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Case Assignment #3
1. Holiday Inn Manila and/or Huber Liner, et. al. vs. NLRC, et.al
G.R. No. 109114, September 14, 1993
Facts:
Elena Honasan applied for employment with the Holiday Inn and was on April 15, 1991, accepted for "on-the-job training" as a telephone operator for a
period of three weeks.1 For her services, she received food and transportation allowance. 2 On May 13, 1992, after completing her training, she was
employed on a "probationary basis" for a period of six months.
Her employment contract stipulated that the Hotel could terminate her probationary employment at any time prior to the expiration of the six-month
period in the event of her failure (a) to learn or progress in her job; (b) to faithfully observe and comply with the hotel rules and the instructions and
orders of her superiors; or (c) to perform her duties according to hotel standards.
Four days before the expiration of the stipulated deadline, Holiday Inn notified her of her dismissal, on the ground that her performance had not come up
to the standards of the Hotel.
RULING:
YES.
On the issue of illegal dismissal, we find that Honasan was placed by the petitioner on probation twice, first during her on-the-job training for three
weeks, and next during another period of six months, ostensibly in accordance with Article 281. Her probation clearly exceeded the period of six months
prescribed by this article.
Probation is the period during which the employer may determine if the employee is qualified for possible inclusion in the regular force. In the case at
bar, the period was for three weeks, during Honasan's on-the-job training. When her services were continued after this training, the petitioners in effect
recognized that she had passed probation and was qualified to be a regular employee.
Honasan was certainly under observation during her three-week on-the-job training. If her services proved unsatisfactory then, she could have been
dropped as early as during that period. But she was not. On the contrary, her services were continued, presumably because they were acceptable,
although she was formally placed this time on probation.
Even if it be supposed that the probation did not end with the three-week period of on-the-job training, there is still no reason why that period should not
be included in the stipulated six-month period of probation. Honasan was accepted for on-the-job training on April 15, 1991. Assuming that her probation
could be extended beyond that date, it nevertheless could continue only up to October 15, 1991, after the end of six months from the earlier date. Under
this more lenient approach, she had become a regular employee of Holiday Inn and acquired full security of tenure as of October 15, 1991.
The consequence is that she could no longer be summarily separated on the ground invoked by the petitioners.
We find in the Hotel's system of double probation a transparent scheme to circumvent the plain mandate of the law and make it easier for it to dismiss its
employees even after they shall have already passed probation. The petitioners had ample time to summarily terminate Honasan's services during her
period of probation if they were deemed unsatisfactory. Not having done so, they may dismiss her now only upon proof of any of the legal grounds for
the separation of regular employees, to be established according to the prescribed procedure.
Facts:
Petitioner Nitto Enterprises, a company engaged in the sale of glass and aluminum products, hired Roberto Capili sometime in May 1990 as an
apprentice machinist, molder and core maker as evidenced by an apprenticeship agreement 2 for a period of six (6) months from May 28, 1990 to
November 28, 1990 with a daily wage rate of P66.75 which was 75% of the applicable minimum wage.
At around 1:00 p.m. of August 2, 1990, Roberto Capili who was handling a piece of glass which he was working on, accidentally hit and injured the leg of
an office secretary who was treated at a nearby hospital.
Later that same day, after office hours, private respondent entered a workshop within the office premises which was not his work station. There, he
operated one of the power press machines without authority and in the process injured his left thumb.
Petitioner spent the amount of P1,023.04 to cover the medication of private respondent.
The following day, Roberto Capili was asked to resign
RULING:
NO.
In the case at bench, the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private respondent was executed on May 28, 1990 allegedly employing the
latter as an apprentice in the trade of "care maker/molder." On the same date, an apprenticeship program was prepared by petitioner and submitted to
the Department of Labor and Employment. However, the apprenticeship Agreement was filed only on June 7, 1990. Notwithstanding the absence of
approval by the Department of Labor and Employment, the apprenticeship agreement was enforced the day it was signed.
Prior approval by the Department of Labor and Employment of the proposed apprenticeship program is, therefore, a condition sine quo non before an
apprenticeship agreement can be validly entered into.
The act of filing the proposed apprenticeship program with the Department of Labor and Employment is a preliminary step towards its final approval and
does not instantaneously give rise to an employer-apprentice relationship. Prior approval by the Department of Labor and Employment of the proposed
apprenticeship program is, therefore, a condition sine quo non before an apprenticeship agreement can be validly entered into.
The act of filing the proposed apprenticeship program with the Department of Labor and Employment is a preliminary step towards its final approval and
does not instantaneously give rise to an employer-apprentice relationship.
Hence, since the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private respondent has no force and effect in the absence of a valid
apprenticeship program duly approved by the DOLE, private respondent's assertion that he was hired not as an apprentice but as a delivery
boy ("kargador" or "pahinante") deserves credence. He should rightly be considered as a regular employee of petitioner
Facts:
Private respondent Potenciano Kapunan, Sr., an eighty-two-year old retired schoolteacher (now deceased), was struck by the Pinoy jeep owned by
petitioner Filamer and driven by its alleged employee, Funtecha, as Kapunan, Sr. was walking along Roxas Avenue, Roxas City at 6:30 in the evening of
October 20, 1977. As a result of the accident, Kapunan, Sr. suffered multiple injuries for which he was hospitalized for a total of twenty (20) days.
Evidence showed that at the precise time of the vehicular accident, only one headlight of the jeep was functioning. Funtecha, who only had a student
driver's permit, was driving after having persuaded Allan Masa, the authorized driver, to turn over the wheels to him.
Agustin Masa, the director and president of Filamer Christian Institute, in his personal capacity in that he personally authorized and allowed said Daniel
Funtecha who was his houseboy at the time of the incident, to drive the vehicle in question despite his knowledge and awareness that the latter did not
have the necessary license or permit to drive said vehicle. His son, Allan Masa, who was with Funtecha at the time of the accident, was not impleaded
as a co-defendant
It is petitioner Filamer's basic contention that it cannot be held responsible for the tortious act of Funtecha on the ground that there is no existing
employer-employee relationship between them
ISSUE: Whether or not the employer can be held liable for Funtecha’s act
RULING:
In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of Allan's house, Funtecha definitely was not having a joy ride. Funtecha was not
driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a "frolic of his own" but ultimately, for the service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner school.
(See L. Battistoni v. Thomas, Can SC 144, 1 D.L.R. 577, 80 ALR 722 [1932]; See also Association of Baptists for World Evangelism, Inc. v. Fieldmen's
Insurance Co., Inc. 124 SCRA 618 [1983]). Therefore, the Court is constrained to conclude that the act of Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel
was one done for and in behalf of his employer for which act the petitioner-school cannot deny any responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond the
scope of his janitorial duties. The clause "within the scope of their assigned tasks" for purposes of raising the presumption of liability of an employer,
includes any act done by an employee, in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the
injury or damage. (Manuel Casada, 190 Va 906, 59 SE 2d 47 [1950]) Even if somehow, the employee driving the vehicle derived some benefit from the
act, the existence of a presumptive liability of the employer is determined by answering the question of whether or not the servant was at the time of the
accident performing any act in furtherance of his master's business. (Kohlman v. Hyland, 210 NW 643, 50 ALR 1437 [1926]; Jameson v. Gavett, 71 P 2d
937 [1937])
Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules implementing the Labor Code, on which the petitioner anchors its defense, was promulgated by the Secretary
of Labor and Employment only for the purpose of administering and enforcing the provisions of the Labor Code on conditions of employment.
Particularly, Rule X of Book III provides guidelines on the manner by which the powers of the Labor Secretary shall be exercised; on what records
should be kept; maintained and preserved; on payroll; and on the exclusion of working scholars from, and inclusion of resident physicians in the
employment coverage as far as compliance with the substantive labor provisions on working conditions, rest periods, and wages, is concerned.
In other words, Rule X is merely a guide to the enforcement of the substantive law on labor. The Court, thus, makes the distinction and so holds that
Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules is not the decisive law in a civil suit for damages instituted by an injured person during a vehicular accident
against a working student of a school and against the school itself.
The present case does not deal with a labor dispute on conditions of employment between an alleged employee and an alleged employer. It invokes a
claim brought by one for damages for injury caused by the patently negligent acts of a person, against both doer-employee and his employer. Hence,
the reliance on the implementing rule on labor to disregard the primary liability of an employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is misplaced. An
implementing rule on labor cannot be used by an employer as a shield to avoid liability under the substantive provisions of the Civil Code.
Facts:
Complainants are deaf-mutes who were hired on various periods from 1988 to 1993 by respondent Far East Bank and Trust Co. as Money Sorters and
Counters through a uniformly worded agreement called "Employment Contract for Handicapped Workers".
In 1988, two (2) deaf-mutes were hired under this Agreement; in 1989 another two (2); in 1990, nineteen (19); in 1991 six (6); in 1992, six (6) and in
1993, twenty-one (21). Their employment[s] were renewed every six months such that by the time this case arose, there were fifty-six (56) deaf-mutes
who were employed by respondent under the said employment agreement. The last one was Thelma Malindoy who was employed in 1992 and whose
contract expired on July 1993.
Disclaiming that complainants were regular employees, respondent Far East Bank and Trust Company maintained that complainants who are a special
class of workers — the hearing impaired employees were hired temporarily under [a] special employment arrangement which was a result of overtures
made by some civic and political personalities to the respondent Bank; that complainant[s] were hired due to "pakiusap"
In this light, the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates that a qualified disabled employee should be given the same terms and conditions of
employment as a qualified able-bodied person.
The fact that the employees were qualified disabled persons necessarily removes the employment contracts from the ambit of Article 80. Since the
Magna Carta accords them the rights of qualified able-bodied persons, they are thus covered by Article 280 of the Labor Code
The contract signed by petitioners is akin to a probationary employment, during which the bank determined the employees' fitness for the job. When the
bank renewed the contract after the lapse of the six-month probationary period, the employees thereby became regular employees. 16 No employer is
allowed to determine indefinitely the fitness of its employees.
The noble objectives of Magna Carta for Disabled Persons are not based merely on charity or accommodation, but on justice and the equal treatment of
qualified persons, disabled or not. In the present case, the handicap of petitioners (deaf-mutes) is not a hindrance to their work. The eloquent proof of
this statement is the repeated renewal of their employment contracts. Why then should they be dismissed, simply because they are physically impaired?
The Court believes, that, after showing their fitness for the work assigned to them, they should be treated and granted the same rights like any other
regular employees.
Read:
1. Art. 57-81
2. R.A. No. 7277 “Magna Carta for Disabled Persons”
4. R.A. No. 10070 “An Act Establishing Institutional Mechanism to Ensure the Implementation of Programs and
Services for Persons with Disabilities in Every Province, City, and Municipality, amending R.A. No. 7277, otherwise
known as the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons, as amended, and for other Purposes.”
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
Section 1. Section 40 of Republic Act No. 7277, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
Sec. 40. Role of National Agencies and Local Government Units. (a) Local government units shall promote the establishment of organizations of
persons with disabilities (PWDs) in their respective territorial jurisdictions. National agencies and local government units may enter into joint
ventures with organizations or associations of PWDs to explore livelihood opportunities and other undertakings that shall enhance the
health, physical fitness and the economic and social well-being of PWDs.
(b) Local government units shall organize and establish the following:
(1) Persons with Disability Affairs Office (PDAO)
PDAO shall be created in every province, city and municipality. The local chief executive shall appoint a PWD affairs officer who shall manage and
oversee the operations of the office, pursuant to its mandate under this Act. Priority shall be given to qualified PWDs to head and man the said office in
carrying out the following functions:
Formulate and implement policies, plans and programs for the promotion of the welfare of PWDs in coordination with concerned national and local
government agencies;
(ii) Coordinate the implementation of the provisions of this Act, Batas Pambansa Blg. 344, otherwise known as the Accessibility Law, and other relevant
laws at the local level;
(iii) Represent PWDs in meetings of local development councils and other special bodies;
(iv) Recommend and enjoin the participation of nongovernment organizations (NGOs) and people’S organizations (POs) in the implementation of all
disability-related laws and policies;
(v) Gather and compile relevant data on PWDs in their localities;
(vi) Disseminate information including, but not limited to, programs and activities for PWDs, statistics on PWDs, including children with disability, and
training and employment opportunities for PWDs;
(vii) Submit reports to the office of the local chief executive on the implementation of programs and services for the promotion of the welfare of PWDs in
their respective areas of jurisdiction;
(viii) Ensure that the policies, plans and programs for the promotion of the welfare of PWDs are funded by both the national and local government;
(ix) Monitor fundraising activities being conducted for the benefit of PWDs;
(x) Seek donations in cash or in kind from local or foreign donors to implement an approved work plan for PWDs, in accordance with existing laws and
regulations; and
(xi) Perform such other functions as may be necessary for the promotion and protection of the welfare of the PWDs.
(2) Focal Person
In consideration of budget restraints, local chief executives of fourth (4th), fifth (5th) and sixth (6th) class municipalities may, in lieu of the creation of a
PDAO, designate a focal person who shall perform the functions of the PDAO. Priority in appointment should be given to a PWD with experience in
providing services to PWDs.
The establishment of a PDAO or the appointment of a focal person, as the case may be, should be done in consultation and coordination with
the National Council on Disability Affairs (NCDA), NGOs and POs.
SEC. 2. References to the term “Disabled Persons” on the title and other sections of the same Act are hereby amended to read as “Persons with
Disabilities (PWDs).
SEC. 3. Within three (3) years after the effectivity of this Act, appropriate agencies, headed by the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD), in consultation with the NCDA and relevant NGOs and POs, shall review its implementation and recommend to Congress the need to mandate
the establishment of a PDAO in fourth (4th), fifth (5th) and sixth (6th) class municipalities.
SEC. 4. In order to effectively carry out the objectives of Republic Act No. 7277, the National Government, through the DSWD, shall ensure that the
annual budget includes provisions to fund programs and provide support for PWDs.
Local government units shall likewise ensure that the necessary fund from any available local revenues is allocated for the implementation of this Act for
the benefit of PWDs in their jurisdictions.
SEC. 5. Repealing Clause. All laws, presidential decrees, executive orders, and rules and regulations inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
SEC. 6. Separability Clause. If any provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional, the same shall not affect the validity and effectivity of the other
provisions hereof.
SEC. 7. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation or in the Official Gazette,
whichever comes first.
Approved:
5. R.A. No. 10524 “An Acts Expanding the Positions Reserved for Persons with Disability, Amending for the Purpose
R.A. No. 7277, as amended, otherwise known as the Magna Carta for Persons with Disability”
Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-third day of July, two thousand twelve.