MALAYANG SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA VS RAMOS

326 SCRA 428 (2000)

FACTS:
Petitioner Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa M. Greenfield (MSMG) is a
local union. Private respondent M. Greenfield is the employer of petitioner's members.
Members of petitioner conducted a strike, which was marred by violence. Private
respondent attempted to quell the same by hiring persons for that purpose. Thereafter,
petitioners were placed under preventive suspension; only some of them were
eventually allowed to return to work.

Petitioners thus filed a verified complaint with the Arbitration Branch of the DOLE,
charging private respondent of ULP, in the form of union-busting, illegal dismissal,
illegal suspension, interference in union activities, discrimination, threats, intimidation,
coercion, violence, and oppression. Private respondent's defense was that the strike
was illegal for it was marred by violence.

ISSUE: WON the strike should be declared illegal on account of violence committed
during the strike.

HELD:
No, where both parties are responsible for the violence committed during the strike, the
strike cannot be declared illegal since the strike cannot be attributed to the striking
employees only. This is an exception to the general rule that the strike shall be declared
illegal where it is marred by violence on the part of the employees.

In the case at bar, the allegation of violence committed in the course of the strike, it
must be remembered that the Labor Arbiter and the Commission found that "the parties
are agreed that there were violent incidents . . . resulting to injuries to both sides, the
union and management. The evidence on record show that the violence cannot be
attributed to the striking employees alone for the company itself employed hired men to
pacify the strikers. With violence committed on both sides, the management and the
employees, such violence cannot be a ground for declaring the strike as illegal.
Manila Electric Co. v. Quisumbing

Facts:
The court directed the parties to execute a CBA incorporating the terms among
which are the following modifications: Wages: PhP 1,900 for 1995-1996; Retroactivity:
December 28, 1996-Dec. 1999, etc. Dissatisfied, some members of the union filed a
motion for intervention/reconsideration. Petitioner warns that if the wage increase of
Php2,000.00 per month as ordered is allowed, it would pass the cost covering such
increase to the consumers through an increased rate of electricity. On the retroactivity
of the CBA arbitral award, the parties reckon the period as when retroaction shall
commence.

Issue:
Whether or not retroactivity of arbitral awards shall commence at such time as
granted by the Secretary

Held:
In St. Luke’s Medical vs. Torres, a deadlock developed during CBA negotiations
between management unions. The Secretary assumed jurisdiction and ordered the
retroaction of the CBA to the date of expiration of the previous CBA. The Court
ratiocinated thus: In the absence of a specific provision of law prohibiting retroactivity of
the effectivity of arbitral awards issued by the Secretary pursuant to article 263(g) of the
Labor Code, public respondent is deemed vested with the plenary and discretionary
powers to determine the effectivity thereof. 

In general, a CBA negotiated within six months after the expiration of the existing
CBA retroacts to the day immediately following such date and if agreed thereafter, the
effectivity depends on the agreement of the parties. On the other hand, the law is silent
as to the retroactivity of a CBA arbitral award or that granted not by virtue of the mutual
agreement of the parties but by intervention of the government. In the absence of a
CBA, the Secretary’s determination of the date of retroactivity as part of his
discretionary powers over arbitral awards shall control.

Wherefore, the arbitral award shall retroact from December 1, 1995 to November
30, 1997; and the award of wage is increased from Php1,900 to Php2,000.
PICOP Resources Inc., v. Taneca
GR 160828

Facts:
Respondents were regular rank-and-file employees of PRI and bona fide members of
NAMAPRI-SPFL which is the collective bargaining agent for the rank-and-file employees of
petitioner PRI. PRI has a CBA with NAMAPRI-SPFL. The CBA contained the following union
security provisions: All employees within the appropriate bargaining unit who are members of
the Union at the time of the signing of this Agreement shall, as a condition of continued
employment by the COMPANY, maintain their membership in the UNION in good standing
during the effectivity of this Agreement. The Company shall give notice of termination of
services of any employee who shall fail to fulfill the condition provided. Atty. Fuentes sent a
letter to the management of PRI demanding the termination of employees who allegedly
supported the FFW during the effectivity of the CBA. NAMAPRI-SPFL considered said act of
campaigning for and signing the petition for certification election of FFW as an act of disloyalty
and a valid basis for termination for a cause in accordance with its Constitution and By-Laws
specifically on Union Security Clause.

PRI served notices of termination for causes to employees on the ground of “acts of
disloyalty” committed against it when respondents allegedly supported and signed the Petition
for Certification Election of FFW before the “freedom period” during the effectivity of the CBA.
A Notice was also served on the DOLE, Caraga Region. Respondents then accused PRI of ULP.

Issue:  Whether respondent employees were validly terminated

RULING:
No, Respondents were not validly terminated. The “Union security” is a generic term,
which is applied to and comprehends “closed shop,” “union shop,” “maintenance of
membership,” or any other form of agreement which imposes upon employees the obligation
to acquire or retain union membership as a condition affecting employment. In terminating the
employment of an employee by enforcing the union security clause, the employer needs to
determine and prove that: (1) the union security clause is applicable; (2) the union is requesting
for the enforcement of the union security provision in the CBA; and (3) there is sufficient
evidence to support the decision of the union to expel the employee from the union. These
requisites constitute just cause for terminating an employee based on the union security
provision of the CBA. On third requisite, the Court find that there is no sufficient evidence to
support the decision of PRI to terminate the employment of the respondents.
The mere signing of the authorization in support of the Petition for Certification Election
of FFW or before the “freedom period,” is not sufficient ground to terminate the employment
of respondents inasmuch as the petition itself was actually filed during the freedom period.
Nothing in the records would show that respondents failed to maintain their membership in
good standing in the Union. Respondents did not resign or withdraw their membership from
the Union to which they belong. Respondents continued to pay their union dues and never
joined the FFW.
MANILA CENTRAL LINE CORP. V. MANILA CENTRAL MANILA FREE WORKERS
UNION

Facts:
This case arose out of a collective bargaining deadlock between petitioner and
private respondent Manila Central Line Free Workers Union-National Federation of
Labor. The parties’ collective bargaining agreement had expired on March 15, 1989. As
the parties failed to reach a new agreement, private respondent sought the aid of the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board on October 30, 1989, but the deadlock
remained unresolved.

At the initial hearing before the Labor Arbiter, the parties declared that
conciliation efforts before the NCMB had terminated and it was their desire to submit the
case for compulsory arbitration. Accordingly, they were required to submit their position
papers and proposals, which they did, and in which they indicated portions of their
respective proposals to which they agree, leaving the rest for arbitration.

The LA ordered the petitioner Union and the respondent Company to execute
and formalize their new five-year collective bargaining agreement (CBA) retroactive to
the date of expiry of the 1986-1989 CBA within thirty (30) days from receipt of the
Decision. Petitioner appealed, but its appeal was denied by the NLRC.

Issue:
Whether the CBA entered into by the parties may be given retroactive effect.

Held:
Art. 253-A refers to collective bargaining agreements entered into by the parties
as a result of their mutual agreement. The CBA in this case, on the other hand, is part of
an arbitral award. As such, it may be made retroactive to the date of expiration of the
previous agreement.

Therefore, in the absence of a specific provision of law prohibiting retroactivity of

the effectivity of arbitral awards issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to Article
263(g) of the Labor Code, such as herein involved, public respondent is deemed vested
with plenary and discretionary powers to determine the effectivity thereof.
SUNDOWNER DEV’T CORP. V. DRILON

Facts:
Private respondent Hotel Mabuhay, Inc. leased the premises belonging to Syjuco
. However, due to non-payment of rentals, a case for ejectment was filed by Syjuco.
Mabuhay offered to amicably settle the case by surrendering the premises and to sell its
assets and personal property to any interested party.

Syjuco offered the said premises for lease to petitioner and formally turned over
the possession of the leased premises to petitioner. Meanwhile, respondent National
Union of Workers in Hotel, Restaurant and Allied Services (NUWHRAIN) picketed the
leased premises, barricaded the entrance to the leased premises and denied
petitioner’s officers, employees and guests free access to and egress from said
premises.

Public respondent Secretary of Labor, assuming jurisdiction over the dispute,

issued an order requiring all striking employees to return to work. The parties were also
directed to submit their respective position papers within ten (10) days from receipt of
the order.

Public respondent then issued an order requiring petitioner to absorb the

members of the union and to pay backwages from the time it started operations up to
the date of the order.

Issue:
Whether petitioner should absorb employees of Mabuhay and pay them their
backwages

Held:
In the case at bar, contrary to the claim of the public respondent that the
transaction between petitioner and Mabuhay was attended with bad faith, the court finds
no cogent basis for such contention. Thus, the absorption of the employees of Mabuhay
may not be imposed on petitioner.

Mabuhay had nothing to do with the negotiation and consummation of the lease
contract between petitioner and Syjuco. It was only when Mabuhay offered to sell its
assets and personal properties in the premises to petitioner that they came to deal with
each other. It appears that petitioner agreed to purchase said assets of respondent
Mabuhay to enable Mabuhay to pay its obligations to its striking employees and to
Syjuco.
MANLIMOS V. NLRC

Facts:
The petitioners were among the regular employees of the Super Mahogany
Plywood Corporation, who had been hired as patchers, taper-graders, and receivers-
dryers. When a new owner acquired complete ownership of the corporation, the
petitioners continued to work and were considered terminated, with their conformity
when they received their separation pay, 13th month pay, and all other benefits due
them computed as of the said month. Each of them then executed a Release and
Waiver.

When the new owner caused the publication of a notice for the hiring of workers,
indicating therein who of the separated employees could be accepted on probationary
basis, the petitioners filed their applications for employment. They were hired on a
probationary basis. They were later on dismissed for allegedly committing acts
prejudicial to the interest of the new management which consisted of their "including
unrepaired veneers in their reported productions on output as well as untaped corestock
or whole sheets in their supposed taped veneers/corestock.”

Issue:
Whether the dismissed workers have remained regular employees regardless of
the change of management

Held:
No. Where such transfer of ownership is in good faith, the transferee is under no
legal duty to absorb the transferor employees as there is no law compelling such
absorption. The most that the transferee may do, for reasons of public policy and social
justice, is to give preference to the qualified separated employees in the filling of
vacancies in the facilities of the purchaser.

The hiring of employees on a probationary basis is an exclusive management

prerogative. The employer has the right or privilege to choose who will be hired and who
will be denied employment. It is within the exercise of this right that the employers may
set or fix a probationary period within which it may test and observe the employee's
conduct before hiring him permanently.
MASTER IRON WORKS CONSTRUCTION CORP VS. NLRC

Facts:
Master Iron Labor Union (MILU) entered into a collective barganing agreement
(CBA) with Master Iron Works Construction Corporation (Corporation for brevity) for the
three-year period between December 1, 1986 and November 30, 1989. The CBA
contains no-strike, no-lock out provisions.
After the signing of the CBA, the Corporation subcontracted outside workers to do the
usual jobs done by its regular workers including those done outside of the company
plant. As a result, the regular workers were scheduled by the management to work on a
rotation basis allegedly to prevent financial losses thereby allowing the workers only ten
(10) working days a month. The Corporation insisted that the hiring of casual workers
was a management prerogative. The workers charged the Corporation with unfair labor
practice for subcontracting work that was normally done by its regular workers thereby
causing the reduction of the latter's workdays. Later, the MILU staged a strike,
maintaining picket lines on the road leading to the Corporation's plant entrance and
premises notwithstanding the no-strike no-lockout provisions in the CBA. The workers
contend that the strike is legal because the reasons therefor are non-economic in
nature.

Issue: Was the strike legal?

Held:
Yes, the strike staged by the petitioners was a legal one even though it may have
been called to offset what the strikers believed in good faith to be unfair labor practices
on the part of the employer (Ferrer, et al. vs. Court of Industrial Relations). Verily, such
presumption of legality prevails even if the allegations of unfair labor practices are
subsequently found out to be untrue (People's Industrial and Commercial Employees
and Workers Org. vs. People's Industrial and Commercial Corporation). Consonant with
these jurisprudential pronouncements, is Article 263 of the Labor Code which clearly
states "the policy of the State to encourage free trade unionism and free collective
bargaining". Paragraph (b) of the same article guarantees the workers' "right to engage
in concerted activities for purposes of collective bargaining or for their mutual benefit
and protection" and recognizes the "right of legitimate labor organizations to strike and
picket and of employers to lockout" so long as these actions are "consistent with the
national interest" and the grounds therefor do not involve inter-union and intra-union
disputes.

An economic strike is defined as one which is to force wage or other concessions from
the employer which he is not required by law to grant (Consolidated Labor Association
of the Philippines vs. Marsman & Co., Inc.) The hiring, firing, transfer, demotion, and
promotion of employees are traditionally identified as management prerogatives.
However, they are not absolute prerogatives. They are subject to limitations found in
law, a collective bargaining agreement, or general principles of fair play and justice
(University of Sto. Tomas vs. NLRC, citing Abbott Laboratories, Inc. vs. NLRC). The
Corporation's assertion that it was exercising a management prerogative in hiring
outside workers being contrary to the contract of employment which, of necessity, states
the expected wages of the workers, as well as the CBA, is therefore untenable.
CALTEX REFINERY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (CREA) vs. HON. JOSE S.
BRILLANTES

FACTS:
Anticipating the expiration of their CBA on July 31, 1995, petitioner and private
respondent negotiated the terms and conditions of employment to be contained in a
new CBA.To settle the unresolved issues, eight meetings between the parties were
conducted. Because the parties failed to reach any significant progress in these
meetings, petitioner declared a deadlock. On July 24, 1995, petitioner filed a notice of
strike. 6 conciliation meetings conducted by the NCMB failed, failed. Marathon meetings
at the plant level, but this remedy proved also unavailing. Secretary assumed
jurisdiction and ordered “Accordingly, any strike or lockout, whether actual or intended,
is hereby enjoined.”xxx But the members of petitioner defied them and continued their
mass action (despite repeated orders) Thereafter, the contending parties filed their
position papers pertaining to unresolved issues. Because of the strike, private
respondent terminated the employment of some officers of petitioner union. The legality
of these dismissals brought additional contentious issues. Again, the parties tried to
resolve their differences through conciliation. Failing to come to any substantial
agreement, the parties decided to refer the problem to the secretary of labor and
employment.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Honorable Secretary of Labor and Employment committed
grave abuse of discretion in resolving the instant labor dispute.

HELD:
Union members have the right to demand wage increases through their collective
force; but it is equally cogent that they should also be able to justify an appreciable
increase in wages. We observe that private respondent’s detailed allegations on
productivity are unrebutted. It is noteworthy that petitioner ignored this argument of
private respondent and based its demand for wage increase not on the ground that they
were as productive as the Shell employees. Thus, we cannot attribute grave abuse of
discretion to public respondent. The disagreement between petitioner and private
respondent on the union security clause should have been definitively resolved by
public respondent. The labor secretary should take cognizance of an issue which is not
merely incidental to but essentially involved in the labor dispute itself, or which is
otherwise submitted to him for resolution. The secretary of labor assumed jurisdiction
over this labor dispute in an industry indispensable to national interest, precisely to
settle once and for all the disputes over which he has jurisdiction at his level. Although
the union has every right to represent its members in the negotiation regarding the
terms and conditions of their employment, it cannot negate their wishes on matters
which are purely personal and individual to them. When parties agree to submit
unresolved issues to the secretary of labor for his resolution, they should not expect
their positions to be adopted in toto. It is understood that they defer to his wisdom and
objectivity in insuring industrial peace. And unless they can clearly demonstrate bias,
arbitrariness, capriciousness or personal hostility on the part of such public officer, the
Court will not interfere or substitute the said officer’s judgment with its own.

CHUNG FU VS. CA

FACTS:
May 17, 1989: petitioner Chung Fu Industries and private respondents Roblecor
Philippines forged a construction agreement wherein Roblecor committed to construct
and finish on Dec. 31, 1989, ChungFu’s industrial/factory complex in Tanawan, Cavite
in consideration of P42M-It was stipulated also that in the event of disputes, the parties
will be subjected to an arbitration resolution, wherein the arbitrator will be chosen by
both parties-Apart from the construction agreement, the parties also entered into
ancillary contracts for the construction of a dormitory and support facilities with a
contract price of 3, 875, 285.00 to be completed on or before October 31,1989 and the
other dated Aug. 12,1989 for the installation of electrical, water and hydrant systems at
the plant site, priced at12.1M and requiring completion thereof one month after civil
works have been finished-However, Roblecor failed to complete the work despite the
extension allowed by Chung Fu-Subsequently, Chung Fu had to take over the
construction when it had become evident that Roblecor was not in a position to fulfill the
obligation-Claiming an unsatisfied account of P10, 500, 000 and unpaid progress
billings of P 2, 370, 179.23,Roblecor filed a petition for Compulsory Arbitration with
prayer for TRO before respondent RTC ,pursuant to the arbitration clause in the
construction agreement-Chung Fu moved to dismiss the petition and further prayed for
the quashing of the restraining order-Subsequent negotiations between the parties
eventually led to the formulation of an arbitration agreement which includes that the“
decision of the arbitrator shall be final and unappealable, therefore ,there shall be no
further judicial recourse if either party disagree swith the whole or any part of the
arbitrator’s award”-RTC approved the arbitration agreement and Asuncion was
appointed as the sole arbitrator. Arbitrator ruled in favor of the contractor Roblecor-
Chung Fu moved to remand the case for further hearing and asked for a
reconsideration of the judgment award claiming that Asuncion committed 12 instances
of grave error by disregarding the provisions of the parties’ contract-RTC denied Chung
Fu’s Motion to Remand and approved Roblecor’s Motion for Confirmation of Award.
Chung Fu elevated the case to CA which denied the petition-Hence, this petition to the
Supreme Court.

ISSUES:
W/N the subject arbitration award is beyond the ambit of the court’s power of
judicial review.
HELD :
No, It’s stated explicitly under Art. 2044 of the Civil Code that the finality of the
arbitrator’s award is not absolute and without exceptions. Where the conditions
described in Arts. 2038, 2039 and 2040 applicable to both compromises and arbitrations
are obtaining, the arbitrators’ award maybe annulled or rescinded. Additionally, Sections
24 and 25 of the Arbitration Law provide grounds for vacating, Modifying or rescinding
an arbitrator’s award.

DEL MONTE VS. SALDIVAR

Facts:
The Associated Labor Union (ALU) is the exclusive bargaining agent of the
plantation workers of petitoner. Respondent Timba, along with four other employees
were charged by ALU for disloyalty to the Union, particularly for encouraging defections
to rival Union, National Federation of Labor (NFL). Timbal filed an answer before the
Disloyalty Board, denying the allegations in the complaint and the averments in Artajo's
affidavit. She noted that the allegations against her were purportedly committed nearly
2years earlier; and that Artajo's act was motivated by hate and revenge owing to the
filing of the aforementioned civil action. The Disloyalty Board recommended the
expulsion of Timbal from membership in ALU and likewise dismissal from DMPI in
accordance with the Union Security Clause in the existing CBA between ALU and
DMPI. The Labor Arbiter affirmed that all five were illegally dismissed and ordered Del
Monte to reinstate them to their former position and to pay their full backwages and
other allowances..NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter's decision. Court of Appeals ruled
that only Timbal was illegally dismissed and that DMPI failed to observe procedural due
process.

Issue:
Whether or not Timbal was illegally dismissed?

Held:
In the matter at bar, the Labor Arbiter who is the proximate trier of facts, and the
Court of Appeals oth appreciated that the testimony of Artajo against Timbal could
notbe given credence. This is due to the prior animosity between the two engendered
bythe pending civil complaint filed by Timbal's husband against Artajo. Considering that
the civil complaint was filed 6days prior to the execution of Artajo's affidavit, it would be
plainly injudicious to presume that Artajo possessed an unbiased state of mind. Such
circumtance was considered by the Labor Arbiter and the Court of Appeals, as they
rendered favorably to Timbal. No credible disputation was offered by NLRC to the claim
that Artajo was biased against Timbal; hence, the Supreme Court adjudge the findings
of the Labor Arbiter and the CA as more cogent on that points. The dismissal for cause
of employees must be justified by substantial evidence, as appreciated by an impartial
trier of facts. The petition is denied and the decision the Court if Appeals is affirmed.
GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:

General milling corporation employed 190 workers. all the employees were members
of a union which is a duly certified bargaining agent. the gmc and the union entered into a
collective bargaining agreement which included the issue of representation that is effective
for a term of three years which will expire on november 30, 1991. on november 29, 1991, a
day before the expiration of the cba, the union sent gmc a proposed cba, with a request that
a counter proposal be submitted within ten days. on october 1991, gmc received collective
and individual letters from the union members stating that they have withdrawn from their
union membership. on december 19, 1991, the union disclaimed any massive disaffiliation
of its union members. on january 13, 1992, gmc dismissed an employee who is a union
member. the union protected the employee and requested gmc to submit to the grievance
procedure provided by the cba, but gmc argued that there was no basis to negotiate with a
union which is no longer existing.

issue: whether or not gmc is guilty of unfair labor practice for violating its duty to bargain
collectively and/or for interfering with the right of its employees to self-organization.

held: gmc is guilty of unfair labor practice when it refused to negotiate with the union upon
its request for the renegotiation of the economic terms of the cba on november 29, 1991.
the union’s proposal was submitted within the prescribed 3-year period from the date of
effectivity of the cba. it was obvious that gmc had no valid reason to refuse to negotiate in
good faith with the union. the refusal to send counter proposal to the union and to bargain
anew on the economic terms of the cba is tantamount to an unfair labor practice under
article 248 of the labor code.
under article 252 of the labor code, both parties are required to perform their mutual
obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of
negotiating an agreement. the union lived up to this obligation when it presented proposals
for a new cba to gmc within 3 years from the effectivity of the original cba. but gmc failed in
its duty under article 252. what it did was to devise a flimsy excuse, by questioning the
existence of the union and the status of its membership to prevent any negotiation. it bears
stressing that the procedure in collective bargaining prescribed by the code is mandatory
because of the basic interest of the state in ensuring lasting industrial peace. the court of
appeals found that the letters between february to june, 1993 by 13 union members
signifying their resignation from the union clearly indicated that gmc exerted pressure on the
employees. we agree with the court of appeals’ conclusion that the ill-timed letters of
resignation from the union members indicate that gmc interfered with the right of its
employee to self-organization.