Hong Kong: why the ‘one how near Hong Kong is to the end of

country, two systems’ model is that road.

on its last legs Designed for elsewhere
The “one country, two systems” model is
a constitutional framework established
Protest organisers in Hong Kong claim
by Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping in the
that nearly two million people, most clad
early 1980s. Under the principle, each
in black and many carrying white
region of China could continue to have
flowers as a symbol of mourning, took to
its own system of government, economic
the streets on June 16 as demonstrations
and financial independence, legal
continued over proposed changes to
system and external trade relations.
extradition law. With a total population
of just over seven million it was an Over the past two decades, the
extraordinary show of grassroots implementation of this model in Hong
politics. Kong has been difficult – largely because
it was never intended for the former
The “fugitives bill”, as it often referred
colony. It was originally devised by Deng
to, would allow extradition to China,
as the model for a future – albeit only
among other countries. Hong Kong is
theoretical – agreement with Taiwan.
currently under no obligation to
But Taiwan would essentially be
repatriate anyone to China, due to the
negotiating any agreement with China
“one country, two systems” model that
itself, and there would be no hard
came into effect following its 1997
deadline. In the case of Hong Kong,
handover from the UK to China.
however, it was the British that were
The joint declaration, signed by Beijing
negotiating – and to a deadline which
and London, states clearly that the
was set without much consultation with
territory shall enjoy civic freedom and
the people living in Hong Kong.
autonomy for 50 years. Enshrined in
this agreement is judicial independence The government of China consistently
from China. took the view that the whole of Hong
Kong should be Chinese territory – in
After protests that attracted global
spite of the fact that Hong Kong Island
media attention, Hong Kong’s chief
was ceded to the UK in perpetuity as
executive, Carrie Lam, agreed to
part of the Treaty of Nanking in 1842 –
suspend the bill – but not remove it – in
and that the New Territories, an
what was seen as a significant
additional 365 square miles, was leased
government climb down. Apologising for
to Britain by the Qing government in
the extradition bill, Lam said it would
1898 for 99 years.
not be reintroduced until people’s fears
had been addressed, and indicated that As the expiration on the lease of the New
it would now be unlikely to pass before Territories on July 1 1997 approached,
the end of the legislative session in negotiations began under Murray
2020. MacLehose, then governor of Hong
Kong, during a visit to Beijing in 1979. It
Yet officials were quick to criticise those
was here that informal discussions were
agitating against the draconian
made on the future of Hong Kong
legislation. Supported by Beijing,
Island, Kowloon and the New
Lam referred to the protests as
Territories. The first formal discussion
“unacceptable for any civilised
was made in September 1982, during a
societies”.
visit to the UK by Deng with the then
If the bill is passed it would British prime minister Margaret
fundamentally alter the judicial Thatcher.
independence of Hong Kong and signal
China proposed the concept of Hong
the beginning of the end of the “one
Kong as a Special Administrative Region
country, two systems” model.
and, in April 1984, both sides agreed
The excessive use of force by police
that Hong Kong would retain a high
against those exercising their legally
degree of autonomy with assurances
protected right to protest, shows just
made on the preservation and
maintenance of the lifestyle of the
people in Hong Kong. In September
1984, both sides agreed on the Chinese
and English versions of the text and the
“one country, two systems” model was
adopted.
Judicial independence
The joint declaration consists of eight
paragraphs, with three annexes. Within
this document, the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region is under direct
authority of the government of the
Peoples’ Republic of China. Yet Hong
Kong enjoys a high degree of autonomy
– except for foreign and defence affairs
– and it is allowed to have executive,
legislative and independent judicial
power, including that of final
adjudication.
Since the joint declaration forms the
basis of the “one country, two systems”
model, it is the section on the
independence of judicial power and final
adjudication that the people of Hong
Kong believe is being prematurely
removed as part of the changes to
extradition law. If the bill is eventually
signed, it would bring an end to this
guarantee by removing independent
judicial power and so marking the de
facto end of the “one country, two
systems” model in its current format.
Since the framework of the model has
been repeatedly suggested to Taiwan,
but has always been rejected, the
authorities and people in Taiwan are
also watching events in Hong Kong
closely.
The erosion of the model has been going
on for some time – and the pro-
democracy “Umbrella Movement” in
2014 was testament to this. Changes in
the nature of the relationship between
the Hong Kong authorities and civic
society are now inevitable in light of the
scale of grassroots-level protest. The
“one country, two systems” model as we
know it is going to change – but in what
way remains uncertain.
What is China’s “one country,
two systems” policy?
Hong Kongers have grown increasingly
suspicious of their relationship with the
mainland
Hundreds Of Thousands Of
Demonstrators Repeatedly Took To The
Streets Of Hong Kong In June To
Protest Against A Proposed Law That
Would Allow The Extradition Of
Criminal Suspects To Mainland China.
Their Demonstrations, Some Of The
Largest In Hong Kong’s History, Were
Instrumental in persuading the
territory’s chief executive, Carrie Lam, to
suspend the bill. In agitating against
closer ties, Hong Kongers made use of
freedoms that are denied in mainland
China. What is their origin?
In the late 20th century three
historically Chinese territories remained
beyond the control of the Chinese
Communist Party: Taiwan, Macau and
Hong Kong. Shortly after emerging as
China’s paramount leader in 1978, Deng
Xiaoping declared his ambition of
achieving “reunification” with Taiwan.
The island is technically the last
stronghold of a government that once
ruled all of China until a civil war ended
in victory for the Communists in 1949,
sending the defeated nationalist army
into exile on Taiwan. Since then it has
become a democracy, and its people
increasingly identify as “Taiwanese”.
Rulers in Beijing are sworn to unify the
island with the mainland, if needs be by
force.
Deng promised Taiwan a “high degree of
autonomy”, describing his proposal as
“one country, two systems”. Taiwan
would be allowed to retain its separate
administration, capitalist way of life and
even its own armed forces as long as it
recognised the Communist government
in Beijing as legitimate in all of China,
including Taiwan.
The Taiwanese did not take the bait, but
China used the “one country, two
systems” idea when it took back Hong
Kong from Britain and Macau from
Portugal. Britain had secured the heart
of Hong Kong in perpetuity as spoils of
the 19th-century Opium Wars but the
final part, the New Territories, was
acquired on a 99-year lease in 1898. The
Portuguese had ruled Macau since the
1500s, but eventually started
withdrawing troops in 1975. With
Britain’s lease expiring and Portugal
abandoning Macau, China began talks
with both countries in the mid-1980s to
make arrangements for the return of the
two territories and to decide their future
political arrangements. Hong Kong and
Macau were to become parts of China
again in 1997 and 1999, respectively.
All parties, including China, recognised
that imposing China’s political system
on the two colonies would create panic
and cause economic mayhem. “One
country, two systems” would allow the
territories to remain much as they were,
with independent legal systems and
police forces. Their political structures
would change little, except that local
“chief executives” would replace
governors sent by the colonial powers.
In Hong Kong, the chief executive would
be elected by a 1,200-member electoral
college from a pool of candidates
approved by the Chinese government
and would preside over a system
modelled roughly on Britain’s, though
with a single legislative chamber. China
even promised that the chief executives
would eventually be elected by
“universal suffrage”, though its exact
meaning in this context is unclear. The
government in Beijing would be
responsible for defence and diplomacy.
These arrangements are to last for 50
years. It is unclear what happens after
2047. In the meantime, democracy
activists have been growing despondent
as pro-establishment forces, some
funded by Beijing, secured majorities in
local councils and the territory’s
legislature, and new loyalty tests were
imposed on candidates for office.
Frustration led to the so-called Umbrella
Movement of 2014, a series of protests
and sit-ins aimed at securing a promise
of genuine democracy.
In response, the central authorities
doubled down on the “one country” side
of the deal. In 2016 and 2017 they
secured the disbarring of six legislators
for disrespecting China by mangling
their oaths of loyalty. This year they
have changed Hong Kong’s constitution
to require the passage of a law that
would punish people for insulting the
national anthem, mirroring a law China
passed in 2017. And they have pushed to
change the current, colonial-era law that
specifically bars extraditions to China.
The proposed bill does not cover
political offences, but many fear that the
Communist Party could use it to secure
the extradition of people deemed
offensive.
Though Ms Lam has suspended the
extradition bill, political veterans expect
the Communist Party to tighten its grip
in myriad, less visible ways. The central
government still praises “one country,
two systems” as a great innovation. In
January China’s leader, Xi Jinping,
stressed the policy’s importance for
securing what he called the “inevitable”
unification of the mainland and Taiwan.
Few in Taiwan are convinced. Recent
events in Hong Kong have only
increased their suspicions. Deng’s
innovative solution to the problem of
reunification has never faced greater
scepticism.
What Boris Johnson’s victory
means for Britain’s place in
the world
With Boris Johnson’s impressive
election victory, one of the biggest
questions in British politics will be
answered: Brexit, in some form, will be
done.
But what does this election victory mean
for Britain’s standing in the world? Who
will the UK now count as its allies, and
its enemies?
The manner of Brexit matters in terms
of Britain’s global standing. The large
majority he has secured might give
Johnson more room for manoeuvre in
Westminster, making a softer Brexit
possible. This would undoubtedly allow
for smoother relations with the UK’s
neighbours, but a softer Brexit might
also have more advantages globally.
Overseas, Brexit is viewed as a form
of national self-harm by many, and a
softer departure may well prevent
Britain’s international standing from
being substantially damaged. A softer
Brexit, which might involve some
freedom of movement, may also allow
Britain to strike a stronger bargaining
position in future trade
negotiations with both the EU and other
nations. By remaining at least partially
linked to the EU, Britain would be able
to present itself in trade negotiations as
part of a larger market, giving it more
power and a louder voice.
US and China
Beyond Brexit, Johnson and US
President Donald Trump will
undoubtedly remain close, meaning the
so-called “special relationship” will be
publicly supported and championed.
This public friendship may not make
Johnson popular on the global stage, but
with his majority, and a potential victory
for Trump in November 2020, he may
not care.
Bonhomie aside, the extent that
camaraderie between Johnson and
Trump will benefit Britain is more
questionable. Securing a favourable
post-Brexit trade deal with the US will
remain very challenging.
Britain is already looking to strengthen
economic and political ties with
Commonwealth countries – Australia’s
prime minister, Scott Morrison, swiftly
tweeted his congratulations to Johnson.
The reality of leaning on the
Commonwealth will not be as lucrative
as membership of the EU, but the
Conservatives are keen to draw on it
nonetheless.
Specific countries, like India, will
become increasingly important. An
economic powerhouse, the UK will want
to secure a trade deal with India. But at
what cost? For India, any trade deal with
the UK will have to come with the
promise of a relaxation of the visa
requirements for Indian nationals. That
pay-off may be difficult for Johnson to
sell to an electorate which has been
repeatedly promised a reduction in
immigration and a tightening up of
immigration policy from the
Conservatives.
China will be another key relationship to
watch in future. Relations with China
have not been particularly good over the
past 20 years. For example China froze
investment into the UK under the
coalition government following David
Cameron’s meeting with the Dalai Lama
in 2012. Johnson’s government will be
looking to improve this relationship in
the hope of a beneficial trade deal.
But how can this be achieved? One
recent example is the Conservative
government’s response to the pro-
democracy protests in Hong Kong. It
might be expected, because of Britain’s
historic links with Hong Kong and
Britain’s desire to maintain democracy
in the territory, that Johnson’s
Conservatives would be outspoken in
their support of the democratic
movements.
Instead, the Johnson government has
been quiet on the violence in the
territory, a response which will
undoubtedly please the Chinese
government. It may be that silence is the
cost of a future trade deal with China – a
stance which has changed from under
the leadership of Theresa May, where
Jeremy Hunt was fairly outspoken on
Hong Kong while foreign secretary.
Weakened
For a post-Brexit Britain, there will
undoubtedly be some economic
opportunities, but there is a cost.
Outside of the EU, Britain is a much
smaller power on the global stage, both
economically and politically.
To secure those all-important trade
deals, Britain will have to decide what
pay-offs it is willing to make. For all his
bluster, Johnson may have to swallow
some uncomfortable truths and some
uncomfortable compromises. Whether
he can sell those at home is another
matter.
The size of the Conservatives’ victory
will hammer the final nail in the coffin
of the hopes of those in the EU, and in
the UK, who wanted a reversal of Brexit.
Johnson is not a popular man in Europe,
but Brexit fatigue has made his
European counterparts keen to work
with him to get Brexit finished. While
securing a trade deal with the EU by the
end of December 2020 will be tricky, it
is also in the EU’s interest to make sure
that trade remains smooth.
What did Hannah Arendt really
mean by the banality of evil?
Can one do evil without being evil? This
was the puzzling question that the
philosopher Hannah Arendt grappled
with when she reported for The New
Yorker in 1961 on the war crimes trial of
Adolph Eichmann, the Nazi operative
responsible for organising the
transportation of millions of Jews and
others to various concentration camps in
support of the Nazi’s Final Solution.
Arendt found Eichmann an ordinary,
rather bland, bureaucrat, who in her
words, was ‘neither perverted nor
sadistic’, but ‘terrifyingly normal’. He
acted without any motive other than to
diligently advance his career in the Nazi
bureaucracy. Eichmann was not an
amoral monster, she concluded in her
study of the case, Eichmann in
Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of
Evil (1963). Instead, he performed evil
deeds without evil intentions, a fact
connected to his ‘thoughtlessness’, a
disengagement from the reality of his
evil acts. Eichmann ‘never realised what
he was doing’ due to an ‘inability… to
think from the standpoint of somebody
else’. Lacking this particular cognitive
ability, he ‘commit[ted] crimes under
circumstances that made it well-nigh
impossible for him to know or to feel
that he [was] doing wrong’.
Arendt dubbed these collective
characteristics of Eichmann ‘the banality
of evil’: he was not inherently evil, but
merely shallow and clueless, a ‘joiner’, in
the words of one contemporary
interpreter of Arendt’s thesis: he was a
man who drifted into the Nazi Party, in
search of purpose and direction, not out
of deep ideological belief. In Arendt’s
telling, Eichmann reminds us of the
protagonist in Albert Camus’s novel The
Stranger (1942), who randomly and
casually kills a man, but then afterwards
feels no remorse. There was no
particular intention or obvious evil
motive: the deed just ‘happened’.
History tells us the Kashmir
crisis will be particularly
dangerous for women – so why
aren’t we talking about it?
On 5 August, the Bharatiya Janata
Party-led government in India
“disappeared” the state of Jammu and
Kashmir (J&K), a disputed territory
between India and Pakistan since 1947,
at the northernmost tip of the Indian
subcontinent. This was accompanied by
the arrests of its leaders, a
communications blackout, a curfew and
an unprecedented deployment of troops
in what was already among the world’s
most militarised zones.
In the two weeks that have followed,
there have been protests, human rights
violations and concerted government
propaganda to deny unrest. More than
4,000 people – including former chief
ministers, other ministers, lawmakers,
activists and workers from political
parties and separatist groups – have
been illegally detained. Kashmir remains
a tinderbox. Whatever happens next,
history tells us that women will bear a
disproportionate burden.
Humanitarian crises always have
a gender angle, particularly those
involving armed conflict and state
actors. Trends analysis by the United
Nations in 2018 shows that sexual
violence is factored into the broader
strategy of conflict, with women and
girls being disproportionately affected.
It has been no different in Kashmir’s
disturbed history. Sahba Husain, an
activist and researcher on gender,
conflict and women’s rights, wrote
in Fault Lines of History, a volume on
sexual violence and impunity in India,
published in 2016: “The
deliberate/strategic use of sexual
violence by the armed forces [in the J&K
conflict] makes it a powerful subtext.”
Likening national honour to women’s
bodies has been used to justify sexual
violence against the bodies of “enemy”
women time and again. This has been
helped to a large extent by a
controversial law known as the Armed
Forces (Special) Powers Act (AFSPA),
which confers “special powers” upon
armed forces to maintain order. AFSPA
has been in force in J&K since 1990, and
is the carpet of impunity under which
various human rights violations,
including rape, are brushed.
“Army personnel have never been tried
in a civilian court and no prosecutions or
punishments following supposed court-
martials have been made public,” say the
authors of the book Do You Remember
Kunan Poshpora? (2016), which is about
an incident on 23 February 1991, of
the mass rape (the numbers vary from
23 to 100 women) in the villages of
Kunan and Poshpora in Kashmir,
allegedly by the 4th Rajputana Rifles
regiment of the Indian Army. While the
army denied the incident, the survivors
of the incident have continued their fight
for justice. Twenty-five years after the
event, in 2017, the Supreme Court
finally admitted the plea for the case to
be heard.
The threat of violence, including sexual
violence, hangs in the air as people go
about their daily lives, Sahba Husain
noted during her fieldwork in 2013 in
J&K. But it isn’t just the fear that you
could be assaulted or arrested or
tortured; there are other kinds of
impacts upon women, including
economic and cultural.
Nitasha Kaul, a Kashmiri academic and
writer, wrote in Feminist Review in
2018: “There is a specifically gendered
aspect to the exoticisation of Kashmir …
which results in a feminisation of the
Kashmiri landscape and Kashmiri
bodies.” Writing about the current crisis,
she adds, “Muslim-majority Kashmir
has always been India’s Oriental ‘other’,
loaded with fantasies of beauty and
cruelty as surely as any Ottoman harem
in the fervid imagination of Europeans.”
“Kashmir is filled with women without
men,” says historian, author and
feminist publisher Urvashi Butalia in a
telephone interview. Often referred to as
“half-widows” – women whose
husbands have been disappeared or
killed by the army – these women are
the primary breadwinners of their
families, charged with the double
burden of running the household as
well. 
“With a curfew in place, it directly
impacts their economic activities, when
they are unable to go to the markets or
when customers cannot come to them
[many of them provide services like
embroidery],” she says.
Butalia also points to the changing
demographics of the protesters who
come out on to the streets. “You see a lot
of young people, including young
women [these days]. This increases the
chances of women being in harm’s
way.” 
With the army nearby, particularly with
provisions like the AFSPA, there is
always a danger of sexual violence. Since
men are at risk of being picked up by the
police and military, women are more
likely to step out after curfew is lifted to
buy provisions, for instance.
Another effect of the ongoing siege is
likely to be a cultural one, Butalia adds.
The BJP, which is a Hindu nationalist
party, has had its sights set on
abrogating J&K’s special status for long,
and it is not a coincidence that this is the
only Muslim-majority state in India. The
airing of the BJP’s Hindu ideology might
result in the increased radicalisation of

the relatively open Islam that has been
followed in Kashmir, particularly in
relation to women.
China doesn't want war, but
Trump's strike against Iran
could present an opportunity to
Beijing
In the wake of the US strike that killed
Qasem Soleimani in Baghdad last week,
Iran's leaders will likely be looking to
those alliances to counterbalance
American aggression, even as Tehran
considers possible retaliation for the
death of one of its most popular military
figures.
China in particular could play a key role
in containing the fallout and preventing
another Middle Eastern conflict. In a
call with his Iranian counterpart
Saturday, Chinese Foreign Minister
Wang Yi condemned the "military
adventurist act by the US" which "goes
against basic norms governing
international relations and will
aggravate tensions and turbulence in the
region."
A statement added that Tehran hoped
China could "play an important role in
preventing escalation of regional
tensions."
Such sentiments are also likely shared
well beyond Iran's borders, including
among other Middle Eastern powers
which are no fans of Tehran. The killing
of Soleimani could present Beijing with
a major opportunity, not only to prevent
another disastrous war, but to increase
its influence in the region, supplanting
an increasingly unpredictable
Washington.
Softly, softly
For decades, Chinese foreign policy has
been to adopt a light touch (at least
rhetorically, if not always in practice).
Beijing's proposition to other countries
is simple: unlike Washington, with its
carping on about democracy and human
rights, or insistence on IMF-style
austerity, China wants "win-win
solutions" that benefit both parties. Its
focus on development and trade above
all else has made it an attractive partner
to countries -- both autocratic and not --
throughout the world.
The late Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping
characterized this approach as "keeping
a low profile and biding your time." But
it could never last indefinitely, and
increased involvement in every corner of
the globe means Beijing's time may just
have come.
Recent years have seen a shift towards a
more interventionist, US-style foreign
policy. This has included increasing
arms sales -- though still nowhere near
the level of the US -- and an expanded
military presence abroad. China now has
bases in the Horn of Africa, Central Asia
and throughout the South China Sea,
and has reportedly been considering a
base in Pakistan on the Indian Ocean.
At the same time, Beijing has also
increasingly replaced Washington as the
leading financial donor for the
developing world, in addition to striking
major trade deals throughout Asia, the
Middle East, and Africa as part of
President Xi's signature Belt and Road
megaproject.
While many of these developments have
occurred in what could be considered
Beijing's traditional sphere of influence,
the Middle East is playing an
"increasingly important role" as China
surges toward becoming the next
superpower, according to analysts
Lindsey Ford and Max Hill.
"Although China's expanding presence
in the Middle East is motivated by
economic calculations, it nonetheless
offers strategic opportunities for
Beijing," they wrote for the Asia Society
Policy Institute last August.
"China's emphasis on noninterference,
state-led economic development, and
regional stability resonates with many
autocratic leaders in the Middle East,
allowing China to promote its
'alternative' model of great power
leadership."
Attractive alternative
A region where politics is massively
shaped by the rivalry between both local
and international powers, the Middle
East is not an easy place to maintain a
neutral policy or stay on the sidelines.
So far -- in no small part thanks to its
humungous checkbook -- China has
managed to thread the needle of
maintaining ties with traditional allies
such as Iran and Syria, while also
improving relations with their rivals in
Saudi Arabia, Israel and the United Arab
Emirates. Beijing has also resisted
strong pressure from Washington to
ditch both Tehran and Damascus, using
its role as a United Nations Security
Council member to rein in some
international action against them.
Yet just as the Kashmir issue has forced
China to choose longtime ally Pakistan
over its economic target India, sooner or
later a crisis in the Middle East was
likely to upset the delicate diplomatic
balance Beijing was treading.
Tehran's enemies may frown at Beijing's
refusal to ditch its old ally to make new
ones, but this policy will appear far more
attractive in the wake of Soleimani's
death. And the distinct chance we could
now be headed for another Middle
Eastern conflict -- or at the very least a
period of saber-rattling and disruption
to global trade -- could prop up Beijing's
ability to play all sides, perhaps
indefinitely.
Writing for the Atlantic Council, a
NATO-aligned think tank, analyst
Jonathan Fulton argued this week that
Beijing's interests "lie in a stable Middle
East, and it has long been assumed that
this would eventually require some kind
of Chinese security role."
"China is not a revisionist state. It does
not want to reshape the Middle East and
take over the responsibility of securing
it. It wants a predictable, stable region --
as much as that is possible -- in which it
can trade and invest," Fulton added. "In
killing Soleimani, (President Donald
Trump) has made that more
challenging. In the short term that will
increase the cost of doing business and
most likely put a lot of people at risk. In
the long term, however, it may increase
China's power and influence in the
Middle East as it assumes a larger
responsibility for securing its regional
interests."
Such a role will likely be welcomed by
many players in the region. Indeed, it's
difficult to think of a more pertinent
example of the contrast between Chinese
and US policy than Trump threatening
-- just as Beijing was calling for calm --
to target Iranian cultural sites, in what
could well be a war crime if it was
carried out.
Since the end of the Cold War, the US
has been the paramount power not only
in the Middle East, but throughout the
globe. As China increasingly challenges
American hegemony, the Middle East
will likely emerge as a key arena for this
rivalry.
By killing Soleimani and plunging the
region into fresh chaos, Trump may
have made it easier for Beijing to
supplant Washington in years to come.
A lesson for Kim Jong Un in the
death of Qasem Soleimani
If the US military conducted a limited
series of strikes on North Korea, would
it scare Kim Jong Un enough to stop the
young leader's dogged pursuit for
nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles?
North Korea's answer, at least in state
media, was a resounding no. Pyongyang
warned it would respond to any military
action against its sovereign territory
with force of its own.
"The empire of America would go to the
hell and the short history of the US
would end forever, the moment he
destroys even a single blade of grass on
this land," a commentary in state media
said in February 2018, months before
Trump and Kim's first meeting.
We'll never know whether North Korea
was serious.
In the end, President Donald Trump
never ordered a strike, thanks in large
part to the diplomatic efforts that led to
Kim and Trump's historic meeting in
Singapore in 2018.
But behind North Korea's colorful
threats was always an important
message: Pyongyang is developing
nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles
capable of reaching the US, so decision
makers in Washington will think twice
about whether to conduct a so-called
"bloody nose" strike or, say, kill a
general whom is deemed a terrorist and
an imminent threat.
This is likely the lens through which
North Korea views the Trump
administration's decision to kill Iranian
commander Qasem Soleimani in a drone
strike on Friday, a strike that has thrown
the Middle East into crisis and inflamed
tensions between Tehran and
Washington even further. Washington
didn't have to fear nuclear retaliation
with Iran. But it does with North Korea.
"North Korea is right next to Iran on the
state sponsor of terror list. And the Both
sides have accused the other of being
inflexible in their attempts to reach a
deal that would see Pyongyang trade its
nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles in
exchange for relief from the economic
sanctions that have crippled the North
Korean economy.
Kim was quoted as saying his country
"will never" give up its nuclear weapons
if the US "persists in its hostile policy" in
an important speech published New
Year's Day.
"The US labeled our state as its enemy,
'axis of evil' and target of its 'preemptive
nuclear strike' and applied the most
brutal and inhuman sanctions against
and posed the persistent nuclear threat
to the latter over the past seven
decades," Kim was quoted as saying in a
speech.
The issue boils down to a catch-22 that
has eluded diplomats for years.
North Korea will likely get rid of its
nuclear weapons program if it has a
trusting and stable relationship with the
United States. And the US will likely
only develop a normal relationship with
North Korea, remove sanctions, and
help Pyongyang grow its economy if it
abandons its nuclear weapons program.
But the decision to kill Soleimani has
added another wrinkle. It proves
Trump's threats are not always bluster,
which could give North Korea reason for
pause if it was considering doing
something provocative, like testing a
long-range ballistic missile or nuclear
weapon.
It could also be more dangerous. If Kim
believes Trump would order a drone
strike on North Korea, "then he may feel
greater pressure to keep his nukes on a
hair trigger," Jackson said.
"There are a lot of questions about
North Korean nukes that we don't have
answers to, and until we do, it's crucial
that we don't make foreign policy
decisions that introduce greater risks of
nuclear instability."administration is
now justifying the assassination of
Soleimani by calling him a terrorist,"
said Adam Mount, a senior fellow at the
Federation for American Scientists.
Soleimani's killing, Mount said, would
likely strengthen North Korea's resolve
to expand its nuclear deterrent.
"In case something happens to their
leadership, they can credibly threaten to
impose costs," he said.
From 'Axis of Evil' to 'Fire and Fury'
When President George W. Bush
entered the halls of Congress to deliver
his first State of the Union speech after
the 9/11 attacks, few -- if any -- on the
Korean Peninsula knew that the Kim
Jong Il regime was about to be included
among the infamous "Axis of Evil" trio.
The ensuing decision to include North
Korea along with Iran and Iraq, and the
subsequent invasion and overthrowing
of Saddam Hussein, likely helped
convince Kim's regime that it needed
nuclear weapons to ensure its survival.
Pyongyang has pointed to leaders like
Hussein and Moammar Gadhafi of Libya
as telling examples of why it needs
nuclear weapons, and why it is so
hesitant to give them up in negotiations.
Gadhafi agreed to abandon his nuclear
ambitions in exchange for sanctions
relief in the early 2000s. Within years,
he was overthrown and killed by rebels
backed by Washington.
"North Korea already believed the US
couldn't be trusted. It already believed
its nuclear weapons were the only thing
that made its fate different than Iraq or
Libya," Van Jackson, a former official in
the Defense Department under the
Obama administration, told CNN.
Trump has hoped that a top-down
approach to nuclear negotiations could
help him succeed where his
predecessors had failed. But the
diplomatic negotiations between
Washington and Pyongyang that have
followed the three summits between
Trump and Kim have not made any
progress in part due to the issue of trust
-- or lack thereof.