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ON THE NOTION OF SIMILARITY IN INDIAN POETICS
Author(s): MADHAV DESHPANDE

Source: Journal of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 2, No. 1 (December 1972), pp. 21-52
Published by: Springer
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MADHAV DESHPANDE
ON THE NOTION OF SIMILARITY IN

INDIAN POETICS
1. Introduction
1.1. The concept of similarity is one of the most fundamenta

in Indian poetics. It forms the basis of various definitions and
tions of figures of speech (alamkâra-s). The Sanskrit works
like sádharmya, sádrsya and sámya for this central notion, w
modern expositions of this subject use terms such as "sim
"similarity", "equality" and "resemblance". From a commonp
of view, there is no difference between notions signified by t
sádharmya (abbrev. SDH) and sádrsya (abbrev. SDR), and in
the works on Indian poetics, these two terms are used as syn
signifying a singular notion of similarity.
Very few efforts are made in the works on Indian poetics
any significant difference between the notions of SDH and SD
interpret them in a rigorous philosophical way. Many discussio
works on Indian poetics actually presuppose the vague identity
two notions. This finally results in very unsatisfactory solutions
problems. The tradition very seldom shows any awareness of t
problems. This paper makes an attempt to point out some of t
problems and offers solutions to them.
The concepts of SDR and SDH need a fresh study and new ca
definitions. On the basis of this primary investigation, we c
problems related to the definition of the figure of speech up
parison", as well as its classification.
2. Sàdharmya and sâdrsya: two relations
2.1. I shall begin the study of these two concepts with the d
given by Vâmanâcàrya Jhalkïkar in his commentary Bâla-b
Mammata's Kávya-prakása.1 He defines sâdharmya as:
Journal of Indian Philosophy 2 (1972) 21-52. All Rights Reserved

Copyright © 1972 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland
22 MADHAV DESHPANDE
SDH is a relation which has the common property (samàna-dharma

and both the object and the standard of comparison (upamâna-u
subjunct.2 [D-l]
He defines sâdrsya as :
SDR is a relation which has the object of comparison as its subjunct an

of comparison as its adjunct. [D-2]
The definition D-l states that SDH is a relation of the ob

parison and the standard of comparison to the common pr
the definition D-2 states that SDR is a relation of the ob
parison with the standard of comparison. The relation of
is thus a relation between the object and standard of com
to be caused by or based on the common property (sam
nimittakd). These two definitions are given by Jhajkïkar
edition of Bâla-bodhinî (p. 541).
In the first edition of Bála-bodhinl, Jhalklkar defines b
SDR, as relations between the object and the standard of
In the second edition, he gives the above stated definitions
enough, a footnote in the fourth edition (p. 545) says that th
of the first edition are correct, while the definitions of the
are not correct. It is not certain as to who added this footnot
for the purpose of the present paper, the definitions D-l and
above are the important definitions.
2.2. Two recent editors of Kávya-prakása, Arjunwadkar and

find this definition D-l not very satisfactory. They try to
leads to unacceptable results.4 I shall summarise their orig
arguments as follows:
If D-l is accepted as valid, then it follows that [a] SDH is the relati
of comparison with the common property (Ci), and that [b] it is als
the standard of comparison with the common property (Ci). If [a] is
object of comparison and the common property (Ci) must have som
property (C2). Similarly, if [b] is valid, then the standard of comp
common property (Ci) must have some other common property (C3). B
cases, there could be no other common property (C2/C3) except the pr
an entity shared by the standard of comparison and the common prop
the object of comparison and the common property (Ci). This co
(C2/C3) as entity-ness (padàrthatva) is certainly not intended to be con
reason, the definition D-l is not acceptable.
ON THE NOTION OF SIMILARITY IN INDIAN POETICS 23
My English paraphrase of the original Marafhl is rather more for

but it clarifies the original arguments. The criticism, however, see
be unacceptable. The original statement of D-l does not mean that
is a pair of relations or either of the two relations as understood
Arjunwadkar and Mangrulkar. It is only one single relation in w
the standard and the object of comparison (upamána and upam
together form one relatum, the subjunct (cf. ubhayánuyogika). This si
subjunct cannot be divided to yield two relations exactly equivalen
the original relation. This can be explained by a simple example.
relation of A to [i?+C] is not the same as the relation of A to B o
or both of these relations. Once this is established, the rest of the crit
needs no independent refutation.
2.3. Both the relations, SDH and SDR, contain the notion of samá
"same or common". This term is related to the term sámánya "gen
property, or a class property". This class property is defined
property which is eternal, single and shared by more than one en
Putting aside eternality for the moment, it is clear that a class proper
is something which is a single property shared by many individua
instances. Unless a dharma "property" is shared by more than on
dharmin "property-possesser", it cannot be called sámánya. SDH
relation of the object and the standard of comparison together t
specific property. Each of them can be said to have some proper
separately, but unless they share in common some specific property, t
specific property cannot be called a common property {samâna-dha
SDH is not a relation caused by or based on a common property,
the common property itself is directly involved in the relation as
of its relata.
2.4. In plain language, it may be said that the fact that two entit
have some common property corresponds to the relation of
whereas the cognitive result that those two entities appear simil
each other on account of that common property, corresponds to
relation of SDR. In this sense, the relation of SDR is based on SDH
Two entities can have some common properties, and also some
acteristically individual 'non-common' properties. In such a case,
relation of SDH would stand valid with reference to the common
24 MADHAV DESHPANDE
properties, while the opposite relation of VDH (vaidhar

having non-common properties") would also be valid w
the non-common properties. Thus in the case of the ve
these two opposite relations can stand valid simultane
a proposition does not involve any logical contradiction
The relation of SDR is different in its nature. It involves
factor of samdna-darsana "same or similar appearance
thetic vision of similarity of the two entities. The two
similar, since they have some common properties, real
the relation of SDR has to be distinguished from the
The observation of common properties is a necessary p
in having a synthetic vision of similarity. In this vision
of cognition, the two entities appear similar as two wh
of the differences they have.
Since the synthetic vision of similarity is a cognitive
tion of common properties is not the only causal factor in
In common experience, two entities do not appear simil
to a person at one and the same time. In technical term
can be related by SDR with reference to a given perso
time, then they cannot be said to be related by the r
(vaisddrsya "relation of having dissimilar appearance") w
the same person and the same time.
2.5. Though the resulting cognitive relation of SDR is

the realization of common properties, it does not
common properties. It is synthetic in the sense that it is o
nature in which the data of common and non-commo
de-emphasized, and are psychologically synthesized to
uniform opinion or judgement. This could be demonstr
way as follows :
Let us suppose that the entity E has the prope

P3 and Ps ; and that the entity É has the prope
P3 and P4. Then, with reference to the commo
Pl, P2, and P3, there is SDH, while with refere
non-common properties P4 and Ps, there is VD
this case, SDH is stronger than VDH, there is a gre
of cognizing SDR.
But suppose that the entity E has the properties Pu P2, P4,
P6 and Ps ; and that the entity É has the properties Pu P2,
P3, Ps and P7. Then, with reference to the common properties
P1 and P2, there is SDH, while with reference to the non
common properties P3, P4, Ps, P6, P7 and P8, there is VDH.
Since, in this case, VDH is stronger than SDH, there is a
greater chance of cognizing VDR.
Thus, theoretically speaking, the proportion of SDH and VDH would
determine the probability generating cognition of SDR and VDR, or the
degree of their strength and weakness. One can take the extreme cases
and say that if SDH is 100% and VDH is 0%, then the probability of
SDR is 100%, and that of VDR is 0%. On the other hand, if SDH is
0% and VDH is 100%, then the probability of SDR is 0% and that of
VDR is 100%. Of course, these extreme cases are in practice impossi
bilities, but it shows that all the cases of SDR and VDR could be fitted
somewhere in this scale of probability.
2.6. Actually, this demonstration only explains the objective factor

involved in the production of the cognition of the relations of SDR and
VDR. But this gives us only an index of probability and not of any
degree of certainty. This is because there is a subjective factor involved
in the production of SDR which plays a decisive role. This leads us to
realize further differences between the relations of SDH and SDR.
SDH and VDH totally depend upon the objective data. If there are
common properties, then one must accept the appropriate degree of SDH,
and similarly, if there are non-common properties, then one must accept
the appropriate degree of VDH. These two relations can be realized
through observation.
SDR depends on an important subjective factor. There may exist
common properties, and yet one may not think that the two entities are
similar to each other. For example a piece of paper and a mountain have
a common property of substance-ness, and yet probably no one would
regard them to be similar. On the other hand, except beauty and shining,
there is nothing common in the moon and the face of a lady. Yet they
appear similar to poetic insight. An observer has to accept the objective
facts of SDH and VDH, but he is free to pass his judgement on the
appearance of similarity between two objects under observation. Follow
26 MADHAV DESHPANDE
ing the objective data and the personal inclination, he may

accept SDR.
Thus SDH is analytical in its character, while SDR is synth
SDH and VDH are derived through collection of data, SD
depend upon the choice and taste of a person. SDH is a logi
while SDR is a cognitive or psychological relation.
3. SÂDHARMYA AND SÂDRÎYA IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEMS
3.1. The basic concepts of SDH and SDR did occur to many Indian
thinkers in the past, though these concepts were not fully utilized in
Indian poetics. When I say that these notions did occur to Indian thinkers,
I do not necessarily mean that we always have clear definitions of these
distinct notions. In many cases, the distinction is implied. Nâgesabhatta
who makes a clear distinction between these two notions, speaks of
"a common property which has both the standard and the object of
comparison, as its loci".6 He discusses sádhárana-dharma-sambandha
"relation [of the object and the standard of comparison] to the common
property". He realizes that SDH is the cause of SDR, which is accepted
as a separate category by some realists and which is established as the
limitor of the property of the primary-meaning in the case of such
words as sadrsa "similar".7 Nâgesa finds his sources in Kaiyata's Pradipa.
Kaiyata speaks of the relation of SDR being caused by common prop
erties.8 Pànini himself uses the words sámánya "common property" and
sádrsya "similarity", but we cannot be sure if he intended the above
distinction between SDH and SDR.9 In the above quoted reference,
Kaiyata makes a distinction between a common property and the relation
of SDR. Surprisingly, in another context, he says: "SDR is called sámá
nya."10 Actually, he is changing the meaning of the term sámánya in a
specific context, rather than identifying SDR with the common property.
He gives as an alternative explanation the interpretation of sámánya as
the common property.
3.2. Bhïmàcârya Jhalkikar provides interesting information about these

concepts as discussed in various philosophical systems.11 In the opinion
of the Mîmâmsaka-s, SDR is a different metaphysical category. It is to
be noted here, that SDR is regarded to be different from sámánya "class
property or a generic property" (which is accepted as an ontological

category in the Vaisesika system). The school of Navya-nyâya also
differentiates SDR from a common property. SDR is defined as: "If x is
different from y and still possesses a number of properties of y, then the
possession of such common properties is called SDR."12 Navya-nyâya
identifies SDH with the common property. According to Navya-nyâya,
the property of beauty is the SDH of the two entities, i.e. a face and a
lotus, in the expression "the face is beautiful like a lotus" (kamalam iva
sundaram mukham). The properties such as padârthatva "property of being
an ontological category", abhidheyatva "namability" etc. are SDH-s, i.e.
"common properties", of all the entities. Sadánanda defines SDH as a
property that recurs in many property-possessors.13
3.3. It is often maintained in the Nyàya school that the determination

of vydpti "pervasion, concomitance" is to be accomplished on the basis
of SDH and VDH. Raghunâtha áarma explains in his Sanskrit commen
tary on Vdkya-padlya as follows :
Logical reasoning attempts to establish facts by taking recourse to examples based on

common and non-common properties. However, these common and non-common
properties are uncertain. By the property of existence, all entities have common
participation, while all entities lack common participation on account of non-common
properties.14
In the Nyàya school, the logical fallacy of false analogy is termed as

sddharmya-sama. This term is very significant. It clearly brings out the
two stages in the realization of cognitive similarity of two entities. Two
entities are considered sama "similar or equal" on account of SDH.
Vàtsyàyana has a very illuminating discussion on this topic. The discus
sion is as follows:
The Self possesses action. The reason is that a substance possesses properties causing
an action. A stick is a substance possessing a property causing action. The same holds
good for the Self. Hence it possesses action. After this conclusion is reached, the other
party also defends himself by taking recourse to the same device of a common property.
The Self is inactive. Indeed an all-pervading substance is inactive. The sky is all-pervad
ing and is inactive. So is the Self. Hence it is inactive. There is no specific reason why
the Self should be active by sharing a property with active things, and not be inactive
by sharing a property with inactive things.15
This argument is very simple. If A has two properties, i.e. Pl and P2,
and if B shares the property Pt with A, then by analogy one thinks that
28 MADHAV DESHPANDE
B also must have P2. This makes it clear how entiti

considered to be similar due to the fact that they hav
properties. Because one thinks of two entities as being simi
to find even other properties of one entity in the othe
synthesis, one forgets the differences. It is SDR or cog
which further leads to imposed identification (abhedádh
entities. Kaiyata realized this phenomenon.16
3.4. Gautama defines the term hetu "middle term" as: "that which
establishes the minor term [as having the major term] by the reason of
having common features with the given example."17 The original rule of
Gautama has the term SDH, which Vâtsyâyana replaces by sàmànya,
while Uddyotakara explains SDH by samána-dharmatá "the property of
having a common property".17 All these discussions in the Nyâya works
show that at least the notion of SDH is not identified with that of SDR.
However, Vâcaspati says that SDR as an entity different from the
generic property is neither seen nor desired.18 In other words, unlike the
Mimâmsakas, the Nyâya school does not admit SDR as a separate
ontological category.
3.5. Kumârila goes into the details of the concept of SDR. He says that
it is the possession of many common elements by entities belonging to
two classes.19 This can be explained by saying that the perception of a
number of features in A accompanied by an awareness that they are
present in B, gives rise to the notion of similarity, i.e. A is similar to B.
Pârthasârathï brings out the relative character of SDR. The degree of
SDR depends upon the proportion of common properties. If there are
only a few common properties, then the resulting SDR would be less
prominent, while if there are more common properties, then the resulting
SDR would be more prominent.20 But this does not mean that the common
properties themselves or their abundance itself is SDR. Kumârila
categorically rejects such a view.21 For him, it is a different ontological
category (padârthântara).
3.6. Finally I would like to point out an interesting discussion by the

Jain grammárian Abhayanandin. While discussing the relation between
the sounds a and á, he says:
Though the sounds a and à are different (i.e., have vaidharmya or VDH) due to their
short and long duration, they have SDH with reference to identical points of articula
tion and articulators. Hence their designation as 'homogeneous sound' (savarna) is
established. If there would have been SDH alone [among entities], then just as in the
case of existence, there would be SDH with reference to all other properties, and
everything would be just one [single entity]. If there would be VDH alone, then there
would be existence for one entity and non-existence for another.22
The author envisions a philosophical problem. No two entities have

SDH or VDH in all respects. No two entities can have all the properties
exactly identical, nor can they have all properties totally different. Every
entity has something in common with others and something that makes
it different from others.
4. The definition of upamâ: "comparison"
4.1. After studying the notions of SDH and SDR, it is profi

investigate the related problems of the definition and classif
the figure of speech upamâ "comparison". As far as the histo
definitions of upamâ is concerned, there is almost no doubt a
nature of the definiendum (laksya). However, different definitio
variations in the exact logical definiens (laksana) or the distin
characteristic of upamâ.23 Before going into the review of th
definitions of upamâ in Sanskrit poetics, I propose to offer a fre
to formulate a definition of upamâ, keeping in mind the di
between SDH and SDR, and the causal relation between them
help us to understand the logical aspects of the available definitio
compare them with the newly formulated definition.
4.2. From the view point of Indian logic, there are three ma
of a definition. A definition may involve over-pervasion (ativ
that which is expressed by the definition is too wide to include m
what should be included. It may involve nonpervasion (avyâpt
definition is too narrow, so that a part of definiendum is not per
that which is expressed by the definition. A definition may i
possibility (asambhava), if that which is expressed by the definiti
not coincide at all with the definiendum.24 The property whi
accepted as the logical definiens for a particular definiendum mu
all the individual instances of the definiendum, it must not ex
30 MADHAV DESHPANDE
individuals outside the definiendum, and obviously it

impossibility for the definiendum to be covered by the de
4.3. With this in mind, the notions of SDH and SDR are
as possible candidates for the definiens of upamd. In lo
is a causal condition for SDR. This cause-effect relatio
logical analysis. A causal condition (karata) is always a
paka) with respect to the effect (kàrya) which is calle
(yyâpya). If x occurs in all and more than all the loci of
said to be the pervader and y is said to be the pervaded
pervaded relation between SDH and SDR may be explai
of three statements:
[1] If there is SDR, then in that instance, there mu

since an effect must be pervaded by its causal cond
[2] If there is no SDH, then there cannot exist SD
absence of a causal condition leads to the absence of the effect.
[3] If there is SDH, then there may or may not be any SDR, since
a single causal condition may not produce the effect in the
absence of other causal conditions.
It is quite clear from these statements that SDH pervades a larger sphere
of instances, which includes within itself the smaller sphere of the occur
rences of SDR.
4.4. Now, let us consider the nature of upamâ "comparison" as a poetic

phenomenon. In poetry, charming and beautifully expressed ideas have
a great value. In comparing two objects in an instance of upamâ, a poet
does not intend to state the bare fact of the two objects having a common
property, but desires to present something beautiful. The aim is to
present an appealing idea that would enhance the principal sentiment
of the poem, and not to present the analysed data of two entities and
a common property. It is often the synthetic vision of similarity which
leads to the experience of beauty and charm. There is that synthetic vision
of similarity when a poet likens the face of a charming lady to the shining
moon. This is generally true of almost every case of poetic comparison.
However general, it cannot be taken to be universally true of all the
instances of upamâ. It is quite possible in some instance of upamâ, that it
is charming and yet does not aim at a synthetic vision of similarity. The
mere participation of the common properties could be charming and
poetic in itself. Where there is a synthetic vision, in those instances, the
common participation must exist, but where there is no synthetic vision,
in those cases also, the common participation can exist and be quite
charming. The basic common participation or SDH would naturally
have to be appealing (hrdya) for a poetic figure.
For example, in an illustration such as kha-puspam iva mano-rathah
"the desire is [baseless] like a sky-flower", the common property shared
by both is baselessness. However, the sky-flower is a non-entity which has
no form to be subjected to a synthetic vision. Therefore, SDR in a real
sense is not possible. However, SDH could be still conceived of, since
the baselessness as a property can be well thought of as characterizing
a non-entity, whose non-existence itself stands as a symbol for vanity.
One may think of unreal but imposed (àhàrya) synthetic vision.26 But as
compared to this imposed SDR, SDH is more realistic and convincing.
Actually, the non-entity sky-flower is in itself unreal and imaginary,
but the conception of its synthetic vision is further unreal.
4.5. There is in fact no need to go into such dubious examples. Even in

the example candra iva mukham sundaram "the face [of a lady] is beautiful
like the moon", theoretically, a similar problem could arise. Since SDR
depends upon the attitudes and inclinations of a perceiver, one may say
that the moon and the face share the property of beauty, but as two
wholes, they do not appear similar enough to manifest a synthetic vision
as such. Thus one may only accept SDH, and reject SDR. For another
person, the moon and the face may appeal so much that he may forget
the differences and enjoy a synthetic vision. Thus, depending upon a
person's individual mental states, the same instance of comparison could
be looked upon differently, resulting in different conclusions. For both,
the instance of comparison is equally charming.
4.6. Thus, from a logical point of view, one must note that in all the
cases, the realization of the SDH relation is the common factor, whether
there is any synthetic vision or not. This analysis shows that it must be
SDH which can be accepted as the definiens of comparison since it
satisfies all the requirements of a valid definiens. Thus the definition of
32 MADHAV DESHPANDE
upamá can be formulated as hrdyam sâdharmyam "charmin

of common properties". In this context, I am concerned
factor in the definition of upamá, and not with other fact
be introduced to distinguish upamd from other figures
on SDH.27
One may feel that in doing this, the importance of the synthetic vision
of similarity or SDR is totally neglected. This is, however, not the case.
By using the terms of Sanskrit poetics, we can say that SDH is svarüpddhd
yaka "a property that brings in the very essential form", while SDR is
utkarçddhdyaka "a property that brings in excellence". This settles the
dispute involved in the formulation of the definition of upamd.
5. Available definitions of upamà in

INDIAN POETICS
5.1. As stated in Section 4.1, what is given in the last

dependent investigation into the formulation of a logicall
of upamd, and not an interpretation of any of the availab
the texts on Sanskrit poetics. Now, the definition formul
a very serious problem, when we turn to the available def
hara, Udbhata and Mammafa use the term sddharmya ; Bh
Vidyânâtha and Visvanâtha use the term sdmya; D
Diksita and Jagannâtha use the term sddrsya ; while
possession of a plurality of common elements (bhüyo
yoga).28 In these definitions, the different wording poses
interpreter, if we approach them with the distinct ide
as explained in the first part of this paper. They may
different views, and such a presupposition would cre
interpretation. One must realize that the distinction o
SDH and SDR as envisioned here, was not present in th
of these authors. They never intended this distinction, an
examine how these authors deal with these various terms.
5.2. In his Kuvalaydnanda, Appaya Diksita uses the term SDR in his
definition of upamd.29 And he uses the term SDH to define upamd in his
Citramimdmsd.30 This could be interpreted to mean that the terms are
synonymous for him and that they are mutually interchangeable. In his
Sáhiíya-darpana. Visvanâtha uses the term sâmya in his definition

upamá.31 He uses the term VDH in contrast to sâmya which is the same
SDH. Often the terms VDH and VDR are used in the same sense, an
hence their counter-positive relations of SDH and SDR are also identified
Often the commentators interpret the term sâmya to mean both, SDH a
SDR.32
In Kávyádarsa, Dandin enumerates words expressing similarity with
a final comment saying that these are the words signifying SDR.33 The
commentators on this line interpret SDR with the term SDH.33 Mammata
uses the term SDH in his definition, while Jagannàtha uses the term SDR.
Jagannàtha criticizes other elements in the definition of Mammata, but
does not criticize his use of the term SDH. This could be an indication
that both the terms meant the same thing for Jagannàtha.
5.3. Though this is the general case, there are some exceptions. Mamma
ta and Vidyâdhara seem to have realized this distinction between the
notions of SDH and SDR. Vidyâdhara, in his Ekàvalî, defines upamá in
terms of SDH and then explains: "Those two entities which have a
common property are the common-property-possessors (sadharman). ...
This feature of these two [entities] is sâdharmya. For instance, 'shining
beauty' etc. which is well known in the conventions of poets is to be
accepted as SDH, and not the properties like substance-ness, cogniza
bility etc."34 He specifically identifies SDH with the common property.35
Mammata uses the term SDH in the definition of upamá and says that
the SDH which constitutes upamá is only that SDH which exists between
a standard of comparison and an object of comparison. He specifically
says that the relation of these two alone with a common property be
comes upamá.36 Mammata also realizes the cause-effect relation between
the two notions of SDH and SDR. He says: "The consideration of SDH
leads to the experience of similarity."37 This very statement occurs in the
Ekàvalî of Vidyâdhara.38
5.4. Mammata has used the term SDR in the context of the secondary
signification function of a word based on their common properties (garni
laksana). He says that SDR is the cause of the secondary signification
function in the examples: "Vâhika is (just) a bull" and "This is Oust) a
bull".39 The person Vâhika and a bull share the properties of dullness
34 MADHAV DESHPANDE
and stupidity etc. This leads to the similarity of Vâhi

Further, this similarity causes the usages where Vâhika
verbally identified (adhyavasána), or one is superimposed
(iâropa). This exactly corresponds to the stages discussed b
says that common properties cause SDR, and this SDR fur
imposed identification (abhedopacdra).i0 Thus Mammata
an awareness of the distinction between SDH and SDR, and also he
seems to have used these terms with distinct meanings. Details of this
question will be discussed later [Section 7].
6. The SrautI-arthI classification of upamâ
6.1. There are several ways of classifying upamâ. The sraut

classification is based on the difference in the way a property accep
the definiens of upamâ is cognized from words. The term srauti has
rendered differently as "direct", "auditory", "provenant de l'aud
etc. ; while árthí has been rendered as "indirect", "implied", "pr
de sens" etc. By etymology, srauti means that kind of comparison, w
the definiens is directly cognized from the heard word (sruti), o
the cognition of the definiens is a direct verbal cognition (sdbda-
Ârthi is that kind of comparison where the definiens is not dire
nized from a word, but its cognition is based on the meaning yie
the word.
Instead of using the term "similarity", I am using above the
"definiens of comparison" purposely, because this is the starting
of all differences. There could be a difference of view as to what is the
definiens of comparison, but once that question is settled, the above
description of the classification stands true. In linguistic terms, the in
stances of srauti comparison involve indeclinables like iva, yathd etc., while
the instances of drthi comparison involve the adjectival nomináis like
tulya, sadrsa etc. There are wide differences in the interpretation of this
classification. I shall discuss these differences under two views, i.e. View
A, and View B.
6.2. View A
6.2.1. This is the usual view of most of the authors on Indian poetics,
traditional and modern. Since the traditional poetics does not make any
distinction between SDH and SDR, these two and other similar terms
signify a single concept of similarity. This unique concept is the definiens
of comparison. This is the first assumption of View A. Sometimes the
followers of this view do accept the duality of SDH and SDR and the
cause-effect relation between these two. But on the ground of the same
cause-effect relation, they identify these two concepts, following the
Vedântic doctrine of non-difference between a cause and an effect.41
6.2.2. According to View A, the particles like iva signify the relation
of similarity directly, while the adjectival nomináis like tulya signify this
relation of similarity indirectly. According to the view of grammarians,
the indeclinables (nipâta-s) actually do not signify any meaning primarily,
but they co-signify or assist other words used in construction with them
to signify some special aspects of their meanings. Thus, iva by itself does
not signify anything. But used in construction with the words candrah
"moon" and mukham "face", it helps these two words to signify the
inherent relation of similarity. This similarity thus signified is the co
signified (dyotya) meaning of the particle iva. Thus the particles like iva
directly co-signify the relation of similarity, without the intervention of
any other meaning.42
On the other hand, words like tulya "similar" are adjectival nomináis.
According to the grammarians and logicians, if the denotata of two nom
ináis are directly related, then that relation must be non-difference
(abheda).iZ In the expression kamalena mukham tulyam "the face is
similar to a lotus", the two words tulya "similar" and mukha "face"
refer to the same object. In other words, the word tulya signifies "a
similar (thing)" or the dharmin "property-possessor" which is referentially
non-different from the face. Thus the direct meaning of the word tulya,
according to this View A, is "possessor of similarity", and hence the
relation or the property of similarity is cognized only through the cogni
tion of the relatum or the locus. In this sense, the cognition of the relation
of similarity derived from the words like tulya is indirect or implied.
6.2.3. Vidyânàtha, in his Pratápa-rudriya, holds this view. I quote from

Filliozat's translation:44
L'upamâ complète est de deux sortes írautí et art hi. Elle est dite irautï, "provenant de
l'audition", quand il y a emploi des mots yathâ, iva etc. qui introduisent d'emblée l'idée
36 MADHAV DESHPANDE
de ressemblance. Elle est dit ârthi, "provenant de sens", quand il

comme sadría, sarrikáía etc. qui introduisent l'idée de ressemblan
comme porteurs de la propriété de ressemblance qui affecte les deu
The contrast between the ways similarity is signified is

the expressions such as (1) "qui introduisent d'emblée
blance" and (2) "qui introduisent l'idée de ressemblance,
comme porteurs de la propriété de ressemblance". The com
pana on Vidyâdhara further explains the way differen
similarity. I again quote from Filliozat's translation :45
Vupamâ est dite srauti quand il y a appréhension de l'idée de res

tion. ... Les mots yathá, iva etc. du fait qu'ils n'expriment pas un
ressemblance pure et simple. Dans ces conditions, "un visage com
fierait "un visage ressemblance la lune". ... De même les mots iva et
le comparant, en eveillant l'idée de ressemblance portent aussi s
ressemblance, en l'intention de celui qui prononce la phrase.
Mallinâtha, in his commentary Tarala on Ekdvali, exp

opinion. According to him, even the words like iva in
the idea of "similar", but directly they co-signify only
the other hand, words like tulya directly signify "
directly they convey "similarity" by the force of implicat
S. D. Joshi has explained and upheld this view. His expo
and the most detailed exposition on this view.47
6.2.4. Recently, two editors of an excellent Marâthï ed

prakása, Arjunwadkar and Mangrulkar, have offered so
but interesting explanations of the srautl-drthl classificati
their Marâthï arguments as follows :48
Though it is true that words normally signify meanings by their p

function etc., there are some words which can generate a cognit
significance just by their very nature as sounds. For instance, t
signifies an auspicious event, not by any primary signification
very nature as a sound. The words like Om, sri and the Vedic recita
ness just by their sound-nature. Similarly, words like iva which qua
comparison signify the relation of similarity just by their nature
by any primary signification function. The term srauti should b
sense of "by nature as a sound", and not in the sense of the cog
directly from words. It should be translated as "auditory" and not
The fantastic extravagance of this explanation is obviou
in the history of grammar and poetics ever meant anything myster

and extra-linguistic by the terms srautl and áríhl.
6.3. View B
6.3.1. Before going into the exposition of View B, it is necessary to tak

a critical glance at View A. The first merit of View A is that it has been
accepted by a large majority of authors in the tradition of Sanskrit
poetics, and even by most of the modern authors on Sanskrit poetics.
Another basic assumption of this, view is that there is no difference
between SDH and SDR, and all the terms signify a single concept of
similarity. With this assumption, View A is perhaps the best method t
account for this classification, and this has been systematically demon
strated by S. D. Joshi in his excellent Sanskrit article. Though View A
must be accepted as historically valid for most of the authors, still, in the
light of new conclusions about the difference between SDH and SDR,
this view needs a thorough investigation. What follows is an independent
criticism of View A, and View B is also a conclusion independently arrived
at. This should not be mistaken for an interpretation of any particular
text in Sanskrit poetics.
6.3.2. In actual experience of an entity as a relatum, there are several

stages. Two entities, A and B, are first cognized as just two entities. Then
due to some reason, one realizes the existence of a relation, R, between
them. After the realization of this relation, R, the two entities, A and B,
are cognized as the relata of the relation R. Without cognizing R, it is
possible to cognize A and B, but one cannot cognize A as a relatum of R.
When a word describes a relatum, it cannot avoid a reference to the
relation. It cannot describe an entity in itself. It expresses an entity as
locus or a possesser of a relation. Thus a word expressing a relatum, in
fact, expresses an entity, a relation and possession or locus-ness with
reference to that relation. The entity is the qualificand, while the relation
is the qualifier. Whatever difference there may be in the logical status of
the relation, it is certainly expressed directly by a word expressing a
relatum.
6.3.3. According to the theory of primary signification of a nominal

word, upheld by the Navya-naiyâyikas and grammarians, a word
38 MADHAV DESHPANDE
expresses an individual entity (vyakti) qualified by a class-p

just a property (dharma). A word like go "bull" denote
qualified by the property of bull-ness (gotva). This prop
fies the individual and itself occurs in the primary m
pravrtti-nimitta "a property that causes or conditions t
word with reference to a class of entities". For instance
could be applied to any individual which possesses the prop
A word, whose usage with reference to an entity is p
occurrence of a specific property in that entity, expre
possessed or qualified by that property. Gadâdhara spec
the primary meaning of a word consists of three elements
a locus of that property and the relation of qualification
The Neo-grammarian Kaundabhatta discusses the two
that either the property alone is the primary meaning
alone is the primary meaning. After discussing them, he s
both of them are primary meanings of a nominal.51 N
that a word expresses a property which conditions its
of that property.52 Thus, the word guda "raw sugar" expr
ual entity qualified by the property of raw-sugar-ness (gu
says that there is absolutely no sequence involved in a
property and its locus. Neither a property without its locu
ual without a property could be cognized by anyone.54
6.3.4. The quality-words (guna-vacana) have been subject

discussions in grammar. Nâgesa says that the word
expresses both, a color (i.e. a quality) and the colore
discussion originates in a vârttika of Kâtyàyana. Kâtyây
the comparison sastrl-sydmd devadattá "Devadattà is d
knife". Commenting on this example, Kâtyàyana says
sydma "dark" denotes the property sydmatva "dark-ne
in both, the object and the standard of comparison.56 T
him, the word sydma "dark" not only denotes the dark
the property of dark-ness. A logical principle concerni
cognition must not be forgotten. Unless the qualifier i
can be no cognition of an object qualified by that qualif
it necessary that the property of dark-ness be also a prim
the nominal "dark", which denotes a dark entity.
6.3.5. With this background, let us consider the signification of

words like tulya "similar". They can be easily compared with the w
like guda "raw sugar", sukla "white" and syáma "dark". In the cas
the word tulya "similar", the property tulyatá "similar-ness or similar
is the property which conditions the use of the word tulya. Thus the w
expresses an individual entity qualified by the property tulyatâ 'simila
It denotes a locus of similarity. Like the word syáma, the word t
'similar' finally expresses three elements, i.e. an individual, the pro
of similarity and the relation of qualification. Just as the word sy
"dark" is an.expresser (vácaka) of the property of darkness, similarly,
word tulya ' similar" is a direct expresser (vácaka) of the property tuly
similarity'. Thus the property similarity forms an inseparable part of
primary meaning of the word "similar". This fact has been frankl
mitted by the commentary Prabhà on Kaundabhatta's Vaiyákaran
saryasára. It speaks of SDR as a part of the primary meaning of the wo
sadrsa "similar".58 Since tulya and sadrsa are synonyms, both of t
primarily signify SDR, along with the locus of SDR, i.e. a similar en
This most certainly goes against View A, which holds that words
tulya "similar" primarily signify only the locus of similarity, but
similarity itself.
6.3.6. In the consideration of the indeclinables like iva "like", the

distinction between SDH and SDR and the causal relationship between
them must be introduced. Similarly, the definiens of upamâ is SDH and
not SDR. As it is explained previously, words like iva have no independent
primary signification function. They are co-signifiers (dyotaka). They
assist other words used in construction to signify some specific meanings.59
According to this theory, the particle ca "and" in the construction ghatah
patas ca "a pot and a cloth" has no primary meaning of itself, but it
helps the words ghata "pot" and pata "cloth" to signify the relation of
collocation (samuccaya) existing between their denotata. Similarly, in the
construction with iva, the particle by itself has no primary meaning, but
it helps words used in construction with it to signify the relation existing
between their denotata.
Now, SDH is the cause of apprehending SDR. Unless SDH is cognized,
SDR cannot be cognized. In other words, unless the particle iva "like"
first co-signifies SDH, there is no way it can signify or imply SDR. For
40 MADHAV DESHPANDE
this reason, it could be concluded that the particles li

signify SDH, and then they may or may not imply S
other factors. Thus words like iva differ from the wo
word tulya directly signifies tulyatá which is identi
SDR is directly spoken of, one infers the existenc
which this directly signified SDR would be baseless. I
directly signified by the word tulya, while SDH is inferr
Another important difference to be noted is that word
co-signify the relation of SDH as the principal quali
a qualifier. On the other hand, words like tulya "similar"
the relation of SDR as a qualifier and not as the qualif
6.3.7. This last difference explains why only words lik

with a genitive affix (sasthi-vat). Traditionally this co
stood to suggest that like the genitive affix, only words
a relation, while words like tulya do not signify a re
both kinds of words do signify relations, but only
relation in the same fashion as that of a genitive affix.
A genitive affix conveys a relation as the principal
turally it is bound with only one word, but by its specific
signifies the relation between two denotata. Helâràja e
sphere of a genitive affix, a relation is manifested as the
He clarifies that the primary meaning signified by a
genitive affix represents a relation limited by its rel
a relation as having sâbda-prâdhânya " principal impor
cognition" in the case of a genitive affix.63
The word iva, though it always structurally follow
nifying the standard of comparison, directly co-sig
of SDH as the principal element. In this respect,
with a genitive affix. This also makes it clear that thi
be taken to mean that words like tulya do not directly s
6.3.8. With this analysis, let us look into the history o

This is an established technical term of the Mïmàmsâ
accepted in other systems in the same meaning. Murâr
sruti as a word that causes a cognition of a particula
primary signification function.64 áañkarabhatta uses
primary signification function itself.65 áabara says that that which is

cognized immediately after cognizing a word is said to be cognized by
sruti.66 He also uses the term sruti in the sense of a direct statement of
something. Kumarila uses this term to refer to a direct assertion.67
According to the Mïmàmsaka-s, the primary meaning of a word is only
a generic property, and an individual entity having that property is
cognized by implication or by secondary signification function. Thus
Somesvara says that a primary signifier word {sruti) has no primary
signification function to relate to the individual entity.68 Thus sruti is
a word which causes a cognition of a meaning without expecting inter
vention of any other meaning.69
6.3.9. From this discussion, it is clear that if a word directly expresses

a certain meaning, then that word is called sruti with respect to that
meaning, and that meaning is called srauta "directly signified meaning"
with reference to that word. The meaning which is not so directly signified,
but is implied or cognized through secondary signification function is
called ártha.
Since the word tulya "similar" directly expresses tulyatá "similarity"

or SDR, this SDR is to be termed as srauta. However, the cognition of
SDH is derived from implication or inference, and hence with respect to
words like tulya, SDH or common-property-participation is to be termed
ârtha. Similarly, the word iva directly co-signifies SDH, and hence with
respect to that word, SDH is to be termed srauta. This cognized SDH may
imply SDR. If it is implied, then this SDR is to be termed ârtha with
reference to the word iva. Since SDH is the definiens of upamá, that
upamá where SDH is srauta "directly signified" is the srauti upamá, and
where SDH is ârtha, that upamá is árthí upamá. This is what I have called
View B. A perfect statement of this view is found in Nâgesa's Laghu
mañjüfá:70
With the use of the words iva etc., the comparison which is of the nature of the relation
of the common property [to the object and the standard of comparison] is directly
signified, while the apprehension of SDR is through implication. With the use of the
words like sadrsa, the apprehension of SDR is a direct verbal cognition, while the
comparison is [cognized] through implication.
I believe that this is the right view concerning the srautl-ârthi classification
of upamá.
42 MADHAV deshpande
7. Srauti-arthi classification IN MAMMATA
7.1. After a general discussion of this classification, and after expressing

my approval of Nâgesa's interpretation, I wish to discuss the classification
as handled by Mammata in his Kàvya-prakàsa. Most of the commen
tators on Mammata, ancient and modern, believe that Mammata's
classification fits in View A as discussed in this paper. In other words,
they believe that Mammata did not know and did not preach the distinc
tion between SDH and SDR. They also believe that according to Mam
mata, words like tulya "similar" stand only for the individual and do not
directly signify the property tulyatá 'similarity'. With all respect to the
scholarship and authority of these ancient and modern critics, I would like
to differ from them. In the following section, I shall offer my arguments
in refutation of these critics, and I shall attempt to prove that Mammata's
classification moreover follows View B as I have explained in the last
section.
7.2. As 1 have shown in Sections 5.3-4, Mammata believes in the differ

ence between SDH and SDR, and he also accepts the causal relation
between them. Thus, when he uses the term SDH in his definition of
upamd, it is purposeful. He also uses the term aupamya for the definiens
of upamá, which is actually identical with SDH. He says that aupamya is
sabda "directly signified" by the words like iva, and it is àrtha 'implied
by the force of the signified meaning' in the case of words like tulya.71
He himself renders the term srauta by sabdopdtta 'obtained directly
from words' and ártha by artha-sâmarthyâd avasiyate 'inferred by the
force of meaning'.72 These are Mammata's own definitions.
7.3. According to View A, the word tulya signifies only the individual
or the relatum, and not the relation of similarity. According to that view,
the relation of similarity is known by implication. To study the validity
of these concepts ascribed to Mammata by commentators, it is necessary
to study Mammata's own views on the primary signification of words.
He discusses a number of views.73 He defines a primary signifier word
(vâcaka) as that word whose significative association (samketa) with a
meaning has been established. He refutes right away the view that only
an individual is the primary meaning of a word. He finally concludes
that it is upàdhi 'attribute' alone (upádháv eva samketah) with which the
significative association of a word is grasped. These attributes are of
four types, i.e. a jdti 'generic property', guna 'a quality', kriyâ 'action'
and yadrcchá 'speakers' desire'. For instance, the word go "bull" signifies
bull-ness alone, the word sukla signifies the white color alone, the word
cala "moving" signifies the action alone, and the word rama signifies the
desire of the speaker to name somebody as Rama. The main point is that
the primary meaning is only an attribute. Mammata discusses some
other views summarily, but this is his final view.74 As far as the cognition
of the individual or the property-possesser is concerned, Mammata
thinks that the individual is implied by the generic property, since the
generic property is invariably connected with an individual.75 Thus for
Mammata, the word go "bull" primarily signifies only the property
bull-ness, and it implies the individual which possesses that property of
bull-ness.
7.4. The view of Mammata is different from the view of the Mïmàmsaka-s
in as much as they believe that all words primarily signify generic
properties.
áabara says that a word, primarily signifying a generic property, signifies
secondarily an individual associated with it.76 Khandadeva states that an
individual is cognized through secondary signification function (laksaná).
Thus, for Mammata, the word tulya, like the words go "bull" and
sukla "white", must primarily signify the attribute (upàdhi) of tulyatâ
'similarity'. There can be no argument against considering that the
cognition of tulyatâ 'similarity' is derived directly from the word tulya,
and hence srauta. If there would be no difference between SDH and SDR
(or tulyatâ), then by this objective analysis, there would be a srautl
comparison with the use of the word tulya "similar". Yet Mammata says
that it is an ârthï comparison. The only way to explain this is to say that
though tulyatâ 'similarity' [= SDR] is directly signified by the word
tulya "similar", still the definiens of comparison is SDH, and this SDH
is only inferred in the case of words like tulya. Mammata clearly
says:78
"SDH is implied [when the words like tulya are used], due to the reason that the
apprehension of tulyatâ 'similarity' [=SDR] can be generated only by the consider
ation of sâmya [=SDH]."
44 MADHAV DESHPANDE
7.5. One may have an objection to this interpretation of

classification. If we accept that according to Mammata a w
signifies only an attribute, then we might have a problem
co-referentiality (sámánádhikaranya) in the example tulyam m
face is similar". The words tulya and mukha would, then, sign
tulyatâ 'similarity' and mukhatva 'face-ness'. Then the prim
of the phrase would be 'the faceness is similarity'. The ex
face is similar" actually means "an entity which has face-ness
which [also] has similar-ness". This could be obtained only by
(arthápatti). Due to this difficulty, one may not be inclined t
interpretation of Mammata.
However, undoubtedly this very view has been adopted b
This also has been accepted by the Mïmâmsaka-s. Kumârila
that in the view of ¡Sabara that a generic property alone is
meaning, co-referentiality {sámánádhikaranya) has to be
taking recourse to the secondary signification function.79
says that an individual can be cognized only through the
signification function, and then the necessary co-referen
pressions could be explained through the individual cogniz
secondary signification function.80 Somesvara replaces t
signification function (lak?a$d) by intention (tátparya).8
exact position can be certainly inferred. According to him, th
gaur anubandhyah "a bull should be tied [to the sacrificial pos
means that 'bull-ness should be tied'. Since this is absurd,
means by implication that a bull should be tied. The same
to the problem of co-referentiality.
7.6. Whether to accept Mammata's view as a satisfactory

is a different question. We are of course free to disagree with
Mammata. Actually for this reason, I preferred the view of t
and Neo-grammarians in Sections 6.3.3-5. According to this
signifies an individual qualified by a property. Thus, co-r
could be explained on the basis of direct primary significa
Thus tbe words tulya "similar" and mukha "face" primari
entity qualified by similar-ness' and 'an entity qualified b
If the entity signified by both the words is identical, the exp
co-referential. With such a view, Kaiyata says that co-ref
the expression tulyam kriyà [= tulyâ kriyá] "similar action" is cognized

directly by the primary signification function of the words.82 Even
Kumârila admits that, in the view that an individual alone or an individual
qualified by a property is the primary meaning, one can explain co-refer
entiality on the basis of direct primary signification function.83
7.7. With all this discussion, I conclude that the srauti-árthi classification
in Mammata is certainly based on the difference in the way SDH is
cognized. I have already cited Nâgesa in support of my interpretation
[Section 6.3.9]. I also find support for my view in the commentary
Sudhâsâgara on Mammata's Kávya-prakása. I shall quote a passage
from this commentary, by way of giving my concluding remarks :84
If on account of something being cognized through implication, a comparison is called

'implied', then it is appropriate to say that on account of the same thing being directly
signified, a comparison is called 'directly signified'. Moreover, the relation of common
property [=SDH] alone is [the definiens of) comparison. Therefore, the classification
of comparison should be based on this [SDH] being directly or indirectly signified.
For this very reason, the following interpretation should not be entertained: words
like yathâ directly signify the relation of similarity like the genitive affix, while
words like tulya directly signify the property-possesser also.
NOTES
1 yah sâdhàrana-dharma-pratiyogika upamânopameyobhayânuyogikah samban

sàdharmyam ucyate, yas copamàna-pratiyogika upameyânuyogikah samband
sàdrsyam ucyata iti sâdharmya-sâdrsyayor bhedah/ Bàla-bodhini, Kâvya-prakâs
p. 541. A. B. Gajendragadkar accepts the distinction between SDH and SD
psychological distinction, though he admits that the two terms are often u
synonyms. Explaining the causal relationship between the two concepts, he say
first realize that two things have a common property and then the idea that t
therefore, similar arises in us." Notes, Kâvya-prakâéa (Gajendra), p. 244.
2 I follow Ingalls in translating anuyogin as "subjunct" and pratiyogin as "ad
Ingalls (1951), p. 44. and Matilal (1968), p. 31-33.
3 Arjunwadkar and Mangrulkar refer to this footnote, but are probably not
to who added it. Notes, Kâvya-prakâsa (Arjun), p. 365. This note is added
probably by R. D. Karmarkar, the editor of the fourth edition, and not by Jh
himself, since the definitions of the second edition are still retained in the
Bâla-bodhini. (Fourth edition, p. 541).
4 Kâvya-prakâsa (Arjun), Notes, p. 365.
5 nityam ekam anekânugatam sâmânyam/ Tarka-samgraha, p. 60.
8 upamânopameyobhaya-nistha-sàdhàrana-dharmavattvena... Parama-laghu-m
p. 121, and Laghu-mañjüsá, p. 618.
46 MADHAV DESHPANDE
' sâdréyaip tu sàdhârana-dharma-sambandha-prayo

katayà siddham. Laghu-mañjüfá, p. 635,
tasmàt sâdhâraria-dharma-sambandhas tat-prayojy
ibid., p. 340.
8 guna-nimitta-sàdriya-pratiti... Pradlpa on Mahâ-bhàfya, Vol. I, Sec. ii, p. 397.
Also see: Scharfe (1961), p. 115-6.
9 The term sâmânya occurs in P. II.1.55, P. II. 1.56, P. III.4.5, and P. VIII.1.74. The
term sàdfiya occurs in P. II. 1.6-7 and P. VI.2.11. Kâtyàyana uses the term sàmânya
a number of times and the term sâdriya in one place ( Vârttika 1 on P. V.2.39.) The
term sâdharmya is absent from all the three grammarians including Patañjali.
10 tat ra sâdriyarn sàmànyam ucyate/guno va dvi-vrttir bhinno'py abhinnatvena vivakfitah
sàmànyam. Pradipa on Mahâ-bhàsya. Vol. I, Sec. II, p. 398.
11 Nyâya-koia on the terms sâdharmya and sâdriya, p. 990 ff and 994 ff.
12 tad-bhinnatve sati tad-gata-bhüyo-dharmavattvam Nyâya-koia, p. 991. This defi
nition presents SDR as a property rather than as a relation. But in Navyanyàya, a
property is often treated as a relation. Matilal (1968), p. 49.
13 anugato dharmah. Nyâya-koia, p. 994.
14 sádharmya-vaidharmya-mülakábhyárrt hi drstântâbhyârn tarko vastu sâdhayitum
prakramate/te ca sâdharmya-vaidharmye avyavasthitejsattayâ hi sarvesânt sâdharmyam
eva, viiefa-rûpatayâ ca sarvesàrji vaidharmyam eva/ Ambá-kartrí, p. 81.
15 kriyâvârt âtmâ/dravyasya kriyâ-hetu-guna-yogàt/dravyarri lostah kriyâ-hetu-guna
yuktah kriyâvân/tathà càtmâ/tasmât kriyâvârt iti/evam upasarrihrte par ah sâdharmyeriaiva
pratyavatiflhate/nifkriya âtmâ/vibhuno dravyasya niskriyatvât/vibhu câkâiarfi niskriyam
ca/tathâ càtmâltasmân nifkriya iti/na câsti vise$a-hetuh kriyàvat-sâdharmyât kriyâvatâ
bhavitavyarji, na punar akriya-sâdharmyân niçkriyenetil Nyâya-koia, p. 997.
16 èastri-sâdrsyàd devadattâ èastri-èabdenocyate, sâdréya-nimittâd abhedopacârâd yathâ
gaur vàhika iti/ Pradipa on Mahâ-bhàsya, Vol. I, Sec. II, p. 396.
17 udâharana-sâdharmyât sàdhya-sâdhanaw hetufi. Nyâya-sûtra 1.1.34.; udâharanena
sâmânyât. Nyâya-bhâfya; sâdharmyam samâna-dharmatâ. Nyâya-vârttika, Nyâya
darsana, p. 526-527.
18 na ca sâmânyâtiriktarji sâdrsyarfi vastvantararn drffam iftam va. Nyâya-vârttika
tâtparya-fikà, Nyâya-darsana, p. 560.
19 bhûyovayava-sâmânya-yogo jâty-antarasya tat. Sloka-vârttika, p. 438.
20 sâmânyâlpa-bhûyastva-vaéena sâdriyasyâlpa-bhùyastva-darianât/ Nyâya-nirrtaya on
Éloka-vàrttika, p. 439.
21 na dharmâ eva sâdriyam, bhûyastâ vâ tad-âsrayâ/ Éloka-vârttika, p. 440.
22 akârâkârayoh hrasva-dirghâdi-kâla-bhedena vaidharmye'pi tulya-sthâna-karanatvena
sâdharmyam astiti sva-sarrijnâ-vyavahârah siddhyati/yadi ca sâdharmyam eva syàt tadâ
astitvenevânyair api dharmaih sâdharmye sarvam ekam prasajyeta/yadi ca vaidharmyam
eva syàt tadâ kasyacid astitvam aparasya nâstitvam anyasya cânyat syàt/ Jainendra
mahà-vrtti, p. 2.
23 For a long list of definitions of upamà in Sanskrit poetics, see: Ekâvali (Trivedi),
Notes, p. 530.
24 Ingalls (1951), p. 81, and Staal (1961), p. 122 if.
25 Ingalls (1951), p. 28.
26 An âhârya "unreal but imposed" cognition is defined as bàdha-kâlikam icchâ
janyarp jññnam [Nyâya-koia, p. 135-6.] "A cognition which is generated just by a
desire for it, and which is coeval with an invalidating cognition."
27 See Kâvya-prakâia (Gajendra), Notes, p. 244-5.
28 See Note 23.

29 upamá yatra sâdrsya-lakçmir ullasati dvayofi. Kuvalayànanda, p. 2.
30 upamânopameyatva-yogyayor eva sâdharmyam upamâ Citra-mimârjisâ, p. 7.
31 sâmyarfi vâcyam avaidharmyarji vâkyaikya upamâ dvayoh Sâhitya-darpana, p. 473.
32 Ibid, pp. 473, 476 and 492.
33 Kâvyâdarsa, p. 166.
34 vilasati sâdharmye syâd upamânopameyayor upamâ/samâno dharmo yayos te sad
harmanî, tayor bhâvah sâdharmyam, kavi-samaya-prasiddhatji kântimattvâdi, na tu
vastutva-prameyatvâdi grâhyam Ekâvall, p. 195.
35 sâdharmyarri ... guria-kriyâ-rûpam anugatam iha bhavet... tasya dharma-rûpatayà ...
Ibid, p. 197.
36 upamânopameyayor eva ... sâdharmyam bhavati iti tayor eva samânena dharmena
sambandha upàmâ Kâvya-prakâsa (Gajendra), p. 34. Gajendragadkar's interpretation
of this passage is not acceptable. He says: "Samânena dharmena is karane trtiyâ and
not saha. Also the relation between upamdnopameya and samâna-dharma will not be
sâdharmya but samavâya, they being related as guna-guninau. ... Sâdharmya means a
relation between upâmana and upameya brought about by a common property."
Kâvya-prakâsa (Gajendra). Notes, p. 244. Actually, sâdharmya has never been regarded
as being caused by a common property. It is either considered as a relation of the
common property to both the object and the standard of comparison, or it is identified
with the common property. Hence, samânena dharmena must be interpreted as samânena
dharmena saha "with or to the common property". The relation of the common
property with the object and standard of comparison may be, ontologically speaking,
inherence {samavâya), conjuction (samyoga) or any other type of relation, but if both
are related to one and the same property, then that relation of possessing a common
property is sâdharmya. Thus the relations like samavâya do not oppose the relation
of sâdharmya.
37 sâmya-paryâlocanayâ tulyatâ-pratitih Kâvya-prakâsa (Gajendra), p. 35. Gajendrag
adkar has some confused remarks on this passage: "This furnishes another glaring
example of Mammata's careless diction. Sâmya and tulyatâ exactly mean the same
thing. So the expression as it stands makes no sense. We must therefore suppose that
tulyatâ has been used for sâdharmya. This has been clearly shown by the following
clause iti sâdharmyasyârthatvât." [Kâvya-prakâsa (Gajendra), Notes, p. 251.] The
expression of Mammata does make perfect sense. The term sâmya refers to sâdharmya
while the term tulyatâ refers to sâdrsya. [Kâvya-prakâsa (Jhal), p. 552.] Mammata
is making a plain statement that the consideration of sâdharmya is a cause of the
similarity of objects, and as the words tulya "similar" etc. directly speak of this simi
larity of objects, one has to infer the relation of sâdharmya by taking recourse to the
cause-effect relation between SDH and SDR. Another reason to equate sâmya and
sâdharmya is that if tulyatâ were identical with sâdharmya, then it would be directly
signified by the word tulya and it would not be ârtha "implied". [See Section 6.3.5.]
The diction of Mammata's expression is far from being careless. It is rather an estab
lished diction. Vidyâdhara's Ekàvali uses exactly the same expression. [See Note 38.]
38 sâmya-paryâlocanayâ tulyatâ-pratitih Ekâvali, p. 196.
39 Kâvya-prakâèa (Gajendra), p. 17.
40 See Note 16.
41 For an excellent exposition of this view, see S. D. Joshi (1964), p. 37 ff. With all
respect to Dr Joshi, who happens to be my revered teacher, I beg to differ from his
view that the srauti-ârthi classification in Kâvya-prakâèa is in accordance with View A,
48 MADHAV DESHPANDE
as I have explained. My disagreement is articulated

[See Sections 7.1-7.] However, I am most thankf
ments and criticism.
42 S. D. Joshi (1964), p. 38.
43 Ibid., p. 38. also: nàmàrthayor abhedánvaya-v
rama-laghu-mañjüfá, p. 117. Also Vyutpatti-vàda,
44 Pratàpa-rudriya (Filliozat), p. 210. pùrnâ dviv
pratipádakevádi-íabdánám prayoge irauti/dharmi-v
sadrSa-sarjikâia-nikàia-pratikâiàdi-iabdânâm pra
bhûçana, p. 356.
45 Ratnàpana, Pratàpa-rudriya (Filliozat), p. 2
srauti/nanu yathevâdi-iabdànârti sadrsadi-sabdavat
sâdriya-paratvarn vaktavyam/tathâ sati mukhaw
evam upamâna-viiesana-bhûlâ yathevâdayah sab
Sabda-Sakti-svàbhàvyât tâtparyeria sàdrsyavati v
yaío-bhüíana, p. 356.
46 ivâdinâm apy arthàt sadréa-paryavasânarfi, irut
tulyâdi-iabdànâm tu srutyâ sadria-paratvam, art
on Ekâvali, Ekâvali, p. 198. This explanation by M
of View A, but I doubt if this is the view of Vidyâd
correspondence to the diction of Mammata. Mallin
with his own view. In a different context [Tarala
word tulya directly signifies sàdrsya "similarity
while in the passage quoted above, he says that th
sadría "similar", while sádríya "similarity" is im
47 S. D. Joshi (1964), p. 39.
48 Kàvya-prakâia (Arjun). Notes, p. 373-4. This
prakâêa has really missed the point.
49 This has been fully supported by V. M. Kulka
speaking this discussion of the distinction betwee
late origin and the early álarrtkárikas were not aw
from their usage of the words sàdrsya, sàmya a
Udbha{a who first uses the word sàdharmya i
eminent predecessors Bharata, Bhámaha and D
supposed distinction, he would have definitely exp
who borrows that word from Udbhata nowhere
distinction. On the contrary, he employs the w
synonymously." Kulkarni (1957), p. 1957. I agree
Mammata knows and intends the distinction. Re
that if at all there is any distinction between iva
by taking recourse to the distinction between sàd
p. 14.
50 tad-viíiffe iaktir ity asya tad-dharma-tad-vaiSitfya-tad-àSrayeçu trisv eva iaktir ity
arthah ... pravrtti-nimitte'pi íakteh sattvát tasyàpi vàcyatayâ vàcyatve sati vàcya
vfttitve sati vâcyopasthiti-prakàratvam iti pravrtti-nimitta-lakfane vàcyatve satiti vise
sana-dànarji, jàtyàkrti-vyaktayah padàrtha iti nyâya-sûtroktarji gotvâdi-jàter gav-àdi
padàrthatvam copapadyate/ Sakti-vàda, p. 41. According to this Nyàya view, both
the individual and the generic property are primary meanings, while according to the
view of Mimàrpsà, only a generic property could be the primary meaning. The extreme
views that the individual alone is the primary meaning, and that the property alo
the primary meaning are discussed by Patañjali. See: Samartháhnika, Text, p. 23 ff,
Translation, p. 148 ff.
51 vast utas tu "na hy ákrti-padárthakasya dravyaiji na padârtha" iti bhâsyâd viiif/
eva vácyam. Vaiyákarana-bhüsana-sára, p. 236.
52 prâtipadikârtha-padena pravrtti-nimitta-tad-ásrayayor eva grahartam. Éabda-rat
pp. 758-9.
53 gudàdi-sabdena guçlatva-jàty-avacchinno guda-padavâcyafi... Parama-laghu-mañjü
p. 27.
54 atra visesana-visesyayor ubhayor api saktih èabdato jâti-dravyayoh kramena
bodhânanubhavât... ásrayánáliñgita-játi-pratyaksasyápy
anubhava-viruddhatvena tatrápi vastutah kramábhávát/ Laghu-mañjüsá, p. 1107.
55 evarji ca suklàdaya ubhayatra saktâh Ibid., p. 1130.
58 na và syámatvasyobhayatra bhâvàt, ubhaya-guna-vácakatvác ca syâma-èabdasya
sâmânya-vacanatvam Vârttika 2 on P. II. 1.55, Mahâ-bhâsya, Vol. II, Sec. II, p. 397.
57 nâgrhita-visefanâ buddhir visesyam upasaipkrâmati.
58 sadrsa-padárthaika-dese sâdrsye Prabhà on Vaiyákarana-bhüsana-sára, p. 375.
59 dyotakatvam ca sva-samabhivyáhrta-pada-nistha-saktyudbodhakatvam Parama
laghu-mañjüsá, p. 113. For different views concerning the meaning of iva. See: Ibid,
pp. 120-2.
80 S. D. Joshi thinks that if both iva and tulya are directly said to signify the relation,
the statemenent of Mammata, i.e. sasthivat sambandham pratipâdayanti, would be
contradicted. In his opinion only words like iva directly signify the relation, and hence
only with them there is irauti comparison. Joshi (1964), p. 39-40.
81 y at ra tu prádhányena udbhütah sambandhah sa visayah sasfhyàh Prakirnaka
prakâsa, p. 108.
62 abhidhá-vyápárena sasfhy-antasya padasya sambandhy-avacchinna-sambandha
pradhànatvât Ibid, p. 110.
63 sambandhasya sâbdam prádhányam Ibid, p. 113.
64 yac chaktyá padártha-jñánarji janayati, yad yatra saktant tat tatra srutir ity asyaiva
suvacatvát/ Murári in his Añgatva-nirukti, quoted in the Mimáipsá-kosa, Vol./VII,
p. 3981.
85 srutyá abhidhayá laksaná bádhyate áañkara-bhatta in his Bála-mimáipsá-prakása,
quoted in Mimámsá-koSa, Vol. VII, p. 3969.
88 iruty-avagatarji hi sravanád avagatam ¡Sabara, quoted in Mimámsá-kosa, Vol. VII,
p. 3973.
87 srutih laksariáyá baliyasi Sabara and Kumârila, quoted in Mimárrtsá-koía, Vol. VII,
p. 3968.
88 sruter dravyánvaye vyápárábhávab Somesvara in his Nyáya-sudhá, quoted in
Mimámsá-kosa, Vol. VII, p. 3972.
89 srutih nirapekso ravah / yac-chabda-jñánam anya-vyavadhánam anapeksya yad-artha
jñánam janayati sa tasminn arthe srutih Mimárfisá-nyáya-kosa, quoted in Mimárjisá
koèa, Vol. VII, p. 3968.
70 evarji ca ivádi-yoge sádhárana-dharma-sambandha-rüpá upamá vácyá / sádríya
pratitis tv árthi / sadrsádi-pada-prayoge sádrsya-pratitih íábdi/ upamá tv árthi/ Laghu
mañjüsá, p. 334-5. For more details, see Kuñjiká on Laghu-mañjüsá, p. 631-2.
71 iva-íabdasya sad-bhávát sábdam aupamyam... tulyárthe vatir iti art ham aupamyam
Kávya-prakáía (Gajendra), p. 70-1.
72 Ibid., p. 49.
50 MADHAV DESHPANDE
78 Ibid., p. 10-11.
74 "In discussing the question of the conventi
mentions the jâtyàdi view of the grammarians fi
confirmed by his àabda-vyâpàra-vicâra where h
Mïmâmsakas." Kàvya-prakâsa (Gajendra). Introdu
between these two views, see: Kâvya-prakàia (Ar
75 vyakty-avinâ-bhàvât tu jàtyâ vyaktir âksip
prakàia (Gajendra), p. 15.
76 ákrti-vacanah iabdah tat-saha-caritârri vyaktir
Jaimini, quoted in Mimârnsâ-koia, Vol. II, p. 78
77 vyakter laksanayâ bodhah Khan^adeva in his
koia, Vol. II, p. 806.
78 Kâvya-prakàia (Gajendra), p. 35.
79 sàmânâdhikaranyâdi ca... laksanayâ kalpya
Tantra-vàrttika, quoted in Mimânisà-koia, Vol. I
80 vyakter laksanayâ bodhah... sâmânàdhikarany
in his Bhàtta-dîpika, quoted in Mimàrjîsâ-kosa, V
81 sâmânàdhikaranyam bhinna-pravrtti-nimittànàm
Somesvara in his Nyâya-sudhâ, quoted in Mimâm
82 tulyarji kriyâ ity anayos tu padayoh irutyaiv
on Mahà-bhâfya, Vol. II, p. 533. This is a very co
is no reason to believe that Mammaja held this
Mammata for considering that the individua
(arthâpatti), and he admits that the Nyâya view t
are both primarily signified is the most satis
82-3.
This is also the criticism of Arjunwadkar and Mangrulkar against Mammata. Kâvya
prakàia (Arjun), Notes, p. 280-1. Mahà-bhâfya discusses a view called guna-vàda,
which holds that a property alone is the primary meaning of a word. Thus the words
virah purusah "a brave man" primarily mean, according to this view, "brave-ness"
(viratva) and "man-ness" (purufatva). Co-referentiality (sâmânâdhikarartya) of the
two expressions could be, then, explained only by taking recourse to the individual
which is the common locus of these two properties, but which is by itself not primarily
signified, [avâcyasyâpy upakârakatvam àiriyate Pradipa on Mahâ-bhâfya]. See:
Samarthàhnika, Text, p. 24 and Trans, p. 153-4.
83 játi-guna-viiisfa-vyakti-vacanatvena iuddha-vyakti-vacanatvena vâ pratyakse bhavati
sâmânàdhikaranyam Kumárila in Tantra-vàrttika, quoted in Mimàrrisâ-koia, Vol. II,
p. 793.
84 yasyaiva hy ârthatayopamâyà àrthatvarfi, tasyaiva irautatayà irautatvaucityât / kirji
ca sâdharmyam evopameti tasyaiva irautatvârthatvâbhyâm upamâ-bhedo yuktah / ata
eva "yathâdinà sàdriya-rûpafi sambandha eva sàksàd abhidhiyate, çaslhivat, tulyâdibhis
tu dharmy api" iti vyàkhyànam anupàdeyaml Sudhâsâgara on Kâvya-prakàia, Kâvya
prakàia (Sudhâ,) p. 553-4. The only difference between view A as discussed in this
paper and the view rejected by Sudhâ-sàgara is that, according to view A words like
tulya primarily signify only the individual or 'something similar' and not the property
of similarity. According to the view rejected by Sudhâ-sàgara, words like tulya seem
to signify .both, the individual and the property. Note the expression dharmy api "also
the property-possesser". However, the interpretation supported by Sudhâ-sàgara is
view B, which I believe is the view of Mammata.
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ON THE NOTION OF SIMILARITY IN INDIAN POETICS

Author(s): MADHAV DESHPANDE

ON THE NOTION OF SIMILARITY IN

1.1. The concept of similarity is one of the most fundamenta

2. Sàdharmya and sâdrsya: two relations

Journal of Indian Philosophy 2 (1972) 21-52. All Rights Reserved

SDH is a relation which has the common property (samàna-dharma

SDR is a relation which has the object of comparison as its subjunct an

The definition D-l states that SDH is a relation of the ob

2.2. Two recent editors of Kávya-prakása, Arjunwadkar and

My English paraphrase of the original Marafhl is rather more for

properties, while the opposite relation of VDH (vaidhar

2.5. Though the resulting cognitive relation of SDR is

Let us suppose that the entity E has the prope

2.6. Actually, this demonstration only explains the objective factor

ing the objective data and the personal inclination, he may

3. SÂDHARMYA AND SÂDRÎYA IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEMS

3.2. Bhïmàcârya Jhalkikar provides interesting information about these

property or a generic property" (which is accepted as an ontological

3.3. It is often maintained in the Nyàya school that the determination

Logical reasoning attempts to establish facts by taking recourse to examples based on

In the Nyàya school, the logical fallacy of false analogy is termed as

B also must have P2. This makes it clear how entiti

3.6. Finally I would like to point out an interesting discussion by the

The author envisions a philosophical problem. No two entities have

4. The definition of upamâ: "comparison"

4.1. After studying the notions of SDH and SDR, it is profi

individuals outside the definiendum, and obviously it

[1] If there is SDR, then in that instance, there mu

4.4. Now, let us consider the nature of upamâ "comparison" as a poetic

4.5. There is in fact no need to go into such dubious examples. Even in

upamá can be formulated as hrdyam sâdharmyam "charmin

5. Available definitions of upamà in

5.1. As stated in Section 4.1, what is given in the last

Sáhiíya-darpana. Visvanâtha uses the term sâmya in his definition

and stupidity etc. This leads to the similarity of Vâhi

6. The SrautI-arthI classification of upamâ

6.1. There are several ways of classifying upamâ. The sraut

6.2.3. Vidyânàtha, in his Pratápa-rudriya, holds this view. I quote from

de ressemblance. Elle est dit ârthi, "provenant de sens", quand il

The contrast between the ways similarity is signified is

Vupamâ est dite srauti quand il y a appréhension de l'idée de res

Mallinâtha, in his commentary Tarala on Ekdvali, exp

6.2.4. Recently, two editors of an excellent Marâthï ed

Though it is true that words normally signify meanings by their p

The fantastic extravagance of this explanation is obviou

in the history of grammar and poetics ever meant anything myster

6.3.1. Before going into the exposition of View B, it is necessary to tak

6.3.2. In actual experience of an entity as a relatum, there are several

6.3.3. According to the theory of primary signification of a nominal

expresses an individual entity (vyakti) qualified by a class-p

6.3.4. The quality-words (guna-vacana) have been subject

6.3.5. With this background, let us consider the signification of

6.3.6. In the consideration of the indeclinables like iva "like", the

this reason, it could be concluded that the particles li

6.3.7. This last difference explains why only words lik

6.3.8. With this analysis, let us look into the history o

primary signification function itself.65 áabara says that that which is

6.3.9. From this discussion, it is clear that if a word directly expresses

Since the word tulya "similar" directly expresses tulyatá "similarity"

7. Srauti-arthi classification IN MAMMATA

7.1. After a general discussion of this classification, and after expressing

7.2. As 1 have shown in Sections 5.3-4, Mammata believes in the differ