A n Editorial O p i n i o n
Guns Don't Kill People
b y H o w a r d M. C o l l e t t
I saw it on a bumper sticker a few
years ago. The subject may be
debatable but the object was
not: " G u n s Don't Kill People;
People Kill People!" Two basic
remedies are evident, but
impossible to dispense: do away
with guns, or do away with people.
A similar but not identical
situation may be found in the realm
of aircraft accidents: "Aircraft
don't kill p e o p l e . . . " I hesitate to
complete the obvious because it
strikes pretty close to home. We are
all responsible, to a large extent, for
our own destiny. Unlike most gun
fatalities, however, people killed in
aircraft crashes are the result of
accidents, not premeditated
planning. Or are they?
A jet aircraft crashes after
takeoff, killing all aboard. The
cause is traced to the aircraft being
refueled with avgas instead of jet
fuel. Is such a situation any
different than loading a .38
revolver prior to attempting a large
cash withdrawal from the local
bank? A helicopter crashes trying
to sneak under the clouds at night
to get to its destination. Is this
action any different than playing
Russian Roulette?
It would be well to point out that
seldom are accidents created by a
single cause. There are often a
number of contributing causes -
any one of which alone would
probably not prove fatal. In the first
instance above, who was at fault - -
the lineman who refueled the
aircraft improperly, the co-pilot for
not observing the operation, or the
pilot for not taking a fuel sample?
In the second case, is the pilot
guilty for flying in darkness,
marginal weather and u n k n o w n
terrain, or is program management
at fault for routinely condoning
such missions all too frequently in
the past?
On every occasion of an
aeromedical mishap, Hospital
Aviation receives a number of
phone calls from operators,
hospitals and sometimes even state
officials looking for an explanation,
and often a scapegoat for the
accident. Motives vary, but almost
2 HOSPITALAVIATION, AUGUST1984
without exception people are
looking for a "quick-fix" to end all
accidents.
On these same occasions, those
affiliated with aeromedical
programs are deeply saddened,
but their fears are quieted by the
fact that they have experienced
pilots. Or they have a new model of
helicopter. Or they've flown under
all kinds of conditions and have
come back every time.
In an effort to dislodge such
complacency, might I state
following a review of aeromedical
accident statistics, that accidents
do happen to experienced pilots.
New helicopters have been known
to crash. And if you've been flying
frequently in marginal conditions,
you're little more than an accident The lighter side from Montana
waiting for a place to happen!
It has continuously been the
opinion of Hospital Aviation that Soon to be six
operational procedures are more
important than a second engine, a DEPARTMENTS
newer helicopter, or pilots with
more than 5,000 hours. The
post-crash changes adopted by
three programs bear this out. 20 Periodical Review
Program A insulates the pilot from Another new department
the requesting agency or other 20 Calendar
pressure in making the go/no go What's happening
decision as it relates to weather, 22 Letters to the Editor
aircraft capability, etc. Program B Our readers write
has elected not to participate in 23 Program News
mountain rescues and flies only to A first for police
designated advance landing areas. 23 Advertiser's Index
Program C will not fly at night to an Something for everyone
accident scene unless the landing
area has received prior approval
during the day (noting approach
routes, hazards, etc.).
It is therefore the responsibility
of each program to take a hard and
serious look at the aviation
component of its aeromedical
operation, and pass judgment to @ 1984. HOSP4TALAVIATION (ISSN: 0740-8315) is
the risk factors it allows its pilots published monthly by Aviation/Hospital Consu rants,
Editorial and executive office at 53 West 1800 South
and medical teams to face.
Whether it be an impressive
three-minute launch time (that
prevents an adequate walk-around
to ensure everything is closed) or
the acceptance of the aircraft with a
malfunctioning engine instrument
or fuel gauge, a tragic end will not
justify the means.