•

ea It
The Abhidhammic Analysis
 11
..

The other Publications of the Author ea it

The Abhidhammic nalysis
• An Introduction to TheravadaAbhidhamma - Singapore - 1998

• Reality and Expression - Singapore - 1999.

• A Short Introduction to Early Buddhist Methods of Meditation

Singapore - 2000

• Early Buddhist Philosophy and - Social Concepts - Singapore

200 1
Prof. Sumanapala Galmangoda
• Abhidha.mniic Interpretations of Early Buddhist Teachings [B.A. (Hons.), M.A., PhD, Royal Pandit]
Singapore - 2005 Senior Professor
University of Kelaniya
• Buddhist Social Philosophy and Ethics - Singapore- 2005 Director, Postgraduate Institute of Pali and
Buddhist studies
• An Introduction to Pali Traditional- Grammar - Singapore
2002
• An Introduction to Sanskrit Traditional - Grammar and
Buddhist Sanskrit - Literature - Sinagapore 2002
Printed & Published
-

A Guide-line to the Graduate Diploma in Buddhist Studies

Singapore - 2002

SARASWATHIPUBLICATIONS
No. 2160, Circular Road,
Divulapitiya,
Sri Lanka.
Tel: 031-2246233, 2246985
033-4927709
Fax: 031-2246985
E-Mail:saraspub@sltnet.lk
 ,

IV
•

Saraswathi Silver jubi

1983 -2008
This book is published under the Saraswathi Silver Jubilee Publication project.

Dedication
,

REALITY: THE ABHIDHAMMIC ANALYSIS

© Sumanapala Galmangoda ,

This work is respectfully dedicated to my revered

1st Edition - Published in 2008
,
reachers including

ISBN 955-1096-45-2

Typesetting & Layout: Saraswathi Computer Unit Yen. Medamulle Seelawansa N ayaka Thera

Yen. Dunagaha N anarama N ayaka Thera

Yen. Pandit Hissalle Dhammaratana Thera

Yen. Pandit Dombawala Dayananda Thera

REALITY: THE ABHIDHAMMIC ANALYSIS
By Yen. Pandit Dr.Kakkapalliye Anuruddha Nayaka Thera
Pro! Sumanapala Galmangoda
and
Printed & Published by
SARASWATHI PUBLICATIONS Prof. N.A.Jayawickrema

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 VI
•

VII
..

Acknowledgements

The present work was undertaken as a research

Table of Contents
leading to the Degree ofDodor of Philosophy under the supervi­
sion of prof. Y. Karunadasa at the University ofKelaniya, Sri Lanka Pages
in 1997.
I should mention with gratitude that this work was Acknowledgements •

VI
successfully completed within a short period oftime due to the con­
stant encouragement and proper guidance of Prof. Y Karunadasa,
Abbreviations .
V111
. .

Director, Postgraduate Institute ofPali and Buddhist studies, Uni­

versity ofKelaniya. It is my duty to record here that a large number
of relevent data for this study was gathered at theAustralian Na­ Introductory
• •

IX - XVI
tional University Library where I was engaged in a PhD research on
TheAbhidhammic concept of Pannatti under an Australian
01
" "
Chapter one : The Early Buddhist Background - 12
scholarship programme in 1 989. And also I should mention that
some parts ofthis research have already been published with slight
change injournals and books. Chapter Two : The Conception ofDhamma in
. I should be very thankful to Mrs.RenUka Jayasinghe the CanonicalAbhidhamma 13 - 21
for preparing the type-setting ofthis work and Mr.Mahinda Mr. Shiran
for their assistance in various ways during this work was in progress.
Chapter Three: Developments in the
I also should be greatful t o Mr.Abeyruwan, Managing
Director,Saraswathi Publications, Divulapitiya for undertaking the
Commentaries
•
22 - 49
publication of this work and to Mr.Kasun Gunarathne for his en­
couragement and co-ordination with the publishers. Last but not Chapter Four : Dhamma and the Two Truths 50 - 73
least I should express my sincere thanks to my wife Chandrika
Malkanthi and two Children Nalini and Dileepa for their assistance Chapter Five : The Four Realities
in this regard.
(Paramatthadhamma) 74 - 92
Prof. Sumanapala Galmangoda
Chapter Six : Parallel DeVelopments 93 - 1 10
Department of Pah and Buddhist Studies,
University of Kelaniya,
Bibliography 111 - 117
Sri Lanka.
2007.12.10
Index 1 18 - 1 3 1
 VIII
, , ,

IX
,

Abbreviations
A - Anguttaranikiiya
AA. - Anguttaranikiiya' Atthakathii
Adhd. - Abhidharmadipa (with Vibhii�iiprabiihv!tti) Introductory
Abhkbh. - Abhidharmakosiibhiisya
Abhsybh. - Abhidharmasamuccayabhiisya Pali Sources
Abhvk. - Abhidhammatthavikiisini
Abhvt. - Abdhammiivatiira This study of theAbhidhamma conception of Dhammii is
ADs. - Abhidhammatthasangaha
based both on primary and secondary literary sources. As to the
ADSDP. - AbhidhammatthasangahadipaIJipiili
ADSS: - Adhidharmriith'asamgrahasannaya former, the relevant texts consulted here are in Piili , Sanskrit and
ADSSV. - Abhidhammaithasatigaha- SankhepavaIJIJanii Sinhala. The Piili sources are the canonical texts (tipitakapiili),
ADSVT. - Abhidhammatthasatigahavibhiivinitikii their commentaries (atthakathii) and sub-commentaries (tikii), the
AI(. - Abhidharmakosa A b hidhamma c o m p e n d i u m s (sangah agantha) and t h e
BSSAK. - Bhiisya- sphutiirthii- sahitaT{l Abhidharmakosalfl
commentaries on them (tikii,anutikii) all edited in Roman, Burmese
D. - Dighanikiiya
DA. - Dighanikiiya Atthakathii and Sinhalese characters. To this should be added Nettippakaral}a,
_DhpA. - Dhammapada Atthakathii Petakopadesa and Milindapaiiha, the post-canonical texts
Dhs. - Dhammasangani compiled before the commentaries on the canon.
DhsA - Dhammasiinssgani Atthakatha (Atthasalim)
Kvu. - Kathiivatthu The canonical texts which represent the earliest phase of
M. - Majjhimaniiikya
Buddhism have been consulted in order to examine the background
MA. - Majjhimanikiiya Atthakathii
Miln. - Milindapalfha to the Abhidhammic conception of Dhamm a. The three post­
canonical works referred to above are very relevant to this study as
•

MKvr. - Mulamiidhyamakasastra ( Devanagari Edition)

MKVS. - Mulamiidhyamakakiirikiivyakhyii ( Sinhalese Edition) they represent the second phase in the development of the
MMT.(MSMT)- Manisiiramanjusiitikii Theraviida Abhidhamma.
MT. - Mulatikii
•

Mvn. - Mohavicchedani
Among the commentaries special attention was focussed on
NdA. - NiddesavaaIJIJii (Saddhammapajjotikii)
the Visuddhimagga and the Atthasiilini. Though the former is not
•

NRP. - Niimarupapariccheda
Ps. - Patisambhidiimagga a commentary on a particular canonical text, as its author himself
Pug. - Puggalapannatti observes, its purpose is to comment on the teachings embodied in
PugA. - Puggalapannatti Atthakathii the first four Nikiiyas. 1 What is more, its exegetical methodology as
S. - Samyuttanikaya
well as its doctrinal discussions had vastly influenced the subsequent
Sn. - Suttanipiita .
Abhidhammic literature.2 To give but one example, the classifying
SnA. - Suttanipiita At{hakatha
s:s: - Saccasankhepa criteria which it employs in presenting the various elements ofexistence
Srt. - SankhepavaIJIJalika (khandh aniddesa) reappear in the same form in all the
Vino - Vinayapitaka Abhidhammic compendiums compiled in the 12th century,Another
VinA. - Vinaya Attakathii (Samantiipasadika)
important feature ofthis work is that while incorporating all the
Vism. - Visuddhimagga
VismS. - Visuddhimiirgasannaya

•
 x XI
fundamental doctrines of the TheravadaAbhidhamma, it does also
clearly establish the identify of Theravada Buddhism.
. As mentioned above, equally important for this study is the
Atthasalini, the commentary on the DhammasangaIJi. It is here,
more than in any other work, that a host of arguments have adduced
to establish the authenticity of the Theravada Abhidhamma. Its
main contribution to the development ofAbhidhamma is to be seen
in its detailed discussions on the nature of mental and material
elements (dhamma) into which the empirical existence is analyzed.
The other commentaries and sub-commentaries contain among
them many aspects relevant to our study, but not found in the works
mentioned above. It must also be mentioned here that not only the
commentaries on the canonicalAbhidhamma but the commentaries
on the Pali Nikayas as we! l are of great relevance to this study.
The main reason for this is that in the latter all the early Buddhist
teachings are sought to be interpreted according to the Theravada
Abhidhamma. In point of fact it is not inconvenient to say that all the
� ommentaries and the follow-up works compiled in Sri Lanka are,
ID tenns of interpretation, Abhidhammic.
In the medieval period the Theravada Abhidhamma came to
be presented in a series of compendiums called Sangha-ganthas.
Where they differ from the commentaries and sub-commentaries is
that unlike the latter they could be understood without reference to
another text. According to the Burmese tradition they are nine in
number and are known as 'little finger manuals' . They are as follows:
Abhidhammavatara - probably belonging to the 5th century AD.
Riipariipavibhaga -
Namariipasamasa (KhemappakaraIJa) - 1 Qth century AD.
Abhidhammatthasangaha
•
Paramatthavinicchaya
Namariipapariccheda
•
Saccasankhepa 12th century AD
Namacaradipaka
Mohavicchedani
Although most of these texts have not been critically studied,
an attempt has been made here to elicit from them the material
relevant to this study. For this purpose we also have made use of
their commentaries.Among them the Vikasini(ika , the commentary
on the Abhidhammavatara, is of great importance as it contains
detailed explanation on the conception of dhamma. The
Vibhavini(ika, the commentary on the Abhidhammatthasaitgaha,
though more concise than the above , is important in many other
respects, particularly in the methods of its exposition. Both were
written by a Buddhist monk called Sumangala in the 12th century
A.D.4 The Sankhepava1JIJana, another commentary on the
Abhidhammatthasangaha was written by a Burmese monk who
came to Sri Lanka in the 12th century A.D.5 Although very concise,
it is very useful for a study of the evolution of the conception of
dhamma. Among the other sub-commentaries which we have
occasionally consulted are the Paramatth amaiijusa, the
Abhidhammatthasangahadipani and the Madhu(ika. Of them
the first is important as it contains many allusions to the doctrines of
the other schools of Abhidhamma. The other two were written in
Burma and seem to follow, both in content and methodology, the
sub-commentaries mentioned above. In clarifying many obscure
matters in the Abhidhammatthasangaha and its commentaries
and in identifying someAbhidhammic developments we depended
much on the Manisaramaiijusa which is a sub-commentary on the
Vibhavini(ika written in Burma in the 15th century AD.6 It is the
latest primary source consulted for this study.
 XIII
...

XII
. .

Dh ammii , Paramatth adh ammii a n d

T h e terms
Sinhalese Sources Abhid hammatth ii that occur in the Theraviida Abhidhammic
texts, refer to the ultimate constituents of the world of experience.
Among the Sinhalese sources consulted for this study are the They are generally classified under the following four headings:
Abhidhammiirthasangraha Sannaya and the Visuddhimiirga
Sannaya. The former was written by MahiisiimiSiiriputta during cltta -conSCIOusness
• • •

L
the 1 2th c e n t u r y A.D.7 It is a paraphrase o n the
Abhid hammatthasangaha and seems to have served as the source ii cetasika - mental concomitants
book of the Vibhiivinitikii. In fact the latter could be considered
i rupa -matter
•

as a Piili version of former. The other source in Sinhala,though a

paraphrase on the VlSuddhimagga, is a voluminous work containing
iv. nibbiil}a extinction -the final goal of Buddhism
-

material which we do not normally expect in a paraphrase. Written

by a Sri Lankan king named Kalikiilasiihitya Sarvajiia Pal}4ita
Pariikramabiihu during the 1 3th century A.D., it gives numerous
references to well-known Buddhist Sanskrit works, such as the
Abhidharmakosa of iiciirya Vasubandh u . W hat is most
interesting about this work is that it quotes from non-Theravada
sources in order to justify the Theravada arguments.
Sanskrit Sources
In the TheravadaAbhidharnma,citta is analyzed into 89 or
1 2 1 states, cetasika into 52 states and rupa into 28 states as far as
the Abhidhammatthasangaha is concerned. Nibbiil}a is
considered as one state because it represents the extinction of
defilements,the smnmum bonum ofBuddhism.Among these analyses
the mental and material states (citta,cetasika,rupa ) are considered
as conditioned (sankhata) while nibbiina is defined as
unconditioned (asankhata). Both conditioned and unconditioned

For the purpose of making some passing commenV' on parallel states are commonly designated by the term dhammii. Sometimes
developments pertaining to our subject of study, the following they are introduced as Par amatth adhammas or
Sanskrit sources were consulted. Abhidhammatthas .

Abhidharmakosa of iiciirya Vasubhandhu ,with its Bhii�ya 'Dhammii' refers to the above
In this study the term
and the commentary on it by Yasomiyta ; Abhidharmadipa with mentioned mental, material and nominal (nibbiil)a) states in the
its commentary,Vibhii�iiprabhiivrtti; MUlamiidhyamakakiirikii Theraviida Abhidharnma. In the other schools ofAbhidharnma,
of iiciirya Niigiirjuna, with its commentary by Candrakirti the term dharma refers not only to the above four categories but
Abhidharmasamuccaya of iiciirya Asanga, with its bhii�ya . a ls o t o s o m e o th e r a s p e c t s of p henomena s u c h a s
(commentary) by Yasomitra; Tattvasamgraha of iiciirya Cittavipr ayuktadh armas (non-mental e lements) of
siintarak�ita ,with paiijikii (commentary) by Kamalasila. the Sarviistiviidins.

Methodology and the content The Abhidhammic conception of Dhammii (Sanskrit -

Dharma) has been dealt with by several scholars during the past
The main purpose of this study is to examine the evolution of
decades and the following works should be mentioned here because
the Theravada conception of dhammii in relation to the Piili canon,
they were very useful for this study.
commentaries, compendiums,sub-commentaries and the ancillary
works such as Sinhalese paraphrases.
 XIV
•
i Geiger, Magdalene and Wilhelm Geiger, Pali Dhamma,
Munich, 1921
ii E.R. Saracchandra, Buddhist Psychology of Perception,
Colombo, 1958
iii Abhidharmadipa with Vibhafjaprabhavrtti, ed. P.S. Jaini,
Introduction, Patna, 1959
iv. Th. Stcherbatsky, the Central Conception of Buddhism and
the meaning of the word "Dhamma", Calcutta, 196 1
v. Y Karunadasa, BuddhistAnalysis of Matter, Colombo, 1967
vi John Ross Carter, Dhamma - Western Academic and
Sinhalese Buddhist Interpretations, A study of a Religious
Concept, Tokyo, 1978 ' the Theravada tradition as a whole covering the range of literature
vii. F. Watanabe, Philosophy and its Development in the Nikayas
and Abhidhamma, Delhi, 1983
viii Y Karunadasa, The Theravada version of Dharmavada ,
Annual Memoirs of the Otani University Shin Buddhist
Comprehensive research Institute, vol. 5, 1987
The philological aspect of the term "dhamma" rather than its
philosophical aspect is emphasized in the " Pali Dhamma".
Stcherbatsky mainly deals with the Sarvastivada interpretation of
the conception of dharma. Although Jaini' s work belongs to the
Sarvastivada tradition he points out some important aspects of
dhamma in relation to the early Buddhist discourses. Karunadasa's
work deals fully with the material elements of the Theravada
Abhidhamma in relation to the other schools of Buddhism while
Saracchandra's work elucidates the mental constituents such as
saiiiia (perception) and bhawinga (stream - consciousness).
Carter's interpretation of the term is mainly based on its cultural
aspect in connection with the Sinhalese sources. Watanabe's
XV
explanation of the evolution of the conception depends on the Pali
canon and several commentaries on it. It should be mentioned that
Karunadasa's " Theravada Version of Dharmavada " includes in
brief many of the most important aspects of the conception of
dhamma which would be the basis of any study on this topic.
According to the foregoing brief account, it is clear that almost all
the aspects of the conception of dhamma has been dealt with by
those scholars. But any of those researches do not take into
consideration the conception of dhamma in the Theravada tradition
as a whole referring to the PaLi canon, commentaries, compendiums,
sub-commentaries and other ancillary works. And also some
important sub-commentaries and Paraphrases such as
Mal}isaramaiijusa, Visuddhimarga sannaya have not been fully
consulted for any of the above researches. Therefore we propose
- ,
to do a research on the evolution of the conception of dhamma in
beginning with the Pali canon upto the 15th centuryA.D. published
in Sinhalese, Roman and Burmese characters. Therefore the first
chapter of this work deals with the canonical background of the
conception of Dhamma with reference to the early Buddhist
discourses. Second chapter explains the expansion of the conception
in the PaliAbhidhammapi(aka. The commentarial interpretation
of the conception is clarified in the third chapter together with the
important aspects included in the compendiums. The connection of
the conception of dhamma with the theory of double truth is
explained in the fourth one and the fifth one gives a brief account of
the four-fold division of the Dhamma (four realities) taking only
some special aspects explained in the commentaries into
consideration. The last chapter, though intended as a summary, refers
to parallel developments in other schools of Buddhist thought, so as
to bring the subj ect into a wider perspective.
 XVI
•

End Notes

1. DA. i,p. 2
2. Cpd.,Editor's preface,p.x
3. Malalasekera,Pali literature ofCeylon,p. 1 56, Buddhadatta's
Manuals,i-ii,PTS,pp. xviii - xix; Cpd.,Editor 's preface,p. vii;
Mohavicchedani,PTS, introduction,p. xi; Saccasankhepa,JPTS,
introduction,p. I; Paramatthavinicchaya,JPTS,preface,p. 1 5 6
4. Malalasekera,op.cit.,p. 200; cpd.,p. 9
5. op.cit.,pp. 1 85, 1 96, 20 1 -203
6. Bode,Pali literature of B urma,p. 42
7. Malalasekera,op.cit.,pp. 1 68, 169

Chapter one
The Early Buddhist Background

The discourses embodied in the Pali Suttapitaka have been

delivered on various occasions for the practical purposes of the
different kinds of followers both monks and lay people. The
Philosophy that we fmd in these early discourses was essentially a
practical one. They include an ethical code as well as a philosophy
which are invariably coherent. Both,the philosophy and the ethical
code have been introduced by the term Dhamma.1

Among the items listed in the Kinti and Anupada Suttas

under the term dhamma, one can notice not only the philosophical
concepts such as phassa (contact), vedana(feelings), saiiiia
(perception), cetana (will),citta (consciousness)2 but also the noble
eightfold path (ariya-a{thangikamagga)3. Sangitisutta of
Dighanikaya 4 classifies about 8 1 8 items under the term Dhamma
and they include almost all the doctrinal concepts analyzed in the
laterAbhidhammic treatises. Some of them are as follows.
 2 3
lobha (great), dosa (hatred),moha (delusion), alobha(non­
greed), adosa (non-hatred), amoha (non-delusion),
pannii(wisdom), kiiya (body), vedanii (feelings), citta
(consciousness), dhamma (doctrines), pathavidhiitu
(element of earth), iipodhiitu (element of water), tejodhiitu
(element of fire), viiyodhiitu (element of air), musiiviidii
veramaIJi (refraining from lying), pisuniiya viicaya veramaIJi
(refraining from tale-bearing), pharusiiya viicaya veramaIJi
(refraining from harsh words), samphappaliipii veramaIJi
(refraining from useless talks)
Dasuttarasutta of the Dighanikiiya also lists a number of
such items under the term Dhammii.6 Thus it is clear that the early
•
discourses include almost all the Buddhist concepts discussed in the
Theraviida Abhidhamma under the term Dhammii.
Although the early discourses have been delivered for the
practical purpose of the followers, some of them such as Sangiti
and Dasuttara can be considered as new compilations prepared
for the preservation of the Buddhist doctrines.- These have been
recognized by the scholars as dharmasfitras (discourses of the
doctrines) representing the second stage of the development of the
conception of Dhammii.7 But the discourses such as Satipa(!hiina8
cannot be properly introduced as such scholarstic compilations
because they definitely explain the path for emancipation. The lists
of dhammas in these discourses are mostly resemble with those of
the scholarstic compilations. For example the following analyses of
the world of experience canonical be seen in many of the discourses
throughout the Suttapitaka:
i pancakkhandha (five aggregates)
riipa-corporealitty;vedanii-sensation; sannii-perception;
sankhiira-mental fonnations; viiiiiiiIJa-consciousness9
' > c ' . , �• • •" . �" '
•
cha dhiitu (six elements)
••
n.
pathavi-earth; iipo-water; tejo - temperature; viiyo- air;
iikiisa - space;
viiiniina -consciousness1 o
...
ID. atfhiirasadhiitu (eighteen elements)
cakkhu - the eye,riipa -the visible, cakkhuviiiniiIJa-the .
visual consciousness; sota - the ear, sadda - sound,
sotaviiiniina-the auditory consciousness; ghii1}Q - the nose,
gan d ha - s m e l l , gn ii IJaviniiiina - the o l f a c t o r y
consciousness; iivhii-the tongue, rasa - taste, iivhiiviiiiiii1}Q
- the gustatory consciousness; kiiya - the body, photthabba
-touch, kiiyaviiiiiiiIJa - the tactile consciousness; mana -
the mind, dhamma - mental objects, manoviiiniilJa, the
mental consciousness 11
iv. dviidasiiyatana (twelve avenues of sense - perception and
mental cognition)
This comprises the six senses and the six related objects as
mentioned in the above analysis into eighteen elements. 12
The purpose of these analyses of the world of experience are
varied. To have an adequate understanding of the aims of these
analyses it is worthwhile to pay our attention to the background of
Buddhism. The Piili canon itself is full of evidence regarding the
religious dogmas, beliefs and philosophies prevalent in India at the
time Buddhism arose. In the Dhammacakkappavattanasutta, the
contemporary religious practices are introduced as two extremes,
namely a t takilamat h ii n u y oga ( s e l f - m o r tification)
kiimasukhallikiinuyoga (self - indulgence). 13 Self-mortification
connects with sassataviida (eternalism) and self-indulgence with
 4 5
ucchedavada ( annihilationism),which are considered the two m�or
divisions of the contemporary religious beliefs. The eternalists
believed in an eternal self and the annihilationists believed that the
self is destroyed at the death. The BrahmajaIasutta includes sixty­
two views prevalent at the timel4 The Samaiiiiaphalasutta
discusses the different opinion of six well-known contemporary
religious leaders. IS These various beliefs and views regarding the so
called individual and the world, have been adequately discussed by
a number of scholars.16 Eternalists normally believed in an
indestructible everlasing entity called atman, brahman,
prajapati,kaya, etc. 17 The Buddha explained that this belief blocks
penetration into the real nature of the world and he pointed out
impermanence (anicca), unsatisfactoriness (dukkha) and
soullessness (anatta) as the real nature of the world. 18 To show the
impermanence, the inherent nature of all phenomena, the Buddha
adopted the method of analysis. He analyzed the world of experience
into discrete constituents so as to prove that there is nothing eternal.
In these analyses we see that the body, mind and the objects of the
senses have been divided into discrete constituents.
It is not out of context to discuss in brief the pJlfPose of these
concepts listed under the term Dhamma in the discourses
representing both kinds mentioned above. In the first analysis into
the five aggregates,the emphasis is placed more on the mental aspect
of the person than on the physical aspect. Here the mental aspect is
divided into four parts: sensation,perception,mental formations and
consciousness. There the corporeality (riipa) represents the physical
aspect. In the analysis into the twelve avenues, the physical aspect
of the individual and the world of experience have been divided
into ten parts in the fmm of a subject and object relationship.The
last two items refer to the mental aspect. The next analysis is called
eighteen elements which includes both physical and mental aspects
in equal measures. In the former analysis the consciousness is
represented by two parts but here it is divided into eight ,emphasizing
its impermanence (anicctita) or conditionality (idappaccayata).
Because some contemporary eternalists held the view that some
mental states like saiiiia (perception) to be the soul of the indivisual,
the Buddha had to the mind and show its impermanency
and conditionality. porrhapadasutta explains some of those views
regarding saiiiia (perception):
(i) without causes and condition there arises and disappears
the saiiiia of the individual;
(ii) saiiiia is the soul or self of the individual which comes and
goes away;
(ill) there are powerful recluses andBrahmins and they drag
on and draw away the saiiiia of the individual;
(iv) there are powerful devas (deities) who drag on and draw
away the saiiiia of the individual.19
And it also mentions three kinds of souls (attaparilabha)
(i) a soul which has a form of four elements ( earth, water,
temperature and air) and feeds on material food;
(ii) a soul which is mental and endowed with all limbs complete
with sense faculties;
(m) a soul which is perceptional and formless.20
The Buddha admits that hepreaches dhamma to reject all
those beliefs in a personality or soul.21 We fmd many other theories
of the soul in different ways in the discourses.22
On the other hand some religionists considered the so-called
elements of matter as permanent entities23 and the Buddha discussing
those elements ID combination with the component parts of the body
and mind emphasized their impermanency and conditionality. And
the analyses of the world of experience in the Buddha's teaching
have taken different forms due to different points of view. As a whole,
all these analyses go to prove that the world of experience is
 6 7
impennanent, unsatisfactory, and soulless.42 This leads the Buddhist
follower to the right understanding of himself an d the world.He
considers everything as "this is not mine, this is not I, this is my
soul ", 52 which is called the realization as they have become (yatha
bhiitaniiaIJadassana). By this method of analysi s the etemalist
views mentioned above and those like sabbam atthi (everything
exists), sabbath ekattam (everything is a unity) were criticized.26
On the other hand, by the method of synthesis (pa(iceasamuppada)
which is introduced in the early discourses those annihilationist views
such as sabbath natthi (nothing exists), sabbath puthuttath
(everything is a plurality) and the mentioned above were criticized.72
The method of synthesis is based on the following fomlula which
occurs in the early discourses:
imasmith sati idam hoti - when this is present, comes
to be;
imassa uppada idath uppajjati - from the arising of this, that
anses;
•
imasmim asati idath na hoti - when this is absent, that
, abstracts from the Satipa!(hanasutta, a well known discourse
does not come to be;
imassa nirodha idath nirujjhati - on the cessation of tliis, that
ceases.28
This formula of causality (pa(ieeasamuppada ) which
comprises positive and negative aspects rejects both extremist views
mentioned above.The twelve-fold formula of causality
(dvadasangapa(ieeasamuppada) 29 is an adequate example
clarifying the mutual relationship or dependency of the analyzed
physical and mental component parts of the individual and the related
world.Another important purpose of analyzing the world of
experience into various parts was to supply the Buddhist follower
with suitable objects of meditation.Mostly the preliminary task of a
Buddhist monk at the Buddha's time was to learn an object of '
meditation (kammauhana) from the Buddha and practise it in
solitude until attaining arhantship.This object of meditation was given
according to the type of character of the follower.
The main purpose of Buddhist meditation was to eradicate all
the defilements based on attachment (raga), hatred (dosa) and ,
delusion (moha) and to realize nibba1}Q, the final goal of Buddhism.
Attachment and hatred (anunayapa(igha) are the two reactions
of the individual towards the world of experience in which he desires
to obtain what he wishes and to reject what he hates.As he always
fails to achieve his goal completely through these reactions, his mind
is constantly in a state of delusion.This delusion (moha) or ignorance
(avijja) is the compulsory result of the individual's reactions to the
world of experience.According to the Buddhist discourses this
should be eliminated through insight (paiiiia) into the real nature of
the world of experience.Insight should be developed through
meditation.In the practice of meditation, the follower concentrates
on the various analyses of the world of experience so as to eliminate
attachment, hatred and delusion on which the above mentioned
etemalist and annihilationist views are established. The following
among the followers of Buddhist meditation, present several such
analyses of the world of experience.
(i) Reflection on thirty-two parts of the body
(kayagatasati-dvattithsakara)
In this the follower contemplates on thirty-two parts of the
.. ..
body separately g the attachment to each one.Some
of the parts are: "kesa-head-hairs, loma-body-hairs, nakha­
nails, danta teeth, taeo-skin, mathsam-fle sh, naharu­
-
sinews, a!(hi-bones, a!(himiiija-marrow, vakkam-kidneys,
hadayath -heart, yakanam liver, kil omakam -pleura,
-
pihakath -spleen, papphasath-Iung s, antath -intestines,
antaguIJath -intestinal track, etc."30
 8 9
(ii) Reflection on elements (dhatumanasikara) It is. vel)' clear that the methods of meditation introduced in
the Satipauhanasutta include a kind of analysis of the world of
Herein the follower reflects on four elements as the component
. . .. experience. Not only the Satipatthanasutta but also many other
parts of his body thereby g attachment to them. The
discourses explain such devices of analysis for different kinds of
four elements are the earth-element, water-element, element
meditational practices.
of temperature and air-element.31

The purposes of these reflections on different analyses are

(m) Reflection on consciousness and feeling
varied. In the Satipatthanasutta five purposes are explained as
(cittanupassana and vedananupassana). general aims of all the reflections described therein:

While in the first two items attention is paid to the physical (i) (mental) purification of the beings;
side, here it is on the mental side, i.e. consciousness and feeling.
In this regard the follower focuses his attention on sixteen
(ii) avoidance of sorrow and lamentation;

different states of consciousness, viz. greedy or not, hateful

(m) disappearance of physical and mental suffering;
or not, deluded or not, cramped or distracted, developed or
undeveloped, surpassable or unsurpassable, concentrated or (iv) realizing what should be realized;
unconcentrated, liberated or unliberated.32
(v) realizing nibbana.37
With regard to the feelings he focuses his attention on five
states as follows: agreeable and disagreeable feeling of body Eradication of attachment to the body is one of the specific
and mind, sensual and su feeling, indifferent feeling.33 aims of contemplating on the analyses of the body.38 The commentary
on the Satipatthanasutta explains that these various analyses of
•

(iv) Reflection on the mind-objects (dhammanupassana). the body ( including c onsciousness), plurality of a unity
(ghal)avinihhhogo), are meant to point out that there are no such
This includes even the five aggregates and the avenues of
eternal entities called body (kaya), woman (itthi), person (purisa)
sense-perception and mental cognition as pointed out earlier.34
and so forth, outside of those component parts or W1·th·In them..
39
Satipatthanasutta describes these two kinds of analyses as
When contemplating on the body as consisting of elements, the view
follows: "0 monks, the follower contemplates on five
of a 'permanent being' (satta ) in the mediator's mind
aggregates: such is the matter, such is the feeling ..... such is
disappears.40SammadiUhisutta has pointed out that these various
the perception .... such is the mental disposition .... such is
types of analyses are helpful to improve the right view (sanuniiditthi)
the conscIOusness
· ...."35
which is the first item of the noble eightfold path (ariya-a{{hangika­

"The monk contemplates on sense-bases thus: he realise the

eye and the objects, the ear and the sounds, the nose and the
smells, the tongue and the tastes, the body and the touch, the
mind and the mental objects."36
magga).41 In brief these analyses help to develop true insight
(paiiiia), which consists of seeing everything as ''this is not mine,
this am not I, this is not my soul''42 The final goal ofBuddhist practices
is to get this kind of understanding regarding the world of experience.
 10 11
Sensory impressions of the world are grasped as permanent entities . End Notes
because of the lack of real understanding of them and the lack of 1. Dhp. ed. Ven. Narada,pp. 75, 1 53 ,2767
true reflection on their impermanent nature. Therefore, the main 2. M. 11, PTS,pp. 238 - 243
characteristics of real understanding and true reflection is the analysis 3. Ibid
of the world of experience (dhammii).43 On the other hand the 4. D. Ill, PTS, pp. 2 1 1 - 27 1
method of analysis is an inherent characteristic of the philosophical 5. Ibid
teachings of Buddhist discourses. Although the term 'vihhajjaviida' 6. M. Ill,PTS, pp. 2 1 1 - 292
(school of analysis) has been ascribed to Buddhism at a later period,44
7. Jaini, introduction, Abhidhammadipa with Vibhasaprabhavrtti,
it is a very familiar term in the discourses.54 Almost all the discourses pp. 22 - 49; Watanabe,Philosophy and its Development in the
named as Vihhanga include such analyses of the dhammas.46 Nikayas and Abhidhamma, p.36; Encyclopedia of Buddhism, Vol. i,
pp. 40 - 42
8. D. 11, PTS, pp. 290 - 3 1 5
•

9. S. iii,PTS,pp. 47, 48
10. S. ii,PTS,p. 249, iii, p. 23 1
11. S.,op.cit., p. 140; Dj, PTS, p. 79
12. D. ii,PTS, p. 302,A, iii,PTS,p. 400
13. Vino I,PTS, p. 1 0
14. Dj PTS, p. 1 2
15. D., op. cit., p. 52
16. Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, chapter 1 - 3 ;
Kalupahana, Buddhist Philosophy, pp. 3 - 1 5
17. Kalupahana, Buddhist Philosophy: A Historical Analysis,p.4; Dj,
PTS, p.56
18. S. iii PTS, pp. 22 - 25
19. D. I, PTS p. 1 80
20. D., op. cit. ,pp. 1 86 - 1 87
21. op. cit.,pp. 1 95, 1 97
22. Dj,PTS, pp. 3 1 , 34, 1 86, 1 87; S. iv,PTS, p. 54; Kvu,PTS, p. 67; M.
i, PTS, p. 233, iii,99. 265,27 1 ; A. I,PTS,p. 284,ii, p. 1 64
23. D. I PTS, p. 56
24. S. iii PTS; p. 88
25. op.cit., p. 89
26. Jayatilleke,Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge,p. 50
27. Ibid.
28. S. ii PTS,pp. 70, 96; M. I, PTS, p. 262
 12 13
29. S. H PTS,p. 65
30. D. ii,PTS,p. 293
31. op.cit.,p. 294
32. op.cit.,p. 299
33. op.cit.,p. 298
34. See p. 8
35. D. H, PTS,pp. 301 - 302
36. op.cit.,p. 302
37. op.cit.,p. 290
38. op.cit.,p. 293
39. MA. i,PTS,p. 242
40. MA. i,PTS,p. 272
41. •
M, i,PTS,p. 539
42. op.cit.,p. 1 85
43. op.cit.,pp. 138, 1 39, 133, 4
44. Stcherbatsky, The Central Conception of Buddhism,pp. 36, 37; Chapter two
AK, p. 296

45. M. i,PTS,p. III The Conception of Dhamma in the Canonical

•

46. Jaini, Abhidhammadipa, Introduction,pp. 33, 34 Abhidhamma

• In the foregoing chapter we noticed that the teml "dhamma"

includes not only the philosophical concepts such as perception and
but also the ethical concepts mainly related to the noble eight - fold
path. It means that the early Buddhism did not make a difference
between philosophy and conduct (vijjacara1}a). The empirical
outlook can be seen throughout the canonical discourses except in
• •
some of them such as Sangiti and Dasuttara which seem to have
been composed at a later period with the aim of perpetuatiOH of the
Buddha's teachings. If we take these early discourses as representing
the first stage of the development of Buddha's teaching, the
•

Abhidhammapi(aka should be given the second place in that

process. Like the Suttapi(aka, the A.bhidhammapi(aka also has
not come down to us at once as it stands today. As far as the
theA.bhidhammapi(aka is concerned the
chronology of
Dhammasangani, the Vibhanga and the Pa((hana are considered
,as the oldest and their history goes back to the second Buddhist
 14
Council held after one hundred years of Buddha's passing away.
The Dhatukathii, Puggalapaiiiiatti and Yamaka are also pre­
Asokan and have been recorded at the third council held in the
reign ofKingAsoka, nearly two and half centuries a:fterthe Buddha's
passing away. It is recorded that the Kathiivatthu was composed
by Yen. Moggalipu.ttatissa at the time of the third Buddhist council. 1
Anyway, as to the conception of Dhammii, the seven texts of the
Abhidhammapitaka still holds the empirical outlook of the early
Buddhist discourses. The abstruse academic style of the later
commentarialliterature has not over - shadowed its simple canonical
way of presentation. This fact is more akin to the Puggalapaiiiiatti
which resembles with some discourses in the Dighanikiiya and the
Anguttaranikiiya.2
It is very interesting to note that all the mental and material
elements of phenomena enumerated in these seven t exts of the
Abhidhammapitaka are designated by the term dha mmii. The
phrases such as
"Kusalii dhamma, akusalii dhammii, abyiikatii dhammii"
"tasmil;, kho pana samaye dhammii honti"
"acetasikii dhammii, cittavippayuttii dh ammii,
cakkhiiyatanena ye dhammii"3
indicate its repeated occurrence throughout passages. No
doubt, this is the most recurrent technical term in the
Abhidhammapitaka. Although the tenn "dhammii" is adopted as
the key term of the Abhidhammapitaka, no attempt has been taken
to define its connotative and denotative meanings as in the later
commentarial literature. It is clear now that the term "dhammii" in
the Abhidhammapitaka is different from that of the later
Abhidhammic treatises. There the term is used with a definite
mearung.
•
e.g. SabhiivasiimaiiiialakkhalJa,;, dhiirentiti dhammii4
15
Dhammas are-so, called because they bear their own
characteristics and the common characteristics.
It should be noticed here that the term "dhammii" appearing
in the discourses also differs to some extent from that of the
Abhidhammapi(aka. In the Sutta, the term is used with a variety
of meanings and it has no a definite meaning in them. But in the
Abhidhammapi(aka it occupies at least a definite context. It is
obvious that the term in the Abhidhammapitaka definitely indicates
the mental and materialelements of phenomena and the related facts.
Therefore, the term dhammii in the Abhidhammapittika represents
the second stage of the development of the conception of dhammii
in the Theraviida tradition.
There are similar and dissimilar characteristics between the
subject - matter of the sutta and that of the Abhidhammapitaka
although both are given under the term dhammii. As Yen.
Nyanaponika explains the Abhidhammapitaka in its most
characteristic parts is a system of classifications, analytical
enumerations and definitions, with no discursive treatment of the
subject matterS The suttas themselves include such classifications
and analytical enumerations but in addition they also possess
discursive treatment regarding them. Further, the terms referring to
the persons, places, animals etc. appearing in the discourses are
not familiar with theAbhidhammic teachings. Abhidhamma employs
an impersonal terminology throughout the texts.Although the way
of presentation or style of the medium is different the objectives
fully agree with each other. To state in brief, what both the teachings
include are:
i an analysis of the phenomena in accordance with the
doctrine of three characteristics,
ii the synthetic function that operate among the facts which
are analyzed and
iii the path leading to the cessation of suffering (nibbii1}Q).
 16 17
Generally the Dammasaligal}i, Vibhaliga, Dhatukatha, as its subject, classifies the individual (Puggala ) into various types.
Puggalapaiiiiatti, and the Yamaka can be considered as the texts Further it also includes the definitions of those individuals.
which possess mostly the characteristics of analysis. The
Dhammasaligani, depending on the early Buddhist conceptions e.g. (i) Which person is a worlding (puthujjana)? -one who

of five aggregates etc. analyses the world of experience into mind, has not yet abandoned the five fetters, and also is not

mental concomitants and material elements. As the divisions of mental yet on the way of abandoning these things, such a person

and material elements are based on the premises (i) wholesome is called a worlding.

phenomena (ii) unwholesome phenomena and (iii) neutral

(ri) Which person is a once-returner (sakadagamin)?­
phenomena, it is obvious that they are not devoid of the ethical
There is who, through vanishing of the three fetters and
aspects of early Buddhism.6 In addition to the enumeration of the
utter weakening of greed, hatred and delusion, is only
elements it also includes some definitions of those terms which are
once more returning. And having only once more
ascribed to Yen. Sariputta. The Vibhaliga consists of eighteen
returned to this world, he will put an end to suffering.
kinds of an alyses which are not only related to the phenomena but
Such a person is called a once-returner.
also to the path leading to the cessation of suffering. Some of them
are as follows:
•
(iii) Which person is a learner (sekha)? -The four persons
who have attained the paths, and the three persons who
analysis of groups (khanda)
•

L
have attained the fruitions of the three lower paths, are
••

n. analysis of bases (ayatana) called learners.

iii. analysis of elements (dhatu) . (iv) Which person is a silent Buddha (paccekabuddha)?
- whoever, in things not previously heard of, himself
iv. analysis of truth (sacca) fully understands the truths, but does not become all­
knowing, nor gain mastery in the ten powers, such a
v. analysis of establishment of mindfulness (satipa{{hana) person is called a silent Buddha. 10

vi. analysis of precepts (sikkhapada)1 The Kathavatthu is different from the other Abhidhammic
texts in regard to the subject matter as well as the style of language.
Method o.f suttanta. classification, method of Abhidhamma
It contains 2 1 6 controversies belonging to the different schools of
classification and the method of catechism are the three methods
Buddhism. The tradition maintains that the text was composed by
followed in those analyses.8 The Dhatukata does not possess any
Yen. Moggaliputtatissa in order to clarify and confirm the
new analyses of phenomena but new arrangements and classifications
Theravada point of view regarding the various views of the world
of the same elements of existence enumerated in the other texts.
of experience and the path leading to the realization of nibbana
Inclusion and Non - inclusion, included and unincluded, unincluded
•

advocated by the other schools of Buddhism. Nevertheless it also

.

and included, included and included and unincluded and unincluded9

includes some explanations more akin to the Abhidhamma
are some of those new classifications of the elements found in the
philosophy mtherthan of the early Buddhist discourses. The following
Dhatukata. The Puggalopaiiiiatti instead of taking the phenomena example will clarify the fact:
 18 19
Theravadin •

• Can there be found any personality in the . Now it isclear.that the most part of the Abhidhammapitaka
real , absolute sense ? is dedicated to the analysis of the world of experience on an ethical
basis. The Dhammas in the canon are the essential fac ts in the
Heretic •

• Yes realization of nibbana. They are no t given a me taphysical

interpretation as in the later ahidhammic explanations . Anyway the
Theravadin •

• Can the personality be found in the real , canonical ahidhammic conception ofdhamma does no t end here.
absolute sense , in the s ame way as a real , It also i ncludes an explanation of the synthetic fimction that operates
absolute fact is found? .. among the so called mental and material elements ofexistence. This
is cl arified in the Patthana, the last and the most important text of
Heretic •

No , that cannot be said.

the Abhidhammapitaka, which explains twenty-four kinds of
•

Theravadin •

• A dmi tyour reputation: If the pe rso nality can
be found in the real and absolute sense, the n
you should also say that the personali ty can
be found in the real , absolute sense , in the
same way as a real, absolute fact is found. 1 1
Many philosophical arguments recorded in the Kathavatthu
are centred on the fimdamental teachings ofBuddhism such as five
aggregates , four noble truths and the three characteristics . These
controversies are related to the later Buddhist theories such as the
theory ofperson, the theory of tri-temporal existence which arose
as a result ofvarious de finitions given to the early Buddhist teachings.
relations·that exis t among the mental and material elements of
existence. This is a development of the early Buddhist teaching of
dependen t origina tion (Paticcasamuppada) . The
P{iccasamuppada presents various causes , condi tions and their
effec ts in order to explain events or si tuations and the Ptthana
ins tead of showing such causes and effec ts , points out vario us
relationships that e xist among the causes and their respective effe cts.
Twenty-four such relations are enumerated in the P{thiina.
1. Root - condition -hetupaccaya
2. objec t condi tion arammaf,lapaccaya
-

Those later de fmi tions are essentially Abhidhammic . As regard to . 3. · predominance condition - adhipatipaccaya
the content of the Yamaka Ven. Nyanatiloka says : "To me it
looks, as if this book was composed for examination purposes, or 4. proximity condition anantarapaccaya
-

to get versed in answe ring sophisticated and ambiguous , or captious

ques tions , on all the manifold doc trines and technical terms of 5. contigui ty condition - samanantarapaccaya
Buddhist philosophy. The questions of i dentity, subordination, and
co-ordi nation, are playing a prominent part in our work, which tries 6. co-nascence condition sahajatapaccaya
-

to give a logical clearing up and delimitation of all the doc trinal

7. mutuality condition - aiiiiamaiiiiapaccaya
concep ts , as to their range and contents" 1 2
8. support condi tion - nissayapaccaya
Therefore, the Yamaka except some new classifications and
a logical scheme of the elements ofexistence does not add anything 9. decisive - s uppor t condi tion upanissaya
to the concep tio n of dhammii in the canonical Abhidhamma.
-

hetupaccaya
 20 21
10. pre-nascence condition - purejata hetupaccaya 13 End Notes
1. Yen. Nyanatiloka, Guide through the Abhidhammapitaka, Foreword
are some of those relations. As in the suttas, the method of by C.A.Perera, p.i.
analysis of the Abhidhamma is against the views of etemalism and 2. Encyclopaedia of Buddhism, Abhidhamma
the method of synthesis is against the views of nihilism. Thus we can 3. DhammasangalJi, Dhatukatha
come to a general conclusion that the conception of dhamma in the 4. Abhvk, p. 1 7
Abhidhammapitaka is not much different from that of the early 5. Yen. Nyanaponika, Abhidhamma studies, p. 1
Buddhist discourses. But the purely scholastic explanations available 6. Yen. Nyanatiloka, Guide through the Abhidhammapitaka, pp. 5 - 7
in some of the later Abhidhammic treatisesl4 are different to some 7. op.cit., pp. 1 7 - 28
extent from the suttas as well as the Abhidhammapitaka. It should 8. DhsA, PTS, p. 2; Expositor i, PTS, p. 4
be emphasized here that though the later abhidhammic texts include 9. Guide through the Abhidhammapi(aka, op.cit., p. 29
scholarstic explanations, they are not completely devoid of the
10. op. cit., pp. 33 - 35
practical aspect of early Buddhism.
11. op. cit., p. 3 9
12. op. cit., p. 66
13. op. cit p. 97
14. e.g. Abhidhammatthasangaha, Vibhavinitika, Visuddhimagga

•
 22 23
"pariyatti, sacca (truth), samadhi (concentration), panni
(wisdom), pakatii (nature), sabhiva (own nature) suRnati
,

(voidness), punna (merit), apatti (commission of a crime)

ne.v.va(that which should be known), etc."4

The Abhidhanappadipika, an ancientPali dictionary, has an

even longer list ofmeanings:

"sabhava, pariyatti, panna, naya (right manner)sacca,

pakati, panna, neyya, guna, acara (civility), samadhi,
nissattata, apatti, kara1)a (cause). etc"5

As for Western scholars, Wilhelm and Magdalene Geiger after

considering the commentarial interpretations suggest five uses for it
as follows:

Chapter three "gu1)a, desana, hetu, pariyatti, nissatta(nijjiva)"6

John Ross Carter, on the basis ofthe Pili commentaries, the

Developments in the commentaries
Abhidhammapitaka and some other Sinhalese texts, including
altogether nine sources, gives thirty-three definitions ofthe term
General definitions ofthe term Dhamma
dhamma claiming that the scope ofthe meaning ofthe tenn was still
The temi 'Dhamma; has been used in various contexts with not exhausted by those definitions. They are as follows:

many meanings in the canonical texts. 1 Attempts have been made to

"gu1)a, desana,pariyatti, nissatta- nijjivata, sunnata, hetu,
elucidate its diverse meanings by ancient commentators as well as
saccani, catusaccadhamma, sacca, samadhi, panna,
modern scholars . . The commentaries on Dhammapada and
pakati, neyya, naya, acara, kara1)Q, maggaphalanibbina
Dighanikaya ascribe the following meanings to it:
(paths-fruits-nibbina), ariyamagga (noble path),
. vyavahara(that which is customary), kusaladhamma
"guna (quality or virtue), desana(teaching), pariyatti (the
canon), nissatta, nijjiva (impersonality, lifeless), etc."2 (dhamma that pertains to what is wholesome), vikara
(constitution of quality), paccaya (con dition),
The Atthasalini presents the following meanings: paccayasamuppanna(th at wh ich h as arisen
conditionally), visaya (object), yutti (custom orfitness),
"pariyatti, hetu (cause), guna, nissattanijjivata, etc."3 nibba1)Q, tripitakapali (the texts that are the treepitakas)
sucarita (good behavioour or good conduct)
The commentary on Majjhimanikaya gives a longer list of
•

buddhabhasita (that which was spoken by the Buddha) ".7

meartIJlg;:
•
 24 25
Most of these definitions seem to be synonymous and can S ome of the, above meanings of term dhamma are
bincluded in the list from the Abhidhanappadipika as follows: comparable to the term ' param' atthadhamma or dhamma in the
(i) Abhidhamma. Nevertheless, we cannot definitely say that those
sabhava
meanings completely represent the connotative and denotative
(ii) pariyatti: desana, tripi(akapali, buddhabh asita meanings of the term param 'atthadhamma or dhamma as
explained in the whole range ofAbhidhammi c literature because
(iii) punna this Abhidhammic term has been interpreted in various ways
--

according to new environments in later Abhidhammic literature.

(iv) naya
--

Therefore, we have to examine the Abhidhammic compendia, sub­

commentaries and the commentaries on sub-commentaries, in order
(v) sacca: saccani, catusaccadhamma, maggaphalanibbana, to understand the concept adequately. However, as we shall soon
nibbana, ariyamagga see the following meanings of the term dhamma among those
(vi) pakati list�d above, are affiliated with the concept of dhamma in the
Abhidhamma:
(vii) puiiiia: kusaladhamma,yutti, sucarita
(i) nissatta-nijjivata impersonality, lifelessness
-

(viii) iieyya
(ri) suiiiiata emptiness or voidness
-

(ix) gU1)a
(m) sabhava - own nature or inherent nature
(x) acara, vyavahara •

(iv) iieyya - that which is to be known

(xi) samadhi
(v) paccayasamuppanna that which has arisen conditionally
-

(xii) nissattata: nissatta-nijjivata, suiiiiata

(xiii) apatti
(xiv) kara1)a: hetu, paccaya, paccayasamuppanna.
The above grouping of the items appears reasonable in accordance
with the meanings of the temlS as far as their wider usage is
concerned. Thus only the two definitions 'vikara and visaya' from
Carter's list can be considered as showing different meanings of the
term dhamma from those of the Abhidhanappadipika list.
(vi) paiiiia- wisdom
It should also be noted here that in the Pali commentaries,
the quotations given to clarify some of the above meanings of the
term dhamma, have been taken from the canonical texts of the
Abhidhamma. Some examples are as follows:
1. Atthasalini, the commentary on dhammasanga1)i, one of
the sevenAbhidhammic texts, ascribes the meaning 'nissata­
nijjivata' (impersonality - lifelessness) to the tefm dhamma
occurring in the phrase ' kusala dhamma' (Dhs.)8
 26
27
2. TheAtthasalini as well as Dhammapadatthakatha ascribe "It is paramattha as it is the object in the highest and
the same meaning to the term dhamma occurring in another
unequivocal sense or as it is the obj ect or field ofthe highest
phrase belonging to the abhidhamma canon: Tasmim kho
knowledge".
pana samaye dhamma honti (Dhs.)9
Because this tranSlation does not convey the real meaning of
3. The commentary on Majjhimanikaya ascribes the meaning
the above definition of paramattha, it should be explained in the
'sabhava own nature or inherent nature' to the term
-
,

light ofthe commentarial discussions. In the compound paramattha,

dhamma occurring in the phrase ' kusala dhamma' (Dhs.) the term parama stands as an adjective describing the tenn attha.
which is also found in the Abhidhamma canon. 1 0
The term attha has various meanings in various contexts. Some of
them as listed in the PTSD are:
4. The commentary on Majjhimanikaya furthermore ascribes
the meaning ' suiiiiata emptiness or voidness' to the term
Result, profit, attainment, interest, advantage, gain, (moral)
-

dhamma occurring in the phrase 'tasmim khopana samaye

good, blessing, welfare, property, well-being, etc. 16
dhamma honti' (Dhs.) which also is found in the
Abhidhamma canon.11 When this term is combined with the adjective parama it
conveys several different meanings. The PTSD lists them as follows:
It has already been mentioned that the dhammavada in the
paramattha the highest good, ideal truth in the ultimate sense,
later Abhidhammic literature came into being on the basis of the
-

philosophical truth. 17 The term paramattha has moreover been

analyses ofthe individual and the related phenomena occurring in
the Pali nikayas and the Abhidhammic canon. The resultant
component parts ofthe analyses ofthe world of experience and of
the individual were d e s i gnateddh amma 1 2
as
param 'atthadhammas 1 3 or Abhidhamm 'atthas . 14
The meaning of the term paramattha
The fundamental meanings ofthe term ' dhamma ' have been
given above and those specific meanings which were added in the
later Abhidhammic literature will be discussed below.
translate by some other scholars in yet again different ways. Shew
ZanAung seems to favour the following three renderings: Things,
the real and reality. IS Yen. Narada while using the term realityl9
or
translate paramattha as ' immutable or abstract thing' depending
on the two terms aviparita (immutable) and nibbatta (abstract)
which qualifies the ternl parama.20 Bhikkhu Nanamoli renders it as
'highest sense' and 'ultimate sense' .21 c.v. Shankar Rau translate
paramattha as ' supreme truth' and paramatthasat as ' absolute
reality' . 2 2 Buddhist Dictionary renders paramatthadhamma as
'realities in the highest sense'23 Y explains it as follows:

Paramattha is a compound of the two words 'parama'
and 'attha' . The best - known definition of the term
paramattha is:
"Paramo uttamo aviparito attho, paramassa va uttamassa
--
nanassa atth 0 gocaro tI'paramattho". 15
•
" . . . . . . . dhammas are defined as saccikattha and
paramattha, this means, not that they partake the
nature ofabsolute entities, but that they are not further
deductible to any other reality, to some kind of
substances which them."24
 29
28
The meanings ofthe termAbhidhamma: (i) Chinese tradition:

Great dharma, peerless dharma, excellent dharma, and the

AtthasaIini explains five special meanings related to the prefix
study about dharmaor facing dharma
'abhi' in the compound "Abhidhamma".

"Because this book shows things that suff�r growth, (ii) The Abhidhammapi{akas and Yen. Vasumitra:

Of proper attributes, to be revered, As it is able to investigate and discriminate the characteristics

of phenomena thoroughly welL Vasumitra further says that it
Well -differentiated, and of worth is expounded in the .

Surpassing, Abhidhamma is its name."25 (m) Bhadanta:

Again the ultimate exposition of the doctrines according to It is called abh idh arma because it collects, arranges and
. .
three nayas (methods) has also been considered as a distinctive di s such problems as defilement, purity etc. by means
mark of the Abhidhamma: of sentences, phrases and words .
•

"In the Abhidhamma they are classified fully by the methods (iv) ParSva:
of Suttanta classifications, Abhidhamma - classification, and
It is called Abhidharmrr because it is ultimate, excellent and
-

catechism."26
infallible wisdom.
"In the sutta -collection there is no such analysis but a partial
interpretation: (v) Dharmaguptakas:

"In the suttantas the four applications in Mindfulness (also It is called abhidharma because of the predominance of
some other doctrines such as eightfold path' , four knowledges, five
dharma.
precepts, etc) are partially classified, not fully."27
(vi) Dar�tantikas:
Because of these reasons the term Abhidhamma can be
Nirvana is supreme amongst all things and the abhidharma
rendered "additional or distinctive doctrine."
is next to it and therefore it is called abhidharma .

Even i n the other schools o f B u ddhism the term

"Abhidhamma" has been defined in various ways and the following
(vii) Buddhadeva:
are some of them: "Abhi" means predominance and this abhidharma is called
abhidharma because it is predominant.
 30
(viiI) Vimalabuddhi:
"Abhi" means veneration and this abhidharma is called
abhidharma because it is venerable and honourable. 28
•
(ix) Vasubandhu:
Abhidharma means facing the dharma and dharma
designates Nirvana and the four truths as the law ofthe ideal.29
According to the above definitions the term "Abhidhamma "
or "Abhidharma " clearly indicates that it is an elaboration or a
developed form ofa collection offundamental teachings. As revealed
by Vasumitra's definition, these fundamental teachings are no other
than the Sutras which represent an earlier stage ofthe development
ofthe Buddha's teachings.
For the above reasons Abhidharma came to be considered
as an additional or a distinctive doctrine.
"Herein what is meant by Abhidharma "7 That which
exceeds and is distinguished from the D.hamma (the Suttas) 30
The specific definition of the term dhamma:
There are a number of definitions of dhammas(elements of
existence) in the Pali Abhidhamma literature ranging from about
5Th century A.D. to about the 1 5th century A.D. When these
defmitions are collected and critically examined, we can clearly
understand the Theravada conception ofdhamma which is different
significantly from that ofthe schools of Sanskrit Buddhism. Here we
propose to examine some ofthem and show the specific standpoint
of the Theravadins in regard to the theory of dhamma which is a
popular subject in the other Abhidhamma schools of Buddhism.
(i) Sabhavasamaiiiialakkhanam dharetiti dhammo:
• other dhammas.35 For example, the hardness (kakkha{atta) of
31
.
.
so called because it bears its own characteristics
as well as the common characteristics.
One way of defining the dhammas was to explain them
according to four-fold definition. Viz. lakkha1)a - characteristics
rasa essential property, paccupatrhana manifestation and
- -
padatrhana immediate occasion.31 By the term lakkha1)a two
-
kinds of characteristics were meant, that is salakkha1)a or
sabhavalakkha1)a (own characteristic or special characteristic) and
samaiiiialakkha1)a (common characteristic). Accordingly
dhammas were defined as those which bear the two kinds of
characteristics, special and common.32 Atthasalini explains the four
- fold method ofdefinition as follows:
" . . . .the specific or generic attributes ofthese or those states
are termed the 'characteristic' (lakkha1)Q). Essential property
(rosa) means function or achievement. Recurring phenomenon
(paccupatthana) means mode of manifestation, or effect.
Immediate occasion (padatthana) means proximate cause."33
We find this method of definition in almost all the Pali
commentarial texts. To have an understanding ofhow this method
was applied in the definitions of the dhamma, let us consider the
following example:
"Moral good (kusala) defined by way of characteristic, etc.,
has faultless, happy results as its characteristic; the destruction
of immoralities as its essential property; purity as its recurring
manifestation; and rational attention as its proximate cause."34
It has already been pointed out that by the term lakkha1)a
two kinds of characteristics are meant as specific and common. Of
these two, 'own characteristic' (sabhavalakkha1)a) means the
specific nature ofa particular dhamma which is not common to the
 32
the earth element (pathavidh atu), knowing the object
(armmal}avijananam) of the consciousness (citta), the inflation or
distention (thambhitatta) of the air element (vayodhatu), are called
'own nature' (sabhavalakkhal}a) or 'specific characteristics'.
Common characteristics (samaiiiialakkhal}Q) are the characteristics
of impermanence (an icca), unsatisfactoriness (dukkha) and
soullessness (anatta) which are common to all conditioned
dhammas .36 Stated otherwise, bhava means ' existence' or existing
in reality' . That which is accompanied by that bhava is called
sabhava (sa-with). All conditioned (sankhata) and unconditioned
(asnkhata) dhammas are explained, perceived, expressed and
clarified according to their sabhava. That own nature (sako bhavo)
of the dhammas is sabhava, that is the hardness (kakkhafatta)
etc. The 'similar nature' (samiino bhavo) that is impermanence
(anicca) ect. is 'common nature' . 37 These characteristics of the
dhammas , the tradition goes on to say, cannot be changed even by
miraculous power.38 Thus bearing their own nature and common
characteristics is one of the main features of the dhammas.
(ii) Attano sabhavam dharentiti dhamma.
Dhammas are so called because-they bear their own nature.
Between this and the former definition there is no difference
in meaning according to its final elucidation. Instead of
sabhavalakkhana here the terms attano sabhava has been used.
•
Commenting on the term dhmma39 the author of the Vibhavinitika
says that the dhammas are so called because they bear their own
characteristics (salakkhal}Q-dharal}Qto). 40 Commenting on the term
salakkhanadharanato of the Vibhavinitika, the author of
• • •
theMal}isaramaiijusatika says that it means the same as the
definition ' attano sabhiivam) dharentiti dhamma.41 All mental and
material dhammas (niimariipadhmma) are also designated by the
tenn sabhava dhamma. As in the case of the fQrmer definition here
also the specific and common characteristics of the dhmmas are
meant by the term sabhava. When taken etymol6gically as derived
from the root dha- 'to bear', the term dhamma implies the meaning
33
of bearing its own nature� 2 As pointed out earlier dhamma is defined
as sakho bhavo and samano bhavo indicating the same meaning. 43
Though defined as bearing its own nature, in reality there is no
dhamma separate from its nature. 44A riipa (matter) separate from
the characteristic of molestation (ruppana), the element of earth
(pathavidhatu)separate from hardness (kakkhafatta) cannot be
found in reality.But for the sake of making known or explaining,
thedh_ammas are defined making an arbitrary difference between
the dhammas and their nature. 45 This is only verbally defined for
easy understanding, otherwise the dhamma and its nature are one
and the same.
(rii) Dhariyanti attano paccayehiti dhamma. 46
Dharnmas are so called because they are causally conditioned
or borne by their (causes) and conditions.
Dhamma is a familiar term in canonical texts. In the statement
made by Ven. Assaji to the wanderer Upatissa ' Ye dhamma
hetuppabhava, tesam hetuTathagato aha, tesaii ca yo nirodho
evamvadi mahasamal}o,47 the term dhamma has been used
inthesense of ' what is causally conditioned' .
Sometimes we find Buddha identifying dhamma with causality
(paticcasamuppada ).48 Among the terms which define the
characteristics of causality, 49 the two terms 'dhammatthitata',
, dhammaniyamata ' (establishing of causes and effects and certainty
of orderliness of causes and effects) refer to the dhammas. The
Visuddhimaggatika commenting on the term ' dhammatthitata'
explains that here dhamma means 'borne by the causes and
conditions'. Further it says dhamma has the meaning of ' fact'
(karal}Q) or 'condition' (paccaya). While there is no a specific nature
separate from dhamma, the nature of the existence of the dhamma
itself is meant by the term ' dhammatthiti'50 In another context this
(ika definitely says that the knowledge of the theory of causality is
meant by the term 'dhammatthitiiial}a' . 51
 34
(iv) _ Na hi kaIabhedena dhammanam sabhavabhedo atthi . 52
There is no difference in the nature of the dhamma according
to the division of time.
According to the Theravada abhidhamma, time
(kala) is
n o t a dh amma b u t only a c o n cept (paiiiiatti) Y The
Mal)isaramaiijusatika observes that dhammas bear the same
nature in the present as in the past and future. The particular nature
of each dhamma does not change in the three periods of time. The
differences of the dhamma made according to the division of time
are 'provisional' (pariyayato) and therefore not ultimately real.54
(v) Rupariipadh ammanam kesaggamattmpi
desantarasankamanabhavato55
Mental and material dhammas do not transmigrate from one
place to another, to a distance even as small as a tip of a hair.
According to Theravada all dhammas are momentary. As Y
Karunadasa observes:
"The most striking thing about the Theravada theory is that
the fact of momentariness is exp1ained in quite a different way:
Each dhamma has three moments, namely uppadakkhal)a:
the moment of origination; (hitikkhal)a, the moment of
subsistence; bhangakkhal)a, the moment of cessation. The
three moments do not correspond to three different dhammas .
On the contrary they represent three phases (avattha) -the
nascent, the static and the cessant of one ' momentary'
dhamma. Hence the statement, namely the dhamma are
momentary, means that a given dhammas has three
momentary phases or stages. It arises in the first moment,
subsists in the second moment and perishes in the third
moment."56
35
Accordingly this means that a dhamma has three phases or
stages within a given "moment" in that process. In this case a
dhamma has no chance of transmigrating from one place to another
in that momentary process. When referring to bodily intimation
(kayaviiiiiatti), a kind of motion (calana) is mentioned. It is
explained that in this case motion means to perish in one place and
to arise in another place, but not transmigration from one place to
another. If motion or transmigration of the dhamma is accepted, it
goes against the theory of the ' momentariness' (khal)ikata) of the
dhamma7
(vi) Sabbe pi riipariipadhmma ah utva sambhonti hutva
pa(IVentl
• •
All mental and material dhammas emerge into existence
without having been and disappear without any residue.
dhammas or sabhavadhammas are delimited by the two
moments ' nascent' (uppada) and ' cessant' (vaya). Space
(akasa) is not a dhamma and it does not have nascent and
cessant phases. Therefore it is explained as endless. 58 The
dhammas, being limited at both ends, do not come from
anywhere before their emergence, nor do they go elsewhere
after their cessation. Between the two limits they behave as if
devoid of any power or authority of their own (avasavattita)
according to the casual law. 59 The Vikasinitika clarifies this
nature of the dhammas with an apt simile:
"When a lute being played there is no pre -existing collection
of sounds from which its sound is produced. Arising, it does
not come from a stored collection; ceasing it does not go to
the directions or sub-directions; and upon cessation it does
not remain stored somewhere as a collection. The sound
emerges because of the lute, the bow and the attempt of the
player on it, without having (previously) been and disappears
without any residue. In a similar way all mental and material
 36
dhammas emerge into existence without having been and
disappear without any residue. "60
(vii) Yathapaeeayam pavattamaniinam dhammiinam natthi
kiici vasavattitii 61
Causally conditioned dhammas have no power or authority
of their own.
It was mentioned earlier that all the dhammas are conditioned
and therefore they come into existence and disappear according to
the law of causality. The casusal law is presented in many discourses
in an impersonal terminology as follows:
"When this is present, that comes to be;
from the arising of this, that arises.
W hen this is absent, that does not come to be;
on the cessation of this, that ceases. "
The dhammas appear and disappear owing to such and such
causes and conditions. For this reason dhammas have no self ­
authority. They have a dependent or relative nature. Accepting a
kind of authority or independence of the dhammas is to support
the theory of a creator god (issaranimmal}avada) and the theory
of soul (attaviida). These theories have no conformity with Buddhist
teaching at all. Therefore,we have no reason to speak of an authority
over the dhammas except their conditional existence.
(viii) There is no agent distinct from the nature of the dhammas.62
To elucidate this fact which also is connected with the fomler
definition, it is very important to discuss here, in brief, the methods
of siidhana followed by the abhidhammika commentators. What
37
is emphasized by this method ofsadhana is that there is not agency
or instrumentality separate from the nature of the dhammas. In the
task of giving definitions to the dhammas, the commentators had to
use various syntactic devices. In those definitions? owing to the
peculiarities of language, there sometimes arose ideas completely
contrary to the accepted theories of the nature of the dhammas.
Because of this, the commentators had to explain the nature of
language usage and make explicit those additional implications in
order to safeguard readers from misconceptions regarding the nature
of the dhammas. Among those explanations, the sadhana -
definition is worthy of consideration. According to the Vibhavinitika,
citta (consciousness) can be defined in three ways.
1. kattusiidhana: agency - denoted - definition:
eintetiti cittam- citta means that which thinks.
.
In this context eitta is the dhamma. Thinking is its action. But
in reality consciousness does not think .
2. Karal}asiidhana: instrumentality - denoted - definition:
cinteti vii etena karal}abhutena sampayuttadhamma ti
elttam
• •
If we change the order of this sentence and put it in a more
simple and short way we have it as sampayuttadhamma etena
eintentiti cittam - eitta means that with which the accompanying
dhammas (mental properties) think .
Here sampayuttadhamma means ' mental properties '
(eetasika). These are so called because they always come into close
c o n t a c t w i t h c o n s c i o u s n e s s . 6 3 O n e c o u l d argue that
sampayuttadhammii can mean even material dhammas
(rupadhamma) because it is accepted that the mental and material
dhammas come into contact in the process of perception.
 . 38 39
kattusadhana-cintetiticittam - Consciou"!1ess is that which
•

The Vibhavinitika definitely states that here in this context only the L

mental properties (cetasika) are meant.64Anyhow, it is stated that thinks

in this case the two intimations, bodily and vocal (kayaviiiiiatti and
karal)asadhana-tena citta,;, vicaratiti vicaro . In this
••

IL
vaciviiiiiatti) cannot be avoided.65 Now it is clear that in the above
example
definition sampayuttadhammii means 'mental properties' . Thus the
sentence:
Which is given for karalJllSadhana, the verb 'vicarati' should

"Sampayuttadhamma etena cintenti" means ' the cetasika
(mental properties) think with consciousness (citta)' . The
instrumentality is attributed to the consciousness (citta) which is to
be defIned (patipadetabbadhamma).
be read as 'vicareti' in accordance with the reading found in
the Vibhavinitika. When defIning the term 'vicara' this text
states ' aramml)e tena cittam vicaretiti vicaro' .68 On another
occasion the Vikasinitika itself defines the same term in a
similar way as ' tenati tena vicarena, karanabh iitena
•

hetubh iitena va cittam arammane vicareti' .69 The example

3. Bhavasadhana: non - attributive - defInition:
for karal)asadhana, given in the Vibhavinitika runs thus:

cintanamatta,;, citta,;, - thinking itself is consciousness.

According to this method of definition, consciousness is
defIned as 'the mere fact of thinking itself is consciousnesses without
there being any attribution of agency or instrumentality to what is
sought to be defIned. This method of defInition is absolutely valid
for all real dhammas. The other two defInitions mentioned earlier
are valid only provisionally. Further, -it should be remembered that
there is no agency or instrumentality separate from the nature of the
dhammas. The above explanation of sadhana is given according to
the Vibhavinitika.66
•
, arammane tena citta,;, vicaretiti vicaro' - Consciousness
is being applied on the object with the help of the sustained
application (vicara)
Here the tenn vicara refers to the agent but it is a nominative
subject.
iii bhavasadhana - visayavijanana,;, citta,;, - The knowing
of the objects itself is consciousness
This is the example given for bhavasadhana. According to
the bhavasadhana definition several facts of the dhammas are

Not only the Vibhavinitika, but also some other sources clarifIed as follows:
speak about these methods of defInition. The Sinhalese paraphrase
1. The Vibhavinitika says that the consciousness arises only
on the Visuddhimagga says that Bhavasadhana is given to
when there is contact with an obj ect. This shows the
elucidate that the dhammas exist according to the causal laws. 67
impennanency of the citta.
The agency - denoted defInition (kattusadhana) is given to show
that there is no agency separate from the nature of the dhammas.
2. Also it clarifIes the behaviour of the cittaas bound with the
The Vlkasinitika explains these methods with more explicit examples
objects.
and it is worthwhile to examine them here in brief though it resembles
the Vibhavinitika in almost every aspect. Here also three examples
are given to elucidate the three methods of defInition:
 40
3. By the statement that ' knowing itself is consciousness' , the
absence of an agent (akarakabhava) ofthe consciousness is
.
clarified.
Further explaining the siidhana in a manner similar to the ·
Vibhiivinitika, the Vikiisini{ikii says that the bhiivasiidhana
definition is absolutely valid and the other two are provisional
(pariyiiya).70
The example presented in the Ma1}isiiramaiijusiitikii to
elucidate the three siidhanas are simple and clear. Instead of the
term sadhana this text uses the term niddesa.
Kattuniddesa-phusatiti phasso - because it touches it is
contact; karananiddesa -phusanti eteniitiphasso - because by
means of it they touch, it is contact.
bhiivaniddesa -phusanamattamphasso - mere touching itself is
contact.
These and many other examples and explanations scattered
in the commentaries clearly show that the commentators had
definitely understood the limitations and wrong implications ofthe
language when it is employed for the task ofdefining the dhammas.
(Ix) Dhammavinimmuttam vii kinei kammam natthi.71
There is no function separate from the dhammas.
As was mentioned before, in defining the dhammas, showing
their functions (rasa) was one ofthe main tasks ofthe commentators.
Of the four methods of definition, viz. lakkha1}a, rasa,
paeeupatthiina, pada{{hiina, rasa means the function or the task
ofthe dhammas. For example:
Phassa (contact) -sanghattanaraso its task is to strike together,
-
41
danii G oy ful feeling)
i((haramma1}iinubhavanalakkha1}a - its task is to enjoy pleasant
objects,
Saiiiiii (perception) -paeehiisaniiii1}akara1}Qrasii - its task
is to make a sign for later recognition.72
Thus showing the main tasks ofthe dhammas separately had
been one of the main features of the Abhidhammi c methods of
definition. Though the case was so, in reality there is no task separate
from the dhammas . In reality dhamma and its task are one and the
same. But for the convenience of understanding, the tasks of the
dhammas have been shown attributively.73 Therefore it is
emphasized that those tasks should not be considered as separate
from the nature ofthe dhammas though they seem to be so according
to linguistic convention.74
(x) Na bhinnajiitiko dhammo bhinnajiitikesu upalabbhati.75
A dhamma cannot be obtained in the dhamma ofopposite nature.
For example, the Ma1}isaramanjusatikii says that ill - will
(patigha) cannot be obtained among the indeterminate (abyiikata)
as it is ofan extremely unwholesome nature (akusaJayabhiivattii).76
In the Abhidhamma, the dhammas are classified into many groups
as wholesome (kusala ), unwholesome (akusala), and so forth,
according to their nature. According to the above rule the components
ofthe different groups never intermingle.
(xi) Vibhagavantanam dhammiinam sabhiivavibhiivanam
vibhiigena vinii na hotU7
The nature ofthe things which are divisible cannot be explained
without showing their divisions.
According to the Theravada Abhidhamma things are not indivisible
discrete entities. Indeed they are endowed with divisible units.
 42
To realize their true nature we have to analyze them into their
constituent parts and that analysis should be thorough. This
analyzability ofthe things shows their impermanence and the various
divisions and sub - divisions ofthe dhammas have been made to
clarify the same fact.
(xii) Dhammasabhavasamaiiiiena hi ekibhutesu dhammesu
yo nanattakaro viseso so aiiiiam viya katva .
upacaritum yutto, evam hi atthavisesavabodho hoti 78
Even among the dhammas which bear (the dhamma nature) in
common the dhamma nature, the special characteristics by which
they differ among themselves, should be differentiated for the sake
ofeasy understanding.
In the task of defining dh ammas and identifying them
separately, some artificial characteristics or features have been
shown. For example, in explaining the division ofmatter (rupa), the
obj ec t o f form (rupayata na ) ha s be en intro du ce d as
sa nidass an ar up a (visible) an d the other rup as as an idh assan a
(invisible). 79 The definition of rup ayatana as san idassan a me ans
that it stands for the fact ofvisibility. However, from this it should
not be concluded that visibility is something other than rupayatana.
However, since the fact ofvisibility is not commonly shared by all
other instances of matter, for purposes of classification it has to be
distinguished from the rest. Commenting on the phrase ' aiiiiehi
dh am me hi ' in the vibhavin itika, theMal}isaram j
aii usa says it
means 'rupayatana differs from all the other dh ammas ' .80 In this
context, however, they have shown this difference to separate
rupayatana from the other rupadhammas in the same category.
Th us we can see many such instances in the exegetical literature of
the Abhidhamma which bring out the differences between the
dhammas . These should be understood merely as differences of
sounds but not of meaning s. The Vibhavin i says, for example, there
43
is only a differ�nce ofthe prefix 'sam' between anantarapaccaya
(contiguity) and samanantarapaccaya (immediacy) ofthe twenty
- four conditions (catuvisatipaccaya), but not in meaning' . Such
differences are shown for the sake of easy understanding of the
different characteristics ofthe dhammas but not because they exist
in reality. To have an adequate understanding ofthe dhammas they
dhammas. The characteristics of the
should be explained with
dhammas namely impermanence (aniccata), unsatisfactoriness
(dukkhata) and substancelessness (anattata) are considered
separately, but do not exist in reality. They are concepts only. Though
there are no such differences among the dhammas they are
introduced according to the differences ofthe words and meaning
which are employed to describe them. Mal}isaramaiijusa says
'though there are no differences in reality, by way usage,
that is by way of speaking and what is to be spoken (vacana,
vacaniya), making and what is to be marked (lakkhal}a,
lakkhitabba),The cittekaggata (one - piontedness of the mind)
and samadhi (concentration) are one and the same though
introduced as two different things or states.81 In reality there is no
place (thana) called patisandhitthana separate from rebirth
(patisandhl). Rebirth or re - becoming and the place of rebirth are
the same. For easy understanding these differences have been made
conceptually. 82
(xiii) Attano sabhavam dharentiti dhatuyo
Dhatus (elements) are so called because they bear their own
nature.
The term 'dhatu' has been defined in a similar way as the
term ' dhamma' in the Abhidhanunic commentaries. As these two
terms denote a similar meaning and as they have been defined with
the same definitive sentences, whatever has been said ofthe dhatus,
are applicable to the nature of thedhammas. As in the case of
dhamma, the ternl 'dhatu' too has been derived from the root dha
- 'to bear'. Affiliating with this meanings ofthe root, the commentaries
 44
have applied various meanings to the term 'dhatu' . According to
the above definition ofdhatus, it says that dhatu is so called because
it bears its own nature. Here 'own nature' means the special
characteristics ofthe dhammas. For example, the hardness ofthe
earth - element (kakkha{atta ofpathavidhatu)
The Vibhavini collects several meanings ofthe term ' dhatu' .83
Accordingly dhatus are so designated because they produce various
types ofsuffering ofexistence, these are borne by beings as a burden,
with these beings produce suffering again and again. The fundamental
meaning of the term 'dhatu' is 'being - less' (nissatta, nijjiva). 84
The Visuddhimaggatika says that the term 'dhatu' which appears
in the teaching ofpaticcasamuppada (causality) has the meaning
of 'nature' (sabhava). 85 The different substances of the body such
as blood are called dhatus. Furthermore, these dhatus are
considered to be a component part of what should be known. All
the dhammas are sometimes called dhatu as they bear their own
nature, as they cause suffering and as they do not exceed the nature
of the dhatus. They are called dhamma because they bear their
own nature and they bear a nature which clepends on mom�ntariness.
All the dhammas or dhatus are impermanent as they are perishable.
They are unsatisfactory because they cause fear. They are substance
- less because they are void. For these reasons the Vism S. says
dhammas or dhatus should be contemplated as having one and
the same nature.86 Thus it is very clear that the two terms dhamma
and dhatu are considered as conveying the same meaning.
(xiv) Khandhanibbal}avajjassa sabhavadhammassa
abhavatoY
There is no sabhavadhamma separate from aggregates (khandha)
and Nibbana.
•
When we look at the origin ofthe dhammavada, the analysis
into five aggregates (paiicakkhandha) occupies an important place.
There are five divisions of the so called being: matter (rupa),
45
sensation (�(lIt ii), perception (saiiiia), mental formations
(salikhara) and consciousness (viiiiialJll) . The first item represents
the physical part of the being and the rest the mental aspects of the
personality. Almost all the later analyses ofthe dhamma have been
founded on this analysis of five aggregates. These aggregates
represent the focus oftranscendental insight (lokuttaraiial}a) and
as a result Nibbal}a also can be realized, Nibbal}a means the
cessation ofthe five aggregates. The main goal ofrealizing the nature
ofthe dhammas through insight is to realize Nibbiil}a. Naturally,
what becomes the focus of insight are the five aggregates and
Nibbal}a. It is further clarified by the canonical statement ' In this
fathom - long body with perception and mind, is included sUffering
(dukkha), its - cause (samudaya), its censsation (nirodha) and
the path leading to the cessation of suffering
(dukkhanirodhagamil}ipatipada). Theravada Buddhism does not
recognize any form ofnoumenon besides the phenomena. Insight
(paiiiia) can only realize the true nature ofphenomena. The obtaining
of insight while the khandhas continue to remain is called
sopadhisesanibbalJlldhatu. (state ofNibbal}a with five aggregates)
and with the cessation of the five aggregates it is called
nirupadhisesanibbal}adhatu. By Nibbal}a is not meant a separate
place but merely the extinction ofwhat was previously extant. It is
stated that in the Theravadin's theory ofdhammas a clear difference
ofphenomenal and noumenal aspects is not shown. According to
the Theravada dhamma are not real entities but impermanent,
unsatisfactory and substanceless states. Therefore there cannot be
a noumenal aspect regarding the dhamma, and the consequent
destruction of the bondage with the dhamma, the power of the
mind which causes rebirth, vanishes. This is called Nibbana.
•
.
(xv) Na hi so dhammo atthiyo cittacetasikanam
arammal}apaccaya-bhavam na gaccheyya . 88
.
There is no such a dhamma which does not become an object
ofmind and mental properties.
 46 47
This statement implies the idea that all dhammas can be End Notes
1. PTSD - s. v. dhamma
realized. By saying that Theravada affirms its standpoint regarding 2. DA i, PTS, p.99; DhPAi, PTS, p.22
the empirical reality of the dhamma. At the same time it should be 3. DhsA, PTS,p. 3 8
emphasized here again that the true nature ofthe dhamma comes 4. MAi, PTS,p. 1 7
5. Abhidhiinappadipitaka, p. 1 08
only into the focus of insight (panna) which is developed through
6. Nagdalene Geiger and Wilhelm Geiger, Pali Dhamma - Vemehmlich in
the steps ofmeditation (bhavana). Realizing the true nature ofthe der kanonischen Literature,p. 4 _

dhammas is an inherent nature of this insight. Buddha also has 7. John Ross Carter, Dhamma - Study of a Religious Concept, pp. 1 56 -
explained them after-their realization through his highest knowledge. 159
These dhammas were not originally produced by the Buddha but 8. DhsA, PTS,p. 1 7
9. Ibid,DhpA; PTS, p. 2
he has explained them as they exist in the world. With regard to 10. MAi,PTS, p. 1 7
undeveloped knowledge (abhavitapanna), the true nature of the 11. Ibid
dhamma does not come into focus. At the beginning, accepting 12. Ads., p. 6; abhvk., p. 1 7
those dhammas faithfully as preached by the Buddha through his 13. ADSVT., p. 4
14. ADS., p. 1
developed insight, we should try to develop our own insight in order 15. ADSVT, p. 4; ADSS.,p. 5
to realize them for ourselves. 16. PTSD., S.V. attha
17. PTSD., S.Y. Parama
(xvi) Tinnam lakkhananam dhammato abhavena . . . .
• • •
18. Cpd., p. 6
19 . Narada,A Manual ofAbhidhamma, pp. 6 - 9 •

The three characteristics are not real dhammas. 20. op.cit.,p. 7

21. Nanamoli,The Path of Purification,p. 871
22. C. V. Shankar Rau,A. Glossary of philosophical Terms.
It was already pointed out that. in the task of defining the
23. Buddhist Dictionary,p. 1 24
dhammas, common practice was to explain their characteristics. 24. Y. Karunadasa, The Theravada Version ofDharmavada,p. 52
These three common characteristics should not be considered as 25. DhsA., PTS, p. 1 9; The Expositor i,PTS,p. 24
real dhammas. Ifwe take these as real dhammas then we have to 26. op.cit.,p. 2; op.cit.,p. 4
27. op.cit., p. 3 ; op.cit.,p. 4
explain the characteristics even ofthem. In this way it becomes an 28. Encyclopaedia of Buddhism i, pp. 3 9 - 40
unending task and it is designated in the Abhidhamma as 29. Ibid,BSSAK i,p. 1 2
anavatthanadosa (fallacy of infinite regression). 89 30. DhsA.,PTS,p. 2; The Expositor i, p. 3
31. Atthiisalini, PTS,P. 63; Expositor I,p. 84
32. Abhidhammatthavikiisini, ed.A.P. Buddhadatta, Colombo, 1 96 1 p.
17
33. Expositor I, p. 84
34. Ibid
35. Visuddhimiirga sannaya iii, ed. Yen. B. Saddhatissa, Colombo, 1 949
P - 55
36. Ma1)isiiramaiijusiitikii H, ed. Yen. B. Saddhatissa,Colombo, 1 949 -
55 p. 1 1 1 1
37. op.cit., I, pp. 1 74 - 75
38. Vikiisini, op.cit., p. 3 9 1 (Abhvk)
 48 49
39. Abhidhammatthasangaha, PTS, p. 6 (Ads) 7S. Msmt L, p. 1 94
40. Abhidhammatthavibhiivinitikii, ed. Yen. Pannananda, Colombo, 1 898, 79. Abhvk., p. 22
p. 27 (Adsvt) 80. op.cit., p. 1 66
41 . SI. Ads., p. 28
Msmt, I, p. 306
42. op.cit., p. 1 08
82. Msmt ii., p. 1 67
83. op.cit., p. 245
43. Visuddhimaggatikii ii, ed. Yen. M. Dhammananda, Colombo, 1 928,
84. op.cit., p. 3 86
p. 76
85. Abhidharmiirthasamgraha sannaya, ed. Yen . Pannamolit issa
44. Abhvk., p. 4 1 4 '
Colombo, 1 926, p. 1 89
45. MiUatikii, ed. Yen. D . pannasara and Yen . P. Wimaladhamma,
86. Adsvt., p. l 32
Colombo, 1 93S, pp. 2 1 - 22
87. Ad s., p. 1 52
46. Vsmt, p.3S4 8S. V smt., ii, p. 226
47. Vinaya I ,PTS, p. 40 89. Visuddhimiirga sannaya ii, p. 889
48. Majjhimanikiiya I,PTS, pp. 1 90 - 9 1 (M)
49. Samyuttanikiiya ii, PTS, p. 25
50. Vsmt., p. 227
51. op.cit., p. 223
52. Adsvt., p. 1 23
53. Ads., p . 39
54. Msmt, p. 240
55. Abhvk., p. 236
56. Y. Karunadasa, BuddhistAnalysis of Matter, Colombo, 1 967, pp. 84,
85
57. Adsvt., p . 1 07 ; Abhvk., p. 276
58. Abhvk., p. 69
59. op.cit., p. 75
60. op.cit., p. 4 1 7
•

61. op.cit., p. 1 1 6
62. Visuddhimiirga sannaya, op.cit., p. 1 0S0
63. Ads., p. 6
64. Adsvt., p. 27
65. ibid
66. op.cit., p. 4
67. Visuddhimiirga sannaya iii, p. 1 0S0
68. Msmt L, p. 3 12
69. Adsvt., p. 1 7
70. Abhvk., p. 1 1 6
71 . op.cit., pp. 1 6, 1 7
72. Msmt i., pp. 3 1 2 - l 3
73. op.cit., p. 322
74. Adsvt., pp. 1 7 , IS
75. Abhvk., p. 1 1 7
76. op.cit., pp. 1 1 9, 2 1 0
77. Adsvt., p . 1 1
 50
Chapter four
Dhamma and the Two 'Truths
Canonical basis:
The main purpose ofBuddhist philosophy is to show the path
to the realization of the true nature of the so called individual
(pugga/a) and ofrelated phenomena through insight (paiiiiii). This
insight has to be cultivated by following the methods of bhiivanii
(meditation). It is necessary to develop insight in order to understand
reality: to one with an undeveloped insight (abh iivitapaiiiia), it is
the outward appearance that comes into focus but not the reality
behind it. Reality is different from the appearances ofthe outer world
which are presented to our minds through the sense - organs
(indriya) . What one understands as persons, animals, trees and
houses etc. are not realities but various assumptions constructed in
the mind according to outward appearances. Once thes e
assumptions, ideas or concepts are constructed in the mind, they
are so designated and used in day-to-day life. Though they are useful
for the purposes of daily life, they are not at all sufficient as far as the
51
realization ofthe .true nature ofthe world is concerned, and only this
realization enables us to get rid ofthe endless suffering ofthe world.
We are led astray by these assumptions and qesignations due to the
lack of understanding ofthe true nature ofthe world, and because
ofthe limitations ofthose designations or linguistic expressions. K.N.
layatilleke explains the process as follows: .
"This is because appearances are sometimes deceptive and
reality is different from that which appearances seem to suggest.
In the everyday world ofcommon sense we not only observed
hard object like stones and tables, which do not seem to change
their form and structure, but also different persons who seem
to continue as self- identical entities being reckoned the 'same'
persons at different times of their existence. But this
appearance, and the reasoning based on it, is deceptive and
is due partly to the failure to see reality as it is and partly to the
failure to understand the limitations oflanguage, which employs
static concepts to describe dynamic process."!
In explaining any philosophy or subject in order to make the
hearers understand the meaning thereof, we have to use words,
patterns of sentences etc. of the language through which we
communicate. The word of a particular language may or may not
express the intended ideas completely. It could happen that the ideas
which comes to the hearer's mind are completely different from that
indented by the communicator: This fact is very marked in the
philosophical teachings of those religious which profess a reality
outside the world of sensory experience. Therefore we find some
speculations regarding the nature oftruth and language in almost all
the philosophies which postulate some kind of reality. 2 As the most
indispensable means to understand reality, language is closely
connected with the description oftruth. In the Theravada tradition,
as will be shown, the Abhidhammic theory of paiiiiatti in its
philosophical context deals with the two aspects oflangmme, namely
word and meaning. This has a close relationship with the theory of
double truth.
 52
53
Language is a system which relates sounds with meaning.3 Its
which enables usto discern the true from the false. The philosophy
two main components are sounds and meanings' which we have to
of Vaise#ka, founded by katiada in the third century RC., also
use to convey the id�a of reality to the hearer. Even in Buddha's
has some observations similar to those ofthe two kinds of truth in
teachings which presents a realistic view of the empirical world,
Buddhism. Theos Bemard explains the Vaise:jika standpoint in
there are adequate explanations ofthe truth and the different usages
regard to the theory ofreality therein as follows:
oflanguage. Here it is proposed to examine them in brief, in order
to clarify the background for the theory of double truth.
"The criterion of truth is the correspondence between the
subjective world ofthought and the objective world ofform.
As Murti points out: "absolutism is committed to the doctrine
Reality is pervaded by existence, therefore, to be real is to
of two truths; it makes the distinction between the obj ects,
exist, and to exist is to be knowable; so when there is perfect
unrelatedly and absolutely, on the one hand and how they appear in
harmony between the inner and outer world the truth ofreality
relation to the percipients who perceive objects through views and
is said to cast its light. "9
standpoints".4 So when we explain the conception oftwo truths, it
classifies the conception of reality as well. Before we go into the
•

As Murti says, all Madhyamaka treatises take the two truths

details oftwo truths in the Theravada tradition, it is worthwhile to
consider here briefly the explanations ofthe same theory in some of
the other Buddhist and non Buddhist schools so as to appreciate its
significance in the wider context oflndian philosophy.
Explaining the standpoint of the Madhyamika, Murti has
shown some connections of the two truths with the Upanisadic
teaching of as the real of the reals and even as the sole reality.5
Elsewhere he compares them with the concepts ofBrahman, maya
and Para Aparavidya in Vedantic philosophy.6 K.N. Jayatilleke
states that ''the doctrine of the two kinds ofknowledge, the higher.
and the lower, which made its appearances in the middle and late
Upan4ads and the theory of standpoints adopted by the Trairasika
AJivikas and the Jains has its counterpart in Buddhism in the doctrine
ofthe two kinds oftruth, conventional truth (sammuti-sacca) and
absolute truth (param 'attha-sacca)".7 In the same work he also
mentions that "in the Pali canon there is nothing strictly corresponding
as vital to the doctrine. IQ Nagarjuna explains that the Buddha's
teach thedharma by resorting to two kinds of truth, namely
lokasaliwrtisatya (conventional truth) and paramartasatya
(absolute truth). Anyone who does not know how to define these
two truths is incapable of understanding the profound state ofthe
Buddha's teaching. 1 1 Bimal Krishna Matilai quotes three definitions
ofsatnvrti (conventional truth) given by Chandrakirti:
(i) Complete covering or the ' screen' of ignorance which hides
truth;
(ii) Existence or origination through dependence, mutual
conditioning;
(m) Worldly behaviour involving designation and designatum,
cognition and cognitwn.12
.

Again Niigaljuna explains the mutual connection ofthe two

to the Naya doctrine ofthe Ajivikas and the Jains, although the
theory ofdouble truth functions in a way essentially like the Naya­ truths thus:
theory".8 The whole philosophy ofNyaya, established by Gautama,
"Without relying on convention, the absolute truth is not
who is believed to have been a contemporary of the Buddha, was
preached. Without relying on the absolute truth, NrvalJa
aimed at an enquiry into the subjects and objects ofhuman knowledge
cannot be realized."13
 54
On the other hand "the paramartha (absolute) is in fact the
unutterable (anabhilapya), the unthinkable, and unteachable.''i4
According to the Vijiiaptimatratasiddhi of Vasubandhu
and its BhaV'a of Sthiramati , the Yogacarins accepted three
levels ofreality as: (i) Parika/pita (the conceptual); (ii) paratantra
(the relative) and (iii) parini�panna (the ultimate). 15 These three
modes of existence are common to all psycho-physical phenomena
and they are mutually inter-related. Parikalpita is a mental
assumption which assumes an unreal as a real. Paratantra means,
to imagine that things arise because of causes and conditions.
Parin4panna indicates the voidness of the paratantra as it is a
mental assumption. According to this tradition, causes and conditions
are merely mental assumptions; they are not realities.
As for the Vaibha�ikas, the nature ofthe two truths depends
on the changeability and non - changeability of the notion of a
particular thing when it is analyzed or fragmented to pieces. For
example, when the pot is broken, the notion 'pot' disappears. That
means it exists relatively (samvrtisat). But when riipa (matter),
vedana (sensation) etc. are analyzed mentally, the notions
corresponding to them do not disappear. This means that they exist
absolutely (paramarthasat). 1 6
What the foregoing briefaccount amounts to is that in most of
the Buddhist and non - Buddhist traditions, the theory oftwo truths
is given an important place.
.
Now let us proceed to examine what Pali Nikayas and their
commentaries say about the theory of two truths. Regarding the
two kinds oftruth in the PaliNikayas, K.N. Jayatilleke observes
that ''there is, however, no clear - cut distinction between these two
kinds of truth in the Pali canon. What we do find is a distinction
between two types of suttas (discourses) which seems to have
provided a basis for the later emergence ofthe doctrine ofthe two
kinds of truth in medieval times . . . . . . . ' 17 Y. Karunadasa points out
55
that there is no positive evidence in the nikayas and agamas to
prove the fact that Buddhist teachings are based on the theory of
two truths. "It must, however, be stated at the very outset that as far
as the Nikaya Agama literature is concerned there is no positive
evidence to show that the Buddhism contained therein are based on
a theory oftwo kinds oftruth, as relative and absolute."18 However,
it is very clear that in the Abhidhammic compendiums and the related
sub - commentaries, the theory is established as an essential part of
Buddhist philosophy, though it represents the theory of paiiiiatti
param 'attha in the later Abhidhammic literature. In introducing
new theories into Buddhist philosophy, the commentators did not
construct them solely depending on their personal views. Instead
they gave much more importance to the original teaching of the
Buddha. It had been an accepted pro cedure among the
commentators that priority should be given to the sutta (discourses)
in determining the meaning ofthe Buddha's teachings.
"Here, in the case, these four - Sutta, Suttanuloma,
Acariyavada and Attanomati should be understood.
-
Here, Sutta means the three collections of canonical texts
(tipitaka) which were accepted in the three councils.
Suttanuloma means the four Mahapadesa. Acariyavada
means the commentaries. Attanomati refers to the
understanding ofone's own according to one's comprehension
and in keeping with logical method. Therein, Sutta should not
be discarded. The four Mahapadesas should be taken in
connection with the suttas. Acariyavada also should be taken
only if it connects with the Suttas. Attanomati has no place
without references to the Suttas because it is the weakest of
all."19
Furthermore, when they introduced new theories, they proved
their validity on two grounds: (i) agama and (ii) yutti. By agama
they established the relationship ofthe theory to be introduced with
the canonical statements and by yutti they showed that the conclusion
was arrived Attanomati through valid reasoning. As an example for
 56
the above fact, the new theory of hadayavatthu in the later
Abhidhammic literature can be considered. Hadayavatthu, the
seat of consciousness, does not appear in the canonical texts. The
Abhidhamma mentions the seat of consciousness in an uncertain
way in the pa({hana without naming it as hadayavatthu.
"tattha yam riipam nissaya manodhatuca
manoviiiiial}adhatu ca pavattanti, tam riipam
manodhatuya manoviiiiianadhatuya
tamsampayuttakanaii ca dhammanam nissayapaccayena
paccayo 20
Depending on this saying and the valid reasoning based on it
the commentators introduced the new concept of hadayavatthu 2 1
Since this was the case, the commentators should have had
many important evidences from the Nikayas in formulating the theory
oftwo truths.
It is true that there is no clear evidence in the Nikayas to
prove the fact that the Buddha's teaching therein are based on the
theory oftwo truths. But it is possible that certain teachings formed
the basis upon which the commentators formulated the theory of
reality. The Nikayas, as they appear, are a collection of discourses
preached to various kinds ofpeople on different occasions. When
we examine them, we fmd many teachings that could be assumed to
have been influential in the emergence ofthe theory ofreality in a
later period.
Generally, the canonical statements ofNibbal}Q, arahantship
or similar state of final liberatwn refer to something that cannot
�
apparently be fully explained by means ofthe con ventional forms of
language. For example, we can consider the following two statements
of Nibbal}a as they appear in the Udana;
"Monks, there exists that condition wherein neither earth nor
water nor fire nor air: wherein is neither the sphere of infinite
57
space nor ofinfinite consciousness nor ofnothingness nor of
neither - consciousness nor unconsciousness; where there is
neither this world nor a world beyond nor both together nor
moon - and - sun. Thence, monks, I declare there is no
coming to birth; thither is no going (from life); therein is no
duration; thence is no falling; there is no arising. It is not
something fixed; it moves not on, it is not based on anything.
That indeed is the end of :11.
"Monks, there is a not - borne, a not become, a not - made,
a not - compounded. Monks, ifthat unborn, not - became,
not - made, not - compounded were not, there would be no
escape from this here that i s born, become, made,
compounded. But since, monks, there is an unborn
. . . ..therefore the escape from this here is born, become . . . . . .
is apparent. "22
In the above two passages, definitely indicating the state of
Nibbana the state is described in negative and positive tenns. This
is not for the lack ofwords but the conventional usage oflanguage is
not capable of describing the absolute state which is beyond the
world (lok'uttara - unconditioned). In another instance it is clearly
stated that the unconditioned state cannot be expressed by means
of words.
"Know, Upasiva", then he said,
There is no measuring ofMan,
Won to the goal, whereby they'd say
His measure's so: that's not for him;
When all conditions are removed,
,
All ways oftelling are removed".
 58
In a footnote to the word 'telling', the translator clarifies the
meaning ofthat term as: "Words carmot describe the unconditioned".
Furthennore, it is made clear that the diverse opinions (sammutiyo)
do not apply to the literated person.
"Whatever these diverse opinions be,
He, who hath found and known, turns not one !
Why should the unconcerned seek the concerned?
Why give accord to things ofsight and ear?"23
Through statements such as the above it is clear that the state
described was beyond he bounds of conventional description.
Perhaps these and the like may have supplied the basis for the
formulation ofthe theory ofabsolute truth in a later period.
On the other hand the Buddha sometimes mentions that
mundane states are the subjects ofdiverse conventions. The various
debates or the diverse opinions oflively conversations always apply
to unIiberated persons but not to the librated.
Persons with defilements cling to their own opinions and argue
with each other. These individual opinions they consider as truth.
But as far as the absolute truth is concerned there can be no such
diverse opinions. Conventions (sammuti) when misinterpreted
according to individual opinions can cause many arguments and
disputations.
"For each declares his view as consummate,
Declares the other's view as lacking worth;
And thus indeed they argue and dispute,
Each saying his opinion (sammuti) is the truth. "24
59
It is to be noted that telm 'sammuti' (convention) itselfhas
been used here. From references ofthis sort it can be assumed that
there are two states: one that can be expressed fully and the other
that cannot be expressed adequately by means of conventional
language. In other words, it is clear that Nibbana comes under the
supra - mundane level. However, this state ofNibbana has to be
explained through conventional language. The understanding which
we get through convention helps us to follow the path correctly and
through that process we can develop wisdom or insight. It is said
that it is only through insight that one is capable ofrealizing the true
nature ofthe world. Therefore, convention is merely a means or a
medium of approaching reality. What Gaurinath Sastri says about
the relationship between language and reality is perhaps also true as
far as the Buddha's explanations of reality. The conventions are
usually denied ofthe supreme reality; still they are necessary aids
and stimulants to the human intellect and prepare the ground for the
subsequent realization.25 The Buddha has made occasional
explanations oflanguage in order to point out its limitations and to
show that one should not be too attached to it in describing reality.
But in some discourses we find that he has given an important place
to the accurate usage oflanguage. As Gaurinath Sastri says: " . . .. . .
in spite ofits limitations human language is a useful instrument in the
hands ofthinkers because, though it may fail to express the reality in
full and give only a pale and blurred vision, it is an index and pointer
to the truth". 26
Again we fmd that in the discourses the Buddha explains very
clearly the fallacy that arises through the unnecessary attachment to
language in the process of spiritual development. In the
Potthapadasu.tta the Buddha explains as follows;
"Just, Citta, as from a cow comes milk, and from the milk
curds, and from the curds butter, and from the butter ghee,
and from the ghee junket; but when it is milk it is not called
curds, or butter, or ghee, or junket; and when it is curd it is
not called by any ofthe other names; and so on. Just so Citta,

60
when any one ofthe three modes ofpersonality is going on, it
is not called by the name of the other. For these, Citta, are
merely names, expression, turns of speech, designations in
common use in the world. And of these a Thatagata (one
who has won the truth) makes use indeed, but is not led astray
by them,"27
Commenting on the above discourse K.N. Jayatilleke says
that "the Buddha uses the term attapa(ilabha to describe these
states but does not assume the existence of an entity or entities
corresponding to the word 'atta' within one's person or body".
And again he says: " the stage when milk has turned into any of
these states it cannot be called by any other name than the name
appropriate to describe each state. To this extent one cannot overstep
convention. Nor should one assume that each ofthese names signifies
an entity within the changing process".28 In essence, though the terms
such as curd, butter, ghee, etc. refer to the same milk we cannot ·
reject them when we deal with them in our day - to - day life. On
the other hand we should not be attached to those terms thinking
that they refer to separate things when we try to understand reality
�y means oflanguage or convention. Referring to the same passage
the translator describes the function oflanguage in relation to reality
as:
"Tbere are a number of qualities that, when united, make up a
personality -always changing. When the change has reached a certain
point, it is convenient to change the designation, the name by which
the personality is known -just as in the case ofthe products ofthe
cow. But the abstract fonn is only a convenient form ofexpression.29
In the Miidhyamaka philosophy, reality is explained as unutterable.
On the other hand, in the Pali nikayas we do not find such a
statement of the Buddha, instead what we do find therein is a
classification ofthe limitations ofthe various expressions oflangllage.
Once we understand its limitations, we are not led astray by them.
Ignorance ofthe imitations oflanguage not only becomes an obstacle
for spiritual progress but also causes many disputes among people.
Therefore, the Buddha on many occasions has shown its limitations
61
in order to use it cautiously. This becomes evident in the
Aral}avibhaligasutta, where the Buddha advises the monks not
to affect the dialect of the countryside and not to deviate from
recognized parlance: 30
"When it is said: 'One should not affect the dialect of the
countryside, one should not deviate from recognized parlance' ,
in references to what is it said? And what, monks, is affection
of the dialect ofthe countryside and what is departure from
recognized parlance? In this case, monks, in different districts
they know (the different words) :
Pati....patta •.•. vittha sarava
.•.• .•.• dharopa. pOI}a. pisila.
..• .•. ••
(all the terms refer to the same object 'bowl') Thus as they
know the words as this or that in these various districts so
does a person, obstinately clinging to it and adhering to it,
explain: ''this indeed is the truth, all else is falsehood". Thus ,
monks, is affection of the dialect of the countryside and
departure from recognized parlance. And what, monks, is non
-affection ofthe dialect ofthe countryside and non -departure
from recognized parlance? In this case, monks, in different
district they know (the different words): pati . . . , yet although
.
they know the word as this or that in these various districts a
person does not cling to it but explains: "These venerable ones
definitely express it thus'. This, monks, is non - affection of
the dialect of the countryside and non - departure from
recognized parlance. When it is said; 'One should not affect
the dialect ofthe countryside, one should not deviate from
recognized parlance' , it is said in reference to this."31
According to the Buddha's explanation, even within one
language there are various usages referring to the same idea or notion.
We have to pay attention not to the words themselves but to the
general meaning which thbse different words convey. Mere
adherence to words is a mark of ignorance and whoever does so,
never understands the real meaning of an expression. The
commentary to the above passage makes this explicit when it defines
 62
' abhinivissa voharati ' and 'tatha tatha voharati
the phrases
aparamasam'
According to it 'Abhinivissa voharati' applies to an ignorant
person who is used to and attached to the word 'pati' for bowl : he
goes to a state where the term 'patta' is used for bowl, and hears
phrases like 'bring apatta', let's wash the patta', and he says to the
people there; 'this is not a patta, it is a pati, call itpati' . This is how
he converses �ering to his own convention. On the other hand, a
wise Man who is not attached to the various usages oflanguage,
having heard the same expressions thinks thus: 'In my state ' pati' is
used for a vessel. These people call it 'patta' . And having thought
thus he gives up his own word 'pati' and uses the term 'patta' without
needless attachment to those tenns.
The terms sammuti and paiiiiatti , as they appear in the
usage ofthe canon, refer to the same meaning, that is 'convention'
Y. Karunadasa explains:
"It must also be noted here that in the early Buddhist discourses
the two terms sammuti andpaiiiiatti are often used more or
less synonymously to mean things whose reality is based on
conventions."32
In addition to the above references, the commentators and
the modem scholars have paid attention to some other specific
canonical passages which they consider as the background to the
two kinds oftruth.
Among them the two kinds of discourses mentioned in the
Anguttaranikaya are of great importance. They are the discourses
(Sutta) having an indirect meaning (neyy'attha) and those having a
direct meaning (nit'attha). Those who do not understand this
distinction and explain the discourses in quite the opposite way,
misrepresent the Buddha :
63
"Monks, these.two misrepresent the Tathagata. What two?
He who proclaims as already explained a discourse which
needs explanation, and he who proclaims as needing
explanation a discourse already explained. These are two.'>33
The commentary on the above passage describes these two
kinds ofdiscourses in a way that can be considered as referring to
the two kinds oftruth (sammuti andparam 'attha) respectively.
"When the Buddha says ' 0 monks, there is one individual,
there are two individuals, there are three individuals, there are
four individuals' this kind ofdiscourse is called "neyy 'attha"
or that which needs explanation. Here, although the Buddha
speaks of one individual etc. there is no individual in the
absolute sense (param 'atthato). Therefore the meaning of
this kind ofdiscourse is left to be inferred. An ignorant person
.
taking this kind of discourse as not needing explanation
(nit'attha) concludes that there is an individual in the absolute
sense. The discourses where impermanence (anicca)
unsatisfactoriness and soulnessness are given these discourses
as needing explanation (neyy 'attha) and interprets them
assuming that there is something eternal, something pl�urable
and something that is called soul". 34
In the above discourse and its commentary there is no clear
statement connecting sammuti and param 'attha to those discourses
styled as neyy 'attha and nit'attha But according to the explanation
given in the commentary which includes the term param 'attha itself
we can assume that the commentator had in his mind those two
kinds of truth when he commented on the passage. However,
according to the Anguttaranikaya quotation and its commentary
there cannot be seen any value judgment applied to those two kinds
of discourses. Both the distinctions of discourses should be
understood in order to realize the truth imparted by them. Both kinds
of discourses have equal value as far as real understanding is
concerned. Onthe other hand, in the Madhyamaka system, two
 64
values are superimposed upon those two kinds of discourses.
However, Murti says that ''this evaluation is made from the absolute
standpoint and samvrti or neyartha can still have some significance
as means to the end (paramartha).35 On the other hand as far as
the Pali canon is concerned it is not an all pervading theory that
necessarily governs all the discourses, though the theory oftwo truths
becomes predominant in the later Abhidhammic literature. In the
Madhyamaka, while this distinction of neyartha and nitartha
becomes the very foundation of its philosophy, it is said
thatN/igaljuna has written his Madhyamaka -sastra to expound
this distinction.36
The commentary on Kathavatthu points out the following
facts in regard to the two truths:
"The talk of the Buddha's is twofold as sammuti and
param 'attha. Talk of being (satta), person (puggala), god
(deva), Brahma etc. is conventional talk (sammutikatha).
The talk ofimpermanence, suffering, soullessness, aggregates,
sense - bases, mindfulness, right efforts etc. is ultimate or
65
Several facts are clear according to the above passage:
(i) Sammuti and paramattha as two adjectives to the term
'katha' - 'talk' , do not refer to two degrees oftruth but two
modes or styles of expression,
(ii) As is the case with paiiiiatti, these two modes of expression
are connected with the difference ofthe individual characters
or personalities.
(m) The one and the same truth or reality is explained in these two
modes for the convenience ofthe different types ofcharacters
but not to convey two kinds oftruth.
(iv) In order to understand the reality both the modes are equally
beneficial.
(v) In a way, these two modes can be compared with some other
divisions ofthe Buddha's sermons e.g.
sankhitta dhammadesana (concise sermon) param'atthakatha
=

absolute talk (param 'atthakatha). If someone is able to

understand reality through the conventional talk such as of vittharadhammadesana (detailed sermon) sammutikatha
=

'being' , the Buddha instructs him in these terms at the very

samukkalhsika dhammadesana (exalted sermon) =
outset. Ifsomeone is able to understand reality through absolute
param 'atthakatha
terms such as of'impelmanence' etc., he instructs him through
conventional terms, he does not give instruction by means of an upubbikadh ammadesana ( graduated sermon) =

absolute terms at the beginning. Having instructed first in

sammutikatha
conventional terms, he later instructs him in absolute terms.
With regard to the person who is capable of understanding nippariyayadesana (non-discursive sermon) param atthakatha
=

by means ofabsolute terms, quite the opposite way is followed.

By nature, absolute terms have a somewhat harsh effect upon pariyayadesana (discursive sermon) sammutikatha
=

the hearer when preached at the very outset. Therefore the

Buddha, having preached first in conventional mode, then These facts can be further illustrated by quoting a similar
preaches in the absolute mode. Whether they preach in passage from Majjhimanikaya commentary, where the two modes
conventional mode or absolute mode, they only preach the of expression are clarified by an apt simile of a teacher which is also
truth, the nature (ofphenomena), without falsehood. "37 found in the same way in the commentary on Anguttaranikaya:
 66
"The blessed one preaches in a conventional mode to those
who are capable ofrealizing the truth through that mode. To
those who are capable ofrealizing the truth through the absolute
mode, he instructs in the absolute mode. The following simile
clarifies the matter: A teacher who is skilled in regional dialects
and who explains the meaning ofthe three Vedas, instructs in
the Tamil language to those who are capable ofunderstanding
in Tamil, and in one of the Andhra languages etc. to those
who are capable ofunderstanding in one ofthose languages.
Here in this simile the teacher is compared to the Buddha.
The three Vedas are compared to the three pitakas (collections
ofthe teachings) which are to be preached. The skill in regional
dialects represents the skill in sammuti and param 'attha.
The students who are capable ofunderstanding the various
dialects are compared to the hearers who are capable of
understanding the dhamma either in the conventional mode .
or in the absolute mode. The teacher's instruction in the Tamil
language etc. is compared to the Buddha's preaching in the
conventional mode or in the absolute mode. "38
In this connection it is worthwhile to pay attention to the details
• o no, sire."
that are given in the Milindapaiiha regarding reality or sammuti
and param 'attha as it it's presented in the form ofdialogues couched
in simple language. There the Yen. Nagasena answers to the question
ofpaiiiiatti in the Dhammasangha1)i. Accordingly this explanation
ofthe Yen. Nagasena can be considered as a definition ofsammuti
or convention.
"Sire, I am known as Nagasena; fellow Brahma - farers
address me, sire, as Nagasena. But though (my) parents gave
(me) the name of Nagasna or Siirasena or Virasena or
Sihasena , yet it is but a denotation, appellation, designation,
a current usage, for Nagasena is only a name since no person
is got at here."39
67
Thus the nameNiigasena is merely a convention. It does not
represent any part ofthe body or the five aggregates separately.
"Is it revered sir, that the hairs ofthe head are Nagasena? 0
no, sire. That the hairs of the body are Nagasena material
shap e , revered sir? 0 no sire. Is Nagasena
feeling . . . . . perception . . . . . the habitual tendencies? I s
Nagasena consciousness? 0 no sire. "40
Another important fact is that the name Nagasena does not
represent the five aggregates collectively.
"But then, revered sir, is Nagasena material shape and feeling
and perception and habitual tendencies and consciousness?
o no sire ."
On the other hand it does not represent something outside the five
aggregates.
"But then, revered sir, is Nagasena apart from material shape,
feeling, perception, the habitual tendencies and consciousness?
•
The very same fact is further clarified with the simile ofthe chariot
as:
"Is the pole the chariot, sire? 0 no, revered sir . . . .the axle
. . . . the wheels . . . . . the body ofthe chariot . . . . the flag - staff
. . . . the yoke . . . . the reins . . . . Is the goad the chariot? 0 no,
revered sir, But then, sire, is the chariot the pole, the axle, the
yoke, the reins, the goad? 0 no, revered sir. But then, sire, is
there a chariot apart from the pole, the axel, the wheels, the
body of the chariot, the flag - staff ofthe chariot, the yoke,
the reins, the goad? 0 no revered sir."41
It is obvious that conventions should be understood as merely
a form of expression but not as a representative of reality. It is only
 68
an indicator or an appendix to reality. The correct definitions of the
terms 'ratha - chariot' and 'Nagasena' should be as follows
according to the Milindapaiiha:
"Because of the pole, because of the axel, the wheels, the
body of a chariot, the flag - staff of a chariot, the yoke, the
reins, and because of the goad that ' chariot' exists as a
denotation, appellation, designation, as a current usage, as a
name. Because of the hair of the head and becaususe of the
hair of the body... and because of the brain in the head and
because of material shape and feeling and perception and
because of habitual tendencies and consciousness that
'Nagasena ' exists as a denotation, appellation, designation,
as a current usage, merely as a name. But according to the
highest meaning the person is not got at here."42
""
As pointed out earlier, the various expressions of language
sometimes mislead people owing to the lack of understanding it as
merely a convention and unnecessary attachment to it and emphasis
on mere terms. This fact is clarified by the Yen. Nagasena regarding
a question raised by king Milinda abo�t unnecessary emphasis 6n
terminology.
"As. sire, people commonly speak of a wagon that is filled
with corn as a corn-wagon though it is not made of corn but
of timber, yet it is because corn is piled up in that wagon that
people commonly speak of it as corn-wagon - even so, sire,
a tree does not converse, a tree is incognizant, but as ' tree' is
a synonym for the devata who inhabits that tree, so to say ' a
tree converses' is the popular expression. Or as, sire, one
commonly says: ' I am churning buttermilk' when one is
churning curds, and though what one is churning is not butter
milk, yet one commonly says, 'I am churning buttermilk' though
he be only churning curds."43
69
Accordingtothe foregoing observation, it would be more
meaningful, if we were to say that as far as the Pali canon and most
of the related commentaries are concerned, there can be seen two
modes of expression - sammuti andparam 'attha - but not two
degrees of reality as conventional and absolute.
Two truths in relation to the dhammas
However as a result of emphasizing the real nature of the
dhammas in connection with their compounds such as beings, trees,
rocks etc. the abhidhamm ic concepts, Citta, Cetasika, riipa and
nibba1)Q came to be recognized as paramatthadhammas (absolute
realities).44 They were called paramattha (absolute) because of
two reasons:
(i) as they are the objects in the highest and unequivocal sense
and
(ii) as they become the objects of the highest knowledge.45
The realities (dhammas) explained in the abhidhamma are
classified into two groups as
(i) conditioned and
(ii) Unconditioned.
Citta, Cetasika and riipa are considered as conditioned
bec aus e they are sub j ecte d to the thre e cha ract eris tics -
impennanence, unsatisfactioriness and soullessness.Nibbana as the
•
extinction of defilements does not belong to the range of conditioned
elements. Therefore it is considered as the unconditioned reality.
These dhammas are accepted as true because they represent the
true nature of the world.46 This true nature does not exist outside the
phenomena. It represents the real nature of the world and it can be
realized only through the wisdom (paiiiia) . On the other hand the
general knowledge is capable of grasping the external forms of the
 71
70
phenomena through the sense - faculties. These are merely the (names or words). Therefore, attha or meanings that become the
concepts based on the limited sense - data. Therefore, the concepts obj ects ofthe ordinary mind essentially represent the conventional
such as men, women, trees, animals which represent the external truth (sammutisacca). On the contrary nama (sounds) ofa given
appearance of the phenomena are designated as sammuti language can represent both conventional and absolute truths because
(conventions). Although they are not "real" in the wider sense ofthe the librated saints express their experience through the words such
term, they are also true because they have been so confirmed by the as nibbana riipa, vedana, saiiiia which indicate the real nature of
common palence.47 the world. But they can be understood perfectly only by those who
have developed their wisdom through the insight meditation
In order to understand the real nature ofthe world, one should analyze
(paiiiiabhavana). Thus it is clear that the ternl "paiiiiatti" occupies
such concepts such as men and women through the wisdom (paiiiia).
an important place in the definitions of two truths in the later
As a result of analysis such concepts disappear and there remain
Abhidhammic literature.
only the real elements (dhamma) which represent the absolute reality.
For example, the concept N ara (man) when analyzed through the
wisdom becomes five aggregates and the concept disappears.
According to the Theravada view both conventional and absolute
truths are equally beneficial as far as the realization of nibbana is
concerned. The untrained mind is not capable ofunderstanding the
real nature ofthe world. So it should be trained first by instructing
through the common usage. The common usage essentially
constitutes ofvarious concepts. By these instructions the untrained
person gradually develops wisdom and ftp.ally realizes the true nature
of the world. On this basis the Theravadins maintain that both
Sanlffiuti (convention) and paranattha (absolute) are true as they are
. equally helpful in the process of realization of the true nature of
phenomena.

In the later abhidhammic literature the term "paiiiiatti" has

been employed instead of "sammuti" but with a special definition
added to it. Accordingly paiiiiatti, has two aspects as attha (meaning
or idea) and nama (noun or sound). This means that the term
paiiiiatti refers to the language by which all kinds of ideas are
expressed. Sanlffiuti (convention) also refers mainly to the common
usage. As to the definition ofpaiiiiatti, attha (meaning of a given
noun) represents the ideas that occur in our minds as a result ofthe
contact between the sense - faculties and the respective obj ects.
These ideas expressed through the vocal sounds are called nama
 72 73
End Notes 31. MaDhlmanlkliya - Atthakathli I, PTS, p. 32
32. . Y. Karunadasa, Abhidhamma Theory of Paiiiiatti, op.cit., p. 76
1. K.N. Jayatilleke, The Message of the Buddha, ed. Ninian Smart, 33. The Book of Gradual Sayings i. PTS, p. 54
London, 1 975, p. 5 1 34. Anguttaranikliya - Atthakathli ii, PTS, p. 1 1 8
2. See: Problem ofTwo Truths in Buddhism and Vedanta, ed. M. Sprung, 35. Murti, op. cit., p. 225
Holland, 1 973 36. op. cit., pp. 254-55
3. V. Promkin and R. Rodman, An Introduction to Language, USA, 1 978, 37. Kathlivatthu - A(lhakathii, PTS, pp. 35, 36
pp. 1 2- 1 3 38. Anguttaranikiiya - Atthakathii i. PTS, pp. 94, 95, Majjhimanikiiya
4. T.R.Y. Murti, The Central Philosophy ofBuddhism, London, 1 960, p. - Auhakathii I, PTS, p. 1 24
243 39. Milinda's Questions i. PTS, p. 34
5. ibid 40. op.cit., pp. 35, 36
6. The Problem of Two Truths, op. cit., p. 1 9 41. op.cit., pp. 37, 37
7. K.N. Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist Theory ofknowledge, London, 1 963, 42. op.cit., pp. 37, 3 8
p. 361 43. op.cit., p. 244
8. op.cit., p. 280 44. ADS, PTS, p. 1
9. Theos Bemard, Hindu Philosophy, Bombay, 1 957, pp. 35 - 62 45. ADSVT, p. 4; ADSS, p. 5
10. Murii, op.cit., p. 243 46. Abhvk, p. 324
1 1. Miilamiidhyamakiikarikii, ed. D. 1. Kalupahana, Delhi, 1 99 1 , chapter 47. ibid.
XXIV
•

12. Miilamiidhyamakiikarikii, Devanagari edition, India, p. 492

13. op. cit., Chapter xxiv
14. Bodhicaryiivatiirapaiijikii ed. P. L. Vaidya, India, 1 960, p. 367
15. Trimasatikii, ed. B. 1. Bhaskar, India, 1 97 1 , pp. 20, 2 1
16. AbhidharmakosaVYiikhyii, ed. D. Sastri, vol, i - iii, Varanasi, 1 970 -
72, p. 338 .
17. Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, op. cit., p. 6 1
18. Y. Karunadasa, The Buddhist Theory of Double Truth, JHSSUK, vol.
iii, iv, 1 984 - 85, Sri Lanka
19. NettippakaraIJa - atthakathii, ed. Yen. W Piyatissa, Colombo, 1 92 1 ,
pp. 69 - 70
20. Vibhiivini(ikii, op. cit." p. 105
21. ibid
22. Verses of Uplift, PTS, pp. 97, 98
23. Woven Cadences, PPS, pp. 1 32, 1 55
24. op. cit., p. 3
25. Gaurinath Sastri, The Philosophy of Word and meaning, Calcutta,
1959
26. op.cit., p . 3
27. Dialogues of the Buddha, i. PTS, p. 263
28. Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, op.cit., p. 3 1 9
29. Dialogues of the Buddha, op.cit., p. 263
30. The Middle Length Sayings iii, PTS, p. 282
 74
Chapterfive
The Four Realities (Paramatthadhammii)
According to abhidhamma, existence is a process ofmental
and physical states which arise and perish momentarily as causes,
conditions and effects. The world which appears as a unity is a
plurality ofconstituents in reality. These are called real elements of
existence because they are the results of analyzing the things in the
world. They are called real as they cannot be further analyzed into
three groups as citta, cetasika and riipa in the Theraviida
Abhidhamma. They never exist independently. Mind and mental
concomitants have four kinds ofrelationships:
1 . They arise together;
2. They perish together;
3 . They take the same object;
4. They arise in the same sense organ.
75
Mind and mental concomitants always arise in connection with
the physical senses. Therefore, mind and form (riipa) never exist
separately.
Citta
Abhidhammatthasaligahadipanipiili defines "citta" as
derived from the root cinta - to think. The ways of thinking are
threefold:
1. ihanacintii (thinking endowed with endeavour): this kind of
thinking comes in vitakka (initial application) in regard to the
first stage of absorption (jhiina).
2. vijiinanacintii (thinking endowed with understanding): this
applies to viiiiiiil}a (cognition or consciousness).
3. pajiinanacintii (thinking endowed with realization): this
applies to paiiiiii (wisdom or intuition).
Of these the second one is applicable to the term citta
(consciousness) because it is defined as having the sense of
'understanding the obj ect.; I
The text furthe r states that term ciUa i n the
Abhidhammatthasaligaha2 has been used in the sense of viiiiiiil}Q
(consciousness).3
The Visuddhimagga states that the terms viiiiiiil}Q, citta and
mana refer to the same thing, i.e. 'consciousness' :.... "The words
viiiiiiil}a (consciousness), citta and mano are one in meaning".4
But it seems that these terms have been used to indicate several
functions or states ofmind.
"In the exposition of consciousness, 'consciousness' (citta) is
so called because of its variegated (citta) nature. 'Mind' (mano) is

76
so called because of it knows the measure of an object. 'Mental
action (manasa) isjust 'mind' .5
The atthasalini further says that "a single moment of
consciousness is introduced by three names: mano (mind), in the
sense of measuring; viiiiial}a (consciousness), in the sense of
discrimination; dhatu(element) in the philosophical sense ofultimate
reality, or of absence ofa living entity".6 In the later abhidhammic
literature the term citta has been preferred to viiiiial}a to indicate
the general meaning of consciousness. Citta derived from the root
cit -, implies the meaning variegation, which is the very nature ofthe
behaviour ofconsciousness.
"Consciousness (citta) is so called for thinking (cit) of an
object, or because it is variegated (citta, citra)". 7
Citta has been described in detail under four different
meanings: 1 . citta as an adjective meaning variegated; 2. citta as a
noun meaning thinking taken as derived from the root cit -to think.8
3. citta as collecting taken as derived from the root ci -to heap up
or collect;9 4. citta as protecting ofwhat js collected taken as derived
from the roots ci - 'to collect' and ta - 'to protect' (ci + ta citta). \0
=
The Atthasalinl explains these meanings as follows:
"By ' consciousness' (citta) is meant that which thinks of its
object, and is aware variously. Or, inasmuch as this word
'consciousness' is common to all states or classes of
consciousness, that which is known as worldly moral, immoral,
or the great inoperative, is termed 'consciousness', because
it arranges itselfin a process ofthought. And the resultant is
also termed 'consciousness because it is accumulated (cito)
by kamma and the corruptions. Moreover, all four classes
are termed 'consciousness' because they are variegated (citra)
according to circumstances. The meaning of consciousness
77
may also be understood from its capacity ofproducing a variety
or diversity ofeffect". 11
In almost all the commentaries what has been described again
and again as the various meaning of the term citta, closely
corresponds to the above definitions. The meaning variegation is
applicable to citta for several reasons. All the variety ofthings in the
world are produced simply as a result ofthinking. Thought precedes
production. Thus the term citta is used in the sense of 'making various
things '.
"Thus all classes of art in the world, specific or generic, are
achieved by the mind. And owing to its capacity thus to
produce a variety or diversity of effects in action, the mind,
which achieves all these arts, is itself artistic like the arts
themselves." 12
The Manisaramaiijusa says that this meaning is relevant for
thirty - two types of consciousness which are accompanied with
intimation (viiiiiatti). 1 3 On the other hand, as citta comprises of
various divisions and sub -divisions such as sphere (bhunu), object
(arammal}a), low (hina), middle (majjhima) and highest (pal}ita),
it is called citta.
"Therefore the varied nature of consciousness should be
understood by way of these characteristics of association,
locality, obj ect, the three degrees of comparison and
dominance." 14
Though citta is so described in the sense ofvariation, it does
not mean one particular consciousness but as a whole all the
processes ofit are meant. Otherwise, one can call even one kind of
consciousness by the name citta in that sense, because it is common
usage in the world that even one constituent part of something is
used for the whole. For example, people who have seen one part of
a mountain say that they saw the mountain. 15 The meaning 'collecting'
 78
applies to citta, in the sense that consciousness arises with actions
(kamma) associated with defilements. 16 Furthermore, 'collecting'
here means the coll ection o f the lineage of impulsion
(iavanasantana).' 17 According to abhidhammic interpretations,
';avana' means the state ofthe mind - process which determines
morality or immorality of the object perceived.18 Because of
consciousness, the personality, or better still the resultant
consciousness (atthabhava), produced by the action ofdefilements
(kammakilesa) is protected. 1 9 When consciousness ceases to be,
the personality produced by the actions also ceases. Therefore,
consciousness is like a protector ofthe personality.20
Consciousness is also defined according to the four ways of
definition as follows: "(Mind or) consciousness is that which thinks
of its object. A definition ofthe word has been given. Cognizing is its
manifestation, a mental and material organism is its proximate
cause."21
The analyses ofconsciousness given according to the methods
ofsadhana clarifies what exactly is meant by it. According
consciousness is that which thinks (katthusadhana). By this
definition it is meant that consciousness knows The object. By
defining it in this way two facts are clarified: 1 . There is no agent
who does this act ofthinking outside ofthe nature ofconsciousness.
2. Disproving the theory that consciousness arises without an object.22
The mere act of knowing the object itself is consciousness
(bhavasadhna). By this definition also several facts are brought
into focus . As consciousness is bound with an obj ect its
impermanency and agentlessness is clarified it has no independence
and hence it is impermanent. So is the nature ofconsciousness . The
defmition 'knowing itself is consciousness' means that there is no
agent who does that action.23 The "karaIJasadhana" definition is
as follows: 'it is called citta because by it the accompanied dhammas
(mental properties) understand the object. '24
•
79
Though we define citta, taking it separately, in reality it arises along
with form (rupa).
Yen.
Nagasena explains the fact thus: "The king said:
'Reverend Nagasena, as to that which you mentioned: name - and
- shape. Which therein is name, which shape?' That which is gross
therein, sire, that is shape. Those subtle mental states that are mental
factors in consciousness, this is name. ' . . . . "These things, sire, are
d e p e n d e n t u p J5 n t h e
When it is said 'the king arrived' it is understood that he has
come with his retinue. Likewise when it is said 'consciousness is
arisen' it means it is arisen with its concomitants (dhammas).
"But consciousness does not arise singly. Just as in saying
'the king has arrived', it is clear that he does not come alone
.
without his attendants, but comes attended by his retmue. "26
According to Theravada Abhidhamma, a dhamma does
not arise singly.
"An aggregate of states, such as contact, etc., is said to be a
group; the consciousness arising in that group of states arises
together with those states. Thus the co - occurrence of many
states is shown. By this word showing the nature ofthe group,
the occurrence of 'one state' only is contradicted.27 The most
difficult task Buddha perfonned was to show that different
states of consciousness focused on one obj ect. As Yen.
Nagasena explains ''this that is difficult to do, sire, was done
by the Lord: he pointed out the arrangement of these
incorporeal mental states that are mental factors in
consciousness and occur in one objective support (for
meditation) saying 'this is sensory impingement, this is feeling,
this is perception, this is volition, this is thought' ."28
In yet another way, consciousness is a dhamma depending
upon the states such as contact and feeling. "Consciousness also
 80
81
appears as a derivative from such phenomena as contact,"29 it is
"(i) They arise and (H) perish together with consciousness (iii)
with regard to consciousness that the convention ' citta' comes into
they have the same object and (iv) basis as consciousness. "38
being30 and therefore it is clear that the term 'citta' has also been
considered as a conventional assumption. Beings deceived by the The mental states that bear these characteristics are generally
common nature of the consciousness, take things which are
considered fifty - two in number. 39 As these states arise and perish
impennanent as pelmanent. Thus consciousness is compared with
together with consciousness, these characteristics do not apply to
magic which deceives people.31 there is no one to command it, but
the material dhamma which lasts longer than a mental dhamma. In
it proceeds according to the natural order of the mind particular, the second characteristic mentioned above is given to
(cittaniyama).32 differentiate it from material elements. The avinibbhogariipas
(inseparable material dhammatO which arise and perish together
Consciousness, explained in various ways above, has been
with consciousness (citta) can possess the first and the second
classified into eighty - nine or one hundred and twenty - one types
characteristics ofthe mental states. Therefore, the third characteristic
in almost all the TheravadaAbhidhammic texts belonging to the
is given to differentiate it from avinibbhogariipas. Further to avoid
medieval period. The passive or vacant state ofconsciousness is
doubt whether these cetasika arise on different bases at the same
called 'bhawznga' and as the term itself conveys it is connected
time with consciousness, the forth characteristics is given.41 The
with previous birth.33 Consciousness is mainly classified under several
cetasikaphassa (contact), vedana (feeling), sanna (perception),
headings: planes (bhiiml)� kind (iati), concomitant (sampayoga),
cetana (volition), ek 'aggata (one - pointedness), ;ivit'indriya
condition (sankhara), trance (ihana), object (alambana) and path
(psychic life) and manasikiira (attention) are common to every
(magga).34 One moment ofconsciousness comprises three moments
consciousness.42 They are common to all eighty - nine types of
or stages as nascent (uppada), static «(hitl) and cessant (bhanga).
consciousness as they arise with them together.43
The time ofsuch seventeen thought -moments is the life -time ofa
.
material element. 35 The term cetasika (cetas + ika) comes under derivative nouns
(taddhita ) which have diverse usages. Accordingly the tenn cetasika
This time - limit has been given according to a statement in
can be defined as 'that which is made by mind' or as 'that which
the discourses; 'the non - material disappears quicker than the
arise from mind' . But ifcetasika is defined in this way its meaning
material' . 36
applies even to the cittasamuUhanariipa (mind - born material
Cetasika (mental properties or states): phenomena).44 In order not to have this meaning, cetasika is
described as comprising three groups: vedana (feeling), sanna
The term 'cetasika' is used in the sense of ' originating in (perception), sankhara (mental formations).45 Further ADSDP
consciousnesses, 'accompanied with consciousness' .37 According defines the term cetasika as having three meaning in accordance
to this definition cetasika is not something different from with its being included into three groups ofderivative nouns (taddhita)
consciousness but comprises characteristics ofit. This fact is further
clarified by the common definition of cetaika which comprises four (I) That which is arisen (in) the mind (bhavataddhita) 46
characteristics:
(2) That w h i c h i s associated (in) with mind
(nissitataddhita )47
 82
(3) That which is engaged in mind (niyuttataddhita)48
The second definition is given to disprove wrong conceptions
like 'whether happiness, suffering and so forth are without will and
whether they are permenrent' .49
According to the four ways of definition:
(1) The characteristic ofcetasika is association with
mind
(2) Its function is not to arise without mind
(3) Having a same object with mind is its manifestation
(4) Its proximate cause is the arising ofmind. 50
When all these details ofcetasikas are considered as a whole,
it becomes clear that the concept of cetasika has come into being
as a result ofthe explanation ofthe different functional characteristics
of consciousness. In the analysis of the five aggregates, viiiiial)a
(consciousness) represents ' citta' inAbhidhammic classifications.
Vedana, saiiiia and sankhara represent the cetasika. In the
abhidhamma what has been described under the heading citta is the
classifications of divisions of consciousness according to bhiimi
(sphere), ;ati (kind) etc. it seems that under the heading cetasika
the internal functional characteristics of consciousness have been
described separately. Therefore, these two abhidhammic concepts,
namely citta and cetasika are but one and the same concept that is
consciousness. It appears that the division into citta and cetasika
was made for convenience of definition rather than because they
were two clearly separate entities in reality. It becomes clear even
by the four characteristics of cetasikas explained above. It is
interesting to note that some cetasikas themselves can be considered
as different characteristics of consciousness rather than as different
cetasikas, for example: manasikara (attention), cit'ekaggata (one
- pointedness ofthe mind), cittapassaddhi (tranquility of mind),
83
cittalahuti (lightness of mind), cittamuduta (pliancy of mind),
citt 'ujjukata(rectitude ofmind).51 In defining some ofthe cetasika,
it seems that what exactly explained are the characteristics ofmind
as the following examples will show: "Uddhacca means the nature
ofrestlessness; that is the characteristic ofrestlessness ofthe mind.
Chanda (conation) means merely the mind's desire of hanging on
to.52 Thina (sloth) means the characteristic ofnon - adaptability of
mind".53 Thus it is very clear now that the cetasika signify some
functional characteristics ofthe first reality, that is, consciousness.
Rupa (matter):
It should be stated at the very outset that the subject ofmatter
in the Theravada tradition in comparison with the same in the other
Buddhist traditions has been ably dealt with by Y. Karunadasa.54
The abhidhammi c concept of riipa represents the physical aspect
ofthe person or individual and the world ofexperience. The common
definition of riipa, in the canon as well as in the commentaries is
"matter (riipa) means that which is subject to molestation".55 Here
molesting means becoming transformed with the effect of cold, heat,
etc. that is the arising in another form when the opposite conditions
such as cold and heat are present. Y. Karunadasa lists seven
meanings of the term rupa as recorded by the two celebrated
commentators Buddhaghosa and Dhammapala as follows:
1. riipakkhandha the material aggregate
-
2. sarira - the physical body ofa living being
3. vanna - colour
• •
4. sal){hana :..- form, figure, configuration
5. kasil)a-nimitta - the 'meditation' - object
6. paccaya - condition, cause
 -- - - - - - . -- - _ .. - -- - - --
-

84 85
7. sabhliva nature56
-
1. sabhlivariipa - they can be noted by their own nature such
as hardness.
The riipas which comprise two groups as primary (bh iita)
and secondary (uplidliya) are twenty - eight in number. 57 All these 2. salakkhal)ariipa - they possess characteristics such as
riipas are of one nature according to eight characteristics: arising, impermanence and hardness

1. ahetuka - rootless 3. nipphannariipa - they are arisen because of the causes,

kamma, etc. by their own nature.
2. sappaccaya - causal
4. riipariipa - they are called riipariipa as they are a riipa
3. slisava - with defilements which is in the nature ofmolesting. Sometimes the term riipa
is used for the objects which are not in the nature of riipas.
4. sankhata - conditioned This nuance of meaning is indicated by the doubling of the
tenn riipa.
5. lokiya- mundane
5. sammasanariipa - they can be obtained in their own nature
6. klimlivacara - pertaining to the sensuous - sphere
and they are worthy to be contemplated applying to them the
(klimaloka)
three characteristics, impermanence, etc.60

7. anlirammal)a- objectless
8. appahlitabba - not to be eradicated. 58
Riipas are called ahetuka, as having no roots such as non -
greed, non - hatred; sappaccaya, as being related to their own
conditions, kamma (action), citta (mind) etc. slisava, as being
connected with defilements which arise regarding themselves;
sankhata, as being conditioned by causes; lokiya, as being engaged
While these eighteen riipas are considered as the riipas the
others have been regarded as the phases or characteristics of the
real riipas. As Y. Karunadasa, after discussing all the definitions of
nippannariipas says, "all these different tenns combine to show
that only those elements, described as nipphanna, are true
riipadhammas. "61 According to the four ways of definition:
1. the characteristic ofriipa is molestation

in the world of five aggregates; klimlivacara, as being subj ect to

2. its function is scattering or dispersing
craving; anliramma1Jll, as not having an object like mental elements;
and appahlitabba, as they cannot be eradicated gradually. 59 3. its manifestation is abylikata62

Among the twenty - eight riipas, only the first eighteen has
-

4. its proximate cause is consciousness (viiiiilil)a)63

been considered as real riipadhammas . This becomes clear through
the definition given to those eighteen. These have been designated
by five terms as follows:
 86
Nibbiina:
•
The Abhidhammic interpretation ofnibbiil)Q, the fmal goal of
Buddhism, somewhat differs from the description of the early
discourses. In the discourses it is described as complete detachment
from the defilements, using mostly words, the commentators have
made an attempt to describe it in a positive way thereby categorizing
it as a realdh amma . Whi l e explai ning nibbiil)a, the
Visuddhimagga presents a quotation couched in negative terms:
"Bhikkhus, in so far as there are dhammas, whether formed
or unformed, fading away is pronounced the best of them,
that is to say, the disillusionment ofvanity, the elimination of
thirst, the abolition ofreliance, the termination ofthe round,
the destruction ofcraving, fading away, cessation, nibbiil)Q. "65
Commenting on it the author says that Viriiga means not
merely 'the fading away ofattachment' but it implies an unconditioned
dhamma.
"Herein fading away is not mere absence of greed, but rather
it is that unformed dhamma wJ;1ich, while given the names
disillusionment ofvanity' , etc., in the clause 'that is to say, the
disillusionment ofvanity, . . . . . nibbiil)a' , is treated basically
as fading away."66
The Abhidhammiivatiira also contributes to the above idea.
According to it to say that 'there is no one nature called nibbiina in
•
reality as it cannot be obtained as soul or the hare's horn' is not
reasonable. Because nibbiil)a can be obtained by the persons who
follow the relevant practices and investigate it through the eye of
wisdom. Anything should not be denied merely because the untrained
persons (puthujjana) do not obtain it. 67
Craving (tal)hii ) is called viil)a in the sense of weaving or
combining the dhammas, aggregates etc. or the existences together.
The separation from that viil)a or tal)hii is designed by the term
87
nibba1)ll Cni + viil)a - nibbiil)Q). 68 The Visuddhimagga elaborates
on this etymology further thus:
"It is called nibiil)a (extinction) because it has gone away
from (nikkhanta), has escaped from (nissa(a), is dissociated
from, craving, which has acquired in common usage the name
fastening (viil)Q)' because, by ensuring successive becoming,
. craving serves as ajoining together, a binding together, a lacing
together, ofthe four kinds ofgeneration, five destines, seven
stations."69
Contributing to the above meanings theADSDP further defines the
term according to traditional grammar as follows:
(1) Derived from the root vi - 'to weave' (vi-yu, vi- ana, v-ana,
viil)Q, ni-viiI), nibbiil)Q)70 the term viil)a indicates the meaning
, dissociated from craving' (viil)a)7 1
(2) Derived from the root vii - 'to relieve (ni + va + yu, nibbiil)a)
the term nibbiil)a indicates the meaning 'here or by this the
fire ofcraving etc. is extinguished' .72
While mentioning that nibbiil)a means to be free from craving
which is called viil)a, the Abhidhammatthasangaha presents two
characteristics ofit as follows:
"Nibbiil)a however is termed supramundane, and is to be
realized by the wisdom ofthe four paths. It becomes an object
to the paths and fruits, and is called Nibbiil)a because it is
departure (ni) from cord - like (viil)a) craving. nibbiil)a is
one-fold according to its intrinsic nature . According to the
way (it is experienced) it is two-fold namely, the element of
nibbiil)Q without the substrate remaining and with the substrate
remaining. It is threefold according to its different aspects
namely, void, signless and longing - free.»?3
 88
Elaborating on the above passage Vihhiivini{ikii says that
the first characteristic that is 'nihhiilJll is to be realized by the wisdom
ofthe four paths' shows the verifiability (realizability) ofnihhiilJll by
the noble ones. The second, "it becomes an object to the paths and
fruits', shows that it can be proved through inference by the
ka/yiil)aputhujjanas. 74 Thus as nihhiil)a can be produced or
proved by two methods or ways namely direct perception and
inference, the wrong conception that mere viodness is nihhiina ' is
•
disproved.75 Regarding the other two divisions ofnihhiina that is
•
sopadhisesa and nirupadisesa, upadhi means the five aggregates.
Those are so called in the sense that they are grasped by the
defilements . The realization ofnihhiilJll with the five aggregates left
is called sopadhisesanihhiil)adhiitu. When the five aggregates
disappear at the death of an arhant that state is called
nirupadhisesanihhiil)adhiitu.76
Details ofthe other divisions ofnihhiil)a are as follows: It is
suiiiiti (void), because it is devoid ofattachment, hatred and delusion
either by way ofobject or ofaccompaniment. It is animitta (signless)
as it is free ofthe signs such as attachment and hatred. It is appal)ihita
(longing - free), as it is free from longing such as attachment and
hatred. Nihhiil)a is also described by some other names as accuta
(death l e s s ) ,
accanta (excee ding the end ) , asankh ata
(unconditioned), anuttara (matchless).77 The commentators have
made an attempt to describe nihhiil)a as having its own nature as
they described the other dhammas as being either mental or material.
The earth element has hardness as its own characteristic, so nihhiina
.
as a dhamma possessing its own nature they wanted to prove it as
a real state and disprove the theory that it is mere voidness. 78 For
this reason ni�hiil)a has also been explained according to the four
ways of definition as in the case ofthe other dhammas. Thus the
characteristic of nihhiil)a is pacification. Its function is making
deathlessness or happiness, its fruit is signlessness and the proximate
cause is renunciation.79 However it must be stated here that the
89
ADSDP says on the contrary that there is no proximate cause for
nihhiina .
•
The Ahhidhammiivatiira presents a catechism in order to
prove nihhiil)a as a nature (dhamma) which can be obtained in
reality. If nihhiil)a is merely the absence of attachment etc., all the
untrained people will be the persons who have realized nihhiil)a.
Not only that but also there falls upon nihhiil)a the fault of being
manifold because the eradications of attachments etc. could be in
many ways. By being so, nihhiilJll comes to the state ofconditioned
Then it will be impermanent and unsatisfactory.80 Therefore
nihhiil)a is not merely the absence ofattachment, etc. By realizing
whatever dhamma, ifthere occurs the eradication ofdefilements,
that state or dhamma is called nihhiilJll as it becomes the foundation
(upanissaya) for the destruction ofdefilements being itselfendless.81
As Buddha has preached in many discourses 'monks, there is a not
- born, not - become, not - made, not - compounded etc. 'we
have to conclude that there is a certain dhamma called nihhiina. 82•
Buddha has said that the four paths, four fruits ofmonk hood and
nihhiil)a are exempt from the threefold cycle of existence and are
immeasurable. Therefore, there is a certain state called nihhiil)a in
reality, otherwise how can we apply the immeasurability to nihhiilJll. 83
On the other hand we cannot reject nihhiil)a as a mere concept.
The Buddha has said that four paths and four fruits ofa recluse have
the objects of immeasurability. If these possess conception as an
object, then they become contradictory with the above saying.84
Therefore nihhiilJll is not a mere concepts but it is a real state which
becomes the condition of object ofthe paths and their fruits, which
is permanent as it has no arising, formless as it has no nature of a
riipa or matter and which is devoid of obsession. 85 Thus
Ahhidhammikas were keen to provenihhiil)a as a real state which
has a nature of its own.
 90 91
28. Milinda's questions, ibid, p. 1 2 1 ; Milin, p. 87
End Notes
29. Expositor I, p. 1 50; DhsA, p. 1 1 3
30. Abhvk, p.22; Abhvt, p. 2
1. Abhidhammatthasairgahadipanipali, Rangoon, 1 929, p. 9
31. Mohaviccedani, ed. Yen. A P. Buddhadatta, A.K. Warder, PTS, 1 96 1 ,
2. Abhidhammatthasairgaha, ed. T.W. Rhys Davids, JPTS, 1 884 (1
p. 1 22
-

48)
32. Abhvk, p. 1 96
3. Abhidhammatthasairgahadipanipali, ibid, p. 8
33. Compendium of philosophy, ibid, pp. 1 1 4 - 1 8 (Cpd.); E.r.
4. Visuddhimagga, ed. C.A.F. Rhys Davids, PTS, 1 9io - 2 1 , p. 452; The
Sarathchandra, Buddhist Psychology of Perception, Colombo, 1 958,
Path of Purification, tr. Bhikkhu Nanamoli, Colombo, 1 964, p. 506
pp. 7 5 - 96
5. Expositor I, PTS, 1 920 - 2 1 , p . 1 85 ; Atthasalini, ed. E. Muller, PTS,
34. MMT I, p. 139
1 897, p. 1 4 1 (DhsA)
35. Abhidhammatthasairgaha, ed. t.w. Rhys Davida, JPTS, 1 884, p. 1 6
6. op.cit. p. 1 87; op.cit. p. 1 4 1
(ADS)
7. op.cit. p. 65, p. 49
36. ADSVT, p. 5 8
8. Abhidhammatthasairgahadipanipali, (ADSDP) op.cit., p. 9
9. ibid
37. Abhvk, pp. 1 07 - 8; abhvt, p. 1 6 ; Visuddhimagga(ika I, ed. M.
10. Abhidharmarthasairgrahasannaya, ed. Yen . Pannamolitissa,
Dhammananda, Colombo, 1928, p. 25 (Vism n; Paramatthavinicchaya,
Ambalangoda, 1 926, p. 6; Abhidhammatthavibhavini(ika, ed. Yen.
ed. Yen. AP. Buddhadatta, JPTS, 1 985, p. 1 76 (Pvn)
W. Pannananda, C o l ombo,
1 8 9 8 , p . 4 ; ADSDP, p . 9 ;
38. A Manual ofAbhidhaf!1ma, ibid, p. 76; ADS, p. 6; Cpd, p. 94
Abhidhammavatara, ed. Yen. P. Buddhadatta, PTS, 1 9 1 5, p. 2 (Abhvt)
39. ADSVT, p. 27; ADS, p. 6
11. DhsA, p. 63; Expositor I, pp. 84 - 84
40. Y. Karunadasa, Buddhist Analysis of Matter, Colombo, 1 967, p. 3 3 ,
12. DhsA, p. 64; expositor I, p. 86; AD SDP, p. 9
Avinibbhogarupa includes eight elements as: earth (pathavi), water
13. Manisaramaiijusa(ika I, ed. S ixth B u ddhist council ,
(a po), temperature (tejo), air (vayo), the visible (riipa), taste (rasa),
Buddhasasanasamiti, Rangoon, 1 960 - 64, p. 129 (MMT)
smell (gandha) and nutriment (ahara)
14. Expositor I, p. 85; DhsA, p. 64; Abhidhammatthavikasini, ed. Yen.
41. ADSVT, p. 27, Abhidharmarthasangraha - Sannaya, ibid, p. 4 1
AP. Buddhadatta, Colombo, 1 96 1 , p. 20 (Abhvk)
(ADSS); Abhvk, p . 1 07, MMT I, p. 3074
15 . MMT I, p. 129
42. Pvn. p. 1 76; ADS, p. 6 ; A Manual ofAbhidhamma, ibid, p. 794
16. Abhvk, p. 2 1
43. ADSVT, p. 28
17. Abhvk, p. 1 30; AD SDP, p. 89
44. A Manual ofAbhidhamma, ibid, p. 303
18. Compendium of philosophy, tr. S.Z. Aung, PTS, 1 9 1 0, pp. 23 - 30;
45. AD SDP, p. 8
Yen. Narada, A Manual ofAbhidhamma, pp. 32 - 33
46. Rupasiddhi, ed. Yen. K. Pannasekhara, Colombo, 1 964, pp. 1 67 - 69
19. M� I, p. 129, 130
47. ibid, pp. 1 59 - 6 1
20. Abhvk, p. 2 1 ; MMT I, p. 1 30
48. ibid, p. 160
21. Expositor I, pp. 1 48; DhsA, p. 1 1 2; Abhvk, p. 1 7
49. ADSDP, p. 9
22. Abhidhammatthavibhavini(ika (ADSVT), ibid, p.4; MMT J, p. 124,
50. ADSDP, p. 1 0
126; AOSDP, p. 9
51. ADS, p . 6 ; A Manual ofAbhidhamma, ibid, pp. 77 - 8 1
23. Abhvk, pp. 4, 16; Namariipapariccheda NRPO, ed. AP. Buddhadatta,
52. ADSVT, p. 29
JPTS, 1 9 1 3 - 14, p. 9
53. ADSS, p. 45
24. ADSDP, p. 9
54. Y. Karunadasa, Buddhist Analysis of Matter, ibid
25. Milinda's questions J, tr. I.B. Homer, SBB, 1 1 964 - 69, pp. 67 - 68;
55. Abhvt, p. 67
Milindapaiiha, ed. V. Trenckner, PTS, 1 962, p. 49 (Milin)
56. Buddhist Analysis of Matter, ibid, p. 1
.

26. Expositor I, p.90; DhsA, p. 67

57. ADS, p. 27.
27. Expositor 1, p. 8 1 ; DhsA, p. 6 1
58. ADS, p. 28; Cpd., p. 1 58, A Manual ofAbhidhamma, ibid, pp. 297 - 99
 92 93
59. ADSVT, p. 1 09
60. ADS, p. 27; ADSVT, pp. 1 05 - 6
61. Buddhist Analysi s of Matter, ibid, p . 43
62. Riipa (material form) is also considered as an abyakata because it
does not reproduce any resultant consciousness in itself, A Manual
ofAbhidhamma, ibid, p. 1 5 8
63. ADSDP, p. 1 0
64. DJ. Kalupahana, Buddhist Philosophy A H istorical Analysis, Hawaii.
1976, pp. 69 - 90
65. Anguttaranikiiya, ii, PTS, 1885 - 191 0, p. 34; Vism, p. 293; The Path
of Purification, p. 3 1 7
66. Vism, p. 293; The Path of Purification, p . 3 1 9
67. Abhvt, p . 79
68. ADSS, p . 1 73 ; Abhvt, p. 79
69. The Path of Purification, p. 3 19; vism, pp. 293 - 9
70. Riipasiddlli, p. 250
71. ADSDP, pp. 9 - 1 0
72. ADSDP, p. ) 0
73. A Manual ofAbhidhamma, p. 3 1 5 ; ADS, p.3 1 ; ALSDP, p. Chapter six
74. ADSVT, p. ) 20
75. ibid
76.
Parallel Developments
ibid
77. ADSVT, p. 1 20; ADSS, pp. 1 73 - 4
78. MMT, ii, p. 223 In the foregoing chapters an attempt has been made to give a
79. Abhvt, p. 79 systematic exposition of Theravada version of the theory of
SO. Abhvt, p . 80 Dhamma, as could be gathered from the Abhidhamma literature
81. Abhvt, pp. 79-80
of the Theravadins. In this concluding chapter we propose to
82. Abhvt, p. 8 1
summarize the various aspects ofthe theory and to compare it with
83. ibid
84. op.cit.p.82 the relevant theories in other schools of Buddhist thought. In this
85. ibid connection our endeavour is to make some passing comments on
the following Buddhist traditions;

Sarvastivada - Vaibllasika
•

Sautrantika - SQlhkrantivada

Madhyamaka - � iinyatavada

Yogacara - Vijiianavada
 94
According to the Theravadins what we experience through
our uncultivated (abhavita) senses is not paramattha (reality) but
sammuti (convention). The various conventions such as individuals
chariots, houses, Sun and Moon that we experience through ou;
senses disappear when they are analyzed (gha1)avinibbhoga) into
their constituent parts. It is these constituents, designated as
dhamma, Paramatthadhamma or Abhidhammattha that are
considered as elements ofreality. Although Nibba1}a, the summum
bonum ofBuddhism, is also brought under the generic tenn dhamma
it represents a higher level of reality as it transcends all laws of
conditionality (asrikhata).
"It must, however, be mentioned here that those elements of
reality are not entities per se but are interdependent. Their
independence is explained, not on the basis of substance and
quality, but on the basis of conditioned genesis. Accordingly
the abhidhammic view ofreality cannot be described either
as pluralism or as monism. The reason for this situation is that
in its methodology the Abhidhamma does not confine itself
either to analysis (bheda) or to synthesis (sangha) but
combine both methods. Hence it is that in the abhidhamma
an analytic statement is always supplemented by another
statement which is synthetic. In this conclusion it should be
mentioned that analysis, when not supplemented by synthesis,
leads to pluralism. On the other hand, synthesis when not
. supplemented by analysis leads to monism. Therefore, the
combination in the abhidhamma ofboth methods enables it
to transcend both pluralism and monism."l
Thus the dhammas or the elements of reality of the Theravadins
can be grouped as follows:
Citta
mental elements (conditioned)
Cetasika
95
rupa
-
•
•
-
material elements (conditioned)
nibbana •
•
-
unconditioned reality
•
Except these dhammas, all other objects ofperception are
called conventions (sammutl).
Although these two categories (sammuti andparamattha)
are considered as two truths as well (sammutisacca and
paramatthasacca), the Theravadins do not make a value judgment
between the two. In their opinion both are complementary to each
other as far as the fmal realization is concerned. Sammuti is valid as
it is based on common convention, and paramattha is true as it
reveals the true nature ofthe world.
The Theravadins' cO)1ception oftruth is mainly based on their
theory ofpaiiiiatti. The fundamental meaning ofthe tenn paiiiiatti
is enactment. The process of sense experience is associated with
the ideas that arise in our minds in connection with various objects
of senses. These ideas or concepts are called atthapaiiiiatti and
their expression through words is called namapaiiiiatti. Now the
question that arises here is whether the four kinds ofreality mentioned
above could also be expressed through the words of language.
According to the Theravadins this question cannot be answered
categorically (ekalnsavyakara1)a). It is a question that requires a
qualitative answer (vibhajjavyakara1}Q). In this connection it should
be mentioned here that the subject ofreality and its expression has
become rather complexed in most Buddhist and n�n - Buddhist
traditions as a result of their attempting to give a direct answer to
this question. In solving this problem the Theravadins have paid
their attention not only to the nature of language but also to the
nature ofindividuals. Accordingly there are two kinds ofindividuals:
ariyapuggalas and anariyapuggalas. The former are the librated
saints and the latter are ordinary persons. The main difference
between them is that the fornler have wisdom developed through
meditation, whereas the latter have only worldly knowledge. The

96
liberated beings explain the reality ofthe world in order to show the
way to enlightenment for all living beings. Therefore they explain the
world in tenns ofboth sammuti andparamattha. Because of this
sammutidesana (conventional
their teachings are twofold as
teaching) and paramatthadesana (absolute teaching). As the
ordinary people cannot understand the absolute teaching through
their uncultivated knowledge all at once, the liberated beings develop
their receptive capacity of mind, first through the conventional
teachings and when their minds become suitable to understand the
nature ofreality they make use of absolute teaching. It should be
remembered that the liberated beings make use ofthe words available
in a given language for both kinds ofteaching. The Pali tenns such
asriipa, vedanii, saiiiia, sankhara, viiiiial}a, anicca, dukkha,
anatta refer to real elements. Though the untrained ordinary people
hear the words that refer to the various elements of reality they do
not understand their full significance as the liberated saints do. Now
it is clear that according to the Theravadins the nature of reality
can be expressed through language. This fact is further clarified in
the Theravada Abhidhamma by connecting the two truths
(sammuti andparamatta) with namapaiiiiatti (nominal concept).
Now there arises another question regarding the words that
refer to the elements of reality. If the ideas corresponding to the
words that refer to the reality are known only by the liberated saints,
these words should have been created by themselves. The
Theravadins attempted to solve this problem by describing those
words as opapatikapaiiiiatti (the words spontaneously arisen),2 1t
means that the words referring to the elements of reality are not
created by the liberated saints but they have arisen naturally. In order
to express the ideas ofreality that arise in their minds the liberated
saints use the natural words and sentences in a given language merely
as symbols. It should be remembered here that these words and
sentences used by the liberated saints are not capable ofmaking the
same corresponding ideas of reality in an ordinary mind ifit is not
developed up to the level of concentration (samadhi) through
97
meditation. In this context we also should pay our attention to the
fact that the sense experience of a liberated saint and that of an
ordinary being differ only in respect ofcertain stages in the process
of perception . 3 Because ofthis reason the liberated beings deliver
their sennons first conventionally in order to make the hearer's mind
fit (ka llacitta ) , soft (m uducitt a), fre e fro m obs tru ctio n
(vinivaral}acitta), overjoyed in rapture (udaggacitta), gladdened
(pa ha( (ha citta), sta ble (an eiijappatta), and fit for work
(kammaniya) . When they understand that the hearer 's mind has
developed to the above level, they deliver their sennons using the
words that refer to the elements ofreality.
As far as reality is concerned, the general understanding of
the context of statement should be coupled with the relevant
cultivation ofmind through the prescribed practices. The foregoing
brief account shows that the Theravadins held an empirical view
ofreality and its expression, through language.
In contrast to this empirical view ofreality in most Buddhist
and non - Buddhist traditions we fmd somewhat mystic or negative
statements regarding the nature of reality. Theravadins maintain
that the nature ofreality, both conditioned and unconditioned, could
,
be expressed in language. In Vedantic philosophy, on the other hand,
the absolute reality cannot be realized or expressed by a mind -
created speech.
Sarvastivada or Vaibha�ika, a well known Hinayana
Buddhist tradition, also provides a detailed exposition of reality
(dhamma) which in some respect is similar to that of the
Theravadins. They also present a list of real elements both
conditioned and unconditioned as follows:
riipa physical reality
-
citta - mind or vijiiana
caitta mental Concomitants
-
 98
riipa-citta-viprayuktasalnskara reality offorces which cannot
. be included either in physical
or mental categories
akasa - space }
pratisalnkhyanirodha } reality unconditioned5
apratisamkhyanirodha }
In the early teachings of the Buddha the empirical world is
analyzed into five groups: riipa, vedana, saiiiia, sankhara and
viiiiialJa. While riipa refers to the physical reality, the other four
groups refer to the mental reality. Theravadins did not include
anything unrelated to the above five groups in their list ofrealities.
On the contrary, Sarvastivadins added a group ofelements under
the heading cittaviprayuktasamskaras and describing it as neither
physical nor mental they have given a mystic nature to the Buddhist
conception of dhamma. Although there are some similarities in the
definitions given to the realities in both traditions,
Theravadins do
not accept the theory oftri - temporal existence (sarvam astivada)
ofthe dhammas as advocated by the Sarvastivada. The following
characteristics of the dhammas or elements of the Sarvastivadins
are similar to some extent with those of the Theravadins:
i Every element is a separate entity
..
11. There is no inherence of one element in another, hence no
substance apart from its qualities, no matter beyond the
separate sense - data, and no soul beyond the separate mental
data (dharma-anatman-nirjiva)
. ..
Ill. Elements have only an instantaneous duration, every instant
represents a separate element; thought is evanescent, there
are no moving bodies, but consecutive appearances, flashings
of new elements in new places (desantara-samkrantl)
99
All elements co - operate with one another (samskrta)
•
lV •
v. This co-operating activity is controlled by the laws ofcausation
(pratityasamutpada).
vi. The world - process is thus a process of co-operation
between many kinds of subtle, evanescent elements such is
the nature of dharmas that they proceed from cause (hetu­
prabhava) and steer towards extinction (nirodha)
vii. Influenced by avidya (sasrava) the process in full swing
influenced by prajiia(anasrava) it has a tendency towards
appeasement and final extinction. In the first case streams
(santana) of combining elements are produced which
correspond to ordinary men (prathag-jana); in the second
the stream represents a saint (arya). The complete stoppage
of the process of phenomenal life takes place with the
attainment oflVirvana .
•
viii. Hence the elements are broadly divided into unrest (dukkha),
cause of unrest (dukkha-samudaya-avidya), cessation
(nirodha), and cause of cessation (marga"1'rajiia).
ix. The final result ofthe world process is its cessation. Absolute
Calm: all co-operation is extinct and replaced by immutability
(assmkrta-nirvalJa)".6
But the Sarvastivada theory oftri-temporal existence ofthe
dhrmas is not accepted by the Theravadins. They accept
only the reality ofpresent dharmas. Sarvastivadins declare
that the three phases of time, the past, the present and the
future are real and the fundamental substance ofthe dhrmas
remains unchanged in the three periods oftime. In order to
prove the reality ofpast and future which is not accepted by
the Theravadins they present the following five arguments:
 1 00
i. Ifpast and future things are real, the consciousness (vijiilina)
of such Gudgments) referring to the past and to the future as
e.g.: 'there was once (a king) Mahlisammata' , or: 'there will
be once the Cakravartin . Sankha' would be obj ectless
(nirlilambana) and then there would be no consciousness at
all,just because ofthe inexistence ofthe objective correlate
(lilambana). Indeed it is said: 'consciousness is essentially
awareness of the corresponding obj ect ( prativastu
vijiiaptylitmakam vijiilinam) and ifthere was no cognizable
object (iiieya), nothing could be known by it' . Hence there
would be no consciousness at all.
ii Moreover (it has been said by Buddha) : ' consciousness
originates in a correlatively dependence on two factors, viz.
in correlative dependence on eye and visual fonns etc. up to
mind (manas) and mental objects (dharmlih)'. Hence, ifthere
was no past no future, consciousness which has them as
obj ective correlates could not originate in a correlative
dependence on those two factors. And thus a contradiction
with the Agama would result therefrom.
iii. The past karma would give no moral retribution (viplika), if
it were inexistent and devoid of all reality, because (then) the
moment moral retribution would arise, the moral cause
(viplikahetu) would be inexistent; and what is inexistent does
not p o s s e s s the potency o f producing e ffects
(kliryotplidanasakti). Indeed, ' inexistence' is defined as a
total absence of all potencies (sarvaslimlirthya-viraha).
iv. The distinctly differentiated consciousness ofYogins, having
as its object past and future (events): 'there was once (a king)
Mandhlitli ' , 'there was once (a king) Brahmadatta' , or:
'there will be once the Cakravartin Sankha', 'there will be
once the Tathligata Maitreya' , would be impossible. Indeed,
there can be no distinct differentiation (vibhliga) ofwhat does
not exist. And, therefore, past as well as future (events) as
1 01
Sriharsa etc. cannot be deprived of substantial reality
•
(=dravyapratiSedharupa).
v. Past and future things are real, because it has been taught
that, j ust like the present, the three Time - epochs are
comprehended under the headings ofrupa etc. Indeed, it has
been said by the Bhagavan : If, 0 monks, there were no past
rupa, a learned Srlivaka could not become disgusted with a
past rupa. But as there exist past rupas, therefore a learned
Srlivaka is disgusted with a past rupa etc. In this manner
whatever past and future rupas may exist, they all must be
put together in order to get the complete class of
rupaskandha. "7
By these arguments they affinn the real existence ofthe past,
the present and the future dharmas and necessity of accepting their
reality in order to explain some facts such as karma stated in the
Buddha's teaching. It is interesting to note that they always quote
passages from the canonical texts to prove their theory. According
to the arguments put forward by the Theravlidins in the
Kathlivatthuppakaral}a, not only the Sarvlistivlidins but also the
other sectarian groups have come to the wrong conclusions mainly
because of their inability to understand the true meaning of the
Buddha's teachings. This fact will be clear by the following arguments
recorded in the Kathlivatthu: Sarvlistivlidins quote the following
passage in order to prove the reality of the past and the future
because there was no disagreement regarding the reality of the
present between the Sarvlistivlidins and the Theravlidins:
"Whatever material quality, bhikkhus, whether past, future,
or present, is either internal or external, gross or subtle,
common or excellent, distant or near, is called the material
aggregate. Whatsoever feeling, whether past, future, or
present, of which the foregoing may be said, is termed the
aggregate offeeling. So also are the other three aggregates."
 1 02
In order to deny the fact that the past and the future exist, the
Theravadins quote the following passage:
"These three modes in word, term, or name, bhikkhus, which
have been distinct in the past, are now distinct, and will be
distinct, are not condemned by recluses and Brahmins who
are wise. Which three? (i) that material aggregate which is
past, which has ceased, which is changed, is reckoned, termed,
named 'has been' ; it is not reckoned as 'exists' nor as ' will
be' . And so for the aggregates of feeling perception, mental
co-efficients, conciousness . (ii) that material aggregate which
is not yet born, and which has not appeared, is reckoned,
termed, named 'wil be' but is not rockoned, termed, named
'exists' , but is not reckoned as 'has been' , nor as ' will be' .
And so for the mental aggregates.
According to the above passage it is clear that the Buddha
used linguistic conventions such as the past, the future not because
they refer to real entities but because they have been accepted by
common parlance. It is an accepted idea of the Buddha that one
should not affect the provincial dialect nor should one deviate from
the common parlance in preaching the dhamma.9 This idea of the
early teachings as well as the accompanied opinion of sammuti in
the Theravada Ahhidhamma seem to correspond to what Ayer
says.
"The use of the term 'substance' , to which we have already
referred, provides us with a good example of the way in which
metaphysics mostly comes to be written. It happens to be the
case that we cannot, in our language, refer to the sensible
properties of a thing without introducing a word or phrase
which appears to stand for the thing itselfas opposed to
anything which may be said about it. And, as a result of this,
those who are infected by the primitive superstition that to
every name a single real entity must correspond assume
• it receives different designations with reference to different avasthas,
1 03
that it is necessary to distinguish logically between the things
itself and any, or all, of its sensible properties."1O
According to the Sarvastivadins the svahhava (own nature)
of the dharma is everlasting and the distinction of the past, present
and future of the dharma is established by karitra (activity or
operation). They define "as present a dharma which has just fully
attained its karitra; as past a dharma whose karitra has already
ceased, as future a dharma which has not yet attainned its karitra.
In this way the three divisions of time is based on karitra."1 1 By
admitting the karitra as something different from the dharma they
have introduced the dichotomy of substance and its quality or activity
which is rejected by the Theravadins. According to the theory of
sadhana, 12 when we say "that which is thinking is consciousness"
the process of thinking is not different from consciousness. We make
such a difference when we define consciousness as that which thinks.
This is what is called agency-denoted definition (kattusadhana).
But in reality thinking itself is consciousness. This kind of definition
is called hhavasadhana. Without understanding the nature of
linguistic expression the Sarvastivadins came to the conclusion that
the dharmas are everlasting and only their characteristics or phases
are changing along with the three periods of time.
There are four well known opinions pertaining to this theory
in the Sarvastivadins tradition. According it Yen. Dharmatrata
"when a dharma is in transition through the phases of time, only its
hhava (special quality) changes, not its substance (dravya)." Yen.
Ghosaka's opinion is that when a dharma is in the past, it is
connected with the lak�a1Ja (characteristic) of the past without
however being, at the same time, free from its connection with the
remaining two lak�a1Jas of the present and the future. Its position in
the future and the present should be understood in the same way.
Yen. Vasumitra states that when a dharma is passing through the
three phases of time, having reached this or another avastha (Phase),
but not with reference to its substance (dravya). Yen. Buddhadeva
 1 04
advocates a theory, according to which there is (only) a differentiation
of the anyatha (relation). He says "when a dharma is passing
through time it is called in each case "another one" in a different
sense in accordance with its relation to the antecedent and subsequent
(moments)."13 All these opinions go to prove the fact that there is a
permanent substratum underlying the dharmas. As Y. karunadasa
explains, the Theravada standpoint is that although each dharma is
said to have its own - nature (sabhava) or its own - characteristic
(salakkhalJO), this so-called own-nature or own - characteristic is
not different from the dharma itself It is only for the convenience of
defInition that such a dichotomy is assumed. In reality they all refer
to the same thing. Hence when a dharma arise in the present moment,
it is not that its own - nature becomes manifest in the present moment,
or when a dharma ceases to exit, it is not that its own - nature
continues to persist as past. Having been not, the dharmas arise
(ahutva sambhonti) and having been, they cease to exist (hutva
pa(iventl). There is no reservoir (sannidhi) from which they come
and there is no receptacle (sannicaya) to which they go. They do
not exist on two different planes, the real essence in all three phases
oftime and the momentary manifestation only in the present phase
of time, because they are not appurtenances of some pervading
stuff."14
It should be remembered here that the opinion of the
Kassapikas, a·sect seceded from the Sarvastivadins, according
to which "the past survives, as presently existing in part" has also
been rej ected by the Theravadins on the ground that "no one can
say a thing both is and has ceased. "15
. The chief critics of the Sarvastivadins, namely the
Sautrantikas also reject the theory of karitra. They argue
"That the Sarvastivadins must concede whether the karitra
is either different or identical with the dharma. In case of
difference, the antecedent and subsequent unreality ofpresent
(dharmas) would arise on account of (their) being a cause,
1 05
being contingent, etc., just as is the case with the karitra. In
the opposite case pennanence would follow on account of
the uninterrupted duration of essence. Indeed, besides
substantial identity there is no other essential mark of
permanence."16
As a accepting the authority only the Siitras they also reject
the Abhidhammapi(aka of the Sarvastivada. Furthermore they
do not accept the following doctrines of the Sarvastivadins:
Asamskrtadharmas (dharma - unconditioned), namely akasa
(space), pratisankhyanirodhar (the cessation ofthe manifestations
ofan element (dharma) through the action ofunderstanding (prajiia),
apratisankhyanirodha (the cessation not due to understanding,
but due to natural causes). sautrantikas deny the real existence of
these asamskrtadh armas . They also deny the fourteen
cittavipyayuktasamskaras'such as prapti (a force which controls
the collection ofthe elements in an individual stream oflife), aprapti
(a force which occasionally keeps some elements in abeyance in an
individual life), nikayasabhagata (a force producing generality or
homogeneity of existences), asaiijiiika (a force which transfers an
individual into the realms ofunconscious trance). 17
According to the well-known theory of moments the
Sarvastivadins accepted four moments of a dharmas in order to
explain the fundamental Buddhist doctrine of impermanence
(anityata). Those four moments are (i) ;ati origination; (ii) sthiti­
-
existence; (iii) ;arata - decay and (iv) anityata - extinction.
Theravadins accepted only three moments as uppada (origination),
(hiti (existence) and bhanga (extinction) which can be applied to a
single dhamma . 18 One reason for accepting the moment ofexistence
both by the Sarvastivada and Theravada is to explain the theory
of direct perception. The Sautrantikas held that there are only two
moments as utpada (origination) and 1paya (extinction), which led
them to accept the theory ofrepresentative perception. 19
 1 06
Although the Sautrantikas have been vehement critics ofthe
Sarvastivada theory of tri - temporal existence which indirectly
supports the theory ofsoul, they also have accepted a similar concept
as eka-rasa-skandha. This refers to bijas (seeds) of one taste,
which continue to exist from time immemorial without changing their
nature.20 They maintain that although the skandas in their gross fonn
do not pass from the skandhas which are of one miilantika or the
original and subtle fonn the skandhas which are of one nature
(ekarasa - one taste), in other words, which are in reality one
substance and not five different substances pass from one existence
to another.21 This theory of ekarasaskandhas can be compared to
some extend with the theory of personal entity (puggala) of the
Puggalavadins. The Puggalavadins, namely Vajjiputtakas,
Sammutiyas, etc. believed in the existence of a personal entity,
some kind ofperduring-essence in man. And this is said to explain
the identity ofa person in a series of existence.22 The Theravadins
also hold a similar idea as is seen in their theory ofbhavanga. This
means "the cause, reason, indispensable condition, of our being
regarded subjectively as continuous; the sine qua non ofour existence,
that without which one cannot subsist or exist."23 In these theories
of Sarvastivada, ekarasaskandha, Puggala and Bhavanga, one
could see an attempt being made to explain the very important
Buddhist teaching on kamma and rebirth without resorting to the
theory ofsoul ofthe non - Buddhist traditions. Among other reasons
that led to the development of these theories is the necessity of
explaining satisfactorily the process of sense perception and the
problem ofmemory.
Nagarjuna, the great philosopher in the Madhyamaka
tradition has employed a new method in order to explain the nature
ofreality. Technically this method was known as prasaliga by which
wrong views have been rej ected. In explaining why Nagarjuna
resort to negative expressions, Kalupahana observes;" . . . .these
verses refer to a positive core ofthe Buddha's teaching, alongside
of the negative aspect which was intended as a rej ection of the
1 07
heretical views. Such an interpretation would leave dependent arising
as the position from which the Buddha rejected the metaphysical or
absolute views and this would support the Svatantrika understanding
ofNagaljuna !24 The reality as explained by Nagarjuna is siinyata
(emptiness). This emptiness is not a mere nought or a blank.25 What
we experience in the world is always a duality such as good and
bad, is and is not, East and West. Emptiness means to transcend
this duality. Therefore it is called non - duality.26 From another point
ofview emptiness is called suchness because one takes reality such
as it is, without superimposing any ideas upon it.27 On the other
hand the emptiness is based on the Buddhist theory of dependent
arising. Ifeverything in the world is dependent on something else,
related to one another, there cannot be anything independent. In
order to explain this dependent nature of the world the most
appropriate term is s iinyata. According to
Nagarjuna many
Buddhists have come to wrong conclusion such as pudgala,
dharma, own - nature ofthe dharmas, self causation, external
causation because oftheir lack ofinsight into the dual nature ofthe
world. Though we find such dual expressions in language, emptiness
is the sole characteristic ofreality. In the SarvastivadaAbhidharma
a dichotomy between an element (dharma) and its own - nature
has been emphasized. Nagarjuna 's position is that these dharmas
should be considered as empty or devoid of own - nature
(dharmanairatmya). As to the expression of reality Nagarjuna
states as follows: "Without relying upon convention, the ultimate fruit
is not taught. Without understanding the ultimate fruit, freedom is
not attained. "28 Though in some commentaries it is said that the
ultimate reality is indefinable, according to the a,bove statement it is
clear that reality can be expressed relying on convention. It is similar
to the Theravada stand - point explained before.
In theSarvastivada, Sautrantika, Theravada and
Madhyamaka traditions it is prajiia (wisdom), the third stage of
the Buddhist path that is emphasized in their theories ofDharma
and� iinyatii. At a later stage in the development ofBuddhist thought
 1 10 111
End Notes Bibliography
1. �
K runadasa, Theravada Version of Dhammavada, op.cit., p. 75
2. Dlana Paul, Paramartha's theory of language, HP, vol. vii
3. Lily de Silva, Sense experience of the liberated being as reflected in
Abhidhammatthasangaha - Vibhavinitika, ed. W. Panri.ananda.
early Buddhism, Buddhist Philosophy and Culture, Essays in honour Colombo 1 898

Abhidhammatthasangaha ed. T. W. Rhys Davids, JPTS, 1 884

ofN.A.Jayawicrema, pp. 1 3-22
4. Ram Chandra Jha, Vedantic and Buddhist reality, pp. 62, 1 45
5. Stcherbatsky, The Central Conception of Buddhism, pp. 80-93
( 1 -48) '
6. op.cit., pp. 62-63 Abhidhammatthasangah adipanipali (chapter 5 - page 82)
7. Essays on time in Buddhism,. Prasad, pp. 33-34
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, , , -
 1 18 1 19
INDEX Antagul}am - 7
Antam ': 7
Abhidhammatthasangaha - 8 7 Anunayapa(igha - 7
Abhidhammattha- 94 Anupada Suttas - 1
Abhavita paiiiiiia - 46, 50 Anupubbikadhammadesana - 65
Abhidhamma - 15, 16, 1 7, 25, 26, 34, 41, 69, 74 Anuttara (matchless) - 88
Abhidhamma -pi(aka - 13, 14, 15, 1 9, 20, 23, 105 Apatti (commission ofa crime) - 23
Abhidhammattha sangaha - 8 7 Apo - water - 3
.
Abhidhammatthasangahadipani- 75 Apodhatu (element of water) - 2
Abhidhammavatara - 86, 89 Appahatabba - 84
•

Absolute reality- l 07 . Appal}ihita - 88

Absolute truth (param 'attha - sacca)- 52 Apratismkhyanirodha - 98
Abyakata -41, 85 Arahantship - 56
Acara (civility)- 23 Arammalia 77
•
-

Acariyavada - 55 Arammal}avijananam - 32
Adosa (non - hatred) :.. 2 Aranavibhangasutta - 61
Agama -55, 100 Ariyamagga (noblepath)- 23
-

Ahetuka - rootless - 84 Ariyapuggalas - 95

Ahutva sambhonti - 104 Asaiijiiika } 05
-

Akarakabhava - 40 . Asankhata - 88, 94

Akasa - space - 3, 35, 98 Atman - 4·
Akusala - 41 . Attachment (raga) - 7
Alambana - 80 Attakilamathanuyoga (self- mortification) 3
-

Alobha (non - greed) - 2 Attanomati - 55

Amoha (non - delusion) - 2
Anantarapaccaya (contiguity) - 43
Anarammal}a - objectless - 84
Anariyapuggalas - 95
Anatta-Soullessness - 4, 32
,
Anavatthanadosa - 46
Aneiijappatta - 9 7 .
Anicca impermanens 4, 32
� Aviparita (immutable) 2 7
_
Attapatilabha - 5, 60
Atthapaiiiiatti - 95
Atthasalini - 22, 25, 26, 28
Avasavattita- 35
Avattha - 34
Avidya (sasrava) - 99
Avinibbhogariipas -81
-

Aniccata- 4, 43 Ayatana - 16 .
Animatta 88 ·
- A((harasadhatu (eighteen elements)- 3
Anityata - 105 Atthi - 7 ·
• •

•
 1 20 121
A({himiiija - 7 Co - nascence condition - sahajatapaccaya - 19
Anguttaranikaya - 62, 63 Contiguity condition - samanantarapaccaya - 19
Bhadanta - 29 Conventional truth (sammuti - sacca) - 52
Bhagavan - 101 Danta - 7
Bhava- - 32, 103 Darstantikas - 29
• •

Bhavana - 46, 50 Dasuttarasutta - 2

Bhavasadhana - 38, 39, 40, 78, 103 Decisive - support condition - upan issaya hetupaccaya - 19
Bhavataddhita - 81 Desana- 22, 23
Bhavanga - 80, 106 Dhamma- Doctrines - 2
Bhangakkha1}a - 34 Dhamma - mental objects - 3
Bheda - 94 Dhamma - 1, 2, 4, 5, 10, 13, 14, 29
Bhumi - 77, 80, 82 Dhammacakkappavattanasutta - 3
Bimal Krishna Matilal - 53 Dhammaniyamata - 33
Brahmajalasutta - 4 Dhammapada - 22
Brahman - 4, 52 Dhammasangani - 13, 25
Buddha - 23 Dhamma(thitata - 33 .
Buddhabhasita - 23, 24 Dhammatthitiiiana - 33
• • •

Buddhadeva - 29 Dhammapad'a!!hakatha - 26
Cakkhu - the eye - 3 Dharma - anatman - nirjiva - 98
Cakkhuviiiiiana - the visual consciousness - 3
•
Dharmaguptakas - 29
Calana - 35 Dharmanairatmya - 107
Catusaccadhamma - 23 Dharmasutras (discourses ofthe doctrines)- 2
Catuvisatipaccaya - 43 Dharmatrata - 103
Cetana (Volition)- 81 Dharmavada- 44
Cetana (Will) - 1 Dharmah - 100
Cetasika - mental concomitant - 38, 80 Dharopa - 61
Cha dhatu (six elements) - 3 Dhatu - 43
Chanda (conation)- 83 Dhatumanasikara - 8
Citt'ujjukata (rectitude ofmind) - 83 Dhatukatha - 14, 16
Citta - consciousness - 1, 2, 32, 38, 75 Dighanikaya - 2, 14, 22
Cittalahuta (lightness ofmind)- 83 Dosa (hatred)- 2, 7
Cittamuduta (pliancy ofmind) - 83 Dravya - 103
Cittapassaddhi (tranquility ofmind) - 82 Dravyapratisedharupa - 101
Cittasamu({hanarupa- 81 Dukkha - Unsatisfactoriness - 4" 32
Cittekaggata- 43 Dukkhanirodhagaminipa{ipada - 45
 1 22 1 23
Dvadasayatalia (twelve avenues 0/sense -perception) - 3 kammakilesa - 78
Ek'aggata (one -pointdness) - 81 Kammaniya - 97
Ekalnsavyakara1)a - 95 Kammattana - 7
• •

Formula 0/causality - 6 Karanasadhana - 37, 78

Four realities - 74 Karana - 23
•

Gandha - smell - 3 Karitra - 103, 104

Gandhabba - 108 Karyotpadanasakti - 100
Gaurinath Sastri - 59 Kasina - nimitta - 83
•

Gautama - 52 Kassapikas - 104

Ghanavinibbhogo - 9 Kathavatthu - 14, 1 7, 18
Ghanaviiiiiana - the old/actory consciousness - 3 Kattusadltana - 3 7, 38, 78, 103
Ghana- the nose - 3
•
Kaya (body) - 2, 9
Guna - 22, 23 Kayagatasati - dvattimsakara - 7
Hadayavatthu - 56 Kayaviiiiia1)a - the tactile consciousness - 3
Hadayam - 7 Kesa - 7
Hinayana - 108 Khandha - 16
Idappaccayata - 4 Kilomakam - 7
Impermanence (anicca) - 4, 32 Kinti - 1
Individual (puggala) - 50 Kusala - 14
Insight (paiiiia) - 50 Lakkhana - 31, 43
•

Itthi - 9 Lakkhitabba - 43
Ittharammananubhavanalakkhana - 41
• • • •
Lobha (greed) - 2
Jarata - decay - 105 Lokasamvrtisatya 53
Jati (kind) - 80 Lokiya - mundane - 84
Javanasantana - 78 Lokuttaraiiana - 45
Jhana -75, 80 Loma - 7
Jivha - the tongue - 3 Luminous consciousness - 108
Jivhaviiiiiana - the gustatory consciousness - 3 Madhyamaka - 53, 60, 63, 64, 93, 106
Jivit'ndriya (psychic life)- 81 Magga - 80
Kakka{atta - 31, 32 Maggaphalanibbana - 23, 24
Kallacitta - 97 Mahapadesas - 55
Kalupahana - 106 Mahayana - 108
Kalya1)aputhujjanas - 88 Majjhima - 77
Kamasukhallikanuyoga (self- indulgence) - 3 Majjhimanikaya- 22, 26, 65
Kamavacara - 84 Mana - the mind - 100
 124
1 25
Manas - 76
Nippariyayadesana - 65.
Manasikara (attention) - 81, 82
Nipphannarupa - 85
MaIJisaramaiijusa - 43, 77
Niralambana - 100
MaIJisaramaiijusatika - 32, 34, 41
Nirodha - 99
Mano - 75, 76
NirupadhisesanibbhaIJadhatu ... 45, 88
Manoviiiiiana - the mental consciousness - 3
Nissata - 87
Manoviiiiianadhatu - 56
Nissata nijjiva - 22, 44
Material elements - 95 Nissitataddhita - 81
Maya -:-52 Nit'attha - 62, 63
Mamsam - 7 Nitartha - 64
Meditation (kammatthana) - 7 Niyuttataddhita - 82
Mental action ' (manasa) - 76 Noble eightfoldpath (ariya - atthaitgikamagga) - 1 .
Mental elements - 94 - Nyantiloka - 18
Mental reality - 98 Object condition - arammaIJapaccaya - 19
Milinda - 68 Opapatikapaiiiiatti - 96
Milindapaiiha - 66, 68 Pabhassaracitta - 108
Moggaliputtatissa- 14, 1 7 Paccayasamuppanna - 23
Moha (delusion) - 2, 7 Paccekabuddha - 1 7
. Mulantika - 106 Pacchasaiiiianakaranarasa - 41
Murti - 52
• •

Paccupatthana - 31, 40
Musavada veramani (refrainingfrom lying)- 2 Padatthana - 31, 40
Mutuality condition - aiiiiamaiiiiapaccaya - 19 Pajananacinta - 75
Nagarjuna - 53, 64, 106 Pakati (nature) - 23
Nagasena - 66, 67, 68, 79 Pali - 3, 23, 31, 52, 54, 60, 69, 96
Naharu - 7 Paiicakkhandha (five aggregates)- 2, 44
Nakha - 7 Paiiiia (wisdom) - 2, 23, 75
Namapaiiiiatti - 96 Paiiiiabhavna - 71
Naya (right manner) - 23, 24 Paiiiiatti - 34, 55, 65, 70
Neyartha - 64 Papphasam - 7 .
Neyy'attha - 62, 63 Param 'atthakatha - 64, 65
Neyya - 23, 24, 25 Paramarthasat - 54
NibbaIJa - extincti on - 7, 9, 15, 44, 56, 59, 86, 88 Paramattha - 26, 27, 94
Nikayas - 55, 56 Paramatthadesana (absolute teaching) - 96
Nikayasabhagata - 105 Paramatthadhamma- 2 7, 94
Nikkhanta - 87
•
 1 26 1 27
ParikaIpita - 54 Puggalavadins - 106
Pariyatti, hetu (cause) - 22 Puggalapaiiiiatti - 14, 16
Pariyatti - 22, 23 Puiiiia (merit) - 23, 24
Pariyaya - 34 Purisa - 9
Parsva - 29 Puthujjana - 1 7, 86
Pathavi - earth - 3 Raga- attachment - 7
Pati - 61 Rasa - taste - 3
Patta - 61 Rasa -31, 40
Pa(havidhatu (element ofearth) - 2, 32, 33, 44 Reflection ofelements (Dhatumanasikara) - 8
Paticcasamuppada - 6, 19, 33, 44 Riip a - matter - 42, 44, 54, 83
Pa(ipadetabbadhamma - 38 Riipa - citta - viprayuktasamskara - 98
Patisandhi - 43
•
Riipa - corporeality - 4
Patisandhitthana - 43
• ••
Riipa - the visible - 3
Pa((hana - 13, 1 9, 56 Riipariipa - 85
Panita - 77
•
.
Riipaskandha - 101
Permanent being' (satta) - 9 Riipayatana - 42
Pharusaya vacaya veramani (refrainingfrom harsh words) - 2 Root - condition - hetupaccaya - 19
Phassa (contact) - 1, 40 Rriipakkhandha - 83
Phenomena - 50 Riippana -33
Philosophy - 51 Sabbam atthi (everything exists) - 6
Photthabba - touch - 3 Sabbam ekattam (everything is a unityJ - 6
Pihakam - 7 Sabbam n 'atthi (nothing exists) - 6
Pisunaya vacaya veramani (refrain ingfrom tale - bearing) - 2 . Sabhava (own nature) - 23, 24, 25, 32
.
Pisila - 61 . sabhavalakkha1}a - 31, 32
Po((hapadasutta - 5, 59 Sabhavariipa - 85
Pona - 61
•
Sabhavasamaiiiialakkhanam - 30
•

pariyayadesana - 65 Sacca (truth) - 16, 23

Prajiia (anasrasa) - 99 Sadda - sound - 3
Prapti - 105 . Sadhana - 36, 3 7, 38, 40, 78
Prasanga - 106 Sako bhavo - 32
Pratisamkhyanirodha -105Sabhavalakkha1}a - 31, 32 Salakkhana - 31, 104
•

Pratityasamutpada - 99 Salakkha1}ariipa - 85
Pre - nascence condition -purejatapaccaya - 20 Samadhi (concentration)- 23, 24, 96
Predominance condition - adhipatipaccaya - 19 Samanantarapaccaya (immediacy) - 19, 43
Proximity condition - anantarapaccaya - 19 Samaiiiialakkhana - 31
•
 1 29
1 28
Sankhitta dhammadesana - 65
Samaiiiiaphalasutta - 4
Santhana - 83
Samano bhavo - 32 • •

Sammaditthisutta - 9 Sekha - 1 7
. Sammasanariipa - 85 Sikkhapada - 16
Sammuti - 58, 59, 63, 64, 95 Somanassavedana Ooyfulfeeling) - 41
Sammutidesana (conventional teaching) - 96 Sopadhisesanibba1)adhatu - 45, 88
Sammutikatha - 65 Sota - the ear - 3
Sammuti-sacca - 52 Sotaviiiiiana - the auditory consciousness - 3
Store - consciousness - 108
Sampayoga - 80
Sucarita - 23
Sampayuttadhamma - 3 7
Suiiiia - 88
Samphappalapa Veramani (refrainingfrom useless talks) - 2
Suiiiiata (voidness) - 23, 25, 26
Samukkamsika - 65
S iinyatavada - 93
Sanidassanarupa - 42
Support condition - nissayapaccaya - 19
Saiiiia (perception) - 1, 5, 41, 45, 81
Surviving consciousness .- 108
Sannicaya - 104
Suttanta - 15, 16, 28
Sannidhi - 104
Santana - 99 Suttanuloma - 55
Sappaccaya - causa - 84 Suttapi{aka - 2
Sarava - 61 Taco - 7
Tathagata Maitreya -100
Sarvasama rthya - viraha - 100
Tathagata - 60, 63
Sarvastivada - 93, 9 7, 98, 99
Tejo - temperature - 3
Sarira - 83
Tejodhatu (elements offire) - 2
Sasava - with defilements - 84
Thambhitatta - 32
Sassatavada (eternalism) - 3
Satipa!{hana - 2, 7, 8, 9, 16 (dvadasangapa{iccasamuppada) - 6
Samkrantivada - 93 Theory of double truth -51
Samskrta - 99 Theravada abhidhamma - 2, 74, 79, 96, 102
Thitikkhana - 34
• •

Samvrti - 53 •

Thina (sloth) - 83
•

Samvrtisat -54
Sangha!{anaraso - 40 Thripi{akapali - 23
Trairasika Ajivika - 52
Sangitisutta -1
Ucchedavada (annihilationism)- 4
Sankhara - conditioned - 80
Udaggacitta - 97
Sankhara - mentalformations - 2, 45, 81
Sanhata - (unconditioned) - 32 Udana - 56
Sankhata - 84 Unconditioned reality- 95
 1 30 1 31
Undeveloped knowledge (ahhlivitapaiiiia)- 46 Vimalahuddhi- 30
Unsatisfactioness (dukkha) - 43 Viiiiiliana - consciousness - 3, 45, 75, 76, 82
•

Unutterahle (anahhillipya) - 54 Viiiiiatti - 77

Uplidliya - 84 Vinivaranacitta- 97
•

Upanisadic - 52 Viplikahetu- l00

Upasiva - 57 Visaya - 23, 24
Upplida - 35, 80, 105 Visuddhimagga - 38, 75, 86
Upplidakkha1}a - 34 Visuddhimagga(ikli- 33, 44
Vacana - 43 Vitakka (initial application) - 75
Vacaniya - 43 Vittha - 61
Vaihhlisiklis - 54, 93, 97 Vitthliradhammadesana - 65
Vaisessika 53 Vyavahlira - 23, 24
Vajjiputtaklis - 106 Vyaya - 105
Vakkam - 7 Y. Karunadasa - 54, 83, 104
Vasuhandhu - 30, 54 Yakanam - 7
Vaya - 35 Yamaka - 14, 16, 18
Viiyo - air - 3 Yathli hhiitanaiilidassana - 6
Viiyodhlitu (element ofair) - 2, 32 Yogliclirins - 54, 108
Vii1}a - 86, 87 Yutti (custom orfitness) - 23 •

Vanna - 83
• •

Vedanli (feeling) - 1, 2, 81
Vedanli - sensation - 45, 54
Vadantic philosophy - 52
,

Vihhliga - 100
Vihhajjavlida' �chool ofanalysis)- 10
,

Vihhajjavylikara1}a- 95
Vihhlivini(ikli - 32, 3 7, 38, 39, 40
Vihhanga - 10, 13, 16
Vicliro - 39
Vijlinanacintli - 75
Vijjlicara1}a - 13
Vijiilinavlida - 93, 108
Vijiiaptimlitratlisiddhi - 54
Viklira - 23, 24 '
Viklisini(ikli - 35, 38, 39, 40