the
evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without
such objection he cannot raise the question for the rst time on
appeal . (Emphases supplied.)
In People v. Pringas, 2 3 we explained that non-compliance with Section 21 will not
render an accused's arrest illegal or the items seized/con scated from him
inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items as the same would be utilized in the determination
of the guilt or innocence of the accused. In the case at bar, appellant never questioned
the custody and disposition of the drug that was taken from him. In fact, he stipulated
that the drug subject matter of this case was forwarded to PNP Regional Crime
Laboratory O ce 3, Malolos, Bulacan for laboratory examination which examination
gave positive result for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. We thus
nd the integrity and the evidentiary value of the drug seized from appellant not to have
been compromised.
We would like to add that non-compliance with Section 21 of said law,
particularly the making of the inventory and the photographing of the drugs con scated
and/or seized, will not render the drugs inadmissible in evidence. Under Section 3 of
Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue
and is not excluded by the law or these rules. For evidence to be inadmissible, there
should be a law or rule which forbids its reception. If there is no such law or rule, the
evidence must be admitted subject only to the evidentiary weight that will accorded it
by the courts. One example is that provided in Section 31 of Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court wherein a party producing a document as genuine which has been altered and
appears to be altered after its execution, in a part material to the question in dispute,
must account for the alteration. His failure to do so shall make the document
inadmissible in evidence. This is clearly provided for in the rules. HCSDca
We do not nd any provision or statement in said law or in any rule that will bring
about the non-admissibility of the con scated and/or seized drugs due to non-
compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. The issue therefore, if there is
non-compliance with said section, is not of admissibility, but of weight — evidentiary
merit or probative value — to be given the evidence. The weight to be given by the
courts on said evidence depends on the circumstances obtaining in each case.
The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs are (1) the
identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of
the thing sold and the payment therefor. 2 4 What is material to the prosecution for
illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took
place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti. 2 5
All these elements have been shown in the instant case. The prosecution clearly
showed that the sale of the drugs actually happened and that the shabu subject of the
sale was brought and identi ed in court. The poseur buyer positively identi ed
appellant as the seller of the shabu. Per Chemistry Report No. D-728-2002 of Forensic
Chemical O cer Nellson Cruz Sta. Maria, the substance, weighing 0.290 gram, which
was bought by PO1 Tolentino from appellant in consideration of P300.00, was
examined and found to be methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu).
In the case before us, we nd the testimony of the poseur-buyer, together with
the dangerous drug taken from appellant, more than su cient to prove the crime
charged. Considering that this Court has access only to the cold and impersonal
records of the proceedings, it generally relies upon the assessment of the trial court,
which had the distinct advantage of observing the conduct and demeanor of the
witnesses during trial. It is a fundamental rule that ndings of the trial courts which are
factual in nature and which involve credibility are accorded respect when no glaring
errors, gross misapprehension of facts and speculative, arbitrary and unsupported
conclusions can be gathered from such ndings. The reason for this is that the trial
court is in a better position to decide the credibility of witnesses having heard their
testimonies and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. 2 6
The rule nds an even more stringent application where said ndings are
sustained by the Court of Appeals. 2 7 Finding no compelling reason to depart from the
findings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, we affirm their findings.
Appellant denies selling shabu to the poseur-buyer insisting that he was framed,
the evidence against him being "planted", and that the police o cers were exacting
P15,000.00 from him. cDaEAS
In the case at bar, the evidence clearly shows that appellant was the subject of a
buy-bust operation. Having been caught in agrante delicto, his identity as seller of the
shabu can no longer be doubted. Against the positive testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, appellant's plain denial of the offenses charged, unsubstantiated by any
credible and convincing evidence, must simply fail. 2 8 Frame-up, like alibi, is generally
viewed with caution by this Court, because it is easy to contrive and di cult to
disprove. Moreover, it is a common and standard line of defense in prosecutions of
violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. 2 9 For this claim to prosper, the defense must
adduce clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that government
o cials have performed their duties in a regular and proper manner. 3 0 This, appellant
failed to do. The presumption remained unrebutted because the defense failed to
present clear and convincing evidence that the police o cers did not properly perform
their duty or that they were inspired by an improper motive.
The presentation of his common-law wife, Amelia Mendoza, and his nephew,
Alejandro Lim, to support his claims fails to sway. We nd both witnesses not to be
credible. Their testimonies are suspect and cannot be given credence without clear and
convincing evidence. Their claims, as well as that of appellant, that they were
maltreated and suffered injuries remain unsubstantiated. As found by the trial court:
The accused, on the other hand, in an effort to exculpate himself from
liability raised the defense of frame-up. He alleged that at the time of the alleged
buy bust he was merely sleeping at the house of his sister. That he was
awakened by the yells and screams of his relatives as they were being mauled
by the police o cers. However, this Court is not convinced. Accused failed to
substantiate these claims of maltreatment even in the face of his wife's and
nephew's testimony. No evidence was presented to prove the same other than
their self-serving claims. 3 1
Moreover, we agree with the observation of the O ce of the Solicitor General
that the witnesses for the defense cannot even agree on what time the arresting
policemen allegedly arrived in their house. It explained:
To elaborate, appellant testi ed that it was 3 o'clock in the afternoon of
December 10, 2002 when he was roused from his sleep by the policemen who
barged into the house of his sister (TSN, July 7, 2003, p. 2). His common-law
wife, however, testi ed that it was 10-11 o'clock in the morning when the
policemen came to the house (TSN, Oct. 13, 2003, p. 6). On the other hand,
Alejandro Lim testi ed that he went to sleep at 11 o'clock in the morning and it
was 10 o'clock in the morning when the policemen arrived (TSN, Feb. 2, 2004, p.
6). He thus tried to depict an absurd situation that the policemen arrived rst
before he went to sleep with appellant. 3 2aITECD
Having established beyond reasonable doubt all the elements constituting the
illegal sale of drugs, we are constrained to uphold appellant's conviction.
The sale of shabu is penalized under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165. Said section reads:
SEC. 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution
and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals. — The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a ne
ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos
(P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by
law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another,
distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and
all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or
shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.
Under said law, the sale of any dangerous drug, regardless of its quantity and
purity, is punishable by life imprisonment to death and a ne of P500,000.00 to
P10,000,000.00. For selling 0.290 gram of shabu to PO1 Tolentino, and there being no
modifying circumstance alleged in the information, the trial court, as sustained by the
Court of Appeals, correctly imposed the penalty of life imprisonment in accordance
with Article 63 (2) 3 3 of the Revised Penal Code.
As regards the ne to be imposed on appellant, the trial court pegged the ne at
P5,000,000.00 which the Court of Appeals reduced to P500,000.00. Both amounts are
within the range provided for by law but the amount imposed by the Court of Appeals,
considering the quantity of the drugs involved, is more appropriate.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02070 dated 28 May 2007, sustaining the
conviction of appellant Norberto Del Monte, a.k.a. Obet, for violation of Section 5,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Nachura and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Penned by Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid with Associate Justices Martin S.

Villarama, Jr. and Arturo G. Tayag, concurring. Rollo, pp. 93-105.
2. Records, pp. 112-116. HETDAC
3. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of

Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals.
4. Records, p. 2.
5. Id. at 11.
6. Id. at 17.
7. Exhs. D, D-1 and D-2; records, p. 62. aESICD
8. Exh. B; id. at 61.

9. Exh. A; id. at 60.
10. Exh. C; id. at 61.
11. TSN, 16 June 2003, p. 10.
12. Records, p. 116.
13. Id. at 119.

14. Id. at 121.
15. G.R. Nos. 147678-87, 7 July 2004, 433 SCRA 640.
16. Rollo, p. 62.
17. Id. at 104.

18. Id. at 111.
19. Id. at 19.
20. Id. at 73-74.
21. SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Con scated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous
Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. — The PDEA shall
take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia
and/or laboratory equipment so con scated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper
disposition in the following manner: TEHIaA
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs, shall, immediately
after seizure and con scation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were con scated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and
the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public o cial who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
22. G.R. No. 171019, 23 February 2007, 516 SCRA 621, 633-634.
23. G.R. No. 175928, 31 August 2007, 531 SCRA 828, 842-843.
24. People v. Adam, 459 Phil. 676, 684 (2003).
25. People v. Nicolas, G.R. No. 170234, 8 February 2007, 515 SCRA 187, 198.
26. People v. Julian-Fernandez, 423 Phil. 895, 910 (2001).

27. People v. Cabugatan, G.R. No. 172019, 12 February 2007, 515 SCRA 537, 547.
28. People v. Sy, G.R. No. 171397, 27 September 2006, 503 SCRA 772, 783.
29. People v. Eugenio, G.R. No. 146805, 16 January 2003, 395 SCRA 317, 323.
30. People v. Zheng Bai Hui, 393 Phil. 68, 138 (2000).
31. Rollo, p. 57.
32. Id. at 81-82.
33. ART. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties.
xxx xxx xxx
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the
following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:
xxx xxx xxx

2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the
deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied. aTcESI

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 168644. February 16, 2010.]
BSB GROUP, INC., represented by its President, Mr. RICARDO

BANGAYAN , plaintiff-appellee, vs . SALLY GO a.k.a. SALLY GO-
BANGAYAN , accused-appellant.
DECISION
PERALTA , J : p
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87600 1 dated April 20, 2005, which
reversed and set aside the September 13, 2004 2 and November 5, 2004 3 Orders
issued by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36 4 in Criminal Case No. 02-
202158 for quali ed theft. The said orders, in turn, respectively denied the motion led
by herein respondent Sally Go for the suppression of the testimonial and documentary
evidence relative to a Security Bank account, and denied reconsideration.
The basic antecedents are no longer disputed.
Petitioner, the BSB Group, Inc., is a duly organized domestic corporation
presided by its herein representative, Ricardo Bangayan (Bangayan). Respondent Sally
Go, alternatively referred to as Sally Sia Go and Sally Go-Bangayan, is Bangayan's wife,
who was employed in the company as a cashier, and was engaged, among others, to
receive and account for the payments made by the various customers of the company.
In 2002, Bangayan led with the Manila Prosecutor's Of ce a complaint for
estafa and/or quali ed theft 5 against respondent, alleging that several checks 6
representing the aggregate amount of P1,534,135.50 issued by the company's
customers in payment of their obligation were, instead of being turned over to the
company's coffers, indorsed by respondent who deposited the same to her personal
banking account maintained at Security Bank and Trust Company (Security Bank) in
Divisoria, Manila Branch. 7 Upon a nding that the evidence adduced was
uncontroverted, the assistant city prosecutor recommended the ling of the
Information for qualified theft against respondent. 8 IDCScA
Accordingly, respondent was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 36, in an Information, the inculpatory portion of which reads:
That in or about or sometime during the period comprised (sic) between January
1988 [and] October 1989, inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent [to]
gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, take, steal and
carry away cash money in the total amount of P1,534,135.50 belonging to BSB
GROUP OF COMPANIES represented by RICARDO BANGAYAN, to the damage and
prejudice of said owner in the aforesaid amount of P1,534,135.50, Philippine
currency.
That in the commission of the said offense, said accused acted with grave abuse
of con dence, being then employed as cashier by said complainant at the time of
the commission of the said offense and as such she was entrusted with the said
amount of money.
Contrary to law. 9
Respondent entered a negative plea when arraigned. 1 0 The trial ensued. On the
premise that respondent had allegedly encashed the subject checks and deposited the
corresponding amounts thereof to her personal banking account, the prosecution
moved for the issuance of subpoena duces tecum/ad testi candum against the
respective managers or records custodians of Security Bank's Divisoria Branch, as well
as of the Asian Savings Bank (now Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. [Metrobank]), in Jose
Abad Santos, Tondo, Manila Branch. 1 1 The trial court granted the motion and issued
the corresponding subpoena. 1 2
Respondent led a motion to quash the subpoena dated November 4, 2003,
addressed to Metrobank, noting to the court that in the complaint-af davit led with
the prosecutor, there was no mention made of the said bank account, to which
respondent, in addition to the Security Bank account identi ed as Account No. 01-14-
006, allegedly deposited the proceeds of the supposed checks. Interestingly, while
respondent characterized the Metrobank account as irrelevant to the case, she, in the
same motion, nevertheless waived her objection to the irrelevancy of the Security Bank
account mentioned in the same complaint-af davit, inasmuch as she was admittedly
willing to address the allegations with respect thereto. 1 3 cTADCH
Petitioner, opposing respondent's move, argued for the relevancy of the

Metrobank account on the ground that the complaint-af davit showed that there were
two checks which respondent allegedly deposited in an account with the said bank. 1 4
To this, respondent led a supplemental motion to quash, invoking the absolutely
con dential nature of the Metrobank account under the provisions of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 1405. 1 5 The trial court did not sustain respondent; hence, it denied the
motion to quash for lack of merit. 1 6
Meanwhile, the prosecution was able to present in court the testimony of Elenita
Marasigan (Marasigan), the representative of Security Bank. In a nutshell, Marasigan's
testimony sought to prove that between 1988 and 1989, respondent, while engaged as
cashier at the BSB Group, Inc., was able to run away with the checks issued to the
company by its customers, endorse the same, and credit the corresponding amounts
to her personal deposit account with Security Bank. In the course of the testimony, the
subject checks were presented to Marasigan for identi cation and marking as the
same checks received by respondent, endorsed, and then deposited in her personal
account with Security Bank. 1 7 But before the testimony could be completed,
respondent led a Motion to Suppress, 1 8 seeking the exclusion of Marasigan's
testimony and accompanying documents thus far received, bearing on the subject
Security Bank account. This time respondent invokes, in addition to irrelevancy, the
privilege of confidentiality under R.A. No. 1405.
The trial court, nevertheless, denied the motion in its September 13, 2004 Order.
19A motion for reconsideration was subsequently led, but it was also denied in the
Order dated November 5, 2004. 2 0 These two orders are the subject of the instant case.
Aggrieved, and believing that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in acting
the way it did, respondent elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65. Finding merit in the petition, the Court of Appeals reversed and
set aside the assailed orders of the trial court in its April 20, 2005 Decision. 2 1 The
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed orders dated
September 13, 2004 and November 5, 2004 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
testimony of the SBTC representative is ordered stricken from the records.
SO ORDERED. 2 2
With the denial of its motion for reconsideration, 2 3 petitioner is now before the
Court pleading the same issues as those raised before the lower courts. DcaCSE
In this Petition 2 4 under Rule 45, petitioner averred in the main that the Court of
Appeals had seriously erred in reversing the assailed orders of the trial court, and in
effect striking out Marasigan's testimony dealing with respondent's deposit account
with Security Bank. 2 5 It asserted that apart from the fact that the said evidence had a
direct relation to the subject matter of the case for quali ed theft and, hence, brings the
case under one of the exceptions to the coverage of con dentiality under R.A. 1405. 2 6
Petitioner believed that what constituted the subject matter in litigation was to be
determined by the allegations in the information and, in this respect, it alluded to the
assailed November 5, 2004 Order of the trial court, which declared to be erroneous the
limitation of the present inquiry merely to what was contained in the information. 2 7
For her part, respondent claimed that the money represented by the Security
Bank account was neither relevant nor material to the case, because nothing in the
criminal information suggested that the money therein deposited was the subject
matter of the case. She invited particular attention to that portion of the criminal
Information which averred that she has stolen and carried away cash money in the total
amount of P1,534,135.50. She advanced the notion that the term "cash money" stated
in the Information was not synonymous with the checks she was purported to have
stolen from petitioner and deposited in her personal banking account. Thus, the checks
which the prosecution had Marasigan identify, as well as the testimony itself of
Marasigan, should be suppressed by the trial court at least for violating respondent's
right to due process. 2 8 More in point, respondent opined that admitting the testimony
of Marasigan, as well as the evidence pertaining to the Security Bank account, would
violate the secrecy rule under R.A. No. 1405. 2 9
In its reply, petitioner asserted the suf ciency of the allegations in the criminal
Information for quali ed theft, as the same has suf ciently alleged the elements of the
offense charged. It posits that through Marasigan's testimony, the Court would be able
to establish that the checks involved, copies of which were attached to the complaint-
af davit led with the prosecutor, had indeed been received by respondent as cashier,
but were, thereafter, deposited by the latter to her personal account with Security Bank.
Petitioner held that the checks represented the cash money stolen by respondent and,
hence, the subject matter in this case is not only the cash amount represented by the
checks supposedly stolen by respondent, but also the checks themselves. 3 0
We derive from the con icting advocacies of the parties that the issue for
resolution is whether the testimony of Marasigan and the accompanying documents
are irrelevant to the case, and whether they are also violative of the absolutely
con dential nature of bank deposits and, hence, excluded by operation of R.A. No.
1405. The question of admissibility of the evidence thus comes to the fore. And the
Court, after deliberative estimation, nds the subject evidence to be indeed
inadmissible. caIDSH
Prefatorily, fundamental is the precept in all criminal prosecutions, that the

constitutive acts of the offense must be established with unwavering exactitude and
moral certainty because this is the critical and only requisite to a nding of guilt. 3 1
Theft is present when a person, with intent to gain but without violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things, takes the personal property of another
without the latter's consent. It is quali ed when, among others, and as alleged in the
instant case, it is committed with abuse of con dence. 3 2 The prosecution of this
offense necessarily focuses on the existence of the following elements: (a) there was
taking of personal property belonging to another; (b) the taking was done with intent to
gain; (c) the taking was done without the consent of the owner; (d) the taking was done
without violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things; and (e) it was
done with abuse of con dence. 3 3 In turn, whether these elements concur in a way that
overcomes the presumption of guiltlessness, is a question that must pass the test of
relevancy and competency in accordance with Section 3 3 4 Rule 128 of the Rules of
Court.
Thus, whether these pieces of evidence sought to be suppressed in this case —
the testimony of Marasigan, as well as the checks purported to have been stolen and
deposited in respondent's Security Bank account — are relevant, is to be addressed by
considering whether they have such direct relation to the fact in issue as to induce
belief in its existence or non-existence; or whether they relate collaterally to a fact from
which, by process of logic, an inference may be made as to the existence or non-
existence of the fact in issue. 3 5
The fact in issue appears to be that respondent has taken away cash in the
amount of P1,534,135.50 from the coffers of petitioner. In support of this allegation,
petitioner seeks to establish the existence of the elemental act of taking by adducing
evidence that respondent, at several times between 1988 and 1989, deposited some of
its checks to her personal account with Security Bank. Petitioner addresses the
incongruence between the allegation of theft of cash in the Information, on the one
hand, and the evidence that respondent had rst stolen the checks and deposited the
same in her banking account, on the other hand, by impressing upon the Court that
there obtains no difference between cash and check for purposes of prosecuting
respondent for theft of cash. Petitioner is mistaken.
In theft, the act of unlawful taking connotes deprivation of personal property of
one by another with intent to gain, and it is immaterial that the offender is able or unable
to freely dispose of the property stolen because the deprivation relative to the offended
party has already ensued from such act of execution. 3 6 The allegation of theft of
money, hence, necessitates that evidence presented must have a tendency to prove
that the offender has unlawfully taken money belonging to another. Interestingly,
petitioner has taken pains in attempting to draw a connection between the evidence
subject of the instant review, and the allegation of theft in the Information by claiming
that respondent had fraudulently deposited the checks in her own name. But this line of
argument works more prejudice than favor, because it in effect, seeks to establish the
commission, not of theft, but rather of some other crime — probably estafa. cCDAHE
Moreover, that there is no difference between cash and check is true in other
instances. In estafa by conversion, for instance, whether the thing converted is cash or
check, is immaterial in relation to the formal allegation in an information for that
offense; a check, after all, while not regarded as legal tender, is normally accepted
under commercial usage as a substitute for cash, and the credit it represents in stated
monetary value is properly capable of appropriation. And it is in this respect that what
the offender does with the check subsequent to the act of unlawfully taking it becomes
material inasmuch as this offense is a continuing one. 3 7 In other words, in pursuing a
case for this offense, the prosecution may establish its cause by the presentation of
the checks involved. These checks would then constitute the best evidence to establish
their contents and to prove the elemental act of conversion in support of the
proposition that the offender has indeed indorsed the same in his own name. 3 8
Theft, however, is not of such character. Thus, for our purposes, as the
Information in this case accuses respondent of having stolen cash, proof tending to
establish that respondent has actualized her criminal intent by indorsing the checks and
depositing the proceeds thereof in her personal account, becomes not only irrelevant
but also immaterial and, on that score, inadmissible in evidence.
We now address the issue of whether the admission of Marasigan's testimony
on the particulars of respondent's account with Security Bank, as well as of the
corresponding evidence of the checks allegedly deposited in said account, constitutes
an unallowable inquiry under R.A. 1405.
It is conceded that while the fundamental law has not bothered with the triviality
of speci cally addressing privacy rights relative to banking accounts, there,
nevertheless, exists in our jurisdiction a legitimate expectation of privacy governing
such accounts. The source of this right of expectation is statutory, and it is found in R.A.
No. 1405, 3 9 otherwise known as the Bank Secrecy Act of 1955. 4 0
R.A. No. 1405 has two allied purposes. It hopes to discourage private hoarding
and at the same time encourage the people to deposit their money in banking
institutions, so that it may be utilized by way of authorized loans and thereby assist in
economic development. 4 1 Owing to this piece of legislation, the con dentiality of bank
deposits remains to be a basic state policy in the Philippines. 4 2 Section 2 of the law
institutionalized this policy by characterizing as absolutely con dential in general all
deposits of whatever nature with banks and other nancial institutions in the country. It
declares: CIAacS
Section 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions

in the Philippines including investments in bonds issued by the Government of
the Philippines, its political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby
considered as of an absolutely con dential nature and may not be examined,
inquired or looked into by any person, government of cial, bureau or of ce,
except upon written permission of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or
upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public
of cials, or in cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter
of the litigation.
Subsequent statutory enactments 4 3 have expanded the list of exceptions to this

policy yet the secrecy of bank deposits still lies as the general rule, falling as it does
within the legally recognized zones of privacy. 4 4 There is, in fact, much disfavor to
construing these primary and supplemental exceptions in a manner that would
authorize unbridled discretion, whether governmental or otherwise, in utilizing these
exceptions as authority for unwarranted inquiry into bank accounts. It is then
perceivable that the present legal order is obliged to conserve the absolutely
confidential nature of bank deposits. 4 5
The measure of protection afforded by the law has been explained in China
Banking Corporation v. Ortega. 4 6 That case principally addressed the issue of whether
the prohibition against an examination of bank deposits precludes garnishment in
satisfaction of a judgment. Ruling on that issue in the negative, the Court found
guidance in the relevant portions of the legislative deliberations on Senate Bill No. 351
and House Bill No. 3977, which later became the Bank Secrecy Act, and it held that the
absolute con dentiality rule in R.A. No. 1405 actually aims at protection from
unwarranted inquiry or investigation if the purpose of such inquiry or investigation is
merely to determine the existence and nature, as well as the amount of the deposit in
any given bank account. Thus,
. . . The lower court did not order an examination of or inquiry into the deposit of
B&B Forest Development Corporation, as contemplated in the law. It merely
required Tan Kim Liong to inform the court whether or not the defendant B&B
Forest Development Corporation had a deposit in the China Banking Corporation
only for purposes of the garnishment issued by it, so that the bank would hold the
same intact and not allow any withdrawal until further order. It will be noted from.
the discussion of the conference committee report on Senate Bill No. 351 and
House Bill No. 3977 which later became Republic Act No. 1405, that it was not the
intention of the lawmakers to place banks deposits beyond the reach of execution
to satisfy a final, judgment. Thus: TIHCcA
. . . Mr. Marcos:
Now, for purposes of the record, I should like the Chairman of the
Committee on Ways and Means to clarify this further. Suppose an
individual has a tax case. He is being held liable by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue [(BIR)] or, say, P1,000.00 worth of tax liability, and
because of this the deposit of this individual [has been] attached by
the [BIR].
Mr. Ramos:
The attachment will only apply after the court has pronounced
sentence declaring the liability of such person. But where the
primary aim is to determine whether he has a bank deposit
in order to bring about a proper assessment by the [BIR],
such inquiry is not allowed by this proposed law .
Mr. Marcos:
But under our rules of procedure and under the Civil Code, the
attachment or garnishment of money deposited is allowed. Let us
assume for instance that there is a preliminary attachment which is
for garnishment or for holding liable all moneys deposited
belonging to a certain individual, but such attachment or
garnishment will bring out into the open the value of such deposit.
Is that prohibited by . . . the law?
Mr. Ramos:
It is only prohibited to the extent that the inquiry . . . is made only for
the purpose of satisfying a tax liability already declared for the
protection of the right in favor of the government; but when the
object is merely to inquire whether he has a deposit or not
for purposes of taxation, then this is fully covered by the
law . . . .
Mr. Marcos:

The law prohibits a mere investigation into the existence and
the amount of the deposit .
Mr. Ramos:
Into the very nature of such deposit . . . . 4 7
In taking exclusion from the coverage of the con dentiality rule, petitioner in the
instant case posits that the account maintained by respondent with Security Bank
contains the proceeds of the checks that she has fraudulently appropriated to herself
and, thus, falls under one of the exceptions in Section 2 of R.A. No. 1405 — that the
money kept in said account is the subject matter in litigation. To highlight this thesis,
petitioner avers, citing Mathay v. Consolidated Bank and Trust Co., 4 8 that the subject
matter of the action refers to the physical facts; the things real or personal; the money,
lands, chattels and the like, in relation to which the suit is prosecuted, which in the
instant case should refer to the money deposited in the Security Bank account. 4 9 On
the surface, however, it seems that petitioner's theory is valid to a point, yet a deeper
treatment tends to show that it has argued quite off-tangentially. This, because, while
Mathay did explain what the subject matter of an action is, it nevertheless did so only to
determine whether the class suit in that case was properly brought to the Court. aAcHCT
What indeed constitutes the subject matter in litigation in relation to Section 2 of

R.A. No. 1405 has been pointedly and amply addressed in Union Bank of the Philippines
v. Court of Appeals, 5 0 in which the Court noted that the inquiry into bank deposits
allowable under R.A. No. 1405 must be premised on the fact that the money deposited
in the account is itself the subject of the action. 5 1 Given this perspective, we deduce
that the subject matter of the action in the case at bar is to be determined from the
indictment that charges respondent with the offense, and not from the evidence sought
by the prosecution to be admitted into the records. In the criminal Information led
with the trial court, respondent, unquali edly and in plain language, is charged with
quali ed theft by abusing petitioner's trust and con dence and stealing cash in the
amount of P1,534,135.50. The said Information makes no factual allegation that in
some material way involves the checks subject of the testimonial and documentary
evidence sought to be suppressed. Neither do the allegations in said Information make
mention of the supposed bank account in which the funds represented by the checks
have allegedly been kept.
In other words, it can hardly be inferred from the indictment itself that the
Security Bank account is the ostensible subject of the prosecution's inquiry. Without
needlessly expanding the scope of what is plainly alleged in the Information, the subject
matter of the action in this case is the money amounting to P1,534,135.50 alleged to
have been stolen by respondent, and not the money equivalent of the checks which are
sought to be admitted in evidence. Thus, it is that, which the prosecution is bound to
prove with its evidence, and no other.
It comes clear that the admission of testimonial and documentary evidence
relative to respondent's Security Bank account serves no other purpose than to
establish the existence of such account, its nature and the amount kept in it. It
constitutes an attempt by the prosecution at an impermissible inquiry into a bank
deposit account the privacy and con dentiality of which is protected by law. On this
score alone, the objection posed by respondent in her motion to suppress should have
indeed put an end to the controversy at the very rst instance it was raised before the
trial court.

In sum, we hold that the testimony of Marasigan on the particulars of
respondent's supposed bank account with Security Bank and the documentary
evidence represented by the checks adduced in support thereof, are not only
incompetent for being excluded by operation of R.A. No. 1405. They are likewise
irrelevant to the case, inasmuch as they do not appear to have any logical and
reasonable connection to the prosecution of respondent for quali ed theft. We nd full
merit in and af rm respondent's objection to the evidence of the prosecution. The
Court of Appeals was, therefore, correct in reversing the assailed orders of the trial
court. cEHSIC
A nal note. In any given jurisdiction where the right of privacy extends its scope
to include an individual's nancial privacy rights and personal nancial matters, there is
an intermediate or heightened scrutiny given by courts and legislators to laws infringing
such rights. 5 2 Should there be doubts in upholding the absolutely con dential nature of
bank deposits against af rming the authority to inquire into such accounts, then such
doubts must be resolved in favor of the former. This attitude persists unless congress
lifts its nger to reverse the general state policy respecting the absolutely con dential
nature of bank deposits. 5 3
WHEREFORE , the petition is DENIED . The Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 87600 dated April 20, 2005, reversing the September 13, 2004 and
November 5, 2004 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36 in Criminal
Case No. 02-202158, is AFFIRMED .
SO ORDERED.
Corona, Velasco, Jr., Nachura and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Penned by Associate Justice Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis, with Associate Justices Perlita J.

Tria Tirona and Jose C. Reyes, Jr., concurring, CA rollo, pp. 136-145.
2. Records, Vol. 2, p. 369.
3. Id. at 379-381.
4. Presided by Judge Wilfredo D. Reyes.
5. Records, Vol. 1, p. 6.
6. Id. at 12-21.
7. Id. at 6-8.
8. Id. at 3-4.
10. Id. at 137-138.
11. Id. at 161-162.
12. Id. at 163-164.
13. Supra note 5 at 165-169.
14. Id. at 173-174.
15. Id. at 176-178.
16. Id. at 219-221.
17. TSN, January 8, 2004, pp. 8-50; TSN, August 20, 2004, pp. 4-65; TSN, September 22,
2004, pp. 27-54.
18. Supra note 2, at 358-359.

20. Id. at 379-381.
21. CA rollo, pp. 136-145.
22. Id. at 145.
23. Id. at 173.
24. Rollo, pp. 3-30.
25. Id. at 14.
26. Id. at 17-18.
27. Rollo, p. 20.
28. Rollo, pp. 173-178.
29. Rollo, pp. 179-181.
30. Supra note 24, at 193-210.
31. Catuiran v. People, G.R. No. 175647, May 8, 2009; and People v. Obmiranis, G.R. No.
181492, December 16, 2008.
32. Reyes, Revised Penal Code, Book II, 15th ed., 685, 708-709 (2001).
33. Id. at 686.
34. Section 3. Admissibility of evidence. — Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the
issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules.
35. Sec. 4, Rule 128, Rules of Court; Fishman v. Consumer's Brewing Co., 78 N.J.L. 300,
302, cited in EVIDENCE RULES 128-134, R.J. Francisco, 3rd ed., 17 (1996).
36. Valenzuela v. People, G.R. No. 160188, June 21, 2007, 525 SCRA 306, 343.
37. Galvez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-22760, November 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 278.
38. Id.
39. It carries the title "An Act Prohibiting Disclosure of or Inquiry Into Deposits with Any
Banking Institution and Providing Penalty Therefor." The law was approved on
September 9, 1955.
40. Republic v. Eugenio, G.R. No. 174629, February 14, 2008, 545 SCRA 384, 414.
41. Section 1, Republic Act No. 1405.

42. Id.
43. Presidential Decree No. 1972, later on modified by R.A. No. 7653; R.A. No. 3019; R.A.
No. 9160.
44. Supra note 40.
45. Id.
46. G.R. No. L-34964, January 31, 1973, 49 SCRA 355.
47. Supra note 46, at 358-359. The portion of the discussion was lifted from Vol. II,
Congressional Record, House of Representatives, No. 12, pp. 3839-3840, July 27, 1955.
(Emphasis supplied.)
48. G.R. No. L-23136, August 26, 1974, 58 SCRA 559.
50. G.R. No. 134699, December 23, 1999, 321 SCRA 563.
51. Id. at 573. (Emphasis supplied.)
52. 16B Am Jur 2d $605, pp. 73-74. See citation 83 therein.
53. Supra note 40.

EN BANC
[A.C. No. 6470. July 8, 2014.]
MERCEDITA DE JESUS, complainant, vs. ATTY. JUVY MELL

SANCHEZ-MALIT, respondent.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, C.J : p
Before the Court is a disbarment complaint filed by Mercedita de Jesus (De Jesus)
against respondent Atty. Juvy Mell Sanchez-Malit (Sanchez-Malit) on the
following grounds: grave misconduct, dishonesty, malpractices, and unworthiness
to become an officer of the Court.
THE FACTS OF THE CASE
In the Affidavit-Complaint 1 filed by complainant before the Office of the Bar
Confidant on 23 June 2004, she alleged that on 1 March 2002, respondent had
drafted and notarized a Real Estate Mortgage of a public market stall that falsely
named the former as its absolute and registered owner. As a result, the
mortgagee sued complainant for perjury and for sum of money. She claimed that
respondent was a consultant of the local government unit of Dinalupihan,
Bataan, and was therefore aware that the market stall was government-owned.
HcDSaT
Prior thereto, respondent had also notarized two contracts that caused
complainant legal and financial problems. One contract was a lease agreement
notarized by respondent sometime in September 1999 without the signature of
the lessees. However, complainant only found out that the agreement had not
been signed by the lessees when she lost her copy and she asked for another
copy from respondent. The other contract was a sale agreement over a property
covered by a Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) which complainant
entered into with a certain Nicomedes Tala (Tala) on 17 February 1998.
Respondent drafted and notarized said agreement, but did not advise
complainant that the property was still covered by the period within which it
could not be alienated.
In addition to the documents attached to her complaint, complainant
subsequently submitted three Special Powers of Attorney (SPAs) notarized by
respondent and an Affidavit of Irene Tolentino (Tolentino), complainant's
secretary/treasurer. The SPAs were not signed by the principals named therein
and bore only the signature of the named attorney-in-fact, Florina B. Limpioso
(Limpioso). Tolentino's Affidavit corroborated complainant's allegations against
respondent. 2
On 4 August 2004, the Second Division of the Supreme Court issued a Resolution
requiring respondent to submit her comment on the Complaint within ten (10)
days from receipt of notice. 3 cHaADC
In her Comment, 4 respondent explained that the mortgage contract was

prepared in the presence of complainant and that the latter had read it before
affixing her signature. However, complainant urgently needed the loan proceeds
so the contract was hastily done. It was only copied from a similar file in
respondent's computer, and the phrase "absolute and registered owner" was
inadvertently left unedited. Still, it should not be a cause for disciplinary action,
because complainant constructed the subject public market stall under a "Build
Operate and Transfer" contract with the local government unit and, technically,
she could be considered its owner. Besides, there had been a prior mortgage
contract over the same property in which complainant was represented as the
property's absolute owner, but she did not complain. Moreover, the cause of the
perjury charge against complainant was not the representation of herself as
owner of the mortgaged property, but her guarantee that it was free from all
liens and encumbrances. The perjury charge was even dismissed, because the
prosecutor found that complainant and her spouse had, indeed, paid the debt
secured with the previous mortgage contract over the same market stall.
With respect to the lease agreement, respondent countered that the document
attached to the Affidavit-Complaint was actually new. She gave the court's copy
of the agreement to complainant to accommodate the latter's request for an
extra copy. Thus, respondent prepared and notarized a new one, relying on
complainant's assurance that the lessees would sign it and that it would be
returned in lieu of the original copy for the court. Complainant, however,
reneged on her promise.
As regards the purchase agreement of a property covered by a CLOA, respondent
claimed that complainant was an experienced realty broker and, therefore,
needed no advice on the repercussions of that transaction. Actually, when the
purchase agreement was notarized, complainant did not present the CLOA, and
so the agreement mentioned nothing about it. Rather, the agreement expressly
stated that the property was the subject of a case pending before the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB); complainant was
thus notified of the status of the subject property. Finally, respondent maintained
that the SPAs submitted by complainant as additional evidence were properly
notarized. It can be easily gleaned from the documents that the attorney-in-fact
personally appeared before respondent; hence, the notarization was limited to
the former's participation in the execution of the document. Moreover, the
acknowledgment clearly stated that the document must be notarized in the
principal's place of residence.
An exchange of pleadings ensued after respondent submitted her Comment.
After her rejoinder, complainant filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Submission
of Additional Evidence. 5 Attached thereto were copies of documents notarized by
respondent, including the following: (1) an Extra Judicial Deed of Partition which
referred to the SPAs naming Limpioso as attorney-in-fact; (2) five SPAs that
lacked the signatures of either the principal or the attorney-in-fact; (3) two deeds
of sale with incomplete signatures of the parties thereto; (4) an unsigned Sworn
Statement; (5) a lease contract that lacked the signature of the lessor; (6) five
unsigned Affidavits; (7) an unsigned insurance claim form (Annual Declaration by
the Heirs); (8) an unsigned Invitation Letter to a potential investor in Japan; (9)
an unsigned Bank Certification; and (10) an unsigned Consent to Adoption. aESICD
After the mandatory conference and hearing, the parties submitted their
respective Position Papers. 6 Notably, respondent's Position Paper did not tackle
the additional documents attached to complainant's Urgent Ex-Parte Motion. aDHScI
THE FINDINGS OF THE IBP

In his 15 February 2008 Report, IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R.
Villadolid, Jr. recommended the immediate revocation of the Notarial Commission
of respondent and her disqualification as notary public for two years for her
violation of her oath as such by notarizing documents without the signatures of
the parties who had purportedly appeared before her. He accepted respondent's
explanations with respect to the lease agreement, sale contract, and the three
SPAs pertaining to Limpioso. However, he found that the inaccurate crafting of
the real estate mortgage contract was a sufficient basis to hold respondent liable
for violation of Canon 18 7 and Rule 18.03 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Thus, he also recommended that she be suspended from the
practice of law for six months. 9
The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-245 dated 22 May
2008, unanimously adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner, with the modification that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for one year. 10
Respondent filed her first Motion for Reconsideration 11 and Second Motion for
Reconsideration. 12 She maintained that the additional documents submitted by
complainant were inadmissible, as they were obtained without observing the
procedural requisites under Section 4, Rule VI of Adm. No. 02-08-13 SC (2004
Rules on Notarial Practice). 13 Moreover, the Urgent Ex Parte Motion of
complainant was actually a supplemental pleading, which was prohibited under
the rules of procedure of the Committee on Bar Discipline; besides, she was not
the proper party to question those documents. Hence, the investigating
commissioner should have expunged the documents from the records, instead of
giving them due course. Respondent also prayed that mitigating circumstances
be considered, specifically the following: absence of prior disciplinary record;
absence of dishonest or selfish motive; personal and emotional problems; timely
goodfaith effort to make restitution or to rectify the consequences of her
misconduct; full and free disclosure to the disciplinary board or cooperative
attitude toward the proceedings; character or reputation; remorse; and
remoteness of prior offenses. TSIEAD
The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution No. XX-2012-119 dated 10 March
2012, denied respondent's motion for reconsideration for lack of substantial
reason to justify a reversal of the IBP's findings. 14
Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, Director for Bar Discipline Pura
Angelica Y. Santiago — through a letter addressed to then acting Chief Justice
Antonio T. Carpio — transmitted the documents pertaining to the disbarment
Complaint against respondent. 15
THE COURT'S RULING
After carefully reviewing the merits of the complaint against respondent and the
parties' submissions in this case, the Court hereby modifies the findings of the
IBP.
Before going into the substance of the charges against respondent, the Court
shall first dispose of some procedural matters raised by respondent.
Respondent argues that the additional documents submitted in evidence by
complainant are inadmissible for having been obtained in violation of Section 4,
Rule VI of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. A comparable argument was
raised in Tolentino v. Mendoza, 16 in which the respondent therein opposed the
admission of the birth certificates of his illegitimate children as evidence of his
grossly immoral conduct, because those documents were obtained in violation
Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1993. 17 Rejecting his argument,
the Court reasoned as follows:
Section 3, Rule 128 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides that
"evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded
by the law or these rules." There could be no dispute that the subject
birth certificates are relevant to the issue. The only question, therefore, is
whether the law or the rules provide for the inadmissibility of said birth
certificates allegedly for having been obtained in violation of Rule 24,
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993. AHCaES
Note that Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 only
provides for sanctions against persons violating the rule on confidentiality
of birth records, but nowhere does it state that procurement of birth
records in violation of said rule would render said records inadmissible in
evidence. On the other hand, the Revised Rules of Evidence only provides
for the exclusion of evidence if it is obtained as a result of illegal searches
and seizures. It should be emphasized, however, that said rule against
unreasonable searches and seizures is meant only to protect a person
from interference by the government or the state. In People vs. Hipol, we
explained that:
The Constitutional proscription enshrined in the Bill of Rights

does not concern itself with the relation between a private
individual and another individual. It governs the relationship
between the individual and the State and its agents. The Bill
of Rights only tempers governmental power and protects
the individual against any aggression and unwarranted
interference by any department of government and its
agencies. Accordingly, it cannot be extended to the acts
complained of in this case. The alleged "warrantless search"
made by Roque, a co-employee of appellant at the
treasurer's office, can hardly fall within the ambit of the
constitutional proscription on unwarranted searches and
seizures.
Consequently, in this case where complainants, as private
individuals, obtained the subject birth records as evidence
against respondent, the protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures does not apply.
Since both Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 and the
Revised Rules on Evidence do not provide for the exclusion from evidence
of the birth certificates in question, said public documents are, therefore,
admissible and should be properly taken into consideration in the
resolution of this administrative case against respondent. 18
Similarly, the 2004 Rules on Notarial Law contain no provision declaring the
inadmissibility of documents obtained in violation thereof. Thus, the IBP correctly
considered in evidence the other notarized documents submitted by complainant
as additional evidence.
Respondent's argument that the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion of complainant
constitutes a supplemental pleading must fail as well. As its very name denotes,
a supplemental pleading only serves to bolster or adds something to the primary
pleading. Its usual office is to set up new facts which justify, enlarge or change
the kind of relief with respect to the same subject matter as the controversy
referred to in the original complaint. 19 Accordingly, it cannot be said that the
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion filed by complainant was a supplemental pleading. One
of her charges against respondent is that the latter notarized incomplete
documents, as shown by the SPAs and lease agreement attached to the Affidavit-
Complaint. Complainant is not legally barred from submitting additional
evidence to strengthen the basis of her complaint. AICDSa
Going now into the substance of the charges against respondent, the Court finds
that she committed misconduct and grievously violated her oath as a notary
public.
The important role a notary public performs cannot be overemphasized. The
Court has repeatedly stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless
routinary act, but one invested with substantive public interest. Notarization
converts a private document into a public document, making it admissible in
evidence without further proof of its authenticity. Thus, a notarized document is,
by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. It is for this reason that a
notary public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of his notarial duties; otherwise, the public's confidence in the
integrity of a notarized document would be undermined. 20
Where the notary public admittedly has personal knowledge of a false statement
or information contained in the instrument to be notarized, yet proceeds to affix
the notarial seal on it, the Court must not hesitate to discipline the notary public
accordingly as the circumstances of the case may dictate. Otherwise, the
integrity and sanctity of the notarization process may be undermined, and public
confidence in notarial documents diminished. 21 In this case, respondent fully
knew that complainant was not the owner of the mortgaged market stall. That
complainant comprehended the provisions of the real estate mortgage contract
does not make respondent any less guilty. If at all, it only heightens the latter's
liability for tolerating a wrongful act. Clearly, respondent's conduct amounted to
a breach of Canon 1 22 and Rules 1.01 23 and 1.02 24 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. ACIDTE
Respondent's explanation about the unsigned lease agreement executed by

complainant sometime in September 1999 25 is incredulous. If, indeed, her file
copy of the agreement bore the lessees' signatures, she could have given
complainant a certified photocopy thereof. It even appears that said lease
agreement is not a rarity in respondent's practice as a notary public. Records
show that on various occasions from 2002 to 2004, respondent has notarized 22
documents that were either unsigned or lacking signatures of the parties.
Technically, each document may be a ground for disciplinary action, for it is the
duty of a notarial officer to demand that a document be signed in his or her
presence. 26
A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed it
are the very same ones who executed it and who personally appeared before the
said notary public to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein.
27 Thus, in acknowledging that the parties personally came and appeared before
her, respondent also violated Rule 10.01 28 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and her oath as a lawyer that she shall do no falsehood. 29
Certainly, respondent is unfit to continue enjoying the solemn office of a notary
public. In several instances, the Court did not hesitate to disbar lawyers who
were found to be utterly oblivious to the solemnity of their oath as notaries
public. 30 Even so, the rule is that disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of
misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an
officer of the court and the Court will not disbar a lawyer where a lesser penalty
will suffice to accomplish the desired end. 31 The blatant disregard by respondent
of her basic duties as a notary public warrants the less severe punishment of
suspension from the practice of law and perpetual disqualification to be
commissioned as a notary public. cDHAES
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Juvy Mell Sanchez-Malit is found guilty of

violating Canon 1 and Rules 1.01, 1.02, and 10.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility as well as her oath as notary public. Hence, she is SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for ONE YEAR effective immediately. Her notarial
commission, if still existing, is IMMEDIATELY REVOKED and she is hereby
PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered into the personal records of respondent
as a member of the bar and furnished to the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts of the
country for their information and guidance.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo,
Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 1-15.
2. Id. at 14-29.
3. Id. at 30.
4. Id. at 33-69.
5. Id. at 142-196.
6. Id. at 256-285; 286-356.
7. Canon 18 — A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
8. Rule 18.03. — A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
9. Id. at 381.
10. Id. at 365.
11. Id. at 382-413.

12. Id. at 495-572.
13. SECTION 4. Inspection, Copying and Disposal. — (a) In the notary's presence,
any person may inspect an entry in the notarial register, during regular
business hours, provided:
(1) the person's identity is personally known to the notary public or proven
through competent evidence of identity as defined in these Rules;
(2) the person affixes a signature and thumb or other mark or other recognized
identifier, in the notarial register in a separate, dated entry;
(3) the person specifies the month, year, type of instrument or document, and
name of the principal in the notarial act or acts sought; and
(4) the person is shown only the entry or entries specified by him.
(b) The notarial register may be examined by a law enforcement officer in the
course of an official investigation or by virtue of a court order.
(c) If the notary public has a reasonable ground to believe that a person has a
criminal intent or wrongful motive in requesting information from the notarial
register, the notary shall deny access to any entry or entries therein.
14. Rollo, p. 575.
15. Id. at 573-592.

16. 483 Phil. 546 (2004).
17. Rule 24. Non-Disclosure of Birth Records. —
(1) The records of a person's birth shall be kept strictly confidential and no
information relating thereto shall be issued except on the request of any of the
following:
a. the concerned person himself, or any person authorized by him;
b. the court or proper public official whenever absolutely necessary in
administrative, judicial or other official proceedings to determine the identity of
the child's parents or other circumstances surrounding his birth; and
c. in case of the person's death, the nearest of kin.

(2) Any person violating the prohibition shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment
of at least two months or a fine in an amount not exceeding five hundred
pesos, or both in the discretion of the court. (Article 7, P.D. 603)
18. Tolentino v. Mendoza, supra note 16, at 557-558.

19. Planters Development Bank v. LZK Holdings and Development Corp. , 496 Phil. 263
(2005).
20. Lustestica v. Bernabe, A.C. No. 6258, 24 August 2010, 628 SCRA 613.
21. Heirs of the Late Spouses Lucas and Francisca Villanueva v. Atty. Salud P. Beradio,
541 Phil. 17 (2007).
22. CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and for legal processes.
23. Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
24. Rule 1.02 — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the
law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
25. Rollo, p. 8; Annex "C" of the Affidavit-Complaint.

26. Realino v. Villamor, 176 Phil. 632 (1978).
27. Cabanilla v. Cristal-Tenorio, 461 Phil. 1 (2003).
28. Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of
any in Court; nor shall he mislead or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
29. Fulgencio v. Atty. Marlin, 451 Phil. 275 (2003).
30. See Lustestica v. Bernabe, supra note 19; Peña v. Paterno, A.C. No. 4191, 10 June
2013, 698 SCRA 1.
31. Bantolo v. Castillon, Jr., 514 Phil. 628 (2005).

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 134530. December 4, 2000.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , plaintiff-appellee, vs . ROBERTO

SAMONTAÑEZ y DELA VEGA , accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
SYNOPSIS
In the early morning of November 25, 1995 Corazon delas Alas saw her 18-year old
daughter, Lolita off to school from their residence. That was the last time she saw her
daughter alive because in the evening of the same day Lolita's lifeless and naked body was
found in the middle of the sugar cane plantation. She was apparently raped before the
attacker ended her life. Nobody witnessed the actual commission of the grisly crime.
However, police investigation revealed that the accused-appellant was seen around 6 in
the evening of November 25, 1995 while he was coming out of the sugar cane plantation
near the place where the body of Lolita was found. Also follow up investigation led to the
recovery of the victim's personal belongings inside the accused bag left at his work place.
Samontañez was formally charged in court with the crime of rape with homicide. He
originally pleaded not guilty to the crime charged but later changed it to that of guilty. Trial
ensued, and thereafter the trial court rendered a decision nding the accused guilty of the
crime charged and was sentenced to death. The case reached the Court on automatic
review.
According to the Supreme Court, the trial court failed to mention and explain clearly to the
appellant the elements of the crime of rape with homicide as charged in the information.
As a result the appellant was not properly accorded his fundamental right to be informed
of the precise nature of the accusation against him, which is an integral part of the due
process clause under the Constitution. Also the trial court considered pieces of evidence
that were inadmissible in evidence for being proverbial "fruit of a poisonous tree."
Ultimately, the conviction of the appellant for the crime charged rested primarily on his
plea of guilty that appeared to be improvidently made. The decision of the trial court was
annulled and set aside by the Supreme Court and the case was remanded to the court of
origin for proper arraignment and trial.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PLEA OF GUILTY TO CAPITAL OFFENSE;

DUTIES OF THE TRIAL COURT. — Section 3 Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure speci cally mandates the course that trial courts should follow in case where
the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, as follows: SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital
offense; reception of evidence. — When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the
court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of
the consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise
degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his behalf. Based on the
aforecited rule, three (3) things are enjoined of the trial court after a plea of guilty to a
capital offense is entered by the accused: 1. The trial court must conduct a searching
inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea; 2.
The trial court must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the
accused and the precise degree of his culpability through the requisite quantum of
evidence; and 3. The trial court must ask the accused if he desires to present evidence in
his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires. It must be emphasized that the said
procedure is mandatory and any judge who fails to observe it commits grave abuse of
discretion.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RATIONALE. — The rationale behind the rule is that the courts must
proceed with more care where the possible punishment is in its severest form, namely
death, for the reason that the execution of such a sentence is irrevocable and experience
has shown that innocent persons have at times pleaded guilty. The primordial purpose is
to avoid improvident pleas of guilty on the part of an accused where grave crimes are
involved since by admitting his guilt before the court, he would forfeit his life and liberty
without having fully understood the meaning, significance and consequence of his plea.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; SEARCHING INQUIRY; CONSTRUED. — Also, the trial court should have
probed deeper to the extent of securing every material detail of the crime in its lengthy
inquiries to the appellant subsequent to his re-arraignment. Questions tending to elicit
corroborative responses to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses should have
been asked of the appellant. Although there is not de nite and concrete rule as to how a
trial judge may go about the matter of a proper "searching inquiry," it would be well for the
trial court, for instance, to require the appellant to fully narrate the incident that spawned
the charges against him, or by making him re-enact the manner in which he perpetrated the
crime, or by causing him to furnish and explain to the court missing details of signi cance
in order to determine, once and for all, his liability for the crime. As it is, the Decision of the
trial court is devoid of any factual nding relative to the actual commission of the crime of
rape with homicide by the appellant. In the nal analysis, it is the quality rather than the
number of questions propounded during the inquiry that serves the task of ascertaining
the voluntariness and full comprehension by the accused of the consequences of his plea
of guilty to a capital offense.
4. ID.; ID.; CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION; EVIDENCE GATHERED THRU ILLEGALLY
OBTAINED CONFESSION, INADMISSIBLE; THROUGH CASE AT BAR. — Lastly, the trial court
lamentably considered pieces of evidence that are inadmissible in evidence for being the
proverbial "fruit of a poisonous tree." The facts show that the appellant Roberto
Samontañez was actually arrested by police authorities of Nasugbu, Batangas on
November 28, 1995 at his workplace in Barangay Galicia III, Mendez, Cavite. It does not
appear from the record that the appellant was apprised of his constitutional rights during
the police custodial investigation which are enshrined in Article III, Section 12(1) of the
1987 Constitution. It also does not appear that he was assisted by counsel during the said
custodial investigation. In the absence of a valid waiver, any confession obtained from the
appellant during the police custodial investigation relative to the crime, including any other
evidence secured by virtue of the said confession is inadmissible in evidence even if the
same was not objected to during the trial by the counsel of the appellant. Thus, the
personal belongings of the victim namely: Omax wristwatch, gold ring and Joop cologne
were recovered and found inside the bag of the appellant when the police authorities
returned to the appellant's place of work at the Hermogenes Trading in Barangay Galicia
III, Mendez, Cavite after they illegally obtained a confession from the appellant. In the case
o f People vs. Alicando, the Court had opportunity to reiterate the rule that evidence
gathered by virtue of an illegally obtained confession is inadmissible, thus: We have not
only constitutionalized the Miranda warnings in our jurisdiction. We have also adopted the
libertarian exclusionary rule known as the " fruit of the poisonous tree," a phrase minted by
Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in the celebrated case of Nardone vs. United States.
According to this rule, once the primary source (the "tree") is shown to have been
unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is also
inadmissible. Stated otherwise, illegally seized evidence is obtained as a direct result of
the illegal act, whereas the " fruit of the poisonous tree" is the indirect result of the same
illegal act. The " fruit of the poisonous tree" is at least once removed from the illegally
seized evidence, but it is equally inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle that
evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain other evidence because
the originally illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained. EDIHSC
DECISION
DE LEON , JR. , J : p
Before us on automatic review is the Decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, of
Nasugbu, Batangas dated May 15, 1998 in Criminal Case No. 1032 convicting the
appellant, Roberto V. Samontañez, of the crime of rape with homicide and sentencing him
to suffer the supreme penalty of death.
In the early morning of November 25, 1995, Corazon delas Alas saw her daughter, eighteen
(18) year-old Lolita delas Alas, off to school from their residence in Sitio Ilaya, Barangay
Bunducan, Nasugbu, Batangas. That was the last time Corazon had seen her alive because
at 8:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day Lolita's lifeless and naked body was found in
the middle of a sugar cane plantation in Sitio Ilaya, Barangay Bunducan, Nasugbu,
Batangas. Lolita was apparently raped before the attacker ended her life.
Nobody witnessed the actual commission of the grisly crime. However, police
investigation reveals that Roberto Samontañez was seen at around 6:30 o'clock in the
evening on November 25, 1995 while he was in the act of coming out of the sugar cane
plantation of Perino Desacola in Sitio Ilaya, Barangay Bunducan, Nasugbu, Batangas near
the place where the dead body of Lolita delas Alas was later found. It also appears that
earlier, at around 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon, Roberto passed by the house of Melecio
Mendoza in Sitio Bulanggutan, Barangay Bunducan and he headed eastward to the
direction of the sugar cane plantation of Desacola. Thirty (30) minutes later, Lolita was
also spotted, and she was likewise heading eastward to her house in Sitio Ilaya. At around
7:00 o'clock in the evening, Roberto returned heading westward and he passed through the
same path along the cane field.
On November 28, 1995, Roberto was fetched by the police authorities of Nasugbu,
Batangas from his workplace at Hermogenes Trading in Barangay Galicia III, Mendez,
Cavite. During the investigation at the Nasugbu Police Headquarters in Nasugbu, Batangas,
Roberto admitted to the police that the other personal belongings of Lolita delas Alas
were inside his bag that was left at his workplace in Mendez, Cavite. A follow-up
investigation conducted by the Nasugbu police authorities at Hermogenes Trading in
Mendez, Cavite led to the recovery of the said personal belongings of the victim.
On January 11, 1996, Roberto Samontañez was formally charged in court with the crime of
rape with homicide, de ned and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, in an Information that reads:
That on or about the 26th day of November, 1995, at about 6:30 o'clock in the
evening, at Sitio Ilaya, Brgy. Bunducan, Municipality of Nasugbu, Province of
Batangas, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of Lolita delas Alas y
Andino against her will and consent and by reason or on occasion of the said
rape accused with intent to kill, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously strangled the
said Lolita delas Alas y Andino with the use of the latter's T-shirt which directly
caused her instantaneous death. Further, the personal properties of Lolita delas
Alas y Andino consisting of a gold ring and a wrist watch in an undetermined
amount were taken by the accused.
Contrary to law. 2
Upon being arraigned on February 1, 1996, accused Roberto Samontañez, assisted by

counsel de oficio, entered the plea of "Not guilty" to the Information in this case.
Pre-trial was scheduled and terminated on March 14, 1996. Before trial on the merits could
ensue the accused, through counsel, manifested his intention of changing his earlier plea
of not guilty to that of guilty. Accordingly, the trial court ordered that the accused be re-
arraigned in Tagalog, a dialect which he understood, and the said accused then pleaded
guilty to the charge of rape with homicide as stated in the instant information. After being
satis ed that the accused entered a voluntary and informed plea by asking some
questions, the trial court required the prosecution to adduce evidence to prove the guilt of
the accused and the precise degree of his culpability pursuant to Rule 116, Section 3 of the
1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. 3
The evidence of the prosecution shows that on November 26, 1995, the victim, Lolita delas
Alas alias Betia, left their house in Sitio Ilaya, Barangay Bunducan, Nasugbu, Batangas at
around 6:00 o'clock in the morning to attend her classes at Kim Harold Computer School
in Poblacion, Nasugbu, Batangas. She was expected to return home at 5:00 o'clock in the
afternoon of the same day. Having failed to come home on time, the victim's mother,
Corazon delas Alas, decided to meet Lolita in Barangay Pantalan which was her usual route
in going home from school. Upon her arrival in Barangay Pantalan however, Corazon was
informed that Lolita had already passed by, and that by then she must have reached their
home. Corazon returned to Sitio Ilaya but found that Lolita was not yet home. Filled with
apprehension, Corazon sought the assistance of her neighbors, Renato Bauyon and
Dalmacio Salao, to locate her daughter's whereabouts. At 8:00 o'clock in the evening
Corazon fainted upon being informed by Bauyon and Salao that the dead body of Lolita
was found in the sugar cane plantation of Perino Desacola. The body of her dead daughter
was already inside the house when she regained consciousness. 4
Corazon gave her sworn statement 5 to the police on December 8, 1995 in connection with
the rape-slay case of her daughter Lolita delas Alas. She knew accused-appellant Roberto
Samontañez for the reason that he was a resident of Sitio Balanggutan, Barangay
Bunducan, Nasugbu, Batangas. The death of her daughter was very painful to Corazon and
that she spent about P40,000.00 in connection with her wake and funeral. 6
It appears that on November 26, 1995, Carlito Samontañez, who is a rst cousin of both
the accused-appellant and the victim, was on his way home after gathering fodder for his
animals when, at a distance of twenty (20) arms length, he chanced upon Roberto at
around 6:30 o'clock in the evening while the latter was coming out of the sugar cane
plantation of Perino Desacola in Sitio Ilaya, Barangay Bunducan, Nasugbu, Batangas.
Carlito and Roberto were coming from opposite directions. However, when they came
close to two (2) arms length with each other, Carlito observed that Roberto, who was
naked from waist up with his T-shirt placed on his shoulder, was perspiring, somewhat
surprised and looked pale ("medyo po namumutla"). Carlito greeted Roberto and asked
him where he just came from, but the latter did not answer and left hurriedly. Carlito
dismissed his cousin's reaction, thinking that he (Roberto) may have been merely drunk. 7
After reaching his house, Carlito joined in the search for Lolita upon learning that she was
missing. At 8:00 o'clock in the evening, the victim was found dead in the sugar cane
plantation of Perino Desacola in Sitio Ilaya. Lolita was lying on her stomach, naked and a
black T-shirt was tied around her neck. 8
Another prosecution witness, Melecio Mendoza, who is an uncle of Roberto Samontañez
by af nity, saw Roberto walking eastward to Sitio Ilaya in Barangay Bunducan at about
5:30 o'clock in the afternoon on November 26, 1995. Melecio also saw Lolita at around
6:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day walking home to Sitio Ilaya. Subsequently, at
7:00 o'clock in the evening, Melecio again saw Roberto passed by his house, this time
heading westward to Sitio Balanggutan in Barangay Bunducan. Roberto was naked from
waist up with his T-shirt placed on his shoulder. 9
Melecio joined in the search for Lolita after having been requested by Renato Bauyon.
Lolita was totally naked and already dead when they found her in the sugar cane plantation
of Perino Desacola in Sitio Ilaya which was approximately one hundred (100) meters away
from his house in Sitio Balanggutan. 1 0
Acting on the report that a dead woman was found in Barangay Bunducan, Nasugbu,
Batangas, SPO2 Buenaventura Masikat and other police of cers of Nasugbu, Batangas,
together with Dra. Estela Hizon, proceeded to the crime scene in Sitio Ilaya, Barangay
Bunducan, Nasugbu, Batangas where the victim, Lolita delas Alas, was found dead and
lying on her stomach totally naked with a black T-shirt tied around her neck. A panty was
stuffed in her anal area. Her hands were stretched upward and her bra was half removed.
11
Dra. Estela Hizon, M.D., Municipal Health Of cer of Nasugbu, Batangas, conducted a post-
mortem examination on the cadaver of Lolita delas Alas which was already in a state of
rigor mortis. Her ndings are contained in her post-mortem certi cation 1 2 dated
November 26, 1995, thus:
1. Contusion around the left eye.
2. Contused wounds at the upper and lower lips

3. Presence of mark of strangulation around the neck.
4. Multiple contusions at the anterior aspect of the chest.
5. Multiple laceration of the hymen.

Cause of death : Asphyxia by Strangulation.

Dra. Hizon also prepared an anatomical sketch of the human body 1 3 showing the location
of the injuries indicated in her post-mortem report and another anatomical sketch showing
the hymenal lacerations 1 4 in the vaginal canal of the victim. She explained that the
contusion on the left eye, the contused wounds on the upper and lower lips with swelling
and blackish discoloration as well as the multiple contusions at the anterior aspect of the
chest of the victim may have been caused by st blows. The horizontal skin depressions
around the victim's neck was caused by ligature possibly with the use of a piece of cloth or
a rope. The protruding tongue of the victim may have been caused by constriction around
her neck. The multiple fresh lacerations of the hymen may have been caused by forcible
penetration of the victim's vaginal canal. There was watery bloodied uid coming out of
the victim's vagina. Finally, the cause of death of the victim was asphyxia by strangulation.
15
Meanwhile, SPO2 Masikat found two (2) short pants and one (1) piece of slipper that
belonged to Lolita delas Alas. 1 6 On the other hand, SPO2 Dionisio Calara took pictures 1 7
of the deceased victim and the scene of the crime on the same evening. On November 27,
1995, police of cers Masikat and Calara returned to the crime scene and found the black
bag of the victim containing a lotion, a pair of maong pants and a pair of shoes. 1 8 They
also found the brown bag of the victim which contained her Kim Harold identi cation card,
coin purse, hair pin, powder kit and powder puff. 1 9 In addition, they prepared a sketch of
the scene of the crime 2 0 and its vicinity. Thereafter, SPO2 Masikat conducted interviews
of the persons in the vicinity among whom were the prosecution witnesses, Carlito
Samontañez and Melecio Mendoza. During the interview, SPO2 Masikat learned, among
others, that the suspect, Roberto Samontañez, could possibly be located at Hermogenes
Trading in Barangay Galicia III, Mendez, Cavite where he worked. 2 1
On November 28, 1995, SPO2 Masikat, together with police of cers Ramos, Malinay,
Ocoma, Lejano and Ilao, all of the Nasugbu, Batangas police found Roberto Samontañez at
the Hermogenes Trading in Barangay Galicia III, Mendez, Cavite. After talking to his
employer, they invited Roberto to the Nasugbu Police Headquarters. During the
interrogation at the police headquarters, Roberto informed SPO2 Masikat and SPO2 Calara
that some of the personal belongings of Lolita delas Alas were inside his bag that was left
at his workplace in Mendez, Cavite. 2 2
On December 4, 1995 SPO2 Masikat and his group returned to Hermogenes Trading in
Barangay Galicia III, Mendez, Cavite and inquired from Mr. Nelson Hermogenes about the
bag of Roberto. Accordingly, Mr. Hermogenes produced a black bag purportedly
belonging to Roberto containing an Omax wrist watch, a Joop cologne and a pawnshop
receipt for a gold ring that was subsequently redeemed by SPO2 Masikat for P500.00. The
three (3) articles were positively identi ed during the trial of the case by Corazon delas
Alas as belonging to her daughter, Lolita delas Alas. The police also found a fan knife
(balisong ) and a Barangay Clearance inside the black bag of Roberto Samontañez. 2 3
The prosecution rested its case on November 30, 1997. During the scheduled hearings on
January 14 and 29, 1998 for the presentation of evidence of the defense, the accused took
the witness stand and reiterated his previous plea of guilty to the crime charged in the
information. Thereafter, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, accused Roberto Samontañez is
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal, of the crime of Rape with
Homicide as thus penalized and is hereby sentenced to DEATH, together with the
accessory penalties provided for in Article 40 of the same code. The accused is
further condemned to pay to the heirs of the victim the amount of P40,000.00 by
way of compensatory or actual damages; P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for her
death; and P100,000.00 as and for moral damages. The accused should pay
costs.
SO ORDERED. 2 4
In his Brief, appellant Roberto Samontañez assails the validity of his plea of guilty to the
charge in the information in this case for having been improvidently made. On the other
hand, the People belie the claim of the appellant by citing portions of the transcript of the
stenographic notes of the hearing during the appellant's re-arraignment on March 14, 1996
and that of the scheduled hearings on January 14 and 29, 1998 to show that he voluntarily
entered the plea of guilty to the crime of rape with homicide as charged in the information
and with full knowledge of the consequences of his plea of guilty. It averred that the guilt
of the appellant was also established beyond reasonable doubt by independent evidence
adduced by the prosecution during the trial of the instant case. aDIHTE
The record shows that the trial court relied on a) the appellant's plea of guilty to the crime
of rape with homicide as charged in the information and b) the evidence adduced by the
prosecution during the trial of the instant case.
Section 3, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure speci cally mandates the
course that trial courts should follow in case where the accused pleads guilty to a capital
offense, as follows:
SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. — When the
accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching
inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his
plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of
culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his behalf.
Based on the aforecited rule, three (3) things are enjoined of the trial court after a plea of
guilty to a capital offense is entered by the accused: 1. The trial court must conduct a
searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his
plea; 2. The trial court must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt
of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability through the requisite quantum of
evidence; and 3. The trial court must ask the accused if he desires to present evidence in
his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires. 2 5 It must be emphasized that the said
procedure is mandatory and any judge who fails to observe it commits grave abuse of
discretion. 2 6
The rationale behind the rule is that the courts must proceed with more care where the
possible punishment is in its severest form, namely death, for the reason that the
execution of such a sentence is irrevocable and experience has shown that innocent
persons have at times pleaded guilty. The primordial purpose is to avoid improvident pleas
of guilty on the part of an accused where grave crimes are involved since by admitting his
guilt before the court, he would forfeit his life and liberty without having fully understood
the meaning, significance and consequence of his plea. 2 7
The Court notes the trial court's efforts to ensure the propriety of appellant's plea of guilty
to the crime of rape with homicide as evidenced by its lengthy inquiries to the appellant in
separate hearings, the transcript of which were reproduced in its assailed Decision. Hence,
during the scheduled hearing on March 14, 1996, the following proceedings transpired, to
wit:
Court:
Ready?
Atty. Exchaure:
Your honor, just a moment ago I informed the accused the fact that we will now
proceed with the trial on the merits of the case, but as usual, the accused
intimated to this representation that he will be pleading guilty to the
offense charged against him. I informed him the gravity of the offense as
well as the corresponding severe penalty attached to the offense which is
death, considering that there is a new law. But the accused insists on his
desire to plead guilty, in fact I brought that desire of his to the attention of
his mother who is present, as well as his aunt, and grandmother, and
according to them, that is the wish of the accused to plead guilty to the
charge against him.
Court:
The Court is asking the accused.
Q: Is the manifestation of your counsel, Atty. Exchaure true and correct that you
have now made up your mind to plead guilty to the offense as charged?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you are doing that with your clear mind, nobody forced you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And did you reveal before to your counsel your decision to plead guilty?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where is the mother of the accused?
Atty. Exchaure:
She is here, your honor.
Court: (To the mother Teresita Samontañez)

Q: Are you related to the accused?
A: He is my son, your honor.
Q: Now, is it true that your son has decided to plead guilty?
A: Yes, your honor.
Q: And as mother, did you counsel your son that pleading guilty will mean his
guilt as charged?
A: Yes, your honor.

Court:
The accused can now be re-arraigned, but after his plea of guilty, the prosecution
still has to present evidence as required by the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure.
Prosecutor Marajas:
Yes, your honor.
Court:
Make your motion, Mr. defense counsel.

Atty. Exchaure:
Your honor, the accused, a moment ago, intimated to this representation that he
is changing his former Plea of Not Guilty to that of Guilty, for which reason,
your honor, I move that the accused be re-arraigned so that he could
properly enter his Plea of Guilty.
Court:
Re-arraign the accused.

(The Court Interpreter read the information in Pilipino to the accused.)
Court Interpreter:
(After reading the Information in Pilipino.)
Your honor, the accused entered a Plea of Not Guilty.
Court:
Place the accused on the witness stand. I want to clear this matter very well,
because of the gravity of the offense.
Court:
(To the accused)
Q: Do you swear to tell the truth and nothing but the truth in this case?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Please state your name and other personal circumstances.

A: ROBERTO SAMONTAÑEZ, 26 years old, single, laborer in a construction, and a
resident of Barangay Bunducan, Nasugbu, Batangas.
Q: You were re-arraigned this morning by reading to you an information in
Pilipino, did you understand the information as read to you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you are a Tagalog speaking because you were born and grew up in Brgy.
Bunducan, Nasugbu, Batangas?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Do you know that by pleading guilty as you did awhile ago, the Court will
impose on you the death penalty as provided for by law for this offense?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And your pleading guilty was nobody's liking but of your own volition and
spontaneous decision?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did your mother tell you to plead guilty?
A: No, sir.
Q: Did your counsel, Atty. Exchaure tell you to plead guilty?
A: No, sir.
Q: Did the prosecutor tell you to plead guilty?
A: No, sir.
Q: Did anybody for that matter tell you to plead guilty?
A: None, sir.
Q: When you pleaded guilty, you were in your right senses?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: What grade did you finish in school or what is your educational attainment?
A: Grade IV, sir.
Q: But you can read and write?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: As in fact, you are a registered voter, as you did vote in the last election?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where did you vote?
A: Brgy. Bunducan, Nasugbu, Batangas, sir.

Q: In other words, you are admitting to have raped and killed the victim in this
case, Lolita delas Alas on that date in question and as charged in the
information?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Nobody gave or promised you any reward for your act of pleading guilty?
A: None, sir.
Q: Did anybody threaten or coerce or cajole you to do so?
A: None, sir.
Q: When you pleaded guilty awhile ago, whose decision is that?

A: It's my own decision, sir.
Q: Do you know the consequences of your pleading guilty?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What is the consequence of your pleading guilty?
A: I will be punished with a grave penalty, sir.
Q: Do you have an idea as to the grave penalty that the Court may impose on
you?
A: None, sir.
Q: Now, I am sternly and emphatically reminding you that the Court may impose
on you the severe penalty of death if you still maintain your plea of guilty?
A: Yes, sir, despite that I am not changing my plea of guilty, sir. My conscience is
bothering me, for what I did to the victim, sir.
Q: Alright, you sign on the notes together with the assistance of your counsel?
A: (The accused affixed his signature on the notes together with his counsel.) 2 8
During the scheduled hearing on January 14, 1998 for the presentation of evidence of the
defense, the following proceedings were duly recorded, to wit:
Atty. Exchaure:
The witness, your honor, is the accused himself. Although he pleaded guilty to
the crime imputed against him, he will explain to the Honorable Court the
reasons and circumstances, if any, why he pleaded guilty when he was re-
arraigned.
Court:
Proceed.
Atty. Exchaure:
Q: Mr. Witness, is it not a fact that when you were re-arraigned, you pleaded guilty
to the charge against you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And in fact, you were asked by the Honorable Court if your having pleaded
guilty is of your own voluntary act?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, up to the present time, do you con rm the fact that you pleaded guilty to
the charge against you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: At the time you pleaded guilty, nobody forced or coerced you to plead guilty?
A: Yes, sir.
Court:
Q: And even now, nobody is threatening you?

A: Nobody, sir.
Atty. Exchaure:
Q: Are you aware of the consequences of your having pleaded guilty?

A: No, sir.
Court:
Q: Why do you say you don't know the consequences?

A: I don't know what will happen to me, sir.
Q: Don't you understand that by pleading guilty, the Court will just penalize you
for the crime that you admitted?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And in fact, the charge to which you pleaded guilty calls for the supreme
penalty of death?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And still you insist on or maintain your plea of guilty made before and you are
confirming the same this morning?
A: Yes, sir.
Atty. Exchaure:
Q: And you are willing to accept whatever will be the penalty will be imposed by
the Honorable Court for having pleaded guilty, which you still maintain up
to now?
A: Yes, Sir.
Court:
Are you remorseful for the crime imputed to you and which you admitted to have
committed?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You just pray to God that in the nal day of reckoning, God will still forgive
you?
A: Yes, sir. 2 9
Also, on January 29, 1998, the following verbal exchange were recorded, thus:
Court: (To the accused)
Q: Roberto Samontañez, your counsel this morning manifested that you cannot
furnish him any evidence at least to mitigate the imposable penalty, now
under your same oath, do you confirm that?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: In other words, you have nothing more to say regarding your plea of guilty?
A: None, sir.

Q: You have nothing more to present at least to mitigate your liability for the
offense which you admitted to have committed?
A: I was then high on marijuana, sir.
Q: Were you a user of marijuana?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you were repentant of what you did to the victim?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: Do you know that your repentance cannot bring back the life of the victim?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you leave your fate to this Court?
A: Yes, sir. 3 0
Nevertheless, We are not convinced that such lengthy inquiries conducted by the trial court
during the re-arraignment of the appellant as well as during the subsequent hearings for
the presentation of evidence of both the prosecution and the defense suf ciently
established voluntariness and full comprehension of the appellant of his plea of guilty to
the crime charged in the Information. It may be noted that the appellant earlier entered the
plea of "Not guilty" to the Information in this case during his arraignment on February 1,
1996. Subsequently, the appellant manifested, through his counsel de of cio, his intention
to change his previous plea to that of a plea of guilty to the crime charged in the
Information. After having entered the plea of guilty on re-arraignment, the trial court
proceeded to propound questions on the appellant during which af rmative responses
were elicited from the appellant apparently to show that his subsequent plea of guilty was
his own voluntary decision. The trial court per its Decision under review, however, failed to
dwell on a signi cant development that transpired during the scheduled hearing on
November 13, 1997 when the appellant revealed in open court, through counsel, that his
subsequent plea of guilty was prompted by "pressure" from a certain policeman so that he
(appellant) agreed to admit the commission of the offense charged. The pertinent portion
of the transcript is quoted hereunder, to wit:
Court:
The prosecution having rested, the Court wants to hear from the defense what it
has to offer.
Atty. Exchaure:
I am now in dilemma, your honor, considering that the accused has already
pleaded guilty to the charge against him and the accused intimated to me
this morning that he is changing his plea of guilty because according to
him when he testi ed before this Honorable Court admitted and pleaded
guilty (sic), he was under pressure by a certain policeman to admit the
commission of the offense.
Court:
Well, that is your point, you have to present your evidence.
Atty. Exchaure:
In that case, your honor, considering the recent development on the intention of
the accused, may I be allowed to confer rst with the accused and ask the
Honorable Court to have this case to move for continuance to give us time
to present the accused himself at the next schedule hearing.
Court:
Granted.
Prosecutor Marajas:
I just manifest for the record that the accused is a detention prisoner if what the
defense counsel stated were true and correct that Mr. Roberto Samontañez
was just pressured, the more he should present the . . .
Court:
Precisely, that's why he is asking for postponement. 3 1
The trial court perfunctorily brushed aside the aforesaid disclosure from the appellant that
he was pressured by a policeman to change his earlier plea of not guilty to that of guilty to
the charge in the information. It did not propound any clari catory questions about the
matter on the same occasion such as the identity of the concerned policeman, the nature
of the pressure and the circumstances under which the alleged pressure was applied on
the appellant. Although further inquiries were undertaken by the trial court in the
subsequent hearings on January 14 and 29, 1998, the questions addressed to the
appellant were primarily aimed at eliciting af rmative responses or con rmations of his
plea of guilty. The statement of the appellant that he was pressured by a certain policeman
apparently escaped the memory or concern of the trial court as it did not crop up in its
inquiry during those subsequent hearings. Left unventilated, the appellant's allegation of
pressure generates doubt on the voluntariness of his plea of guilty to a capital offense.
Certain other considerations pose nagging doubts on the clarity of appellant's grasp of the
true meaning, full signi cance and consequences of his plea of guilty. The trial court failed
to mention and explain clearly to the appellant the elements of the crime of rape with
homicide as charged in the Information. 3 2 As a result, appellant was not properly
accorded his fundamental right to be informed of the precise nature of the accusation
against him, which is an integral aspect of the due process clause under the Constitution.
Notably, the appellant who reached grade IV only stated that he did not know the
consequences of his plea of guilty during the hearing on February 14, 1996 and again,
during the hearing on January 14, 1998. While the trial court informed the appellant that his
plea of guilty meant that he admitted liability for the crime of rape with homicide, as
charged in the information, which carries the penalty of death, it failed to emphasize that
his said plea of guilty would not, under any circumstance, affect or reduce the death
penalty, the imposition of which is mandatory under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659.
3 3 In which event, the appellant must be made to understand in plain and simple language
the precise meaning of the term "mandatory." 3 4 Additionally, the trial court failed to
apprise the appellant of the civil liability (e.g . indemnity, moral damages and exemplary
damages) arising from the crime of rape with homicide which shall be imposed on him as
perpetrator of the crime. 3 5 Despite appellant's apparent willingness to accept the penalty
for his crime, it is not farfetched to say that appellant was actually led to believe that the
penalty for his crime may still be reduced upon his plea of guilty thereto especially when
the trial court informed the appellant, through counsel, that he should adduce evidence.
Also, the trial court should have probed deeper to the extent of securing every material
detail of the crime in its lengthy inquiries to the appellant subsequent to his re-
arraignment. Questions tending to elicit corroborative responses to the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses should have been asked of the appellant. Although there is no
de nite and concrete rule as to how a trial judge may go about the matter of a proper
"searching inquiry," it would be well for the trial court, for instance, to require the appellant
to fully narrate the incident that spawned the charges against him, or by making him re-
enact the manner in which he perpetrated the crime, or by causing him to furnish and
explain to the court missing details of signi cance in order to determine, once and for all,
his liability for the crime. 3 6 As it is, the Decision of the trial court is devoid of any factual
nding relative to the actual commission of the crime of rape with homicide by the
appellant. In the nal analysis, it is the quality rather than the number of questions
propounded during the inquiry that serves the task of ascertaining the voluntariness and
full comprehension by the accused of the consequences of his plea of guilty to a capital
offense.
Lastly, the trial court lamentably considered pieces of evidence that are inadmissible in
evidence for being the proverbial " fruit of a poisonous tree." The facts show that the
appellant Roberto Samontañez was actually arrested by police authorities of Nasugbu,
Batangas on November 28, 1995 at his workplace in Barangay Galicia III, Mendez, Cavite. It
does not appear from the record that the appellant was apprised of his constitutional
rights during the police custodial investigation which are enshrined in Article III, Section
12(1) of the 1987 Constitution. 3 7 It also does not appear that he was assisted by counsel
during the said custodial investigation. In the absence of a valid waiver, any confession
obtained from the appellant during the police custodial investigation relative to the crime,
including any other evidence secured by virtue of the said confession is inadmissible in
evidence even if the same was not objected to during the trial by the counsel of the
appellant. Thus, the personal belongings of the victim namely: Omax wristwatch, gold ring
and Joop cologne were recovered and found inside the bag of the appellant when the
police authorities returned to the appellant's place of work at the Hermogenes Trading in
Barangay Galicia III, Mendez, Cavite after they illegally obtained a confession from the
appellant. In the case of People vs. Alicando, 3 8 the Court had opportunity to reiterate the
rule that evidence gathered by virtue of an illegally obtained confession is inadmissible,
thus:
We have not only constitutionalized the Miranda warnings in our jurisdiction. We

have also adopted the libertarian exclusionary rule known as the "fruit of the
poisonous tree," a phrase minted by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in the celebrated
case of Nardone vs. United States. According to this rule, once the primary source
(the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or
derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is also inadmissible. Stated
otherwise, illegally seized evidence is obtained as a direct result of the illegal act,
whereas the "fruit of the poisonous tree" is the indirect result of the same illegal
act. The "fruit of the poisonous tree" is at least once removed from the illegally
seized evidence, but it is equally inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle
that evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain other
evidence because the originally illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence
subsequently obtained.
The only other evidence of the prosecution are the testimonies of Carlito Samontañez and
Melecio Mendoza, both of which merely seek to establish the presence of the appellant
near the vicinity of the crime scene on or about the time when the crime took place.
Ultimately, the conviction of the appellant for the crime charged in the case at bar rested
primarily on his plea of guilty which appeared to have been improvidently made and hence,
contrary to the letter and spirit of Section 3, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Court, supra.
CaSHAc
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, of Nasugbu, Batangas
dated May 15, 1998 in Criminal Case No. 1032 convicting the appellant, Roberto V.
Samontañez, of the crime of rape with homicide and sentencing him to suffer the supreme
penalty of death is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE; and the case is remanded to the
court of origin for the proper arraignment and trial of the accused until terminated.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Penned by Judge Antonio A. De Sagun. Rollo, pp. 27-61.

2. Rollo, pp. 1-2.
3. TSN dated March 14, 1996, pp. 2-7.

4. TSN dated June 10, 1997, pp. 2-5; Exhibit "S".
5. Exhibit "S".
6. TSN dated June 10, 1997, pp. 9-10.

7. TSN dated March 14, 1996, pp. 9-13; Exhibit "A".
8. Id., pp. 14-15.

9. TSN dated June 26, 1996, pp. 4-8; 10-11.
10. Id., pp. 8-9.
11. TSN dated July 11, 1996, p. 5.

12. Exhibit "B".
13. Exhibit "C".

14. Exhibit "D".
16. Exhibits "Q", "R", "H".

17. Exhibits "F" to "F-4".
18. Exhibits "K" to "K-3".

19. Exhibits "L" to "L-3"; Exhibits "M", "M-1".
20. Exhibit "J".

21. TSN dated July 11, 1996, p. 13.
22. Id., pp. 13-14.

23. Exhibits "N" to "P-3".
24. Rollo, p. 61.
25. People vs. Camay , 152 SCRA 401, 403 (1987); People vs. Derilo, 271 SCRA 633, 651 (1997);
People vs. Sevilleno, 305 SCRA 519, 528 (1999); People vs. Bello, G.R. Nos. 130411-14,
October 13, 1999.
26. People vs. Dayot, 187 SCRA 637, 641 (1990).
27. People vs. Albert, 251 SCRA 136, 145-146 (1995) citing 14 Am. Jur., Criminal Law, Sec. 271,
p. 951; People vs. Gonzaga, 127 SCRA 158, 163 (1984); People vs. Havana, 199 SCRA
805, 811 (1991).

29. TSN dated January 14, 1998, pp. 2-5.
30. Minutes dated January 29, 1998. Original records, pp. 164-165.
31. Minutes dated November 13, 1997. Original records, pp. 152-153.
32. People vs. Sevilleno, supra, p. 528.
33. People vs. De Luna, 174 SCRA 204, 212 (1989); People vs. Sevilleno, supra, pp. 528-529;
People vs. Bello, supra, G.R. Nos. 130411-14.
34. People vs. Alicando, 251 SCRA 293, 308 (1995).
35. Ibid.
36. People vs. Estomaca, 256 SCRA 429, 437 (1996) citing People vs. Dayot, supra.
37. Article III Section 12 paragraph (1) provides:
SEC. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel,
he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.
xxx xxx xxx

38. Supra, pp. 314-315.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 121087. August 26, 1999.]
FELIPE NAVARRO , petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and the

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , respondents.
Lorenzo O. Navarro, Jr. for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.
SYNOPSIS
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
December 14, 1994 which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City
dated July 27, 1992 finding petitioner Felipe Navarro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
homicide and sentencing him to suffer ten years of prision mayor, as minimum and
fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum, but
increased the death indemnity awarded to the heirs of the victim, from P30,000.00 to
P50,000.00. In this appeal, petitioner contended that the appellate court had decided the
case not in accord with law and with the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court. Its
conclusions were based on speculation, surmise and conjecture and its judgment was
based on a misapprehension of facts; its finding was contradicted by evidence on record;
and its finding was devoid of support in the record. cAaTED
The Supreme Court ruled that the appeal was without merit. Petitioner had not shown that
the trial court erred in giving weight to the testimony of the prosecution witness. In fact,
the prosecution witness' testimony was confirmed by the voice recording he had made
which established that (1) there was a heated exchange between petitioner Navarro and
the victim Lingan on the placing of the police blotter of an entry against him and reporter
Jalbuena; and (2) that some form of violence occurred involving petitioner and the victim
Lingan, with the latter getting the worst of it. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of
Appeals was affirmed with the modification that petitioner is sentenced to suffer the term
of 8 years of prision mayor as minimum, to 14 years and 8 months of reclusion temporal,
as maximum.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; THE TESTIMONY OF A

WITNESS WHO HAS AN INTEREST IN THE CONVICTION OF THE ACCUSED IS NOT, FOR
THIS REASON ALONE, UNRELIABLE; CASE AT BAR. — Petitioner Navarro questions the
credibility of the testimony of Jalbuena on the ground that he was a biased witness, having
a grudge against him. The testimony of a witness who has an interest in the conviction of
the accused is not, for this reason alone, unreliable. Trial courts, which have the opportunity
to observe the facial expressions, gestures, and tones of voice of a witness while
testifying, are competent to determine whether his or her testimony should be given
credence. In the instant case, petitioner Navarro has not shown that the trial court erred in
according weight to the testimony of Jalbuena.

2. CRIMINAL LAW; WIRE TAPPING ACT; THE LAW PROHIBITS THE OVERHEARING,
INTERCEPTING, OR RECORDING OF PRIVATE COMMUNICATIONS; CASE AT BAR. —
Indeed, Jalbuena's testimony is confirmed by the voice recording he had made. It may be
asked whether the tape is admissible in view of R.A. No. 4200, which prohibits wire
tapping. The answer is in the affirmative. The law provides: SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful
for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or
spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to
secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a
device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or
tape-recorder, or however otherwise described: It shall also be unlawful for any person, be
he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the next preceding sentence, to
knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such record, or
copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured either before or after the
effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any
other person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in
writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other
person: Provided, That the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil,
criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in Section 3 hereof, shall not be
covered by this prohibition. . . . SEC. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the
existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the same or any part thereof,
or any information therein contained obtained or secured by any person in violation of the
preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-
judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation. Thus, the law prohibits the
overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private communications. Since the exchange
between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is not
prohibited.
3. ID.; REVISED PENAL CODE; MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES; SUFFICIENT
PROVOCATION; DEFINED; TO BE SUFFICIENT, IT MUST BE ADEQUATE TO EXCITE A
PERSON TO COMMIT THE WRONG, WHICH MUST ACCORDINGLY BE PROPORTIONATE IN
GRAVITY; CASE AT BAR. — It is argued that the mitigating circumstance of sufficient
provocation or threat on the part of the offended party immediately preceding the act
should have been appreciated in favor of petitioner Navarro. Provocation is defined to be
any unjust or improper conduct or act of the offended party; capable of exciting, inciting, or
irritating anyone. The provocation must be sufficient and should immediately precede the
act. To be sufficient, it must be adequate to excite a person to commit the wrong, which
must accordingly be proportionate in gravity. And it must immediately precede the act so
much so that there is no interval between the provocation by the offended party and the
commission of the crime by the accused. In the present case, the remarks of Lingan, which
immediately preceded the act of petitioner, constituted sufficient provocation. In People v.
Macaso, we appreciated this mitigating circumstance in favor of the accused, a policeman,
who shot a motorist after the latter had repeatedly taunted him with defiant words. Hence,
this mitigating circumstance should be considered in favor of petitioner Navarro. DHaECI
4. ID.; ID.; HOMICIDE; PENALTY; AS THERE WERE TWO MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES

AND ONE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE, THE PENALTY SHOULD BE FIXED IN ITS
MINIMUM PERIOD; CASE AT BAR. — The crime committed as found by the trial court and
the Court of Appeals was homicide, for which the penalty under Art. 249 of the Revised
Penal Code is reclusion temporal. As there were two mitigating circumstances and one
aggravating circumstance, the penalty should be fixed in its minimum period. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner Navarro should be sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty, the minimum of which is within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, i.e.,
prision mayor, and the maximum of which is reclusion temporal in its minimum period.
DECISION
MENDOZA , J : p
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals, dated
December 14, 1994, which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5,
Lucena City, dated July 27, 1992, finding petitioner Felipe Navarro guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of homicide and sentencing him to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as
minimum, and fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal,
as maximum, but increased the death indemnity awarded to the heirs of the victim, Enrique
"Ike" Lingan, from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00. LLphil
The information against petitioner alleged —

That on or about the 4th day of February, 1990, in the nighttime, in the City of
Lucena, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, being then a member of the Lucena Integrated
National Police, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously assault one Ike Lingan inside the Lucena police headquarters, where
authorities are supposed to be engaged in the discharge of their duties, by boxing
the said Ike Lingan in the head with the butt of a gun and thereafter when the said
victim fell, by banging his head against the concrete pavement, as a consequence
of which said Ike Lingan suffered cerebral concussion and shock which directly
caused his death.
The evidence shows that, at around 8:40 in the evening of February 4, 1990, Stanley
Jalbuena and Enrique "Ike" Lingan, who were reporters of the radio station DWTI in Lucena
City, together with one Mario Ilagan, went to the Entertainment City following reports that
it was showing nude dancers. After the three had seated themselves at a table and
ordered beer, a scantily clad dancer appeared on stage and began to perform a strip act.
As she removed her brassieres, Jalbuena brought out his camera and took a picture. 2 dctai
At that point, the floor manager, Dante Liquin, with a security guard, Alex Sioco, approached
Jalbuena and demanded to know why he took a picture. 3 Jalbuena replied: "Wala kang
pakialam, because this is my job." 4 Sioco pushed Jalbuena towards the table as he warned
the latter that he would kill him. 5 When Jalbuena saw that Sioco was about to pull out his
gun, he ran out of the joint followed by his companions. 6
Jalbuena and his companions went to the police station to report the matter. Three of the
policemen on duty, including petitioner Navarro, were having drinks in front of the police
station, and they asked Jalbuena and his companions to join them. Jalbuena declined and
went to the desk officer, Sgt. Añonuevo, to report the incident. In a while, Liquin and Sioco
arrived on a motorcycle. 7
Sioco and Liquin were met by petitioner Navarro who talked with them in a corner for
around fifteen minutes. 8 Afterwards, petitioner Navarro turned to Jalbuena and, pushing
him to the wall, said to him: "Putang ina, kinakalaban mo si Kabo Liquin, anak yan ni Kabo
Liquin, hindi mo ba kilala?" 9 Petitioner Navarro then pulled out his firearm and cocked it,
and, pressing it on the face of Jalbuena, said, "Ano, uutasin na kita?" 1 0
At this point, Lingan intervened and said to petitioner Navarro: "Huwag namang ganyan,
pumarito kami para magpa-blotter, I am here to mediate." 1 1 Petitioner Navarro replied:
"Walang press, press, mag-sampu pa kayo." 1 2 He then turned to Sgt. Añonuevo and told
him to make of record the behavior of Jalbuena and Lingan. 1 3 cda
This angered Lingan, who said: "O, di ilagay mo diyan." 1 4 Petitioner Navarro retorted:
"Talagang ilalagay ko." 1 5 The two then had a heated exchange. 1 6 Finally, Lingan said:
"Masyado kang abusado, alisin mo yang baril mo at magsuntukan na lang tayo." 1 7
Petitioner Navarro replied: "Ah, ganoon?" 1 8
As Lingan was about to turn away, petitioner Navarro hit him with the handle of his pistol
above the left eyebrow. Lingan fell on the floor, blood flowing down his face. He tried to
get up, but petitioner Navarro gave him a fist blow on the forehead which floored him. 1 9
Petitioner Navarro turned to Jalbuena and said: "Kita mo yan ha, buhay kang testigo, si Ike
Lingan ang naghamon." 2 0 He said to Sgt. Añonuevo: "Ilagay mo diyan sa blotter, sa harap ni
Alex Sioco at Dante Liquin, na si Ike Lingan ang naghamon." 2 1 He then poked his gun at the
right temple of Jalbuena and made him sign his name on the blotter. 2 2 Jalbuena could not
affix his signature. His right hand was trembling and he simply wrote his name in print. 2 3
Capt. Coronado, the station commander, called petitioner Navarro to his office, while a
policeman took Lingan to the Quezon Memorial Hospital. The station manager of DWTI,
Boy Casañada, arrived and, learning that Lingan had been taken to the hospital, proceeded
there. But Lingan died from his injuries. 2 4 cdll
Unknown to petitioner Navarro, Jalbuena was able to record on tape the exchange
between petitioner and the deceased. 2 5 The following is an excerpt from the tape
recording:
Lingan:
Pare, you are abusing yourself.
Navarro:
Who is that abusing?
Lingan:
I’m here to mediate. Do not include me in the problem. I'm out of the problem.
xxx xxx xxx
Navarro:
Wala sa akin yan. Ang kaso lang . . . .
Lingan:
Kalaban mo ang media, pare. Ako at si Stanley, dalawa kami. Okay. Do not
fight with me. I just came here to ayusin things. Do not say bad things
against me. I'm the number one loko sa media. I'm the best media man. . . .
Navarro:
Huwag tayong mag-lokohan sa ganyan! Huwag na tayong mag-takotan!
Huwag mong sabihing loko ka!
Lingan:
I'm brave also.

Navarro:
Ay lalo na ako. Tahimik lang naman ako. Wala ka namang masasabi sa akin
dahil nag-tatrabaho lang ako ng ayon sa serbisyo ko. LibLex
Lingan:
You are challenging me and him. . . .
Navarro:
Ay walastik ka naman Ike! Pag may problema ka dito sinasabihan kita na

may balita tayong maganda. Pambihira ka Ike. Huwag mong sabihin na . .
. Parang minomonopoly mo eh.
Lingan:
Pati ako kalaban ninyo.

Navarro:
Talagang kalaban namin ang press. Lahat, hindi lang ikaw!
Lingan:
You are wrong. Bakit kalaban nyo ang press?
Navarro:
Pulis ito! Aba!
Lingan:
Alisin mo ang baril mo! Alisin mo ang baril mo! Suntukan tayo, sige.
Navarro:
Mayabang ka ah!
(Sounds of a scuffle) LibLex
Navarro:
Hinamon ako nyan! Pare hinamon ako nyan! Pare hinamon ako nyan, testigo
kayo. Alisin ko daw ang baril ko. Hinamon ako nyan. Pare, ilagay mo diyan,
hinamon ako sa harap ni Stanley. Testigo kayo, hinamon ako. Pulis tayo
eh. Puta, buti nga, suntok lang ang inabot nyan. Sa harap ni Alex, ni Joe, ni
Stanley, hinamon ako. Pare, hinamon ako, kinig nyo ha. Hinamon ako
nyan. Sige, dalhin nyo sa hospital yan.
Petitioner Felipe Navarro claims that it was the deceased who tried to hit him twice, but he
(petitioner) was able to duck both times, and that Lingan was so drunk he fell on the floor
twice, each time hitting his head on the concrete. 2 6

In giving credence to the evidence for the prosecution, the trial court stated:
After a thorough and in-depth evaluation of the evidence adduced by the
prosecution and the defense, this court finds that the evidence for the prosecution
is the more credible, concrete and sufficient to create that moral certainty in the
mind of the court that accused herein is criminally responsible. dctai
The defense's evidence which consists of outright denial could not under the
circumstance overturn the strength of the prosecution's evidence.
This court finds that the prosecution witnesses, more particularly Stanley
Jalbuena, lacked any motive to make false accusation, distort the truth, testify
falsehood or cause accusation of one who had neither brought him harm or
injury.
Going over the evidence on record, the postmortem report issued by Dra. Eva
Yamamoto confirms the detailed account given by Stanley Jalbuena on how
Lingan sustained head injuries.
Said post-mortem report together with the testimony of Jalbuena sufficiently belie
the claim of the defense that the head injuries of deceased Lingan were caused
by the latter's falling down on the concrete pavement head first. LLpr
The Court of Appeals affirmed:

We are far from being convinced by appellant's aforesaid disquisition. We have
carefully evaluated the conflicting versions of the incident as presented by both
parties, and we find the trial court's factual conclusions to have better and
stronger evidentiary support.
In the first place, the mere fact that Jalbuena was himself a victim of appellant's
aggression does not impair the probative worth of his positive and logical
account of the incident in question. In fact, far from proving his innocence,
appellant's unwarranted assault upon Jalbuena, which the defense has virtually
admitted, clearly betrays his violent character or disposition and his capacity to
harm others. Apparently, the same motivation that led him into assailing
Jalbuena must have provoked him into also attacking Lingan who had interceded
for Jalbuena and humiliated him and further challenged him to a fist fight.
xxx xxx xxx
On the other hand, appellant's explanation as to how Lingan was injured is too
tenuous and illogical to be accepted. It is in fact contradicted by the number,
nature and location of Lingan's injuries as shown in the post-mortem report (Exh.
D). According to the defense, Lingan fell two times when he was outbalanced in
the course of boxing the appellant. And yet, Lingan suffered lacerated wounds in
his left forehead, left eyebrow, between his left and right eyebrows, and contusion
in the right temporal region of the head (Exh. E). Certainly, these injuries could not
have resulted from Lingan's accidental fall. LLpr
Hence, this appeal. Petitioner Navarro contends:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED THE CASE NOT IN
ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME
COURT. ITS CONCLUSION IS A FINDING BASED ON SPECULATION, SURMISE OR
CONJECTURE; THE INFERENCE IT MADE IS MANIFESTLY MISTAKEN, ABSURD
OR IMPOSSIBLE; IT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION; ITS
JUDGMENT IS BASED ON A MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS; ITS FINDING IS
CONTRADICTED BY EVIDENCE ON RECORD; AND ITS FINDING IS DEVOID OF
SUPPORT IN THE RECORD.
The appeal is without merit.

First. Petitioner Navarro questions the credibility of the testimony of Jalbuena on the
ground that he was a biased witness, having a grudge against him. The testimony of a
witness who has an interest in the conviction of the accused is not, for this reason alone,
unreliable. 2 7 Trial courts, which have the opportunity to observe the facial expressions,
gestures, and tones of voice of a witness while testifying, are competent to determine
whether his or her testimony should be given credence. 2 8 In the instant case, petitioner
Navarro has not shown that the trial court erred in according weight to the testimony of
Jalbuena. cdphil
Indeed, Jalbuena's testimony is confirmed by the voice recording he had made. It may be
asked whether the tape is admissible in view of R.A. No. 4200, which prohibits wire
tapping. The answer is in the affirmative. The law provides:
SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the
parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or
by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record
such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a
dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or
however otherwise described: dctai
It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or
acts penalized in the next preceding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape
record, wire record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies thereof, of any
communication or spoken word secured either before or after the effective date of
this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other
person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in
writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any
other person: Provided, That the use of such record or any copies thereof as
evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in
section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition.
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents,
substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any
information therein contained obtained or secured by any person in violation of
the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any
judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.
Thus, the law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private

communications. 2 9 Since the exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not
private, its tape recording is not prohibited.
Nor is there any question that it was duly authenticated. A voice recording is authenticated
by the testimony of a witness (1) that he personally recorded the conversation; (2) that the
tape played in court was the one he recorded; and (3) that the voices on the tape are those
of the persons such are claimed to belong. 3 0 In the instant case, Jalbuena testified that he
personally made the voice recording; 3 1 that the tape played in court was the one he
recorded; 3 2 and that the speakers on the tape were petitioner Navarro and Lingan. 3 3 A
sufficient foundation was thus laid for the authentication of the tape presented by the
prosecution. LLpr
Second. The voice recording made by Jalbuena established: (1) that there was a heated
exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan on the placing in the police blotter of an
entry against him and Jalbuena; and (2) that some form of violence occurred involving
petitioner Navarro and Lingan, with the latter getting the worst of it.
Furthermore, Dr. Eva Yamamoto, who performed the autopsy on the body of Lingan, issued
a medical certificate, 3 4 dated February 5, 1990, containing the following findings:
Post Mortem Findings:
= Dried blood, forehead & face
= No blood oozed from the ears, nose & mouth

= Swelling, 3 cm x 2 cm, temporal region, head, right
= Lacerated wound, 2 cm in length, 1-2 in depth, lateral, eyebrow, Left
= Lacerated wound, 0.5 cm in length, superficial, between the left & right
eyebrow
= Lacerated wound, 2 cm in length, 1 cm in depth, forehead, Left
= Cyanosis of the tips of fingers & toes
CAUSE OF DEATH:
= CEREBRAL CONCUSSION & SHOCK
= BLOW ON THE HEAD
Dr. Yamamoto testified:

Q Give your opinion as to what was the possible cause of this findings
number one, which is oozing of blood from the forehead?
A It may be due to a blow on the forehead or it bumped to a hard object, sir.

Q Could a metal like a butt of a gun have caused this wound No. 1?
A It is possible, sir.
Q And in the alternative, could have it been caused by bumping on a concrete
floor?
A Possible, sir.
FISCAL:
What could have been the cause of the contusion and swelling under your
findings No. 2 doctor?
WITNESS:
It may be caused by bumping to a hard object, sir.

Q Could a butt of a gun have caused it doctor? cdasia
A The swelling is big so it could have not been caused by a butt of a gun
because the butt of a gun is small, sir.
Q How about this findings No. 4?
A By a bump or contact of the body to a hard object, sir.
Q And findings No. 5 what could have caused it?

A Same cause, sir.
Q This findings No. 6 what could have caused this wound?
A Same thing, sir.
Q How about this last finding, cyanosis of tips of fingers and toes, what
could have caused it doctor?
WITNESS:
It indicates there was cardiac failure, sir.

FISCAL:
In this same post mortem report and under the heading cause of death it
states: Cause of Death: Cerebral concussion and Shock, will you explain it?
A Cerebral concussion means in Tagalog "naalog ang utak" or jarring of the
brain, sir.
Q What could have been the cause of jarring of the brain?
A It could have been caused by a blow of a hard object, sir.
Q What about the shock, what could have caused it?
A It was due to peripheral circulatory failure, sir. LLphil
Q Could any one of both caused the death of the victim?

A Yes, sir.
Q Could cerebral concussion alone have caused the death of the deceased?
A May be, sir.
Q How about shock?

A Yes, sir.
FISCAL:
Which of these two more likely to cause death?
WITNESS:
Shock, sir.
Q Please explain further the meaning of the medical term shock?

A It is caused by peripheral circulatory failure as I have said earlier, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
FISCAL:
Could a bumping or pushing of one's head against a concrete floor have
caused shock? Cdpr
WITNESS:
Possible, sir.
How about striking with a butt of a gun, could it cause shock?
A Possible, sir. 3 5
The above testimony clearly supports the claim of Jalbuena that petitioner Navarro hit
Lingan with the handle of his pistol above the left eyebrow and struck him on the forehead
with his fist. prLL
Third. It is argued that the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation or threat on

the part of the offended party immediately preceding the act should have been
appreciated in favor of petitioner Navarro. Provocation is defined to be any unjust or
improper conduct or act of the offended party, capable of exciting, inciting, or irritating
anyone. 3 6 The provocation must be sufficient and should immediately precede the act. 3 7
To be sufficient, it must be adequate to excite a person to commit the wrong, which must
accordingly be proportionate in gravity. 3 8 And it must immediately precede the act so
much so that there is no interval between the provocation by the offended party and the
commission of the crime by the accused. 3 9
In the present case, the remarks of Lingan, which immediately preceded the act of
petitioner, constituted sufficient provocation. In People v. Macaso, 4 0 we appreciated this
mitigating circumstance in favor of the accused, a policeman, who shot a motorist after
the latter had repeatedly taunted him with defiant words. Hence, this mitigating
circumstance should be considered in favor of petitioner Navarro. Cdpr
Furthermore, the mitigating circumstance that the offender had no intention to commit so
grave a wrong as that committed should also be appreciated in favor of petitioner. The
frantic exclamations of petitioner Navarro after the scuffle that it was Lingan who
provoked him shows that he had no intent to kill the latter. Thus, this mitigating
circumstance should be taken into account in determining the penalty that should be
imposed on petitioner Navarro. The allowance of this mitigating circumstance is
consistent with the rule that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a
felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. 4 1 In
People v. Castro, 4 2 the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a
wrong as that committed was appreciated in favor of the accused while finding him guilty
of homicide.
However, the aggravating circumstance of commission of a crime in a place where the
public authorities are engaged in the discharge of their duties should be appreciated
against petitioner Navarro. The offense in this case was committed right in the police
station where policemen were discharging their public functions. 4 3
The crime committed as found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals was homicide,
for which the penalty under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal. As
there were two mitigating circumstances and one aggravating circumstance, the penalty
should be fixed in its minimum period. 4 4 Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
petitioner Navarro should be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty, the minimum of which
is within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision mayor, and the maximum
of which is reclusion temporal in its minimum period. 4 5 cdasia
The indemnity as increased by the Court of Appeals from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00 is in

accordance with current jurisprudence. 4 6
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the modification that
petitioner Felipe Navarro is hereby SENTENCED to suffer a prison term of 8 years of
prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years and 8 months of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Quisumbing and Buena, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Per Justice Godardo A. Jacinto and concurred in by Justices Ricardo J. Francisco and
Ramon A. Barcelona.
2. TSN pp. 4-8, May 28, 1990.
3. Id., pp. 9-10.
4. Id., p. 10.
5. Id., pp. 10-11.
6. Id., p. 11.
7. Id., pp. 11-14.
8. Id., p. 15.
9. Id., pp. 16-17.
10. Id., p. 20.
11. Id., p. 23.
12. Ibid.
13. Id., p. 24.
14. Ibid.
15. Id., p. 25.
16. Ibid.
17. Id., p. 26.
18. Ibid.
19. Id., pp. 26-32.
20. Id., p. 32.
21. Id., p. 34.
22. Id., pp. 34-35.
23. Id., pp. 35-37.
24. Id., pp. 45-53.
25. TSN, pp. 8-11, June 26, 1990.
26. TSN, pp. 5-6, Sept. 16, 1991.

27. See People v. Mandal, 188 SCRA 526 (1990).
28. People v. Padilla, G.R. No. 126124, January 20, 1999.
29. Ramirez v. Court of Appeals, 248 SCRA 590 (1995).
30. United States v. Jones, 730 F. 2d. 593 (1984).
31. TSN, pp. 8-22.
32. Id., pp. 11-13.
33. Id., p. 11.
34. Records, p. 56.
35. TSN, pp. 7-11, Aug. 23, 1990.
36. Pepito v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119942, July 8, 1999.

37. People v. Paga, 79 SCRA 570 (1977).
38. People v. Nabora, 73 Phil. 434 (1941).
39. Supra, note 35.
40. 64 SCRA 659 (1975).
41. REVISED PENAL CODE, Art. 4.

42. 117 SCRA 1014 (1982).
43. People v. Regala, 113 SCRA 613 (1982).

44. REVISED PENAL CODE, Art. 64.
45. Act No. 4103, §1.
46. E.g., Pepito v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119942, July 8, 1999.

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3D

EVID-LTT Atty. Señga

RULE 128. GENERAL PROVISIONS

[G.R. No. 190846. February 3, 2016.]

TOMAS P. TAN, JR. , petitioner, vs. JOSE G. HOSANA , respondent.

Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by

2. Id. at 26-36. Penned by CA Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao and concurred in by

10. Id. at 28.

19. Id. at 28-29.

25. Id. at 21-24.

30. Id. at 46-47.

34. Id. at 15-17.

52. Nool v. Court of Appeals, 342 Phil. 106, 110 (1997).

b) Determinate subject matter; and

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[A.C. No. 5151. October 19, 2004.]

PEDRO G. TOLENTINO, ROMEO M. LAYGO, SOLOMON M.

Before us is a complaint filed by Pedro G. Tolentino, Romeo M. Laygo, Solomon M.

The evidence of complainants to support their charge of immorality consists in a)

By and large the evidence of complainants consisting of the testimonies of

The evidence presented by complainants reach that quantum of evidence required in

c. in case of the person's death, the nearest of kin.

Consequently, in this case where complainants, as private individuals, obtained the

In Zaguirre vs. Castillo, 1 8 we reiterated the definition of immoral conduct, to wit:

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Norberto M. Mendoza is hereby found GUILTY of

1. TSN of June 10, 2002, pp. 4–14.

4. Exhibits "C" to "C-2," Rollo, pp. 34–36.

8. Exhibit "E," Rollo, p. 38.

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[G.R. No. 124514. July 6, 2000.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , plaintiff-appellee, vs . VICTORIANO

BERNARDINO CARANGUIAN y PINAPIN , accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; QUANTUM OF PROOF; PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE

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The Information for murder states: 4

That on or about August 1, 1991, in the Municipality of Amulung, Province of

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Hence, the present appeal.

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1. The records did not indicate his middle name or initial.

21. Francisco, R., Basic Evidence, p. 212.

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[G.R. No. 179940. April 23, 2008.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , plaintiff-appellee, vs . NORBERTO DEL

Assailed before Us is the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.

On 10 December 2002, appellant was sleeping in his sister's house in Poblacion

Appellant anchors his appeal on the arresting policemen's failure to strictly

1. Penned by Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid with Associate Justices Martin S.

2. Records, pp. 112-116. HETDAC

3. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of

8. Exh. B; id. at 61.

13. Id. at 119.

17. Id. at 104.

26. People v. Julian-Fernandez, 423 Phil. 895, 910 (2001).

xxx xxx xxx

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[G.R. No. 168644. February 16, 2010.]

BSB GROUP, INC., represented by its President, Mr. RICARDO

Petitioner, opposing respondent's move, argued for the relevancy of the

Prefatorily, fundamental is the precept in all criminal prosecutions, that the

Section 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions