Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leongson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola,

Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang, Lasam, Palma, Bongalon, Ongtioco, Casungad, Villamayor, Lopez
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Balbino Cuison vs. Norton & Harrison Co. (1930)

Facts: On the afternoon of August 9, 1928, Moises Cuison, a boy 7 years of age, the son of the
plaintiff Balbino Cusion, was on his way to the Santa Mesa School in Manila in company with
his sister Marciana. As they came near to the fire station, some large pieces of lumber on a truck
which had stopped fell from it pinning the boy beneath, and causing his almost instant death. The
truck in questioned was owned by Antonio Ora. It was driven by Felix Jose, with Telesforo
Binoya as the washing and Francisco Bautista as the helper, the two latter being youths less
than18 years of age. Jose Binoya, and Bautista were employees of Ora. The truck was rented by
Ora to Norton & Harrison Co. On the truck were the letters "N-H," which were the first letters of
the firm name. Ora was in the employ of Norton & Harrison Co. as a capataz. It was his duty as
such employee to direct the loading and transportation of the lumber. When the accident
occurred the lumber had become loosened, and it was to rearrange it that the truck halted,
without, however, there arrangement having been made before the pieces of lumber had fallen
and killed the boy.

Plaintiff filed an action to recover damages in the amount of P30,000 for the death of his
son allegedly to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant. Court of First Instance
absolved the defendant from the complaint.

Binoya and Bautista, pleaded guilty to the crime of homicide through reckless
negligence, and were sentenced accordingly.

Issue: Whether Ora was a servant of Norton & Harrison Co. or an independent contractor.

Ruling: Ora was a contractor and an employee at the same time of Norton & Harrison Co.

The basis of civil law liability is not respondeat superior but the relationship
of paterfamilias. This theory bases the liability of the master ultimately on his own negligece and
not on that of his servant.

Under the civil law, an employer is only liable for the negligence of his employees in the
discharge of their respective duties. Here Ora was a contractor, but it does not necessarily follow
that he was an independent contractor. The reason for this distinction is that the employer
retained the power of directing and controlling the work. The chauffeur and the two persons on
the truck were the employees of Ora, the contractor, but Ora, the contractor, was an employee of
Norton & Harrison Co., charged with the duty of directing the loading and transportation of the
lumber. And it was the negligence in loading the lumber and the use of minors on the truck
which caused the death of the unfortunate boy. On the facts and the law, Ora was not an
independent contractor, but was the servant of the defendant, and for his negligence defendant
was responsible.
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leongson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola,
Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang, Lasam, Palma, Bongalon, Ongtioco, Casungad, Villamayor, Lopez
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De Leon Brokerage Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals (1962)

Facts: Respondent Angeline Steen suffered injuries as a result of the collision between the
passenger jeepney in which she was riding, and petitioner's (De Leon Brokerage Co. , Inc.) cargo
truck recklessly driven by its employee, Augusto Luna. Luna had been prosecuted and convicted
of the crime of homicide with physical injuries thru reckless imprudence. In the criminal action
against Luna (and the driver of the passenger jeepney, who was, however, acquitted), respondent
had reserved her right to file a separate civil action.

After a judgment of conviction had been rendered, respondent filed in CFI Manila an
action for recovery of damages against Luna and petitioner. As proof of Luna's negligence, she
presented during the hearing the judgment of conviction in the criminal case and likewise
established her claim for actual, moral and exemplary damages. Defendants (Luna and
petitioner) sought to prove by means of the former's testimony that he was not engaged in the
performance of his duties at the time of the accident.

CFI Manila held petitioner and Luna solidarily liable to respondent for the sums of
P1,183.70 for actual expenses; P3,000.00 for unpaid medical fees; P7,000.00 as moral damages;
and P1,000.00 as attorney's fees. CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issues:
1. Whether respondent was suing for damages resulting from a quasi-delict or for civil
liability arising from crime.
2. Whether the judgment of conviction is admissible against it as evidence of a quasi-delict.
3. Whether the employee, Luna, was in the discharge of his duties at the time of the
accident.
4. Whether De Leon Brokerage Co., Inc. can be held solidarily liable with Luna for
damages.

Ruling:
1. Respondent's complaint is based on a quasi delict. She alleged that she suffered injuries
because of the carelessness and imprudence of petitioner's chauffeur who was driving the
cargo truck belonging to petitioner, which truck collided with the passenger jeepney
wherein she was riding. Since averment had been made of the employer-employee
relationship and of the damages caused by the employee on occasion of his function,
there is a clear statement of a right of action under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The
complaint does not, and did not have to allege that petitioner did not exercise due
deligence in choosing and supervising Luna, because this is a matter of defense.

The reservation made in the criminal action does not preclude a subsequent action
based on a quasi-delict. It cannot be inferred therefrom that respondent had chosen to file
the very civil action she had reserved. The only conclusion that can reasonably be drawn
is that she did not want the question of damages threshed out in the criminal action, but
preferred to have this issue decided in a separate civil action.
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leongson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola,
Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang, Lasam, Palma, Bongalon, Ongtioco, Casungad, Villamayor, Lopez
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2. Considering that the judgment of conviction had been admitted without objection, its
competency can no longer be questioned on appeal. It established the fact of Luna's
negligence, giving rise to the presumption that petitioner had been negligent in the
selection and supervision of its employees. And petitioner failed to prove that it had
exercised such requisite care and diligence as would relieve it from responsibility.

3. Luna testified that on the day of the accident he had been instructed to go to Pampanga,
from there to proceed to Nueva Ecija, but that after unloading his cargo in Pampanga, he
at once returned to Manila. However, his reason for immediately returning to Manila is
not clear. He could have returned for purposes of repair. It does not appear that he was on
an errand of his own. In the absence of determinative proof that the deviation was so
complete as would constitute a cessation or suspension of his service, petitioner should be
held liable.

4. Since both Luna and petitioner are responsible for the quasi-delict, their liablity is
solidary, although the latter can recover from the former whatever sums it pays to
respondent.

SC affirmed the decision of the CA.

Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela vs. Court of Appeals (1996)

Facts: Plaintiff's version of the accident is as follows: At around 2:00 in the morning of June 24,
1990, plaintiff Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving a blue Mitsubishi lancer from her restaurant
at Marcos highway to her home. She was travelling along Aurora Blvd. heading towards the
direction of Manila. Before reaching A. Lake Street, she noticed something wrong with her tires;
she stopped at a lighted place to verify whether she had a flat tire and to solicit help if needed.
She parked along the sidewalk, about 1-1/2 feet away, put on her emergency lights, alighted from
the car, and went to the rear to open the trunk. She was standing at the left side of the rear of her
car pointing to the tools to a man who will help her fix the tire when she was suddenly bumped
by a Mitsubishi Lancer driven by defendant Richard Li and registered in the name of defendant
Alexander Commercial, Inc. Because of the impact, plaintiff was thrown against the windshield
of the car of the defendant, which was destroyed, and then fell to the ground. She was pulled out
from under defendant's car. She was brought to the UERM Medical Memorial Center where she
was found to have a "traumatic amputation, leg, left up to distal thigh (above knee)". She was
confined in the hospital for twenty (20) days and was eventually fitted with an artificial leg. The
expenses for the hospital confinement (P120,000.00) and the cost of the artificial leg
(P27,000.00) were paid by defendants from the car insurance.

In her complaint, plaintiff prayed for moral damages in the amount of P1 million,
exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 and other medical and related expenses
amounting to a total of P180,000.00, including loss of expected earnings.

Defendant Richard Li denied that he was negligent. He was on his way home.
Considering that it was raining, visibility was affected and the road was wet. Traffic was light.
He testified that he was driving along the inner portion of the right lane of Aurora Blvd. towards
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leongson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola,
Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang, Lasam, Palma, Bongalon, Ongtioco, Casungad, Villamayor, Lopez
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the direction of Araneta Avenue, when he was suddenly confronted, in the vicinity of A. Lake
Street, San Juan, with a car coming from the opposite direction, travelling at 80 kph, with "full
bright lights". Temporarily blinded, he instinctively swerved to the right to avoid colliding with
the oncoming vehicle, and bumped plaintiff's car, which he did not see because it was midnight
blue in color, with no parking lights or early warning device, and the area was poorly lighted. He
alleged in his defense that the left rear portion of plaintiff's car was protruding as it was then "at a
standstill diagonally" on the outer portion of the right lane towards Araneta Avenue. Defendants
counterclaimed for damages, alleging that plaintiff was reckless or negligent, as she was not a
licensed driver.

The lower court sustained the plaintiff's submissions and found defendant Richard Li
guilty of gross negligence and liable for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. The trial
court likewise held Alexander Commercial, Inc., Li's employer, jointly and severally liable for
damages pursuant to Article 2180. The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the
defendant Li was liable for the injuries sustained by the plaintiff but absolved the Li's employer,
Alexander Commercial, Inc.

Both parties assail the respondent court's decision by filing two separate petitions. Both
petitions were consolidated.

Issue: Whether Alexander Commercial, Inc. is liable as the owner of the car driven by Richard
Li.

Ruling: The Supreme Court concluded that Li was negligent in driving his company-issued
Mitsubishi Lancer.

It sustained the finding of the CA that Valenzuela was not guilty of contributory
negligence. Under the "emergency rule", an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation
of danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be
adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what
subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was
brought by his own negligence. Valenzuela did exercise the standard reasonably dictated by the
emergency and could not be considered to have contributed to the unfortunate circumstances
which eventually led to the amputation of one of her lower extremities. The emergency which
led her to park her car on a sidewalk in Aurora Boulevard was not of her own making, and it was
evident that she had taken all reasonable precautions.

The relationship in question is not based on the principle of respondeat superior, which
holds the master liable for acts of the servant, but that of pater familias, in which the liability
ultimately falls upon the employer, for his failure to exercise the diligence of a good father of the
family in the selection and supervision of his employees. Utilizing the bonus pater
familias standard expressed in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, we are of the opinion that Li's
employer, Alexander Commercial, Inc. is jointly and solidarily liable for the damage caused by
the accident of June 24, 1990.
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leongson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola,
Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang, Lasam, Palma, Bongalon, Ongtioco, Casungad, Villamayor, Lopez
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Li was an Assistant Manager of Alexander Commercial, Inc. In his testimony before the
trial court, he admitted that his functions as Assistant Manager did not require him to
scrupulously keep normal office hours as he was required quite often to perform work outside
the office, visiting prospective buyers and contacting and meeting with company clients. 30 These
meetings, clearly, were not strictly confined to routine hours because, as a managerial employee
tasked with the job of representing his company with its clients, meetings with clients were both
social as well as work-related functions. The service car assigned to Li by Alexander
Commercial, Inc. therefore enabled both Li - as well as the corporation - to put up the front of a
highly successful entity, increasing the latter's goodwill before its clientele. It also facilitated
meeting between Li and its clients by providing the former with a convenient mode of travel.

Alexander Commercial, Inc. has not demonstrated that it exercised the care and diligence
of a good father of the family in entrusting its company car to Li. No allegations were made as to
whether or not the company took the steps necessary to determine or ascertain the driving
proficiency and history of Li, to whom it gave full and unlimited use of a company car. Not
having been able to overcome the burden of demonstrating that it should be absolved of liability
for entrusting its company car to Li, said company, based on the principle of bonus pater
familias, ought to be jointly and severally liable with the former for the injuries sustained by Ma.
Lourdes Valenzuela during the accident.

(c) Illicit act of employee is by reason of the functions entrusted to him

Dulay v. Court of Appeal (1995)

FACTS: On December 7, 1988, an altercation between Benigno Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon
Dulay occurred at the "Big Bang Sa Alabang," Alabang Village, Muntinlupa as a result of which
Benigno Torzuela, the security guard on duty at the said carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon
Dulay. Thereafter, the wife of the deceased filed an action for damages (actual, exemplary,
compensatory, and moral and Attorney’s fee) against Torzuela together with his employer, the
Superguard Investigation and Security (Superguard). On its answer, the Superguard contends
that the act of Torzuela is beyond the scope of his duty and a complaint for damages based on
negligence under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code, such as the one filed by petitioners, cannot
lie, since the civil liability under Article 2176 applies only to quasi-offenses under Article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code. Thus, the filing of the complaint is premature considering that the
conviction of Torzuela in a criminal case is a condition sine qua non for the employer's
subsidiary liability. The lower court grant the motion to dismiss of Superguard based on that
ground, which later upheld by the CA. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether Superguard is also liable for damages on the illicit act committed by its
employee by reason of the function entrusted to him.

HELD: Private respondents also contend that their liability is subsidiary under the Revised Penal
Code; and that they are not liable for Torzuela's act which is beyond the scope of his duties as a
security guard. It having been established that the instant action is not ex-delicto, petitioners may
proceed directly against Torzuela and the private respondents. Under Article 2180 of the New
Civil Code as aforequoted, when an injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leongson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola,
Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang, Lasam, Palma, Bongalon, Ongtioco, Casungad, Villamayor, Lopez
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instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or
employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after
selection or. The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not
conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the
insolvency of such employee. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private respondents to prove
that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of
their employee.
Since Article 2176 covers not only acts of negligence but also acts which are intentional and
voluntary, it was therefore erroneous on the part of the trial court to dismiss petitioner's
complaint simply because it failed to make allegations of attendant negligence attributable to
private respondents.

(d) Presumption of negligence and its effects

Umali v. Bacani (1976)

FACTS: On May 14, 1972, a storm with strong rain hit the Municipality of Alcala Pangasinan.
During the storm, the banana plants standing on an elevated ground were blown down and fell on
the electric wire on the transmission line of Alcala Electric Plant. As a result, the live electric
wire was cut, one end of which was left hanging on the electric post and the other fell to the
ground under the fallen banana plants. On the following morning, the barrio captain passed along
the area and saw the broken electric wire. Thus, he warned the people not to go near the live
wire. He also notified one of the laborer in the said Plant about the broken line and asked to fix
it. However, the laborer said he could not do it but he was going to find the lineman to fix the
said broken wire. Sometime after the barrio captain and Cipriano Baldomero had left the place, a
small boy of 3 years and 8 months old by the name of Manuel P. Saynes, whose house is just on
the opposite side of the road, went to the place where the broken line wire was and got in contact
with it. The boy was electrocuted and subsequently died. It was only after the electrocution of
Manuel Saynes that the broken wire was fixed by the lineman of the electric plant.

ISSUE: Whether there was negligence on the part of Umali as the owner and manager of Alcala
Electric Plant and thus liable under the concept of quasi-delict as a proximate cause for the death
due to electrocution of the child.

HELD: A careful examination of the record convinces Us that a series of negligence on the part
of defendants' employees in the Alcala Electric Plant resulted in the death of the victim by
electrocution. (1) That the employees did not take precautionary measures to eliminate the big
and tall bananas as it could be a source of danger to the electric line; (2) That known to the
employees of the plant that possible damage may brought by the storm, did not cut off the floe of
electricity along the lines; and (3) Employee Baldomero was negligent because even if he was
already made aware of the live cut wire, he did not have taken the necessary precaution to
prevent anybody from approaching the live wire; instead he left the premises and obviously
forgetting that if left unattended to it could endanger life and property.

Art. 2179 of the Civil Code provides that if the negligence of the plaintiff (parents of the victim
in this case) was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leongson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola,
Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang, Lasam, Palma, Bongalon, Ongtioco, Casungad, Villamayor, Lopez
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defendants' lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the
damages to be awarded. This law may be availed of by the petitioner but does not exempt him
from liability. Petitioner's liability for injury caused by his employees negligence is well defined
in par. 4, of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, which states:
The owner and manager of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by
their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on tile occasion of their
functions.

The negligence of the employee is presumed to be the negligence of the employer because the
employer is supposed to exercise supervision over the work of the employees. This liability of
the employer is primary and direct (Standard Vacuum Oil Co. vs. Tan and Court of Appeals, 107
Phil. 109). In fact the proper defense for the employer to raise so that he may escape liability is
to prove that he exercised, the diligence of the good father of the family to prevent damage not
only in the selection of his employees but also in adequately supervising them over their work.

Secosa v. Francisco (2004)

FACTS: On June 27, 1996, at around 4:00 p.m., Erwin Suarez Francisco, an 18 yr old, 3rd yr. PT
student of the Manila Central University, was riding a motorcycle along Radial 10 Avenue, near
the Veteran Shipyard Gate in the City of Manila. At the same time, Raymundo Odani Secosa,
was driving an Isuzu cargo truck owned by Dassad Warehousing and Port services Inc. on the
same road. Behind Francisco was a sand and gravel truck, which in turn was being tailed by the
Isuzu truck driven by Secosa. The three vehicles were traversing the southbound lane at a fairly
high speed. When Secosa overtook the sand and gravel truck, he bumped the motorcycle
causing Francisco to fall. The rear wheels of the Isuzu truck then ran over Francisco, which
resulted in his instantaneous death. Fearing for his life, Secosa left his truck and fled the scene
of the collision. Thereafter, the parents of Francisco filed an action for damages against Secosa
and Dassad Warehousing impleading Sy, its president. The lower court ruled against Secosa,
which affirmed by the CA in toto. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether Dassad Warehousing and Port Services, Inc. exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees

HELD: When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there instantly arises a
presumption that there was negligence on the part of the employer either in the selection of his
employee or in the supervision over him after such selection. The presumption, however, may
be rebutted by a clear showing on the part of the employer that it exercised the care and diligence
of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee. Hence, to evade
solidary liability for quasi-delict committed by an employee, the employer must adduce
sufficient proof that it exercised such degree of care.

How does an employer prove that he indeed exercised the diligence of a good father of a family
in the selection and supervision of his employee? xxx In the selection of prospective employees,
employers are required to examine them as to their qualifications, experience, and service
records. On the other hand, with respect to the supervision of employees, employers should
formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation, and impose disciplinary
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leongson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola,
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measures for breaches thereof. To establish these factors in a trial involving the issue of vicarious
liability, employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence.

Jurisprudentially, therefore, the employer must not merely present testimonial evidence to prove
that he observed the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his
employee, but he must also support such testimonial evidence with concrete or documentary
evidence. The reason for this is to obviate the biased nature of the employer’s testimony or that
of his witnesses.

Applying the foregoing doctrines to the present case, we hold that petitioner Dassad
Warehousing and Port Services, Inc. failed to conclusively prove that it had exercised the
requisite diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees.

Mercury Drug Corporation vs. Sebastian M. Baking (2007)

Facts: Sebastian M. Baking (Baking) went to the clinic of Dr. Cesar Sy for a medical check-up.
He underwent an ECG, blood, and hematology examinations and urinalysis, Dr. Sy found that
Baking’s blood sugar and triglyceride were above normal levels. Dr. Sy then gave Baking two
medical prescriptions – Diamicron for his blood sugar and Benalize tablets for his triglyceride.
Baking then proceeded to Mercury Drug Corporation (Alabang Branch, hereinafter, Mercury) to
buy the prescribed medicines. However, the saleslady misread the prescription for Diamicron as
a prescription for Dormicum. Thus, what was sold to Baking was Dormicum, a potent sleeping
tablet. After taking the said medicine for three consecutive days, Baking figured in a vehicular
accident. The car he was driving collided with the car of one Josie Peralta. Baking fell asleep
while driving and could not remember anything about the collision nor felt its impact. Suspecting
that the tablet he took may have a bearing on his physical and mental state at the time of the
collision, Baking returned to Dr. Sy’s clinic. Upon being shown the medicine, Dr. Sy was
shocked to find that what was sold to respondent was Dormicum, instead of the prescribed
Diamicron.

Baking filed with the RTC of Quezon City a complaint for damages against Mercury where the
RTC rendered a decision in favor of Baking ordering Mercury to pay the former damages as
fllows: (1) P250,000.00 as moral damages; (2) P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses; (3) plus ½% of the cost of the suit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision,
affirmed in toto the RTC judgment; MR was also denied, hence, this petition.

Issues:
1. Whether petitioner was negligent, and if so, whether such negligence was the proximate
cause of respondent’s accident; and
2. Whether the award of moral damages, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and cost of the suit
is justified.

Ruling: Petition is denied.

Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides:

 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leongson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola,
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Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence,
is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions
of this Chapter.

To sustain a claim based on the above provision, the following requisites must concur: (a)
damage suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant; and, (c) connection of
cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damage incurred by the
plaintiff.

There is no dispute that respondent suffered damages.

It is generally recognized that the drugstore business is imbued with public interest. The health
and safety of the people will be put into jeopardy if drugstore employees will not exercise the
highest degree of care and diligence in selling medicines. Inasmuch as the matter of negligence is
a question of fact, we defer to the findings of the trial court affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Obviously, petitioner’s employee was grossly negligent in selling to Baking Dormicum, instead
of the prescribed Diamicron. Considering that a fatal mistake could be a matter of life and death
for a buying patient, the said employee should have been very cautious in dispensing medicines.
She should have verified whether the medicine she gave respondent was indeed the one
prescribed by his physician. The care required must be commensurate with the danger involved,
and the skill employed must correspond with the superior knowledge of the business which the
law demands.

Petitioner contends that the proximate cause of the accident was respondent’s negligence in
driving his car.

We disagree.

Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in a natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, such that the result would not have
occurred otherwise. Proximate cause is determined from the facts of each case, upon a combined
consideration of logic, common sense, policy, and precedent.

Here, the vehicular accident could not have occurred had petitioner’s employee been careful in
reading Dr. Sy’s prescription. Without the potent effects of Dormicum, a sleeping tablet, it was
unlikely that respondent would fall asleep while driving his car, resulting in a collision.

Complementing Article 2176 is Article 2180 of the same Code which states:
ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by
their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their
functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within
the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leongson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola,
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xxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

It is thus clear that the employer of a negligent employee is liable for the damages caused by the
latter. When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there instantly arises a
presumption of the law that there has been negligence on the part of the employer, either in the
selection of his employee or in the supervision over him, after such selection. The presumption,
however, may be rebutted by a clear showing on the part of the employer that he has exercised
the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his
employee. Here, petitioner's failure to prove that it exercised the due diligence of a good father of
a family in the selection and supervision of its employee will make it solidarily liable for
damages caused by the latter.

(ii) Employer need not be engaged in business to be held liable

Jose A. Ortaliz vs. Corado Echarri (1957)

Facts: Jose A. Ortaliz (Jose) is the lawful father of the child, Winston Ortaliz. On or about
December 18, 1953, at the corner of Washington and Justicia Streets, Bacolod City, Philippines,
the Studebaker Sedan Car with Plate No. 35-1138 of the Corado Echarri (Echarri), which was, at
that time of accident was driven and controlled by Segundino Estanda, a driver under the employ
of the Echarri. The said vehicle struck Winston Ortaliz causing upon him physical injuries as a
result he was taken to the Occidental Negros Provincial Hospital.

A criminal case was filed against Segundino Estanda for the crime of Slight Physical Injuries
Through Reckless Imprudence, where the latter pleaded guilty to the crime charge where he was
sentence to suffer the penalty of five (5) days of Arresto Menor and to pay the costs in a
Decision rendered in said case. Jose is now claiming in a separate civil case damages he had
suffered in the form of expenses paid for the hospitalization, medicines, physicians' fees and
incidental expense of his son, Winston Ortaliz, in the amount of P446.58; and further asks for
moral damages of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000), Philippine Currency.

On the other hand, Echarri filed a motion to dismiss wherein, after admitting the ownership of
the Studebaker Sedan car with plate No. 35-1138, he alleged that the complaint does not allege
that defendant was nor is engaged in any business or industry in conjunction with which he has
at any time used the said car, much less on the occasion of the alleged accident, nor the
defendant had at any time put out the said car for hire; and that the obligation or liability of
Echarri, if any, for the damages alleged in the complaint, being an obligation arising from a
criminal offense, is governed by Article 1161 of the Civil Code, which, in turn, makes the penal
laws applicable thereto; and under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, it is essential, in order
for an employer to be liable subsidiarily for felonies committed by his employee, that the former
be engaged in some kind of industry, and that the employer had committed the crime in the
discharge of his duties in connection with such industry. Therefore, defendant cannot be held
subsidiarily liable for the crime committed by his driver as alleged in plaintiff's complaint.
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leongson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola,
Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang, Lasam, Palma, Bongalon, Ongtioco, Casungad, Villamayor, Lopez
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Trial court (Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental) granted said motion to dismiss, hence
this petition.

Issue: Whether or not CFI erred in dismissing the case for failure to state the cause of action.

Ruling: Petition granted. Remanded back to the trial court for further proceedings.

Jose contends that under paragraph 2 of Article 2884 of the Civil Code and paragraph 1 and 5 of
Article 2180, a sufficient cause of action has been clearly alleged in the disputed complaint and
therefore the same should not have been dismissed. Article 2180 in part provides:
ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omission but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.

and Article 2184 in its last paragraph provides:

If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of Article 2180 are applicable.

Having in view the aforequoted provisions of law and those of Article 2176 to the effect that
"Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done", there seems to be good reason to support plaintiff's
contention that the complaint in question states sufficient cause of action. Defendant-appellee,
however, claims that there is no allegation in the complaint that "the defendant was engaged in
some kind of industry and that the employee had committed the crime in the discharge of his
duties in connection with such industry," hence the defendant cannot be held subsidiarily liable
for the crime committed by his driver and therefore the complaint failed to state facts sufficient
to constitute a cause of action. But paragraph 5 of Article 2180 refutes this contention for it
clearly provides that “Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.”

Echarri also contends that when the judgment in Criminal Case No. 2607 of the Municipal Court
of Bacolod was rendered against the driver Segundino Estanda, Jose did not reserve the civil
action and thus he lost his right thereto and consequently the present action against the
defendant-appellee would not lie. This contention, however, is untenable, for Article 33 of the
Civil Code clearly provides:
ART. 33. In cases of physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct
from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

(iii) Defense of negligence in selection and supervision of employees

Mr. and Mrs. Amador C. Ong vs. Metropolitan Water District (1958)

Facts: Metropolitan Water District (MWD) owns and operates three recreational swimming
pools at its Balara filters, Diliman, Quezon City, to which people are invited and for which a
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leongson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola,
Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang, Lasam, Palma, Bongalon, Ongtioco, Casungad, Villamayor, Lopez
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nominal fee. The main pool it between two small pools of oval shape known as the "Wading
pool" and the "Beginners Pool." The care and supervision of the pools and the users thereof is
entrusted to a recreational section composed of Simeon Chongco as chief, Armando Rule, a male
nurse, and six lifeguards who had taken the life-saving course given by the Philippine Red Cross
at the YMCA in Manila. For the safety of its patrons, MWD has provided the pools with a ring
buoy, toy roof, towing line, saving kit and a resuscitator. There is also a sanitary inspector who is
in charge of a clinic established for the benefit of the patrons. MWD has also on display in a
conspicuous place certain rules and regulations governing the use of the pools, one of which
prohibits the swimming in the pool alone or without any attendant. Although MWD does not
maintain a full-time physician in the swimming pool compound, it has however a nurse and a
sanitary inspector ready to administer injections or operate the oxygen resuscitator if the need
should arise.

In the afternoon of July 5, 1952, Dominador Ong, a 14-year old high school student and boy
scout, and his brothers Ruben and Eusebio, went to MWC’s swimming pools. After paying the
requisite admission fee, they immediately went to one of the small pools where the water was
shallow. After a while, Dominador Ong told his brothers that he was going to the locker room in
an adjoining building to drink a bottle of coke. Upon hearing this, Ruben and Eusebio went to
the bigger pool leaving Dominador in the small pool and so they did not see the latter when he
left the pool to get a bottle of coke. In that afternoon, there were two lifeguards on duty in the
pool compound, namely, Manuel Abaño and Mario Villanueva. Between 4:40 to 4:45 p.m., some
boys who were in the pool area informed a bather by the name of Andres Hagad, Jr., that
somebody was swimming under water for quite a long time. Another boy informed lifeguard
Manuel Abaño of the same happening and Abaño immediately jumped into the big swimming
pool and retrieved the apparently lifeless body of Dominador Ong from the bottom. The body
was placed at the edge of the pool and Abaño immediately applied manual artificial respiration.
Soon after, male nurse Armando Rule came to render assistance, followed by sanitary inspector
Iluminado Vicente who, after being called by phone from the clinic by one of the security
guards, boarded a jeep carrying with him the resuscitator and a medicine kit, and upon arriving
he injected the boy with camphorated oil. After the injection, Vicente left on a jeep in order to
fetch Dr. Ayuyao from the University of the Philippines. Meanwhile, Abaño continued the
artificial manual respiration, and when this failed to revive him, they applied the resuscitator
until the two oxygen tanks were exhausted. Not long thereafter, Dr. Ayuyao arrived with another
resuscitator, but the same became of no use because he found the boy already dead. The doctor
ordered that the body be taken to the clinic.

In the evening of the same day, July 5, 1952, the incident was investigated by the Police
Department of Quezon City and in the investigation boys Ruben Ong and Andres Hagad, Jr.
gave written statements. On the following day, July 6, 1952, an autopsy was performed by Dr.
Enrique V. de los Santos, Chief, Medico Legal Division, National Bureau of Investigation, who
found in the body of the deceased the following: an abrasion on the right elbow lateral aspect;
contusion on the right forehead; hematoma on the scalp, frontal region, right side; a congestion
in the brain with petechial subcortical hemorrhage, frontal lobe; cyanosis on the face and on the
nails; the lung was soggy with fine froth in the bronchioles; dark fluid blood in the heart;
congestion in the visceral organs, and brownish fluid in the stomach. The death was due to
asphyxia by submersion in water.
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leongson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola,
Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang, Lasam, Palma, Bongalon, Ongtioco, Casungad, Villamayor, Lopez
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Issue: Whether the death of minor Dominador Ong can be attributed to the negligence of
defendant and/or its employees so as to entitle plaintiffs to recover damages.

Ruling: Petition is denied.

There is no question that appellants had striven to prove that MWD failed to take the necessary
precaution to protect the lives of its patrons by not placing at the swimming pools efficient and
competent employees who may render help at a moment's notice, and they ascribed such
negligence to MWD because the lifeguard it had on the occasion minor Ong was drowning was
not available or was attending to something else with the result that his help came late. Thus,
Ongs tried to prove through the testimony of Andres Hagad, Jr. and Ruben Ong that when
Eusebio Ong and Hagad, Jr. detected that there was a drowning person in the bottom of the big
swimming pool and shouted to the lifeguard for help, lifeguard Manuel Abaño did not
immediately respond to the alarm and it was only upon the third call that he threw away the
magazine he was reading and allowed three or four minutes to elapse before retrieving the body
from the water. This negligence of Abaño, they contend, is attributable to MWD.

But the claim of these two witnesses not only was vehemently denied by lifeguard Abaño, but is
belied by the written statements given by them in the investigation conducted by the Police
Department of Quezon City approximately three hours after the happening of the accident. Thus,
these two boys admitted in the investigation that they narrated in their statements everything they
knew of the accident, but, as found by the trial, nowhere in said statements do they state that the
lifeguard was chatting with the security guard at the gate of the swimming pool or was reading a
comic magazine when the alarm was given for which reason he failed to immediately respond to
the alarm. On the contrary, what Ruben Ong particularly emphasized therein was that after the
lifeguard heard the shouts for help, the latter immediately dived into the pool to retrieve the
person under water who turned out to be his brother. For this reason, the trial court made this
conclusion: “The testimony of Ruben Ong and Andres Hagad, Jr. as to the alleged failure of the
lifeguard Abaño to immediately respond to their call may therefore be disregarded because they
are belied by their written statements. (Emphasis supplied.)

On the other hand, there is sufficient evidence to show that MWD has taken all necessary
precautions to avoid danger to the lives of its patrons or prevent accident which may cause their
death. Thus, it has been shown that the swimming pools of MWD are provided with a ring buoy,
toy roof, towing line, oxygen resuscitator and a first aid medicine kit. The bottom of the pools is
painted with black colors so as to insure clear visibility. There is on display in a conspicuous
place within the area certain rules and regulations governing the use of the pools. MWD employs
six lifeguards who are all trained as they had taken a course for that purpose and were issued
certificates of proficiency. These lifeguards work on schedule prepared by their chief and
arranged in such a way as to have two guards at a time on duty to look after the safety of the
bathers. There is a male nurse and a sanitary inspector with a clinic provided with oxygen
resuscitator. And there are security guards who are available always in case of emergency. The
record also shows that when the body of minor Ong was retrieved from the bottom of the pool,
the employees of MWD did everything possible to bring him back to life.
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leongson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola,
Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang, Lasam, Palma, Bongalon, Ongtioco, Casungad, Villamayor, Lopez
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Sensing that their former theory as regards the liability of MWD may not be of much help,
appellants now switch to the theory that even if it be assumed that the deceased is partly to be
blamed for the unfortunate incident, still MWD may be held liable under the doctrine of "last
clear chance" for the reason that, having the last opportunity to save the victim, it failed to do so.
We do not see how this doctrine may apply considering that the record does not show how minor
Ong came into the big swimming pool. The only thing the record discloses is that minor Ong
informed his elder brothers that he was going to the locker room to drink a bottle of coke but that
from that time on nobody knew what happened to him until his lifeless body was retrieved. The
doctrine of last clear chance simply means that the negligence of a claimant does not preclude a
recovery for the negligence of defendant where it appears that the latter, by exercising reasonable
care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to claimant notwithstanding his
negligence. Or, "As the doctrine usually is stated, a person who has the last clear chance or
opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or the
negligence of a third person which is imputed to his opponent, is considered in law solely
responsible for the consequences of the accident." (38 Am. Jur. pp. 900-902)
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of
antecedent negligence in planting himself in the wrong side of the road. But as we have already
stated, the defendant was also negligent; and in such case the problem always is to discover
which agent is immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of the
two parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the
negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these circumstances, the law is that a
person who has the last clear chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable
with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party. (Picart vs.
Smith, 37 Phil., 809)

Since it is not known how minor Ong came into the big swimming pool and it being apparent
that he went there without any companion in violation of one of the regulations of MWD as
regards the use of the pools, and it appearing that lifeguard Abaño responded to the call for help
as soon as his attention was called to it and immediately after retrieving the body all efforts at the
disposal of MWD had been put into play in order to bring him back to life, it is clear that there is
no room for the application of the doctrine now invoked by appellants to impute liability to
MWD.
The last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party charged is required to act
instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after
the peril is or should have been discovered; at least in cases in which any previous negligence of
the party charged cannot be said to have contributed to the injury. O'Mally vs. Eagan, 77 ALR
582, 43 Wyo. 233, 350, 2, P2d 1063. (A.L.R. Digest, Vol. 8, pp. 955-956)

Ramos v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co (1967)

FACTS: Placido and Augusto Ramos sued Pepsi-Cola Bottling and Andres Bonifacio in the
Court of First Instance of Manila as a consequence of a collision, on May 10, 1958, involving the
car of Placido Ramos and a tractor-truck and trailer of PEPESI-COLA. Said car was at the time
of the collision driven by Augusto Ramos, son and co-plaintiff of Placido. PEPSI-COLA's
tractor-truck was then driven by its driver and co-defendant Andres Bonifacio.
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leongson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola,
Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang, Lasam, Palma, Bongalon, Ongtioco, Casungad, Villamayor, Lopez
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The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Ramos, finding Bonifacio negligent and declaring
that PEPSI-COLA had not sufficiently proved its having exercised the due diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent the damage.

Not satisfied with the judgment, PEPSI appealed to the CA saying that he had observed due
diligence in selecting its employees. PEPSI has explained their process in selecting their drivers
thru the testimony of Anasco. they looked into his background, submitted clearances, previous
experience, physical examination and later on, he was sent to the pool house to take the usual
driver's examination, consisting of theoretical and practical exam.

CA found the employer PEPSI not liable. hence the petition of Ramos.

ISSUE: WON PEPSI has observed due diligence in selecting its employees? WON it is liable to
Ramos?

DECISION: No.

Such being the case, there can be no doubt that PEPSI-COLA exercised the required due
diligence in the selection of its driver. As ruled by this Court in Campo vs. Camarote 53 O.G.
2794, 2797: "In order that the defendant may be considered as having exercised all diligence of a
good father of a family, he should not be satisfied with the mere possession of a professional
driver's license; he should have carefully examined the applicant for employment as to his
qualifications, his experience and record of service.

Article 2180 of our Civil Code is very explicit that the owner's responsibility shall cease once it
proves that it has observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. The
Bahia case merely clarified what that diligence consists of, namely, diligence in the selection and
supervision of the driver-employee. Neither could SC apply the respondent superior principle.
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the basis of an employer's liability is his own negligence,
not that of his employees. The former is made responsible for failing to properly and diligently
select and supervise his erring employees. We do not — and have never — followed the
respondent superior rule. So, the American rulings cited by petitioners, based as they are on said
doctrine, are not authoritative here.

Filamer Christian Institute v. IAC (1992)

FACTS: Daniel Funtecha was a working student of Filamer. He was assigned as the school
janitor to clean the school 2 hours every morning. Allan Masa was the son of the school
president and at the same time he was the school’s jeepney service driver. On October 20, 1977
at about 6:30pm, after driving the students to their homes, Masa returned to the school to report
and thereafter have to go home with the jeep so that he could fetch the students early in the
morning. Masa and Funtecha live in the same place so they usually go home together. Funtecha
had a student driver’s license so Masa let him take the driver’s seat. While Funtecha was driving,
he accidentally hit an elderly Kapunan which led to his hospitalization for 20 days. Kapunan
filed a criminal case and an independent civil action based on Article 2180 against Funtecha.
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leongson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola,
Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang, Lasam, Palma, Bongalon, Ongtioco, Casungad, Villamayor, Lopez
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In the independent civil action, the lower court ruled that Filamer is subsidiarily liable for the
tortious act of Funcheta and was compelled to pay for damages based on Article 2180 which
provides that employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. Filamer assailed the decision and it
argued that under Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Labor Code IRR, working scholars are
excluded from the employment coverage hence there is no employer-employee relations between
Filamer and Funcheta; that the negligent act of Funcheta was due to negligence only attributable
to him alone as it is outside his assigned task of being the school janitor. The CA denied
Filamer’s appeal but the Supreme Court agreed with Filamer. Kapunan filed for a motion for
reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether or not Filamer should be held subsidiarily liable.

DECISION: Yes.

This time, the SC ruled in favor of Kapunan (actually his heirs cause by this time Kapunan was
already dead). The provisions of Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Labor Code IRR was only
meant to provide guidelines as compliance with labor provisions on working conditions, rest
periods, and wages is concerned. This does not in any way affect the provisions of any other
laws like the civil code. The IRR cannot defeat the provisions of the Civil Code. In other words,
Rule X is merely a guide to the enforcement of the substantive law on labor. There is a
distinction hence Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules is not the decisive law in a civil suit
for damages instituted by an injured person during a vehicular accident against a working student
of a school and against the school itself.

The present case does not deal with a labor dispute on conditions of employment between an
alleged employee and an alleged employer. It invokes a claim brought by one for damages for
injury caused by the patently negligent acts of a person, against both doer-employee and his
employer. Hence, the reliance on the implementing rule on labor to disregard the primary
liability of an employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is misplaced. An implementing rule
on labor cannot be used by an employer as a shield to void liability under the substantive
provisions of the Civil Code.

Funtecha is an employee of Filamer. He need not have an official appointment for a driver’s
position in order that Filamer may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act, it being
sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of Filamer (the act
of driving the jeep from the school to Masa’s house is beneficial to the school because this
enables Masa to do a timely school transportation service in the morning). Hence, the fact that
Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting with the scope of his janitorial duties does
not relieve Filamer of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was
negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant or employee, or in the supervision over
him. Filamer has failed to show proof of its having exercised the required diligence of a good
father of a family over its employees Funtecha and Allan.
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leongson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola,
Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang, Lasam, Palma, Bongalon, Ongtioco, Casungad, Villamayor, Lopez
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Child Learning Center v Tagorio (2005)

Facts: In the afternoon of March 5, 1991, between 1 and 2 p.m., Timothy entered the boy’s
comfort room at the third floor of the Marymount building to answer the call of nature. He,
however, found himself locked inside and unable to get out. Timothy started to panic and so he
banged and kicked the door and yelled several times for help. When no help arrived he decided
to open the window to call for help. In the process of opening the window, Timothy went right
through and fell down three stories. Timothy was hospitalized and given medical treatment for
serious multiple physical injuries.

In its defense, CLC maintained that there was nothing defective about the locking mechanism of
the door and that the fall of Timothy was not due to its fault or negligence. CLC further
maintained that it had exercised the due care and diligence of a good father of a family to ensure
the safety, well-being and convenience of its students.

The trial court decided in favor of Tagorio. P200,253.12 as actual and compensatory damages,
P200,000 as moral damages, P50,000 as exemplary damages, P100,000 as attorney’s fees and the
costs of the suit. CA affirmed its decision.

Issue: WON CLC is negligent?

Decision: Yes.

In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, plaintiff has to prove by a
preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or negligence
of the defendant or some other person for whose act he must respond; and (3) the connection of
cause and effect between the fault or negligence and the damages incurred. In this tort case,
respondents contend that CLC failed to provide precautionary measures to avoid harm and injury
to its students in two instances: (1) failure to fix a defective door knob despite having been
notified of the problem; and (2) failure to install safety grills on the window where Timothy fell
from.

Petitioners’ argument that CLC exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of its employees is not decisive. Due diligence in the selection and
supervision of employees is applicable where the employer is being held responsible for the acts
or omissions of others under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. In this case, CLC’s liability is under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, premised on the fact of its own negligence in not ensuring that all
its doors are properly maintained.