SUCCESSION: ATTY. RESCI ANGELLI R.

RIZADA

TESTAMENTARY SUCCESSION 6.
I command, in this my addition (Codicil) that the Lot No. 1392, in the event that
ARTICLE 783. A will is an act whereby a person is permitted, with the the one to whom I have left and bequeathed, and his heir shall later sell, lease, mortgage
formalities prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree the disposition of this said Lot, the buyer, lessee, mortgagee, shall have also the obligation to respect and
this estate, to take effect after his death. deliver yearly ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y
Belleza, on each month of December, SEVENTY FIVE (75) piculs of Export and TWENTY
[ GR No. 113725, Jun 29, 2000 ] FIVE (25) piculs of Domestic, until Maria Marlina shall die, lastly should the buyer,
JOHNNY S. RABADILLA v. CA lessee or the mortgagee of this lot, not have respected my command in this my addition
390 Phil. 11 (Codicil), Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, shall immediately seize this Lot No.
1392 from my heir and the latter's heirs, and shall turn it over to my near desendants,
FACTS: (sic) and the latter shall then have the obligation to give the ONE HUNDRED (100)
piculs of sugar until Maria Marlina shall die. I further command in this my addition
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 23, (Codicil) that my heir and his heirs of this Lot No. 1392, that they will obey and follow
1993, in CA-G.R. No. CV-35555, which set aside the decision of Branch 52 of the that should they decide to sell, lease, mortgage, they cannot negotiate with others than
Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City, and ordered the defendants-appellees. my near descendants and my sister."

PETITIONER: heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabanilla to reconvey lot No. 1392, together with its Pursuant to the same Codicil, Lot No. 1392 was transferred to the deceased, Dr. Jorge
fruits and interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza. Rabadilla, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44498 thereto issued in his name.

In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife Rufina and children
Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was Johnny (petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, all surnamed Rabadilla.
instituted as a devisee of 511, 855 square meters of that parcel of land surveyed as Lot
No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre. The said Codicil, which was duly probated and On August 21, 1989, Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza Villacarlos brought a
admitted in Special Proceedings No. 4046 before the then Court of First Instance of complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 5588, before Branch 52 of the Regional Trial
Negros Occidental, contained the following provisions: Court in Bacolod City, against the above-mentioned heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to
enforce the provisions of subject Codicil. The Complaint alleged that the defendant-heirs
1.) violated the conditions of the Codicil, in that:
I give, leave and bequeath the following property owned by me to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla
resident of 141 P. Villanueva, Pasay City: 1. Lot No. 1392 was mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank and the
(a) Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. Republic Planters Bank in disregard of the testatrix's specific instruction to
RT-4002 (10942), which is registered in my name according to the records of the sell, lease, or mortgage only to the near descendants and sister of the
Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental. testatrix.
(b) That should Jorge Rabadilla die ahead of me, the aforementioned property and the 2. Defendant-heirs failed to comply with their obligation to deliver one
rights which I shall set forth hereinbelow, shall be inherited and acknowledged by the hundred (100) piculs of sugar (75 piculs export sugar and 25 piculs domestic
children and spouse of Jorge Rabadilla. sugar) to plaintiff Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza from sugar crop years
4. 1985 up to 1989 despite repeated demands for compliance.
(a)....It is also my command, in this my addition (Codicil), that should I die and Jorge
Rabadilla shall have already received the ownership of the said Lot No. 1392 of the 3. The banks failed to comply with the 6th paragraph of the Codicil
Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10942), and which provided that in case of the sale, lease, or mortgage of the
also at the time that the lease of Balbinito G. Guanzon of the said lot shall expire, property, the buyer, lessee, or mortgagee shall likewise have the
Jorge Rabadilla shall have the obligation until he dies, every year to give to Maria obligation to deliver 100 piculs of sugar per crop year to herein private
Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, Seventy (75) (sic) piculs of Export sugar and Twenty Five respondent.
(25) piculs of Domestic sugar, until the said Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza dies.
The plaintiff then prayed that judgment be rendered ordering defendant-heirs to
5. reconvey/return-Lot No. 1392 to the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza, the
(a) Should Jorge Rabadilla die, his heir to whom he shall give Lot No. 1392 of the cancellation of TCT No. 44498 in the name of the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and
Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10492), shall the issuance of a new certificate of title in the names of the surviving heirs of the late
have the obligation to still give yearly, the sugar as specified in the Fourth paragraph of Aleja Belleza.
his testament, to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza on the month of December of
each year. On February 26, 1990, the defendant-heirs were declared in default but on March 28,
1990 the Order of Default was lifted, with respect to defendant Johnny S. Rabadilla,

From the joint efforts of Dayanghirang|Delfin|Guinzon|Hermino|Masanguid|Silo 1

SUCCESSION: ATTY. RESCI ANGELLI R. RIZADA
who filed his Answer, accordingly.
During the pre-trial, the parties admitted that:
On November 15, 1998, the plaintiff (private respondent) and a certain Alan Azurin,
son-in-law of the herein petitioner who was lessee of the property and acting as
attorney-in-fact of defendant-heirs, arrived at an amicable settlement and entered into
a Memorandum of Agreement on the obligation to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar,
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the aforegoing findings, the Court finds that the action
is prematurely filed as no cause of action against the defendants has as yet arose in
favor of plaintiff. While there maybe the non-performance of the command as
mandated exaction from them simply because they are the children of Jorge Rabadilla,
the title holder/owner of the lot in question, does not warrant the filing of the present
complaint. The remedy at bar must fall. Incidentally, being in the category as creditor
of the left estate, it is opined that plaintiff may initiate the intestate proceedings, if only
to establish the heirs of Jorge Rabadilla and in order to give full meaning and semblance
to her claim under the Codicil.
RTC: COMPLAINT DISMISSED
On appeal by plaintiff, the First Division of the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the trial court; ratiocinating and ordering thus:
"Therefore, the evidence on record having established plaintiff-appellant's right to
receive 100 piculs of sugar annually out of the produce of Lot No. 1392; defendants-
appellee's obligation under Aleja Belleza's codicil, heirs of the modal heir, Jorge
Rabadilla, to deliver such amount of sugar to plaintiff-appellant. defendants-appellee's
admitted non-compliance with said obligation since 1985;
Issue:
Whether the or not the codicil of Jorge Rabanilla shall be inherited by his heirs?
Ruling:
Yes.
and, the punitive consequences enjoined by both the codicil and the Civil Code, of
seizure of Lot No. 1392 and its reversion to the estate of Aleja Belleza in case of such
non-compliance, this Court deems it proper to order the reconveyance of title over Lot
No. 1392 from the estates of Jorge Rabadilla to the estate of Aleja Belleza.
However, plaintiff-appellant must institute separate proceedings to re-open Aleja
Belleza's estate, secure the appointment of an administrator, and distribute Lot No.
1392 to Aleja Belleza's legal heirs in order to enforce her right, reserved to her by the
codicil, to receive her legacy of 100 piculs of sugar per year out of the produce of Lot
No. 1392 until she dies.
Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to take the place
of the heir or heirs first instituted.—Substitution is the designation by the testator of
a person or persons to take the place of the heir or heirs first instituted. Under
substitutions in general, the testator may either (1) provide for the designation of
another heir to whom the property shall pass in case the original heir should die before
him/her, renounce the inheritance or be incapacitated to inherit, as in a simple
substitution, or (2) leave his/her property to one person with the express charge that
it be transmitted subsequently to another or others, as in a fideicommissary
substitution. In the case at bar, it has been held by the CA through evidence provided
From the joint efforts of Dayanghirang|Delfin|Guinzon|Hermino|Masanguid|Silo
that the heirs of Jorge Rabanilla shall follow the codicil made by him through his will.
Under Art. 783 of the Civil Code, a will is an act whereby a person is permitted,
with the formalities prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree the
disposition of this estate, to take effect after his death.
TESTATE ESTATE OF CARLOS GIL, DECEASED. ISABEL HERREROS VDA. DE
GIL, ADMINISTRATRIX AND APPELLEE, VS. PILAR GIL VDA. DE MURCTANO,
OPPOSITOR AND APPELLANT.
Facts:
The Court of First Instance of Manila admitted to probate the alleged will and
testament of the deceased Carlos Gil. The oppositor Pilar Gil Vda. de Murciano
appealed to this Court, raising only questions of law.
The only copy available is a printed form contained in the record appeal in case G. R.
No. L-254, entitled 'Testate Estate of Carlos Gil; Isabel Herreros Vda. de Gil, petitioner
and appellant vs. Roberto Toledo y Gil, oppositor and appellee.' Both parties are
agreed that this is a true and correct copy of the will.
The appeal being only on questions of law the above finding of the court below cannot
be disputed. The conclusions of law reached by said court are based on it. Moreover,
the finding is correctly based on the evidence of record. The parties agreed that said
copy is true and correct. If it were otherwise, they would not have so agreed,
considering that the defect is of an essential character and is fatal to the validity of
the attestation clause.
It will be noted that the attestation clause above quoted does not state that the alleged
testator signed the will. It declares only that it was signed by the witnesses. This is a
fatal defect, for the precise purpose of the attestation clause is to certify that the
testator signed the will, this being the most essential element of the clause. Without it
there is no attestation at all.
Issue:
Whether or not the attestation clause can prove a validity of a will by the signature of
the testator.
Ruling: Yes.
The attestation clause does not state that the alleged testator signed the will.
It only declares that it was signed by the witnesses. This is a fatal defect for the precise
purpose of attestation clause is to cerify that the testator signed the will, this being
the most important element of the clause, without it there is no attestation at all. It is
also contended that the deficiency was cured at the lat paragraph of the will.
Attestaion Clause:
In section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended, it is declared, among other
things, that the attestation shall state that the testator signed "the will and every
page thereof" in the presence of the witnesses, also that the attesting witnesses
signed the will "and all pages thereof"
MONTINOLA VS HERBOSA ( COURT OF APPEALS CASE)
241 PHIL. 1045
Facts:
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SUCCESSION: ATTY. RESCI ANGELLI R. RIZADA
This case arose from a petition filed by private respondent Atty. Eduardo F. Hernandez
on April 22, 1981 with the Court of First Instance of Manila (now Regional Trial Court)
seeking the probate of the holographic will of the late Herminia Montinola executed on
January 28, 1980. The testatrix, who died single, parentless and childless on March
29, 1981 at the age of 70 years, devised in this will several of her real properties to
specified persons.
 On April 29, 1981, private respondent, Hernandez who was named executor
in the will filed an urgent motion for appointment of special administrator.
 On June 29, 1981, Matilde Montinola Sanson (petitioner), the only surviving
sister of the deceased but who was not named in the said will, filed her
Opposition to Probate of Will, alleging inter alia: that the subject will was not
entirely written, dated and signed by the testatrix herself and the same was
falsely dated or antedated; that the testatrix was not in full possession of her
mental faculties to make testamentary dispositions; that undue influence was
exerted upon the person and mind of the testatrix by the beneficiaries named
in the will.
After a hearing on the merits, the probate court, finding the evidence presented in
support of the petition to be conclusive and overwhelming, rendered its decision
allowing the probate of the disputed will.
Petitioner thus appealed the decision of the probate court to the Court of Appeals
which affirmed in toto the decision.
 On September 24, 1986, petitioner filed with the respondent court a
motion for new trial Attached to her motion was the Affidavit of
Merit of Gregorio Montinola Sanson, petitioner's son, alleging
that witnesses have been located whose testimonies could shed light
as to the ill health of testatrix as well as undue influence exerted on
the latter.
 Appellate court in its resolution of October 13, 1986, denied the
motion for new trial of petitioner on the following grounds: (1) the
Affidavit of Merit attached to the motion alleged that efforts were
exerted to locate unnamed witnesses only after the court's decision
was handed down, and (2) the unnamed witnesses would allegedly
shed light on the fact of grave illness of the testatrix as well as the
undue influence exerted on her which are merely corroborative or
cumulative since these facts were brought to light during the trial.
 October 27, 1986, motion for reconsideration of petitioner was
likewise denied by the appellate court in its resolution of November
20, 1986 on the ground that the affidavit of one Patricia Delgado
submitted with the motion constitutes cumulative evidence and the
motion being in reality a second motion for reconsideration which is
prescribed by law.
Issue:
Whether or not the holographic will of the late Heminia Montinola is valid and can be
exercised.
Ruling: Yes.
From the joint efforts of Dayanghirang|Delfin|Guinzon|Hermino|Masanguid|Silo
The Court renders judgment declaring the holographic will marked in evidence as
Exhibit 'H' as one wholly written, dated, and signed freely by the late Herminia
Montinola in accordance with law while in possession of full testamentary capacity,
and allowing and admitting the same to probate.
In addition, We agree with the appellate court that since the alleged illness of the
testatrix as well as the charges of undue influence exerted upon her had been brought
to light during the trial, any new evidence on this point is merely corroborative and
cumulative which is generally not a ground for new trial.[16] Accordingly, such evidence
even if presented will not carry much probative weight which can alter the judgment.
During the hearing before the probate court, not only were three (3) close relatives of
the testatrix presented but also two (2) expert witnesses who declared that the
contested will and signature are in the handwriting of the testatrix. These testimonies
more than satisfy the requirements of Art. 811 of the Civil Code in conjunction with
Section 11 of Rule 76, Revised Rules of Court for the probate of holographic wills.
It is within the right of the testatrix not to include her only sister who is not a compulsory
heir in her will. Nevertheless, per testimony of Asuncion Gemperle, the latter had
reserved two boxes of jewelry worth P850,000.00 for petitioner.
JOSE MERZA, PETITIONER, VS. PEDRO LOPEZ PORRAS, RESPONDENT.
Facts:
The testatrix was survived by her husband and collateral relatives, some of
whom, along with the husband, were disinherited in Exhibit B for the reasons set forth
therein.
The opposition to Exhibit A was predicated on alleged defects of the attestation
clause. Written in the local dialect known to the testatrix, the attestation clause, as
translated into English in the record on appeal, reads:
"The foregoing instrument consisting of three pages, on the date above-mentioned,
was executed, signed and published by testatrix Pilar Montealegre and she declared
that the said instrument is her last will and testament; that in our presence and also
in the very presence of the said testatrix as likewise in the presence of two witnesses
and the testatrix each of us three witnesses signed this testament."
The opponent objected that this clause did not state that the testatrix and the
witnesses had signed each and every page of the will or that she had signed the
instrument in the presence of the witnesses.
The Appellate Court dismissed the first objection, finding that "failure to state in the
attestation clause in question that the testatrix and/or the witnesses had signed each
and every page of Exhibit A were cured by the fact that each one of the pages of the
instrument appears to be signed by the testatrix and the three attesting witnesses.
Issue:
Whether or not the attestation clause of the will is valid.
Ruling. Yes.
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SUCCESSION: ATTY. RESCI ANGELLI R. RIZADA
Held: Considering that the witnesses' only business at hand was to sign and
attest to the testatrix's signing of the document, and that the only actors in the
proceeding were the maker and the witnesses acting and speaking collectively and in
the first person, the phrase "in our presence", used as it was in connection with the
process of signing, cannot imply anything but that the testatrix signed before them.
No other inference is possible. The prepositional phrase "in our presence" denotes an
active verb and the verb a subject. The verb could be no other than signed and the
subject no other than the testatrix. The use of the word "also" is no less enlightening.
It denotes that, as each of the witnesses signed in the presence of the testatrix and of
one another, the testatrix signed similarly or in like manner—in their presence.
G.R. NO. 82027 MARCH 29, 1990
ROMARICO G. VITUG, PETITIONER,
VS.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND ROWENA FAUSTINO-
CORONA, RESPONDENTS.
RUFINO B. JAVIER LAW OFFICE FOR PETITIONER.
QUISUMBING, TORRES & EVANGELISTA FOR PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
Facts:
This case is a chapter in an earlier suit decided by this Court involving the probate of
the two wills of the late Dolores Luchangco Vitug, who died in New York, U. S.A., on
November 10, 1980, naming private respondent Rowena Faustino-Corona executrix.
In our said decision, we upheld the appointment of Nenita Alonte as co-special
administrator of Mrs. Vitug's estate with her (Mrs. Vitug's) widower, petitioner
Romarico G. Vitug, pending probate.
Spouses Dolores and Romarico Vitug entered into a survivorship agreement with the
Bank of American National Trust and Savings Association. The said agreement
contained the following stipulations:
(1) All money deposited and to be deposited with the Bank in their
joint savings current account shall be both their property and shall be payable to and
collectible or withdrawable by either or any of them during their lifetime; and
(2) After the death of one of them, the same shall belong to and be the sole property of
the surviving spouse and payable to and collectible or withdrawable by such survivor
Dolores died naming Rowena Corona in her wills as executrix. Romarico later filed
a motion asking authority to sell certain shares of stock and real property belonging
to the estate to cover his advances to the estate which he claimed were personal funds
withdrawn from their savings account. Rowena opposed on the ground that the same
funds withdrawn from the savings account were conjugal partnership properties and
part of the estate. Hence, there should be no reimbursement. On the other hand,
Romarico insists that the same are his exclusive property acquired through the
survivorship agreement.
Issue:
1. Whether or not Survivorship agreements are permitted by the Civil Code
2. Whether or not the appointment of special administrator is valid and the objections
that the special administrator lack kinship from the testators.
From the joint efforts of Dayanghirang|Delfin|Guinzon|Hermino|Masanguid|Silo
Ruling:
1. Yes.
A validity of the contract seems debatable by reason of its “survivor-take-all” feature,
but in reality, that contract imposed a mere obligation with a term, the term being
death. Such agreements are permitted by the Civil Code.
2. No.
The executrix’s choice of Special Administrator, considering her own inability to serve
and the wide latitude of discretion given her by the testatrix in her will, is entitled to
the highest consideration. Objections to Nenita’s appointment on grounds of
impracticality and lack of kinship are overshadowed by the fact that justice and equity
demand that the side of the deceased wife and the faction of the surviving husband be
represented in the management of the decedent’s estate.
G.R. NOS. 140371-72 NOVEMBER 27, 2006
DY YIENG SEANGIO, BARBARA D. SEANGIO AND VIRGINIA D.
SEANGIO, PETITIONERS,
VS.
HON. AMOR A. REYES, IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION, BRANCH 21, MANILA,
ALFREDO D. SEANGIO, ALBERTO D. SEANGIO, ELISA D. SEANGIO-SANTOS,
VICTOR D. SEANGIO, ALFONSO D. SEANGIO, SHIRLEY D. SEANGIO-LIM, BETTY
D. SEANGIO-OBAS AND JAMES D. SEANGIO, RESPONDENTS.
Facts:
On November 27, 2006, there was a petition for the probate of an alleged holographic
will which was denominated as “Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng mana.” The private
respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate proceedings primarily on the
ground that the document purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo did not
contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus did not meet the
definition of a will under Article 783 of the Civil Code. According to private
respondents, the will only showed an alleged act of disinheritance by the decedent of
his eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing else; that all other compulsory heirs were not
named nor instituted as heir, devisee or legatee, hence there was preterition which
would result to intestacy. Such being the case, private respondents maintained that
while procedurally the court is called upon to rule only on the extrinsic validity of the
will, it is not barred from delving into the intrinsic validity of the same, and ordering
the dismissal of the petition for probate when on the face of the will it is clear that it
contains no testamentary disposition of the property of the decedent.
Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss contending
that: (1) generally, the authority of the probate court is limited only to a
determination of the extrinsic validity of the will; (2) private respondents
question the intrinsic and not the extrinsic validity of the will; (3) disinheritance
constitutes a disposition of the estate of a decedent; and (4) the rule on
preterition did not apply because Segundo’s will did not constitute a universal
heir or heirs to the exclusion of one or more compulsory heirs.
The RTC issued an order dismissing the petition for probate proceedings, hence, a
petition for certiorari was filed where petitioners argued as follows:
First, respondent judge did not comply with Sections 3 and 4 of the Rule
76 of the Rules of Court which respectively mandate the court to: (a) fix the time
4
SUCCESSION: ATTY. RESCI ANGELLI R. RIZADA
and place for proving the will when all concerned may appear to contest the
allowance thereof, and cause notice of such time and place to be published three
weeks successively previous to the appointed time in a newspaper of general
circulation; and (b) cause the mailing of said notice to the heirs, legatee and
devisees of the testator Segundo;
Second, the holographic will does not contain any institution of an heir, but
rather, as its title clearly states, Kasulatan ng Pag-alis ng Mana, simply contains a
disinheritance of a compulsory heir. Thus, there is no preterition in the decedent’s will
and the holographic will on its face is not intrinsically void;
Third, the testator intended all his compulsory heirs, petitioners and private
respondents alike, with the sole exception of Alfredo, to inherit his estate. None of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line of Segundo were preterited in the holographic will
since there was no institution of an heir;
Fourth, as it clearly appears from the face of the holographic will that it is both
intrinsically and extrinsically valid, respondent judge was mandated to proceed with
the hearing of the testate case; and,
Lastly, the continuation of the proceedings in the intestate case will work
injustice to petitioners, and will render nugatory the disinheritance of Alfredo.
Issue:
Whether or not the document executed by Segundo can be considered as a holographic
will.
Held: Yes.
A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be entirely
written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other
form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
The document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance
instrument, conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is
written, dated and signed by the hand of the testator himself. An intent to
dispose mortis causa (Article 783) can be clearly deduced from the terms of the
instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the latter’s
property, the disinheritance of the son nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself.
In other words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the
testator in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of the eldest son.
Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the
testator, expressed in the form and within the limits prescribed by law, must be
recognized as the supreme law in succession. All rules of construction are designed to
ascertain and give effect to that intention. It is only when the intention of the testator
is contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it cannot be given effect.
Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not
learned in the law should be construed more liberally than the ones drawn by an
expert, taking into account the circumstances surrounding the execution of the
instrument and the intention of the testator. In this regard, the document, even
if captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-alis ng Mana, was intended by the testator to
be his last testamentary act and was executed by him in accordance with law in
the form of a holographic will. Unless the will is probated, the disinheritance
cannot be given effect.
Art. 784. The making of a will is a strictly personal act; it cannot be left in
whole or in part of the discretion of a third person, or accomplished through
the instrumentality of an agent or attorney.
From the joint efforts of Dayanghirang|Delfin|Guinzon|Hermino|Masanguid|Silo
CASTAÑEDA V. ALEMANY, 3 PHIL 426
Petitioner: Antonio Castañeda
Respondent: Jose E. Alemany
Facts:
Jose Alemany contested the validity of the will of Dona Juana Moreno on the ground
that although the attestation clause in the will states that the testator signed the will
in the presence of three witnesses who also each signed in each other’s presence, the
will was not actually written by Dona Juana Moreno.
Issue:
Should the will be written by the testator herself in order to bevalid?
Ruling:
No.
Section 618 of the Civil Code requires (1) that the will be in writing and (2) either the
testator sign it himself or, if he does not sign it, that it be signed by someone in his
presence and by his express direction. Who does the mechanical work of writing the
will is a matter of indifference. The fact, therefore, that in this case the will was
typewritten in the office of the lawyer for the testatrix is of no consequence.
The mechanical act of drafting the will can be left to a third person. What is important
is the testator signs the will or he let another person to sign but under his direction.
Art. 788. If a testamentary disposition admits of different interpretations, in
case of doubt, that interpretation by which the disposition is to be operative
shall be preferred.
DIZON RIVERA VS. DIZON (33 SCRA 554)
Petitioner: Marina Dizon-Rivera
Respondent: (ESTELA DIZON, TOMAS V. DIZON, BERNARDITA DIZON,
JOSEFINA DIZON, ANGELINA DIZON - Siblings of Marina) and LILIA DIZON -
daughter of Ramon(Brother of Marina)
Facts:
Testatrix Agripina J. Valdez, a widow, died in Angeles, Pampanga and was survived by
seven compulsory heirs - six legitimate children and a legitimate granddaughter Lilia
Dizon. Lilia is the only legitimate child and heir of Ramon Dizon, a pre-deceased
legitimate son of Agripina. Six compulsory heirs, except Marina (executrix-appellee),
are the oppositors- appellants.
Agripina left a will executed on February 2, 1960 and written in the Pampango dialect.
The beneficiaries of the said will were the compulsory heirs and seven other legitimate
grandchildren.
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SUCCESSION: ATTY. RESCI ANGELLI R. RIZADA
In her will, Agripina divided, distributed and disposed of all her properties apprised at
P1,801,960.00 among the heirs. Testate proceedings were commenced and the will
was duly allowed and admitted to probate. Marina was appointed executrix of
Agripina’s estate.
The real and personal properties of Agripina at the time of her death had a total
apprised value of P1,811,695.60 and the legitime of each of the seven compulsory
heirs amounted to P129,361.11. (1/7 of the half of the estate reserved for the legitime
of legitimate children and descendants.) In her will, Agripina commanded that her
property be divided in accordance with her testamentary disposition, whereby she
devised and bequeathed specific real properties comprising practically the entire bulk
of her estate among her six children and eight grandchildren.
Marina filed her project of partition adjudicating the properties to each of the
compulsory heirs, to their legitimes to P129,254.96.
The oppositors also filed a counter-project of partition, proposing that the whole estate
of Agripina to be reduced into half -- one half for the heirs, and the other half would
be deemed as constituting the legitime of Marina and the six other heirs, to be divided
among them in seven equal parts of P129,362.11 as their respective legitimes.
The lower court approved the project of partition of Marina on the ground that Articles
906 and 907 of the New Civil Code provide that when the legitime is impaired or
prejudiced, the same shall be completed and satisfied. While it is true that this process
has been followed and adhered to in the two projects of partition, it is observe that
Marina and the oppositors differ in respect to the source from which the portion or
portions shall be taken in order to fully restore that impaired legitime.
Issue:
Does Marina’s project of partition give effect to what Agripina intended in her
will?
Ruling:
Yes.
The Supreme Court ruled that Agripina’s testamentary disposition was in the nature
of a partition of her estate by will, which is valid, as contemplated and authorized in
the first paragraph of Article 1080 of the Civil Code, which provides that, “Should a
person make a partition of her estate by an act inter vivos or by will, such partition
shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory
heirs.” This right of a testator to partition his estate is subject only to the right of
compulsory heirs to their legitimes. This right is safeguarded by the provisions of the
Civil Code in Articles 906 and 907.
It is very clear in the will of the testatrix that she wanted to give certain properties to
certain persons and those dispositions or those persons should be respected. If the
legitime or the rightful shares of the other heirs are prejudiced, then that should be
completed by the delivery of cash in accordance with the wishes of the testator.
From the joint efforts of Dayanghirang|Delfin|Guinzon|Hermino|Masanguid|Silo
VDA. DE VILLANUEVA VS. JUICO (4 SCRA 550)
Petitioner: LEONOR VILLAFLOR VDA. DE VILLANUEVA (Niece of Don Nicolas
Villafor)
Respondent: DELFIN N. Juico, in his capacity as Judicial Administrator of the
testate estate of (deceased)FAUSTA NEPOMUCENO(widow of Don Nicolas)
Facts:
Don Nicolas Villaflor, a wealthy man of Castillejos, Zambales, executed a will in
Spanish in his own handwriting, devising and bequeathing in favor of his wife, Dona
Fausta Nepomuceno, one-half of all his real and personal properties, giving the other
half to his brother Don Fausto Villafor.
Don Nicolas died on March 3, 1922, without begetting any child with his wife. Fausta,
already a widow, thereupon instituted a settlement of her husband’s estate, where she
was appointed judicial adminstratrix. She submitted a project of partition, which
showed that she received the ownership and possession of a considerable amount of
real and personal estate, and the use and possession of all real and personal properties
mentioned in the 7th clause of the will.
Dona Fausta died without having contracted a second marriage, and without having
begotten any child with Don Nicolas. Her estate was settled in the lower court, and
Delfin Juico was duly appointed as judicial administrator.
Leonor Villaflor instituted an action against Delfin Juico contending that upon Dona
Fausta’s death, she (Leonora) became vested with the ownership of the real and
personal properties bequeathed by Don Nicolas pursuant to the 7th and 8th clause of
the will.
The lower court ruled in favor of Delfin and held that the title to the properties of Don
Nicolas became absolutely vested in the widow upon her death, on account that she
never remarried.
Issue:
Can Leonor validly recover the properties from her grand-uncle Don Nicolas?
Ruling:
Yes.
The Supreme Court agreed with Leonor that the plain desire and intent of Don Nicolas,
as manifested in clause 8 or his testament, was to invest Dona Fausta with only a
usufruct or life tenure in the properties described in the seventh clause, subject to the
further condition that if the widow remarried, her rights would thereupon cease, even
during her lifetime. That the widow was meant to have no more than a life interest in
those properties, even if she did not remarry at all, is evident from the expressions
used by Don Nicolas “uso y posesion mientras viva” (use and possession while alive)
in which the first half of the phrase “uso y posesion” instead of “dominio” or
“propriedad” reinforces the second “mientras viva.” The testator plainly did not give
his widow the full ownership of these particular properties, but only the right to their
possession and use (or enjoyment) during her lifetime.
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SUCCESSION: ATTY. RESCI ANGELLI R. RIZADA
The intention of the testator here was to merely give usufructuary right to his wife
Doňa Fausta because in his will he provided that Doňa Fausta shall forfeit the
properties if she fails to bear a child and because she died without having begotten
any children with the deceased then it means that Doňa Fausta never acquired
ownership over the property. Upon her death, because she never acquired ownership
over the property, the said properties are not included in her estate. Those properties
actually belong to Villaflor. That was the intention of the testator. Otherwise, if the
testator wanted to give the properties to Doňa Fausta then he should have specifically
stated in his will that ownership should belong to Doňa Fausta without mentioning
any condition.
DEL ROSARIO VS. DEL ROSARIO (2 PHIL 321)
Petitioner: RAMON DEL ROSARIO
Respondent: CLEMENTE DEL ROSARIO
Facts:
Testator Nicolas declares in his will the following:
Eight. The testator declares that the P5000 which he brought to his marriage he
hereby bequeaths to his nephews Enrique and Ramon, natural children of his brother
Clemente, notwithstanding the fact that they purport to be the issue of the marriage
of Escolastico and Rosendo, successively.
Ninth. The testator declares that the said sum of P5000 is to be divided , P3000 to the
first named and P2000 to the second named, the delivery of the sum is to be effected
by the wife of the testator, provided that this young men behave themselves as they
have done up to the present time, and do not cease to study until taking a degree of
Bachelor Arts and then take a business course, if their health will permit, their
support to paid out of the testamentary estate and they to live in the house of the
widow.
Issue:
Is the description of the legatees makes the legacy conditional?
Ruling:
No. In the interpretation and construction of testamentary provisions the intention of
the testator controls.
In this case, where legatees are appointed out by name in the will the fact that they
are referred to as natural sons of third person does not make the legacy conditional
upon proof of such relationship but is descriptive merely.
BALANAY, JR. VS. MARTINEZ
Petitioner: FELIX BALANAY, JR.
Respondent: AVELINA B. ANTONIO and DELIA B. LANABAN (Siblings of Felix Jr.)
From the joint efforts of Dayanghirang|Delfin|Guinzon|Hermino|Masanguid|Silo
Facts:
Leodegaria Julian died and survived by her husband, Felix Balanay Sr, and 6
legitimate children. She left a will which her son Felix Jr, petitioned for probate. She
stated in her will that 1. She was the owner of southern-half of 9 parcels of land, 2.
She’s the absolute owner of 2 parcels of land which she inherited, 3. That her
properties should not be divided if her husband is still alive, and 4. That the legitimes
of her heirs should be satisfied by fruits of her properties (by money).
Also, she added that upon her husband’s death, all of the conjugal assets should be
owned by her and be distributed according to the one stipulated above. Thereafter,
her daughter, Avelina and Felix Sr. opposed the probate of the will on several grounds.
Felix Jr, replied to the opposition and attached an affidavit stating that his Father,
Felix Sr, withdrew his opposition and conform to the will left by Leodegaria. Felix Sr
also renounced his hereditary rights in favor of his 6 children.
Avelina, in her rejoinder contended that the said affidavit was void. That Leodegaria
invalidly claimed to be the owner of the southern portion of the lots and she cannot
partition the conjugal estate by allocation. Several series of litigation happened and
the RTC dismissed the petition for probate thus it converted it to intestate proceedings.
Issue:
Was it proper for the RTC to declare the whole will void
Ruling:
No.
"Where some of the provisions of a will are valid and others invalid, the valid
parts will be upheld if they can be separated from the invalid without defeating the
intention of the testator or interfering with the general testamentary scheme, or doing
injustice to the beneficiaries"
The statement of the testatrix that she owned the "southern half of the conjugal lands
is contrary to law because, although she was a coowner thereof, her share was
inchoate and pro indiviso but this illegal declaration does not nullify the entire will. It
may be disregarded.
The provision of the will that the properties of the testatrix should not be divided
among her heirs during her husband's lifetime but should be kept intact and that the
legitimes should be paid in cash is contrary to article 1080 of the Civil Code.
However, it should be stressed that by reason of the surviving husband's conformity
to his wife's will and his renunciation of his hereditary rights, his one-half conjugal
share became a part of his deceased wife's estate. His conformity had the effect of
validating the partition made of the will without prejudice to the legitimes.
In the instant case there is no doubt that the testatrix and her husband intended to
partition the conjugal estate in the manner set forth in paragraph V of her will. It is
true that she could dispose of by will only her half of the conjugal estate but since the
husband, after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership, had assented to her
7
SUCCESSION: ATTY. RESCI ANGELLI R. RIZADA
testamentary partition of the conjugal estate, such partition has become valid,
assuming that the will may be probated.
It results that the lower court erred in not proceeding with the probate of the will as
contemplated in its uncancelled order of June 18, 1973. Save in an extreme case
where the will on its face is intrinsically void, it is the probate court's duty to pass first
upon the formal validity of the will. Generally, the probate of the will is mandatory.
Art. 789. When there is an imperfect description, or when no person or property
exactly answers the description, mistakes and omissions must be corrected, if
the error appears from the context of the will or from extrinsic evidence,
excluding the oral declarations of the testator as to his intention; and when
an uncertainty arises upon the face of the will, as to the application of any of
its provisions, the testator's intention is to be ascertained from the words of
the will, taking into consideration the circumstances under which it was made,
excluding such oral declarations.
DEL ROSARIO V. DEL ROSARIO,
Petitioner: RAMON DEL ROSARIO
Respondent: CLEMENTE DEL ROSARIO
Facts:
Don Nicolas del Rosario died on July 14, 1897, leaving a last will, the ninth, eleventh,
and eighteenth clauses of which are as follows:
Ninth. The testator declares that the sum of 5,000 pesos is to be divided, 3,000 pesos
for the Enrique and 2,000 pesos for the Ramon, the delivery of the said sums to be
effected by the wife of the testator, provided that these young men behave themselves
as they have done up to the present time, and do not cease to study until taking the
degree of bachelor of arts, and then take a business course, if their health will permit,
their support to be paid out of the testamentary estate and they to live in the house of
the widow.
Eleventh. The testator declares that in a case the said young men should be still
engaged in study at the time of the death of the testator's wife, they shall continue to
be supported at the expense of the testamentary estate, without deducting such
expenses from their legacies, if they should desire to continue the same studies.
Eighteenth. The testator further states that although his wife is at the present time
fifty-five years of age, and consequently is not likely to marry again, as she herself
says, nevertheless it is impossible that the opposite of what she asserts might occur,
and, if so, then it is to be regarded as sufficient reason to authorize the young men
Ramon and Enrique, so often referred to, separate from their aunt, in which event they
are to be supported by the testamentary estate on a small allowance of twenty-five
pesos per month, provided that they continue their studies or should be in poor health,
this without in any respect reducing the amount of their shares.
Don Ramon del Rosario brought this action in 1902 against Don Clemente del Rosario,
the then executor, asking, among other things, that the said executor pay him an
From the joint efforts of Dayanghirang|Delfin|Guinzon|Hermino|Masanguid|Silo
allowance from the death of the widow of the testator at the rate of 75 pesos a month,
and that the executor allow him to live in the house in which the widow was living at
that time.
The widow of the testator, Doña Honorata Valdez, died on July 7, 1900.
Issue:
Is Ramon entitled to his claim?
Ruling:
So far as the disposition of that part of the inheritance left in the aunt's will to Doña
Luisa for life is concerned, the question is free from doubt. It is distinctly declared that
Ramon del Rosario and Enrique Gloria shall take certain parts of it after 1,000 pesos
have been deducted.
They are pointed out by name as the legatees. It is true that they are called the natural
sons of Don Clemente. But this is merely a further description of persons already well
identified, and, if false, can be rejected in accordance with the provision of article 773
of the Civil Code, which by article 789 is applicable to legatees.
As to the estate of Don Nicolas, the only thing here in question is the right to the
allowance. As we hold that the plaintiff is not entitled to it, he is not entitled to any
statement of accounts as such pretended legatee.
As to the estate of Doña Honorata, he is entitled to be paid a legacy of 1,500 pesos.
Article 907 requires the executor to render accounts to the heir, not to the legatee;
and although by article 789 all of the provisions of Chapter II (in which both articles
are found) relating to heirs are made applicable to legatees, we cannot hold that this
requires an executor to submit his accounts to one who has no interest in the estate
except to a money legacy when there is no suggestion that it will not be paid when the
right to it is established.
ESTATE OF RIGOR VS. RIGOR
G.R. NO. L-22036, APRIL 30, 1979
AQUINO, J.
FACTS:
Father Pascual Rigos left a will containing a devise stating that he leaves as a devise,
a riceland which he gives to his ‘nearest male relative’ who would pursue an
ecclesiastical career. Also, it was stated in the will that during the interval of time that
no person qualifies in the requirement contemplated, the administration of the
riceland shall be given to the current Parish Priest of Victoria.
The heirs of Father Rigor moved to declare the devise as inoperative due to
nonexistence of the person who qualifies the requirement and that the wording of the
devise was vague and without clear duration as to how long they have determine
anyone who qualifies for the devise.
8
SUCCESSION: ATTY. RESCI ANGELLI R. RIZADA
ISSUE:
Whether the devise is inoperative.
RULING:
Yes.
Art. 789 of the Civil Code provides that an imperfect description found on the will
should be interpreted based on the actual intention of the testator with consideration
and the circumstances during the making of the will. Thus, in this case, the Court
held that it could not have been the intention of the testator to wait indefinitely after
his death for a person to qualify because it would have been very difficult to follow the
will should it be interpreted like that. Hence, the Court recognized that the devise was
intended to be determined when succession opens or at the death of Father Rigor.
During his death, no one qualified to become the devisee.
Thus, the devise should be deemed inoperative.
RABADILLA VS CA
G.R. NO. 113725 , JUNE 6, 2000
PURISIMA, J.
FACTS:
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla was instituted as the devisee of a parcel of land owned by Aleza
Belleja surveyed as Lot No, 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre. In the provisions of the will,
the institution of Dr. Rabadilla included a condition that he shall give 75 piculs of
export sugar and 25 piculs of domestic sugar every year until the day he dies to Maria
Belleza Villacarlos. Moreover, Belleza provided also the condition that should Dr.
Rabadilla dies, hhis heirs shall inherit the land mentioned above and shall have the
same obligation required by Aleza. It shall also be the same case if they shall deem to
sell, lease or mortgage the land in favor of another person.
Maria Villacarlos filed a case in 1983 to reclaim the property given to Dr. Rabadilla or
failure of his heirs to comply with the condition of the devise.
ISSUE:
Whether the lot may be reclaimed due to the non-fulfillment of the condition even after
ownership was transferred already to Dr. Rabadilla.
RULING:
Yes.
The interpretation of the will shall be made based on the intention of the
testator/testatrix. In this case, it is very clear that the condition was a must in the
From the joint efforts of Dayanghirang|Delfin|Guinzon|Hermino|Masanguid|Silo
institution of Dr. Rabadilla and therefore, its compliance is a necessity to preserve the
devise.
The failure of Dr. Rabadilla’s heirs to continue providing for the piculs of sugar should
make the devise ineffective and the property should be reclaimed by reopening the
estate of Aleza.
Art. 791. The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to
every expression some effect, rather than one which will render any of the
expressions inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be
preferred which will prevent intestacy.
DIZON RIVERA VS DIZON
G.R. NO. L-24561, JUNE 30, 1970
TEEHANKEE, J.
FACTS:
Agripina Valdez died leaving a will to her seven compulsory heirs. She also named
seven legitimate grandchildren as beneficiaries in the will.
After her death, the will was subjected to testamentary proceedings and Maria Rivera
(one of her children) was appointed as executrix.
During the proceedings, Maria presented her project of partition. In recognition that
some heirs will lesser than their legitime, Maria proposed that each heir shall receive
the exact properties given to them thru the will. Any lacking in the value of the property
compared to the legitime shall be compensated by those who will receive more than
their legitime.
Oppositors of the project provided by the executrix submitted their own project of
partition which summarizingly disregads the division provided for in the will creating
a new partition which may satisfy the legitime of all the heirs.
ISSUE:
Whether the project of partition presented by the executrix be accepted.
RULING:
Yes.
In case a will may have multiple interpretations, Art. 791 of the Civil Code provides
for us a guidance to choose among the interpretations that which will prevent
intestacy.
In this case, the oppositors’ project may not be applied since it totally disregarded the
will executed by the testatrix and thus, technically will result to an intestate
succession.
9
SUCCESSION: ATTY. RESCI ANGELLI R. RIZADA

The law upholds the preservation of the intention of the testatrix by adopting to a
partition which will uphold testacy. Thus, the project of partition presented by the
executrix should be used over the project presented by the oppositors.
VDA DE VILLAFLOR VS JUICO
G.R. NO. L-15737, FEBRUARY 28, 1962
REYES, J.B.L., L.
FACTS:
Don Nicolas Villaflor executed a will in Spanish in his own handwriting. The will
instituted her wife Dona Fausta Nepomuceno and his brother Fausto Villaflor one-half
each of his properties.
Inclusive of the will is a property devised to Fausta with the condition that she will not
remarry else it shall be given to Leonor Villaflor. Upon the death of Dona Fausta,
Leonor Villaflor demanded to the administrator of Fausta’s estate that the propert
mentioned above be given to her to effect the will of Don Nicolas.
Issue:
Whether Leonor is entitled to receive the devise.
on August 10, 1942, Maria Gonzales executed a will bequeathing to Angelina Gonzales
and Mario Pablo all of her properties situated in Sta. Rosa, Laguna. The will was
probated in 1948.
Succeedingly, Delfin Yambao went to Angelina and Mario to request that he be placed
as tenant of the riceland which, by an express provision of the abovementioned will,
they were directed to give to him for cultivation as tenant, and when they refused
alleging that they had already given it to another tenant he filed the present action.
ISSUE:
Whether the heirs are bound to comply in making Delfin the tenant of the land.
RULING:
Yes.
A will should be gven an interpretation in which all of the expressions therein shall be
given some effect. This is provided for in Art. 791 of the Civil Code. The command to
make Delfin the tenant of the land involved was specifically stated in the will and thus,
should be given credence and effect.
Delfin should be employed as tenant.

Ruling: Art. 795. The validity of a will as to its form depends upon the observance of
the law in force at the time it is made.
Yes.

The wording of the will of Don Nicolas indeed provided that Dona Fausta is meant only
to possess the property during her lifetime. The phrase ‘uso y posesion mientras viva’ TESTATE ESTATE OF ABADA VS ABAJA
provides that the intention was not to merely give the property to Don Fausta as a G.R. NO. 147145, JANUARY 31, 2005
whole but to let her have possession of it until she is alive. As Art.791 of the civil code CARPIO, J.
provides, the wrds of the will must receive an interpretation which will give to all the
expression some effect. Denying the right of Leonor to the property will make of the FACTS:
phrases in the will of Don Fausto, particularly the phrase ‘uso y posesion mientras
viva’ be left without an effect. Abada executed a wil in 1932. He died in 1940. Upon his death, the law requires that
a will must bear an acknowledgment before a notary public. The will of Abada did not
Thus, Leonor should be given he property involved in effect of the death of Dona have such acknowledgment.
Fausta.
ISSUE:

YAMBAO VS GONZALES Whether the will is valid.

G.R. NO. L-10763, APRIL 29, 1961
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J. RULING:

FACTS: Yes.

Under Art. 795 of the Civil Code, the validity of a will as to its form depends upon the
law in force at the time it is made.

From the joint efforts of Dayanghirang|Delfin|Guinzon|Hermino|Masanguid|Silo 10

SUCCESSION: ATTY. RESCI ANGELLI R. RIZADA
In this case, the will was governed by the Code of Civil Procedure and not the present
Civil Code. In the Code of Civil Procedure, an acknoledgment before the notary public
is not required. Thus, such should be applied to the will of Abada.
ENRIQUEZ VS. ABADIA 95 PHIL 627
G.R. NO. L-7188 AUGUST 9, 1954
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Petioner: SEVERINA A. VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ
Respondent: MIGUEL ABADIA, oppositor
Facts:
Father Sancho Abadia, parish priest, executed a document purporting to be his Last
Will and Testament. Resident of the City of Cebu, he died on January 14, 1943, in the
municipality of Aloguinsan, Cebu, where he was an evacuee. One Andres Enriquez,
one of the legatees, filed a petition for its probate in the Court of First Instance. Some
cousins and nephews who would inherit the estate of the deceased if he left no will,
filed opposition.
The learned trial court found and declared it to be a holographic will. Although at the
time it was executed and at the time of the testator's death, holographic wills were not
permitted by law still, because at the time of the hearing and when the case was to be
decided the new Civil Code was already in force, which Code permitted the execution
of holographic wills, under a liberal view, and to carry out the intention of the testator
which according to the trial court is the controlling factor and may override any defect
in form, said trial court by order admitted to probate it as the Last Will and Testament
of Father Sancho Abadia.
Issue:
Whether the New Civil Code can be applied to the probate of Abadia’s Last Will and
Testament.
Ruling:
No.
Article 795 of this same new Civil Code expressly provides: "The validity of a will as to
its form depends upon the observance of the law in force at the time it is made." The
above provision is but an expression or statement of the weight of authority to the
affect that the validity of a will is to be judged not by the law enforce at the time of the
testator's death or at the time the supposed will is presented in court for probate or
when the petition is decided by the court but at the time the instrument was executed.
One reason in support of the rule is that although the will operates upon and after the
death of the testator, the wishes of the testator about the disposition of his estate
among his heirs and among the legatees is given solemn expression at the time the
will is executed, and in reality, the legacy or bequest then becomes a completed act.
By parity of reasoning, when one executes a will which is invalid for failure to observe
and follow the legal requirements at the time of its execution then upon his death he
should be regarded and declared as having died intestate, and his heirs will then
inherit by intestate succession, and no subsequent law with more liberal requirements
or which dispenses with such requirements as to execution should be allowed to
validate a defective will and thereby divest the heirs of their vested rights in the estate
by intestate succession.
From the joint efforts of Dayanghirang|Delfin|Guinzon|Hermino|Masanguid|Silo
IN RE WILL OF RIOSA, 39 PHIL 23
G.R. NO. L-14074 NOVEMBER 7, 1918
MALCOLM, J.:
Facts:
Jose Riosa died on April 17, 1917. He left a will made in the month of January, 1908,
in which he disposed of an estate. The will was duly executed in accordance with the
law then in force, namely, section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The will was not
executed in accordance with Act No. 2645, amendatory of said section 618, prescribing
certain additional formalities for the signing and attestation of wills, in force on and
after July 1, 1916. In other words, the will was in writing, signed by the testator, and
attested and subscribed by three credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and
of each other; but was not signed by the testator and the witnesses on the left margin
of each and every page, nor did the attestation state these facts. The new law,
therefore, went into effect after the making of the will and before the death of the
testator, without the testator having left a will that conforms to the new requirements.
Issue:
Whether in the Philippine Islands the law existing on the date of the execution of a
will, or the law existing at the death of the testator, controls.
Ruling:
In this case, the SC ruled that the law that shall be applied is that in existence on the
date of the execution of the will.
The rule prevailing in many other jurisdictions is that the validity of the execution of
a will must be tested by the statutes in force at the time of its execution and that
statutes subsequently enacted have no retrospective effect. This doctrine is believed
to be supported by the weight of authority.
The will was executed prior to the enactment of Act No. 2645 and the death occurred
after the enactment of this law. The will executed shall be allowed to be probated.
IBARLE VS. PO
G.R. NO. L-5064 FEBRUARY 27, 1953
TUASON, J.:
Petioner: BIENVENIDO A. IBARLE, buyer of the parcel of land from Sps. Canoy, first
sale buyers
Respondent: ESPERANZA M. PO, second sale buyer
Facts:
Leonard J. Winstanley and Catalina Navarro were husband and wife, the former
having died on June 6, 1946 leaving heir the surviving spouse and some minor
children. Upon the death of L.J. Winstanley, he left a parcel of land which is under
their conjugal property.
Catalina Navarro Vda. de Winstanley sold the entire parcel of land to the spouses
Maria Canoy, alleging among other things, that she needed money for the support of
her children. A year after, spouses Maria Canoy and Roberto Canoy sold the same
parcel of land to the in this case named Bienvenido A. Ebarle.
In 1948, Catalina Navarro Vda. de Winstanley, after her appointment as guardian of
her children, sold one-half of the land Esperanza M. Po which portion belongs to the
children.
11
SUCCESSION: ATTY. RESCI ANGELLI R. RIZADA
Issue:
Whether the sale to the spouses Canoy was valid.
Ruling:
No.
Article 657 of the old Civil Code provides: "The rights to the succession of a person are
transmitted from the moment of his death." in a slightly different language, this article
is incorporated in the new Civil Code as article 777.
When Catalina Navarro Vda. de Winstanley sold the entire parcel to the Canoy
spouses, one-half of it already belonged to the seller's children. No formal or judicial
declaration being needed to confirm the children's title, it follows that the first sale
was null and void in so far as it included the children's share.
On the other hand, the sale to the Po having been made by authority of the competent
court was undeniably legal and effective.
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is stipulated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the
order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national
law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be
the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property
may be found.
MICIANO VS. BRIMO
G.R. NO. L-22595 NOVEMBER 1, 1927
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
Petioner: JUAN MICIANO, administrator
Respondent: ANDRE BRIMO, one of the birthers of Joseph Brimo, the deceased
Facts:
Joseph G. Brimo died and left estate. The judicial administrator of this estate filed a
scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased, opposed it
based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph
G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality,
for which reason they are void as being in violation or article 10 of the Civil Code
which, among other things, provides the following:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession
as well as to the amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is
in question, whatever may be the nature of the property or the country in which it
may be situated.
However, Andre Brimo was not able to prove in these proceedings what the Turkish
laws are.
Issue:
Whether the CA erred in not applying the Turkish Law in the probate of Joseph Brimo’s
estate.
From the joint efforts of Dayanghirang|Delfin|Guinzon|Hermino|Masanguid|Silo
Ruling:
No.
Andre Brimo did not present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws are on the
matter, and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be the
same as those of the Philippines. There is, therefore, no evidence in the record that
the national law of the testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in the testamentary
dispositions in question which, not being contrary to our laws in force, must be
complied with and executed.
BELLIS VS. BELLIS
G.R. NO. L-23678 JUNE 6, 1967
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Petioner: PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY (executor), MARIA CRISTINA
BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS (2 out of 3 illegitimate children)
Respondent: EDWARD A. BELLIS, one of the legitimate children
Facts:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United
States." By his first wife, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children. By his
second wife, he had three legitimate children. Finally, he had three illegitimate
children.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he
directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for,
his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, first to his first wife. Next to his
three illegitimate children. After the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the
remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives.
Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to
probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests.
Two of the illegitimate children filed their respective oppositions to the project of
partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate
children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.
The lower court issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the
executor's final account relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national
law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for
legitimes.
Issue:
Whether the Texas Law shall apply in the need for the recognition of legitimes of the
illegitimate children.
Ruling:
Yes.
It is evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our
System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession
of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of
successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail
over general ones.
Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of
Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity
of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined
12
SUCCESSION: ATTY. RESCI ANGELLI R. RIZADA
under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of
Amos G. Bellis.
TESTATE ESTATE OF CHRISTENSEN VS. GARCIA
G.R. NO. L-16749 JANUARY 31, 1963
LABRADOR, J.:
Petioner: ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the
deceased
Respondent: HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, devisee, acknowledged natural child
Facts:
Edward E. Christensen left a will with express provisions directing the executor to
reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen, his child, the amount of P3,600 paid by her to
Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy Christensen
entitled to the residue of the property to be enjoyed during her lifetime, and in case of
death without issue, one-half of said residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C.
Borton.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen Christensen
Garcia, insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an acknowledged natural
child. The legal grounds of opposition are (a) that the distribution should be governed
by the laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said order of distribution is contrary thereto
insofar as it denies to Helen Christensen, one of two acknowledged natural children,
one-half of the estate in full ownership. She alleged that the law that should govern
the estate of the deceased Christensen should not be the internal law of California
alone, but the entire law thereof because several foreign elements are involved, that
the forum is the Philippines and even if the case were decided in California, Section
946 of the California Civil Code, which requires that the domicile of the decedent
should apply, should be applicable. Maria Helen Christensen having been declared an
acknowledged natural child of the decedent, she is deemed for all purposes legitimate
from the time of her birth.
Issue:
Whether the distribution should be governed by the laws of the Philippines.
Ruling:
Yes.
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article
16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country where said property may be found.
There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in
the United States, each state of the Union having its own private law applicable to its
citizens only and in force only within the state. The "national law" indicated in Article
16 of the Civil Code above quoted cannot, therefore, possibly mean or apply to any
general American law. So it can refer to no other than the private law of the State of
California.
From the joint efforts of Dayanghirang|Delfin|Guinzon|Hermino|Masanguid|Silo
There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States
and of the State of California at the time of his death. But there is also no question
that at the time of his death he was domiciled in the Philippines.
Laws of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents
therein and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason demands that
the Supreme Court should enforce the California internal law prescribed for its citizens
residing therein, and enforce the conflict of laws rules for the citizens domiciled
abroad. If the law of California should be enforced as in comity the Supreme Court is
bound to go, as so declared in Article 16 of our Civil Code, then the law of California
shall be enforced in accordance with the express mandate thereof and as above
explained
Under the California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will in
the form and manner he desires. In accordance therewith and following the doctrine
of the renvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary provision in question
should be referred back to the law of the decedent's domicile, which is the Philippines.
As the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of California, is the Philippines,
the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the
appellant, should be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art.
946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal law of California.
CAYETANO v. LEONIDAS & CAMPOS-PAGUIA GR No. 54919, May 30, 1984
Facts:
January 31, 1977 - Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving her father, petitioner
Hermogenes Campos and her sisters, private respondent Nenita C. Paguia, Remedios
C. Lopez and Marieta C. Medina as the surviving heirs.
Note: Hermogenes Campos was substituted by Polly Cayetano (petitioner) in this case
upon the former’s death.
As Hermogenes Campos was the only compulsory heir, he executed an Affidavit of
Adjudication under Rule 74, Section I of the Rules of Court whereby he adjudicated
unto himself the ownership of the entire estate of the deceased Adoracion Campos.
November 25, 1977 – Nenita C. Paguia filed a petition for the reprobate of a will of the
deceased, Adoracion Campos, which was allegedly executed in the United States and
for her appointment as administratrix of the estate of the deceased testatrix.
Nenita alleged that the testatrix was an American citizen at the time of her death and
was a permanent resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that the testatrix died
in Manila while temporarily residing with her sister; that during her lifetime, the
testatrix made her last will and testament on July 10, 1975, according to the laws of
Pennsylvania.
January 11, 1978 – an opposition to the reprobate of the will was filed by herein
petitioner alleging among other things, that he has every reason to believe that the will
in question is a forgery; that the intrinsic provisions of the will are null and void; and
that even if pertinent American laws on intrinsic provisions are invoked, the same
could not apply inasmuch as they would work injustice and injury to him.
Respondent, Hon. Tomas T. Leonidas, presiding judge, issued an order admitting and
allowing probate in the Philippines of the Last Will and Testament of Adoracion
Campos.
Issue: W/N the provisions of the will valid? – Yes.
Ruling:
13
SUCCESSION: ATTY. RESCI ANGELLI R. RIZADA
As a general rule, the probate court’s authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity
of the will, the due execution thereof, the testatrix’s testamentary capacity, and the
compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity
of the will normally comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly
authenticated. However, where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic
validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet
the issue.
Application of Article 16
In the case at bar, the petitioner maintains that since the respondent judge allowed
the reprobate of Adoracion’s will, Hermogenes C. Campos was divested of his legitime
which was reserved by the law for him. This contention is without merit.
Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner and thus, the
respondent judge should have denied its reprobate outright, the private respondents
have sufficiently established that Adoracion was, at the time of her death, an American
citizen and a permanent resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.
Therefore, under Article 16 par. (2) and 1039 of the Civil Code which respectively
provide: Art. 16 par. (2). "However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with
respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of
the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of
the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. Art.
1039. "Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent." Law
of Pennsylvania Governs The law which governs Adoracion Campo’s will is the law of
Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the national law of the decedent. Although the parties
admit that the Pennsylvania law does not provide for legitimes and that all the estate
may be given away by the testatrix to a complete stranger, the petitioner argues that
such law should not apply because it would be contrary to the sound and established
public policy and would run counter to the specific provisions of Philippine Law. It is
a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, as
provided for by Article 16 (2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the
decedent must apply.
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK v. THE HONORABLE
VENICIO ESCOLIN GR Nos. L-27860 and L-27896, March 29, 1974
Facts:
May 23, 1957 - Linnie Jane Hodges died in Iloilo City leaving a will executed on
November 22, 1952 in Iloilo City.
December 22, 1962 - Charles Newton Hodges, Linnie’s husband, died.
The spouses Hodges were American citizens originally from Texas, USA. However,
said spouses had lived and worked for more than 50 years in Iloilo City and had,
therefore, acquired a domicile of choice in said city, which they retained until the time
of their respective deaths.
The PCIB, as the testate administrator of Charles Hodges, claims that the Conflict of
Law of Texas, which is the "national law" of the testatrix, Linnie Jane Hodges, provide
that the domiciliary Philippine law should govern the testamentary dispositions and
successional rights over movables (personal properties), and the law of the situs of the
property (also Philippine law as to properties located in the Philippines) with regard to
immovable (real properties).
From the joint efforts of Dayanghirang|Delfin|Guinzon|Hermino|Masanguid|Silo
Issue: W/N the law of Texas govern? – No. The law must first be proven before the
Philippine courts.
Ruling:
FOREIGN LAWS MAY NOT BE TAKEN JUDICIAL NOTICE OF AND HAVE TO BE
PROVEN LIKE ANY OTHER FACT
Since there is no reliable evidence as to what the applicable laws of Texas are, U.S.A.
"with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights", the
cases should be returned to the court a quo, so that the parties may prove what said
law provides.
The question of which parts of the laws of Texas govern the matters in issue is, in the
first instance, one of fact, not of law. Elementary is the rule that foreign laws may not
be taken judicial notice of and have to be proven like any other fact in dispute between
the parties in any proceeding.
EXCEPTIONS TO THE GENERAL RULE ON LACK OF JUDICIAL NOTICE
REGARDING FOREIGN LAWS
(a) the said laws are already within the actual knowledge of the court, such as when
they are well and generally known or
(b) they have been actually ruled upon in other cases before it and none of the parties
concerned do not claim otherwise.
MALANG V MOSON GR 119064, AUGUST 22, 2000
Facts:
Hadji Abdula Malang, a Muslim, contracted 8 marriages in his lifetime, all of which
were celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code and before the enactment of the
Muslim Code. Four were terminated by divorce, all of which also took place before the
enactment of the Muslim Code. Herein petitioner, Neng Malang, was his 4th wife
excluding the wives he had divorced. Their marriage bore no child.
On December 1983, Hadji Abdula died without leaving a will. Petitioner instituted a
petition for the settlement of Hadji's estate with a prayer that letters of administration
be issued in the name of her niece, Tarhata Lauban. In the petition, petitioner claims
that she was the wife of the Hadji Abdula, and that his other legal heirs are his 3
children and that he left 7 parcels of land, 5 of which are titled in Hadji Abdula's name
"married to Neng P. Malang", and a pick-up jeepney.
The Shari'a District Court ordered the publication of the petition and on March 1994,
Hadji Mohammad Ulyssis Malang (Hadji Mohammad), the eldest son of Hadji, filed an
opposition. Hadji Mohammad listed his father’s surviving spouses and children as
surviving heirs.
Hadji Mohammad also allege that he and his brother Hadji Ismael helped their father
in his business, and that they were more competent to be administrators of his estate.
The Shari'a Court later appointed Hadji Mohammad as administrator of properties
outside Cotabato City, and along with Hadji Ismael, as joint administrators of the
estate in Cotabato City.
In a Memorandum filed by the petitioner, she contends that all the properties located
in Cotabato City were conjugal properties and the properties located outside of
Cotabato City were exclusive properties of the decedent. On the other hand, the
oppositors contend that all properties left by Hadji Abdula were his exclusive
properties.
14
SUCCESSION: ATTY. RESCI ANGELLI R. RIZADA
Shari'a Court: No conjugal partnership of gains between petitioner and the decedent.
The Civil Code provision on conjugal partnership cannot be applied if there is more
than one wife because "conjugal partnership presupposes a valid civil marriage, not a
plural marriage or a common-law relationship." The description "married to Neng
Malang" in the titles to the real properties is jnsufficient to prove that the properties
belong to the conjugal partnership of gains.
The court also noted that under Islamic Law, the regime of property relationship is
complete separation of property in the absence of any stipulation to the contrary in
the marriage settlements or any other contract pursuant to PD 1083.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari contending that the law applicable on issues of
marriage and property regimes is the New Civil Code, under which all property of the
marriage is presumed to belong the conjugal partnership.
Issue 1: What law governs the validity of Muslim marriages celebrated before the
Muslim Code?
Ruling: The Civil Code. All 8 marriages of Hadji Abdula were celebrated during the
effectivity of the said Code. Accordingly, it governs said marriages.
Issue 2: What law governs the property relations of Muslim marriages celebrated prior
to the passage of the Muslim Code?
Ruling:
The Civil Code. In the case at bar, at the time of the celebration of the marriages in
question, the Civil Code was the only law on marriage relations, including property
relations between spouses, whether Muslim or non-Muslim.
Which law would govern depends upon:
1.When the marriage took place;
2.Whether the parties lived together as husband and wife; and
3.When and how the subject properties were acquired. In a long line of cases, the SC
has interpreted the co-ownership provided in Article 144 of the Civil Code to require
that the man and woman living together as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or under a void marriage must not in any way better incapacitated to marry.
Hence, the co-ownership contemplated in Article 144 of the Civil Code cannot apply
to Hadji Abdula's marriages celebrated subsequent to a valid and existing marriage,
since for the point of view of the Civil Code, Hadji Abdula is not capacitated to marry.
However, the wives are not precluded from proving that the property acquired during
their cohabitation with Hadji Abdula is their exclusive property. Absent such proof,
however, the presumprion is that property acquired during the subsistence of a valid
marriage is conjugal property of such subsisting marriage.
Issue 3: What law governs the succession and dissolution of property regimes?
Ruling:
The Muslim Code. Hadji Abdula died when the Muslim Code was already in effect,
thus it shall be the Muslim Code which should determine the identification of the heirs
in the order of intestate succession and the respective shares of the heirs. The status
and capacity to succeed on the part of the individual parties who entered into each
and every marriage ceremony will depend upon the law in force at the time of the
performance of the marriage rite. The status and capacity to succeed of the children
will depend upon the law in force at the time if the conception or birth of the child.
From the joint efforts of Dayanghirang|Delfin|Guinzon|Hermino|Masanguid|Silo
Issue 4: What are the properties constituting the estate of Hadji Abdula at the time of
his death?
Ruling: A. Properties acquired during the existence of a valid marriage are conjugal
properties and should be liquidated and divided between the spouses under the
Muslim Code, this being the law in force at the time of Hadji Abdula’s death.
B. Properties acquired under the conditions prescribed in Article 144 of the Civil Code
during the period August 30, 1950 to August 2, 1988 are conjugal properties and
should be liquidated and divided between the spouses under the Muslim Code. The
wives other than the lawful wife as determined under the first corollary issue may
submit their respective evidence to prove that any of such property is theirs
exclusively.
C. Properties acquired under the conditions set out in Articles 147 and 148 of the
Family Code during the period from and after August 3, 1988 governed by the rules
on co-ownership.
D. Properties acquired under conditions not covered by the preceding paragraphs and
obtained from the exclusive efforts or assets of Hadji Abdula are his exclusive
properties. Evidence in the instant case is inadequate to resolve it entirely. The case
was remanded for the reception of additional evidence.
LLORENTE v. COURT OF APPEALS GR 124371, November 23, 2000
Facts:
Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the US Navy from 1927 to 1957. In
1937, Paula and Lorenzo were married in Camarines Sur. Before the outbreak of the
Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for US and Paula stayed in the conjugal home
Camarines Sur.
In 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to the US Citizenship, and then a Certificate of
Naturalization was issued in his favor by a US court. When the Philippine was
liberated by US forces in 1945, Lorenzo visited his wife in the Philippines. He
discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and was "living in" and having an
adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente.
In 1945, Paula gave birth to a child named Crisologo Llorente but then the certificate
stated that the child was not legitimate and the line for the father’s name was left
blank. Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her.
Lorenzo returned to the US in 1951 and filed for divorce and issued a divorce decree
by Superior Court of the State of California which became final in 1952. Lorenzo
returned to the Philippines and married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila who had no
knowledge of the first marriage even if they resided in the same town as Paula, who
did not oppose the marriage or cohabitation.
From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife. Their
twenty-five (25) year union produced three children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all
surnamed Llorente, In 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament where
Lorenzo had bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their three children.
In 1983, Lorenzo filed a petition for probate and allowance of his will but was denied
for the reason that he was still alive. Later, the trial court admitted the will into probate
in 1984. In 1985, before the proceedings could be terminated Lorenzo died. Paula filed
with the court for letters of administration contending that she was the surviving
spouse and that the disposition in the will made by Lorenzo was encroaching on her
legitime.
15
SUCCESSION: ATTY. RESCI ANGELLI R. RIZADA
The trial court issued the letters to Paula, finding that the divorce decree granted to
Lorenzo was void, thus the marriage to Alicia was also void.
Issue: What is the applicable law?
Ruling:
The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before and
at the time of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his
will; and (4) death, is duly established, admitted and undisputed. Thus, as a rule,
issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by foreign law. True,
foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged
and proved.
First, there is no such thing as one American law. The "national law" indicated in
Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to general American law. There is no
such law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States. Each
State of the union has its own law applicable to its citizens and in force only within
the State. It can therefore refer to no other than the law of the State of which the
decedent was a resident.
Second, there is no showing that the application of the renvoi doctrine is called for or
required by New York State law.
The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it contained dispositions
in favor of Alice, who in the trial court's opinion was a mere paramour. The trial court
threw the will out, leaving Alice, and her two children, Raul and Luz, with nothing.
The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice entitled to one half
(1/2) of whatever property she and Lorenzo acquired during their cohabitation,
applying Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The hasty application of
Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will, already probated as duly
executed in accordance with the formalities of Philippine law, is fatal, especially in
light of the factual and legal circumstances here obtaining.
Divorce Decree is Valid
In Quita v. Court of Appeals, where it is proven that the respondent (in this case the
Lorenzo) was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner,
the ruling in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. would become applicable, and petitioner could
very well lose her right to inherit from him. Thus, the Court held that the divorce
obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in
this jurisdiction as a matter of comity.
Foreign Law Need be Pleaded and Proven
The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and children
by her is glaringly shown in the will he executed. We do not wish to frustrate his
wishes, since he was a foreigner, not covered by our laws on "family rights and duties,
status, condition and legal capacity."
Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues
best proved by foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was
executed in accordance with the formalities required is answered by referring to
From the joint efforts of Dayanghirang|Delfin|Guinzon|Hermino|Masanguid|Silo
Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated. As a guide however, the trial court
should note that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our
system of legitimes, Congress did not intend to extend the same to the succession of
foreign nationals. Congress specifically left the amount of successional rights to the
decedent's national law.
Fallo: The court remands the cases to the court of origin for determination of the
intrinsic validity of the will of Lorenzo as well as the determination of the successional
rights allowing proof of foreign law.
IN RE TESTATE ESTATE OF SUNTAY G.R. Nos. L-3087 and L-3088 July 31, 1954
Facts:
In 1934, Jose B. Suntay, a Filipino citizen and a resident of the Philippines, died in
Amoy, China. He left real and personal properties in the Philippines and a house in
Amoy. During his lifetime, he married twice.
The first wife was Manuela Cruz, with whom he had several children. The second
marriage was with Maria Natividad Lim Brillian, with whom he had a son, petitioner
Silvino Suntay. Intestate proceedings were instituted by the heirs from the first
marriage.
While the second wife, the surviving widow who remained in Amoy China, filed a
petition for the probate of the last will and testament of the deceased which was
claimed to have been executed and signed in the Philippines on November, 1929.
The petition was denied due to the loss of the will before the hearing thereof. After the
pacific war, Silvino, claimed to have found among the records of his father, a last will
and testament in Chinese characters executed and signed by the deceased on
January, 1931 and probated in the Amoy District Court. He filed a petition in the
intestate proceedings for the probate of the will executed in the Philippines on
November 1929 or the will executed in Amoy China on November, 1931.
Issue: W/N the will executed in Amoy, China can still be validly probated in the
Philippines. – No.
Ruling:
The fact that the municipal district court of Amoy, China is a probate court must be
proved. The law of China on procedure in the probate or allowance of wills must also
be proved.
The legal requirements for the execution of the will in China in 1931 should also be
established by competent evidence. There is no proof on these points. In the absence
of proof that the municipal district court of Amoy is a probate court and on the Chinese
law of procedure in probate matters, it may be presumed that the proceedings in the
matter of probating or allowing a will in the Chinese courts are the same as those
provided for in our laws on the subject.
It is a proceeding in rem and for the validity of such proceedings personal notice or by
publication or both to all interested parties must be made. The interested parties in
the case were known to reside in the Philippines. The evidence shows that no such
notice was received by the interested parties residing in the Philippines.
The proceedings had in the municipal district court of Amoy, China, may be likened
to a deposition or to a perpetuation of testimony, and even if it were so, it does not
16
SUCCESSION: ATTY. RESCI ANGELLI R. RIZADA
measure or come up to the standard of such proceedings in the Philippines for lack of
notice to all interested parties.
The order of the municipal district court of Amoy, China, which reads, as follows: The
above minutes were satisfactorily confirmed by the interrogated parties, who declare
that there are no errors, after said minutes were loudly read and announced actually in
the court does not purport to probate or allow the will which was the subject of
the proceedings.
In view thereof, the will and the alleged probate thereof cannot be said to have been
done in accordance with the accepted basic and fundamental concepts and principles
followed in the probate and allowance of wills. Consequently, the authenticated
transcript of proceedings held in the municipal district court of Amoy, China, cannot
be deemed and accepted as proceedings leading to the probate or allowance of a will
and, therefore, the will referred to therein cannot be allowed, filed and recorded by a
competent court of this country.
ANCHETA v GUERSEY-DALAYGON GR No. 139868, 490 SCRA 140, June 8, 2006
Facts:
Sps Audrey and Richard Guersey are American citizens who have resided in the
Philippines for 30 years. They adopted Kyle Guersey Hill. Audrey died leaving a will
bequeathing all her estate to Richard. Richard was also appointed as the executor, but
due to his renunciation of such appointment, one Phillips was named to be the
executor.
Petitioner Ancheta of the of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices
was also named as ancillary administrator. The will was admitted to probate before
the Court of Maryland, USA.
In 1981, Richard married respondent, Candelaria GuerseyDalaygon, they have 2
children, Kimberly and Kevin. In 1982, Audrey’s will was also admitted to probate by
the CFI of Rizal. Ancheta filed an inventory and appraisal of the subject properties.
In 1984, Richard died, leaving a will, bequeathing his entire estate to respondent. The
will was also admitted to probate before the Court of Maryland, USA.
Phillips was named as the executor, who in turn designated Quasha or any member
of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices as ancillary
administrator.
Petitioner filed a motion to declare Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey. It was granted
and Kyle was given ¼ of the properties of Audrey, leaving the ¾ to Richard. Meanwhile,
Quasha, the ancillary administrator of Richard’s estate also filed a project of partition
wherein 2/5 of Richard’s 3/4 undivided interest of the Makati property was allocated
to respondent, while the 3/5 of which were given to the 3 children of Richard.
Respondent opposed on the ground that under the law of the State of Maryland, "a
legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of the testator in the property subject
of the legacy." Since Richard left his entire estate to respondent, then his entire ¾
undivided interest in the Makati property should be given to respondent.
Respondent also contended that petitioner willfully breached his fiduciary duty when
he disregarded the laws of the State of Maryland on the distribution of Audrey’s estate
in accordance with her will.
From the joint efforts of Dayanghirang|Delfin|Guinzon|Hermino|Masanguid|Silo
Respondent argued that since Audrey devised her entire estate to Richard, then the
Makati property should be wholly adjudicated to him, and not merely ¾ thereof, and
since Richard left his entire estate, except for his rights and interests over the A/G
Interiors, Inc., to respondent, then the entire Makati property should now pertain to
respondent.
Petitioner answered that he acted in good faith and applied the Philippine law and it
is to the "best interests of the surviving children that Philippine law be applied as they
would receive their just shares."
Issue: W/N the law of the State of Maryland governs. – YES
Ruling:
It is undisputed that Audrey Guersey was an American citizen domiciled in Maryland,
U.S.A. During the reprobate of her will, it was shown, among others, that at the time
of Audrey’s death, she was residing in the Philippines but is domiciled in Maryland,
U.S.A.; her Last Will and Testament was executed and probated before the Orphan’s
Court in Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A., which was duly authenticated and certified by
the Register of Wills of Baltimore City and attested by the Chief Judge of said court;
the will was admitted by the Orphan’s Court of Baltimore City on September 7, 1979;
and the will was authenticated by the Secretary of State of Maryland and the Vice
Consul of the Philippine Embassy.
Being a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of Audrey’s will, especially with regard
as to who are her heirs, is governed by her national law, i.e., the law of the State of
Maryland, as provided in Article 16 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
Article 1039 of the Civil Code further provides that "capacity to succeed is governed
by the law of the nation of the decedent."
As a corollary rule, Section 4, Rule 77 of the Rules of Court on Allowance of Will Proved
Outside the Philippines and Administration of Estate Thereunder, states:
SEC. 4. Estate, how administered.—When a will is thus allowed, the court shall grant
letters testamentary, or letters of administration with the will annexed, and such
letters testamentary or of administration, shall extend to all the estate of the testator
in the Philippines. Such estate, after the payment of just debts and expenses of
administration, shall be disposed of according to such will, so far as such will may
operate upon it; and the residue, if any, shall be disposed of as is provided by law in
cases of estates in the Philippines belonging to persons who are inhabitants of another
state or country. (Emphasis supplied)
While foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice of them; however, petitioner, as ancillary
administrator of Audrey’s estate, was duty-bound to introduce in evidence the
pertinent law of the State of Maryland.
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SUCCESSION: ATTY. RESCI ANGELLI R. RIZADA
Art. 798. In order to make a will it is essential that the testator be of sound
mind at the time of its execution.
LOURDES L. DOROTHEO
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, NILDA D. QUINTANA, VICENTE DOROTHEO and JOSE
DOROTHEO
G.R. No. 108581 DECEMBER 8, 1999
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
FACTS:
Vicente and Jose Dorotheo are the legitimate children of Alejandro Dorotheo and
Aniceta Reyes. Aniceta died in 1969 without her estate being settled. Alejandro died
thereafter. Lourdes Dorotheo, who claims to have taken care of Alejandro before he
died, filed a special proceeding for the probate of Alejandro’s last will and testament.
The children of the spouses namely Vicente,Jose, and Nilda filed a "Motion To Declare
The Will Intrinsically Void." The trial court granted the motion and declared Lourdes
Legaspi not the wife of the late Alejandro Dorotheo; that the provisions of the last will
and testament of Alejandro Dorotheo as intrinsically void; and declaring the oppositors
Vicente, Jose and Nilda as the only heirs of the late spouses Alejandro Dorotheo and
Aniceta Reyes.
Lourdes assails the Order of the upholding the order which declared the intrinsic
invalidity of Alejandro's will that was earlier admitted to probate. The heirs of Alejandro
opposed the motion on the ground that petitioner has no interest in the estate since
she is not the lawful wife of the late Alejandro.
ISSUE:
May a last will and testament admitted to probate but declared intrinsically void in an
order that has become final and executory still be given effect?
RULING:
No. A final and executory decision or order can no longer be disturbed or reopened no
matter how erroneous it may be. Moreover, it has been ruled that a final judgment on
probated will, albeit erroneous, is binding on the whole world.
Under the Civil Code, due execution includes a determination of whether the testator
was of sound and disposing mind at the time of its execution, that he had freely
executed the will and was not acting under duress, fraud, menace or undue influence
and that the will is genuine and not a forgery, 10 that he was of the proper
testamentary age and that he is a person not expressly prohibited by law from making
a will.
Under Article 960 of the Civil Code, on the law of successional rights that testacy is
preferred to intestacy. But before there could be testate distribution, the will must
pass the scrutinizing test and safeguards provided by law considering that the
From the joint efforts of Dayanghirang|Delfin|Guinzon|Hermino|Masanguid|Silo
deceased testator is no longer available to prove the voluntariness of his actions, aside
from the fact that the transfer of the estate is usually onerous in nature and that no
one is presumed to give — Nemo praesumitur donare. No intestate distribution of the
estate can be done until and unless the will had failed to pass both its extrinsic and
intrinsic validity. If the will is extrinsically void, the rules of intestacy apply regardless
of the intrinsic validity thereof. If it is extrinsically valid, the next test is to determine
its intrinsic validity — that is whether the provisions of the will are valid according to
the laws of succession. If both test are not satisfied the rules of intestacy will apply.
In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that the will of Alejandro was extrinsically valid
but the intrinsic provisions thereof are void. Alejandro gave all the property to Lourdes,
his concubine. Such is invalid because one cannot dispose what he does not own. In
this case, the whole property is the conjugal property of Alejandro and Aniceta. Such
has become final and executory. The only instance where a party interested in probate
proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of
circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable
to negligence with circumstances do not concur herein.
Even if the will was validly executed, if the testator provides for dispositions that
deprives or impairs the lawful heirs of their legitime or rightful inheritance according
to the laws on succession, the unlawful provisions/dispositions thereof cannot be
given effect.
ANTONIO B. BALTAZAR, ET.AL.
VS.
LORENZO LAXA
G.R. NO. 174489 APRIL 11, 2012
DEL CASTILLO, J.
FACTS:
Paciencia was a 78 year old spinster when she made her last will and testament
entitled "Tauli Nang Bilin o Testamento Miss Paciencia Regala".Childless and without
any brothers or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her properties to Lorenzo Laxa and
his wife Corazon Laxa and their children Luna Lorella Laxa and Katherine Ross
Laxa.More than four years after the death of Paciencia, Lorenzo filed a for the probate
of the Will of Paciencia and for the issuance of Letters of Administration in his favour.
Antonio Baltazar and the others filed an opposition contending that Paciencia’s Will
was null and void on the ground that Paciencia was mentally incapable to make a Will
at the time of its execution. The oppositors, through their witness Rosie, claim that
Paciencia was "magulyan" or forgetful so much so that it effectively stripped her of
testamentary capacity. They likewise claimed that Paciencia was not only "magulyan"
but was actually suffering from paranoia.
ISSUE:
Is the state of being forgetful necessarily make a person mentally unsound so as to
render him unfit to execute a will?
18
SUCCESSION: ATTY. RESCI ANGELLI R. RIZADA
RULING:
No. Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind.
Under Art. 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full
possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken,
unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or other cause. It shall be sufficient if
the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature of the estate to
be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary
act.
And also under Article 800 of the New Civil Code states:
Art. 800. The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of proof
to the contrary.
In this case, there was no substantial evidence, medical or otherwise, that would show
that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the Will. On the
other hand, it was worthy to note as to the soundness of mind of Paciencia when she
went to Judge Limpin’s house and voluntarily executed the Will. More importantly, a
testator is presumed to be of sound mind at the time of the execution of the Will and
the burden to prove otherwise lies on the oppositor. The burden of proof that the
testator was not of sound mind at the time of making his dispositions is on the person
who opposes the probate of the will; but if the testator, one month, or less, before
making his will was publicly known to be insane, the person who maintains the
validity of the will must prove that the testator made it during a lucid interval. Here,
there was no showing that Paciencia was publicly known to be insane one month or
less before the making of the Will. Clearly, the burden to prove that Paciencia was of
unsound mind lies upon the shoulders of Antonio et.al however the same was not
proved and the court affirmed the probate of the will of Paciencia.
JULIANA BAGTAS
vs.
ISIDRO PAGUIO, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-6801 MARCH 14, 1912
TRENT, J.
FACTS:
The last will and testament executed by Pioquinto Paguio who died a year and five
months from the execution, was propounded by by the executrix, Juliana Bagtas,
widow of Paguio. However, Paguio’s son and several grandchildren by a former
marriage opposed the probate asserting that Paguio was not in the full of enjoyment
and use of his mental faculties and was without the mental capacity necessary to
execute a valid will. According to them, Paguio suffered from a paralysis of the left side
of his body. This resulted to the impairment of his hearing, lost of the power of speech
and uncontrolled saliva discharge. Despite the paralysis, Paguio retained the use of
his right hand and was able to write fairly well. Paguio was able to indicate his wishes
to his wife and to the other members of his family,through the medium of signs.
ISSUE: Is paralysis a ground to establish mental incapacity that would disqualify the
testator to execute a valid will?
From the joint efforts of Dayanghirang|Delfin|Guinzon|Hermino|Masanguid|Silo
RULING:
No. The mere weakness of mind and body, induced by age and disease do not render
a person incapable of making a will. The law does not require that a person shall
continue in the full enjoyment and use of his pristine physical and mental powers in
order to execute a valid will.Perfect soundness of mind is not essential to testamentary
capacity. A testator may be afflicted with a variety of mental weaknesses, disorders,
or peculiarities and still be capable in law of executing a valid will.
In the case at bar, at the time of the execution of the will, it does not appear that
Pioquinto’s conduct was irrational in any particular. He seems to have comprehended
clearly what the nature of the business was in which he was engaged. The evidence
show that the writing and execution of the will occupied a period several hours and
that the testator was present during all this time, taking an active part in all the
proceedings. Hence, the will in the case at bar is perfectly reasonable and its
dispositions are those of a rational person.
CATALINA BUGNAO
vs.
FRANCISCO UBAG, ET AL.
G.R. No. 4445 SEPTEMBER 18, 1909
CARSON, J.
FACTS:
This is an appeal admitting to probate a document purporting to be the last will and
testament of Domingo Ubag, deceased. The instrument was propounded by his widow,
Catalina Bugnao, the sole beneficiary. The probate was contested by brothers and
sisters of the deceased. The appellants contend that the evidence is not sufficient to
establish the execution of the alleged will in the manner and form prescribed; and that
at the time when it is alleged that the will was executed, Ubag was not of sound mind
and memory, and was physically and mentally incapable of making a will, as he was
extremely ill, in an advanced stage of tuberculosis complicated with severe
intermittent attacks of asthma; that he was too sick to rise unaided from his bed; that
he needed assistance even to rise himself to a sitting position; and that during the
paroxysms of asthma to which he was subject he could not speak
ISSUE:
Does physical weakness of a testator establishes his mental incapacity or a lack of
testamentary capacity?
RULING:
No.Evidence of physical weakness in no wise establishes mental incapacity or a lack
of testamentary capacity.It has been held that "mere weakness of mind, or partial
imbecility from the disease of body, or from age, will not render a person incapable of
making a will, a weak or feeble minded person may make a valid will, provided he has
understanding memory sufficient to enable him to know what he is about, and how or
19
SUCCESSION: ATTY. RESCI ANGELLI R. RIZADA
to whom he is disposing of his property"; that, "To constitute a sound and disposing
mind, it is not necessary that the mind should be unbroken or unimpaired,
unshattered by disease or otherwise"; that "it has not been understood that a testator
must possess these qualities (of sound and disposing mind and memory) in the highest
degree.
In this case, the evidence of the subscribing witnesses as to the aid furnished them
by the testator, Ubag, in preparing the will, and his clear recollection of the boundaries
and physical description of the various parcels of land set out therein, taken together
with the fact that he was able to give to the person who wrote the will clear and explicit
instructions as to his desires touching the disposition of his property, is strong
evidence of his testamentary capacity.
MANUEL TORRES and
LUZ LOPEZ DE BUENO
vs.
MARGARITA LOPEZ
G.R. No. L-24569 FEBRUARY 26, 1926
MALCOLM, J.
FACTS:
On January 3, 1924, Tomas Rodriguez executed his last will and testament. Thereafter
died leaving a considerable estate. Subsequently, Manuel Torres, one of the executors
named in the will asked that the will of Rodriguez be allowed. Opposition was entered
by Margarita Lopez, the first cousin of the deceased on the grounds: (1) That the
testator lacked mental capacity because at the time of senile dementia and was under
guardianship; (2) that undue influence had been exercised by the persons benefited
in the document in conjunction with others who acted in their behalf; and (3) that the
signature of Tomas Rodriguez to the document was obtained through fraud and deceit.
It was presented in this case, Rodriguez had reached the advanced age of 76 years. He
was suffering from anemia, hernia inguinal, chronic dypsia, and senility. Physically
he was a wreck.
As to the mental state of Tomas Rodriguez on January 3, 1924, there were conflicting
results. Doctors Calderon Domingo, and Herrera certify that the intellectual faculties
of the patient are "sound, except that his memory is weak," and that in executing the
will the testator had full understanding of the act he was performing and full
knowledge of the contents thereof. Doctors De Los Angeles, Tietze and Burke certify
that Tomas Rodriguez was of unsound mind and that they diagnosed his case as senile
dementia of the simple type approaching the deteriorated stage.
ISSUE:
Did Tomas Rodriguez possess sufficient mentality to make a will?
RULING: Yes.
Testamentary capacity is the capacity to comprehend the nature of the transaction in
which the testator is engaged at the time, to recollect the property to be disposed of
From the joint efforts of Dayanghirang|Delfin|Guinzon|Hermino|Masanguid|Silo
and the persons who would naturally be supposed to have claims upon the testator,
and to comprehend the manner in which the instrument will distribute his property
among the objects of his bounty. The mental capacity of the testator is determined as
of the date of the execution of his will.Of the specific tests of capacity, neither old age,
physical infirmities, feebleness of mind, weakness of the memory, the appointment of
a guardian, nor eccentricities are sufficient singly or jointly to show testamentary
incapacity. Each case rests on its own facts and must be decided by its own facts.
There is one particular test relative to the capacity to make a will which is of some
practical utility. This rule concerns the nature and rationality of the will. Is the will
simple or complicated? Is it natural or unnatural? The mere exclusion of heirs will
not, however, in itself indicate that the will was the offspring of an unsound mind.
In the present case, the court opined thatTomas Rodriguez, comprehended the nature
of the transaction in which he was engaged. He had two conferences with his lawyer,
Judge Mina, and knew what the will was to contain. The will was read to him by Mr.
Legarda. He signed the will and its two copies in the proper places at the bottom and
on the left margin. At that time the testator recollected the property to be disposed of
and the persons who would naturally be supposed to have claims upon him While for
some months prior to the making of the will he had not manage his property he seem
to have retained a distinct recollection of what it consisted and of his income.
Occasionally his memory failed him with reference to the names of his relatives.
Ordinarily, he knew who they were, he seemed to entertain a prediliction towards
Vicente F. Lopez as would be natural since Lopez was nearest in which the instrument
distributed the property naming the objects of his bounty. His conversations with
Judge Mina disclosed as insistence on giving all of his property to the two persons
whom he specified.
On January 3, 1924, Tomas Rodriguez may have been of advanced years, may have
been physically decrepit, may have been weak in intellect, may have suffered a loss of
memory, may have had a guardian and may have a been extremely eccentric, but he
still possessed the spark of reason and of life, that strength of mind to form a fixed
intention and to summon his enfeebled thoughts to enforce that intention, which the
law terms "testamentary capacity." Hence, the will of Tomas Rodriguez will be
admitted to probate.
G.R. NO. L-39033 NOVEMBER 13, 1933
IN RE WILL OF THE LATE MATEA ABELLA. MONS. SANTIAGO
SANCHO, APPLICANT-APPELLEE,
VS.
MARCIANA ABELLA, OPPONENT-APPELLANT.
SOTTO AND ASTILLA FOR APPELLANT.
B. QUITORIANO FOR APPELLEE.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
FACTS:
The testatrix, Matea Abella left her home situated in the Sinait, accompanied by her
niece, Filomena Inay, to consult Dr. Antonio Querol in his clinic. She stopped by a
convent where the parish priest, Father Cordero, was an acquaintance of her. She
20
SUCCESSION: ATTY. RESCI ANGELLI R. RIZADA
went twice to Dr. Querol’s clinic during her stay at the convent where she learned that
she has dyspepsia and cancer of the stomach. She ordered a sexton of the convent to
call Atty. Teodoro R. Reinoso to whom she expressed her desire to make a will, in the
presence of the Father Cordero's sister, Father Zoilo Aguda, Macario Calug and the
fiscal of the convent. Due to his busy schedule, the lawyer could not finish hi interview
with the testatrix in one day, hence, they continued it the following day in the presence
of the same people and some children who were at the convent. The lawyer returned
again for the third time to continue the interview in the presence of the same persons.
The lawyer drafted the will in Ilocano, the dialect of the testatrix. Calug read to her
and she approved. When the will had been copied clean, it was again read to the
testatrix and she expressed her approval but did not sign the document until a later
date. The signing of the will took place and Abella was the first to sign in the presence
of each and every one of the instrumental witnesses thereto and of other persons,
followed by the witnesses who signed in the presence of the testatrix and in the
presence of each and every one of the other witnesses. Thereafter, Atty Reinoso
delivered the original and the copies thereof to the testatrix. On July 3, 1932, Matea
Abella died of the senile debility in the municipality of Sinait at the age of 88 years.
Marciana Abella attempted to prove that Matea showed indications of mental insanity
among which is that the testatrix has a bad eyesight and , deaf, unable to recognize
her and that in her will she bequeathed properties which she had already donated to
other persons.
ISSUE:
Whether the testatrix has been unduly influenced in the execution of her will?
RULING:
No. Marciana claimed that Matea could not recall her recent acts, hence, it is an
indication of her senile debility. As to the mental sanity of the testatrix at the time of
the execution of her will, the court has the undisputed fact of her having left her home
in Sinait, Ilocos Sur, on April 13, 1932, in order to go to San Fernando, La Union, to
consult Dr. Antonio Querol — of whose ability she had heard so much — regarding
her headaches and stomach trouble and other instances that happened thereafter (e.g.
she went to the convent, called Atty Reinoso, the fact of her not wishing to sign her
will immediately but signed it the following day, in order to be able to see it better, and
the fact of her having affixed her signature, in her own handwriting, to the original as
well as to the copies of her will which consisted of nine pages..)
All these data show that the testatrix was not so physically weak, nor so blind, nor so
deaf, nor so lacking in intelligence that she could not, with full understanding thereof,
dispose of her properties and make a will. Neither senile debility, nor blindness, nor
deafness, nor poor memory, is by itself sufficient to incapacitate a person for making
his will. The mere fact that in her will Matea Abella disposed of properties, which she
had already donated to other persons at a prior date, is not an indication of mental
insanity. At most it constitutes forgetfulness or a change of mind, due to ignorance of
the irrevocability of certain donations. Also, there is no showing that the testatrix has
been unduly influenced in the execution of her will.
Thus, the court held (1) That neither senile ability, nor deafness, nor blindness, nor
poor memory, is by itself sufficient to establish the presumption that the person
suffering therefrom is not in the full enjoyment of his mental faculties, when there is
From the joint efforts of Dayanghirang|Delfin|Guinzon|Hermino|Masanguid|Silo
sufficient evidence of his mental sanity at the time of the execution of the will; and (2)
that neither the fact of her being given accommodations in a convent, nor the presence
of the parish priest, nor a priest acting as a witness, constitutes undue influence
sufficient to justify the annulment of a legacy in favor of the bishop of a diocese made
in her will by a testatrix 88 years of age, suffering from defective eyesight and hearing,
while she is stopping at a convent within the aforestated diocese.
FRANCISCA ALSUA-BETTS, JOSEPH O. BETTS, JOSE MADARETA, ESTEBAN P.
RAMIREZ, and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR ALBAY PROVINCE, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, AMPARO ALSUA BUENVIAJE, FERNANDO BUENVIAJE,
FERNANDO ALSUA, represented by his guardian, CLOTILDE S. ALSUA and PABLO
ALSUA, respondents.
Rafael Triumfante for petitioners.
Sabido-Sabido & Associates and Madrid Law Office for private respondents
Facts:
On November 25, 1949, Don Jesus Alsua and his wife, Doña Florentina Ralla, both of
Ligao, Albay, together with all their living children, Francisca Alsua-Betts, Pablo Alsua,
Fernando Alsua thru his judicial guardian Clotilde Samson, and Amparo Alsua de
Buenviaje, entered into a duly notarized agreement, Escritura de Particion
Over the then present and existing properties of the spouses Don Jesus and Doña
Florentina enumerated in a prepared inventory, Exhibit 8-A, the essential features of
which are stated in private respondents' Brief, pp.
26-29, to wit:
"(1) Basis of the partition: Inventory of all the properties of the Alsua spouses, which
inventory consists of 97 pages, all of them signed by the spouses and all the
abovenamed heirs in the... left margin of every page (parafo primero).
(2) An acknowledgment of the spouses that all the properties described in the
inventory (Annex A) are conjugal properties with the exception of five parcels of land
identified with the figures of 1 to 5 and 30 shares of San Miguel Brewery... stock which
are paraphernal properties of the late Doña Tinay (segundo parafo).
(3) An acknowledgment that during their marriage, they had nine children but five of
them died minors, unmarried (parafo tercero y cuatro).
(4) An acknowledgment that on the basis of Article 1056 of the Civil Code (old) to
avoid possible misunderstanding among their children concerning the inheritance
they are entitled to in the event of death of one of them they have decided to...
effectuate an extrajudicial partition of all the properties described in Annex "A"
thereto under the following terms and conditions: (Parafo quinto):
1. To Francisca Alsua, married to Joseph O. Betts were allotted or assigned all the real
properties with the improvements thereon specifically described from pages 1-12 of
said inventory or, 34 parcels of land with a total land area of 5,720,364 sq. meters,...
with a book or appraised value of P69,740.00.
2. To Pablo Alsua, married to Teresa Locsin were allotted or assigned all the real
properties with the improvements thereon specifically described from pages 12-20 of
said inventory or, 26 parcels of land with a total land area of 5,679,262 sq.
meters, with a book or appraised value of P55,940.00.
21
SUCCESSION: ATTY. RESCI ANGELLI R. RIZADA
3.To Fernando Alsua, married to Clotilde Samson were allotted or assigned all the real
properties with the improvements thereon specifically described from pages 20-33 of
said inventory or, 47 parcels of land with a total land area of
6,639,810 sq. meters, with a book or appraised value of P89,300.00.
4.To Amparo Alsua, married to Fernando Buenviaje were allotted or assigned all the
real properties with the improvements thereon specifically described from pages 33-
47 of said inventory or, 47 parcels of land with a total land... area of 5,630,715 sq.
meters, with a book or appraised value of P58,830.00.
(a) Each and every one of the heirs named above acknowledge and admit that
the totality of the properties allotted and adjudicated to the heirs as described
in the preceding paragraph, constitute one-half of the properties described in
Annex "A",... including any amount of cash deposited.
(b) That all the heirs acknowledge and admit that all the properties assigned to
them as their hereditary portion represent one-half not only of the conjugal
properties but includes the paraphernal properties - waiving now and forever...
any complaint or claim they have or they may have concerning the amount, value,
extension and location of the properties that are allotted to each and everyone. They
also waive any claim they have or they may have over the remaining portion of the
properties,... which spouses reserved for themselves.
(c) That in case of death of one of the spouses, each and everyone of the heirs
acknowledge that the properties which are left in the possession of the surviving spouse,
including any amount in cash, are even less than the one-half that should... correspond
in absolute ownership as his legitimate participation in the conjugal properties. In
consequence they waive any claim that they have or may have over said portion of said
properties or any amount in cash during the lifetime of the surviving spouse,...
including any right or claim they have or they may have over the paraphernal properties
of Doña Tinay in the event the surviving spouse is Don Jesus.
(d) The spouses on their part in case of death of any one of them, the surviving
spouse waives any claim he or she may have over the properties assigned or
adjudicated to the heirs under and by virtue of this deed. The properties... which
were reserved for them (the spouses) should be considered as his or her legitimate
participation in the conjugal properties and the fair compensation of his or her
usufruct on the properties that the surviving spouse reserved for himself or herself
which shall be... distributed in equal shares among the heirs upon his or her death
unless said properties or some of them have been disposed of during the lifetime
of the surviving spouse.
(e) Any heir who may dare question the validity and legitimacy of the provision
contained herein shall be under obligation to pay to the other heirs, in the concept of
damages and prejudice, the sum of P5,000.00 plus attorney's fees.
(f) The provisions of this deed shall bind the successors of the herein heirs.
(g) In the event of death of one of the spouses, the properties assigned or adjudicated
to each and everyone of the heirs shall be considered as his share or participation
in the estate or as his inheritance left by the deceased and each heir shall...
become the absolute owner of the properties adjudicated to him under the
partition.
On January 5, 1955, Don Jesus and Doña Florentina, also known as Doña Tinay
separately executed their respective holographic wills (Exhs. 6-B and 7-B), the
provisions of which... were in conformity and in implementation of the extrajudicial
partition of November 25, 1949. Their holographic wills similarly provided for the
institution of the other to his or her share in the conjugal properties, the other half...
of the conjugal assets having been partitioned to constitute their legitime among their
From the joint efforts of Dayanghirang|Delfin|Guinzon|Hermino|Masanguid|Silo
four living children in the Extrajudicial Partition of 1949. The wills also declared that
in the event of future acquisitions of other properties by either of... them, one-half
thereof would belong to the other spouse, and the other half shall be divided equally
among the four children.
"TESTAMENT
I, FLORENTINA R. DE ALSUA, 67 years old, Filipina, married to Don Jesus Alsua,
resident of and with postal address in the Municipality of Ligao, Province of Albay,
Philippines, being in the full possession of my mental and... physical faculties freely
and spontaneously execute this my last will and testament in my handwriting and
signed by me and expressed in the Spanish language which I speak, write and
understand, this 5th day of January, 1955 in the Municipality of Ligao, Province of
Albay, and in which I ordain and provide:
"First: That in or about the year 1906 I was married to my husband Don Jesus Alsua
and begot nine (9) children with him, four (4) of whom are still living and they are
Francisca Alsua, Pablo Alsua, Fernando
Alsua and Amparo Alsua. The other five (5) died during their minority, single and
without children.
"Second: That after my marriage to my husband Don Jesus Alsua and during our
conjugal union, and as a result of our efforts and industry, we were able to acquire
conjugal properties consisting of abaca (abales) and cacao... lands and urban lands
registered in the office of the Registry of Property of the Province of Albay and in the
City of Manila.
"Third: That I institute as my heirs with right to inherit the following: my spouse
Don Jesus Alsua, one-half (1/2) of my properties, real and personal, and the other
half, to my children Francisca Alsua, married to Joseph O. Betts, Pablo Alsua,
Fernando Alsua, married to Clotilde Samson, and Amparo Alsua, married to
Fernando Buenviaje, in equal parts. It is to be... understood, however, that the other
half that corresponds as legitime to my above named children have already been given
to them, pursuant to a document dated November 25, 1949 and ratified on the same
day, month and year before Notary Public Segundo G. Flores (Reg.
No. 525; Pag. 15; Lib. II; Series of 1949) enjoining each and everyone of them to respect
and faithfully comply with each and every clause contained in the said document.
"Fourth: That should I acquire new properties after the execution of this
testament, the same shall be partitioned among my spouse and above named
children or the children mentioned in above par. 3 in the same proportion, that
is, one-half (1/2) to... my spouse; and the other half to my children in equal
parts.
"Fifth: That I name as my executor my husband Don Jesus Alsua without having to
post any bond.
IN VIRTUE WHEREOF, I hereby sign in my own handwriting this testament on this
5th day of January, 1955 in the Municipality of Ligao, Province of Albay, Philippines.
(SGD.) FLORENTINA R. DE ALSUA
As previously stated, Don Jesus Alsua executed a separate but similar holographic
will on the same day, Jan. 5, 1955 in exactly the same terms and conditions as the
above will of his wife.
On May 21, 1956, the spouses Don Jesus and Doña Tinay filed before the Court of
First Instance of Albay their respective petitions for the probate of their respective
holographic wills which were docketed as Special Proceedings No. 484
(Jesus Alsua, Petitioner) and Special Proceedings No. 485 (Doña Florentina Ralla de
Alsua, Petitioner)
22
SUCCESSION: ATTY. RESCI ANGELLI R. RIZADA
On August 14, 1956, the spouses Don Jesus and Doña Tinay executed their mutual
and reciprocal codicils amending and supplementing their respective holographic
wills. Again, the codicils similarly acknowledged and provided that... one-half of all
the properties of the spouses, conjugal and paraphernal, had been disposed of,
conveyed to and partitioned among their legitimate heirs in the "Escritura de Particion"
of November 25, 1949, but that they reserved for... themselves (the spouses Don Jesus
and Doña Tinay) the other half or those not disposed of to the said legitimate heirs
under the above agreement of partition, and that they mutually and reciprocally
bequeathed unto each other their participation... therein as well as in all properties
which might be acquired subsequently. Each spouse also declared that should she or
he be the surviving spouse, whatever belongs to him or her or would pertain to him or
her, would be divided equally among the four... children. It was also declared in
both codicils that upon the death of either of the spouses, the surviving spouse was
designated mutually and reciprocally as the executor or administrator of all the
properties reserved for themselves.
The codicil executed by Doña Tinay written in Spanish reads, as translated:
"CODICIL
This codicil supplements and amends the preceding testament. That my spouse and
I have agreed to divide the properties which we have acquired into 2 parts. The 1/2
that would correspond to me covers all the properties that I have... partitioned among
my children in the Document of Partition dated November 25, 1949 before Notary
Public Segundo G. Flores, Jr. (Doc. No. 525; Pag. No. 15; Lib. No. II; Series of 1949)
(and) even as the properties which by reason of this testament I leave to my... husband
as his share and the other half that corresponds to my husband constitutes all the
properties that up to now have not been disposed of, particularly the urban lands
situated in Legaspi, Albay, Ligao of the Province of
Albay and in the City of Manila, with the exception of that portion that I bequeath to
my husband as his inheritance and as his legitime.
That I institute as my heirs with the right to inherit my husband Don Jesus Alsua and
my children Francisca Alsua, Pablo Alsua, Fernando Alsua and Amparo Alsua. I
leave... to my aforecited children all the properties described in the above mentioned
Document of Partition dated November 25, 1949 which correspond to each one
of them and in the profits (fruits) expressed in the same, and in the event that
the properties granted to one or... any of my children should exceed in quantity or
value those corresponding to another or others, I hereby declare that it is my will that
the same be divided among my children as their inheritance from the free portion of
my property.
I leave to my spouse Don Jesus Alsua as his legitime and as his inheritance the part
of the free portion of my property which have not been allocated in favor of my children
in the Document of Partition aforecited and that which... should exceed 1/2 of the
conjugal property of gains that pertains to him as above stated, including all those
properties which we shall acquire after the execution of this document.
In case it should be God's will that I survive my spouse, I hereby declare that it is my
will that any and all kinds of property that pertain to me or would pertain to me, which
have not been disposed of pursuant to the partition, should be divided equally among
my... above-mentioned heirs after my death
And as stated previously, on the same day, August 14, 1956, Don Jesus executed also
a separate but similar codicil in exactly the same terms and conditions as the above
codicil of his wife. Also on the same day of August 14, 1956, the spouses Don Jesus
and Doña Tinay both filed their respective supplemental petitions for the probate
of their respective codicils in the probate proceedings earlier filed. On February
From the joint efforts of Dayanghirang|Delfin|Guinzon|Hermino|Masanguid|Silo
19, 1957, their respective holographic wills and the codicils thereto... were duly
admitted to probate.
Upon the death of Doña Tinay on October 2, 1959, Don Jesus was named executor to
serve without bond in an order issued by the probate court on October 13,
1959. Letters testamentary having been issued in favor of Don Jesus, he took... his
oath of office and performed his duties as such until July 1, 1960.
Don Jesus cancelled his holographic will in the presence of his bookkeeper and
secretary, Esteban P. Ramirez, whom he instructed to make a list of all his remaining
properties with their corresponding... descriptions. His lawyer, Atty. Gregorio
Imperial, Sr. was then instructed to draft a new will which was duly signed by Don
Jesus and his attesting witnesses on November 14, 1959 at his home in Ligao,
Albay. This... notarial will and testament (Exh. A) of Don Jesus executed on
November 14, 1959 had three essential features: (a) it expressly cancelled,
revoked and annulled all the provisions of Don Jesus' holographic will of January
5, 1955 and... his codicil of August 14, 1956; (b) it provided for the collation of all his
properties donated to his four living children by virtue of the "Escritura de Particion
Extrajudicial" of 1949, and that such properties be taken into account in the
partition... of his estate among the children; and (c) it instituted his children as
legatees/devisees of certain specific properties, and as to the rest of the
properties and whatever may be subsequently acquired in the future, before his
death, were to be given to Francisca and Pablo,... naming Francisca as executrix
to serve without a bond.
After all debts, funeral charges and other expenses of the estate of Doña Tinay had
been paid, all her heirs including Don Jesus, submitted to the probate court for
approval a deed of partition executed on December 19, 1959 (Exh. 7-Q)... and which
essentially confirmed the provisions of the partition of 1949, the holographic will and
codicil of Doña Tinay. On July 6, 1960, the court approved the partition of 1959 and
on January 6, 1961 declared the termination of the... proceedings on the estate of
Doña Tinay.
On May 6, 1964, Don Jesus Alsua died.
On May 20, 1964, petitioner herein Francisca Alsua Betts, as the executrix named in
the will of November 14, 1959, filed a petition for the probate of said new will of
Don Jesus Alsua before the Court of First Instance of Albay and was... docketed
as Special Proceedings No. 699. Oppositions thereto were filed by Pablo, Amparo and
Fernando, thru his judicial guardian Clotilde Samson, on the following grounds: (a)
that Don Jesus was not of sound and... disposing mind at the time of the execution of
the alleged will; (b) that the will was executed under duress or influence of fear or
threats; or it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part
of the main beneficiaries and of person or... persons in collusion with them, or the
signature of the testator was secured by or thru fraud; (c) that the will was not
executed according to the formal requirements of the law; and (d) that the alleged will
subject of probate contravened the Extrajudicial Partition of 1949... agreed upon by
him, his deceased spouse, Doña Tinay, and all his children, Francisca, Pablo, Amparo
and Fernando thru his judicial guardian Clotilde Samson, and also contravened Don
Jesus' own probated holographic will and... codicil of 1955 and 1956, respectively,
essentially confirming and implementing the said partition of 1949 which had already
been partially executed by all the signatories thereto in the partition of the estate of
Doña Tinay in December, 1959.
According to the oppositors, these properties consist of thirty-three (33) premium
agricultural lots with a total land area of
23
SUCCESSION: ATTY. RESCI ANGELLI R. RIZADA
1,187,970 square meters, or approximately 119 hectares and with a total assessed
value of P48,410.00 or a probable total market value of P238,000.00 at only P2,000.00
per hectare, and four (4) commercial urban lots ideally located in the business section
of Legazpi
City including the lot and the building presently occupied by the well-known "Mayon
Hotel" with an assessed value of approximately P117,260.00 or a probable market
value at the time of P469,040.00. It appearing from the new will that these...
properties were bequeathed to Pablo Alsua and Francisca Alsua-Betts, specifically, 3
parcels of the 33 agricultural lands to Pablo and the rest to Francisca, the oppositors
also raised in issue the non-inclusion of said properties in the... inventory of the estate
of their late father. In answer, Francisca claimed ownership over the same, alleging
that she bought the properties from their father and presenting the two Deeds of Sale
now being assailed, one dated August 26, 1961 purporting to show... the sale of the
33 parcels of agricultural land to Francisca by their father for the price of P70,000.00
and the other dated November 26, 1962 evidencing the sale of the four urban lots for
the sum of P80,000.00. Claiming fraud in the sales, the... oppositors filed Civil Case
No. 3068, seeking the annulment of the aforesaid two deeds of sale, with damages,
which upon agreement of the parties was then jointly heard and tried with Special
Proceedings No. 699 for probate of the last Will and Testament of Don
Jesus executed on November 14, 1959.
After a joint hearing of the merits of these two cases, the Court of First Instance of Albay
promulgated a decision on January 15, 1973, the dispositive portion of which states:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered, to wit:
1. In Special Proceedings 699, the Court hereby APPROVES and ALLOWS the Will
executed by Don Jesus Alsua at Ligao, Albay, on November 14, 1959,... the Court of
Appeals, the court reversed the appealed decision in a judgment rendered on April 4,
1977, the dispositive portion of which states, as translated, thus -
"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Tribunal finds itself constrained to set aside as
it hereby sets aside the decision appealed from in the following manner: (1) in Special
Proceedings 699, the probate of the will is hereby denied; (2) in Civil Case No. 3068,
Exhs. U and W and the titles issued on the basis thereof are hereby declared null and
void, ordering the appellees Francisca Alsua and Joseph Betts to pay to the plaintiffs
in the concept of fixed damages.
Issue:
Whether or not the changes in codicil of Don Jesus is valid.
Ruling: No.
The next issue that commands Our attention is whether the respondent court erred
in not allowing the probate of the last will and testament of Don Jesus
Alsua. Petitioners claim that the disallowance was based on speculations, surmises
or... conjectures, disregarding the facts as found by the trial court. The Civil Code is
very clear and explicit in providing the cases where a will may be disallowed under
Article 839 which provides as follows:
"Art. 839. The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases:
On October 2, 1959, Doña Florentina died at Ligao, Albay. About 2 weeks after said
death of his wife, Don Jesus Alsua decided to make a new will, thereby revoking and
cancelling... his previous holographic will which he made on January 5, 1955 and also
its codicil dated August 14, 1956. In the presence of his bookkeeper and secretary,
Esteban P. Ramirez, he crossed out in ink each and every page of said page he wrote
on each... page the word "cancelado", and affixed his signature thereon (Exh. V-5, V-
From the joint efforts of Dayanghirang|Delfin|Guinzon|Hermino|Masanguid|Silo
6, consecutively up to and including Exh. V-14). He then instructed Ramirez to make
a list of all his properties with their corresponding... descriptions.
Meanwhile, Don Jesus Alsua sent for his lawyer, Don Gregorio Imperial, Sr. and the
latter came accompanied by his son, Atty. Jorge S. Imperial, who, incidentally, is now
a judge of the Court of First Instance of Naga City, Camarines Sur. Don Jesus
informed his lawyers that he wanted to make a new will, and accordingly gave more
detailed instructions as to how he wanted to divide his properties among his four
children. He handed to them a list and on the... left he indicated the name of the child
to whom the listed properties shall pertain. Atty. Jorge Imperial took notes of the
instructions of Don Jesus Alsua. To Don Jesus, Spanish is his major language, as in
fact his... conversations with Don Gregorio are always in Spanish. A few days before
November 14, 1959, Atty. Jorge S. Imperial showed to Don Jesus the semi-final draft
of the will and after reading it Don Jesus said that it was as directed by him, and after
making a few... minor corrections, he instructed Atty. Jorge S. Imperial to put the will
in final form. He further told Atty. Jorge Imperial that the signing of the will should
be at his home in Ligao, in the morning of November 14, 1959, and that the
witnesses... should be Mr. Ramon Balana, the then Register of Deeds of Albay; Mr.
Jose Madarieta who is a friend of the family; and Mr. Jose Gaya who is a sort of
employee of Don Jesus.
Thus in the morning of November 14, 1959, Don Gregorio and Atty. Jorge S. Imperial,
riding in a sedan, stopped at the Legaspi residence of Mr. Ramon Balana, and informed
the latter that Don Jesus was requesting him to be one of the... attesting witnesses to
his will. Mr. Balana, having a very high regard for Don Jesus, considered it an honor
to be so asked, and gladly went with the Imperials. They arrived at the residence of
Don Jesus at Ligao,... Albay, almost ten o'clock of that morning, and they were
ushered in by Mr. Jose Gaya, and the latter requested them to be seated at the usual
receiving room on the ground floor while he announced their arrival to Don Jesus who
was on the second... floor. Soon Don Jesus came down, carrying with him the will to
be signed placed inside a cartolina folder. He greeted Don Gregorio, Mr. Balana, and
Atty. Imperial and immediately joined them in... conversation. Mr. Gaya called for Mr.
Jose Madarieta, whose residence is just across the road from the house of Don
Jesus. Mr. Madarieta was already informed by Don Jesus himself about the fact of...
signing the will that morning, and so, on being advised by Mr. Gaya that the Imperials
had already arrived, Madarieta proceeded to the residence of Don Jesus, without much
delay. With the coming of Madarieta and the... coming back of Gaya, there were now
six people gathered in the living room, namely: Don Jesus Alsua, Don Gregorio
Imperial, Atty. Jorge S. Imperial, Mr. Ramon Balana, Mr. Jose Madarieta, and Mr. Jose
Gaya. All the witnesses who testified for the petitioner declared that Don Jesus was
in bright and lively conversation which ran from problems of farming and the merits
of French-made wines. At 11:00 o'clock, Don Gregorio made a remark that it is about
time to do what they were there for, and this was followed by a more or less statement
from Jesus, who said:
'Precisamente es por lo que he llamado a ustedes que esten presentes para ser testigos
de mi ultimo voluntad y... testamento que ha sido preparado por el abogado Sr.
Gregorio Imperial segun mis instrucciones cuyo documento tengo... aqui conmigo y
encuentro que, despues de lo he leido, esta satisfactoriamente hecho segun mis
instrucciones, Como... saben ustedes tengo cuatro (4) hijos todos ellos.' (pp. 43-44,
t.s.n., hearing of December 7, 1967, Sarte).
On request of Don Jesus, all of them moved to the big round table on another part
of the same sala for convenience in signing because there were chairs all around
this table. The will which consisted of nine pages, with a... duplicate, and
24
SUCCESSION: ATTY. RESCI ANGELLI R. RIZADA
triplicate was laid on the round table and the signing began, with Atty. Jorge S.
Imperial assisting each person signing by indicating the proper place where the
signature shall be written. Don Jesus, as testator, signed... first. After signing the
original and the two other sets, the three sets were then passed to Mr. Ramon Balana
who signed as attesting witness. After Mr. Balana, Mr. Jose Madarieta signed next as
another... attesting witness, and when Mr. Madarieta finished signing all the three
sets, the same were passed to Mr. Jose Gaya who also signed as the third attesting
witness. On each of the three sets, Don Jesus signed ten times, - one on the... margin
of each of the nine pages, and at the end of the instrument proper. Each of the three
attesting witnesses (Balana, Madarieta and Gaya) signed eleven times on each set, -
one on the margin of each of the nine pages,... one at the end of the instrument proper,
and one below the attestation clause. The original will was marked as Exh. A (or set
A); the duplicate as Exh. K (or set K) and the triplicate as Exh. L (or set
L). During the hearing, each signature of Don Jesus, Mr. Balana, Mr. Madarieta, and
Mr. Gaya were identified by Mr. Balana, Mr. Madarieta and Atty. (now Judge)
Imperial. It was... also clearly established that when Don Jesus signed the will, Mr.
Balana, Mr. Madarieta, and Mr. Gaya were present and witnessed said signing, and
that when each of these three witnesses was signing, Don Jesus and the two other
attesting... witnesses were present and witnessing said signing. The signing by the
testator and the attesting witnesses having been completed, Atty. Jorge S. Imperial,
as Notary Public with commission for the entire province of Albay, notarized the will,
and... sealed it with his notarial seal, which seal he brought along that morning. After
all the three sets were notarized, they were all given back to Don Jesus who placed
them inside the same folder. At that moment, it was already... about 12:30 P.M. and
Don Jesus invited all of them to lunch, which invitation was gladly accepted by all of
them. (pp. 474-480, Joint Record on Appeal in CA-G.R. No. 54492-R)... which findings
are supported by the evidence, - it is quite difficult to conclude that the same had not
complied with the requirements of Arts. 804-806 of the New Civil Code. x x x" (CA
Decision, pp. 13-16, as... translated).
This cited portion of the appealed decision accepts as a fact that the findings of the
lower court declaring the contested will as having been executed with all the formal
requirements of a valid will, are supported by the evidence. This finding is...
conclusive upon this Tribunal and We cannot alter, review or revise the same. Hence,
there is no further need for Us to dwell on the matter as both the lower court and the
respondent appellate court have declared that these are the facts and such facts are...
fully borne and supported by the records. We find no error in the conclusion arrived
at that the contested will was duly executed in accordance with law. We rule that the
questioned last will and testament of Don Jesus Alsua... fully complied with the formal
requirements of the law.
Respondent court, however, denied probate of the will after "noting certain details
which were a little bit difficult to reconcile with the ordinary course of things and of
life." First was the fact that the spouses Don Jesus and Doña Tinay together with their
four children Francisca, Pablo, Amparo and Fernando had executed the Extrajudicial
Partition of November 25, 1949 (Exh. A) which divided the conjugal properties of the
spouses between the spouses themselves and the... children under the terms and
conditions and dispositions herein-before stated and to implement its provisions, Don
Jesus and Doña Tinay subsequently executed separately their respective holographic
wills both dated January 5, 1955 and codicils dated
August 14, 1956 with the same terms and conditions as reproduced herein
earlier. Both holographic wills and codicils having been probated thereafter and upon
the death of Doña Tinay, Don Jesus was appointed executor of the will and in... due
From the joint efforts of Dayanghirang|Delfin|Guinzon|Hermino|Masanguid|Silo
time the partition of the properties or estate of Doña Tinay was approved by the
probate court on July 6, 1960.
The respondent court ruled that the Extrajudicial Partition of November 25,
1949 was an enforceable contract which was binding on Don Jesus Alsua as the
surviving spouse, barring him from violating said partition agreement, barring him from
revoking his... holographic will of January 5, 1955 and his codicil of August 14, 1956,
and further barring him from executing his new will and testament of November 14,
1959, now the subject of the probate proceedings elevated to this Court.
We do not agree with this ruling of the Court of Appeals. We hold that the Extrajudicial
Partition of November 25, 1949 is null and void under Article 1056 in relation to Article
1271 of the old Civil Code which are applicable hereto.
These Articles provide as follows:
"Art. 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his property by an act inter vivos,
or by will, such partition shall stand in so far as it does not prejudice the legitime of
the forced heirs. x... x x"
"Art. 1271. All things, even future ones, which are not excluded from the commerce
of man, may be the subject-matter of contracts.
Nevertheless, no contract may be entered into with respect to future inheritances,
except those the object of which is to make a division inter vivos of an estate, in
accordance with Article 1056.
All services not contrary to law or to good morals may also be the subject-matter of
contract."
Article 1056 specifically uses the word "testator" from which the clear intent of the law
may be deduced that the privilege of partitioning one's estate by acts inter vivos is
restricted only to one who has made a prior will or testament. In... other words, Article
1056 being an exception cannot be given a wider scope as to include in the exception
any person whether he has made a will or not.
Respondent court citing the same Article concluded that under both the old and new
Civil Code, a person who executes a will is permitted at the same time or a little
thereafter or even before as long as he mentions this fact in the will, to partition his
properties pursuant... to the provisions of Article 1056 of the old Civil Code. The court
further added that jurisprudence is to the effect that the partition presupposes the
execution of the will that it ratifies or effectuates, citing the case of Legasto vs.
Verzosa, 54 Phil. 776. Finally, respondent court held the opinion that the extrajudicial
partition of November 14, 1949 was ratified in the holographic will executed by Don
Jesus on Jan. 5, 1955 and in the codicil of August 14, 1956.
Again, We do not agree with this ruling of the respondent court. In Legasto vs.
Verzosa, supra, the Supreme Court categorically declared the necessity of a prior will
before the testator can partition his properties... among his heirs, and We quote the
pertinent portions of the decision:
"The first question to decide in the instant appeal is whether the partition made by
Sabina Almadin of her property among her nieces, the defendants and appellants
herein, was valid and enforceable.
Article 1056 of the Civil Code provides:
'Art. 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his property by an act inter vivos,
or by will, such partition shall stand in so far as it does not prejudice the legitime of
the forced heirs.'
The Supreme Court of Spain, in a decision rendered on June 13, 1903, laid down the
following doctrine:
'Considering that the language of article 1056 cannot be interpreted to mean
that a person may, by acts inter vivos, partition his property referred to in the
25
SUCCESSION: ATTY. RESCI ANGELLI R. RIZADA
section wherein said article is found, without the authority of a testament
containing an... expression of his last will, or the authority of law, for, otherwise,
a partition thus made would be tantamount to making a will in a manner not
provided for, authorized, nor included in the chapter referring to testaments,
and especially, to the forms thereof, which is... entirely different from the legal
consequences of a free disposition made by parents during their lifetime,
whereby they give to their children the whole or a part of their property;
'Considering that, inasmuch as the second paragraph of article 1271 makes reference
to the aforesaid article, in providing that no contracts may be entered into with respect
to future inheritances except those the object of which is to make a division inter vivos
of the estate in accordance with article 1056, it is evident that said difference likewise
leads to the conclusion that a partition thus made should be on the basis of a
testamentary or legal succession and should be made in conformity with the
fundamental... rules thereof and the order of the heirs entitled to the estate, because
neither of the two provisions could be given a wider meaning or scope than that they
simply provide for the division of the estate during the lifetime of the owner, which,
otherwise, would have to be done... upon the death of the testator in order to carry
into effect the partition of the estate among the persons interested.'
G.R. No. L-6322 February 21, 1912
DOLORES AVELINO, as administratrix of the estate of Pascual de la
Cruz, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. VICTORIANA DE LA CRUZ, Defendant-Appellant.
FULL TEXT:
Issue: Whether the visual impairment of the testator can invalidate a will ( Nag full
text ko kay mubo ra kayo hehe)
The present is an appeal from an order of the Honorable George N. Hurd, judge of
the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, in which he had legalized the will
of the said Pascual de la Cruz, deceased.
The contention of the opponent is that at the time of the making of the will the said
Pascual de la Cruz was blind and had been for a number of years, and was incompetent
to make the will in question.
Against this contention of the opponent, all of the witnesses who signed the will
were called as witnesses, and each declared that the deceased was of sound mind
at the time said will was made and fully understood its contents and signed the
same in their presence and that they each signed the will in the presence of each other,
as well as in the presence of the deceased
The appellant attempted to show that the deceased was incompetent to make his will
because he was blind at the time the same was executed and had been for several years
theretofore.
There is absolutely no proof to show that the deceased was incapacitated at the time
he executed his will. No presumption of incapacity can arise from the mere fact that he
was blind. The only requirement of the law as to the capacity to make a will is that the
person shall be of age and of sound mind and memory. (Sec. 614, Code of Procedure
in Civil Actions.) Section 620 of the same code prohibits blind persons from acting as
witnesses in the execution of wills, but no limitation is placed upon the testamentary
capacity, except age and soundness of mind.
From the joint efforts of Dayanghirang|Delfin|Guinzon|Hermino|Masanguid|Silo
In our opinion the record contains nothing which justifies the modification of the order
made legalizing the will in the present case. The order of the lower court admitting
to probate and legalizing the will in question is therefore hereby affirmed with
costs.
CUYUGAN VS. BARON
Petitioner: VIVENCIO CUYUGAN,
Respondent: FAUSTINA BARON and GUILLERMO BARON,
Facts:
Silvestra Baron died on January 30, 1933, leaving an estate exceeding in value the
sum of P80,000 which she disposed of by will dated December 17, 1932. She died
single without forced heirs. The will appointed Vivencio Cuyugan, her nephew, as
executor. The petition for probate recites that on the date of the execution of said will
on December 17, 1932, the said testatrix was about 80 years old, more or less, and
was found in disposing mind, and not acting under duress, menace, fraud, or undue
influence, and was in every respect competent to dispose of her estate by will.
Guillermo Baron, brother of the deceased, and Faustina Baron, sister of the deceased,
allege, that at the time of the execution of the alleged will, Silvestra Baron was mentally
and physically incapacitated for the execution of a will; and, second, that her signature
and alleged consent to the said will was obtained and the attorney who prepared the
document and the witnesses who affixed their signatures thereto.
Issue:
Did the testator possess testamentary capacity at the time of the making of
the will?
Ruling:
No. An instrument purporting to be a will executed and witnessed in accordance with
the formalities required by the statute is entitled to the presumption of regularity. But
the burden of the evidence passed to the proponent when the oppositors submit
credible evidence tending to show that the supposed testator did not possess
testamentary capacity at the time or that the document was not the free and voluntary
expression of the alleged testator or that the will, for any other reason, is void in law.
She never saw the alleged will at any time again prior to her death which occurred
forty-four days later. It was immediately taken away by an attorney who kept it in his
possession alleging that she had instructed him to keep it secret. There is, however,
credible evidence in the record that before her death she had denied to several persons
that she made any will.
This belief on her part that she had not made any will explains her failure to do any
act of revocation in the forty-four days during which she lingered in this life. The
doctrine that where the testator has had an opportunity to revoke his will subsequent
to the operation of an alleged undue influence upon him but makes no change in it,
the courts will consider this fact as weighing heavily against the testimony of undue
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SUCCESSION: ATTY. RESCI ANGELLI R. RIZADA
influence, has no application to cases in which there has been an initial lack of
testamentary capacity.
JOCSON VS JOCSON
Petitioner: RAFAEL JOCSON
Respondent: ROSAURO JOCSON
Facts:
On June 10, 1920, Rafael Jocson, Cirilo Manlaque, and Filomena Goza presented a
petition in the court below f or the probate of the document Exhibit A, as the last will
and testament of the deceased Marcelo Jocson. This petition was opposed by Rosauro,
Asuncion, and Dominga Jocson, alleging that: (a) The supposed will was not the last
will of the deceased, and the signatures appearing thereon, and which are said to be
of the testator, are not authentic; (b) the testator, that is, the deceased, was not of
sound mind and was seriously ill at the time of its execution; and (c) the supposed will
was not executed in accordance with the law.
After trial the lower court rendered decision finding, among other things, as follows:
"For all of the foregoing reasons the court finds that some hours before, during and
one hour after, the execution of his will, Marcelo Jocson was of sound mind; that he
dictated his will in Visaya, his own dialect; that he signed his will in the presence of
three witnesses at the bottom, and on each of the left margins of the three sheets in
which it was written; that said three witnesses signed the will in the presence of the
testator and of each other, all of which requirements make the document Exhibit A a
valid will, in accordance with the provision of section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645.
"By virtue thereof, it is adjudged and decreed that the document Exhibit A is the last
will and testament of the deceased Marcelo Jocson, and it is ordered that the same be
admitted to probate, and Rafael Jocson is hereby appointed administrator of the estate
left by said deceased, upon the filing of a bond in the sum of fifteen thousand pesos
(P15,000)."
The appellants argue that the testator Marcelo Jocson, at the time of executing the-
will, did not have the mental capacity necessary therefor; that said will was not signed
by the witnesses in the presence of the testator; that the witnesses did not sign the
will in the presence of each other, and that the attestation of the supposed will does
not state that the witnesses signed in the presence of the testator.
Issue:
Does Marcelo Jocson has the capacity to make a will?
Ruling:
Yes.
From the joint efforts of Dayanghirang|Delfin|Guinzon|Hermino|Masanguid|Silo
To constitute a sound mind and disposing memory, it is not necessary that the mind
shall be wholly unbroken and unimpaired by disease or otherwise, or that the testator
be in full possession of all his reasoning faculties. Failure of memory is not sufficient
unless it be total or extends to his immediate family or property.
And in Bugnao vs. Ubag, supra, it was declared:
"Proof of the existence of all the elements in the following definition of testamentary
capacity, which has frequently been adopted in the United States, held sufficient to
establish the existence of such capacity in the absence of proof of very exceptional
circumstances: 'Testamentary capacity is the capacity to comprehend the nature of
the transaction in which the testator is engaged at the time, to recollect the property
to be disposed of and the persons who would naturally be supposed to have claims
upon the testator, and to comprehend the manner in which the instrument will
distribute his property among the objects of his bounty.'"
CAGUIOA VS CALDERON
G.R. NO. 6625, OCTOBER 24, 1911
JOHNSON, J.
FACTS:
Emigdio Zarate died leaving a last will and testament. In 1910, Juana Caguioa
presented this will before the court for probation.
Maria Calderon opposed the probate of the will alleging that Emigdio Zarate was not
of sound mind during the execution of the will. As a proof, Calderon presented a doctor
who shared that Zarate was suffering from insomnia months prior to the execution of
the will. Although, the doctor was not able to talk with Zarate during his last days and
thus, the effects of insomnia he presented were merely hypothetical. Juana presented
on her side the parties present during the execution of the will. They testified that
Zarate was of sound mind during those days and no signs of any mental problems was
seen upon him.
ISSUE:
Whether Zarate is considered of sound mind during the execution of the will.
RULING:
Yes.
Art. 798 of the Civil Code requires that the testator must be of sound mind during the
mking of his will.
In this case, the testimonies of the witnesses of Juana justifies the mental stabiity of
Zarate during the making of the will. The doctor’s testimony cannot be held upon since
it failed to establish that the insomnia attacks of Zarate which was way before the
will’s execution affected his thinking up to that point.
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SUCCESSION: ATTY. RESCI ANGELLI R. RIZADA

Thus, Zarate is held to be of sound mind.

YAP TUA VS YAP CA KUAN
G.R. NO. 6845, SEPTEMBER 1, 1914
JOHNSON, J.
FACTS:
Tomasa Yap Caog died in August 11, 1909. In August 23, Yap Tua filed a petition for
the probation of an alleged will of Tomasa.
Initially, there were no opposition to the said will. However, prior to its final
proceedings, Yap Ca Kuan and Yap Ca Llu intervened in the proceedings against the
will mentioned above and presented another will which was alleged to be signed by
Tomasa invalidating the will presented by Yap Tua. Yap Ca Kuan ad Yap Ca Llu also
alleged that the will presented by Yap Tua was invalid and because Tomasa was not
of a sound mind during the execution of it.
A certain Dr. Papa witnessed that he visited Tomasa for four days prior to her death
on August 11 which was to August 10. He admitted that on those occasions, Tomasa
was actually very weak due to Tubercolosis.
Other witnesses however, testify that Tomasa was of sound mind and condition to
execute a will on August 11. She even sat and asked for a pen to sign the will.
Facts:
The probate of the will of Mariano Corrales Tan is being opposed by Vicente Corrales
Tan Quintin who is allegedly his son.
Quintin alleged that the will cannot be valid because the testator was not of sound
mind during the period he supposedly signed it since he was on coma. Quintin
presented Dr. Tee Han Kee as a witness who testified that Mariano was indeed under
coma during this period. Dr. Tee Han Kee visited Mariano in the evening of December
25 and he was seemed to be in a state of coma and he was able to visit again in the
forenoon of the following day testifying that he was still in the same state of coma.
However, other witnesses who were present when Mariano signed the will alleged that
he was strong and of sound mind during those time which was a lucid interval of his
coma.
Issue:
Whether Mariano was of sound mind.
Ruling:
Yes.
The testimony of the other witnesses provides for a strong proof that Mariano was
actually of sound mind when he signed the will.
The mere speculation of Dr. Tee Han Kee, although based on his professional
knowledge may not defeat the actual event witnessed by the others.
Thus, Mariano is considered to be of sound mind during the signing of the will.
GALVEZ VS. GALVEZ
G.R. NO. L-6650 DECEMBER 5, 1913
TORRES, J.:

Petioner: SANTIAGO GALVEZ

ISSUE: Respondent: CANUTA GALVEZ, testator’s only legitimate daughter

Whether Tomasa was of sound mind. Facts:

Counsel for Santiago Galvez petitioned the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for the
RULING: probate of the will which it was alleged Victor executed in the dialect of the province,
on August 12, 1910, in presence of the witnesses Juan Dimanlig, J. Leoquinco, and
Yes. Nazaria Galves. This instrument appears also to have been signed by the witness
Lorenzo Galvez, below the name and surname of the testator.
The testimonies of the witnesses who were with Tomasa on August 11 satisfy the Further on in the same record, pages 6 to 7, there appears another will written in
justification that indeed, Tomasa was of sound mind during those time. The testimony Tagalog and executed on the same date by Victor Galvez in presence of the witnesses
of Dr. Papa about her bad condition cannot hold water because those were Cirilo Paguia, Florentino Sison, and Juan Mendoza.
descriptions of events which more than 24 hours earlier from the actual signing of the In the second will executed by Victor Galvez on August 12, 1910, and signed in his
will. Circumstances after his visit may have changed making Tomasa be of sound mind presence by the witnesses Juan Dimanlig, Nazaria Galvez, and J. Leoquinco, and, as
after his visit. the testator was no longer able to sign on account of his sickness, Lorenzo Galvez, at
his request, affixed his own signature to the instrument, for him and below his written
name. This will, written in Tagalog and translated into Spanish.
SAMSON VS. CORRALES TAN QUINTIN Canuta Galvez, the testator’s daughter, alleged that her father, owing to his very
serious sickness with cholera, lacked the intellectual capacity and clear judgment
G.R. No. L-19142 March 5, 1923 requisite for making a will.
OSTRAND, J.: The physician Dr. Vicente de Jesus, in his testimony, referred to the effects and results
Petitioner: FLAVIANA SAMSON of cholera on a patient in ordinary cases and in the regular course of this disease.
Respondent: VICENTE CORRALES TAN QUINTIN, oppositor and alleged son of the However, he was not able to examine Victor Galvez, nor did he even see him between
deceased the hours of 12 in the morning and 3 in the afternoon of the 12th of August, 1910,

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SUCCESSION: ATTY. RESCI ANGELLI R. RIZADA
during which period the testator ordered his will drawn up and the attesting witnesses
signed it, Galvez having died at about 6 o’clock that same afternoon.
Issue:
Whether Victor Galvez was of sound mind in the creation of the will.
Ruling:
Yes. In order to hold that a testator, as the result of cholera, was not of sound mind
and did not have full knowledge of his acts and was incapable of executing a valid will,
it is indispensable that the proceedings disclose conclusive proof of his mental
incapacity and of his lack of reason and judgment at the time he executed his will in
due form. In this case, aside from the evidence by the witnesses who testified that the
mental faculties of the testator were unimpaired, the contents of the will, and the
desire manifested by the latter to rectify an error he incurred in the execution of his
first will, show that the testator was of sound mind and perfectly aware of his duties
with respect to the legal, inviolable rights of his daughter and sole heir.
Statements by a physician who did not see or examine the testator at the time the
latter was making his will, based on the condition and mental state of a cholera patient
in ordinary cases and in the regular course of the disease, cannot serve as a ground
for declaring the testator incompetent when, notified of an error incurred by him in
his firsts will executed a few hours before, and exhibited in court, he declared his
desire to correct the same by executing a second will; inasmuch as the testimony of
the subscribing witnesses and of the person who drew up the document, shows that
the mental and physical condition of the testator was an exception to the general rule
enunciated by the said physician, since the patient demonstrated that he had
sufficient moral energy and clear intelligence, in spite of the inroads made by the
disease, to have been able to execute his last will and testament in accordance with
the requirements of the law.
CARRILLO v. JAOJOCO 46 Phil. 957, No. 21015 March 24, 1924
Facts:
December 9, 1918, Adriana Carrillo executed a document of sale of eleven parcels of
land, with one-half of the improvements thereon, situated in the barrio of Ulong-Tubig,
municipality of Carmona in favor of Marcos Jaojoco.
Nine days afterwards Adriana Carrillo was declared mentally incapacitated by the
Court of First Instance, and later on died; and proceeding having been instituted for
the administration and settlement of her estate, her sister Miguela Carrillo was
appointed judicial administratrix of said estate.
In her capacity as such administratrix, Miguela Carrillo now brings this action for the
annulment of said contract of sale executed by Adriana Carrillo on December 9, 1918,
against Marcos and his father Justiniano Jaojoco.
The defendants were absolved from the complaint, and from this judgment the plaintiff
appealed. The plaintiff has attempted to prove that prior to the year 1918 and specially
in the year 1917, Adriana Carrillo performed acts which indicated that she was
mentally deranged.
From the joint efforts of Dayanghirang|Delfin|Guinzon|Hermino|Masanguid|Silo
In January, 1917, her husband having died, she was appointed judicial administratrix
of the latter's estate, and to this end she took the oath of office, gave the proper bond
and discharged her functions in the same manner and with the same diligence as any
other person of knowingly sound mind would have done.
We have given special attention to the fact of Adriana Carrillo having executed
contracts of lease, appeared in court in the testate proceeding in which she was
administratrix, and in fact continued acting as such administratrix of the estate of her
husband until August, 1917, when for the purpose of taking vacation, she requested
to be relieved from the office.
On November 13, 1918, Adriana Carrillo entered the "Hospital de San Juan de Dios"
by reason of having had an access of cerebral hemorrhage with hemiplegia, and there
she was attended by Doctor Ocampo until she left on the 8th of December of the same
year very much better off although not completely cured. Asked about the mental
incapacity of Adriana Carrillo during her treatment, Doctor Ocampo answered that he
did not pay attention to it, but that he could affirm that the answers she gave him
were responsive to the questions put to her, and that the hemiplegia did not affect her
head but only one-half of the body.
After leaving the "Hospital de San Juan de Dios" on December 8, 1918, Adriana
Carrillo called at the office of the notary public, Mr. Ramon Salinas, and there
executed the contract of sale in question on the 9th of that month.
The notary, Mr. Salinas, who authorized the document, testified that on that day he
has been for some time with Adriana Carrillo, waiting for one of the witnesses to the
document, and he did not notice anything abnormal in her countenance, on the
contrary, appeared to him dignified.
It must be noted that the principal witness for the plaintiff and the most interested
party in the case, being the plaintiff herself, was the surety of Adriana Carrillo when
the latter was appointed judicial administratrix of the estate of her husband in 1917.
It cannot be understood, if Adriana Carrillo was in that time mentally incapacitated,
why Miguela Carrillo, the plaintiff, who knew it, consented to be a surety for her. It
must likewise be noted that the other witnesses of the plaintiff, "who testified to the
incapacity of Adriana Carrillo, also made transactions with her precisely at the time,
when according to them, she was mentally incapacitated. In view of all of this, which
is proven by documents and the testimonies of witnesses completely disinterested in
the case, it cannot be held that on December 9, 1918, when Adriana Carrillo signed
the document, she was mentally incapacitated.
Issue: W/N Adriana Carillo was mentally incapacitated.—No
Ruling:
Nine days after the execution of a document of sale of several parcels of land, the
vendor was declared mentally incapacitated by the Court of First Instance, and having
died later, the judicial administratrix of her estate, alleging that the vendor was
mentally incapacitated, brought an action for the annulment of the said contract of
sale.
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That under the circumstances of this case, the fact of the vendor having been declared
mentally incapacitated after the execution of the document of sale does not prove
conclusively that she was incapacitated when the contract was executed, and that it
not having been proven that the vendor was mentally incapacitated at the time
of the execution of the contract of sale, which it was the obligation of the
plaintiff to prove, the mental capacity of the vendor must be presumed.
HERNAEZ v. HERNAEZ GR 857, February 10, 1903
Facts:
The subject of this action is the will executed by Doña Juana Espinosa, widow of Don
Pedro Hernaez, on December 5, 1894, in Bacolod, Island of Negros, before a notary
public, and three witnesses, and with the aid of an interpreter, the testatrix not
understanding Spanish. In this will, the principal dispositions are those relative to the
legacy of the third part of the hereditary estate of free disposal, which the testatrix
leaves to her eldest son, Rosendo, to the betterment of the other third made in favor
of this same son, and the distribution of the remaining third in six equal parts among
her five children, Rosendo Domingo, Magdalena, Mateo, and Eulalio Hernaez y
Espinosa, and her two granddaughters, Peregrina and Victorina Parapa y Hernaez, in
representation of their deceased mother, Clara Hernaez y Espinosa.
The plaintiff is one of the sons of the testatrix and the complaint has not been
acquiesced in by Magdalena Hernaez y Espinosa nor Peregrina and Victorina Parapa
y Hernaez, whose consent plaintiff sought to obtain.
The action brought is for the annulment of the will upon the ground: (1) of the
incapacity of the testatrix; (2) the incapacity of the notary, attesting witnesses, and
the interpreter; and (3) a substantial formal defect in the will.
The incapacity of the testatrix according to the complaint is alleged to consist in this:
That on the 5th of December, 1894, she was over 80 years of age and was so ill that
three days before she had received the sacraments and extreme unction, and that two
days afterwards she died; and that prior thereto she walked in a stooping attitude,
and gave contradictory orders, as a result of her senile debility. The incapacity of the
notary in that he did not understand the Visayan dialect, the language of the testatrix.
The incapacity of the attesting witnesses is supposed to consist in their not having a
perfect knowledge of Spanish, and the incapacity of the interpreter in that he was an
amaneunsis of the notary and was the person who wrote out the will. The substantial
formal defect of the will is supposed to consist in the fact that two physicians were not
present to certify to the sanity of the testatrix at the time of its execution, and the
absence of two interpreters to translate the will, because executed in a foreign
language.
Issue: W/N the testatrix was of sound mind when she executed the will? – Yes.
Ruling:
The fact that on old woman gives contradictory orders, that she walks in a stooping
position, that she has fainting fits, that she received the sacraments some days before
making her will, are circumstances which even if fully demonstrated by proof could
no lead the court to establish a conclusion contrary to the mental soundness of a
person who is to be presumed to be in the full enjoyment of the mental faculties until
From the joint efforts of Dayanghirang|Delfin|Guinzon|Hermino|Masanguid|Silo
the contrary is conclusively proven. The notary in compliance with the requirements
of article 695 of the Civil Code certifies that in his judgment the testatrix had the
necessary legal capacity and the use of the necessary mental faculties for the purposes
of the execution of the will. "The Code might have adopted either one of two systems
[with respect to the mental capacity of the testator] - that of establishing as a general
rule the presumption of soundness of the mental faculties until the contrary be
proven, or that of presuming mental weakness in the absence of proof that the act was
performed while the mental faculties were in their normal condition. Under the first
presumption, a will made should be declared valid in all cases, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary. Under the second, it would have to be considered as void
upon the presumption that it was executed by a person demented, unless the contrary
is shown. The Code has adopted the first system as being the most rational, by
accepting the principle that mental soundness is always to be presumed with respect
to a person who has not been previously incapacitated until the contrary is
demonstrated and proven by the proper person and the correctness of this choice is
beyond doubt; in the meantime the intervention of the notary and the witnesses
constitutes a true guaranty of the capacity of the testator, by reason of their knowledge
of the matter. (Manresa, Commentaries, vol. 5, p. 344.)
TRINIDAD NEYRAVS. ENCARNACION NEYRA
C.A. No. 8075 March 25, 1946
DE JOYA, J.:
FACTS:
Encarnacion Neyra and her sister, Trinidad Neyra had a litigation in the Court of First
Instance regarding the properties left by their father.
During the course of the litigation, Encarnacion Neyra had been suffering from
Addison’s disease and on the day before her death, Encarnacion and Trinidad
reconciled and had a long and cordial conversation, in the course of which they talked
about the properties left by their father and their litigations which had reached the
Court of Appeals, they then agreed to have the latter dismissed, on the condition that
the property involved therein should be given exclusively to Trinidad Neyra, that the
latter should waive her share in the rents of said property collected by Encarnacion.
On November 3, 1942, Attorney Panis prepared a document of compromise embodying
their agreement and prepared Encarnacion’s last will and testament.
On November 4, 1942, Encarnacion unexpectedly died allegedly from heart attack, as
a consequence of Addison’s disease.
Atty. Lucio Javillonar, claiming to represent Encarnacion Neyra, and other relatives
of hers, filed a petition claiming that the alleged compromise or agreement could not
have been understood by Encarnacion Neyra, as she was already then at the threshold
of death, and that as a matter of fact she died the following day.
ISSUE: Was Encarnacion Neyra of sound mental condition at the time of the execution
of the compromise and of her last will and testament?
30
SUCCESSION: ATTY. RESCI ANGELLI R. RIZADA

RULING: YES.
Encarnacion Neyra was of sound mental condition at the time of the execution of the
compromise and of her last will and testament.
Presentacion Blanco, niece of Encarnacion, in the course of her cross-examination,
frankly admitted that, in the morning and also at about 6 o'clock in the afternoon of
November 3, 1942, Encarnacion Neyra talked to her that they understood each other
clearly, thus showing that the testatrix was really of sound mind, at the time of signing
and execution of the agreement and will in question.
The deceased was not poor and did not lack the means to procure domestic services:
she did not live alone or was alone in her home since she became ill; and in fact, the
deceased had nine servants at her service. The deceased was never without company
in her room during her illness, especially during her last days, because she required
continuous care. Therefore, it is incredible that Adriano Ruiz and the other
instrumental witnesses of the alleged testament of June 24, 1936 could enter inside
the room of the deceased or even inside her house, without being seen or noticed by
anyone. The granting of the will in question could not be done in a short moment; it
had to take a long time, enough time for those in the house to realize that there were
strangers in it, at a time when it is not customary to visit.

It may, therefore, be reasonably concluded that the mental faculties of persons Additionally, the calligraphy expert Arcadio Laperal, who made a thorough study of
suffering from Addison's disease, like the testatrix in this case, remain unimpaired, the signatures "PERPETUA A. VDA. DE SORIANO” that appear in the will comparing
partly due to the fact that, on account of the sleep they enjoy, they necessarily receive them with the authentic ones of the deceased and those that appear in the testament
the benefit of physical and mental rest. And that like patients suffering from and in the codicil legalized by the Court a quo, which were not discussed, express the
tuberculosis, insomnia or diabetes, they preserve their mental faculties until the opinion that they could not have been written by the same person, helped or not by
moments of their death. another because they differ in all respects.
The logical conclusion is that Encarnacion Neyra was of sound mind and possessed
the necessary testamentary and mental capacity, at the time of the execution of the We believe that the opinion of the aforementioned expert is based on the facts,
agreement and will, dated November 3, 1942. especially considering that the deceased could no longer see well, as one of the
testament witnesses said, and yet the signatures are written with great symmetry,
ALFONSO ALBORNOZ, vs DOLORES ALBORNOZ and JOSE ALBORNOZ rightly, and keeping the letters to each other, almost the same distance. And even if
[GR No. 47428. April 8, 1941.] the decedent had been helped
DIAZ, M.:

FACTS:
Perpetua A. Vda. de Soriano executed a will. The will was presented by Alfonzo and
Dolores Albornoz for probate but it was rejected by the Court of First Instance of Ilocos
Norte and ruled that Perpetua A. Vda. de Soriano had no mental capacity when she
executed her will.

Perpertua died on June 25, 1936, in the municipality of Laoag of the Province of Ilocos
Norte, then she was 68 years old. She suffered from diarrhea and enteritis with
complications of myocarditis from June 3, 1936 until the time of her death. On June
22, 1936, Perpetua could barely move and talk and if she spoke, her words were
incoherent. And on June 23, 1936, she completely lost speech, and although her eyes
were open, they no longer move. In these circumstances, it was physically impossible
for her to execute her will considering that the document shows on its face that it was
executed at 6 am on June 24, 1936.

Dolorez Albornoz, for her part, stated that the late Perpetua in executing her will, was
with complete freedom, being in full enjoyment of her mental faculties and in the
presence of witnesses whose names and signatures are mentioned and appear in the
testimony clauses of her will.

ISSUE: Does Perpetua A. Vda. de Soriano have the mental capacity to execute her
will?

RULING: NO.

From the joint efforts of Dayanghirang|Delfin|Guinzon|Hermino|Masanguid|Silo 31