Ganuelas vs Cawed

FACTS:

Celestina Ganuelas Vda. de Valin executed a Deed of Donation of Real Property

in favor of petitioner Ursulina Ganuelas. The pertinent portion of the Deed of Donation
reads: ―That for and in consideration of the love and affection which the DONOR has
for the DONEE, and of the faithful services the latter has rendered in the past to the
former, the said DONOR does by these presents transfer and convey, by way of
DONATION, unto the DONEE the property above, described, to become effective upon
the death of the DONOR; but in the event that the DONEE should die before the
DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed rescinded and of no further force and
effect.

However, more than a month before Celestina died, she executed a document
revoking such donation. After her death, Ursulina claimed ownership over the donated
properties and refused to give private respondents Leocadia G. Flores, et al., niece of
Celestina any share in the produce of the properties despite repeated demands. Thus,
prompting Flores, et al. to file a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
challenging the validity of the Deed of Donation. They alleged that such donation is void
for failure to comply with the formalities of wills and testaments, which is necessary in a
disposition mortis causa.

On the other hand, Ursulina maintains that there is no need to comply with the
formalities of wills and testaments because such donation was inter vivos. The RTC
ruled that the Deed of Donation is a disposition mortis causa, thus, void for failure to
comply with the formalities of wills and testaments.

ISSUE:

Is the Deed of Donation void for failure to comply with the formalities of wills and
testaments, which is necessary in a disposition mortis causa?

RULING:

Yes. The donation is mortis causa. Crucial in the resolution of the issue is the
determination of whether the donor intended to transfer the ownership over the
properties upon the execution of the deed. Donation inter vivos differs from donation
mortis causa in that in the former, the act is immediately operative even if the actual
execution may be deferred until the death of the donor, while in the latter, nothing is
conveyed to or acquired by the donee until the death of the donor-testator.

If the donation is made in contemplation of the donor‘s death, meaning that the
full or naked ownership of the donated properties will pass to the donee only because of
the donor‘s death, then it is at that time that the donation takes effect, and it is a
donation mortis causa which should be embodied in a last will and testament. But if the
donation takes effect during the donor‘s lifetime or independently of the donor‘s death,
meaning that the full or naked ownership (nuda proprietas) of the donated properties
passes to the donee during the donor‘s lifetime, not by reason of his death but because
of the deed of donation, then the donation is inter vivos.

The distinction between a transfer inter vivos and mortis causa is important as
the validity or revocation of the donation depends upon its nature. If the donation is inter
vivos, it must be executed and accepted with the formalities prescribed by Articles 748
and 749 of the Civil Code, except when it is onerous in which case the rules on
contracts will apply. If it is mortis causa, the donation must be in the form of a will, with
all the formalities for the validity of wills, otherwise it is void and cannot transfer
ownership.

The distinguishing characteristics of a donation mortis causa are the following:

1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the

transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the
ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive;

2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at
will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved
power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed;

3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.

In the donation subject of the present case, there is nothing therein which
indicates that any right, title or interest in the donated properties was to be transferred to
Ursulina prior to the death of Celestina. The phrase ―to become effective upon the
death of the DONOR admits of no other interpretation but that Celestina intended to
transfer the ownership of the properties to Ursulina on her death, not during her lifetime.
 CELESTINO BALUS, Petitioner,
vs.
SATURNINO BALUS and LEONARDA BALUS VDA. DE CALUNOD, Respondents.
G.R. No. 168970, January 15, 2010
FACTS:
On January 3, 1979, Rufo mortgaged a parcel of land as security for a loan he obtained
from the Rural Bank of Maigo, Lanao del Norte. Rufo failed to pay his loan. As a result,
the mortgaged property was foreclosed and was subsequently sold to the Bank as the
sole bidder at a public auction held for that purpose. On November 20, 1981, a
Certificate of Sale was executed by the sheriff in favor of the Bank. The property was
not redeemed within the period allowed by law. On January 25, 1984, the sheriff
executed a Definite Deed of Sale in the Bank’s favor. Thereafter, a new title was issued
in the name of the Bank.  Subsequently Rufo died on July 6, 1984. On October 10,
1989, herein petitioner and respondents executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of
Estate adjudicating to each of them a specific one-third portion of the subject property
consisting of 10,246 square meters. The Extrajudicial Settlement also contained
provisions wherein the parties admitted knowledge of the fact that their father
mortgaged the subject property to the Bank and that they intended to redeem the same
at the soonest possible time.

Three years after the execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement, herein respondents
bought the subject property from the Bank. On October 12, 1992, a Deed of Sale of
Registered Land6 was executed by the Bank in favor of respondents. Subsequently,
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-39,484(a.f.) 7 was issued in the name of
respondents. Meanwhile, petitioner continued possession of the subject lot. On June 27,
1995, respondents filed a Complaint 8 for Recovery of Possession and Damages against
petitioner, contending that they had already informed petitioner of the fact that they were
the new owners of the disputed property, but the petitioner still refused to surrender
possession of the same to them.

ISSUE:
Will the subject property form part of the estate of petitioner and respondents’ father?

HELD:
NO, The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment of his
death.14 In addition, the inheritance of a person consists of the property and
transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of his death, as well as those
which have accrued thereto since the opening of the succession. 15 In the present case,
since Rufo lost ownership of the subject property during his lifetime, it only follows that
at the time of his death, the disputed parcel of land no longer formed part of his estate
to which his heirs may lay claim. Stated differently, petitioner and respondents never
inherited the subject lot from their father.

Petitioner and respondents, therefore, were wrong in assuming that they became co-
owners of the subject lot. Thus, any issue arising from the supposed right of petitioner
as co-owner of the contested parcel of land is negated by the fact that, in the eyes of
the law, the disputed lot did not pass into the hands of petitioner and respondents as
compulsory heirs of Rufo at any given point in time.
Ining Vs Vega
FACTS:
Leon Roldan (Leon), married to Rafaela Menez (Rafaela), is the owner of a 3,120-
square meter parcel of land (subject property) in Kalibo, Aklan covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. (24071) RO-6305 (OCT RO-630). Leon and Rafaela died without
issue. Leon was survived by his siblings Romana Roldan (Romana) and Gregoria
Roldan Ining (Gregoria), who are now both deceased.

Romana was survived by her daughter Anunciacion Vega and grandson, herein
respondent Leonardo R. Vega (Leonardo) (also both deceased). Leonardo in turn is
survived by his wife Lourdes and children Restonilo I. Vega, Crispulo M. Vega,
Milbuena Vega-Restituto and Lenard Vega, the substituted respondents.

Gregoria, on the other hand, was survived by her six children: petitioners Natividad
Ining-Ibea (Natividad), Dolores Ining-Rimon (Dolores), Antipolo, and Pedro; Jose; and
Amando. Natividad is survived by Edilberto Ibea, Josefa Ibea, Martha Ibea, Carmen
Ibea, Amparo Ibea-Fernandez, Henry Ruiz and Pastor Ruiz. Dolores is survived by
Jesus Rimon, Cesaria Rimon Gonzales and Remedios Rimon Cordero. Antipolo is
survived by Manuel Villanueva, daughter Teodora Villanueva-Francisco (Teodora),
Camilo Francisco (Camilo), Adolfo Francisco (Adolfo), Lucimo Francisco, Jr. (Lucimo
Jr.), Milagros Francisco, Celedonio Francisco, and Herminigildo Francisco
(Herminigildo). Pedro is survived by his wife, Elisa Tan Ining and Pedro Ining, Jr.
Amando died without issue. As for Jose, it is not clear from the records if he was made
party to the proceedings, or if he is alive at all.

In short, herein petitioners, except for Ramon Tresvalles (Tresvalles) and Roberto
Tajonera (Tajonera), are Gregoria’s grandchildren or spouses thereof (Gregoria’s heirs).

In 1997, acting on the claim that one-half of subject property belonged to him as
Romana’s surviving heir, Leonardo filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kalibo,
Aklan Civil Case No. 52756 for partition, recovery of ownership and possession, with
damages, against Gregoria’s heirs. In his Amended Complaint, Leonardo alleged that
on several occasions, he demanded the partition of the property but Gregoria’s heirs
refused to heed his demands; that Gregoria’s heirs claimed sole ownership of the
property; that portions of the property were sold to Tresvalles and Tajonera, which
portions must be collated and included as part of the portion to be awarded to
Gregoria’s heirs; that in 1979, Lucimo Francisco, Sr. (Lucimo Sr.), husband of herein
petitioner Teodora, illegally claimed absolute ownership of the property and transferred
in his name the tax declaration covering the property

In their Answer with counterclaim, Teodora, Camilo, Adolfo, Lucimo Jr. and Herminigildo
claimed that Leonardo had no cause of action against them; that they have become the
sole owners of the subject property through Lucimo Sr. who acquired the same in good
faith by sale from Juan Enriquez (Enriquez), who in turn acquired the same from Leon,
and Leonardo was aware of this fact; that they were in continuous, actual, adverse,
notorious and exclusive possession of the property with a just title; that they have been
paying the taxes on the property; that Leonardo’s claim is barred by estoppel and
laches; and that they have suffered damages and were forced to litigate as a result of
Leonardo’s malicious suit.

ISSUE: Are the parties co-owners?

HELD:
YES,  Since Leon died without issue, his heirs are his siblings, Romana and Gregoria,
who thus inherited the property in equal shares. In turn, Romana’s and Gregoria’s heirs
– the parties herein – became entitled to the property upon the sisters’ passing. Under
Article 777 of the Civil Code, the rights to the succession are transmitted from the
moment of death.
Gregoria’s and Romana’s heirs are co-owners of the subject property.

Thus, having succeeded to the property as heirs of Gregoria and Romana, petitioners
and respondents became co-owners thereof. As co-owners, they may use the property
owned in common, provided they do so in accordance with the purpose for which it is
intended and in such a way as not to injure the interest of the co-ownership or prevent
the other co-owners from using it according to their rights.37 They have the full
ownership of their parts and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and may
alienate, assign or mortgage them, and even substitute another person in their
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved.38 Each co-owner may demand at
any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is
concerned.39 Finally, no prescription shall run in favor of one of the co-heirs against the
others so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.

What escaped the trial and appellate courts’ notice, however, is that while it may be
argued that Lucimo Sr. performed acts that may be characterized as a repudiation of
the co-ownership, the fact is, he is not a co-owner of the property. Indeed, he is not an
heir of Gregoria; he is merely Antipolo’s son-in-law, being married to Antipolo’s daughter
Teodora.

Under the Family Code, family relations, which is the primary basis for succession,
exclude relations by affinity.

Art. 150. Family relations include those:

(1) Between husband and wife;

(2) Between parents and children;

(3) Among other ascendants and descendants; and

(4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.

In point of law, therefore, Lucimo Sr. is not a co-owner of the property; Teodora is.
Consequently, he cannot validly effect a repudiation of the co-ownership, which he was
never part of. For this reason, prescription did not run adversely against Leonardo, and
his right to seek a partition of the property has not been lost.

Likewise, petitioners’ argument that Leonardo’s admission and acknowledgment in his

pleadings – that Lucimo Sr. was in possession of the property since 1943 – should be
taken against him, is unavailing. In 1943, Leon remained the rightful owner of the land,
and Lucimo Sr. knew this very well, being married to Teodora, daughter of Antipolo, a
nephew of Leon. More significantly, the property, which is registered under the Torrens
system and covered by OCT RO-630, is in Leon’s name. Leon’s ownership ceased only
in 1962, upon his death when the property passed on to his heirs by operation of law.

In fine, since none of the co-owners made a valid repudiation of the existing co-
ownership, Leonardo could seek partition of the property at any time.
Rodriguez vs Borja
FACTS:
Celistino Rodriguez died on Feb 12, 1963 in Manila. A month later, Apolonia Pangilinan
and Adelaida Jacalan delivered to the Clerk of Court of Bulacan a last will and
testament of Fr. Rodriguez. Days later, Maria Rodriguez and Angela Rodriguez, through
counsel filed a petition for leave of court to allow them to examine the alleged will. Later
on, before the Court could act on the petition, the same was withdrawn.

Subsequently, Maria and Angela Rodriguez filed before the CFI of Rizal a petition for
the settlement of the intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez alleging, among other things, that
Fr. Rodriguez was a resident of Parañaque, Rizal, and died without leaving a will and
praying that Maria Rodriguez be appointed as Special Administratrix of the estate; and
that on March 12, 1963 Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan filed a petition in this
Court for the probate of the will delivered by them on March 4, 1963.

It was stipulated by the parties that Fr. Rodriguez was born in Parañaque, Rizal; that he
was Parish priest of the Catholic Church of Hagonoy, Bulacan, from the year 1930 up to
the time of his death in 1963; that he was buried in Parañaque, and that he left real
properties in Rizal, Cavite, Quezon City and Bulacan.

In a motion to dismiss, Rodriguez’ contend that since the intestate proceedings in the
CFI of Rizal was filed at 8:00 A.M. on March 12, 1963 while the petition for probate was
filed in the CFI of Bulacan at 11:00 A.M. on the same date, the latter Court has no
jurisdiction to entertain the petition for probate.

ISSUE: Which proceeding shall be preferred, and which court has jurisidiction?
FACTS:

In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix AlejaBelleza,

Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S.
Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee of 511, 855 square meters of that parcel of land
surveyed as Lot No. 1392 of theBacolodCadastre. The said Codicil, which was duly
probated and admitted in Special Proceedings No. 4046 before the then Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental.
 “That should Jorge Rabadilla die ahead of me, the aforementioned property and
the rights which I shall set forth hereinbelow, shall be inherited and acknowledged by
the children and spouse of Jorge Rabadilla”

a)….It is also my command, in this my addition (Codicil), that should I die and
Jorge Rabadilla shall have already received the ownership of the said Lot No. 1392 of
the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10942),
and also at the time that the lease of Balbinito G. Guanzon of the said lot shall expire,
Jorge Rabadilla shall have the obligation until he dies, every year to give to Maria
MarlinaCoscolluela y Belleza, Seventy (75) (sic) piculs of Export sugar and TwentyFive
(25) piculs of Domestic sugar, until the said Maria MarlinaCoscolluela y Belleza dies.

Should Jorge Rabadilla die, his heir to whom he shall give Lot No. 1392 of the
Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10492), shall
have the obligation to still give yearly, the sugar as specified in the Fourth paragraph of
his testament, to Maria MarlinaCoscolluela y Belleza on the month of December of each
year.

If Dr. Rabadilla or his heirs decide to sell, lease or transfer, the buyer, lessee or
transferee shall also have the same obligation to the testator’s sister. Failure to do so
will forfeit the property to the sister and nearest relatives.

Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife Rufina and
children Johnny (petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, all surnamed Rabadilla.

ISSUE:

Is there a substitution under Article 859?

RULING: NO

Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to take the

place of the heir or heirs first instituted. Under substitutions in general, the testator may
either (1) provide for the designation of another heir to whom the property shall pass in
case the original heir should die before him/her, renounce the inheritance or be
incapacitated to inherit, as in a simple substitution, or (2) leave his/her property to one
person with the express charge that it be transmitted subsequently to another or others,
as in a fideicommissary substitution.

In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in default of the first
heir by reason of incapacity, predecease or renunciation. In the case under
consideration, the provisions of subject Codicil do not provide that should Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla default due to predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the testatrixÊs near
descendants would substitute him. What the Codicil provides is that, should Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the conditions imposed in the Codicil, the property
referred to shall be seized and turned over to the testatrixÊs near descendants.

In a fideicommissary substitution, the first heir is strictly mandated to preserve

the property and to transmit the same later to the second heir. In the case under
consideration, the instituted heir is in fact allowed under the Codicil to alienate the
property provided the negotiation is with the near descendants or the sister of the
testatrix. Thus, a very important element of a fideicommissary substitution is lacking; the
obligation clearly imposing upon the first heir the preservation of the property and its
transmission to the second heir. „Without this obligation to preserve clearly imposed by
the testator in his will, there is no fideicommissary substitution. Also, the near
descendantsE right to inherit from the testatrix is not definite. The property will only pass
to them should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the obligation to deliver part of
the usufruct to private respondent.

Another important element of a fideicommissary substitution is also missing here.

Under Article 863, the second heir or the fideicommissary to whom the property is
transmitted must not be beyond one degree from the first heir or the fiduciary. A
fideicommissary substitution is therefore, void if the first heir is not related by first
degree to the second heir. In the case under scrutiny, the near descendants are not at
all related to the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
 ANGELA RODRIGUEZ, MARIA RODRIGUEZ, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN DE BORJA, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan,
Branch III,
ANATOLIA PANGILINAN and ADELAIDA JACALAN, respondents.
G.R. No. L-21993,  June 21, 1966
FACTS:
Celistino Rodriguez died on Feb 12, 1963 in Manila. A month later, Apolonia Pangilinan
and Adelaida Jacalan delivered to the Clerk of Court of Bulacan a last will and
testament of Fr. Rodriguez. Days later, Maria Rodriguez and Angela Rodriguez, through
counsel filed a petition for leave of court to allow them to examine the alleged will. Later
on, before the Court could act on the petition, the same was withdrawn.

Subsequently, Maria and Angela Rodriguez filed before the CFI of Rizal a petition for
the settlement of the intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez alleging, among other things, that
Fr. Rodriguez was a resident of Parañaque, Rizal, and died without leaving a will and
praying that Maria Rodriguez be appointed as Special Administratrix of the estate; and
that on March 12, 1963 Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan filed a petition in this
Court for the probate of the will delivered by them on March 4, 1963.

It was stipulated by the parties that Fr. Rodriguez was born in Parañaque, Rizal; that he
was Parish priest of the Catholic Church of Hagonoy, Bulacan, from the year 1930 up to
the time of his death in 1963; that he was buried in Parañaque, and that he left real
properties in Rizal, Cavite, Quezon City and Bulacan.

In a motion to dismiss, Rodriguez’ contend that since the intestate proceedings in the
CFI of Rizal was filed at 8:00 A.M. on March 12, 1963 while the petition for probate was
filed in the CFI of Bulacan at 11:00 A.M. on the same date, the latter Court has no
jurisdiction to entertain the petition for probate.

ISSUE: Which proceeding shall be preferred, and which court has jurisidiction?
RATIO:
The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan became vested upon the
delivery thereto of the will of the late Father Rodriguez on March 4, 1963, even if no
petition for its allowance was filed until later, because upon the will being deposited the
court could, motu proprio, have taken steps to fix the time and place for proving the will,
and issued the corresponding notices conformably to what is prescribed by section 3,
Rule 76, of the Revised Rules of Court. The use of the disjunctive in the words “when a
will is delivered to OR a petition for the allowance of a will is filed” plainly indicates that
the court may act upon the mere deposit therein of a decedent’s testament, even if no
petition for its allowance is as yet filed.

Where the petition for probate is made after the deposit of the will, the petition is
deemed to relate back to the time when the will was delivered. Since the testament of
Fr. Rodriguez was submitted and delivered to the Court of Bulacan on March 4, while
petitioners initiated intestate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal only on
March 12, eight days later, the precedence and exclusive jurisdiction of the Bulacan
court is incontestable.

As long as there is a will, even if that will is found later and even if the proceeding for
the settlement of the estate of a person with a will is filed later, that should be preferred. 
The will should be probated.  The will should be given effect as much as possible in
order to give effect to the wishes of the testator.  The wishes of the testator must be
given such preference first.  Probate of the will is needed in order to determine whether
or not the will was indeed valid, whether or not the will was executed in observance with
the formalities required by law and whether or not the testator executed it with a sound
mind. 

If later on in the probate proceeding, the will is found not to have validly executed, then
you go to intestate proceeding.  But first you go to testate. 
Rabadilla vs Ca
FACTS:
In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla,
was instituted as a devisee of a parcel of land. The said Codicil, which was duly
probated before the then CFI of Negros Occidental. Pursuant to the same Codicil, the
subject land was transferred to the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and the Transfer
Certificate of Title thereto was issued in his name.Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died and was
survived by his wife Rufina and children Johnny (petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida,
all surnamed Rabadilla.

Respondent brought a complaint before the RTC in Bacolod City, against the above-
mentioned heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to enforce the provisions of subject Codicil. The
Complaint alleged that the defendant-heirs violated the conditions of the Codicil.

The plaintiff then prayed for the reconveyance/return of the subject land to the surviving
heirs of the late Aleja Belleza, because it is alleged that petitioner failed to comply with
the terms of the will; that since 1985, Johnny failed to deliver the fruits; and that the the
land was mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank, which is a violation of the will.

In his defense, Johnny avers that the term “near descendants” in the will of Aleja
pertains to the near descendants of Aleja and not to the near descendants of Dr.
Rabadilla, hence, since Aleja had no near descendants at the time of his death, no can
substitute Dr. Rabadilla on the obligation to deliver the fruits of the devised land.

ISSUE:
1. WON the obligations of Jorge Rabadilla under the Codicil are inherited by his
heirs.
2. WON the testamentary institution of Dr. Rabadilla is a modal institution.

RATIO:
Yes, It is a general rule under the law on succession that successional rights are
transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent and compulsory heirs are called
to succeed by operation of law.  Under Article 776 NCC, inheritance includes all the
property, rights and obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death.
In a modal institution, the testator states (1) the object of the institution, (2) the purpose
or application of the property left by the testator, or (3) the charge imposed by the
testator upon the heir. A "mode" imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee but it
does not affect the efficacy of his rights to the succession. On the other hand, in a
conditional testamentary disposition, the condition must happen or be fulfilled in order
for the heir to be entitled to succeed the testator. The condition suspends but does not
obligate; and the mode obligates but does not suspend.  To some extent, it is similar to
a resolutory condition.
Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to take the place of
the heir or heirs first instituted. Under substitutions in general, the testator may either (1)
provide for the designation of another heir to whom the property shall pass in case the
original heir should die before him/her, renounce the inheritance or be incapacitated to
inherit, as in a simple substitution,  or (2) leave his/her property to one person with the
express charge that it be transmitted subsequently to another or others, as in a
fideicommissary substitution. 
 A Will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a person disposes of his
property, to take effect after his death. Since the Will expresses the manner in which a
person intends how his properties be disposed, the wishes and desires of the testator
must be strictly followed. Thus, a Will cannot be the subject of a compromise agreement
which would thereby defeat the very purpose of making a Will.
Borromeo vs Borromeo
FACTS:
Vito Borromeo died on March 13, 1952, in Parañaque, Rizal, at the age of 88
years, without forced heirs but leaving extensive properties in the province of Cebu.
Junquera, filed with the CFI of said province a petition for the probate of a one
page document as the last will left by said deceased, devising all his properties to
Tomas, Fortunato and Amelia, all surnamed Borromeo, in equal and undivided shares,
and designating Junquera as executor thereof.
Teofilo Borromeo filed an opposition to the probate of the will based on several
grounds, one of which is that the testator was mentally incapable of making a will at the
time of its execution. Subsequently, the Court removed Junquera as special
administrator and appointed Dr. Patricio Beltran in his place.
On October 1955, the Republic of the Philippines filed a motion for leave to
intervene and join the oppositors in contesting the probate of the will, on the ground
that, should the estate be adjudicated the latter by intestacy, it stood to collect a
considerable amount by way of estate and inheritance taxes.
 After a prolonged trial, the Court rendered a decision denying the probate of the
will and declaring itself without jurisdiction to pass upon the question of ownership over
the thirteen lots which the Cebu Arcade etc. claimed as its own.
The proponents of the disputed will, mainly with the testimony of the three
attesting witnesses, Cornelio Gandionco, Filiberto Leonardo and Eusebio Cabiluna,
sought to prove the following facts:
Vito Borromeo executed first, the document Exhibit "F", witnessed by Gandionco
and Cabiluna. Later, Vito Borromeo, being of sound and disposing mind, and without
pressure or influence exerted on him, dictated the substance of his will to Tomas
Borromeo, who in turn typewrote it in proper legal language. The document was then
read by Vito Borromeo, who later signed and thumbmarked it.
The trial court refused to believe the testimony of the attesting witnesses and, as
a result, denied the petition for probate, because, in its opinion, they appeared not to be
"wholly disinterested persons" and because of the serious discrepancies in their
testimonies with respect to the number of copies made of the disputed document.
The court also found that the physical condition of the deceased at the time of
the execution of the questioned document was such that it was highly improbable, if not
impossible, for him to have affixed his signatures on the documents in the spontaneous
and excellent manner they appear to have been written. Thus, the court was also led to
believe the testimony of the handwriting experts for oppositors, - adverse to the
genuineness of the signatures of Vito Borromeo on the questioned document - more
than that of the handwriting expert presented by the proponents of the will.

ISSUE: Is the evidence of record sufficient to prove the due execution of the will in
question?

RULING: NO.
The subscribing witnesses to a contested will are regarded as the best witnesses
in connection with its due execution. It is similarly true, however, that to deserve full
credit, their test, testimony must be reasonable and unbiased, and that, as in the case
of any other witness, their testimony may be overcome by any competent evidence —
direct or circumstantial.
We cannot see our way clear to holding that the trial court erred in refusing to
give full credit to the testimony of the three subscribing witnesses.
It has also been held that the condition and physical appearance of a questioned
document constitute a valuable factor which, if correctly evaluated in the light of
surrounding circumstances, may help in determining whether it is genuine or forged.
Subscribing witnesses may forget or exaggerate what they really know, saw, heard or
did; they may be biased and, therefore, tell only half truths to mislead the court or favor
one party to the prejudice of the other.
This cannot be said of the condition and physical appearance of the questioned
document itself. Both, albeit silently, will reveal the naked truth, hiding nothing,
forgetting nothing, and exaggerating nothing. For this reason, independently of the
conflicting opinions expressed by the handwriting experts called to the witness stand by
the parties, we have carefully examined and considered the physical appearance and
condition of the original and two copies of the questioned will found in the record —
particularly the signatures attributed to the testator — and We have come to the
conclusion that the latter could not have been written by him.

Gevero vs IA