International Studies Quarterly (2012) 56, 163–177

Is China a Status Quo or Revisionist State?

Leadership Travel as an Empirical Indicator of Foreign
Policy Priorities1
Scott L. Kastner
University of Maryland, College Park
and
Phillip C. Saunders
National Defense University

China’s rising power and increased global activism have attracted increasing attention, with particular focus
on whether a stronger China is likely to be a revisionist or status quo state. Power transition theory highlights
the potential for a dissatisfied rising power to challenge the existing international order, but it is difficult to
evaluate whether a rising power is dissatisfied. Where Chinese leaders choose to travel can offer insights into
whether China’s behavior is more consistent with that of a revisionist or status quo state and into China’s
broader diplomatic priorities. We present a series of expectations concerning how the travel patterns of a chal-
lenger state are likely to differ from the travel patterns of a status quo state. Using a newly compiled data set,
we then analyze the correlates of travel abroad by top Chinese leaders from 1998 to 2008. Our results are
more consistent with a status quo conceptualization of China, though there are some important exceptions
such as willingness to travel to rogue states. We also use travel data to test other hypotheses about Chinese for-
eign policy behavior.

China’s rapid ascent as a great power represents one
of the most important developments in the contem-
porary international system. Since the beginning of
the reform era in 1978, China’s economy has
averaged nearly 10% annual growth. Though still a
developing country, the People’s Republic of China
(PRC) has become one of the world’s largest trading
nations, while amassing vast holdings of foreign
reserves. In recent years, China has also made
significant strides in modernizing its military, and by
some estimates, China now spends more than any
other country except the United States on defense.
Along with these growing capabilities, China has
become more active diplomatically, seeking to
resolve long-standing territorial disputes (Fravel
2008), participate more actively in international
institutions (Johnston 2008), and to build relation-
ships with countries across the globe, from South-
east Asia to Africa to Latin America (Kurlantzick
2007).
Not surprisingly, a burgeoning literature considers
some of the broader global consequences of China’s
rise (for example, Shambaugh 2005; Saunders 2006;
1
Authors’ notes: The authors thank Anne Meng, Ryan Symonds, Patrice
Thomas, and David Szerlip for excellent research assistance, and Allen Carl-
son, Michael Hanmer, Michael Glosny, and two anonymous reviewers for
very helpful comments. The views expressed in this paper are those of the
authors and do not necessarily reflect the policy or positions of the
National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the US govern-
ment. The data used in this article are available from the authors or from
the ISQ data archive.
Gill 2007; Kang 2007; Lampton 2008; Ross and Zhu
2008; Medeiros 2009). A central question motivating
much of this literature concerns the long-term impli-
cations of China’s rise for regional and global stabil-
ity: in essence, will China’s rise continue to be
peaceful? Certainly, the rise of a new great power
has the potential to be destabilizing. As its capabili-
ties grow, a rising power may seek to alter the exist-
ing regional and global order—which could trigger
conflict with existing great powers (Gilpin 1981).2
The rise of Germany and Japan in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries starkly illustrates
that the rise of a new great power can generate insta-
bility. However, neither history nor theory suggests
that war or even great instability is an inevitable
by-product of a new power’s rise. The United States,
for instance, peacefully surpassed Great Britain as
the world’s leading power in the early twentieth
century. Indeed, a great deal of literature suggests
that the preferences of the rising power matter a
great deal. In particular, power transition theory, the
preeminent international relations (IR) theory
exploring the rise and decline of great powers, sug-
gests that a rising power generally satisfied with the
existing international order is less likely to provoke
instability than a rising dissatisfied power intent on
challenging the existing order (Organski 1968;
Organski and Kugler 1980; Kugler and Lemke 2000;
2
We follow Ikenberry (2001) in conceptualizing order to mean the
rules and norms governing the international system.

Kastner, Scott L. and Phillip C. Saunders. (2011) Is China a Status Quo or Revisionist State? Leadership Travel as an Empirical Indicator of Foreign Policy Priorities. International
Studies Quarterly, doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00697.x
 2011 International Studies Association
No Claim to original U.S. government works.
164 Is China a Status Quo or Revisionist State?
Levy 2008).3 The long-term implications of China’s
rise are thus likely to depend to a considerable
extent on whether the PRC is satisfied with the exist-
ing order, or whether China is dissatisfied and hopes
to challenge the existing order once it has the capa-
bility to do so.
Assessing whether or not a rising power has revi-
sionist intentions, however, is not a straightforward
task. Intentions can change as a state’s power
increases, and a dissatisfied rising power has incen-
tives to try to hide its revisionist intent (lest it trig-
gers a preventive response from existing powers). As
Kugler and Lemke (2000) write, a number of studies
in the power transition theory literature have dealt
with this problem by utilizing ‘‘creative measures’’ to
operationalize the extent to which a particular state
is dissatisfied with the existing order. Kim (1991),
for example, assumes countries are dissatisfied to the
extent they have allies that are different from the
dominant state’s allies, while Werner and Kugler
(1996) assume that a rapid increase in military
spending is an indicator that a state is dissatisfied.
Unfortunately, these measures cannot easily be
applied to the specific case of China. For instance,
the PRC currently has only one formal alliance (with
North Korea), undercutting the utility of an alliance-
based measure. Likewise, while China’s military
spending has grown rapidly, the motivations underly-
ing that growth are unclear (growth in military
spending could be a consequence of security
dilemma dynamics rather than a desire to challenge
the existing order).
Some recent studies have shed light on China’s
intentions by exploring PRC behavior within the
current international order. Perhaps, the most sys-
tematic study in this vein is Johnston (2003), who
finds that Chinese behavior along a variety of dimen-
sions (including participation in international insti-
tutions, conforming to international norms, and
willingness to challenge existing rules) suggests
that China is more of a status quo power than a revi-
sionist power.4 Numerous other studies reach
conclusions broadly consistent with Johnston’s
assessment—finding, in essence, that China is
becoming more cooperative and engaged in interna-
tional politics, and that China’s diplomacy is not
obviously at odds with other major international
actors such as the United States. For example, China
has become more engaged in regional institutions
(Shambaugh 2005) and more willing to participate
3
Not all theorists agree on the importance of the distinction between
a satisfied and a dissatisfied state. For offensive realists, for instance, all ris-
ing powers will be dissatisfied (Mearsheimer 2001). Others point to other
salient factors that help to explain whether a power transition will be peace-
ful, such as the extent to which the existing order can accommodate newly
rising powers (Ikenberry 2001). A number of recent studies have applied
power transition theory to China’s rise. See especially Chan (2008), and the
contributions in two edited volumes: Lemke and Tammen (2003) and Ross
and Zhu (2008).
4
See also Chan (2008) for a systematic analysis of whether China is a
revisionist state; Chan’s findings are largely consistent with Johnston’s. For
an earlier discussion, see Xiang (2001) and the response by Shambaugh
(2001).
in multilateral diplomacy to address regional issues
such as the North Korean nuclear program (Glaser
and Wang 2008). China has sought to build stable
relationships with other major powers (Goldstein
2005; Zhang and Tang 2005) while reassuring neigh-
bors about its peaceful intentions (Zheng 2005;
Kang 2007). More concretely, Beijing has
dramatically improved historically tense relations
with neighboring countries such as Vietnam (Shamb-
augh 2005) and has worked to resolve many long-
standing territorial disputes along its land borders
(Fravel 2005). China has also become more active in
international non-proliferation efforts, while reduc-
ing exports of arms and sensitive technologies
abroad (Medeiros 2007). And China’s links to the
global economy have grown rapidly (Lardy 2002),
while recent Chinese leaders have travelled abroad
much more frequently than did previous leaders
(Saunders 2006; Zhang and Liu 2008). In sum,
numerous studies examining a wide range of Chi-
nese foreign policy behaviors have painted a picture
of a cooperative China that is increasingly engaged
in the existing international order.
However, a second school of thought sees
China’s diplomacy as more actively challenging US
interests within the existing order. Proponents of
this view point to other patterns in PRC foreign pol-
icy that appear at odds with the depiction of a coop-
erative China becoming socialized to the existing
world order and that instead might suggest a PRC
with substantially different interests and priorities
than those of the current order’s primary architect,
the United States. Examples include a PRC willing-
ness to engage and even provide backing for rogue
states such as Sudan and Myanmar, and a more
general willingness to offer support to nondemocrat-
ic or corrupt regimes (Kagan 2006, 2009; Friedman
2008; Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Small 2008). China’s aid
policies toward Africa, for instance, have been criti-
cized by some as undermining efforts to promote
good governance in the region (Amosu 2007; Naim
2007). Some in the United States have also
expressed concern about perceived PRC efforts to
aggressively court US allies in East and Southeast
Asia (Blumenthal 2005; Sutter 2005a; Gill 2007).
Chinese efforts to lock up energy and strategic com-
modities may also indicate a PRC foreign policy that
challenges US interests (Leverett and Noel 2006;
Blumenthal 2008).
In short, there is some controversy concerning the
extent to which China’s foreign policy priorities and
interests are broadly consistent with the current
US-led international order. While a number of pat-
terns in PRC behavior suggest a cooperative China
that is becoming deeply integrated into the existing
order, other evidence appears to contradict this
conclusion. Obviously, that a great power’s foreign
policies may appear contradictory at times should
not be all that surprising: such contradictions can
arise from any number of sources, such as bureau-
cratic rivalry or a complex international system. But
the starkly different assessments highlighted above
 Scott L. Kastner and Phillip C. Saunders
suggest that more systematic analysis of China’s
diplomatic priorities is needed. To what extent, for
example, are China’s close relationships with Myan-
mar, Sudan, and North Korea indicative of a broader
willingness to engage regimes at the fringes of inter-
national society? Alternatively, do China’s relations
with these countries constitute outliers when consid-
ered in the context of China’s overall diplomacy?
More generally, which factors are most important in
determining whether China will spend significant
resources cultivating relations with a particular coun-
try? Having a better sense of these factors can
inform the debate over China’s intentions toward
the US-led order and on Chinese foreign policy
priorities more generally.
Suppose, for example, that China places dispro-
portionate weight (relative to the resources it spends
on relations with other states) on relations with
rising powers on the fringes of the current order, or
with states that systematically violate the rules and
norms that define the current order. Such a finding
would appear more consistent with a China that is
looking to challenge the current order than with a
status quo China looking to integrate more deeply
into that order. On the other hand, finding that the
PRC pours relatively few resources into developing
relations with such states would seem more consis-
tent with a cooperative China becoming more
engaged in the current order. One obvious problem,
however, is that it is difficult to measure China’s
diplomatic priorities in a systematic manner. While
Chinese official statements provide some sense of
priorities, actual commitments of foreign policy
resources better reveal underlying preferences.
In this article, we focus on one simple indicator of
the importance the Chinese government places on
developing relations with a particular country: the
frequency with which China’s top leaders visit that
country. Although there are clear shortcomings (as
we discuss later), we believe that leadership travel is
a useful tool for gauging Chinese diplomatic priori-
ties for several reasons. First, international travel by
top leaders involves a significant commitment of
resources due to the high opportunity cost of their
absence from their normal duties. This reflects the
Saunders axiom: the scarcest resource in govern-
ment is high-level attention. This opportunity cost is
especially high in the Chinese political system, where
the President ⁄ General Secretary and Premier ⁄ head
of government play important symbolic and func-
tional roles in decision making and in mobilizing
government action on behalf of leadership priorities.
Second, travel by Chinese leaders is generally the
culmination of extensive preparations by lower-level
officials and the Chinese embassy in the country
being visited. This usually includes a series of prepa-
ratory visits by lower-level officials and negotiations
on economic and other agreements that will be
signed during the top leader’s visit. Chinese leaders
typically travel with a large entourage of government
officials and business leaders; summit visits often
include the announcement of Chinese aid commit-
165
ments, investment deals, and signing of various polit-
ical and economic agreements. Thus, a visit by one
of China’s top leaders typically represents a large
commitment of the Chinese government’s economic
and foreign policy resources. Third, because China’s
top leaders make the final decision about which
countries they will travel to, top leadership visits may
represent leadership priorities more directly than
other aspects of Chinese foreign policy, which may
be the outcome of routine economic or bureaucratic
processes. Finally, leadership travel may be a useful
‘‘leading indicator’’ of Chinese diplomatic priorities
and commitments. Chinese leaders often use high-
level summits to set future goals and targets for bilat-
eral relations. In the Chinese political system,
endorsements by senior leaders are an important
means of focusing attention and resources on leader-
ship priorities. Moreover, if China is a revisionist
power, one would expect efforts to cultivate interna-
tional support for changes in international rules and
norms to precede direct challenges. High-level dis-
cussions would be an important means of assessing
and building support for such changes.
We have constructed a new data set that codes all
foreign travel by the Chinese President and Premier
from 1998 through 2008, and we use this data set to
identify the factors that make Chinese leaders more
or less like likely to visit a particular country. In turn,
we relate these factors to the debate over China’s
preferences relating to the current global order and
whether a rising China is challenging that order. To
preview, our findings are mixed, but mostly point to
a characterization of China as a status quo power. As
such, our findings are largely consistent with those
of Johnston’s (2003) pioneering study.
In addition to shedding light on the debate over
Chinese intentions toward the current international
order, our findings allow for testing other arguments
about Chinese foreign policy priorities. Many of
these arguments have been constructed inductively
using qualitative methodologies or based on Chinese
government official statements about priorities. For
instance, some scholars have suggested that the cur-
rent Hu Jintao administration has a different set of
foreign policy priorities than the previous Jiang
Zemin administration. Since our travel data span the
two administrations, we are able to subject these
sorts of arguments to further empirical testing.
Patterns in Chinese Leadership Travel and Their
Implications
Leadership Travel and Chinese Intentions
While we believe that leadership travel represents a
good way to measure Chinese diplomatic priorities,
relating those priorities to China’s broader inten-
tions toward the current international order is a
more difficult task. How, specifically, are the foreign
policy priorities of a challenger state likely to differ
from a status quo state? Both challenger and status
quo states are likely to share a number of priorities.
166 Is China a Status Quo or Revisionist State?
For instance, we might expect that a status quo state,
because it is invested in the current order, hopes for
regional stability. As such, it is likely to pursue a
‘‘good neighbor’’ policy with an emphasis on main-
taining stable relationships with nearby countries.
But a challenger state is also likely to place a high
priority on relations with neighboring countries, due
to incentives to ‘‘get its own backyard in order’’
before adopting a more assertive role internationally.
(Among other things, good relations with neighbor-
ing states make those states less likely to join with
the United States in balancing against China.) In
this regard, finding that Chinese leaders do in fact
visit neighboring countries more often than other
countries (ceteris paribus) does not clearly indicate
whether China is a challenger or status quo country:
such a finding is consistent with both types. Simi-
larly, both challenger and status quo states are likely
to place a high priority on relations with other
powerful states in the system.
However, other patterns in leadership travel deci-
sions do have the potential to distinguish between
the two types of states. Below, we describe four areas
where we would expect to see some differences
emerge in the priorities of a challenger versus a sta-
tus quo China.
Relations with ‘‘Rogue’’ or ‘‘Pariah’’ States
China has come under considerable criticism for its
relationships with certain states—such as Myanmar,
Sudan, and North Korea—that are sometimes viewed
as ‘‘pariahs’’ or ‘‘rogue’’ states in the international
community because they pursue policies (internally
and externally) that are in clear violation of interna-
tional norms.5 A status quo state that identifies with
the current international order should thus be disin-
clined to prioritize relations with rogue states,
precisely because those states pursue policies that
run afoul of that order. If China is a status quo
country, we would expect that its leaders would gen-
erally avoid visits to rogue states. On the other hand,
even if China is a challenger country, it is not
obvious that its leaders would want to identify openly
with rogue states, given the negative attention this
would draw (as seen in international criticism of Chi-
na’s links to Sudan). Finding that Chinese leaders
have no aversion to visiting rogue states would
increase our confidence that it is a challenger state,
while a finding that Chinese leaders are less likely to
visit rogue states does not have any clear implica-
tions for whether China is a status quo or a chal-
lenger country.
Relations with Other Rising Powers
Any rising power—whether revisionist or not—will
have reason to place great emphasis on its relations
5
The concept of a ‘‘pariah’’ or ‘‘rogue’’ state is inherently murky and
controversial. Caprioli and Trumbore (2003) note, for instance, that coun-
tries are sometimes labeled as rogue simply for pursuing policies at odds
with US interests. We conceptualize a rogue state as one in clear violation
of international norms; we describe in the next section how we operational-
ize this concept in practice.
with other major powers in the international system.
However, we do expect that a rising challenger
would have especially strong incentives to seek close
relations with other rising states outside the core
architects and beneficiaries of the current world
order, since such states are potential future allies in
efforts to reshape the current order. For example,
one would expect a revisionist China to seek close
ties with other members of the BRIC (Brazil, Russia,
India, China) grouping (Glosny 2010). Conversely,
there is no clear reason to expect that a status quo
state would prioritize its relations with this set of
countries in particular. As such, finding that Chinese
leaders were more likely, ceteris paribus, to visit
other rising powers outside the core of the current
order would increase our confidence that China is a
challenger state, while a negative or insignificant
finding would increase our confidence that China is
a status quo state.
Relations with Countries that Have Antagonistic
Relationships with the United States
A diplomatic focus on countries that have antago-
nistic relationships with the United States would
be clearly consistent with the behavior of a chal-
lenger state. Prioritizing relations with such coun-
tries indicates a willingness to challenge US
interests directly. However, even a challenger state
might shy away from such behavior, fearing the
strong reaction it might elicit from Washington.
Thus, while finding that Chinese leaders were more
likely, ceteris paribus, to visit countries hostile to
the United States (relative to other states) would
increase our confidence that China is a challenger
state, finding an insignificant or negative relation-
ship between hostility to the United States and Chi-
nese leadership travel would not have clear
implications for whether China is a status quo or
challenger country.
Relations with US Regional (Asian) Allies
As we noted in the introduction, some US observers
(for example, Blumenthal 2005) have expressed
concern that China appears to be aggressively court-
ing US allies in the region. While we would expect
that China would prioritize its relations with neigh-
boring countries regardless of Beijing’s long-term
intentions, finding that the PRC has made particular
efforts to engage US regional allies would strike us
as an indication of challenger behavior: it would sug-
gest active efforts to reduce US influence in the
region. Thus, finding that Chinese leaders were
more likely, ceteris paribus, to visit US allies in Chi-
na’s vicinity would increase our confidence that
China is a challenger state. On the other hand, find-
ing that Chinese leaders are not more likely to visit
US regional allies would increase our confidence
that China is a status quo state.
Changes over Time
Finally, the power transition theory literature stresses
the power of the rising state relative to the hegemon
 Scott L. Kastner and Phillip C. Saunders
as a key variable. Given China’s faster growth rate,
China’s power has increased over the last decade rel-
ative to the United States. This change in relative
power should reduce constraints on the rising
power’s foreign policy behavior and increase the
incentives for a revisionist state to engage with poten-
tial allies in seeking changes in international rules in
norms. Accordingly, if China is a revisionist state, we
would expect evidence of this to be stronger in Hu’s
term (when China’s relative power had increased)
than in Jiang’s term. We would expect these changes
to be evident across the four areas described above.
In summary, we believe that patterns of Chinese
leadership travel to four types of countries—rogue
states, other rising powers, states with antagonistic
relations with the United States, and US regional
allies—can inform the debate over whether China is
a challenger or a status quo state. Table 1 summa-
rizes what different findings would imply about
China’s type; shaded areas represent findings that
would increase our confidence that China is a
challenger state.
There are clear limits to our approach, and we
wish to acknowledge these at the outset. First, lead-
ership travel is at best a proxy for foreign policy pri-
orities. It can help tell us which relationships are
high priorities for China, but it does not say any-
thing about the quality or content of those relation-
ships. We therefore need to be cautious in drawing
inferences from our findings. For example, Chinese
leaders travel often to North Korea. This could indi-
cate efforts to build a close relationship with a
rogue state that often challenges US interests. How-
ever, it could also indicate Chinese efforts to per-
suade North Korea to change its ways and conform
more to global rules and norms. We are thus appro-
priately cautious in making sweeping claims based
on our findings. Second, we need to recognize that
China is a strategic actor. If its leadership intends
to challenge the current order, it has incentives to
hide that fact until it possesses sufficient capability
to make big changes (for example, to be a clever
rather than a clumsy challenger). This could affect
the willingness of Chinese leaders to make highly
visibly visits to foreign countries opposed to the
United States. On the other hand, it is worth
emphasizing that excessive restraint would greatly
limit China’s ability to cultivate potential allies, par-
ticularly given the need for senior Chinese leaders
to engage directly with top leaders in authoritarian
systems on such sensitive topics.6 Finally, as we have
already noted, many factors correlated with Chinese
leadership travel tell us little about whether China
is a challenger state. In short, there are clear limits
in our ability to draw inference regarding China’s
type based on patterns in Chinese leadership travel.
6
At the limit, a clever challenger would be so careful that its observa-
ble behavior would be indistinguishable from a status quo state. However,
such a high degree of restraint would make it very difficult to cultivate sup-
port for revisionist aims. In practice, a challenger state would probably
focus on keeping the content of high meetings private rather that adjuring
such meetings entirely.
167
Our analysis should thus be viewed as a piece of
the puzzle, rather than the final word, in the debate
over China’s intentions toward the current interna-
tional order.
Using Chinese Leadership Travel to Evaluate Other Claims about
Chinese Foreign Policy
An analysis of Chinese leadership travel also has the
potential to further our understanding of China’s
foreign relations in other ways not directly related to
the challenger ⁄ status quo dichotomy. Indeed, pat-
terns in leadership travel provide a new way to evalu-
ate a range of arguments that scholars and analysts
have made about China’s diplomatic priorities in the
literature on Chinese foreign policy. They also pro-
vide a potential means of comparing China’s offi-
cially stated foreign policy priorities with its actual
behavior. In the remainder of this section, we briefly
summarize some of these arguments, and we relate
them to expected patterns in leadership travel.
Great Power Status
Qualitative studies have documented China’s efforts
to stabilize relations with other great powers as part
of an effort to prevent the emergence of any future
coalition that might seek to contain China (for
example, Goldstein 2005: chapter 7). Some studies
have suggested that there may be differences
between the Jiang and Hu administrations in this
regard, with Hu placing somewhat less emphasis on
other great powers and more emphasis on improving
China’s relations with the developing world (see, for
example, Lam 2006:159–161; Shirk 2007:111). We
thus expect to find that Chinese leaders are more
likely, ceteris paribus, to visit other great powers than
they are to visit other states. We also expect this ten-
dency to be less pronounced under Hu than under
Jiang and to find an increased tendency under Hu
(relative to Jiang) to visit developing countries.
Proximity
A number of recent studies have highlighted Chi-
nese efforts to improve relations with countries in
East, Central, and Southeast Asia since the mid-
1990s (Shambaugh 2005; Sutter 2005b; Saunders
2008). Chinese government officials regularly high-
light the importance of regional stability to provide
a good environment for China’s economic develop-
ment. Chinese efforts to improve relations with
countries in the region have been manifest in,
among other things, renewed efforts to resolve
long-standing land border disputes with neighbor-
ing countries (Fravel 2008) and increased participa-
tion in regional institutions such as the ARF
(Shambaugh 2005; Gill 2007; Saunders 2008). Given
this emphasis on relations with regional states, we
would expect to find that Chinese leaders have
been more likely, ceteris paribus, to visit regional
countries than they are to visit other states; they
should be especially likely, we suspect, to visit bor-
dering countries.
168 Is China a Status Quo or Revisionist State?
TABLE 1. Possible Outcomes and Their Implications for China’s Type
Variable
Rogue states
Insignificant
Rising non-core powers
Insignificant
Countries antagonistic to United States
Insignificant
US regional allies
Insignificant
(Notes. Sign refers to each variable’s relationship with the frequency of leadership travel to a country (so + indicates that Chinese leaders were significantly
more likely to visit the sort of country described in the first column). Shaded boxes indicate outcomes that increase confidence that China is a challenger
country.)
Trade and Foreign Direct Investment
Since the beginning of the reform era in 1978,
China has become increasingly integrated into the
global economy—a trend that accelerated in the
1990s (Lardy 2002). China has become one of
the world’s major trading states, and it is by far the
largest recipient of foreign direct investment among
developing countries. In more recent years, China’s
direct investment abroad has also increased. Some
analysts have argued that China’s foreign policy
follows distinct economic and strategic logics (for
example, Saunders 2006). However, the relative pri-
ority of economic and strategic interests in Chinese
foreign policy has been a subject of debate. Our data
allow us to test the extent to which China prioritizes
relationships with its principal economic partners.
Our expectation is that Chinese leaders do prioritize
relations with key economic partners, and as such
should be more likely to visit those countries than to
visit other countries, ceteris paribus.
Resources
Rapid economic growth has made China’s economy
increasingly dependent on imported resources,
particularly oil. A growing number of studies have
argued that this dependence, in turn, is leading the
PRC to place increased emphasis on its relations
with resource-rich countries and regions (for exam-
ple, Zweig and Bi 2005; Lieberthal and Herberg
2006; Sutter 2008:355; Wu and Storey 2008; Kennedy
2010). Given the apparent Chinese belief that state
action can play an important role in a world with
increased competition for energy and other
resources (Downs 2006; Herberg 2007), we would
expect to see Chinese leaders traveling to resource-
rich countries more frequently than other countries,
ceteris paribus. China’s increasing dependence on
imported resources, combined with sharp rises dur-
ing the 2000s in the price of commodities (especially
oil), also leads us to suspect that resources should
be a more salient factor driving leadership travel
under current president Hu Jintao than they were
under previous president Jiang Zemin.
Sign Implications
) Consistent with both challenger and SQ state behavior.
Inconsistent with SQ state behavior, consistent with challenger behavior.
+ Inconsistent with SQ state behavior, consistent with challenger behavior.
) Consistent with SQ state behavior; inconsistent with challenger state behavior.
Consistent with SQ state behavior; inconsistent with challenger state behavior.
+ Inconsistent with SQ state behavior; consistent with challenger state behavior.
) Consistent with both SQ and challenger state behavior.
Consistent with both SQ and challenger state behavior.
+ Inconsistent with SQ state behavior; consistent with challenger state behavior.
) Consistent with SQ state behavior; inconsistent with challenger state behavior.
Consistent with SQ state behavior; inconsistent with challenger state behavior.
+ Inconsistent with SQ state behavior; consistent with challenger state behavior.
Research Design
The Dependent Variable: Chinese Leadership Travel Abroad
We focus on leadership travel abroad by leaders at
the very apex of China’s political system: the Presi-
dent and the Premier. We use a comprehensive new
data set on all travel abroad by top Chinese leaders
from the years 1998 through 2008. The data were
collected by a team of research assistants at the Insti-
tute for National Strategic Studies under the supervi-
sion of Phillip Saunders. The coders relied on a
variety of sources for information on Chinese leader-
ship travel. The starting point was generally various
editions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs annual
yearbook China’s Foreign Affairs (Beijing: World
Affairs Press). Both Chinese and English editions
were used. This source was supplemented by tar-
geted Open Source Center ⁄ Foreign Broadcast Infor-
mation Service (FBIS), Lexis, and Google searches,
and by data from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign
Affairs web site. The results were double-checked by
separate research assistants and by comparing the
data with China Quarterly’s review and chronicle of
Chinese foreign relations.
The period covered by the data set spans two dif-
ferent sets of Chinese top leaders. From 1998 until
early 2003, Jiang Zemin served as President and Zhu
Rongji served as Premier.7 In early 2003, Hu Jintao
became President and Wen Jiabao became Premier.8
We analyze leadership travel abroad in the two peri-
ods separately.9 To begin, our dependent variable is
7
The previous premier, Li Peng, took a trip to Europe in early 1998
before Zhu Rongji became the premier in March. Li’s trip is not included
in our analysis.
8
Neither Jiang nor Zhu travelled abroad in 2003 prior to the March
meeting of the National People’s Congress, when Hu and Wen became
President and Premier.
9
We analyze travel by the two administrations separately since we
expect that the coefficients on at least some of the independent variables
will differ across the two administrations. As such, pooling them together
could produce misleading findings. Suppose, hypothetically, that variable X
has a substantively large, positive, and significant effect on travel under Hu,
but a substantively large, negative, and significant effect on travel under
Jiang. If we pooled the two administrations together, the coefficient on X
would likely be substantively small and insignificant.
 Scott L. Kastner and Phillip C. Saunders
simply the number of trips the president and pre-
mier combined to take to a particular country i over
the years 1998 through early 2003 for Jiang and
Zhu, and over the years 2003 through 2008 for Hu
and Wen. We also ran regressions where our depen-
dent variable was the number of days that the presi-
dent and premier combined to spend in a particular
country i over the years 1998 through early 2003 for
Jiang and Zhu, and over the years 2003 through
2008 for Hu and Wen.
For both leadership periods (Jiang ⁄ Zhu and
Hu ⁄ Wen), we exclude trips made solely for the
purpose of attending a multilateral meeting in a
particular country. However, if the visit was
extended either prior to or following the multilat-
eral meeting, the trip to i is included.10 In robust-
ness tests, we consider alternative ways of coding the
dependent variable, including not counting trips
made to i as part of a multilateral meeting at all.11
Generally speaking, results were not greatly affected
by using this alternative specification, as we note
below.
Independent Variables
In the previous section, we argued that the relation-
ship between leadership travel and four different
variables can inform the challenger ⁄ status quo
debate. Here, we describe how we operationalize
these variables. Unless otherwise indicated, all time-
variant independent variables are coded based on
1998 data when examining Jiang ⁄ Zhu travel, and
2003 data when examining Hu ⁄ Wen travel.
Whether or Not a Country Is a ‘‘Rogue’’ State
The concept of a rogue state is a somewhat murky
one that we defined as a country pursuing policies
that violate international norms. We operational-
ize the concept using two variables. First, we include
a variable that equals 1 if country i is the target
of United Nations sanctions, and 0 otherwise
(U.N. Sanctions).12 Second, we include a variable
(authoritarian state) that equals 1 for highly
authoritarian states and 0 otherwise (under the
assumption that such states run afoul of interna-
tional norms).13
10
If, for example, Jiang Zemin attended an APEC meeting and left
right after the meeting, the visit is not included. If he stayed an extra day,
it is coded as a visit to that country.
11
Meaning that, if Jiang Zemin travelled to country i for an APEC
meeting and stayed an extra day, the trip would still not be coded as a trip
to i (under the presumption that Jiang would not have gone at all had it
not been for the APEC meeting).
12
Source: Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot (2007). Variable is coded 1 if
the country was a target at of UN sanctions in at least three calendar years
from 1998 to 2003 (for Jiang ⁄ Zhu) or in at least three calendar years from
2003 to 2007 (for Hu ⁄ Wen).
13
Specifically, this variable takes a value of 1 if the Freedom House
Freedom in the World Survey political rights index equals 6 or 7, and 0 otherwise.
The scores range from 1 (free) to 7 (not free); in some robustness tests, we
also used a continuous version of this variable. Data available at: http://
www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw/FIWAllScores.xls. (Accessed November
9, 2010.)
169
Countries with Antagonistic Relations with the
United States
Two variables are meant to capture whether or not a
country has an antagonistic relationship with Wash-
ington. First, we include a variable that equals 1 if
country i is the target of US economic sanctions,
and 0 otherwise (U.S. sanctions).14 Second, we
include a measure (affinity) that uses votes in the
United Nations General Assembly to capture the
extent to which country i’s interests are similar to
those of the United States.15
Rising, Non-Core, Powers
To operationalize the concept of a rising power
residing outside the core of the current interna-
tional order, we code a variable (rising power) that
equals 1 for members of the G-20 that were not also
members of the original G-7. This definition
includes the other members of the BRIC.
US Allies in the Region
Here, we create an interaction between a regional
variable and a dichotomous variable indicating
whether or not a country is a US ally (US regional
ally). The region variable (Asia) takes a value of 1
if country i is located in Central Asia, South Asia,
East Asia, or Oceania, and 0 otherwise. The ally
variable takes a value of 1 if country i has a formal
defense pact with the United States, and 0 other-
wise (U.S. ally).16 In some specifications, we use
one of two alternative measures of a country’s
security relationship with the United States. First,
we code a variable (US troops) that equals 1 if the
United States stationed at least 100 troops in coun-
try i, and 0 otherwise.17 Second, we include a vari-
able (ln US arms transfers) that equals the natural
log of the value (in 1990 US dollars) of US arms
transfers to county i over the years 1998–2002 for
Jiang ⁄ Zhu, and over the years 2003–2008 for
Hu ⁄ Wen.18
In section II, we also introduced a number of
other factors derived from the literature on Chinese
foreign policy that might drive leadership travel deci-
sions, including:
14
Source: Hufbauer et al. (2007). Variable is coded 1 if the country
was a target at of US sanctions in at least three calendar years from 1998 to
2003 (for Jiang ⁄ Zhu) or in at least three calendar years from 2003 to 2007
(for Hu ⁄ Wen).
15
Source: Erik Gartzke’s ‘‘The Affinity of Nations’’ data set, available
online at http://dss.ucsd.edu/~egartzke/htmlpages/data.html. (Accessed
November 9, 2010) We use his variable s3un4608i, which is based on three
category voting (yes, no, abstain), and which interpolates missing values.
The variable ranges from 1 (most similar) to )1 (least similar).
16
Source: The Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions Project.
Available at http://atop.rice.edu/home. (Accessed 22 July 2008.)
17
Source: Kane (2006).
18
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Arms
Transfers Database. Available at http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/
page/values.php. (Accessed November 9, 2010) With the exception of vari-
ables that take the form of percentages, we include continuous indepen-
dent variables in their natural log format because we suspect that the
marginal effects of these variables will decrease for larger values.
170 Is China a Status Quo or Revisionist State?
Great Power Status
Ideally, to capture the extent to which a country i
is a great power, we would want to include a range
of variables measuring various national attributes
such as size, economic strength, and military
spending. In practice, these different indicators
tend to be highly correlated with each other, and
as such, we only include one indicator in any sin-
gle regression model. The initial models reported
below use as an indicator of power the natural log
of country i’s population (ln population). We begin
with this indicator simply because it tends to pro-
duce models with the best fit. However, we also
considered, in alternative specifications, the natural
log of a country’s defense spending in current US
dollars (ln defense spending) and its gross domestic
product (ln gdp).19 As we note below, all three
indicators of great power status generally produce
similar results.
Economic Development
Here we use the natural log of country i’s per capita
income (ln pci).20
Proximity
In addition to the regional variable (Asia) described
above, we also include a variable (shared border) that
takes a value of 1 if a country shares a land border
with China and 0 otherwise.
Economic Linkages
In some models, we include a variable equal to
the natural log of country i’s exports to China
plus its imports from China (ln trade).21 However,
the variable is closely correlated with the measures
that capture great power status, so we only include
it in specifications that exclude the great power
19
Source for population, GDP, and per capita income data: Alan He-
ston, Robert Summers, and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.2,
Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income, and Prices
at the University of Pennsylvania, September 2006. Available at http://
pwt.econ.upenn.edu/. (Accessed 23 July 2008) Defense spending data
come from The International Institute for Strategic Studies (various,
years).
20
Ibid.
21
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China. Available at http://
www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/yearlydata/. (Accessed 23 July 2008.)
22
Ibid.
23
1998 data on Chinese outbound FDI data were obtained from the
China Commerce Yearbook (formerly the Yearbook of China’s Foreign Eco-
nomic Relations and Trade prior to 2004) published annually by the Minis-
try of Commerce. (Here, we simply added up outbound flows over the
years 1993–1998.) This is the best available source of data for Chinese out-
bound FDI data before 2003, but has significant problems due to inconsis-
tent reporting procedures and difficulty in tracing the ultimate destination
of outbound FDI transiting FDI havens such as Bermuda, the Cayman
Islands, and the Virgin Islands to other destinations. For a discussion of the
methodological issues in Chinese outbound FDI statistics and revised data
for 2003–2006 compiled using improved reporting procedures, see Saun-
ders and Dietz (2009). Note that for a handful of countries accumulated
Chinese direct investment in country i was negative; we changed these val-
ues to 0. 2003 data were obtained from the 2006 Statistical Bulletin of China’s
Outward Foreign Direct Investment, published by the PRC’s Ministry of Com-
merce.
variables. We also include a variable equal to the
natural log of country i’s direct investment
flows into China in 1998 for Jiang ⁄ Zhu and 2003
for Hu ⁄ Wen (ln inward FDI);22 and a variable
equal to the natural log of Chinese accumulated
direct investment in country i as of 1998 for
Jiang ⁄ Zhu and as of 2003 for Hu ⁄ Wen (ln outward
FDI).23
Natural Resources
We consider two variables meant to capture coun-
try i’s endowments in strategic natural resources.
First, we include a variable equal to the natural
log of country i’s proved oil reserves (ln oil
reserves).24 Second, we include a variable meant to
capture country i’s strategic metals production: for
six key metals (bauxite, copper, iron, manganese,
uranium, and nickel), we calculated country i’s
production as a percentage of world production
and then averaged across the six metals (metals
index).25
Finally, given the attention China’s relations with
Africa have received in recent years, we also include
a control variable equal to one if country i is in
Africa, and 0 otherwise.
Sample
We drop from our analysis all countries that main-
tained formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan (the
Republic of China) as of 1998 for the Jiang ⁄ Zhu
administration and as of 2003 for the Hu ⁄ Wen
administration. Top Chinese leaders would obvi-
ously be highly unlikely to visit countries that do
not recognize the PRC diplomatically, so leaving
such countries in the sample would, in essence, arti-
ficially inflate the sample size. After removing these
countries, we have complete data for a total of 153
countries for Jiang ⁄ Zhu, and 154 countries for
Hu ⁄ Wen.
Model specification
Since our dependent variable is an event count, we
use a Poisson regression model when modeling the
number of trips leaders took to a particular country.
Ordinary least squares models are generally inappro-
priate for event-count data, in part because they
can predict negative values for the dependent
variable in some cases. When the dependent
variable is the number of days (rather than number
of trips) leaders spent in a particular country, we
used instead a negative binomial regression model
because a key assumption of the Poisson was violated
24
Source: U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administra-
tion. Available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/oilreserves.
html. (Accessed 23 July 2008) We used data from 1998 for Jiang ⁄ Zhu and
2003 for Hu ⁄ Wen.
25
We used 2002 data for both Hu ⁄ Wen and Jiang ⁄ Zhu. Source: British
Geological Survey (2008).
 Scott L. Kastner and Phillip C. Saunders 171

(King 1989).26 All models were estimated using Sta- effect of per capita income is also quite large. A
ta ⁄ SE version 10.0. shift from the 25th to the 75th percentile in per
capita income, while holding all else constant, yields
an expected jump from 0.17 trips on average
Results
(which translates into only a 16% probability of at
Travel by Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji, 1998–2003 least one trip) to 0.69 trips on average (a 50%
probability of at least one visit). And a shift in both
The first column of Table 2 reports regression find-
population and per capita income from their 25th
ings when the dependent variable is the number of
percentile values to their 75th percentile values
trips taken by Jiang and Zhu to a particular country;
leads to a jump in the expected number of visits
the second column reports regression results when
from 0.11 (or an 11% probability of at least one
the dependent variable is instead the number of
visit) to 1.02 (a 64% chance of at least one visit,
days spent in a particular country.
and 27% chance of two or more visits). Finally, to
Three variables—ln population, ln pci, and shared
get a sense of border effects, consider the case of
border—are highly significant statistically (>99%
Pakistan, which shares a 523-km-long border with
confidence) in both models. That is, Jiang and Zhu
the PRC. The trips model predicts that leaders
were more likely, all else equal, to travel to a country
would visit a country with Pakistan’s characteristics
that borders China, and more likely to travel to a
0.64 times, which translates into a 47% chance of at
country the larger its population and the higher its
least one visit.28 Now imagine a country otherwise
per capita income. The US sanctions variable is
the same as Pakistan, but that lies outside of Asia
statistically significant at the 90% level of confidence
and shares no border with China. In such a sce-
when the dependent variable is number of trips
nario, the model predicts only 0.20 visits on aver-
abroad (with leaders less likely to travel to states that
age, or an 18% probability of at least one visit (and
are targets of US sanctions), but the variable
an 82% probability of no visits).
becomes insignificant when the dependent variable
is measured in days. The variable authoritarian state is
Alternative Specifications
significant at the 90% level of confidence when the
As we noted earlier, several different measures that
dependent variable is measured in days spent in a
capture aspects of power—including population,
country, but the variable is insignificant when the
GDP, and defense spending—are highly correlated
dependent variable is measured in trips to a country.
with each other. And, in fact, if we substitute either
And the regional variable Asia is significant for days
defense spending or GDP in for population, results
but insignificant for trips. Other variables are not
are very similar: both are strongly and positively
significant predictors of travel decisions for Jiang
correlated with number of trip taken to a country
and Zhu.
and number of days Jiang and Zhu spent in a partic-
The variables that are statistically significant tend
ular country. Regardless of how we measure the
to have relatively large substantive effects (see
concept, it appears that Jiang and Zhu were much
Table 3). Imagine, for example, a hypothetical
more likely to visit large, powerful countries.
country in which population is set to its 25th per-
Remember that we omitted trade from the model
centile value, and all other independent variables
because it too was strongly correlated with popula-
are set to their mean/median values. The trips
tion and the other measures of power. If we include
model reported in Table 1 predicts that Jiang and
trade but none of the power variables, trade remains
Zhu would visit such a country on average 0.21
positively correlated with leadership travel for both
times, which translates into a 19% probability of at
models presented in Table 1. However, the trade
least one visit (and an 81% probability of no vis-
variable is only significant at the 90% level of confi-
its).27 If population is instead set at its 75th percen-
dence when the dependent variable is measured in
tile value, with all other variables being held
trips.
constant, the model predicts an average of 0.47
The findings presented in Table 1 are not highly
trips to the country. This translates into a 37%
sensitive to how we measure US allies. If we substi-
probability of at least one visit. The independent
tute in US troops or ln US arms transfers for the
defense-pact based US ally, results are similar.
26
A Poisson model is only appropriate if the count data are not over-
Finally, recall that our dependent variable includes
dispersed, meaning the variance is not significantly greater than the mean trips taken to a particular country to take part in a
(King 1989). This assumption is not violated when the dependent variable multilateral meeting if the trip was extended on
is the number of trips leaders took to a particular country, but when the either end to include a bilateral visit. If we instead
dependent variable is instead the number of days leaders spent in a particu-
code the dependent variable so that these trips are
lar country, the variance does become significantly greater than the mean.
To be safe, we also used a negative binomial specification to model the not counted at all, it has little effect on the results
number of trips leaders took to countries abroad. The standard errors were reported in Table 1. In short, the results reported in
virtually identical to those reported below using the Poisson regression Table 1 appear to be quite robust to alternative
model, and the over-dispersion parameter was not significantly different specifications.
from 0 for either the Jiang ⁄ Zhu administration or the Hu ⁄ Wen administra-
tion.
27
Predicted rates and probabilities were calculated using the spost
28
commands in Stata (Long and Freese 2005). In reality, Jiang and Zhu combined for one visit to Pakistan.
172 Is China a Status Quo or Revisionist State?

TABLE 2. The Correlates of Leadership Travel Abroad under Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji, 1998–2003

Number of trips (Poisson) Number of days (Negative binomial)

Independent variables Coefficient p Coefficient p

U.N. Sanctions 0.78 .334 0.29 .701

Authoritarian State 0.32 .313 0.60 .055
U.S. Sanctions )0.92 .073 )0.40 .397
Affinity 0.08 .858 0.74 .155
Rising Power 0.18 .621 0.19 .609
U.S. Ally )0.07 .837 )0.002 .994
Asia 0.54 .152 0.95 .015
U.S. Regional Ally )0.47 .387 )0.43 .459
ln Population 0.36 <.001 0.54 <.001
ln PCI 0.75 <.001 0.98 <.001
ln Inward FDI )0.004 .839 )0.01 .616
ln Outward FDI 0.02 .303 0.02 .419
ln Oil Reserves )0.01 .485 )0.02 .127
Metals Index 0.98 .811 )0.61 .896
Shared Border 1.08 .004 1.09 .005
Africa 0.30 .509 0.38 .352
Constant )13.20 <.001 )16.87 <.001
N 153 153
Pseudo R2 0.2695 0.1647

(Notes. Countries recognizing the ROC excluded.)

TABLE 3. Predicted Probabilities for Jiang ⁄ Zhu Travel

Expected number of trips Probability of

by Jiang and Zhu
For a country with these characteristics to that country 0 trips 1 trip 2 trips >2 trips

Average country 0.31 .73 .23 .04 0

Population at 25th percentile 0.21 .81 .17 .02 0
Population at 75th percentile 0.47 .63 .29 .07 .01
Per capita income at 25th percentile 0.17 .84 .14 .01 0
Per capita income at 75th percentile 0.69 .50 .35 .12 .03
Both population and per capita income at 25th percentile 0.11 .89 .10 .01 0
Both population and per capita income at 75th percentile 1.02 .36 .37 .19 .08
Pakistan 0.64 .53 .34 .11 .03
Pakistan if not in Asia, no shared border 0.20 .82 .17 .02 0

(Notes. Predicted probabilities based on the model reported in column 1 of Table 2. An ‘‘average’’ country is one in which all variables are set at their mean
values, unless the mean lies outside the 25th–75th percentile range, in which case the median value is used. Probabilities sometimes do not sum to 1 due to
rounding.)

Implications they run afoul of the existing international order;

Broadly speaking, travel abroad by Jiang Zemin and
Zhu Rongji appears more consistent with a status
quo China than with a PRC aiming to challenge the
existing international order. Jiang and Zhu were not
more likely to visit countries antagonistic to the Uni-
ted States and in fact were somewhat less likely, cete-
ris paribus, to visit countries that were the target of
US sanctions. They were not any more likely to visit
rising, non-core powers than they were to visit other
states (rising power was insignificant), and there is no
evidence in these findings that they disproportion-
ately prioritized relations with US allies in the region
(the interactive variable U.S. regional ally was also
insignificant). The one exception here concerns the
variables meant to capture rogue states. Recall our
expectation that leaders of a status quo country
should generally avoid such states precisely because
the coefficients on the rogue state variables, then,
should be negative and significant for a status quo
China. Yet, the variable U.N. sanctions is insignificant,
and the variable authoritarian state is actually posi-
tively and significantly correlated (at the 90% level
of confidence) with leadership travel when the
dependent variable captures the number of days
leaders spent in a particular country. Thus, while on
balance travel by Jiang and Zhu was consistent with a
status quo characterization of China, travel to what
we have defined as rogue states was more indicative
of challenger-type behavior.
Moving beyond the status quo ⁄ challenger debate,
our findings here are consistent with priorities in
Jiang’s foreign policy emphasized in the broader
literature on China’s foreign relations. For instance,
some studies have emphasized that Jiang sought to
 Scott L. Kastner and Phillip C. Saunders 173

TABLE 4. The Correlates of Leadership Travel Abroad under Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao (2003–2008)

Number of trips (Poisson) Number of days (Negative binomial)

Independent variables Coefficient p Coefficient p

U.N. Sanctions )0.96 .257 )0.89 .146

Authoritarian State 0.20 .543 0.20 .426
U.S. Sanctions 0.91 .055 0.99 .006
Affinity )0.16 .719 )0.01 .975
Rising Power 0.05 .900 0.19 .477
U.S. Ally 0.48 .195 0.59 .038
Asia 0.72 .048 1.06 .001
U.S. Regional Ally )0.50 .317 )0.54 .171
ln Population 0.23 .023 0.31 <.001
ln PCI 0.50 .006 0.57 <.001
ln Inward FDI 0.03 .260 0.03 .134
ln Outward FDI 0.05 .049 0.05 .013
ln Oil Reserves 0.000 .986 0.003 .753
Metals Index 3.00 .442 3.40 .265
Shared Border 1.17 .001 1.11 <.001
Africa 1.00 .022 1.31 <.001
Constant )10.64 <.001 )11.91 <.001
N 154 154
Pseudo R2 0.3093 0.2425

(Notes. Countries recognizing the ROC excluded.)

improve relations with other great powers (for exam-
ple, Goldstein 2005); the significance of the various
indicators of power is consistent with a PRC that pri-
oritized its relations with great powers. Similarly,
some studies (Medeiros and Fravel 2003; Shambaugh
2005; Sutter 2005b; Saunders 2008) have highlighted
efforts under Jiang to improve China’s relations with
countries in the region, especially countries border-
ing China. Again, our findings provide empirical
support for such a priority, as the border variable is
consistently significant, and the Asia regional vari-
able is also significant in some specifications.
Travel by Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, 2003–2008
Findings for the Hu ⁄ Wen period are reported in
Table 4. The variables that were most strongly corre-
lated with leadership travel under Jiang and Zhu
(population, per capita income, shared border)
remain highly significant, though the substantive
effect of population and, especially, per capita
income is considerably smaller for Hu and Wen than
was the case for Jiang and Zhu (see Table 5). Border
effects, on the other hand, remain large (as a repeat
of the exercise with Pakistan demonstrates—see
Table 5). Several other variables emerge as signifi-
cant predictors of travel for Hu and Wen, including
Chinese outward foreign direct investment in a
country,29 the U.S. sanctions variable, and the Asia
and Africa regional dummy variables; these variables
29
China’s outbound foreign direct investment grew rapidly in the years
after 2003. As a robustness check, we also ran the regressions using Chinese
accumulated FDI in a particular country through 2007 (instead of through
2003); significance levels are similar to those reported in Table 4, and the
coefficient more than doubles in size, when the 2007 data are used instead.
are significant, moreover, regardless of whether the
dependent variable is measured in trips or days. In
substantive terms, a shift in ln outward FDI from its
25th percentile value (which was 0) to its 75th per-
centile value leads to nearly a tripling in the
expected number of leadership trips to a particular
country (see Table 5). The substantive effects of U.S.
sanctions and Africa are also quite large. The trips
model predicts that absent US sanctions, Hu and
Wen should have combined for 0.44 trips to Cuba,
but with sanctions in place, the number of expected
trips rises to 1.11 (see Table 5; in reality, they com-
bined for two trips to Cuba). Likewise, the model
predicts that Hu and Wen should have visited South
Africa a combined 2.04 times. If we imagine a hypo-
thetical country otherwise the same as South Africa,
but located on another continent, the expected
number of trips drops sharply to 0.75 (again, see
Table 5).
Alternative Specifications
As with our findings for Jiang and Zhu, the findings
for Hu and Wen reported in Table 4 generally hold
up if we use alternative measures of country i’s
power. Both defense spending and GDP are consis-
tently significant predictors of travel if substituted
for population. Trade is also consistently a signifi-
cant predictor of travel if it is substituted for popula-
tion. The findings are also similar, for the most part,
if we exclude trips involving international confer-
ences.
However, a few general findings from our various
robustness checks that diverge from those reported
in Table 4 are worth noting. First, the outward FDI
variable at times becomes statistically insignificant or
weakly significant when trips involving international
174 Is China a Status Quo or Revisionist State?

TABLE 5. Predicted Probabilities for Hu ⁄ Wen Travel

Probability of
Expected number of trips
For a country with these characteristics by Hu and Wen to that country 0 trips 1 trip 2 trips >2 trips

Average country 0.25 .78 .19 .02 0

Population at 25th percentile 0.19 .83 .16 .02 0
Population at 75th percentile 0.33 .72 .23 .04 0
Per capita income at 25th percentile 0.15 .86 .13 .01 0
Per capita income at 75th percentile 0.41 .67 .27 .06 .01
Outward FDI at 25th percentile 0.11 .89 .10 .01 0
Outward FDI at 75th percentile 0.28 .75 .21 .03 0
Pakistan 3.19 .04 .13 .21 .61
Pakistan if not in Asia, no shared border 0.79 .45 .36 .14 .05
Cuba 1.11 .33 .37 .20 .10
Cuba if no US sanctions 0.44 .64 .28 .06 .01
South Africa 2.04 .13 .26 .27 .33
South Africa, if not in Africa 0.75 .47 .35 .13 .04

(Notes. Predicted probabilities based on the model reported in column 1 of Table 4. An ‘‘average’’ country is one in which all variables are set at their mean
values, unless the mean lies outside the 25th–75th percentile range, in which case the median value is used. Probabilities sometimes do not sum to 1 due to
rounding.)

conferences are not counted as visits to the host
countries in our data. Second, when international
conference trips are excluded, the inward FDI vari-
able does at times become a significant predictor of
leadership travel. Third, the UN sanctions variable
does become significantly and negatively correlated
with travel decisions in some specifications, such as
when the dependent variable is measured in days
and military spending is used as a measure of power
(instead of population). Fourth, the significance of
the Asia regional dummy variable is not robust
across different specifications. Fifth, the interactive
variable U.S. regional ally becomes significantly and
negatively correlated with travel when ln U.S. arms
transfers is used instead of the defense-pact based
U.S. ally.
Finally, we probed the finding concerning U.S.
sanctions at greater length. The variable’s significance
reflects leadership trips to Cuba (twice), Sudan, Bel-
arus, North Korea, Uzbekistan (twice), Cambodia,
and Fiji. However, in two instances (a trip by Hu to
Uzbekistan and a trip by Wen to Fiji), the leadership
visit preceded the event triggering US sanctions. If
we drop Uzbekistan and Fiji from the analysis, the
US sanctions variable becomes insignificant when
the dependent variable is measured in trips, and
weakly significant (p = .117) when the dependent
variable is measured in days.
Implications
Our findings for Hu and Wen are again largely con-
sistent with a status quo characterization, though
with some ambiguities. Hu and Wen, for instance,
were not any more likely to visit rising, non-core
powers than they were to visit other states, ceteris
paribus. There is also little evidence to suggest that
Hu and Wen prioritized US regional allies. To the
contrary, in some specifications, Hu and Wen were
significantly less likely to visit US allies in the region
than they were to visit other states, all else equal.
However, some findings paint a mixed picture less
consistent with a status quo characterization. For
instance, in most of our model specifications, Hu
and Wen generally appeared no less likely to visit
rogue states than they were to visit other countries,
ceteris paribus; our expectation was that a status quo
country should be less likely to visit such countries.30
Furthermore, Hu and Wen were more likely, ceteris
paribus, to visit countries that were the target of US
sanctions, though as noted above this finding is not
highly robust and should probably be discounted. In
sum, our findings on balance appear largely consis-
tent with a status quo characterization of China,
though there are some hints of challenger-type
behavior. It is worth noting that there appear to be
more indications of challenger-type behavior for Hu
and Wen than was the case for Jiang and Zhu—-
which is consistent with our expectation that any
challenger behavior should be more pronounced in
the Hu period than under Jiang given the increase
in China’s capabilities.
Our findings for Hu and Wen also have interest-
ing implications for other studies of Chinese foreign
policy that do not focus on the challenger ⁄ status
quo debate. For instance, a great deal of attention
has been paid in recent years to China’s resource
diplomacy (Zweig and Bi 2005; Lieberthal and Her-
berg 2006; Sutter 2008:355; Wu and Storey 2008;
Kennedy 2010). Much of this literature, supple-
mented by journalistic accounts of trips by top Chi-
nese leaders, highlights access to resources as a
major Chinese foreign policy goal. Yet surprisingly,
China’s top leaders did not appear to be any more
likely to visit countries with large oil reserves or
countries rich in strategic metals. Some of China’s
efforts to acquire resources might be picked up by
30
However, as noted above, in some specifications, the U.N. sanctions
variable does become significantly and negatively correlated with travel—a
finding that is more consistent with a status quo characterization of China.
 Scott L. Kastner and Phillip C. Saunders
other variables, such as the Africa regional variable
that is a consistently significant predictor of travel by
Hu and Wen. Likewise, China’s outbound FDI is
often invested in resource extraction (Wang 2002;
Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada 2005; Zhao
2009). Again, the positive relationship between travel
and outbound FDI may partially reflect a prioritiza-
tion on resource issues. Other studies (Lam 2006; Ei-
senman, Heginbotham, and Mitchell 2007; Shirk
2007) have suggested that the Hu administration has
been more focused than Jiang on building relation-
ships with the developing world, and our findings
appear to offer some hint of this. This can be seen
most clearly by the strongly significant coefficient on
the Africa variable, which was insignificant under
Jiang. Moreover, although the coefficient on the per
capita income variable continues to be significant
and positive (suggesting a continued prioritization
on relations with more developed countries), the
substantive impact of per capita income was some-
what smaller under Hu.
Conclusions
China’s foreign policy activism, coupled with its
growing economic, political, and military weight,
makes the PRC an increasingly important actor in
world politics. A growing IR and Chinese foreign
policy literature examine China’s current foreign
policy behavior and seek to predict how a stronger
China may behave in the future. These studies,
mostly qualitative or theoretical in nature, highlight
key questions such as whether China is a status quo
or revisionist power and put forward a number of
hypotheses about the drivers of Chinese foreign pol-
icy. Our study focuses on Chinese top leadership tra-
vel as a proxy for Chinese diplomatic priorities and
uses a new data set to conduct empirical tests of Chi-
nese foreign policy behavior. Leadership travel
abroad is costly and reflects decisions made at the
apex of China’s political system. The decision to tra-
vel to a particular country does not necessarily tell
us whether bilateral relations are good or bad, but
does indicate that the bilateral relationship is a pri-
ority for China’s leaders. Where Chinese leaders
choose to travel can therefore potentially offer
insights into whether China’s behavior is more con-
sistent with that of a revisionist or status quo state
and into China’s diplomatic priorities more broadly.
We identified patterns of Chinese leadership travel
to four types of countries—rogue states, other rising
powers, states with antagonistic relations with the
United States, and US regional allies—that could
inform the debate over whether China is a chal-
lenger or a status quo state.
Most of our findings are consistent with a charac-
terization of China as a status quo power. Jiang and
Zhu were not more likely to visit countries antagonis-
tic to the United States and were somewhat less
likely to visit countries that were the target of US
sanctions. They were not any more likely to visit ris-
ing, non-core powers than other states, and there is
175
no evidence in our data that they placed a dispro-
portionate priority on relations with US allies in the
region. Our findings also indicate that Hu and Wen
were not any more likely to visit rising, non-core
powers than other states and provide little evidence
that Hu and Wen prioritized visits to US regional
allies. On the other hand, we found some patterns
that appear more consistent with the challenger
argument, and these patterns are somewhat clearer
in the later Hu ⁄ Wen period than in the earlier
Jiang ⁄ Zhu period. Leaders in both administrations
were not significantly less likely to visit what we have
defined as rogue states than they were to visit other
countries, contrary to our expectation that leaders of
a status quo China should be less likely to visit such
countries. In the Hu ⁄ Wen period, moreover, we
found some evidence that China’s top leaders were
more likely to visit countries that were the target of
US sanctions, though this finding was not especially
robust. In sum, though our findings do suggest some
ambiguity, the overall pattern that emerges is most
consistent with the characterization of China as a sta-
tus quo power.
Our analysis also allowed us to evaluate other
arguments about Chinese foreign policy priorities.
For instance, our data enabled us to explore differ-
ences in priorities between the current Hu Jintao
period versus the previous Jiang Zemin period. Our
findings suggest a high degree of continuity in some
Chinese foreign policy priorities. Shared border was
a strong predictor of travel decisions in both admin-
istrations, as was a particular country’s population.
These findings suggest that both leaderships placed
high priority on relationships with neighbors and on
relationships with the major powers in the interna-
tional system, which is hardly surprising. But our
findings do suggest some shifts in Chinese foreign
policy priorities under Hu and Wen. For example,
outward FDI became a significant driver of leader-
ship travel decisions under Hu (whereas it had been
insignificant under Jiang). Meanwhile, our findings
reveal a somewhat greater focus on building relation-
ships with the developing world in the Hu Jintao
era: in particular, the Africa variable became strongly
significant under Hu, while the substantive effect of
per capita income declined relative to Jiang. Finally,
and somewhat surprisingly, the resource variables
remained insignificant for both administrations,
though we believe that energy and resources con-
cerns may be picked up by other variables, such as
outward FDI and the Africa dummy variable.
We believe our approach illustrates that quantita-
tive analysis of the empirical indicators of China’s
foreign policy behavior can be a useful undertaking
and can complement the large body of work on Chi-
nese foreign policy that relies on more qualitative
methods to reach conclusions. Our initial hypotheses
were formulated in part by consulting prior qualita-
tive studies of Chinese foreign policy; our analysis
indicates that quantitative analysis of Chinese foreign
policy can provide a means of further testing hypoth-
eses derived from qualitative analysis. Most of our
176 Is China a Status Quo or Revisionist State?
findings appear to be quite robust to alternative
specifications, which increases our confidence in
these results. The analytical framework developed
here can be used to examine whether China’s future
behavior evolves in revisionist or status quo direc-
tions and potentially can also be used to evaluate
the travel of other Chinese political, economic, and
military officials to examine Chinese policy priorities
in other areas. Yet, we wish to conclude on a note of
caution: while leadership travel offers a useful way to
assess which bilateral relationships are prioritized by
top Chinese leaders, it is still an imperfect indicator.
Future research should seek to identify other quanti-
fiable markers of Chinese diplomatic priorities to
further assess the robustness of the findings pre-
sented here.
References
Amosu, Akwe (2007) China in Africa: It’s (Still) the Governance,
Stupid. Foreign Policy in Focus Report, March 9. Available at
http://www.fpif.org/reports/china_in_africa_its_still_the_gov-
ernance_stupid. (Accessed November 9, 2010.)
Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada. (2005) China Goes Global:
A Survey of Chinese Companies Outward Direct Investment Inten-
tions. Vancouver: Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada.
Blumenthal, Dan (2005) The Impact of China’s Economic
Growth on North and Southeast Asia. Testimony before the
US-China Economic and Security Review Commission,
Washington, DC, July 22. Available at http://www.uscc.gov/
hearings/2005hearings/written_testimonies/05_07_21_22wrts/
blumenthal_dan_wrts.htm. (Accessed November 1, 2011.)
Blumenthal, Dan. (2008) Concerns with Respect to China’s
Energy Policy. In China’s Energy Strategy—The Impact on
Beijing’s Maritime Policies, edited by Gabriel Collins, Andrew
S. Erikson, Lyle J. Goldstein, and William S. Murray. Annapo-
lis: Naval Institute Press.
British Geological Survey. (2008) World Mineral Production,
2002–2006. Keyworth, Nottingham: British Geological Sur-
vey.
Caprioli, Mary, and Peter F. Trumbore. (2003) Identifying
‘‘Rogue’’ States and Testing Their Interstate Conflict
Behavior. European Journal of International Relations 9: 377–
406.
Chan, Steve. (2008) China, the U.S., and the Power Transition The-
ory: A Critique. New York: Routledge.
Downs, Erica. (2006) China. Brookings Foreign Policy Energy
Security Series. Washington, DC: Brookings.
Eisenman, Joshua, Eric Heginbotham, and Derek Mitchell,
Eds. (2007) China and the Developing World: Beijing’s Strategy
for the Twenty-First Century. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.
Fravel, M. T. (2005) Regime Insecurity and International Coop-
eration: Explaining China’s Compromises in Territorial Dis-
putes. International Security 30: 46–83.
Fravel, M. T. (2008) Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and
Conflict in China’s Territorial Disputes. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Friedman, Edward (2008) Testimony before the US-China Eco-
nomic and Security Review Commission, Washington, DC,
March 18. Available at http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2008
hearings/written_testimonies/08_03_18_wrts/08_03_18_fried-
man_statement.php (Accessed November 1, 2011.)
Gill, Bates. (2007) Rising Star: China’s New Security Diplomacy.
Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
Gilpin, Robert. (1981) War and Change in World Politics. Prince-
ton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Glaser, Bonnie S., and Wang Liang. (2008) North Korea: The
Beginning of a China-U.S. Partnership? The Washington Quar-
terly 31: 165–180.
Glosny, Michael A. (2010) China and the BRICs: A Real (but
Limited) Partnership in a Unipolar World. Polity 42: 100–
129.
Goldstein, Avery. (2005) Rising to the Challenge: China’s Grand
Strategy and International Security. Stanford, CA: Stanford Uni-
versity Press.
Herberg, Mikkail E. (2007) Energy Security Survey 2007: The
Rise of Asia’s National Oil Companies. NBR Special Report
No. 14. Available at http://www.nbr.org/publications/spe-
cialreport/pdf/Preview/SR14_preview.pdf. (Accessed Novem-
ber 9, 2010.)
Hufbauer, Gary C., Jeffrey J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elli-
ot. (2007) Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd edition. Wash-
ington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics.
Ikenberry, G. J. (2001) After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint,
and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
International Institute for Strategic Studies. (Various
years) The Military Balance. London: Routledge.
Johnston, Alastair I. (2003) Is China a Status-Quo Power? Inter-
national Security 27: 5–56.
Johnston, Alastair I. (2008) Social States: China in International
Institutions, 1980–2000. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
Kagan, Robert (2006) League of Dictators? Why China and Rus-
sia Will Continue to Support Autocracies. Washington Post,
April 30. Available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2006/04/28/AR2006042801987.html.
(Accessed November 9, 2010.)
Kagan, Robert. (2009) Ambition and Anxiety: America’s Compe-
tition with China. In The Rise of China: Essays on the Future
Competition, edited by Gary J. Schmitt. New York: Encounter
Books.
Kane, Tim (2006) Global US Troop Deployment, 1950–2005. Avail-
able at http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2006/05/
global-us-troop-deployment-1950-2005. (Accessed November
9, 2010.)
Kang, David C. (2007) China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in
East Asia. New York: Columbia University Press.
Kennedy, Andrew B. (2010) China’s New Energy-Security Debate.
Survival 52: 137–158.
Kim, Woosang. (1991) Alliance Transitions and Great Power War.
American Journal of Political Science 35: 833–850.
King, Gary. (1989) Variance Specification in Event Count Mod-
els: From Restrictive Assumptions to Generalized Estimator.
American Journal of Political Science 33: 762–784.
Kleine-Ahlbrandt, Stephanie, and Andrew Small. (2008) Chi-
na’s New Dictatorship Diplomacy: Is Beijing Parting with
Pariahs? Foreign Affairs 87: 38–56.
Kugler, Jacek, and Douglas Lemke. (2000) The Power Transi-
tion Research Program: Assessing Theoretical and Empirical
Advances. In Handbook of War Studies II, edited by Manus I.
Midlarsky. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Kurlantzick, Joshua. (2007) Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft
Power Is Transforming the World. New Haven, CT: Yale Univer-
sity Press.
Lam, Willy W.-L. (2006) Chinese Politics in the Hu Jintao Era: New
Leaders, New Challenges. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.
Lampton, David M. (2008) The Three Faces of Chinese Power: Might,
Money, and Minds. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Lardy, Nicholas R. (2002) Integrating China into the Global Econ-
omy. Washington, DC: Brookings.
Lemke, Douglas, and Ronald L. Tammen. (2003) Power Transi-
tion Theory and the Rise of China. International Interactions
29: 269–271.
 Scott L. Kastner and Phillip C. Saunders
Leverett, Flynt, and Pierre Noel. (2006) The New Axis of Oil.
The New Republic 84: 65.
Levy, Jack S. (2008) Power Transition Theory and the Rise of
China. In China’s Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of Inter-
national Politics, edited by Robert S. Ross, and Zhu Feng. Ith-
aca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Lieberthal, Kenneth, and Mikkal Herberg (2006) China’s
Search for Energy Security: Implications for U.S. Policy. NBR
Analysis 17. Available at http://nbr.org/publications/analy-
sis/pdf/vol17no1.pdf. (Accessed August 14, 2008.)
Long, J. S., and Jeremy Freese. (2005) Regression Models for Cate-
gorical Outcomes Using Stata, 2nd edition. College Station, TX:
Stata Press.
Mearsheimer, John J. (2001) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.
New York: Norton.
Medeiros, Evan S. (2007) Reluctant Restraint: The Evolution of Chi-
na’s Nonproliferation Policies and Practices: 1980–2004. Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press.
Medeiros, Evan S. (2009) China’s International Behavior: Activism,
Opportunism, and Diversification. Santa Monica, CA: RAND
Corporation.
Medeiros, Evan S., and M. T. Fravel. (2003) China’s New Diplo-
macy. Foreign Affairs 82: 22–35.
Naim, Moises. (2007) Rogue Aid. Foreign Policy 159: 95–96.
Organski, A. F. K.. (1968) World Politics, 2nd edition. New York:
Knopf.
Organski, A. F. K., and Jacek Kugler. (1980) The War Ledger.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Ross, Robert S., and Zhu Feng, Eds. (2008) China’s Ascent:
Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics. Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press.
Saunders, Phillip C. (2006) China’s Global Activism: Strategy, Driv-
ers, and Tools. Institute for National Strategic Studies, Occa-
sional Paper 4. Washington, DC: National Defense University
Press.
Saunders, Phillip C. (2008) China’s Role in Asia. In International
Relations in Asia, edited by David Shambaugh, and Michael
Yahuda. Lanham, MD: Roman and Littlefield.
Saunders, Phillip C., and Joel Dietz (2009) China’s Outbound
Foreign Investment: A User’s Guide to Official Statistics. Washing-
ton, DC: National Defense University. Unpublished manu-
script.
Shambaugh, David. (2001) China or America: Which Is the Revi-
sionist Power? Survival 43: 25–30.
177
Shambaugh, David. (2005) Return to the Middle Kingdom?
China and Asia in the Early Twenty-First Century. In Power
Shift: China and Asia’s New Dynamics, edited by David Shamb-
augh. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Shirk, Susan L. (2007) China, Fragile Superpower: How China’s Inter-
nal Politics Could Derail Its Peaceful Rise. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Sutter, Robert G. (2005a) China’s Regional Strategy and Why It
May Not Be Good for America. In Power Shift: China and
Asia’s New Dynamics, edited by David Shambaugh. Berkeley:
University of California Press.
Sutter, Robert G. (2005b) China’s Rise in Asia: Promises and Per-
ils. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
Sutter, Robert G. (2008) Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy
Since the Cold War. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
Wang, Mark Y. (2002) The Motivations behind China’s Govern-
ment-Initiated Industrial Investments Overseas. Pacific Affairs
75: 187–206.
Werner, Suzanne, and Jacek Kugler. (1996) Power Transitions
and Military Buildups. In Parity and War, edited by Jacek
Kugler, and Douglas Lemke. Ann Arbor: University of Michi-
gan Press.
Wu, Kang, and Ian Storey. (2008) Energy Security in China’s
Capitalist Transition: Import Dependence, Oil Diplomacy,
and Security Imperatives. In China’s Emergent Political Economy:
Capitalism in the Dragon’s Lair, edited by Christopher A.
McNally. New York: Routledge.
Xiang, Lanxin. (2001) Washington’s Misguided China Policy.
Survival 43: 7–23.
Zhang, Qingmin, and Liu Bing. (2008) Shounao Chufang yu
Zhongguo Waijiao [Leadership Travel Abroad and Chinese
Foreign Policy]. Guoji Zhengzhi Yanjiu [International Politics
Research], 2008 (2): 1–20.
Zhang, Yunling, and Tang Shiping. (2005) China’s Regional
Strategy. In Power Shift: China and Asia’s New Dynamics,
edited by David Shambaugh. Berkeley: University of Califor-
nia Press.
Zhao, Hongtu (2009) China’s Overseas Energy Investment: Myth
and Reality. Contemporary International Relations, March: 89–
100.
Zheng, Bijian. (2005) China’s ‘‘Peaceful Rise’’ to Great-Power
Status. Foreign Affairs 84: 18–24.
Zweig, David, and Jianhai Bi. (2005) China’s Global Hunt for
Energy. Foreign Affairs 84: 25–38.