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28 RESERVATION ID 156144050581
68062320v1
NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.7
1 TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:
January 14, 2021, at 8:30 a.m.
2 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on a date and time to be determined1 or as soon thereafter
3 as this matter may be heard in Department 37 of the above-entitled Court, located at 111 N. Hill
4 Street, Los Angeles, California 90012, Defendants Religious Technology Center (“RTC”) and
5 Church of Scientology International (“CSI” and collectively with RTC, the “Defendants”) will and
6 hereby do move the Court for an Order imposing monetary sanctions jointly and severally on
7 Plaintiff Valerie Haney, her counsel Robert M. Thompson, and Mr. Thompson’s law firm,
8 Thompson Law Offices, P.C.,2 pursuant to Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 128.7 in the amount of $160,220
9 for (1) reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred and anticipated to be incurred by Defendants in
10 connection with opposing Plaintiff’s meritless motion for reconsideration; and (2) reasonable
11 attorney’s fees and costs incurred and anticipated to be incurred by Defendants for filing and arguing
12 this motion to address Plaintiff’s violation of Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 128.7.
13 This motion is based upon the following grounds: on March 3, 2020, Plaintiff filed in this
14 action a motion for reconsideration of this Court’s January 30, 2020 ruling granting the motions of
15 Defendants to compel religious arbitration. The claims, defenses, and other legal contentions made
16 in Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration are not warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous
17 argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new
18 law. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 128.7(b)(2). Moreover, the allegations and other factual contentions of
19 Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration do not have evidentiary support. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code
20 § 128.7(b)(3). In addition, Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration violates the requirements of Cal.
21 Civ. Proc. Code § 1008 for motions for reconsideration and is therefore sanctionable under Cal. Civ.
23
24 1
Due to the COVID-19 orders in place, it is not currently possible for Defendants to reserve a
hearing date for this motion. Defendants understand that the Court will select a hearing date and
25
request that this motion be set for August 11, 2020 at 1:30 p.m. to be heard concurrently with
26 Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration.
2
Sanctions may be awarded against Plaintiff Valerie Haney if this Court finds a violation of Cal.
27
Civ. Proc. Code § 128.7(b)(3). If the Court finds only a violation of Cal. Civ. Proc. Code
28 § 128.7(b)(2), then sanctions should be awarded against Plaintiff’s counsel. See id. § 128.7(d)(1).
68062320v1 2
NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.7
1 Prior to filing this motion, Defendants complied with Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 128.7(c)(1) by
2 personally delivering this motion to Plaintiff’s counsel of record on June 25, 2020. The facts
3 supporting Defendants’ compliance with Code of Civil Procedure § 128.7(c)(1) are set forth in the
5 This motion is based upon this notice of motion and motion, the attached memorandum of
6 points and authorities; the declarations of Matthew D. Hinks and William H. Forman3 filed herewith;
8 William H. Forman, Lynn R. Farny, Deidre Assam, Gary S. Soter, and Michael Sutter, filed in
9 connection with Defendants’ opposition to the motion for reconsideration; the [proposed] order
10 submitted herewith; the case files herein; and such other evidence and argument as may be permitted
12
14
JEFFER MANGELS BUTLER & SCHEPER KIM & HARRIS LLP
15 MITCHELL LLP
16
17 By:_________________________________ By:_________________________________
MATTHEW D. HINKS WILLIAM H. FORMAN
18 Attorneys for Defendant RELIGIOUS Attorneys for Defendant CHURCH OF
TECHNOLOGY CENTER SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
3
Defendants use the abbreviation, “Forman 128.7 Decl.” to refer to the attached Declaration of
28 William H. Forman. The Declaration of William H. Forman filed with Defendants’ opposition to
Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration is referred to herein as the, “Forman Decl.”.
68062320v1 3
NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.7
1 TABLE OF CONTENTS
2 Page
3 I. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................7
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68062320v1 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.7
1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
2 Page(s)
3 Cases
19 LeFrancois v. Goel,
35 Cal. 4th 1094 (2005)..........................................................................................................7, 18
20
In re Marriage of Green,
21
213 Cal. App. 3d 14 (1989) ..........................................................................................................9
22
In re Marriage of Herr,
23 174 Cal. App. 4th 1463 (2009) ...................................................................................................18
68062320v1 5
NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.7
1 Schiffer v. CBS Corp.,
240 Cal. App. 4th 246 (2015) .....................................................................................................11
2
Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp.,
3 929 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1990) ....................................................................................................10
4
Young v. Rosenthal,
5 212 Cal. App. 3d 96 (1989) ..........................................................................................................9
6 Statutes
14 Other Authorities
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
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68062320v1 6
NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.7
1 I. INTRODUCTION
2 Plaintiff opposed Defendants’ Motions to Compel Arbitration with blatant, demonstrable
3 lies. This Court was not distracted by those tactics and rightfully ordered the enforcement of the
4 various arbitration agreements she signed. Now Plaintiff has returned to this Court to repeat some
5 of her old lies, together with some new ones, in the form of a Motion for Reconsideration. If there
6 is ever an instance that warranted imposition of significant monetary sanctions under Code of Civil
7 Procedure § 128.7, this is it. Plaintiff and her counsel finally must learn that repeated attempts to
8 mislead this Court will not be tolerated. As shown below and in the accompanying opposition of
9 Defendants4 to the motion for reconsideration, Plaintiff’s motion is based upon the falsehood that it
10 is supported by new facts and new law. That falsehood is easily exposed.
11 For reconsideration to be appropriate, Plaintiff had to demonstrate either (1) new facts that
12 could not have been discovered with reasonable diligence or new law that warrants changes to the
13 Court’s order, Civ. Proc. Code § 1008 or (2) an error by this Court based on the record before it on
14 the original motion. LeFrancois v. Goel, 35 Cal. 4th 1094 (2005). Plaintiff’s motion for
15 reconsideration misleads the Court and does not even facially satisfy these requirements. Most
16 notably:
17 The central “new documents” to Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration were filed in this
18 case and/or quoted by Plaintiff in her complaint. Plaintiff’s counsel’s claim that these
19 documents were “unknown and unavailable” to Plaintiff is false.
20 The central “new witness” who “contacted” Plaintiff’s counsel after the hearing on the
21 motion to compel arbitration, sits on a Board of Directors with three of Plaintiff’s lawyers
22 in this case, and co-hosted a television show on which Plaintiff and her counsel have
24 Of the nine “new” documents Plaintiff submits to the Court as a basis for reconsideration,
25 two were filed by Defendants in this action prior to the hearing, one is cited in
26 Plaintiff’s complaint, one contains facts alleged in Plaintiff’s complaint, and four are
27
4
28 Religious Technology Center (“RTC”) and Church of Scientology International (“CSI” and
collectively with RTC, the “Defendants”) jointly bring this motion for sanctions.
68062320v1 7
NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.7
1 available in the public record, including on websites Plaintiff’s counsel has visited and
3 to those at issue here. Plaintiff makes no argument based on the remaining document.
4 The previously un-asserted legal arguments are based on existing case law and known
5 facts. Indeed, the most recent case cited in Plaintiff’s Memorandum is from 2016.
6 It is no secret that a motion for reconsideration can only be based upon “new or different
7 facts, circumstances, or law.” Any reasonable attorney would agree that Plaintiff’s fundamentally-
8 dishonest motion for reconsideration does not come close to meeting this standard. Plaintiff and her
9 counsel’s abuse of this Court, the law, and the truth must end now. They should be made to pay in
10 full Defendants’ fees and costs in bringing this motion, and in opposing the motion for
11 reconsideration, so that they finally may be discouraged from their contemptuous behavior.
14 CSI and a member of the Sea Organization, Scientology’s dedicated religious order. (Declaration of
15 Matthew D. Hinks (“Hinks Decl.”) ¶ 2.) Over the years, Plaintiff executed a number of agreements,
16 including a Staff Departure Agreement she executed in 2017, in which she agreed to arbitrate any
17 dispute she may ever have with Defendants or any other Scientology entity or official. (Id., ¶ 3.) On
18 August 1, 2019—just over a month after Plaintiff filed this lawsuit—Defendants’ counsel apprised
19 Plaintiffs’ counsel of the agreements. (Id., ¶ 3.) After Plaintiff refused to dismiss this lawsuit and
20 pursue her claims through arbitration, Defendants, on December 20, 2019, filed motions to compel
21 religious arbitration. (Id., ¶ 3.) The hearing on the motions took place on January 30, 2020, at the
22 conclusion of which the Court granted the motions, ordered the action stayed pending the
24 Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s arbitration ruling on March 3, 2020.
25 (Id., ¶ 5.) RTC thereafter prepared and served this motion on June 25, 2020. (Id., ¶ 5.) Plaintiff’s
26 deadline to withdraw or correct the motion pursuant to the 21-day “safe harbor” provision of Cal.
27 Civ. Proc. Code § 128.7(c)(1) was July 17, 2020. (Id., ¶ 5.)
28
68062320v1 8
NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.7
1 III. ARGUMENT
2 A. Legal Standards
3 Pursuant to Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 128.7 (sometimes, “Section 128.7”), a court may impose
4 sanctions for filing a pleading if the court concludes the pleading was filed for an improper purpose
5 or was indisputably without merit, either legally or factually. See Peake v. Underwood, 227 Cal.
6 App. 4th 428, 440 (2014). Recognizing that frivolous motions for reconsideration are necessarily
8 that a violation of the statute may be punished with sanctions as allowed by Section 128.7. Cal. Civ.
9 Proc. Code § 1008(d). Young v. Rosenthal, 212 Cal. App. 3d 96, 123 (1989) (sanctions appropriate
10 where reconsideration motion was “clearly frivolous”); In re Marriage of Green, 213 Cal. App. 3d
12 Section 128.7 mandates that every pleading, including motions and other papers filed in
13 court, “shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney’s individual name ….” Cal.
14 Civ. Proc. Code § 128.7(a). By signing, filing and later advocating the motion or other paper, an
15 attorney “is certifying that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed
17 “The claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law
or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law
18 or the establishment of new law” and
19 “The allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically
so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for
20 further investigation or discovery.”
21 Id. §§ 128.7(b)(2), (3). In other words, an attorney filing a motion in court makes, as relevant to this
22 motion, substantive certifications as to both fact and law. See Peake, 227 Cal. App. 4th at 440 (“A
23 claim is factually frivolous if it is ‘not well grounded in fact’ and it is legally frivolous if it is ‘not
24 warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of
25 existing law.’”). A violation of either of these certifications as to fact or law warrants the imposition
26 of sanctions. Eichenbaum v. Alon, 106 Cal. App. 4th 967, 976 (2003).
27 Section 128.7 imposes an affirmative duty on an attorney to investigate both law and fact to
28 prevent frivolous claims and arguments and costly, meritless motion practice. See Laborde v.
68062320v1 9
NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.7
1 Aronson, 92 Cal. App. 4th 459, 465-66 (2001) (disapproved on other grounds). Sanctions are
2 appropriate where a “reasonable inquiry into facts” would have revealed the claim to be without
3 merit. Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Comm. Enter., Inc., 498 US 533, 550 (1991). Townsend v.
4 Holman Consulting Corp., 929 F.2d 1358, 1364 (9th Cir. 1990) (“reasonable inquiry” means an
5 inquiry reasonable under “all the circumstances of a case”); see also Eichenbaum, 106 Cal. App.
6 4th at 975 (Section 128.7 “modeled” on Rule 11; “California courts may look to federal decisions
7 interpreting the federal rule” when examining Section 128.7). A reasonable inquiry requires an
8 attorney to “take into account [the adverse party’s] evidence.” Peake, 227 Cal. App. 4th at 441.
9 Thus, sanctions should be imposed where a litigant continues to argue facts and law after the moving
10 party demonstrates in a motion brought under Section 128.7 that “the specific factual and legal
11 grounds supporting his position that [the party’s] claims [a]re without merit.” Id. at 448-49.
13 under Section 128.7 are warranted where “the party’s conduct in asserting the claim [i]s objectively
14 unreasonable.” Peake, 227 Cal. App. 4th at 440; Bockrath v. Aldrich Chem. Co., Inc., 21 Cal. 4th
15 71, 82 (1991) (“The actual belief standard requires more than a hunch, a speculative belief, or
16 wishful thinking: it requires a well-founded belief.”). A party moving for reconsideration based on
17 new facts must meet a “strict requirement of diligence” and establish “a satisfactory explanation for
18 failing to provide the evidence earlier.” Garcia v. Hejmadi, 58 Cal. App. 4th 674, 690 (1997). These
19 standards must be taken into account to determine whether Plaintiff’s motion is frivolous.
20 Regardless of whether any of Plaintiff’s evidence is new (it is not), Plaintiff does not even
21 attempt to show that she diligently pursued obtaining the evidence submitted with her motion (even
22 though her counsel was put on notice by Defendants on August 1, 2019 that Plaintiff’s claims were
24 that she has presented new evidence, and was diligent in pursuing the new evidence, is manifest.
25 Plaintiff does not even attempt to justify her failure to raise new legal arguments previously, or her
26 re-raising of arguments the Court has already rejected. Both the factual and legal contentions thus
27 are objectively unreasonable for a motion for reconsideration and warrant sanctions.
28
68062320v1 10
NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.7
1 B. Sanctions Are Warranted Here Under Because Plaintiff’s Memorandum Is
2 Founded Upon Three Frivolous and Easily Disprovable Factual Contentions
3 Sanctions are warranted here under these standards because Plaintiff’s Memorandum5 is
4 built upon a foundation of mistruths. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that three supposedly new facts
5 (i.e., facts that Plaintiff “did not know, and could not know (without discovery)” (Pl.’s Mem. 6:22-
6 27), justify reconsideration of the Court’s arbitration ruling under Code of Civil Procedure § 1008:
7 1. that Plaintiff had been declared a “suppressive person” before she signed the Staff Departure
Agreement, (Pl.’s Mem. 3:5-6) (“Factual Contention 1”);
8
2. that she had been terminated by Defendants before she signed the Staff Departure
9
Agreement, (id., 3:2-5) (“Factual Contention 2”); and
10
3. “that Defendants misrepresented to this Court that the ‘so-called’ arbitration is an avenue
11 for Plaintiff to seek justice when they knew it was not, but really a ‘Committee of
Evidence,’” (id., 6:22-27) (“Factual Contention 3”).
12
The evidence, however, disproves Plaintiff’s contention that this supposed evidence is new. In
13
particular, the evidence shows that Plaintiff’s bogus “new” facts fall into two categories: (A) facts
14
Plaintiff did know before the January 30, 2020 hearing or (B) facts Plaintiff unquestionably could
15
have discovered with reasonable diligence before the hearing on the arbitration motion.
16
1. The Fitness Board Turndown Is Not New Evidence
17
Plaintiff had actual knowledge of Factual Contentions 1 and 2 before the January 30, 2020
18
hearing on Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration, and that the evidence is not “new” within the
19
meaning of Section 1008. See Schiffer v. CBS Corp., 240 Cal. App. 4th 246, 254-55 (2015) (evidence
20
known to a party prior to the hearing on the motion and issuance of the challenged order is not
21
new evidence under Section 1008); New York Times Co. v. Superior Court, 135 Cal. App. 4th 206,
22
208 (2005) (same). There can be no reasonable debate about this since Plaintiff argues in the
23
Memorandum that she learned the facts from the Fitness Board Turndown (“FBT”), and RTC filed
24
and served the FBT in connection with another motion prior to the arbitration motion hearing. In
25
fact, at the January 30 hearing, Plaintiff’s counsel made the exact same arguments based on the FBT
26
27 5
As Defendants observed in their oppositions to the motion for reconsideration, Plaintiff failed to
28 file a notice of her motion and, instead, filed only a memorandum for reconsideration (the
“Memorandum”). The Memorandum is a “similar paper” within the meaning of Section 128.7(a).
68062320v1 11
NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.7
1 that Plaintiff’s Memorandum argues here. (Declaration of William H. Forman (“Forman Decl.”),
2 Ex. A (Hearing Tr.) at 3:12-4:10 (arguing he discovered Plaintiff had been declared a suppressive
3 person before she signed the Departure Agreement from the FBT)). Because Plaintiff had the FBT
4 and made arguments based on it at the hearing, it is not a “new” fact under Section 1008. Not
5 surprisingly, there is no declaration from Plaintiff stating that she was not aware of the FBT. The
6 truth is that Plaintiff reviewed the FBT when she left CSI’s staff in 2017. (Declarations of Michael
7 Sutter, at ¶ 5, Deidre Assam, at ¶ 5.) Because Plaintiff’s counsel possessed the FBT and made the
8 same arguments at the hearing, Plaintiff’s request for reconsideration under Section 1008 based
11 deny arbitration rests on a lie. Plaintiff misrepresents the meaning of the FBT. Her Memorandum
12 falsely states that “Plaintiff was declared an enemy of Scientology (“suppressive person”)
13 approximately a week before she signed the ‘Staff Departure Agreement.’” (Pl.’s Mem. 3:5-6.)
14 However, the FBT does not declare Plaintiff a suppressive person. It states that if she takes certain
15 actions “she is subject to declare.” (Rinder Decl. Ex. G (emphasis added)). A reasonable
16 investigation—i.e., asking one’s own client whether she had been declared a suppressive person at
17 the time she signed the Departure Agreement—would have revealed to Plaintiff’s counsel that the
18 underlying “fact” is untrue. Certainly, no reasonable lawyer could persist in making such a
19 contention when the evidence has proven it false. See Peake, 227 Cal. App. 4th at 448-49 (attorney
21 What’s more, the allegations of the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) show that Plaintiff
22 assumed she had been declared a suppressive person through her own actions. The FAC alleges
23 “Defendants declare anyone who flees or speaks out against Scientology a suppressive person.”
24 (FAC ¶ 33.) While Defendants dispute Plaintiff’s allegation, given that she alleged she “escaped”
25 Scientology (FAC ¶ 60), by her allegations she assumed she would have been “declared” long before
26 her counsel seized upon that false assumption (without apparently checking with his client) as
27 somehow significant. Nor can Plaintiff claim that the Memorandum’s false allegations regarding
28 the so-called “Fair Game” policy were unknown to her earlier. Indeed, Plaintiff included detailed
68062320v1 12
NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.7
1 allegations concerning “Fair Gaming” in her FAC. (See FAC ¶¶ 32-43.) Moreover, although her
2 Memorandum “cites” to the Declarations of Mr. Thompson, Mr. Rinder, and Ms. Whitfield for the
3 supposedly new “facts,” the content is copied nearly verbatim from the Complaint in the case Bixler,
4 et al. v. Church of Scientology, et al., LASC Case No. 19STCV29458 (“Bixler Case”) – drafted by
5 her counsel and filed on August 22, 2019. The Memorandum even includes the original footnotes
6 from the Bixler Complaint. (Compare Pl.’s Mem. 3:6-21 with Forman Decl. Ex. K (Bixler Compl.)
7 ¶¶ 37-40, 47.)
10 Nor is Factual Contention 3 new. Plaintiff claims she learned the basis for this contention
11 from former Scientologists—i.e., Rinder and Whitfield—who allegedly contacted her counsel
12 following the January 30 hearing and provided her new information. (Thompson Decl. ¶ 5.) Based
13 upon the supposedly new information, Plaintiff argues that reconsideration is warranted because
14 “Defendants have materially misrepresented to this Court what the ‘so-called’ arbitration entails.”
15 (Pl.’s Mem. 9:28-10:1.) Not surprisingly, the Memorandum does not cite to a single statement by
16 Defendants or their counsel regarding the arbitration procedures, much less demonstrate its falsity.
17 But more troubling, Plaintiff conceals from the Court material facts, which show that (1)
18 her contention that the evidence is “new”; and (2) her counsel’s suggestion that he was contacted
19 out of the blue by Mr. Rinder, are lies. Plaintiff has long been affiliated with Mr. Rinder and her
20 “legal team” knew of Mr. Rinder long before he “contacted” Plaintiff’s counsel after the January 30
21 hearing.6 (Thompson Dec. ¶ 5.) The evidence is overwhelming; Mr. Thompson’s claim that, after
22 the arbitration hearing, he “and/or other members of Plaintiff’s legal team” were suddenly contacted
23 by Mr. Rinder is flat out untrue. The reality is that Plaintiff and her counsel are associates of Mr.
24 Rinder. Plaintiff worked with Rinder on an anti-Scientology television series, Leah Remini:
25
26
6
Plaintiff’s counsel also knew of Ms. Whitfield prior to the arbitration motion hearing, having
27 spoken at the same anti-religious conference. (Forman Decl. Ex. S.) In any event, the information
2 Leah Remini, and Plaintiff was Ms. Remini’s personal assistant. (Farny Decl. ¶¶ 5-6; FAC ¶ 69.)
3 Plaintiff also appeared over the past two years on three episodes of the Aftermath with Mr. Rinder;
4 and Plaintiff’s counsel, Marci Hamilton, appeared on another episode with Mr. Rinder in August
5 2019. Id. Mr. Rinder also sits on the Board of Directors of Child USA, a non-profit lobbying
6 organization. (Forman Decl. Ex. R.) That board contains 7 members, including Mr. Rinder and 3
7 of Plaintiff’s attorneys of record here: Marci Hamilton, Jeffrey Fritz and Brian Kent. (Id.) Ms.
9 In short, Mr. Rinder, Plaintiff and her lawyers know each other well and have known each
10 other for some time. Where the movant “undoubtedly possessed the means to” contact potential
11 witnesses and obtain testimony from them previously and chose not to, the testimony is not “new”
12 evidence on a motion for reconsideration. New York Times Co., 135 Cal. App. 4th at 214; Jones v.
13 P.S. Dev. Co., Inc., 166 Cal. App. 4th 707, 725 (2008). Because Plaintiff and her counsel could have
14 presented a declaration from Mr. Rinder with her opposition to the motions to compel arbitration, it
15 cannot be the basis for a motion for reconsideration. No reasonable lawyer could present the Rinder
16 Declaration as “new” evidence. The contention that it is new shows counsel’s brazen willingness to
18 Even further, Mr. Rinder provided two publicly-available declarations in 2013 and 2014 in
19 the lawsuit entitled, Garcia v. Church of Scientology Flag Service Org., Inc., M.D. Fla., No. 8:13-
21 Decl. ¶¶ 13, 17, Exs. L, P (Dkt. # 95 & 133-1)). Defendants cited to the Garcia Case in their motions
22 to compel arbitration and argued them at length. (CSI MTC Arb. at 17:9-14 & 23:2-9; RTC MTC
23 Arb. at 15:13-18, 16:16-22, 19:22-20:5, 20:25-21:5.) Even in the very unlikely event Plaintiff’s
24 counsel could legitimately claim that they had no actual knowledge of the Garcia Case before the
25 January 30 hearing, a reasonable investigation would have uncovered it given (1) that Defendants
26 cited it prominently in their motions to compel arbitration and (2) Rinder’s close affiliation with
27 Plaintiff and her counsel. Mr. Rinder’s declarations in the Garcia Case contain the same information
28 (at times, verbatim), as Mr. Rinder’s declaration here. (Compare Thompson Decl. Ex. 5 (Rinder
68062320v1 14
NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.7
1 Decl.) ¶¶ 2, 9, 11, 13, 16.a., 16.b., 16.c., 16.d., 18 with Forman Decl. Ex. P (Rinder Decl. Dkt. #
2 133-1) ¶¶ 1, 4, 3, 5, 6.a., 6.b., 6.c., 6.g., 11 & id., Ex. L (Rinder Decl. Dkt. # 95) ¶¶ 8.a., 8.b., 8.c.)7
3 Indeed, even without contacting Rinder or Whitfield, Plaintiff could have presented the
4 information she claims is “new” in her original opposition: Nearly all of the information was either
6 the Garcia Case and on websites Plaintiff’s counsel has visited. Mr. Rinder and Ms. Whitfield assert
7 that the applicable arbitration procedures (to which Plaintiff objects) are contained in Introduction
8 to Scientology Ethics. (Rinder Ex. C, and HCO Policy Letter of 7 September 1963, Rinder Ex. D;
9 Rinder Decl. ¶¶ 16-17, 19, 21; Whitfield Decl. ¶ 7.) Plaintiff’s counsel quoted Introduction to
10 Scientology Ethics in the Complaint in the Bixler Case. (Forman Decl. Ex. K (Bixler Compl.) ¶ 27,
11 p. 7, n.5.)) CSI also submitted the HCO Policy Letter of 7 Sept. 1963 as an exhibit to its motion to
12 compel arbitration. (Id., Ex. E (Farny Decl. Ex. 6)). Exhibit 4 to the Thompson Decl., Exhibit A to
13 the Whitfield Decl., and Exhibits A, C and D to the Rinder Decl. were all filed in the Garcia Case.
14 (Forman Dec Ex. L, M, N, O.) Similarly, with regard to Rinder Decl. Ex. E, Plaintiff’s counsel
15 visited the same main webpage, Scientologynews.org, on August 13, 2019 to access a different
16 “frequently asked question.” (Forman Decl. Ex. K (Bixler Compl.) p. 12, n.20.) The FBT (Exh. G
17 to the Rinder Decl.), was filed by RTC before, and argued by Thompson at the January 30 hearing.
18 It was also shown to Plaintiff in 2017. (Sutter Decl. ¶ 5, Assam Decl. ¶ 5.) Plaintiff makes no
19 substantive argument regarding the one remaining document, Rinder Decl. Ex. F, which she could
21 Moreover, Factual Contention 3 is premised upon three additional purported facts, all of
22
7
Defendants’ motions to compel arbitration explained that the Garcia court rejected the Garcia
23 plaintiffs’ unconscionability challenge “to arbitration provisions which were the same and/or very
24 similar to which Plaintiff agreed” and the Garcia plaintiffs’ “objections to Scientology procedures.”
(CSI MTC Arb. at 17:10-14 & 23:2-9.) Accordingly, the motions alerted Plaintiff and her counsel
25 that the Garcia Case considered—and rejected—the exact arguments concerning the exact topics
that Plaintiff seeks to make on reconsideration. Surely a reasonable investigation would have led
26 Plaintiff’s counsel to review the Garcia Case PACER file before they claimed in this Court that the
information from that case was “new.” Of course, this is all academic because it is a certainty that
27 Plaintiff’s counsel was aware of the Garcia Case prior to the hearing on the reconsideration motions.
28 In fact, Plaintiff’s lawyer, Ms. Hamilton, appeared on a podcast during which the host of the podcast
described the Garcia Case to her. (Forman Decl. ¶ 21, Ex. T.)
68062320v1 15
NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.7
1 which were also known to Plaintiff and her lawyers well before the January 30 hearing: (1) the
2 purported “Fair Game” policy and the Church’s alleged treatment of suppressive persons, (Pl.’s
3 Mem. at 3:2-4:11); (2) that Scientology arbitration “is a proceeding known as a ‘Committee of
5 Ethics,” (id. at 4:13-5:15); and (3) that the procedures require the arbitrators to be Scientologists in
6 good standing, (id. at 10:23-11:2, 11:22-25). As to her claims about “Fair Game” and the treatment
7 of suppressive persons, Plaintiff’s Complaint and the Complaint in the Bixler Case make the same
8 allegations as her Memorandum, often verbatim. (Compare Pl.’s Mem. 3:6-21 with Forman Decl.
9 Ex. K (Bixler Compl.) ¶¶ 37-40, 47 & id., Ex. B (Haney FAC) ¶¶ 32-42 & id., Ex. C (Haney Compl.)
10 ¶¶ 69-76.) The Memorandum itself admits that Plaintiff knew these “facts.” (Pl.’s Mem. at 4:8-10
11 (“Plaintiff knew what it meant to be declared a ‘suppressive person’ and that she would be subjected
12 to ‘Fair Gaming.’”)). Second, as to her claims about the Committee of Evidence procedures,
13 Plaintiff’s counsel already possessed the publication Introduction to Scientology Ethics (as reflected
14 by the fact that her counsel quoted from it in the Bixler complaint) and HCO Policy Letter of 7
15 September 1963, which describe the procedures for a Committee of Evidence. (Forman Decl. Ex. K
16 (Bixler Compl.) p. 7, n.5; id., Ex. E (CSI MTC Farny Decl. Ex. 6)). Further information concerning
17 the procedures for a Scientology religious arbitration was also available on the docket in the Garcia
18 Case. (Id., Ex. Q (Garcia Dkt. # 91)). Third, as to her claims about the arbitrators being
19 Scientologists in good standing, Plaintiff argued this fact in her oppositions to the arbitration
20 motions. Indeed, it is a provision plainly disclosed in the arbitration agreements upon which
21 Defendants moved to compel. (Pl.’s Opp. at 4:3-12; see also id. at 6:17-19.)
22 In short, Mr. Rinder is not a “new” witness, and “facts” regarding the procedures for
23 Scientology arbitration are not “new” facts. With even a modicum of diligence, these arguments
24 could have been presented in Plaintiff’s original opposition. Her request for reconsideration based
25 on these purported “new facts” is without factual or legal basis, and is, therefore, frivolous.
26 Moreover, even if the facts were new, Plaintiff’s claims concerning the nature of
27 Scientology’s arbitration procedures are false and misrepresented, and therefore do not warrant
28
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NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.7
1 reconsideration in any event.8 Plaintiff claims that Scientology arbitration is the same as a
3 and Rinder Declaration Exhibit D, “Committees of Evidence,” to argue that Scientology arbitration
4 charges certain offenses against an “interested party” and that the body adjudicating the dispute is
5 selected by a “Convening Authority” and can be dissolved by the Convening Authority, which in
6 turn is “ultimately subject to the International Justice Chief.” (Pl.’s Mem. at 4:13-25.)9 But what
8 arbitration is just that: an arbitration. In fact, the arbitration provisions of the Agreements that
9 Plaintiff executed spell out how the arbitration is to be conducted, including the method of selection
10 of arbitrators, who may serve as an arbitrator, and the scope of the arbitration. (Forman Decl. Ex. E
11 (CSI MTC Farny Decl.) ¶ 14, Ex. 7 at ¶ 6.d.) See Garcia v. Church of Scientology Flag Srvc. Org.,
12 Inc., No. 8:13-cv-10844160, 2015 WL 10844160, at *6-*8, *9 n.11 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 13, 2015)
14 Justice Chief (“IJC”) Michael Ellis taken in the Garcia Case, which Plaintiff selectively quotes in
15 excerpts, sources such as Introduction to Scientology Ethics and “Committees of Evidence” are used
16 to supplement the agreed-upon arbitration provisions with procedural rules, such as “the system of
17 getting evidence, the system of interviewing witnesses.” (Thompson Decl. Ex. 4 at 115:2-4.) But
18 the rules for selecting the arbitrators and to vest authority in the panel of arbitrators (and not in the
19 IJC) to make a final, binding decision are as set forth in Plaintiff’s agreements with the Church.
20 These arbitration rules are “different procedure[s]” than for addressing a matter of internal discipline
21
22 8
Plaintiff claims that suppressive persons cannot participate in Scientology arbitration. This
23 allegedly new fact is untrue; indeed, suppressive persons can—and have (the Garcias)—participated
in Scientology arbitration. (Farny Decl. ¶¶ 3-4.)
24 9
As noted above, Defendants previously explained to this Court and the Garcia court that
25 Scientology has developed its own “internal justice and dispute resolution structure,” referred to in
Plaintiff’s Agreements as “Scientology’s internal Ethics, Justice, and binding arbitration
26 procedures.” (Forman Decl. Ex. E (CSI MTC Farny Decl.) ¶ 14, Ex. 7 at ¶ 6.d.) Defendants did so
through specific reference to Introduction to Scientology Ethics and “a fact finding body called a
27 Committee of Evidence.” (Id., ¶¶ 18 & 20.) CSI also submitted to the Court the Scientology
28 document setting forth the procedures for a Committee of Evidence. (Id. at Ex. 6.) None of this
evidence is new.
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NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.7
1 through a Committee of Evidence. (Id. at 114:10-23.) Had Plaintiff’s lawyers bothered to look at
2 the Garcia docket, they would have seen that the procedures utilized in connection with internal
3 disciplinary proceedings that they now complain of—such as the vesting of ultimate authority in the
4 IJC—is not how the Garcia arbitration was conducted, where the arbitrators made a binding decision
5 that was contrary to the Church’s position and the final decision was confirmed by a court. Garcia
6 v. Church of Scientology Flag Service Org., Inc., No. 8:13-cv-220-T-27TBM, 2018 WL 3439638
13 (2005). In LeFrancois, the California Supreme Court held that a trial court has inherent authority to
14 reconsider on its own motion prior interim orders. In doing so, however, the Court also held that
15 motions for reconsideration attempting to invoke the Court’s inherent authority are per se improper:
16 [N]othing would prevent the losing party from asking the court at a status conference
to reconsider a ruling. [citation] But a party may not file a written motion to
17 reconsider that has procedural significance if it does not satisfy the requirements of
section 437c, subdivision (f)(2), or 1008. The court need not rule on any suggestions
18
that it should reconsider a previous ruling and, without more, another party would
19 not be expected to respond . . . .
20 Id. at 1108 (emphasis in original). In other words, Plaintiff has filed a brief seeking reconsideration
21 under the very authority that holds that such a tactic is not allowed. Even if it were allowed, the
22 court has inherent authority “on its own motion, to reconsider its prior interim orders so it may
23 correct its own errors.” Le Francois, 35 Cal. 4th at 1107 (emphasis added). “In order to grant
24 reconsideration on its own motion, the trial court must conclude that its earlier ruling was wrong,
25 and change that ruling based on the evidence originally submitted.” In re Marriage of Herr, 174
26 Cal. App. 4th 1463, 1470 (2009) (emphasis original). Yet here, Plaintiff impermissibly requests that
27 the Court reconsider its ruling based on “new evidence” and arguments not presented in the original
68062320v1 18
NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.7
1 2. Plaintiff’s Legal Arguments Concerning the FBT Are Frivolous
2 Plaintiff argues that the FBT provides new evidence that the Staff Departure Agreement was
3 executed under duress and is therefore unconscionable. (Pl.’s Mem. at 7:16-8:19.) In so doing,
4 Plaintiff attempts to prove two things that cannot possible be true at the same time: that (1) she had
5 no knowledge of the FBT prior to the January 30 hearing and it is therefore new evidence, and (2)
6 the existence of the FBT shows that Plaintiff signed the Staff Departure Agreement under duress.
7 But, if she knew of the FBT when she signed the Staff Departure Agreement then by definition it is
8 not new evidence, and, conversely, if it is new and she did not know about the FBT, it is not evidence
10 Moreover, the entirety of the argument concerns only the Staff Departure Agreement. None
11 of Plaintiff’s arguments concerning the FBT affect the several other religious arbitration agreements
12 Plaintiff signed. Yet, the Court ordered arbitration based upon all of them. (January 30 Order at 4-6
13 (citing various agreements to arbitrate); id. at 10 (Plaintiff’s argument concerning her entry into the
14 Staff Departure Agreement “does nothing to show that the earlier agreements were entered into due
15 to duress or coercion” and the Staff Departure Agreement “does not contain language indicating that
17 Further, the “facts” are immaterial to enforcement of the Staff Departure Agreement. The
18 Memorandum argues that Plaintiff being terminated from the Sea Org before she signed the Staff
19 Departure Agreement “mak[es] said agreement a nullity since she was no longer staff and not subject
20 to the requirements of Defendants, including, but not limited to, ‘religious arbitration’
21 requirements.” (Pl.’s Mem. 7:23-26.) The Memorandum cites no authority in support of the claim
22 that the Staff Departure Agreement is now a “nullity.” See Peake, 227 Cal. App. 4th at 443
23 (“argument … not founded on any reasonable legal principles” warrants sanctions under Section
26
10
27 Plaintiff’s contention that she believed she was declared a suppressive person is also disproved
by the transcript of the video taken when Plaintiff signed the Staff Departure Agreement, in which
28 she states that she is a dedicated Scientologist and plans to remain a Scientologist following her staff
departure.
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NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.7
1 of $4500) was not part of the FBT. The Staff Departure Agreement is not a “nullity.”
2 3. Plaintiff’s Legal Arguments Are Not New, and Are Therefore Frivolous
3 Plaintiff reasserts several of the arguments she made in opposition to Defendants’ motions
4 to compel arbitration: (1) that she signed the Staff Departure Agreement under duress, (Pl.’s Mem.
5 7:5-9:27); (2) that she should be entitled to discovery, (Pl.’s Mem. 14:19-15:15)11; and (3) that the
6 arbitration procedures are unconscionable because the arbitrators are Scientologists in good
7 standing, (Pl.’s Mem. 11:2-12:4). Plaintiff’s original opposition already presented these arguments,
8 and the Court already rejected them. (Pl.’s Opp. at 9:12-12:5; id. at 15:4-26; id. at 4:3-12, 6:17-19.)
9 The Memorandum cites the same cases and quotes verbatim from Plaintiff’s original opposition.
10 (Compare, e.g., Mem. 7:11-22 with Pl.’s Opp. 9:19-23 & 10:11-18.) An argument that has been
11 made before and rejected is, by definition, not based on “new or different facts, circumstances, or
12 law” within the meaning of Section 1008 and is therefore frivolous when it is made as part of a
13 motion for reconsideration. Gilberd v. AC Transit, 32 Cal. App. 4th 1494, 1500 (1995).
14 Plaintiff’s Memorandum also improperly includes legal arguments based on known facts
15 and existing law that could have been asserted in her original opposition but were not. Specifically,
16 Plaintiff argues for the first time on reconsideration that enforcement of her agreements to arbitrate
17 violates the free exercise of religion clauses of the Federal and California Constitutions (Pl.’s Mem.
18 12:4-13:24), and public policy (id., 13:25-14:18). The most recent cases Plaintiff cites in support of
19 these arguments are from 2012. Legal arguments that could have been raised in the original briefing,
20 are also, by definition, not new and objectively unreasonable on a motion for reconsideration. See
21 Midwest Television, Inc. v. Scott, Lancaster, Mills & Atha, Inc., 205 Cal. App. 3d 442, 454 (1988).
24 … impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties that have violated
25 subdivision (b) or are responsible for the violation.” Sanctions may include, “the reasonable
26 attorney’s fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation,” which in this case
27
11
28 Plaintiff’s argument that she should be allowed to conduct discovery is inconsistent with her
contention that she has new facts to justify reconsideration.
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NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.7
1 would include the fees and costs incurred by Defendants opposing the motion for reconsideration.
2 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 128.7(d). Moreover, the Court may also award fees and costs for the expense
3 of bringing the sanctions motion. Id. § (c)(1). Here, Defendants have thoroughly documented the
4 frivolousness of Plaintiff’s factual and legal contentions, and, in compliance with Section 128.7(c),
5 provided Plaintiff with a 21-day safe harbor period to withdraw or correct her motion. Plaintiff
6 refused to do so. In these circumstances, Defendants submit that the Court should impose sanctions
7 against Plaintiff and her counsel in the amount of fees and costs incurred by Defendants opposing
8 the motion for reconsideration and preparing and arguing this motion, which totals no less than
9 $160,220. Hinks Decl., ¶¶ 6-9; Forman 128.7 Decl., ¶¶ 2-3. Sanctions are clearly authorized jointly
10 and severally as against Mr. Thompson and his law firm given his violations of the certification
11 requirements of Section 128.7(b)(2) and (b)(3). Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 128.7(c)(1). Sanctions may
12 also be awarded against Plaintiff personally given the violation of Section 128.7(b)(3). See Laborde,
13 92 Cal. App. 4th at 466 (sanctions may be awarded against represented party for violation of
14 subsection (b)(3)).
15 IV. CONCLUSION
16 For all of these reasons, the Court should grant this motion and award sanctions to
17 Defendants and against Plaintiff and her counsel in the amount of $160,220.
19
JEFFER MANGELS BUTLER & SCHEPER KIM & HARRIS LLP
20 MITCHELL LLP
21
By: _________________________________ By:_________________________________
22 MATTHEW D. HINKS WILLIAM H. FORMAN
23 Attorneys for Defendant RELIGIOUS Attorneys for Defendant CHURCH OF
TECHNOLOGY CENTER SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL
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25
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NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.7
1 DECLARATION OF MATTHEW D. HINKS
2 I, Matthew D. Hinks, declare as follows:
3 1. I am an attorney duly admitted to practice before this Court. I am a partner with Jeffer
4 Mangels Butler & Mitchell LLP, attorneys of record for Defendant Religious Technology Center
5 (“RTC”). I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth herein. If called as a witness, I could and
6 would competently testify to the matters stated herein. I make this declaration in support of the
7 motion by RTC and Defendant Church of Scientology International (“CSI”) for sanctions pursuant
9 2. Plaintiff’s operative pleading in this action is the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”)
10 filed on September 30, 2019. Plaintiff alleges in the FAC claims arising out of her time as a staff
11 member for RTC and CSI and a member of the Sea Organization, Scientology’s dedicated religious
12 order. A copy of the FAC is attached as Exhibit B to the Declaration of William H. Forman, filed in
14 3. Having reviewed the relevant documents and participated in the drafting of RTC’s
15 motion to compel religious arbitration, and having appeared at the hearing of the motions, I am
16 aware that, over the years, Plaintiff executed a number of agreements, including a Staff Departure
17 Agreement she executed in 2017, in which she agreed to arbitrate any dispute she may ever have
18 with RTC and CSI, or any other Scientology entity or official. On August 1, 2019—just over a
19 month after Plaintiff filed this lawsuit—counsel for CSI sent a letter to Plaintiff’s counsel apprising
20 them of Plaintiff’s numerous agreements to arbitrate. After Plaintiff refused to dismiss this lawsuit
21 and pursue her claims through arbitration, RTC and CSI, on December 20, 2019, filed motions to
23 4. The hearing on the RTC’s and CSI’s motions to compel arbitration took place on
24 January 30, 2020, at the conclusion of which the Court granted the motions, ordered the action
25 stayed pending the completion of arbitration, and scheduled a post-arbitration status conference.
26 5. Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s arbitration ruling on March
27 3, 2020. I thereafter prepared this motion and, on June 25, 2020, caused it to be served on Robert
28 W. Thompson via personal delivery and electronic mail. Plaintiff’s deadline to withdraw or correct
68062320v1 22
NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.7
1 the motion pursuant to the 21-day “safe harbor” provision of Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 128.7(c)(1) is
3 6. I have reviewed JMBM’s invoices and billing systems to determine the total amount
4 of fees RTC has incurred and will incur in connection with the preparation of this motion as well as
6 7. RTC has incurred and will incur no less than $35,276.50 in attorney’s fees
7 attributable to preparing, serving and filing this motion. I have done the majority of the work
8 researching and drafting this motion. I have spent no less than 34.8 hours reviewing Plaintiff’s
9 motion for reconsideration and accompanying papers, researching issues regarding reconsideration
10 and Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 128.7, and drafting, finalizing and serving this motion. I reasonably and
11 conservatively estimate that I will spend no less than 5 hours reviewing the opposition papers and
12 any cited case law, drafting, finalizing and filing and serving the reply brief and attending the hearing
13 on this matter. My billing rate is $795 per hour. My partner, Robert Mangels, also assisted with the
14 preparation of this motion, and will also assist with the preparation of the reply brief and appear for
15 the hearing on this motion. According to JMBM’s billing records, Mr. Mangels has spent no less
16 than 7.7 hours in connection with the preparation of this motion. I reasonably and conservatively
17 estimate that Mr. Mangels will spend no less than 5 hours reviewing the opposition papers, working
18 with me in connection with the preparation of the reply brief and attending the hearing on this matter.
19 Mr. Mangels’ billing rate is $995 per hour. Thus, in addition to the $35,276.50 in fees thus far
20 incurred in connection with this motion, we anticipate an additional $8,950 in fees, for estimated
22 8. In addition, RTC has incurred and will incur no less than $17,758.50 in attorney’s
23 fees attributable to the opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. I have spent no less than
24 14.8 hours reviewing Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration and accompanying papers, researching
25 issues regarding Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1008, and working on issues in support of RTC’s opposition
26 to the motion. I reasonably and conservatively estimate that I will spend no less than 5 hours
27 reviewing the reply papers and any cited case law, and preparing for and attending the hearing on
28 the motion. Mr. Mangels has spent no less than 6.1 hours in connection with the review of the motion
68062320v1 23
NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.7
1 for reconsideration and preparation of RTC’s opposition brief. I reasonably and conservatively
2 estimate that Mr. Mangels will spend no less than 5 hours reviewing the reply papers and any cited
3 case law, and preparing for and attending the hearing on the motion. Thus, in addition to the
4 $17,758.50 in fees thus far incurred in connection with the motion for reconsideration, we anticipate
5 an additional $8,950 in fees, for total estimated total fees of $26,708.50 in connection with the
7 9. The accompanying Declaration of William Forman calculates the fees that have been
8 and will be incurred by Defendant Church of Scientology International (“CSI”) in connection with
9 this motion and CSI’s opposition to the motion for reconsideration. Mr. Forman indicates that CSI
10 has incurred and will incurred no less than $19,735 attributable to this motion and no less than
11 $69,550 in fees attributable to CSI’s opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. Thus, in
12 total, RTC and CSI have incurred and/or will collectively incur no less than $160,220 in attorney’s
13 fees in connection with this motion and Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration.
14 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing
17
18
Matthew D. Hinks
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68062320v1 24
NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.7
1 DECLARATION OF WILLIAM H. FORMAN
2 I, William H. Forman, declare as follows:
4 Scheper Kim & Harris LLP (“SKH”), attorneys of record for Defendant Church of Scientology
5 International (“CSI”). I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth herein. If called as a witness,
6 I could and would competently testify to the matters stated herein. I make this declaration in support
7 of the motion by CSI and Religious Technology Center (“RTC”) for sanctions pursuant to California
9 2. CSI has incurred and will incur no less than $9,035.00 in attorney’s fees and costs
10 attributable to preparing, filing and arguing this motion for sanctions. I have spent no less than 5.6
11 hours researching issues regarding Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 128.7, and drafting and finalizing, this
12 motion. I reasonably and conservatively estimate that I will spend no less than 8 hours reviewing
13 the opposition papers and any cited case law, drafting, finalizing, filing, and serving the reply brief,
14 and attending the hearing on this matter. My billing rate is $850 per hour. My partner, Margaret
15 Dayton, also assisted with the preparation of this motion, and will also assist with the preparation
16 of the reply brief and appear for the hearing on this motion. According to SKH’s billing records,
17 which I have reviewed, Ms. Dayton has spent no less than 5.7 hours in connection with the
18 preparation of this motion. I reasonably and conservatively estimate that Ms. Dayton will spend no
19 less than 6 hours reviewing the opposition papers, working with me in connection with the
20 preparation of the reply brief and attending the hearing on this matter. Ms. Dayton’s billing rate is
21 $750 per hour. Thus, in addition to the $9,035.00 in fees thus far incurred in connection with this
22 motion, we anticipate an additional $10,700 in fees, for estimated total fees of $19,735.
23 3. CSI already has paid SKH in excess of $51,850.00 in attorney’s fees and costs
24 attributable to preparing and filing the opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration
25 (“Opposition”). Both Ms. Dayton and I worked on the Opposition. I have reviewed our firm’s billing
26 records for the Opposition. Ms. Dayton billed in excess of 44.2 hours in connection with researching,
27 drafting, revising, and preparing for filing the Opposition, supporting declarations, and objections
28 to Plaintiff’s evidence. Ms. Dayton’s billing rate is $750. I billed in excess of 22.0 hours in
68062320v1 25
NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.7
1 connection with such tasks. My billing rate is $850 per hour. We billed CSI for that work, and CSI
2 promptly paid invoices in excess of $51,850. I reasonably and conservatively estimate that I will
3 spend no less than 12 hours reviewing the reply papers and any cited case law and preparing for and
4 attending the hearing on this matter. I reasonably and conservatively estimate that Ms. Dayton will
5 spend no less than 10 hours reviewing the reply papers and any cited case law and preparing for and
6 attending the hearing on this matter. Thus, in addition to the $51,850 in fees already paid in
7 connection with the Opposition, we anticipate an additional $17,700 in fees, for estimated total fees
8 in excess of $69,550.
9 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing
12
13
William H. Forman
14
15
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68062320v1 26
NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.7
1 PROOF OF SERVICE
2 STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
3 At the time of service, I was over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. I am
employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. My business address is 1900 Avenue
4 of the Stars, 7th Floor, Los Angeles, CA 90067-4308.
5 On July 20, 2020, I served true copies of the following document(s) described as
9 as follows:
21 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the
foregoing is true and correct.
22
Executed on July 20, 2020, at Los Angeles, California.
23
24
25 Victoria Robles
26
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67676487v1
1 SERVICE LIST
2
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ATTORNEY NOT ADMITTED TO THE
9 CALIFORNIA BAR – SERVED VIA U.S.
MAIL AS A COURTESY
10
Ricardo M. Martinez-Cid Attorneys for Plaintiff Valerie Haney
11 Lea P. Bucciero
PODHURST ORSECK, P.A.
12 One S.E. 3rd Avenue, Suite 2300
13 Miami, FL 33131
rmartinez-cid@podhurst.com
14 lbucciero@podhurst.com
15
Brian D. Kent Attorneys for Plaintiff Valerie Haney
16 Guy D’Andrea
M. Stewart Ryan
17 Lauren E. Stram
LAFFEY, BUCCI & KENT, LLP
18 1435 Walnut Street, Suite 700
Philadelphia, PA 19102
19 bkent@lbk-law.com
26 Philadelphia, PA 19104
hamilton.marci@gmail.com
27
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67676487v1
1 SERVED VIA U.S. MAIL Attorneys for Defendant Church of Scientology
International
2 William H. Forman
David C. Scheper
3 Margaret E. Dayton
SCHEPER KIM & HARRIS LLP
4 800 West Sixth Street, 18th Floor
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67676487v1
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