Law as a Weapon in Social Conflict

Author(s): Austin T. Turk

Source: Social Problems, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Feb., 1976), pp. 276-291
Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the Society for the Study of Social Problems
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/799774 .
Accessed: 06/08/2013 14:49

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

University of California Press and Society for the Study of Social Problems are collaborating with JSTOR to
digitize, preserve and extend access to Social Problems.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 128.252.67.66 on Tue, 6 Aug 2013 14:49:58 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 LAWAS A WEAPON
INSOCIALCONFLICT

AUSTIN T. TURK
Universityof Toronto

Explicit or implicitin most researchon law and societyis the

"moralfunctionalist" conceptionof law as essentially a meansfor
settlingor precluding disputes.Themajorlimitations ofthisconcep-
tionare thatit (1) introduces culturalbiasintoresearch bydefining
away the disruptiveand exploitiveaspectsof law, (2) tendsto
equate legal with consensualmethodsor processesof conflict
management, whicharepresumed to be moreeffective thancoercive
ones, and (3) encouragesresearchin whichnaturallaw and/or
functional-systems assumptions are taken forgranted.A superior
alternativeis the conceptionof law as power,i.e. a set ofresources
whosecontroland mobilization can in manyways- as indicatedin
a seriesof propositional statements- generateand exacerbatecon-
flictsratherthanresolving or softeningthem.

Despite persistent challengesby proponentsof a wide rangeof alternative

theoretical and ideologicalperspectives,1 themostprevalent conceptionof law
or
explicit implicit in recent researchon law and societyis that most
articulated
notablyin the worksof Fuller(1964, 1971) and Selznick(1961, 1968, 1969)
and prominent in suchinfluential sourcebooks as Aubert(1969), Nader(1969),
and Schwartzand Skolnick(1970). Law is characterized as essentiallya means
forsettling or precluding disputesby(a) articulating requirements an idea
the of
of justice (expressedas prerequisites forsustainedinteraction and the viable
organization of social life),and (b) restrainingthosewhoseactionsare incom-
patiblewithsuchrequirements. Accordingly,thepresumptive aimsofsocio-legal
researchare to determine how legalconcepts,institutions, and processesfunc-
tionin preventing, minimizing, or resolving howsuchlegalmechanisms
conflicts;
emergeor are created;howtheyrelateto complementary non-legal mechanisms;
andhowtheycanbe mademoreeffective.
Not to denyeitherthatlaw oftendoes contribute to conflict management or
thatthequestfora just and securesocialorderis honorableandnecessary, the
objectivesin thispaperare(1) to notecertainfundamental limitationsofwhat
may be termedthemoralfunctionalist conceptionof law; (2) to marshalargu-
mentsfora conceptionof law freeof thoselimitations - i.e.,theconception of
law as a formor dimension ofsocialpower(as empirically morea partisan weap-
on in thana transcendent resolverof social conflicts);
and (3) to formulate a

* Substantiallyrevisedand expanded versionof a workingpaper discussedat the annual

meetingsof the American Sociological Association, New York, 1973, and published in
German translationby R. Hahn and W. Kaupen as "Recht als Waffein sozialen Konflikt"
in the newsletterof the section on sociologyof law of the GermanSociological Association
(Informationsbrief, Nr. 3, February1974).
For theircommentsand advice, seriouslyconsideredthoughnot alwaysfollowed,I am
especiallygratefulto Ilene Bernstein,WilliamChambliss,Donald Cressey,Allen Grimshaw,
Sheldon Stryker,and the participantsin the discussionat the 1973 ASA meetings.
1 Some recentformulations of historicallyfamiliarpositionsmay be foundin Black 1972,
1973; Chamblissand Seidman,1971; Diamond, 1971; Gibbs, 1968; Pospisil,1971; Quinney,
1974; Turk,1969, 1972; and Wolff,1971.

This content downloaded from 128.252.67.66 on Tue, 6 Aug 2013 14:49:58 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Law and Conflict 277
set of basic empiricalpropositions
about law and socialconflictto whichthe
powerconceptionoflaw directssocio-legalresearch.
LAW AS CONFLICT MANAGEMENT
To definelaw as a meansof conflictmanagement is to leavetheoryand re-
searchon law and societywithoutan analyticalframework independent of
particular ethicaland theoretical preferencesand aversions. Whileit mayfacili-
tatecritiquesof totalitarian or bureaupathic decisionsand actionstaken"in the
nameof law," sucha definition appearsat thesametimeto impedethedevelop-
mentof an understanding of lawin whichevidenceofitsregulatory functions is
integrated withevidenceof its disruptive andexploitive usesandeffects. Merely
condemning the seamierside of law as perversions or departures from"therule
of law," and attributing themto humanfallibility or wickedness, encourages
neglectofthepossiblysystemic linkagesbetweenthe"good" and "bad" features
of law as it is empiricallyobserved.Moreover, insofaras themoralfunctionalist
conceptionof law has directly or by defaultencouraged suchneglect,it hasleft
socio-legalresearch vulnerableto chargesofbiasfavoring certainculture-specific
ideas and institutions, and helpedto provoketheradicalcounter-assertion that
exploitationand disruption constitutethedefining realityof law whileregula-
tionis onlyillusionand suppression (see Lefcourt,1971; Zinn,1971; Quinney,
1974).
A relateddifficulty with the moralfunctionalist conceptionof law is that
legalmeansof conflictmanagement tendto be equatedwithpeacefulones;and
thereis a strong to assumethatconsensual,
inclination non-coercive methodsare
theonlyreallyeffective waysofpreventing ormanaging conflicts.Thedifficulties
withsuchassumptions areexemplified in Barkun's(1968) volumeappropriately
entitledLAW WITHOUT SANCTIONS. From his usefulanalysisof conflict
management in segmentary lineageprimitive societiesand in international rela-
tionsBarkunadducesevidenceof thedevelopment of legalcontrolsin theab-
senceof anyWeberian (or Austinian)enforcement staff.Insteadofcoercion,he
findsthebasesoflegalcontrolin theseinstances to be "consensuson procedures
and on perceivedmutualself-interest" (Barkun,1968; 123) - a consensuspro-
duced by "the humancravingfororder"(160, and see 78-92) in conjunction
withthehumanpropensity to fixuponthefeatures ofinitialdispute-settlements
as conceptualandprocedural modelsforhandling subsequent conflicts
(132).
Interaction are a
experiences by process of social learningtransformed into
sharednormative perceptualframes thatconstrain behaviorbydefining theavail-
abilityand meaningof variousbehavioralalternatives. Ratherthanupon the
socialstructuring of enforcement power, bindingimpactof law is foundto
the
dependupon acceptanceof thevalueofcontinued interaction andofthereality
and usefulnessof the normativeframework, includingproceduralrules for
determining the meaningand applicabilityof particularrules.Thoughthe
achievement of orderbysuchmeans,as byanyothers, is assumedto benecessarily
a matterof degree,Barkunconcludesthattheevidencedoes confirm theem-
piricalpossibility ofnon-coerced legalorder.
Barkunis able to reach such a conclusionbecausehe combinesa severely
restricteddefinition of coercionwitha virtually unrestricted definitionof law
(cf. Pospisil,1971: 41). Coercionis taken to mean only the most obvious
exerciseor threatof physicalforceby a centralenforcement agency- thus
the
excluding many otherdirect and indirect ways social controlforpolitical

This content downloaded from 128.252.67.66 on Tue, 6 Aug 2013 14:49:58 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
278 TURK

purposesis effected.In contrast,apparentlyany behavioralor interactional

patternmay be construedas a legal norm(especiallywheresuchpatterns are
reflected in linguistic conventions as "rules");and anyorderor system ofsocial
interaction may be viewedas a legal order(especiallywheresuchan orderis
explicitlyrecognizedand acceptedas a constraining - thoughnot necessarily
determining - social reality).Thus,anycontinuing relation in theabsenceofa
physicallythreatening formally instituted "umpire" becomes evidenceforhis
thesis,as doesanycasein whichsanctioning is accomplished byothermeansand
agencies.
WhatBarkundoes accomplish, admirably, is to demonstrate thatlaw as a cul-
tural,or ideological,structure can contributegreatlyto the maintenance of
socialordersbyproviding perceptual guidesforchanneling andlimiting disputes.
He fails,however,to demonstrate that "law withoutsanctions"is possible
exceptwithinthe narrowboundsof his definitional assumptions. To thecon-
trary,he himselfobservesrepeatedly thatsuchnormative frameworks arevery
muchsubjectto rejectionand deterioration whenthe costsof acceptancebe-
come too highfora conflicting party.In addition,he makesit clearthatsuch
frameworks can in theircreationand applicationbe manipulated on behalfof
partisan interests, notingespecially manipulation bypartiesexternaltoparticular
conflictsbut interested in preserving theorderedcontextof theconflicts (i.e.,
the tribal,international, or othersystem).Giventhatsocial relationships are
evidently quite vulnerable when sustained onlyby self-defined and
interests, that
the rulesfordefining and defending suchinterests arenot immuneto partisan
manipulation, themoretenableconclusionto be drawnfromBarkun'sstudyis
that"norms"(whetheror not legalin somesenseor other)areweakandunreli-
able conflict-regulators to theextentthatthey(a) restonlyupon conventional
understandings unsupported by any "teeth"in theeventof seriousminunder-
standing, (b) reflectonlythebargaining andmaneuvering ofcurrent orpotential
adversaries, or (c) are not accompaniedby thereplacement oradequatemodifi-
cationof thosesocialarrangements thatgenerate conflicts.
At a moregeneraltheoretical level,themoralfunctionalist conception oflaw
impedesefforts to approachthescientific idealofunbiasedinquirybyencourag-
inginvestigators to definetheirresearch problems in termsoftheoretical models
derivedfrom"naturallaw" and/or"functional-systems" assumptions. First, the
biasintroduced bynaturallawphilosophy, eventhoughsecularized (cf.Selznick,
1961), leavesresearchers unableto dealconvincingly (i.e.,in strictlynaturalistic
and empirically demonstrable propositions) withthe observation or viewthat
anyidea ofjusticeis foundedultimately uponfaith,notuponempirical criteria
(Stone, 1965). Second,manycrucialmethodological and theoretical issuesare
not resolvedbut evaded to the extentthat researchbeginswith,insteadof
testing,theassumptions (a) thatlegalphenomenaconstitute a system, (b) that
the system-referent is empirically obvious,or at least readilydetermined, and
(c) thatthe systemembodiesthe meritocratic or egalitarian prerequisities for
socialwelfare.In particular, boundedness and theotherassumptions ofsystems
modelingareleftunexamined, as aretheconventional or traditional understand-
ingsof whatare "legal things,"while- despitetherecognition of structured
inequitiesin particularinstances(e.g., Nonet, 1969)-thereis no conceptual
resolution of theissuesraisedbythefactthattheprerequisites, however, defined,
forthe welfareor survival of some are not necessarily consistent withthepre-
requisites forall.

This content downloaded from 128.252.67.66 on Tue, 6 Aug 2013 14:49:58 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Law and Conflict 279
To summarize themajorlimitations
briefly, of themoralfunctionalist concep-
tion of law forthe purposesof socio-legalresearchare thatit (1) introduces
culturalbias intoresearch bydefiningawaythedisruptive andexploitive aspects
of law, (2) tendsto equatelegalwithconsensualmethodsor processesof con-
flictmanagement, whicharepresumed to be moreeffectivethancoercivemeans,
and (3) encouragesresearchin whichnaturallaw and/orfunctional-systems
assumptions are takenforgranted.If researchon law and societyis to be even
relativelyunbiased by culturally,
ethically,methodologically,and politically
partisanassumptions, a moreneutraland empirically-grounded conceptionof
law is needed.The remainder of thispaperis devotedto an attempt to develop
sucha conception.
LAW AS POWER
It mustbe grantedthatpeoplemayuse thelanguageof normsand generally,
moreor less consciously, accepttheirconstructions as binding in theabsenceof
a centralizedenforcement agency,or indeedof any reliablemeansof forcing
conformity. However,as has alreadybeen observed, it is equallyclearthatthey
maycometo believethattheirinterests arebetterservedbyviolating thenorma-
tiveexpectations of others.In thisconnection, theincreasingly formalarticula-
tion of suchexpectations and the recognition or invention of the rightto seek
or attempttheirenforcement (Hoebel,1954; 28) impliestheincreasing inability
of peopleto getalongwithone anothersolelyon thebasisoftacitor consensual
understandings. Furthermore, the persistence and growthof law as a cultural
(symbolic,perceptual)and social (interactional, relational)realityis at leasta
kindof evidencethatpeoplehavenotyet foundthattheycan do withoutsuch
formalization, whetherby a return to primitivismor byattaining somenewcon-
sensualplateau.The effortto developan adequateconceptionof law must,
therefore,beginby recognizing thecentrality of diversity and conflictin social
lifewherever law - provisionally understood as theprocessof formally articu-
lating normative expectations - is discernable.
Giventhatlaw is intimately linkedwithsocialdiversity andconflict, themost
parsimonious explanationof thelinkageseemsto be thatpeoplefindtheycan-
not truststrangers. As thescaleandcomplexity of socialrelatedness increase,so
does thediversity ofhumanexperiences. The morediverse theexperiences people
have had, themorediversetheirperceptions and evaluationsof behavioraland
relationalalternatives may be. The greaterthe diversity of perceptionsand
the
evaluations, greatermay be the in
variability what is perceivedas justicein
the specifictermsof everyday life.(The implieddistinction is between"norms
in action"versuswhatever similarities mightbe foundin termseitherof a gen-
eralbeliefin justiceas an abstractvalue,or of verbalresponsesto hypothetical
questioning regarding the substantive meanings and relativeimportance of vari-
ous normative statements orlabels.)Awarethatothers'ideasofjusticemayvary
fromtheirown,peopletry- in accordwiththeirownideasandinterests as they
understand them- to maintainor gaincontrolof,or to contestor evade,the
processesby whichnormative expectations come to be formally articulated and
enforcedacross,ratherthanonlywithin,theboundaries of culturally homogen-
eous groups(whetherthe salientboundariesbe thoseof families, clans,tribes,
nations,or othergroupings).
The empiricalrealityof law - apparently wellunderstood in practiceifnotin
theory-seems, then,to be thatit is a set of resourcesforwhichpeople con-

This content downloaded from 128.252.67.66 on Tue, 6 Aug 2013 14:49:58 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
280 TURK

tendand withwhichtheyare betterable to promotetheirownideasandinter-

estsagainstothers,giventhenecessity of working out andpreserving accommo-
dativerelationships with strangers. To say that people seek to gain and use
resourcesto securetheirownideas and interests is, of course,to say thatthey
seekto haveandexercisepower.Whilethemeaningofpoweris farfromsettled,
a convenient pointis to viewpoweras thecontrolofresources,
starting andthe
exerciseof poweras theirmobilization in an effortto increasetheprobability of
acceptableresolutions of actualor potentialconflicts.2 Althoughit helpsto re-
cognizethat"law is power,"a morespecificconceptualization ofwhatkindsof
resourcecontrolare possibleis necessary if we are to arriveat a usefulunder-
standingof what the generalpropositionmeans.I see fivekindsof resource
control,all represented in the culturaland social structural realityof law.
Theseare(1) controlof themeansof directphysicalviolence,i.e.,warorpolice
power;(2) controloftheproduction, allocation,and/or useofmaterial resources,
i.e., economicpower;(3) controlof decision-making processes,i.e., political
power;(4) controlof definitions ofand accessto knowledge, beliefs,
values,i.e.,
ideologicalpower; and (5) controlof humanattentionand living-time, i.e.,
diversionary power.3
1. Havingthelaw on one'ssidein a conflict impliesthatone can rightfully use
or calluponothers(allies,champions, or theauthorities claimingjurisdiction over
the area,people,or mattersinvolved)to use violenceto supportone's claims
againstothers.Modernpolitiesarecharacterized bythepresenceandavailability
of controlagenciesspecializing in the accretion,organization, and use of the
meansof violence,and asserting theprinciplethatviolenceis - excepting more
and more narrowlydefinedemergency situations- a resourcereservedfor
officialuse only. Decisionsby authorities, includingdecisionsregarding the
respective claimsof disputingparties,are accompaniedby theimpliedthreatof
physicalcoercionshouldanyof theaffected partiesrefuseto actin accordwith
suchdecisions.
2. People's life chancesare affectedjust as decisively by how muchtheir
economicpoweris enhancedor erodedbylaw. Theinvention andelaboration of
property and tax laws,in particular,
reflect andhelpimplement decisionson (1)
whatkindsof activities,products, andpeopleshouldbe rewarded moreandwhat
kindsless,and (2) how greatshouldbe therangebetweenmaximumandmini-
mumrewards."Radicals"seek modifications of law so as to changethecriteria
forreward,and veryoftenalso to reducetherangeof rewards;"liberals"seek
modifications so as to insureat least a "decent" minimumin the rangeof
2
"Control" meansthe availabilityor accessibilityof resources,varyingfromthe extremely
limitedaccessof the helpless,throughthe sharedaccess of competitorsor allies,to the exclu-
sive access of the almighty."Resource" meansanythingof biologicalor culturalsignificance
forhumanwelfare.The distinctionherebetweencontrollingand mobilizingresourcesis ana-
logous to that which Etzioni (1968: 314-317) makes between"assets" and "power." How-
ever,his concept of "power" is much morerestricted, or truncated,in thatit refersonly to
mobilizationagainst resistanceand excludes much of what is involvedin the controland
mobilizationof symbolicresources.Withratherunnecessaryinconsistency, he defines"per-
suasive power" as "exercised throughthe manipulationof symbols" (358) aftersuggesting
that "the assetsfromwhichpoweris generatedare much morescarce thanthe symbolswhich
are the main base of communication"(335) and arguingthat"communication"can be sub-
stitutedfor"power" (336).
3 My conscious indebtednessfor termsand ideas used in thiseffortto sortout the forms
and dimensionsof power is mainlyto Russell (1938), Schermerhorn(1961), and Gamson
(1968).

This content downloaded from 128.252.67.66 on Tue, 6 Aug 2013 14:49:58 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Law and Conflict 281

rewards, and mayaccept- if theydo not seek - somereduction in therange;

"conservatives" resistmodification, but may acceptsome "decentminimum."
Thoughorderly(usuallymeaninglimitedand gradual)economicchangescan be
facilitatedby law,economicdecisionsonce articulated in andsupported bylaw
become postulateswhichfurtherelaborationsand even modifications of the
law must satisfy.Radical economicchanges,therefore, become increasingly
difficultto effectbylegalmeansbecausetheyrequirenotlegalreasoning to satisfy
the postulatesof a bodyof law, but rathera new set of postulatesand thusa
newbodyoflaw.
3. The formulaeand proceduresof legal decision-making areintegralto the
of
workings politicallyorganized societies. Organizational decisions arein signif-
icantwaysinfluenced by andexpressed through legaldecisions.Mostimportant,
the law as cultureand as social structure providesthe rubricforarticulating,
interpreting, and implementing organizational normsand decisions.As a sub-
stantiveand proceduralmodel and as an ultimatesupportfor institutional
normative structures, thelaw contributes - as Selznick(1969) andmanyothers
have demonstrated - to privateas wellas publicsocialordering, and provides
some of the weightiest criteriafor assessingproposedchangesand resolving
internalas well as inter-organizational conflicts.Whilenon-legalfactorsclearly
affectpoliticalstruggle in generaland organizational decision-making in partic-
ular,the law - as themostauthoritative recordof eventsand as the definitive
model,criterion, and arbiterof rightness - is itselfa politicalresource ofmajor
importance.
4. Legalconceptsand thought-ways developin thecourseofpragmatic efforts
by mento comprehend problemsof socialinteraction so as to managethem-
includingtheproblematics of dominating thelivesof otherpeople.Thoughnot
in thisregarddifferent fromotherproductsof suchefforts, law as culturehas
an especiallystrongimpactupon the framesof reference people use to give
meaningto theirsituations.Those definitions of the real,the true,and the
or
worthygivenlegalexpression approval thereby are giventhesupportofwhat
is not onlyone ofthemostprestigious ofculturalstructures, butalso thatstruc-
turemostdirectly supported bytheapparatusofpoliticalcontrol.The realityor
valueof alternative conceptionscan be deniedeitherbysimplydenying recogni-
tionin law,or else moreforcefully by explicitlyrejecting themin waysranging
fromthemostextreme forms ofsuppression to themostsubtleformsof rejection
in practiceconjoinedwithverbalacceptanceor toleration. Censorship byomis-
sionor commission is nonethelesscensorship. Yet,thegreatest importance oflaw
as an ideologicalresourceprobablyliesnotin thefactsofdeliberate or inadvert-
ent intervention on behalfof someperceptualalternatives versusothers,but in
the factthatlegalismis theculturalbedrockofpoliticalorder.Theveryconcept
of legalityis designedto promoteadherence to thegroundrulesof conventional
politics(Turk,1972:15-16) - whichamountto agreement amongcontending
partieson the supremevalue of theircommonmembership in a politywhich
mustbe preserved.
5. Humanattention andliving-time arefinite resources - a tritebutprofoundly
consequentialobservation. Insofaras the rhetoric and the realworkings of law
occupymen'sattention andtimetotheexclusionof otherphenomena - perhaps
of greaterimportfortheprobability and qualityof life- thelaw exertsdiver-
sionarypower.As entrepreneurs of thenews,publishing, advertising, andenter-
tainment industrieshavelongknown,at leastthemorereassuring, or
titillating,

This content downloaded from 128.252.67.66 on Tue, 6 Aug 2013 14:49:58 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
282 TURK
luridaspectsof law can in thenameof"humaninterest" and"information" be
presented tocaptureandholdthepublic'sattention. Norhavetheobviously close
linksbetweendiversionary and ideologicalpowerbeenneglected. Preoccupation
withthe law, especiallyin itsmoreattractive and innocuousaspects,not only
diverts attention frompotentially moredangerous concerns(fromtheperspective
of authorities, de factoincluding loyaloppositions) butalso reinforces thesense
of law as an overwhelming, scarcelychallengeable reality andcriterion ofreality.
The conceptionof law as a set of resources, as power,is methodologically
superior to the conception of law as conflictregulator in thattherelationship
betweenlaw and conflictis not assumed,but leftopen forinvestigation, and
thedistinction betweenlegaland non-legal phenomena is grounded in empirical
observations ratherthan normativeassumptions. Insteadof askinghow law
regulates conflict, the investigatorencouraged askwhether
is to law regulates or
generates conflict,orinwhatwaysandin whatdegreetheuse oflegalpowerdoes
both.Insteadofassuming thatlegalandnon-legal actionsandrelations aresome-
how differentiated by criteriaof morallegitimacy or functional necessity, the
investigator askswhether and how theinvocationof suchcriteria andtheintro-
ductionof the distinction itselfexemplifythe controland mobilizationof
ideologicaland diversionary resources.Freed fromarbitrary ideologicaland
theoretical constraints, theinvestigator directlyconfronts theempirical realities
that legal powercan be used in waysinconsistent as well as consistent with
normativecriteriaof legality,that the empiricalrelevanceof such criteriais
decidedby the actionsratherthantheclaimsof thosewho wieldlegalpower,
and thatthelaw - sinceit is necessarily promulgated, interpreted, implemented,
or enforcedby peoplewithspecificsocialandcultural involvements - cannever
reallybe neutralvis-a-vis socialconflicts.
A particular advantageof the powerconceptionof law is thatit facilitates
analysis of the processes(as distinctfromparticular structures) bywhichnorm-
ative expectations are given"cross-group" as wellas "intra-group" significance
- i.e., how theybecomeformally bindingupon people who themselves have
neithergeneratedsuch normsnor been socializedas childrento acceptthem.
At themostgeneralanalytical level,theprocessesarethose- stigmatization and
otherformsof manipulation - anygroupuses to achievesomebehavioral and
relational coherencedespitethevarying idiosyncraciesofitsmembers. Nonethe-
less, as one's attention shiftsfromthemostephemeral and leastdifferentiated
formsof grouplife to moredurableand complexsocialentities, theprocesses
come more sharplyinto focus as the distinction betweenlegal and nonlegal
emerges andacquiresincreasing socialandculturalreality. Thepowerconception
of law suggests analysisof theseprocessesin thespecificempirical termsofhow
people actuallydeal withone another,regardless of any conventional under-
standings or rationalesabout the existenceand significance of particular legal
phenomena.Thus, socio-legalresearchis cast not in termsof the assumed
concreteness or meaningfulness of thelegal-nonlegal distinction, butin termsof
the humanactionscreatingthe distinction, givingit empiricalsubstance,and
altering or erasing it.
the
Finally, powerconceptionof law givessocio-legalresearcha distinctive
focus,relatedtobutnotconfusedwiththegeneralconcerns of thesocialsciences
with social order,conflict,and change.Insteadof losingthe legal-nonlegal
distinction in the quest for knowledgeusefulin conflictmanagement (as in
Barkun'scase), the distinction itselfbecomesin two waysthebasisfordefining

This content downloaded from 128.252.67.66 on Tue, 6 Aug 2013 14:49:58 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Law and Conflict 283
researchproblems.First,the problematic statusof the distinction impliesthe
needforhistorical andanthropological studiestodetermine thespecific conditions
whereit is introduced (and perhapsto suggesttheconditionswhereit maybe
transcended) in social life.4Second,as the core taskof socio-legalresearch is
takento be thatof developing a predictively usefulunderstanding ofthecontrol
andmobilization oflegalresources, theavailability ofsuchresources is necessarily
presupposed. Thatis, scientifically meaningful research questionsaboutlaw and
societybecomepossibleonlywhentheconceptof law is empirically grounded
by thedifferentiation of legalfromotherculturaland socialphenomena in one
or moreof the following ways: (1) verbal articulation of a set,in some degree
a system,of explicitnorms;(2) establishment of procedures formaking, inter-
preting,implementing, and changingnormativedecisions;(3) occupational
specializationin knowingthesubstantive law andin usingtheestablished proce-
dures;(4) institution of explicitprovisions fortheenforcement of substantive
and procedural norms,by actualor threatened deprivations; and (5) associated
withanyor all of theotherways,thedisplayofsymbolictrappings designedto
the and
emphasize reality,rightness, might law.s of Rather than some kindof
essence,property, or function to be sought in an apparently unlimited variety
ofculturalandsocialconfiguration, "law" thusbecomesanempirically specifiable
setof objectsof scientific attention.
In sum,in thepowerconceptionoflaw students oflaw andsocietyareoffered
a methodologically tenabledefinition of thescopeoftheirinquirythatincludes
it withinthesocialscientific enterprise without reifying, mystifying, or obscuring
thelegal-nonlegal distinction. Giventhentheavailability and amorality of legal
power, the formulation and of
testing propositions about the exercise of such
powerbecomecentralconcernsforthescientific studyof law as it is,as distin-
quishedfromdoctrinalor appliedresearchon behalfoflaw as someonebelieves
it shouldor mustbe.6 Becauseof theavailability of so muchworkon law as a
regulator and the relative paucity of work on law as a sourceandmeansofcon-
flict,thereis a particular need forpropositions about waysin whichlaw may
generateor sharpensocial conflicts.Accordingly, an efforthas been made to
developseveralpropositions indicatingwhatseem to be the majorwayslaw
promotesor facilitates conflict. To theextentthattheseandrelatedpropositions

4 This formulation is intendedto emphasize that the legal-nonlegaldistinctionis a prob-

lematichumaninventionratherthanan inevitableproductof some supra-humanevolutionary
process. Againstany emergentistconception of "legal evolution" as an unavoidableand/or
oflegal fromnonlegalphenomenais simply
linearprogression,the differentiation
irreversible
recognized as an historicallyspecificaccomplishmentthat has occurred,may occur, and
may continue.
5 The extent to which sequential or functionalrelationshipsmay
be found among these
indicantsof the fivekindsor dimensionsof legal poweris an empiricalquestion. Thoughnot
directlypertinent,the mediation-courts-punishment-police-counsel cumulativescale order
that seems to be -emergingfrom the work of Schwartz and others (Schwartzand Miller,
1964; Wimberley,1973; Baxi, 1974; Schwartz,1974) suggeststhatsome such relationships
may well exist.
6 While the distinctionis essentiallythat proposed by JeromeHall (1963:42) between

"normative"or "humanisticlegal sociology" (whichhe approves)and "scientificlegal socio-

logy" or "legal science" (which he disapproves),thereis no compellingreason to oppose
these two kinds of inquiryto each other.The point is merelythatforthosewhose primary
aim is to develop scientificknowledgeof law as a social and culturalphenomenonan ap-
propriatelyobjectiveconceptionof law is essential.For those withotherprimaryobjectives,
the moralfunctionalistor some other"committed"conceptionmay well be more useful.

This content downloaded from 128.252.67.66 on Tue, 6 Aug 2013 14:49:58 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
284 TURK
are sustainedand elaboratedwithgreaterprecisionin further research,theyare
expectedtoconstitute thebasisfora theoryoflaw able to explaintheconditions
whenand how conflictmanagement maybe accomplished by thecontroland
mobilizationof legalresources- i.e., a theoryableto dealwithconflictmanage-
mentas a problematic outcomeinsteadof a defining of law as a
characteristic
socialandculturalphenomenon.
PROPOSITIONS: LAW AND SOCIAL CONFLICT
1. The availability of legalresources is in itselfan impetusto socialconflict,
because conflicting or potentiallyconflicting partiescannotriskthe possible
costs of not havingthelaw - or at leastsomelaw - on theirside.Whenlegal
resourcesare not availableor are negligible, partiesare forcedor able to rely
upon nonlegalpowerto deal withtheproblematics of socialinteraction;law is
irrelevantexceptperhapsin the loose senseof a generally recognized rightof
self-helpforaggrieved partiesable to assertit (cf.Hoebel,1954: 25-28).As law
becomesavailable,it becomesrelevantas a contingency whichmustbe met.It
thenbecomesnecessary to actso as to gainorincreasecontroloflegalresources,
if onlyto neutralize themas weaponry an opponentmightemploy.The pointis
illustrated in the long effortby Americansouthernwhitesto use the "white
primary"and otherostensibly legaldevices(Wirt,1970: 56-71),supplemented
by extralegaland illegalones,to preventblacksfromusingresources formally
granted thembyemancipation and subsequent legalenactments anddecisions.
2. Givenpressureto contendforcontrolof legalresources, differentialnon-
legalpowercan be expectedto resultatleastinitially incorresponding differences
in legalpower.The partywithgreater legalas wellas non-legal powermaythen
be able to increaseitsedgeoverweakerparties, evento theextremeofexcluding
theweakeraltogether fromaccessto thelegalarena,cuttinghimofffromeven
the opportunity to advancehis claimsand defendhis interests "legally."For
instance,sincethe formation of theinegalitarian SouthAfrican nationin 1910,
the weakernonwhites have had theirlegal positionsteadilyeroded,losingbe-
tween1936 and 1955 evenvotingrights guaranteed bythe"entrenched clauses"
of theSouthAfricaAct (May, 1955: 47-78; see also Sachs,1973: 143-145and
passim)- South Africa'sconstitution untilit was superseded by theRepublic
ofSouthAfricaConstitution Act, 1961.
3. Legal powerprovidesboth the opportunity and themeansto accomplish
the effective denialof therealityof conflictsby makingit impossibleor inor-
dinatelydifficult forthemto be articulated and managed- as amplydemon-
statedin the long and stubborneffortto denylegal recognition and support
fortheeffective unionization ofagricultural laborers(McWilliams, 1942;Tangri,
1967;Galarza,1970).
However,the persistent recurrence of struggles againsteconomic,racial,and
otherformsof domination and exploitation makeit clearthatissueswhichcan-
not be couchedin thelanguageof law, or willnot be acceptedas actionableor
justiciable,eventually have to be foughtout in non-legalarenae-where resolu-
tionsmaybe achieved,butoftenat greater costand withlessdurability. It is,of
course,truethatthe lack of appropriate legalmechanisms formanaging some
issuesmayresultfromunintended as wellas intendedactions.Nonetheless, even
thoughthe denialof accessto law maybe explicablein objectiveterms, "objec-
tive"denialappearsto bejustas realin itsconsequences as "subjective."
4. Wherepowerdifferences are ratherless extreme, theavailabilityoflegalre-

This content downloaded from 128.252.67.66 on Tue, 6 Aug 2013 14:49:58 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Law and Conflict 285

sourcesmayencouragelitigiousness-a wordindicative of thefactthatthepre-

senceof law encourages itsuse by partieshopingto improvetheirpositionsby
methodsrelatively lessdangerous or costlythannon-legal powerstruggles, espec-
icallywithformidable opponents.Partiesconfronting morepowerful opponents
maybeencouraged to hopethatbythreatened oractualrecourseto law theywill
be able to reduce,eliminate, or reverse initialpowerdifferences, ormerelyto ex-
tractsome concession.For example,Nonet(1969: 81-83,133-137)concluded
thatthe New Deal turnedlaw intoan allyratherthanan enemyof American
tradeunionism,so thattheunionswereencouragedto pursuea policyof self-
helpthrough legaladvocacyinsteadofrelying uponadministrative procedures for
handlingworkmen'scompensation claims.On theotherhand,stronger parties
movingagainstweakeronesmayfindit advantageous to cloaktheirmoveswith
legitimacy, especially to minimize the chance of third-party intervention on be-
halfof the underdog-asin theuse of antitrust, conspiracy, right-to-work, and
otherlaws to impedethe development of effective labor unions(Blumrosen,
1962;Nonet,1969: 81-83).
5. Apartfromencouraging litigiousness, the availability of legalfacilities de-
creasesthe pressureupon conflicting parties to resolve disputes in terms of
the non-legalresources theycan mobilize.Informal and privatesettlements, or
at least accommodations to non-legalpower differences (e.g., race relations
"etiquette")seemslesslikelywherethepartieshavetheoptionorhopeoflegal
recourse.Similarly, wherean olderlegalsystemis giving wayto a newerone,as
in theNorthern Rhodesian(Zambian)copperbelt, partieswithoutrecourse in the
oldersystem(e. g.,youngmenprotesting againstthepoweroftheirwife'skinto
intervene in maritalandfamilial affairs) maybe encouraged to appeal"to norms
irreconcilably opposed to those of the traditional tribal system" (Epstein,1958:
222).
6. Articulation in law of s6cialcategories, boundaries, and roles-withtheiras-
sociatedrightsand obligations-can sharpen old conflicts andproducenewones.
Heightened awareness of the problematics of social inter.action and relatedness
can decreasethe chancesof resolving or avoidingconflicts, because"bringing
thingsout intotheopen" frequently hardensexisting boundaries, cleavages, and
or
inequities(whetherobjectively perceptually "real") by making it less easyto
ignore,tacitly live with, or quietly and informally erase or change them. Rather
thana transformation of conflictintoa formmoreamenableto a reasonable re-
solution,legalization of a conflictcan amountto an escalationthatmakesgen-
uine settlement moredifficult. Recognition of suchpossibilities has oftenbeen
usedforresisting theuse oflaw as an instrument of socialchange-e.g.,theviews
of some southernmoderates,as well as conservatives, in the 1950's regarding
theprobableimpactoftheU. S. SupremeCourt'sdesegregation decisions(Tumin
andRotberg,1957).
7. Legal procedural normsare oftenusedto excludeor distort information es-
sentialto an adequatecomprehension ofempirical problems, andthuscan impede
orprevent conflict resolution. In particular, legaldistinctions betweenadmissible
and inadmissible evidencetendto workagainstconsideration of perceptual, or
subjectivefactors-those perhapsnot objectively important or recognizable by
legalcriteriabut extremely important in termsof whatis significant to someor
all of the involvedparties.European,especiallyAnglo-American, legalsystems
have frequently been criticallycontrastedwithnon-European systems(e. g.,
Epstein,1958, 198-223;Gibbs,1963; severaloftheselections in Nader,1969) in

This content downloaded from 128.252.67.66 on Tue, 6 Aug 2013 14:49:58 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
286 TURK

whichthereare fewif anyrestrictions upon whatmaybe considered in deter-

miningthe contextualsignificance of facts.These non-European systemsem-
phasizethequalitative morethantheformalaspectsofwhatis seenas a contin-
uingratherthanan episodicrelationship betweenthedisputing parties.Similarly,
thoughin a different vein,"bourgeois legalism"has beenrejectedbyMarxists in
favorof "socialistlegality," wheretheemphasis is assertedto be (and in non-po-
liticalcasesnormally is) upontheeducationofdisputants andoffenders to social
awareness and responsibility (Berman, 1966: 277-384).
8. Legal formulae andprocessestendto emphasizethelimitation andcessation
of overtconflictbehavior, discouraging not onlyall-outbattlesofprinciple but
eventherecognition thatat leastsomesocialconflicts arezero-sum, notvariable-
sum (e.g. czarsvs. communists: whiteracistsvs. blackrevolutionaries).' To a
considerable extent,law is orientedto regulating thesymptoms ofconflict with-
out getting at themoreintractible problems ofremoving thesourcesofconflict.
Howevertacticalconcernwithsymptoms maysometimes be dictatedbya stra-
tegicconcernto minimizepoliticalor othercostsofdealingwiththosesources.
Considerthefrequently notedjudicialpreference, supported by andexpressed in
such operatingprinciplesas staredecisisand certiorari, forcarefully delimited
case-specific issuesratherthanopen confrontations overthepoliticaland eco-
nomicpremisesof "the givenorder."Nonetheless, insofaras thelegalization of
conflictsdoes no morethanlimitthe meansof conflictand/orobfuscatethe
real issues,as in zero-sumstruggles, someor all of theconflicting partiesmay
cometo viewlegalization as simplyanotherdeviceforout-positioning an oppo-
nentor forgaining timeto mobilizeor regroup one'snon-legal forces-anattitude
characteristic ofbothrevolutionaries andcounter-revolutionary policeagents.
9. The tacticsrequiredto accomplish a legalsettlement can conflict withthose
requiredto accomplish a genuinesettlement, Wherecommunication betweendis-
putantsmay be essentialforthemto becomeawareof commoninterests with
priority overthoseat issue,communication maybe precludedbytheriskof dis-
closinginjuriousfacts,violatingrulesagainstcollusion,or otherwise weakening
orcontaminating thecase at hand.The terminology andstyleofpubliclegalcon-
flict-asinverbalexchanges in legislativeandjudicialproceedings-may emphasize
insteadof correcting the affective and cognitive biasesassociatedwithconflict.
Obtaining formal, open concessionsfromopponents in thecourseoflegalstrug-
gle can makeit moredifficult forthemto backdownor acceptdefeat,andcan
reducethe chancesof buildinga fundof mutualtrustwiththemas a way of
makingfurther conflictsmoreamenableto resolution. Such considerations ap-
pear to explainthe reluctance of businessmen to conducttheirtransactions in
strictly legalisticterms(Macaulay,1963), as wellas theoppositionofmanyaca-
demicsto themoreexplicitlegalization of faculty-student relationships.
10. Legal decisionsmayprematurely signaltheend of conflicts withoutactu-
allyresolving them.Theprocessesoflegalhearing, trial,and appealoftenamount
to ritualsof dispute-settlement resulting in onlyillusory resolutions ofconflicts,
i. e., formaldecisionsthatseem to settledisputesbut do not do so on terms
acceptableor eventolerableto thelosers(and sometimes also thewinners). Not

7 Whetheror not all human conflictsare in principletransformable into variable-sum

terms,and thereforeresolvableby consensualmeans,itappearsthatin empirical,historically
specific,ratherthan philosophical termsthere are limits to the abilityand willingnessof
people collectivelyto accomplishsuch transformations.

This content downloaded from 128.252.67.66 on Tue, 6 Aug 2013 14:49:58 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Law and Conflict 287

onlymaydissatisfied partiesbe forcedto seekredress bynon-legal meansin such

presentconflicts but thepretenseof conflictresolution whichtheyhaveexperi-
encedas the realityof law in actionmaymakethemfarlesswillingto enterthe
legalarenain futureconflicts. To theextentthatlaw producesillusoryinstead
of real conflictresolutions, it not only aggravates existingconflictsbut also
makesfutureconflicts morelikely,and likelyto be worse.Racial conflicts, for
instance,haveclearlynot been resolvedin SouthAfricabythelegalization ofa
policyof racialseparation-tobe gradually accomplished duringa "transitional"
periodof dejurewhitedomination (Sachs, 1973), or in NorthAmericaby the
legalization ofa policyof racialintegration-to be gradually accomplished during
a "transitional" of
period overcoming de facto whitedomination "withall delib-
eratespeed" (compareBlausteinand Ferguson,1962,withSwett,1969,Moore,
1971 and Balbus,1973).
11. Insofaras legalcultureis incongruent withthesocial-behavioral realitiesof
legalpoweras exercisedbyauthorities, thelaw itselfpromotescynicism, evasion,
and defiancewithrespectto normative expectations and decisions-even among
its representatives and practitioners (on lawyers,see Blumberg, 1967; on police,
see Galliher,1971). The law providesauthorities withthecloakof claimedim-
partiality,a difficultclaimimpossible toliveup to alwaysandentirely. Apartfrom
predispositions arisingfromtheirsocialorigins, legalofficials developat leasta
partialityon behalfof theirown organizational and careerinterests (Aubert,
1963) and routines for and
categorizing handling cases withas littleeffortand
riskas possible(Cicourel,1968: 170-242).
Moreover, whetheror not authorities tryto be unbiased,theintentofthelaw
can neverbe identicalwiththe effectof thelaw as experienced. Eventhemost
"understandable" differences betweeninterpretation and interpretation, inter-
pretationand action,or actionand action,may not be "understandable" to
affected partieswhobelievethemselves-probably correctly-to be disadvantaged
by the outcome.Credit,tenancy,welfare,and otherlaws affecting economic
opportunities, privileges,and liabilitieshave often been shown to work system-
aticallyagainstthepoor (Caplovitz,1963; Carlin,Howard,andMessinger, 1966;
tenBroek, 1966).
The crucialpointis thatbiasis notjusta matterofintention or evenobjective
behavior, much less a matter only of due process under formal rules.Bias is
also-and forthe tasksof conflictregulation mostimportant-amatterof per-
ceptionand inference. Law believedto be biasedmaybe just as ineffective, or
worse,as law thatis biased.
12. Legal changesthat precipitateor facilitatenon-legalsocial and cultural
changesinevitably-barring theimprobable caseofunanimity on themeaningand
desirability of thechanges-sharpen andproduceconflicts. As newlaw supersedes
old, olderideas and interests maybe shuntedasideor demotedto lowerpriority
ratings-aswillbe thosepeoplewhoseidentifications and commitments are de-
finedin termsof thoseideas and interests. Nowhereis thefactoflaw as a party
with its own interests to safeguard and enhance,potentially in conflictwith
others,moreinescapableto people thanwhenlegal powerservesto override,
subvert, or simplyrejecttheirvaluesand ways.Regardless of thepossiblelong-
run impactof legallypromotedchanges,theshort-run impactwillcertainly be
somecontribution to increasingand exacerbating conflicts-most especiallycon-
flictsbetweenlegalauthorities andat leastsomeofthoseoverwhomauthority is
claimed.The degreeof conflictresulting fromlegalchangeswill,ofcourse,vary

This content downloaded from 128.252.67.66 on Tue, 6 Aug 2013 14:49:58 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
288 TURK

with the type of innovation, of thoseaffected,

the social characteristics and
otherfactors(Zimringand Hawkins,1971),fromtherelatively mildconflictsof
conventionalpoliticsto theextremeconflictsresulting into
fromlegalintrusions
mattersof sacredbeliefand practice-asin the Bolshevikattemptof the1920's
to imposesexualequalityupon the largelyMoslempeoplesof SovietCentral
Asia(Massell,1968).

CONCLUSION
As manyothershavesaidin variousways,thoseengagedin socio-legal research
mustconstantly the
question assumptions easily so received from jurisprudence
if thesocialscienceof law is to be morethana servant power,al-
of established
beita servant withcriticalintelligence.Socio-legal inquirythatassumesthegood-
nessor badnessof any set ofculturalandsocialphenomena cannotbe expected
to producevalidandreliableknowledge ofthefullrangeofproblematic relation-
ships within thatsetand between that setand others.8It had been argued in this
paperthatthemostprevalent conceptionof law orienting contemporary socio-
legalresearch-the "moralfunctionalist" conceptionoflawas in essencea means
of conflictregulation-isin thisand otherrespectsdemonstrably inadequatefor
thepurposesof scientific research, howeverusefulit maybe forotherpurposes.
A farmoreadequatealternative, it hasbeenfurther argued,is thepowerconcep-
tionof law,whichrecognizes in law a setof resources whosecontrolandmobil-
izationcan in manyways-as indicatedin a seriesof propositional statements-
lead towardinsteadof awayfromconflicts. Whilethespecifics undoubtedly need
extension, elaboration,and qualification, theformulation offeredherewillhave
servedits purposeifit stimulates socio-legaltheorists andresearchers to be more
alertto theoftensubtlerealities ofpowerand conflict. In anycase,thereshould
be no quarreloverthefactthatlaw mayindeedcontribute to conflict
manage-
ment-notleastby itsrolein creating, sustaining, denying, andchanging theper-
and
ceptions understandings by which people live.

REFERENCES
Aubert,Vilhelm
1963 "Competitionand dissensus:two typesof conflictresolution,"Journal of Conflict
Resolution7:26-42.
1969 (ed.) Sociology of Law. Baltimore:PenguinBooks.
Balbus, Isaac D.
1973 The Dialectics of Legal Repression:Black Rebels before the AmericanCriminal
Courts.New York: RussellSage Foundation.
Barkun,Michael
1968 Law WithoutSanctions.New Haven: Yale University.
Baxi, Upendra
1974 "Comment-Durkheimand legal evolution:some problemsof disproof."Law and
Society Review 8(Summer):645-651.
Berman,Harold J.
1966 Justicein the U. S. S. R.: An Interpretationof Soviet Law. Cambridge:Harvard
University.

' In this connection,the social science of law can benefitfromthe historyof crimino-
logy,blinderedand retardedby just such assumptions.Only as criminologicalresearchhas
become informedby largerand moreneutralperspectiveson social organizationand human
behaviorhas it been able to move towardbecomingeven a usefulservant.

This content downloaded from 128.252.67.66 on Tue, 6 Aug 2013 14:49:58 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Law and Conflict 289
Black, Donald J.
1972 "The boundariesof legal sociology." Yale Law Journal81(May)1086-1100.
1973 "The mobilizationof law," Journalof Legal Studies 2(January):125-149.
Blaustein,AlbertP. and ClarenceC. Ferguson,Jr.
1962 Desegregationand the Law: The Meaningand Effectof the School Segregation
Cases. New York: VintageBooks.
Blumberg,AbrahamS.
1967 "The practice of law as a confidencegame: organizationalcooptation of a pro-
fession,"Law and Society Review 1(June) :15-39.
Blumrosen,AlfredW.
1962 "Legal process and labor law: some observationson the relationbetweenlaw and
sociology," Pp. 185-225 in WilliamM. Evan (ed.), Law and Sociology. New York:
Free Pressof Glencoe.
Caplovitz,David
1963 The Poor Pay More, New York: The Free Press.
Carlin,JeromeE., JanHoward,and Sheldon L. Messinger
1966 "Civil justice and the poor: issuesforsociologicalresearch,"Law and Society Re-
view 1(November):9-89.
Chambliss,WilliamJ. and RobertB. Seidman
1971 Law, Order,and Power. Reading,Mass: Addison-Wesley.
Cicourel,Aaron V.
1968 The Social Organizationof JuvenileJustice.New York: Wiley.
Diamond, Stanley
1971 "The rule of law versustheorderofcustom,"Pp. 115-144 in RobertP. Wolff(ed.),
The Rule of Law. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Epstein,A. L.
1958 Politicsin an Urban AfricanCommunity.Manchester:ManchesterUniversity.
Etzioni, Amitai
1968 The ActiveSociety. New York: The Free Press.
Fuller,Lon L.
1964 The Moralityof Law. New Haven: Yale University.
1971 "Human interactionand the law," Pp. 171-217 in RobertP. Wolff(ed.), The Rule
of Law. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Galarza, Ernesto
1970 Spiders in the House and Workersin the Field. South Bend: University of Notre
Dame.
Galliher,JohnF.
1971 "Explanations of police behavior: a critical review and analysis," Sociological
Quarterly12(Summer) :308-318.
Gamson,WilliamA.
1968 Power and Discontent.Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey.
Gibbs,JackP.
1968 "Definitionsof law and empiricalquestions," Law and Society Review 2(May)
429-446.
Gibbs,JamesL., Jr.
1963 "The Kpelle Moot: a therapeuticmodel forthe informalsettlementof disputes,"
Africa33:1-11.
Hall, Jerome
1963 ComparativeLaw and Social Theory.Baton Rogue: Louisiana State University.
Hoebel, E. A.
1954 The Law of PrimitiveMan. Cambridge:HarvardUniversity.
Lefcourt,Robert(ed.)
1971 Law Againstthe People. New York: VintageBooks.
Macaulay,Stewart
1963 "Non-contractualrelations in business: a preliminarystudy." AmericanSocio-
logical Review 28(February) :55-67.
Massell,GregoryJ.
1968 "Law as an instrument of revolutionarychangein a traditionalmilieu: the case of
Soviet CentralAsia." Law and Society Review 2(February) :179-228.
May, HenryJ.
1955 The South AfricanConstitution.ThirdEdition) Cape Town: Juta.

This content downloaded from 128.252.67.66 on Tue, 6 Aug 2013 14:49:58 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
290 TURK
McWilliams,Carey
1942 Ill Fares the Land: Migrantsand MigratoryLabor in the United States. Boston:
Little,Brown.
Moore,Howard,Jr.
1971 "Brown v Board of Education: The Court's relationshipto Black liberation."
Pp. 55-64 in Robert Lefcourt(ed.), Law Againstthe People. New York: Vintage
Books.
Nader,Laura (ed.)
1969 Law in Cultureand Society.Chicago: Aldine.
Nonet,Philippe
1969 AdministrativeJustice: Advocacy and Change in a GovernmentAgency. New
York: RussellSage Foundation.
Pospisil,Leopold
1971 Anthropologyof Law: A ComparativeTheory.New York: Harperand Row.
Quinney,Richard
1974 Critiqueof Legal Order.Boston: Little,Brown.
Russell,Bertrand
1938 Power: A New Social Analysis.London: Allen and Unwin.
Sachs, Albie
1973 Justicein South Africa.Berkeley:Universityof California.
Schermerhorn, RichardA.
1961 Society and Power. New York: Random House.
Schwartz,RichardD.
1974 "Legal evolutionand the Durkheimhypothesis:a replyto ProfessorBaxi." Law
and Society Review 8(Summer) :653-668.
Schwartz,RichardD. and JamesC. Miller
1964 "Legal evolution and societal complexity." AmericanJournalof Sociology 70
(September):159-169.
Schwartz,RichardD. and JeromeH. Skolnick(eds.)
1970 Societyand the Legal Order.New York: Basic Books.
Selznick,Philip
1961 "Sociology and naturallaw." NaturalLaw Forum 6:84-108.
1968 "The sociology of law." Pp. 50-59 in David L. Sills (ed.), InternationalEncyclo-
pedia of the Social Sciences,vol. 9. New York: Macmillanand The Free Press.
1969 Law, Society,and IndustrialJustice.New York: RussellSage Foundation.
Stone, Julius
1965 Human Law and HumanJustice.Stanford:StanfordUniversity.
Swett,Daniel H.
1969 "Culturalbias in the Americanlegal system."Law and Society Review4(August)
:79-110.
Tangri,BeverlyS.
1967 Federal Legislationas an Expressionof United States Public Policy Toward Agri-
culturalLabor, 1914-1954. Berkeley:Universityof California,unpublishedPh.D.
dissertation.
tenBroek,Jacobus(ed.)
1966 The Law of the Poor. San Francisco: Chandler.
Tumin,MelvinM. and RobertRotberg
1957 "Leaders, the led, and the law: a case study in social change." Public Opinion
Quarterly21(Fall) :355-370.
Turk,AustinT.
1969 Criminality and Legal Order.Chicago: Rand McNally.
1972 Legal Sanctioningand Social Control. WashingtonD. C.: Supt. of Docs., U. S.
GovernmentPrintingOffice,DHEW Pub. No. (HSM) 72-9130.
Wimberley, Howard
1973 "Legal Evolution: One FurtherStep," AmericanJournalof Sociology 79 (July):
78-83.
Wirt,FrederickM.
1970 Politics of Southern Equality: Law and Social Change in a MississippiCounty.
Chicago: Aldine.
Wolff,RobertP. (ed.)
1971 The Rule of Law. New York: Simon and Schuster.

This content downloaded from 128.252.67.66 on Tue, 6 Aug 2013 14:49:58 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Law and Conflict 291
Zimring,Franklin,and Gordon Hawkins
1971 "The Legal Threat as an Instrumentof Social Change," Journalof Social Issues
27(2):33-48.
Zinn, Howard
1971 "The Conspiracyof Law," Pp. 15-36 in RobertP. Wolff(ed.), The Rule of Law.
New York: Simon and Schuster.

This content downloaded from 128.252.67.66 on Tue, 6 Aug 2013 14:49:58 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions