AMEBICAH OFIIIIOM OF FRAICE, 1940-1945

by

Bene Girard

Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School

in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree, Doctor of Philosophy,
in the Department of History,
Indiana University

June, 1950
 ProQuest Number: 10295238

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 peeface

The object of the present study was to determine the impact of

French affairs fro® June, 194Q, to June, 1945, on American opinion* The

French defeat of June, 1940, was a major event and its effect on American

thinking was tremendous* The defeat was envisaged, in this study, from

the viewpoint of American political philosophy and an analysis of the

various comments provoked by the quick destruction of French democracy

was made* In a sense a trial of French democratic institutions took

place in an atmosphere of American insecurity unprecedented in recent

American history. This study attempts to show how Americans adjusted

their thinking to the destruction of the world balance of power* The

place formerly occupied by France appeared suddenly empty and the reali­

sation of this fact had Its effect also on French cultural influence in

the United States*

The creation of the Vichy government in July, 1940, created new

problems for American opinion# The political philosophy of Pltain’s

government was a radical departure from the French democratic tradition#

The problem of how much this new situation should affect traditionally

friendly Franco-American relations became acute when the maintenance of

diplomatic ties with Vichy appeared to many Americans to be in contra­

diction with the avowed American policy of supporting the cause of the

nations at war with Germany and Italy# This problem was not solved when

America entered the war or even when diplomatic relations with Vichy were

finally severed following the United Hattons* landing in Horth Africa*

ii
It only took a new fora with the setting-up of a pro-Allied administra­

tion which stemmed directly from the Vichy government#

For the purpose of this study, the French defeat of June, 1940,

appeared a more logical starting point than the declaration of war on

September 2, 1939, for this second ©vent had little effect on American

opinion* the "phony war” of 1939-1940 seemed to belong to the preceding

era, and a study of American attitudes toward France during that period

could not be separated from earlier American reactions to Munich and

previous crises# The logical place to close this study seemed to be the

formation of the French Committee of national Liberation in Algiers, an

event which marked the end of the disunity between the two French groups

fighting Germany# It brought also the end of the American policy of

dealing separately with three rival authorities in the French Empire#

Vichy was deprived of its last vestige of power with the loss of its

colonial outposts in the Western Hemisphere; de Gaulle and Giraud merged

their territories and set up an administration which, for all practical

purposes and in spite of the attitude of the American government, became

the de facto provisional government of the French Republic. From that

time on, although many Americans questioned the committee*® ability to

become the government of liberated France, the strained relations between

Algiers and Washington were widely interpreted as resulting chiefly from

the distrust of President Roosevelt and other American officials of

General de Gaulle, the head of the committee#

The purpose of this study was principally to indicate trends in

American opinion* Compiling complete statistics on press opinion would

only have shown the influence of syndicated columnists and the importance

of press associations and newspaper chains. Although public opinion

ill
polls were used upon occasion, it seemed to the writer unwise to give

too much space to the opinions of those whom the poll-takers called

"fairly well-informed persons." Statistics and percentages would hare

added little significance to this study. As a rule, each notation of

public opinion was illustrated by at least one characteristic example

chosen from sources representative of the various shades of American

political opinion*

The writer desires to express his deep appreciation for the

patient guidance he has received fro® Professor F. lee Benns in the

preparation of this dissertation* He also wishes to thank the Informa**

tion Division of the French Embassy in the United State® and the staff

of the library of Indiana University for the aid rendered him in the

collection of the material*

iv
 TABLE OF contents

Page

PREFACE • * . .................... « ........ ii

Chapter

I* AMERICAN OPINION OF THE CAUSES OF THE FRENCH DEFEAT W 1940 1

The Franco-German War of 1959-1940 ........... 1

Influence of Foreign Comments on American Opinion . . . . 5

The Bightist Interpretation 9

Influence of Vichy Propaganda on this Interpretation * 9

Attacks against the French Left and the Popular Front • 10
Attacks against Roosevelt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Influence of this Interpretation on American Opinion • 14

The Liberal Interpretation . . . . . . . . .......... 15

The '’Betrayal Theory” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Attacks against the French Rightists* . . . . . . . . . 17
Attitude of the Liberals toward French Democracy • . . 19
Attacks against the Church, the Army and Business* * . 22
Attacks against French Foreign Policy........ . . . £5
Influence of the Liberal Views on American Opinion • • 25

Comments Influenced by the Rightist Interpretation ... 27

Difficulty in finding a Common Criterion for these

Comments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Comments on French Political Disorder . . . . . . . . . 27
Comments on French ’’Moral Decadence” . . . . . . . . . 32
Answers to these Attacks . . . . . . .............. 34

Miscellaneous Comments . .................. 35

Comments on French Military Inferiority . . . . . . . . 35

Comments on the Fighting Qualities of the French Army * 38
Comments on the French Psychological Preparation for
the War . . . . .......... 40

Conclusion . . ........ . . 44

II* IMPACT OF THE FREHCH DEFEAT OK AMERICAN POLITICAL THINKING 46

v
Chapter ^S®

The American Feeling of Insecurity after the French

Defeat ................ .. . . . ...... 46

The Progress of the Interventionist Movement #•••»* SI

The Weakening of Isolationism......................... 56

Impact of the French Defeat on the Presidential Campaign

in 1940 . . . . . . . . . . . ...................... 61

Leftist Isolationism * ........... .• ............- 65

The American Nationalist Reaction ........ 67

III* THE TEMPORARY DECLINE OF FRENCH CULTURAL INFLUENCE IK THE

UNITED STATES 72

American Tributes to French Culture and Concern for Its

Future after the Defeat * * * ....... .......... . • 72

Criticism of France among American Intellectuals • • .. 77

American MIntellectual Isolationism11 34

Criticism of the French System of Education • * « • * • » 89

The French Language in American Schools after the

Armistice................................... . . 92

American Opinion of the Future of French Fashion Leader*-

ahip after the Defeat 96

The Decline of French Cultural Influence in the United

States » 101

IV. AMERICAN MOTIONS TO DEVELOPMENTS IK OVERSEAS FRANCE IN

1940 . . . . ............... . , * . 105

Developments in Overseas France from June to October,

1940 . * 105

American Attitude toward the French Colonies at the Time

of the Armistice ..................... 107

American Opinion of Franco-British Relations after the

Armistice Ill

British Attempts to Keep the Colonies in the War • •* 111

Growing Hostility between France and Great Britain .. 115
The Gran Battle 115
The Consequences of the Oran Battle on American Opinion 120

vi
Chapter Page

the Problem of French Possessions in the Western

hemisphere * .......... 122

The Problem of Japanese Penetration into Indo-China * • • 127

Be Gaulle and the Free French » . * ............... ISO

First American Reactions to de Gaulle fs Attitude after

the Armistice * • « • * » « » # * * * * • • • » • * • * ISO
The Coolness of the American Government toward
de Gaulle and Its Consequences on American Opinion • * 132
The Bakar Fiasco * . . ..........................135

V. AMERICAN OPINION W THE VICHT ‘T O ORDER"............... 159

The Political and Economic Situation of France under the

Vichy Regime « * * , * * . . . * * * . * . . . * . • * * 159

American Sources of Information on France during the

Vichy Regime « * « • * » * ........... 140

The Influence of German and Vichy Propaganda on American

Opinion »*• « « , * * * . » • • * 144

American Comments Favorable to Marshal Retain until

Laval*s Return to Power in April, 1942 , . * . * « . * * 148

American Comments Unfavorable to Retain ....... . . . 155

American Opinion of the Attitude of the French People

during the Vichy Regime ....... * * « ........... 162

American Opinion of Vichy* s Achievements in France • * « 166

American Hostility to the Vichy Regime • • « * « . « • 166

American Opinion of Vichy1s Political Reforms . » » . « 169
American Opinion of Life in France during the German
Occupation and the Vichy Regime • • • • • • • • • « • • 171
American Opinion of the Economic Situation during the
Vichy Regime , . » « * • * • » # • * » « • * * • • • » 175
American Opinion of the German-Vichy Political Terror . 178
American Belief In France « * * . . . • • • « • • « * * 180

VI* AMERICAN OPINION OF WASHINGTON'S RELATIONS WITH VXGHY,

1940-1941 .......... 182

Political Developments Influencing Franco-American Rela­

tions from the Fall of France to Pearl Harbor ......... 182

The Problem of the Relations between Branco and the

United States in the Summer of 1940 185

vii
Chapter Page

American Opinion of Vichy’s Foreign Policy during the

Fall of 1940 . . . ♦ * ........................ 107

Laval and the "Latin Bloc” ............... 188

The Montoire Interview 1B9

The French Diplomatic Problem at the End of 1940 . • • . 132

The Mopes Haloed by the Presence of Weygand in North

Africa • * » . ..................... 192
The Dismissal of Laval •• ....... • 195
American Concern for the French Food Problem • * • • • 196

American Opinion of Franeo-American Relations from

December, 1940, to May, 1941 , » * * • • « • » • * » * « 198

fhe Arrival of Admiral Leahy in Vichy • * « . « • • • • 198

Petain’a attitude toward Laval ............... 199
The Murphy-Weygand Agreement in North Africa « « • • » 200
The American Government’s Decision to Garry this Policy
to Unoccupied France ............ 201
Liberal Opposition to the American Policy » » » . » • « 203

Darlan’s Policy of Collaboration in May, 1941, and Its

Effect on American Opinion ........ * .......... 205

Durian’s negotiations with the Germans * ........... 205

Liberal Demands for a Break with Vichy « • • • • • • • 209
The Paris Protocols • • • • • ................. 2X0
Later American If&uaents on Vichy’s Refusal to Sign the
Paris Protocols 212

American Opinion of Vichy’s Foreign PollGy fro® June to

December, 1941 « » . * » « * .......... 215

French Hesistance to the British Campaign in Syria . , 215

Vichy’s Concessions to Japan in Xndo-China * * • • » « 219
The Dismissal of Weygand and the Saint Plorentin
Interview « « . . » . * * . t * . . . * « « » » * • * » 220

VII. AMERICAN OPINION OF DI GAULLE, RETAIN AND UVAL, 1941-1942 225

Political Developments Influencing Franco-American Rela­

tions from December, 1941, to November, 1942 . * • * . , 225

American Opinion of the de Gaulle Movement fro® Septem­

ber, 1940, to December, 1941 ....... . » . ....... 226

The Saint-Pierre and Miquelon Incident • • * .......... 229

vlii
Chapter

Americas! Opinion of the de Gaulle Movement from January,

1942, to April, 1942 236

The Blow Trials * * .......... . * . * 239

Laval*a Return to Power........... . , ............. 246

Significance of Laval’s Return to Power* * * ......... 246

American Distrust of Laval . » ............ •. » 248
Attacks against the Vichy Policy after Laval’s Return
to Power « • • » * ........... 250
The Recall of Admiral Leahy from Vichy * • • • • « • « 252
Demands for a Complete Break with Vichy * * • » • » • * 252
The Interpretation of Laval’s Return to Power . . . . . 285
Defense of the American Policy « * • » » • » « » • • * 258
Attacks against the Vichy Policy during the Sumer and
Fall of 1942 ........ * ............... 2S9

American Opinion of the de Gaulle Movement from April,

1942, to November, 1942 ........ 261

State Department Attempts to Broaden the Basis of the

.Movement « * * .« t . * • « . * . » * . < * * . * » * 261
The Caledonia Incident 264
Demands for Recognition of de Gaulle and the Battle of
Blr Hackeiia , . * * ................... . . . . . 265
The State Department Note to Fighting Franc© on July 9,
1942 ............... 270

The Martinique Problem....... * .................... 271

VIII* AMERICAN OPINION OF THE ALLIED DEALINGS WITH DARLAN IN

NORTH AFRICA * . . .................... 277

Political Events in North Africa from the Allied Landings

to Darlan’s Assassination ........... 277

American Interest in Africa and in Dakar before the

Landings ......... • » » « • • « 278

The Diplomatic Preparation for theLandings........... * 2S3

The United States Government and the French Political

Problem before the Landings • 287

Exclusion of de Gaulle from the North African

Operation * « . . . . » * * * * * .... • ....... 287
The Search for a Leaders Giraud. . . . . . . . . . . 289

American Reactions during the Landings and the Fighting

between American and French Forces . * *• ............ 291

Ix
Chapter ?&g*

the Darlan Appointment and the Opposition to It . . . . . 295

First American Reactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295

the Problem of Darien*s Presence in Algiers at the
Time of the Landings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296
Flews of the Different Croups of American Opinion re*
garding the French Political Problem . . » « . . * » » 500
The Declaration of Roosevelt on November 17 and Its
Consequences • ........ 301
The Liberal Opposition and the Campaign in Favor of
de Gaulle ..........* . .. ............. 302
The Result of the Censorship ....... . . . . . . . . 305
The Intervention of Wendell L. lUlki© and Its
Consequences . . . . . . . . . .......... . . . . . 504

The Defense of the Darlan Appointment 506

Political Reasons which Influenced Conservative Opinion

in Favor of the Darlan Appointment 306
The Attitude of the Average American 309
The Argument of Military Necessity • • . . « • • • • « 311
Conservative Attacks on the Fighting French and
American Liberals • 312
The Rallying of West Africa to the Darlan
Administration .......... 314

American Opinion of the Scuttling of the French Fleet .. 315

The Assassination of Darlan 317

The First American Reactions ............. 317

American Opinion of Darlan ........... . . . . . . 318

IX. AMERICAN OPINION OF THE GXHAHD-DE GAULLE RIVALRY IN 1945 . 825

Political Events Influencing Praneo-Aiaerican Relations

from January to June, 1943 « * « • • • . * . . . . • « . 325

Comments on Giraud’s Accession to Power ♦ * . ....... 524

American Opinion of Giraud 328

American Opinion of the North African Situation after

Qiraud's Appointment • • • ....... . * • • • • . . . » 335

American Desire for Allied Intervention in the North

African Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......... 355
The Political Arrest® in North Africa and their inter­
pretation by American Opinion........... 356
American Views on North African Opinion........ • • 337

x
Chapter

The Attitude of the American Correspondents in North

Africa ........ • • 341
British Criticism of Elsenhower and Its Effect on
American Opinion ...........344
The loyalist Efforts in North Africa and their Inter­
pretation in America ..................... 346
Criticism of the American Policy in North Africa • * • 348

The Casablanca Conference 549

The French Problem at Casablanca , » » « * . » • » » * 349

Hopes of American Opinion after the Conference , * • « 351

American Opinion of the Bsyrouton Appointment • * * « » • 354

The Appointment of Marcel Peyrouton as Governor General

of Algeria • • « * • * * * * * * » « • * # . . • * • * 354
Liberal Protests against the Peyrouton Appointment • * 55?
Defense of the Peyrouton Appointment and Attacks
against the Liberal Attitude * » * * * « * » • » * • « 361

De Gaulle and the North African Administration • * . . » 565

American Misconception of the Relative Strength of

Giraud and de Gaulle * • * * « » • * » « * * * » » * • 365
The Weakening of de Gaulle*s Position in American Opin­
ion after the Casablanca Conference * * • « • « * * * * 366
The "Richelieu* Affair . . . • ................. 367

De Gaulle1$ Political Successes in his Rivalry with

Giraud ....... . ........... . • » 371

The Political Improvements in North Africa « » • * • « 372

The Distrust of the American Liberals for Giraud • » * 572
The Military Successes of Fighting Prance and their
Effect on American Opinion ....... 375
The Weak Legal Foundations of Giraudfs Authority • . * 374
Giraud1® Speech on March 15 and Its Effect on American
Opinion « 379
Giraud*» Failure to Reestablish the Cremieux Decree and
It® Effect on American Opinion « • • » • • ' • • * * * 381

American Opinion of the Negotiations Leading to the For­

mation of the French Committee of National Liberation • • 384

The Guiana Incident between Giraud and de Gaulle and

It® Interpretation in the American Press * • » « • • • 304
Til© Developments in Martinique and the Demands for an
American Military Occupation ...........365

xi
Chapter

American Reactions to the negotiations between Catroux

end Giraud . . . . . . ......... 386
American Efforts to Keep de Gaulle out of Africa « • * 386
The Formation of the French Goroittee of national
Liberation 380

The Reestablishment of French Unity In Overseas France • 391

BIBLIOGHAHCT * . * * ........ * ** ................ . . . * * * 393

adl
 ch a p te r x

AMERICAN OPINION OF IKK CAUSES OF THE FRENCH DEFEAT IN 1940

In March, 1938, Hitler remilitarized the Rhineland, repudiated

the treaty of Versailles and the Locarno Pact. France did not interfere

on that occasion and she did not interfere either during the Ethiopian or

the Spanish venture of the dictators. At Munich, In September, 1988,

France accepted the destruction of her ally, Czechoslovakia, at the hands

of Nazi Germany. One of the most serious consequences of Munich was

Russia*s apparent abandonment of the hope of forming a common diplomatic

front with Britain and France, a decision which evidently led the Soviet

government to sign a non-aggression pact with Germany in August, 1989.

Following the lead of Britain, France decided to make good her pledge to

defend Poland against any aggression. On September 1, Hitler Invaded

Poland. On September 8, France declared war on Germany.

Germany destroyed Poland in four weeks and divided the country

between Russia and herself* In spite of the welcome "non-belligerence*

of Italy, the French high command, probably mindful of the terrible and

useless blood-letting of the last war, remained curiously inactive. The

situation remained unchanged during the winter of 1989-1940. In April,

1940, Germany successfully invaded Denmark and Norway and hastened to

complete the occupation of northern Norway in spite of a feeble

British-French attempt to maintain a foothold in this area.

With HItier*s invasion of the Low Countries and of France Itself

1
 £

on May 10, 1940, the military consequences of the gradual weakening of

France became obvious* General Ganelin rushed the best French armies to

the defense of Belgium In spite of the latter*s previous refusal to con-

alder common military measures in the ease of a German attack* The quick

annihilation of Holland deflected the attention of many from the southern­

most portion of the battleline, the mountainous Ardennes region where the

famous fortifications of the Maginot Line ended* Suddenly, on Hay 15,

the Germans forced a break through the French lines near Sedan* General

Gamelin, the Allied Commander, underestimated the potentialities of the

German armored divisions which, instead of driving toward Paris, were de­

scribing a wide are pointing toward the Channel and threatening to close

in on the Allied armies in Flanders* The incredible speed of the Geraan

columns revealed the failure of the French command to grasp the

significance of the new mechanical weapons*

Premier Paul Reynaud understood how desperate the situation was*

General Weygand was appointed to succeed Gamelin* Marshal Petain, who

was then the French Ambassador to Spain, was made vice-premier* General

Charles de Gaulle, the disregarded and almost unknown advocate of a mecha­

nised warfare, was appointed under-secretary for war* But these changes

could not stop the German columns which reached Boulogne on the Channel

on May £3* Among those trapped in the Flanders pocket was the whole Bel­

gian army which capitulated on May 28, British and French units were

successfully evacuated by sea after a heroic resistance in the harbor of

Dunkirk but they lost all their materiel* The British contribution to

the campaign on the land was practically ended, Weygand*s attempt to es­

tablish a line of defense on the Somme was unsuccessful* In a series of

frantic appeals Paul Raynaud pleaded with President Roosevelt for American
 3

help* On June 6 the government left Paris, which was occupied by the

Germans on June 14* On June 10 Mussolini declared war on France* By

that time the French army could no longer oppose a continued line of de­

fense to the German tanks* General Weygand was applying pressure on the

government to end the fighting. Led by Marshal Petain, the pacifist group

in the French government forced Reynaud to resign on June 16, 1940* Petain

immediately formed a new cabinet and, through the intermediary of Spain,

asked Germany for armistice terms. An armistice between Germany and

France was signed on June 22 in the Goapiegn© forest* An armistice with

Italy followed on June 24* lighting ceased the next day.

II

The fall of France came as a shock to international public opin­

ion. Even though many people believed no longer that the French army was

the best in the world, the swiftness of its collapse provoked a universal

amazement.

This major international event aroused more comments in the

United States than in any other country because, as many American jour­

nalists pointed out, It was of immediate concern to the United States*

Many people were conscious not only of the fact that their security was

endangered by the rise of Germany to world supremacy but also that the

fate of democracy in the Western Hemisphere could not be separated from

its fate in Europe* Moreover, Franc© had symbolised for a century and a

half certain values and a certain way of life. Because of the French

failure to defend these successfully, many felt compelled to reconsider

these values or at least to ask or search for the causes of the French

debacle* American explanations of the French defeat were, in turn,

 4

strongly Influenced by the clash between French factions, which was not

suppressed by the French defeat but continued in all places where freedom

of expression was guaranteed to French political refugees end more

especially in the United States*

Many books and articles were written, purporting to explain the

causes of the French collapse* These works constituted the main source-

material of some American commentators, ©specially those who were not in

France during the critical period of May-June 1940* the testimony of

French and other eye-witnesses carried naturally a great weight since they

could all pretend to bring confidential revelations to the uninformed

American public*

These bodes were of unequal value* Their very number and the

repetitious character of some of them finally killed the curiosity of the

readers who became critical* The book-reviewer of The Atlantic Monthly

warned his compatriots against hastily prepared works on current events t

Although it may be listed ason© of the minor tragedies, the year

1940 was not much fun for a bookreviewer • . • % there were ten books
purporting to tell true inside stories of the fall of France* * * »
The authors of the ’fall* books were not conceivably in aposition to
know very much about their subjects (the fog ofwar still obscures the
campaigns) and the confession stories often had a smugness about them
that cancelled their virtues* * * *
The quickies are part of an intellectual atmosphere that makes it
almost impossible to discuss anything rationally* * . *^

Some authors took advantage of a well-established literary repu­

tation and wrote on matters of whichthey had only a superficial knowledge.

The works of the French writer AndreMaurois, for instance, were not taken

seriously by all observers* Professor Henri Peyr© of Xale University

^The Atlantic Monthly* March, 1941*

 5

described Maurois * literary activity in America daring the war by stating

that he "related the fall of France, then the history of America, the

love affairs of great literary heroines, and then his own loves and mar­

riages*^ With the help of a few well-chosen quotations, the journalist

Porter Sargent with sarcasm showed his readers what a shrewd observer of

the European scene Maurois had been? "It was on a 1beautiful summer

night* that 1negligently sipping champagne1 at the ball of the Polish

Embassy* * • .« Maurois gathered his confidential information* Porter

Sargent termed tragedy in France "the sort of pabulum he [Mauroisl

serves up to formas and womens clubs.“ 3

Some critics saw the work of novelist Jules Remains, The Seven

Mysteries of Europe, in the same light* The personality of its author

made the book popular for a while and It was much quoted during the sum­

mer of 1940j but, according to Henri Peyre, the book was only m attempt

"to wield the detective-story technique#«*

As a general rule, works on the French defeat were greeted accord­

ing to the reader*s political bias* The nationality of the author mat­

tered less than his political opinions* It is rare to find remarks like

that of R* K* Gooch, who, in the Virginia Quarterly Review, advised

Americana to beware "French sophism*11

An attitude characterized by an unquestioning assumption of pos­

session of the truth may readily be imagined to be connected closely

^Franco-American Pamphlets, Third series, Ho. 4 (Hew York, 1945),

p. 19*

3Porter Sargent, Getting Us into War (Boston, 1942), p. 560# For

further comments on Tragedy '&>' France, see Frederick L* Schuman, Hight
over Europe (Hew York, 1945), p T T B T

^FTanco-Aaerican Pamphlets, Third series, Ho* 4, p* 19.

 6

with the tragic downfall of France* * . . Typical French accounts

are, from the nature of the case, scarcely likely to be valuable* *
• * The serious reader will find their contribution to a fundamental
explanation of the downfall of France worthless, if not worse*5

A study of Mr* Gooch's article reveals that the books which he considered

as typical French accounts were those which failed to consider the po­

litical attitude of the French upper class as responsible for the catas-

trophe* He supported the conclusions of other books because they de­

nounced "men who had no scruples about aiding the forces of evil against

their own country, and who have accepted and are employing the support of

a victorious ene^y in order to further their own interests and to do away

with their country's democracy* • . *tt5 It is possible to conclude that

the criterion of Mr* Gooch is political, but this fact was not apparent

to him because the French accounts which he mentioned offered a conserva­

tive interpretation of the French defeat* These were Maurois1 and

Remains1 works as well as the book published by Laval's son-in-law,

Rene de Chambrun*? According to him, the American observer Glare Booth5

was also a victim of the "same French mental disease."

Books presenting the leftist point of view had considerable suc­

cess in the liberal press.® Hone of them was written by a Frenchman**®

Syirginla Quarterly Review, Winter, 1941, p* 1S2*

%r# Gooch her© referred to Andre Simone, J*accuse J (Hew York,

1940) and Heins Pol, Suicide of a Democracy (Hew Yoric,' 1§40).

7Rene de Ghambrun, I Saw France Fall (Hew York, 1940).

8Clare Booth, Kurope in the Spring (Hew York, 1940).

% s a general rule, more conservative newspapers did not pay so

much attention to foreign sources*

l®Gnly the books published before 1942 are taken into account in
this chapter*
 7

They were the work of political exiles who had taken refuge in France

before coming to America#31 they were especially bitter because of the

treatment of anti-Fascist refugees in republican France and because of

French bureaucratic methods#^

British and Belgian accounts were chiefly concerned with present­

ing their various national points of view.^S Both countries wanted to

retain or acquire the favor of African opinion# The British, for obvious

reasons, were especially eager to Improve their standing in American pub­

lic opinion. British activity helps explain why most American comments

on the campaign of May-Jun© 1940 adopted the British view of the Dunkirk

operation*^

Although there was no important work presenting the genuinely

liberal French point of view,IS many French journalists of leftist

*^%any believed that it was a Frenchman who had published J1accuse

under the French pseudonym of Andre Simone. Among the proposed identifi-
cations were the names of Andre Malraux, Fertinax (Geraud), Edouard
Harriot, Jacques Maritain# Professor Andre Morlse, writing in the Boston
Herald. January 28, 1941, revealed that Andre Simone was a German refugee#

3%ans Hftbe, A Thousand Shall Pall (Hew Tork, 1941) | Arthur

Koestler, Scum of the*"Earth Kfijwr York, '"1^41); Leo Lania, The Darkest
Hour (Boston, I^SlTT*

^%elgian American Educational Foundation, The Belgian Campaign

and the Surrender of the Belgian Army (1940); Belgian *feEHstiy ofForelgn
Adairs ,'feelgiiMt*"The HpfTIoiar’Account of What Happened 1989-1940
(1941); E. Gamraaerts, The PriSQner ^ LaeScent King Leopold— legend and
Fact (1941)#

count Gort, Despatches, Summary in the Hew Tork Times, Octo­

ber 17, 1941; Memorandum of lnFoSatlon on Foreign Affairs anBTES? World
Crisis, July, 1940 (Imperial 'Policy Group, Loncion, 1940) f"Harry j#
Greenwoll, "Franc© in a Coma,11 in The Nation, September 14*21, 1940#

^Robert de Saint-Jean’s France Speaking (1941) is not repre­

sentative of French liberal outlook# llle j 7 Bois* The Truth on the
Tragedy
m of iFranc®
mrnmmmlmpMmm mmm ninuWwiwwiiiwe (London,
9 1941) did not have a large diffusion in
America at the time#
tendencies voiced their opinion in numerous newspaper articles #3,6 xhey

even entered heated arguments with other French, American, or foreign

journalists in the columns of American newspapers and magazines •*? a 1j>-

Minister Pierre Got defended hia position in The Sew Republic,*® Foreign

Affairs,*® and The Nation# ^ Articles by Raoul de Eoussy de Sales,

Genevieve Tabouis, Fertinax, and Henri de Kerillis were also favorably

commented upon by the liberal press, which they provided with many argu­

ments# Although de Kerillis was far from being a liberal, he united with

the others in denouncing the pro-Fascist feelings of many wealthy and

powerful Frenchmen* They were not all able to remain objective, however,

and followed the natural human tendency to over-emphasiz© the points with

which they had had personal contacts# Nevertheless, some Americans gave

them too much Importance or mistook their point of view for that of all

the Frenchmen who were opposed to the policy of appeasement# In “Contem­

porary Explanation of the French Debacle” Mary Steele Owen, trying to

find out the causes of defeat, expressed the opinion that “eminent French

journalists, notably Tabouis, Pertinax, and Kerillis, should have been

*®Pfcrtinax in the Boston Herald, December 8, 1940; Living Age#

September, 1840; Foreign Affairs . January# 1941. Pierre LaiareSf in
Life, August 26, 1 ^ ; Harper'1s Slagasine, December, 1940. P&re Couturier,
Bnmanuel Mounter and BeiEsetoTtougemont in The Commonweal. Pivert in
Common Sense, August, 1940; etc,

*?See for Instance the exchange of letters between Hans Habe,

Heinz Pol, Kay Boyle, Thomas Keman on the military role played by the
anti-Nad refugees in the New Tork Times Book Review, October 19,
November 2, December 28, 1941, and January 4, KHE7"

*®January, 1941.

19July, 1941.

K W o h 14, 1942.
 9

utilised, but Instead they were humiliated and treated with suspicion,

thus neutralising any effect they might have had*®**

Americans were told repeatedly in all these works that french

democracy was more similar to the American than any other. This was

enough to make the fall of France very disturbing. A study of the causes

of the French debacle seemed to be a national duty since only a well-

informed America could be sure to avoid the mistakes which had brought

about the downfall of her sister-democracy* it is perhaps not surprising

N
that American anxieties were exploited for political ends. Political

quarrels played a prominent part in the American debate on the causes of

the French defeat. As Edmond Taylor noted,

The so-called collapse of Franc® is a subject of controversy and

sometimes very heated controversy in this country. It is so con­
troversial that there is not only disagreement on the causes of the
collapse but even In the understanding of the event itself

Moreover, preoccupation with domestic politics very often took pre­

cedence over a critical study of the French situation. Since the voices

of those who had an “ax© to grind” wore the loudest and since their in­

fluence was very considerable, it appears natural to study first those

American comments which were most obviously inspired by a pre-conceived

political bias.

XII

The first group of American answers to the problem of the French

defeat contains all the arguments tending to prove that a radical policy

^Mary Steele Owen, "Contemporary Explanation of the French

Debacle of 1940” (Master's thesis, Indiana University, 1944), p. 173.

^Public Opinion Quarterly. December, 1940.

 10

of social progress endangers the country ’which pursues it* Most of the

reasons which were brought forward by American observers were taken from

the French rightist press, the supporters of the Vichy Government, or

books published by refugees of a conservative oast of mind* Very often

it is hard to decide whether there is a direct influence from the French

rightist circles or whether the similarity of expression is due only to

an identical outlook on lift*

There was nevertheless an important difference between the out­

look of the Vichy propagandists and that of their American counterparts.

The Vichy propagandists intended to prove that the French democratic tra­

dition was a source of corruption, but they maintained that the "real

France" had been contaminated only superficially by the leftist theories*

In other words their argument was more a political weapon for French use

than a purely masochistic reaction in front of the German might. While

American observers also used their conclusions as a political weapon,

this time for American use, they neglected to make a distinction between

the Frenchmen who had kept aloof from the evils of social democracy and

those whose corruption had brought about the disaster* Their writings

constituted an all-out attack against French society as such and did not

spare even the rightist "prophets." There was also a difference in vo­

cabulary. There was naturally no attack against "democracy" in American

newspapers; the attacks were against "socialism" and "Hew Deal policies."

Every group chose from the set of "explanations" on hand those

which were in accord with its own political, social, or religious bias.

The Catholic World, commenting on Thomas Kernar^s France on Berlin Time, ^

was an example.

23Thomas Keraan, France on Berlin Time (Mew York, 1941).

 11

The religious attitude of a people in which m commonly find the men

of the middle-class family anti-clerical, while the women are devout
church-goersj the preoccupations with sex which ate into the institu­
tions of family and marriage; the practice of abortion and intoxica­
tion unchecked until the Germans cam©} the shabby moral atmosphere
* . * all this makes the great debacle comparatively easy to
understand*^
r

On the other hand, publications which were usually considered as

representing the ideas of big business emphasised chiefly the economic

policies of the late Popular Front* Typical was an article by Hartley W.

Barclay in Mill and Factory for duly 1, 1940, which Senator Vandenberg

Judged worthy of being reprinted in the Congressional Hecord* According

to it, the “theories of Henri Barbusse, Leon Jouhaux, Leon Blum and other

assorted Leftists of varied hues had brought the nation finally to its

knees* * * *rt^& Why? Because they had not dedicated themselves to “eco­

nomic stability*11 Mr* Barclay's conclusion was the usual warning to

American opinions “If Leftist power remained unchecked here* • .

William Philip Simms wrote that “everyone admits that France is paying

the price for having attempted too rapid social progress* * * *H^® His

conclusion also was that this should be a lesson for the United States*

Columnist Westbrook Pegler was then given an opportunity to develop themes

with which he already was very familiar. According to hi® Franc© had

fallen because she had allowed too much freedom of action to her trade-

unions and had allowed too many ant1-Fascist refugees to enter.^? The

g4The Catholic World, October, 1941, p. 113.

^Congressional Hecord, August 21, 1940.

26Chicago Daily Hews, dune 6, 1940*

^7Se© The nation, December 8, 1940,

46?58
 n

fall Street Journal expressed the opinion that France had collapsed be*

cause the Popular Front m s opposed to "sound business methods*1* It ad*

vised the United States to return to "sound business methods" In the fora

of wage sacrifices for the workers in armament factories, otherwise

America would suffer the same fate as France*^® But it was in the Chicago

tribune that the "Popular Front theory" found Its most perfect expressions

"France is prostrate because Leon Blum sent her best arms to the Gommu*

nists in Spain and because the Communists sat down in her aras-making

factories."^ xt is sometimes difficult to determine which was the more

powerful motive behind these attacks, isolationism or antl-iew-Deal Re~

publican!sin* In the above-sentioned article it was obviously isolation­

ism. The Chicago Tribune was even more outspoken when it proclaimed on

the next day? "Like M. Blum in France, Mr* Roosevelt is sending

military equipment abroad which will be needed. . ,

The most curious thing about these attacks is that they did not

prevent the same newspaper from commenting unfavorably upon the "Maginot

Line mentality," which kept France from helping her allies offensively

and brought about her final isolation. The Tribune decided that it was

politically preferable to accuse France of too much "interventionism"

rather than of too much "isolationism*" It finally attempted to suppress

the contradiction, which led it to conceal the way the French system of

European alliances was destroyedi "France had constructed a protective

system of alliances which, when tested, were too frail."53-

2%ee The Nation, September 7, 1940.

29Chicago Tribune. June 17, 1940.

^Jiine 10, 1940,

s*June 89, 1940. Italics mine.

 15

President Roosevelt remained the main target of the Isolationist

and anti-Hew-Deal politicians* the Chicago tribone presented its readers

with a completely original explanation of the French defeat which was di­

rected against him* the origin of this theory was undoubtedly the dis­

patch sent from Paris by Alex Small, which was published on dune 18, 1940*

this dispatch reads

They [the Parisians] were discussing tiae cause of the catastrophe * *

* , the majority at that little cafe followed the national propensity
of finding a scapegoat for their sins* Whom do you imagine it was?
You are rightj nobody but mean old uncle Shylock* It was, 1 heard,
the fault of America that France had not and could not build enough
airplanes; that their equipment is often poor; that their general
staff had been incompetent, and their soldiers half-hearted, and
especially that their statesmen rushed into a war they were not
ready to wage.^

The editorial interpretation of this dispatch the next day was

probably a surprise to Mr. Smallj

American reporters in Paris write that the common people of France

are blaming America for their defeat* It is to be expected, of
course, that a nation worsted in war will seek a scapegoat to account
for the disaster, but there is also much rational justification for
the feeling of the French that this country betrayed them.
Mr. Roosevelt had given France every reason to think that America
was guaranteeing their victory and he didn*t make it good.&S

The same day the Tribune published a cartoon entitled ”the will-ot-the-

wiap, how it led two great nations to their destruction.” The cartoon

showed two soldiers, one French, one English, tramping in the mud and

looking hopefully toward a pale sun which was labeled ^Roosevelt war

promises.” This allegory purported to show that France and Great Britain

had been lured into war by the fallacious promises of Roosevelt.

^Chicago Tribune, June 18, 1940.

SSlbld*. June 19, 1940.

 14

Although this theory seems to be a creation of the Chicago Tri­

bune, it should be connected with the attacks against William 0* Bullitt

which were so frequent In France among pro-Munich newspapers. As Newsweek

pointed outt "Former Ambassador William G. Bullitt has been accused in

France and by isolationists in this country of urging France into the

war#«S4 Colonel Charles A. Lindbergh, too, violently denounced American

diplomacy at the time of Reynaud's appeals to Roosevelt. He accused the

United States of doing "to England and France what they did to Abyssinia,

to Chechoslovakia, to Poland, to Finland and to Norway."^*

Attacks against the Popular Front, French "socialist philosophy,"

or American diplomacy, even if the logical link between them was weak,

were launched at the same time by the conservative and Isolationist oppo­

sition to the Roosevelt administration. The same factors— Gersan triumphs

and French collapse— which played in France in favor of a violent shift

to the right, had a diminished but still sensible effect in far-away

America. They gave the offensive to the conservative opposition* This

explains a curious result of the French defeat on American opinion, Pub­

lic opinion polls showed that "war-feeling," which was on the increase

immediately after the invasion of the Low Countries and France, somewhat

subsided when it became apparent that France was rapidly being defeated.^

In the United States political conservatism tried, as it did in France,

to prove that the battle of the Meuse had been a test which "New-Deal

democracy" had failed to pass. The relative success of their efforts was

34Chicago Tribune, February IT, 1941,

York Times, June 16, 1940,

**%ee p. 5"9'
 IS

reflected in the public opinion polls. Many Americana saw in the French

collapse a proof of the political acumen of these conservative news*

papers* They were thus all the more disposed to follow them on the

ground of isolationism*

IV

Another proof that the French defeat gave the offensive to the

conservative elements in the relentless struggle for political preferment

is to be found in the correlatively defensive attitude which the liberal

newspapers had to adopt, at least during the first days which followed

the collapse* They had to fight their opponents on their own ground be*

fore trying to present their own interpretation of the events* The

Nation was the first one to attack the "Popular Front theory**:

An attempt is being made in this country to blame the lack of pre­

paredness in Franc© on the Blum government and its program of social
reforms and nationalisation of the armaments industry. This is a
most unjust accusation, obviously for domestic political purposes.
It takes no account of the fact that labor standards had been allowed
to lag far behind those of other industrial countries. It omits to
mention the pressure maintained on the workers by the concentration
of wealth in the hands of a few families * • »nor does it explain
the equal unpreparedness of Great Britain.37

Raymond Gram Swing made the same observation in the Mew York

Herald Tribunes

It may be good politics to tell people in this country that France

fell only because of the mistakes of the Bins government. The state­
ment has some factual authenticity* But it is not truth, it is only
a fragment of the truth which is to say that it is untruth in its
effects on the people to whoa it is told.®8

S7The Nation, June 22, 1940.

®%ew York Herald Tribune* November 24, 1940.

 16

The almost total silence of the French leftist circles, either

stunned by the blow or silenced by Vichy and by the Germans, did not

facilitate the task of the liberal newspapers* Helther did the presence

at the head of the reactionary French government of a man like Fetaln,

who was not yet very vulnerable to direct attaok#

In France, as in America, liberal elements had been hit the hard-

est by the blow# Their first reaction had often been the negative "France

was betrayed*" It was the same thing as the w0n a &te tr&hi" of the

French soldiers who suddenly found themselves behind the German lines*

In its first and genuine form, this "explanation" was non-political* It

fed upon the fifth-column stories which were so numerous at the time* It

was the protective and normal reaction of dazzled minds looking for a

magic word capable of breaking a chain of causes and effects, the evidence

of which was not tolerable. The word was "treason." From this first and

instinctive stage, the "France-was-betrayed theory" developed into the

interpretation of the French defeat which will new be considered. This

development was much faster In America than it was in France because it

was helped by the free expression of the liberal refugees and American

journalists in the liberal press.

In France the Vichy Government attempted to use this reaction

against pre-war French democracy, but its normal evolution did not lead

to a rightist interpretation of the French defeat, especially in America

where the initial shock which made It possible could not be caused by

frustrated nationalism as in France, but had to stem from a genuine con­

cern for the fate of democratic principles in Europe and in the whole

world.

In France, patriotic sentiment, as well as love for democracy,

 17

was likely to provoke a "betrayal complex'1 of patriotic origin was un­

doubtedly more susceptible of being influenced by a propaganda of the

Vichy type then one due to a vigilant democratic consciousness. Petain's

popularity in France was partly the result of a skilful utilization of

the wounds suffered by French pride*

As a matter of fact, certain French elements in the United States

reacted as Vichy wanted them to react and passed from the "we were be­

trayed" attitude to a Betainlst attitude* Sheer sympathy could also pro­

duce such a reaction among old friends of France, like General Hugh

Johnson, who declared on June 25: "The collapse of French resistance

simply can't be explained except by soft spots.n$°

As a general rule those Americans who said "France was betrayed1*

in June shifted to "democracy was betrayed" in July and August* On

June 29, 1940, The Nation was still writing "the brave and steadfast men

of France have been sold out • • « but as early as June 22, the same

newspaper was already improving on the "betrayal theory*" "In so far as

treachery has played a part in the French defeat, it is the treachery

mainly of those in high places who intrigued with the Nazis before the

war and are now creep-back as Nazi puppets*"

This shift was also apparent in The Hew Republic* which combined

"treachery" with "appeasement" as the main reasons for the debacle: "When

the whole story of the French surrender is known, we may find that the

defeat was caused far more by treachery and appeasement40 than by German

military might.

s%argent, Getting Ua into War, p. 545.

^Italics mine.

4^The Hew Republic. July 8, 1940.

 IB

In a book written after America^ entrance Into the war, Homan

Thomas took a position against the over-simplified "treachery theory*1*

While it is conventional to say we are fighting fascism, in effect

the most articulate preachers of the crusade against it have reduced
it to m expression of the German character* * * * It is a sort of
corollary of this theory that fascist manifestations in other coun­
tries— for example • * * the temporary eclipse of French democracy—
was due not to more or less universal causes or to those profound
social changes which constitute the revolution of our times, but spe­
cifically to German intrigue* Of course there was and is such in­
trigue* It was active in France before France fell* But the weak­
nesses of French democracy were by no means chiefly of German cre­
ation, and the assumption that the fall of Franc© was mostly due to
these weaknesses is an exaggeration if not a complete fiction* • • *42

From the simple "treachery theoryliberal elements in the United

States moved toward an explanation of the French defeat which, politically,

was the exact opposite of the explanation of the Petain Government in

France and of the ultra-conservative newspapers in America. The magazine

Scholastic summarised it in one sentence? "There were a few xich and

powerful men who wanted to undo all that had been done since the French

Revolution,,,4S Those who adopted this theory saw in the French situation

a political lesson for the United States. The Hew Republic wrote?

The lesson for the United States is all too plain* We have our
traitors to the democratic ideal— including some of the men who talk
In its praise most loudly and persistently* They may prove as dan­
gerous to us as their French counterpart have been to the cradle of
liberty, equality and fraternity.44

At first, the supporters of this theory hesitated to say that

France had been the victim of a plan carefully laid and carried out in

^Norman Thomas, VSfhat Is Our Destiny? (1944), p. 24.

4SSohola8tlc, January 13, 1941.

44to» Hew Republic* July 15, 1940.

 19

cold blood# They talked of the “blindness of the governing classes,11 of

their fear of Bolshevism which prevented any practical action against

aggression# It mas only after Retain fs suppression of the third Republic

that the liberal theory found its perfect expression# Retainfs first

totalitarian measures helped its formulation# The surrender became the

central point of the argument and the defeat of the French armies on the

field was considered a secondary consequence of the rightist betrayal#

In the Virginia Quarterly Review, E# K# Gooch denounced the m m

who had "no scruples about aiding the forces of evil against their own

country, and who have accepted and are employing the support of a victo­

rious enemy in order to further their own interests#*1^ Gooch linked

these two points; aiding the forces of evil before and during the war

and collaborating with the enemy* The weak point in this reasoning was

the fact that the French governments of the Third Republic had been

elected by the French people and that the free play of democratic insti­

tutions had never been seriously disturbed until after the French defeat#

It was difficult to believe that & premeditated plot against French

Republican institutions could have been successful in such circumstances#

There were two solutions to this problem* The first one was to

refuse to admit that the French leaders were real democrats and to show

that they were either hypocritical or at least passive traitors to de­

mocracy. This view was held by Communists and by most extremists among

American liberals# They looked with the earn© contempt at the reaction­

aries of the right and at those of the left. It mattered little to them

whether they had been sold out to British or to German imperialism.

a Quarterly Heview, Winter, 1941, p# 13£#

 20

Earl Browder, Secretary General of the American Communist Party, entitled

a collection of his articles and public addresses during the *phonytt war

The Second Imperialist War*4$

The second solution was to emphasise the tremendous power wielded

behind the scene by the rightist opposition and the weakness of the

French governments* This solution was the most widely utilised* The

conservative theory had tried to show that the Popular Front had been

successful not only in destroying this leftist coalition but also in de­

stroying the whole nation* The French governments which succeeded each

other during that period were not considered as full of traitors as they

were of weaklings who lacked the democratic courage necessary in the

struggle against Fascism* William L* Shirer, for instance, accused them

of confusing "democracy with weakness* To take action against those who

would overthrow democracy, they argued, would in itself be overthrowing

democracy* • • *m47 Shirer characterised Dalsdier as "the courageous

but confused leader of the Eadical-Soeialists ♦*

The main problem remained to decide which elements in the French

people openly or secretly favored a German victory* Many newspapers

searched back In French history and decided with Herbert Guterman

that national defeatism on th© part of the ruling class is nothing

new* The history of France in the nineteenth century is articulated
by crises resulting from attempts to carry out th© promises inherent
in the revolution of 1789, and to transform formal freedom into real
freedom* The predecessors of the Levels, Flandins and Retains were
always on the other side of the barricade, often at the expense of
the national interest*48

^%arl Browder, The Second Imperialist War (Hew fork, 1940)*

47The Atlantic Monthly* May, 1942.

48The Mew Republic, September 16, 1940*

 21

It is interesting te note that American newspapers were much more

outspoken when dealing with French affairs than they would have been when

talking about America. They felt much more free to carry their thinking

to Its logical extremes* Anti-labor columnists, when they discuss Ameri­

can trade-unions, make a careful distinction between th© deceived masses

and their corrupt leaders* There was no such distinction in the argument

about France* Fighting on alien ground, th© opposed ideologies or in­

terests did not have to respect fair-play rules, since there was no na­

tional unity to safeguard and no hope to win over at least some of the

most passive opponents*

Professor Schuman*s attacks against the French lack of democratic

vigilance are so far-reaching that at first glance, they seem to be based

on a nationalist rather than on a political criterion:

The quest for scapegoats after the debacle became interminable* The
details of the witch-hunt are tedious* Each group exculpated itself
and blamed its enemies* * # * In each case the targets of accusation
accused their accusers* Each saw truly some elements of the total
and terrifying truth* France succumbed less to brutal assault from
without than to a cancer within which had spread unseen through ©very
organ and limb.4®

Following this general Indictment, however, Professor Schuman formulated

more precise accusations which place his book in the class of explanations

which is now studied*

Many of the pygmies and parasites who were the lost leaders of the
Republic placed Property above Patriotism. In their delusion regard­
ing the means by which Property could beet be protected, they made
Communism at home and the U* S* S* R. abroad their favorite enemies,
thou# neither had power to threaten their privileges. . . * While
the enemy of the Left was smitten hip and thigh, the enemy of the
Right was studiously ignored* » • • The Cagoulerds • . . had friends

4®Schuman, Ki#t over Europe, p* 510*

 zz
In high places including Weygand, Retain, Laval and numerous army
officers* * • * For them French defeat at the hands of the Fascist
Caesars waa preferable to French victory in the name of a ’democracy*
which they equated with Communism and deemed a menace to Property.^

The Hew Republic was especially bitter against th© Catholic

Church. Answering a reader who reproached the newspaper for confusing

Fascism and Catholicism, the editor maintained:

It cannot be denied there is a strong fascist element in the Catholic

church. . . . Historically th© church has been th© enemy of liberal­
ism in general and of the democratic French Republic in particular*
It is therefor© no surprise that in Franc© the leaders of th© surren­
der to Fascism should be catholics* One would hardly expect them to
be followers of Rousseau and Voltaire*^1

The Army and th© French military traditions got their full share

of criticism* The liberals did not emphasize the Army’s military role

during the operations but its political role at th© time of the surrender.

Weygand was denounced as a reactionary, who, during the campaign, was

more worried by the attitude of th© Communists in Paris tlian by the ad­

vance of the German troops. Th® Havy was spared only until the battle of

Oran*52 it had not played a prominent part in the wsurj its leaders had

not reached important political positions 5 and before July 5 there was

still so m hope that certain units would rally to the British* The "in­

terventionist” liberals did not want to say anything which could h a m

the British cause*

Even the most liberal newspapers had little to say about th©

failure of French industry to provide weapons for th© French army. They

®%chuman, Right over Europe, pp. 511-512.

slThe Hew Republic. July ZZ, 1940.

^See p. 105.
 25

repeated what they read in ^accuse or other foreign sources on the trea­

sonable attitude of certain banking concerns and the Grands Cartels#

While the conservatives focused their attention on French domestic policy

in their search for the causes of the French defeat, liberals turned

toward French foreign policy* They refused to admit that the enforcement

of the Versailles Treaty might have solved the Franco-German problem*

They believed with The Jfew Republic that? “In 1919 th® problem of French

security could have been solved once and for all, if the German revolu­

tion had been allowed to run its course* Clemenceau preferred to grant

machine guns to th® Russian reactionaries.“S®

French policy toward Germany, according to th© liberals, obliged

France to rely on a protective system of alliances which was wrecked by

the Munich policy of appeasement* Former Foreign Minister Georges Bonnet

was considered as th® main engineer of this policy which had been planned

by th© treasonable elements. Th© most useful of these alliances was the

1955 pact with Russia which French reactionaries and, among them, the

man who had affixed his signature on this document, Herr© Laval, had

decided to sabotage from the outset. Professor Schuman wrote:

Had it been firmly based, it might have prevented the war. Too many
politicians in France were fundamentally opposed to the new alliance,
however* they disliked the Nazis, but they liked the Communists even
less* The pact was seldom worth more than a scrap of paper. . • •
Here was sheer tragedy*54

Bom people would not have admitted that these French politicians

disliked the Nazis. They pointed mainly to Laval and

5%he Hew Republic, September 16, 1940#

^Sohuman, Might over Europe, p. 470.

 24

Pierre-Etienne Flandin In their attempt to show that there was a deliber­

ate plot against the Republic* A* J* Liebling, of The Hew Yorker, wrote*

Th© men served by Laval, Ghautemps, and their team of interchangeable

shills and blinds at Bordeaux were the chiefs of heavy industry who
since late in 1954 had been working for France’s subjection to Ger­
many* they preferred that she be brought into the Gexman orbit as a
satellite rather than annexed* They wanted to distribute the patron­
age, subject to confirmation by Germany, rather than have administra­
tors imposed on them direct* they thought that Hitler would leave
them their share of Europe and Africa to run, just as their col­
leagues, the German members of the steel and coal cartels, which long
ante-dated Hitler, had left them their share of business* Theirs
was the really dangerous International •$5

Thus, for the liberals, the real responsibility of politicians

and industrialists was not in the failure to organise the war effort suc­

cessfully but in the field of foreign policy* The Ration* also, saw in

the wreckage of the French system of continental alliances the result of

Fascist and reactionary forces working within France* The result on the

French people was the creation of Rth® Maginot line mentality.11

nationalist hostilities, racial prejudices, historical animosities,

economic rivalries; such ferments working actively enough in France
before the war to destroy the alliance with Russia, continued after
the declaration of war# . . . They did this by creating first of all
that ’Maginot mind* which goes with a nationalism that has become
hostile to cooperation with foreigners and is compelled therefore to
fall back upon purely ’defensive’ strategy*SB

The Hew York Times also denounced the "Maginot jaind** In an evi­

dent attempt to influence isolationist opinion in the United States, but

this newspaper differed from the liberals in its comment upon French

opposition to the European alliances s

s% * j* Hebling, The Hoad Back to Faris (Hew York, 1944),

56the Nation* February 14, 1942#

 25

The Maginot Line was to France what the Atlantic ocean la to the
United States* * * * It was a symbol of th® outlook and temper of
the French people* The French wanted only to be left alone behind
their bulwark# The couaaitments mad© by successive governments in
the East— th© Little Entente and the Franco-Soviet pact— never re­
ceived the whole-hearted support of the little people, the petit
bourgeois, who are the backbone of the republic*57

Supporters of the liberal theory very soon concentrated their

attacks upon the men in power at Vichy# There were attempts to link

Petain with the Cagoulard plot, investigations of his activities when he

was Ambassador in Spain and of his record during the First World War#5®

The liberal theory was not as thoroughly thrashed out by con­

servative newspapers as the Popular Front theory had been by liberal

newspapers. Edmond Taylor, the author of The Strategy of Terror*5® who

claimed to approach the subject without any apolitical or ethical bias”

attacked the liberal theory on th© ground that the composition of the

"peace- and war-parties” was not ideologically clear-cut since the first

included leftist leaders like Paul Faure and, the second, reactionaries

like d© Gaulle. wTo my raind,” he wrote, Bit is a great mistake to attri­

bute th© downfall of France to a deep schism in opinion#” He nevertheless

acknowledged that the main difference between the two factions was politi­

cal Then he declared that the division was Bb©tween two concepts of the

Nation, th© revolutionary one, whether Jacobin or Bonapartist, and th©

Legitimist one# • # But h® refused to pass judgment on th® decision

S7R©w York Times* June 19, 1940.

®%e© p. 16>o.

5%dmond Taylor, The Strategy of Terror (Boston, 1940).

6QPublic Opinion Quarterly. December, 1940*

 26

to surrender. He thus refused to admit that there was a premeditated

plot to overthrow the Third Republic.

Supporters of the Popular Front theory made sarcastic remarks

shout the "Hew Deal politicians11 who wanted to hide their own failure by

defending the record of their French counterparts, but the heat of the

argument slowly subsided until it was momentarily revived at the time of

the Rioja trials*®-** Eventually, the attitude of the Vichy government, in

this instance and in many others, America*s entrance into the war, the

rise of the French Underground, and especially British and Free French

propaganda contributed to spread the conviction that the most important

cause of the French defeat was the antidemocratic attitude of certain

elements of French society* This belief, however, was still far from

general during the summer of 1940*

It is always easy to trace which political motivation, if any,

is hidden behind the reasons brought forward to explain the French defeat;

but many observers were not aware of all the political implications of

the problem* They were inclined to put more or less emphasis on this or

that argument according to the influence brought to bear upon them by

French, American, or other "eye-witness accents1* or by their own temper-

aments and interests* Between the ultra-conservative views and the lib­

eral theory lay the largest part of American opinion* A study of their

reactions to the French defeat brings at first a feeling of hopeless

confusion*

This feeling of confusion is often caused by the imperfect

*%ee pp. 239-2li6.

 n

assimilation of a French propaganda leitmotiv* For instance, Edmond

Taylor, in his already-mentionod article, numbered among M s "causes”

the influence of French Free Masonry* According to him.

Grand Orient Masonry, which had played such a big part In the cre­
ation of the Third Republic, played an important role in its down­
fall by constantly preaching capitulation in the name of some mystic
principle of harmony (notably during the sixth of February riots and
at th© time of Munich).

It is a well known fact, however, that attacks against Free Masonyy—

Scottish Rite as well as Grand Orient— were characteristic of pro-Faaeist

elements, who denounced them, not for being pacifist, but for having

urged France into a hopeless war. It is clearly impossible to classify

such documents according to a logical criterion.

Th© most striking fact about all the comments on the French de­

feat is that those which were influenced by conservative views are more

numerous than those which reflect a liberal outlook* This is easily ex­

plainable if one does not forget that the only expressions of French

opinion which were allowed to cross the Atlantic came from Vichy or from

occupied Paris. Besides, the books written by the most popular French

writers in America presented American commentators with arguments which

generally played into th© hands of reactionaries. The French collapse

affected liberal circles throughout the world like some sort of anaes­

thesia, while at th© same time the Rawls were clamoring that their tri­

umphs were due both to the moral regeneration of Germany through Hasism

and to the democratic decadence of France.

Usually writers of conservative tendencies and those who were

^Public Opinion Quarterly. December, 1940.

 29

deeply influenced by the rightist interpretation of the French defeat in­

sisted chiefly m the political, moral, and psychological cuases of the

collapse. In their comments they emphasised "internal dissensions, in­

credible factional hatreds which rotted away the spine of France while

Germany m w waiting to strike, m x i a m H. Chamberlin, for example,

repeated the frequent American condemnation of French political life:

France*s swift collapse is a stem condemnation of many features of

French political life. The multiplicity of parties, the short-lived
cabinets, the party bickerings and intrigues, the not infrequent
scandals— all that was not a very edifying picture in normal times.
It was an utterly intolerable waste of national energy and resources
since 1955,64

Emphasis on the French political quarrels actually placed the

blame on the pre-war goverranents, since French political life had been

practically at a standstill since the advent of the Daladier government.

It was very close to the Popular Front theory, "We shall be told that

the weakness of France was the result of the hopeless divisions created

by th® demagogues," protested Albert Guerard, "This is a bold travesty of

the plain facts. ’Hopeless division1 resulted fro® th© refusal of the

minority to co-operate with the Front Popnlalre majority."GS

In spite of such protests, most Americans remained convinced that

there was something wrong with French democratic methods and the attitude

of Leftist French politicians. The Popular Front received most of the

blame. The state of American public opinion in that respect may be summed

up in the careful statement of Professor William L, Langer in Our Vichy

®%enneth Down In Mewsweek, July 29, 1940,

g*The Atlantic Monthly, September, 1940, p, 502*

Q%irginia Quarterly Review, Winter, 1940, p. 16,

Gambler "The Popular Front governments, whatever else might be said of

them, had served to accentuate the age-old conflict between the

democratic, republican elements and the counter-revolutionary forces*"66

Attacks against the French Communists were undoubtedly numerous,

but they were not as bitter as those against "Blum’s Hew Beal.® They

were naturally milder in liberal newspapers.67 According to some ob­

servers, th© French government had mad© victims out of the Communist

leaders.68 In the other newspapers, indictment of th© French Communists

very often turned out to be another occasion to attack the Popular Front

because it had not hesitated to collaborate with them. The Communists

were also accused of having Inspired the sit-down strikes which had

handicapped production, William H* Chamberlin wrote in The Atlantic

Monthly?

The role of the French Communists, following the shifting orders from
Moscow, was first to aggravate greatly the class differences within
the country, then to push France into a war for which the Communist-
inspired strikes had made it unprepared and finally to execute an
abrupt turn toward defeatism after the war against Hitler’s Germany
had actually begun.69

In some instances, attacks against the French Communists were

virulent. Some American commentators, like radio-broadcaster Wythe

William, gave free vent to their imagination:

You will recall that late in August France had a military alliance
with the Soviet Union. . . • This alliance was strongest when the

6%illiam L. hanger, Gur Vichy Gamble (New York, 1947), p. 66.

67^h0 position of Russia in 1940, however, worked against the

French Communists, especially among liberal circles,

®%averley Root, The Secret History of the War (New York, 1945),
I, 159-160.

^%he Atlantic Monthly, September, 1940, p. 505,

 30

Front Populaire. made up principally of Communists and Socialists *70

conducted the affairs or the French Republic* Aninterchange or
military missions between France and Russia took place, with Bed
generals invading Parle in considerable numbers. * . • The Red of­
ficers, under the protective guidance of their French comrades, did
a thorough job. They mapped every bit of French fortifications that
was worth mapping. . . . They carried this information to Moscow. <
• • And Stalin, without batting an eyelash, turned the secret maps
and other details of the French defense organisation over to
Adolf Hitler.
Today the allied governments still seem Incapable of drawing con­
clusions from past mistakes. Again they are trying to play marbles
with Stalin. Again they are courting the man who gave Hitler the
initial dagger with which to stab F r a n c ® . 71

Many people, on the faith of information like the broadcast quoted above,

believed that the Communists had played a prominent part in the Popular

Front coalition and had even been members of the governments. Th® Spanish

Front# Papular had been the victim of exactly the same misconception.

Some of th# arguments against pre-war French governments were

based on misinformation^ some of them contradicted one another. The same

people who disapproved of the Popular Front policy of nationalization of

industry, for instance, accused the French governments of having failed

to mobilise all th# resources of the nation In time of war. They ex­

pressed the opinion that m "iron directing will" could have saved the

country. Th# advocates of free economy blamed governments which had

failed to interfere with an economic system, the larger part of which had

remained free* Fortune wrote that Hitler’s successes

were due to a failure more devastating than the success of th® weap­
ons* the failure of th# democracies to perceive the total implica­
tions of the gathering threat and to mobilize the vast power of

^Italics mine.

71m ax Wylie, ed», Best Broadcasts of 1939-I94Q (Rew York, 1940),

p. 346.
 u

their institutions to me t it* * * * This is really the *n©w

conception* that appalled Premier Reynaud*7^

Such conclusions should have led their authors to investigate the

«ay in which French Industrialists, left to themselves, had carried out

the war effort* This was generally not done, not even by the liberal

newspapers* Bertrand Thompson, who had lived in France for twenty years

and m s industrial expert during the Second World War, was one of the

rare American observers who did not deal with this problem from a purely

political point of view* Talking about French factories, he blamed their

failure, not only on the "collapse of discipline* but also on the "low

level of competence among manufacturers#* He termed the industrial con­

sultants a "horde of charlatans*”73 An Associated Press dispatch which

could have constituted quite a weapon in the hands of those who suspected

the patriotic attitude or competence of some of the French industrialists

passed almost unnoticed* In this dispatch, United States engineering ex­

perts from Spain described French factories as "some of the world *s best

equipped,* which under the Germans might turn out as many as 1350 planes

a month**74
Insistence on th© political aspect of th© problems involved in

th© French defeat, even if it is not a proof that th© writer ha© an "axe

to grind," usually show©, as we have seen, that he was influenced by

those who tried to utilise this event for political ends* The same thing

is true of those comments which emphasise chiefly th© "moral” and

"psychological” reason© for the collapse*

^Fortune, July, 1940, p* 52.

7%he How Republic* December 9, 1940#

7%argent, Getting U® into War, p. 374*

 32

The argument of “moral decadence” was exploited by some news­

papers'^ to show the results of a radical policy in a country faced with

a national emergency* these papers took for granted that American affairs

had taken the same course as French affairs, Hew Deal being the equivalent

of Popular Front* Many American® were genuinely sincere in their belief

that moral relaxation had been the primary reason for the French debacle,

but they were not ready to accept th© idea that America was in the same

situation a® France* The very fact that France was a democracy was nev­

ertheless extremely disturbing and many Americans were led to assert

that “French democracy had contracted diseases which were hers ©nly.w?$

Comforted by this thought, such Americans felt free to engage in a criti­

cism which Included practically all phases of French history, all /rench

institutions, all the features of French life, and all classes of French

society during the Third Republic*

“Those Frenchmen who have not been corrupted by politics, alcohol

and the cheap newspapers are ashamed from th© bottom of their hearts,11

affirmed Life* Typical of thousands of articles published at the same

time all over America is th© editorial published by the Carroll County

Independent of Center Ossipee (H* fi*)#

As feature articles by competent observers continue to be pub­

lished regarding the defeat of the French nation, one is able to
slowly secure a fairly complete picture of what happened,. The French
High-Gostmand • • » certainly knew th© techniques being used by th®
Germans but they simply sat back in smug complacency and did nothing.
In the French cabinet and among civilian administration officials,
love of self, love of pocket-book, cynicism, and easy living made

7SSee pp 10- U.

76Tha Catholic World, October, 1941, p. 113.

7?Lif». July 1, 1940.

 $8

complete surrender the logical way out* Among the great French
middle-class, corrupt newspapers, corrupt politics, and soft living
had sapped the vitality of th© nation* Socialist government and
Socialist propaganda had crippled the airplane industry so that
French production of military machines was more or less of a joke*
Gone was th© spirit of Verdun of the First World War. The grim
cry "on m passe gas1**— <*Th©y shall not pass**— was neither heard nor
much of any attempt made to live up to it. The Germans went through
Verdun like a hot knife through butter*
It is unfair and impossible to indict a whole nation on the faith
of a few newspaper articles, no matter how accurate those articles
may be, but at the same time it is possible to say with considerable
assurance that corrupt politics, corrupt newspapers, too much soft
living, and too much love of self and too little love of country
brought th© downfall of France* If the United States ever goes tit©
way France has just gone. . . *79

In the preceding examples, the influence of French rightist cir­

cles was not so obvious as that of previous American comments, On the

French debacle Sonia Tamara, of the Hew fork Herald Tribune, showed how

the former was exercised. She related her conversation with a few

French people just after the collapses

The majority attributed France1s weakness to her form of government

and to the inefficiency of the men in power* Some more thoughtful
Frenchmen79 expressed their fear that the reason foFlSe Trench de­
feat lay deeper than the faults of the regime* They wondered, in
the course of conversation, whether France had definitely lost her
vitality and fighting spirit and was declining while the German
people were rising to supremacy in Europe# • # #8‘
9

This is an interesting example of transfer to America of some of th© re­

flections of part of the French middle and upper-class following ten

years of political education by the Rosenberg-influenced Canalde and

Qringoire»

78Carroll County Independent of Center Qssipee (h* H.), July 12,

1940*

79Italics mine*

^Kewswoek, July 29, 1940*

 M

It is sometimes difficult to decide which, in the opinion of th©

writer, was the most important factor in France’s moral deterioration,

whether “decadence11 was brought about by “French corrupt leadership and

subversive philosophy," or by "the French national character*f* Janet

Flanner seemed in favor of the second factor# For her it was a permanent

psychological feature of th© French people which caused the catastrophe#

“The French people with their passion for money « # « perhaps honestly

felt they could not afford to go on trying for a victory in this war

and felt that defeat would be cheaper*"8^ In her "Contemporary Explana­

tions of the French Debacle,*1 Mary Steel© Owen found an even more basic

reason for the break-through on th© Meuse River? “The French had long

been distinguished for their reactionary and negative philosophy,®*^

Most observers, nevertheless, were generous enough to conclude

that “the French race® had lost only temporarily their old virtues and

refrained from condemning most of the past as well as the present# For

Ralph Delahay© Paine, Jr#, head of the European staff of Life and Time,

th© only serious trouble with the French was too much civilization!

everything else could be easily corrected. "The French people— essen­

tially good, though perhaps too civiliaed, given too much food, drink

and above all talk— had forgotten how to work."®®

All those who saw in th© French defeat a consequence of a special

French disease contracted by French democracy or by the French people

were sharply criticized by C# Q. Paulding in The Commonweal;

®^The Hew Yorker, June ?, 1941#

®®Owen, "Contemporary Explanations of the French Debacle,®

p. 178.

88Llfa. July 8, 1940.

 55

The fact from which everyone starts Is thiss France, which before
the war was in a state of democratic confusion of purpose, permitted
that confusion to persist after the war had started, and for this
reason, although there may have been others, France lost the war*
That confusion of purpose is attributed by the Germans and the Fas­
cists to democracyj by others not to democracy but to an assumed
French stupidity, or venality, or decadence* * * • We say that
French democracy has failed and we use the adjective French because
we feel that it is essential to attribute it to a special corruption
which w© thus localise and isolate* We do this because we still be­
lieve in the democratic system in general and are proud of it in
particular as happily applied to us* We still think in terms of na­
tions and we still believe in the possibility of local success and
failure* So that if we can with difficulty deny that pre-war French
policy and French political life existed in a climate of democracy,
at least now we can attribute the French failure to some peculiar
misuse of perversion of the democratic principle*84

A letter to the New York Times expressed the belief that ’’the sins as­

cribed to the French republic could, with small variants, be ascribed to

all the governments of the world, present, past and future*1*88 gut such

interventions in th© argument about the fall of France remained rare and

their Influence was limited. The French defeat had a deep and lasting

influence on American opinion of France#

YI

While emphasis on French domestic policies and "moral** causes of

the French defeat usually showed at least a leaning toward the ultra­

conservative theory, insistence on the demographic, economic or military

situation, although it may stem from sheer sympathy for France, was or­

dinarily the approach of more liberal minds# Their comments attempted

to give the lie to what Time had writtent "Truth was that France was not

conquered, France collapsed* The French defeated themselves and they

®^The Qommonweal, July 28, 1940*

8% 0W York time. April 19, 1942.

 36

knew They attempted to show that the French had been the victims

of overpowering circumstances*

Other factors than a liberal outlook may have been involved In

this category of comments. Isolationism may have played its part as it

did in an article in The Patriot;

Almost every explanation has been given for the fall of France, ex­
cept the right one. France has been dead for some years. The kill­
ing and killing andkilling of th© last war was too much for her,
and she simply died a hideous second death . . , leaving what was
left of Franc© to endure th© insultsof our vilo and lying press. .
• • It seems to methat those of us who saved France, futilely, in
1915, 1916 and later, must speak up to save America from the fate
which has overwhelmed France.8?

It was also isolationism, or anti-British feeling, which led some

to attack Great Britain for not giving enough help to Franc© or for ex­

ploiting the Dunkirk episode for propaganda purposes* “The terrible

tragedy of Dunkirk,” wrote Porter Sargent, “was transformed by skillful

publicity into a heroic chapter in the history of the British people,

and one of which they will always speak with pride.”88

Since moat of the liberal newspapers were anxious to help Great

Britain in her desperate fight against Germany, they naturally refrained

from saying anything which might harm her cause. A Gallup poll of

August, 1940,88 showed, nevertheless, that many Americans thought the

“British had let the French down.” The poll indicated that nearly 28 per

8®Time> July 1, 1940.

87The Patriot, December, 1940, quoted in Sargent, (Setting Us

into War, p. 5^4. "^

88Sargent, Getting Us into War, p. 547.

88Public Opinion Quarterly. December, 1940, p. 711.

cent of the population shared this belief. Only 13 per cent held that

the "French had let the British d o w n * T h e s e figures seem to prove

that even among interventionist circles the attitude of Great Britain

was criticised.

The uncensored dispatches which American reporters in retreat

sent from Spain or Portugal were not all full of reports on "French de­

cay*" Taylor Henry, and many others, voiced the recriminations of

Petain*

The Allied lack of man power was due in part to th© difference be­
tween 10 British divisions fighting in France in 1940 as against 8S
in critical phases of the last war, and also to Italy’s entry into
the war on Germany’s side*91

He also emphasized the difference of populations in France and Germany,

which was, he thought, "the basic reason for this lack of man power.'*

It soon became apparent, nevertheless, that this disparity be­

tween the number of soldiers at the disposal of France and Germany had

not played a direct part in the outcome of the battle* Most writers put

the emphasis on the tactics used by the Germans and their technical

superiority*

Allowing for some treachery and much incompetence on the Allied side,
the truth la that the Germans crashed through their opponents not
merely because they had piled up enormous quantities of the new weap­
ons of war, but because they had drilled a huge army in original
methods of warfare which swept the enemy off their feet.92

Others mentioned the fact that French colonial troops, which had been so

90$»or th© discussion of that poll, see p* J13.

^Chicago Tribune* July 2, 1940*

^Oswald Garrison Villard in Th© Atlantic Monthly, August, 1940,

p. 170,
 58

effective in trench warfare f were a handicap In a war where planes and

tanks played a leading role. Many ©aphasia© the “fifth column system”

and considered it as an unfair way to wag© a war.

The attitude of Belgium before the war cam© in for strong criti­

cism among interventionist circles. They said that Belgium, by attempting

to maintain an impossible neutrality, had brought about her own downfall

and had thus helped to bring about that of France. "In justice to

Garaelin,” wrote John Chamberlain in Harper1s Magazine, “it may be re­

marked . , , that a linear defense at the Albert Canal In Belgium might

have worked if King Leopold had allowed the French and British to move

their troops into position last winter instead of calling for help at the

confused eleventh hour.”®3

In spite of the many tributes paid to “the bravery of the French

soldiers,” there were few attempts to defend the record of the French army.

In some dispatches sent from Lisbon French infantry officers were accused

of having deserted their men and having fled with their families in their

private ears, taking along their silverware and most precious possessions.

Foreign correspondent Edgar Ansel Mowrer was extremely severe

with the French army. Like most observers of liberal tendencies, he was

inclined to put the blame on the highest level of the hierarchy. Accord­

ing to him, the French generals were responsible for the French technical

inferiority. “French generals told me during the Flanders Battle that

with 100 more planes, 1000 more tanks and 5000 more guns, they could have

won. . . . If they were not purchased it was the generals and not the

politicians which were chiefly at f a u l t . j n another article, he

®%argerl£ Magazine, August, 1940.

^Newsweek, July 89, 1940.

 59

explained French deficiencies on the field by the attitude of the French

officers* “the French Infantry, repeatedly deserted by their officers,

melted away* What happened to the French officers? For the most part

they sere hostile to the Third Republic*“98 In a third article, a dis­

patch sent from Lisbon on July 2, he questioned the sill to fight of the

French army as a wholes

Individually, the men and units undoubtedly fought well* But com­
pared with the French army at Verdun, or with the Poles at Warsaw,
these French armies fought without that savage desperation that alone
can save a desperate situation*
When the French decided to yield their capital city rather than
have it share the glory of ruined Warsaw, the prevailing frame of
mind m s apparent to the world* This frame of mind m s not
sufficiently heroic*®®

A* J* Liebling discussed the French military record in terms of

sport*

It must have been a little like one of those football games in which
one team seems certain in advance to beat the other by two or three
touchdowns, but in which the inferior team plays far below its form.
• * * After such a game the spectators always think the winning team
much stronger than it really is and the losers weaker than they
possible could have been.®7

It m s only after the official list of casualties m s published that the

defenders of French military valor could uphold their argument with one

facti the daily ratio of French killed and wounded during the blitzkrieg

was much higher than during the First $orld War.

nevertheless, moat Americans remained impressed with the speed of

®%*w York Times* August 22, 1940.

Baltimore Evening Sun, July 2, 1940.

®7Liebling, The Hoad Back to Paris* p* 102.

 40

the German advance and with its apparent ease. There was even a tendency

to consider the German campaign as a pleasure trip. Demaree Bess en­

titled his article on the fall of Paris "With their Hands in their Pock­

ets.'*^ Host Americans pondered figures published by many newspapers.

The French had at least three million men under anas and most of them
were put in action against the Germans at some time during the battle.
Tot the German Panzer divisions which smashed through them with
apparent ease numbered hardly two hundred thousand men."

The latter figure probably was too low, for when Germany had published

her total casualties on the Western Front, the men killed, wounded, or

missing were said to number 156,492.

If the French did not fight well, there is at least one explana­

tion on which all American observers agreed, namely, there was no war

enthusiasm in France. Dorothy Thompson attributed this situation to a

lack of democratic consciousness. "The failure of the French morale

arose, in my own observation, from the fact that the french did not know

for what they were fighting. The ultra-conservat1ve and isolationist

Chicago Tribune, on the other hand, used the French example to imply a

threat against the American governments

In this connection it is not necessary to examine the question whether

it was actually in the interest of the French people to enter the war.
The point to be emphasized is that the people of France did not fully
share the judgment reached by the French government and for that rea­
son, among others, France's military effort was weak. If our

Saturday Evening Post, August 51, 1940.

" L od e, August 27, 1940.

100Hew Tork Times. July 5, 1940.

lOljntroduction to M. Fodor, The Bevolution Is On (Cambridge,

Mass., 1940), p. xi.
 41

government maneuvers the American people into m unpopular war,

similar consequences may be expected."52

American observers found several reasons for the French lack of

enthusiasm for war. The first one was the corruption of the French press.

Most American studies of the international press bear witness to the fact

that the French press had a bad reputation in the United States, even be­

fore the war. On the occasion of the defeat, many journalists recalled

how some French newspapers had been bought by the Russian government in

order to facilitate the launching of the French loan to Russia before the

First World War. Starting with this example, they gave many other

instances of the corruption of the French press.

In the specific ease of the 1940 defeat, however, it was diffi­

cult to connect the moral standards of the French newspaper editors di­

rectly with the failure of French arms, since no real opposition to the

war was expressed in French organs of public opinion. The liberals could

logically accuse the French rightist press of having undermined French

morale, before the war, by preaching a blind admiration of Mas! Germany

and Fascist Italy or by supporting the policy of appeasement. They did

not fail to do it. But it is surprising to see a man like William H.

Chamberlin, who took a position against "appeasement," reproach French

newspapers for not voicing the opinion of pacifists who wanted a second

Munich.

A strange fatalistic apathy hung over the country during the few
weeks before the beginning of hostilities. Bo doubt strong hints,
financial and otherwise, had been given to the press, and meetings
on the subject of war and peace were discouraged. . . • Every other
Frenchman with whom one talked was convinced that war would mean

lOZchicago Tribune. July 5, 1940.

 42

disaster* But almost no one ventured to voioe this opinion, although

there was still no censorship or special punitive legislation* A
study of the French newspapers during the last week before the decla­
ration of war would reveal a few protesting or questioning voices*
There was an anti-war resolution of the congress of French teachers,
a similar manifesto, addressed to Premier Daladier, by a group of
women who had been active in social work* But In general the
Frenchman • . . bowed to fate with Oriental resignation.3*0®

The attitude of French newspapers just before or during the war

was not conclusive * It was therefore necessary to consider the responsi­

bility of the press during the years which preceded the war. Talking in

Boston, Edward J* Flynn, chairman of the Democratic national Committee,

complained that the American press was trying to ^destroy Congress,»1°4

and compared it with the French press under the Third Republic# Raymond

Clapper, for instance, protested his statement 31that the people of France

lost respect for their democracy because the French press was doing what

the American press is doing f’He probably do©sn*t know," said

Raymond Clapper, 31that the French press was notoriously for sale. The

only difference between the French prostitute newspapers and independent

American newspapers is that both are printed on white paper.’*3*06

The second reason for the low French morale was said to be mili­

tary censorship. Whether or not French newspapers would have done their

job of informing the public during the war, no one could know, since a

censorship, which William H. Chamberlin termed "at once severe, stupid

and capricious,"1°? eliminated from French or American dispatches any

l°®Harperfa Magazine, May, 1941, p. 561.

I0%ew York World Telegram, June 18, 1942.

lOSjbid.

10%®* york World Telegram, June 18, 1942.

^HarperT& Magazine, May, 1941, p. 564.

 45

suggestion that everything was not going smoothly* Hone among the Ameri­

can journalists who had suffered personally frost this limitation to their

freedom raised his voice in defense of "Anastasia." Many of them saw in

tdie military censorship a typical example of "French inefficiency."

Kenneth Doans described it as Ma paralyzing, sinister censorship which I

have reason to believe contained Its good share of Has! agents and which

contributed materially to France’s defeat*"108 waverley Root held the

same opinion*

The French military censorship * . . played a considerable part in

making the defeat of France possible. Whether by stupidity or design,
the holding of an entire population in ignorance concerning the
gravity of France’s situation until it was too late had the effect
of preventing the popular reaction which might have forced a change
in the direction of French military affairs.1^9

This was not the first encounter between French bureaucracy and

America* It was not to be the last. Sherry Mangan probably reflected

the American irritation.

The French civil administration have learned nothing. They are still
under the impression that wars can be won and nations made great by
never telling anybody anything but writing everything down in purple
ink in very large books* They have simply doubled the red tape or
chinolserle as they call it, although I don’t know why the French
should make the Chinese the goats for their own worst
characteristic •H O

French people being kept ignorant, they were all the more in­

clined to listen to the skillful German propaganda. This was the third

IQQflewgweeki August 5, 1940.

IQ^Backetage of the War, May 51, 1945. This was a syndicated

column dietributed by theTress Alliance.

H Opife, September 16, 1940,

reason advanced for the bad French morale, German propaganda was espe­

cially successful over the radio, according to American radio specialists,

she could cite the testimony of French refugees who confessed the inferi­

ority of French propaganda*^ xn Radio Goes to War»^ % J, Eolo gave a

sad picture of the French international station, Paris-mondial, The work

of dean Giraudoux, who was in charge of French propaganda at the outset

of the war, was praised for it® literary merits, but was considered inef­

fectual in comparison with the work of Goebbels. In an article on

"United States International Broadcasting,” J, Eolo and H, Strauss~Hupe

claimed that in France the German radio propaganda had won

what is to date Its most spectacular triumph. The French National

Radio, directed by a group of tired Academicians and politicians of
dubious integrity, failed woefully to provide the newshungry civilian
population and bored poilus in the Haginot line with even passable
newscast® or entertainment,US

Many thought, however, that the success of German propaganda in France

was merely a symptom rather than the cause of Francefs poor morale,

FIX

Almost all American observers adopted the same criterion in their

search for a true picture of French democracy. They assumed that its

capacity for national defense was in direct proportion to its intrinsic

value as a guardian of democratic principle®. Regardless of whether they

considered that French democracy had taken a bad course or had only fallen

into the hand® of anti-democratic elements, they all took it for granted

^■Robert de Saint dean in The Atlantic Monthly* November, 1940,

Hole, Radio Goes to War (New York, 1942), chap, 7.

^ ^torper* 8 Magazine, August 19, 1941, p. §02,

 45

that ^perfect democracy," whatever conception of it they might hold,

would have been the best bulwark in the battle against Nasi Germany,

Even those who believed that only some kind of international or­

ganisation could save the world from complete chaos failed to carry their

philosophy into their study of the Franco-German war of 1939-40, Even

the advocates of internationalism could not avoid thinking in national

terms. Medieval poetry Is based on allegories personifying thoughts which

the reader has trouble grasping in their abstract form, Nations are mod­

ern allegories which people endow with artificial personalities. In many

respects they are nonentities, whose shadows weigh on the thinking of the

Individual and blind hi® to certain truths. For example, public opinion,

at least in Western countries, is not determined by national boundaries.

It is determined by economic, social, geographical, historical factors

which make the concept of national responsibility look almost absurd.

This study shows that American opinion had not outgrown the na­

tionalist conception, Andre Visson, in As Others See Us, claims that

American opinion, in the case of the French defeat, proved its maturity

by being able to distinguish between the few responsible men and the mass

of the French people, innocent of any guilt,^ It is impossible to be

satisfied with this kind of maturity* The problem of the "guilt” or ’'in­

nocence" of the French people was trivial. What mattered was to take

cognisance that the French collapse was the forerunner of events which

would change the world to such an extent that the mature political

thinking of one day would appear childish on the next one.

^Andre Visson, As Others See Us (hew York, 1949), p. 147,

 chapter n

IMPACT or THE FRENCH DEFEAT ON AMERICAN POLITICAL THINKING

The French defeat created in America a feeling of national emer­

gency* Many Americana realised then that the democracies of Europe ware

really ♦'Americans first line of defense.® They looked toward the future

with anxiety. Uncertainty was at its height at the time of the armistice.

No prophet can now predict with assurance what other catastrophes lie
ahead} how desperate the situation will be, either in Europe or in
Asia, by the time our presidential campaign beginsj what great emer­
gencies or what Immense decisions may face the government of the
United States during the four months that lie immediately ahead, let
alone the four years that will comprise the ter® in office of the
new administration,1

This feeling of emergency was due to the fact that the swiftness

and completeness of the French defeat had shaken the American belief in

an Allied victory. A Gallup poll taken at the beginning of the war had

shown that more than 00 per cent of the American people believed in an

Allied victory* This figure is not much below that of the people who—

according to Mr* Gallup— wished an Allied victory. The difference between

the two figures would probably have been more important in France than in

America* It is safe to say that an enormous majority of the American

people wanted to believe and believed in an Allied victory. The

3-New fork Time®, June HI, 1940*

40
 47

destruction of Poland and the inaction of the French army during the

winter did not change this situation in a sensible maimer

The Scandinavian war and the poor showing of the Allied Expedi­

tionary Force slightly modified the situation but, at the outset of the

campaign in the Y/est, Allied propaganda was still in complete dominance

of American thought concerning the conduct of the war. Very negative

success, indeed, since It reinforced isolationism. It was primarily due

to a general apathy concerning war news.

This "faith" was suddenly destroyed at the beginning of the cam­

paign in the West. The change took place even before the bad news began

to pour In. By May SO, a majority of the American people had stopped be­

lieving in a French victory. At that time it was just as difficult In

America as it was in France to distinguish the idea of a French defeat

from that of an Allied defeat. After all, even Hitler could not separate

the two— to say nothing of Betain, Darian and many others.

During the summer of 1940 the belief that Germany would win the

war was very general. The number of those who wanted a British victory

had not changed, but, according to a Gallup poll taken in June, only

SB per cent thought that this wish would be fulfilled, 55 per cent picked

Germany as the winner, and 55 per cent could not make up their minds.s

A poll by Fortune showed a low of 50.5 per cent betting on England, a

high of 40 per cent favoring Germany ttregardless of hope,” and 27.9 per

cent who "didn’t know" or did not want to choose.^ The intimate

^Public Opinion Quarterly. March, 1941, p. 155.

sIbld.. June, 1940.

^Fortune. July, 1940.

conviction of many of those who said that England would win or refused

to apeak was probably that Hitler had already won the war.

Their reasoning was, and it looked irrefutable, that France had

been the only country among the Allied powers who had an army— not the

best in the world to be sure, but at least worth mentioning. France had

been defeated in no time* The protection granted the British Isles by the

Channel was discounted because the operations had shorn that air-power

was now the weapon number one and could achieve almost anything. Germany

was supreme in the air. Even if Hitler did not succeed in destroying

Great Britain, the idea of organising an expeditionary force capable of

winning the continent back from Germany seemed utterly ridiculous. The

German army which could defeat any force on the continent would find It

even easier to prevent a landing on occupied soil. Stalin was still "al­

lied" with Hitler and the possibility of a war between the two accomplices

seemed all the more improbable to many American people because the unholy

friendship between these two villains gave them a comfortable

Intellectual reassurance.

This conviction that everything was over with the end of the

fighting in Franc© was shared by some in high places* Ambassador

Joseph P. Kennedy, when he returned from Great Britain, expressed it pub­

licly. Senator Key Pittman of Nevada, chairman of the Senate Foreign

Relations Committee, handed reporters a statement that advised the Brit­

ish government to abandon the British Isles.5 Apparently, President

Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull did not share this belief

and tried to communicate their confidence to their entourage.® The few

% « e . July 8, 1940.

®Cord«ll Hull, Memoirs (Hew lork, 1948), p. 838.

 49

who, like President Roosevelt himself, had not entertained Illusions con­

cerning French military power found themselves in a better position to

avoid discouragement after the capitulation*7

The official attitude of the United States government resulted

probably from an intimate conviction but it also served a purpose# Com­

plete discouragement would have been as dangerous as the complete optimism

of the previous months. For the Minterventionist press," the problem was

to find a happy medium between the two#

Americans did not need to be reminded twice that they should "re­

cast their thinking about national protection#11® The American reaction

was "as rapid as the rush of ©vents#"® Cordell Hull pointed out that the

American public "was more keenly conscious of the grave dangers threaten-

ing us than at any tiara since [he] Had entered the State Departaent.-lO

The rapid legislative measures which followed somewhat assuaged

the fears of the American people. The conversion of American industry to

war uses began during the summer of 1940 and was primarily due to the

shock created by the French defeat* It made it possible for President

Roosevelt to satisfy, at least partially, the demands of Great Britain

for war supplies. On December 29, 1940, Roosevelt announced that America

would be the "arsenal of democracy."^1 This promise would have had little

7Langer, Our Vichy Gamble, p* 5.

8President Roosevelt to Congress in Hew York Times, May 17,

1940.

^Alfred L. Burt in Allan Kevins and Louis M. Hacker, eds., The

United States and Its Place in World Affairs (Boston, 194$), p. 4S9.

l®Hull, Memoirs, p. 794.

u New York Times. December 50, 1940.

 so

immediate significance if production of armaments had not increased

considerably after the french defeat.

Popular support for preparedness was not slowed down by the French

armistice and Betain** suppression of the third Republic as the "inter­

ventionist movement11 was. Isolationist newspapers like the Saint Louis

Fost Dispatch never wavered in their support of the defense policy. In

September, 1959, only 51 per cent of the American people thought that one

year compulsory military training should be established* According to

the Gallup polls, by dune 2, 1940, the number of these people had in­

creased enough to constitute exactly half of the American people. On

duly 10, the day Retain suppressed the French Republic, those who approved

compulsory military training had become a majority by a margin of 2 per

cent. On August 11, the idea was approved by a majority of two-thirds.^

this demand for American military preparedness, coming even fro®

the isolationists, was an indication of a growing belief that American

security m s endangered. People realized that an implacable law of power

politics, which they had refused to accept before and which they now felt

confusedly more than they understood, had plunged them into the war from

the first day, whatever they might have thought, said or done. This was

the first result of the French defeat on American opinion. Roosevelt re­

called "the uproar that had ensued when he had implied that the United

States had an interest in the Rhine frontier. "3.5

^Harper's Magazine, April, 1941, p. 552.

^Alden Hatch, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, An Informal Biography

(Hew York, 1947), p. 26X1 Roosevelt referred to a secret meeting of the
senators of the Military Affairs Committee at the White House on Janu­
ary SL, 1939. See Denys Smith, America and the Axis War (New lork,
1942), pp. 185-186.
 SI

A second consequence of the French defeet was the progress of the

idea of pan-^oasrican solidarity. As Thomas A* Bailey pointed out in The

Man in the Street, public support for defending any South American coun­

try was lukewarm before the French defeat but "overwhelming” after the

fall of France.^ This change in opinion was due not only to security

reasons but also, especially after the French armistice and the end of

the Republic, to a general "Back to the Americas" movement which was re­

flected in the tremendous favor met by Spanish and Portuguese studies and

the correlative disfavor met by French, German and Italian studies *3*5

The same change occurred in certain South American countries where Ameri­

can influence increased sensibly during the war,

II

Demand for preparedness and organisation of a common defense plan

with all other countries of the Western Hemisphere was voiced by all the

various shades of American public opinion except the Communists* The

necessity of helping Great Britain in her fight against Masi Germany also

seemed obvious to a powerful majority of American public opinion but there

were more opponents of that policy* Before the French defeat, only 20

per cent of the American public favored an increase of American aid to

the Allies, They were 70 per cent at the end of dune, 1940,^ The pre­

vious successes of Hitler had not stirred enough American sensibilities

to provoke such a reaction. Hitler was considered as a megalomaniac, a

^Thomas A, Bailey* The Man in the Street (Mew York, 1948),

p* 174.

3*%©a pp.<3&-3^'
^Public Opinion Quarterly* June 29, 1940,
hoodlum playing with the lives of millions, but one who could certainly

not succeed and would be checked sooner or later* After Munich, there

had been anger because the European democracies were too slack in carry­

ing out their functions of policemen but it was only after the fall of

France that Americana forgot Hitler and Mussolini and took conscience of

the power of Nazi Germany*

The collapse of France exposed Great Britain as she had never

been exposed before, not even in the days when she stood alone against
the mighty napoleon and h© controlled about as much of the Continent
as Hitler did now, for then there was no air power and Britain's navy
was supreme* If the French fleet now passed to the other side, might
not the fall of France lead to the fall of Great Britain, her sea
power, and her empire? What sort of a world would it leave for us
to face— and all alone? We shuddered at the very thought*37

The only answer to this threat, many Americans thought, was to

help Great Britain to resist the forthcoming assault* The only chance

for America to stay out of the war was to keep Britain in it and to give

her all possible aid "short of war*” A majority of Americans were now

ready to accept measures, the necessity of which they had failed to grasp

until France fell* Those who were already ahead of the average opinion

in the previous period now advocated even more radical measures*

The march of the German armies across Western Europe resounded

louder and louder in American ears as June brought early summer* A
sense of apprehension swept the nation, and, as fear mounted counsels
divided* A minority urged that the United States enter the war im­
mediately against the Basis and Fascists* A majority urged that we
sent all possible material aid, but no more, to the Allies— when
France crumpled, to Britain alone.38

17Burt in Bevins and Hacker, eds*, The United States and Its
Place in World Affairs* p. 462.

^Current History* July, 1940, p* 12.

 53

The number of those who publicly advocated Americafs entrance

into the war was never very large. According to QsUiiitpi iiJ i*os8 to X9

per cent— the equivalent o£ about ten million voters— after the French

defeat*^® The Nation mentioned polls showing an increase from 7 to 14

per cent in this group.20 Among these people were quite a few Americans

of French origin. The Oberlin Review complained about a French teacher

"whose martial impulses outran his discretion."21

President Roosevelt was the leader of all those who thought that

the survival of Great Britain was vital to American security, but his at­

titude was also dictated by the necessities of American domestic politics*

His most important task was to convince isolationists that h© was right

on foreign issues* The impression created by the French defeat helped

him to secure the aid of some of the most important independent or Repub­

lican newspapers which had severely criticised the New Deal policy# Among

these newspapers, Robert Sherwood noted the New fork Herald Tribune, the

Boston Herald, the Chicago Daily News, the Des Moines Register and the

San Francisco Chronicle.2% The most important syndicated columnists were

also behind this policy,25 They wanted to show that it was not enough to

watch the French drama with a horrified curiosity. "Their disaster in­

volves us,B wrote Dorothy Thompson, "we should face that fact with

^Current History, January 23, 1941*

^The Nation, June 29, 1940*

fc^ffhe New Republic* July 15, 1940.

^Robert Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins (New York, 1948),

p# 105* 1.

2%e© for instance Walter Lippmann’a column, "Today and Tomor­

row, H during the blitzkrieg in the New York Herald Tribune, May 10-
June 20, 1940*
 54

complete clarity in order that, out of today's defeat we may draw tomor­

row's strength and wisdom.11*^ the result of the French defeat and of

this concerted action was a tremendous change in American opinion. Most

Americans were not ready to enter the war voluntarily but they did not

think that war could be avoided. Arthur Krock of the Sew fork Times, who

was not an ''Interventionist,14 attempted to describe American opinion at

the time of the armistice*

If anyone can make a reliable guess about the attitude of the

average American community toward our present relation to the war,
the guess is probably this*
Armed intervention not yet, and never if It can be avoided with­
out endangering our security, a desire to aid Germany's foe or foes
to the full point where deprivation of our own defense needs
begins*25

Senator Vanderberg was one who ©hanged his mind at the time of

the French defeat* His record in Congress was one of complete Isolation,

at least from all European affairs. He had been one of the sponsors of

the Neutrality Act of 1956. He had voted to retain the embargo on war

material in 1959. He once went so far as sayings "It matters little

which of the two sides wlnsn^ $ but on June 3, just before the fall of

Paris, he declared that the United States could no longer afford isola­

tionism. He asked that "this country give all possible help to the

Allies short of going to war or impairing its own defenses *"27

^Reprinted in the Congressional Record. July 29, 1940.

2%ew York Times, June 20, 1940,

2%mith, America and the Axis War, n., p. 256.

27Eadio address sponsored by the Republican National Committee.

 55

in
All this excitement was watched with anxiety by the politically

active isolationist groups in Congress and in the Brass* They did their

best to minimise the importance of the French defeat* Some of their

comments could have created the impression that nothing had changed since

the Franeo-Prussian war of 1870* They branded guilty of top “hysteria"

newspapers which granted too much space to international news and all

those who showed signs of anxiety. Touring the Middle West in a series

of pre-election speeches, Senator Robert Taft expressed his discontent

at seeing the people give so much attention to foreign affairs and neg­

lecting the task of “perfecting America*” This statement was surprising,

since most observers agreed that the French defeat did not disturb the

Middle West as much as it did the East, the West and the South*

All the factors present among groups which exMbited little or no

interest in French affairs were especially active in the Middle West.

These factors were Isolationism, conservative Republicanism, a relative

lack of French cultural influence, and the presence of sometimes very

homogeneous groups of German origin which had not entirely forgotten the

“Vaterland.” Answering a letter from an isolationist reader, writer

Bernard de Voto, in his Harper13 Magasine column, “The Easy Chair,** did

not try to minimise these regional differences in American opinion*

By the diagnosis of a gentleman in Michigan, the Easy Chair needs

medical attention* Hysteria i The evidence is that, reaching Santa
Fe, just when the House of Brabant saved itself by enslaving its peo­
ple, just when the Nasi tanks and bombers began the attack that was
to enslave France, the Easy Chair wrote that these things were a dan­
ger to America, that they threatened the gentleman’s home town* That
made the gentleman in Michigan mad. . . . He called the Easy Chair
an agent of the hysterical East. He said that it ought to get away
from the East oftener and seek the quiet of the West. • . . The
 56

West, understand, was quiet in that the death of Europe did not dis­
turb it. It saw no portentsj it wasn’t scared. Maybe the Nasals were
making a new earth under a new heaven, but let’s take that in our
stride— it was only Europe after all, and the Western pulse was calm*
You’re wrong, brother, it wasn’t the West that was quiet when
Europe died* X found the West, where the conditions of life, so much
harder than those you’re used to in Michigan, make people realistic—
X found the West just as disturbed as I was by those trivial events
overseas, just as certain that American was in ghastly danger.28

The Gallup atate~by*atate poll on ftwar sentiment,” taken at the

beginning of the French campaign, may be used as a gauge of American in­

terest in the French drama. It showed that the most unconcerned state

was Wisconsin, followed closely by Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, and Minne­

sota#2^ Thomas Bailey found geographical reasons to explain that the

West was, as a whole, less disturbed than the East coast. Having left

the excited urban centers of the East at the time of the French collapse,

he noted that?

In the vastness of Utah, with the blue ramparts of the Rockies

towering through the distant base • • * it seemed incredible that the
world was falling to pieces. The collapse of France was like in a
vaguely remembered dream. The United States seemed so secure simply
because it was so big and so wide.30

American war correspondents coming back from France found their fel-

low-citizens very apathetic, even in the "war-minded” Hast. A. J. Liebling

expressed his own amassment in The Road Back to Paris. Talking some time

after his return to a friend who had just come back and was still under

the impression of the violent change between Europe at war and America at

peace, he explained humorously! tfI used to be like you myself * , , but

^Harper’s Magazine, November, 1940, p. 660.

^Public Opinion Quarterly, June £9, 1940.

^Bailey, The Man In the Street, p, 245.

 57

now, after a couple of months in a sane atmosphere compounded of

Lindbergh*s speeches and editorials of the Mew Masses, I see how things

really are*11$3* Isolationist newspapers claimed that only "Long Island

aristocracy*1 and a few college professors wanted to drag America into the

war*2® Although the effect of the news from France was not limited to

the intellectual elite, it was undoubtedly less marked on the mass of the

American people* The French defeat was the most important external fac­

tor which, by weakening the Isolationist position, prepared American

opinion for the Second World War. However, a study of public opinion

polls during the period which followed the collapse shows that the action

of the American press and radio was even more important than the event

itself. If it had not been for this action, American masses would never

have reached the same conclusions as their leaders concerning that

momentous event*

Isolationist newspapers registered with relief the end of the

French campaign which, in their view, prevented Roosevelt from sending an

expeditionary force to the Continent. According to the Saint Louis Post

Disgatch, "with France on the verge of surrender, the danger of seeing

American doughboys on the battlefields of Europe is reduced to practically

nothing.*35 The Chicago Tribune also felt sure that "in this dark hour

Americans can find some comfort in the knowledge that there is little

prospect of another military adventure in Europe on our part. There is

no front in France to be defended by our men and guns.”34 The purpose

^Llebling, The Road Back to Paris, p. 114*

^Chicago Tribune, duly 13, 1940.

S3Saint Louis Post Dispatch. June 18, 1940.

^Chicago Tribune t July Z$ 1940.

 58

of such remains m s obviously to convince people that the end of the war

in France was the end of the war in Europe and that It was no use to help

Great Britain or to prepare an attack of the Continent* On June 15

Lindbergh declared* “Arming to attack the continent of Europe would ne­

cessitate that the lives and thoughts of every man, woman and child in

this country be directed toward war for the next generation, probably

for the next several generations*11

Isolationist newspapers, although they repeated every day that

German conquests in Europe should have been as indifferent to Americans

as if they had taken place on the moon, were not the last to complain

about American lack of preparedness* Very few American isolationists

attempted to conciliate these contradictory facts* Some maintained that

America should always be armed because it was a great nation* the value

of this nationalistic and militaristic argumentation was Impaired, how­

ever, by the attitude which isolationists adopted on the question of the

French possessions In the Western Hemisphere* Very few insisted that

Martinique and the other islands should be taken over by the United States

because “America belonged to the Americans •” They usually preferred to

exploit the all-powerful argument of a Maai threat on these French

colonies*

The magas&ne Fortune* summing up American opinion during the year

1940, concluded, and this conclusion was also true of the isolationists,

that, with the French defeat, na whole generation*® concept of security

crumbled in a few days *“36

!®Sew Toxic Times* June 16, 1940*

^Fortune* January, 1941, p* 54*

 The isolationists, however, were somewhat helped in their task

of convincing America that the war was over by the French armistice it­

self. This event brought about a temporary regression of Interventionist

feeling. American opinion never went back to its indifference during the

“phony war** period but pro-Allied sentiment was checked temporarily*

Taking Gallup polls in war time is precarious business* The last

published survey showed a rise in war sentiment to 7 per cent# An­
other survey was being taken when the French surrender was reported*
Before the surrender, th© ballots Indicated that war feeling had
jumped to 14 per cent* The bad news brought an immediate diminution
of the fever and compelled the institute to start all over again.$7

The accuracy of these polls may be contested but th© trend they

noted was obvious enough# In America and the Axis War* British journal­

ist Denys Smith recorded: “The shock of the French surrender checked for

a time the rising pro-Allied sentiment in the United States*n$8 Isola­

tionist Francis Neilson noted in th© June 27, 1940, entry of his diary

“the change which has taken place in a fortnight* For a week or ten days

after the debacle in Belgium, people generally were in a ferment of ex­

citement. How, in the Middle West, they m m to be reconciled with the

inevitable and wonder whan it will be all over.tt$9 A few days later he

exclaimed: “What a slump has taken place in the ardor of interventionists

since the downfall of France J"40

Most observers thought that th© main reason for this trend was

87The Nation* June 29, 1940*

8%mith, America and the Axis War, p* 259*

^Francis Keilson, The Tragedy of Europe (Appleton, Wisconsin,

1940), p. 554*
 60

th© American conviction that Hitler could not be defeated. This was the

explanation brought forward by Denys Smith and Heilaon. It was argued

that the French had given up the fight because they had understood that

nothing could be done. This seemed obvious also to many Americans who

gave up the idea of any attempt to check Hitler on th© Continent* This

was undoubtedly not th© only reason for the regression of interventionist

feeling. The surrender of France was a new blow to Great Britain which

was now fighting alone. American security was more compromised than ever,

and American desire to help the champions of democracy who were still in

the fight should have been greater than before. On the other hand, the

French defeat had created a state of tension and nervousness but no such

feeling of hopelessness as to account for a desire to surrender everything

to Hitler without a fight. This explanation did not suffice to explain

a widespread reaction which manifested itself even before the armistice.

It should be remembered, in order to explain this reaction, that the

French defeat not only proved Hitler*s strength, but, in th© opinion of

many, it also proved the terrible weakness of th© French democracy. The

political and moral significance which, rightly or wrongly, was attributed

to the French collapse contributed to this surprising resurgence of

Isolationist feeling in the midst of the international catastrophe.

The first articles purporting to explain th© French defeat were

published in the second half of May, 1940. The conservative theory which

put the blame on the Popular Front and the French politicians of the Left

was fully developed in the first half of June. The reaction of the lib­

eral opinion was much slower to come* Many Americans accepted these first

explanations and concluded that their isolationist newspapers which had

always opposed, on the American domestic scene, the very policies which
 61

had proved deadly to France, had shown more political insight and were

more trustworthy than the interventionists who, at least in th® North,

were generally associated with a more liberal outlook on domestic Issues*

Public opinion polls on the relative strength of the Republican and

Democratic parties during the crisis confirmed that fact* the April sur­

vey showed that 54 per cent of the people favored the Democrats; 46 per

cent, the Republicans• On June 15 the figures were 68 and 42*

On© highly significant fact, however, which tempers this picture

somewhat is that public opinion immediately after the German invasion
of Holland and Belgium was even more Democratic than the figure shown
today. First returns between Hay 10 and May 24 showed 69 per cent
favoring the Democratic party; hence there ha® been a slight drop in
Democratic strength in lie last two weeks.41

This fact explained why American conservative and isolationist

newspapers emphasized their political explanations of the French defeat so

much* They knew that, in the minds of many people, isolationism was tied

to a very conservative attitude on social and economic problems and that

any success won in one of these fields would reflect on the other css®.

The results of this strategy were too limited to change the course of

events but it exercized a considerable influence on American opinion of

France after the French defeat.

The French defeat had important repercussions on American domestic

politic®. It brought about a feeling of emergency which facilitated

Roosevelt *s reeleotion for a third term* The Republican convention which

was held at the end of June was also completely dominated by

■ % e w York Times, June 16, 1940.

 62

international affairs, This very concern was a first defeat for the

isolationist Republicans because it ran counter to the argument that the

French defeat was of no special interest to America, except as a reminder

that socialism meant military weakness* Most delegates did not adopt this

view of the situation* Th© Republican party tried to convince the public

that only a Republican administration could prepare the country for any

emergency and keep it out of the war at th© ©am© time. Th© long debate

over the foreign policy plank clearly indicated that Republican leaders

did not agree on the best way to combine these two objectives. This de­

bate also showed that the isolationists had regained some of their

confidence after the armistice* As Ann© 0 fHare McCormick pointed out*

Th© final draft of foreign policy plank4^ is at once a platoni©

and elastic declaration. It goes farther than th© die-hard isola­
tionists in the committee desired but not nearly as far as the Repub­
licans were prepared to go immediately after France was invaded.
Public feeling ran so high at that time that they were ready to
pledge all measures of assistance *short of war* to the Allies by
name, but, since the capitulation of France, the supposed swing of
sentiment in the opposite direction has strengthened the influence
of the isolationist members.

Isolationism, however, received a new blow in the nomination of

Wendell L. Willkie as Republican presidential candidate. His nomination

was certainly influenced by his stand on foreign affairs, and with his

nomination the isolationists lost their political fight. During the

presidential campaign which followed, foreign issues undoubtedly played

42»our sympathies have been profoundly stirred by invasion of un­

offending countries and by disaster to nations whose ideals most closely
resemble our own. We favor the extension to all people fighting for lib­
erty, or whose liberty is threatened, of such aid as shall not be in vio­
lation of international law or inconsistent with the requirement of our
own national defenses.’* hew fork Times, dune 27, 1940*

48Xbld.
 65

a very important part but the candidates outdid each other in their prom­

ises to American mothers to keep their sons out of "foreign wars.11 The

British statesman, Harold Laskl, like maty other people believed that the

French defeat, which had revealed to America that its choice was between

"victory and death" was the main cause for Roosevelt*s reflection.44 xt
may have been true that in spite of a political campaign during which both

candidates tried to look equally isolationist, well-informed observers,

although they knew that both were equally interventionist, also realised

that Wendell Willkie*s action in the foreign field might be influenced by

his isolationist supporters* Most of these people, however, would proba­

bly have voted for Roosevelt regardless of the international situation*

Norman Thomas was probably right when he wrotes "It was not

Mr* Roosevelt!s foreign but his domestic policy, more precisely It was

Mr* Roosevelt’s personal popularity with the masses * * * which elected

him. "45

Isolationist newspapers, however, which had not been very enthu­

siastic about Willkie’s nomination, tried to emphasise the differences

between the two candidates. "When did Mr* Willkie say that the frontier

of America is on the Rhine or in France?" asked the Chicago Tribune* but

the same newspaper felt the need to warn Willkie and his advisers that

"the good opinion of the people of the county seats will be fax more im­

portant to the candidate than the support of the Long Island aristocracy*

The fact must be recognized that the county seats want to stay out of the

4%jarold Laski, Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time (New

fork, 1945), p. 157.

4%orman Thomas, What Is Our Destiny? (New York, 1944), p. 15,

 64

European war and Long Island wants to get Into it.n46 willkie apparently

tried to remember everything. He tried to make Roosevelt responsible not

only for the fall of France, and this was an isolationist argument, but

also for the Munich surrender, and this was harder to conciliate with

isolationist philosophy* His comparison of Roosevelt with Leon Blum

fitted all purposes since, fortunately for Willkie, Blum was accused at

the same time of having wasted away the best part of the French array in

Spain and of having betrayed the democratic cause through sheer weakness

in front of the Fascist threat.47 Robert Sherwood noted the diversity of

Willkie1s attack© against Roosevelt and “his fine disregard for consist­

ency. “48 This is true of many candidates for political offices at any

time but the confusion of minds was certainly increased during the 1940

presidential campaign by the fact that the French defeat had destroyed

many well-established concepts* American masses, however, had had no

time to adjust their thinking to the new circumstances* Although they

held basically the same position on foreign issues, neither of the two

candidates ever dared ©peak his mind on the subject for fear of losing

the votes of many peace-loving but uninforaed citizens. The last Repub­

lican broadcast, as reported by Robert Sherwood who was campaigning for

Roosevelt, was typical of the tone of the whole campaign*

When your boy is dying on some battlefield in Europe or maybe

in Martinique^— and he is crying *Mother I Mother J*— don't blame

^Chicago Tribune, July IS, 1940*

47Ibld., July 2, 1940.

48
Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 188*

49Xtalics mine* Many isolationist newspapers demanded at that

time American intervention in the French Antilles. See pp* i2£~ 1.2.7,
 65

Franklin D* Roosevelt because he sent your boy to war— -blame

YOURSELF because YOU sent Franklin D. Roosevelt back to the White
House*60

All isolationism was not conservative in 1940* There was also m

isolationism of the Left which, although less influential, was no less

vigorous in its manifestations* The American Communist party had taken

a position against the "imperialist war" and repeatedly expressed the

opinion that the working class had nothing to do in a war between the

Fascist dictators and the "western plutocrats*" This purely pacifist at­

titude was very attractive to many intellectuals* This ideologically

orthodox line of action was maintained until June, 1941, when the Germans

attacked Soviet Russia# The Socialist party was also isolationist but

there was not among its members the same unity as in the Communist party*

The fall of France upset many pacifists who were not following the Com­

munist line and was the occasion of many a crisis of conscience* Oswald

Garrison Villard, m old-timo collaborator of The Nation* explained in a

letter to the magazine why he retired prematurely* "My retirement has

been precipitated at this time by the editor’s abandonment of The Nation’s

steadfast opposition to all preparation for war * * • and to all war*"51

In the same issue of The Nation* Reinhold Niebuhr explained how he had

displeased the American Socialist party by adopting an attitude opposed

to that of Oswald Garrison Villard*

Isolationists of the Left, like isolationists of the Right, at­

tempted to minimise the consequences of the French defeat. They felt

5%herwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 1$8.

slThe Hatlon. June 29, 1940.

 66

sure that capitalistic democracy offered no protection against the Nasi

threat and mere eager to show that Hitler was only an outgrowth of false

democracy* As far as France was concerned, tliis section of American opin­

ion was especially contemptuous of the French foreign policy between the

two wars* The attitude of Clemenceau at Versailles was the target of at­

tacks* University youth was especially attracted by this view of the

European war and it was sometimes hard to distinguish between the argu­

ments of Rightist and leftist isolationism, in spite of the basio differ­

ence in the two attitudes* Both groups, for instance, were influenced

by the revisionist discussions of the causes of the First World War*

The best criterion for detecting leftist isolationism was its at­

titude on social problems* Far from condemning the Popular Front, leftist

isolationists thought that French morale had collapsed because of the

French failure to carry out needed social reforms* Their conclusion mat

ttlet us perfect America instead of looking abroad for fighting evils which

we have not been able to correct at home*” A young New Yorker sent a

letter to Harper* a Magasine in answer to an article by Roy Helton*

The fate of France, says Mr* Helton, was that of a country which
behind a barrier of arms enjoyed a delicious respite* Hot so,
Mr* Helton* Franc© urns rotten to th® cor® by disaffection nurtured
on years of unemployment and hopelessness for its people, its youth,
Its soldiers and its statesmen* Just there, Mr. Helton, we too are
side, and growing more so at a frightful pace*
If we are to survive to th© year £000 w© must be tough, writes
Mr* Helton* Behind these words is a world of thought* Boes he mean
a people who can go hungry, jobless, and hopeless that they may have
th© guns to protect their rights to go on being hungry, jobless and
hopeless?
Franc© thought that, and In the foreboding lull of th© long
winter months her soldiers, h©r youth, weighed that concept and in
the spring found it not worth a candle.52

^Harper*s Maga&lne, January, 1941, p* 158.

 67

To many American intellectuals, however, the French defeat was

the first opportunity to abandon the "dream world" of "Escape and Appease*

stent*”5$ In The Kation, Freda Kirchwey led a vigorous fight against this

kind of isolationism*

Hitlerfs legions conquer France by means of unspeakable methods

of slaughter and terrorism; Jews and liberals and leftists are hounded
into exile and death; rooted ways of living and feeling are torn up
and discarded by a despotism that acknowledges no boundary lines*
These things are set down in the record and duly deplored* But they
happen at a great distance; they are our concern only if we choose
to make them so*
The people who inhabit that dream world— isolationists and paci­
fists, many of whom are also reformers and radicals— naturally choose
not to be concerned* They note the all-too-obvious imperfections in
the democracies which are in process of being crushed and point out,
comfortably* a host of reasons why their extermination was
inevitable*»4

VI

American isolationism was not dealt a fatal blow by th© French

defeat* It reacted vigorously but lost many of its positions* Isolation­

ist propaganda, on the other hand, contributed largely to the American

nationalist reaction, which may also, in many respects, be considered a

consequence of the French collapse* This phenomenon was first observed

during the hectic days of May, 1940* Henry Steel© Commager, professor of

history at Columbia University, noted? ttA major consequence of th® pres-

sent crisis is th© revival of American nationalism* This new

consciousness of Americanism is evident wherever we turn*1,55

It is immediately obvious that, although this nationalist

^%’reda Kirchwey, "Escape and Appeasement," The Hation, June 29,

1940*

s4Ibid.

^Scholastic, May 20, 1940.

 68

reaction was not directly linked to the spread of Nazi and Fascist to­

talitarian ideas, many of its manifestations were opposed to the trend

of evolution taken by Western democracies in the last decade# This re­

action contributed to widen the eift between those who wanted to precipi­

tate tMs evolution and those who wanted to defend the past# The American

nationalist reaction was not due to Nazi propaganda but it was the result

of the German triumph® in Europe# What isolationism lost in the

collapse of France was gained by nationalism#

As a result of the psychological impact of th© French defeat

faith in democracy was diminished and there was anxiety concerning it®

future. The Boston Transcript, for Instance, compared the French and

American democratic realities to the German totalitarian efficiency#

There are times in the affairs of man when we must take th© long
look of things# # • • In 20 years, a people stripped of their wealth
and manpower by war and Inflation, have built for themselves one of
the most powerful positions in the long history of Europe* They made
every sacrifice to do it, including that of freedom# # • # After the
same interval, her neighbor victorious only twenty years ago, lies
prostrate# . • • Democracy has not been functioning efficiently in
Franc© # * • national unity had reached a low ebb* Democracy in
America, also has fallen into bad days# Our economic structure has
been creaking* We • • « have been living beyond our means.56

B# B# White noted humorously in Harpers Magazine some of th© remarks he

heard after the French defeat#

On© man told m® that h© thought the Nazi ideal was sounder than
our constitutional system 1because have you ever noticed what fine
alert young faces the young German soldiers have in the newsreel?1
He added four American youngsters spend all their time at th© movies
--they are a mess I1

After this conversation, Whit© met another m m who told him that

^Boston Transcript, June 18, 1940.

 69

anyone who took any kind of government seriously was a gullible fool*
You could be sure, he said, that there is nothing but corruption,
*because of th© way Clemenceau acted at Versailles.1 He said it
didn*t make any difference really about the war. It was just another
war. Having relieved himself of this majestic bit of reasoning, he
subsided.67

A second effect of the psychological impact of the French defeat

was correlatively a tremendous admiration of Hitler* Writing for American

youth In The Atlantic Monthly Professor Arnold Whitridge of Yale

University warned young Americans against this natural feeling.

A few of you, but I think only a very few, are actually hoping
for a German victory. More than a few admire Hitler tremendously.
You canft help it. You have been taught to admire success whether
it be in the realm of athletics, business, social life or politics,
and Hitler is the greatest exponent of success the modern world has
ever seen.SS

The French collapse dealt a serious blow to certain moral and

esthetical principles irreconcilable to Fascism, Haadsm or any kind of

fanatically nationalist totalitarianism. In spite of the many tributes

paid to French culture at the time of the fall of Paris, th© reaction of

many was on© of cynicism toward th© values with which the French order,

rightly or wrongly, was associated. At the root of the problem, once

more, was the question of the causes of th© French defeats Did France

fall because French thinking was outmoded and because there was no place

for a France in the modem world or did France fall because she had proven

unfaithful to her own genius? Many pragmatist minds answered th© first

question affirmatively. Thus th© French defeat proved harmful to certain

^Harper*s Magazine, September, 1940, p. 441*

5%h© Atlantic Monthly, August, 1940, p. 135.

 70

values which, in the United States as elsewhere, constituted a brake on

the most radical expressions of political, religious and nationalist

fanaticism# These values were a consciousness of the international soli­

darity of culture, a cultural rather than biological or sentimental defi­

nition of country, religion and philosophy considered as a school of

tolerance, personal freedom considered as a safeguard of the individual

against the tyranny of ignorance# The French defeat was especially ef­

fective in France itself in that respect but its consequences were also

felt in other countries• The failure of France to carry on the war suc­

cessfully and even more her surrender to th© enemy were interpreted by

many as indicative that th© French conception of a civilised society was

not capable, and therefor® not worthy of survival. People now discovered

that previous failures and previous surrenders had suppressed in th®

hearts of the present French generation even the desire to defend an or­

der which had probably become meaningless in the twentieth century. The

French collapse appeared almost as much the result of a collective

suicide as the consequence of blows dealt from the outside*

The study of American newspapers and magazines in 1940 shows th©

presence, to a lesser degree, of the trends which prevailed in anti­

democratic France after the armistice* Roy Helton claimed in Harper*s

Magazine that the only real threat was America*s 11own softness.11 H©

felt sure that Great Britain and France had acted f,on a female pattern,11

thus implying that Germany and Italy Restem nations wore the only ones

to have a virile behavior. 59 in The Atlantic Monthly Lewi Mumford re­

peated the standard and still apparently innocuous moral accusations

5%arperts Magagine* September, 1940*

 ?1

which were heard so often in America* This time, however, he applied

them to France, Great Britain and the United States, leaving out the

totalitarian states which were considered a® “active barbarians” instead

of “passive” ones like the people of these democracies.

In Great Britain, Franco and the United States, power in the form
of money took precedence over power in the form of military weapons.
And the cult of the primitive in these countries came back less in
the forms of violence than in those of sensuous indulgence, drunken­
ness and promiscuous sexuality and the paraphernalia of material
wealth. These people are passive barbarians no less than the more
active one® that have produced fascism, they deny the value of mind
and spirit and renounce discipline and the sacrifice that make men
truly human.®®

It would be easy to multiply examples. They would all show that

the French defeat diminished American faith in the principles on which

Western democracy was founded* This situation led some Americans to stand

more firs than ever in the affirmation of their democratic principles.

These principles, however, were never as firmly implanted in the masses

as some would like to believe. In 1940, in France as in America, a gen**

oral reaction to th© successful Nazi onslaught, and for some, the only

way to overcome a possible inferiority complex in view of the triumph of

the totalitarian machine, was a more vigorous affirmation of their

national characteristics and a blind confidence in th© destiny of their

country.

®®The Atlantic Monthly. September, 1940, p. 274. Italics mine

 CHAPTER III

THE TEMPORARY DECLINE 0®' FRENCH CULTURAL BIFLUEHCE 1M AMERICA

The fall of France awakened a deep and sincere echo in many

American hearts. Franc©, one of th© rooks of Western civilization, ap­

peared secure in her “ivory tower.” She fell in one month and the catas­

trophe was too sudden for many to realize its consequences. Some did not

even attempt to do it. “Americans read in the headlines during the last

week of June that France had surrendered to Germany* but old habits of

thinking persist and it is hard to adjust ourselves to new conditions.

It may be a long time before our people begin to realize what that sur­

render means.”1 On this matter The Mew Republic agreed with th© Chicago

Tribune, which felt that “the plight of France is not easily comprehended.

The prostration has boon too rapid, its consequences too staggering and

the future too ominous to permit a full perception of it.H^

The shook was especially brutal for American intellectuals.

A. J. Liebling stated why he had been so sure that France could not be

destroyed.

It never occurred to me that he Hitler might destroy France, be­

cause it would have been as hard for me to prefigure a world without
France as survival with one lobe of ray brain gone, France

-kghe Mew Republic, July 15, 1940.

^Chicago Tribune, June 25, 1940,

72
 75

represented for me the historical continuity of intelligence and

reasonable living, ihen this continuity is broken, nothing anywhere
can have meaning.5

Many American newspapers tried to define these French qualities

which made France a unique country in the Western community of nations.

According to the New fork Times, th© French were the "most civilised peo­

ple in th© world” because of their "devotion to freedom and intelligence

and gaiety and beauty, ”4 This newspaper was careful not to judge France

by the political machinery of the Third Republic— a mere stage-setting—

in spite of which "flourished a civilization so brilliant, so human, so

gracious and beautiful, that mankind will be in its debt forever,1'5 In

its appreciation of "French civilization,” the New York Times went so far

as to say that "the French order was much more coherent than ours."6 All

newspapers Insisted that th© fall of France was a catastrophe for all

mankind,

For the Mew York Herald Tribune, the French contribution to civi­

lization "was illustrated in a language of wonderful clarity, in a beau­

tiful sense of logic and proportion, in delicate irony, humor and toler­

ance, in an idealism that was sometimes earthy and sometimes heavenly."7

All newspapers, even those least interested in intellectual problems

found a way to pay tribute to "France, her thinkers and her artists."

The expression of this admiration was sometimes awkward, even in the most

3Liebling, The Road Back to Paris, p. 11,

^Uew York Tinea, June 18, 1940.

5Ibid., June 23, 1940.

6Ibld.

7Uew York Herald Tribune, April 4, 1942,

 74

widely circulated magazines, life wrote* "Here lies France, the France

of the Third Republic, of Zoln and Anatole France and Clemenceau and

Marcel Proust and Dreyfus and Cezanne and Foch and Briand and Boni d©

Castellan© and Cocteau and Josephine Baker and Pasteur and Paul Morand

and Andre Maginot."®

Very often it was in memories of Paris that this American love

for France found its best expression* Many magazines published the nos­

talgic souvenirs of Americans or refugees on “Paris at high noon*1*9 In­

accessible Paris became so popular that song writers felt the need to

exploit its sentimental appeal. The hast Time I Saw Paris was the title

of a book and of a popular song. Both catered to the popular taste so

well that they became best-sellers. The book also reflected the most

common American opinions about France•iO

The last time X saw Paris

Her heart was warm and gay,
Mo matter how they change her
I’ll remember her that way.H

The collapse of Franc© had more tangible consequences than a

temporary fad. Many American Intellectuals feared these. Those who

thought that th© destiny of th© Western world was linked to that of France

could not hid® from themselves the fact that the end of French influence

on American life was in sight. Everybody was trying to determine what

8hife. July 22, 1940.

% , A. L. Fisher, “Paris at High Moon," The Atlantic Monthly,

April, 1941, pp. 416-423,

10Elliot Paul, The Last Time I Saw Paris (New fork, 1942).

^■Oscar Hammerstein II, The Last Time I Saw Paris, copyright by

Chappell and Company, 1940. "*
 75

chances were left for the French civilization— many did not say Western

anymore— to survive. To most people, Franc© appeared doomed as a world

power# Th© only unanswered question was whether Franc© was to remain a

factor in that Western civilization or to become a province of the great

Reich.

This question was somewhat academic and many felt that It was

presumptuous, if not unfair, to try to answer it in 1940. The future was

nevertheless conditioned by the grim present and the bare fact remained

that;

A country with which we have been in constant touch in all the widely
diversified field® of human relationship ever since the United State®
existed as a nation, now is silent, tlo Frenchman in France can speak
to an American in America* Th© lines of communication are cut. We
outside Franc© and outside the tyranny of silence can only remember
that France exists.

No one believed that French literature and French art could remain pro­

ductive under German occupation. Advising movie fane to "shed an added

tear for France1® films," John McDonald thought it unlikely that "French

films as we have known them will be again produced until the liberal

culture which formed their soil is restored."3*$

Most American observer® were acutely conscious of the fact that

in the past no great culture had ever developed or maintained itself under

enslaving conditions. Interdependence between the various national cul­

tures, ©specially in Western countries— this interdependence Increased by

modem conditions— was not apparent to many of them. The fate of French

culture was thus tied to th© fat© of the French state and "everything

3% h e Commonweal, July 12, 1940, p. 2S7,

^Public Opinion Quarterly, September, 1940, p. 522.

 76

was in doubt.*3-4 Nazi power "may destroy forever th® most gracious civi­

lization the western world has known If it can shatter the soul of

F r a n c e , A t best, paralyzed and agonizing France was to be transformed

into a museum of th© French past* "Even if Franc© ceases to b© a great

power, it will still represent a great culture,” declared Current History

which did not venture any guess on the future of this culture*^® Most

Americans were with Paul Valery very aware that "nous autres civilisations

nous savons que nous somms mortelles1* and all their writings on France

sounded like funeral orations. Some people who did not want to look

frightened by the spread of Nazism held the opposite view. Ann© Lindbergh

expressed her confidence in The Wave of the Future: WI have such faith

in the French that I feel convinced that their ultimate contribution to

the future will be even more beautiful than their contribution to the

past.112.7

The question of the future of French culture was not answered in

1940. To many th© attempt to draw conclusions appeared ludicrous.^ It

is not surprising to discover that those who refused to draw conclusions

were generally those who refused to define th© war as being only the last

episode of the Franco-German feud. Their opinion of the real nature of

th© struggle was often a consequence of a more intimate acquaintance with

Europe* Being more conscious of the ties which united Europe and the

k^rime, July 28, 1940.

^John Chamberlain in The Atlantic Monthly, October, 1940.

^Current History, July 24, 1940*

^Anne Lindbergh, Th® Wave of the Future (New Xork, 1940), p. 25.

G* Pauldin, "Were They Wrong?” The Commonweal, July 26,

1940.
 77

Western Hemisphere, they were at the same time more afraid of the spread

of Nasi destruction and more optimistic about th© outcome of a struggle

which could not remain limited to Western Europe.

It was impossible for these people to believe that the mad men

from Nurmberg could model Europe according to their caprice* When France,

which they had thought allergic to th© Nazi disease, surrendered to

Hitler, they refused to consider this surrender as final.3$ They denied

his conquest to Hitler, not even hoping that like defeated Greece, France

might one day conquer her victors* Such a thought would have been a

tribute to German p o w e r , T h © type of intelligent living represented

by France was fudged by them to be so superior to Nazism that they re­

fused to admit that Fascist brutality could ever stamp it out or be won

over to it.

II

All aspects of French life and French achievements in all fields

of human activity cam© into the limelight during th© summer of 1940. Con­

currently with th© regrets and anxieties aroused by the defeat there was

also a widespread criticism of "French civilization."

Even among some of the American intellectuals who had lived in

Paris there was a tendency, in 1940, to limit th© importance of th© French

contribution to Western civilization, to consider French culture important

only as "the ideal atmosphere for the creation of expatriate art," Writ­

ing about Paris France, by Gertrude Stein, the critic of The Nation noted

*9Pauldin, "Were They Wrong?" The Commonweal, July 26, 1940,

^Gertrude Stein, nevertheless, exploited this lieu coaanun in an

article entitled "Th® Winner Loses," The Atlantic Monthly','''October, 1940,
 78

that °to those Frenchmen, Hiss Stein does not grant m y role except that

of 'inevitable background' in the creation of twentieth century art."21

This "patronizing attitude," however, was characteristic of only part of

the American and other refugees who had belonged to the intellectual

circle® of pre-war Paris.

While some writers considered that France was chiefly a stage-

setting for the play put on by the international intelligentsia, others

defined "French civilization" in a way which limited the importance of

the French contribution to ?«estern civilization* They spoke of the gulf

"which divides and will always divide Latin civilization and German kul-

tur,f|22 once again reducing the conflict to its nineteenth century propor­

tions and refusing to France the place which she has always claimed as

hers, that of a bridge between the Mediterranean and Northern Europe.

The French liked to think that their cultural heritage is a perfect syn­

thesis of the classical tradition of Greece and Home with the romantic

mysticism of the Gelts, the Germans and the Anglo-Saxons, that it is the

only incarnation of the Western spirit in its totality. France m s the

"intellectual clearing-house of E u r o p e . "25

Far from accepting this view, some American writers discovered

that there was something definitely wrong with this French civilization

which had been so much admired. Most of them decided that the trouble

lay with France's imperfect understanding of democratic principles. Start­

ing from opposite observations they arrived at the same conclusions as

21Tha Nation, July 27, 1940*

2%lbid«, February 22, 1941.

2William A. Nitze and E. Preston Dargan, A History of French

Literature (New fork, 1927), p. 6.
 79

the Fascist thinkers* Franc© had had too little democracy— too much,

said the Fascists; France had perished because of her failure to under­

stand democrary— to get rid of it, said the Fascists, The destruction of

France had thus been mad© necessary by the faults of French thinking and

could not have been avoided# Seen in this light, it was not a catastrophe,

but was only the final consequence of a state of things which made France

not only useless but even harmful to the development of Western civilisa­

tion. Commenting on The Ground We Stand Qn,^ by writer John Bos Passos,

critic John Chamberlain of Harper*a Magazine stated this theory* Accord­

ing to him, the French revolutionists, whose minds were still under the

totalitarian influence of Bichelieu, could understand Kfreedom” only as

the right for a political group to suppress its opponents* He saw in th©

fall of France the proof that her people had never understood democracy.

He saw th© real democratic spirit in the Cromwellian revolution and as­

sumed that the United States and the British Dominions, th© only true

heirs of this revolution, were th© sol© hop© for th© world of the future.

He compared French democracy with Latin-iuaerican democracy* Both systems

cared more for replacing the "ins" with the ”outs” than for protecting

the essence and true spirit of democratic government.

This mistrust of the French democratic spirit was based on th©

French failure to suppress the anti-democratic French tradition, so

firmly rooted on French soil. Such sweeping condemnations were to be ex­

pected, perhaps, but even as superficial an observer as Thomas K©man,26

24John Dos Passes, The Ground Be Stand On (Hew Xork, 1942),

pp. 285—380.

^Harper 1a Magazine, October, 1942.

% e m a n , France on Berlin Time, pp. 235-240.

 BO

who had the opportunity to observe French affairs after the armistice,

distinguished carefully between two Frances, the democratic and the au­

thoritarian, the latter turned toward the past, her eyes closed to th©

rest of the world. This view was very different from believing that all

French achievement® were vitiated because French people had never under­

stood the meaning of democracy. But it was ©specially difficult to dis­

tinguish the two Frances at the time of the armistice and very tempting

to generalize. Time expressed the sentiment of those who ceased to be­

lieve in France at the time of the capitulation.

To some it seemed that because of that final acquiescence, France,

now brazenly Fascist, must always have been unfaithful to democracy
at heart. Perhaps they were right* For last week it was crystal
clear that France’s collapse had been preceded by a long, slow
disintegration of the democratic and republican ideal,

This suspicion with which many American observers viewed the

products of French intellectual activity extended to all areas in which

French intelligence exercised itself. When philosopher Henri Bergson

died, at the end of 1940, the critic Erwin Edman suspected him of having,

perhaps unconsciously, contributed to the disintegration of th© democratic

conscience of France, "The ’elan vital’ means a renaissance to a poet}

to a barbarian it means brut© power, Th® reactionary forces now in con­

trol of France are also exhibition of the elan vital,’* For Edman, Henri

Bergson was obviously only on© of those Frenchmen whoa Dos Passes accused

of not understanding democracy* The weight of a wicked tradition was

bearing heavily upon him.28 Whatever may have been th© influence of

27Tlms. July *2* 1940.

^Tfaa Nation, January, 1941, p, 77,

 81

Bergson on French intellectual evolution, this article is typical of the

reaction of some American Intellectuals to the French defeat,, Accustomed

as they were to accept everything French with a favorable prejudice, they

began to investigate the intellectual products of France with a critical

mind* Some of them were naturally led to shift to the opposite bias, and

they soon condemned French Intellectual achievements as a whole# Th©

manner in which some showed their readiness to forget fifteen centuries

of culture after on© month of military defeats was somewhat bewildering*

Certain judgments passed on French culture must be considered as

only th© product of th© atmosphere of 1940* According to Life, Franc©

after the armistice was waiting "for some national ethos to develop*"29

Apparently the reporters of Life had listened, but not attentively enough,

to th© French rulers in Vichy* According to th© latter, France must re­

ject her democratic tradition but even they did not think that she needed

to be helped by foreigners or needed to improvise a new system* In their

opinion, France had only to go back to the fountain® of political health

and to the "real" national ethos which had been fully developed two hun­

dred years before* Mary Steel© Owen referred several times to th© "French

negative and reactionary p h il o s o ph y ” SO without apparently remembering

that if there is on© "philosophy** which may deserve th® appellation of

"French philosophy,!* it is that on© which is most closely appnrented to

the principles on which American democracy was built# It would be wrong

to think that this attitude toward the French cultural heritage was nec­

essarily due to a nationalist prejudice or to a political bias. More

2%ife, September 25, 1940.

S^Owen, "Contemporary Explanations of the French Debacle,0

p. 187.
 82

often it was caused by an Ignorance of foreign realities combined with

an irresistible temptation to generalize*

There were other factors involved in this widespread criticism of

the French way of life and of French cultural achievements* One was what

Professor Albert Guerard termed the "strong dose of mutual exasperation”

which the friendship between America and France "has always contained and

healthily absorbed*w31 Professor Guerard considered that this was one of

the main features offered by the relations between the two countries* This

feeling of irritation was undoubtedly increased, at least in certain

groups, by the French defeat and by the nationalist revival® in the United

States provoked by the war*

According to Professor Guerard, this "exasperation" was due to a

"mutual tendency to idealize* Neither side can forgive the other for not

being quite the land of heart1s desire*” This exasperation was also due

to the belief among many people of both countries that there were field®

in which they complemented each other* This mutual dependence created

among some a feeling of frustrated competition* After the French defeat

France looked toward America for economic support and even political pro­

tection* America’s new international responsibilities made Americans con­

scious that, in some way®, they were still dependent on Europe and spe­

cifically on France* In both countries there were people who resented

these obvious facts* As usual, they were those who had not realized how

outdated the nineteenth century conception of nationalism was.

booking at a foreign land, th® average citizen of any country

always has a tendency to judge everything from a nationalist point of

^Southeastern Review, Autumn, 1944, p. 7.

 35

view and bo direct his observations towards the fields in which the com­

parison would be advantageous to his own country* It is only natural

that the attention of an individual should be focused on th© fields which

consume th© largest amount of national energy. Comparing economic condi­

tions in France and In the United States, Americans very often neglected

to take into account their country1s enormous resources in raw materials.

It was more agreeable to believe that th® American ascendency was th© re­

sult merely of an American superiority in talent, energy, and discipline,

or that it arose from a better understanding of th© principles of demo­

cratic government* Some were probably even inclined to think that it was

due to different wracialH characters. The same nationalist attitude made

French people very "culture-conscious," especially after the French de­

feat* Because of frustrated national pride, many Frenchmen boasted about

French Intellectual achievements, the meaning of which they themselves

often failed to grasp. And they were often bitterly resentful when they

were faced with th© political and moral consequences of their country1s

intellectual ©volution*

These nationalist shortcomings are inevitable and probably not

harmful so long as they are not exploited for dubious purposes. The lit­

tle game of comparing nations is usually not very honest and is usually

meaningless. It is generally based on prejudiced, Incomplete, outdated,

or imperfectly assimilated Information. It Is the easiest way to satisfy

a curiosity which is not intense enough to take the form of scientific

investigatlon•

In Franca and in America, people seem to enjoy comparing more

 34

than in other countries. Scenes de la vie future, by Georges Buhamel,^

was a good example of French prejudice against America* Andre Visson’s

As Others See 08^ constituted an attempt to exploit human pettiness *

Without mentioning errors of interpretation, one can say that it does not

serve any useful purpose to exhibit the anti-American prejudices of the

uninformed European to the prejudiced mind of the uninformed American,

It is ©von worse to measure the shortcomings of the first by th© narrow

standards of th© second, Visson was right, at least, when he noted: "The

British want to be respected, Th© Germans want to b® feared. But the

Americans and th© French want to be appreciated. They believe that they

are entitled to universal appreciation**34 And what Henry dames wrote

in 1880 was still true in 1940* *It is, I think, an indisputable fact

that Americans are, as Americans, th© most self-conscious people in th©

world and the most addicted to the belief that th© other nation© of th©

earth are in a conspiracy to undervalue them.”35

III

Many Americans with a college education had been raised in the

belief that Franc© grew the best wines, manufactured the best perfumes,

tailored the most elegant dresses, in short that th© French way of living

was the most refined in th© world. They had learned that the French lan­

guage was that of the intellectual elite in the whole world and that

^Translated into English under the title, Americas The Menace*

Scenes from the Life of the Future (Hew York, 1931).

ssAndre Visson, As Others See Us (Mew York, 1949),

%«riry James, Hawthorne (Mew York, 1800), p. 148.

^tylaaon, As Others See Us, p. 19.

 85

Paris was still in some respsots the capital of the Western world. They

felt that America had toward France a cultural debt similar to that which

every other Western country had toward classical Greece and Rome or toward

the Italy of the Renaissance* The chief difference was that the Greeks

and the Italians of today were not thought of particularly as the direct

heirs of the classical or renaissance cultural tradition but only as being

privileged to live in a museum. Although France m s also considered a

museum, it was usually conceded that twentieth-century Paris was a labo­

ratory in which th© future of Western civilisation was still being shaped.

Although the importance of th© French contribution to sciences had de­

clined in the last decades, many pointed out that Paris was still without

rival as the capital of th© world of arts*®®

This sort of seniority and superiority, granted to Paris in at

least some fields, m s accepted by others only in a grudging way or m s

vigorously denied. The French defeat was for many Americans a good occa­

sion to affirm th© independence of America from Europe* Europe under the

Nazis was going back to the Middle Ages, they argued; it was thus time

for Americans to realise that the destiny of their country was decided In

their country and in their country only. Europe’s chaos compared with

America’s orderly development was offered as a proof that America was not

only larger and richer than any other country but that th© 11American sys­

tem" and th© "American way of life*1 were superior to those of Europe.

American© of this type claimed that the United States had created an

William H. Chamberlin, "Franc© in June, the Collapse," The

Atlantic Monthly, September, 1940, p. 298.

^Representative Woodruff, of Michigan, in the Congressional

Record, August £8, 1940.
 86

original culture which was distinct from the cultural heritage of the

Western world* In order to preserve America from the European diseases,

they urged that the country be closed to "foreign ideologies" and "foreign

cultures*" French culture was considered particularly "decadent" and

harmful* Paris was judged responsible for th© trend followed by modem

art, a trend which these critics did not approve? and this art, in turn,

was only one symptom of the lowering of "French morals."

In other words, the confusion between the political, economic,

and social problems of Franc© on one hand and her intellectual evolution

on the other led some Americans to advocate a sort of intellectual isola­

tionism* This intellectual isolationism m s naturally the companion of

political isolationism, iriter Conrad Aiken described it in The

Atlantic Monthly*

What is really being proposed to us here, let us be in no doubt about

It, is a moral, or social intrusion into th© world of letters. * . .
Above all, now that the world is at war, and when cultural interchange
between the nations is so difficult (thus run® a common argument),
now 1® the very time for a complete retreat, a return to our own in­
exhaustible inner resources, our own beautiful and inviolate region­
alism and national purity* Let us therefor© close the doors once
again on these ♦foreign1 Ideas, these naughty, and alien, and for us
so insoluble poisons. In short, let us now be good wholesome Americans
and have a good wholesome American art. The time for decadence is
past— and it was never really natural to us, anyway*2®

This isolationist attitude was rather comon among American

youth. In a letter to The Atlantic Monthly, a student from Yale affirmed

that America had no more use for Western Europe.

W© have a mission to perform— we of the Western Hemisphere are in the

process of creating a world civilisation. All our native genius and
capacities are required for this task, and we shall be doing scant

^T he Atlantic Monthly, April, 1942, p. 479.

 87

service if we dissipate our energies In other fields. It is absurd

to suppose that we must forever seek our leadership In Europe or
that our fate is inexorably linked to hers, 39

This letter shows how political isolationism was linked with intellectual

isolationism, Although the correspondent of The Atlantic Monthly did not

Oi— w w rnunmmmmmmmmrnm

pass judgment on this "civilisation” which had become useless to America*

others did. According to the latter, th© French type of civilization

must have been overrated since it ended in a "failure," One may wonder

what was meant by these overworked words, culture andcivilization, They

were at times used in very strange associations.^0

As in all other countries, the larger part of the Americanpeople

were incapable ofconceiving the positive results of a creative or criti­

cal contact with th© world of thought, art, and literature. They also

did not realize that our cultural heritage is the sum of such personal

experiences, that what we call "civilization" is mainly our memory of the

struggles of others. An Individual's definition of the word "culture"

can not be superior to the best of his intellectual achievements5 his

conception of "civilization" can not be higher than the part he plays in

maintaining that civilization* The words "culture" and "civilization"

were thus reduced by many to their most accessible aspects, notably tech­

nical achievements, folklore, national habits, and popular art* The high­

est forms of human activity were Ignored and those who dedicated their

89s » Atlantic Monthly, October, 1340, p* 411.

^Representative Woodruff, of Michigan, talcing position in favor

of Lindbergh, a m in America "one hundred and thirty millions who enjoy
today the highest standard of living the world has ever known. Our cul­
ture is so far superior to that of any other nation as to be beyond com­
parison and it is today the responsibility of th© House of Representa­
tives that It be maintained," Congressional Record, August S3, 1940,
 33

lives to them were not only not understood but were even ridiculed*41

The result was that, in all Western countries, many people were not con­

scious of the profound unity of our culture* They did not see that the

task of maintaining it could not be restricted to such or such a country*

It was thus not surprising that in America many people had the

feeling of having been the victims of a conspiracy of snobs, who had fol­

lowed blindly the caprice of other snobs whose headquarters were in

Paris*^2 the special position of some American literary and artistic

circles whose members, at least during the twenties, preferred to live

in Paris rather than in America contributed to spread this belief. The

presence of real snobs among the "literary expatriates," as in any other

group of intellectuals, widened the gulf between the artists and writers

and the mss of the American people.

The attitude of these semi-exiles being widely resented, there

was something like a feeling of relief among many Americans at the time

of the French defeat.43 Some utilitarian minds not only saw a direct re­

lation between the overprised French intellectual achievements, the col­

lapse of France, and her final submission to Nasi Germany but they con­

cluded that this surrender and this submission were final and would

destroy forever the unique qualities which made France and Paris attrac­

tive to American artists. The French defeat and the capitulation were

thus used as a weapon against French influence in the United States* But

^*3ee "The Culture of Democracy," Fortune, February, 1940.

^Van Wyck Brooks, The Opinions of Oliver Allston (Hew York,

1941), pp. 203-209.

4%ee "Europe's Revolt against Civilisation," Harper's Magazine,

December, 1940.
 89

those who loci th© attack were somewhat hampered by their own understand­

ing and appreciation of cultural achievements— apparently no prominent

figure of American art or literature belonged to this category of critics

— and it was impossible to find among Its exponents any coherent defense

of the Mback to America theory.* Th® word "decadence" was repeated many

times by th© art critics of many second-rate newspapers for lack of a

more elaborate indictment. The similarity between this attitude and the

Fascist attacks on French art in France and Germany should be noted#

Fortunately, the American democratic tradition and common sense prevented

these critics from following the Nazi pattern to its logical extreme of

stigmatising the "Judeo-Masonic art of Paris.1*

IF

Many American educators felt that there was something wrong with

th© French system of education. They had always been extremely conscious

of the contrast between the French and the American outlook in this field.

Comparisons between th© cultural standards of the French people and of

th© American people by well-informed observers were usually in favor of

th© former. Waldo Frank, for instance, reviewing in The Motion a work

of Jacques Maritain, declared that "if the book has a fault, it is per­

haps that it is too cursory and allusive in its variety of awareness. It

assumes in the reader a knowledge . * . justifiable in a Frenchman, ac­

customed to a public with a cultural memory— a public, that is, which is

non-existent in the United States.'*4^

To many American educators it appeared that their French col­

league© had concentrated a little too much on developing that cultural

44The Ration. May SI, 1941, p. 644.

 90

memory* Here again, this accusation seemed very similar to th© standard

Nasi indictment of the German or French system of classical education*

The Nazi reaction was anti-intellectual, The Nazis claimed Justly that

the classical conception of culture hampered th© development of their

superman— whom they thought similar to ?$letzche,s3 hero— and prevented the

individual from blindly devoting his energies and life to the State. The

American conception was very different. In the United States the concept

of political democracy— as understood by the majority of Americans— was

more closely tied to the concept of patriotism than in any other country*

In Franc© the two Ideas had become practically antagonistic with the

weakening of the Jacobin© tradition* Many Americans looked with horror,

for instance, at the pacifist internationalism of many French elementary

school teachers,45 far from suspecting that their attitude was very often

dictated by the same motives as that of American isolationists. Accord­

ing to many American observers, the sin of these French teacher© was the

same as that of th© French industrialists who preferred Hitler to th©

Popular Front, This was the root of an important misunderstanding between

France and America* Most Americans did not realize that, under the pres­

sure of economic, historical, and geographical forces, many French people

had modified radically their traditional nineteenth-century thinking,

Which was based on nationalism, on a democracy which was exclusively po­

litical, and on the sanctity of private property. Americans confused

those who were opposed to the traditional conception of democracy with

those who thought it was outdated. For most Americans, any departure

from th© traditional principles of democracy constituted a betrayal of

^Keman, France on Berlin Time, p. 150*

 91

th© "democratic ideal*" In The Atlantic Monthly, Paul Gram stigmatized

th© responsibility of the French school teachers, moat of them veterans

of th© First World War, who for the second time in twenty-five years had

not taught their pupils how to die nobly* "Their first duty to French

democracy was to prepare their youth for the terrible hour of decision*

Franc© was not ready for th© supreme test and there is an awful lesson

in that fact for ©very teacher in every democracy in th® world*"4$

Lack of patriotism was thus assigned to a lack of "democratic

spirit" and, according to some, if the French lacked democratic spirit

it was that French education followed "the pattern of the class system

of society, "47 The belief was widespread that only the members of th©

"upper class" found it possible to enter French universities* Few Ameri­

cans were aware that secondary education was free and that tuition fees

in French universities were practically non-existent.

Th© main criticism against French education remained that Franc©

had not succeeded in working out a successful compromise between classi­

cal education which endows man with a cultural memory and technical spe­

cialisation which teaches how to use the various tools necessary to the

functioning of our mechanised society*4S

The ton® of the discussions about French culture and French edu­

cation indicated that many Americans thought that France had lost the

privileged spiritual position she had claimed as hers for the preceding

4®Paul Cram, "Undergraduates and the War," Th© Atlantic Monthly*

October, 1940, pp. 410-421.

47John Dale Russell and Charles H* Judd, The American Educa­

tional System (New York, 1940), p. 25.

^Keman, France on Berlin Time, p. 134*

 92

tiro centuries. Some even thought that this claim had never been justi­

fied. «For th© Frenchmen, France is almost synonymous with civilisation

and all other people are merely bad Frenchmen," noted Time sarcastically.4®

To a majority of Americans it appeared that the French defeat would bring

about a regression of French influence on the development of Tiestern

civilization in the countries of the Western community and more

specifically in the United States.

On© of the first consequences of the French defeat was a loss of

prestige for th© French language. Although French had never played in

English-speaking countries th© part which it played in Central Europe, in

the Near East or in South America, most American high schools and all

American universities had always succeeded in enrolling a large number

of students in their French courses. French enjoyed the unusual advantage

of being considered simultaneously as a luxury, as a classical discipline,

and as a language useful in th© international, scientific and even

business fields.

French enrollment had increased after the First World War to the

point that, after 1922, it was by far the most popular foreign language

in American establishments of secondary education.SO The only factor

which played against French in America was the same one which played

against English in France. As Bernard Shaw pointed out, the two most

49Time, June 17, 1940.

S^Arna Pauline McCreary and James B. Tharp in The French Review,

February, 1942. Percentage of high-school population taking foreign
languages: 1915: 55.6 per cent; 1922: 27.4 per cent; 1928: 25.4 per
cent; 1924: 19.7 per cent. Percentage of high-school population taking
French: 1915: 8.8 per cent; 1922: IS.5 per cent; 1928: 14.0 per
cent; 1924: 10.9 per cent.
useful languages of the Western world, English and French, are also the

most inaccessible ones to the people who did not start learning them when

they were two years old* Although they are closely related to each other,

those whose mother-language is one of these two find it especially dif­

ficult to acquire mastery of the other one. This difficulty was overcome

by many Americans ©very year, however, and not only universities but as­

sociations like the Alliance Francaige endeavored to maintain and improve

the position of the French language in America.

In that respect as in others, th© French defeat was harmful to

French influence in America. Professor Henri Peyre of Isle University

commented with some bitterness on what happened in th© summer of 1940:

France proved deficient and powerless. She was lavishly blamed by

many sever© or rash onlookers, who hastened to proclaim the end of
th© country which had failed to serve them as their rampart. Her
politics and her moral© were branded as corrupt. Her literature and
art were accused of *softness® and decadence* Sophomores in several
American colleges even undertook to punish France for her defeat by
withdrawing their patronage from th© language of Racine and
Voltaire.51

The main reason for the decrease in French enrollment was un­

doubtedly a practical one. Most American students felt that th© useful­

ness of the French language would decrease rapidly In a world where, what­

ever happened, France would not play th© same part as in pre-war years.

Teachers of French in America attempted to persuade them that this was a

very short-sighted view. Until 1943 they did not succeed. In a letter

to th© New York Times.52 President Henry M. MacCracken of Vassar College

admitted that wat Vassar, which is probably typical, the loss of French

^Pranco-Aiaerican Pamphlets, Third Series, No. 4, p. 3.

®N«w York Times. August 10, 1941.

 94

in the three upper classes ia over a third*11 In his message to the mem­

bers of the Association of Teachers of French, the President, Stephen A*

Freeman, of Middlebury College, although h© did not give any precis©

figures, refused to be so pessimistic:

the present situation ia far from being entirely discouraging. At

first, many teachers of French allowed themselves to be frightened
and stampeded by th© decline in enrollment* Mow we can view the
facts more sanely. There is no need to deny that the decline has
been serious and probably worst in the larger centers, where fickle
popularity plays a larger role, for the whole country and for all
schools, 1 do not think that final figures will show a decrease of
more than twenty per cent. In the East, th© decline does not seem
to average more than IS per cent, and in many sections, it Is hardly
noticeable. W© must expect that there will be further decrease, at
a slower rat®, this year and next and even until the victory over
Hitler is won and all France is free one© more. It is self-evident
that our professional interest© is inseparably linked to a final
British victory,®®

It is Interesting to not© the fact that the deolin© was not serious in

the East. This confirms th© previous observation that there was a defi­

nite connection between the attitude characterised as “interventionist”

In 1940 and the amount of curiosity and interest shown toward Europe

and France.

There was at least one encouraging sign. An important portion

of the French literary works written after 1940 were published abroad*

Th© only European center of French editions which remained free was

Switzerland and war conditions prevented any important trade between

Europe and America. French editions, therefore, became a flourishing

business In th© Western Hemisphere. In that field New lork entered into

an often successful competition with Argentina, Mexico, and Canada. New

fork not only published th© French version of the works on current events

5% h . French Review, October, 1941, p. 60,

 95

written by European refugees in America, but two publishing h o u s e s 5^ de­

voted a large part of their activity to classical or modern French

literature.55

Ho more telling proof of the place occupied by French as a second

language of cultured groups could have been afforded than this large
number of French volumes. . . • The number of Italian or German
works printed in America at the same time is, in comparison to that
blossoming of the French book trade in America, strikingly
insignificant,

There were soon more reasons to hope. When America entered the

war many Americana understood that the increased responsibility of their

country in international affairs would require on their part a serious

effort toward understanding foreign countries* Many realised that, after

all, the Second World War was something even more important than God’s

punishment for the sins of France* A new conscience of international in­

terdependence led many to consider futile any attempt to determine which

one of their neighbors would be hit hardest by the tempest which was

shaking the whole world. They felt that in the smaller post-war world,

the French language could still be an important means of exchange* In

1945 th® University of Minnesota reported an Increase in its enrollment

in French as well as in other languages* But th® most important progress

was in Spanish* In 1944 French and Spanish were on the increase again,

and this time, although the total number of new students was still larger

S4Brentano,s and La Maison Francaise.

Cfi
A. Bon, Livres franca!s parua mi Amerique de 1940 a 1944 (Rio
de Janeiro, 1944)* "~

SGffranco-American Pamphleta, Third Series, Ho* 4, p* 4.

 96

in Spanish, the rat© of increase was highest in French#^ The moat Irv-

teresting fact was that there was an increase of 112 per cent among be­

ginners. This trend was nation-wide* In Hew York city high schools there

were more new students of French in 1944 than of any other foreign lan­

guage.58 The figures were far from th© all-time high of 72,779 high-

school students of French in 1934, but, at least in the universities, the

return of American veterans waa destined to give a strong impulse to the

study of French in th© United States*

VI

Among the people who did not lose much time crying over the

French defeat were those who dealt in ”haute couture” and all those

related to the fashion world in America#

The influence of Franc© and of French ideas was nowhere more pow­

erful than in the field of women's fashions. Since the eighteenth cen­

tury, women all over the world had looked toward Paris when they wanted

to know th© last word in these matters* American women were no exception.

Just as in art and literature, this influence was never greater than dur­

ing the decade which followed the First World War. The depression of the

thirties inevitably had a marked effect on that field, however, as well

as on other aspects of Franco-Ameriean relations* During th© thirties,

competition between French and American fashions became keen. French

®\he French Review, January, 1945* Spanish: 1942 * 761 stu­

dents 5 194IT W T T 9 4 4 * &L1. French* 1942 : 275$ 1943: 3053 1944:
560# Beginners: 73 in 1943; 160 in 1944.

5% h e French Review, March, 1944. French: October, 1943:

47,0761 February1,' 1944: 4*7,680. Spanish: Octobers 59,305$ February:
59,552* German: October: 6,124$ February: 6,514. Italians October*
7,992$ February: 8,183# Th© Increase in the number of students was*
French 604$ German 390$ Italian 191$ Spanish 27#
 97

superiority wag still manifest in the fact that both industries were

fighting over the domestic American market*

this acute competition produced some hard feeling. French spe­

cialization in feminine fashions probably showed to what an extent France

had lost her virile qualities. According to Roy Helton, France was de­

feated because she had acted in a "female pattern."59 This was a rather

unexpected argument since it ran counter to th© popular belief that the

French woman, being legally powerless, occupied only a secondary position

in French society* He pointed out that th© French people had forgotten

the old "Jacques Bonhomm©,"^ and that "Marianne,11 the personification

of the French Republic, was a little bit out of place in company with

John Bull and Unci© Sam*61

French fashions were criticized as startling and extravagant*

Many newsreels offered, and still offer, to their audiences a few glances

at a Paris "presentation" with an appropriate commentary on the overso­

phisticated chic of "mademoiselle.** This was routine work for American

cameramen, just as their French counterparts, when showing American

5%oy Helton, "The Inner Truth? Our own Softness," Harper*s

Magazine. September, 1940, p. 330.

®%ome Americans, on th© other hand, did not seem to be aware of

the disappearance of Jacques Bonhomme, or, maybe, felt the need to rein­
vent him as a masculine personification of France and the average French­
man* As far as the average Frenchman was concerned, Jacques Dorihomm© had
become "Monsieur Dupont, Francals moyen." Jacques Bonhomme, the French
peasant of the seventeenth century has lost any symbolical meaning for
the uneducated Frenchman of the twentieth century. He nevertheless oc­
cupied in the American Journalistic vocabulary a place which h© should
have lost long ago. His name gave to soma articles on Franc© a curious
flavor which was not the twentieth-century local color which he was
supposed to provide.

®^Helton, "The Inner Truth? Our own Softness," Harper*a Maga­

zine, September, 1940, p. 333.
 90

fashions, tried to convey to their audiences an impression of expensive

and tasteless display for idle women. It is difficult to tell how suc­

cessful they all were in defending the national industry but they de­

lighted their respective audiences, Americans always liked to hear about

"the moral laxity of the French people" and Frenchmen to contemplate

"the American lack of taste,"

In spite of their efforts, American couturiers acknowledged that,

during the decade which ended in 1940, "the prestige and th© glamour have

continued to carry a Paris date-line, They were also sure that the

French defeat was th© end of the "Paris dictatorship,11 The Chicago

Tribune wrote editorially?

Nobody knows what will become of Paris in the years ahead. If

the German victory is to be a lasting on©, Paris ©ay decline from its
position as a great world city to that of a provincial capital,
Vienna, another essentially feminine town - is already started on
that course. Maybe the day is coming when Paris will no longer be
able to command th© services of the artists and artisans who have
done so much to appeal to women* s tastes\ and maybe even If the skill
remains, those who possess it will be deprived of th© materials with
which to work,§3

Newsweek did not give Paris a chance, even in case of a future

German defeats

For four hundred years, Paris has ruled the world of women’s
fashions with an iron hand sheathed in silk. In Mid-June of 1940
that dynasty virtually collapsed without a flutter of lace as the
German army marched Into the French capital, Whereupon millions of
American women shrilly voiced th© questions what will replace Paris
as the style center of the universe?^

®%inifred Haushenbuh, "Fashion Goes American," Harper’s Maga­

zine, December, 1941, p. 79*

Chicago Tribune, July 6, 1940,

^^Newsweek, September 16, 1940,

 99

This question was already answered by many American women* "It seems

probable," wrote the Chicago Tribune, "that Mew York will become the

feminine capital of the world."65 Newsweek itself answered its own ques­

tions a few months later*66 "The fall of Paris gave the American eagle

an opportunity to ruffle its feathers and try to establish Mew York city

as style headquarters*"

In Harper »s Magazine, Winifred RaushenbSh showed particular venom

against the "Paris dictatorship," which, in her opinion, "was slipping

long before the Nazi tanks rolled down th© Champs Elysees." According to

her, "the Sedan of the fashion world11 occurred not in 1940 but in 1939*

At that time, she explained, "Paris introduced the wasp waist corset* •

• • The entire American fashion industry was in a dither* Would women

accept these corsets or wouldn*t they? * * • Within a few months, the

whole matter was settled. Women had said no."67 Miss Raushenbuh over­

looked the fact that, in France too, common sense was— for the first time,

probably— more powerful than the fancy of the couturiers* Th© new fashion

had been conceived before the declaration of war. Although it was backed

by quite a number of fashion magazines in France and in America,68 the

new-born European war killed it. Writing about the new style which Mew

York had to Improvise after the fashion upset, Miss Raushenbuh paid an

unconscious homage to the still existent influence of Paris: "The short

6SChlcago Tribune. July 8, 1940.

86HCTBHeakt January 20, 1941*

67Raushenb§h, "Fashion (Joes American," Harper's Magazine,

December, 1941, pp. 75-83.

^Particularly the magazine Vogue, one of Paris's "principal

spokesmen" In America.
 100

skirt was preserved, short skirt which of course will always appeal in

war time*1*®® Apparently Miss Raushenbuh forgot that American women were

still at peace In 1939* She also made a rash promise to her American

readers when she said that never again would American women lengthen their

skirts on Paris’s orders as they had don© sometime in the thirties

Miss Raushenbuh also took a position against a statement of

Madam© Schiaparelli, a French fashion specialist, in the spring of 1939*

Madam© Schiaparelli had said? ’'The woman with th© worst possible taste

is the woman who dress©© to look pretty* Women should dress to look

smart, not to look pretty."71 The Hollywood principle had been noted by

a "well-known fashion columnist" who had been watching two leading raotion-

picture stars trying on hata and what they wanted was "hats which would

flatter their faces, rather than startle and excite their friends.0 The

"Hollywood principle," decided Miss Raushenbuh, "was better adapted for

th© ready acceptance by American women than the Paris principle.1*

All American women did not agree with Mias Raushenbuh but many

were inclined to think with her that th© French laws against style-piraoy

were not democratic. They preferred th© American inexpensive mass-

reproduction of expensive models. By protecting th© work of th© design­

ers, the French laws had maintained the prestige of Paris but they had

also protected the snobbiam of "rich women who bought haute couture models

not to have those models worn by people in th© lower-income bracket."^

69XtaUos mine*

70Ihay did it again in 1947,

7%arp.r,8 Magazine, Deoenber, 1941, p. 79.

72Ibid.
 101

fix
Dressmakers were not the only ones who thought that the United

States had something to gain from the French defeat* Hot only would

America be free of French competition but Americans would also inherit

French treasures*

Many art collections had left France for th© United States during

the "phony war.M?$ Even after the defeat , war refugees usually managed

to escape with at least part of their most valuable possessions* Douglas

and Elisabeth Rigby compared in Harper1b Magazine the relative situation

of France and America to that of Greece and Rom© at the time of Paulus-

Railius* They thought that the French defeat had only accelerated a

movement which had started long before* They foresaw that many of these

art treasure® which, intentionally, had been only temporarily removed

fro® France or other countries would permanently enrich United States

collections* Private collectors who had justly thought that the United

States was th© best hiding place for their treasures, they believed,

would be forced to sell because of their changed financial situation*?4

These refugees themselves constituted a capital which the United

State® was acquiring* Many observers had to emphasize that fact for ob­

vious humanitarian reasons* Certain sections of American opinion were

inclined to consider them a "poor addition to American life" and feared

that they would only increase the number of urban radicals and the power

of th© "interventionists,” whose ranks they naturally joined immediately*

Dean Charles Matthews of the Divinity School of th© University of

78Karper*s Magazine, January, 1941, p* 2(X)«

7*Ibld.
 102

Chicago, president of the American committee for Christian refugees, in­

sisted on the value of the writers, artists, musicians, and scientists

who took refuge in A m e r i c a . M a n y similar organisations also helped the

refugees In their most difficult period of transition between European

and American life. Most American intellectuals did not need to be con­

vinced that Dean Matthews was right. 11Jules Remains, Andre Maurols,

Pertinax, Genevieve Tabouis, are only a few of the well-known figures in

French literature and journalism who have found asylum in America," wrote

William H. Chamberlin in Harper’s Magazine. According to him also, the

French defeat only speeded up a movement which had started years before:

Thor© was a time when the balance of cultural exchange between

Europe and America was favorable to the older continent, when th©
number of Americans who went to Europe for study or permanent resi­
dence in a more congenial intellectual and artistic atmosphere far
exceeded the number of Europeans who came to America for th© same
reasons. Th© situation has now been entirely reversed. There has
been a mass exodus of Americans from Europe. At the same time there
has been a flight to America of European writers, scholars, scien­
tists, artists, and publicists that suggests the scattering of Greek
scholars among the countries of th© West after the fall of
Constantinople to the Turks•^

This time, in Mr. Chamberlin1a words, the bell tolled not only for th©

French but for th© whole "European civilization."

In his bitter satire of American life, th© American writer,

Henry Miller, violently expressed his disapproval of the reaction of

certain of his fellow citizens at the Time of th© French defeats

How can I forget the ill-concealed joy of the New-Yorker when he

learned that Paris had fallen. ’Now our city shall be the art

^Chicago Tribune. July 4, 1940.

?%illiam H. Chamberlin, "Europe1a Revolt against Civilization,"

Harper’s Magazine. December, 1940, pp. 14-21.
 105

center of the world.♦ That Is what people were saying to one another*
With every artist who took refuge there, their pride, greed and envy
swelled* *We shall have them all here soon* * They were so certain
that one© here, one© inoculated with the American virus, these artists
would never return to their homelands* fle will give the® dollars,
millions of dollars** As if that were certain to hold them* ♦Paris
is finished* Europe is dead,1 How they chuckled, how they gloated
over their good fortune* Never have I witnessed anything more
disgraceful*77

But Miller had generalised too hastily on the basis of a few ob­

servations. The important article of poet Archibald HacLeish in the

Saturday Review of Literature showed how unjust he had been. MacLeish

thought that any attempt to make political capital out of cultural values

or to use them for purposes of national competition would only be the

repetition of on© of th© tragic and ridiculous errors of Fascism. He was

aware that the works of art and literature of the present and the past

were th© common good of all mankind, whatever th© place where they have

been conceived, whatever the language in which they were written, but

he also knew that:

The preservation of French culture in France or anywhere else on

earth is the affair of the French people only. The Library of Con­
gress can preserve upon its shelves the books which the envious van­
dalism and th© intellectual timidity of th© Fascists have destroyed
in Europe* The Librarian of Congress can maintain th© free access to
the treasures of French literature in America which the individual
whoa the Nazis have appointed to the direction of the Bibliothequ©
National sic is obliged to r e f u s e . put neither the Library of
Congress nor any other institution of learning in the United States
can preserve French culture*?®

The title of MacLeish1s article, "AmericaTs Duty to French

^Henry Miller, Remember to Remember (New York, 1947), p. 517.

^Bernard Fay, known for his works against French Free Masonry*

^Saturday Review of Literature, December, 1940, p. 18£.

 104

Culture,’1 was typical of th© attitude of the real American intellectuals*

Most of them were not ready to believe that everything France represented

had perished in on© month because the French array had not been able to

resist th© onslaught of th© German tanks* However, French prestige among

the mass of th© American people was at its lowest ebb during the period

which followed th© French debacle* Men like Archibald MacLeish and many

other intellectuals like British writer Charles Morgan thought It vms

their duty to the Paris they had known to raise their voice in defense

of France* Writing in the name of the Anglo-Saxon community, Charles

Morgan reviewed in Th© Atlantic Monthly the standard accusations against

Francei "I have heard it said that France is decadent, that she is cor­

rupt, that to th© world of th© future no good can come from her, that the

British Empire and America can do without her»” This he denied vigorously

and he warned his American readers that "there is in her a unique element

without which th© energies and virtues of the Anglo-Saxon people cannot

yield their full fruit. "80

Charles Morgan, "France Alive," The Atlantic Monthly. August,

1941, p. 194.
 CHAPTER IV

AMERICAN REACTIONS TO DEVELOPMENTS IN OVERSEAS FRANCE IN 1940

By the terms of the Franco-German armistice signed on June 2&,

1940, th© French government was left in control of only about on© third

of France, its only maritime outlet being the Mediterranean, France was

required to surrender her military equipment and forbidden to manufacture

war materiel. She had to pay exorbitant sums for the costs of occupation

and her two million prisoners were to stay in Germany until the end of

th© war* Hitler, however, did not ask for th© French fleet, which was to

be demobilized in ports designated by the Gomans and Italians* He also

prevented Mussolini from occupying large portions of metropolitan France

or th© empire* Nevertheless, It seemed clear to Allied and American

opinion that the fleet and the empire were doomed to pass into

totalitarian hands*

Americans were ©specially interested in th© fat© of the French

fleet, Th© American government asked Franc© to renew her pledge that ah©

would not allow th© Axis powers to seize her naval forces,! Britain took

more drastic measures* The French commanders in Alexandria and Oran re­

ceived a British ultimatum demanding that the French be demobilized under

British control or continue the war on the British side* At Alexandria,

Admiral Godefroy accepted to immobilize his ships for the duration of the

^Langer, Our Vichy Gamble, p* 97.

105
 106

war, but at Oran, th© ultimatum was rejected and the British navy sank

part of the French fleet on July 5, 1940* Pbtain broke off diplomatic

relations with Britain*

The united States was also concerned with th® French colonies in

the Caribbean Sea, The American government warned Germany that any shift

of sovereignty in these possessions would be interpreted as a violation

of the Monroe D o c t r i n e I n spit© of th® American government's decision

not to question Vichy's sovereignty on these Islands, it wms obvious that

the pressure of the economic and political situation placed the fate of

this territory in the hands of the American nations*

Vichy seemed incapable of retaining control of the colonies* Even

before the armistice, Japan had given evidence of her Interest in French

Indo-China. Traffic between the colony and Nationalist China was con­

trolled by Japanese officials and Franc© recognized Japan's “special

needs" in China. In August, Japan obtained th© right to move her troops

across the country* In September, French authorities allowed Japan to

establish air bases In northern Indo-Chlna and to keep troops in th® area*

Another factor worked against the unity of the French empire*

From London, General de Gaulle urged all overseas Frenchmen to continue

the struggle on Britain's side. In August and September, th© French

African territories around Lake Chad and in lamerun, French Equatorial

Africa, French India and the French Islands in th© Pacific sided with

de Gaulle* Meanwhile, however, the Fetain government seemed to be tight­

ening its grip over the rest of the empire* In September, a British-

French expedition led by General de Gaulle was successfully repelled by

%ull, Memoirs, p* 817*

 107

the pro-Vichy forces end failed to land at Dakar, the main harbor of

French West Africa.

II

After the French armistice of June, 1940, the paramount question

In the minds of well-informed Americans was: What is going to happen to

the Imperial assets of France, to her fleet end her overseas territories?

Although many people thought Great Britain had very little chance of re­

sisting a frontal attack, everybody realised that the Allied cause would

seem a little brighter if the French Baplre remained in the war. The

power of Hitler was limited to th® continent; and a warlike attitude on

the part of the French Empire seemed so natural that, during the two weeks

which preceded th® armistice, there were various reports that France was

already withdrawing her best weapons from continental Franc® in order to

continue the struggle behind an improved Maginot Line, the Mediterranean,

just as Great Britain was going to fight behind th® English Channel. The

formation of a puppet government in France appeared inevitable but it was

thought that this would not hamper the war effort of the French colonies.

In other words, many observers expected France to follow the example of

Poland, Norway, the Netherlands and Belgium.

On June 20, newspapers reported that French planes were flying

toward Africa and that the French fleet was leaving Its home ports to

join British craft in the Mediterranean.5 On June 18, Mark S. Watson

speculated upon th® question of what would happen to the French fleet:

wIf it ia 1captured1 by th® British fleet with which it has been oper­

ating, it would presumably preserve the present British superiority over

% e w York Timas. June 20, 1940*

 108

th© Axis powers In most naval categories.4 The word ’’captured® within

quotation marks was, of course, intended to mean that collaboration be­

tween French and British units would be voluntary but that the French

navy would pretend to have been forced to fight with the British, in

order to avoid German reprisals in continental France.

This suggested course was not followed by the ’’men of the armi­

stice.’1 It was termed by them ’’revolutionary,” and It undoubtedly was.

It was revolutionary because It required an understanding of the balance

of forces, which Frenchmen were ©specially reluctant to accept, and at a

time when Russia and the United States were not yet in the war, an under­

standing of th© strategical situation which was eventually to prevail dur­

ing the Second World War. It was, furthermore, a complete departure from

the traditional German conception since the days of Bismarck that Germany

had nothing to fear in Europe one© France had been put out of the fight.

In signing the armistice Retain*s government, regardless of all

other factor® involved, mad© a mistake just as Hitler did when h© failed

to attack England immediately after Dunkirk. S©me American observers ex­

pected such early attack against England^ and when the armistice was

signed they were soon won back to the traditional conception boro in four

years of fierce battles and anxieties in the trenches of northern France

during the First World War. They gave too much importance to the defeat

of the French armies.®

%altiaoro Sun. June 18, 1940.

^"Fierce Nazi attack on England to follow Holland occupation,”

predicted Drew Pearson and Robert Allen In their syndicated column in
the Miami Herald. May 16, 1940.

®Kirke L. Stimeon in Wall Street Journal, May 18, 1940; Miami

Herald, May 22, 1940,
 109

During the summer of 1940 British attempts to neutralize or to

swing to their side what was left of French power met with success and

failure* These efforts were followed sympathetically by a majority of

American public opinion which wanted to see Great Britain resist Germany

victoriously. Fear of Hitler and belief in his military ability was such

that many observers thought the French Empire might become a springboard

for fantastic German expeditions suggestive of Alexander the Great.7

During this time the official American policy toward French af­

fairs was slowly maturing. This policy took no account of the attitude

of most well-informed Americans, who showed a strong distrust of the Vichy

government and a great desire to help dissolve the ties between the Vichy

government and the French Empire. This part of American opinion had, at

that time, great confidence in the men who were In charge of American

foreign policy and expected that some day events would prove that theirs

had been the best course.®

A study of American reactions to French events during the summer

of 1940 should take into account important facts. In the first place, much

of the news coming from occupied France, unoccupied France, and the French

Empire came from German or German-controlled sources.® In the second

place, American sympathies and interests were on the British side. The

British reaction to the French armistice was very violent and influenced

pro-British circles in America* Isolationist opinion viewed the official

French position in the light of their opposition to British policies and

7See pp. 278-281.

8See pp. 199.

®See pp. 11*0-1bk.

 no

were much more favorable to the Vichy government. In the third place,

the United States had always been traditionally opposed to the colonial

policy of the countries of Western Europe. Various factors were involved

in the American anti-colonialist attitude* It was an important feature

of th© genuine democratic tradition of the United States.

The particularly fortunate conditions in which American power

grew up made It possible for that anti-colonial tradition to remain In­

tact. America looked at all colonies in the light of her own colonial

history. Religious motives were also powerful. The Christian Science

Monitor, for instance, remained one of the most consistent opponents of

the colonial policy of any European country.^ British and French colo­

nial policies were the chief argument used by those who claimed that the

United States had nothing to do in a war which was not really being

fought for democratic principles.^

Negro opinion in th© United States was perhaps naturally anti­

colonial. Although American observers admired the French people because

racial prejudices were not so common in France as in their own country,

Negroes disapproved French African policies. In circles influenced by

leftist thought the opinion prevailed that insistence on the Nazi racial

theories was a particularly shameless propaganda trick at the hands of

the British, the French, and ’’interventionist” Americans, lhat we have

termed "leftist isolationism” was a very common attitude among Negroes.

An article by a German refugee, Hans Habe, entitled "Th© Nazi Plan for

^Norton Webb, "What of France’s Empire?" Christian Science

Monitor. April 11, 1942.

■^Oswald Garrison Villard, "Our Moral Confusion,” The Christian

Century, July 9, 1941. — »
 Ill

Negroes,”12 attracted some indignant comments from Negro readers. Negro

leader George S. Schuyler replied to Hans Habe:

The Nazi Negro policy seems to be the eme as that of France, the
British Empire, Belgium, Holland, Portugal and the United States ex­
cept that Hitler wants or plans to use Negroes only in labor battal­
ions (as moat United States blacks were used in 1917-18) whereas the
other white powers permit them to risk their lives in defense of
those who despise them.IS

A correspondent of the Negro Pittsburgh Courier, Merguson, was quoted as

being one who "frankly implicates the French for their insistence that

Africans must fight au sauvage, that is in hand-to-hand encounters with

knives and pistols. French Insistence on Negro savagery rebounded in an

equally ferocious savagery."24

III

The first American reaction at the time of the armistice was that

the French Empire was going to crumble. The Baltimore Sun wrote edito­

rially: "Its possessions range from huge chunks of territory to tiny

specks in distant seas. But in the event of the breakdown of the empire

with the defeat of the mother country, it i© difficult to say which might

seem more important to inheriting nations.”3.5 Some predicted that the

empire would perish under the pressure of oppressed nationalities, but

moat observers were more preoccupied with the British resistance than

with ideological considerations. The attitude of General Mittelhausar,

ffighe Nation, March 1, 1941, p. 255.

1$Ibid., April 5, 1941, p. 419,

^Ibid.

■^Baltimore Sim, June 22, 1940.

 112
comaander-in-chief of French armed force© in the Near East, attracted

attention* He did not order his troops to cease fighting at th© time of

the armistice* General Auguste Hogues, commander in Morocco and a Blum

appointee, stated publicly that he would not tolerate any Germans in

Morocco* On June 28 American newspapers wore full of reports from

Gibraltar announcing that powerful units of th© French fleet, "perhaps

the greater part of it," had steamed to North Africa for a "fight to the

finish."^ General Hogues was credited with th© most belligerent atti­

tude *2-7 But nothing happened in th® following days, American hopes were

reported to be more and more centered on General de Gaulle and his London

committee* Few wanted to abandon th© belief that some daring move could

wrest the French Empire from the German grip.

If the Retain Government’s authority over the French Empire and the
fleet and over French financial resources abroad is allowed to go
unchallenged, those resources will fall into the hands of Germany*
Hence, though General Petain seems to have come into power through
the usual process, his authority may be subject to challenge by the
Free French National Committee.*8

Marcel Peyrouton, Resident General of Tunisia, worked hard to

convince th© French pro-consuls in Africa and Asia that they should fol­

low Petain* They finally agreed. Reports from London at the end of

June, 1940, were discouraging* Recognition of de Gaulle as the only

French leader having the ability to rally French support came only when

the last British hope had vanished. Correspondent Helen Kirkpatrick

cabled from London that "ten days of effort to build up organized

^Baltimore Sun, June 28, 1940,

17H*w York Ilmen. June 28, 1940.

^Baltimore Sun. June 26, 1940.

 115

resistance in the French colonies were unsuccessful. What the position

of llorth Africa will be is not clear. • •

Hostility between the British and the French people was considered

by American opinion as one of the first logical consequences of this situ­

ation* It was then murmured in some quarters that there had been irri­

tation between French and British military circles even before the German

offensive#2*5 There was a general agreement that British help had been

too limited to influence the course of operations in the West* Americans

were so aware of this fact that a public opinion poll registered a large

percentage of people who thought that the British “had let the French

down.11 Those who thought that the French “had let the British down”

were fewer*25*

The armistice was a terrible blow for Great Britain and British

resentment was expected* Broadcasting from London on June 17, Edward

Murrow knew very well what sort of story his American audience was ready

to listen to and sought to counteract its

It would be quite easy on a day like this to exhaust one*s vocabu­

lary and breath in describing British reaction to the french decision
to give up the fight* It would be easy but inaccurate, because the
British impulse when something happens is to do nothing, say nothing,
until all the facts are known* • * • There is, so far no tendency
in official circles to criticise or malign the French. Most British­
ers are quite willing to admit that the French have fought this war
so far almost alone, except at sea, while to the British it‘s been
something of a luxury war*22

^%aLtimore Sun* June 50, 1940#

^Chicago Tribune. July 6, 1940*

^Public Opinion Quarterly, December, 1940, p. 711*

^Wylie, ed«, Best Broadcasts of 1959-1940, p* 358*

 114

But many Americans were ready to emphasise Anglo-French hostility#

It confirmed the predictions of come of them. It was used as a political

argument by others# Anti-British feeling which was so easy to arouse in

a large section of American opinion made it an agreeable thing to

contemplate.

To a lesser degree, this readiness to admit that the French hated

the British was probably also influenced by the resentment against Franc©

created by the armistice# Isolationists were eager to show their fellow-

citizens how worthless any commitment with a European nation was since

commitments between European nations were broken so ©asily.2 ^ There was

finally a desire to show that Great Britain was in a mortal danger# French

hostility increased this danger# Isolationists wanted to prove that it

was no us© to help.2^ interventionists wanted to show that it was urgent

to help#2® Hostility between the French and th© British was encouraged

by German propaganda in the United States. This kind of propaganda did

not stop with the armistice at Compiegne.2®

On June 24 the Interventionist New York Times stated with stark

realism what was to happen in the near futures

Th© British are bound to treat occupied France as enemy territory# #

• * The horrible sequel will be that the British will be forced to
make war upon French territory now in enemy handsj they may bomb
French cities, and incidentally kill French civilians, and perhaps
starve Franc© in the grim effort to blockade and starve Germany.

2®Chlcago Tribune, July 9, 1940.

24Ibld,

2®The Nation, July 6, 1940.

2%lex Small’s dispatch from Faria in the Chicago Tribune,

July 9, 1940#
 115

Only the .future can tell what the result will be in misery, In
bitterness, in tragedy for the French and British people alike

In the days which followed, official French resentment against

Great Britain was expressed by Betain.&® Churchill1s reaction was also

violent.2® Even American newspapers which refused to accept the Vichy

government as an emanation of the French people were seriously concerned

over the hostility between French and British officials.

These fears were soon confirmed by the events which took place

at Oran on July 5# Although many American newspapers had expressed con­

cern over the fate of the French fleet, the British blow at the French

warships assembled in the harbor of Mers~el~Kebir came as a surprise.

American concern had expressed itself in figures showing the strength of

Hitler*8 naval forces with and without the addition of th© French fleet.

Nobody knew what Hitler would do, but tils promises concerning the French

fleet were believed of no value# Cordell Hull expressed the opinion of

th© whole American government in that respect.

As the President and I minutely scrutinized the wording of arti­

cle V I I I of the armistice terms, relating to the fleet, we could

27Hew Xork Tines. June 24, 1940.

28Ibld.. June 25, 1940.

28Ibld.. June 26, 1940.

^French version of the armistice convention between France and

Germany of June £2, 1940; Article 8. La flott© d© guerre francaise,-
a 1*exception de la parti© qui est laissee^ a la disposition du Gouverne-
ment Franqais pour la sauvegard© des intereta francais dans son empire
colonial,- sera raaserablee dans des ports a determiner ©t devra etre
demobilises et desarmee sous le control© de 1 1Allemagn© ou respectlvement
d© 1*Italic.
La designation de ces ports sera fait© d'apres les ports
d*attach© des navires ©n temps d© paix. Le Gouvernement Allemand declare
solennellement au Gouvemement Franqais qu’il nfa pas 1*intention
 116
not but be anxious« If the Germans were to superintend the disman­
tling of the French warships, they could also seise them* As for
German promises not to use the French fleet for their own war
purposes, they were worth less than an oat*31

Most Americans realized that this question of the French fleet

was vital for their country* The possession of the French fleet would

allow Hitler to extend his sphere of action beyond the European continent,

and nobody expected that he would tales such an opportunity* As early as

dune 20 the Hew York Times wondered why Hitler had not acted more quickly

and why "the French were allowed to put at least part of their fleet and

air force out of jhlsj reach*"32 Most newspapers did not think that Great

Britain could resist th© combined German, Italian and French fleets* The

Kation declaredt "Britain has still to be crushed* * • » Much will de­

pend on what happens to the French navy*"33 Ko one denied that this

problem interested the Western Hemisphere almost as directly as the

British Empire*

In Great Britain and the Americas last week, the first reaction
to news of the fall of France was grim silence* Next wase What
about th© French navy? * , * Whether its officers would obey a call
to come in and surrender or would scuttle or intern themselves, or

dfutiliser pendant la guerre a ses proprcs fine la flott© d« guerre fran-

£aise stationed© dans lea ports sous contrble allemand, sauf lea unites
neeessaires a la surveillance das cotes ©t au dragage des mines*
II declare, en outre, solenellement ®t formellement qu*il n*a pas
1*intention d© formuler d© revendications a l*egard de la flott® d© guerre
fran^aise, lors d© la conclusion d® la paix* Exception fait© de la parti©
de la flott® frangaise, a determiner, qui sera affect^© a la sauvegarde
dee interete francais dans lfEmpire colonial, tous les navires de guerre
se trouvant en dehors des ©aux territorial©® fi*anpaises, devront etre
rappelets en France*

33-ML1, Memoirs, p« 795.

^%ew York Times* June 20, 1940,

8% » Nation. June 88, 1940.

 117

would stay with the British became a question upon which the fat© of
Great Britain— -and perhaps the fat© of the Weetern world— hung.

Then came the British action against the French ships at Oran.

There were few dissenting voices in the general approval of th® British

policy# Criticism was based mainly upon th® psychological effect that

such an action would have on French opinion* Francis Heilson wrote in

his diary:

What a strange war! Was it necessary to commit this act?

• » • Churchill • * * must have been conscious that it was a reckless
deed but I doubt whether he thought for a moment that it would stif­
fen the resistance of the Gomans and, perhaps, give Hitler the very
thing that was lacking in his plan to attack England with all his
force* This has given the Fuhrer an excuse for dealing relentlessly
with the British.
There is another matter to be considered in connection with tills
exploit: the effect it will have upon th© French mind, and what will
the rest of the world think of this act of England turning her guns
on her former ally* * . »
There is no parallel, not even in the Peloponnesian War, for this
extraordinary act* The thought of it fills one with foreboding i56

But this was not a typical American reaction to the “strangest

of all naval actions in world's history*”56 The feeling of relief was

such that even newspapers like th© anti-British Chicago Tribune wrote

enthusiastic comments.

If th© French naval command was determined to comply with th© terms
of th© Armistice and put th© ships in German and Italian hands, the
British government had no alternative to the measures taken. The
terms Mr. Churchill offered th© French admirals were the only terms
he could offer. That th© prim® minister was truly affected * . *
there should be no doubt •

^Tiae. June 24, 1940.

^Heilson, The Tragedy of Europe, p. 545*

^Baltimore Hews Post* July 4, 1940.

37Chicago Tribune, July 6, 1940*

 118

Senator Pittman, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, asserted

that "patriotic Americans” would applaud the British “seizure” of the

French ships,3® Frederick Schuman called th© sinking of th© French ships

“an • . . act of imagination and audacity, reflecting Churchill's will to

victory*"3® It is certain that the British initiative restored some de­

gree of confidence in British arms* Robert Sherwood noted that “Oran had

a tremendous effect on world opinion, particularly in the United States*"4®

But it was not th© effect dreaded by Mr* Hellson| it "served forcibly to

underscore Churchill's defiant assurance that 'we will fight them in the

streets' and 'never surrender. *11 Life recalled th© period which preceded

that daring action* "As weeks passed and nothing happened, American ob­

servers concluded that the British were hopelessly strangled in red tape,

mentally incapable of direct action*n4^ It is certain that Oran proved

to Americans that the British were still capable of taking the initiative

but the effect of this initiative was all the greater because it was un­

expected* Before July 5 no suggestion that the British navy should at­

tempt to destroy the potentially dangerous French ships seems to have

been made by th© American press*

There was a note of sadness and regret in most American comments

but it was felt that th© British were right* The positive results of th©

military operation were more Important than French opinion. “It may be

painful for Frenchmen to contemplate these results, but the German

^Chicago Tribune, July 4, 1940.

3%chuman, Night over Europe, p. 520.

^Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 149.

'“•Life, September 16, 1940.

 119

chagrin must be even deeper," declared the Baltimore Sun, "and it is this

German chagrin, revealed in the bitter comments in Berlin, which places

British action and French naval losses in their true perspective.

Some newspapers attempted to show that the French refusal to ac­

cept th© British proposals had been dictated by Germany or that the

French leaders could not communicate freely with the ships in North

Africa. Edward Angly cabled from London to th© Hew York Herald Tribune i

Many hours before th© Franco-British naval battle opened yester­

day in the Mediterranean, I learned from a trustworthy source of a
•last order' in secret code which Admiral Darlan had sent to the com­
manding officers of all French warships on th® day after he became a
member of th© Government of Marshal Petoin.
In that message he infomed his commanders that he was giving
them his last order, that all future orders signed with his name were
to be ignored •because,' the message explained, *1 m not free.'
'This last order,' he wrote, 'is that you shall not surrender
your ships.*43

The French reaction after Oran, and especially the bombing of Gibraltar

by French planes, did not give much credit to this theory* It was soon

forgotten but it reappeared many times In the following years in an at­

tempt, on th© part of some American observers, to interpret favorably

French official actions which seemed to b© opposed to th© real French

Interests*

The battle of Oran was also th© first French matter on which

well-informed American opinion, while in harmony with th© opinion in the

Allied countries, was not reflected by at least some of th© American gov­

ernment circles and especially the State Department. Since this action

^Baltimore Sun* July 5, 1940.

4SN©w York Herald Tribune, July 5, 1940.

 120
action had been "solely between the British and the French,"44 the State

Department did not officially comment upon it, but Secretary of State

Cordell Bull later expressed his personal opinion in his Memoirs:

I did not think th© attack had been necessary. I could not help be­
ing inexpressibly saddened by this latest manifestation of the tragic
break between Britain and France* . , . How for th© warships of
Britain and Franc© to fire on one another, at the very moment when
the hordes of Hitler were preparing to overwhelm the last remaining
bulwark of Western civilization in Europe, was to me a tragic
blunder.43

In the light of what finally became of the remnants of th© French fleet

Hull's opinion turned out to be defensible but most Americans would not

have believed him in 1940* American newspapers took it for granted that

Hitler had been stopped short of an important bloodless victory by the

British attack* A Newsweek headline summed up American opinion in that

respect: "Dramatic British sea stroke blurs Axis strategy picture.”46

After Oran there was an almost unanimous feeling in th© United

States that th© hat© between Franc© and Great Britain was a fact to b©

reckoned with for the next thousand years* More than ever before,

isolationist newspapers emphasized that point*

At the present moment there is probably no hatred in ©11 Europe

so intense as that of the British for th© French and of many French
for th© British. • * *
The sinking and capture of French ships by the British navy will
be th© end of the undependable British-French alliance and the old
hereditary enemies may again take their place in history.4?

^^Hull, Memoirs* p. 795.

4SXbld«

^Hewawoak, July 15, 1940.

4?Chicago Tribune* July 9, 1940.

 121
On July 4, Vichy broke diplomatic relatione with Great Britain.4® Fro®

Paris Alex Small reported to the Chicago Tribune that the event had

aroused "a wave of indignation that has swept away practically all op­

position to the government of Premier Marshal Henri Philippe Pei&in and

silenced Frenchmen who believed Britain would lead Franc® to victory.11

Like many other newspapers, th© Hew York Times admitted the possibility

of a Franco-Brltish war.4® Ho one could see any reason to hope for an

improvement of Franoo-British relations in the foreseeable future. The

Christian Science Monitor believed that it would take a very long time

"for the French to forget that Great Britain did not come to their assist­

ance in their hour of need."3® John MacGomac was no more optimistic

about British opinion and was afraid that she would not forget that the

leaders in Vichy had long and secretly hated their erstwhile ally*5^

For liberal newspapers and all those who believed in an "Atlantic

community of nations,1* the rupture of this "natural alliance" was a catas­

trophe. These newspapers could hardly put the blame on Great Britainj

that country was still in th® fight and had to be helped by ©very possible

means. On the other hand the defeat and especially th© armistice had

diminished "American faith in the French people") th© political tendencies

of the new government were repugnant to liberal circles and everything

made for a stem condemnation of France. In spite of its expressed in­

tention not to confuse "the men of Vichy” and th© "real France," The

4®Hew York Times, July 6, 1940*

49Ibld,, July 5, 1640.

^Christian Sclsnoe Monitor, July 12, 1940.

®^John UaoOormao, America and World Maatery (Haw York, 1942),

p. 807.
 m

Nation assarted; "The alliance between th© two greatest European democ­

racies * i , has been smashed not by the victorious arms of Germany but

by the collapse of French unity and fighting spirit."^

IV

The portion of the French Empire which was situated in the West­

ern Hemisphere interested Americans more than any other part* Th© French

West ladies had attracted public attention even before the French defeat*

In The Man in the Street* Bailey saw the origin of this attitude in the

French defeat* "After the collapse of France in 1940, our attention m s

focused on the orphaned West Indian islands of Franc© and the Netherlands *

Strong public support developed for seising them or buying them or advanc­

ing loans on them*"S3 The last two solutions had already been advocated

by many observers during th© "phony war." It had been suggested that a

cession of th© islands would be a good way to get paid for war materiel

in case th© Allies were short of cash* Public opinion polls on this mat­

ter showed that a large majority of th© American people were in favor of

buying foreign possessions in the area of th© Panama C a n a l . T h i s move­

ment gained momentum with th© German offensive in the West* On May 11

Hellson wrote in his diarys

I made th® suggestion that both Great Britain and France might cede
to the United States their islands in the West Indies and along the
Worth American ©©aboard* This would not only be a wise thing to do,
in view of th© great debt these countries owe us, it would also be a
practical one* It might put an end to the alarm that has been cre­
ated in this country regarding the possibility that Hitler would

s2The Hation* July 13, 1940.

5%&l©y, The Man in the Street* p* 276.

^Harper1s Magaaine* April, 1940, p. 182.

 123

attack the Western Hemisphere, should he triumph In Europe, and take

these islands for air base®* This notion la worthy of
consideration*^

A Gallup poll previous to the German offensive showed that 31 per cent

of the American people were in favor of the United States and other Ameri­

can republics buying the British, French, and Dutch possessions In th©

area of the Panama Canal if th© Allies needed more money*5® According to

the Chicago Tribune, however, “most of them [the coloni.es] already have

been paid forw57 since all the countries which ruled these territories

were still indebted to the United States*

The United States government sent a formal note to the German

government stating that the United States would not tolerate any transfer

of sovereignty from one European power to another one*58 This was don®

In th© name of the Monroe Doctrine* The New York Tiros compared the

situation in 1940 with that which had occurred in 1825 when a French

fleet appeared off Cuba and Henry Clay, the American Secretary of State,

had Informed France that only Spain was entitled to keep armed forces in

that area* The German government, therefor®, should not be shocked by

the American demand*S9 The German answer, which denied that Germany had

any intention of occupying the islands, naturally pointed out that th®

American position was untenable since these territories were already

®®Nellson, The Tragedy of Europe* p. 469*

^Harper*s Magazine* April, 1941.

^Chicago Tribune* July 9, 1940.

®®Hull, Memoirs, p. 817*

^%ew York Tiros* June 20, 1940*

 124

European possessions*60 This answer provoked the anger of many newspa­

pers* Isolationist newspapers attacked Roosevelt because these European

possessions had not been “liquidated” in time.81 Liberal newspapers

pointed out that Hitler did not need any transfer of sovereignty to be

in control of the island* The Hew Republic noted*

We have said we will not tolerate th© handing over of possessions in

this hemisphere from one European power to another. But what shall
we do when the French colonies near our shores ar© ruled by a puppet
government responsible only to Hitler* Might we not discover that
in effect th© Nazis have already invaded this hemisphere?^

The Nation suggested that “our government should be prepared to assume

guardianship of the colonies in this hemisphere of any European country

which abandons a democratic form of government under d u r e s s . “8 8

These demands were not only the result of American fear that

Germany could us© the islands militarily but also a consequence of the

increased feeling of Pan-American solidarity which followed the French

defeat* Professor H* C. Leaves, of the University of Chicago, expressed

the common belief that in case of a complete German victory “the Americas,

including Canada, Central and South America, will have to organize under

United States' l e a d e r s h i p * ”84

The surprising accord between different schools of thought on this

matter of European colonies, the quickness with which those who used to

®%ull, Memoirs* p. 817.

Chicago Tribune, July 8, 1940.

^Ihe Hew Republic, July 8, 1940,

®%he Nation, June 29, 1940.

^Chicago Tribune, July 5, 1940,

ridicule “war hysteria” became suddenly aware of a German threat in the

Western Hemisphere itself, and the tone of certain utterances on the sub­

ject led some observers— and the German propagandists— to believe or say

that the main reason for that unity of purpose was imperialism* This was

denied by Bailey in The Man in the Street* He declared: “The primary

motive was not imperialism but security* Our existing Caribbean poor-

houses, under the proud fold of the Stars and Stripes, were worries

enough*“8®

In spite of the clamors for quick action in Martinique, Secretary

of State Cordell Hull and President Roosevelt, who had already decided

what course of action America would follow with th© Vichy government, had

resolved to maintain the status quo in the French Antilles*86 American

warships were dispatched to the Caribbean as a warning to the British

that the American government would not be pleased by a second Oran battle

in American waters *87 "Time passed on • • • quietly * * * on American

islands now nominally ruled by the new totalitarian government of France,

which in turn is subservient to th© totalitarian government of Europe*“88

Time saw “two solid reasons” for the “stalemate** in Martinique, The first

one was that the Brazilians had proposed that Brasil be given a mandat©

over British, French, and Butch Guinea* This proposal embarrassed the

American government, which did not wish to harm British interests* The

second reason was that Guba was agitating for the freedom of ail

8®Bailey, The Man in the Street* p* 276.

®®Hull, Memoirs, pp* 804-005*

 126

colonies* "In view of Latin American complications, it seemed to be to

United States advantage to avoid a final settlement, avoid establishing

dangerous precedents. “89 The influence of the State Department was even

©ore obvious in a New lork Times editorial on this s u b j e c t . For th©

American policy-makers, th© question of th© French Antilles was too easy

to solve in case of an emergency to necessitate any rash action which

might cut th© ties between Vichy Franc© and the United States*

Many newspapers pointed out that the French warships in this area

were potentially very dangerous Such papers were also worried by the

hundred odd American planes which war© being shipped from United States'

factories to France and had become stranded in Martinique at th© time of

the armistice. Th© French Admiral Robert was apparently not willing to

give up these planes which could have been so useful in th© battle of

Britain.7^ Referring to the American planes on the Island, the Hew York

Times explained American policy on the question and tried to alleviate

American fears.

It is, of course, annoying to find this American contribution to

the Allied cause should now be immobilized in th© Caribbean, exposed
to rust and deterioration, because of the French armistice with Ger­
many. But, much as th© British would like to get these planes, much
as we should like to help them, the United States is hardly likely
to violate French sovereignty and create an 'incident* for such a
cause.
The real fear In Washington is that Martinique and Guadeloupe,
as well as strategically Important Dakar in lest Africa, may any day
become Nazi-controlled in fact if not in name. . . . It is wholly
natural and right, therefore, that our Government should keep

69Kew York Herald Tribune.

^W*r York Times, November 8, 1940.

^New York Post, November 13, 1940.

^Hull, Memoirat p. 820.

 127

destroyers on patrol outside Martinique and should watch carefully,

in accordance with the Monroe Doctrine and the Havana resolution,
for the slightest sign of any transfer of the island to unfriendly
control.

Some interventionist and liberal newspapers, however, began to wonder why

their government was so lenient with the French colonies whose governor,

Admiral Robert, remained so faithful to Petain. They became impatient

with the American attitude but soon realised that it was only a minor

part of the Administration1s policy toward ¥ichy France.

French sovereignty was also threatened in parts of the French

Empire outside th© Western Hemisphere. Even before the end of the hos­

tilities with Germany, Japan exerted pressure to stop any trade in muni­

tions between the French colony of Indo-Ghina and the Chungking government

of China. Japan acted to cut the supply route fro® Indo-Ghlna to the

Central Chinese government.74 Even before that, Americans had began to

wonder whether Japanese troops had already entered Indo-China. Indo­

china seems to be doomed to be the next victim, * stated The nation on

June 22. ”The French collapse leaves the American fleet the only effec­

tive military bar— apart from the Chinese army— to Japanese expansion.**

It was certainly obvious that French Indo-Ghlna was just as powerless be­

fore Japan as metropolitan France was before Germany. Japanese warships

were petroling Indo-Chinese waters to “observe the movements** of vessels

which might slip out with contraband for Chungking. Ho one expected that

these warships would go home after the arrival of a Japanese

7®New York Times. November 8, 1940

^Hull, Memoirs, p. 896.

 128

“inspectorate.M This was what the Japanese had promised, but their in­

spectorate looked very much like an armistice commission. France had to

sign an agreement recognising Japan’s “special interests” in South-

Eastern Asia. Ambassador Arsen® Henry “sighed and sighed.’*75

But it soon became apparent that Japan would not be satisfied

with so little. In August she asked for an economic agreement with Indo-

Ghlna, the right to move troops across the country, and air and naval

bases. In spite of Secretary of State Hull’s declaration that any change

in the status of Indo-China would have “an unfortunate effect1* on American

public opinion, the Japanese government continued its pressure and Vichy

finally agreed to permit Japan to establish three airbuses In Indo-China

and to garrison troops at Haiphong*7® The Nation opened its columns to

Km T. Chen, a friend of Ghang-Kai-Chek, who declared! “Chinese troops

• , • were ready to help the French at a moment’s notice. But the courage

of the French was broken and they could think of nothing but yielding.”

He termed Vichy’s action a “selfish betrayal of China and a violation of

the Franco-Chines© pact.” He also expressed the hazardous opinion that

“with more than one million soldiers tied up In China and having lost an­

other million killed or crippled, the Japanese war lords could spare no

spare no troops to cause real trouble elsewhere.”77 What angered inter­

ventionist and liberal newspapers was the attitude of the Vichy government

which represented th© whole matter as a proof of th® good relations be­

tween Japan and France.78 They were, however, In an embarrassing

75Tirae, July 1, 1940.

78F. Lee Benns, Europe since 1914 (Mew York, 1947), p. 560.

77The Nation, September 21, 1940*

7^Ibld., September 28, 1940.

 129

situation and it was difficult to talk about a “betrayal of China” since

Great Britain, which was also subjected to pressure, had closed the Burma

road* The interventionists understood that America was the only power

which could atop Japan but no voice was raised to ask for military inter­

vention. All they could hope was that Japan's attitude would speed up

negotiations with the British to give the American fleet access to Singa­

pore and would bring about the embargo on oil and scrap iron exports to

Japan.7®

Liberal irritation was increased by the reactionary domestic

policies of the Vichy government. French foreign policy in Asia was

logically construed as a consequence of the Fascist tendencies of Vichy.

Japan had moved in with “what appears to b® full agreement with the local

French a u t h o r i t i e s The liberals had more reasons than anybody else

to think that French domination in Indo-China was endangered. Even if

Japanese supremacy in the Orient were to be short-lived, they viewed th®

French position as anachronisticAmerican opinion did not agree on

the attitude of the Indo-Chinese population. Remembering how easily th®

conquest of the country had been carried out by the French marines at the

turn of the century, many observers still believed with Newsweek that

“the yellow-hued, easy-going Buddhist natives have on the whole fitted

meekly into the French economic and social set-up.”8^Joseph Hilton

Smith, however, voiced the opinion of the liberals in the Living Age.

7%he Nation, September 28, 1940.

BQIbid.

8%all©tt Abend, Pacific Charter (New York, 1945), as quoted In

Curt Rlese, ed., They Were'^her'e (New York, 1944), p. 581.

^Newsweek, October 7, 1940.

 130

He warned that °this viewpoint ignored the intons© and bitter feeling

against France long nurtured by th® majority of Indo-Chinese.”85 Hativ©

hostility, increased by the inefficiency and ruthlessness of the classi­

cal colonial methods which Vichy would naturally try to revive or to

maintain would, according to observers like Hallett Abend, make the French

position untenable in th© f u t u r e . T h e y were nevertheless much more

worried by a possible occupation of Indo-Ghlna by Japan# Obvious strate­

gic reasons made Japan*s move a serious threat to th® Allied cause in

case of a war in Asia. As Time noted, Singapore was Mflanked”®® by the

Vichy-Japanes® accord. At the end of th© year, not only governmental

circles but all thoughtful Americans realised that further developments

in the Far East could be expected shortly and that the Indo-Chinese

problem was only one episode of th© world struggle.

VI

Meanwhile, General d© Gaulle’s famous speech on June 18, 1940,

had not passed unnoticed in America. At least on© French military leader

did not want to give up th© struggle. A few days later, when he was

recognised by the British as th© leader of all Frenchmen who wanted to

keep fighting on th© British side, do Gaulle’s gesture acquired political

meaning* This was followed, on August 4, 1940, by a formal agreement

which constituted the charter of th© Free French Forces.®® D© Gaulle,

®^living Age, April, 1941.

®^Curt Hieas, ed., They Were There, pp. 582-383.

esTime, October 7, 1940.

8%oward G* Hice, France 1940-1942, A Collection of Documents

and Bibliography (Cambridge, MassT,"T942), p7 140.
 151
however, was almost unknown in America. Hla political career had begun

in the midst of the catastrophe of 1940 whan Paul Reynaud had appointed

him Under-Secretary of War. To most Americans, de Gaulle’s attitude meant

primarily that relations between the Vichy government and Great Britain

would be cloudy.®? For those who were anxiously watching Great Britain

and wondering whether she could hold against th© mighty German air force,

at a time when everybody was deserting what was considered to be the next

victim of Nazi military genius, no help, no matter hew small it might be,

m s negligible. American interventionists and liberals never forgot that

de Gaulle proclaimed his faith in a British victory in June, 1940* For

those who tried to stem the wave of resentment against France for her

’’desertion1* of the Allied cause, it m s heartening to see that at least

one French general refused to bow to Hitler, even at the cost of French

logic and common sense* America soon learned that de Gaulle was the au­

thor of a nprophetic” book on mechanised warfare which th© French general

staff had never taken seriously. Be Gaulle became immediately a symbol

of French nationalism. To the liberals he became a symbol of the French

resistance to Fascism although it was already murmured that, like many

other French officers, de Gaulle had nothing but contempt for French

democracy.

De Gaulle’s challenge to Hitler raised great hopes in America as

may be judged from this editorial of the New York Timess

The British have in effect recognised what may be th© genesis of a

rival French government under the leadership of General de Gaulle,

York Times, June 24, 1940.

®®V©rs 1’armee de metier (Paris, 1954). This book was published

in Biiglish under the tiiTe",fhe Army of the Future (How York, 1940).
 152

the disregarded French prophet of mechanized warfare. . . . Perhaps

an attempt will be made to transfer title to French gold reserves,
merchant shipping and other resources abroad to a rump government,
even though Retain and his colleagues have full legal authority in
France itself,99

In spite of its proverbial prudence the New York Times had been too hasty,

however. Three days later James B# Reston corrected in the same

newspaper the impression created in the editorial.

There is no question of M. Corbin’s remaining her© to co-operate with

General de Gaulle’s committee, the importance of which, it is now
felt, has been exaggerated In the last few days. Instead of being
established as^a political committee that would attempt to compete
with Marshal Retain for the support of the French people the Committee
is more than likely to develop a military recruiting office for the
British a r r a y , 90

This was, perhaps, the first expression of American official cool­

ness toward de Gaulle and Ids movement. At that time, in fact, ”de Gaulle

had as yet no following to speak of. No French leader of eminence had

joined In his Memoirs Secretary of State Bull pointed out that

recognition by the British "was not recognition of d© Gaulle as the head

of a Government . . . and Mr, Churchill carefully avoided such recogni­

tion.* According to Hull, however, the Committee was regarded as

something more than a *recruiting office.*

Our own attitude toward.d© Gaulle was that of waiting to see what he
would do and to what extent he could rally Frenchmen to his cause,
There was no question of our ’recognizing1 him. We could not accord
him diplomatic recognition as a government and at th© same time
maintain diplomatic relations with the Vichy government,92

89N©w York Times, June 24, 1.940,

^Xbid., June 27, 1940.

9^Hull, Memoirs, p. 806.

danger, Our Vichy Gamble, p, 77,

 133

De Gaulle’s prestige in America suffered from this indifference*

By the middle of July he seemed half-forgotten*

The man on horseback who will try to make France strong again had
not appeared last week. He was not likely to materialize out of any
of the figures now running the country* Some people thought that, if
the British should win, General Charles de Gaulle might be such a man.
More likely it would be someone a® obscure as Adolf Hitler in 1918*
Perhaps It would take a revolution to produce him.98

Interventionist newspapers were doing their best to attract public atten­

tion to de Gaulle, but The New Republic was not very optimistic about

his chances of acquiring political prominence*

General de Gaulle in London, a brilliant and aggressive officer,

* • * Is attempting to rally a committee of prominent Frenchmen to
save what is possible. It is yet uncertain whether he can succeed
in the face of the Retain brand of leadership, which has disowned
him and threatens him with court-martial»^

De Gaulle’s first real success was to win over to the British

coalition part of the French colonial empire. “African domain rush to

join General de Gaulle and British,” headlined Newsweek on September 9,

1940* This event was greeted by the American press with the same satis­

faction as the Oran battle. Its military significance was limited but

it eliminated one danger and constituted a hopeful sign as far as the at­

titude of the other French colonies was concerned* Some people expressed

the belief that the decision of French Equatorial Africa was due to

Britain’s enhanced prestige for resisting Nasi air attacks.95 Many

thought, too, that the attitude of this colony was due to economic

9STime* July 22, 1940.

^The New Republic* July 1, 1940*

9%he Nation* September 7, 1940.

 154

reasons *96 It m m viewed more as a British success in an undeclared war

on France than as an episode In the fight between two rival French

groups*97

For manor newspapers, th® move of French Equatorial Africa was

interpreted, like the Indo-Chinese situation, as a sign that the French

Empire was dissolving* "Last week th© world’s second greatest colonial

empire began to fall apart,” asserted Newsweek in S e p t e m b e r *98 Declared

The Commonweals

The French colonies are seeking their own salvation * . * th© contri­
bution of th© colonies may not prove insignificant* But their action
has a far more far-reaching meaningt in claiming their political
liberty of action and in breaking with th® French government, the
colonies are submitting to a profound necessity of organising their
life on the national basis of regional groups, rather than on a con­
tinued dependence on a political relationship with the mother coun­
try * * * what w© see in these ©vents is a first sign of a regrouping
of elements, detached from their former political connection In
continental structures*99

The fact that The Commonweal took, at the same time, a position against

th® d© Gaulle movement and denied any political importance to it was

probably the most significant part of this article*

General de Gaulle and the men who have answered his call are
simply volunteers In foreign service acting on their individual re­
sponsibility against a system which has oppressed their country, act­
ing to liberate their country but from a position outside It and
themselves detached from it* Literally they have left their country
to fight for it* Any talk of their being th® ’real’ French
government is absurd*190

9®The Commonweal» September IS, 1940*

97Hewsw®ek» September 9, 1940.

"ibid*

9%he Conaaqnweal* September 13, 1940*

XQQIbid*
 155
The Nation did not view the situation very differently*

The Vichy government seems to be losing control of th© colonies.

• • • Dissident elements seem to be encouraged by two factors— the
stout resistance put tip by Britain and the desperate economic plight
of the colonies which are practically cut off from trade with the
outside world.101

Isolationist and anti-British circles were even more inclined

than the general run of Americans to consider de Gaulle as a British pup­

pet. The attitude of the American press toward de Gaulle was probably

the most important success achieved by the Vichy propaganda in th© United

States. In the index of his diary, Meilson mentioned de Gaulle under the

heading? **D© Gaulle, General, campaign against France,’*!^

D© Gaulle *s name became better known but his prestige was further

diminished by the abortive Free French-Brltish attack upon Dakar, th©

capital and th® main harbor of French West Africa. B© Gaulle had thought

that he would be able to induce French authorities in Dakar to resume the

fight against Germany. His attempt failed* After some fighting, the

British units withdrew from the scene. Th® impression created in America

by this incident was disastrous. It was considered almost as a major de­

feat, as one more British '♦r&barkment” in the series which began in Nor­

way and continued at Dunkirk.^03 Very few American observers accepted

th® British claim that the ^Allied forces refused to attempt a landing”

to avoid a struggle with the French under the command of Governor

General Boisson.

^°^The Nation, September 7, 1940*

10%eilson, The Tragedy

lQSxiae, October 7, 1940.

 156

The British Memorandum of

VaWHbMMiMMMMMvwM
Inforaation
mmm* mmmmmm v***
on Foreign Affairs ex-
mmtMmm mtmttm
« w« m

plained the outcome at Dakar a® due to the superiority of German

information*

More often than not during a crisis, German news reaches America
a long time before ours does. Terrible tales of calamity appear be­
fore the anxious eyes of the American public, and only later do re­
ports from London begin to straggle in. There have been innumerable
instances of this. The latest case of muddling news was over the
Dakar affair. This was badly handled from first to last. The German,
Italian and French stories reached the public long before ours, and
for the first twenty-four hours, at least, the various communiques
from th® Allied side were hopelessly confusing, whereas th® eneay*s
story was certainly cut and dried and simple to r e a d * ^

Most Americans undoubtedly thought that there was something wrong not only

with the British propaganda but with th® British conduct of the war, also.

According to Bemaree Bess, it was the British Intelligence which was at

fault and wrevealed its incompetence In this field by incorrectly report­

ing that French officer® at * . . Dakar would welcome a joint British and

de Gaulle landing f o r c e . The information had been actually supplied

by de Gaulle. Waverley Boot considered that the woperation was a tragi­

comedy of errors, a tissue of mistakes from beginning to end.”1**6 Ilk®

William L. Danger,107 he thought that the main cause for the failure was

the fact that three French cruisers and three destroyers had been allowed

to slip through the Straits of Gibraltar in time to reach Dakar and take

part In the defense.

^British Memorandum of Information on Foreign Affairs (Imperial

Policy Group, London), Octofrer, 1940^ pT l5*'

^Q%aturday Evening Post. January 5, 1942.

^%averley Boot, Secret History of the War (Hew York, 1945), I,

580.
‘^Langer, Qur Vichy Gamble, p. 85.
 XS7
The first comments of American newspapers, which were eager to

report a success for the Allied cause, bore witness of the lack of suf­

ficient infcitation from th© British side. "General de Gaulle’s expedi­

tion to Dakar is wrapped in mystery,” declared The Nation after the first

reports*X08 Newsweek termed th® attempt rtan unglorious failure.”109 The

Hew Republic showed how confused and worried American opinion was*

The affair is beclouded with conflicting reports but even if de

Gaulle *s version is strictly correct, the outcome shows poor prepara­
tion and strategy* If the undertaking was based upon a belief that
Dakar would surrender without a struggle, the intelligence service
is at fault* If It was based cm no such belief, why was th© port at­
tacked at all if th© besiegers were not ready to finish the job.
Worst of all, Dakar remains under Axis control.XIO

For isolationist and serai-isolationist newspapers, the "Dakar

fiasco”— the expression became classical— was a good occasion to attack

Great Britain. Tim© used a historical comparison which hardly fitted th©

present respective positions of th© French and British governments or th©

position of d® Gaulle’s movement.

In 1795 the British were persuaded by French emigres that a mon­

archist uprising against the revolutionaries could easily be started
in Franc© and that it would soon sweep the country, to th© glory of
Britain and her throne. The British backed a handful of braided arid
powdered French officers with phony French money printed by the solid
bank of England. . . * H h m the expedition arrived at Quiberon Bay,
it found less than half the recruits it expected, its staff work was
atrocious, and the expedition was a blood-saturated flop.
The British have a weakness for lost causes like that of Quiberon*
There have been others— Barcelona in X70S, Toulon in 1793, Norway in

108Ths Nation. September 28, 1940*

lfl%ewgw©ek, October 7, 1940.

n o Th& Hew Republic t October 7, 1940*

 im

1940# But the worst of them all, because the iob looked so easy and
the repercussions of failure were so drastic, was last week’s fiasco
at Dakar.13-1

Time concluded with many other observers that de Gaulle was finished#

According to this periodical, even before the expedition^ "the British

had • . # concluded that General de Gaulle was a mediocrity, who by

accident had achieved world prominence, not to be taken very seriously.11

The consequences of the Dakar expedition were extremely serious

for Pranco-American relation® in the following years* It was partly the

memory of this abortive expedition which prevented de Gaulle from getting

his share of the North African operation*31& The mass of the American

people soon forgot an incident which appeared insignificant compared with

the events which followed it# Nevertheless, the name of de Gaulle re­

mained associated with ideas of inefficiency and failure# Dakar was not

only a serious defeat but it made de Gaulle look politically unfit for

the tasks ahead of him# Moreover, there was sometiling particularly

humiliating in a defeat received at the hands of already defeated

fellow-countrymen.

u % j*b , October 7, 1940,

^ S e e pp. 287-289.
 CHAPTER ¥

AMERICAN OPINION OF THE VICHY ’T O ORDER” IN FRANCE

The Petain cabinet which replaced Raynaud’s war government on

June 16, 1940, included many politicians who had formerly advocated an

entente between France and Germany. Mainly through the efforts of Pierre

Laval, this government checked the efforts of those who wanted to con­

tinue the fight in Africa* On July 9, 1940, the two houses of the French

parliament, almost unanimously, gave full power to Marshal Petain to draw

up a new constitution* On July 10, the French National Assembly, con­

sisting of the two houses voting together, confirmed these powers by a

large majority* On July 11 Petain issued three constitutional decrees

which adjourned the parliament sine die and gave him plenary executive

and legislative powers as nchief of the French state*11

The successive Vichy cabinets, which ware frequently reshuffled

by Retain, came to reflect more and more the authoritarian and socially

reactionary tendencies of the French extreme light. The Vichy government

endeavored to destroy the work of the liberal Republic. Religious schools

were made eligible for state aid* Discriminatory legislation against

foreigners and Jews was promulgated. The government interfered freely

with local administration and practically converted France into a police

state. Furthermore, many French and foreign opponents of Nazism were

ferreted out of their hiding places or taken from concentration camps

and turned over to the German Gestapo*

139
 140

Meanwhile, French economic life was brought almost to a stand­

still by war destruction, the disruption of communications, Gorman requi­

sitions and economic infiltration, and the tight demarcation line which

divided France into tm cones • The people suffered fro® political op­

pression, foreign occupation and economic distress# French brade-unions

were suppressed and even the Labor Charter, based on the Has! and Fascist

system remained a dead letter* Germany and Vichy made abortive attempts

to induce French workers to go to work In Germany# In 1945 a system of

conscription and deportations was inaugurated*

II

After the French defeat many American newspapers published edito­

rials warning their readers not to believe news reports coming from

France*^ It soon appeared that there would not be, as some believed,2 a

wall of silence between America and France but a wall of lies# As early

as July 7 the Baltimore Sun declared;

When Marshal Petaln, still nominally Premier of France, issues a

statement, the first Instinct of an American Is to accept It at its
face value# France for generations had known free speech* » • « The
news of France which appeared in this city bears unmistakable marks
of Has! censorship# * * • Only long after is it likely that the truth
of French sentiment can be known# And even this must inevitably be
affected by the suppression of the news from other countries#3

The first result of the French defeat had been a breakdown of the

international information system in France. The occupied area of France

remained during the first months in "almost complete isolation# A few

■'•Baltimore San, July 7, 1040.

ftfhe Commonweal. July 12, 1940, p. 237.

^Baltimore Sun. July 7, 1940,

 141

news stories were sent out by American correspondents and subject to con­

siderable delay.*4 As far as radio was concerned, Paris became Ha blank

spot on the map#" Only a few American correspondents remained In Paris

and, like the French newspapers, their only source of information was the

German official news agency* They also had other troubles. Sherry Mangan

described their plight In Llfet

Only a handful of foreign correspondents are left in Paris and they

have to stand aside wl&le correspondents who came from Berlin with
the Germans speed comfortably about in staff cars* Germany won the
war and its correspondent® with it and as Pierre J# Huss of Hearstf3
International lews Service said, *le*ve gone without coffee and eggs
for two years while you guys ate at Maxim1s. How it’s our turn*1
And he whl&sed off.5

Hoy Porter explained in Uncensored France why it took so long for

dispatches sent from occupied France to reach America# Every mail went

first to

Berlin, where all our dispatches and letters were censored before
being passed on, either to the Berlin office or to our families and
friends back in the United States. This channel was not open to the
general public but was a special arrangement made by the German mili­
tary propaganda division for foreign correspondents • * * . The ac­
tual time for a dispatch or a letter to get from Paris to Berlin was
about 24 hour®. But the complicated censorship organisation in
Berlin held them up for another five days, on the average. That *s
why most of our dispatches were marked 'delayed* whan they appeared
in the American papers.®

In unoccupied France the situation was not much better* Vichy

was linked with the outside world only by wireless. Joseph Barnes,

^Joseph Barnes, foreign news editor of the Hew York Herald

Tribune, in Public Opinion Quarterly, December, 1940.

®life, September 16, 1940*

®Eoy Porter, Unoenaored France (Hew York, 1942), p. 23b.

 142

foreign news editor of the Hew York Herald Tribune, explained how the

new® was transmitted from Vichy to America*

Press Wireless continued to send news daily finding a time allotment

of five hours sufficient for a relatively small news file by the two
American agencies and the five newspapers which maintained regular
correspondents at Vichy* The amount of new® wa® cut down after the
fall of France both by the shift of military operations to England
and by strict censorship.?

Hews broadcasts from Vichy were also retransmitted from Berlin under a

censorship which uat times approached the fantastic*^ Associated Press

correspondent Lloyd Lehrbas explained why there was so much censorship in

Vichy* “The Petain-Laval government doesn't want some stories to reach

the United States. The Germans insist upon censorship of stories which

might reflect on the German occupation. The Italians are touchy on sto­

ries involving any Italian interests.”9 Herman Hebert reported in Public

OP1"100 how> UIlder that »ystela "kich worked in both directions,

foreign correspondents themselves were very poorly informed. Richard

Mowrer, Chicago Dally Hews correspondent, “spent a good portion of his

furlough reading back issues of his own paper to get his first coherent

picture * This situation was not improved by the demarcation line which

separated occupied Franc© from unoccupied France. It was only on July 31

that the Germans allowed information on births, deaths, and illness to be

transmitted on printed postcards.^ Grossing the lino remained forbidden

^Public Opinion Quarterly, December, 1940, p. 675.

8Ibid,

9Ibid.

10Ibld.. p. 114.

U Rloe, France 1940-1942. p. 7S.

 143
unless a special permit was issued. It was long and difficult, sometimes

impossible, to get such a permit. Jay Allen of the North American News­

paper Alliance learned this at his own expense. He was caught by the

German military police on the demarcation line and remained in jail for

several weeks.^ American correspondents in one zone had very little

reliable information on what m s going on In the other one.

Meanwhile, the Germans were flooding America with their own news

stories mid other means of propaganda* The Nasi version of the Western

campaign, wSieg Ira featen,11 was shown In New York theaters.1® Another

NassI film, “Blitzkrieg im Westen,” was shown to two thousand Harvard stu­

dents, but, this time, “as a kind of mass-psychology test organized by

the anti-Pascist Harvard Student Liberal Union.‘*14 German newsreels were

on the average more successful than Allied newsreels which had bored the

American audience with “six months of ruins and wrecks.“IB The American

public, as a whole, were tired of war showings.

The best German propaganda was that which came directly from

Vichy or Paris, sometimes signed by the name of an American correspondent.

Even in that case, however, this propaganda was very easy to detect. The

Baltimore Sun again remarked, “When it has not been lying it has been

ludicrous. Even the pigeons of the Tuileries were being tamed by Teutonic

kindness, according to one notorious dispatch.”^® Alex Small cabled to

^Public Opinion Quarterly, June, 1941.

1%he Nation, July 5, 1941.

14Ibld.

^®John MacDonald in Fab11c Opinion Quarterly. September, 1940.

10Baltlmore Sun. July 7, 1940.

 144

the Chicago Tribune many articles on life in Paris during the first

months of the occupation* One of them, for instance, was published under

the title “Basis let Paris girls know that rouge is taboo* Results

plain feminine beauty returning*w

It is common occurrence on Paris cafe terraces today to see a

German soldier drinking a glass of beer with a pretty girl, scruti­
nizing her hands disapprovingly, and expostulating with her about her
scarlet fingernails or even obligingly producing a pocket knife to
scrape off the offending polish,*?

The innocuousness of such “news items*1 was only apparent* They were in­

tended to show the Germans In the best possible light* They were also

useful as a proof that the integration of the French into the Nazi order

would be an easy task* In that respect th© goal of German propaganda

coincided with that of the American isolationists, who wanted to prove

that America should stop worrying about Europe* Alex Small took the

writings of the Paris press at face value* According to him, “One of the

serious aspects of the situation is the rising feeling in all classes of

the population against the Jews.’*!® Newsweek published a German photo­

graph of Nasi and French officers, “friendly foes,” together visiting

the Maglnot line*3-9

III

Th© Nazi victory in th© West had been the signal for an all-

out offensive of the forces which, consciously or not, fought on the Nazi

side* Ann© Lindbergh in her book, The Wave of th® Future* included

^Chicago Tribune, July 16, 1940,

3-6Ibid.. July 13, 1940.

^•%OTBireak. July 22, 1940.

 145

England, France and th© United States among the “forces of the past.“20

The forces of the future were Nazism, Fascism and Communism. In spite

of th© German-Soviet pact Germany continued to offer protection against

communism a® an attractive feature of the Nazi program* Vichy was an im­

portant asset in the German game* Being devoid of th© dynamic and appar­

ently revolutionary side of Nazism Vichy appealed to all those whose per­

sonal interest or intellectual timidity had mobilized them in defense of

the existing order*21 To many people it was apparent that property, re­

ligion, nationalism and social hierarchy were not endangered but protected

by the German army, which looked with favor on the new regimes of Spain

and France and on older Fascist strongholds like Italy and Portugal, It

was obvious that a war against Germany might provoke social revolution

all over Europe and reinforce American radicals* These circles hoped

that America could reach an agreement with Baal Germany* Vichy might be-

come a bridge between Hast Germany and Anerlea.22 Newspaper reports

seemed to show that the Petain government had the support of the highest

religious authorities* Th© Chicago Tribune* for example, reported that

the Vatican was believed “turning about to favor totalitarian regimes*

because the Osservator© Romano had praised “the good Marshal *“23 Even

after the Nazi invasion of Russia and th© passage of th© lend-leas© bill,

Ambassador Weddell, on his return from Spain, voiced the Franco point of

^Anne Lindbergh, The Wav© of the Future* p* 21,

2%his Is a personal opinion of the writer.

22lioot, Secret History of the War* I, 450-454; P, M., April 16,

1942,

2®Chicago Tribune, July 19, 1940.

 146

view and declared that “the Spaniards*^ regarded the war as a large scale

projection of their civil conflict— 1a war between the forces of

communi&m and the civilizing forces of opposition*'"25

As a general rule, American observers favorable to the Retain

regime were representative of political and intellectual trends or of so­

cial consciousness which were also characteristic of the French supporters

of Retain, Some newspapers and magazines accepted articles favorable to

Vichy and criticized those who denounced the “new o r d e r , “26 a h those

who had interpreted the French defeat as a consequence of a policy of so­

cial reforms were inclined to view the efforts of th© Vichy government

with sympathy. It was difficult for Westbrook Pegler to condemn a govern­

ment which suppressed free trade-unionism. It was difficult for certain

American Catholics to attack people who had annulled the “lois scelerates"

and appropriated money for Catholic schools. Newsweek admitted that there

could be two opinions on th© new government* “According to th© prejudices

of the outsider, the Petals government in France can be criticized as

weak and blind,27 or on the other hand compared with the regime of the

great Adolph© Thiers who resurrected France after 1871.” Newsweek found

some good reasons to hold the second opinion* “It, at least, chose not

to join th© sad array of Polish, Czech, Dutch and other governments in

exile— some of th® reforms it accents— such as youth training and

24IUlios mine*

2%h® Nation, March 7, 1942, p. 271.

2®Felix Morley, WU, S. Responsibilities to France," Philadelphia

Evening Bulletin, October 25, 1940.

2?Italics mine* These two epithets certainly did not sum up

American criticism of Retain and his regime*
 147

suppression of political chaos strike at serious weakness in the past.”**®

Time also defended the Vichy government* '’Th© much abused Fetaln govern­

ment, not popular in lower Hew York, has been trying to remedy abuses

Frank Norris, who went to Vichy to take pictures of th© Marshal for life,

sent dispatches which helped to spread the belief that the Fascist decrees

were only a facade intended to fool Germany. He described sympathetically

the paternal rule of the good old Marshal*

If this is Fascism, a lot of Germans and Italians would like to

have so gentle a brand.
On© looks long and hard in Vichy or in m y other part of Unoccu­
pied Franc© for evidence of iron totalitarian control. It is true
that Free France no longer operates under a constitution providing
for representative government* It is true that th© present govern­
ment is composed of soldiers and of men who under th® Republic were
extreme Rightists* But it would also appear to be true that on that
terrible last Sunday night in June at Bordeaux, when the Army had
broken on the Somme, th© Rightists and th© Generals were about all
that was left of French authority. • . • Th© Socialist deputies seem
to have been as sick of French parliamentarism as their more con­
servative colleagues* * * * If this is Fascism it is nursery
Fascism#2®

Th© publication of anti-Jewish decrees by th© Petain government

was extremely shocking to most Americans but some observers attempted to

show that they were forced upon Vichy by Germany and that the moderate

elements in the Vichy government had opposed them. wTh©re is a story be­

hind the French anti-Jewish decrees issued last week,” wrote Newsweek on

October 28. "The laws and the statements Justifying them were drawn up

six weeks ago but hold up because of sharp disagreement in the Vichy

cabinet* Petain himself is said to have thought the decrees too hard."

ftQflewgweek, July 22, 1940.

2% 1 m , September SO, 1940.

September 25, 1940.

 148

Tima admitted that "Vichy commits th© pardonable sin of wishing to please

the conquerors so that the peace will be gentle* Therefore, some of the

sentences of Vichy have a guttural German harshness about them."SI

Prohibitionists also were pleased by some of Retain*s reforms#

'’The Frenchman,” asserted Newsweek* "was said to have become th© world1©

heaviest tippler, Imbibing an average of two and a half quarts of alco­

holic beverage a week # • « th® Retain regime therefor© decreed a modi­

fied prohibition#" "Th© aperitif, that time-killing breeder of alco­

holic insanity and impotence is outlawed," applauded life a little

later.83

in
A study of American opinion of Marshal Retain during th© four

years of German occupation would not give a faithful picture of American

opinion of the Vichy government as a whole, for the French generals of

the First lorld War were among th© Frenchmen whom Americans were most in­

clined to respect. Retain was th© last of these great French generals.

He commanded the respect of many American veterans who had fought in

France. In a way, h© was almost as much an American institution as a

French one. American liberals who attempted to destroy th© "Petain myth"

in America encountered th© same difficulties, ran into the same psycho­

logical barriers and had to move with th© same prudence as their french

counterparts. For many people, any attack against a personality like

Petain was bad taste and denoted a dangerously revolutionary state of

^Time, October 2Q, 1940.

^Newsweek, September 2, 1940#

S®Life, September 23, 1940.

 149

®ind. Dorothy Thompson, who had no sympathy for Retain, acknowledged

that fact* "Some gallantry in us shrinks from hitting a man when he is

down* Marshal Retain, hero of Verdun, has profited from that gallantry*

Friends of France— and who is not a friend of France— wanted to believe

the best*"84

The did age of Retain also played in his favor* It was practi­

cally impossible, especially during the first months of his leadership,

to find any reference to him without seeing his name preceded by the

epithets "old" or "aged." For admirers of Retain*s work, his eighty-five

years of age were almost a proof of his unselfish devotion to his country.

By the opponents of the Vichy regime, it was accepted as an excuse. Retain

was too old to be aware of th© situation and he was only the nominal mas­

ter of France. Even the liberal press was at first reluctant to attack

him personally. The New Republic suggested that "Marshal Retain, aged

eighty-four" would be only a “cardboard replica of Hindeniburg.“85 The

Nation envisaged the possibility that the “aged Retain perhaps was only

partly conscious of his role. . . . He has # . • been pushed forward as

cover for such Fascist tools as Pierre Laval, the real head of the
Cabinet. "36

Petain was one of the main assets of the Vichy government. Bis

name was used in France and abroad with a judicious sense of propaganda.

One of th© first Retainist notes was sounded by the Hew York Times* cor­

respondent in Vichy, G. H. Archambault* “Over all tliis pettiness towers

84n ©w York Rost * April 17, 1942*

8®The New Republic* July 15, 1940.

”2» Nation* June 29, 1940.

 150

Marshal Petain, still lucid, still above intrigue, still the personifi­

cation of that France which must continue to live. He has always kept

aloof from politics and still does."87 The belief in a Petain "aloof from

politics" was quickly dispelled, however, and there was no further mention

of it, even in Fetainist writings. David Barrah sent to the Chicago

Tribune details on the Marshal1s public and private life which were very

sympathetic to the chief of state.88 Qn th© ev© of Bastille Bay, 1940,

th© Chicago Tribune published a cartoon representing Petain standing at

attention in front of Foch’s and Jo£fr©*s graves* The heading read#

"They didn’t live to see their country die," and Petain added, "How

fortunate you were c o m r a d e s J ” 89

Observers who were favorable to Petain insisted on his popularity

with the French people. Ambassador Bullitt, when he came back from Vichy

at the end of July, 1940, confirmed the fact that "Marshal Retain is uni­

versally respected in France." As far as Petainfs policies were con­

cerned, all Bullitt said to the press m s that he m s "doing his best to

bring out order out of desperate disorder." When he was further ques­

tioned about th© Fascist tendencies of the new French state, he refused

to answer. Bullitt was probably convinced that whatever his answer might

have been it would have been harmful to the French government. A negative

answer would have been harmful to Franco-German relations. An affirmative

answer would have been harmful to Franco~American relations* H® repeated

that "Marshal Petain has a tremendous reputation and is thoroughly honest

s#7SUew York Times, June 21, 1940.

^Chicago Tribune. July 27, 1940*

59Ibid*. July 13, 1940.

 151

and straightforward. Retain is absolutely the boss. He is trying to do

his best in an extraordinarily difficult situation.

The dismissal of Laval corrected th® impression created by the

HitleivPetain interview at Montoir©. Petain was the watchful guardian

of national honor and had jailed a minister who wanted to betray the

country* Although Scholastic resented the fact that "he was the willing

and conscious instrument by which th© French Republic was destroyed,” it

felt sure that “Marshal Retain*s patriotism cannot be questioned, nor his

devotion to what he considers to be the best Interests of France. He has,

since the surrender, don© all that was humanly possible to preserve th®

last shred of his humiliated country’s dignity#"41 Even Th© Nation be­

lieved that Retain’s attitude was an Important factor of international

politics. "The problem of reconciling Nasi demands for an active instead

of a passive anti-British policy with Retain’a rigid ideas of the limits

imposed by national interest and honor remains to be solved.

Among th® American observers who were fortunate enough to travel

in unoccupied France, those whose French connections were limited to a

certain type of French middle-class or who spent a great deal of time in

circles close to Marshal Retain himself adopted the outlook and even the

style of their Petainist friends* Janet Planner, for instance, was very

much impressed by the popularity of th© Marshal.

To th© majority of Free French Zone French he seems not even a

man but a cult. * * # Though lots of disillusioned French regard him
merely as th© least of the evils which have com® with defeat, in the

^Irx Longer, Our Vichy Gamble* p. 76#

^Scholastic* January 13, 1941*

42The Nation* December 21, 1940,

 152

minds of millions he appears to have stirred something they vaguely

call a mystique, a word that represents such words as ’love,’ 'ven­
eration,1 ’faith,* ’patriotism,* and la belle France, all words which,
since the empty victory after th® lasTlorici War anti' in the subse­
quent decline of French humanism, the modem French generation has
abstained from pronouncing*43

Miss Planner reported, without checking on them, many of Vichy’s propa­

ganda mottoes* "Of the Germans, up to date, the Germans say, Das 1st

sift Man*“44 French supporters of Petain always complacently brought for­

ward supposed German— or American— admiration for the old Marshal* Miss

Flanner failed, however, in one of her efforts to show that Petain was

venerated by the French. According to her, many people in Vichy and else­

where "respectfully" called Petain le vieuau Howard L. Brooke also re­

corded that the expressions le vieux or le pauvre vieux were commonly used

to refer to Petain, but h© understood that all they could express was

pity or scorn. 45

The book published by Associated Press correspondent Roy Porter,

after his return from Vichy, contained a defense of the Marshal dedicated

to the Americans who despised him* Porter was aware of the fact that some

of his judgments would shock Americans but he intended to publish them

because they were based "on careful conclusions drawn from personal

4%ven th© French addicts of the word mystique had trouble defin­
ing it in their own language. It was significant, however, that Miss
Flanner*a proposed translations were closely related to the reassuring
but worn-out social and national myths which Petain intended to revive.
The reported "decline of French humanism" was also typical of the Vichy
mentality. It meant that French thought had taken a course which Miss
Planner’s friends resented or were incapable of understanding. Their
only recourse was to charge that French youth had lost faith in
everything and was "atrociously materialistic."

4^Yhe Hew Yorker. March 15, 1941.

4%rooks, Prisoners of Hope, p. 247.

 158
observations inside and outside the Marshal’s circle.”45 Many of Porter’s

statement© sounded exactly like th© Inscriptions on the photographs of

Petain which were ©bid or given away In every French shop during the first

two years of Vichy France. "Today he stands alone, as no other man in

France, devoting the last remaining energy of the closing period of his

life to the service of his country*11 According to Porter, "the French

themselves, gradually but with continuing certainty, are looking upon

Petain as the saviour on whose trembling hand® th© future of France now

rests."47 this gradual increase of popularity contrasted, however, with

the observation® of most observers who reported that Retain’a prestige

was at its peak during the summer 1940 and never ceased to decline.48

For some others the peak was reached with Laval’s dismissal on Decem­

ber IS, 1940.49 porter's judgment of Retain’® political opinions was

worthy of the French ministry of informations "He is neither for nor

against any foreign country or creed. He is a Frenchman who believes he

Is serving France."80

France on Berlin Time, by Thomas Kernan, like Uncensored France,

reflected the opinions of its author. In this ease th© writer was th©

representative in France of the American raagassin© Ve^ue and he was appar­

ently connected with many well-to-do Paris businessmen. Like them, h©

was well informed about the pillage of Franc© by the Germans and this

48porter, Uncensored France, p. 250.

47lbid.t pp. 250-253*

4%rooks, Prisoners of Hope, p. 245.

4%ex Bonware ever Station WQ3CR, August 11, 1942.

8®Port©r later became adqu&Inted with Laval and gave on this

instance another example of his Intellectual pliability.
 154

somewhat tempered his sympathy for Petain1s efforts* He was far from be­

ing as devoted a® Porter to the person of the Marshal and was inclined

to view with skepticism Vichy's "moral reforms.”

American official policy toward the Vichy government contributed

to maintain the prestige of the Marshal in America at least as much as

it did in France. The problem of Petain* s position had been presented by

many liberals as on© of political morality. The only way to evade this

problem was to maintain that Retain had good intentions and should be pro­

tected against his entourage* For many other people the problem was even

more simple. Th© very presence of Admiral Leahy In Vichy was a proof in

itself of the "decency” of Retain.

Many American officials never ceased to distinguish between Retain

and th© men around him. Typical of those having this attitude was

Secretary of War Henry L* Stirason.

The names and actions of the Frenchmen who were conspicuous at

Vichy were profoundly disappointing to Stimson. . . « Th© position
of Retain he viewed with more sympathy? whatever his errors of policy
and whatever his failings from simple senility, Petain, In Stimson*s
view, was an honest servant of France.5^*

The mayor of Now York, Fiorello L. La Guardia, also distinguished

between Laval and Retain,

A new term has been coined and will b© used in medicine. For
hereafter one who had a great past, one who had great courage, one
who loved his country and rendered great service to It, when he be­
comes old and feeble and looses his courage, and doesn’t know what
he Is doing,— this will be known a® Petainitis. And we sympathise
with that. He I® under duress.^

83-Henry L. Stimson and Me George Bundy, On Active Service in

Feace and War (New York, 1947), p. 542*

^Broadcast cm July is, 1940.

 155

The most Important statement in Petain*s behalf came from

Admiral Leahy who, after his return from France In June, 1942, gave a

press conference during which he declared that Retain was in favor of an

Allied victory and was “stoutly" resisting pressure. He declared that he

had "a high personal regard for P e t a i n . x h e Admiral’s personal pres­

tige, the competence of a man who had been close to Retain for more than

on© year and whose position as the ambassador to Franc© gave him all pos­

sible means of information mad© it difficult for American newspapers to

contradict this statement. Th© belief was widespread that Germany was

eager to get bases in the French Empire and such statements seemed to

ascribe to Retain*s attitude Hitler’s failure to reach that goal* At th©

time of Laval’s return to power, in April, 1942, Ann© O’Hare McCormick

wrote in the New York Times that, perhaps, it was time for Americans to

recognise that, up to that date, Retain had don© “a magnificent job of

stalling" the German army and the German political machine*54

Admiral Leahy’s private utterances on Marshal Retain had a some­

what different tone from his public statements. After his arrival in

Vichy, he had written to President Roosevelt his first impressions of

Vichy, He found Petain “remarkably capable for a man of his age," but he

admitted frankly that “the burden of work which he has assumed is beyond

his physical capacity,“85 After the dismissal of Weygand in

8% © w York Times, June 10, 1942.

84ibid., April 15, 1942.

85ju Longer, Our Vichy Gamble, pp. 124-125. Letter to the

President on November^’,"I'§41.
 1S6

November, 1941, Leahy had written to Hoosevelt about Petain *s “abject

surrender." He had described his government as one "headed by a feeble

frightened old man, surrounded by self-seeking conspirators." He thought

that Petain would never resist German pressure if applied strongly enough

and gave up hope of giving "some semblance of backbone to a jellyfish."58

Admiral Leahy apparently must have regained some confidence in the use­

fulness of his mission, since he remained in Vichyj but it is interesting

to note that, at least in some of his private comments, he agreed with

what liberal observers had always proclaimed. The latter, although they

were somewhat puzzled by the apparent inability of Germany to gain any

important advantage beyond the terms of the armistice, were nevertheless

convinced that no hope should be staked on Petain. "Ho matter how impos­

ing his powers appear he Is and he will remain a hireling of hirelings,"

declared The Nation a week after the Vichy coup d ’etat in 1940.57

The political ideas of Retain and the manner in which he intended

to apply them were th© main reason for American hostility to Retain. All

those in America who were capable of recognising th© essence of Fascism,

and among them there were naturally many of th© future supporters of the

State Department ’s French policy, recognised some of its spirit in Retain.

During the last days of the French parliament, the New York Times clearly

analyzed in its editorials the political significance of P&tain’s

constitutional plans.

Marshal Retain *s discourse to the commission that is to compos© a

new constitution for the now Franc© which he wishes to establish is
curious in its conceptions and Its language. . . •

8% n Longer, Our Vichy Parable, p. 194* Leahy to the President

on November 22, 1941.

57The Mafrlon. July go, 1940.

 157

To th© Marshal the ’hierarchical society implies th© exercise of

responsibility on ©very level.’ This, however, is not th© responsi­
bility of every person on every level, for he rejects equality and
universal suffrage. He wishes to return to suffrage by status. The
new Franc© is to consist of layers of th© elite in groups, family,
commune, trade, profession, and so on. This policy of stratification
is a return to the Middle Ages, 58

On® of Petain*s worst mistakes, as far as the handling of his

foreign propaganda was concerned, was an article which he published in

the Revue des deux sondes in which he tried to show that the authoritarian

philosophy on which Fascist Italy and Maai Germany were founded was a

French invention.®9 Living Age advised th© Marshal not to

wonder that much of th® world regards him as more than mildly de­
luded. . . . Th© Fascist dominated areas of the world, however,
have reached a point of such addled thinking that virtually anything
is possible? nothing nowadays in the thought of millions can be too
ridiculous or too preposterous. Doubtless the astronomical fact is
that th© moon is made of limburger.®9

Retain’e reactionary ideas became more obvious with the first

“reforms" of th© Vichy government. These ideas were exposed for the

first time to an American journalist when Retain, on December 17, gave

to Jay Allen of the North American Newspaper Alliance his first interview

ever granted to a foreign correspondent. Th© Marshal obviously sought to

pacify those Americans who regretted “liberte, e^wtllte, fraternite." He

claimed that his "new order" was different from th® German and Italian

m U m York Times, July 10, 1940.

5%tevue des deux rnondes, November I, 1940, pp. 109-112.

f l y i n g Ago, November, 1940. Everything was possible, indeed,

even in American minds. In France on Berlin Time, p. 136, Thomas Kernan
mentioned Petain’s article as evidence T&iaST Vichy was willing to follow
in th© German footsteps and was “introducing organized athletics to th©
French consciousness .**
 158

"revolutions,** and declared that France wanted "to restore quality in

labor, fecundity is fatally life and the more compelling pervasive sense

of La Patrie."

’There,* the Marshal cried, ’you have a true revolution. Believe me,
this revolution has need of liberty, but to a ciegro© it excludes in­
dividualism* This revolution calls for equality, but for ©quality
of sacrifice* It rejects demagogy* This revolution calls on the
spirit of fraternity, but this spirit of fraternity it will organize
to save the said revolution from temptations to deviate and from
falling into a caricature of itself.

But such attempts as this had very little influence on American opinion*

Some American observers who went to France during the Petain regime did

not limit to the salons of Vichy and the military and professional cir­

cles close to the government their investigations of the effect of Vichy

rule. Howard Brooks, who worked in France for the Quakers and who visited

Vichy's concentration camps, presented in his book, Prisoners of Hope.

conclusions which were very different from those reached by Porter In On-

censored France. Brooks thought that "on© of the illusions about Petain

which would not bear close examination was that he was an old man, with­

out personal ambition, who had sacrificed his personal comfort to give

France th© leadership she needed.”®^ According to him, Retain always be­

haved like a "ftthror" for whom obedience was th© first virtue* Petain

was the man who had killed democracy in France and M s popularity— which

was decreasing very fast— was duo to th® desperate situation of Franc©

after the armistice* Petain was already hated by the working class and

it cannot belong before all Franc© will understand that never for a
moment did Petain try to oppose Hitler, that otherwise h© would not

curt Riess, ed., They Were There, p. 219.

^Brooks, Prisoners of Hope, pp. 240-247.

 159

be in power today* It was an extraordinary clever stroke on the part

of Hitler that h© did not get rid of th© Marshal. He understood
Retain*a popularity and resolved to make use of it. He preferred to
rule through the pauvre vieux, allowing the French nation to harbor
illusions that were never justified and that cost the battle for
freedom many precious months. He permitted Hitler to use him as a
screen. By being so enormously useful to Hitler, Petain has harmed
the rest of humanity* In the language of the courts, he is an
accessory after the fact*®®

In order to fight th® American respect for Petain and the reluc­

tance of most people to admit that he was just m much and maybe more

responsible for th© Vichy policies than any other member of his govern­

ment, the liberal press started a campaign which resembled th© tactics

used by the British Broadcasting Corporation. Some British propaganda

was even used directly by American newspapers. P. M. published a cartoon

of Retain wearing the German Iron Cross. The portrait was torn to pieces •

The caption read# “The British radio reported yesterday; Marshal Petain

has received by mail hundreds of envelopes, everyone of which contained

his picture which had been torn in two.M®d This campaign reached a climax

with th© return of Laval to power* P. I* warned its readers not to "be

fooled by Petain subtle face-saving act. • » • He sought to mislead the

world into believing that he, not Laval, was still Vichy's head man, and

that Laval would operate under his authority. Th© truth Is that both

Laval and Petain are under Hitler's a u t h o r i t y . T h e prestige of Petain

was the most dangerous obstacle in th© way of those who thought that all

Frenchmen fighting on the Allied side should be helped unconditionally*

Th© attacks against Petain reached a high degree of bitterness•

®%rooks, Prisoners of Hope, p. 247.

64P. M., April 23, 1942.

65Ibld.t April 20, 1942.

 160

Johannes Steal, for instance, maintained: "One can almost respect Laval

more than Retain. Laval has always been pro-German. ♦ * . Petain is a

hypocrite. Be is a modern fartuffe."®® The New York Post carried a car­

toon showing Petain leaning on a can© and on Pierre Laval* Petain said:

“When he speaks, he speaks for ®e.H Hitler was laughing In the background

and saying: “When either of these rats speak, they speak for me."®7

Basing their argument on Glemenceau1a judgmentsth© liberals

explained that Petain had always been a "defeatist.“ He was compared to

Marshal Bazaine, who surrendered to th© Germans without a fight in 1370.

“He has repudiated his own work," wrote Dorothy Thompson, “if Verdun

really was his own work. Some historians have doubted it. They say he

wanted to give up there, and he was forced to stand against his will,“70

The New Republic decided that he was “still th© same Petain who wanted

to give up to th© Germans in th© last war.“71

On© weak point in the indictment of Retain was his apparently

successful resistance to permanent and vigorous German pressure. It was,

indeed, strange that this “venerable defeatist"7^ who, supposedly for

fear of German reprisals, had made a premier out of a man he wanted to

send to Jail could have refused the Nazis the use of Dakar for two long

®%ew York Post , July 19, 1942.

67Ibid., June 15, 1942.

Raymond Poincare, A.u Service de la Franc© (Paris, 1926-55),

IX, 567, 420? X, passim.

"Philip Guedalla, The Two Marshals (New York, 1945).

7°n ©w York Post, April 17, 1942.

7*The New Republic, November 23, 1942.

^Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins. p. 146.

 161

years. The liberals, like many other Americans, honestly believed that

Hitler wanted Dakar almost as much as he wanted Stalingrad. They had to

acknowledge the fact that “Marshal Petain did not give Hitler all the

help he wanted from France, but he gave a good deal of help, and above

all he saved Hitler th© trouble, the expense and th© moral consequences

of having to deal with France as he deals with Poland or Norway. ”75 in

Men behind the War, a book published in 1942, Johannes Steel ironically

remarked that “Retain has gone as far in the direction of collaboration

as it was safe for a great ’patriot* to go."7*

With Laval’s return to power, however, Petain’s prestige was ir­

remediably compromised in the minds of most Americans. Even as moderate

a newspaper as the Mew York Times commented bitterly on Retain’s attitude.

Yesterday, on the second, anniversary of his surrender to Hitler,

Retain spoke to th© French people. It was a strange little speech,
filled with abject confessions of loss of confidence in his own re­
gime and of the complete failure of the armistice he sought to bring
real peace to France? . . . he is, as h© has always been, the pris­
oner of his own tragically wrong guess that Britain could not hold
out against the Nazi war machine once France surrendered.75

But, a© it is usual with that kind of irrational feelings, the

attacks against the French Marshal created sentiment in his favor among

a few people. To them Retain was a martyr, reviled not only by the Ger­

mans and by his own fellow countrymen but also by uninformed public opin­

ion in the rest of the world. This feeling was exploited for political

7%alt©r Lippman in the New York Herald Tribune, April 16, 1942.

74Johannes Steel, Men behind the War (New York, 1942), p. 193.

7% © w York Times, June 19, 1942.

 162

purposes.?^ Th© silence which spread over his name after th© occupation

of North Africa was almost as harmful to his reputation as the attacks

of the preceding period.

VI

Americans were extremely interested In knowing how the French

people viewed their own situation during these terrible times. Immedi­

ately after the armistice the feeling was widespread that France readily

accepted German occupation. This belief arose from several circumstances.

Th© swiftness of the French collapse was often interpreted a® the result

of a French unwillingness to fight. It was thus assumed that the French

had accepted th© possibility of German occupation even before th© German

offensive. Then, French resentment against the British was often inter­

preted as pro-German feeling. Reports fro® British observers contributed

to that impression.7? Furthermore, German propaganda in the United States

urns designed to show that French people and German troops were on the

best of terms. Finally, th© absence of resistance against th© new regime

or the German army during th© first months after the armistice was par­

ticularly disturbing to observers and tended to confirm th© claim of

Retain that the armistice and Vichy were the results of a deep

anti-democratic conviction on the part of th© French people as a whole.

This supposed absence of nationalist spirit was considered ob­

jectionable even by those who had previously felt that French nationalism

?%h© "American Committee to Free Retain" published an adver­

tisement urging de Gaull© to free Petain in th® Now fork Daily News.
August 27, 1945. So® also Charles Sweeny, Moment of Truth (New lork,
1945), pp. 1S7-1S8.

??See Harry J, Greenwall, 5llitch-Hunt at Rio®," and "Franc© in a

Coma,'1 Th® Nation, September 21, 1940.
 165

was one of the main obstacles to real peace in Europe.79 As in France

at the same time, and in spit© of the careful distinction between wNa»iw

and “German*1 which was maintained by some writers, patriotism, democratic

philosophy, and hatred of the German people became temporarily united in

the minds of many people. This was especially noticeable after America

entered the war* Anti-German feeling was a French national duty just as

anti-Japanese feeling was a national duty for Americans.

American disappointment in French opinion immediately after the

defeat was also part of the American nationalist reaction. Even for the

isolationists, the French surrender was a desertion of the American cause.

Isolationist newspapers, however, complacently insisted on French apathy.

According to the Chicago Tribune, the French were disgusted with British

dishonesty, Roosevelt’s “false promises,** and their own Leftist leaders.

The Tribune hinted that such circumstances were liable, in case of war,

to provoke a similar reaction In any normal p e o p l e , F o r some, the

French were the smart people who refused to follow British orders.60 For

others, it was a proof of good sportmanehip, with a touch of specific

French frivolity.9*-

The problem of American security and the battle of Britain helped

to give a more serious tone to most American comments on the French. Lib­

eral newspapers did not know whether to accept the unfavorable reports

7% h e Row Republic, September Z, 1940,

^Chicago Tribune, June, July, 1940.

®®H©llson, The Tragedy of Europe, X, 653 (entry for October 23,

1940).

®*Gertrude Stein, “The dinner Loses,” The Atlantic Monthly.

October, 1940.
 164

from France and therefore to condemn the French, or to classify every re­

port coming from Franc® as German propaganda. On July 13 The Nation chose

the second solution and affirmed that "Fascist France is not France."

Two months later, however, the same journal reported} "The demoralization

of France goes a p a c e * Life saw in the Vichy coup d’etat a genuine

French reaction* "It appeared that the French now hold very lightly the

democracy for which they claimed to be fighting.

Many Americans thought, like Petain, that the French needed to

be reminded that they had been defeated.

Life must go on, we suppose, even in defeated France, but it has

been going on a little too glibly in Kathleen Canneil1s dispatches
from Paris to the New Tork Times. . . . On June 29, she revealed
that the French dressmakers plan to return to Paris from their exile
in Biarrits and present their August collection as usual. . . • She
. . . noted rather proudly that the Paris couture will have set a
record not to have missed a single season Paris fashion opening be­
cause of this war. W© are curious to see what a well-oppressed
people will wear.^4

This reported indifference of the French to the war and its consequences

was considered by some as complicity with Vichy and Nasi Germany.

Opponents of the Vichy regime absolved or condemned the French

people according to the manner in which they themselves had solved the

problem of popular responsibility for an autocratic government. For some,

Petain1s popularity with the middle-class was a proof that Franc® had

surrendered body and soul to Naslam. Stephen S. Wise accepted this

principle of collective responsibility in the Jewish magazine, Opinion*

"The Nation, September 28, 1940.

88Ufe, July 15, 1940.

®^The Nation, July 13, 1940.

 165

Kothlog could be harder for one who loves France and has been
twice honored by its government than to speak critically of France,
long and rightfully said to have been the fatherland of every
civilised inan. * * *
The tragedy of France betrayed has moved continuously forward
until it is about to be revealed as France betraying, • » * the
height or depth of the tragedy being the full and explicit assent
of France to the faith and spirit of Naeisia.®®

In The Christian Century Charles A* Micaud refused to accept the princi­

ple of national responsibility but accepted that of class responsibility.

It seems clear that for the French bourgeois his class interests
outweigh the interests of the nation# Hence it would be unrealistic
for us to expect the present French government, and the bourgeoisie
which backs it, to give us any help In freeing them from Has! Ger­
many for the purpose of re-establishing the democratic system which
they are only too glad to have replaced by the fnew order. *86

There was an attempt on the part of extremely conservative news­

papers to show that the working class was at least as favorable as any

other to the new regime. The Chicago Tribune reported that the workers

were “interested.**®? The adhesion of a few ex-labor leaders to Vichy was

widely publicised and gave the impression that the working class wanted

to collaborate. This impression was reflected in the Christian Science

Monitor two years later. “Discontented European workers who believed

Hitler's promises that establishment of his 'new order1 would represent

merely a victory over their capitalist overlords now know better,”®®

But at the end of 1940 America became reassured regarding the

8®Qplnlon, June, 1941.

8®The Christian Century, April 50, 1941.

^Chicago Tribune. July 18, 1940#

^Christian Science Monitor, May 19, 1942.

 166

condition of French opinion# In January, 1941, for Instance, the Lansing

(Michigan) State Journal reported! “The Hassle were early to recognize

that the first flush of pro-Germanism after the armistice had faded#**®®

In Collier's Therese Bonney recorded that "those who wore quit© 'pro'

during the first months swear today that they will never live under a

Nazi regime. This is why it seems very doubtful that the collaboration

pill can ever be sugared enough to make the average Frenchman swallow

it,n®0 Many American observers began to recall the sad days of 1940 with

a sigh of relief which meant "fortunately it's over#" Radio commentator

Rex Benware admitted: "If, after they had conquered France, the Germans

had proved magnanimous about food, they might have succeeded in winning

the French people's more or less willing collaboration with Germany. But

the Kazia were the reverse #"92* Albert Guerard expressed the same

opinion in Common Sense. "We have good evidence," he wrote, "that for a

few weeks after the stunning blow, Hitler could have won many Frenchmen

to his new order*

VII

After a period of hesitation and confusion during which many

well-established American ideas about Franc© were threatened with ruin,

most Americans eventually agreed that "the voic© of ViGby Is certainly

not the voice of Franc©."®® In The Hew Europe Bernard Newman charged:

8%ansing (Michigan) State Journal. January IS, 1941.

^Collier's, December 6, 1941.

% Q X R , August 11, 1942.

^Common Sense. October, 1942.

®®Paul Birdsall, Versailles Twenty Tears After (Hew York, 1941),

p. 505.
 167

"The present Fascist regime in Franc© Is of course alien to all French

traditions and i d e a s * ” ®4 According to William H* Chamberlin in The

Atlantic Monthly, "It is almost certain that the Vichy regime will go

down with the Nasis*"®® Bernard Newman was more categorical. "Nothing

is more certain than that it will disappear with the collapse of Ger­

many*"®® Summing up the influence of Vichy after its downfall, Gordon

Wright concluded in The Reshaping of French Democracy:

Of all the regimes under which France has lived during the past two
centuries, Vichy proved to be the most ephemeral, the least capable
of putting down roots in the country. . • . Other French regimes of
equally brief duration had left behind them a permanent heritage, a
lasting mark on French political thinking. Vichy might conceivably
have done the same, If Retain and his closest advisers had been men
of a different sort*®?

By 1942 all shades of American opinion were finally convinced

that the Vichy government blindly followed German orders, at least as far

as domestic policies were concerned. As early as June 51, 1940, the

Chicago Tribune had published a cartoon showing Retain as figurehead of

a ship of which Hitler was the captain with a crew of Nasi pirates* Many

observers, however, maintained that there was a conflict between the be­

lief of the Vichy leaders in a German victory and their French national­

ism. Except for Laval, who was universally despised in America, the men

of Vichy were almost as much an object of pity as an object of scorn.

There were distinctions between the different Quisling regimes.

®%ernard Newman, The New Europe (New York, 1945), p. 485.

®% h a Atlantic Monthly, June 1942, p. 672.

®%ewman, The Hew Europe, p. 485.

®?Gordon fright, The Reshaping of French Democracy (New York,

1948), p. 27.
Raphael Lemkin, for instance, in his book, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe,

stated that the laws of occupation "were promulgated not only by Axis

partners themselves but also by puppet regimes and puppet states which

were established in Norway, Serbia, Croatia, Slovakia, the Protectorate

of Bohemia and Moravia, and to a certain extent®® in Vichy France."®®

Scholastic explained one day why it was only fair to make a distinction

other puppet governments and Vichy France. "The most important of these

conquered countries is France. . . . Its government does pretty much as

Hitler tells it to. But at the same time it's not aiding the Germans in

their war against England. "2-00

This equivocal character of the Vichy regime, which allowed its

leaders to maintain until the end of the war that they were "patriots,"

increased the resentment of many American liberals* The latter were w i n ­

ing to concede that there was a struggle in these men between their sub­

mission to Germany and their nationalist feeling* But they did not see

why this nationalism should absolve them* The outcome of this struggle

was foregone* The scales were weighted by their authoritarian ideas and

their desire to stay in power in favor of a continued collaboration with

Germany* Liberals did not see anything noble in a conflict between a

narrow nationalism on on© side against selfish interests and reactionary

idea® on the other side* They did not accept a nationalist conception of

World War II. Retain had decreed that one did not leave his country even

in order to save it. To the liberals such a statement appeared not only

"italics mine,

"Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe (Washington,

1944), P* IX.

^^Scholastic, November 4, 1940,

 169

criminal but ridiculous* The Vichy men were helping the Nazis; they were

enemies* To Frederick Sehuman "the regime seemed less a government, or

even an executive committee of the Axis, than a silent crowd of monstrous

spiders feeding over the body of a France that was dead J"101 probably

some Americans felt with him that “the miserable efforts of the French

Munichmen to buy favors from the conquerors are scarcely worth

recounting,"102

Petain* s "national revolution” was not taken seriously in America*

Even the people who felt some sympathy for the principles of the Vichy

government did not try to defend its doings very long* Many observers

played with the Idea that the French were satisfied with their government

in order to frustrate the efforts of the American interventionists and to

show that there was nothing to "liberate#" The real interest of these

isolationists was not in the French situation but in the American domestic

scene. Even the Petain sympathizers had to admit that nothing in the

French situation could Justify any confidence in the French government #3X)S

Some observers maintained that some of his Ideas were good but could not

be enforced because of the continued presence of the Germans.104 For most

Americans, however, Petain* s efforts to "turn back the clock to the Ancien

Reg3Lme"2X)5 would have been only ridiculous if France's loss of liberty

had not been tragic. Even the easily influenced Janet Planner tried to
_ i-- t 1 t — 1----------------------------------------- — r- r~n—“ i------------------------ 111 ■ ■■■ ■■.■...... ..... ..

^^Schuman, Night Over Europe, p. 522.

IQ2lbid., p. 521*

105Janet Planner in The New Yorker, March 15, 1941.

Importer, Uneeasored France, pp. 247-265.

1Q5Newsweek. July 22, 1940*

 170

visualize the effect which certain of Plain's reforms would have had in

America* Commenting upon Retain's desire to revert to the old provinces

as administrative unite,l°® she wrote? “It's as if Americans were going

to find themselves ordering their automobiles from Detroit, Northwest

Territory, or making reservation® for a week-end in New Orleans, Louisiana

Purchase."307 “Revolutions can also be in reverse «»10® exclaimed Pro­

fessor John G. Heinberg of the University of Missouri. P^tsin’s youth

movements were judged in the same light by Howard L. Brooks in Prisoners

of Hope.

I do not wish to be misunderstood. I am not against hikes and pic­

nics and happy songs; but I would like to see them come from a posi­
tive emotion. They must be the expression of something real, of a
justifiable joy in life. Mo joy in Franc© can be justified in these
times. What I heard from the throats of those young people was the
vehement expression of their will to escape reality. It was an at­
tempt to close their eyes, to shut themselves off, irresponsibly
from the world.2*09

From the United States, the condition of a France partly occupied

by the Germans and partly subjected to the “Vichy cure" appeared pathetic.

In spit© of some favorable reports at first,2*2*0 by the end of th© year

1940 enough eye-witness accounts of the conditions of life in France had

been published to give a fair idea of the future potentialities of the

Vichy regime. Burning up correspondents’ dispatchesJ!Living Age

concluded that

lOSfhis reform was never carried out.

I°?The New Yorker, March 15, 1941.

I°%Iarold Kink and Taylor Cole, eds., Government in Wartime

Europe and Japan (Mew York, 1942), p. 202.

I°%rook8, Prisoners of Hope, p. 299.

^^Bee pjp. i
 171

Th© record of totalitarian accomplishment in France is negative

throughout* First of all the Vichy government is still lacking pos­
session of Paris, which is far more than in a symbolical sense the
heart, brain and bowels of France* Marshal Petain and his contempti­
ble right hand, Pierre Laval, issue almost daily bulletins to the ef­
fect that they are ’regenerating France.’ Meanwhile they are unable
to ’regenerate* enough steam-power in the unoccupied zone to run half
enough trains to meet the demand# • • * ’The French workers who have
no work, the small business people who have no trade * * • the mil­
lions of prisoners who never got a chance to fight, these wretched
people who under the joint Laval-German regime are getting no news,
no food, no encouragement, and no real leadership S’
But all these omissions are unimportant# In an authoritarian
state, presumably# you can suffer anything in exchange for the boons
of regeneration,!*!

Americans did not need to be told what kind of a life the French

were living in such circumstances, although with "pathetic, obstinate de­

votion, the last die-hard American expatriates to leave Paris have de­

clared on their arrival in the United States that in Paris a normal life

is still the norm* **332 Most observers, however, reported like journalist

Lars Moors that in Paris "the atmosphere was depressing#"!!5 The first

reports about gay life in defeated France were forgotten* The Parisians

had too much trouble with the German occupation, the food and heating

problems to think of anything else# The little details of Parisian life

were eagerly sought for in America*!!^ Old friends of Paris wanted to

know what the city looked like when it was covered with German posters

and filled with German girls "striving so earnestly to be chic and

!!!jiying Age, November, 1940#

!fflfhe Hew lorker, March 15, 1941*

!!®Lars Moers, Under the Iron Hoel (how fork, 1941), p» 510*

!!%©©, for instance, Ida Treat, "The Billboard on the Rue de

Longchamp" in The Hew lorker, June 21, 1941$ "Anonymous Letter from
Paris" in The Nation* January 10, 1942*
 in

elegant in hastily bought Parisian dresses.'*1^ America considered it­

self actually very well Informed about these thing®. A H the rumors cir­

culated in a Paris, which knew more about the Allied or the German war

effort than about what happened twenty miles from the capital, were re­

ported in America* "Down comes the Eiffel Towor,’^** announced Americans

several times during the war. This was on© of those Paris rumors which

never came true*

Life in other French cities was not happier than in Paris* Janet

Planner reported that Marseilles was the only French city which m s really

"flourishing."l^7 Howard Brooks described it in Prisoners of Hope*

The quiet of the grave* * • • At first glance you d±dn*t under­

stand* Ton had to look twice. Everything seemed almost normal. The
cafes cm the Cancbiere M were crowded, every table taken* As you
would expect in a large Mediterranean port, you heard a dossen differ­
ent languages* But you seldom heard laughter, seldom a loud word*
Sometimes it seemed to me that th© people had forgotten how to talk.
They simply sat there and drank idiatever they could get. They sat
there like the refugees sat in our waiting-room.
Then there was ray hotel* X was staying at the Terminus, near the
gar© Saint-Gharles* Everything appeared to be quite normal there. *
« • But th© trouble was that you could not get much to eat in the
elegant restaurant* And in the up-to-date bathrooms there was hot
water only on Saturday® and Sundays, The shops were full of fine
things* But when you entered a department store, you rarely saw a
customer* Everything was rationed and nobody In Marseilles could
legally get enough tickets even for the necessary clothing. The news­
stands were piled high with newspapers and magazines. But when you
looked closely, you saw that all of them were filled with propaganda,
and that half of th© magazines ware completely German.
Naturally X had noticed at one© th© lack of taxis and private
automobiles on the streets* » - •
Le Vieux-Fort, formerly full of life, lay deserted* It was m

^ % e m a r d Ragner, "Paris under the Germans," The American

Mercury* February, 1941, p. 136*

^Marquis Child in The Atlantic Monthly, February, 1042*

^ T h e New Yorker, March 16 and June 7, 1941*

 ITS

If on© came into a home where death had ©truck and members of the
family ware trying desperately to live a normal life but not
succeeding#!!^

What future had Germany reserved for Franc© in her European

order? This was th© question most frequently asked by Americans of

observers coming back from France*

French emigres and American expatriates newly arrived here seem

confused, perhaps fortunately, in their notion of what Hitler plans,
if not defeated, to do ultimately to and with France* So far Franc©
is receiving what in conquered Europe may be called Grade A
treatment! Poland is an example of Grade Z*!!®

In spite of the fact that Franc© was receiving Grade A treatment

— and this was an argument in favor of Petain, although impartial ob­

servers reported that Belgium, Holland and Denmark also shared athis

honor"— it was obvious that it was being emptied of its wealth by the

Germans* Expert Nasi businessmen, accompanied by propaganda specialists,

rushed to France immediately after the armistice#

As if conducting a gigantic Freudian advertising campaign aimed

to wipe from French memory the Germans * 1914-18 Schrecklichkelt slo­
gan, today in Paris th© Masts pathologically, patiently’plug th© idea
of collaboration! m m in the country they are equally patiently
destroying# !*& ~

The first German master trick had been the separation of th© two

Frances, the occupied Franc© and th© "free" Franc®, by th© rigid demarca­

tion line "that runs like a jagged wound across th© face of France* It

^^rooks, Prisoners of Hope, p* 37*

!!^Janet Planner in The Mew Yorker* June 7, 1941#

w o ibid.
 174

may look like a juridical fiction but no frontier is tougher to cross,"121

Waverley Hoot remarked that it had become "almost commonplace to point

out the diabolical cleverness of the Germans in separating France into

two aones, and setting one against the other* Thus the disunity of Franc©

was perpetuated and multiplied*"122 Most people also remarked, with

Waverley Hoot, that, regardless of the strategic situation, th© Germans

had acted cleverly when they "disdained to take over the unoccupied son©,

always a picturesque losing proposition, being satisfied with th© regions

which contained industries, resources and strategic positions*"123 The

distinction between the two m n m mattered a great deal to the French but

very little to th© German© who could exercise their profitable activities

in both* "The French are rated as highly money-minded, but they seem to

have met their match," announced Kewsweek^ in January, 1941* American

observers noted that Germany charged France much more than she needed for

the maintenance of the occupation army. Before the total occupation of

France, she utilized, according to Waverley Hoot, only about 100,000,000

francs out of th© daily 400,000,000 she got from France for occupation

expenses «

That left her credits of 500,000,000 francs daily* She utilized them
to buy up French agricultural and industrial products, thus plunder­
ing France of her own resources at her own expenses ? to pay for mate­
rials and labor for the fortification of France, making Franc© pay
the bill for a rampart designed to prevent her future liber&tion|

^ ^ Time, November 11, 1940*

!^%oot, The Secret History of th© War, I, 580.

u sIbld.

•^ K e w w e e k . January 20, 1941.

 17S

and to buy up the stock of important French corporations In order

to obtain control of French business*125

Commenting upon the figure© published by Richard Austen Butler,

British under secretary for foreign affairs, figures which showed that

France was paying more than three times the maximum amount Milch was ever

required from Germany after the First World War, th© Philadelphia In­

quirer exclaimed9 "Ho wonder the peoples of conquered Europe live In

prayerful hop© of release from the Nazi bandits# Their fortunes, their

homes and their lives have been taken over by the Invading plunder-

bund#**!2S Although very little information was available, American econo­

mists were not misled about the nature of German activities in France,

which aimed at a complete control of all French industries*!^? They were

so aware of the situation that they were not surprised when they found

out that the Basis were not only permitting but encouraging

private companies in conquered areas to pay up debts here* Thus

France*s Midi railway has just retired dollar bonds held in the United
States* The most plausible explanationi The Basis want the conquered
countries to maintain their credit here so that Germany can use those
countries as channels for heavy borrowing in the U* S* after the war*
The theory is that postwar Investor© here who would not buy Nazi bonds
(even If Germany wins) might well purchase securities of France.!2S

and that behind

the conquering Wehrmacht, experts of the *Economic Mobil© Unit* fol­

lowed like jackals, stripping industry. This system had a twofold
purpose* First, since France was to be chiefly an agricultural tract

! ^ % 0ot, The Secret History of the War, I, 391*

^^Philadelphia Inquirer, March SI, 1941*

!^See Reman, France on Berlin Time*

^ %ewaweek, December 2, 1940,

 176

In the master plan of the Mew Order, and an exporter of luxury Items,
she would not need this machinery* Second, the stuff that th© French
actually did need until the Meuordnung was accomplished could be used
as barter goods to trade back: to the rightful owners for concessions
profitable to the Hazie*!29

American observers reported, for Instance, how th© Germans tried to take

over and did take over many Paris newspapers* This they did not only for

political but for business reasons* The result was th© "lowest kind of

journalism" in the history of th© world.

Frenchmen who had agreed to remain, in concerns controlled by

Germans were generally despised in America*!®! A few people attempted

to justify their attitude and interpreted it as a last-ditch defense

against Nazi penetration*!®^ xt was generally considered, however, that

collaboration!sm" helped the Germans and mad© spoliation easier and more

hypocritical* Liberals saw in this attitude the reaction of individuals

who were frightened by the possibility of a social revolution* Suoh

persons accepted the German "protection" and impoverished their country

in order to save at least part of their privileges.!®® Liberals also

foresaw that post-war nationalisation of French industry would be made

easier in certain sector© by th© attitude of collaboration of many

stock-holders and members of management*

!^Glen M* Stadier in Frederick Qechsner ©t al, This is the

"Boston, 1942), reproduced in Curt Bless, ©17,’They ^ere There,

!S0B«rnard Ragner, The American Mercury, February, 1941*

.
!®%enry W* Ehrmann, French Labor from Popular Front to Libera-
. _uw M p iw n a « M M w H iiu u u u wwi1* mmmmmm -mm*** w m m m m m nm m *
tlon (New York, 1947), p* 251*

!®£Janet Planner, "Blits by Partnership,11 The New Yorker,

June 7, 1941*

!®%ioot, The Secret History of the War, I, 404-415.

 177

Th© general attitude of French big business was « • • another

factor In forging the unity of labor and giving it a role in the van­
guard of the resistance movement. It had long been whispered that
many industrialists, because of their hatred for the France of the
Popular Front, preferred Hitler and defeat to the despised republic.
Such suspicions seemed justified by the unmitigated readiness of many
of the larger concerns to engage in economic collaboration with the
invader* Only a handful of former labor leaders, soon without any
following, aligned themselves with th© Germans or their Vichy satel­
lites, but in all major fields of industrial production and trade
there was frank and fruitful collaboration.^*®*

Th© treatment of labor by the Vichy government m e at first In­

terpreted as a consequence of the totalitarian ideas of the Vichy leaders*

The French Labor Charter looked like a feeble attempt to copy the German

Labor Front and the Fascist corporations .1®® The attempt failed lamen­

tably, mainly because of the opposition of the French working class* The

main result of the Vichy policy, however, was to suppress the trade-

unions and to deprive "the French workers of their bargaining power

against management or the government."18G According to Henry W* Ehrmann,

the fact "that th© Labor Charter was tantamount to the end of free trade-

unionism was intentional*"^®'? Many suspected later that the main objec­

tive had been to prevent workers from protecting themselves against the

"well-established Vichy policy of trading in french labor with Germany. "3-®*

This practice of sending forced labor to Germany deeply shocked America,

^^hrmaim, French Labor from Popular Front to Liberation,

p. 251. ~ —

l®^wThe French Labour Charter," International Labour heview.

March, 1942, pp. 269-285. ~~

^Leakin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, p. 184.

157Ehraannf French Labor from Popular Front to Liberation,

p. 242.

1S8Ibld.
 178

©specially American trade-unions. then Aaerica entered th© war it was

considered as illegal help of th® German war effort by a neutral

government*

There is nothing whatever in th© armistice terms between Germany and

Franc© that requires the Vichy government to furnish forced labor to
Hitler* * . * This is a violation of France’s responsibility under
international law* It Is an overt act of hostility toward th©
United States, which is at war with Germany. 189

In March, 1942, some 140,000 to 150,000 workers were recruited

on a more or less voluntary basis* In June, again, 550,000 more workers

were requested by Germany, and the system of deportations began.l^Q

Americans listened skeptically to the various propaganda devices by

which Laval tried to turn bad bargains into good ones*

Even a Germaxv-bom Hast could hardly match th© stupid or cynical dis­
regard of simple arithmetic which Herre Laval showed yesterday when
he went to Compiegne to ’welcome home* a trainload of 1,000 released
French prisoners. • . • Laval boasts of a new bargain. • . • For
every sick man coming back France will send three workers. . ♦ *
One expects Hitler to make bargains like this* In the beautiful
old French phrase he is that kind of esp&oe d© cochon. But it does
seem queer to see a Frenchman getting' out' the bancf and making a
speech in honor of such base trickery.141

But there was still another tragedy in France, and Its victims

were even more pitiful than th© mass of the French people. At the time

of th© armistice there were in France many anti-Fasciet people from vari­

ous nations who had taken refuge in that country. Their plight under the

Republic m s not very enviable but it became hopeless after the fall of

i3% e w fork Times* October 19, 1942.

^%hrmann, French Labor from Popular Front to Liberation,

p. 271.

^iSfew lork Times* December 8, 1942*

 179

Franc© and th© installation of th® Vichy government* A special clause

of th© armistice demanded that German political refugees in France be

turned over to the enemy. The Hew Republic termed that clause the "most

dishonorable in that dishonorable document*”3*42 According to The Nation,

th© only country which could do anything for these refugees on a vast

seed.© was the United States.

The Nation appeals to the President of the United States and to

the American people in behalf of the anti-Naai and anti-Fascist
refugees in France* • • . The reactionary and pro-Fascist elements
composing the Petain cabinet represent factions which have always
been hostile to these refugees* But the Cabinet may well b© glad
to b© relieved of their responsibility for their maintenance and
anxious not to evoke universal disgust by giving them up to the
Gestapo.143

Th© plight of these refugees was described by American relief workers

in Primes©.

Caught in th© concentration camps of South eastern France, or

congregated in the larger cities, Fau, Montauban, Toulouse, Nice and,
above all, Marseilles, th© refugees lived in an agony of fear and
apprehension. • * . Under the strain of these alarms, many
refugees committed suicide.144

During the first weeks after th© debacle escape was easy, and

many refugees went to Portugal through Spain and wore granted visitorsr

permits to th© United States. In th© fall of 1940 it became more diffi­

cult to leave illegally but In January, 1941, the Vichy government began

to grant exit visas to foreigners. Unfortunately, th© American govern­

ment revised its visa policy in June, 1941, and "the way to safety was

^ T h e Hew Republic* July 1, 1940*

14%*]rie Nation, June 29, 1942*

^4%aiian Fry in The Hew Leader, April 25, 1942*

 180

once more b a r r e d . **-45 Many refugees were still in France. Most of them

were in concentration camps In France and in North Africa. A large num­

ber of them were Spanish Republicans .*46 Americans received many reports

about the "inhuman treatment” to which they were subjected* "The plight

of the Spanish Republican refugees in France was miserable enough before

the Vichy regime took over. But today these men— the vanguard of the

democratic resistance— are treated like convicts by the latest victims

of Fascist aggression.147 American papers described th© ,!imbreathable

atmosphere of human hopelessness” which prevailed at th© Camp of Gurs.*48

Various American organisations worked in Franc© to improve the condition

of these victims .*49 Howard L. Brooks in Prisoners of Hope described his

experience as a representative of th© Unitarian Service Committees

It is a curious sensation to see children in a camp for th© first

time. There is something unreal about It3 you find it hard to be­
lieve. Naturally, I had heard that there were many children in th©
French camps. What else could the mothers do but take the children
along with them? What could th© German-Jewish families do when,
without warning, they were forced to leave their homes and were sent

*45varian Fry in The New Leader, April 25, 1942.

146Xbid.

*47jhe Nation, January 11, 1941*

*4% h e Christian Century, February 5, 1941.

*4%rooks gave in Prisoners of Hope a list of these organisa­

tions s Unitarian Service ComTttee,"directed by Noel Field (Brooks
worked for this organisation)3 International Red Cross; International
IMCA, whose representative in France was Doctor Lowriej th® Quaker organ­
isation called American Friends Service Committee, which had centers in
Marseilles, Toulouse, and Perpignanj The Joint Distribution Committee,
which operated the Centre de secours m x enfanto; American Friends of
Czechoslovakia, representeT"in Marseilles by lioctor Lowriej and the
Centre americain de secours. directed by Varian Fry. Fry had to leave
unoccupied jVance^because he facilitated the escape of many refugees.
 181

off to French camps* And sine© women were interned without any
regard to their condition many children were b o m in the camp* • • *
But it is one thing to know and another to see for yourself*
How, seeing these child-tnternees, I felt for the first time the
whole Inhumanity, the appalling cruelty, of the situation* I real­
ised in a new way how merciless the world had become. If there were
anything worse than this imprisonment of children, X thought while
there, it m s the indifference of th© world, th© fact that the world
was not revolted.ISO

150Brooka, rtrlaonara of Hope, p. 81.

 CHAPTER VI

AMERICAN OPINION OF WASHINGTON'S RELATIONS WITH VIGHY,

1940-1941

The advent of the P&tain dictatorship did not interrupt the course

of normal diplomatic relatione between the United States and France* Ihen

the French government left Paris on June 6, 1940, Ambassador tilliaia L*

Bullitt remained in the capital and Anthony J* Drexel Biddle replaced him

as the American representative to the French government* He followed this

government to Tours and Bordeaux* He remained In Vichy until the arrival

of the new ambassador, Admiral William B* Leahy, in January, 1941* The

chief objective of American policy In France was to prevent Vichy from

helping Germany beyond the requirements of the armistice agreement,

notably in naval and colonial matters*

It soon became apparent, however, that th© Vichy government was

committed to a pro-German policy* Laval managed eventually to arrange an

interview between Petain and Hitler at Montoir®, on October £4, 1940,

after which Retain announced that Germany and Prance would adopt a policy

of mutual rtcollaboration•" On December 15, however, Laval was unexpect­

edly and brutally dismissed by Petain* Pierre Etienne Flandin, -who re­

placed him as foreign minister, was an old-time advocate of Naai-Freneh

amity but he himself had to yield his position, in turn, to Admiral Jean

Darlan, the commander of the immobilized French fleet, in February, 1941•

North Africa, where General Maxime Weygand had been sent by

IBS
 185
Petain as delegate general of the French government, was looked upon by

the State Department as a possible center of resistance to Germany. State

Department official ftobert Murphy was sent to Algiers at the close of

1840 to investigate th® possibilities of setting up such a center of re­

sistance. On February 26, 1841, ieygand signed an agreement by the terms

of which th® United States was to supply much-needed commercial supplies

to North Africa under the supervision of American vice-consuls*

Meanwhile, Admiral Dorian was attempting to reopen th® Nasi-Freneh

negotiations which the Germane had broken off after the dismissal of

Laval* He finally succeeded, and further negotiations resulted in the

so-called Paris Protocols which made far-reaching military concessions to

the Germans in Syria and in Worth and West Africa. Although the Paris

Protocols war® never ratified by th® Vichy cabinet, Darlan permitted th®

Germans to utilise air facilities in Syria to bring help to the opponents

of British rule in Iraq, and the British and Free French invasion which

followed was met by bitter resistance on the part of th® Vichy commander

in Syria. All those Franco-German developments caused tension between

Vichy and Washington, a tension which was further increased when Vichy

made new concessions to the Japanese in Indo-Ghina, when General Vmygmd

was forced to resign his North Africa post on Vichy’s order® in November,

1941, and again when Petain conferred with Marshal Goering on December I,

1941.

II

The American government hesitated before recognising th® Vichy

government* Even before th® Vichy legal coup d'etat, American liberal

newspapers were hostile to continued relations between the Petain

government and the United States. According to The Nation.

 184

Th© French people have been given no opportunity to make their

views known* . * * Moreover no attempt has been made to obtain the
approval of the Chamber of Deputies for the Petain Cabinet, Only at
some unspecified date in th© future is parliamentary indorsement to
be sought. Thu® the Cabinet’s constitutionality is doubtful, and our
own administration must seriously consider whether it Gan continue to
recognise a rump government which, at best, is th© prisoner of the
invader*^

Hostility against th© armistice government m s created by American con­

cern for the fat© of Great Britain, France had betrayed the cause of the

democracies* The Hatton declared that there was ^nothing honorable about

an agreement which splinters a solemn oath between Allies to conclude no

separate peace, and turns Franc® into the passive accomplice of th® dic­

tators.’1^ Condemnations of th© French attitude were sometimes extremely

brutal.

Poland was destroyed as Norway, Holland, Belgium and France have

been; but the Poles were far more unanimous In their willingness to
die for their country. There were no Quislings or Retains among
them. The Germans tried but failed to set up a puppet government * ,
* • Perhaps it is better after all to be a live jackal than a dead
lion, but the Poles didn’t think so.^

Liberal and interventionist Indignation against the French govern­

ment increased when ’’the Third Republic . « , died in th© fashion earlier

prescribed by its own degenerate leaders for th# Republics of Spain and

Czechoslovakia, The events in Vichy clearly showed that Franc© not only

surrendered to the Germans but intended to copy their totalitarian ways.

^Tfae Nation, Juno 29, 1940*

gIbid.

ftfhe Hew Republic, September 2, 1940.

^Schuman, Might over Europe, p, 517.

 185

It was difficult to deny th® legality of these moves* ’’Stricken France’s

Parliament signed the death warrant of the democratic Third Republic * . *

by giving Premier Marshal Henri Philippe Petain unrestricted powers to

writ© a new totalitarian constitution.”5 a© Professor F. Lee Benns of

Indiana University noted in Europe Since 1914, it was by "legal steps’*

that "the Third Republic was converted into the Petain dictatorship*"®

Americans could, however, "scarcely be sanguine about the Vichy regime

in spite of the constitutionality of the moves whereby Petain*3 powers

were acquired."7 As the Baltimore Sun remarked, the vote of the Parlia­

ment was "bom of defeat and desperation."® Some ©von wondered whether

th© proximity of the German army had not removed freedom of action from

the French deputies and senators. Professor Harlow J# Heneraan of th©

University of Michigan also pointed out* "Men have ruled France since

June 16, 1940, who could hardly have held office under a system where

their tenure of office was dependent upon th© support of a legislative

majority."® Were not free elections the only real democratic criterion

of legality?

The American State Department refused to consider this side of

the question. "The test for us had almost invariably been whether an­

other government was willing to live at peace with th© United States

Baltimore Sun, July 10, 1940.

®B©nns, Europe Since 1914, p. 520.

7J. 0. ilsinbsrg, "French Government under Petain," in Harold Zink

and Taylor Cole, ©ds., Government in Wartime Europe and Japan (Boston,
1941), p. 185.

^Baltimore Sun, July 10, 1940.

^American Political Science Review. February, 1941, p. 94.

 186

and was prepared to fulfill the ordinary obligations of international

intercourse*11!® In spit© of this there was some thought given by th©

American government to the possibility "of following th© British example

and at least allowing relations with th© new Franc® to lapse."!! on

June 25, 1940, m Associated Press dispatch reported? "On the question

of whether the United States would continue to recognise the French Gov­

ernment in Bordeaux or transfer recognition to th© French committee set

up in England, the Presidential secretary said Mr* Roosevelt had told him

there was *no news* on that point*"32 Undoubtedly there were people in

th© immediate entourage of Roosevelt who favored a rupture with th© Nazi-
v
dominated French government* Regardless of th® constitutionality of her

government it appeared that "Franc© died a® a great Power or as a Power

of any magnitude* For an indefinite future La grande Nation ceased to

exist as a subject of diplomacy and became merely a helpless subject*"15

In such a situation "recognition" of de Gaulle would have had little sig­

nificance fro® a French point of view but would have been a challenge to

th© dictators and a gesture of solidarity towards Great Britain.

Th© State Department remained opposed to such a course.!4 There

were no "prominent Frenchmen" with de Gaulle, and in "the midst of gen­

eral uncertainty it seemed . . . to be the part of wisdom to stand by the

Vichy government and do whatever might be possible to prevent the new

3%,anger, Our Vichy Gamble, p* 76.

n Ibid*

^Baltimore San, June 25, 1940*

^chuman, Might over Europe, p* 517.

14Hull, Memoirs, pp. 804-806*

 187

regime from falling completely under the influence of the conqueror*"!®

William L« Bullitt, the former American ambassador to France, played an

important part in formulating the future American policy toward th® Vichy

government* He publicly took position in favor of th© Vichy government#!®

Anthony J* Drexel Biddle remained as temporary envoy of America in France#

French Ambassador de Saint Quentin was replaced by Gaston Henry-Hay©, who

had the reputation of being a friend of Laval and quickly acquired that

of "not being outstanding from th® point of Intelligence* '*!7 On his ar­

rival in New lork harbor, he was disagreeably surprised to find pickets

carrying signs bearing anti-Vichy slogans* Margaret Hughes, who had

taken part in th® French campaign with American ambulances, cam® back to

America on the same boat which transported th® French ambassador* "Bn

arrivsnt * * * a Mew lork, j*ai vu des jeunes gens ei d©s ©nfants qui

portaient des placards avec les motes fHeil Honry-Kaye, f pour accueillir

le nouvel ambaasadeur. J’ai pu deja me rendre compte que d© violent©®

discussion® font rag® au sujet des Frangais.*!^

Ill

Subsequent events were well mad® to increase suspicions that

Vichy was more or less voluntarily helping the Axis in its fight against

Great Britain* Vichy yielded to Japan in Indo-Ohina without uttering a

word of protest* Th© French navy refused to accept the British proposals

danger, Our Vichy Gamble, pp* 76-77.

16lbld.. p. 76.

17Ibid., p. 99.

"*Margaret> Hughes, Las hauriers sont croupes (New York, 1941),

p. 248*
 188
at Oran, and Dakar m s successfully defended against a British-supported

attack* Martinique showed no desire to co-operate with America in her

attempts to neutralise the potential danger which European outposts in

the Western Hemisphere could constitute for the American republics* Laval

tried very hard, however, to convince public opinion abroad that France

still had an independent foreign policy* During the months which followed

the armistice, the American press gave much attention to Laval4s policy

of a "Latin bloc*" The Nation recorded In July that "Mussolini Is be­

lieved to have a plan for a powerful federation of fascist Latin states

embracing Italy, France, Spain and P o r t u g a l * t h e aim of these rumors

was obviously to show to fearful Americans that there would still be a

balance of power in the new Europe* they had little success* Hswswsek

was willing to concede that the Vichy government

has a semblance of a foreign policy— however ghostly it may be— in

that Laval is one of those who, assuming that Italy is as much the
unwilling prisoner of Germany as France is, believes that a Latin
bloc can eventually save Europe from Teutonic domination* Its weak­
ness Is that tbs leaders may fail to get the confidence either of
the French people or of Hitler arid hence must exist on the dubious
support of Mussolini alone or give way to new men#20

Many people thought that Hitler was going to sign a peace treaty

with France* Newspapers commented on the numerous rumors from neutral

capitals about Hitler*s future treatment of France* It was said that

Nazi Germany planned a Nazi Flemish state comprising Belgium, Holland

and northern France*^! Observers also noted that "Breton separatism"

*%he Nation, July 20, 1940

^Newsweek, July 22, 1940*

21Ibid.
was encouraged by the Germans and some predicted a complete

dismemberment of the defeated country. 82

The Montoire interview between Petain and Hitler dealt a death

blow to the rumors of a Latin bloc as well as to the belief that Hitler

would make peace with Franc© before the end of the war, Nobody knew what

had taken place at Montoire, however, and American newspaper© were kept

guessing* Most of them naturally believed that Hitler went to Montoire

with a definite plan and specific conditions which B^tain had no choice

but to accept. According to Time, "the German term© were hard but not

unacceptable*"^ American observers were naturally more interested in

the concessions which Germany could wring from Franc© than in the advan­

tages which Vichy could gain in the bargain* Some people predicted that

France was going to be completely occupied, others thought that Petain

was going to be replaced by more radically pro-Nazi elements or would

have to transfer military bases to Germany in North Africa.^ Just as

after Oran, many newspapers announced that France might declare war on

Great Britain* There were naturally reports that Germany had asked for

the French f l e e t Laval commented on the Montoire interview in a press

conference on October 31. uXn every domain," h© said, "and especially

in the economic and in the colonial sphere, we have envisaged and will

continue to examine in what practical forms our collaboration may serve

the interests of France, of Germany and of Europe*"86

^Newsweek. July Z Z 9 1940.

^ftrime, November 4, 1940.

24Ibid., November 11, 1940.

2SZbid*

^Longer, Our Vichy Gamble, p. 100,

 190

This statement calmed many fears. It was obvious that no

sensational move had been decided upon.

As the winter campaign develops, we shall doubtless learn the results

of Hitler*e conferences with Laval, Retain and Franco. Laval at least
is doubtless eager to offer every possible aid to Fascism, and liis
succession to the post of Foreign Minister in the Vichy cabinet— re­
placing Baudoin, who himself was sufficiently pro-Axis— is
undoubtedly a bad sign.
But it does not seem likely that either France or Spain will
join th© war on Hitler1s side in the sense of actually dispatching
large armies against Great Britain.^?

According to Time, correspondents "began to guess more cautiously."88

Collaboration was still envisaged as a two-sided affair, with th© Germans

helping French industry to resume production in th© interest of French

consumers. It was difficult to guess how much would be expected fro®

France in return.

The final result of the Montoire interview was to increase Ameri­

can suspicion of the Vichy government. It soon became obvious that the

meeting had been fruitless, but the French government had taken publicly

a position in favor of the enemies of Great Britain and had thus asserted

its conviction that the future of France lay with Germany. There were

demands for a revision of the American policy toward th© French Antilles.2^

Montoire was for the interventionist© a proof that Hitler dominated a

country nominally headed by Petain, a weak old man, and by Laval, “a

political chameleon."30

8?Xhe New Republic, November 4, 1940,

8% ! ® © , November 11, 1940.

8% © w Tork Herald Tribune, November 8, 1940.

^Gaspar 0, Bacon and Wendell D. Howie, On© by One (Cambridge,

Mass., 1943), p. 89.
 191

It was later explained, in America as in France, that Petain had

successfully resisted German demand® during that period and that he was

fighting a "rearguard battle" which gained more time for the democracies.

This theory was especially popular with those who approved the American

policy of upholding the Vichy government in its allegedly anti-German

policies.SI pro® the German record of the Montoire interview,32 it is

obvious that this interpretation of Retain*s attitude was based on the

false assumption that th© Montoire interview, like all other phase® of

Franco-German relations during the occupation, was the result of Hitler*s

desire to acquire military bases in th© French empire and use of the

French fleet* William L* hanger concluded that "Hitler did not press

Petain for any specific engagement" because, "having just come from a

disappointing and Irritating debate with Franco, he was not in an exuber­

ant mood."33 if Hitler had wanted something specific from France, the

Franco interview would probably have mad© him more exacting than ever*

Th© turth doubtless was that Hitler*a main objective was to demon­

strate to the British "how completely the Continent m s under Nazi con­

trol," hanger mentioned only in two footnotes Erich Kordt*®3^ testimony

on that point.3S Hitler understood that the unstable equilibrium which

was reached after th© armistice and was so advantageous to Germany could

be maintained indefinitely. He knew that the men of Vichy would be the

^Anne 0*Har© McCormick, in lew York Times, April 15, 1942.

®^Langer, Our Vichy Gamble,pp. 89-100.

55Ibld», p. 96.

^German official who accompanied Hitler to th® meeting*

S5Langer, Our Vichy Gamble, p. 9o, n, 31j p. 96, n* 35.

 192

prisoners of their own prejudices and that German interests would be pro­

tected by the new and old quarrels which would develop between the French

and the British. The armistice allowed th® Massia to exploit French eco­

nomic resources to the limit without having to account to anyone» The

territory Hitler occupied in France was all he needed to pursue the war.

Th© French fleet and the empire were immobilised. Obviously all Germany

was interested in was in maintaining the status quo* hanger himself

quoted a text essential in that respect, the ”Graaiani Papers,” in which

was recorded the conversation between Hitler and Mussolini on June 18,

1940, just after Petain*s plea for armistice negotiations. Mussolini

wanted to take everything he could but Hitler explained to him that it

would be a mistake to occupy all France,

in order not to favor the establishment of a French government In

England or elsewhere. It would be better to permit the existence of
a French government in France, which would be the sole responsible
one* * * * With regard to the French fleet the Fuhrer said that the
best thing that could happen would be to have the French sink it. .
* . It would not be well to demand purely and simply that the French
surrender their fleet. France will not agree to that and, as against
the very slight probability that the French may sink the fleet, there
would be the much greater probability that they would send it to join
the British fleet* . . . Furthermore, it seems wise to leave France
the hope of regaining her fleet once peace has been made.56

IV

Meanwhile, General Maxim® Weygand had bean appointed delegate

general of the French government in Horth Africa. This was considered

by the State Department as a very fortunate development.

To us it seemed that Yieygand in Horth Africa might become a

cornerstone around which to build a policy of resistance to Germany.
We could have no hopes that he would declare in favor of the Free

S3
“Graziani Papers,” in Langer, Our Vichy Gamble* pp. 48-49.
 195

French, as French Equatorial had done, but we could hope he would

organize the French Army in North Africa, shy away from any conces­
sion to the Axis, and bide the time when an Allied army could join
in aligning French North Africa in the battle against Hitler*37

Many American observers accepted the official hints that some hope

should be staked on the presence of Weygand in North Africa,

in the event of intolerable Axis demands the Vichy regime can always
flee across the Mediterranean and continue the war* • . , There have
been many indications that Weygand has been adopting an increasingly
independent attitude toward the Vichy authorities. Two events might
influence Weygand to place French Africa on the side of Britain
again s 1) humiliating demands by the Axis on the Vichy government
and 2) a general Mediterranean offensive by Britain that showed real
promise of defeating Italy.38

Such comments opened the door to the theory that Weygand could be coaxed

away from Germany by shipments of food and by a display of American

friendship.^ For a large part of the American press the whole problem

of Vichy consisted in showing the French how nice the Allies— and ©spe­

cially still neutral America— were. Weygandfs choice was almost thought

to be between the "American way of life" and the bad manners of the Nazi

chieftains. Life, however, considered "tenuous11 the "hope of aid from

France*s General Maxime Weygand who does not much like the English but

may now be learning to hate the Germans and Italians even more.'‘4°

The liberals did not accept such a simplified view of the situ­

ation. They did not yet oppose a policy which had not completely taken

shape, but they were worried by the American tendency to believe that

3?Hull, Memoirs, p. 855.

^Newsweek, November 25, 1940.

3%anger, Our Vichy Gamble, pp. 104-108; Hull, Memoirs, p. 855,

^ L i f e , December 16, 1940.

 194

some of the Vichy men were secretly trying to join the fight against the

common foe or were driven into Germany1® arms by Allied attacks against

them. 41 Weygand repeated time and again that his only allegiance was to

Petain. "There is no reason," warned The New Republic, "to doubt

Weygand1s remarks as to where his duty lies."42 The liberals did not

doubt that French Africa was "Vichy*s hole card."43 They reasoned that

the man entrusted with guarding this last trump would be a faithful Vichy

devotee. It was equally certain that he would be conscious that his

power in the Vichy set-up was the result of his privileged position. Ac­

cording to the liberals, there was no hope that Weygand would move his

little finger to help th© Allies until he was sure that th© Allies had

won the war.44 Before that day, an Allied occupation of North Africa was

just as catastrophic as a German occupation. It would suppress any hope

to maintain the power of Vichy. Weygandfs nationalism could not be dis­

tinguished from his fear of a social revolution. Vichy was the only pos­

sible way to save the French Empire and to save France from socialism at

the same time. Extreme collaborators In Paris who had no nationalist

scruples and who advocated complete submission to Germany, rightly pointed

out that this argument was totally unrealistic.45 its only hope resided

in a white peace between England and Germany. Resistants who accepted

4%©r an example of this last point of view, see Felix Morley,

"United States Responsibilities to France," Philadelphia Evening
Bulletin, October 25, 1940.

4^The New Republic, December 23, 1940.

4%ewaweek, November 25, 1940.

^4yhe New Republic, December 23, 1942 j The Nation, January 18,
1941, p. SlfT

^Robert de Bauplan in L *Illustration, February 1, 1941.

 195

the risk of social transformations or desired them were indignant. Ameri­

can liberals had exactly the same reaction* They thought that any com­

promise with the sordid calculations of the men of Vichy was a useless

betrayal of the democratic ideals. In the fall of 1940, however, American

opinion, including liberal opinion was extremely confused# 40 France ap­

parently accepted the Vichy rule# The whole diplomatic and ideological

picture was blurred and obscured by mysteries of which the German-Soviet

pact was only the most shocking example.

The dismissal of Laval on December 13, 1940, made Petain look

Ilk© a bigger weygand playing for higher stakes* There was no doubt in

the minds of most Americans that Retain had dismissed Laval because the

latter wanted to help the Germans beyond the conditions required by the

a r m i s t i c e . 47 Petain was a prisoner of the Germans, no doubt, but he also

was a vigilant patriot, determined to do everything to "save France"— in

th© traditional meaning of the term* Hull declared that American "diffi­

culties with Vichy France seemed suddenly and somewhat alleviated by the

dramatic dismissal of Laval* "48 Roosevelt concluded optimistically his

fireside chat on December 2j "I believe that the Axis powers are not go­

ing to win this war* I base my belief on the latest and best informa­

tion*" Very little in the military situation justified such a statement.

Laval*a dismissal was the only favorable news item in the last month, ex­

cept for the Italian failure in Greece which had little bearing on the

general situation. Hull actually mentioned in his Memoirs that

^Danger, Our Vichy Gamble, p# 116*

^Newsweek, December 23, 1940.

^Huil, Memoirs* p* 882.

 196

Roosevelt*® information "included such items as , , * the dismissal of

Laval, a resurgence of spirit in North Africa."49

The liberals were not so easily satisfied. They were glad to see

that everything m s not going smoothly In collaborationist France but

they warned that it could not mean that Vichy would change its policy.

They suspected that the dismissal was the result of a French Internal

feud and that a new faction had won over the easily Influenced old

marshal. "Whatever the reason," wrote The New Republic, "th® change

means little in practical fact."50 Even some liberals, however, were

hopeful. They assumed falsely that Germany m s exerting a violent pres­

sure in order to get military assistance. The dismissal of Laval seemed

to be an indication that Retain would rather scuttle his government than

surrender to German demands*

The final say about th© extent of Franco-German collaboration rests

with Retain, who so far shows no sign of yielding to demands for the
use of French bases and the French fleet against Britain. Yet th®
Germans* need of such assistance is growing with the losses suffered
by Italy. The possibility of Nazi occupation of the whole of Franc®
has been mooted in case Retain maintains his stand. This would give
Hitler Toulon, but it might easily mean the return to the side of
Britain of the French Empire and the fleet.

An important factor in the foreign policy of Vichy was the food

situation in metropolitan France. Americans were very much concerned over

the food situation in western Europe after the French defeat* All ob­

servers reported that there would be general starvation in the winter*

According to some people, the situation in France was "somewhat better"

4%ull, Memoirs. p. 885.

3®The New Republic, December 23, 1940,

S1The Nation, December 28, 1940,

 197

because France had been "able to raise export surpluses of wheat in re­

cent years."SB Various dispatches, however, described th® French food

problem as acute after the armistice. S e w dispatches were obviously

colored by the Germans. "Even French farmers were reported living off

German relief," announced the Chicago Tribune on July 26. Newsweek

reported:

The German Army . , * was having trouble getting French township© to

feed the horde of prisoners. Consequently they began shipping them
across the demarcation line into unoccupied France, The Vichy gov­
ernment was alarmed at their coming, having a food problem of his own.
Those who lived in th® unoccupied area were sent home, but the others
were kept in the French army in the hope that the Gomans would take
them back again.53

Such dispatches had obviously a double objective: firstly, to

convince American opinion that th® Germans were doing their best to help

the French; secondly, to emphasize French need for more food supplies.

The Germans were interested In convincing Americans that they should send

food to Europe. Regardless of its military value, any leak in the Brit­

ish blockade was a psychological success for the Germans. Any movement

of opinion in America in favor of sending food to occupied countries put

the British in a very embarrassing situation. The German efforts were

partially successful. American concern for the conditions in war-torn

Europe was not due to German propaganda but this propaganda undoubtedly

tried to exploit the feelings of kind-hearted Americans for political

purposes. Anti-British and isolationist newspapers particularly stressed

the European need for food. The Mew York Daily Hews, for instance,

revealed that

5%ew York Herald Tribune, July 7, 1940.

5%ewgweek, August 5, 1940, Italics mine.

 198

Europe * • « faces a horrible winter, with actual starvation threat­

ening millions of noncombatants, men, women and children* Malnutri­
tion lowers resistance to disease, meaning that those who go on liv­
ing will suffer more and more of such things a® pellagra, scurvy,
mastoiditis, influence, anemia, stomach trouble, trench mouth, etc*,
etc*
This state of affairs * * * can only work against the British*
Xou don’t love somebody who proposes to starve you, even though
he does so in the name of democracy, righteousness, the rights of
th© small nations to exist and govern themselves*5a

Most American newspaper® believed that food should be sent, pro­

vided Germany agreed to fulfill certain conditions such as American con­

trol of the distribution of supplies, control of German food requisitions

in France, and th© like* The more ninterventionist” the newspapers were,

the more stringent their minimum requirements were. Hull explained in

his Memoirs what was at that time his own attitude and that of th©

Presidents

Our own humanitarian feeling® were stirred by th© plight of th©

occupied countries, but it was obvious to th© President and me that
the sending of supplies to the conquered nations would simply lighten
Hitler1© obligation® to furnish such supplies * * * •
Former President Hoover, whose relief operations in Belgium dur­
ing th© first World War were well and warmly remembered, was now mak­
ing relief plans for France, Belgium, and Holland* He cam© several
times to enlist my support* 1 got along well with him, and I could
appreciate his sincerity and hum&nitari&rxism; but, since his plans
were in conflict with our ideas and those of Britain on winning the
war, 1 could not encourage him.55

The American government finally agreed to the shipment of medical

supplies and food for children through the International Red Cross*

Th© early days of 1941 saw a new development in Franco-American

^I’
Jew fork Daily Mews, October 21, 1940*

SSHull, Memoir®, p* 804.

 199

relations. Admiral William B. Leahy was appointed the American ambassa­

dor to Vichy France and sailed for France, via Spain, on the American

warship Tuscaloosa* Life termed this mission 55one of the touchiest * . *

any United States diplomat ever undertook* ”56 Leahy was to uphold the

old marshal in his resistance to German orders and make France aware of

"America’s compelling desire for a British victory and the restoration of

a free democratic France.”57 Apparently liberal newspapers paid little

attention to Leahy’s mission* It was only later that they wondered

whether these goals would be best achieved by honoring with the visit of

such a distinguished ambassador those who had destroyed French democracy

and were helping Germany destroy Great Britain*

Meanwhile, relations between Vichy and Germany had cooled off as

a result of Laval’s dismissal. Humors from neutral capitals kept Ameri­

can observers in a state of great agitation* There were, for instance,

reports that Petain had delivered ills own ultimatum to illtier threat­
ening to resume the fight as Britain’s ally from Africa rather than
yield to repeated demands for the French fleet. Airplanes were even
said to be waiting at Vichy to fly th© French government to Africa*
Some French warships were reported to have been shifted to Africa so
the officers and men could have ’vacations* ’58

The liberals did not attach much importance to these rumors and pointed

out that Laval was in the background, ready to comeback on German orders.

’’The Nazi campaign to force Laval on Marshal Petain appears to have suc­

ceeded,” asserted The Nation on February 8 , "and bythe end of the week

he is expected to bo in power in Vichy, endowed with greater power than

56Ufe, January 6, 1941.

57jbid.
5%ewaweek, January 6, 1941.
 200

before.” Laval did not come back but The Christian Century remarked a

week later that it Mdo®s not appear that Petain defied Hitler by

refusing to admit Laval to his Cabinet.”59

Laval was the main concern of the American press but the State

Department had other problems# Th© economic agreement, which had been

initiated by the negotiations between Robert D# Murphy, Count do Bose,

the representative of Weygand, and finally Weygand himself, had been de­

layed by friction between the American and th© British governments con­

cerning the lifting of th© blockade. The British were hostile to any

favor given to the Vichy government. Their blockade, however, m s "any­

thing but tight” and the State Department finally decided to go ahead

without British agreement* This fact, when it became known to the lib­

erals at a time when they had frankly taken a position against the Ameri­

can policy, provoked their indignant comments. Four months later Th©

Nation addressed one of its editorials to the British peoples

We want you to know that w© are as shocked as you are by the news
that our State Department has brought pressure on th© British govern­
ment to permit shipment of American oil and other supplies to Vichy-
dominated North Africa; and that th© State Department’s action was
not the result of any decision arrived at after democratic, debate in
Congress or elsewhere.
The idea that Weygand can be weaned from Vichy by special favors
seems to us as dangerous as the idea some of your diplomats nourished
— that Mussolini might be weaned from th® Axis, Goring separated
from Hitler.51

Washington wanted to avoid having the final agreement signed by

Darlan, the French premier, and wanted to consider it a© a strictly North

5%ho Christian Century. February 19, 1941*

5°Langer, Our Vichy Gamble, p. 150*

Nation, July 12, 1941.

 201

African affair.Weygand signed on February 26 and went to Vichy fro®

March 5 to March 10* Admiral Darlan sanctioned the agreement on

March 10.®5 Bloat American observers thought that leygand*® trip m s

motivated by the perpetual rumors of a German invasion in Horth Africa*

They even saw a connection between Weygand1s visit to Vichy and the Brit­

ish efforts in Libya* The Saginaw (Michigan) Hews wrote for instance

that;

One guess which appears to have a fair basis is that th© French
commander is looking ahead to th© time when th© British win— as they
evidently hope to— control of western Libya and Tripolitania from the
Italians. Then they will stand on the frontier of French Algeria
CsicJ • It is more than possible that they will attempt to strike
some kind of active partnership with the French to continue th©
war*64

Longer recounted in Our Vichy Gamble how rumors of German infil­

tration in Horth Africa kept London and lashington in a state of anxiety.

tt®very effort was mad© to substantiate these reports, which in th© end

proved to be quit© u n f o u n d e d , H e assumed, however, that Weygand went

to Vichy **in connection with th© possibilities11®® ©f German action in

Horth Africa* He gave no evidence of this, however, and it was more

likely that the main reason for leygand*® trip was his desire to secure

Darlan1a approval of his dealings with th© Americans.

The State Department wanted now to carry its policy of calculated

^Danger, Our Vichy Gamble, p. 1S5.

6gIbid*

®%agin«w (Michigan) Hews, March 7, 1941.

®®Lang©r, Our Vichy Gamble, p. 136.

66Ibid.
 202

relief to unoccupied France. But, according to Danger, th© situation in

Vichy was thoroughly discouraging”®?5 Hull described it as tone too

encouraging.According to Leahy*s reports, Petain m s obsessed by his

hatred of de Gaulle* As for Darian, Petain himself told the American

ambassador that ”his trouble is his habit of telling anecdotes about the

B r i t i s h * T h e State Department, however, saw some hope of establishing

a policy of resistance to the Germans. American and British intelligence

were more convinced than ever that Hitler was planning an invasion of

Horth Africa. Actually th© Germans were preparing for their campaign

against Russia, but the British tried to communicate their anxiety to the

Americans and to involve them in a shooting war. All they obtained, how­

ever, was a decision to expand the American policy of economic inducements.

David Eccles, the representative in Washington of the British ministry of

economic warfare, remarked that wit was about 11955 in respect of economic

cooperation” with both Spain and France, but h© felt Hhat straw and

carrots should be held out for what they were worth.

Darlan was really doing his best to get Wstraw and carrots.” In

a public statement he threatened to use the French fleet to break th©

British blockade in order to secure importation of food into France.

Th© problem of feeding the occupied countries regained actuality in th©

American pres®. Again the American press was divided on the matter. The

^Danger, Our Vichy Gamble, p. 142.

w * i r t p i. nn n * m m m m m m m m *

6®Hu 11, Memoir®, p. 940.

69Langer, Our Vichy Gamble, p. 142.

70Ibid., p. 145.

71Ibid.. p. 157.
 203

division between isolationists and interventionists on this question was

slowly giving way to a division between the radical and liberal elements

on the one aide and the rest of American opinion on the other one. A

newspaper like The Christian Century was still in favor of sending food

for humanitarian reasons and this was in keeping with its isolationist

line* "The people of the United States alone are able to bring about the

lifting of the blockade and to supply the needed food. If we fail to act

we, along with the nations at war, become responsible for every death

which occurs in the preventable f a m i n e , M a n y newspapers, however,

following th© lead of the State Department, considered th© sending of

food as a mean® of diplomatic pressure. Time, for instance, explained

that the Vichy thesis was*

France did not collapse; France was beaten after a hopeless fight*
Under the terms of the armistice France may do nothing to help Britain
— but Franc© will do nothing to help Germany. Franc© must collaborate
with Germany until Germany lose© th© war, but France hopes Germany -
will lose. Meanwhile France must be fed, because starvation will
drive France into Germany*s arms.?®

Admitting that th© "American public is certainly in a dilemna re­

garding France,'* Dorothy Thompson charged that this article in Tim© was

"hardly calculated to contribute to clarity," and called it "one of the

most remarkably confusing statements ever issued on a matter of policy."

She concluded that "America can no longer afford to play the Good Samari­

tan to th© enemies of her basic institutions and ideals. If we give food

to Franc© w® must be perfectly certain that we are feeding freedom and

*^ h © Christian Century* February 26, 1941.

73Time, March 10, 1941.

 204

not t y r a n n y t h e main argument of the liberals against those who

maintained that an actual sea battle between the French and the British

should be avoided by sending food to France and upholding the Vichy gov­

ernment was that the French would not accept to fight Great Britain.

The bigger obstacle to that development hitherto has not been the
Vichy government, which is wholeheartedly anti-democratic and com­
posed of men who, in effect, have bet their shirt© on a German tri­
umph, but the strongly anti-Nazi and pro-British attitude of the
French people. That was the real reason for Laval*s dismissal.?®

Those whom The Nation attacked in this editorial were not the isolation­

ists, whose power was diminishing every day, but those who believed that

Vichy could be turned against Germany by a clever diplomacy. Although

many supporters of this policy defended it primarily on humanitarian

grounds, some observers were ready to define it as a purely practical en­

terprise. Demaree Bess, recalling these times less than a year later in

th© Saturday Evening Post, admitted that

The only effective weapon w© possessed was a bribe— mid the on©
great bribe we could offer was food. Both occupied and unoccupied
France were desperately hungry# . . .
Our problem was not to regard food as a humane means for saving
lives but as a weapon for waging war.?®

Once more the State Department dicided to carry out its food

policy even without British approval. Churchill, in view of the American

Insistence on this matter, agreed, because he had come to consider tills

problem as a part of the capital question of Brltiah-Aiserloan relations*

74H«w York Herald Tribune# March 10, 1941.

7®Th© Nation, March ZZt 1941.

?%atuyday Evening Post, January 3, 1942*

 205

Th© good will of th© American State Department, in the opinion of many

British officials, m s well worth two shiploads of wheat to Petain or

even Hitler* The British ministry of economic warfare, however, did not

view th© matter from that angle; neither did American liberals* The

Hatlon charged that there were "still many people in this country includ­

ing officials of th© State Department, who close their eyes to the true

character of Vichy*"77 According to The Hatton* reports on Franco-German

relations went

far to justify the British contention that it is impossible to send

supplies to France without favorably affecting th® German position.
1© may well ask, therefore, why these facts remained hidden during
the recent negotiations over th© dispatch of food to France. The
State Department has not asked Ambassador Leahy to make a full re­
port concerning the exchange between the occupied and unoccupied ter­
ritories* * * * That is information to which m are entitled, whether
or not the Naais object to Its disclosure, before we are asked to
urge Britain to modlty Its blockade.7®

VI

On April 50, 1941, Leahy was instructed to see Petain “at one©

and by all means alone” to explain to him that America was going to send

two shiploads of wheat to unoccupied Franc©."7® Danger wrote that "the

marshal had departed on May 5 for a week1© rest in southern France and

was therefore inaccessible to Admiral Leahy but he did not explain

why Leahy could not see Petain between April 30 and May 5. Darlan was

obviously fearful that he might suffer the fate of Laval during his

77The Nation* April 15, 1941*

78Ibid.

^®Langer, Our Vichy Gamble* p. 147.

60Ibld.
 206

absence from Vichy and apparently had decided to keep Petain away from

outside influences* Durian had finally succeeded in opening negotiations

with th© Germane. The fact that these negotiations were on French initi­

ative was very important, since many Americans believed that Vichy was

yielding inch by inch only under German pressure* hanger wrote that

Darlan . . . had been wooing th® Haaia ever since December, but
only to get the cold shoulder* Th© Germans were still pining for
Laval and refused to collaborate with any other French
government* • • •
Durian*8 procedure in general was to make concession© to the
Germans out of hand, in th© hope of attaining later some larger and
more definitive arrangement* Thus he agreed at the outset to make
available to Rommel a number of French trucks that had been stocked
in North Africa* * * *
After these preliminaries Darlan was invited to Paris to confer
with Abets (May 3). Evidently delighted to be received into the good
graces of th© victors, and on assurance that Laval would be left out
of account,, ho prowised everything,8*

This part of Langer*s book was not based on American or British

intelligence work but on the anonymous “Diary of a French Diplomat1* which

gave no evidence of German pressure on Darlan. On the contrary, it

seemed, Darlan wanted to prove that he was better than Laval and he agreed

to raake French munitions and airplanes in Syria available to the Iraqi

who had rebelled against British rule#®^ It was also decided that German

planes would be refuelled in French Syria.®3 Darlan even instructed

General Denta to give the Germans all facilities in Syria and to oppose

any British attempt to i n t e r f e r e ,84 Darlan was then invited to

8Aanger, Our Vichy Gamble, p. 148.

82Ibid.

8 5lbid.

8 4 i b l d . , p. 149.
 207

Berchtesgaden and saw Hitler on May 11-12, 1941* Again, the record of

this interview in hanger* s Our Vichy Gamble showed that Hitler had no in­

tention of launching an expedition in French Africa. American anxiety,

however, reached its peak when, after Darlan*s return to Vichy, Petain

mad© a speech (May 15) in which he announced that the interview between

the admiral and Hitler “permits us to light up th© road into th© future

and to continue the conversations that had begun with the German

government.” He declared*

It is no longer a question today of public opinion, often uneasy

and badly informed, being able to estimate th© chances we are taking
or to measure the risks we take, or to judge our acts.
For you, the French people, it is simply a question of following
me without mental reservation along th© path of honor and national
interest*85

Obviously, American protests against Darlan*a first concessions

to th© Germans and the promise of the two shiploads of wheat which Leahy

had finally imparted to Petain had not been enough to deter the French

government from Its policy of collaboration with Germany. Roosevelt mad©

a public statement on May 15, appealing to th© French people over the

head of their government*

The people of the United States can hardly believe that the pres­
ent government of France could be brought to lend itself to a plan of
voluntary®® alliance implied or otherwise which would apparently de­
liver upFrance and its colonial Empire, including French African
colonies and their Atlantic coasts, with the menace which that
involves to the peace and safety of the Western H e m i s p h e r e . ® 7

The Hew York Times asserted Its confidence in the firmness of the French

®%ew York Times* May 16, 1941.

Italics mine.

®7Mew York Times* May 16, 1941.

 208

people* "No man on earth, and no power that is conceivable, can trans­

form the French people into willing partners of the ignorant and obscene

barbarians who rule Nasi Germany.11 This newspaper, however, was very

pessimistic on the future development of the situation. “Franc© still

plays for time* But all the available evidence indicates that we are

about to witness, in a dark hour for the French people, the tragic, long-

delayed denouement of th© enormous miscalculation made by the French gov­

ernment a year ago."®® Th© Hew York Times was typical of the reaction of

th© American press* "Petain and Darlan continued on their course

unmoved."®®
Admiral Leahy himself, apparently, had lost confidence in the

policy of personal friendship with Petain and suggested the possibility

of sending American troops to save at least North Africa, in the hope

that some of Weygand*s troops would side with the Allies.®® Sumner

Welles prepared with President Roosevelt a message to be delivered to

Congress which emphasised American interest in Africa.

The seizure of, control over, these areas, some of which are barely
sixteen hundred miles from the coast of South America, by powers
which are bent on world conquest, would constitute so immediate a
threat to the peace and safety of th© Western Hemisphere that the
situation arising therefrom could not be regarded passively by the
United States.

But Cordell Hull talked th© President out of making this statement, argu­

ing that it would be an invitation to Germany to move into Africa and

8% © w York Times* May 16, 1941,

88Lang©r, Our Vichy Gamble* p. 152.

^Ibld.. p. 158.

% u n , Memoira. p. 958.
 209

pointing out that wit would provoke the fiercely vociferous resentment

of the isolationists in and out of Congress.*1 The secretary of state was

endeavoring l,to ascertain Just what can be salvaged through the Vichy

Government by every kind of practicable, wise treatment.

The liberals urged immediate rupture with Vichy. Like The Hew

Republic, they condemned the whole American policy toward France sine©

the armistice.

Gnee again m have been guilty of wishful thinking.

From the time of the armistice there was never any real hope that
the Vichy government would be able to make a stand against Germany or
would not ultimately yield to Hitler in everything* . . . Let us
abandon our grotesquely unsuccessful policy of trying to aid countries
that we hop© will remain neutral and instead limit such aid to the
countries that definitely show they are anti-Aids. . . .
let us dismiss the pro-Fascists and anti-Semites in th© American
State Department who have been largely responsible for the policy
mentioned.®®

On May 21, 1941, the Hew York Post published its first editorial

asking for “recognition1* of the Free French movement.

Suppose the whole Vichy headache is washed up by a frank break in

diplomatic relations— which looks extremely likely, In view of the
Nasi-directed hostility to the United. States— then it should be about
time for the Free French struggle of General de Gaulle to receive
our sympathetic consideration.
Recognizing de Gaulle would place this country again where it
wants to be, in congenial association with the custodians of the
French tradition, shoulder to shoulder against the oppressor.

Hull recorded in his Memoirs that, at that time, the administration “mat

with heavy pressure from various quarters, both in Britain and in the

United States to recognize" the Free French movement.

Memoirs, p. 958.

Mo t Republic, May 80, 1941.

 210

Neither the President nor I, however, could see any benefit to

be derived from recognizing Be Gaulle* Such recognition would have
meant the repudiation of our universal policy of noninterference in
the internal affairs of another country* It would have meant a com­
plete break with Vichy, th® withdrawal of our diplomatic mission
there and of our consular staffs in cities of metropolitan France*
It would have left the field clear for th® collaborationists* It
would have resulted in a rupture of the fruitful contact we were
maintaining with Weygand In North Africa and the recall of all our
officials in Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and French West Africa*^

Negotiations between the Germans and Darlan continued in great

secrecy while American observers tried to guess their object and their

results* Since it was believed that the Germans had taken the initiative

in the negotiations, most American observers were inclined to think that

they would give France something in exchange for far-reaching concessions*

Wrote Anne 0*11are McCormick in the Wow York Times; "Undoubtedly , . *

th® Germans are offering better terms j and this circumstance should warn

the French that Hitler himself is less sure of victory."Even The

Nation was too optimistic when it declared? "So far, th© concessions ob­

tained by the Vichy representatives do little more than give France th®

privilege of being squeezed to death rather more slowly than heretofore."$®

It was Indeed difficult to guess that th© final Paris Protocols, signed

on May 28, contained no compensation for the Vichy government, and that,

aside from some meaningless minor military concessions, only "vague

promises of concessions in political and economic matters"^ were made.

There was much pessimism in the United States concerning th©

94Hull, Memoirs. p. 961.

York Times, May 17, 1941.

®®The Nation, May 24, 1941* /

^Danger, Our Vichy Gamble, p* 156.

 211

German side of the bargain* Interventionist newspaper’s declared that the

program of aid to Great Britain should be reconsidered, since Vichy*s aid

to Germany would be immediate.9® Darlan*s speech on May 24 was intended

to reassure French and world opinion. He affimed that Hitler had not

asked for the fleet, for colonial territory or a declaration of war on

England. "Germany won the war alone and judges herself able to end it

alone against no matter what coalition." " This statement had a soothing

effect on American opinion. According to the New York Times,

The very fact that his [Hitler* sj forbearance is calculated is en­

couraging, He cannot work his entire will with the French, except
at a cost greater than at the moment he can afford to pay. Whatever
may be the case with Vichy or with certain Fascist and pacifist ele­
ments in France, th© French people are not completely defeated.^0

No one knew exactly what had happened in Paris but there was even

more uncertainty as to what America should do to counteract the German

threat in France. Th© liberals wanted a rupture with Vichy and maintained

that any attempt to "appease" the French collaborationists was bound to

fail. The isolationists, who denied the existence of a German threat

anywhere, were also inclined to agree that the policy of meddling in Vichy

France had been a failure. Senator Burton E. Wheeler declared that

"closer collaboration between France and Germany" showed "more than ever

the futility of our getting into the war."^^ Vichy*a answer to

Roosevelt*s message of May 15 was that nobody in collaborationist Prance

"The Nation, May 21, 1941.

99Langer, Our Vichy Gamble, p. 156.

100New York Times, May 24, 1941,

i01|feW8Week, May 26, 1941.
 212

wanted any harm to the United States. This reply was for the isolation­

ists sufficient proof that interventionist fears were unfounded.10®

When the Paris press wrote that Roosevelt should intervene to stop the

war, according to Newsweek, "some of the isolationists urged th© President

to avail himself of the *opportunity.1 Most other newspapers denounced

the Paris gesture as ’blackmail.1" Still according to Newsweek, most

observers were certain that th© efforts to keep France from helping Ger­

many beyond th© terns of th© armistice had failed and agreed "that the

time therefore has come for action rather than words,

Americans did not know how extensive French concessions had been.

Government circles, thanks to th® efforts of the American embassy in

Vichy, were better informed. What they learned "fulfilled" their "worst

expectations."^^1 The most dangerous clauses, from an American point of

view, were those which gave permission to th© Gormans to use Blzerte in

connection with their Libyan campaign and Dakar in connection with their

submarine campaign.105 The Paris Protocols were never accepted by th©

Vichy government because th© African governors, General Weygand, Admiral

Bstevs of Tunisia, and Boisson of lest Africa, were opposed to a plan

which would have diminished their authority in th© free parts of the

French Empire*^® Supporters of th© American Vichy policy contended after

th® war that Petain was maintained in th© right direction by th®

10%Newaw©©k, May 26, 1941.

108Ibld.

104Hull, Memoirs, p. 962.

10sIbld.

106Langer, Qur Vichy Gamble f pp. 157-159.

 zu
influence of Admiral Leahy and by the American influence on General

leygand.W According to Secretary of State Hull,

now we were to see the ripening of the fruits of our many months
spent In carefully developing closer and substantial relations with
French Africa* leygand and Boisson threw all their weight against
the Barlsn agreement. « . . Leahy added his influence to theirs,
and P^tain began to see that carrying out the agreement would possi­
bly mean a break of diplomatic relations with the United States and
war with Great Britain.^08

Langer, who wrote at the request of Secretary Hull, m s more

moderate in his estimate of the effects of the American policy on this

specific question* Admiral Leahy was informed of the situation by anti-

German officials of the trench foreign ministry* Leahy did not have any

interview with Pstain during the period of crisis* All Langer could say

was that ^indirectly, at least, all the influence of Admiral Leahy and

M s staff m s brought to bear*n^ ® He admitted that nto the General

[weygand] belongs the chief credit for frustrating the Harlan policy.

Weygand used his favorite argument that everything should be done to pre­

vent a popular uprising against the legal government.*^ fear that

concessions to Germany would excite the revolutionary instincts of the

French people at least partly substantiated the liberal claim that col­

laboration was checked by the opposition of the French population* This

time Weygand*s phobia worked against German interests. He undoubtedly

^^Bexter Perkins, America and Two Wars (Boston, 1944), p* 174.

108Hull, Memoirs, p. 962.

10W r , Our Vichff- Gamble, p* 159.

U 0Ibid.. p. 161.

m Xbld., p. 159.
 214
emphasised the repercussions of the Paris Protocols on Franco-American

and Franco-British relations but it was difficult to claim that his stand

was the aresuit of Robert Murphy’s presence in Rorth Africa or of American

exports to this area which had been too insignificant to modify the

situation in any sensible manner.

The most significant fact was that all French officials in Africa

were opposed to an agreement which would have destroyed their privileged

position in the Vichy set-up. Bven Admiral Esteva, who collaborated with

the Germans in the defense of Tunisia in 1942, opposed the Paris Proto­

cols. Finally, it should be noted that the French refusal to carry out

Harlan’s promises to the Germans did not provoke any reaction on the part

of the German government. This complete inaction was hard to conciliate

with the theory of a Vichy government successfully resisting the pressure

of Hast diplomacy, thanks to American moral and economic help. The whole

affair was the result of Harlan’s political ambitions which coincided

with Gtto Abeta’s dream of solving the Franco-German problem in a senti­

mental— although still Haai— way and his desire to please his fuehrer.

Langer wondered how Harlan made his peace with the Germans and

noted that since the latter were tTon the eve of the great attack upon

Russia . . . this entailed, for the time being at least, abandonment of

the grandiose plans that had been elaborated for the Mediterranean. "US

The German attack on Russia had been planned long before the beginning

of the negotiations which led to the Paris Protocols and was only delayed

by the Balkan operations. Hitler probably never entertained these

^ T h © list of American exports to Horth Africa figures in the

Appendix of Harold Callender, A Preface to Peace (London, 1944), p. 260.

^ “®Langer, Our Vichy Gamble, pp. 159-160.

 215

"grandiose plans.11 The Germane were ready to accept military concessions

which would have helped Eommel in Libya and the submarine campaign in the

Atlantic. They were obviously not ready and not willing to assume the

responsibilities which a full-fledged campaign in Africa would have en­

tailed. The text of the Paris Protocols showed very clearly that the

military concessions granted by the Germans to the French were not a re­

ward for the French docility. The German general staff understood very

literally the clause of the agreement stating that

he Gouvernement Frangais se chargo d*assurer, par ses propres moyens,

la defense desdites organisations untilisees du cote all©mand,H4
ainsi que cells do I1ensemble des possessions francaises en A.O.^8
©t do resister a toutes attaques, merae en passant le oas echeant, b
une action offensive contre les points d ’appui ennemis d*ou sont
parties les attaques m question#^®

The Germans were obviously afraid that military cooperation with the

French might lead to a breakdown of th© French Kmpire and the destruction

of the situation created by th© French armistice. The Germans did not

attempt to carry out th© agreement and one may wonder whether the Paris

Protocols, while they were being scuttled in Vichy, were not suffering

th© same fat© in Berlin when they reached the desk of th© real German

policy-makers•

VII

Th© best proof that Germany and the United States were apparently

carrying out th® same policy in the French Empire— that of maintaining

^%arbor facilities at Dakar.

^^Afrique Occidental© Frangaise*

d a n g e r , Our Vichy Gamble, Appendix II, p. 408.

 216

th© unity of the French colonies behind Vichy— m s given during the

Syrian campaign. The American people, ©specially the liberals, under­

stood perfectly the reasons which motivated the British intervention in

the French mandate *2.17 The British-Free French invasion of this terri­

tory was the only practical result of the Darlan’s policy. The Germans

were not long in understanding th© results of military collaboration with

the French. In spite of what m s probably a great temptation, since the

Free Frenoh-British force® which invaded Syria were militarily weak, they

refrained from helping Vichy’s efforts to maintain the Ra d privileged

position in this area. They understood that the advantages to be gained

from a military adventure in the French Empire were not worth compromis­

ing th© authority of th© Vichy government* American opinion did not un­

derstand this and Interpreted Franco-German collaboration in Syria as an

Indication that Germany was going to defend the territory. The Ration,

for instance, advised Britain ttto call Vichy’s bluff and march into Syria

before th© Raals establish themselves there in any strength* **21.8 It was

only after th© beginning of th© struggle that some observers were sur­

prised at th© German attitude* The Christian Century noted? "There are

many mysterious elements about this campaign* Most important are th©

reasons as to why the Germans haven’t fought against th© invader and why

the French have,"2-19

Most American newspapers predicted that th© conquest of Syria

could be achieved very easily.

117The SatIon, Juno 7, 1941.

U 8Xbld.

•^ T h a Christian Century, June 25, 1941.

 21?

It Is highly probable that th© occupation would prove a bloodless

operation for there are many signs that th© French arsy in Syria, if
not completely disaffected, had little stomach for a fight against
the former ally. I© do not believe that many Frenchmen would resent
such a movement. On th© contrary, they would regard it as a sensi­
ble step toward thwarting Hitler and therefore entirely in the
interests of the true France.^0

Many observers also expected that th© Arab population would revolt

against French r u l e a n d d© Gaulle*s promise to make Syria and Lebanon

independent states was considered not only democratically right but po­

litically wise. In these circumstances, the slow advance of th® invading

ansy was disappointing to Americans| according to most observers it was

the result of a "comiaendable If somewhat misguided effort to save

lives*"3^ During this campaign, American indignation against Vichy

reached heights unknown until that time# Among some commentators it de­

veloped into attacks against France as a whole* The Christian Century

reminded Americansj

Under any circumstance, there is nothing to be gained by trying to

stir up American hatred against a people who are facing the dilemma
which confronts the French. let that is just what such a widely syn­
dicated columnist as Westbrook Pegler has tried to do, with refer­
ences to fa selfish country which 1ms shown th© United States
nothing but ingratitude and g r e e d 3

Most newspapers, however, refused to believe that Vichy spoke

for Franc©, and were all th© more resentful towards the French government*

^ ®The Nation, June 7, 1941*

•^*The Christian Century, June 7, 1941.

"^^New fork Herald Tribune* July 10, 1941*

^^The Christian Century, May 20, 1941.

 218

Of all th® lesser wars engendered by the colossal crime of Nazi

aggression this was the most useless, th© most pathetic, the most
confusedly disingenuous in its motives* Good men were killed on both
sides for no reason except th© tortuous dishonesties and self-decep­
tions of the Vichy politicians who are pretending to be France* In
most wars th© loathesomeness is touched with nobility* About the
Vichy effort, first to capitalise on Syria by lending it secretly to
th© betrayal of the democratic position and then to hold it, mainly
with the blood of native African troops, against the reaction to
which the British and the Free French were thus forced, there is
nothing to excite anything save distaste tinged with disgust* The
whole episode is a commentary upon Vichy too obvious to b©
emphasized,1^4

Criticism of the State Department for maintaining its relation

with Vichy acquired in certain liberal newspapers a sarcastic bitterness*

the Hation, for instance, found the solemn marches and counter-marches of

traditional diplomacy a little out of step in a period of blitzkrieg;

there is a growing suspicion here that American diplomacy has already

delivered a crushing blow to Vichy* On Friday M* Henry-Haye, the
French Ambassador, asked Mr* Hull for an interview* M* Henry-Haye
was kept waiting* M* Kenry-Haye, after a wait, was informed that un­
fortunately th© Secretary of State was very busy* The suspicion
spread that M* Henry-Haye, as evidence of this government*® displeas­
ure, had been snubbed. Th© clever part of tills, if X remember my
Grotiua, is that a ©nub, even th© snub intentional, is not a casus
belli. The sly foxes of th® State Department had again taken
measures short of war.^5

The "Fight For Freedom" Association published a paid advertise­

ment in th© lew York Times before Bastille Day, 1942* "Just an idea,

Mr, President, to break with Vlohy on the fourteenth of July.f*^26 But

the State Department resisted "the wav© of emotionalism"^’? and kept

2£%ew York Herald Tribune, duly 10, 1941.

12SSj® Nation* June 14, 1941.

^ K e w York Xiwws. July 11, 1941.

^Langer, Our Vichy Gamble, p. 160*

 219

Ambassador Leahy in Vichy* The German campaign in Russia m s by then in

fell swing bat no on© thought that Russia could withstand the Nazi on­

slaught and American interventionists were not people to forget that

Germany would probably soon be free to turn against th© French Empire

and Dakar. According to Freda Kirchwey,

Hitler's press in Paris has indicated clearly enough what is going

to happen as soon as Hitler's hands are freed. Vichy will find that
Dakar and other key points are threatened by th© United States which,
as th© Paris newspapers point out— and their contention is backed up
by such helpful American observers as Senator Wheeler and Mr. Lind­
bergh— is now assuming the role of 'aggressor* in the Eastern At­
lantic. Vichy will beg its good neighbor, Germany, following th©
generous example of Japan, to assist it in defending these outposts
of empire. . . .
Vichy is a little worse than Berlin because it is Berlin in dis­
guise. The State Department has been dealing with the disguise, pla­
cating it, honoring its representatives, snubbing its o p p o n e n t 3.128

Ihen, in July, Vichy agreed to surrender southern Indo-Qhina to

th© Japanese, anger against th© Vichy government spread to all sections

of American opinion. Hull described the reaction of th© American public

when it learned that Vichy had invited” the Japanese government to Me-

fend the integrity” of Indo-Ghina against aggression.

Popular reaction her© to the occupation seemed more bitter against

Vichy Franc© for legalising the move than against Japan for making
it. W!© again received a wave of demands that urn break relations with
Vichy and occupy Dakar. This wav© rose when Retain mad© a radio ad­
dress on August 12 that seemed to pull the last underpinnings out
from under whatever remained of democracy in France, placed all pow­
ers in the hands of the Government, and doubled th© police force. ^29

Ambassador Henry-Haye called on the secretary of state on August 20 to

128Th® Nation, August 2, 1941.

^%ull, Memoirs, p. 1038.

 220

protest against the attitude of the American press. Freda Kircfcwey

had chargedi "The abasement of Vichy Is complete* Further acts of sub­

servience can reveal no new d e p t h . u . k a all other liberals, she at­

tacked the American economic agreement with North Africa* uIf Vichy sur­

rendered Indo-Ghina under duress, on what theory could w© continue to

sell oil to the Victor forces in North Africa? Do we have reason to think

that they will 'defend the Empire* there by tactics different from those

applied in th© Far East? let us turn to Syria for our answer.**1®

Further proofs of Vichy pro-Axis policies were yet to come. In

spite of nthe wholesale shooting of hostages by th© Germans in October,”

th® Darlan-Pucheu faction of the Vichy government decided that Weygand

should be deaoted.^S Daniel T. Brigham cabled from Berne to the Hew

fork Times on November 16? ’'Decisions are about to be taken in an effort

to break the apparent deadlock between two schools of thought prevailing

in the Vichy government,"18* Th© faction which was in favor of offering

military collaboration to the Germans won out.^®5 Many American newspa­

pers considered that the dismissal of Weygand was the result of German

pressure. Such was the opinion of Langer, although h© admitted that

Barian and Fuohsu agreed on "the need of getting rid of Weygand.” Retain

naturally complained to Leahy that he was the victim of a German

130Hull, Memoirs, p. 1088.

1 5 1 ^ Nation, August 2, 1941.

lgaIbid.

^®®Langer, Our Vichy* Gamble, p. 192*

3*®*New York Times, November 17, 1941.

^^Weygand was dismissed on November IS, 1940.

 ZZ1
ultimatum. 136 xt was hia usual defense when the United States protested

some pro-Axis action of th® Vichy government. Undoubtedly Otto Abets,

the German ambassador in Paris, used his influence against leygand but

one© more his pressure may have been the result of French intrigues a®

well as that of orders from his government. German distrust of Weygand

was very natural, however, in view of th© hopes his presence in Worth

Africa had raised in the American press. A Washington report to the Hew

fork limes noted that there were several interpretations of th©

significance of Weyganddismissal.

For some time now the possibilities that th® United States or
Britain might land an expeditionary force in North Africa to cooper­
ate with General Weygand in a campaign that would eventually lead to
an Allied attack of th© continent from across the Mediterranean has
been freely discussed in the American press.
Robert I). Murphy • . • has been in North Africa, as have been a
number of United States 1observers*1 Thus, as cm© official stated
tonight, ’the democracies have again talked too much and done too
little in implementing their policies of war.1
This interpretation of th® events of th® day does not mean that
the Germans have abandoned their schemes to take over Casablanca and
Dakar . . . but for the moment there is little reliable evidence to
g?PP<»t ttw viaw that Vichy has gona aTl the m y over to the German
side or that This Germans are ready for their Casablanca drived 57

Most American newspapers, especially th© interventionist ones,

did not agree with this interpretation of the situation in Vichy. The

New York Times sounded an alarmist note in its editorials*

The great battle now raging in the distant desert between British
and Axis armies, and the capitulation of Marshal Fetain to Hitler’s
demands for the removal of General Weygand, must be viewed as closely
related events in the struggle for a continent. In the outcome of
that struggle th© United States had a direct concern^ for German
troops based at Dakar, opposite the bulge of Brasil would constitute

^®®lang®r, Our Vichy Gamble, p. 195.

^®7New York Times, November 21, 1941* Italics mine.

 ZZ2

a real threat to the security of this hemisphere as they would to

Great Britain*s communications with her Eastern Empire* This danger
has long been recognised. How that it is actually taking shape, th©
United States does not need to stand by and watch helplessly. . . •
Hitler has taken steps towards obtaining another foothold on the
southern shores of the Mediterranean* That is the real meaning of
the ousting of General Weygand.138

This belief was shared by many liberals. Ralph Ingersoll wrote in P. M*

that "at this moment of writing, Hitler's armies are farther from London

than they are from Hew York* "3.39 According to Ingersoll, there were no

military obstacles between Hitler and America via Dakar while there were

armies on watch on the British coasts* These fears increased the Mew

York Times* conviction that the American efforts in Vichy were necessary

and useful.

In view of the dangers to the United States in this Axis mnmvre,

all thoughtful Americans must give thank® that far-seeing statesman­
ship has made it possible for us to play a part in this crucial
struggle, not only by exerting political and economic pressure but
by putting weapons in th© hands of our friends .3*40

For the liberals th© dismissal of leygand was one more proof that Ameri­

can influence in Vichy m e not sufficient to modify the course of events

and thus not worth the ideological cost of maintaining relations with

the French Fascists,

On November 20 a press release announced that the whole American

policy toward France "was being reviewed" and that the shipments to North

Africa were s u s p e n d e d , 3-41 This news was greeted with enthusiasm by the

l^Mew York Times, November 21, 1941,

M.,
mm mm * November 18,w 1941.

■^Henr York Times, November 21, 1941,

141Ibld.
 22b

liberal pres® and many newspapers expected that severance of the diplo­

matic ties with Vichy would follow* "On further consideration," wrote

Langer, "the State Department revised itself."3.42 As a matter of fact,

the hesitations of the State Department were only m aspect of th® feud

between Cordell Hull and Sumner Welles, The latter had issued this press

release without the knowledge of the Secretary of State who was as

convinced as ever of th® efficacy of his diplomatic methods.3-4S

To many observers th© interview between Retain and Goering at

Saint-Florentin on December 1 was the logical consequence of Petain's

first surrender, th© removal of Weygand from his African poet* Most

American newspapers predicted that French-Gersian collaboration was going

to enter a new phase. It is now known that this meeting was just as

fruitless as Montoire had been but there was then much anxiety in America

about the fate of French Africa and Dakar* According to the Hew lork

Post, Potain m s reported

to have agreed that Germany can have all the Vichy naval and air
bases in North Africa. * * * Capitulation was the expected outcome
of the Goering-Petain conversations, the logical event to succeed
the *resignation* of General Weygand and th© natural parallel to
Vichy’s capitulations in th© Far East.
We should break relations with Vichy, oust the Vichy-Naai spies
from the country and accord full recognition and aid to the Free
French government. We should occupy French Guiana, Martinique and
Guadeloupe, thereby sterilising direct Nasi infection in this hemi­
sphere* We should, if it is within our military power, seize
Dakar.3.44

American attention, however, was focused on the Pacific. Just

3-42^ang@r^ pur Vichy Gamble, p. 196*

^4%ull, Memoirs, p. 1043.

144SJew fork Post, December 6, 1941*

 224

before and after Pearl Harbor few American observers had time to bother

with the details of the French situation* But this did not prevent the

liberals from attacking the State Department’s French policy, chiefly on

th© matter of American shipments to North Africa which ware resumed

shortly after the removal of Weygand* Liberal indignation was increased

by th© fact that America was then at war with th© Axis*

Th® American attitude toward Vichy just before Pearl Harbor was

investigated by public opinion experts. They found out that only about

one American out of two had any vague knowledge of th® existence of th©

Vichy government. Only IS per cent of these well-informed citizens had

a favorable opinion of this government; only 20 per cent expected that

it would resist a German attempt to use th© French fleet against Great

Britain; 72 per cent were decidedly hostile to Vichy* On the question

of whether America should break off diplomatic relations with Vichy, the

result of this poll reflected th© division of American press opinion*

Of those who had some knowledge of the French situation 48 per cent ac­

cepted what a majority of American newspapers had to say in favor of the

State Department's French policy but a powerful minority of 44 per cent

were convinced that a complete break with Retain would be more useful to

the cause of the United Nations than new attempts to prevent Vichy

France from becoming a full partner of G e r m a n y *3*45

^^Quostions asked on November 26, 1941, Four La Victoire,

February 28, 1942.
 CHAPTER VII

AMERICAN OPINION OP IS GAULLE, F H U V AID LAVAL, 19la~l$l2

the Vichy policy of collaboration with Germany and America’s

entrance into the war did not bring about a rapprochement between the

United States and General Charles de Gaulle1s Free French movement. Al­

though th© Free French territories were included in th© Lend-lease pro­

gram in November, 19hl> a month later the unexpected occupation by the

Free French of Saint-Pierre and Miquelon, small French islands off the

coast of Newfoundland which were still under Vichy rule, created much

displeasure in the State Department# Early in April, 191*2, an American

consul was sent to Brazzaville, the capital of Free French Equatorial

Africa, but it was only in accord with the American policy of dealing

with all local authorities in th© French empire and in no way constituted

recognition.

Meanwhile, the prestige of th© Vichy government was further im­

paired by the Riom trials, in which the government failed to prove that

responsibility for th© defeat of June, 19LG, lay solely with th© liberal

politicians who had preceded Vichy in power. The proceedings were fi­

nally discontinued on Hitler*s order in April, 191*2. A few days later

Petain appointed Laval prim® minister. This event led to Admiral Leahy’s

recall to Washington but diplomatic relations between Vichy and th©

United States were not broken off.

225
 226

Th© American government did not help th® Free French force® in

their attempt to bring more French territory into th® war. In Marti­

nique , for instance, an agreement aiming at the protection of Pan*

American interests against possible German infiltration was concluded in

December, 19lil, between State Department representatives and Admiral

Robert, the governor of th® French possessions in*$he Western Hemisphere,

who signed as Vichy* s representative. Laval*9 return to power, however,

led the American government for security reasons to seek tighter mili­

tary control of th® French Antilles* Mew negotiations were initiated

with Admiral Robert, this time without reference to Vichy in spite of

Robert*s continued allegiance to Retain but also without reference to

d® Gaulle despite his claims to the French colonial possessions.

D© Gaulle1a position was improved, however, when, after long ne­

gotiations over the political future of France, representatives of the

French resistance movements, who had gathered in London, recognised him

as the spokesman abroad of the French underground. Th© Free French move­

ment then changed its name to that of Fighting France. On duly 3, 19h2,

this new situation was sanctioned by th® British government, which gave

to th® French National Committee, presided over by ds Gaulle, a large

measure of practical recognition as th® nsymbol*1 of French resistance to

the Axis* On July 9 th® American government, however, went only so far

as to recognise 11the contribution” of the French National Committee and

to pledge its military assistance.

II

The future of the d@ Gaulle movement seemed doubtful after th©

"i
Dakar Mfiasco.K French Equatorial Africa and the French islands in th©

^Se© p p.
 227

Pacific had accepted his leadership and broken away from Vichy, but these

colonies were remote and had little strategical importance, then d© Gaulle

completed his bloodless conquest of French Equatorial Africa by occupying

Gabon, Current History remarked that

strategically the victory amounted to little* It prevented the

Axis from securing a useful submarine base and furnished the
Allies with an outlet for the cocoa, vegetable oils, and other
products of French Equatorial Africa. More importantwas its
effect on de Gaulle*a wavering prestige* Once more the Radio
general could afford to thunders *Join me— to save Franc©.*2

Th© term ‘'Radio general,*' was commonly used at the time.In Radio Goes

to War, Charles J« Role notedthat Md® Gaulle is superbly ©quipped by

nature for th© role of Radio General* Ha has a genius for martial oratory

that is in keeping with the best Gallic tradition. • » . Unquestionably

th© Fro© French movement owes its existence as much to the power of radio

as to the aid of th© British government.^

During th© months which followed d® Gaulle made very little pro­

gress in American opinion. It was only in the spring of 19kl that lib­

eral newspapers took a position in favor of his movement. On May 31,

19kl, th© New York Poet asked for “recognition” of th® Free French. The

Jewish newspaper, Opinion, demanded at that time “that every Jew in

America, who lived in France yesterday and throughout th© years, shall

stand sturdily, helpfully, sacrificially by th© side of General d© Gaulle

and under the banner of Free Francs A public opinion poll, however,

taken in July, 191*1, revealed that only about one third of th© American

2
Current History, December 10, 19kG»

\olo, Radio Goes to gar, pp. 197-198.

h ,

Opinion, June, 19kl*

 228

peoples knew approximately who de Gaulle was* It was veiy significant to

note, however, that the better Informed an American was, the more in­

clined he was to consider that do Gaulle represented the opinion of the

French people as a whole* The better informed Americans were, the more

suspicious they also were of Vichy fs policy* A total of 73*h per cent

of those who had heard of do Gaulle saw in him the real representative of

France* Only XO*ii per cent thought that Fetain could talk for the French

peopled A poll taken one month later showed that about Ih per cent of

the population also favored extension of the LencHGease program to the

Free French forces, and that only about 16 per cent were opposed to that
6
measure*u

On September 2t, %9bX> the Free French national Committee was

organised in London* Cordell Bull noted in hi® Memoirs that ffthe British

Government accorded it a considerable degree of practical recognition*

To the President and m cam© a renewed flood, of demands that m do like-

wise*”? The Secretary of State was quite opposed to such a recognition*

Be Gaulle had just scandalised American diplomatic circles by an inter­

view he had given to George Weller of the Chicago Daily hews. This inter­

view was in fact a demand for direct American support* teller had quoted

de Gaulle as offering to the United States bases in the African terri­

tories and Pacific islands under Free French control ^without demanding

destroyers in return*u* According to Bemarce Bess, when do Gaulle

^Questions asked on July 29, 19hl* (This poll was communicated

by the information Division of the French Embassy. )
A
Public Opinion Quarterly, Winter, 19&L, p* 630*
7
B e ll, Utaaoirs, p* 10t$*
"ww~ rw
Ilebllng, The Bocd Back to Paris, p« 1*>6.
 229

realised 11how badly this interview was received,’1 both In th© baited
9
States and in Britain, ”h© attempted to repudiate it.” Old school dip­

lomats were very shocked by de Gaulle’s direct methods. His territories

10
were, however, included in the Lend-Lease program on November 11, 19ul*

In November, too, the free French were given permission to constitute a

11
delegation to the United States* The "Official belegation of Free

France to the United States” was presided over by Adrien TiadLer, who had

been a collaborator of John finant, United States ambassador to France.

The conversations between Rene Pleven and th© State Department resulted

in various economic and financial advantages for th® Free french. Every

sign pointed towards recognition by the United States government of the

12
increased importance of the Free French movement.

Ill

Th© relations between th© Free French movement and the United

States government reached a critical low in the winter of 19hl, however,

as a result of de Gaulle’s occupation of Saint Pierre and Miquelon, the

two small French islands off th® coast of Newfoundland. These two tiny

islands, whose small population was entirely French, were under the jur­

isdiction of Admiral Robert, th© governor of the French Antilles, with

whom the American State Department had juat signed an agreement guaran­

teeing th© status quo of all territories under his command.

The origin of the incident was the fear of the Canadian govern­

ment that th© radio station on Saint Pierre might be used as a guide to

^Bemaree Bess in The Saturday Evening Post, January 3, 19U2.

10Hull, Memoirs, p. 1GL2.

•^itoot, The Secret History of the War, II, . 228.

12Ibid., II, pp. 195-96.

 230

German submarines. It was thought that the pro-Vichy representative of

Admiral Robert on Saint Pierre could not be trusted, and the British sug­

gested as a natural solution an occupation of th© islands by the Free

French*3^ secretary of State M l rejected this solution because It was

incompatible with the pursuance of his Vichy policy. Be also added in

his Memoirs that he 'locked with something like horror on any action that

would bring conflict between th© Vichy French and the Free French or the

B r i t i s h B u t such a conflict had been going on unabated for one year

and a half and it turned out that no Frenchman on the islands was ready

to shed blood in defense of P&baln's rule.

The Canadian govexment was in a difficult situation since the

British were opposed to any direct allied intervention in the islands.*^

They probably feared that such a move might be misinterpreted by French

opinion# The Americans were opposed to any solution in which the Free

French would play a p&rt.^ Admiral Bawdier, commander of th© Free

French navy, who had been sent by de Gaulle to "inspect the Free French

corvettes in Newfoundland," promised to abide by the American decision.18

Later he was ordered by d© Gaulle to carry out his instructions in spite

of American opposition. Be occupied the island® without firing a shot

and the population cheered heartily the sailors of Free France. There

*%ull, Memoirs, p# 1128.

^Xbld.

lgIbid.

l6ionger, Par Vichy Gamble, p# 215*

*^Hull, Memoirs, pp. 1128-113?.

18
Unger, tor Vichjr Gamble, pp.
were two foreign reporters m the spot, a correspondent of Le Jour in

Montreal and Ira Wolfer who cabled his story to th© Har York Tima?. "A

little less than half an hoar after the first sailor had jumped ashore

the islands had been secured in the military sense#^ The next day

there were elections and only one and a half p m emit of the population

voted in favor of returning the islands to Vioby rule*2®

Robert Sherwood described the American reaction in his book,

Roosevelt and Hopkins; "The American people hailed this m m joyfully*

They had been absorbed by terrible news for th© past eighteen days and

they were delighted to cheer any evidence that anyone on the Allied side

had actually don© something that was bold, adventurous and successful#”2^

American newspapers applauded the Free French gesture and war© ready to

forget it. Then th© State Department published a statement condemning th©

Free French action In the most sever© terms, and, as Waverley Hoot noted,

the effect was "to convert a on©~day newspaper story into a major inter­

national incident, thus producing fatally by its own action, the very re-
22
suits which it blamed Admiral l-uselier for producing#" It was actually

impossible for the American press to interpret the bitter American note

as anything but th© result of Hull’s personal resentment o f the ire©

French disregard of the State Department *s decision# To many liberals

th© State Department appeared more concerned with m$pty diplomatic forms

^Hew Toxk Times, December 25, l$il#

*^Eoot, The Secret History of the War, II, &+ 205* ”19 per cent
of th© ballots were InvSIdT" be¥a\ise tS^r were Improperly filled out or
illegible, 1 1/2 per cent in favor of collaboration with the Axis through
Fie^fl 79 1/2 per cent in favor of the'Free French#"
21
Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 181#
 232

than with th© broader Issues involved in the Saint Plerr© incident.2^

Th© State Department *s not© was baaed on the agreement between

the United State® and Martinique, the Monroe Doctrine, and the Havana

conference which forbade any transfer of sovereignty in European posses­

sions in th© Western Hemisphere* This was ©specially surprising in view

of th© State Department’s alleged policy of maintaining French unity with­

in and without the Vichy orbit* The not© issued by the State Department

mentioned that the islands had been occupied by "three so-called 11?©©

French ships which had landed m th© island” of Saint Pierre.2^ Ibis

sentence particularly infuriated liberal opinion.2'* The State Depart­

ment received letters of protest addressed to the "so-called” Secretary

of State*2** Cordell Hull never foxgav© da Qaulle for this outburst of

criticism* According to Sherwood, he did not accept it in a spirit of

"amused indifference.” Hull had been, until that time* "virtually ex-

esgjt” from the criticism directed against all th© other members of Presi­

dent Roosevelt’s cabinet*.

As an elder stateuam and a figure of great dignity, M l had

established for himself a position that was almost sacrosanct*
It was bewildering m well as infuriating for M m to find himself
the target of the kind of insults and gibes to which many of his ««
colleagues in th© had long sine© become acatstoraed.

^The Hm Republic, January 5, 19^2*

December 25, W kl* Hull, Memoirs, p. 1129*

2%elegram of the Union for Democratic Action to the State Depart­

ment, in New York Herald Tribune, December 23, 19i*l| telegram of "fifty
prominent citizens'* to Ibosevalt’, claiming that the action was a violation
of "both th© letter and th© spirit of the Atlantic Charier,” in Hesr York
Times, January 2, X9l|2*

^Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. i*32* Hull, Memoirs, p. 1131*

27
'Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p# k$3*
 233

la his lesaolrs Hull gave the impression that Admiral Muselier’s quarrel

with de c&ulle had teen caused primarily by the former's consciousness

of having offended the American Secretary of States#2^ from that time on,

Hull1® resentment against de Gaulle became an important factor in the

American attitude totrarcte the free French movement * As Hull put it him­

self, "few actions that seemed so minor have ever aroused opposition that

became so bitter*"2^ Secretary of Far Hemy L. Stiaison wrote that «He

could not believe that it was wise of the State Department to have so

long a memory for such annoyances* ”3®

All American attempts to bring about a withdrawal of the Free

French forces on Saint Pierre and Miquelon proved futile* Sherwood noted

erroneously that "the semblance of fichy sovereignty over St Fierro and

Miquelon was restored, with provisions for strict Allied supervision of

the activities of the radio station* The British, however,, refused to

accept any solution which would not have the consent of de Gaulle*

Speaking at Ottawa, ?/instou Churchill attacked Vichy and praised de Gaulle

in a speech which sounded Ilka a condemnation o f the State Department*s

attitude*32 This, coupled with th© attitude of the American press,

caused, in the words of Sherwood, "Hull’s rage to mount to hurricane

pr op o r t i o n s . B u t the New York Herald Tribune commented favorably on

08
H&ll, Memoirs, p# 1129*

59Ibid., p. 1130*

^Quoted In Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p* 1*89#

3lIbid*

**2Hew York Times, December 31# 191*1#

^Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 1$3 *

 aft
Churchill *s speech*

If there wm mgr logger any qu©stion about it, the Prims

Minister has certainly blown. all questions of Saint Pierre and
Miquelon and Washington*s wso-called Tm& French* through the
dusty windows of th© Stats department.
Her© as elsewhere, Mr* Churchill understands that In the grim
psychology of war there are moments when the fortright and ag­
gressive spirit, the boldness to demand as well as dicker, and
the capacity to grasp emotional values of a situation, are more
important than all the gains of deviousness and subtlety* That
is what the State Department has failed to realize in respect to
th© problem of France* Uninformed as to what the Department Is
trying to do, most Americana will still hesitate to criticize its
recent action) few after this can do otherwise than criticise the
befuddlement and want of courage in the manner of its utterances*^

The speech of Churchill had a great influence on American opinion.

According to the figures compiled by the lamas S* Tewtiey Associates, *it

was one of th© most collet© reversals of press opinion in a ye&r**^

«Why this sudden reversal?® asked P»M* ffXn the first place the press,

immediately after the occupation of the islands, had thought it a fine

thing* Only after the State Department*$ protest did it swing into line*

Then came public reaction* % m came the speech of Churchill. ^ the

Hew York Post led the attack* In front-page editorials this paper de­

manded that the #nullifiersw be swept out.*^ Samuel Grafton was °so hap­

py over th© St.Piexre-Mlquelon incident® that he «could sing# ^ He sug­

gested that Wendell Wtllkie be appointed the Secretary of State and

^ I n Sherwood, Booseveli and Hopkins, p. M3*

January 6, 19t2*

^^Ibid#

Z'fitm York Post, December 29, 19lil«

^Xbld*, January 3, lft2.

 235

attacked the whole American foreign policy*

w© shall begin to win the war when we give up our pose of

injured innocence, confess frankly that we spent the last fire
years playing a shrewd and in many respect® a naughty game, and
heat our head® to the earth as a m r k of repentance and reform***#
It is m t Inmcence, fee bullet-pocked walls of fee world and
fee orphan® of the democratic dead cay ou t feat it is not innocence $
fee wounds of France laid open by Hitler and salted by us, speak
with their red, mouths, saying that the cosing of the war has not
yet changed our policy *35*

The Slew York Times tried to defend the State Department# Ann©

OUl&re YscGonaicik approved de Gaulle's action but oppressed the opinion

that

The St* Pierre affair cannot be considered apart from our policy
toward France a® a whole, and to criticize it as State Dqparfeent
policy is absurd to anyone who knows the f&et***«The fact Is feat
Washington lias hmxi fighting a delaying action in France as truly
as General l&cArtkur has h e m playing for time in the Philippines *
***lt may b© argued that our entry into the war changes our rela­
tion to the United nations fighting Hitler, but our belligerency
does not diminish the necessity of waging diplomatic battles as
successfully as we can until we are ready for military battles*^

This article showed to feat an extent the incident had shocked American

public opinion* ISns* McCormick was appealing to the habitual supporters

of the Vichy policy who were puzzled by more ^appeasement# aright after

Pearl Harbor.

The final, result of fee Saint FieiTe-Miquelon affair was not fav­

orable to de Gaulle* Although he acquired faithful supporters among

American liberals and all those who thought he was persecuted by the

American government, his rm h action created a deep resentment in

loan governmental circles, including- the President himself# "Ostensibly

totk Post, December 31, 19hX»

Yolk Tfcaes, January ?, 1^2*
 236
d© Gaulle geared a resounding success,** wrote ir* langer, % ui he had for­

gotten fee old diplomatic adage that it is dangerous to play little tricks

on great powers.*^ Sherwood also condemned 4© Gaulle*® initiative m

plainly outrageous and taoamsable, oven though it was in con**

fonaance wife Allied militaxy policy, and sound policy at that*
It was an act calculated - and it would seem - deliberately cal­
culated. - to cause acute embarrassment to three of France *s most
powerful friends and Allies - Britain, Canada and the United States*
It was a daaensir&iiea of the arrogance and recalcitrance as well m
the courage and fierce devotion to the cause of French sovereignty
which made him fee strange character he was***2

IV

After the Saint Fierre-Miquelon incident, fee de Gaulle movement

once m m appeared to b© taring its end* Even the supporters of General

de Gaulle had doubts concerning his ability to give political importance

to his movement# Yhe editorials of the newspapers which supported the

State Department *s policy certainly did not help the Free French in this

task# Th© Christian Science Monitor, for instance, rmarked that "fee

political activity of fee movement has not measured up to its fine mili­

tary achievements,** and that "th© amorphous political state of the Free

French movement leads to frequent blunders fetch weaken th© prestige of

the movement*" the conclusion was typical of many similar editorials?

"For fee French, General d© Gaulle remains a brilliant general and a gal­

lant manj he is not recognized a® the political leader of a n m France

which shall rise from defeat **^3 Liberal newspapers continued to fight

for de Gaulle* Begardless of the fact feat he was a "difficult man to

deal with," he was the only french leader fighting Oermqy. Liberals

^Langer, Our Vichy Gamble, p# 221*

^Sherwood, Bposevelt and. Mopklna, pp* 480-481*

^Christian Science Monitor, January 8, 1$42*

 237

charged that most of the difficulties had been created by Washington's

^appeasement" of Vichy and that tills inexperienced diplomat had been up­

set by th© State Department*s perfidious tactics*

The "logic of war obliged the United States to deal with de

Gaulle in the Pacific* In order to get bases against the Japanese, the

United States agreed to eo-oper&i© with the Free French in the defense

of the French Pacific islands* This was done very unceremoniously but

The Nation optimistically noted that it was "left-handed recognition at

least * * • and a real slap at Vichy* Early in April, 19k2, the State

Department sent a consul to Brazzaville, the capital of Free French

Africa*^ This was naturally done without consultation with Vichy# The

American press applauded the move* The New Tork &un remarked that

In Brazzaville there are - we say be thankful for it - no

Vichy officials* Equatorial Africa is administered by Frenchmen
who will not abandon their territory to Japanese or Germans or
Italians without a fight*
To ask Vichy*s permission to send an American consular rep­
resentative to our friends in Brazzaville would be to proffer a
gratuitous insult to every French lover of and fighter for lib-
erty.k?

Although Washington *s attitude in Equatorial Africa was m de­

parture from its policy of dealing with authorities in control on the

spot - as in Martinique ~ some coroentators attached a special signifi­

cance to the State Departments gesture* According to Edwin L* James,

"the move was more than an ordinary step" as "shown by the statement in

Hatlon, March 7, 19h2.

k%bid.

^lesr Yoift Ttaes, April 5, 19li2.

“h m roxk Sun, April 9 , 19k2.

 &8

Washington that It m s a recognition of the potential value of the tor*

rltories Involved in the united wax effort#^ This was, however, a

meagre consolation for those who wanted to see the free French accepted

a full-fledged ally# tim fork Herald Tribune felt tlrnt »The an*
x m m m m t might be applauded politely If it could be considered to rep­

resent a spontaneous step in the crab-wise progress of the State Depart­

ment toward a realisation of the significance of the Free French noire**

ment*#^ The San Francisco Chronicle reacted in the same maimer*

We are recognising F m e France on the installment plan*

First It was lew Caledoni&g n m It is French Fquatorial Africa*
Both of these are parts of Wrm France****
Recognition wouM strengthen the hand of the Free French and
encourage them mightily*
We ought to recognise the Free Iranch# They are fighting m
m t side| they are entitled to our help* We could make them more
useful to our side* Why do we wait? why do we still sen! supplies
to the Vichy French in Africa when we know such supplies have been
handed over to the Arts? This is one of the mysteries of our State
Department *5®

An American fighting with the Free Franch in Africa, Hassoldt Davis, de­

scribed in his bode Half Fast When his reaction aid that of his French

friends to the attitude of the State Department*

The United States had promised m m planes half a year ago, but the
policy of deliberate discouragement of the Fighting French was as
effective then as now* 1 begged in cables, broadcasts and articles
for essential material, but there m s no sign of m ? recognition of
our needs, except, finally, the posting of a consul to Br&m&ville#
'Oils cheered us somewhat3 it should have meant that American rela­
tions with Vichy were at an end* It meant nothing ox the sort* It
was merely a preparatory move towards America *s using the French

Mew Xork Times , April 5$ 191*2.

k%ew xorfe Herald Tribune, April 6, X9hZ*

^®$on Francisco Chronicle, April 6, 191*2*

 zw

facilities of air and hafhor bases while remaining disdainful

of the Fighting French themselves ,51

Hobody denied that the situation relative to the Free French was

lamentable* but many people did not think that it m s only the result of

the State Department fs policy. Even Waverley Boot admitted in The Secret

History of the War that the Fro© French wore handicapped by political dis­

sension.^ The Christian Selene® Monitor answered negatively the question

«!las France a Government?M

With the Has! sabotage of France, the Petaxi**Vichy minority

maneuvering to be acclaimed the real masters of France* and General
de Gaulle seeing to establish his group as a French Government, it
can b® said that France today has no true goverrsaent. In this sit­
uation, friends of France are reduced to encouraging both groups' to
oppose the lads, measswhil© seeking by every means to support the
spirit of freedom in the French people - who will eventually obtain
a true and representative gOK&rmm%*$3

?
During the spring' of 1$|2 American attention was also focused on

Vichy France. The long awaited political trials of French leaders had

begun at H i m on February 19, 19&2* Criminal proceedings had been insti­

tuted by the Vichy government against members of falser governments ac­

cused of being responsible for the declaration, the conduct, and the dis­

astrous course taken by the war in 1939 and Cementing upon that

^H&ssoldt Davie, Half Fast When (Em Xork, 19U*}, P* £>*

Hoot, The Secret History o£ tie War, 11, f& 19$*

^Christian Science Monitor, April 13, 19ii2.

^Constitutional Act of August 1, 1$ 40, in Lemkin, Axis Buie in

Stain®. no. 180-81* nThe court shall try persons who"have cam-
Bitted offenses or nave violated their m x x m by acts which contributed
to passing from a state of peace to a state of war before September 1*,
1939, and also those persons who later on aggravated the consequences of
the situation thus created.0
 22*0

procedure fro® a legal point of view# Baph&el La&in declared In Axis

Fule in Occupied Burope that FSueh a fortaulatlon of criminal reaponsi-

*********** »ini<<nin inwn^iitOiiiiftiiMiintiiiitiiiiiir •>*^Mnw i» W»r iw»» *i

bility represents ex-peab«f&eto legislation and violation of well recog­

nised principles of criminal Aa early as September# 1<&0# the

living Age had predicted that "the trials at f&om* * ♦idll prove abortive*

and that# ,Tlike the Leipzig trials of the Oeman *war criminals* they will

be more of a farce than a responsible study of the genesis of Tforld far

Two***-^ The sensibilities of even those who believed that the mistakes

of the pre-war governments were responsible for the French defeat were

offended by the Kiom trials*

The tragic confusion of France in defeat does not seem to bo

bettered by the bitterness of the factions* It Is not improved
by the temper which will put Daladier and his associates in gov***
erment on trial for war guilt* That has the Franc©-$panish touch#
as if France had been engaged in a civil war and the winners were
now to take vengeance on the losers * . * *
Guilt is all over the political map of France* A popular tri­
bunal of justice Blight give the world a speetable of govmmental
inconpetency and selfishness which would be exe&plary and admoni­
tory to all people• but the French trial will present the guilty
trying: the guilty*??

The Vichy government encountered understandable delays in setting

up its stag© show# but the French political prisoners were not forgotten

by American liberal thinkers • On the occasion of his birthday* the fol­

lowing telegram was sent to Leon Blum* the leader of the French Socialist

Farfcy*

Axis Bale in Occupied Europe* p. 181*

^living Age* September# 19k0 *

??Chicago Mbtm©# duly 29# 192$ •

 21*1

The fallowing p W P of American educators, cler&caenj writers,

journalists, artists, all those with faith in democracy ** take the
occasion of your birthday to egress io y m their sympathetic
greeting and to caress m m i l the hope that you may soon be justly
freed of charges. fTe wish to express our ewtfictanoe in your persons
al integrity and your devotion to the best interests of France and
her people*>8

When the trial finally began in February, 191|£, there was a new

outburst of indignation in the American press*® It soon became obvious

that the trial would turn to the confusion of the accusers. According

to Robert Sherwood, It may be possible that Fet&la1® decision to admit

the press was due to Roosevelt*s personal interest In the trial.

He called treHec and said, °3end a cable t© Bill Leahy asking him
to tell Fctain that I want to get tfeto full transcripts of those Idem
trials from day to dsy*rt
Roosevelt did not core to wait until the end of the war to read
this interesting material*^

The Haw Republic could write in the w m of practically all. American ®pinr

ion when it affilmed s

The Biom trial is not a real trial. It is an episode in the

world fight between fascism and its adversaries# From the first
hearings American public opinion has sided with the accused against
the Vichy Government. This reaction Is a sign of the moral and po­
litical good health of this country# In spite of the mistakes and
weaknesses of the Third Republic* between those who represent French
democracy accused at Riom and their fascist accusers, America doesn't
hesitate#$1

^ Letter of Helen Grace Carlisle to The Hatton, May 20, 191*1#

Among the signatures wore the names of HarryTS^F'Sffines, Louis Brosa-
field, Carl Sandburg, Quincy Howe, Freda Kirchwcy, Dorothy Thompson,
Raymond Oram Swing, Oswald Garrison Villard, John Dewey, Paul Muni, and
Clarence Streit.

% m Ywtk Times, February 5, 191*2#

^Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 500.

Hew Republic, March 23, 19l*2«

 g£{2

Fra®. Hloa The Nation ?s correspondent reported at the outlet of

the trials that "Slum w u H -be the leading spirit in the defense* Hie

spirit of France shone once more when Leon Blum facts! the court at the
62 It Boon became ap~
opening of the long^delajod H I ® war guilt trials ♦”

parent that the trial would not be a trial* The old contro­

versy about the causes of the French defeat m s revived in the RLoei court

room and in American newspapers as well| but in 19&2 the voice of the lib­

erals and of the defenders of the leftist wing in French politics was much

louder than it had been in IS%0* Regardless of the fact that they denied

the competence of the tribunal, since the defendants had been freely

elected by the French people, liberals and radicals accepted the challenge

of Vichy and eauuborattael:ccl violently* ffIt Is the fault of military men,

not of politicians,” charged l?Callicustt In /jfee ilar Republic, **that France

could oppose to the modern conceptions of the Geraan General Staff only

the methods of Hie last war, The man who* sine® the death of Foch, was

the highest French military was not Daladier but Petain,1^ The nation

also insisted on the responsibility of the military men*

Evidence presented at the M o m trial continues to reveal ap­

palling inefficiency in the war leadership of French generals, many
of whoa are today in positions of high rsaposssibility in the Vichy
regime* * * *
In fact, the defendants, become Hie accusers before the court of
public opinion* They place where It belongs— on Farslml Fetain and
his military clique— the responsibility for many, If not for most,
of the deficiencies of the French Irmy*^

*.««*«***
Hatton,
mm *r
February 23, I9h2*
61
The ifar Republic, March 23, 19l*2•

^ H i a Itettaa, March 28, l?t(2.

 Only a fm American newspapers failed to interpret the Rian tri­

als as a farce staged, by reactionaries against democracy* Foremost among

these were the Bears't papers, In an editorial the Hear York Journal Amer-

lean claimed that

Hie trial of Daladier and Blum in France may be the beginning of a

new era of justice and peace on this earth, , * * It is surely
time that the men responsible for the murder and the misery of war
should be tried and convicted and desertedly punished for the high­
est of all crimes against heaven and humanity*
It is hoped that the guilty will be convicted in France and
that their prosecution will afford an example - a precedent
which all the other outraged people of the world will follow. ^

The most remarkable thing about tills editorial wm that It looked at the

M m . trials, not even so much frara the Fichy point of view which was al­

most as nationalistic as political, but purely from Hitler’s point of

view. More than two months after Pearl, Harbor the Journal American as­

sumed that «*w»r guilt* was on the democratic side, Commenting on this

document, The Hation remarked ?

The extraordinary thing about It 1® that, except for a brief note

in P*H«f no responsible coramentator has thought this inflammatory
editorTal worth mentioning* If some eccentric professor should
write a book developing ih© theme of j$r* Hearst'*s article it would
reach comparatively few readers but would, no doubt be denounced and
discredited by reviewers all over the country, Xe-t for every hun­
dred readers reached by such a book and by Hie review of It, Mr,
Heerst reaches 10,000,^6

Without poirtm so far as the Journal American, m m conservative Americans

— »* M<,aww.i'.w,i .I.HWirtw** w up-.iji m iwmnimwm— »

either accepted the trials an a serious affair— as did the reader of a

Hew York paper who suggested that it was Pierre Cot’s duty to go to

^Quoted in The Nation, Search 7, 19l$.

<iw«>i.miwl» «■* »»*»**

6T h « H&tion, itercb 7,
 9hh

France ©33d stand trial^?— or attributed the1repulsive side of the Hie®

trials to direct German intervention and freed the Vichy government of

respomibilitr*68

As a-matter of fact the trial® Hook an unexpected t u m " ^ a®

well for those who expected they would be a farce as for those who thought

they would prove the wgulltw of the Republican leaders * They regained a

farce in ihoir conception, in the respective positions of the defendants

aid accusers, in the attitude of the government toward them, but the

French Judiciary traditions prevented them from turning into a totali­

tarian comedy 6n the Berlin or Moscow pattern# As one correspondent noted,

"The Third Republic never looked so good as it has under fire from its

s u c c e s s o r # *70 Even more important, for America at war, was the fact, ob­

vious from the outset of ih© trial®, that the Vichy government did not

dare accuse Paladier and Eeynaud of being responsible for the outbreak of

the war# Dorothy Thompson emphasised that point in an address at the

French American club#

In this tragic farce no on®, not even the accusers, is prepared to

put upon France or any frenchman the guilt for this war* And since
this was the only purpose that Hitler hoped to have served by this
trial— the final degradation of a nation that says on its knees s
»Hot only am I defeated, but I was an evil nation and you are a
noble character”— the Flora trials acquit France whether they acquit
Gameljji, Dala&ier and Blum or not. It iss a terrible tiling to see
the men of Vichy put the guilt for the defeat upon the shoulders
of their fello^eountrymen| it is a disgraceful tiling to see that

^Quoted in the Free World, April, 19h2*

^William Philip Simms in the New lork world Telegram, April 16,
1$*2 .
69Ibid.
70
Quoted in Laager, Our Vichy Gamble, p, 2b$*
 2k$
those whose blase for the lack of preparation la at least
for let xm mot plead the M. m case In this roa^— se-ek scapegoats,
yet some last vestige of national pride on the part of the men of
?lchy prevents them £ t m rendering a verdict against France m be­
half of Germany.71

According to The observation led m to suggest

that maybe "Vichy is mot m supine in its relationship to Oersa&ny as is

commonly supposed** Bat this newspaper found, out that there **w&s little

other evidence to support this viw.B It was difficult to believe that

the Vichy government had consented to ridicule Itself In order to condemn

Has&ism at the seme time* Thg lation concluded with other liberal news­

papers that "The Him trials prove, however, that Hi© 3’

r mh. courts are

resisting Mass! dictation just m the German courts did in the first years

of Hitler*s regime* *72 was also the collusion of G# I* Archmb&ult,

the correspondent of the Hew Tosds Times, when the court adj©urmed— never

to- meet again— a little after Hitler *s public outburst against the pro­

ceedings at Horn*

The original intention was to discover and punish the men nre­
sponsible for the war,* which manifestly was in accord with Oera&n
desires. But by the time the court had gathered some hOO depositions
and had read ream upon re&ts of pleadings and attendant memoranda,
its terms of reference were limited to an investigation of unpre-
paredness. « . •
Defending counsel are the first to recognise that the court has
proved judicial and impartial although striving to remain within the
terms of reference [from Blumfs accession to power to the Armistice].
Judge Caoue, indeed, has succeeded in creating an atmosphere that has
set at res t earlier assumptions that everything at the trial was pre­
arranged. * « •
The conclusion is unavoidable— it is not n w — that France was not
prepared for war, In numbers, in material, in doctrine and possibly

71
Address delivered by Dorothy Thompson at the French American
Club, March 9$ 19h2 (Coraminicatec? by the French Embassy).

^Yhe Matlon, llarch 28, 1$*2.

 2U6

also in the morale of her troops and people*

But what of the responsibility for all of this? Can it be
pinned specifically m certain, men and if so in whole or in part?
Or can it be ascribed to defects inherent in the eyrfcoa of govern­
ment that passed away with defeat? And is the court in a position
to decide these matters?
these questions— and the answers*— are of such import that they
could explain why the Supreme Court may not sit again* at least not
until the war is over*73

?!
The Hiom trials dealt a serious blow to what was left of the pres­

tige of the Pet&in regime. HO one was more conscious- of it than Detain

himself* and his anxiety over the German reaction to the trials was ap­

parently the main reason for Laval’s return to power in April, 19it2. In

Our ?lchy Gamble, hanger accepted the current theory that Laval *s rein­

statement as prime minister was the result of Gcsmn pressure, but he gave

absolutely no evidence of such pressure* Instead, he noted that Gearing

himself had advised Laval wnot to re-enter the french government, but to

wait until peace had been made and real collaboration became possible*

Hitler evidently never abandoned his contemptuous indifference toward the

Vichy leaders. Laval had sent his aon-inrlasr, Eon«S de Chamhrun, to Vichy

in oilier to frighten Detainj but it m B Detain who took the initiative of

negotiations with Laval. If proof were needed that the return of Laval

was mostly due to the fear of the men of Vichy, the Goebbels diaries would

provide it. Goebbels noted several times the American nervousness at

French developments* He recorded on April 19s !lThe French Cabinet shift

still elicits great interest in the world. We continue to maintain reser­

vations.*^ This remark would not have been made if France bad only

^Hew York Times, April 5, 191*2.

^Lapger, Our Vichy Gamble, p. 21*6.

^Louis loehncr, ed., The Goebbels Diari.es (Hew York, 191*3), p. 36.
Entnror vkaimiliy S&, 19&&. ltUIcs**iEn©r"
 m

carried out a German order* It was Gocbbel’a inaction to a French in­

itiative made to pleas® the lia&is, as a matter of fact so obviously made

to pleas© the Iteis that it did not ooa^letely alleviate Gernaan suspi­

cions of the French government*

Hi© only indication of Gentian pressure in Langer’a expose was a

rumor heard by Leahy that f!Darlan, in order to foil .Laval, had reported

to the Germans the various American efforts to prevent the appointment,

and that thereupon Hitler had decided to make the matter a teat of strength

between Germany and the United S t a t e s . I f this were true it would seem

to indicate that m Geiman pressure was applied before American pressure

was applied, and there was no American intervention before the interview

between Detain and Laval on Harch 25, which was: decisive# It would also

indicate that the main trump of Laval was the anxiety his name aroused

in Allied circles.

The fact that the Germans were interested in Laval only in view

of the American hostility toward M m was confirmed by Swiss ambassador

to Vichy Walter Stuck! in his bock Jon Detain m x vlerten Depubllk.

I&val aetste all© Hbb.e1 in Bewegung, m wiedor sur I&cht su

gelangen. Die Deuischen versagten Ihm ssuaSchat eine ©ntscheidead©
Unterstutsung. Erst als sein Kachfolger als Ansacm&inisier und
HKonprinsw, der Admiral Earlan, besonders achlsu zu sein glaubte,
wenn er die Deutschen t&ssen Hess, Amerika tnircie sich einer
PHckkehr von Iaval wider® etaaa, erst d&rm haben di© Beutschon
ultimaiiv dleee EHekkchr verlangt. * . . Darlan. # .war* der
rlchtig© ndchmiod seines 01iicksfi, er hatte sich selber wegmanb-
vrierbJ??

This circumstance gave mch satisfaction to the Gossans.

76
Laager, Oar Vichy Gamble, p. 2W.

^Walter Stucki, Von ?£tain isur vlerten Bepubllk (Berne, 191*7),

p# 9. See also Pierre Laval,! H S y T®fTo5k7lWol7 P* $7*
 m

The guessing game in JM dm and in l'&sM,ngton concerning the

pending appointment of Laval continue©* Laval is developing into
the most sensational m l mysterious personality of present day
international politics* The energy powers worry more and more
about him* They already have visions of the French fleet oper­
ating in the Mediterranean with the Italian arid German fleets.
They see Malta and Aleimndria lost, etc*7^

This was an accurate description of American reactions to the

Laval appointment and the tt4&sost childish outburst of abuse” which sa­

luted Laval** return to Paris*7^ «of course the French fleet will be

handed to Adolf Hitler,** affirmed the Salem (Mass*) Kve?d.ng Howsj^ and

a writer to The Nation declared, "With the acquisition of the French

fleet Hitler will Obtain possession of Casablanca, Dakar, Toulon, Blserte

and Madagascar, and he will control the Atlantic, the Mediterranean and
81
the Indian Ocean.**1 America*® leading newspapers were not more opti­

mistic . "The days of ’Yichy France* are over,” announced the lew York

Times, "Laval is Hitler*1^ Mark Sullivan predicted that Laval1s return

would have the most terrible consequences. «By today’s event Great

Britain is brought to the greatest peril in its empire histosy* . * .

Since we are bound up with Britain* . *m likes?ise are in a danger which

we can overcome only by the utmost energy arid resolution. He, and

Britain, must fight with a courage which is beyond, courage.*®

^Lochner, ed., The Goebbels Diaries, p* Xlk (April 18).

7%oot, The Secret Histoiy of the war, IX, >c 22h*

^Sale® (Maes.) Evening Hews, April 17, 19l*2.

^The Nation, May 9, 19h&*

S2Ncwr Yoxk Times, April 15, I9h2.

York Herald Tribune, April 17, 191*2•

 $k9

Although Freda Klrchwcy expected grim consequences from ibis

si,
"ainor Pearl Harbor# **** some liberals expressed their satisfaction on

two grounds * According to them Hitler*s ambitions had been frustrated

in France, and they had been frustrated not by the French government but

by the passive resistance of the French people* To then the appointment

of X&val appeared to be a desperate move, which proved that Hitler had

lost any hop© of winning Franc© to his "Hot Order*0 Walter iJLppmann re*

cordeds

There has never been a time since the French armistice when Hitler
was unable to do what he has now done with laval. In European
France he has always been able to appoint the government * The
reason tihyr he has hitherto preferred the sanl-iodepeadesifc govern­
ment of retain to an out-and-out Quisling government under laval
has been that he had much more to gain from the P^talm regime*

Mary newspapers accepted this theory that Laval r$ return 'ires a defensive

reaction on the part of Hitler* To the Toii: Times it was a proof that

^Hitler] hsa not b o m able to exploit his conquest* Ho administered

a defeat without gathering .the finite of victm j* hold all the cards
without being able to use them to play the game* Therefore he is
forced at the crisis of the war to protect his Hark from France as
if the conquered country were still m active enemg* . * * This is
the most remarkable aspect
/* of the .recall of Laval J**®

This gave observers added reasons to hope* To the Balm (Mass*) Evening

Hews it was doubtful 19if a better could be found for consolidating

the people of France against their Axis conquerors than in the enforced
8?
return of Pierre Laval to power*0 Halter Lippmann was even more

^Froda Klrchwey# The Hation, April 25# 19h2*

^Sfflr York Herald Tribune# April 16, 19k2*

To-ric Times# April 16# l$b2*

^Saloa (lass*) ttvmlm Urns, April 17# 19k2*

certain that by "imposing Laval on the French people# Hitler has brought
op
France back into the war#n

There was ©till m o th e r reason for the satisfaction of liberal

newspapers. They kn m that the end of Vichyvfeerlc&n relations was in

eight and their relief rrn® n m shared by many American newspapers of more

conservative views* Major Georg© Fielding 10,lot announced in the Hew

Toxic Herald Tribune that "the return to power of Pierre Laval in France,

Mirks the bankruptcy of a political line of action which never made sense
09
from the strategical viewpoint*" * Almost unanimously the American press

asked for severance of diplomatic relations with Vichy* "Laval and the

men about him will only represent maggots# spawned first in corruption

and now poisoning the wounds of France* Can the United State©# officially

or unofficially# r i m the new Vichy regime In any other The

Tim Toxic Sun decided that

The return to power of Laval appears to signify* * «that the use­

fulness of the American Ambassador, Admiral Leahy has ended* . . •
Anybody who supposes that Pierre .Laval can be buttered up or
soft soaped to our adrantage is a candidate for psychiatric atten­
tion.^

Even the tlcw Toxic Times began to advise the government in favor of a rap­

ture of the diplomatic ties between Vichy and Washington* "It becomes

necessary for our am Government to consider whether it will still at­

tempt to maintain relations with Fetainfs successor or whether it will

88
Hew fori: Herald Tribune, April 16, 19kZ»
 2%
0*^
break off these relations**'*’ Ike Times became even core positive,

“there can be no question that II a German agent is in control at Vichy*

the usefulness of an American mission in France Is ended and a new pol­

icy is indicated in respect to the neighboring French territories»

liberal newspapers expressed their satisfaction at this conse­

quence of Laval % return. The Hew York Post published a triua^iant edi­

torial entitled "Lot us be insolent*K

TJe }iav© no intention of leaving the WItold you soM in cos?-*

nenting on the return of Laval to power in Vidiy, afteralmost
two years of mastmdnding by our State Department to £.mp just
that from happening, T.liex a bueti
This is a war, not a tearparty. * * * Will the State Depart*
ment cling to its sticky little legalisms

Ibis satisfaction became so noisy that Freda Klrchwey thought good to re­

mind 5*thoss of us who havw insisted since the fall of France that retain

was a tesporaay ©xpediGrtfc rather than an obstacle to ftftsi s d m n that they

’test beware of talcing an easy satisfaction In his downfall and the immi­

nent end of American appeasemtiibJ* She was extremely concerned by the

possible oonsequesices of Laval *a return and curiously enough, in view of

her past record, she insisted, that % e must leave it to Laval to make the
9*3
break that will put the final touch to M s stupendous unpopularity,11 ?

Her article was extremely significant becau.se it showed tc what an ex­

tent Americans, including the liberals, believed that Hitler wanted the

French float and Ai'rieaa bases* From Freda Kirehwey’s pen these words

^S'ew load: Times, April 19k2*

y3toid., April 16, Xpi*2.

9hjar York Post, ^ril 1?, 1912.

Matlon, April 25, 1<?U2.

were almost a confession that the State Department had been right in its
fichy policy* Bat the influence of the State Department was probably
more direct on Anno G*Ha?s JSfcGoafsaick1© writings*

'for a long time the ISaais have desired to get rid of the American
Esabassy to unoccupied France* They are disturbed by »As®riean inr*
finance,partlcitlaxly the moral suasion o f Admiral. Leahy, ?$iieh
they hold responsible for the non-cooperative attitude of Marshal
Detain* , * * ■ It is true that the American mission in Vichy— of
which this ra&y mrk the m drrm zk not only a valuable observation
post but mi ©ncouragoaent to -opposition, .tt is clear that the Gejv
jaans are deters&ned to force us to recall Admiral Leahy*^5

Secretary of State Ihill was opposed to the recall of Adteiral

Leahy* The very harsh note handed. Ambassador Heroy-lfaya by Sumner Well.es

was not approved by him* Ho had to yield to the ccNbined pressure® of

Allied public opinions* certain members of the Department o f -State, and

the British government, which deeidod to ask the Canadian gwrermeat to

recall its ambassador* lull cemented acidly to British Ambassador Lord

Halifaxs

It will apparently not be possible for the United States Govern­

ment long to keep up diplomatic contacts with Vichy* « ♦after
Canada rebuffs that Govensaenti This is especially so because
British propaganda agencies are continuing their past policy of
makinf it appear that the British Government is not only opposed
to American relations with Vicljy but that in some respects those
relations are of a sinister nature*9?

Most newspapers did not envisage the simple recall of Admiral

Leahy "for consultationsn but a formal rupture with Vichy. The btate
Department fs obvious reluctance to take that step was soon, criticized.
The How Xcsrfs Dost noted on April 10 that ^Ambassador Leahy has been

called home, but we're still on speaking terms with vichy," Demands

P&jtm totk Times, April 35, 1?2*£.

9fM l 9 Memoirs, p* H ? 3.
 253
98
for m iMmadlate occupation of Martinique and Dakar became more wide-

spread# F«n» believed, that has com© to try fore© on Vicky* # * •

nothing but M e d forces has worked in this war* It lodes like the time

has come to try it— f i r s t * T h e I « Xork tea contrasted the hesitation

of tha state Department with the quick decision of five French embassy

attaches in Washington.*

Maintaining relations with Vichy has- proved t m much for the

stomachs of five mosbears of M* Henry-Haye*s embassy in Washington,
including' the counselor* They have handed in their resignations*
The State Department for its part, ha® not » d © up its idnd*3^

the gesture of these French functionaries obtained wide publicity# The

Hear Orleans States claimed that 11For this courageous stand the people

of free America applaud them,*1 and this newspaper mad© the optimistic

and hazardous guess that wlf Ambassador Henry-Haye himself made known

his real sentiments, they would burn up the collabomtionist clique#

Further proofs of the complete French subjection to Germany gave

new arguments to the partisans of a formal break with Vichy. On April

13, 1S4-2, a note had been sent to Vichy amomcing American recognition

of Free French rule In French Equatorial Africa*^ Sumner Welles de­

clared in a press conference that the French rejection could not be ac­

cepted because the ambassador *s communication had been admitted to the

Germans for approval# This Welles- denounced m Hh© most amassing fact11

in tiie history of one hundred and fifty years of friendship between

98See p. 27U.
"P.M., April 17, 1&2.

loric San, April 23, 19ls2.

*®4je«r Orleans States, April 16, lSl*2.

^ S e e p.'?'2>7''
 2a

France and the tfedtad States**^ **now can w e w i a on friendly rela­

tions with ficby whan its relations with ue are filtered through Berlin

and dictated by ierlinf** asked Louis Fischer in The iEtden*^ Attach

against the State Deployment increased in violence*

The impression that too much lac© hangs In the State Depart­
ment*© parlors is heightened by our M u unwillingness to take
Martindqae, Guadeloupe, Mtotisgftacar, and other Vichy French bases,
• » *Wr* h m X has knocked the chip off our shoulders, he has
crossed the line drawn in the dirt, he has made faces, he has
pulled our sister’s hair* But the State Department*® reaction
(as piped out to reporters in «dopew stories) Is that Mr* Laval *8
speech w m about England, not about * * # This sissy reac­
tion opens the whole question, whether our State Department is
equipped to lead us diplomatically through a period of offensive
warfare

Liberal newspaper® were not the only ones m m to join the anti-fichy

campaign# The Hear Toxk $ m pmi&twl lously and repeatedly*

again we ©ay that Admiral 'Leahy, to come home, ought to slam the
door and not leave the place in charge of a ^career diplomat,**
faint of heart*
ire would like the site to be so loud that it would echo
through France and reinforce w M t the President told them and us
when he saidj
»Tha United Nation© will take measure©, if naoaasary, to pre­
vent the us© of French territory in any part of the world for
military purposes by the lads powers*^/

The occupation of Madagascar by the British was cheered as a slap at

Xaval at least as much as an Improvement of the United nations over-all

^ B & c o n and. Howie, One One, p* 75*

^ T h e Nation, April 25, 19l2.

*®^Referenee is to the speech in wide* Laval said he desired a
German victory#
•^Samuel Grafton in the Hew xcark Post, April 2h» 19li2.
fork Sun, April 30, 19)*2# Reference to Hoosenrelt speech
on Laval, on April
 255

strategic picture. Unfortwaitely for the literals, it also looked like

100
a sl&p at de Gaulle isho had not h m n informed of the Intended operation*

Meanshlle, Laval had proceeded ?fto advocate m old idea of M s —

the fcarnation of a Latin bloc of States#**^ liberal observer®, thought

that .Laval was intriguing to h m e the United States coj&imie it® nap~

p e m m m t» tactics toward, fichy*”

™ Actually he was doing his best to

maintain diplomatic relation® with Washington*^ An unexpected result

of Laval’s efforts was a renewed Italian agitation for **fHce, Corsica,

Savoy, Tunisia*w American dbserrers expressed their &w«mest at seeing

^tho thieves fall out#”^ Maty people wore inclined to think that the

whole affair was on® more 00i » maneuver and no proof of an independent

Francc-Itallan policy# nAn alterative theory,*1 Tbg latioii suggested,

*is that the iteis h m e realiMd that cdlaboratlon cannot hm effected

with the -aid of any bought French loader, w e n Laval, and are therefor©

preparing to occupy the # 10X0 countjy***^^ This v i m was probably the

final result of the emotion created by Laval’s return to power* A H

Americans expeeted him to take drastic steps to satisfy the colonial re­

quirements of his ftesd master* The Interventionist aliment that America

was directly and immediately threatened by Oemany had strong3y Influenced

American outlook on the Gemaa policy towards the French aspire* When

The Secret History of the War, I, ?<• 6Q$*

^Ibld., I, p. It5l.
110
Freda Kirchwey, The Hatton, April 25, I$j2.

Danger, Our Vichy Gamble, p# 2l$#

112Cartoon is H«r leak Post, My 27, 15>U2.

^Xtoe Katloa, m y 30, l?hZ.

nothing happen©:!, w e n with Laval in power, rtrumors were circulated that

he algfct be deposed and hie Job be given to some store aealoue collabor­

ationist such as Darioi#*^

Before Laval’s return to power the supporters of1the American

Yichy policy had congratulate! American diplomats for their wonderful

achievemmts, and the supporters of Petain had admired the general for

M m ’’skillful double Jeu*w Laval’s return mined the hope* of American

diplomats, who had attached too m ch importance to his dismissal in 1$ 40|

it also frightened the supporters of Petain, #io had chosen Laval as a

scapegoat for all the evils of fichy* th e liberals, who had staked their

hopes on the resistance of the French people, had less fear because they

kneer that 'the reappointment of Laval would reinforce this resistance*

Of all the arguments put forward to explain, the mysterious process by

which Hitler’s efforts to take Dakar had been checked, the liberal theory

was probably' the only one to have ease factual support* Hitler would

probably not have hesitated to take Dakar, Biserte, and other bases if he

had needed them but his legions were busy in Russia and Hitler w m too

conscious of strategic possibilities to launch an expedition la the Sahara

for the vain pleasure of silencing American isolationists * Hitler knar

that it was not necessary to send mudwieeded araieo to Africa in order to

enjoy its relatively limited economic facilities * His armistice commis­

sions sufficed for that ml* lb® defense of his policy which Laval wrote

In prison, shortly before his death, is very significant in that respect*

Laval was undoubtedly vexy eager to prove that, like everybody else, he

had 'always secretly worked for the French and the Allied cause* He never

^ t h e llatlon, June 13, 1?2*2.

boasted, however, to have kept the Germans out of Korfch Africa*"^ The

only explanation for tills silence is that the Gexmms never asked for It*

The liberal argument* however* was not limited to an explanation

of Hitler*a frustration* and it® main cogency reside! in the obvious fact

that a war which was pictured m a war of the people against Fascism

should have enrolled the help of all enemies of Fascism and tried to open

as ®any eyes as possible to Its evils* liberals contended that the main­

tenance of the American embassy in Vichy* even after the departure of

Admiral Leahy, instead of *feaintainiiig the faith of the French people in

democracy*1 would increase the prestige of a government which tried to conr-

vinee the French that they should pray for a Gorman victory and accept a

Fascist regime in France*

Hie best I can make of our current policy is that we insist the
French people shall rise in revolution, but not against their gov­
ernment* * * -
Hew can the French people revolt against the Ihsia without re­
volting against Laval* their agent, and against the cloudless
Petain? How can they sake an omelet without breaking those eggs?
At this point we always get back to the famous French fleet*
Fe have to centime to behave strangely in Vichy, -the argument goes,
to keep the French from giving their fleet to Hitler. This means we
think the French fleet is more Important than the Freadh revolution*
But Hitler thinks the French revolution is more important than
the French fleet* * * * Hitler let® the fleet alone, to sustain
Vichy *s prestige, and we sustain Vichy*® prestige in order to save
the fleet. 2.16
One of us must be taking a hell of an Ideological beating.

Similarly, Johannes Steel said in a radio broadest that "there will be

no revolt in Franc® so long m Petain and Iaval can claim American

backing* . . . Hie French people are confused by the American brad

H^Pierre Laval, Biaiy (ifw York, 191*8).

^Samuel Grafton, Hew fork Post, Juno 16, lpl[2*

 2S8
stand and* ♦ .tJ«8* recognition is tlmjgreatest asset the Vichy government

has»

The United States government, however* attested to defend a pol­

icy which, since Laval’s return to power, had boon attacked by a great

part of the American prme * Official declarations were widely publicised

but they produced little effect because they did not constitute a real

answer to the liberal charges, the real nature of which they seemed to

ignore* The defense of the Vichy policy which "deserve® the most re™

spcctf^18 and produced the meet effect was that of Admiral Laslsj when ho

finally cam© back to Dashington*^ The American aiabassMor ^ustifiod

American policy by his "high personal regard* for Detain, hut the ■liber-*

als answered that Detain was powerless* He repeated that Vichy was the

only means thereby the United States could keep contact with the French

people, but the Itm York Herald Tribun© noted that it was "difficult to

see how American recognition of a governseat that openly collaborates with

France’s oppressors can reassure the French people that they will eventu­

ally be freed from their oppressors*"^0

Charles McheXson, director of publicity for the Democratic na­

tional Committee, wrote a pamphlet entitled "Dispelling the Fog*" Ac­

cording to him the maintenance of a diplomatic mission in Vichy was an

obvious necessity since "that may be a puppet government under duress,

121
but it is still on© to which we can send diplomatic representatives#" “

^Broadcast over station TICA, quoted in P»M«, June IV, 1VU2*

*^ullew York Herald. Tribune, June 12, 191},2*

■^Ambaesador Leahy had been delayed in France by the illness and

death of his wife* He reached. H w York in the second week of June.

^■^rJew York Herald Tribune, June 12, 19t2*

In further comments upon "Dispelling the Fog* and its "truly remarkable

reason for xwcognifilhg Vichy," the Kerr York Herald Triune suggested that

na H the recent <mtpourlnga about France may have been attempts to dispel

Klclielson. They cert&irdy served no other purpose.

Senator Tom Comially, chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Cora-

sdttee, also came out in favor of the State Department’s policy and, ig­

noring liberal attacks, remaifced that "America had to maintain relations

with Vichy" in order to enlist the support of the French people in mili­

tary operations on the western front. jt should be noted that this

speech was made at the time when de Gaulle was successfully concluding his

negotiations with the French resistance movement*^* These negotiations

were largely ignore by the American press.

In connection with Connolly’s argument in favor of the American

policy toward France, argument which was restated by Longer in (£r Vichy

Gamble when ho said that Adrslral Leahy’s presence in Vichy "gave aid and

cmfort to inmmerable patriot Frenchman# within the Vichy gmremaeafc as

well m In the country at large, It is interesting to quote the im­

pressions of an American observer in Horth Africa, Samel Bashiell, who

never othoxwlse questioned the wisdom of the American attitude.

Hardly a day passed that some Frenchman or refugee patriot would

not drop Into the American consulate in Algiers 'bo inquire rather
naively If they could find means of getting to Gibraltar or to Amer­
ica. "England is an ally of America,* they would say, long before
we wore in the war, and these deluded callers would often go assay
disappointed aid discourager!. Kany of them frankly asked to be token
into the American army or navy. There they ran plumb into that cold
wall of diplomatic protocol. It is probable that some of them were

*^Mew York Herald Tribune, Juno 12, 19lt2.

12\ © w York Times, Jure 18, 19h2.
*\p}t
Ibid., Jure 23, 19)4.21; Wright, Reshaping of French Democracy, p. 1*5.
-^Laager, Our Vichy Gamble, p. 393*
 260

would-be spies, but once discovered these might have been useful as
well, Sometime® X would feel genuinely mrry for thm* especially
the .young ones* They had offered their services in apparent sin­
cerity, only to he turned d m m coldly* I think we might have been
a little more kindly to these youths, even though a strict inter­
national m d m m snore severe Immigration regulation® prevented us
from accepting their services* 1 could Imagine the weeks of self-
torment some of these young fellows must have gem through before
deciding to risk all and place themselves at our disposal* Aid
then, after so momentous a decision, it must have been a cruel dis­
appointment ia the great America, HArsenal of Democracy,n to be
turned «my»^26

By that time, 'the French question had become an American domestic

issue# Its political significance appeared very clearly in the following

cements of Samuel Grafton on Comally and Leahy.

Hates for the future Ph.D. >et When the time comes to write the
books about this struggle, none of the subtler facts should be over-
looked, and so I invite the attention of scholars of 1S$Q to a cu­
rious circus®'toco* fcfitMs the last fortnight, tm prominent
Americans, Admiral Leahy and Senator Tom Connally, have advocated
continued recognition of the Laval government in America* And last
week, the sane 'two gentlemen put up a hot fight before the Senate
to continue the battleship-feuiHing program* * * *
If© now have it on record that Leahy* who started out m aa old-
school admiral, winds up as an old-school politician, while GonnaHy,
who started out as an ©Ici-school politician, shews signs of devol­
ving rapidly into m old-school admiral, , * « Warn we find the
$ m e two gentlemen in th© opposition on both plane, desperately
fighting, against change, political or mechanical, searching for the
key to victory among their souvenirs, clutching the tattered remnants
of the world that was, saying to both the aroused people of France
md to the aroused designers of modern weaponsi "Keep quiet, you 2n
we are entitled to state the fascinating parallel and let its o m
victims explain it away as they can#^7

Observers pointed to the mobilisation of French labor for Germany,

to the closing of French factories, to the new wave of' unrest which swept

m m France*^ Once again the American Committee for democratic Action

•k^Dashtell,* »«»!.—
Victory. » iim
tlnmgh Africa, pp. 223*»2£U.
l m i ' iK . n w * *

^*3amel Grafton in the lew Xork Poet, June 30, X$%2*

12®lim Xork Times, April 26, May 6, l$t2#

 261
urged a break with Vteky*3^ Some newspapers waged a campaign against

the French, ambassador In Washington, Gaston Henry-Hayo* American official

displeasure had manifested itself In the arrest of John Leonard Mtotea, a

naturalised ciiissen of Swiss tdrth, who was accused of being an unregis­

tered agent In the pay of the Vichy government, of gathering information

and of spreading propaganda*3^ in Septoa^er, I9 h l, the Toifc Herald

Tribune had charged that ?tea was a *Vichy 3py," but without result. This

time the paper charged that he was gathering military1information for the

Axis **3! These attacks did not achieve any result, however, on the diplo­

matic relations between Vichy and Washington* During the whole summer and

fall of 19li2, the campaign against Vichy continued# In its November issue,

The Atlantic Monthly wondered once more? TWtll the Germans move into Feat

Africa and what will such a move do to relations between the tJ.ni.tef.! States

and Vichy.

vrt
At the time of Lava! *s return to power, relations between the Free

French movement and Washington had. reached, a n m low* negotiations had

been held between the representatives of M Gaulle and the State Depart­

ment, but th.es© negotiations were not facilitated by reports, obviously

influenced by the State Department, which showed very clearly that America

did not look with favor upon any extension of the Free French movement *s

political influence* A United Press dispatch reported that "the political

York Times, .April 22, 19k%*

^ Saily Mirror, July 15, 19li2.

131
llm Tork Herald tribune, July 22, 19l*2.

^ T h e Atlantic Monthly, November, 1.9^2, p. 6.

 262
trend among the de G&ullisis in London la repugnant to irishmen. on. the

fighting front® who feel the only worthwhile objective at the ttwaxt i©

to continue the battle' for F M freedom*"1^ The Mew fork Time© to*

nouneed that there had hem "signs of deterioration within the FTm French

delegation here in WasMngfcon • One report declared that the State De­

partment had called upon General do Gaulle to "put hi& house in order*

These tactics provoked indignant ttmsmts from the liberals*

Hie Free French are getting the rawest deal of any group asso­
ciated with the United Nations in this war* • * *
The Free French would ha even more powerful today, both inside
France end out, if it were not for the policy tendon ant Washington
have felt obliged to follow since the Franco-German arsdstict * * •
The Free French h a w been the victims o f a systematic sniping
campaign ever since the State Departsant’s famous reference to the
"so-called" Free French at the time Admiral isusalier occupied St
Pierre and ISiquclon.136

The State Feparbneit had expressed, the desire to see fee basis of

the Free French movement broadened* On this point Secretary of State Hull

declared;

I should have liked to see ereated a Free French political com­

mittee headed by a noted Frenchman* One of the tragedies of the
Be Gaulle situation was that Be Gaulle had attracted to himself
not a single eminent Frenduaan* The very fm who had. gotten m ay
from France distrusted M m or could not m r k with him*13?

This desire to make the Free French movement more representative and the

^ £ 5Ha* Ma^ 3> 1S4i2*

^Heer Toik Times, fay 2, 19ii2*

■^Itoob, Xh® Secret History of fee far, IX, 23b*

^^Varian T r y , "Justice for the F ree French, Keproblic, June

8, 19h2.
M m r m l r s , p* tl$9*
hop® that d© Gaulle m x Id be i w W aside were imtnr&lXy increased by the

return of' Laval to power* The first m m ® put forward as a possible French

leader for the movement w m that of Pierre Chautaspsu^lS Clmttope had

been, discredited by the-part he had played in the decision to ask for an

armistice in June, 1$*Q# According to the liberals# the mention of his

m m e was an effort to coj^imls© the Free French movement. Be Gaulle him­

self attacked Chsuteapi violently in a public statement^ »®hich happens

to bo completely true," in the opinion of Dorothy Thcmgjson.^ The mention

of Pierre cot*^ did not get as much publicity because his name was really

embarrassing to the Free French movement. He was genuinely anti-Fascist

but as an ex-minister of -aviation he was considered by many Frenchmen as

one of the men most responsible for the 19hQ defeat.

In some circles it was pointed out that Got and Qhautemps were not

the only Frenchmen to have been sounded out. Alexis Leger, the anti-ap­

peasement secretary general of t o French foreign office before t o war

and well-known poet# apparently "refused to be associated with do Gaulle*

Philosopher Jacques Ilaritain m & also suspicious of do Gaulle fs political

leanings end ambitions*2^ American liberals misunderstood t o na­

ture of this opposition to do Gaulle. They realised that many people

feared the radical elements in the de Gaulle movement and t o y concluded

Xork Times, May 21, 1S^2.

■C^iajr 27, i & 2 .

Blue Hetawnfe, May 28, 19li2.

■^Meir Yoife time, ISay 21, 19b2.

■^langer, Oar Vichy Gamble, p. 26l.

 261*

that till opposition to- de ( M I U was motivated by fear of a social

revolutiom*

Between the fighting french end the Vidhyites ©dated a far

m m in London and. fmMngtoaa who were neither#- Some a m who were
disappointed that do Oarc&lft had not immediately offers them a
high position# One or two were typical French intellectual# who
could be happy in m organised effort*
In America were some representatives of french big business*
They feared that because the Busslane had gone further than &r$r
other government In recognising de Gaulle as representing France,
do Goalie was too far to the left* CoMinism was still a bugbear*
It was from men like these that the story about the nmen
around do Gaulle* originally came. Ihe whisper that ho was a
Fascist, a Bppapartist, might be good propaganda. Spread that
in America#"**

At the same time the prestige of do Gaulle was further weakened

by the friction which took place in lew Caledonia* Hews stories r©~

ported that -do Gaulle had appointed two governor© in that Pacific is­

land. «#iG had quarreled so violently that an aarcaed clash w m narrowly

averted**^ Finally, both governors had left the island and there w m

no administration except for the American c o w n d « , amoral Patch, who

%ad proved more successful ikon the conflicting French administration

to satisfy the needs of the natives This smckI to ba a good ax-

as^L© of de Gaullefs genius for sowing dissension wtiewer he interfered

with the existing state of things*^ The liberals did their best to

minimise the incident# Varim Fry, for emmple* called it a «tempest in

a teapot,* &rd compared it to %hat happens everyday in Washington like

^MacVane, J m m ® y into War, p. 171#

Hi!?
Hoot, The Secret History of the far, II, pC 238*

l W XMd.

French fracasj lew Caledonia Squabble©,* I l w r t ,

to e 1, 1S%2#
 265

the fight between the State Itaparbsgent and the Board of Economic v/ar-
fare* or the ©seeMnge of cospllmenia between Mayor la Guar&la and Dean
XaaJia.OM lAberiOa did not afaayo agree, hewwer, in their intarpi-G-

t&tiorn of the events* Waverley Boot was fell of praise for Admiral

Thierxy d^rgenlieu* the Free French military colander and said that

the friction was "typical of that v&ieh often arises when a civil and

military administration are aupggrfo^aad* It was aggravated somehow by

easy-going Governor Sautot *s inertia against ending years of comfortable

tropical living and buckling down to an intensive war e f f o r t . Johannes

Steel hold the opposite v i w that ft?ice-Admiral B 1ArgenXieu hag shown M s

authoritarian spirit in. lew Caledonia#

In spite of all these dcmalop&enbs* and m a result of the re­

turn of Laval to powerj nit was not surprising** as Xangor noted*

that the popular dm&ncl in the United States for a complete rap­
ture and for -out-and-out recognition of de Gaulle and the Free
French movement should have grown apace. The two demands usually
went hand in hand and seemed to many American liberals and radicals
to be logical counterparts

Once again the lew York Post proposed a n m policy toward Free France*

Let us enter upon an agreement with the Free French, and

through them with the real France, that will provide for these two

e Free french to have the status of a member of the United

’ nations, and to receive our aid and cooperation as such# The Free
French to enter into a sotean undertaking with the other members
of the United nations to fight through to the peace and wfcen the
war Is won to- call a National Constitutional Assembly, hold na~

Boot, The Secret History of toe war, IX* k. 235

^Stoei, M m Behind the war, p. 236.

1%anger, Oucr 7lcby Gttrible. p. 257.
 266
tional democratic elections and establish the Fourth Republic
in accordance with the wishes of all the French peopleA52

these were the very promises which de Oaulle in London m s then making

to the representative of ilia French underground Various

American peiBomlities took e position In favor of de Gaulle* Louis

Bromfield , president of 'the Franco-American Club, made an address on

June h$ 19l*2, in which ho celled "upon the United States to recognise

the da Gaulle as a member of the United MatIons

Passions wore inflated by the celebration of United Hattons Day

which coincided with the Free French feat of arms at Bir Aeheim In

Libya'where a small Free French garrison fighting with the British

Eighth Army held up the attack of tanks for sixteen days* Mb-

era! newspapers were afraid that the Free Fronch movement would not be

included in the parade which was to march in Hew York on June 13* A

Harvard alumnus wrote to the Boston Herald to express his criticism for

the ©mission of the French flag in the display of United nations color®

m coMamcement days

It stru c k at. least one aluarns m shocking that itdle thus rep­
resenting our solidarity with a good many nations which are only*
up to the present* rnm im lly in this war* Harvard University should
have* on a mere technicality* failed to honor- one of our most gal­
lant allies* the Free French forces, who that very day were de­
fending with their life blood the strategic lybian forts of Bir
Aeheiia.W

York Post, June U$ 19h2*

■^Wright, Reshaping of yrenfth Democracy, p. L5’#

^Italics mine*
York Times, June 5, X9l*2#

^Boston Herald, June 17, 19h2.

 26?

On that vexy day# Secretary of the Wavy Frank Knox mad© an address to

th« Harvard alumni which# according to m editorial of the E m York

Herald Tribune# explained the basis of the faulty Mexican policy towards

France* **Do you k n m any people anywhere#* asked the Secretary of the

Navy# ^wh© are fro© because somebody made them, fre@; is not freedom in

its true sense# something which must he wtrn and maintained by those who

et^oy itfd&t

The Free French volunteers woro undoubtedly not numerous cnougli

to meet the requirements of Secretary Knox and liberate their country with*

out outside help but they were doing their vexy b m % in the Libyan desert#

At the vexy moment when the Free French in the terrible

heat of the Libyan desert# h m & been heroically defending against in*
eeasant t a i bribing and. assault the strategic garrisons oi Bir
B&cheim m d Knightabridge* official America celebrates a United
Nations Flag Day m which it honors all its allies but the fighting
French|158

To some people the Bir H&cheim episode w m only part of the cCUnrer Free

French propaganda# but these suspicions were contradicts by the reports

of American correspondents with the British Eighth te$r* Eieimrd m o *

Milan entitled on© of his chapters in Mediterranean Msigmeni «Tfa© }^>lc

of Bir Acheiau” He turned the battle #16 days of the most blistering and

intense warfare experienced la the Libyan desert campaign* Huescl

Hill recounted in Desert Congest his Interview with the British c m *

mender# General X&chtie# who told him that "The resistance of the French

garrison there has appealed to our chaps * :!imagination# anti they have

^Nesr York Herald Tribune# JUn© 17# 19h2*

^Fdchard Ifaciaillaa, Mediterotttean Assignment (lew Toxic# 19l*3)#

chapter XIII.
 268

taken. the Free Preach under their idngs*l! Blehtie ehwed Hill the French

ocuaador General Koenig*® telegram to the M F reading# ,fBrav©, merci for

the Free F r e n c h i l e x s m d e r Clifford described in The Conquest of

i— •mtmmrr rn^mm

Horth Africa how twice he tried to drive "dam tlaero and see this great

tiling if only from the outside# Bach time I was headed off in the per­

ilous, empty^looking no n&a's land ?&lch surrounded Hachetsu*^ Allan

Koorehead d xm in Bon*t Htoe the General® ids mm conclusions from his

personal experience on the Ilbyan front*

In the crisis there was revived spontaneously in the desert ail

the spirit of the French soldier in the last, war* In its small way
there wm a touch of ferduu about ®ir Aeheim* As the guards had
fought with stubborn discipline at Knightsferidg©* so t m the French
fought with art and desperate comradeship and were gallant in their
mm way* ,AH the bitter accusations against the French soldier after
the fall d France were being denied and proved false under this
little tricolour that kept hanging In dusty folds m the ridges of
Bir ACheim* Wherever you went In the desert- you found the rest of
the men of the Eighth Anagr full of glowing pride for the- French.^ 2

Bir ACheim had a favorable influence on the cause of Free France* The Hew

York Times, which had not mentioned d© Gaulle In an editorial comra^oratlng

the French capitulation,^ decided on June 28 that wThe de C^aullist cause

was not injured when Free french troops fought bravely though vainly,

against Rommel at Bir Acheim the other dog."

Be Gaulle *® declaration on the French war aims and the program of

Fro© Frame to restore democracy in liberated France^* also made a good

Hus®el Hill, Desert Conquest (Hew York, p# $3*

^Alexsodesr Clifford, The Gonouest of Worth Africa (lew York,

1*3), P. 205* ~
162
'Allan loorehead, Donf.t Blame the Generals, (Hew Toik, 19k3)»P*%%9*
163Hew Twrtc tljuca, June 17, 19i;2.
*In connection with his negotiations with the French resistance
movement#
 269

SsprosBim * To those who might coaplain that da Gaulle was making a mm

Incursion in the forbidden political field, the now Torts Herald Tribune

replied that de Geallefs statement was Apolitical in the sense that the

American Declaration of Independence was political The Hen Tozk

Times, which was becoming raore favorable to FTce France wary day, ven­

tured a prophecys r,The day when &© faulted France will take full rank

among the governments in exile is probably n e a r e r # T h e Christian

Science Monitor felt that %©- more appealing statement of war -alms has

cm® f r m any of the United Hattons than that issued. * *by General de

Gaulle on behalf of the Free .French movement.

More leading personalities expressed their sympathy for the Free

french movement. Wendell t»» Wlllkie made a public address at the opening

of Free French Week at Freedom House on July 0, V)bt2, i n which he

praised de Gaill© and wthose intrepid volunteers who, at a price m their

heads, risked all to follow him.1* On the occasion of the French National

Holiday on Bastille Bay, General l&eArfchur was one of those too sent mesK

sages to de Gaulle. ttSome things can never die* One of those is- Free

France, its principles are just to Mm and reverent of Gad* Of such is

tHSortaXIty-."1^

Public opinion polls indicated that during the summer of 1*2 a

veay strong majority of %elX-informedn Americans ware in favor of miking

the Free French a full-fledged ally and of breaking with Fichy. But only

^ n m Task Herald Tribune, June 26, 1*2.

Hew York Times, Jbme 26, 1*2.
^Christian Science Monitor., July 2, 1*2.
W f m t communicated by the French Hmbassy#
^Teact CQwmicated by the French i&abassy. (The telegram was sent
to "France forever* in Hew Toiiu)
 270

56 p m cent of ih® popu3& tion claimed they knew vfoe de Gaulle wm* Among

these, eight m3, three-tenths p m cent could not give any coherent explan­

ation of his role and six: per cent thought that the Free Frisch were the

French colonies in Horth Africa# Most Americans had m i^rfect under-

standing of the diplomatic position of their m m government* Asked whether

their government dealt with the Free French or with the flchy government

headed by Laval# 32*1 per cent answered that America dealt with the Free

French, 1*8*2 per cent answered that America dealt with Tidiy, only two and

two-tenths per- cent answered that it dealt with both# nevertheless, the

discrepancy between the number of people thinking that their government

dealt with Fiehy— M *2 per cent-^and the number of those who thought that

this government should deal with ?ichy--X2*8 per eeafc-*was a clear indica­

tion that the press campaign had created a rather widespread criticism of

the American policy

This campaign subsided somewhat after the note sent to fighting

on duly 9 by the S^ate Department# this note "recognised the

contribution1* of the movement and pledged *hftl possible military assiast-

ane^#«l?2 jybidral Harold K* Stark and Brigadier General Charles L* Bolte

were sent to London as representatives of the American government to Mis-

cuss matters relating to the prosecution of war*n173 xt was obvious that

America did not want to discuss long-range political issues. This move

1* ° W U t taken in August, 192*2? commicatecl by the Information

Division of the French £kabassy«
171
After the agremenfc with the French Underground, the Free
French movement had changed its name to Fighting France in order to in­
clude the metropolitan Frenchmen#

Memoirs, p* 1 X62 #

17W
 2ft
had been made imperative by the broader fom of recognition granted by

the British on Jb2y 3*^^ Ibe British action Itself was an acknowledge-

neni of the agrsostfmt between anti-H&si metropolitan Franc® m3, the Free

French movement* Secretary of State Hull did not realise the rbnportance

of tide agreement bat noted In his Memoirs that ttIt became apparent to m

[at the State pepartmont] that larger sepsents of the- French population

wrere rallying to de Gaulle than before #w3*7S yhe American gesture was

greeted with an extreme satisfaction by most American Observers, They

even granted to this action an importance which it did not have in the

eyes of the State Department officials* For Walter fdpptmm# this recog­

nition was % o mere diplomatic gesture n&lch ha® little practical military

significance» xdke m n y other comaentators, he considered that this

was a sign that United States strategy was getting bolder and shifting

from the defensive to the offensive, tte implying that de Gaulle would

participate in any offensive action to liberate French territory* it

seemed that the growth of the Free French movement wm mm xtod by the de-

cadence of the Laval regime and that smooth sailing was assured until the

liberation of France*

Fill

Agitation for a quick solution of the ]£arfcinique problem had never

stopped but It had become United to liberal newspapers w h m it had become

evident, during the summer of 19hOf that the State Department was opposed

to any drastic action against the Fiohylte governor, Admiral Bebert#

17W
17tfew Too* Herald Tribune, July 17, 15*1*2.
 2n

Negotiations were initiated between the French admiral and the envoy o£

the State Bear Ad&tral John W , Grmisl&de, The Governor of

IDartinique, "this martinet with a tendency to megalamnia, “W 7was nolr-

fe&fce,"*?® and the planes which "could have been used in the defense of

Britain against Coring#s air arcada rusted assay Liberals were some—

what pu»2led by American leniency toward the hiobert dictatorship” and

case to consider the attitude of their government toward the Vichy colony

as part of the general policy of "appeasement” of Vichy France, The fate

of the French colonies which -wuaXd have starved without supplies, from the

flatted States was completely in Anericon hands. Militarily' and econom­

ically, Jlartiniquc was as much tlie prisoner of tho united States as Vichgr

was of Ccmsmy. Haay newspapers, however, had toned down their recrimi­

nations . As far as? planes and gold were concerned, "The United States

©Emphatically wants neither plan® nor gold to reach either Vichy Franc©

or flaai Oeraany."1^0

The value of ForMoFraace, the main harbor of li&riirdque, was

deprecated by newspapers which voiced the official attitude* Theodore C*

Alford, chief of tho Washington bureau of tho Kansas- City Star, noted;

The amateur strategists, who are thriving now as was never

ejected before tho advent of the newspaper columnists, are of­
fering TJncle Sam a lot of advice about this West Indian island*
« • * llie port of Fort-de-France has been pictured as an ideal
W e , when it Is nothint; than an open, unprotected harbor
suitable only for peace-time uses. * . . TMrtyfive miles south
of the Brench-owned island is St, Lucia, the site of one of the
new American bases in the smaller Antilles, and to the north,

U7root.m mThe i ii>i Secret ol,

*mmn.toii»»iiiwwm history i the
iVwh w gar,
ommm*1 II,
mwiw* mt w x, 216.
178j
^ f l u l l , Memoirs, p* 818
119Ibid.

Jmaaiy 13, IShX

 273
about halfway to Puerto Bice* is Antigua, another base to be de­
veloped by the Baited States in the Caribbean aim#
This country has mdtesly become base-conscious. 1

Martinique was a little Vichy, and American newspapers' viewed

this problem according- to their Interpretation of the State Department *©

French policy# The Daily Worker charged that "Martinique In VIoty*s

hands i® a Hasi base" and warned that It could "be used for wholesale

bombing of American cities*#^ The obvious solution, according to the

liberals, was to hand the French Antilles over to de Gaulle# When support

of de Gaulle became almost fanatical, the main issue, which was supposed

to be the elimination of a military threat, was overshadowed by the do

Gaulle-pltain controversy# In % broadcast over WMG4, Johannes Steel esc-

pressed fear that Vichy might offer to surrender totinique to American

military control* "VIeby, knowing that It can*t hold Martinique indefin­

itely, hopes by this offer to torpedo French resistance and destroy Gen­

eral de Gaulle *s prestige.*1**®

It was finally mnounced in December, 19hl, that an agreement had

been reached regarding Martinique* Ho details were given but this accord

was supposed to insure American security as well as the island*® economic

survival. Bven the adversaries of Washington1© "appe&sment tactics" hoped

for the best.

It is to be presumed that the understanding is sufficiently

ironclad to make it unneeessaiy for the American Navy to detain
vessels in the neighborhood of that Island so as to be sure that

K a n s a s City m m , January 18, 15>ltl.

^ W l y Worker, Becember 13,

l83S51KA, in P#M*j December 17, 1$*2.

 Zlk

the French naval and air force® there shall not fall into Q « M n
taida*lSb v

Texy disturbing, however, for ‘t o general American public was the re­

ported increased activity of Oersian submarines in the Caribbean aesu18^

When Laval came back to power, demands for an immediate occupation of

Martinique became "vociferous, and m m I r m various sections of Amer­

ican opinion* The Hew Xoxk Daily Hews thought that the presence of Laval

at the head of the French govenraeat made it imperative for the Halted

State® to "proceed to take Martinique and Guadeloupethis newspaper also

advised the State Department "not to try to bind fate® Americans by any

prosdses ever to give or sell these islands back to Prance* On the

Martinique problem the liberal and the uXtrarconserv&tive press were al­

most in cosg&ete agreement* The only difference between the Daily Mem

and the lew Toxic Post was that the latter envisaged action on the part of

the United nations.

the French islands. • .are now in a mess, because some of them,

like Saint-Pierre and KUgoal&n* are held by the Free French, while
others, like Martinique, are held by the Vichy French.
We think all those islands ought to be occupied ty a hemi­
spheric commission, by United Nations agreement, and that elections
ought to be run off in each for the establishment of constituent
assemblies, to write whatever constitution the inhabitants thereof
desire.
Thus these islands would become free and independent nations,
after which they couM be invited to join the United Nations j pooling
defense facilities and so mJ-®®

!8%©w York Herald Tribune* December 20, l$jl«

^According to William Laager, the American government was certain
that a German submarine lad taken refuge in Martii&que. Laager, Our Vichy
Gamble, p. 236.

x86X b M », p* 255.
X8?Hew Toxk Daily Wms, April 10, I9h2.
x®%©w Toxk Poet, Uagr 2, 1$*2#
 editorial einrioasly deviated from the M e Oaulle line*1which wag

usually faithfully followed by the lew Tork Fegt* M m jaoderate organs,

however, refrained from advocating such radical solutions! but suggested

the establishment of m American base m the french island, with or with­

out the consent of Admiral Robert.

The United States government was act ready to- go- that far* Admiral

John Em Hoover aid Samel Eeber, assistant chief of the State Departments

division of European affairs, wore sent to l&rilnique* The State Depart­

ment m m m o d that Mirect negotiations were necessitated by Laval*© col­

laboration policyj1*3^ in other 'words, the State Bop&xtneob announced that

it would sot recognise Admiral Robert*-© elation© with ¥ieky. Opponents

of the slow American procedures were hopeful again* According to the Mm

loife Herald Tribune, the negotiation© plainly indlmtei Mthat th© long

faree-iragedy is- reaching its end***^®' Moat newspaper took for granted

that the negotiations had been initiated by Admiral Robert* The Herald

Tribune believed that the occupation of Madagascar might Ml&rify the facts

for Frenchmen everywhere, and it is gratifying to sec evidence that it may

have done so for Admiral Robert* fives the If&tlon believed that this

move meant a complB te change in the State Department *s policy*3-^ All

newspapers made it clear that terieans would not- be satisfied with as­

surance© that Martinique would remain neutral. A cartoon of the Hew York

Post showed Unci© B m rejecting with disgust a pledge offered by Laval

^HUll, Memoirs, p* H<60*

190
Mew lodk Herald Tribune, May lit, 19U2.

1 ? 1 Xbld.

1?2The Nation, May 16, 1$;2.

 276

that Martinique would not be used against th® Allies**^ The Mm York

felt well-infomed enough to announce what th© k m r i & m condition

would bet

the leasing of strategic point® in the fremh West Indies* * .and

French Guiana, to be fortified by the United States* The disarming
of French warship®. * * * The surrender of French tankers and mer­
chantmen docked in American pests. The placing, of French West lyjdies
CQEwmlcation® under Fanribaeriean activities * ^ %

Hone of these conditions was fulfilled. American satisfaction was

short-lived. It soon became apparent that in Martinique as in Vlehy France,

American policy had remained unchanged. At the e»3 of June demands for an

immediate occupation of the islands again became rmierms* The Hew York

Herald Tribune asked a question which wm in many American minds* BXn

view of Fierro Lavalhs essprotsod hope of an Axis victory and his co­

operation with Hitler to bring it about, isn’t it time we because realists

and seised all French possession® in this hemisphere?*3^ In the case of

Martinique as in the larger problem of Franco-American relations, a major­

ity of American newspapers emphasised the necessity for more vigorous

action in order to frustrate the French supporters of the Has! order*

W 3 B » York Post, Bay 15, 19l*2.

19Siew Torts Tlmea, May 17, 15>l»2.

Hew York Herald Tribune, June 28, 19l2.

 CHAPTER H U

M m x o m OPINION m THE AIXXBD BfitXXHOS WITH

BABLAH H 101©i AFRICA HI 1#*2

On November 7, the united nations, landed in Nbrth Africa*

little or no resistance was expected by them from the Vichy authorities

both because of pre-loading contact© established by Hebert Itophy with

some North African Frenchmen and because of an agreement with General

Henri Olraud to whom was intrusted the task of rallying the population to

the anti-Axis cause, French idlitary authorities, however, maintained

their allegiance to the Vichy government and ordered the French North Af­

rican troops to resist. Admiral Jean Barlan, the ccRB&aa&er of all Ylehy

French forces, was in Algiers in November, 191$, and It was eventually

through him that General Mark Clark, deputy supreme ccsaaaader of the Allied

forces, obtained a cease-fire order on November 10, 19b2* % the so-called

*Claa&~Darlan agreementn Iforth Africa re-entered the war on the Allied

side, with Harlan as the head, of it© administration.

Xfeaxmhlle, In France Petals had broken diplomatic relations with

the United State© and Q e m m troops had crosses! the armistice demarcation

line into unoccupied southern France* Parian vainly urged the French

fleet to leave Toulon for the North African harbors, but the ships were

merely scuttled by their commander© when the Gomans attempted to seise

them* Although Harlan was officially repudiated by the Vichy government,

he argued that Retain wag now In German hands and was therefore not free

277
 278

to express his will* Pretending still to act in Detain*© name, ho set

his©elf up m rfchief of state** and created an advisory ^imperial coun­

cil,*4 consisting of the m m t Important Vichy leadens in Africa and Cirsud,

cmmml& r of the French aimed force© in Earth Africa# Governor-general

Pierre Boisson of French West Africa soon joined farces with Parian* But

the Vichy political and adr&inlsirativ© organisation remained essentially

unchanged*

General do Gaulle, the leader of the Fighting French movement,

who load already brought part of the Freneh m p iro into the war, had not

b m n offered a part in the Horth African operation by the Allies* Bever*

thelesa, he declared Maes©If billing to cdlstborate with Gtraud# He re™

fused, however, to negotiate with Parian* All necessity for such xmgp~
/

ti&tlon was m&&& on Deeasabor 22** X$*2, when Parian was assassinated by

a young Frenchman, fermnd Beamier do 3a ChapeXle*

11

The landings in Africa did not come m a surprise even to the jaost

easual Merlcan observers* WawrXey Foot noted in his Secret 111story of

the Tter that

impressed by the fact that the shortest passage across the Atlantic
from the eastern to the western hemisphere is fr m Dakar to the
bulge of Brasil, Meric$m in 1^2 becsas© DaksrKsonsclous * The
nsa© of this port of West branch Africa was never mentioned in the
press or on the air without the remnder that it was the jussping-off
point for an attack m the Americas

Actually, It was long before 19i2 that America b e a m intere&ted In Africa*

Bren before the ill-fated expedition of de Gaulle against Dakar, Africa

l
Hoot, The Secret History of th© Dar, I, p. £8G*
 w

had become a keif point in t o interventionist argument to prove that the

United States should enter the war* The American consulate in Dakar was

recessed after the French defeat and consul Thorns Wasson arrived tore

on September 15* 19k&» %tth instructions to watch carefully all German

activities***^

from that time until after t o Allied landing In North Africa* nu~

serous feature articles were published In newspapers and magazines pur­

porting to describe the strategical importance of Dakar in the German mili­

tary plans sb well as pres©at or future activities in the harbor#^ In

December* 1$|1* for instance* Eugene Wright published in Harder % Magazine

an article entitled "Dakar* key to Africa* why is it iHporfcsnfc to America."

We know today wh&t would be likely to happen if Dakar were con­

trolled by ftasi Germany* We have a far better idea of Dakar*© im­
portance to t o Western iieasrlspher© than ever before* from the point
of view of our own interests as well as from those oif a Itoi-domi-
natod Europe* We are beginning to realise that control of Dakar
together with Egypt* can mean control of the entire African conti­
nent .4

fiie loudly publicised construction of t o Sahara railway and ¥ichy*s

boasting that North Africa would soon be connected to Dakar by this stra­

tegical line which would facilitate tho "defease of the %>ire" increased

American fears * Many saw behind these plans the hand of Germany* Dakar

could also be used— was already used* some thought— as a submarine base

and could naturally became the springboard, for much more ambitious plans*

"If allowed to remain in German hands until ‘the Sahara railroad is

2
Danger, Our Vichy Gamble, p. 55.

See Hew Xfiak Sun* February 1* IPkl and Hanson W* Baldwin in $ m

York Times * Hay 19$ 19ET7

harp er* a Hagaglne, December* l?hl$ p* 23*

collated*11 concluded Bigene fright, Mit will callow half of Africa*

And if Egypt £&lX©"-ssiake no id®take about it, tho shadow of the Dark
t*
Continent will reach the Andes #t?;> In January* 1$$, Paul M* Atkins wrote

in the -Saturday Svaning Post about ITThe sjysrfcexy of Bakar*fl In his opinion,

"recent events have made clear 'that the Gersians wouM like to secure thin

important base and soon# the pressure which Germany is, at this writing,

exerting on the Vichy govemaexst is enoiwows.^ Actually, there was no

Qom an penetration in heat Africa# Even in forth Africa tho German aanofc*
7
stice commissions wore chiefly interested in jxilice and economic problems*
£
hanger tsr&od this Ctcrsnan Inactivity a "curious thing *n * It was curious

only when cohered with American anxieties#

The highest government authorities in the United States took a

very serious view of the E&kar thimt, especially at the time of Darlas1#

negotiations with the Ctexss&ns. On April 2L, l$tl, Secretary of the Sfeyy

Knox ^recalled to M s audience the grave menace which confronta! us#^

Too £ m of us realise, and still fewer acknowledge, the slse

of the disaster to Ataericte hemispheric safety if Cenmany, already
the conqueror o f Prance, should establish herself in Dakar, a french
colonial, possession# Free there, with her surface ships, submar­
ines and long-range bosaber®, a victorious Germany could substantially
cut us off from all ecoansree with South America and wake tho fonroe
Doctrine a scrap of paper*!®

$}ltoper*3 I'agasiiie, December, 19’;1#

Ssi^ EC S E & !2Sh xo> 15%2*

^Thomas C* Wasson, **The fysiery of Dakar* enigma resolved,,1*
A m rlp m foreign Device Joimml, April l?t3, p* 1&9* Wasson was
comui 1^1® ! ^ # ’^ ”' *
8
hanger, Our Vichy Gamble, p* 187*
9 " •
 281

A t m days later President Koosevelt utilised Dakar in m effort- to- prove

that America was already in the war*

Thm Basis have the armed power' at any moment to occupy Spain and
Portugal! and that threat eactends not only to French Berth Africa
and the western end of the Mediterranean, but also to the Atlantic
fortress of Dakar, and to the Islands outposts of the Bear World--
the Asores and the Cape Verde Islands* Hie Cape Verde Islands are
only seven hours -distant from Brasil by bomber or troop-carrying
planes* They dominate shipping routes to and from the South At­
lantic* Hie war is approaching the brink: of the Western Hemisphere
itself* It is earning very close to

lass than three months later. Secretary of War Stimson roe^hasised the

Meriean interest in Dakar in a radio address*

Germany has been pushing into North Africa and m have season
to believe that a major advance will be made by her into feat -con­
tinent* At Dakar, which is held by Vichy forces, now friendly wife
Germany, th© great western bulge of the African coast arrows the
South Atlantic ocean until the distance .from Dakar to the easierar-
most point of Brasil c m be easily traversed by air or sea*^

According to WaverXey loot, ^the presentation of the Importance

of Dakar owed more to journalistic than to mUitaay apprehensions,^ but

it was an important factor in fee American feterproiation of th© strata

gical situation, fh-ea, In 19k%» America*© defensive outlook was abandoned

in favor of offensive plains, this continued interest in Dakar led many to

think that fee West African port would be chosen as the first target for

the American effort in the Buropean theater of operations* Broadcasting

over WABC on October Ip, 19t2, William L, Shirer discovered certain signs

suggesting that West Africa would become America *s second front instead

■^lioosevelt %
n fireside feat on May 27, 19^1, H«r fork Times,
lay 28, 19hl*
12
August 15, l$il, in laager, Our Vichy Gamble, p# IB?.

^Root, Secret Histoiy of the War, I, 580,

 282

of This hypothesis was not without merit# it m® absolutely

necessary to help Bussia in M r desperate fight but it wm to

face the whole German m w ^ t h inexperienced troops * f m observers

thought that a landing in the Mediterranean might be possible* since the

French possessions there wore protected” by the German airforce and the

Italian' mvy* The most likely place wm thus Dakar in spite of Its r&~

mo%mms from any other military objective# Some observers pointed to

the Free French operations in Idkya to show that desert warfare offered

many possibilities* In the Henr lotic World Telegram William Philip $l»®

declared that **to&ay it is perfectly possible for an army to cross the

desert and do It In doublenpick On October 27* h a w w j he '-re­

peated the opinion of a t m Free French strategists in Mm l®sk* **$ueh a

blow," he wrote* "would hardly begin at Dakar* hitherto virtually the only

French base on the African w m t coast to receive much mention# According

to French strategists, the region of Casablanca and Habat wouM be a more

logical starting point.

In spite of such warnings, the actual location of the landings

m m m a happy surprise to both the American and the French people* It

seemed to prove that the United Nations strategy m s getting bolder and

that the long chain of defeats and failures would finally be broken.

% A S C , October 19, l?Ii2.

Toric World I’clegraai, October 23, 19li2.

16
Ibid., October 27, WbZ.
 283

HI

The diplomatic and intelligence work which had preceded the land­

ings in Horih Africa got' wide publicity Immediately after the opening of

that theater of operations * In M s press conferences of 8 and 9

Secretary of State Hall, Incensed by the attacks against M s Vichy policy,

claimed that the landings had been made possible by the work of the State
17
Department# He claimed that the preparation of future operations In

Africa had b&m the first concern of the State Bepartansait in its dealing®

with Tlcky* Waverley Boot* in jpgn»WK«i

Hie Secret)>*■ History of the War# relied to
<*>*//$*•. *r*mm mmir.Mw nummnm

take this claim seriously# Vteyo-ne who wishes to believe that the State

Department in toe* 15?h0* a f m t and a half before t%>an*a surprise attack

precipitated xm into- tho war* foresaw the north African Invasion of two

ami a half year® later* and tailored it® policy with that objective in
17a
mind may do so* * * *?l nevertheless, Demarco Bess, almost one year be­

fore the landing®* published in fee Saturday Evening Post an article which

offered to give seme basis for B U I 1® assertion* 'Whatever the value of

their intervention may have been* military and diplomatic observers were

really ©cut to Tlorbh Africa with the idea that it could someday become a

basis for operations*

I talked with an American strategist only a f m weeks after the

collapse of Prance* and I remember having asked his* ©Ufcy b m the
American Government rushed its military and diplomatic scouts to
French Horth Africa?1*
He replied* '**In a. war like tills you ajuast look far ahead# Let us
suppose that we will have to send an expeditionary force to Europe
before this war Is over* naturally* we must have Isaacs where we can
land such a force* * *w© will have to find springboards for our ex­
peditionary fares much closer to Surope than anything we m m pos­
sess.M * « *

lork Times* Wmmfaer 9* l$?k2#

l7aRoot* Secret History of the War* II* 2?8#
 m

Both British and A»rican strategists, however much they might

disagree on m m point® * united In regarding ifr i m m the m m t
likely sprtngbo&M for their eventual onslaught upon Hitler*® n m
toopean Qapire#3.8

At first there was little criticism of the manner in which this

task of preparation had bean aceotapliahed* The result® seeraad Jbqpressiva

enough* it took only a £ m day© to overcome the resistance and pexwaade

the .French to change sides* After the "Darlim deal** h w m r * tho liberal

press noted that pmctically everything had to be lopwlssd, and began to

gnestlon the political abilities of the State Department envoys and of the

Office of strategic Sendees* X. f* Stone charged, in comrection with tho

fro m h problem* that nTm Office of Stmtagic Services, m l® h seems to do

amch of the sm&*$ political thldking* 1$ m mixed in its cor^oeitlcm as

its chief William 1# Donovan, is in his thinking**^

The eptood* which m& m m t publicised wm General Clark1® secret

mission to Churchill near Algiers' on October 23» l$k2* The first account
20
was an Associated Press dispatch dated Sorafeer 13* These stories gave

the impression that American authorities were in close touch with a vast

underground organisation whose malfIcations covered all Bbrtfo Africa and

which Involved many leaders of the I t e h any* Iffig o r noted in Our fichy

Gttfcle^ that certain accounts exaggerated the importance of the

^ Smm aturday Evente ■Post,

»»)**+***»
n>PHuBi.*wii.>»if*
January/ 3, 1& 2,

The Ballon, Bwanbcr 23* 12!$*

20See also, Captain Godfrey B* Courtney in life, December 28,
19li2i Bidgeway B# Knight In Foreign Service J m m m X T ^ m h 3 ipli3j B « a m
Bess in the S a t u r d a y G a l l a g h e r , M Door
to Berlin ( H m Wr k, I 5 0 T , G * Iml Price, Glraud ayiTHe
J m ^ S T S tn m {Mm Xosk* 1§IA), pp* 92 ££# j and H# L# XiTTm337 Secret
StSfetos (w m fork, T m u *
^11#, p* 330* Be referred to Frederick C* P&lnton, *Secret Ms -
eion to- Horth Africa,* 1aa&sys 1 Digest, May, 1?1*3* For Langerhs own
version of Claak% aissIST’ Sie Our vlc^y Gamble, pp* 328-331*
 285

intelligent© obtained* 3m h stories bad the advantage of increasing

American confidence in tidied Stasis® rdlltary leader and of distracting

public attention from the political situation which wm developing at the

tine* They contributed, however, to the false Idea of tloith African opin­

ion which created so m c h confusion later*. It was difficult, m the basis

of these reports, to realise that the Irenchaen who were hostile to Ger-

laaoy mawi adjso hostile to ?ic3y* it w impossible to ?a&aEStand that the

aa3y French military leader who took part in this affair was Osnoral wmt*

As hanger pointed out, "The French officer corps fait strictly hound by

its oath to Fetain and ooqplfttely blotted all those, like Oeneral Mast,
22
who had had dealings with the Amaadcam**

The local result® of Fobert Ifarpbybs entente with the Algiers

underground were not open to debate. The easy occupation of Algiers was

probably greatly facilitated by the armed intervention of the underground,

21
although American forces did not land at the agreed place of msle«vons.

If Birphy had tried to work only with elements opposed to the Yiehy regime

the struggle for control of iforth Africa by the Allies mi^ht have turned

into a political and a social revolution, Many liberals did not $m&

averse to 'taking that risk^ but the supporters of the official United

States policy answered that the military situation made ouch a course im­

practical and. dangerous, Samuel Dashiell noted in Victory through Africa

that Hh© rank and file of the population disarmed and disorganised as

they were, could not be counted on as a stable element to deal idih.*^

^Danger, Our Vfoiy Gaable, p« 352*

^Kenneth Pen&ar, Mventure in Diplomacy (Mew Toxk, 19h5), p* 10?#

pit
S m the editorial entitled "Down with Parian,! in the Hew lark
Post, Movositoer 16, Wk2*
^Dashiell, Victory through Africa, p, 295*
 286

Sooner or later, supporters of the argued, American troops

would have bad to polio© & territory t o m by civil strife.^' The M

group also argued that it w impossible to recruit a n m acfeinistration

to replace the faithful Vlehyites*^ They point^'Wt, fios&ly, that

Morphy wm m t reluctant to deal with French undergsmici organisations

when he could find trace of then, as the Algiers emiple proved*

negotiations between the Fraxsh underground and Allied 'authorities,

however, lost srnch of their practical value because of the suspicious at­

titude of the Americans toward, their French partners * This distrust was

noted by mr® than one obssrv&r*®^ L&nger worded that ^American lack of

confidence in the French sense of security m a evident throughout the dis­

cussions* For example, at no time before the beginning' of the operations

29
were the French informed on wh&t beaches the landings w o M be made,11

Frl.ce attributed the change in the date of the landings to the fear that

tee French might talk*

The Allied General staff were growing uneasy about tee fact teat they
had h e m obliged to take the irsatfc patriots into their confidence.
They could not tear to what eictent tee German- Jntellige&ce Gerrie©
in Algiers had succeeded in getting access to their secrete# Dy thus
advancing tee date of tee arrival of tee Allied troops, they hoped to
dislocate any am&ngemerrte the Q eim m might have .made to cope with
a landing on hoveeber 2?te*33

This lack of confidence was not limited to tee French imderground«Ac­

cording to Boberi Shewed, f,Thore is ooufisiderable room,forspeculation

^Gallagher, Back Boor to Berlin, pp* 123-125*

27Ibid.
28
Pendor, Mventere in Bfpfeycy, pp* 96-971 Susie©! Eliot Morison,
Operations in l^orte'lkfrieTm iffieSS'1'(Boston, 19U7), P* 66*
on
''linger, Our Vichy Gamble, pp. 330-331*
*^Pric@, Giraud and the African Scene, p, 103#
 28?

m to whether Rogues or Etchelier would have ordered such determined re­

sistance In Morocco if ifo© ggc&et of the landing had been 1m s well

kepi ana both had been made m m m o f the strength of the force© that were

moving In on Morocco and Algeria*

Xf

The American government had realised long before the Morth Airi-

can landing© that the central problem ■of i'raaco-Aisaerican relation© in the

period which would follow the liberation «tf north Africa and. precede the

liberation of Frane© would be the choice of a Frenchman capable of gov-

earning the liberated ters&f$Kl©s and of mobilising French energies for

32
the pursuit of the war m the Allied side* if Mexicans had been asked

before the landing who this m i would be> m o m m om majority of them

would most certainly have i m w General de Gaulle♦ jhi© choice appeared

natural* since de Ga&H© had hmm® fa u n a for rebelling against the armi­

stice government and had succeeded in rallying around him vast areas of

the French inspire which were ©miimiag the fight on the Allied ©id©* Al­

though some superficial, observers did not even realise that de Gaulle had

been inf©nctionally kept out at north Africa* it was generally understood

that the American g o vo rm m t had consciously snubbed de Gaulle for various

reasons*^ Mttny people accepted the State Peparbnent,s statements that

Horth Africa was antirde Gaulle and pro-Vichy. According to Harold

^%ierwood* Hoosevelb arg. Hopkins» p. 6hB*

32
Callender, A Freface to Peace, p* 60,

0*Hare McGoimek# Hew Xoik Times, Hovmber 28# 19h2$

Pender, Mventuro in Diplomacy* pp* 87-88*
Callender in A Preface to Peaeo# tii© State Department more or lens re­

garded de Gaulle m a British puppet * or s in more dignified terms.* n&

artificial figure bearing tbs trademark of London* where he had

been ’built up* by the British radio and financed by the British Troas*

W * w Callander had another reason to explain, why do Gaulle was ‘to-

fitted1' for north African purposes * "He was a military man and the French

for at leant two generations had distrusted military men as national load*

ere#**35 Other observers readily admitted that de GaaHe was personally

disliked by American, policy makers *

To Washington the obvious alternative to Durian* General.

De Gaulle* Is not coEpIeieXy acceptable. * « *
Had it not been for the inspiring and able leadership of
Fmsch generals like Gentilhesame* K'oonig and Catrous the Free
French w p m m s t might have died of spiritual undernouilehxBienfc.
For though Be Gm&Xe*s ideals are as lofty as he is tail* he
is a difficult man to understand and more difficult to love.
Those who know him actalt lie is arrogant* self-willed* and cold,
He is minenily v n ^ f r m c h ^

Observers who had followed the course of relations between de Gaulle

and America since the Saint Pierre and Hiquelon incident?^ were not sur­

prised to see that de Gaulle had been "forgotten*5 in the preparation of the

Forth African operation* Obviously Secretary of State Bull had never for­

given the Free French leader for this incident* Kaay a&mpapers and col*

uanists* ©specially liberal m m and even m m of those who approved

America's Bbrth Africa policy* recalled this incident as a reason for the

Callender * A Preface to Peace* p» 60,

%<
IMd* It might not bo us©.lees to recall that A Preface to
Peace was published two years after the landing in Hbrth""Ajffica*“r

Trank Gervasi, But SbMlers Wondered Why (Kfcar Torfc* 1910)>

p$>*

^See pp.^3 '

 289

da al*^ According to Sherwood these observers were wrong* **2n

the subsequent protest over American policy on this there were tether

attacks on the State Pepartaaeofc repercussions of the % ^called Free

French,*1 blua&erj hot this policy was attributable directly to Boosevelt

h h m e lt aid not to the State Beparfenent#^ Sherwood repeated Feoeevelt'«

O&a written stat«aent that he considered it ,ress©ntial that de Gaulle be

kepi out of the picture and pew&tted to have no infcreation whatever,

regardless of how irritated and irritating he may become

Since de Gaulle m s not- considered satisfactory for recognition

ancl leadership in Horth Affcloa* fee Smorlean go?wrmen& attcsptcd to win

over sonK popular french figure who could enroll the support of the nfc»

jorlty of the population.# *hey thoug^it that Mouard Harriot night be

such a leader*^ lie refused to leave JYaacoi**® but perhaps the liopos of

the government were not corjpletdy blasted, m m after the fa4d.au agree­

ment , since -fee Hear Jm k Thnm mentioned Herriot aaong other t m m in an

editorial obviously influenced by gpveaOTsnt circles.

FlaMln*s harsh consermtim, m m Fascism, make him ineligible

for any sustained cooperation with the United Nations * But, if he
can be of any real use in winning the war* he will be used— the test
being whether he can do more good than hare* and how rraeh.
fhe Fighting French are not free of inner controversy ihcssm
selves.. In some sections there is a distinct competition for power
between General de Gaulle aid General Catrouac*
Until the situation produces a catalyst, the United nations
must employ all the conflicting? ©lemmts if It can* But If

Dorothy Thastpsoo, How I cafe Post, Jammiy 1$, ISlc*

^Sherwood, Boosevelt and n o t f ^ p. 689.

^Danger, Our ¥ldxj Gamble, p. 2^0.

^ U a l l t M e r , A Preface to Peace, p* 61*

h2lbU.
 290

I* Herriot emtd set vp a government in. forth Africa, the catalyst

would prbbably quickly sfjptar in his eminent p ® m m M

The supporters of American policy revealed, after the two failures

of Oirand in Barth Africa, that ho had been chosen because there 'was so

other candidate*^ the ©vitaiee to support that affiliation wm probably

that Weyg&nd had decided to r « l n ^faithful to the Marshal* until ho

learned that Gir&ud had accepted.*^ It & m m 9 however, that, except for

Harriot, the American search for a French leader was strictly limited to

military circles* Ibis was naturally due to the fact that French troops

in north Africa were the big problem before the landings. Amartcm Charge

d*Affsires S. Ftjtasy- ftsete m s the first on© to suggest to the State De-

partsieot that Glrsrnd might be the mm of the hour# Soon after the latter1®

escape f t m Koenigsteln, Tuck reported to Washington fro® Ftahyi

A number of weH-infOTied goveramsKt officials who have here­

tofore mentioned Weygand as the possible leader of such a movement
against ike Germans $ mahi? mppm® the thought that Girsmd, who is
considered to have both the requisite qualities of leadership and
the necessary prestige both with the Ar&y and civilian, might
possibly be the wm for the job.ho

In Berth Africa, Gimsd*© possible candidature was- warmly supported by

teaigreHtobreuil,^ who wm Eeheri IUrp^r% trusted adviser* Bis m m

was also welcome to the Americans involved in the planning of the llorfch

^Bew t o *4c Times, loraiber 1?, 1<&£,

^Danger, Our ?ichy Gamble, p* 361.

^Iblcl., pp. Z W and 2?0.

*^Sjay 2, 1$*2. toto.* p. 2?S.

^Lsaaigre-Ettbraillj a i>ench indtastriAlist eenneeted with the

E*©aeh banking interests collaborating with Germany was accused to be a
Fascist by French and American liberals.
 25&

African operation* He seemed to be *the man of the future*®^

Apparently the American government defied it necessary to justify

the Ilorth African operation with the help of a classical diplomatic pre­

text-# It was officially amamecd that American intervention wm intended

to forestall German action in this area.^ Some American editorial® curi­

ously re®«hled Htasl explanation® at the time o f the invasion of D m m xk

and I-Ioreay* The Baltimore Sun wrote on SfovsB&er 9 s

There had been no fctbb about the reality of the Iasi* breaches
of the french arts&aiic© treaty or Laval's toleration o f them; nor
Is there any doubt about the Imminence of Mas! m o of french Afri­
can facilities for the greatly altered war in the Mediterranean and
m the high sea®.

Such cements tended to belittle the revolutionary and popular character

of the war# Fortunately, the french learned about the invasion from

Booeevelt himself, but, as seme observers pointed out, the Allied cause

had nothing to gain f r m using military and diplomatic arguments instead

of stating frankly that the real moral justification of Allied interven­

tion was the desire of the French people to get rid of their oppressors.

The aam opposition between two radically different political

philosophies manifested Itself in the first American reaction to the

fighting between French and Americans on the Barth African beaches*

Cmricusly enough, the most nationalist element® in the United States did

not react violently against the attitude of the French emtfnders, BoguSs

^longer* Ogr Vichy GmMe, pp. 2?8-?9.

^Roosevelt »s arniouneement on Hdwember 7, 19&2, Hew Y&tk Herald

Tribune, Hwei&er 8* 3£l*2#
 m
and Admiral Etch-olter#^ Some people seemed to hove accepted the French

sdlitaay %hmty that akrnmrn required resistance on the part of the French

troops or that the French I&vy m e ’’trsdiiiomlly mti-British# This

attitude was very frequent m m g those who defended the deal***

This military outlook which placed discipline above everything else may

be observed in amoral George S* Fatten1® mmoiiw*® He did not comment

m the fact that the war began in Morth Africa with the Allies fighting

the French and not the Germans* He -called the French #the enosor* and gave

a guard of honor to the delegation headed by legues and Hehelier because

it was % o use kicking a m m # i m he is down*** the nesd day# however,

while inspecting the Morece&n cavalry, he showed some concern for the

french situation but.he was apparently still thinking in military t e w *

X coi?plimmted the French officers eor^Maixiing the Moroccan cavalry

soldiers on their appearance which m s truly soldierly in the 19m
meaning of the word* Xi was rather pathetic to think that m e of
the light tanks in the escort which X had turned down could have _
easily destroyed all of the splendM creatures standing at salute*”

American liberals wore .extremely indignant at the Vichy author*

tiles. Koberb Sherwood lamented* "For the ’honor1 of the Vichy govern­

ment m s enacted the sordid spectacle of Frenchmen shooting at and. killing

Frenchmen* It was like a tragic misprint m the pages of history*^

The correspondent of The m#

*
How Torfcer, A* J* htebling#* feB lucky not to
*»,!■■ i»«* wtf^yw m<*n mi1'!' Jwww»iii»y wr

have landed with the shock troops because he "hadnever wanted to see a

Hogues and S&cheller were the civil andmilitary authorities

in Morocco*

%!orison, Operations in fforth African Waters, pp. 67-68 .

^Georges S. fatten# War as X Knar It (Boston, X$i?) pp. 10-12.

%bM.
Cli
Sherwooda Roosevelt and Hopkins# p, %$>
 m

fight between Moriomm arid Frenchmen**® Waiting ©IX the African coast

before going ashore, he "reoogniaed a kindred spirit® ia Dili© Stewart of

the Baltimore AfrcHimaricaR* «rWhere do you hope to land at?* he asked

me* *SomepXae© where resistance has ceased,1 I told him* 'Thai estab­

lished a perfect rapport.*^

For a £ m days, .however, American opinion was exclusively preoc­

cupied with tli© progress of the landing operations* there was practically

no m m about the French reactions* The almost Immediate cease-fire in

Algiers was a hopeful sign, but fighting continued at Oran and m the

Moroccan coast. There was no account of Gir&ud1s activities hist there

were accounts of his latest escape, from Marseilles, disguised ,!as an

old lady.*®' Sver/oody knew wife the Baltimore Bua feat the great

question was

whether those who apeak for Fmnce in North Africa will join
General Girand and others® ±n talcing full advantage of the op­
portunity which prSSEmliself. If they do, there will be more
reason than ever to hope that the rigors of the extended occupation
of metropolitan France will be of limited duration.®

The tone of this editorial indicated that by Nevenfcesr 12 American

observer© had ceased to think that the Vichy regime would crumble at the

first appearance of the United nations flag©* Many people suspected that

fftf
^J.ebling, The Road Back to Pari©, p. 213*

5^ b M .

Baltimore mmamnamb
Sun, Swasher 12, 1S&2.
?>8
Italics mine. These two word© showed that many people thought
d© Goullft would have aanabfcing to do in the North African operation.
<o .
Baltimore Bun, November 12, I9ii2*
 29k

the situation might contra some diplomatic suiprises* According to

Walter U pgm m g it wm "evident that the real test of' our diplomatic and

political preparation lies not behind us, hut ahead of u«uH^ This too

an answer to Secretary of State Ball’s claim that the Vichy policy had

made the invasion of north Africa possible# "The critical question,**

Walter lippman continued, f,is whether the decisions have been taken and

the preparations made for the situation ifeioli now edsts m a result of our

occupation in French teth Africa m d of Hitler1® overriding of Marshal

ps£t&in*»^ foot observes, however, were not as suspicious as waiter Ilpp*

mam* The occupation of the Vichy territory by Gexmay and the lose of the

African oitpire was considem" m the end of Vichy as a political entity*

Sate dispatches m m announced that Fetain was on hie way to the Allied

headquarters in forth Africa*^ It was felt that the political vacuum thus

created would be filled easily by anti-Axis Frenchman like Giraud, de Gaulle

m d others* Typical of those temporary illusions m m The Atlantic lohthly

of December which was- obviously at press when the m m of the Darlan agree*

meat reached America*

invasion of French forth and West Africa {sie] has revealed,

in the brief time which has elapsed since it began, the cracks and
fissures running through the structure of Vichy controls in Algeria,
Morocco, and the five southern colonies governed from Baker on the
Africa bulge (sic) . General Giraud*s clear voice, ringing' over the
radio from l&b&t with clarion pride that France’s hour of deliverance
was at hand,® the mutiny of Colonial regiments, the imdiate

^°N«r York Herald Tritof November IF, I9k2*

mwmi muarimniwi?

6llhM.

York Times, November 12, !$L$.

speech was ne:itl.icr ■written mi’read, over tho radio by Gen*

ersl Giraud who was still in Gibraltar.
 2?5

unraveling: of civil war as supporters of General de Gaulle strove

to curt? opposition to the invaders, the swift development of sab*
ot&ge against Vichy’s apparatus for defense, the succession of
rapid suxrerders’— all attest h m ramshackle aid- unreal are the
foundations upon which the F&talivMval regime has endeavored to
base authority over a people bred in the traditions of liberty*®**’

¥1

On foveaber 10, 191$, American nc^mpapors announced that Admiral

dean Dorian was the '"prisoner* of the Allied forces*^ She nsrt day it was

reported that he was *in Allied hand**# On f!evc©ber 12 ha was described

as a Mystery,! and it was announced that ha had given orders to suspend

hostilities & On Ifovestber llj. the nevrs that Harlan had bean chosen as the

head of the French administration in North Africa was imparted to the Amer­

ican correspondents gathered in Allied Headquarters in Algiers* HacVane,

in Journey into War, described the effect it had on these people* «te

were dmbfounded* ’Hie story was something out of Alice In Wonderland being

told, not by a Mad flatter, but by an apparently sane and collected American

g e n e r a l , ,flt was a group of gliui-faced reporters who left headquarters*

We bad come to liberate forth Africa# We wondered what the French would

think when the news mm made public *n f.^cVans, like theotherreportera,

however, wrote a story which insisted upon rthe realistic view" taken by

American authorities* "We gave the world as fair an account as was

^■fhe Atlantic
.
nijiw iwuw
llonthly, December, 191$, p, k*
..... mmw>iBwwi,ifnwn^Wai>i **

® H o w York Times, Wavoasfoer 10, 19l|2*

^Ibid*, fovmber 11, X9l$*

S M * » Kovcsaber 12, I9h2.

w Mao¥me, Journey into War, p# 77#

69,General lasdc Clarte*
 296

possible for the Darlan appointment *w^

The n&m did not roach America in time to be published in the

aoraing newspapers* They published, hmeter# dispatches indicating that

Parian bappmod to be in Algiers at the timo of the landing, %ad been en­

tertained with all the ccusideratiojas due to his rank," and had given a

cease-fire order to the French troops* this was enough to convince the

How Yoxk Thscs that the State ’Dcpartiaent bad prepared everything before*

hand* According to this j^^p®per*c editorial on novomber 15, Barlanls

intervention was part of the harvest reaped by Secretary .Mull in fichy*

The success of one after another, the quick capitulation

of port after port, with evidence of little bloodshed., the dramatic
appearance of General Giraud and his appeal to tie French people
and finally the order of Mrilral B&rXan for the French in Africa to
cease resistanc©«-all this gave mounting evidence of the extreme care
and efficiency with which the whole enterprise had b& m planned and
e&ecn.ted*?3>

In the same newspaper, StMa L* James was already preoccupied with the po­

litical problem created by t o presence of Bsrl&rx but be realise! that it

was Mimch too early to d m any definite conclusions * The situation has

to develop *n^

It was natural to wonder why Parian was in Algiers at the time of

the landings* ■It was soon explained that his presence was due o:ly to

chance and that the agye&aent entered into with liim had not been premedi­

tated*^ Many supporters of the Barlan agr«meni neoaed to believe that

^%aeVam*w J o u m © “ into far,■ *

p* 77#

Xork Times, Hov^ab&r 15, 19&2#

72TbM,

^ n o o se v eltfo statement in Mew York Times, Moveaber IS, 19^2.

 m

it m s necessaiy to prove BarXan*s ignorance of the Allied plans in order

to justify t o arrangement with him* C* Ward Price wot© in Giraud and the

African Scene that Parian1© Kcoraing m s apparently due to no political mo­

tive1* and Price was sure that the m m of the landing cmm m a ^shattering

surprise14 t© Parian*^ In Back Poor to Berlin, Wes Gallagher recorded that

he talked with Clark, Msehtarer, llorpby, and other participants in the

negotiations, and “all are convinced that Parian4© presence in Algiers at

the i t o of the Allied landing m s purely accidental**1^ French journalist

Henri de KcrilXIs, like m a y ,

American supporters of the Parian arrangement,

ascribed t o rmaors that Parian. %ners and that Murphy % xm that the ad­

miral knew** to de Gaulllst propaganda* »This hypothesis has no merit,11 af~

flmed de Kerillis, who had %ad the opportunity to consult the best soursos

and. * .access to certain documents still uftomm to t o general public,

Unfortunately, de Korillia bed not ee«mie&tecl with Captain Bariy

C* Butcher, who was specific on this point in M s diary, Jgr Three Years

with Maenhm&r* In October, I9k2, tophy was informed by Parian1® emis-

series that the latter was ready to change sides and bring over t o amay

and the fleet, provided he could remain in command of theFrenchforces

in Worth A f r i c a * T h e reaction of Murphy wascertainly veryfavorable.

Longer pointed out, "Dorian *8 advances were not to be taken lightly. He

was, after all, commandoi^tochlef of all French forces— land, sea, and

air— and his authority over the fleet was unqueEtioned, Linger admitted

^Prlc©, *
Gftraeud and the African Scene, p* 123*
i in*mii]iMHttni*i|M 1 rnvmm .•*■ « •*« » ww»hw»i*>« IIiii-ii m m vmwma *

^Gallagher, Back Boor to Berlin, p# 68*,

7^aHenri de Kerillis, I Accuse de Gaulle (Hew Yoik, X9h6), p. 89*

flarcy c. Butcher* }& Three Years with Eisenhower (Mm York,
19h6}9 p. Ih5, entjy for Oct3EeF177 T O ----- ■/ '
^ U m g er, Our Vicfcy Caaible, p, 322,
 29$

that it w m only because of *tho of the hour* and the opposition

of the French ttn&ergro^ and General Mast that ,!Darlan mm dropped from

eonaideimtion for the tftae being

the supporters of the official policy maintained that there had

been no arrangement with telan prevtat© to the landings* According to

linger "there 1u nothing to substantiate" the theosy of a secret agree­

ment with Parian,^ and t a n d believed HSmt if such, charges were true

the fact would hare become erMent long since, no matter h m powerful or
go
cOBprahensiv® the atteapta to suppress ii*« Apparently there was m

formal charge in American newspaper© that the Harlan deal" was premedi­

tated* S&ny people <|uestioiwl theoften-repeated assertion that Barl&n

did not even know that there wouldbe an Invasion of North Africa* Sbe

cements of W i n Iac?ane m this question were typical of the liberal

attitude#

Why Darlan was in tiorfch Africa at this particular time is still

a subject for discussion* * * * 1 find it hard to believe that a
m n m smart as Barlan should have happened to arrive in Horth Africa
in the f a n of IShZ by m m duumse# A good ja&ry people in Vichy France
knew the fm & rlcm s and British were planning something against Berth
Africa* Although it is pure guesswork on agr part# I believe Parian
m j have caught a hint of thisand have taken a m n down to North
Africa to check up on the fieby officials and look over the general
defensive situation at the same time as he visited, his son* Playing
his cards close to hi© chest a© usual, fee may not have revealed his
knowledge to the official® who ©urmindec!

gndcmbtedly# insistence ■on Parian*© complete innocence appeared

suspect to many observers* Suspicion was increased by the manner in which

78"'" ” '

Banger# t o yM&jr Gamble, p* 323,

^ m n . , p. 3t5.
Qf\
““Sherwood, Koogwelt and Hopkins, p. 61(8.

®WeVane, Journey Into war, pp. $3-51*.

sosae supporters of the State Department *a Vichy policy claimed prudently

that the presence of Dorian in forth Africa was on© acre proof of the wis-
So
dom of this institution* IMs claim was quickly draped# In v i m of the

irMespre&d criticism of the Dorian deal” which followed* The m p p v r b m

of the official policy found thooeelvQ* in an eajfoamtssing situation*

They did not dare follow the principle of wmilitary ©jspedisricy” to its

logical wdrmtm and ultimately denied vigorously that Barlsm had been ap­

proached before the landing* They even denied that Parian had approached

the Americans or knew shout the landing**® jn that respect thcy* at

least implicitly* accepted the liberal conception of Apolitical warfare*”

The vigor of their denials clearly demonstrated that the would have dis­

approved any long-range plan to place France1

*a rajmber three collaborator

at the head of liberate forth Africa# They justified the Darlan appoint­

ment by stating that it wm an improvised solution which had been made nec­

essary by the dangerous political and military situation which had devel­

oped at the time of the landings*®* This confession was ©rfcsmely sur­

prising one week after Hull1© trimphant press conference* Sherwood in

ftooseyglt and Hopkins used the papers of Harry Hopkins * who had no sympathy

for Hull’s rigid and conservative conception of diplomacy. *There m s no

previous deal with Harlan*11 Sherwood concluded* ”but there m s a degree of

unaccountable ndscalculation and misinformation which caused a subsequent

deal with him to seem to be the only solution*”®

88iftw leak mm, Hcwsaber 15, 19^2.

\es Gallagher, Bad-- Door to Berlin, p. 60

'^‘ibld.i p , ?!».

3%usrwood, Roosevelt aad Hopkfaa, p. &0.

 300

Bo nOTpaper* ho e w * could criticise the preparation© for Hie

landing at a time when the success of the operation was still in doubt*

Fart of these preparation© had been carried out by military authorities

who were practically immune to criticism in war time* 0a the other hand*

Hi® people who defended Hie Harlan appointment were those who had approved

the Vichy policy* They had praised to tbs sides a policy* the result of

which should have been to suppress the obstacles which made the ”te©poraiy

arrangement” a **miliiaay necessity*” Liberal opponents of this policy were

&$o in a false situation* however* They despised any coaproid.se with a

ITasi puppet but they had criticised violently a policy which* according to

them, had result ad in the chaotic Borth African situation* It m s thus

difficult for the liberals not to agree to H e theoiy of ’•military neces­

sity* and they had to accept the tosporaiy amngoaent which prevented a

collet® political vacuum in Barth Africa* This e^lalaed why there was

at first tub little public opposition to the Harlan appointment* Even

Samuel Grafton said over WOE that ”0nr comanclere in the field were justi­

fied in using Harlan to shorten combat and save American and. French lives*

Most people believed that the arrangement was merely tc^orury* nfhe rea­

sons for this- rather unexpected decision on the part of the United States

are obvious,n wrote Egon Kaskelilne in Hie Christian Science Monitory "French

armed forces in Uorth Africa and probably part of the fleet are stall fol­

lowing Admiral Harlan’s orders. * * • Part of Hie French fleet at Toulon

may finally join the Allied navies

A storm of direct protests, however, %urst on Bomerelt *s head

* * .the people who had mistrusted his Vichy policy were bewildered. by

^.VOK, Sovwifcej- l£, 191,2.

^Christian Selene* Keillor, Hovacier 16, 19l*2.
 M
SB
this n m adventure in ' On llwessiber 16 the fer Tork feet

published an editorial entitled with Harlan.n Robert Sherwood re­

corded that it was M s a m advice* together with that at Hopkins s which

decided Roosevelt to sake & public statement in which he pointed out that

the arrangement was purely temporary and. did not engage the future of

Franca in any manner* The president also assured Americans that the United

States had asked for an immediate release of all political prisoners*®

During the press conference a Htemyn&iTided journalist "suggested the

sppropriaieness of an alleged Balkan proverb which was said to m n sees**

thing like this 5 child* you are permitted in time of great danger to

walk with the devil until you have crossed the bridge* Tills statement

bM a favorable effect on many cfoaerrors. Walter tlppmmi wrote with sat­

isfactions

the ITesident used very carefully chosen words when he stated

that he had "accepted Oensral Eiesaafeoirsr^ political armng&sents
made for the HmeSEiig in northern and western Africa*" 1.1ms he
made it clear that he did not know of thsa in advance* and it is
equally obtain* 1 believe* that General Eisenhower made the decision
on the spot after he had discovered that the information he had re­
ceived from our political agents was on the crucial question incor­
rect*91

Idppssaan decided a little hastily that In "this unplamed, but wisely im­

provised fashion* there has come an orderly m d of the power of Vichy in

Africa#" He concluded with a plea that the Third Republic1© laws be re­

established in Horth Africa and that de Gaulle be invited to Algiers*

®%atch, Franklin Delano Booswelt* p* 309*

0%«r Toifc W a g , Swaibcr 18, 19b2.

90
Dewey L* Fleming in Baltimore Sim* Kwcciber 18* 19k2*

915Iew Tork Herald Tribune* liovember Ip* 1212.

"For while General de Gaulle 2ms made mistakes* as Indeed who has not* he

18 on© of the historic figures of1 our generation tfnm it is as 'stupid as

it is mean not to welcome to our cause*w^

The fears of The fcr header were also allayed 'by the President*s

statmmt*

President Roosevelt has made a highly satisfactory statement con­

cerning the agreement reached in Hortfc .Africa between General Elsen­
hower and Admiral Barlan# * * *
Although political eo&ideraiiosjs sasst be subordinated to military
emergency, they cannot be neglected* She excitement provoked in some
circles by the arr*mgeiami with B&rlaa* though esmggoraiod and perhaps
too hysterical* 1& not without foundation* * * *
Sms restricted* the fa^oraiy leadership of the Parian admin­
istration in French Africa a m be of great m® m d at the sm a time
derived of political danger#??

The Baiion and' Thg however, in their first issues written

after the Parian deal became public* came out with violent attacks against

the American policy*

#hat doubtless appeared a reasonable military axpadimt is

proving a costly political blunder* and various government spokesmen
in Washington are trying to mitigate the effect of the transaction
by explaining that it is only a teerporary deal at worst* . . * Un­
fortunately— or perhaps foitumtely— this confession of sharp practice
is not very disarming* P m m m t i c statesmen vtiio announce their inten­
tion to double-cross a double crossor cut a rather sorry figure in
the eyes of friends and enemies alike*9a

The main argument advanced against Barlan was th e effect his name

would have on French opinion* \?averley hoot recalled in his syndicated

column that "On two occasions? striking clemonstratiouB of the extent to

which the do Gaulle movement had acquired support among Frenchmen inside

92
Hew Xork Times* Hwcmber 18, 19h2.

^The Tim Leader, Hoveaber 21* 19ii2*

Franc© were presented* only to bo Inanely ignored by t o United States*"

He restated Americans tot t o unity of this undergmnd m v m m t had been

achieved in, spite of American policy and that the n m developmeiits aster*

gored this unity so p& ±pl\dly achieved* In his opinion, the Parian ap­

pointment was chiefly an m b af hostility toward de Gaulle# »to State

Department find* itself mipportir^ Bibier% Quisling against Hitler**

esaeajyl*^ t o Iear Republic y m equally anxious.

Has General Gir&ud* or' his Admiral Parian, received more of a

mandate from the French people than General de Csnilo? By shunting
asM© all Fighting Prmek tore is a danger of serving notice on
them that there is no mom for their cause in a posi-imr french gov­
ernments that to prefer the summer soldiers and the m m shtm patriots
like Parian, who wears whatever political garment protects him bast
at any given moment# Those Frenchmen who recall tot only a while
ago Parian ms vying with Laval for the right to carry out t o behest*
free Berlin mist, feel dased and bewildered *9«

t o validity of this reasoning was acknowledged e rm by certain supporters

of the official policy, In Bad-: Door to Berlin# Woe Gallagher remxtesd that

Dealing with Darlm probably had, a bad moral effect on Allied

underground workers in IT&si^nsl&vad Burepe. tofcfcsr this moral ef­
fect* which must have been tm p m z y in the light of subsequent de­
velopment© * was offset by t o military advantages such, m the opening
the way to 'fundsla, the aequisition of Dakar and part- of the French
fleet* is a question tot historians have to decide after the war*97

t o attacks against Barlan and the American policy became m m

widespread and increased in intensity when it became clear tot t o sit­

uation in Horth Africa wotiM m b be inprmd immediately# t o strict cen­

sorship of nmm coming f r m tot area helped to irritate liberal

^overlay Hoot* "Backstage of the -far," Koves&er 3.9* I9k2*

Q&
The Hew Republic, jfaveraber 23, 19U2 •
07
Gallagher* Back Door to Berlin* p. 75.
journalists, General Mssr&owar later admitted in Camsede In Europe that

the establietesnt of this eamomhip wm a mistake#

In this period I made amtt&v error* even though £rm a good

motive* It was the application of censorship to political news f v m
Hoith Africa for a period of six wmakc « Betas* of personal dislike
of eensorefelp* I had to be convinced that the reason for such action
was Important# * * «
We wanted to avoid aimers to de Gsullist attacks in ttertfe
Africa including local french officials, They argued bitterly, m
did the press representatives in the theater. I think the censorship
had some of the desired effect*, and it was lifted the second I learned
that Gir&ud and Be Gaulle had agreed to meet at Casablanca* The rea­
sons for the censorship could not be eocplsdLned# however# and were of
course misinterpreted at home*98

W fm supporters of the Parian arrangement resented the censorship# espo-

99
ei&XXy American journalists in Worth Africa, In Bade Boor to Africa#

Wes Gallagher* a supporter of the official policy* referred eontet^tuottsly

to the nso~c&Iled 1Psychological bteiors*1 who were taking a none too

bright hand in the political, eworship,n Bmm liberals at home were even

more bitter*

As for the journalists who have hitherto been able to protect the
people from the unforeseen consequences of mistaken diplomacy, their
hands are now tied# They might know of the most dunging move® of the
State Department# but ihqy would be prevented from revealing them by
the clause in the ccnBorsMp code which prohibits «premati« dia~
closure of diplomatic negotiations or conversations.* The word »pr@~
mature^ would undoubteflly be interpreted by the State Department as
meaning disclosure in time to prevent any harm, being done by a mis­
taken pollcy.l^

During the month of December* 1$*2, criticism of the Parian deal

became more widespread# T3a© liberal® gained a powerful supporter in

Wendell L* billkie# the 1S>1»0 hepublicant candidate for the Presidency#

98
Eisenhower* Crusade in Europe# p. 131,
99
Gallagher# Back Boer to Berlin* p. 81,

*0%averley Boot # «Baokatage of the War#* Ncwea&er 19* I$i2#

 30?

Xu an interviw published in the Clrristi&n Advocate,

101 the afficdal

of the S^thodlst C&urch, 'Hillkie charged that America had "lost

acre1 forces 8 lu the Barlach deal and "therefore by it, we m & lose the

peace*« He demanded a clear definition of the United Hatlom war $da», a

definition which the Allied people m well as their leaders should help

femulate# Secretary of iirar Stirason, who had been ^astonished8 at the

"number and quality of those who disagreed8 with i&serihoirer's policy, un­

dertook an "energetic caiaj:.a%nn to defend the arr&iigemeiit with Barlan#*^

He personally tried to restrain^® Westell billkie* Unfortumt^ly, Senator

Yandenberg in defending the American policy of nesqx;d:Lencyn i n the Senate

did not mention ¥1111:1© by im m but referred to reams.!;® isadc by him in Ills

article in the Christian Advocate* ^ Willkle answered at a luncheon at

the Astor Hotel, sponsored by the latioml Conference of Christians and

the Administration policy of espedleaey is defended by Senator

T&nder&erg and the Chicago Tribune gives prominent front page copr
mendatcsry prominence to t h e 3 H ^ o r % naaxks# 3nch defemes give
m reassurance of the rightness of agr position* f|f belief Is that
the strongest force on our side in this war is not m r ami©® but
our moral position in the world* I fear the effect of our compro­
mises and our e^ediency m the millions of conquered people in
Europe# whether they ultimately rise against their oppressors and
fight on our side will detcmme the mnriber of lives which w. 11 be
lost in this war.lt*?

^ Christian Advocate,; PeceBiher 5s X9b2»

10?
Stlason and Bundy, On Active Service in Peaee and War, p. 5b3*
103
Sherwood, Boosevelt a m Kspkto., p* 675*

fork Herald Tribune, Beceniber 13, 19lf2*

 306

Tb
hese attacks on the Barlan agrBSraettt carried a great weight# Two

days after willkie fs imtervlar in the Christian Advocate radio commentator

Baymond Gram Swing, who rarely criticised the /uMntetxatian’s policy, esc-

pressed his' concern over the results of military esjpediency* wIt is note*

worthy that our axagr no sooner had landed, in Africa than a temporary deal

was made with B&rl&n of Ylcky. This was explained by President Pooeeveli

as a tesaporaiy aapediGrrt* Hcm-ever, other factors in the international,

picture appear somewhat Barlenosqc,e. yor^: p^^ald Trilmne also

tod: a position against Parian and launched a direct attach against the

American policy:

Ticliy^— that corrupt source for more than two years of so nmch
weakness, confusion and division in the free nations* conduct o f
the war— is deadj but its rebirth in forth Africa in Urn person of
Admiral Barlan is rapidly threatening to produce even worse effects
of the same kind *^7

Opponents of the Barlau. policy insisted that "criticism o f the Parian deal
tnA
is far more widespread in Britain than in this country*t¥ The Tmr York

Herald Tribune charged that C&mrehlll's personal tntmention in the Cmr

m m to eaq&ain the ndo©lM had h m n caused, by "popular diasay*w^

TO

Harold Callender explained in A t<Preface

** **m
'r-^a
to
•,<**&*+
Peace why opposition
wh^wiiwww *

to the Parian agreement was so vigorous. It was, he stated, not due to

a special poisonous quality of French politics but to

^Iteiond Gram Swing, Previer of History (Hew York, 19t<3), P* 129

(December 7 M
^ B e w York B y a H Tribune, December 8, 19li2*
^®®The B&tlon, De ck er 19, 19t2#

^ B e w York Herald Tribune, December 8, 19ls-2.

 30?

suspicions of American policy* * *whieh bad eadstsd for about six

years and seemed confirmed by what happened after the Allied landing
in Africa* & « y bad their origin in the Spanish Civil War, beginr
nlng In 1936, •when American sympathies were sharply, m m bitterly
divided, partly on religious lines | when the supporters of the Be-
public believed the United States government to have been unduly
influenced in favor of the pro-itods and partly Fascist rebellion of
General Francisco Franco* The recognition of the Yidby regime, which
took on a fascist ting#, appeared to repeat the policy towards Spain*
and the pact with Barlan# * .appeared to repeat the policy toward

Eeasaefch Crawford also believed that the ierth African operation was

end of a dream for those who wanted to fight all form of Fascism.

If it did not actually change the character of the war, it at least

changed the world*® understanding of the kind of war the United na~-
tionsu *■ .were fightii^* * * « the assui^tiim had m u wide accept**
ance, particularly in the United States & M England, that this war
was merely a violent continuation of the social revolution which bad
been in progress since the First World War* indeed, it was c<Mao:nly
referred to m world revolution* Almost all American radicals 023d
'liberals, once the Ccosamlsta had abandoned isolationism, became war
enthusiasts because they thought they were fluting for a world order
in which the repressed m m m of all nations, through a process of
socialisation, would achieve a larger share of power and goods.™*

Crawford made the significant remark that RSome conservatives be-

came violent, anti-war isolationists^ because they, too, accepted Hie revo­

lutionary concept.**^ This fact was cited to eacplain why the North

African episode reconciled to the American foreign policy some of the m s t

bitter enemies of Boosevelt*® sdsdnistration*^ £r ® that time on many

conservatives fait much more at ease in a war, the consequences of which

tb^r had previously feared so much* They disapprove! of Koosovelt*s

^Callender, A Preface to Peace, p. 69 *

^ K e r w t h N* Crawford, leport on North Africa (New T0*k, 1913),

p. vii*
*%bM.

n ^Chica|pi Tribune.* Decoder 11, I9h2.

 306

political utterance feat temr&om. policy In liberated territories allayed

m m of their worst ■fears African supporters of Bw&eveli were

tm n between their belief in the ultimate wisdom of M m m e It and their

own conclusions from the situation in North Africa* Els opponents, al~

though they did not trust the President, were more satisfied. They tried

to maintain the fiction that all the credit for this satisfactory foreign

policy should be iscrifeed to the army and not to the administration

but It was difficult to believe that the American generals were the real

policy makers of the United States govexment. One thing at least was

certain and that was that the v%<Mnistmtion accepted the Darien arrange*

meat* It was so hard, however, for some of Roosevelts cneales to asso­

ciate his name with something as reassuring to themselves as the Barlan

^ointment that s w m tried, to show that the President had sabotaged

Sisenhcwer^a policy* Colonel Charles Sweeny, for instance, interpreted

Roosevelt *a declaration on November 1? as a disavowal of the Allied cost*

mander-in-chief *s action.*

The last word, most always be his* * * * Sicenhcwer failed to

understand this. He dared to act on his own initiative* Paced
with a critical situation, he perceived the only way out and came
to an agreement with Parian* The President, lefWiendedly, dis­
avowed him* . . .
Disavowals, open or disguised, of a subaltern^ action* * ♦
can only lead to confusion, disorder, discontent and loss of con-
fldenoe.116

The main motivation behind those conservative approvals of the

Barlan agreement was fear of the revolutionary dements in the de Gaulle

group and in the French resistance movement* The Chicago Tribune joined

^ C h i c a g o Tribune, December 11, 19k2.

nW
*1^
Sweeny, Moment of Truth, pp. 213 and 216.
 309

in this concert of approval ted went far beyond the or&mmt of %dli-

teary necessity." This newspaper assailed the apposition whichVillkiites

*a& ccmmista, and 'like rabble haw imped upon Jftaedtwm^s amngeaents

with local French authorities1

!^ The fact that the toaditional forces of

nationalism had stopped cosseting in order to fight a oossm enaagr was

never more obvious than in this- passage from Moment of Tayths

And let us now try to understand, and, ye®, appreciate, Barl&m,

loguds> Bolaeon, tJUln, Girmid and many others. Their understanding
and quick decision saved m m w * lives and pcaiiape a stinging
defeat. . * * These men are eomtaaed because they stuck to their’
countiy and its leader, Marshal Retain, instead of following de
Gaulle into the English casp. « » . bet us. * *pat ourselves in
their place. Let us assume that they w e tr m Frenchmen, acting as
Frmehmm. Then let us remember the saying of our own Stephen
Decaturs goimfesy, m y it ever be light, but right or wrong,
ly Country. n31o

Support of the "Parian deal" was certainly more powerful than op­

position to it* lost local and chain newspapers and all the large circu­

lation magazines defended, the Administration policy. Only the extreme

segments of American opinion fully realised the political problems in­

volved in the Merican handling of* the Earth-African political situation*

These radical observers realised that m y solution of a political problem

had to be political. To the mass of the American people It was only a

question of war time discipline* To a majority of people it was probably

evident that all the trouble in Berth Africa came either from the vicious-

nsss of "French politicians" or the iaeo^otenee of American leadership,

and they probably joined the two by saying that American diplomats were
119
Incapable of finding their way in the Intricacies of European politics.

^Chicago Tribune,
uititr
niL'„i,,jn,
Jamaay 21, 19h3*
Sweeny, Boaent o£ S E & , p. 33?.
^ s e e "Hie Sucker’s Tradition" in Bailw', The Man in the Street,
m #*m «k p* tmtmmim m *• m w » m+m v u m m M' » h«i .i i I m . n

pp. IThlaS*
 310
Hrn© they expressed disapproval of their government and of the European

®©t«up* Europe was diabolical and any good American should bo ignorant

of it, but American officials were elected or paid to protect this bliss­

ful innocence# It m s obvious that American ignorance of certain Buropean

reaction® had brought about much trouble. It was s&so obvious that the

shortcomings of American Intelligence abroad were partly responsible for

that ignorance'* For the liberals these shortcomings were still a question

of political philosophy# Bxoy found it very significant that American in­

telligence failed to indicate facts which would have contradicted a policy

which m s pc&imps not pro-c^igfolisheci but towards the solutions of which

©any &merican policy masters found thosmelves irresistibly attracted*^

Hie mass of the American people did .not understand this accusation*

They believed that the Bay!Ian appointment had been made necessary by Amer­

ican mistakes, French treachery, or systerioua and unespeetad circum­

stances* nothing els© mattered and the people accepted the necessity of

national discipline in war time* Ibis need for discipline and obedience

was the only common bond in some of the arguments brought forward in de­

fense of the American policy# For Samuel Bashlell, for instance, the ar­

rangement was satisfactory because Harlan’s repudiation of Vlehy w m not

forced upon Bashiell was apparently unaware that Parian, far

from repudiating Vichy, justified his own authority by maintaining, pub­

licly and privately,3-^ that he was carrying mit the orders of Petain,

^ISaeVane, Journey Into war, p. 158#

^B&sbiaXX, Victory throng Africa, p. 296.

122 v „ ,
Petmin cent several contradictory messages to Parian buu the
most important one in DarX&n*s eyes was a secret message approving what
he had done and pemitti^ him to collaborate with the Allies in. Africa#
hanger, t o Vichy Gamble, p* 353 #
n<m a prisoner o f th e Gemus* Apparently tm K ie ll had m t listened *

carefully to liberal charges either* sin ce he was unam re that none o f

his fellow countrymen would have seen any harm in “forcing* something

upon BarIan* There wm more logic in the argument of military necessity,

m expressed by Harold Callender in A Preface to Peace:

Military exigencies* which justify killing people* may be regarded

m excusing departure© from strictly moral associations or strict
veracity* such as those involved in accepting the aid of doubtful
eharacieare and in bullying successfully a French Ktr&ster of State*' ^

Most supporter of the administration complained that the critic©

did not understand the ^distinction between milS-t&zy and political d©~

daiona.”1^ It was stolons* Iitswer, that nanjr of those who prayed

American liberal© and French de Gaullists to concentrate on winning the

war were very much satisfied with a political status quo in north .Africa*

A reader of the Mew York Herald Tribune* for instance* & M not 90 m to be

able to abide by the rule he urged de Gaulle to follow* He asked de Gaulle

to forget politic© but* at the same time* he wrote an. enthusiastic apology-

far Petain1a behavior*

0m cannot completely abandon the ©oil of one1a fatherland*

When* with a knife at his throat and a pistol at his side* he*
for months on end* prevented the Germans from occupying all France*
the parts of the Mediterranean and the approaches to North Africa,
I felt that he wm preparing for ultimate German defeat#*®

Most attempts to justify the Parian d m ! by a defense of the Petain

government were based on the belief that Tichy had protected Worth Africa

^Callender* A Preface to Peace* p* 73*

1S>|(
Mari; Sullivan in ife York Herald Tribune* December 33* lpJ+2*
12H
Ibid** levamber 23* 19h2*
 312

from a German invasion* The writer cited above also professed to admire
<1© Gaulle* although the first H u e of the above quotation exemplified one
of the moot frequent attacks upcm him* His conclusion m s somewhat un­
expected in view of the political discussion which came before? "It is

tragic to see that politico cum be thought of in the face of the jaost
colossal and Imperative necessity."
Many observers reacted to the attacks against the Barlan arrange­
ment by violent attacks against de Gaulle and the Fighting French* Kven
some liberals admitted that the controversy acquired more bitterness be­
cause of the Fighting French propaganda**^ Soaso people* however* tried
to deny de Gaulle1s claim to .political leadership on very specious grounds*
They were apparently not aware that he had been kept out of Ilorth Africa
by the American government* In the Hew York Herald Tribune* for axample,
Bark Sullivan remarked that sjost critics of the arrangement believed that
**the only French leader we should ever recognise or have dealings with
was the head of the Fighting French, General Charles de Gaulle*11 Sullivan
continued: "This part of the outciry [against Darlanj neglected the fact
that de Gaulle was not in Sortii Africa and could not help uc there* while
Admiral Darlan t;&s and did*w^ of the attacks against de OsulX©
were obviously inspired by the State Department# There was,, for example,
an attempt to prove that de Gaulle*a attacks against the Darlan s y s t m
endangered French sovereignty in the north African possessions*

International lawyer® here have pointed out# « *ibat unless

some constituted French authority had been recognised and dealt
with by the Anty in l^orth Africa the restoration of the terrl*
boxy to Franco after the war would have been complicated both
legally and morally*

^^lAebling, The Bead Back to Paris, p* 236.

Mm lork Herald M k a e , December 13, X9h£*
 313

# * * fh&t the historian says of the conquest of Algesia by

the French is generally true of French Morocco and Tunisia. nThe
land had to toe wrested fro® the natives yard toy yard.” « * *
Suppose General iftaenhwer, after discovering that collabora?-
tion with Admiral Parian wm the only one that would toe effective*
had assumed the position of the critic of the Parian appointment#
The alternative would, have toeen to institute an M o ri cm military
governorship# This would have washed out the postwar claims of
France for the restoration of the territory if the Atlantic Charter
is to toe read in the light of its spirit as well as in accordance
with its text#126

And Arthur Frock concluded that Usonlwer had not ©siablished a puppet

government la Horth Africa#. ^Instead, he found a way to safeguard

France*s sovereignty in Horih Africa and add to his own military strength

and protection#M^ 9 This argument m s repeated several times during the

months which followed, but It suddenly backfired against the supporters

of the administration1© policy when Gimtd .repudiated the lam of Vichy

under pressure of public opinion and, removed any legal basis for his
regime#^30

The main argument in favor of the Parian agreement remained that

of military necessity# Wes Gallagher stated it thus in Back Boor to

Berlins

If the Allies had had the military sight to occupy Morth

Africa as an invading army, hold it down by force, and strike for
Tunisia, it would hover have been necessary to- deal with Parian
except as an enemy commander in the field# But they did not have
the force# Although Clark often threatened to use ids military
power, in reality there m s little to- us©# In Algiers the Ameri­
can troops totaled less than 10,000 during the negotiations .
Eisenhower, wise in the ways of Washington and London, made
the decision to deal with Parian, knowing full well the storm of
criticism that would arise in the Baited States and Britain#131

^ A r t h u r Krock in Hew York Times, December 10, 19^2#

12%bid*
110
^ vSee pp. 378-379.
131
Gallagher, Back Poor to Berlin, p# 7i*
 31Ii

The value of 'tils argument was actawrledged even toy the liberals*

Samuel Grafton w m satisfied with Boosevelt *» declaration m IJm«ber

1?|^2 Walter Xlppmann also approved*^ Sow supporters of the offi­

cial policy conveyed the ftaprosoian, in their later writings, that most

critics had entirely neglected the military angle of the problem*^4.

Although some observers maintained that the French army would have joined

the Allied side even if its pro-fiohy leaders had been shot or jailed,^

most liberals accepted the *dteal* as a very temporary armng«ent* criti­

cism became widespread when, in spite of Booeevelt »a declaration on Wov-

ember 17, Parian consolidated Ms- hold on Hbrih Africa and. maintained the

Vichy political and economic set-up# The argument of mUitaiy necessity

also lost some of its cogency after it became certain that the Germans

could no1>— probably did not attest— to throw the invasion forces back to

the sea# Supporters of the American policy claimed, however, that "the

recriminations ignored the continuing mllitmy necessity for the B&eenhower-

B&rlan collaboration*

Supporters of the official policy also claimed that Wert Africa

would probably not have joined the fight voluntarily if it had not been

for the agreement with the Vichy commander# Barlan presented this

achievement as a personal trixaaph* «$o far,” wrote the Baltimore Sim,

«thar© is nothing but satisfaction to be expressed over Adsdral B&rlai*1®

*3%ew York Post, I$w«toer 19, 19k2*

*^R«r York Herald Tribune, November 19, 193*2#

^Callender, A Preface to Peace, pp* $8-60*

^^llacVan©, Jm xn m into War, Chapter 3*

^^52S2Sfe* B e c k e r 21, 19i*2#

assurance that today all of French west Africa— i*e* most notably Bakaa>—

is undar his e w s a d while ho remains in agrea&ezsfe with General User*-

3 m m people e©uM wonder hm Americaa policy makers had

ffispected to solve this West African problem, when they did not wen know

whether or not they would find a D&rXan to deal with.

rax
Another argument in favor of continued collaboration with Parian

disappeared when the Frenbh navy was scuttled in Toulon*s harbor by her

own officers and sailors* This action delivered America from a nightmare

which had lasted more than two years * but it disappointed those who

thought that Parian*c prestige with the French navy would lead the French

officers to decide to follow his «gmple* The IWeneh sailors were % m b l e

to decide where the path of honor lay,***^ but their attitude was judged

highly patriotic and reports m the fights which took place in the bailor

received wide publicity*

Through widening golden & m m

In the awed spirit withdrawn
Hark I «tis the guns of Toulon
Besmmdlng f o r e w l W

To the supporter® of the Hearth African policy, the scuttling of

the fleet w m proof that the French navy did not like Germany and that

Dorian, who also was a sailor, probably did not like them either*

^aattaor® Ssn, Swasher 2lt, 19i«2.

1'"Hatch* Franklin Delano Roosevelt* p. 309.

■^Villlam Base Benet in the Saturday P.CTiosr of literature*

Dec«ber 5, Vh2. -----------------------
 3X6

Ho one cun a»ay that Adroiral Dorian had Birthing to do with the
scuttling of the French fleet* But the fleet was formerly under
his coumnd, and mm that events at Toulon h«m demonstrated the
French lavy*© uMarlyirtg hostility to Germany perhaps there will
he a more pronounced inclination to withhold for a time at least
cendennatlis! of the Parian arrangement*1^1

To the liberals, the ©entiling of the fleet was proof that &p~

peasant of Vichy had been useless, since, in spite of the dramatic

break between Hoosevelt and Flrfeain and although Admiral Leahy w m not in

Vichy to influence the French, the French sailors had refused to sttrren-

dor their warships to Germany*

Sunk beneath the waters of Toulon, Harbor, along with the French
navy, is a jqyth that bedeviled m r foreign policy for more than two
years*— the myth that it was noeessaxy for the Unit©:! State© to play
ball with Vichy in order to keep the French fleet out of Hitler*©
hands* !e know now that orders to dectray the ©hips rather than let
t t m be employed to fight for the Axis were issued when France fell*
It was the only order that could have been given, for If the ma­
jority of French naval officers were bitterly anti-British, the rank
and file were no less anti-Oaxmn# Urns the fleet could not be used
by either side; it could only fight if attacked and corsmXi suicide
if its position became helpless *3l|2

After the occupation of all France by the Kasis, liberal newspapers pro­

claimed that Vichy was dead, killed by the complete German occupation

and by the loss of toe empire and the fleet* The nation wondered why

America should try to revive it in the liberated territories* Pet&In,

the "toothless symbol/1 had lost all his political significance, and The

Nation concluded! "How we shall have to find means of scuttling

Bsrl&n**2^

■^Baltimore Sun, lorember 28, 191*2*

a 2The HatIon, B e e p e r 5* 19t»2.

 3X7

XX

Darlfcn was killed by a young BVencbsaan, Bonnier ct© la Ch&pelle,

on Christman eve, 19k2* There was undoubtedly widespread suspicion that

this murder had been the result of de OanXXist Intrigues* Thm® sus­

picions were shared by the American governraent and de Gaulle*© intended

trip to Algiers was cancelled .Xki- American nmmp^peW f however, did not

voice these suspicions, Frank Gorvasl openly admitted in his bods, But

Soldiers Wondered Why, that "The assassination of Barlaiu • .solved one

of the democracies* major problem. «Xi$ Ho one publicly ©tpressed su ch

a thought Immediately after the assassination although the liberals mr®

inclined to think that popular feeling had been stronger than the mistaken

policies o f foreign offices *XW The Christian Science Unitor refused to

accept these views m d tried to restrain those who greeted the death of

the ads&ral with satisfaction. "Those who are incline to see in the as­

sassination of Parian a proof that Washington policy toward him was mis­

taken must reckon with this facts that tho most pressing problem raised

by the crime Is the finding of a successor, "Xk? The H w fo r k Tiiaes

claimed that

Ev&n those in this country, in Britain or among the Free French

who were most bitterly opposed to the Administrations recognition
of Admiral Parian as Hi # Coaawlaaioner in French North Africa and
West Africa mist eondem Ills assassination* It is only too ignorant

^General d ’Astler do la Vigerie had conferred with Giraud and

Kismhmrer in Algiers in Beee&sber, He represented de Gaulle in confer'
m o m for the formation of a new administration. Id© brother was compro­
mised in the Bonnier de la Chapelle affair. "It was a deplorable sis-
chance." Sherwood, Koosevelt and Hopkins, p# 662.

^Gervasi* But Soldiers wondered fly, p. 251*

^^M&cV&ne, Journey
,TWi minto
nt *mmm-p. 137*.
i... far,
ij

Xk^chriatlain Science monitor, Becatoer 26,

 3X8

and the thoughtXess #10 will as3um© that such a murder at such
moment Solves” a peculiarly difficult problem, lb# problem
remains .It®

It ms obvious* however* that wen the supporters of Hie American

policy were relieved by the death of the French admiral* The Christian

Science Monitor assumed that it offered "The United States* Britain an!

their allies a n m opportunity to m uk out solutions of internal differ­

ences which were bound to exist until the nature of B&rlan*# role could

be ascertained*11* ^ The Hot lork Times concluded*

We may hope that out of the present situation there will com
both a continuation of the political stability which has existed
in Worth Africa under Parian and. a closer union of .all the French
groups fitting Hitler* But we are not untitled to expect these
things to happen automatically as the result of an. assassin1#
bullet*15^

The death of Parian took Washington and the United States by sur­

prise* Hi© attention of the world .was still focused on that man* His

behavior had been puselino his personality m s shrouded; in mystery* He

was less known to the American press and public than Detain, Laval, or

de Gaulle# It was difficult for the leftist press to attack M m person­

ally because there was no popular caricature- of M s personality* The

enigma of his motives and this inner power which slrm^s seeded to push

him to the foreground mad© rather for admiration than for hate* The of­

ficial regrets expressed by the highest authorities after Iris death and

reasons of sample decency prevented even M s enemies from insulting M s

lork Times* Feeember 26 , 19h2•

^Christian Science Monitor, December 26* 19l;2*

Wesr lork Times* I)sG®ib'©r 27* 19h2*

 31?

memory after bis death* Above all, the silent efficiency of the man who
bad been presented as the only Fronciaoan capable of reversing the Ilortb

African situation predisposed American people in his favor*

Frank Qervaai noted that "Parian »s personality was not ingrati­
ating to .Americans who came in contact with him, *151 idsehhowor was no

exception to the rule*

V& entire acquaintanceship with Parian covered a period of six

weeks. His reputation was that of a mtorious collaborator with
Hitler but during the time that he served as the achainlstrator of
French North Africa he never once, to our knowledge, violated &ny
ceasaltmeni or praise, On the other band, Ills ^annsriss® and per­
sonality did not Inspire confidence and in 'pLm of hie reputation
we were always uneasy in dealing with hia*l^'

The word which was seat frequently used In describing Parian*s

character, from the beginning of his brief career on the Allied side and
in the years which followed was "opportunist," This was the conclusion

of hanger In Our Vichy Gamble, ,flt seems reasonably clear that on this
occasion in North Africa , as m so many others, he acted as a simonrpure
opportunist.”153 After the landings in North Africa and the Harlan ap­
pointment, Darlan was called an ^opportunist” much m m often than he was
* or a ^collaborationist,11 Those last two words
called a ttcollaborator1

bad acquired for Americans, especially after Americafs entrance into the
war, the special moaning Which they already had in occupied Biropen It
was certainly obvious that in the specific circumstances of occupied
Europe, !lopportunietsK became ^collaborationistsw but the actions of

-^•ervasi, But Soldiers Wondered Why, p, 251*

1<P
^ iiseahower, crusade in Eiycpe, pp* 129-30,

^Laager, Our Vichy Cfl’

M s ? p. 363*
 320

these people were so lofttheaome that a nessr word had to be coined as

though they were afflicted with a special disease to wMeh ordinary

people were Ijsfservlous* in Greek tragedies, supreme evil, as manifested

in great crboinalif, was of divine nature* Parian had undoubtedly "col­

laborated,” but it was difficult for those who did not go as far as

calling him ”Americ&*3 first Quislingi^^ to admit that they' had a *co3r-

laboratioMst11 m their side* Hie word was ambiguous. All good, diplomats

in a way were opportunists* Darlan could be considered an opportunist of

the Talleyrand or even of the Bichelieu brand. Behind his practical op­

portunism, Ills permanent motivation might have been devotion to M s country*

Darlan made his actions plain when he said, 11As long m the
Allied nations were not ready to help France resume the struggle,
I tried, sad and resigned, to prevent France from dying under the
German heel.” # • « Collaboration under duress certainly gains
less from the conquerors than total confiscation.155

If this were true, D&rlan, although not vexy reliable from an American

point of view, was "honorable” enough for an agreement with the American

array and government.

The presence of the adjective "ambitious” in front of "opportun­

ist” removal the ambiguity of tho latter word alone* In that case,

Darl&Mc talents and pliability were utilised primarily to further Darien**

personal interests, and served M s country only when he.r interests coin­

cided with M s own ambitions* Proofs of Parian*s "ambitious opportunism*1

had been provided long before the North African campaign by the liberals

who wanted to show that the ,!m 'order” was not entitled to condemn the

iSli-Freda Kirchweya "America^ First Quisling»” The Nation,

, 19kZ*
■^Letter to the editor of the lew Tork Time®, Jamaay 2, 19i*3<
Third Republic* like Howaxt! z* Brocks* they nm blom d DarXan*® connec­

tions with the Popular front and his good relations with Leon

Before tho Korth .African op&ration, Brodies recalled,* in Prisoners m mof

tmnom w,1** **nn)hmw>ni*w<»»

Hope, that "Parian had one important characteristic in common with the

Marshal. He shared in the guilt of the former regime*" Brooks chargedi

tho fact that he was concerned above all with his career &<m
not imply that he was ever anything but a reactionary. The French
navy has always been led by a amll eXique of reactionaxd.es
royalists* Its policies wore always chauvinistle— ^ilch meant that
as the Ocrmn fleet was too small to be dangerous, It was always
anti-British and anti-Semitic •W f

M i k e many others, Brooke was careful not to give the ispression that m

‘‘opportunist" was necessarily a man iho had. no political opinions* On

the contrary, ho was probably ready to say that any political opportunism,

since it took advantage of a position of leadership established to defend

the interests of the people, wm by definition reactionary*

Hre c&m of Parian and other "opportunists » or ^collaborators” wm

met clearly analysed by those who, like Brocks, consented to envisage the
case of Parian as only one e^axqXe of a certain mentality resulting in

certain reaction®# Those #10 limited their'* observations to French cos-

mupl®3 and. consciously or unconsciously put the craphasis on unimportant

personal and national differences thus relegated to the background the

really essential educational, intellectual, and social factor® which de­

termined the attitude of Parian and the Tichy goverrmmt* Only those who

were 'not afraid or, like the liberals, were eager to shew that the factors

which influenced political behavior 'were little or not at M l Influenced

^^roaks, Prisoners of Hope, p* 2iX.

XS7IbW.
 322
1<3
by national differences and indeed overlapped national boundaries,

could interpret Parian *s actions without having to picture M m as In­

human or super-busm*

■0°£, BirrtWj "Darlan*!j Vichy Career," The Eation, Serresfcer 21,

ISdrf.
 c m n m xx
ambricaat opinion of the onwoiHDS trnim m u m m isto

1
After the death of Admiral Barlirn the American government urged

M s i^eri&l council to appoint Giraud high ccmissioner in french Africa,

and on December 26, 1$*2, Giraud -was intrusted with all military and civil

affairs in Horfch and lest Africa* The political situation in B>rih Africa

was not changed, however, by the death of B&rlan, and the Vichy leaders

still retained the key ackdrdstrative and military positions * A purge

of the Vichy dements was regarded by Fitting France m a prollaslnaxy

condition for a merger of the two French group® fixating the Axis. Dur­

ing the Casablanca conference of J&rm&iy, X$i3j Roosevelt and Churchill

made an effort to 're-establish French unity and unify Anglo-American pol­

icy m French problems. Be Oaall© reluctantly went to Casablanca where

personal negotiations between M m and Giraud proved fruitless* The rift

between the two groups was deepened by the appointment of ex-¥ichy tin-

ister of the Interior Marcel Peyrouton as governor general of Algeria.

Slowly, however, seme of the most conspicuous Vichy supporters in Africa

were eliminated from positions of leadership. On March Ij, 12l0> General

Giraud abolished in principle all Vichy legislation in the areas under

his control#

Meanwhile, the existence of conflicting French authorities in the

French colonies had had serious political consequences. Be Gaulle and

Giraud not only competed for the allegiance of new territories like

323
Frenah Guiana, which rallied to the Allied cause* but m m for the aHe-

gianee of personnel on Fremh warships in M m Tork and Boston# The of­

ficers of these ships followed Oiraud bat part of their cress rallied to

fighting fiance* In these cases, as in Martinique where Mmlxml Bobert

was still trying to maintain nsmlultermted fichy rale in spite of an Amer­

ican food blockade* the State Department w e d its influence in favor of

the Gtemd adminiotmtion.*

negotiations conducted between Giraud arid do Mile's representa­

tive* General Georges C&trcmx, finally lead de G&ulle to go to Algiers in

the hope of bringing about a fusion of the two French group® fighting

Gemngr* On lay 31* 191*3* an agreement between de Gaulle and Giraud was

reached and the French Committee of llatioml liberation w m created. It

was agreed that this body w to be preaided over alternatively by Giraud

and by de Gaulle.

IX

Giraud »s accession to leadership in north Africa was considered

by most American observers as likely to bring about some kind of unity

between the Fighting French, of General de Gaulle and the French adminis­

tration la %rth Africa. Harold Callender* reporting the general senti­

ment in Washington circles, was very optimistic.

It may became possible to bridge the rift that has existed ever
since the 19i*0 armistice between the .Fighting French. . .and ’
those
Frmchmm* especially in IJorih Africa and other colonies* who pre­
ferred to follow, officially at least, the n m state of
Henri Philippe Detain* m m completely a prisoner of the Germans,1

M e O’Hare McCormick had & m m realistic view of the situation when

%«sw Torfe Times, Beeper 2?, I$t2.

 325

she stated in her solum in' the 1m look p m a that »it will not be easy

for the follower© of General de Gaulle to fight under a successor of Dar­

ien who has been chosen by the ttsmtered .Admiral1© own »Imperial Conor

oil- *H She nevertheless saw sme hopeful signs in the situation, espe­

cially the fact that both Giraud mod do Gaulle were ^publicly on record

as willing' to fight together**1 She realised that the problem was more

than a purely French affair,, howwer, since ©he concluded that if both

Americans and. British could, agree on Giraud, as they apparently had be­

fore the landings, % source of friction* would be ^removed at the most

Ijs
opportune moment#*

A H over America lummox-able editors did their best with the ma­

terial furnished by the State Department, and cemented upon Giraud *s

daring escape frw the Konigsteln1© fortress m well m upon his bravery

during his short-lived cfflpaigm in 191*0*^ Secretary of State Bull him-

self teck the lead in that direction and expressed officially American

satisfaction*

The selection of General Giraud to- his new post is a most

fortunate choice and. on© that will, 1 am air©, receive the en­
thusiastic cojmen&atlom of all# General Giraud is one of' the
groat eomadsrs of the world today and M s receni selection will
result in greater unification, of all groups and elements behind.
M s military leadership and will go far to insure the c ® » a
victory with the restoration of French liberty ever^here.a

Host newspapers rajoleed over the fact that Giraud was not a

^politician#* Curiously enough, ©von the beat informed mmp&pers war©

% © w loadc Time©, December 28, 19h2*

\
He was taken prisoner almost immediately after being appointed
commander of General Corap*® &ns^*
“K*r Toric Times, Deeeaixsr 2?, 1?!j2.
 $%6

inclined to consider Giraud *a political ignorance a blessing for the

Allied cams©* Editorially, the K m fork Times declared that tthe is not

so closely identified with any political group as to have aroused the un­

yielding hostility of all other political groups* Best of all, h© is a

soldier, not a statesman^ Hi© Jte fork Herald ftrikms, ihich was very

favorable to Free France, also expected much good from Olraad*® appoint­

ment#

Giraud* * *is identified with only one principle— the defeat of the
powers that have enslaved his native eountiy. He has no damaging
associations with the forces of collaboration, neither does he stand
— like General de Gaulle— as a living reproach to those who- once em­
braced (or tolerated} collaboration**

It is interesting to not© k m lenient the K m York Herald Tribune suddenly

felt toward the ^collaborators#** lathing was neglected in order to pave

the way for a general fromh reconciliation* Walter Lippmn was so opti­

mistic that he eonsidemi French unity an already accomplished fact* »In

order to make that political unity possible,* he wrote, m event and not

words was retired, am d that event is the passing of Marshal P&ain*s

authority into tee hands of a m m whose loyalty is universally aeknosrl-

7
edged# * * * Until that happened, Franco was Irreconcilably divided#*

He asked for recognition of the government which he thought 'would not fail

to be created very soon* *Th© change in the situation now calls for a re­

vision of our official doctrine teat France does not m o d a recognised

government until after peace is restored* * * * It Is of vital importance

5
War York Times, December 28, 191*2#

^lew Yoxk Herald Tribune, December 28, 19ii2*

7M d ,
 32?

that there should merge as so m as possible a french provisional gov-

In this hamonlous concert, which so soon obliterated the memory

of the tragic note struck by Bonnier de la Chapdle* a fear dissenting

voices were heard, although most observers thought that it would be easy

to work out a compromise between Giraud and de Gaulle, some voices close

to the State Department indicated that American inflame© would be used

to prevent any agreement from being concluded on de Gaulle*s terms*

Arthur Krock noted in the IT® York Times that there was % ! » difference

of opinion on the answer to %he questions *Xs General de Gaulle basing

his thoughts and actions on present m ilita r y or future political eonsid-

9
© r a t i o n s T w o days later he repeated a veiled threat which ho had al­

ready Yosml&ted at the worst purled of the Darl&n controversy#

It is believed by m m officials hare that the United States

and Great Britain may be obliged to warn anti-Axis french leaders
that, unless iiwy can settle their differences over procedure and
achieve unity in military effort, it may become noceSSy'for the
United nations to break the chain of French sovereignty with a
formal military occupation of Horth Africa and West Africa, thus
stimulating a postwar irredentist w m m m t and clouding the legal
claims of prance to tide vast area of the old french Empire in
Worth and West Africa**#

On the other hand, the extremist groups of American liberal opin­

ion, who at the time of the landing® already feared that Giraud could be-

come a rival of de Gaulle, thought that his presence would not have a

very favorable effect on the development of the situation, Johannes

%©v? York Herald- Tribune, December 28, 19^2*

^Wesr York Times, Xhweufijer 31, 19^.2*

J a m m y 2, X9l;3. Also in Waverlegr Root, Casablanca to

Katyn (HwTESHk, 19?+6}» p* 173* Italics mine.
Steel. , f o r instance, assgrtod that ffthe appoiritent of Giraud cannot be

anything bat & stop-g&p measure* This general cannot be anything but a

figurehead in addition to being a military leader*

III

There was nothing in Giraud*s personality to attract the sympa­

thies of American opinion* ifmSike de Gaulle, he did not enjoy the tre­

mendous build-up given to the free French movement by the powerful British

propaganda services* Be was not a democratic symbol like de Gaulle, and

liberal elements distrusted him* For some of the French he could have

became a symbol, but a symbol of French nationalist, military, and author­

itarian traditions which had little sentimental appeal m m for the most

conservative American, opinion* His stem physical appearance, his disdain

of publicity in any fern, and his fear of being mistaken for a "politician”

contributed directly or indirectly to his being urtaotn by the larger part

of the American public* The only spectacular incident, in his career which

might have helped to make him a popular international figure, his escape

from Koenisstetn, took place at a time #ien his personal conduct could not

have any real Influence on the course of the war. later, the liberals

attacked this glamorous episode in Giraudfs life and questioned the offi­

cial interpretation— or his own version— of his ©scape from the German

fortress • Waverley Root claimed that the German political strategists

ip
were delighted to see a m m like him in power in North Africa* Pierre

Van paassen wrote in the I ® Yozk Post that Giraud*r> fame rested "upon

having managed to have himself taken prisoner twice and to have escaped

Toric Post, December 31, 191*2.

12 '
Hoot, Casablanca to Katyn, p* 137*
 329
twice* the second time under very auspicious circumstances . Giraud

also suffered la American opinion for his failure to carry the day during

the frantic search for a French leader who might stop the fighting lit

Hovmber, 19h2. His failure m s widely publicised} since it proved that

the agreement vdth Dorian was an Imperative necessity.

Most observers took it for granted that Giraud was a **good gener­

al*’* Although American newspapers had become accustomed to judge French

military men according to whether or not they were In favor of M e Gaulle*s

tactics1’ before the French defeat* the only gauge by which th^jr could

test technical awareness samag th e leaders of the defeated. French arny,

they carefully avoids the application of the usual criterion to Clraud.

I* J# Loibling, who wrote a penetrating* humorous, snd oft® cruel anal­

ysis of Giraud *$ character in The Head Back to Paris assured his readers

that "he is* m I had knam since* the Battle of France, a good general.

G# V# Price, whose book, Oirand and the African Scene, was written with

the help of the general himself, naturally never questioned the military

capacities of big1hero# Cordell Hull called him "one of the great com-

mandej’s -of the world

The m n who was probably most competent and had the best oppor­

tunity to judge Giraudfs military capacities rm General Eisenhower# For

obvious reasons h© did not make his findings available to the public un­

til after the war. When Giraud left France in November, 191$, he was

convinced that he liras going to be given command of the entire Allied

■Pfew Xozic Post, Jsiraac 27, 19hk.

“ eie&Lirxg, Tbs fioatl Back to Paris, p. 232.

ip m w wi i i ni # .

York 2 gJ# December 29, 191$.

 330
forced Bobert taphy, who had COTmnlcated with Gimid through laaaigre-

Dubreuii* had avoided diaeustion in his letters of the ihture part- to be

played by Giraud in the military operations*-^ Giraud did not realise

that IiAsehhower was the supreme commander and that the Allied forces would

not be placed under his own orders until he arrived at Gibraltar and met

General Eisenhower and his staff,^ Even after Giraud had accepted the

subordinate role of comuidar of the French force® and leader of Worth

Africa, h© still attested to sell the Allied command m his plan of in­

vasion of Southern France. "Militarily, no doubt, these plans were

sound," wrote I/anger xn Our Vichjjr Cxamble* But tins was not tne opinion

of General Eisenhower.

In further talks with General Giraud it developed that there was a

radical difference between his conception and mine of what, at that
moment, should be don® strategically* He was in favor of turning
immediately to the attack of southern France, paying no attention
to northern Africa* I showed him that even as he spoke the troops
wore landing on their selected beaches; that there was no possi­
bility of providing air support for the landing he proposed; and
that the Allied shipping then in existence would not provide a
build-up for an invasion of southern Frame that could withstand
the fore© the Germans would, assuredly bring against it* Finally
I explained that the c&Bgmign on i&ieh we were embarking was backed
up by such intricate and detailed maintemnee arrangements that the
change he proposed was completely impossible#
He eotilri not sec the need of Worth Africa as a base— the need
for establishing ourselves firmly and strongly in that region be­
fore we could successfully invade the southern portion of Barone.
He was not aware of the lessons the war had brought out as to
the affect of land-based aviation upon unprotected seaborne craft.
He had probably never assessed, in term of tactical meaning, the
loss in the Southwest Pacific of the two great British ships, the
Prince of Wales and the Repulse, when they were heedlessly exposed
to aitacF by’land-based iv$EEIcn, He assumed, moreover, that if

danger, Oar Vichy OgMc, p. 321#

17
Ibid*, pp* 332-314, 336#
18
Eisenhower, Cras&fc in Europe, p* 100*

^Langer, t o Vichy Gamble, p. 362*

 331

th© Allies chose to do so they could place $00,000 m n in the south

of Prance in a natter of tm or three weeks* it m s difficult for
hla to understand that m had undertaken an operation that stretched
our resources to the limit, and that* * .our initial strategic ob­
jectives had to be carefully calculated,.^

the liberals were inclined t© be suspicious of Giraud *s Military

genius, especially -sine© it night have bean used m a propaganda, weapon

against de Gaulle* It was difficult for th® to believe that a nan who

was so old-fashioned in all other respects did not carry bis habitual

prejudices to his professional field* American observers in north Africa

had many occasions to see him at work and finally concluded that % e had

an exaggerated idea of his. cm co®|>©tmce*tt21 The liberals went further

in their hostility against him* Pierre fan Paassen called him «& mili­

tary nonentity*1*^

Bo American had any illusion about Giraud *s lack of political

capacities but many thought at first that this was one -more outstanding

quality, the sum of which led. Ann© Q'ftare McCormick to conclude that

wGiraud wm cast for the role he now assumes#*^ ibis curious argument

was undoubtedly influenced by the traditional isolalionlst**natioimliot

mentality. It satisfied those who believed that th© north African Im­

broglio was primarily due to the tricks of ^French politicians,n tricks

which no American could or should be able to understand* The; ideal

solution was thus to find, a French leader who was as naive m American

'Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, pp* 101-02*

2\ r w Middleton, Our Share of Might (Hew loxk, 19h6)$ p.* 191.

«hwm* ukiiwwiw

^Nessr Xoxk Post, J&mary 27, !$&•

2%
Hew York limes, December 28, 19h2*
 332

diplomat© and generals in a political seme. But it did not take very

long for i m v i o m narspapers to consider lids political innocence in

another light* As Sherwood pointed out, Darlanfs advice- to the teeri*

cano~*nhe is not jour man, politically he is a child»--proved lamentably

correct.^* Eisenhower, too, soon found out that

Giraud was no help. He hated politics] not merely crookedness

and chicanery in politics, but ©very part of the necessary task
of developing an orderly, democratic qrsten of government appli­
cable to the forth African kaleidoscope# . * « His purpose was
pure but his capacity for larger administrative work and organ­
isational tasks was doubtful.O

Newspapers which supported the State Department policy did not cast doubt

on Giraud rs administrative abilities until after de Gaulle assumed power

in forth Africa. Although suspicious of de Gaulle1® intentions, they

comforted themselves by stating that "after all Giraud never was a good

politician.

At the time of the Kosdgstaia escape, the Hew York Times had

published a ringing editorial m -the brave and chivalrous French general#

"Ee is admired for his personal qualities, Ids resourceful courage and gay

ii^erturbabHity* There is something in him of Baron Trench, Edmond

Dantes, of Bayard, of the Chi, of Inland and Olivier, arid the heroes of

the Chansons de C-este*w^7 There was a name which did not figure in that

string of comparisons, a name which comes Immediately to the mind whm

one reads the various portrait© of Giraud by American observers in North

+Sher»ood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 6B9.

Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 129*

njt
Herny J. Taylor in New York World Telegram, January 5, 19klj.

”*m York Tiaes, April 30, 19l*2.

 333
Africa * Tne name is that of Bon Quixote» To t.h« most sympathetic db-

servers the most striking characteristic of Giraud was the stubborn way

in which he pursued his goal, regardless of obstacles*®^ His anti-Gczman

fa!.is,ticisi?j«-*al.though it was a reassuring quality after dealings with men

IBte Harlan-— lodeed like an abstract expression o f m outdated French

nationalism which was almost emb&xT^sing to many Americans*

flKis mare appearance explained a great deal,f! wrote Alan Moore-

head,^ and m m the most radical eXeaerrts could not resent too m ch his

old-fashioned brand of reaction. It seemed only unfortunate that his

prejudices made him so easy a p m j for the more dangerous Fascist® who

crowded the lorth African stage. Giraud was too much like a s a m piecej

one could only1look at M m curiously and wonder. That Giraud held the

same political views a® P^tain was never contest®! by anyone*^ The Amer­

ican public soon learned that fact from their liberal n»papers,31 Bat

the campaign against Harlan .had naturally emphasised the latterr© active

itles as a ^collaborator” and a ^traitor” and it was thus puasling to the

average American to learn that Giraud, who had afeays been praised as

being anti-Germm, was almost as dangerous as Parian and beloved to the

Qm& category of Frenchmen.32 it m s not hard, to lead people to the

conclusion that 'neither Frenchmen nor radical® of any nationality would

ever be satisfied and stop futile arguing,

j— twwijwwwwowrtwui imwi%u»*wiiwn ii*j<j*ii«n)iw»«

rtfl
Price, Ciraud and the African Scene, p. 60,

^Alan Moorehead, The M M M M )* »*-Kftfttttt

in Africa (tor York, 191*3), p* 72*
■» WW* i,lW MH|MWt»MwW*wWi

10
Langer, Our Victor Gamble, p* 273*
mw uim * -wwwrtUWew.wgg6.Mi

■?i
r . & , January 22, 19h3>
32-.,
Xbid#
 33fe
Giraud *b emanations of the French defeat would have been viewed

in a very different light by many Americans if they* had placed them .in

the south® of some of their own. leaders but they catered to too many pop­

ular ideas about France to be evaluated objectively* 0* V* Price, for

instance, summarised a report which Giraud had written for Petain after

his escape. He almost seeded to endorse Giraud*s

trenchant Indictment of that period of progressive political decay

which had prepared the downfall of France. * . *
Self-indigence had. became a national principle. Sport had. de-
devloped into a large industry, but it was spectacular sport, nest
the kind In which the people themselves participate. The French
race, formerly solid and resistant, was contaminated by dririle and
disease. • . •
In all grades of society the main aim of life was aassement,
Egotism and personal well-being had become the supreme goal of
existence* Idealistic and spiritual factors had disappeared fro®.
the mental horizon of the average Frenchman* Atheism, m s widespread.

A, J, Lleblini; s ® .in Clraud a typical product of the French mill-

toy schools, He compared him with de Gaulle and noted that, having been

a general for a much longer time, Giraud had Settled into the role more

comfortably,H De Gaulle1s expression wls occasionally irascible, as if

he anticipated that somebody might challenge his authority* The thought

had not occurred to Giraud for year®. The painter he suggests is not

H Greco, but Yeissoz&er. ”3^ luprossed by the fact that Giraud had m o m

not to waar any decoration until he wm back in lets, liebling wondered:

"Vets. A politician would have said Paris, a sentimentalist would have

named his own native province. But Mots is a garrison town, the most

important strategically on the Franco-German frontier# The soldier

^ Price, Giraud m i the African Scene, p# £8.

31* ,

Liebling, Hi© Bead Back to Paris, p. 23h*

wanted to get back to his barracks. In spite of M s mm different out-*

lock, Price also emphasised the role played by Giraudfa military career

in shaping his character am! cane to practically the sane conclusions as

Liebling*

These cireuastancHse [ihrench military education] combine to pro­

duce a mentality which, though highly efficient for military pu2>
poses, is sometimes not so well adapted to cope with.political and
administrative problems* * * .
Lack of experience in this diplomatic art of persuasion, and a
tendency to expect personal decisions to be accepted without ques­
tion, were handicaps to General' Giraud in his assumption of supreme
civil as well as military control of French Berth M ‘ric&,36

1?

Giraud*s accession to power had been considered as at least fa­

cilitated by .American influenced? Mpst American newspapers failed to

envisage that a problem of French sovereignty was involved in this matter,

Many people considered that he wan more or less appointed by the American

ambassador*^ Alan Hoorcke&t! m m forgot entirely the late Admiral Bar-

lan*3 Imperial Council, which was officially appointed to designate a suc­

cessor to Bortli African leadership, and wrote: With relief Mr* Murphy

turned to the only course open to him, he asked General Giraud to step in­

to the Admiral*s p l a c e , I t should be noted that m m the liberals ex­

pected and wished for American intervention,^ but in favor of General

^TAebling, The Road Bade to Paris,p. 231;*

•^Price, Qiraod and the Morth African Scene, p, 6,

3?MooreheM, The End in Africa, p. 71*

^Langer, Our Vichy Gamble, pp. 379-80*

m' iiii>him»w*ii ■—nn.Tri-trinffirr vnNHMMMiiNViHMaMVHMM

^%foordiead, The M . in Africa, p. 71. iww w ww w-

hoRoot, Casablanca to Katyn, p. IfcO*

de Gaulle* For a few days, however, many observers hoped that Giraud

would act as a mediator between the Free French and the Vichy administra­

tion in forth and fast Africa*© They were quickly disillusioned,

In spite of the strict censorship, news coming fro® Africa was ex­

tremely ominous for all those who feared lest the Vichy regime 'be continued

under a different head* Host surprising in its brevity was the report

that French people were being arrested f or planning to murder Giraud and

Robert B&pfay.© The murder of Darlm was still, sxxetezious and, although

the official French ccwunique had purportedly mentioned the fact that

Bonnier de la Cbapa!ll«t« mother m s Italian^ it was difficult to believe

that the Admiral had been the victim of an Axis agent* It was much store

logical to think that the de G&ulXist opposition to Vicky was at the root

of the murder. It was also logical to guess that the arrests were directed

against radical elements atiich were opposed to the Barlam regime* Ths Bar

Toik Herald Tribune considered the amouneement

inexplicit enough to offer a wide range for conjecture as to the pre­

cis© political situation in that region. Since such conjecture,
lacking facts, can hardly servo ary useful purpose, it is enough to
say that the episode reveals something of the ferment which led to the
assassination of Adairs! D&rl&n and which clearly has not fully sub­
sided.,©

The announcement was followed by comments on the acute need of food and

clothing in French Africa* It is difficult to interpret these censored

dispatches© in &r$r other way but as trying to convey to the American public

©Callender, Urn lOrk Times, December 29, 191*2*

©Ibid., December 31, 191*2,

©fer Xork Host, December 26, 191*2*

©Hew York Herald Tribune, Jam&ry 2, I9k3*

 337

the ijpmsien that X m l m had been assassinated m d that Giraud and

tophy were in danger of suffering the sme fate at the hands of hungry

and anarchic mobs ready to turn their blind, toy against the Allied forces.

At the $mm time, American dispatches corroborated the Trench of­

ficial vi w that all ttsoundM eleeeate la the population were fanatically

behind P^iain and the Vichy regime# "North Africa, it is emphasised, was

not de G&ullist when we landed there, and it is' not n m * pictures of

Marshal Henri jphlltpp© Petaln were said still to stand In shop windows

there Hadio eomentator Bagnaosti Grm Swing claimed that 9of the mil­

lion Frenchmen lining there, by far the greater part are extreme conserva­

tives to the point of being almost out of synpathy with democracy as we

understand the t e m . ^ Writing after French postwar elections, which

contradicted his statement, laager waa certain that wHorth-Africa, thou#

It was anti-German, was passionately devoted to Marshal FeUdn and the

Vlehy government.”k7 This picture of perfect unity contrasted with other

dispatches and coments containing of the ©onpHcatlon of the Horth Afri­

can political situation &sd the multiplicity of political parties*^ Ob­

viously, many observers and most official experts judged French opinion

in North Africa by the same criteria that had been used by Admiral Leahy

to gutegc Pctain*$ pppolarlty in Vichy Franco. They generalised from ob­

servations which were limited to the small upper crust of the population.

lork Tines, December 3®? 191:2.

I£
B^mond Gram Swing, Preview of Histmy Ole? Yoa&, 19h3)> p* 162
(February 3, 19i$).
1*7
linger, t o ?tchy Gamble, p. 36I.
18
Arne Obiar© HcComLcic in New 102% Times, January 16, 19^3*
 333

Ho one denied that Mgh~rahklng officers of the French were

% o ¥icby*«dtod or so legall^sinded or so loyal to Petaln that its guns

could he silenced only by petals or his deputy* The observation

held good for the great landowners of forth Africa nihm oost African ob­

servers jigged re&ctionaiy, narrow and bigoted* Both opponents and sup­

porters of the official policy agreed on that fact* In his Victeiy throuji

Africa Samuel Baefciell noted before the landing that »to colonists- who in

the main. were rich, well provided for* and remote from the law* showed

their usual apathy toward everything but making money In Journey into

War John MacVan© recorded how disgusted he was with Algiers * bars and

hotels and preferred the atmosphere at the front* He talked of the B®hal-

low stupidity evidenced in tot French society existed in the city.w^ In

Our Share of lligfat Brew Mddleton pointed out that «the shopkeepers and

middlemen of t o coastal cities were equally happy under flchy^2 which

had suppressed Jewish competition and to communist threat* Summing up

his Impression of the French upper and middle classes in Horfch Africa* he

statedi

As is always the case when one people^In this case the French)
dominates another (in this case t o Arabs) economically* socially*
and politically, t o dominant people Is debased. Intolerant, nar­
row, and fearful, t o French in iforth Africa constituted a bour­
geoisie more reactionary than any tot could bo found in France while
t o rich outdid t o rich of France in their hatred of t o great
principles upon which the Third Republic had bean founded*53

^Callender, A Preface to Peace, p* 6?.

^Dashiell, flctory through Africa, p. 230.

^MacVane, Journey into War, p* 30.

Middleton, Our Share of light, p* 191*

^Ibid., p, 190*
 339

All this* evidently, did net constitute a very promising picture

for the future of dm m cm tio principles In north Africa m d State popart-

ment experts could claim that the French preferred their Vichy regime to

their former republican totitations* tiferopapm like the mm York Herald

Tribune were not convinced, however* but had no opportunity to verify

their suspicions# *Narfeh Africa at present possesses m true organ of

public opinion or legal avenue for public protest, so far as it is t a w m * ^

Brew H|ddleton*s skillful dispatches to the Hew York Times was?© very sig­

nificant to those who realised h m strict the political censorship ms*

In a dispatch dated Januaxy 1$ he described the tm main political current

in North Africa, the various groups which supported Vichy, and Mth© great

voiceless mass tlmi sticks to the traditions of the Third Bepublic*"^

The liberals always refused to believe tlmt the North African masses were

Fascist* fhen .taaigre-Bubreuil, Girand*s chief political adviser, de­

clared that all French people #10 had collaborated with the G o t w were

hated by the population, Samel Grafton was delighted*

For a £ m weeks or months, America flirted with the official

theory that the plain people of North Africa really like collabora­
tionists, really prefer collaborationists, so that if they were not
allowed to have a collaborationist leader, they would be sad, they
would sulk, they would not help us* « * •
Oh, the rain it minehh ©very day for those split personalities
who, in their ecstatic camaentaries on H* Barlan, tried to male© a
case for him at the grave cost of making a case against the people.
They went far beyond the President,% concept of military expediency,
and, using the opening thus presented, gave m the whispers w© heard
about how the population of North Africa was pretty m©h fascist, and
therefore, needed a Barlanish leader* They tried to g|ove their pol­
icy was right by proving that North Africa was crmy*?®

York Herald Tribune, January 2, lpit3*

York gfo^,Jaraaay 15> 19h3#
£6Hew Yosk Post, Jamary 13, 19lt3*
 31*0
Suspicion tot t o early picture of North African public opinion

was not coEspleto was shared by some in high circles* General Ftoenhower

approached the question front the de GauHist angle which created much coir-

fusion in many American minds* »lh© local antagonism in t o French Army

end in all echelons of government against Be Gaulle m s interne, but he

enjoyed a distinct popularity with the civilian® and this sentiment pro­

gressively increased as prospects of Allied success brightened.”^ It is

hard to ascertain whether d©-Gaulle*® popularity was really increased by

Allied successes, but it should b© noted tot General Elsenhower was al­

ways conscious of It and that it became more obvious with the gradual

easing' of the authoritarian grip on Berth Africa which coincided with

Allied successes*

It was* however, m t o basis of censored dispatches tot American

newspapers painted toir picture® of the North African situation which

were very gloomy* indeed, but which exonerated American policy makers of

all responsibility. The m&y possible conclusion m s tot North Africa,

or at least all its "sound elements,” was VIchyite m d tot the dements

opposed to Vichy were also hostile to the A l l i e s 1 M b would even have

inclined some to think that, in spite of official reassurances, there

were seme de oaullists in North Africa. The emphasis on the need for

food and clothing ceuM give the impression tot t o de OanlXist demagogue©

recruited their supporters from among people whoa hunger had tmatfoxmd

into dangerous radicals and irresponsible rioters. From Washington,

Harold Callender reported to the M m Tork Time® that "to warning of t o

®v?
Eisenhower, Crusade to Europe, p. 131*

*8H«r tojfe Staa, Jamaiy lit, 192*3.

 need, of food ant! clothing for the civil population if serious

trouble is to be avoided, 'drew attention sharply to the confusion and dis­

unity in which Frenchmen find themselves in that theatre of war mid ©lee-

where* "59 U s conclusion was w e n store obviously influenced by t o Amer­

ican official policy* "Unity* * *can be achieved soonest and most ef­

fectively# * .upon the mllif&sy plane, where all factions m y logically

be expected to find cosaon ground, rather than upon the political plane,

where fv m c h s m show an exeeptlmsal propensity for dividing and subdividing.

t o situation in North Africa, In Hoveaber and December, 1&2, and

in January, 391*31 was not fully appraised in America because of the polit­

ics! censorship* American correspondents on the spot described it later,

however,, in various books and articles * A# J* iiebling, in The Bead Back

to Paris, pictured the $«1-P&sclrb regime of North Africa which had been

left intact after the Allied loadings#

t o Legion dee Aneiens Combattante, the opposite number of the

Sturn-Abteilung, paradedj t o Service d ’Qrdr© de la Legion, which
corresponded to t o Stotoi&ffel, strutted^ the Cmpagncras d©
France, facsimile of t o Hitlerjugend, aatie the early mornings'
hideous with their mnshlag song, "Slarechal m m veils!*60

t o arrest of the fourteen Frenchmen officially accused of plotting

against Giraud*s and Mirphy*® lives led American correspondents to decide

to interfere in a situation which appeared intolerable# The fourteen men

wore well known to American correspondents * Most of thesa had taken an

active part In the uadergitsuivl preparation of the Allied landings* They

wore "among t o mast prominent Allied sympathisers in Algiers# They were

<9
Mm Xoxfc Times, Januaxy 3, 191*3*
do
Ilebling, t o Hoad Back to Fails, p* 219#
men respected in North African life."^ Among the® wm Dr. Haphael

Aboulker who had read Giraod% original proclamation on the day of the

landingsHaving related to A# J* Liebling t o circumstances of t o

arrest of her father, the married daughter of Dr# AbouBcer

walked off into another room and earn® bade carrying a black Han-*
burg .hat* She handed it to me* It was quit© a good hat, made by
Christy*® of London, the kind that anybody who wanted to be mistaken
for a Foreign Office man night b© glad to wear*
"The hat of M# MirpbyP* t o said* "He left it here tot evening
of the landing* He said* *I,11 be right back* and went out. He
h&sn*t been here sincelwo3

The reaction of American newspapermen "restored all the esteem

liebling had. had for joumaliste %hen he wm twenty years old.*^

There were about thirty journalists in Algiers at t o time, including

radio reporters, and not one of them accepted the official French
version of t o arrests— -that t o motive had really bem the safety of
General Giraud— or t o far more disturbing American efforts to play
down the whole affair* • * # It made me all the happier that not
only t o professing liberals, but t o representatives of conservative
papers, and t o plain routine second- and third-string representatives
o f press associations a ll got t o Idea* I think it even impressed
the Army and State Department people miming t o North Africa show*
They could stop us from sending our stuff out, and they did, bit they
s m In us an articulate, tangible cross section of t o opinion toy
would have to face at bom©#®

It is true that even people who were not used to criticising the American

policy were scandalized by this incident,

^!!acVane, Journey into Tfor, p. 3li8.

£f>
Ibid.. p. U j9,

^lAebllng, % e Road Back to Paris, p. 230.

^Ibid., p. 231.

®lMd.
 3*0
X have no brief for the asarmar in which de Gaulle and his followers
m m treated -when the Allies were solidly entrenched in French North
Africa* The Allies obstinately maintained Oiraud and his pseudo*
totalitarian regiue in Algeria and Morocco* * *and it was not until
public opinion in the United States and Great Britain forced the issue
that the Allied representatives in Algiers protest®! against the im­
prisonment of the men who had prepared, the way for the landings in
Horfch Africa*^

MUrphy, flanked by a united States airy colonel3 invited the ne®-

peperaen to a cocktail, in his villa and tried to explain how difficult the

whole situation was*^ Girsmd received the angry reporters and was ©c-

treacly surprised, to see that American newspapers could be so interested

£M
in a minor French incident* His total, ignorance of the political prob­

lem impressed the journalists * They were irritated by the attitude of the

Vichy officials %ith their apparent assumption that we know nothing of

the situation they were discussing# Host of us had worked on many hundred

stories in different parts of the world,Belying on this assumed ig­

norance, Rlgmilt, the Algiers police chief, explained to John baeVane that

•American and British reporter must take good care not to reveal the

truth— that the fourteen men arrested* * *had de GauHist connections.

This— I'lgault went on— wcmXd infuriate the local population and make union

impossible, H&eVane mad other reporters were not fooled by this appar­

ent concern for the good name of do Gaulle in Horth Africa* They thought

that this sort of thing with a Horth .African official ®fteans that he

^Uddleton, Our Share of Might, p# 191*

^MacVane, Journeyinto ftar, p* X50| Liebling, The Jioad Back to
Paris, p* 235# “ — — ~ *
^MacVane* Journeyinto War# p* 153 S Liebling, The Eoad Back to
Paris ,pp* o2-3b*
^SacVane, Journey into Var, p. 160.
70I'biri.
 M
ssqseets the reporters to spread th© story, but ha doesnft want it pinned

on hfijru*,,^ ‘ Hi© general ispression of Mexican dbstirvero in North Africa

tms that Mews and. Frenchmen who had publicly stressed satisfaction at

our landing trere .now serving jail sentences fo r their bad taste* ♦ ♦ »

The slogan of the occupation was, *Ke©p the rascals in#*«^

British coneorship was not so tight as the American, The conse­

quences of the political situation in liberated territories suddenly be­

came more serious when some British newspapers began to criticise openly

the American policy end its official source, the Supreme .Allied. Coriander,

General Elsenhower*^ This British reaction attracted Immediately a storm

of angry protests from some American newspapers which accused the British

of being opposed to the coinrmtder because h© was m American* 7^ in spite

of the political censorship which was almost as strict between Groat

Britain and America as between Africa and America, a United Press dispatch

dated January 13, \% 3* quoted an article of the london Nam Chronicle *H I#n,i w*ww'w<iHwiM*lww»wwmi*

stating that ^limteiwit-General Dwight Elsenhower was responsible for

public confusion as to the situation in .French North Africa# Keferring

to the delay in the assault on Tunisia and to the obscure political situ­

ation In Algiers, the Newe Chronicle had declared? "This deplorable situ­

ation has been aggravated, if not actually provoked, by General Kiaertoror#*

:imi.LJ-JWxi»<il»»iJim|t-W-|.Wi|W«W»M**i>#l|l1
»niiviirrTTT,nrtri>r' 'f* 11)1iirlllltli(Tlwrnn-rtm.lifn'|lr"T,-'-“ l “ -.r *r-"-r -rr— l '— ■TTT—n——

^WsVane, Journey Into Ffar, p# 160,

^Llebllngi The Baad Back to jJsJfi* P* 220

73
New York Timesi January lb, 19h3*

York Sub , January lit, 19k3*

75
New York Times, January li, 19^3*
 3h$

for the liberals# most American newspapers were estramely

roseatful of British criticism* 3fIt is plain#’3 wrote David tezmce in

the }im York Sun# "that General Eisenhower has been plunged into the sddst

of a dangerous political fight and it certainly is surprising to see th©

British press assume a position of antipathy gainst an Amerieaa. general

who# like all other commanders of our farces# lias not the slightest inter*

est in Burcjfpoan politics*,{^ terrene© suspected that "the Free French ele­

ments in London# which are vejy close to the British Goveimeni and the

British press# have not forgiven General Eisenhoirer for' putting- the late

Admiral Darlaa in ccmiand and they are detensined to oust due American

comandcr if they caxi+^J Q^ite a £ m Americans# however# were impressed

by the criticism, of General E^eatarer, and# although the supporters of

the official policy seemed almost pleased to be able to interpret discos

tent as the result of personal hostility against the Arrterican eoamnder#

it seemed for a while that the position of General ii&sanhower was endan­

gered* As early as Januaay 7# Arthur Krock atinitted that there were one

or teo weak points in the solid front o f aJisehb0«rer,s supporters in fash*

Ingtoa# ’’These exceptions m v administrators m o a e doctrinal ideas# in*

ternsiicui&L and domestic# have often prevented them from concentrating on

the business in hand# which also is General l&senhgwer*s# of winning the

78
war on the military front*11 Criticism was not directed against Disco,**

hm & r 9 however, and ’It worried some correspondents greatly that he did

not ask© it plain that he was responsible only in so far as he* approved

7<w York Sun# daimaiy 1U # 1543 *

77Ibld.

7®’ier Iotk Tlwssi Januajy 7> lpli3»

 3ii6

the political advice and the. political, policies presented roady-?tsade by

State Department averts. In order to solve this difficult imbroglio#

liberals began to advocate the appointment of a "political comlB$&r,

with authority aver all but military matters.Johannes Steel expressed

the hope that the situation wild shortly improve "with the appointment of

Koberb 1* Sherwood aa American Minister Plenipotentiary to Worth Africa

with fall power over Hoherfc inrphy and all diplomatic representatives on

the scene.w® This suggestion Boomed to indicate the real target o f at*

tack was not General Fismhovor but Hobart f&trphy.

Weamhile* American opinion was kept in a state of confusion by

alassiing reports from Worth Africa. The Count of Parts# prompt ire hair

to the French throne# was plotting in Algiers for a restoration of the

French mnarehy* His almost childish intrigues were never taken seriously

by American observers on the spot^ but ho created quite a sensation in

America.® jAker&Xa exploited the activities of the French pretender to

show that American policy had. made worth Africa an easy prey for all anti-

democratic elements*^ It was also played up by official, sources as

proving that there was m solution to the French political problem and

that Frenchmen were hopelessly divided.® Liberals maintained that

^IfacVane* jo u rn e y i n t o w ar, p . 82*

iriifrir.Tp.ulfir"!!' l -iTT-rpr *WWWWi«B»M WH|I W i *

u%ew York Tim®, January ?* 19k3*

JH
Mm York Post, January 12# 19u3.

^See MacVane# Journey into war# pp. 1404^7*

83
Um Toxic Times# January 13, 19li3*

Thcwson# Um York Post# January IS# 1913*

* m UM M M

8hwr 7ork 11s®, January lit, X9l<3.

 3h7

do Gaulle alone could restore French moralej other® chatted that he would

only bring civil war*®** Anne 0*T!ara !\c€orrfick eophasissed the difficulties

of the situation*

Europe in noxml tlmm takes a lot of mademUMing* To chart a

wise course through the present wreckage and confusion calls for
m m knowledge of the background as well m solf-deryi^, resolve on
the part of the powers leading the advance* . * , The military men
have learned the hard m y that Frenchmen are not neatly divided into
genera! categories headed by Vichy on one hand and General do Gaulle
on the other* They have learned that m m am%: the ©Kile® xaany
liberals and staunch republicans are not do Oatdlist and con­
servative and traditionalists are not pro-Vichy# They have diseov-
cred what the Itels know—*that not many Frenchmen of any cast of
mind are natural collaborationists * In Africa they have found rem­
nants of a H the parties that split the Third Kepahlic into frac­
tions# and a rcyalist group besides# plotting to restore the
monarchy.^»

8mm American correspondents in north Africa tiled to correct the

impression given by official source. Drrn Middleton^ for instance, tried

to convey the idea that m o h of what was said about the royalists could

be classified under the heading "inspired stories*" He denounced "the

wholly disproportionate view taken of the monarchists by many official

Observers, the monarchists haw been used by Fascists and collaborators

to veil doings more sinister than the Koyalists * rather pathetic demon-

Strattons for a restoration of the monarchy." The attempts of the news­

papermen to present thatr own v im s of the situation were successful

enough to increase the nervousness of American liberals at hoots* Broad­

casting from Algiers# Charles uoUingwood cemented upon the etateomt

of the newly arrived British representative# Harold Macnillaa, who said

86
Chicago Tribune# January 2h? 19h3*
87
Hew fork Times# January 16# 1543»

^IbidU# January 34,# 1943*

 3W
that the Allies should ha tiarefift

not to crsat© a situation where authoritarian groins can got control

and prevent the will of the people f r n being £ree&y ewerciwed* W1
f e d very strongly that the aatWarish Ism and decree still in
effect Mist be changed, because British and United States public
opinion will never be happy until they are” and Br. me&ill&m
made it clear that there wmre other things hare that ought to be
changed*
that the British Minister said node a good deal of sense to
the correspondents who have grow* somewhat tired of wiliness and
evasion* • • • We have titgen a great many things here that we don't
want to see happen again*^

In a dispatch to the lew loads times Brew Middleton clearly showed

that the French forth African leaders were in mo hurry to cany cut

political ref©nas*

The political house cleaning will take considerable tia© if it

continues at the present m t % but at least it hm started and the
government Is slwrly being reconstituted on a more democratic
basis* * * •
It must be remembered that m m of the French political leaders
who are loudest in their protestations of devotion to the Allied
cause are shrewd judges of the way the m r is ping and are climbing
on the bandwagon while the eliding is go©d*$®

On the basis of such, reportsf newspapers like the New lark Herald.

Tribune gave up their policy of watchful waiting and announced that "the

time has come, it seems to tils newspaper, when it is iterative that

some wholesome drafts of fresh air be let into the festering Berth

African situation***^

It is a condition, we suspect, which stems less from the

specific policies adopted in North Africa than from the. secrecy,

An
Broadcast over the Columbia Broadcasting System on January It,
I9h3*
90
New totfc Urnee, damasy 3i, 1& 3.
^%ew loik Herald Tribune, Jaraiaiy lh, I$i3#
 3h9
censorship and propaganda In which they have been wrapped, the one
worst m l most dinnapting thing about the course of events in north
Africa has been the dense &%mk of 'suspicious mystery and confusion
which has been thrown over them* « • *
the reasons are uMorstandable * The practical results are la*
menfcable# There has not been really frnik or Intelligent neat dis*
patch from north Africa since the landing of the A3igl<Hk5ierlcan
force acre than two months ago. Ho one, either in this country or
Great Britain, has any mild idea of what has actually been going
on there# It has become is|>osslble to believe that the reqtdrements
of legitimate military secrecy can support this extreme of suppres­
sion#?®

The lew lork Timm also chafed that "the news from North Africa, now the

focal point for translating a french policy into action, lias hem obscure,

delayed, and woefully Inad«$mte.w^ In spite of this cosaplaist, the

lew York Times maintained the official line and, although praying for

French unity, advised Frenchmen to forget politics for a while*

It Is significant enough that the french in Africa are back in

the war on the side of their allies, and are retrieving their re­
putation fo r valor by winning the only current successes reported
from that front# * * «
The two armies^ wb® they sect, will not be divided by polit­
ical ideologies or considerations of what the French people will do
with their freedom Wh$n it is won* ©so armies mrehing toward their
rendezvous ?dH fight together with the one thought of beating the
cmton enemy*9.5

\ The Casablanca conference w not motivated by American and British

desire to bring about an agrtmot between the conflicting French leaders,

^Srar Toik Herald Tidtoo, January 11, 19^3*

^Stow Task Times, January 15, 1$C«

^De Gaulle *s Ffghting French in the British Eighth Amsy and
Giraud»s force® In Tunisia*
95
Hew Xoak Times, Jamazy 1, 191.3*
 350

**but hoosevelt and ClmrcblXX -immediately became Involved in the politics

of the inescapable French situation. The conference remained secret

until the official communique w m published.^? This comsijm^qiic, however,

iraft given unusual publicity# wllliara L. Shirer did not hesitate to admit

that the main importance of the Casablanca conference w m in the field of

propaganda# He considered that its success was considerable but that "the

unprecedented buildup given to the armouneomeni of the meeting m m a psy­

chological mistake, not because the parley m s not Important but because

asst o f its result, the military decisions, of necessity had to be kept

secret."^

In these circumstances, the lade of a spectacular agreement between

Giraud and de Gaulle m m deeply felt. American opinion saw in the hand­

shake between the two generals a premise of unity tfcich was not fulfilled.

Observers on the spot had realised that it was "not a spontaneous ges­

ture* "99 As far as de Gaulle m e concerned, "it requested something ap­

proaching physical fores* to persuade him to pas© for m m photographers

with Girsud*"^® The coMmlque published by the two generals w opti­

mistic but it was clear ttmt m agreement had been reached. As Waverley

Hoot rioted, "about the only thing thsy had In common m m teat both wanted

to put the Gormans out of Praneo."-^

^Sherwood, Roosevelt aid Hopkins, p. 675.

“^January 26, 19k3, at 10 P.M.

Task Herald Tribune, January 31, 19k3*

^tacVane, Journey into War-, p# 18§.

^Crawford, Report m North Africa, p. 89*

m Hoofc, Casablanca to Katyn, p. 21k.

 351

We have met. Ife have talked* We have registered our entire

agreement on the end to be achieved* ifcich is the liberation of
France and the triumph, of democratic principles by the total defeat
of the enemy.
This end will be attained by the union in war of all Freachaen*
fighting aid© by aide with their allies*

the part devoted to the French situation in the final canEtunique of the

conference was wan m m clearer confession of failure than the C&raudbd#

Gaulle c<Erani<pe.n^

The occasion of the- meeting between the President and Prime

Minister made it opportune to invite General Giraud to confer with
the Combined Chiefs of Staff and to arrange a meting between him
and General de Gaulle* Th# two generals have been In close coir*
snilt&tion*

For most newspapers* the very fact that Ftooem&i and Churchill

had taken the French problem into their am. hands was in itself a guar­

antee of success*^ Casablanca, m s only one instance of the usual Ameri­

can reaction to the may efforts towards a solution of the thorny question

of Fi^nco*4merican relations during that period * Conscious of their war-

tiate responsibilities^ t m t newspapers were syapathi&ieally optimistic

and maintained that the m d of all difficulties wm in s i g h t . T h i s

was especially true of liberal newspapers and of all those which wer©

especially concerned over the French situation* .Probably this otoi**

optimism was in the long run more harmful to French interests in the United

States than a more realistic view of the situation. 0n3y well-trained per­

sons could detect In newspaper editorial® an embarrassment which betrayed

^Koot, Casablanca to Katyn, p* 226.

York Times* Februaiy 2* I9k3<

X<\ e w fork HeraM Tribune* January 21, 191$.

deep B&sgiYinp and anxiety. Other people became tired of hearing every

t^ee to^s that the French problem had been or was about to be solved.

It m s mi surprising that they finally decided that the French could

never agree in spite of the M y chances which were given to tfcess.^

The French political problem wag thus reduced to a question of rival

ambitions.

The Casablanca failure certainly resulted*to a large extent* fro®

tl^e identical pride and prejudices two typical representatives of the

French military circles. Tills was so obvious that most Americans did not

see that a capital problem loomed beyond this personal ami psychological

deadlock* This lack of political insight was the result largely of ih®

attitude of m z $ local ami national newspapers* A minority was conscious

of the problem but inclined to deny its existence because they were hos­

tile to any solution which would take in account the Leftist friends of

de Gaulle. They were delighted when they saw that the American policy

makers neglected to take into account tee ideological aspect of tee French

situation,*^ On the other hand, tee liberals had decided that the Glrand-

de Gaulle quarrel was purely a question of democratic doctrine* They knew

that French liberals were ovenfhelmiag^ in favor of de Gaulle and uaaa-

Imcmsly distrusted the French adsidnlstration in Ntarth Africa# They knew

that de Gaulle would refuse to have anything to do with Gir&ud until the

latter*s adiainistration m s purged of its pro-Fascist elements* The prob­

lem of ascertaining whether de Gaulle*s attitude was dictated by his demo­

cratic principle® oar by the nature of his political support was trivial.

■^Letter to tee editor of the Itewr York Times* February 191*3.

^Chicago Tribune* January 29* 191*3•

 353

!Io was the only one to jspestc In the m m of and act in conformitiy with

the French democratic tradition.^

On January 21* X9b3* the Bew Toik Herald Tribune daroied a large

part of its editorial on the nreMes-vo\:s at Casablanca11 to the French

situation* The article m s typical of many hopeful and ©a&arrassed

comments *

It is evident fro® the place chosen for this historic meeting

that the French problem was t^enwet in the mind© of both Mr*
Hoosevelt and ¥r* ClmrohilX*. Neither felt safe to temporize longer
with a situation, which found French factions in an open quarrel and
British and American opinion drifting dangerously apart *iQfJ

The editorial concluded* rather ©irangely, that among the teedSja.be re­

sults of the conference vrm »& n m unity on the part of our French Allies**

falter Ilppm&rm* too,, was satisfied and believed that the conference was

an American concession to de Gaulle.

The two old masters at Casablanca have now set in a new perspective
the Parian affair,' the Psyrouton affair* the problem of General
Giraud and General do Gaulle, and the intimations which have re­
cently come underlie# out o f certain official quartos In Washington
— namely that we were so pleased with the Parian affair that we might
make it the model for- all our dealings in Europe#
A gale of fresh air hi® been blown into this miasm of double-
talk and super-dnper realteuW

This optimism was somewhat shaken whm the disappoints and re­

sentful President Poosevelt declared, that the French problem had not

loomed large In the deliberations at Casablanca* There were protests

•^Samuel Gmfton in the m m Toik Pest, February 15, I9k3*

York Herald Tribune* January 2?, I9h3*

10?Ibld., Jarrnar/ 23, 191*3.

from de 0&txXXisi eywp&tMsexw. A letter to tlae Hew. loxk IfsraM Tribune

teoplained that “the conference In Casablanca did not bring a eolation of

HO
tho political problem in Horth Africa*Revtediig all trie arguments

against nm p era xy military mrrmi&€mnt8$” the miter claimed that do

Goalie was still the only <mn entitled to speak for Franco because %@

was continuing the fight of the French Republic before Pehain% coup

d ’et&t** !)e Gaulle <s popularity in America* however, was endangered by

the belief that he was qi% a tool of ^British Imperialisms This belief

had increased since the attacks of the British press upon Eisenhower* It

was devious that for George SoJealski of the Hew Yori: Sun the presence of

de Gaulle in Worth Africa as a French leader could only be the result of

a successful British intrigue*

The President bets made strides to solve the Horbb. Africa prob­
lem* the squabbles among the different French factions* the differ­
ence of opinion between the Untied State and Great Britain* * *&nd
the divorcing of political fro® military activities in that area*
Certainly our caaroan&er, General Eisehhower, or ishoover say succeed
him* ought not to be Im^olvcd in the typo of Buropeasi Intrigue end
double-crossing which m American Is tested to understand*. We are
a nation that plays with four aces in the deck and some of the
Europeans play it a different way*311

n
Most Americans had never heard of or did not remeraber the name

of Marcel Peyrouton when, on December 3* 1$ j.25 they read a small item in

their newspapers informing them that he had given M s support to the Par­

ian regime in Horth Africa* Ho was then in Argentina where ho had held

the position of French ambassador until Laval’s return to power* He was

fork Herald Tribune, Feforaaiy 6* X^lf3 •

.W M k M M M W * !* t >•i »Wi W*» W>*»

fo r k Sun* J a a m a iy 29, X 9U 3 *
 355

well known In France for hie administrative career in forth Africa and

for hie participation in the Pet&In government a® a minister of the inte­

rior* The Fight considered him an excellent administrator and a promising

politician! the heft looked upon him as a Fascist* There was on© very

good point In hi® favors he m s a personal m m $ of Laval «£us* he had ar­

rested in the name of Retain on December 13, 191$* General Elsenhower was

persuaded that he was a good, choice*

In the search for satisfactory individuals we decided to bring

larcel Peyrouton to .Algiers* It was reported to mo that Peyrouton
was then a virtual exile in Argentina# * * * We explained our prob­
lem to the State Department and after some exchange of messages on
the subject were inl'omed that the State Department m s in agreement
with us#11^

General Elsenhower wm the only one to accept the responsibility

of Peymiton*® appointment. In his Memoirs, Secretary of State Hull de­

clared that he tried to convince ghuettomer that Peyrouton was an unfor­

tunate choice but that he bad had to yield to the authority of the military

commander.1^ Kingsbusy Smith, writing "with the approval of the State

Department,” asserted in The American Mercury* "The State Department

tried to block the request, twice held it up, but finally it went through

at the insistence of the War Department s 1^ Sherwood, in Roosevelt m d

Hopkins, told a different story*

Hull approved this suggested appointment, and arrangements were

accordingly made in a routine manner and, as Roosevelt stated,
without his knowledge* Peyroutoxi went to Kio de Janeiro to await

^I&serhcwer, Crusade in Europe, p* 130*

■^Bull, Memoir®, p* 1201.

^•She toerican Barclay, Bovsoiber, 19M».

 transportation by air to Africa and, early In Janu&xy, press cor**
respondents discovered M s presence there and the probable reason
for it.135

As a matter of fact, American correspondents In Algiers had learned

about the impending appointment of Peyrouton at the press conference which

Robert itophy held after the arrests of Allied sympathisers.11^ •Ibis

press conference took place on December 30, X9is2, but ^>parently the first

reports did not reach America until January 6.11? lAebling, in The Road

Back to Pari®, recorded that ,?Mr. Itepby introduced the name of larcel

Peyrouton and asked us what we thought of him. Everybody who had been in

France thought he was terrible, so Murphy decided to bring him on any­

way.1*11^ Coming after a discussion on the way® to improve a situation

mad© Impossible by the authoritarian vimvs of French leaders like Darlan,

such a suggestion amas©& American reporters* John l&cfan© bluntly asked

lurpfcys **Peyrouton. • • « the difference between the

In the United States, the first attacks against Peyrouion for his pro~

Fascist leaning® were published in Wmrlsy Root1® syndicated column on

January 16. Sherwood recalled s

The newspapers presented the unsavory details of Feyrouton*® record

as a particularly brutal Minister of the Interior in the Vichy gov­
ernment. . . .
When Sumner Welles learned of PeyrOuton*s presence in Bio h©
gave oxder® for the cancellation of his further passage and A m
Bull learned of Idles *s orders h© overruled them, taking the po­
sition that the State Department should not assume responsibility

^^Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 6?5*

* n rrrn nm'- ijm m H M ir mmmrnm

116.
See p. 31(3,

U T««r Toric Tiaes, January 6, 19li3.

Jl
Uebling, H » Road Bade to Parla, p. 235.
119
MacVane, Joui-ney into War, p* 1$2»
 357

for denying a request by Murphy which had been transmitted with the
authority of General Heenhmmr. (All.cables out of north Africa
y e signed with Meas&oeyhf name# 7 ^ ll^ ey ro a iizf^ iE id
Algiers, a w © i % ULfKii"i^mt ffle"same time Roosevelt arrived at
CasublajKsa*l*l

Roosevelt *s insistence that he did not t a w ^bout Feyreaton's in­

tended trip to north Africa might give the impression that he had never

heard of the whole affair* ^Tet the president apparently ^proved, or at

any rate did not disapprove, the appointment of I. Poyrouton which took

place while Mr* Roosevelt was at Casablanca and in eonsecrtion with which

the President later said he and !r* Churchill had given some advice*ffl^

Apparently, ndther the President nor the Secretary of State wanted to ap­

pear responsible for a measure which raised so much criticism* Marcel

Fqyronton was appointed governor general of Algeria*1^ Waverley Root or-

plained hm tide appointment m s ^accompanied by disarming explanations*1

of politically naive cosrespoMents* He quoted several correspondents who

cabled to their newspapers that «the arrival of Peyrouton was expected to

initiate Ta thorough shake-up of the Isperial Council sat up by the late

Admiral Jean Francois Parian^* * ♦aimed as ranch at increasing govern­

mental efficiency as at liberalising the regime*1**12^ The- liberal press,

however, took up the matter and began a campaign which surpassed in in­

tensity anything occasioned by P'ranco-American problems in the past*

120_. n, .
Italics- mine*

^Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p* 61$.

^Callender, A Preface to Peace, p*

Xmk Times, January 10, 1$<3*

^ A s the governor of Algeria peyrouton wtotaatiaally became a
w asher of the «Baperial Council*tt
 358

After the Casablanca conference "the outraged protests fawn the United

State® and Britain were plainly audible in the villa *Dar m S&ada.

St Pierre and Miquelon warn alive again*

Walter Mppaann wrote some "plain words about north Africa*" Ho

had earlier' approved the theory of "military necessity*' and had accepted

the Parian deal. But' now, irritated by the censorship, be claimed that

tlie "self-restraint" of jouxmlists of good will had been "abused." He

charged that the laaparfe&tion of Peyrouton was opposed even by the Petate-

bsts as "uhmIs®," and that Americans were ki$>t ignorant of the real situa­

tion. H© refused to believe that this last mistake was the work of Eisen­

hower. "fh&t likelihood is there that General Eisenhower had ever- heard

of M* Feyronton, imch lees of his record? let that is the kind of burden

we have placed on the shoulders of this brilliantly promising young Ameri­

can ccHssaander*"^

P.M. published a full page editorial entitled "Mr. President!

clean up the African mess." Reminding President Roosevelt of his pros&se

that the D&rlan arrangement was a temporary affair,12^ P»g» charged*

When Girarod, operating under -our auspices, puts in a Fascist of the

caliber of Peyroutor^calls M m from 6000 iles asray*— as Governor
of Algeria, m are making a penaanent arrangement-* Peymtoa is
the last stone carefully fitted into place in an anti-democratic
government that nodfias been firmly established in pcwei'— and perma­
nently, by all political siaMm-da— with the aid and assistance of

^^The residence of itariean vice-consul Kenneth Pendar in

Marrakech* Roosevelt and Churchill were his guests after the conference.

^Sherwood, Boo®wit and Hopkins, p* 6?£.

128
Hear York Herald Tribune, January 19, 19lt3.

12%oos@velt *s declaration on November 17, 19h2«

 359

the U*S# Government* The fact he doesn't like another Fascist,

lAval| doesn't absolve him of Fascism*!#*

In a dispatch to the Chicago Dally ffews,!31 Filltam stoneasn concluded?

wSince m t arrival hero on !Iovrober 8 we have persistently pursued a lino

of collaboration and friendship with those very French authorities who or­

ganised resistance to our landing and who today slap tta© elves an the

hack for having done so*w

Dorothy Thomson wrote, an m m m m violent in&ctmeiit of the

American policy*

truth demands that we ackntsfledge that the 0iraucVPeyrcmton regime

in toth-Afrlca » created by the American invasion an! rests upon
American bayonets* It is not something that came into being by de­
mocratic process*. Also# to say that our only aim In this war is to
beat the enery, regardless of what to beat him for, is to Insult the
men who- are laying down their lives*13$

W ss Thompson was particularly asperated by a dispatch fro® Allied Head-

quarters reporting the creation by Peyrouton of a ffPenaaneni Council of

¥ar Economy*w The dispatch asserted that this was "the .first step toward

the rebirth of representative goverwaeat, for its members will be elected

by various economic groups* * *the heads of various Algerian financial,

ladtostrial, and agricultural groups arid presidents of Chambers of Commerce

end trade organisations *tt Anyone acquainted with Fascist economic theories

needed, m further infoxmtion* "If that is representative gwemment,»

charged Miss Thoroson, f,So is ?tosalini*B**!33 ^he campaign against the

^ F * M * , J a m m y 22$ 19h3*

^Dispatch dated February 8, 19k$»

^ N r n loik Post, February 12, 19h3*

 ■360

tonic c*a policy in llerth Africa reached its climaa; when Edgar Ansol Wmr&r

signed his past as deputy director of the Office of War inflation.

The state Department had. refused him a permit to go to Uasth Africa*!^

Ho charged that the State attitude was "dictated by salon

habitueos without political education and .afraid of real democracy*"

According to him, "the deal with the FIchylies was planned deliberately

at least two months before the Allied Invasion*

Kenneth Crawford, a writer for P*I* and the Chicago Sun, who ar­

rived in. flortti Africa in February, 19143, on the other hand, m e impressed

by Robert Murphy*® good faith and wrote a book, Report on Worth Africa,

which was an apology for the official policy# Referring to the attacks

on Miiphy *s policies, he stated?

By the time of Peyroa’ton% appointment, th© forth African

political complex m m being covered like a TtaMqr scandal by most
of the American press, newspaper and aagaaine articles backtracked
to the Cppeidieisish addition of General Clark -to mm% lurpby m&
other Americans, together with their french Allies, In a country
place near Oran* # • * Glass's brief account of what had happened
became evidence conclusive to some terican editors that we had
bribed our way into !iorth .Africa* This presmtion beeaams a key
piece In. the jigsaw of soand&l reconstructed*!3v

AVen liebling, who was not tender with the State Department, recorded?

"Rsw&abering the Harlan days* the liberal press refused to accept any­

thing that was said about North Africa thereafter*" He suspected that

"the Fighting French propaganda took advantage of tills opening in their

smear-Giraud campaign. T,x37

^Root, Casablanca to Katyn, p. 227#

February 26, 19<k3*

136
Crawford, Report on Horth Africa, p. 82*

^^Liobling, The Head Back to Paris, p* 236*

 361

TJadoubte&Ty tli© Peyreuton affair was a boon to the Fighting: f r w k

because there was little to say fro® the doctrinal level in favor of the

&aru After repeating quite a few times that he was Laval*s temp and had

resigned as the ambassador of France to Argentina after Laval re return to

power, Peyrouton's supporters ran out of arguments * Some found that it

was difficult to imp00 e democracy on people who did rnt want ih.1^ He*

lying on the State Department % public opinion esperte, H&ymoix! Gram Swing

thought that American policy should aim at enlisting the support of all

,
Frenchmen*

if France is going to be reconstituted, It will be with all elements*

or it will be by the elimination of some elements* Ho doubt the
French who feel violently think elimination would be hotter* and one
hears,that civil war in France is going to eliminate in full fury
when the opportunity presents itself, Those who criticise the ar­
rangements to enlist the service of reactionaries in northern France
^continental Franco-] in the war effort may not mean to* but they
really argue in favor of eliminating the®* a© though the Allied
Eapeditioii&ay Force should have taken on that assftgaa&ife* * « •
If American co-operation with reactionary Pimcteen in Horfch
Africa were to count m our am ideological line* both at horn© and
abroad, that would be southing else*

Thus Swing looked upon the Feyroutmi ^ointment almost as the result of

a consistent policy of nosvdntervention on the part of the American gov­

ernment.^0 It was probably on the basis of such reports that Dashlell,

in Victory through Africa, wrote s "And once more, I met remind myself

lest 1 grow violently critical of weather-cocks like Feyrouton that we

are obliged to let France choose Its asm government*»3^1

Swing, Previn of op, 162*63*

139Ibid*

■^Itdd.

•^nshieU, Africa, p. 3&h*

 362

Conservative observers found excuses to justify the presence of

Parcel Pegrrauton in Algiers, He v&s "tough m l able*”^ The extreme

conservatives went farther* Although the Chicago Tribune did not mention

Pqyxwban,:s nose in its editorial on North Africa of January 2l, 1&2, it

attacked violently the attitude of the American liberals» Once more, ac­

cording to this newspaper, the He* Beal "lunatics" were attempting to

sabotage the war effort for ideological reasons*

To use an American aangy to force the unwanted Be Gaullists upon

the people of Horth Africa might bring on catastrophe# let that
is the very thing that a certain type -of master mind in far away
council chambers, drpring rooms, and editorial sanctums & m m bent
upon accomplishing *^3

A reader of the lar York tlm® m m a m in the Worth African political

situation a proof that "the allies that fate^ has given us are allies

for ma t of whom, the French Bopublic is dead and no regime that does not

stem fro® Vichy is legitimate or acceptable*"*^

The controversy between the "Pcyreutonists" and the "anti-

Pcyroutonists" reached such proportions that many Americans got the im­

pression that the political factions of the Third Republic had established

headquarters in the editorial rooms of some Hew York newspapers ami were

thus communicating their fanaticism to many Americans.^ The net result

was not favorable to French democracy.

*^Pondar, Adventure in Horth Africa, p* 160.

■^Chicago Tribune, Jorraaiy 2b, I9b3*

^Dashlell, Victory through Africa, p. 3Q&*

^tetter to the editor of the Net lork Times, February 28, 19h3*

February 12, 19h3*

 These squabbles are disheartening to France*3 friendtej * «
in the quarrel© about revising or not rariving the French Republic
there Is little to deepen the primary Allied conviction that such
a step should be the wisest* * * * If French propagandists could..
bury their hatchets they might help theraselves and their cowjrtay***»

The Gtrauti~de Gaulle quarrel outlasted the Peyrouton episode* The

governor general of Algeria# Ttan experienced politician# .appeared to be

taking some of his critics into camp*** wrote Kenneth C-. Crswfoxd In Report

on Iteth A f r i c a Liebling# who was a very outspoken opponent of the

official policy# decided that# after all, Pcyrtrut<m% appointment to the

governorship was a good idea# flpeyrooton had decided that we were going

to win the war, and he saade an excellent ferret for us# bringing numerous

collaborationist rats -out of the administrative sewers they were hiding

Xn^V-i9 According to liobling, American liberal newspapers refused to

admit that the political situation was Smproving) he related hot# when

Kenneth 0* Crawford reported to his employers that there was very little

to get indignant about in Worth Africa# *ihey decided he had gone over to

the e n e m y * I E © statement was not mite fair* KklXe most liberal

newspapers claimed that minor improvements in Africa did not bring any

solution to the major problem# they were willing to acknowledge these

improvements when ‘
they were sure that they were not <m3y written down on

paper but translated into facts* It mis, however# difficult for most of

them to proclaim with Alan Soorehead that "the prlmcmover in these

^Letter to the editor of the 7je*r York Times# February 3.5# I$0*
US "

Crawford# Report m Worth Africa# p. 33*

^Liebllng# The flpad Pack to Paris# p. 235*

150.
 3&i

inpwc&aenfcs was non® other than the renaaalcable figure of M* Harcel

^eyroitton*^®* Stoey preferred, to interpret the l^rwements as a result

of the Casablanca conference# Sozcie of them even shared how mch wgood

vrl.U»lfe ifoBy jja*j and hos? m e n prestige the personal intervention of

fkras&wsXt carried, by cooling off considerably toward dc Gaulle in the

period which followed the conference# Some of Walter lipraamhs comenis

on the French situation were weary sijpalficaat in that respect#

It seemed that nothing particular was accoB$>lieh©d in improving

the political condition among the French# But, in fact, there ie an
increasing evidence of a decided, turn for the better since the Presi­
dent aid the Prime Maistcr took a direct instead of an Indirect hand
in the matter* What they did, chiefly, it would seo% was to begin
the re-education of the French authorities who had been living for
more than two years behind the curtain of Asds-Vichy censorship and
propaganda* that is why the general atmosphere is clearing in North-
Africa, why measured steps are being taken to qualify SVance once
more m a partner of the United Nations, why some objectionable of­
ficials are being replaced and others— let us m y co-ordinated* that
is why General de Gaulle*s Fighting French and General Giraud*®
Frenchmen who mean to fight are— in North Africa, in London and In
Washington— seeding one another out and coming to Imoir and trust one
another again*1?3

Whatever the role of Feywmton may have been and whatever his eon*

duct from January to Juno, 2$k3$ competent observers concluded that M s

Importation into Algeria was a mistake* General Eisenhower was specific

m that point#

Bringing Peyroutari to Algeria as governor was a mistake, even

though he was a vast issptwessent over his soft and vacillating
predecessor* It was difficult indeed to find i®n who had any

^laoorehe&d, The I,aid in Africa, p* ?!♦*

■falter Mppmnn ia llmr Xork Herald Tribune, January 19, 19^3•

— *•
Ibid,, F«tauuy 20* 1A3*
 365

VKptfeimm 1a French colonial adB&r&etettlon and at the same time

here no trace of the fiehy trademark

Kenneth G* Crawford* mho thought that American policy in Borih Africa was

nnjustly accused* came to the same conclusion. »ln liberal eyes the Fey*

ronton appointmmt was iMefaMble. It was a bed mistake*1’3-'®

The period which followed the. Casablanca conference was dominated

In French affairs by the negotiations between the fighting French of Lon­

don and the Horth African administmtion. All FrencJmen fitting Germny

felt that unity should be achieved m early as possible for obvious n&~

timml and international reasons. Both groups* however# wanted to have

unity os their own terms. the Fighting French refused to ocefprcndae with

people who had been associated with the Uichy goveiment*®^ enviously

the North Africa administration wanted to reduce the liberal and radical

allies of de Gaulle to political i^otence* Apparently# the North African

rulers held all the advantage* In this struggle# They were the masters of

the most iaport&nt French terrltexy at war with Geimry. It appeared

normal that the bigger partner should finally elimimi© the smaller in

case of a m rg e r of the two rival parts of the French Bhtplre, It was also

obvious that Giraud enjoyed the support of the American averment whose

influence was supreme in French North and fast Africa. The French North

African rulers could afford to temporise in the hope that the Fighting

'^Eiseijfoower# Crusade la Europe* p. 130.

155
Crawford# jRspoari on North Africa# p. 83*
156
Be Gaulle*s broadcast over the B.B.C. on Febru&iy b, 191*3* in
CasablaiKsa to Katyn# p. 25?.
 366

French power and influence could not survive th© agreements between North

Africa and its allies* America was .©quipping a fighting force of 300,000

which ©rayone felt would weigh a great deal in future .political dealings

in. the French Mpire or in liberated France,3^ Th© Casablanca conference

further contributed to pit de Gaulle in m inferior situation. After

President Boosevdt^ personal intervention, it appears! that the tempor­

ising tactic® were not those of the North African adidnlstmtion but of

de Gaulle, whose political ambition seemed to be the only obstacle to

French unity*3-®

Hoosev©lt*s role in this matter did not m & with the conference

itself* Back in America he did not try to hid® what he thought of de

Gaulle| according to loot, the President invited Wilbur Forrest# editor

of th© New Io2k Herald Tribun© to a conference, because he was very saich

concerned over the opposition of this newspaper*3'®

The mm% convinced supporters of do Gaulle c©plained that

a kind of whispering campaign against de Gaulle goes on contirm-

ously and sisybe somebody ought to open the window m d h i m the room
out* It is said for instance that the General is stubborn, . * •
And so whoa, proponents- of a s©mi~f&s©lst ©fficialcta in north Africa
say that do Gaulle is hard to get along with* * .that is nothing new,
the Germans in 19i|0 found M a impossible to get along with* They
had never met such a difficult fellow* When mraiy reasonable m n
knew that France was finished# de Gaulle gritted his teeth and said
it was not true. Such hauteurJloO

I)e Gaulle# however, was vulnerable to these kinds of statements because

^®Ncw Tozfc Times, Jammy 2* X9i3*

Fendar, Adventure in Plploaacy, pp* 3ii3*"W&*

Casablanca to Katyn, p* 272*

160
Saranel Grafton in. the New York Post, February 15, 191*3«
 367
they were confirmed by m m French refugees in America* Andre Raynal

answered in Jbt M m Im d m «fee of the charge® gainst Otamd by retorting

that d© oaalle m e no better* In an open letter to Fdg&r A m el Iwrer,

Brew Pearson# and professor Itas M m of Smith Coliege# he wrote s

The charges made attest General Girand by liberal® and feXXosr trav­
eler® are well known to us*. Bat these weary ehargee are made against
General do Gaulle by Oaullists m d socialists In Zmsdmi* The Jean
f m r w group, which presents French socialist refugees in England,
recently aqnmmed its concern met de Gaulle and the French national
Committee in terms which hear a singular^resemblance to those which
ere applied to Oiraud by Mr* Mmm &ohn.l6l

The improvement of the political situation in Berth Africa was

another factor which played against de GtaXle# This was precisely why

the French North African rulers had made concessions* The political

astuteness of Marcel Feyrouton seemed to have been a decisive factor*

This liberalisation, hmmmr# did not amount to more than the r m oval or

the shift of nom of the sit sharply criticised officials^ and the re­

lease of political, prisoners, including the suspected ^assassins® of

Glraud and Robert Maiphy*^®

A grave incident which took place in America itself further con­

tributed to convince many Americans that de Gaulle m & ready to do anything

in his fight for political preferment# even to sabotage the French war ef­

fort# On February 15 American newspapers headlined the arrival for re-

paS|ia of the French battleship Richelieu and other French ships in M m

l6lThe Mm header, Jteeh 6, 1913*

162
Pea&ar, Adventure in Diplomacy, pp. 159*60.
16%
Hew Toxk Times, February k, 19ii3*
Totte»s harbor*3® 1 needed some cheerful m s at the time of

Romraslts successes In Ttontolft* Arthur Krock wot© In the lim tork Times

that the presence of these ships m s "the met striking symbol of the

practical ■wisdom" of the American policy*3® Admiral Feiumi# the French

commander# held & press conference announcing that the morale of every

m m in the crews wm very high* The Hew Yoric Times printed a sketch

showing three battleships flying the French, British and American flags*

They were sailing together# "one for all arid all for ono»nl66

On February 28 newspapers stated that some sailors# on shore leave#

had been volunteering for service In the Fighting French forces*3® A few

day® later Otraud,s naval mission in Washington called on the American,

naval authorities for help*3^ The navy referral than to the State Depart-

sent,*® and finally the Xadgr&tloa Departnent sent out officers to arrest

the sailors in lew York Citya3?® On March 9 twelve French sailors were

sent to KLXis Island* liberal commentator Wfiverley Foot spoke over radio

station WINS Just after receiving this piece of m m "which shocked t o

profoundly*®

It is an action being taken by our government which I c m describe

by no other word than %hamefklH* • * * It is that today, Fighting

* % b e presence of the French ships in M m loik and Boston*®

harbors was kept secret for a few days for security reasons.

York Times# February 15# X9t3*

166lbid>, February 21, 1?!,3.

^Ibid., February S3, 13k3.

168
Ibid., March 12, 1?U3.
 369

French sailor are being arrested m the streets of' Bar York m&
sent to mils Island-* Their only exam© Is that they iwtsfc to fight
for as against the &&mm+ * « * The entire Imident m y seem
slight in itselfj it is only m the system is slight compared with
the disease* It is an indication of a fundamental rottenness in
m r entire thinking in regard to the profound philosophical and
political principles for which we are fighting.W

the nest day newspapers published full stories and the liberals

took a position in favor of the arrested sailors*^ The Department of

Justice explained that the « had been arrested for illegal entry into

the United States*^ It appeared, however, that the charge had little

foundation, since there « an agreement between Fighting Frame and the

United States according to which sailors on shore leave could be in M m

York*X74

Exporters went to Mils Island and o m back with stories about

the political attitude of of the french officers of the Bieheliea

who were hostile to Aaeriea* It was reported that a French officer had

called Roosevelt "a d « m * * ^ /apparently some of the m m had left Frame

long before in cider to joia do Goalie* They had enlisted in the ¥ichy

tmy before the landing to await m opportunity to go to the other side.

They believed that "after years of inaction thqr were at last in a posi**
i

tlon to strike back at the eaBKgr*1* Their shore leave in New York was

their first opportunity. The pro**!© Gaulle Hew York Herald Tritoe took

171t-'X3S, Karoh 10, 19!>3.

^ Sc* York Poet, i*a*oh 11, 191*3*

X73Ibid», Uuwh 12, 19l*3.

^Agreement of M g m t 2, 13lA, in Feet, Casablanca to Katyn,

P* 397*
**7IL
Hew loik T&k b , Slarch 11, 19li3*
 370

& position In their favor*X f6

In the present situation *&en have "deserted” French warship® in

American port® with no intention of residing hero or of evading
active service. They left their ships, which flew the French flag,
to fight in other ships flying the French flag because they believed
they could, thereby, serf© the real France better. They chose, as
soon as opportunity for free choice offered, to enlist under of­
ficers who had never abandoned the French Republic* who had never
turned their guns on m ally and never ceased firing against the
enemy. . . . If the French sailors arrested her® are, in fact, "de­
serters* to the Fighting French it would be an official rebuke by
the United State® to m n who are is^atient at the alow1rebirth of
democracy in French territory,177

Secretary of the Issvy Frank S x m issued a sta&mot to defend the posi­

tion of American authoritioi-*

The ©neisy would profit directly txm the ins&OblliamtlQn of these

vessels regardless of the cause* It follow, therefore, that the
greatest service which their creem can render to Finance and to the
United nations is to stay with their ship®. These vessels
pledged to fight on our side against the cowai enesgy*™

last American observer eapmsed their azaaaement at this unusual and dis­

graceful spectacle. Hie Ifm X<a& Ttoes deplored

the dangerous situation developing aboard the French warships In

this countjy which are threatened with a peanaanent issEObilisation
because of the desertion of part of their crow* • « •
The laws do not yet permit ships1 arms to select their officers,
or the time and. place where they will consent to fight* To persuade
sailor® that they have a right to do these things is a subversion of
military discipline punishable under the law of the French Republic,
And, incidentally, under American 1mm as well.W

York Tims, March XI, 191*3*

177
The quotation from the Herald Tribune 1m taken, from Hoot,
Casablanca to Katyn, p. IjOQ*
j jll | i «f«HW*h. i M M M M *

)
lew loads Times, llareh l l , 19k3*
179
Ibid., larch l£, 3$h3*
 m

Tbs 'letter which idgar Ansel W m m r wrote to the Hew York fixm in answer
to this Mltorial showed that# for mor American liberals, the question

had never been United to a minor incident in m American harbor, mfaat

they resented was the American intervention to protect the Oiraud officers,

Mowrer accused the Times of being l,Petuini$tM and denied that the terra

ftfactionw could be applied, to the de Gaallists*

If the de GaulHsts arts more than a faction, the C&raadlsts

(e^Petainiste) are less* They have, virtually spewing.., no French
cession people behind thsasu • » * Fascist-mindM officers, officials
and economic privileged* mgr of whom collaborate with the Geaans
and practically all of w t m backed the treasonable regime of Vichy.
To put t h m on a par with the Gaullists is to e m p ® m Benedict
Arnold with George WasMngion,l®0

The sailors were soon released but the effect of the incident was

vesy harmful to French Interests in the Baited State©* It was used as m

argument against rearming the French Most people did not go into the

details of the affair but m m very unfavorably igpressed by tills breach

of military discipline in war time* It was specially harmful to d@

Gaulle, who appeared to erne like the head of a dangerous gang of revo­

lutionists and conspirators

•TOI

The factors playing in favor of da Gaulle in his quarrel with

Girsud were not as apparent to American opinion m those playing in f&v~

or of Giraud* Only the liberals who were willing to consider the

lark Times, ISarch 2h» 29h3*

^Pendar, Adventure in Diplomoy, p# 16?,

 372
ideological aspect of the question understood the importance of the agree**

laent between d® Gaulle and the French underground in X$s3*

American observers had ignored the agreement completely or minimised the

importance of French resistance

A second factor which hat! m .Indirect influence on the situation

was the easing of the authoritarian rule in Africa, !3ary American ob­

servers noted curiously that Africa became °de Cauilloh* after do Gaulle>s

arrival in Algiers,^ They concluded that de Gaulle*s propaganda was

excellent, since he had b e ® able to reverse the situation In such a short

time* It m s indeed surprising to hear of pro~d® Gaulle demonstrations In

a French territory which was described a© passionately and unanimously

Fetalnist three souths before* Is a matter of fact, the Worth African

administration was faced by a difficult choice* I t could s a t i s f y Allied

public opinion and reestablish some freedom of expression in Worth Africa

or it could maintain the Vichy regime and safeguard its own position. It

could not do both. It tried, unsuccessfully to ccs^romise. A large section

of Allied opinion remained unsatisfied and the restlessness of a large

part of the population In Worth Africa contributed to hasten the victory

of de Gaulle over his rival. The political situation in Worth Africa

weakened Glrsadhs administration in assay respects.

The rearming of the French troops did not go as fast as it was

supposed to because there was much opposition In America, "Thar® was some

criticism of the fact that while American pilot® were without ships to

fly, aircraft >?ere being made available to the French* *^3 The fear was

•^Pendar, Mvenbure in Diplomacy, p. 173 •

^Roofc, Casablanca to Katyn, p* 333*
 373

widespread, m m among supporters of the official policy and in the Amer­

ican g&rexwmi%$ that Oirsnd or some other general might use the French

forces to establish a dictatorship in liberated France#^* Xfcw Middleton

cabled to the itw Xork Times a

There is a disposition to see something questionable behind

General Gir»ndfs raising- of a great Worth African an%%. These
people reason that he will lead it to France after m allied vic­
tory and dominate Franc© and her choice of government trough his
comiaand of the only organised French force on the Continent* He
will then act up a reaeilen&iy military govearmont, they fear*187

It wm also apparent to kmricm observers that Hho morale of same units

was not hlgSu#^® It seated t!mt some officers were nostalgic for the un­

adulterated Yieby regime and many soldiers must have felt like th© Hde~

sorters** of the Richelieu, llacfan© reported that during the second week

of February, 19k3> "the French were hracz**ej&eteirt * at the front ishile

they were befog brought back for reequipment."189

The situation chafed radically a little later but, at the time,

it contrasted singularly with the brilliant successes of the small but

dynamic Fighting French £woes with the British .Eighth Army* The nest

spectacular exploit of the Fighting French had. been the campaign of Qmr

©ral Leclcre from take Chad to Libya* newspapers favorable to do Gaulle

naturally mtph&Bized the Fighting French successes.

This is the third time that the Fighting French tee broken out
of the Lake Chad region to invade Fesaan and capture the Italian
posts in southern Libya, With each major offensive the band of

ilull, Memoirs, pp. 1200-10.

Lesr foife Times, February 21, l?lt3.

 nk

French patriots who held Africa against the Axis suc­

ceeded in iarovising some sort of a striking force* when the
British tide washed bade, the fighting french withdrew rdth their
invaluable booty* Mm It appears certain they will drive through
to \fo® Mediterranean after tls© equivalent of a marelx I’m l&sml
to M m tost;— through the blank spaces on the map*
IXaxi this desort assault been made from bases on the sea or from
regions well supplied by railway® and roads it would have been cred­
itable enough to the hardy frenchmm and their native supporters*
But they started from the heart of Africa— frca Conrad*s %©&rt of
darkness'"— operating against an enesy whose every defeat brought him
closer to well filled depots* . » , to march from hake Chad to
northern Trlpolitania is a feat in itselft to march and win battles
constitutes a truly magnificent exploit *3-5®

The Fighting Fronch reached Tripoli in the fourth week of January, 1943*

Th© Host York Times wrote an editorial in their honor*

The- story of these fighting men will outlast the quarrels of

war and peace* « « * In passion and fuiy these m m yield to no
soldiers who have taken part in tide- war* When a free France is
■altogether restored, under wlmiever elected heads, they will b©
honored and their' memories immortalised *191

It was in the political Held, however, that do Gaulle enjoyed

his most iapartarrb advantage* The first half of February, 1943, was a

period of great political activity for the Fro© French movement* General

de Gaulle held a press conference in which he declared that-..the reestab­

lishment of the 1ms of the Kepubli© was the only basis on which the union

of .the Empire could he realised*^ The position of the Fighting Flinch

movement was very strong, since it liad continued th® republican legality

in the part of the French Lmpire it controlled and since the Allies had

at various occasions pledged themselves ‘to reestablish democracy in France*

^ M e w York Herald Tribuiaa,

**1
*i* >*» ■i**w»
January 20, 1943*
w ^W '**■

^ “lew York Times, Jammy 27, 1943*

XS>arbid,3 February 10, l?h3.

 y i$

The key sentence of de Gaulle*® stataaent constituted a good sunaaxy of

the Fighting French political strategy and an explanation; of the relative

strength and weakness of the two rival groups*

1 believe that If In Iteth Africa, as in the rest of the Empire,

they merely applied the 1mm of the Republic, and, la particular, if
liberties were restored there— that is, liberty of the press, liberty
of the individual, liberty of assembly and liberty of opinion— vcny
little time would pass before these vexy liberties and the public
opinion engendered thereby would effect a union.193

The practical effect of this strategy was obvious in the following editor­

ial of the moderate Christian Science monitor*

Apparently General de Gaulle is now apprehensive over the pos­

sibility that moves will be made to submerge the Fighting French
group in the system set up in forth Africa* This might explain why
he has chosen this moment to make his first categorical pledge to
the ideal of the Republic In France.
In doing so, however, he has chosen a sya&ol around which most
Frenchmen will one day rally, and to which th© sympathies of Britons
and Americans are strongly attached. His statement clarifies th®
position of the Fighting French and challenges General Gir&ad— who
has been reported as opposed to th© Republic— to make as unequivocal
a pronouncement on his own aims. And since State Department policy
has supported General Giraud against General de Gaulle, Americans
may lock to their diplomatic representatives in Horth Africa to help
clarify the situation there at least to the e&tent that the de
Oaulllst position has been clarified.1$*

The reaction of the newspapers previously favorable to de Gaulle

was naturally store outspoken* The Hew Tork Herald Tribune found th© re-

mrks of d© Gaulle Mas direct as that of the little boy in the faixy

story who pointed out that the prince had no clothes oxuM That observa­

tion led the same newspaper to point out that the present conduct of the

193Root, Casablanca to Katyn, p* 269*

^Christian Science Monitor, February IS, 19h3*

 376
war would determine the fate of the world to come*

There has been m difficulty in restoring' the law and guarantees

of th® Republic In all the vast territories, preserved, for France by
the Fighting French* The British had no trouble in sweeping out of
Trlpolitania such totalitarian abominations as the anti-Semitic 1mm*
%by is it so impossible for the French general®..and officials whom
we are supporting and walking with in Africa to m k e so ele­
mentary a confession of faith In the freedoms fpr which the war is
being fought? Why do we abet their hesitation by ourselves ©alloying
all the totalitarian devices of secrecy, censorship and propaganda?
The answer is paSnfully obvious* It is Ytchy# Consciously or
uncomelously, what is going on in Worth Africa is an elaborate ma­
neuver to preserve the mm, the jobs, 'the reactionary institutions
and anti-democratic philosophy of the Yiety coup d*etat» « #in a
coming world in which the Western democracies antf'SOussitoS are
triua^hant* . . •
Haw can the oppressed Europeans believe in democracy if w® give
them the impression that we believe ©o little in it ourselves? There
are but two choices before the democracies now* Om is to cooperate-
with Hussia in rebuilding the world— as there is an eoooeUent chance
of doing, if we believe in the strength of m r c m principles and
prove it by applying them* The other is to get Involved in intrigues
with all the reactionary and antidemocratic forces of Europe, the
only result of which will be to alienate the Era&Lla on on© hand and
on the other to make Cassmmists in the ©coupled territories faster
than th© Comintern could ever make thm*19>

lost newspapers, however, did not realise that d© Gaulle*3 confi­

dence came from his agreement with the French. Resistance lavement. Th©

French journalist, Henri de Kerillis, whose newspaper, Four La Yictotre,

was just adopting a bitter anti-d© Gaulle attitude,- wrote an article in

which he explained that th© French people could not be satisfied with th©

Third Kepublic and wanted a new om, assuming that de Gaulle1® statement

was a declaration of his intentions as to the future of liberated

F r a n c e . E v e n the New York Herald Tribune took the bait and quoted

d© Kerillis* article.

•^Hew York Herald Tribune in Hoot, Casablanca to Katyn, pp.

270-71 •
^^Mar York Herald Tribune, February 23, l$i3*
 377

Both General de Gaulle and General Giraud are committed,

©peaking In th© name of the two principal areas of French opinion
which are able to fsimulate a policy, to the idea of free recon­
struction of France* General de Gaulle proposes to work chiefly
through the laws of th© Third Republic; General Giraud through an
adaptation of the Fichy a&inistratlon* neither approach may be
wholly satisfactory to the French because of the errors of the
regimes which they connote*

The maneuver was not entirely successful, however, since the Herald Tribune

concluded that

whatever may be the opinion of Francs concerning the Third Bepublic,

whatever her hopes of a Fourth Republic, the fomer at least provides
democratic machinery i&earefey the latter m y be created* In ©oaserving
that mchinesy General d© Gaulle lias rnt retained an instrument of
reaction, but the most efficient means of building a t m

The confidence with which a newspaper as favorable to Fighting France as

the Host loik Herald Tribune accepted de Kerillis* remarks showed that very

f m Americans realised where the real strength of de Gaulle resided.

Hot until dun© 19h2 did de Gaulle cut himself loose £rm the dead
hulk of th© Third Republic, Then, after sever&l months of nego­
tiation©, th© leaders of the growing resistance normat within
France agreed to throw in their lot with de Gaulle* The negotiations
had made it abundantly clear that at least ninety per cmt of th©
resistance leaders would have nothing to do with a restoration of the
Third Republic m m if th© latter were to be remodeled, at once. Be
Gaulle met thcdr wishes in a declaration which the resistance leaders
accepted as a binding pact; "A moral, social, political, economic
regime, abdicated in defeat after having paralysed itself in license*
Another regime, born of a criminal capitulation, now emits itself
on the basis of personal power* Th© French people condemn both*
While they unify their strength for victoiy, they assemble for a
revolution*!^

^ n m leik Herald Trjbuae, February 23, 19ii3*

The Residing of French Democracy, pp* IWiS*

 378

With Ids demand far the reestablishment of republican laws in

Africa, de Gaulle had undoubtedly mad© a point. Americans had soon an­
other opportunity to realize that the legal foundations of Giraud *a
authority In Horth Africa were extremely weak* At the beginning of larch,
191*3, Giraud, under the pressure of public opinion, had to annul m anti-
s@nitic decree issued in Vichy on October 19, 1$*2 which some zealous
Viehyite officials had, incorporated in th© Joarnal offioiel of Algeria on
March 2, 19143* In his coMuntque Giraud stated*

This publication war made without sy authority* It emanate®

from the Directorate of Reserved Affairs of the General Government
and I immediately order its suppression* * * *
Copies of the Journal Offield of IMrch 2, 19h3, ar© withdrawn
from the circulation*
A decree signed in Vlehy is not valid in French Africa* The
German occupation has Xaimupted the free exercise of national sov­
ereignty .199 we imxsi consequently draw the logical consequences•
All that is necessary will be d o n e . 200

The amazing tone of this communique and the off-hand manner in

which the constitutional problem involved la this action was treated did

not pass unnoticed by American liberal newspapers • If Vichy decrees were

not valid in Africa, to what legislation was North Africa subject? Sup­

porters of the State Department*© policy had emphasized that it was im­

possible to suppress Vichy authority with one stroke of the pen* But

this Giraud had done in Ids cosmmique. Unfortunately he had not re­

placed it with anything else. Walter Lippraarm understood the importance

If Giraud meant that Vichy legislation published before the

total German occupation was legal, his remark could not apply to the two
decrees Involved, which were dated October 19, 19ij,2. lie must thus have
meant that there had not been a free government since the armistice, a
theory which rendered his legal authority even more questionable*
200
Boot, Casablanca to Katyn, p. 3?0*
 m

this prc&taau

By what authority do General Giraud m d hia associates govern?

To whom do they owe allegiance? Sy what right do they raise armies#
wear the French uniform# carry the French flag and make war?
These are not abstract and academic question®* * * *
It is ic^poBBlble to create an army of Frenchmen without -their
knowing and without our* knowing to whom m i to what they owe alleg­
iance* I® it to General Giraud? fmm whon does General Oiraud de­
rive his authority? It cannot he from Vichy if the decrees and there­
fore the authority of Vichy have always been invalid.
There is only one possible solution to these pussies• It is to
restore formally and sdesmly the constitution and the law. of the
only legitimate French regime* namely that of -the Third Republic*
This ha® been done In all the French territory administered by the
Fighting French* • * *
This is the only way in which Frenchmen can be.malted* Th^
cannot be reunited hj aodiortation from Washington* They cannot bo
reunited by a deal among generals* ©one of whom owe allegiance to
th© French Republic# m m to Marshal F^tain# who subverted th© Pe~
public* some to nothing in. particular* except the fact that Mr*
Robert ilurphy selected theta.^L

The & ituation of Giraud was obviously untenable and on larch lh

he mad© a public address which had a double purpose* to pacify Allied

©pinion and to answer a de Gaulle memorandum of February 23 which esposed

in & detailed manner the Fro© French conditions for a union of th© French

Aspire* Giraud promised to abolish all fichy laws in the near future*

m e shall begin to m i k imcdiately,« It© ©aid* n o reestablish a situation

of o r d e r * H e reestablished the Third Republic *s Council® General and

municipal aasedblies* He also abolished Vichy's racial laws* This speech

had a very favorable effect on American public opinion* Fditoilal support

for the official policy climbed to 50 per cent# about what it had been

just -’*after th© Casablanca conference.*® Th© law Xork Times thought th©

^ % ® w fork Herald Tribune,, March 11, 19h3.

202Baltimore Sun# tech 35# 19l*3*
203
Root, Casablanca to Katyn* p* 3% *
 380

speech “Biat€9eanlikeM and am in it an important milestone on the way

toward unity, unless "personal ambitions and doctrinaire purposes'* inter­

fered in the process For many supporters of the official policy,

Giraud*® speech was proof that he was just as democratic as do Gaulle and

that the flatted States should, not waver in its support of the iforth Afri­

can ucMniatration* The newspapers favorable to de Gaulle rerc also

pleased but they interpreted the speech as a concession to de Gaulle* The

Hew York Herald Tribune was aure that Giraud had complied with the four

main requests in the de Gaulle mmor&ndum.

The French National Cossaittee set up four indispensable condi­

tions for unity* The first was the disavowal of the armistice.
General Giraud asserted flatly: “The French people; have not accepted
the armistice*51 The second and third conditions were interrelated:
One dealt with the restoration of traditional French liberties$ the
other demanded that Vichy laws*— including the laws which created
Vichy— be declared mil and void, and “republican legality“ be re­
established* The generalfs response was to stats emphatically that
legislation subsequent to June 22, IflO, either originated in our
bureaucracy or dictated from abroad, is devoid of legal value and
can only be considered as void, framed and promulgated without the
participation of the French people and directed against idiom,
He gave assurance of the equality of Frenchmen before the law and.
asserted, that “the laws of racial discrimination* * ♦no longer exist*11
The fourth point, dealing with the liberty of the French to choose
her own government after the war, was act by the fim statement that
the French people would be permitted to form a provisional government
tinder the laws of the republic, and the general pledged himself to
serve under the orders of such a government as soon as it was consti­
tuted*®?

This speech modified the attitude of even very l&passioned critics

of the State Department like Edgar Ansel Mwrer* He had just written a

pamphlet on American policy in Berth Africa and felt obliged to mention

York Times, larch 16, 1913.

^ S w York Herald Tribuns, larch 15, 19l»3.

 361

in & foreword that "since this pamphlet mm first set in type, General

Henri Giraud has broadcast to the world his speech of March Ikth, guar­

anteeing the reconstitution of the French government under th© laws of

the Republic

It was certainly obvious that Giraud*s speed:; m s not tho result

of his political meditations and it was credited, to Giraud *s Allied ■ad­

visers. The Associated Frees dispatch preceding the text of the address

stated frankly that "the liberal tone of his speech* coupled with promise

of reforms* reflected efforts of Robert Hurphy and Harold KacElllan, th©

American and British ministers* to eliminate some features of the Horth

African administration criticised by th© British and American public*"^

Bat a few liberal observers were not cofflplotely satisfied: with the tone

of Giraud *8 elocution* They were especially intrigued by one obscure

sentence which followed the amwiusccweat that ©11 Vichy racial legislation

was abolished. "With th© wrne desire to eliminate all racial. discrimina­

tion* the Crlmieux Decree* which established in 18?0 the difference of

Status between th© native Kbalems and native Js?m is abrogated."^ Ap­

parently* the editors of the dispatch which preceded the text- of the

speech did not knew what the Cremieux decree was* since they held to re­

peat nfraud fs own utterance on this subject in their smmmy of the major

points of the address. American observers soon discovered that the

Cremieux decree declared all th© native Jem of Algesia to be French citi­

zens. Th© Moslems still had to seek naturalization under an older law if

Edgar Ansel Mcrrorer* Our State Department and North Africa

(Union for Democratic Action* CHcagoTsEcn7^E37*

^ B altim ore Son, {torch 1$, 19h3-

 m
they wished to beoem© citizens* Thus, a measure which Giraud presented

os a part of his program against racial dlscriminatloi>*mo®t of which was

aimed at Jewish people-^Mnmted to taking French citisenship away from

100,OX) Jews, a large part of whom were as coopleteSy French as if ihey

had Uvea in metropolitan France for several generation®. Gtnmd's

action did not. increase the rights of the Arabs but diminished those of

the Jews. Liberal newspapers partioflarly resented the fact that cessing

Iffissediately after the mention of ?icby discriminatory legislation, the

OmtfLmx Decree was presented ass another reactlonaiy I m which should have

disappeared long ago. Spewing over KQIR* Lisa Sergio launched a violent

attack against the %^igti©aa Giraud speech*11

General Giraud suddenly repealed in his speech not only the tiehy
laws, but in a sweeping- gesture eliminated an ancient law of 1670
which was mad© under the Eepublie and which therefore could only be
abrogated by the republic but not by a tesrapor&xy government, ©stab*
lished in only one part of French territory such a© Giraud1® actually
is. Henry Torres, one of Franc©*® greatest lawyers today, questioned
th© legality of this repeal* He added that Giraud acted ostensibly
on th© pretext that the law represented racial discrimination, but
the actual result is that an entire category of French citizens will
suddenly be excluded from French citizenship which had been granted
them by the EepubHc * * * * The truth as it appear® to so many
students of this complex picture 1® that this situation will enable
the Viehytstes* * .to make discrimination against the Jewsin forth
Africa even more effective than Vichy itself had made i t . ™

Liberals were especially worried because the very text of the ad­

dress betrayed American interference* It was hard to believe that Giraud *s

reference to the Gettysburg Address was due to his o m pen or that of his

French advisers.^0 Liberal observers scrutinised the speech and found

March 16,
210
loot, Casablanca to Katyn, p. 382*
 m

only vague prci&ass in it* They concluded ndth W&verley Boot la Casa­

blanca to Katyn that

Oimid1® contribution to the advance of democracy, of which his

speeds had. been loudly hailed as a striking demonstration, was re­
duced to its correct pm)oxticm$— zero. Or it might to© been fig­
ured even m a minus quantity* For not content with failing to
turn the clock forward from 191*0, he had turned it back to 1870*
The "edvance* of March th$ I9k3* had really been a retreat of sev­
enty-three years into the past*211

In defense of his policy, Giraud indicated that such a measure

was necessary because "both Arab and Jewish residents of Berth Africa mat
jMp
be placed on the same footing. Most Jews would qualify for Immediate

naturalisation under the old la? as literate propertyHmm* The real

obstacle to naturalisation for the Arabs was polygamy* -These explanations

did not satisfy liberal ewtenb&iors. Georg© Hamilton Combs, Jr., de­

clared over station WH?J that the qualification for naturalisation as "lit­

erate propei’ty-omser" m s "traditional colonial hornswoggling, not unlike

our poll taxes and literacy tests in the South. Few weH-lnfomed

cosmcntaiers denied that the measure had been taken tinder American in­

fluence or at least with American approval. Kenneth G* Cranford assumed

in Report m Berth Africa that the repeal was decided at the Casablanca

conference. He wondered "why Americans thought it necessary to play up

the Arabs at the expense of the Jews," and reported that "except for minor

incidents at Casablanca, I heard of no evidence of violent Moslem

^Reot, Casablanca to Katyn, p. 39k-

gig
Hanson W. Baldwin In the Hew York Times, March 12, 19k3*

^%HM, quoted in P.M., March 23, 19k3* Se© also Vaiian Fry in
The Hew Republic, ISsy 10, WES*
tiareat**^ Ssmol DashM!# however, in Victory through Mtlea, was

pawled by t o lib m X com e m for t o French Jem* lie thought tot

American critics %lght be rminded that th© governments of oar allies

are not run to please us, bat to. please toe&selves*® Apparently still

thinking of American criticism of Giraud# he concluded? «l have often

thought hcwr wonderful it muld he in this world if each nation would be

somewhat more inclined to mand its own business**2^

At t o time of the repeal of the Crmimxx Decree# another Incident

farther convinced American liberals that unity between the rival French

authorities could not wait any longer* On March 19# 19ii3> the French mili­
tary mission in Washington announced tot French Guiana had joined forces

with General Giraud*a fiorfch African "government."216 On San* 21 Americans

read the surprising news tot there were two new anti-Axls French gover-
pi7
nors of Guiana on their w^y to assume charge* 1 One had been appointed

by General Giraud# the other by General de Gaulle* Once again the Free

French movement appeared to be torn by dissensions * t o Giraud governor

«$on the race#1' and Johannes Steel reported, over station WUCA tot ,rihe

State Department had, seen to it tot a representative of Giraud was dis­

patched by airplane to French Guiana and de Gaulle *s representative kept

out**23'® lisa Sergio thought that America was in danger of losing the

^^rasrford, By*rb on Harth Africa# pp* 86-83*

M t*
Dashiell, Victory throarh Africa, p. 30?.
216
V,m Toric Timas, ?.«rch 19, 192*3.
21?
Ibid., Karsh 21, 191*3.

in p »k «» Msath 23# 19143*

 m
war "if tre contime to pursue the dreadful policy in other French

possessions as we are doing at this moment in French Guiana,"^ lawerXey

loot r^jorted that editorial, support for American policy tcmrd Francs#

which had risen to $0 per cant after Giraud *s speech, "slumped 22.3 %9

leaving the State Department with only 2?*? % of th© papers of th© nation

behind its policy*"22® American opinion was esstremaly disappointed that

unity had not yet been realised in the French fepire*

t o situation in Martinique was another object of concern for the

American people. After the return of Iwal to power negotiations with

Admiral Hobart had been resumed because the accord reached la XPhX ^peered

insufficient to guarantee American security. At the time of the Worth

African landings supporters of t o official policy were still certain that

nothing was working against Allied and American interests in ?#rtlniqu@

"with which we have hem consistently friendly, largely through m r State

Department*s policy of regarding Admiral Bobert as the chief of a local

government and not even recognising his relations 'with Vichy* ”22^

Wovember 23, Secretaiy M l announced tot m agreement had been reached

and, without giving any details, stated that it rendered m American oc­

cupation uunecessajy and assured teericaii security* Although liberal

newspapers were not satisfied idth this "piecemeal technique of dealing

with th© French,"222 it m e generally believed tot this agreement meant

a rupture between Martinique and Vichy* The Martinique radio, however,

n \< m , in P.M.. SBWSi 23, 19li3«

^Boofc, Casablanca to Katya, p. 3®5.

pyi
Baltimore Sun, Wovmbor 10, I9h2*
222
Mew To3rik Herald Tribune, flovember 2h, 19h2*
 386

continued to broadcast anfci-AlXled propaganda2^ a M it became obvious

that Admiral M>ert was taking advantage of the GLrand-de Gaulle rivalry

to maintain the Vichy regime in the French Antilles * when the State De­

partment announced that food shipments to Martinique had. been discontinued

since Hovember# 191$,22^ dem?&1s for a military occupation of Bartlniqae

became widespread*® t o Clsrletian Science Monitor constd-sred the situa­

tion of Martinique "ano®alcmt":at a tir n when the bulk of th® French em­

pire was back in th© war on the allied ©Ide.22^ .After the recall of the

American consul the same newspapers termed, "incongruous" the behavior of

the "clique on lartii&qi©.**22? t o let Jerk Times also considered the

French admiral a "mysteiy" for American observers*22® It was evident that

tbs staid of Admiral Bobert vrm m&e possible only by the disunity of the

anti-Axls French and that m satisfactory solution could be reached as

long m there m s no sirmi; authority in the French e^tre*

Bat American wishes were at last about to be fulfilled* General

Georges C&troux had left for Algiers and conferred with Giraud in the m m

of the French national CMdtiee* All newspaper© began to hope again*

As General Catroux arrived in Algiers to meet General Giraud#

the leader of the Fighting French spoke from London in a immer which
affords the happiest auguries for a union of a H Frenchmen in the war
against the Axis. . * * Certainly the speech should go far to sweep

22%ic Ilation# December 5# 1$*2*

Toik Times , March 9# X$i3*

®®Srm Tork Post, March 9# I$i3*

226
Christian Science iftnitor# March 11# 19b3*

^ T b U . t Kay 1, 19^3.

S*6* * roA Times, W y 2, 1?2»3.

 30?

away the host of petty obstacles which events have.- contributed to

raise between the leaders and to render easier the task ox
©XiMmting the snare serious problems of viewpoint and practical
administration which still confront then*229

These negotiations were followed, with passion by a part o f th© American

public* The controversy htrtzmm Giraud and de Gaulle had almost become a

domestic issue in America* Some people maintained that Giraud could not

coispromise because of his military seniority war de GaulX©*^0 Interest

in th® French problem was not limited to Washington and Hew Toxic* The

Richmond Wews Leader, for instance, tried to analyse the reasons behind

de Gaulle*® political successes• Referring to the Giranti-Catrotuc meeting,

this newspaper noted.8

This exchange is merely one of u m f in a long succession of de­

signing maneuvers by m m who wish to be on top whm the Allies
march again through the Arch of Triumph in Paris* It is sagging honr
vigorously Be Gaulle is ab3.e to negotiate with a party that has the
advantage of office in Africa and of Allied recognition* The reasons
are two*— the feebleness and venality of some of the irench leaders in
Morocco and, second, the grip De Gaulle has m public opinion in
Britain and In America* He is far stronger with the people than with
the gwexmentn ♦ This in tm m is eke partially to the imaginative
appeal m Oaullists sjade when they stood alone, m d also to the e*-
ceUence of their publicity, Th© propaganda that reaches American
newspapers from the Fighting French is in skill of presentation the
best of all* We could wish m l had somecme who produced as stunning
a pamphlet as th© latest of th© Fighting French.231

This editorial was typical of i m y other editorials all over America*

It refused to consider the political, aspect of the problem* Whatever may

have been wrong in north Africa was merely due to "feebleness" or "venal­

ity1* on the part of the French rulers* There was no mention of d© Gaulle*s

®^W«r fork Herald Tribune, March 27, l$k3*

Casablanca to Katyn, p* 26? •

23lSichnend mm html&r, April 1,

 388

with the French resistance lavements in the search For the

causes oi hie ^amassing" political strength*

lost chain and local newspapers were following the lead of the

State Dcpastment on foreign policy and the State department did not even

try to keep an appearance of neutrality* Liberal observers gathered new

evidence of this whm, follosdng the meetings between C&troux and Glr&nd,

do Gaulle prepared, to leave for Algiers. It was learned that Ltsehhsfwer

had asked him not to ceae*®* The M York Herald Tribune considered the

whole matter a "dispiriting Testification*11

General de Gaulle, with M e bap packed for Algiers, is politely

but firmly requested to keep ouWnot by the American or British
government, the State Department or any authority responsible for
policy asking, but by General Elsenhower, who for months t o seemed
to take no part in the business* So now it is a military matter and
therefore ifimuae to question* Yet for a Miliary matter it seems to
be surrounded by an uncommon amount of political maneuver*^33

FellMMomad circles in 'Gaskiiigton m m seething with n m o m that de

Gaulle was being kept out for political reasons. Borne thought that he

was "too friendly with the Coemnlsts,*1 others that there was an ag re m m b

between Men and the American govermmi to keep General Giroud in power*®*

It m s whispered that there was a secret "treaty*1 between Ciraud and

Eoosovelt*®^ The llm York Times, however, accepted the official version

of the incident* Ita editorial was entitled ,fWar comes first,w and ad*

vised de Gaulle to follow the example of hie own soldiers*

York Times, April 6, 15?li3*

^ S e r York Herald Tribune, April 7, 19h3*

23W
&%tz
M&eV&ne, Journey Into War, p# 169*
 3$9

General d© Gaulle -m believe, must urn this clearly that

war come® first. Certainly it Is clear to his own military forces
in forth A£rlca--th© gallant hand of Fighting French who their
historic march from Lake Chad to the sea to take part in this first
battle for the liberation of their country* Without waiting for the
signal of complete &gre«nt between de Gaulle m d Girand, without
asking for apolitical assurance®** or laying dom condition® of any
kind, they have thrown themselves furiously into the very thick of
the pretest fighting in llmisia.230

Soon afterwards, however, the incident appeared much more mys­

terious, when it wm reported that General Eisenhower had read with sur­

prise the statement issued by the Fighting French making M m responsible

for the postponement of de Gaulle*© trip*237 this situation led the Horth

African military headquarters to state that Eisertew*® message had been

only advisory. In fasMngton, Secretary of War Henry L. Stlmson declared

that the responsibility was civilian a® well as military,23$ i«pap-ers

opposed to the official policy were quickly convinced that Hjehhosrer,s

name had been used for strictly political purposes*239 consenting in The

CqEEsoiweal m Franco-Merican relations at that time# Georg© da BantilXana

was pessimistic, "Later, much later, American® will be askitjg themselves

in deep puzzlement why it was that Europe exploded in their faces. It

has always been, they will say, m ispossible continent,**2^

The effect of this incident was favorable to de Gaulle who was

making great headway in ispite of the opposition of the American goveraaent.

Liberal observer© noted trim^hantly that the often-used argument that he

23%ew York Times, April 8, 19l*3.

° 8I W . , April 9, 19!i3.

23SW loik Post, April 9 , 19lt3.

^°Thg CoamoiBreaL, la^r its, 19l*3-

 390
m m supporters in North -Africa m m given the lie when the city

Gabes in Tunisia cabled it® allegiance to him.2^3- Gabes had been occupied

by Fighting French force® but# a® the Hew fork Herald, frihaae points out#

ttGiraud im sufficiently concerned to fly straightway to Gabes to investi­

gate this encroachment upon his domain* The other Franc® m m getting very
near his France *"2li2

It' was getting nearer all the tine* De Gaulle finally went to

Algiers and began personal negotiations- with GiraucL Although Churchill

semed to have abandoned M s champion and did not mention the Fighting

French In his victory speech after the capture of Tunis#21*3 this omission

had little effect on the outcom of the negotiations* ChuroidXL*® omission

was resented almost m a personal insult by some American liberals*

He had ringing words of praise for General Elsenhower and General

Gir&ud for their achievements in clearing the mm%r out of Africa*
But he had no word of any kind# not even the mention of the name#
for General de Gaulle and his Fighting French, who have been fighting
in Africa ever since the downfall of France,
Why this omission? But $r* Churchill lost the enthusiasm for
General de Gaulle and M s movement that he has so frequently and so
eloquently expressed in the past? If so# why? * * *
We question such a policy* We shall question it until it c m
no longer stand questioning— and ends# as end it must.^w

There were more days of anxiety before the transfer of the Fighting

French capital of Algiers# and the opposition to the official policy in­

creased in proportion to the nervousness which preceded the formation of

the French Committee of National Liberation. It became certain that the

two separate parts of the French Bsipire had finally joined hands* When

Near Toads Times, April ?, 11# 191*3•

^ U e w Tork Herald Tribune, April 11, 19tt3.

Tork Time,, May 20, 19l»3.
2Mnf«r leak foal, Bur 21, 19it3.
 391

th© Fpernh Committee of National liberation was created^ Walter lippaann

summed up in his column the results of the official American policy from

the death of Darlan to June# 191*3.

Our French policy lias been vitiated by the radical error of our
diplomatic agents in failing to understand and therefore to report
corrects to the State Department and to the White House the domi-
sating and ascending is^ortaace of the national t m m m % which ha®
rallied around General Charles de Gaulle. Aa a result m find our*
selves with a French policy which is not based on the realities. , • •
We were assured m supposedly high authority that General de
Gaulle had only a small following in France and practically none in
North Africa* forgetting that General de Gaulle now speaks for a
federation of powerful organisations inside of Franco# we have been
told that the problem of French unity was a question of getting two
proud generals to come to a personal understating. * * *
Finally# we had drifted to a point where m have been in grave
danger of fostering a French political authority of our oim~~an
authority based not upon the French nation but upon cur military and
economic power, this is something that cannot be done# and we shall
burn our fingers badly if’we do not look out .W

With the formation of the French Committee of National liberation

a period of French history came to an end* From dun©# 19fc0# to June#

lpli3# forces of dissociation appeared to be stronger than the efforts to­

ward French unity. Although the uneasy union achieved between General de

Gaulle and General Giraud in no way bridged the gap which divided French­

men ideologically# the formation of the committee marked the end of Vichy

as a political power of any magnitude# re-established Republican legality#

■and created a single authority to represent France among the Allied power®.

Such achievements restored among French people a certain degree of con­

fidence in the future. This confidence was usually shared by the American

^ N « r tork Times# June 1, 19ii3»

tork Herald Tribune# June 3# 1$*3«

 392

people who had sometimes held different views on the best way to assure

French unity but had never failed to agree on the basic objective of

American policy toward. France# namely# the re-establishment of the sover­

eignty of the French people over the destiny at their country*

BIBLIOOr&PfflC
 BXBUOOMPHX

A. AKBRICAJS SOOHBES

I. Htmpapera

Baltimore Evening Son

Baltimore Howe Post

Baltimore B m

Boston Herald

Boston transcript

Carroll County (M* H«) Independent of Center Osgipoe

The Catholic World (Catholic, conservative)

Chicago Dally Hews (conservative)

Chicago Tribune (dira-conaervative)

Christian Advocate (Methodist)

Christian Science Monitor (Boston)

« M # w i« w M in k wmwiir, mi—o»—Ww*»

Daily Mirror (Hew Tork, ultra^comservative)

Daily Worker (Hew York. Cawmist)

Kansas City Tims

Lansing (Michigan) State Journal

Miami (Florida) Herald (conservative)

the Be* Leader (Hew York, liberal)

Hew Orleans States

Mew York Daily Mews (ultra-conservative)

Hew York Herald Tribune

Hew York Post (liberal)

394
 rm s t e i (m m m m tim )

Sar lost Tim®

Vim lorfe florid telogim

Bwwl«B S S S M E

rMl^^phla im^ulrty

P. S* (tt* foark* Hbroa)

MO!«*$ leader

saginwr (li<Mim) m m

saint tool* foot Blap&tefo (cnmrm^iva)

saian ( W m m k m ^ m ) W m & a $ llsw

Sm\ Fmoeiseo ciiTOlele

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( m m ^ w )
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XI. Siltorial CosMsts la iMLodlealtt

The Atlantic iion&hly

The Catholic World (Cafct&lie# cosnemfcian)

Tm Chrtotiaa Castey
M— O i ^ m n w«ni m i r iirM!») iwl»n w>>

CTOey S m m

Th& C m m m m l (Catholic)

Cmrrmt Kfeteay

Fore&m Affaire

Fyrto» (eomerv&tiw)

French terlar (paiiodioal of the fmm±am teacher® of French)

iiiii>iiiiLMi"MiiiWftr»mifr rn m a m m m m m

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 596

Uviag k m

The hation (liberal)

The Haw Republic (liberal)

The Hew Yorker

fimamdk

Opinion (Jewish)

The Patriot

Public Opinion Quarterly

Saturday Evening Poet (conservative)

Saturday Preview of literature

m M M w M f t r t M N M if e m m m m trn m m m . m u m - mnn iUme n *

Scholastic

Time

XXX. Article® in Periodicals

Anonymous. "Letter from Paris»tt The h'ation. vol. 154. January 10. 1942.
pp. 39-40. ’

Aiken, Conrad. “American Writers Come of Age," The Atlantic

vol. 169, April, 1942, pp. 476-481. ~

Atkins. Paul It*. “The Mystery of Dakar/* Saturday Evening Post. vol. 214,
January 10, 1942, p. 27. *-- ^ ----- -- -

Benet, William Hose, "The Ctee of Toulon,"Saturday lieview of literature,

vol. 2S, December 5, 1942, p. 2S. —

Bess, Demme, “Backstage Story of Our African Adventure," Saturday

Evening Post, vol. 216, July 3, 1945, pp. 14-15®

Bess, Beaartt, "Our Undeclared War in Prance," Saturday Evening Post,

vol. 214, January 5, 1942, p. 26.

Bess, Demaree, **with Their Hands in Their Pockets," Saturday Evening

Post, vol. 213, August 81, 1940, p. 29.

ain, John, "The Hew Books," oolvm in Harper1®

Chamberlain,
1940-1945, passim.
 597

Chamberlin, William K., "The Crists la H*re,« The Atlantic Monthly,

vol. 109, June, 1942, pp. 867-674.

Chamberlin, WHliam H., "Europe's Revolt against Civilisation," Harper1a

Sfogaaine. vol. 182, December, 1840, pp. 14-21.

Chamberlin, William H., "France in June, the Collapse," The Atlantic

Monthly, vol. 186, September, 1940, pp. 298-504.

Chamberlin, William H«, "The Malady of Wishful Thinking," Harper's

Magazine, vol. 182, May, 1941, pp. 561-568.

Childs, Marquis, "Weapons from Waste," The Atlantic Monthly, vol. 168,
February, 1842, pp. 153-141. '™

Clapper, Raymond, column in the Hew York World Telegram, passim.

Coamager, Henxy Steele, "Today*® Events in the light of History,"

Scholastic, vol. 36, May 20, 1940.

Courtney, Oodefrey B.f "General Clark*a Secret Mission," Life, vol. IS,
December 28, 1842, pp. 75-76,

Cram, Paul, "tftidergraduates and the War," The Atlantic Monthly, vol. 166,
October, 1940, pp. 410-421.

Be Veto, Bernard, "The Easy Chair," column in Harper's Magaaine,

Edman, Erwin. "Henri Bergson," The Ration, vol. 132. January 18, 1941,
pp. 70-77.

Eliot, George Fielding, column in the Hew York Herald Tribune,

1940-1943, passim.

Fisher, Herbert A. L», "Paris at High loon, Autobiography," The Atlantic

Monthly, vol. 167, April, 1941, pp. 416-423.

Planner, Janet, "Blit® by Partnership," The Stew Yorker, vol. 17, June 7,
1941, p. 42.

Planner, Janet, "Le nouvel ordre," The Hew Yorker, vol. 17, March 15,
1941, p. 17,

Freeman, Stephen A., "Message from President Freeman," French Review,

vol. IS, October, 1941, pp. 60-64,

Fry, Varlam, "France, Once 'Haven of Exiles,* Becomes Gestapo Man Trap,"
The Mew Leader. April 25, 1942, p. 5.

Fry, Varian, "Giraud and the Jews," The Hew Republic, vol. 108, May 10,
1943, pp. @26-629.

Fry, Varlam, "Justice for the Free French," The Hew.Republic9 vol. 106,
June 8, 1942, pp. 785-787.
 m
Oaliicus, pwiud*, «*fbe Iiioa trial/ the Jfarn i&publio. vol. 106, March 26,
1942, pp. 600*601*

Gooch, B* K*» “Who Killed % » 0eraey in France?” Virginia Quarterly

Review, Winter, 1940, pp. 18MJB* '-----

Grafton, Samuel, “I'd Slather Be Right/ column in the Mew fork Feat,
1140*4043, passim*

Guerard, Albert, "Befleotioua on the French Disaster/

Review* vol. 16, Winter, 1940, pp* 499*612*

Owerard, Albert, Southeastern Beyiew* Autumn, 1944, p. 7*

Guterman, Robert, “Why France fellt Review of J*Accuse I The Inside Story
of the Men Who Betrayed the French Motion by Amir© Simone/ The
106, September 10, 1940, p* 392*

Helton, Boy, “The Inner Truths Our Own Softness/ Harpers Magaaine,
vol* 181, September, 1940, pp. 337*343* '

Haneman, Harlow J., “Recent Qm®rnmnt®l Mfozm in France/ American

Political Science Eeview, vol* 38, February, 1941, ppTW-TO.

Kirchwsy, .Freda, “The Abasement of Vichy/ The Hation* vol* 156,

August 2, 1941, pp. S4-SS*

Kirchwey, Freda* “America*it First Quisling** The Ration, vol* 155*

Ummtomt 21, 1942, p. 529* — —

Xirchwey* Freda* *l£»oapo and Appeasement," Th® Motion* vol* ISO* dune 29*
1940, pp. 775-774* “ ™ “

Kirchwey, Freda, “Laval Takes Over,” The Motion* vol* 154, April 25,
1942, pp. 477-478.

Knight, T&dgemry B*, “General Clark's Secret Mission to Algeria on

October 21* 1942*w American Foreign, Service Journal* vol, 20*
March, 1945, pj>, l A S C ------ --------------

Krock, Arthur, MXn the Nation/ column in the Mow Tork Tim m 9 1940-1943,
asafr
Lasch, Robert, “Chicago Patriot/ The Atlantic Monthly, vol. 189, June,
1942, pp. 691-605*

Uppmann, Walter, “Today m i Tomorrow/ column in the Mew Tork Herald

Tribune, 1940-1945, passim*

MaeLeish, Arcidbald, “America'a Duty to French Culture/ Saturday-Review

of Literature* vol* 25, November 14, 1942, pp. 5-6*

Mangan, Sherry, “Paris under the Swastika/ Life, vol. 9, September IS,
1940, pp. 74-70*
 599

McCormick, Anns O’KeVtt* column in tide fork Times. 1940-1945, passim.

McCreary, Aran Pauline, and Tharp, Jaws B*, «Th® 1941 French Teacher
Census Enrellwnts,*> French Review, vol* 15, February, 1942,
pp. 291*502,

Parley, Felix, United States Responsibilities to Franc©,0 Philadelphia

Evening bulletin* October 25, 1940.

itaford* Lewis, "Passive Barbarian#,0 The Atlantic tenthly, vol. 106,

September, 1940, pp. 274*270, ~ —

Murrow, S., “Barlan*# Viofcy Career," The Ration, vol. 155. Hovember 21,
1942, p. 527#------------- --------

Riebuhr, Heinold, "Itod to Illusion®,1* Tla© Ration* vol. 150. June 29*
1940, pp. 778*779, *

Harris, Prank, "Free France, Poor and Paralysed, Waits for Germany to
Finish the War," Life, vol. 9, September 25, 1940, pp* 78-80.

Paine Jr., Ralph Delahaye, "France Collapsed from Internal Decay. Leaders
Failed Her in Crisis,** Ufa, vol. 9, July 8, 1940, p. 25.

Painton, Frederick 0«, Ms©cret Mission to Worth Africa,*1 Readers* Digest,

vol. 42, May, 1945, pp. 1-8*

Pauldln, C. Q., «lere They Wrong?**-The GeimonMeal, vol# 52# July 28*
1940, pp. 280-282. *

Pearson, Brew, and Allen, Robert, column in the Miami Herald, 1940-1945,
passim.

Peyre, Henri, "French Literature Between 1940 and 1944,** Pranco-Aaeriasia

Pamphlets, Third series, Ho. 4 (Hew Tork, 1945), ppTTSS7” ~

Ragner, Bernhard, wParis under the Germans,0 Ths American Mercury*

vol. 52, February, 1941, pp. 155-145.

Eaushenbush, HInifred, ’’Fashion Coes American,** Haxper*® Magaains.

vol. 184, December, 1941, pp. 75-85*

Rigby, Douglas, ami Rigby, Elisabeth, "Embattled Collectors,'1 Harper*®

Magaslne, vol. 182, January, 1941, pp. 200-208.

Holo, Charles J., and Strausa-Hupe, R», "United States International

Broadcasting,** Harper*® Magaaiae, vol. 185, August, 1941,
pp. 301-302.

Root, Waverley, "Backstage of the War," syndicated column distributed

by the Frees Alliance, passim.
 400

Shiner, Willim 1*, "The Poison Fen/ Th© Atlantic Monthly, vol* 169,
May, 1942, pp* 848-552#

Sima, William Philip, column in the M m tork World Telegram* 1940-1946,

passim*

Smith, Kingsbury, "Unrevoaled Facts about Robert Murphy/ The American

Warmest.* vol. 59, November, 1944, pp. 528-558.

Steel, Johannes, "Steel Filings,” column in the Mew York Post,, 1940-
1945, passim*

Stein, Gertrude, "The Winner loses* Life in France During and After
Fighting," The Atlantic Monthly* vol. 166, October, 1940,
pp# 571-535.

Stone, I# F*t "fighting the Fighting French/ The Motion, vol. 155.
November *8, 1942, pp. 665-566* ~

Taylor, Edmond, "Democracy Demoralised* The French Collapse," Public

Opinion Quarterly, vol. 4, December, 1940, pp* 630-650.

Thompson, C. Bertrand, "I Saw France Fail," The Mew Republic, vol. 105,
December 9, 1940, pp* 782-784*

Thompson, Dorothy, ”0n the Record," column in the Mew York Herald
Tribune and the Hew York Feat. 1940-1945, passim*

Treat, Ida, "The Billboard m the Rue de iongchaap." The Mew Yorker,
vol. 17, pp. 49-52.

Villerd, Oswald Garrison, "Germany’s Military Success/ The Atlantic

Monthly, vol# 166, August, 1940, pp. 170-176*

Vlllard, Oswald Garrison, "Issues and Men," The Ration. June 29, 1940*

Vlllard, Oswald Garrison, "Our Moral Confusion," The Christian Century,

vol. 58, July 9, 1941, p. 881,

Wasson, Thomas C«, "The Mystery of Dakar* An Enigma Resolved," American

Foreign Service Journal, vol, 20, April, 1943, pp. 169-1

Webb, Norton, "What of France’s Empire?" Christian Science Monitor,

April IX, 1942.

White, B. B*, "One Man’s Meat," column in Harper’s Magazine, 1940-1943.

Ihitridge, Arnold, "Where Do You Stand?" The Atlantic Monthly, vol. 166,
August, 1940, pp. 133-137.

Wright, Eugene, "Dakar, Key to Africa, Why It Is Important to America,"

Harper’s Ma&a&ina. vol. 184, December, 1941, pp. 22-29.
 401

IV* Rodtess Primary Sources

Butcher, Harry 0., Mr three Years with BUenhower (New York, 1948)*
Diary of Gaftaln ButSer «So wai“ou licoohoiwsr1s staff. This
bock is important for the relations between the French Vichy
leaders and American authorities before and after th® landings
in North Africa*

Elsenhower, Dwight D,, Crusade in Europe (New York, 1948)*

Memoirs of the Supreme UmSSSSr of the Allied force® in North
Africa*

Hull, Cordell, Memoir® (New York, 1948)*

Memolrs”oIriHe American Secretary of State*

hanger, William U , Gur Vichy Qaable (New Tork, 1947)*

this book was written St tfii request of Secretary of State
Cordell Hull to explain the American policy toward Vichy France,
It was used as a primary source In several instances.

V* Book®? Secondary Sources

Bacon, Caspar 0., and Howie, Wendell D«, One by (toe (Cambridge, Mass*,
1945).

Bailey, Thomas A,, The Man in the Street, the Impact of American Public
Opinion m fjS&i(ijj£ TSffijy XSewTorlcT-lliuTT"

Birdeall, Paul, Versailles Twenty Years After (New York, 1841)*

Booth, Clare, Europe in Spring (New York, 1940).

Brooks, Howard L*f Prisoner® of Hope (New York, 1842).

Brooks, Van Wyck, The Opinion® of Oliver Allston (New York, 1941)*

Browder, Karl, The Second Imperialist War (Hew York, 1940)*

Callender, Harold, A Preface to Peace (London, 1944)*

Clifford, Alexander, The Conquest of North Africa. (New York, 1945).

Crawford, Kenneth N«, Report on North Africa (Now York, 1943)*

Dashiell, Samuel, Victory through Africa (Now York, 1943)*

Davis, Hassoldt, Half Past When (New York, 1944).

Dos Pasaoa, John, Ybo around We Stand On (New York, 1942).

Ehrmann, Henry W.t French Labor from Popular Front to Liberation (Mew
York, 1947)" ' ‘ ' ~~
 m
Fodor, M. W*, The KevoluttQn Is On (Cambridge, Mass., 1940).
Introduction by SoStEy fEnmpson.

Gallagher, Wes, Back Door to Berlin (Mew York, 1943).

Gervasi, Frank, But Soldiers Wondered m y (Hew York, 1943).

Guodalla, Philip, The Two Marshalss Baaain©, Petain (Hew York, 1943).

Hatch, Alden, Franklin Delano Roosevelt. An Informal Biography (Hew

York, JSWj: A-JZ*.

Hill, Russell, Desert Conquest (Hew York, 1943).

Hughes, Margaret, leg lauriere sont coupes (Hew York, 1941),

dames, Homy, Hawthorne (Hew York, I860),

Jewell, W. L« A., Secret Mission Submarine (Hew York, 1944),

Keraan, Thomas, Franc© on Berlin Time (lew York, 1941),

Lemkin, Raphael, Axis Role la Occupied Europe (Washington, 1944).

Liebling, A, J., The Road hack to Paris (lew York, 1944),

Lindbergh, Aim®, g ® Wav© of the Future (lew York, 1940).

Mac fane, John, Journey into tar (lew York, 1943).

McCormac, John, America and World Mastery (lew York, 1942),

Moa&llan, Richard, Mediterranean Assignment (Hew York, 1943).

Middleton, Drew, Our Sham of Wight (Mew York, 1946).

Miller, Henry, Remember to Remember (Mew York, 1947).

Moers, Dare, Under the Iron Heel (Mew York, 1941).

Horlson, Samuel Eliot, Operations in Worth African Waters (Boston, 1947),

Walloon, Francis, The tragedy of Europe (Appleton, Wisconsin, 1940).

Ravins, Allan, and Hacker, Louie M», ©de., The Unitod States and Its
Place In World Affairs (Boston, 194*5)7

Kewwan, Bernard, The Mew Europe (Mew York, 1943).

Hitae, William A., and Dargan. E. Preston# A Histoxy of French

Literature (Mew York, 1927).

Fatten, George S., War as I Knew It (Boston, 1947).

 m
to l* m m 9 p m A * , m m t n m I Bm Jtais (Wm t m ,

Pml&rs fameth* M m $% m ia B iptoay ( t o Xo*fc, 1$$}.

told * * * Dirter* to r ta * m l tm v m n (Boston* l& t ).

totar# Bogri (totofc* 1$$)*

M*t* Q. fto* tls to t o tjy Mrlmi $®mm (toYttfc* WI&}*

IEM i Us®?to C«| tone®* 4 Go&lsctlm of D w ® t® and BibXi-
mzmtoar W g f K ; M EfJT^ ----

lEsas* Cart# taU* S S 1 S .^S2 WMO*

1®X% ClmrXes M is O w to W ( t o Toit, 1$U%)*
rm tg t o t x t o * c & t o l» a j s aaftm ( t o fa it* 1<&6)*
tot# toH&qr# toto t o t o y j£ jto* t o (to M e , XA?)#2tos*

Botoil* Jobs Balt, m I JadriU fta to s»* % • M m ± tm BSncational t o t o

{to Wtkf 19fc0)« “ ~ ~ ~ •

$aa$«afc* tofcor* Patting m Jsta W (Boston, 3$i&)»

Sctaxaoa* ¥m&mM z U $ M^st m m (IIw Talk, 2&3)«
a h m t o * Botoi* tostott t o Btjtoft.* An Xntlaat® fjatoty (Btar Tto,
3#W). . . . . —

Stto# Jotamas* t o Bsfato th® ISr (Star M e # X9t*2}#

stein* Gtorod©* f t o s ( t o fail:* 3$ttQ)#

StltaMm* i n L** t o Bnn%# B&owgo* On Active te v is o In to c o and
gar (Ilow Torti, lg t f) ,
Sasarsr, ChM&eB, Koenait of
w ' m ii.M n^ .tia tiW w i. m m ii
a«tb (Saw Tort, 1&3)»
w w m tm m r

a&ng* Pspsto Oram, l ^ w of l i s t e r ( t o Xmk$ 1$*3)*

T ^ lo r , Waaadg tbs tombsy ta[ t o w (Boston* X^O}*
Tmm»f Hoimn, th a t Xs Oar ttatosg? (Itar TooSc* X9liii).

VlBSfln* Andrfe, |g Ofclsata Sjg ® {Her fork# l$h9)*

Flight* Gosloa, Jbj Fs£iMpim“! Ftamh I)«3aaa^ (Bsr Tent* X^bO)*
to# id#* t o t B ltotots ^ (to foric# XS^O)#
Einli# Ilarold, t o CoX®* t^ iar* sds*, Oownwmt in warttoe l^rop® t o
J^aaa ( t o tote* m 2 ) *
 404

VI* Broadcasts

tonware, Re*, over statical WQXft, August 14, 1942.

Grafton, tossuel, over station WOE, November 15, 1942*

Hoot, Wavorlay, over station WM$, March 10, 1945*

Sergio, Lisa, over station T O , March 16 and March 21, 1943*

Shirer, William L., over station mBO, October 19, 1942.

Thompson* Dorothy, over the HBlue Network" of BBC, March 28, 1942.

VII* Miscellaneous Sources

Congressional Record

Ha&mrstein XI, Oscar, The last Tim X toe Baris, popular song
copyrighted by SS!pp5IT and Cospany7^*5«

Moerer, Edgar Ansel. Our State Department and Worth Africa (pamphlet
published b£ I S B * m V r n S S M S n U m t T W e e g o branch,
1948).

Owen, Mary Steele, "Contemporary Explanations of the tench Debacle of

1940” (Master*a thesis, Indian® Bhiversiby, 1944).

Polls cm American opinions, communicated by the Information Division of

tlie tench Embassy, 610 Fifth Avenue, few Tork 20, Mew Tork*

Thompson, Dorothy, Address delivered at the French American Club,

March 9, 1942.

Willkle, Wendell, Address delivered at the opening of tee tench week

at Freedom House, July 8, 1942.

B* MOfr^UBBZOAN SOURCES

I. newspapers and Periodicals

tee World (tee tench magasine in America)

International Labour Review

Memorandum of Information on Foreign Affairs and the World Crisis

(Imperial Policy Croup, London).

Pour La Vlctoire (Mew Tork).

 405

XX* Periodical Articles by Foreigners

Bauplan, Rbbert de, **U collaboration FrancoWOlemande ,n L«Illustration,

February 1, 1941, p, 104#

Chen, IU I#, "China*a Threatened Life Line,11 the Ration* vol, 151*
September 21, 1940, pp# 259-241#

Oort, Viscount, Despatches* summary in the Hew York tiros, October 17,
1941#

Qreenwall, Harry J#, "Franc® in a Cgto ," the Ration# vol# 151,
September 21, 1940, pp# 241-245#

a m n m l l , Hnrcy J*, "Witch Hunt at Mom#" the Ration# vol* 151#

September 14, 1940, pp, 215-215# “ — —

Hebe, Hans, "the Ha&i Flan for Kegroes," the Ration, vol* 152# March 1#
1941, pp* 252-255, " !

Morgan, Charles, "France Alive," the Atlantic Monthly, vol* 109,

August, 1941#

retain, Henri Philippe, "Message du Mareehal Ptetain, chef de I’Rtat

fr&ncaia," Revu® dea deux taondes, Roveaber 1, 1940, vol* 60,
pp* 109-1X2; ! ~

Remains, Jules, "The Seven Mysteries of Europe," Saturday Evening Post,

vol* 215, September 21, 1940, pp* 10-171 vol.^13, September’ IB,
1940, pp. 12-15.

Saint Jean, Robert de, "Battle of Words,n The Atlantic Monthly# vol* 166,
Hovember, 1940, pp* 612-£16*

III* Books by Foreigners*Primary Sources

Belgian American Educational Foundation, inc.,The BelgianCampaign and

the Surrender of the Belgian Arw, May IiR87'l^4^XlewfSrk,
w m m m rnum m ro w rnm rnmm m um * tmmm** mmmmmm *

W ot;
Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Belglmn; The Official Account of
Whet Happened, 1939-1940 (London, 1041).
SocSei
entB p^li T O ^ «dl*d Belgian authorities in London*

Laval, Pierre, The Diary of Pierre Laval (Hew York, 1948)*

It was ttSer "Sing sentenced todeath that Laval wrote this
defense of his policies*

Lochner, Louis, ed*, The Qoebbela Diaries (Hew York, 1948)*

Certain remarKT*of ^oebbelFThrow an interesting light on
Franco-German relations during th© Vichy regime*
 406

Poincare, Raymond, Au Service de la France (Paris, 1926-55), vola. IX

and X#
Poincare*a judgment of Retain was at th© origin of many attacks
against the latter in the American liberal circles.

IV. Books by Foreignerss Secondary Sources

Bols, Eli© J., The Truth on the Tragedy of France (London, 1941)«

Bon, A*, Ldvres francosparus ®nAmerlque de 1940 a 1944 Odo de

Janeiro,~I§44r/• *"* ~‘ “

Csmmaerts, Emile, The Prisoner at Laekens? King Leopold— Legend and

Fact (London, 18®"*"J"

Chambrun, W&xd de, I Saw France Fall (Hew Tork, 1940)#

Guhamel* Georges. Americas The Menace. Scenes of the Future Life (Hew
York, imiT* ' ' " “

Gaulle, Charles de, TheArmy of the Future (Hew York, 1940).

Hebe, Hans, A Thousand Shall Fall (Hew York, 1941).

Kerillis, Henri de, I Accuse de Gaulle (Hew York, 1946).

Koestler, Arthur, Scum of the Earth (Mew York, 1940).

Lanin, Leo, The Darkest Hour (Boston, 1941).

Laskl. Harold. Reflections on the Revolution of Our Tim© (Mew York,

1945).

Maurois, Andre, Tragedy in France (Hew York, 1940).

Moorehead, Alan, Donft Blame the Generals (Mew York, 1943).

Moorehead, Alan, The End in Africa (Mew York, 1945).

Pol, Keina, Suicide of a Democracy (Mew York, 1940).

Saint Jean, Robert d®, France Speaking (Mew York, 1941).

Simone, Andr&, pseud., J1accuse (Mew York, 1940).

Smith, Denys, America and the fuels War (Mew York, 1942).
/
Stuck!, Vvalter, Von Retain zur vlerten Republik (Berne, 1947).