Amir Jahanchahi


UNION FOR THE

SECOND REPUBLIC
OF IRAN
Putting an end to the dictatorship of Ahmadinejad










Without boldness, courage and sacrifice,
no major challenge is overcome;
no great cause is done.




Foreword

Why I fight



June 12th, 2009 was a bleak day for my country.

It will also be a bleak day for the 21st century history if the
free world gives in to Ahmadinejad. On

June 12th, he was “re-elected” president of the Islamic

Republic of Iran; thanks to a massive and unprecedented
fraud. Regardless of the desire for change expressed
throughout the streets of Tehran and the country’s major
cities by the population of Iran. With this re-election,
Ahmadinejad took the last step towards absolute
dictatorship. This is clearly the greatest threat to human
rights that Iran has had to face for the past thirty years.
But the danger that looms ahead for my country is only the
emerged tip of the iceberg that reaches the whole region
and beyond, the West and



9



all democracies.

For Iran is preparing, deaf to world public opinions, to

transgress the last step towards imperialistic and aggressive
politics and acquire military nuclear power. We must
rally all our forces to stop this. Should Ahmadinejad’s
Iran possess the bomb, the world would be only left the
power to watch the Near and Middle East set ablaze.
There is a simple reason to this: Israel will never accept an
Islamist and nuclear Iran. And the western powers cannot
ignore that unrest in the region would be a plunge into the
unknown, maybe even the beginning of World War III.
My country and its surroundings are therefore at a turning
point of their history —possibly a turning point of History.

The present situation is comparable in many ways to the

one that created World War II in 1939-1945. Are we now
in 1929 when a financial crash led to the Great Depression;
or in 1938 when the Munich Pact was cowardly signed,
leading to World War II; or both simultaneously?





10
 Why I fight



Alas, I fear that our opened world and speedy

communications bring these two dates dangerously
together, whereas they were a decade apart seventy years
ago.

Should we decide to go on living our comfortable lives,

postponing the time to face the truth, like in the 30s; we
would endure the collective responsibility of casting aside
the memory of millions of deaths of World War II.
Should we go on ignoring the dangers afoot in my country;
our delusions will entail the same deaths and suffering.

I left my country precisely thirty years ago, in September of

1979. I was only 19 years old and knew very little, except
that despite the historical and ancient connections of my
family with Iran, it was impossible for me to serve the new
Islamist oppressors’ regime. That is why I have been a
political refugee for thirty years, and as such banned from
Iran.

I did however return to my country once, in secret.

It was late spring of 1980; I was living in Paris, where I

studied at Paris II Assas University.



 


11
 


One afternoon during class break, I decided to go home and

take a nap, in my tiny room in the 15th arrondissement. I
usually stayed in the university during break time and ate a
sandwich or studied in the library. This decision was truly
unusual —all the more that I never took naps. My room
was spartan, as were my resources at the time: a bed, chair,
table and pouf. I am a very pious person, although I do
not practice my religion. As I lied down on my bed, I
pondered on the fact that there had to be a justice and that it
was impossible not to see my father ever again, who was in
prison since the beginning of the Iranian revolution. I was
convinced that we would meet again some day. I closed
my eyes and fell asleep with that idea.

Some minutes later, I was awoken by the phone ringing.

It was my father —I had given my number in the letters we
wrote, obviously checked by his jailers. He had just left
prison!

Thirty years later, although I believe like many mystical

Iranians
12
 Why I fight

in spiritual force, I can only say that my presence at home

at the exact time he would try to contact me is only pure
chance. My father explained that he had been judged at
last. He was sentenced to five years of imprisonment but
that, by an extraordinary chance, he had a temporary
permission. It actually looked like the regime was
offering him a chance to run away, which I later realized
was true: the mullahs always preferred to clear the country
of their troublesome opponents rather than keep them in
prison, where they could prove to be more dangerous.
And of course, we were going to seize that chance.

That very evening, I talked to my father over the phone

again, and told him that I had decided to meet him in
Tehran, at my mother’s parents’ house where he was hiding
(a safe place, for my parents had been divorced for several
years), to help him prepare his escape. He predictably
tried to talk me out of it claiming it was too dangerous. I
firmly argued: “It’s my duty and more importantly, my
pleasure”.
13
 


My resources, as I have already said, were scarce at the

time. But with the help of my father’s friends, who never
asked any questions, I was able to get a counterfeit passport
and, more important, the resources to organise and finance
his escape. Before the Revolution, our whole family
would travel in 1st class. In this case, my ticket was
economy class and the seat was at the very back of an Iran
Air 747. I remember my delight in smelling the Iranian
dishes that were being warmed up in the trolleys before
being served to the passengers.

This was my first encounter with my roots. There were to

be many more all along the trip.

When I arrived in Tehran, I was greeted by one of my best

friends who had stayed behind —the only person who knew
I was back. We took different paths: he fervently
supported the new regime and was even an active
collaborator through his responsibilities in one of the
famous Committees that were so significant in
overthrowing the Shah and in the early days of the Islamist
Republic. I was probably insane to trust him.



 14

Why I fight

Maybe I was just as insane to have made the trip. Some

would bring up the recklessness of youth. But as far as I
was concerned, sacred duties superseded danger, and I
would do it all over again today, if need be.

We spent three days together. My father was released

from prison in a very weak condition, he had lost 3 stone,
but those three days were exceptional, in more than one
way. We talked a lot about him, me, the future of our
country and the world. But we also needed to prepare his
escape from Iran. The Revolution was still too recent in
everyone’s minds, and my father was too famous to risk
taking a plane out of the country, even with forged ID: he
could be recognised in the airport. My father was
therefore to leave the country very discretely via Turkey,
first in a car, and then on horseback. I then found out that
even a political getaway should be organised with the very
people who watch the borders for smugglers. They have
the required networks and accomplices.



 


15






But most of all, during these three days, I walk tirelessly

around Tehran, deliciously taking in the colours and
fragrances of my country —I remember that I stopped
several times in front of bakers’ open displays to revel in
the smell of baking bread.

For three days, I watched and smelt. And I came to firmly

believe that I could never consider myself as able to live
outside of Iran. After those three days, I understood that
although I had left Iran by the back door, and had no idea if
I would return to my country —not through the “front
door”, but simply the official door— I was at least sure of
one thing: I would return some day, even if that happy
moment would take a long time to come.

Almost thirty years have gone by. I have built my life in

Europe, and am immensely grateful. However, over all
those years, my firm belief that my true place is in Iran,
serving my country, has remained intact. And when, in
2005, I experienced the grief of burying my father in Passy
cemetery, in Paris, in my mind I only buried him
temporarily: I knew that one day I would repatriate his
body to Iran.



 16

Why I fight

Today, my conviction is more than ever consolidated with

the dramatic summer of 2009 and its serious consequences.
The fixed re-election of Ahmadinejad did not come as a
surprise, but the people’s subsequent anger proved that our
history must at last turn a new page.

As of today, every Iranian, of all political sides, must forget

past divisions and start a resistance against the dictator.

We must get rid of Ahmadinejad.

Firstly, I intend to prove here that there is another way.

My country can and will —I shall demonstrate it— triumph
over the despotic regime of Ahmadinejad and end the
hideous Islamist interlude that it is subjected to for the
thirty past years. We must then build a modern, booming
and democratic Iran, bearing everyone’s rights in mind.

But peace will only be possible and long-lasting in the Near

and Middle East if we, the populations of the region, are
able to build together the outlines of a vast economic



 


17

cooperation, like the populations of Europe did after World

War II, to put an end to of Europe did after World War II,
to put an end to barbarity in their countries.

Before demonstrating this way, I must remind how today’s

explosive situation came about.

For, to avoid the worst, you must confront it squarely.






PART ONE



Why Ahmadinejad wants the

bomb








1
“Imposing Koranic law
throughout the world”

To understand the imperialistic plan of Ahmadinejad, and

the threat it is, we must go back to the origins. When
Ahmadinejad built his belief and created his destiny. We
must go back to the Ayatollah Khomeini. For Ahmadinejad
is fulfilling today the dream that Khomeini once nurtured
but that was impossible because of age and circumstances.
21



Khomeini admired Hitler. Like the Nazi dictator, besides

his despise of democratic values, he hated the Jews. Hitler
wrote Mein Kampf, a delirious programmatic book, which
seeded the essence of the future Nazi regime. During his
political exile, Khomeini wrote three books, The Kingdom
of the Learned, The Key to Mysteries and The Explanation
of Problems, in which he exposed in the same manner, long
before accessing supreme authority, his vision of an ideal
regime —in this case, Islamist. Reproduction in full or in
part of these three books, as well as their translations, was
fully copyright-free, in order to encourage the spreading of
the author’s principles. This is how Jean-Edern Hallier
published in autumn of 1979, some months after the Islamic
Revolution, the “Little Green Book” summing up in French
the outlines of Khomeini’s beliefs.

I imagine that similar translations were made in other

languages. The free world’s democracies, like with Mein
Kampf, are not interested in these texts, which is a mistake
for they express the intrinsically expansionist nature of
Khomeini’s Islamist ideology.
22



“Imposing Koranic law throughout the world”

“The homeland of Islam, single and indivisible, was divided

by the dealings of Westerners and despotic and ambitious
leaders”, he wrote, “To free the Islamic homeland of
Western domination or influence, we have no other choice
than form a true Islamic government, and strive to
overthrow the other tyrannous so-called Muslim
governments implemented by foreigners”. According to
Khomeini, a Muslim was a man constantly at war, and he
then went further still: the Holy War, as he wished it, was
“a war of conquest, with the ultimate target of imposing
Koranic law throughout the world”. Now that is what I call
explicit!

Khomeini was greatly influenced, in his youthful days, by

the experience of the Muslim Brothers, a pan-Islamic
association founded in 1928 in Cairo to overthrow Egypt’s
secular state and replace it with an Islamic regime. The
ideology of the Muslim Brothers was mainly nationalist.
And they advocated “bottom-up” Islamisation:
23



first, each individual should be made a good Muslim, and

then the family, population, government, and lastly the
whole nation.

Their failure prompted Khomeini to do the exact opposite:

to succeed, the Islamist ideology should first control the
apparatus of a rich and powerful State such as Iran. But
more importantly, it should not be limited to the borders of
the said State: to stay in control, it should export by
targeting first the mostly Shia Muslim countries, then Sunni
Muslim countries with a Shia minority, then all Muslim
countries, and lastly the whole world, since, as we said
earlier, the ultimate aim was to “impose Koranic law
throughout the world”.

This expansionist doctrine was soon implemented. Several

weeks only after the Revolution of 1979, Tehran’s new
Islamist regime provoked neighbouring Iraq again and
again. It was a carefully chosen target: besides the fact that
Iraq was mostly Shia, like Iran, it was a secular republic, a
regime that Khomeini spurned: “Any secular authority, in
any way, has to be atheist, therefore a work of Satan”,
24



“Imposing Koranic law throughout the world”

he wrote in The Kingdom of the Learned.

But Iraq had just, that very year of 1979, appointed a

certain Saddam Hussein as leader. The new Iraqi president,
not quite yet a dictator, of Sunni extraction, obviously
frowned intensely at the militant Shiism of the mullahs who
overthrew the Shah. And he himself had an eye on Iranian
oilfields that he thought were easy to conquer, convinced
that the Iranian army had not yet recovered from the
traumatic Revolution. In these conditions, war was
inevitable. It started in September 1980 and lasted eight
years, a surprise on both sides, making over one million
deaths, without any side winning or loosing.

My country was left battered and ruined: the Iranian

government officially estimated that 300 billion dollars at
the time (in 1988) would be required to rebuild the country.
Eight years of war and the enormous cost made the regime
temporarily suppress its expansionist aspirations, or at least,
its most visible and provocative aspects.
25



For at the same time another strategy, more underhand but

terribly efficient, was already being implemented: the
besiegement of Israel.



2
The Hezbollah “octopus”

When in June 1982 Iranian Pasdaran —the famous

“Guardians of the Islamic Revolution”— arrived in
Lebanon, there were hardly three dozen of them. At the
time, for the Lebanese, even the 35% Shia, Iranians were
nothing but foreigners. But a few fanatic emissaries of
Tehran’s new regime were sent to Bayreuth in reaction to
the Israeli invasion of South Lebanon. These Pasdaran were
to found the Hezbollah —the “party of God”— with the
mighty efficiency that they revealed during the summer of
2006, when Israel made another incursion into Lebanon:
this time, although the Tzahal tanks would
27
have seemed to have conquered land, the world public
opinion was convinced that the Hezbollah won the battle.
During thirty-four days of fierce and bloody war, Israel,
despite great resources in the field, could never really get
the upper hand facing an enemy with fewer men and
weapons. The psychological impact was tremendous:
suddenly Israel no longer seemed invincible to Arab
populations.

The connection between the Hezbollah and my country’s

Islamist regime is not only historical: it has remained
constant, as Iran has continuously, since 1982, supplied the
Hezbollah with weapons and money, and influenced all its
decisions. So much so that in the summer of 2007, for the
first anniversary of the Lebanese war of 2006, Hassan
Nasrallah, Secretary General of the Hezbollah, claimed
before the press that his organisation “fought for Iran”.

To the benefit of the Israeli invasion of 1982, Tehran’s

Islamist regime was able to make the most of the Lebanese
refusal of Israeli occupation, by injecting money and their
ideology, thus creating in its service, in less than a quarter
of a century,
28
The Hezbollah “octopus”

a sophisticated guerrilla force, now one of the most

dangerous in the world, extremely and entirely devoted to
its authority. The Islamist regime of Iran will strive to
reproduce this model elsewhere, and particularly in
countries bordering Israel. This is practically already done
—I will explain later— in the Gaza Strip with the Hamas.
The next goal is Egypt: in April 2009, Egypt’s government
accused the Hezbollah with organising attacks against
Israeli tourists in Sinai. The announcement caused much
comment in the Near East, for it publicly revealed for the
first time the infiltration of Iran acolytes in Nasser’s
country. But the Hezbollah now spreads its tentacles far
beyond —including, as we shall see later, South America…





3
September 11th: a
“godsend” for Iran

It is not impossible that those who, within the Iranian

Islamist regime, had been working for some time towards a
tougher regime had contributed to instigate and facilitate
the September 11th attacks, or had simply been warned. In
any case, the way the United States handled the
post-September 11 did not only rid Iran of one of its main
enemies, Iraq, and marginalise both its competitors
Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, it especially contributed to
setting my country as only reference authority of the
Muslim world and the Middle East.
31
We recall that President Bush’s decision to invade Iraq after
September 11th was inspired by the group of ideologists
then affiliated to the White House called the
neoconservatives. This small group of hardliners was itself
influenced, in its analysis, by the formal and repeated
accusations of an opponent to Saddam Hussein in exile,
Ahmed Chalabi, who affirmed that Saddam possessed
weapons of mass destruction. He also claimed that with a
“support network” within Iraq, the Americans would be
greeted as liberators by the Iraqi population. The following
events refuted these two fictions. Although the Ba'ath
dictator certainly embodied absolute evil for his people,
there never was any proof of the presence in the Iraqi
territory of weapons of mass destruction and therefore that
Saddam Hussein was a danger to the region and world. The
invasion of Iraq did however happen, with the deplorable
consequences that we all know.
32
September 11th: a “godsend” for Iran

Not a single American soldier was greeted as a saviour, on

the contrary.

Protected by the American authority, invited to all

Washington’s official receptions, Ahmed Chalabi seemed
to be heading for a bright future until the early days of war:
the Bush administration even planned to place him at the
head of the new Iraqi government. And then, in spring of
2004, he experienced a brutal disgrace: the CIA and FBI
started investigating him. Ahmed Chalabi was suspected of
transmitting utmost information to Tehran. They then
realised that he was in fact a gold-digger in the Iranian
regime’s pay. In other words, he grossly manipulated the
United States.

Unfortunately, the consequences of this sinister farce are far

from over. In 2011, the American troops will finish
withdrawing completely from Iraq. This announced and
inevitable departure will leave the coast completely free for
Ahmadinejad, who has been waiting for this to happen. By
applying the method that worked so well in Lebanon, the
Islamist regime has already started to draw benefit from the
chaos in which Iraq has sunk, by installing and
33
consolidating his hold on the Shia southern part of the
country, to later finish by taking over all Iraq, then made an
auxiliary of Iran.

Similar strategies are also implemented in other weakened

countries of the region: Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain,
Dubai, Jordan, Egypt… and even beyond. On 25 February
2009, Morocco recalled its ambassador in Iran, to protest
against the declaration of an Iranian high religious dignitary
who explained that Bahrain “was once the fourteenth
province of Iran” —meaning: it could soon go back to
being that. In reality, Rabat cares little about Bahrain, but
does not like the growing influence of Ahmadinejad’s Iran
within the Moroccan Islamist movements, which could
endanger the very foundations of the Hashemite Kingdom.



4
Taking over the
Israeli–Palestinian conflict

There is another consequence to the catastrophic handling

of September 11th by the Bush administration: the growing
hold of Iran on the Palestinian question.

After the September 11 attacks, the United States ordered

Saudi Arabia to stop funding the Hamas, the Palestinian
ultranationalist and Islamist movement created in 1987 that
denies Israel the right to exist. To survive, the Hamas then
turned towards Iran, which, lets face it, was exactly want
they wanted.
35
Today, although the connection is not exactly comparable
to the one with Hezbollah, Hamas has clearly become a
movement not only funded by Tehran, but also subjugated
to its interests.

A “fortunate” chain of circumstances —September 11th

attacks and short-sighted American analysis — therefore
enabled this apparently impossible coupling between a
Sunni Palestinian movement, Hamas, and the Shia
theocracy of Iran’s Islamist regime. In fact, today’s
determining influence of Iran’s Islamist regime on Hamas
is a mere materialisation of Khomeini’s expressed will, as
soon as he accessed power, to pre-empt the Palestinian
problem.

It is obviously not a coincidence if Yasser Arafat was the

first foreign dignitary received in Tehran, with pomp and
circumstance, after the Islamist Revolution —it is even said
that this was the only time Khomeini was glimpsed smiling
in public. Khomeini had understood that the Palestinian
cause would be his Trojan horse to conquer the Muslim
world. While the Palestinian question was lived
exclusively, for decades,
36
Taking over the Israeli–Palestinian conflict

as an Arab affair, Iran now is, and all the more since Yasser
Arafat died, at the heart of the problem. It is, in a way,
History’s finest political hold-up: Iran, Persian and mostly
Shia, has become the champion of a cause uprising mainly
the Arab world, which is practically all Sunni. This is why
the Islamist regime leading my country today will never
accept peace between Israel and the Palestinians: this would
deprive it of the ideological issues it uses to maintain its
hold on the region.

The Americans have actually understood this.

The accession to the White House of Barack Obama gave

the signal of a significant inflection of US diplomacy in the
Israeli–Palestinian conflict. This was plain to see in May,
when Benjamin Netanyahu visited Washington.

With his undisputable legitimacy, President Obama firmly

pointed out that America now intended to continue backing
their historical Israeli “ally” provided a Palestinian State is
created. The American initiative is in a way a
37
revival of Saudi Arabia and Morocco’s peace plan, initiated
after September 11th, that was never completed.

Facing the threat of Ahmadinejad’s nuclear Iran and his

growing influence in the region, America and the Arab
world wish to get rid of the Palestinian obstacle first,
hoping to weaken the Islamist regime, if not destabilise it.
But despite the outward and true will of all Arab leaders,
despite the support from most Palestinian and Israeli public
opinions and despite the US means of pressure, the
influence and personality of President Obama, Tehran will
strive to sabotage this plan, for should it succeed, it would
be the downfall of the Islamist regime.

Although I do understand the reasons why President Obama

made this choice, I am still firmly convinced that we must
first deal with the Ahmadinejad threat, for the key to
solving the Israeli–Palestinian conflict

—a prelude to reconstruction throughout the region— lies

within my country.



5
The early days of a dictator

In 2005, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected for the first

time President of the Islamic Republic of Iran “to
everyone’s surprise” —as the western media put it.

In fact, the man who was nicknamed the Supreme Leader’s

“dogsbody” demonstrated throughout his first term of office
that he had a political vision of his own, and was able to
concentrate more powers than any other president had done
before. But naturally, his whole politics were supported by
Ali Khomeini, the Supreme Leader, chosen for this dignity
twenty years before, after Khomeini died, after he relieved
39



his first designated heir apparent, Ayatollah Montazeri,

considered too soft with the opposition. Khamenei was
Khomeini’s closest confidante and shared the same very
radical opinions and expansionist vision of the Islamist
Revolution. For the past twenty years, the Supreme Leader
has only respected and continued the heritage of the
regime’s founding father. Ahmadinejad showed that he was
no longer a mere loyal executor: he now boldly leads the
country’s foreign policy towards the Islamic imperialism
wished by Khomeini.

And besides, Ahmadinejad, younger than Khamenei and

less austere, is better at summoning the masses. And time
has perfectly shaped his discourse. Western press is the
only one to see his recent allocution at the UN conference
against racism in Durban as a “provocation”. On the
contrary, Ahmadinejad was simply sending yet another
crystal clear message to his usual targets: all those who feel
deprived, oppressed, underclass, and exiled from inside on
their own territory… A message that, among Muslims, is
able to transcend traditional
40
The early days of a dictator

dissensions between the Shia and Sunni, but also resounds

far beyond the Muslim world. This is how Ahmadinejad
was recognised, during the four years of his first office, as
the unquestioned and unquestionable leader of the Muslim
world, while incarnating Khomeini’s plan and ideals.

In these conditions, could Khamenei, the Supreme Leader,

object to his re-election?

In a way, the influence acquired by Ahmadinejad within the

Muslim world is a consequence of the fall of the Berlin
Wall. Communism represented, obviously wrongly, for the
lost and deprived populations hope for change, a light in the
darkness of injustice sometimes created by liberal
economy. As soon as communism —thankfully—
disappeared, this alternative to the capitalist model was not
replaced. The “weak” populations were orphaned.
Ahmadinejad with his radical Islamism rushed into the
breach. He took advantage of these populations’
frustrations, who felt somewhat anti-American and
anti-Western.
41



The present economic crisis, because it is unusually

widespread, is the final —and providential— stepping stone
for spreading his venomous message. The Stock Market
Crash of 1929 took three or four years to pervade through
the real economy and create the Great Depression, which
helped Nazism rise in Germany devastated by rampant
inflation and bitter about the Versailles Treaty. This time,
the financial networks and economies are so globalised that
the contamination only took several months, after Lehman
Brothers went bankrupt, to devastate economy around the
world.

All the countries in the world and all the economic sectors
were affected with unprecedented violence.

But in 1929, Nazism was not a government force. In 2009,

radical Islamism, the ideology of Ahmadinejad, already has
powerful State machinery.

And it has been serving for thirty years a reasoned and

implacable expansionism policy. This is why, in my
opinion, we are both in 1929 and 1938. Except that should
the world climate turn to worse, the strength of
42



The early days of a dictator

the Islamist ideology will not only be transmitted to 70

million German-speakers like Nazism did, but to hundreds
of millions of Muslims in the Near and Middle East, and to
part of the Muslim populations of rich countries
—Germany, Great Britain, France… for the rising poverty,
due to the economic crisis, will surely concentrate first on
these badly integrated populations, making them even more
receptive to a radical discourse.

The situation is therefore highly explosive. And never

before were the conditions so very concrete for the Islamist
expansionism of Ahmadinejad to gather largely the fruits of
the policy initiated thirty years ago by Khomeini. But for
Iran to become a reference regional authority as wished by
Ahmadinejad, and a serious threat for the rest of the world,
he still needs an unquestionable argument. He still needs
the bomb.





6
The bomb, the ultimate
“bayonet”

“All the governments in the world rely on the force of

bayonets”, explained Khomeini in his books. With this, he
means that a strong power must rely on an operational
army. In this respect, Iran’s regular army is the largest in
the region, behind Tzahal. Counting the land and air forces,
navy, anti-aircraft defence, the Pasdaran and their many
elite units, the Iranian army can call up some 750,000 men
(without even counting the million reservists).
45



As a comparison, the French army employs a little less than

350,000 people, including civilian staff.

However, as we saw with the Hamas and Hezbollah,

Islamist Iran not only has an impressive conventional army,
it also perfectly masters asymmetrical war, or guerrilla.
This is unique for a State of its size. Neither Israel or the
United States, or even any other great nation, is at present
able to control asymmetrical war, and this incapacity now is
a weakness in modern conflicts. This proved true during the
2006 Lebanon War, operations against Hamas, and in
Pakistan and Afghanistan today.

However, Ahmadinejad wants more: the nuclear arsenal.

This is my country’s long-lasting dream.

Indeed, the bases of the Iranian nuclear programme do not

date back to the Islamic Revolution.

It all started in fact in the late 1950s, under the Shah’s

reign. There was the Cold War. Iran at the time was
considered by the United States as a stable regime amicable
46



The bomb, the ultimate “bayonet”

towards the West, and both countries signed a civil nuclear

cooperation programme in 1957. Two years later, Tehran
opened its Nuclear Research Centre with much pomp. It
boasted a 5-megawatt reactor supplied by Washington.
During the 1970s, Iran started developing a full
electronuclear system on its territory. In 1974, the Shah
believed that oil was “too precious to be unnecessarily
burnt” and was well aware that it is much more profitable
when exported. He therefore planned to implement 23
nuclear plants in his country by 2000. At the same time, he
invested one billion dollars in the Eurodif consortium
managed by France to acquire enriched uranium. His
purpose was to completely control the atom’s cycle. Did the
Shah already want the bomb at the time? It is quite
possible, and several people in Europe and the United
States were fretting already.

But everything suddenly changed in 1979 with the Islamic

Revolution, for the danger was instantly seen as the
devastating use the new regime could have of the bomb, if
they managed to control the nuclear chain reaction. The
United States suddenly withdrew
47



their support to the Iranian nuclear programme. So did

France. They also refused to pay back the billion dollars
that the Shah provided to Eurodif. A tug-of-war between
France and Iran shed blood for several years; everyone
remembers the attacks on Paris in 1985-1986. An agreed
compensation between both countries eventually ended the
struggle.

Iran’s nuclear programme was at a standstill for five years,

then re-activated in 1984 during the

Iraq-Iran War. This time, they had official help from Russia
and backing from the father of the Pakistani atomic bomb,
as well as the North-Korean regime. In February 2003, the
Iranian regime officially announced that they had started a
uranium enrichment programme on their territory. From
that date, there was nothing to stop the Islamist regime in
pursuing its aggressive intentions.

At the end of 2008, the IAEA (International Atomic Energy

Agency) tried to warn the world about the “quick and
preoccupying progress of the Iranian enrichment
programme”. This programme “we all know has no civil
finality”, bluntly declared
48



The bomb, the ultimate “bayonet”

Nicolas Sarkozy on 15 January 2009 when expressing his

New Year’s wishes to the diplomacy.

The threat is therefore well known. Then what could

explain the fatality and powerless behaviour of Western
leaders, leading us strait to disaster?





7
The risk of world upheaval

Everyone remembers that at first the atomic bomb was the

deterrent weapon par excellence. This was during the Cold
War, when both superpowers would eye one other with
their respective arsenals. At the time, as neither nation was
part of the very select nuclear power club, neither claimed
the bomb as an offensive weapon. This would alas not be
the case, should my country soon possess the bomb. For
there is no way we could delude ourselves on the intentions
of the
51



Islamist regime: in the hands of Ahmadinejad, the bomb

would not only be a deterrent, but a weapon of conquest.

Israel is all too aware of this. In this country, the

unthinkable is an everyday reality: while most of the
Western world considers the dramatic Holocaust that
happened seventy years ago as an unacceptable accident in
History that will never happen again, the Israeli are
convinced, on the contrary, that it could very well happen
again. At all costs, they will never risk letting anything
seriously endanger the existence of their country and
people. However, for the first time in their history, they
now consider that a possible Iranian atomic bomb may
threaten their future. In these conditions, they will not think
about the cost —human, political, historical…— of
deciding to attack my country. Their imperative survival
will prevail over all other considerations.

“As sanctions against Iran are ineffective, we will have no

other choice than attack Iran to end its nuclear process”,
declared Ehud
52



The risk of world upheaval

Olmert in June 2008. And he further declared: “To put an

effective end to it”.

Shortly after coming into office, President Barack Obama

declared that he was against air strikes on Iranian nuclear
facilities. But whatever the US may think, if Ahmadinejad
says he has the bomb, or if Israel comes to believe that Iran
is about to have it, I am convinced that Tzahal will launch a
massive attack on my country’s nuclear sites —however
complex and delicate this operation may be. Without
warning the Americans, or only once the aircraft have lifted
off. What will happen thereof?

For Ahmadinejad, these bombings will be a sort of

“godsend”. Within the Muslim world, an Israeli attack
would indeed be considered as an unacceptable
provocation. Popular upheavals, more or less spontaneous,
will take place in several Near and Middle Eastern
countries. Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan, Dubai, Qatar, Bahrain…
and even in the oil-producing regions of Saudi Arabia,
along its eastern coasts, where the
53



population, 75% Shia (only 20% in all Saudi Arabia), is the

poorest of the country.

At the same time, Hezbollah and Hamas will obviously

return to the grindstone, in Lebanon and Palestinian
territories, with their crushing rocket attacks, considerably
harder than in 2006.

As for Ahmadinejad, he will shoot back with surface-to-air

missiles installed and buried in the south of the country, and
a few ultra fast speedboats to torpedo the super tankers that
transit through the Strait of Hormuz every day. When the
strait is blocked, most of the oil supply to the West will be
threatened.

And besides, the oil and gas fields of the Gulf monarchies
would probably be bombed. Furthermore, Ahmadinejad
was so bold as to imply the threat during the riots that
followed the fixed elections of June12th: should these
monarchies conform to the western position, and interfere
in
54



The risk of world upheaval

Iranian affairs, he openly assured that there would be

reprisals.

America and Europe will have no other choice than react

forcefully to unblock the strait and, therefore, declare war
on Iran. The Muslim world would only become more
indignant.

The dormant terrorist cells in France, Great Britain,

Germany, etc. would awaken and attack. The world would
go ablaze, to the sole benefit of the Iranian Islamist regime.

Although Israel has the resources to shell the nuclear sites

in my country, no army can invade and defeat Iran. All the
more that, may I remind, Iran is the only major power to
control conventional war as well as asymmetrical war.

Indeed, if war generalises, I am convinced that a Western

coalition would eventually win. There is no questioning that
point, but against how many sacrifices? Unlike in Iraq
where 100,000 or 200,000 men were needed, there would
be 1 million or more. Victory, albeit certain, would take
years. Comparatively, it was
55



much easier to overthrow the Nazi regime —limited to a

single man, power, and nation. Over the thirty years since
the Islamists have taken over my country, they have had
enough time, as we have seen, to weave their expansionist
web throughout the region.



8
Long-term vision

For several months, international media have focussed on

the progress of the Taliban in Pakistan, worried that they
may take over the Pakistani nuclear arsenal.

However, the danger of them getting the bomb seems

practically inexistent to me.

For one reason, the Taliban have no imperialist designs.

They simply wish to recover Afghanistan, and conquer
certain provinces of Pakistan that they consider themselves
entitled to. But although their ideology is not expansionist,
there is of course no reason to give them anything, or even
talk with them,
57



for despite what the American administration believe, there

are no moderate Taliban. The only solution remains to
fight, and it is up to the local authorities —today Afghani
and Pakistani, tomorrow Iranian— to do it.

Another reason is, even supposing certain Pakistani

provinces come under Taliban influence, the larger part of
the Pakistani army is preserved from radical Islamist
beliefs. In any case, should the Taliban spread alarmingly,
the Pakistani army has —with help from the United States
and probably their leadership— neutralisation or
redeployment resources for nuclear warheads.

Lastly, as a final recourse, the American special forces

based in the Indian Ocean and US submarines fitted with
cruise missiles would be ready to operate and destroy any
danger.

If things go that far, the Muslim world would raise no

protest, unlike if Israel attacks Iran.

Indeed, Pakistan was built on a religion and not on an

established nation, and is as such a time bomb. The country
could seriously
58



Long-term vision

break up, and this must be prevented at all costs. But we

must first eradicate the threat of the Islamist regime that
holds my country, not only for regional and world peace,
but also for the very foundations of our civilisation.

We, Iranian, think in years, if not centuries. You,

Westerners, in months or, at best, terms of office. This is
the whole difference. While Obama said: “This is what I
shall do in the six coming months”, the Iranian regime
thought fifteen or twenty years. Although Ben Laden is a
“hit” man himself, with a very instantaneous vision of time,
the Iranian Islamists have a very long-term vision.

They want to build an empire, with vassal regimes at their

command. This empire would encompass all the Gulf
countries, all the way to the Mediterranean, including
Egypt, and even beyond, therefore closing Israel in, and
wiping it off the map. And for the first time such a large
empire would be created without annexation or war, just
with the backing of local forces bound to its cause.
59



Whenever possible, its allies will take over in the polls

(Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestinian territories). As for the rest,
submission to Tehran will come about with insurrections,
upheavals or revolutions. In the meanwhile, the Iranian
Islamist regime weaves its web in every one of these
countries, with a diabolical and very sophisticated,
multi-level infiltration strategy.

Firstly, in banks and companies under Iranian control,

operating in very different sectors, and employing
thousands of people in each country. Approximately thirty
were counted in Egypt, about a hundred in Lebanon, and
even more in some countries in the Gulf. Remember that
my country is rich: if the Islamist regime still maintains
most of the Iranian population in poverty, it uses its
petrodollars to fund its expansionist policy.

Secondly, in associations and charity foundations funded by

Iran, which provide social, medical, or university backing
when local governments fail to.
60



Long-term vision

The third level is cultural: the training of its staff, including

languages (Persian, Arabic or English) and Koranic and
traditional philosophies, or controlling the media.

The forth level, and not the least, is the various branches of
Hezbollah active in the region —I have already mentioned
the prepared attacks recently failed in Egypt that were
blamed on Hezbollah. Anyway, Hezbollah is not only the
extraterritorial paramilitary force of the Iranian regime in
the Near and Middle East: its tentacles have spread much
further, all the way to South America, as I will explain
later.

Besides, the Iranian Islamist regime develops a subtle

strategy to seize the region’s energy channels.

It already has virtually full control over Basra, the only sea
access and main export route for Iraqi oil. The hold of the
Iranian regime on the Shia south of Iraq, that produces
some 2 million barrels per day —most of the country’s
production— is plain to see for everyone.
61



But this is not enough. The regime of Ahmadinejad wants

all Iraq, the annexation of its whole production capacity
and, with that, 65% of world oil deposits under the Persian
Gulf coasts. He also wants the Strait of Hormuz, where
some 17 million barrels of petrol transit every day. He has
his sights set on the international gas pipeline plan to carry
gas from Central Asia to Pakistan via Iran or Herat
(Afghanistan) under Iranian control; and on the future
pipeline connecting the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf,
while nowadays most of the latter’s petrol is exported
through the pipeline that travels under Georgia and Turkey
to the Mediterranean.

According to experts, Caspian Sea exports could represent

by 2020 as much as 5 million barrels per day, instead of
some 1 million today.

Today, Syria is the only objective ally of the Iranian

Islamist regime in the Near and Middle East, with no
imperialist motive,
62



Long-term vision

as was Italy for Nazi Germany before World War II.

Incidentally, President Sarkozy was very right to try and
separate Syria from Iran, a policy continued by Obama’s
administration, hoping to cut connection between the
Iranian regime and Damascus. As for all the other countries
of the region, and mainly those in the Gulf, for fear of the
power of the Iranian regime, they refrain from doing
anything that could be construed as hostile towards them.
Consequently, the region is more or less under Iranian
domination, despite the American armed forces in Iraq and
several countries of the Gulf.

But Iran also has other relays in the world.



9
Fiendish allies



Between the Islamist regime and the North Korea, the

“honeymoon” has been lasting for over twenty years.

Specifically since 1985, when Iran, in the middle of war

with Iraq, turned to Pyongyang for their missiles, copied
from the famous soviet Scuds in North Korea.

From that date, Korea is notoriously one of Iran’s major

missile suppliers. But the collaboration between the two
countries, commercial at first, progressively changed and
became an inspired partnership.

For North Korea, like Iran, wants the bomb. And

Pyongyang and Tehran are prepared to



65








pool their technicians and capital to get it.

In this race for the bomb, North Korea is now in the lead.
On 9 October 2006, they announced that they had
completed a first underground test. In fact all the experts,
Chinese and American included, believe that this test failed.
Still, the announcement was unanimously frowned upon all
over the world —except in Iran, where the State’s
television made a eulogistic coverage. Less than three
years later, on 25 May this year, North Korea made another
test, this time a success. Kim Jong-il’s regime became the
world’s 9th nuclear state.

Bad as it may be —nuclear proliferation is obviously a

danger for the planet— this news must however not
overshadow the Iranian threat, infinitely more dangerous.
For North Korea, the world’s most self-sustaining country
has no imperialistic intentions. The regime is desperate, a
military dictatorship at the end of its rope, lingering on in a
collapsing economy, for which the nuclear weapon is the
last chance of survival against its South Korean neighbour.
This is, therefore,



66
Fiendish allies



incomparable with Ahmadinejad’s strategy of conquest.




4



However, possessing the bomb is not enough.

You must also be able to reach a target; that falls within the
ballistics’ competence. This is why all the international
military experts are convinced that Iran and North Korea
are working together, since the early 2000s, on a long-haul
missile plan; a total infringement to the decisions of the UN
Security Council. Early in the spring of 2009,
international tension went up a notch when North Korea
—again— announced its intention to shortly proceed to
“firing a rocket”, to “send a communications satellite in
orbit”. Nobody doubted that the said rocket was in fact a
disguised missile. And the Japanese press said that some
fifteen Iranian technicians had arrived in Pyongyang, with a
letter from Ahmadinejad. In the end, regardless of the
unanimous hostility,



67





even from China, North Korea fired the rocket on Sunday

5th April. Pyongyang cried victory, but, like the nuclear
test of October 2006, Pentagon experts claimed another
failure. Nevertheless, the initiative was once again
universally condemned, except by Islamist Iran, who,
through diplomatic spokesman Hassan Ghashghavi,
declared that North Korea “had every right to launch its
rocket”. Several weeks later, Iran then announced the
firing of a long-haul missile (over 2,000 kilometres)…

Another strategic “honeymoon” has developed since 2005

between Iran and Venezuela.

So much so that outgoing and provoking Hugo Chavez

even refers to Ahmadinejad as his “brother”, whom he
obviously thoroughly congratulated for his re-election.
Both men fiercely hate the United States. And everyone is
aware that they share mutual interests. On 27 April 2008,
both presidents declared that they



 68

Fiendish allies

had decided, after a long telephone conversation, to “take

their cooperation further”. Just about one month later, in
June 2008, it was heard that emissaries from both countries
were working on a “common development bank” plan.
On 3 April 2009, the said bank was officially opened.

No one was surprised that it was based in Tehran. Once

again, the petrodollars are very handy. Islamist Iran will
provide capital and technicians to support Venezuelan
development plans. In exchange, Chavez opens up to Iran
his uranium mines, so necessary to the Islamist regime’s
nuclear programme.

These mines do not officially exist. They are in fact an

open secret. Venezuela’s uranium resources are estimated
to be some 50,000 tonnes. According to the American
secret services, two illegal extraction sites are already open
under innocent disguises: one plant producing bicycles and
producing motorcycles. When confronted by the
American intelligence services, Chavez simply



 


69



dodged the accusations: “The world’s first atomic

bicycles!”, he joked.

On 30 April 2009, the Iranian Minister of Defence visited

Caracas for the first time with the regime’s dignitary elite.
At the end of his trip, during which he spoke to his
Venezuelan counterpart, and also with President Chavez,
both countries publicly declared that this time they would
“develop their military alliance”…










10
Dormant networks



In 1992, and again in 1994, Buenos Aires was bombed.

The target was the Jewish community —South America’s
largest with over 200,000 Jews living in Argentina. The
first attack reached Israel’s embassy, the second, buildings
of an Israeli mutual company. Both attacks killed over
one hundred people, and injured hundreds. The
investigations floundered miserably. Until October 2006,
twelve years after the second attack, when the Argentinean
government officially accused Hezbollah and Iran of
organising them. Since, no progress has been made,



 


71



and no convict was sent prison. But these events prove

the existence throughout the world, and especially in major
Western democracies, of dormant terrorist networks
working for Tehran. And they would suddenly awaken
should Israel attack Iran.

Sometimes these networks, all led by Hezbollah emissaries,

are simply covered by Iranian embassies. Others are
formed in lawless enclaves. This is case of the
“headquarters” of organised crime in the so-called “Triple
Frontier” along the junction of Paraguay, Argentina, and
Brazil. The Triple Frontier is an Arab enclave in Latin
America: indeed the region hosts migrants from the Near
and Middle East since the early 1980s —especially
Lebanese radical Shia exiled during the civil war. Many
of them have invested the main local economy —the drug
trade—, and continuous reports from American intelligence
services reveal that part of narcotrafficking profits go to
fund



 


72
 Dormant networks



Hezbollah activities. Incidentally, it is said that the “party of

God”, under Iranian command, has implemented there a
significant support base should its positions in the Near and
Middle East be threatened.





11
The “Gate of Tears”



And now the most recent development of the expansionism

of Ahmadinejad’s regime is not the least. Various western
sources indeed affirm that there are, since December 2008,
Iranian military forces and equipment in the port of Assab.

This Eritrean port is on the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb —the

Gate of Tears. The general public does not really know of
this strait, but it is very important strategically, as it
commands the entrance to (or exit from) the Red Sea in the
Gulf of Aden via the Suez Canal. Tens of oil tankers and
cargoes go through the Strait every day,



 


75



with 25% petrol and 10% maritime world trade.

Significant oil reserves were discovered these past years in
Nigeria, Sudan, Gabon, Guinea… American oil companies
are therefore very active in this part of Africa, and an
already sizeable amount of America’s oil consumption
comes from this region, and transits through the Strait de
Bab-el-Mandeb.

Ahmadinejad’s Pasdaran arrived in Eritrea under the

pretence of renovating the local refinery, closed since 1997
because it was outdated. By way of petroleum tools, they
actually unloaded military equipment in the port of Assab
—mainly medium range ground-to-air missiles. This
location is useful to Tehran in various ways.

It is an outlying station to bombard Israel and even Saudi

Arabia. It is also useful to counter the stronghold of
Djibouti, a French garrison and moorings for the American
Navy that could host, should there be war in the region,
significant American and NATO armed forces.



 


76
 The “Gate of Tears”

But, by controlling the port of Assab, Ahmadinejad wants

first and foremost to block the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb. I
have already explained that the Strait of Hormuz would be
one of Tehran’s priority targets should Israel attack their
nuclear sites. By doing likewise with the Strait of
Bab-el-Mandeb, Iran would therefore be able to block
virtually all oil supplies to America and the West. And
then the strait would really be a “Gate of Tears”. And this
new latent offensive of the Islamist regime proves, if need
still be, that Tehran is indeed preparing for war.

Besides, the inauguration on May 26th in Abu Dhabi, by

President Nicolas Sarkozy, of a French permanent military
base said the same. This base was named “Peace Camp”,
wishful thinking maybe? Concerned about Iranian
hegemony, the United Arab Emirates had asked for this
base, the first tangible move from France since its
reintegration in NATO. Should there be war in the region,
it could be a logistical support for the free world’s forces.



 


77
 


I could give many more examples, take the demonstration

further, but are all the details really necessary? I believe
that I have clearly demonstrated in the first section, the
expansionist design of the dictatorial regime that occupies
my country. This will, as mentioned, has progressed
significantly in recent years, and even more these last
months. This could surely create an impression of
impunity.

One thing is certain: Ahmadinejad will never turn back.

And he will not give away a single millimetre of gained
ground, before the final conquest. For him, the American
administration’s negotiations, although their diplomacy has
high hopes, and despite the legitimacy and credit of
President Obama, will only be a good time-gaining device.

And if the Israeli do not dare go against the wishes of

President Obama, and therefore refrain from bombarding
Iran, then the world will begin another bipolar era. On
one side, the United States of America, and their allies in
the democratic world;



78
 The “Gate of Tears”

on the other side, the imperialist Islamist regime of

Ahmadinejad, that will soon control all the Near and
Middle East.

This bipolarity will degenerate sooner or later into a

large-scale armed conflict.

The dilemma is therefore insoluble. We can either stop

the despotic regime of Ahmadinejad from becoming a
nuclear power, with endless and unfruitful negotiations; or
on the contrary let Israel launch air strikes on my country:
in both cases, there will be war.

This is why the only true hope of avoiding the worst is to

change this regime from the inside.





PART II



Workings of the Iranian

society





1
Aftermath of the Revolution
of 1906



The very long history of my country was marked, in

modern days, by an event —that some call an epic—
reminiscent for the Iranian people of immense hope, and
also deep suffering. I obviously mean the Constitutional
Revolution of 1906. The events of 1979 can only be
understood in the light of 1906, for the Revolution of 1979
was a finishing stroke after the Revolution of 1906.



83



At the turn of the 20th century, Iran was an absolute

monarchy with age-old traditions, a still very archaic
country ruled with an iron hand by a monarch who knew no
opposition. But a liberal fringe (in the democratic sense)
grew among the wealthy and intellectual bourgeoisie.
Several representatives travelled to Europe —France, Italy,
England…—, and brought back the republican ideals that
gradually gained these countries.

These knowledgeable elite instilled throughout my country

a demand for reform, soon relayed by the people,
dissatisfied by injustice and inequality in the country.
They were backed by the Shia clergy, who took the side of
the “deprived”.

There were upheavals in 1905 that the monarch tried to

quash in a bloodbath. But soon, popular mobilisation was
too strong. And the troops refused to open fire against the
thousands of people who took refuge in mosques. After
several months, the sovereign had no other choice than to
give in and accept the revolutionaries’ demands to adopt a
Liberal Constitution.

Iran then became the first Muslim country —and the first
country in the region, fifteen years before Ataturk’s



84
 Aftermath of the Revolution of 1906

Turkey— to adopt a democratic Constitution, ratifying the

principles of free opinion and social justice. This
Constitution was written by an elite group of liberals and
intellectuals, including the great grandfather of one of my
aunts. Henceforth, as stipulated in this organic text, the
sovereign was to share his power with a Parliament freely
elected by the people, a legitimate representative of their
rights. This Parliament, for example, fought the English
takeover of the oil discovered in my country in 1908.
Furthermore, in the wake of this liberalisation, Iranian
women started an emancipation movement placing them at
the forefront of modernity in the Muslim world.

Our country’s reminiscence of this Revolution of 1906 is

that of immense pride. But also the bitter taste of failure.
In 1921, Reza Shah, at a time when the West had their
sights on Iranian oil, seized power with a military coup
d’état and founded the Pahlavi dynasty: his son, the last
Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, succeeded to him in 1941.

Ten years of reign started for the new sovereign, who

reigned without ruling, as the Parliament



 


85
 and successive governments had a certain independence
and autonomy in managing the country’s affairs.

The Mossadegh episode, 1951 to 1953, led the Iranians to

believe that they had definitively recovered their rights.
But the CIA banished Mossadegh and re-established the
Shah. This was when Mohammad Reza Shah appointed
himself full powers, which was contrary to the Constitution
of 1906.

However, the population remembered well this original

Revolution. And, from the mid 1970s, a chain of similar
circumstances progressively led to a pre-Revolutionary
situation like in1906. Firstly, a liberal elite group
claimed a division of power. Mehdi Bazargan, who
became first Prime Minister of the government created after
the Revolution of 1979, after being the liberal opposition’s
spearhead, asked nothing else from the Shah than to apply
the fundamental laws of the Constitutional Revolution of
1906; but to no avail.

Secondly, there was a very widespread popular

discontentment, related in particular to an uneven
redistribution of



86
 Aftermath of the Revolution of 1906



oil-related resources. And lastly, the active position of the

clergy, particularly their exiled leader, Khomeini, who
clearly backed the “deprived” as did their predecessors in
1906.

Had the Shah heard the liberal call for greater democracy in
time, I stand convinced that nothing that happened
afterwards would have occurred. The pressures, in 1977,
of the American administration for a greater application of
human rights compelled the sovereign, unwilling to
displease his main ally, to release several hundreds of
political prisoners. His opponents saw this as a sign that
the time had come to intensify their fight. The liberals,
religious, Toudeh party communists, People’s Mujahideen,
Marxists, etc., all gathered in a single objective coalition
that came down to the motto that Khomeini repeated
constantly from his exile: “The Shah must go”. With the
people’s massive support, the movement bolted and
Revolution triumphed. But nobody foresaw at the time
that the religious would rush in and seize it. Once again,
the ideals of 1906 were ridiculed.





87



Those who claim that Iran will only recover its freedom
provided it terminates the Revolution of 1979 “interlude”
are totally mistaken about my country. This Revolution
was completely in line with our history and the people’s
democratic aspirations. It is its seizure by the religious
that is the interlude that needs ending.






2
A people crushing machine



When in September 1978 it became obvious, after the

sinister “Black Friday” during which the Shah’s troops
fired at the protesters, that the Revolution was inevitable, I
was 18 years old. I therefore had a live experience of the
events. And despite the connection of my family —my
father in particular— with the reigning family, I understood
the population’s fierce desire for change that emanated
greater every day from the protest marches. I understood,
but did not take part in the movement.



 


89

Not because I felt that the popular movement was going to

stray from its democratic path, nor that I foresaw that it
would be seized by the Islamist ideology. Because my
family’s position (my father was Minister for the Shah; my
uncles were President of the Central Bank and Minister of
Culture) restrained me from taking action and joining the
nation’s protesters including its younger population, among
which were some of my friends.

Little by little, I realised that our world was about to

change. My life, our family’s… but it seemed logical and
I did not rebel. Anyway, I had little means to stand in the
way, but I was not even intellectually opposed. Even after
my father was arrested and imprisoned with other
dignitaries of the fallen regime, and my sister and I had to
leave our home to hide with friends.

Suddenly, we were nobodies: we had no past, no present,

and I did not even know if there was a future for us.

Every day, for weeks, I would turn on the




90
 A people crushing machine

radio at 7 a.m., and listen to the list of the day’s death

sentences, fearing to hear my father’s name. It was hell,
one of the worst times of my life, and yet I knew that it was
my personal price to pay for the welfare of the masses.
The grief of knowing that my father was in prison, and that
I could not even visit him, outshone my vision of national
happiness. During the weeks that followed the Shah’s
departure, I could feel this happiness, sense it, but could not
join in. This happiness was not bleak: chadors had not yet
appeared and no bearded men imposed their terror. It was
the happiness of the whole nation, including most of the
regime’s former supporters.

But as I accepted this Revolution, without being part of it,

and sensed that there would be no place for me in the new
regime, because of my past, I decided to leave. This was
in September 1979.



 


91
I have already told the story1 of how, on the day before my
departure, I still tried to visit my father, whom I had not
seen in nine months. On that day, in the courtyard of Evin
prison, near Tehran, where I had been waiting since dawn, I
was confronted to an unbearably violent scene. A mother,
who had been denied by the Pasdaran the right to see her
death-sentenced son, threw her chador to the ground and,
driven insane by grief, literally pulled her hair out under our
very eyes. I would have never thought that hair could be
pulled out in that way, one fistful after the other. Soon her
head was a bloody mass, and the many Pasdaran who had
rushed up were enjoying the scene.

I was eventually luckier than the poor lady: I was able to

see my father and embrace him. But the memories of
those few highly emotional minutes spent with him and the
scene I that witnessed earlier remain inextricable. Thirty
years later, they still haunt me. For at that moment
































































1

 


1. Amir Jahanchahi, Vaincre le III Totalitarisme , Ramsay
e

(2001).

92

A people crushing machine

I knew that the Revolution was straying from its democratic

path, and that it would become an inhumane people
crushing machine.

This is why I believe that the abandonment by the Shah of

his country is unforgivable.

“This revolution is not democratic”, he said before his

destitution, “It is Marxist and Islamist”. Two scenarios
are possible: either it was a manoeuvre to try and save his
throne, or with his knowledge of the country and the forces
in presence he was able to foresee —before everyone
else— what was going to happen. One cannot but notice
that his prediction became true. In these conditions, even
in an ailing condition (which we did not know at the time),
he had no right to abandon his country under the pressure of
the West. That is the whole difference between a political
man and a statesman. The statesman, when convinced to
be right, must make the decisions imposed by the situation,
leaving it up to History —not the Americans, or any other
foreign nation— to judge him. Facing a peril jeopardising
the country’s foundations, citizen freedom and, eventually,
peace throughout the region,

93

the Shah should have had the Islamist leaders massively

arrested. This was not so. Likewise, with his
procrastination, he was not able to let democracy settle in
when it was still time. He had sensed the threat of
Islamism, but his untimely handling of events is in part
responsible for what happened later.

The day after I visited my father, I left Iran. In my mind,

this departure planned several weeks before was at first a
simple exile. But, after what I had seen the previous day
in the prison courtyard, I knew that I would henceforth be
an opponent to the new regime. And that I would never
know inner peace —maybe because I felt guilty for not
having been able to help that lady— until the day the
regime would crumble.

Since then, I have accepted no other nationality, either

French (my country of refuge) or English (my country of
residence). I still am a political refugee and will remain
that way until I return to Iran. But I was young then, 19
years old when I arrived in Paris, and I needed to build my
life.

94
 A people crushing machine

I knew that before being able to serve my country usefully I

had to first build my personal life. What I did not know,
of course, is that the regime would produce a dictator of
Ahmadinejad’s calibre.











3
th
Pre-June 12 , 2009: why
oppositions failed



Two months after I left Iran, Mehdi Bazargan resigned

from Prime Minister. He had opened his eyes at last, and
his resignation was a sign of impotence before the
progressive seizure of the Revolution by the religious and
their expansionist strategy:

“Khomeini wants Iran to be for Islam, while we want Islam

for Iran”, he said. I will not go through the tedious list of
measures that affirmed a little more each day the



 


97



mullahs’ power. It took less than two years to “lock” the

country. Disillusionment of the younger population, anger
of women, and bitterness of the deprived who considered
themselves tricked… divorce between the Islamist power
and Iranian society was consummated since long. During
the summer of 1999, the twentieth anniversary of the
Revolution was even “celebrated” in the streets of Tehran
with massive protests of students against the government.

How is it then possible that this detested regime,

symbolised today by Ahmadinejad, has not yet fallen?

The first opposition that formed outside the country, in the

wake of the Revolution, was mainly royalist and
reactionary.

Led by the first emigrants, it started too soon, against the

will of the people who then massively supported the new
regime, which had not yet been seized by the mullahs.
This opposition thought that the army had remained
“loyalist”, and would have backed a coup d’état. Little
did they know of Iran. All along our great history —two
thousand five hundred years!—, the Iranian administration
and army —which are



98

Pre-June 12th, 2009: why oppositions failed

incidentally our future strength— always proved to be

legitimists. When in 1953 the Shah was driven away by
Mossadegh, the army and administration went along with
him. When the Shah returned several days later, with the
support of the CIA, the army and administration also turned
in his favour. This occurred again in 1979, I witnessed it
with my very eyes: the army, television, though managed
by a cousin of the empress, administration… all decided to
serve the new regime overnight. Even the Imperial Guard
could not resist. The same scenario will be played again
tomorrow: when the imperialist Islamist regime ruling the
country today will fall at last, the government machinery
will immediately join, for the sake of legitimism, the
democrat’s ranks.

To the pioneering royalist and reactionary opponents were

soon added other forms of foreign opposition, impulsed by
the scale of the Iranian diaspora formed in a few years —I
shall come back to that later—, who all dreamt of strategies
to overthrow the new regime, without always knowing what
to replace it with.



99
 IRAN’S HITLR

Generally speaking, the Islamist regime always preferred to

let its opponents leave rather than keep them in the country,
where they were a greater threat. For the regime,
opposition abroad is just hot air for they have no access to
what could make a change; I mean the people. True, to
this day opposition abroad was only hot air, but not because
they could not reach the people, because they had no
unanimously acknowledged leader, or structure, or clear
rallying plan and no credible alternative to mobilise the
people.

In the meanwhile, however, the circumstances had changed:

Iran was henceforth at war against Iraq, and, until the late
1980s, these opponents abroad still swimming against the
tide of popular opinion. When a country is at war,
fighting and trying to overthrow the regime is a major
mistake, whatever the regime, for it has the “sacred union”
of the population facing the enemy.

Then there were the two presidencies of Hachemi

Rafsanjani, elected once in 1989 and re-elected in 1993.
Rafsanjani was a pragmatic man



 


100
Pre-June 12th, 2009: why oppositions failed

who opened several windows of freedom in his first term of

office. The country had just been at war; the people had
paid an outrageous price to save their borders, and were not
prepared for a revolution to overthrow the government.
Once again, those who fought the regime from abroad
consumed their energy in vain and lost any possible credit
in the eyes of the Iranians that could have been useful later.

Succeeding to Rafsanjani in 1997, Mohammad Khatami

aroused genuine hope for change. Religious Khatami
would have been Iran’s Gorbachev. At one time, we did
think that he would manage to separate political and
religious affairs within the regime. Unfortunately,
Khatami proved not to be the right man for the job.
When, in July 1999, the students made massive street
protests, it was a sign that the people were maybe ready to
make the regime change. Khatami should have jumped to
the occasion and claimed the population’s support against
the Pasdaran and Leader of the Revolution.

But he did not. As I have already mentioned, the Shah’s

attitude towards the upheavals threatening his throne



 


101



was unforgivable. How, in these conditions, could we

forgive Khatami, who personified the hopes of Iran’s
people, for failing in imposing democracy?
4
Divisions within the very
regime



I have mentioned, in the first part, how the first election of

Ahmadinejad, who had always been a background figure in
the Islamic regime, had surprised the West. He was
indeed a very insignificant man at first sight —but then
again, so was Hitler. His “surprise” election came about
when the regime was ready to conquer the region. As
proved earlier, his expansionist strategy and decision to get
the bomb were by far pre-existent to his first election. By
bringing



 


103



Ahmadinejad to the foreground, the regime thought they

had found the man who could, incarnating the expansionist
desire of the Islamic Republic, be a fuse. Their main view
was to buy time in the race for the bomb. With President
Obama offering to hold talks on one side and on the other
threatens sanctions, if talks do not make any significant
“progress” before the end of 2009, the fuse could have been
useful. The Supreme Leader could have curbed the
hard-line regime by preventing Ahmadinejad’s re-election
and preferring Mousavi, also an Islamist, but far more
“presentable” for the West. In the meanwhile, the
clandestine centrifuges would have gone on turning to
enrich uranium. The coup d’état of Ahmadinejad is
obviously an affront to the President of America’s
outstretched hand policy. It is a bad omen for the
negotiations that America would want to start, and
especially announces the imminence of war.

Iran’s people must now not only face the stranglehold of

the regime on their



 


104
 Divisions within the very regime

individual rights, but also the seizure of oil money for the
benefit of a small few, trampling of human rights and all
the other unbearable and unacceptable injustices he is guilty
of. As it is now clear to see that this dictatorial regime is
on the warpath —and nothing like the conflict that opposed
my country to Iraq for eight years— the time has come to
go beyond old divisions between partisans and opponents
of the Islamic Republic. Our country has just lived the
painful, but alas predictable, experience that neither its will
for change, or massive mobilisation, or enthusiastic youth,
or even public backing from several VIPs, even religious,
were enough to steer the regime a single inch away from its
tyrannical and expansionist intrigues.

Now that the people are aware that the expression of their
will in the ballot boxes has failed, they must organise the
largest possible coalition of all those who do not want war
in the region, a war that will impact the whole planet. A
coalition to rally the Iranian people, Iranian diaspora

105
 


throughout the world, governments of greater powers, all

Arab countries —the first concerned along with Israel by
Ahmadinejad’s imperialism—, and all those who within the
very regime fear that the hard-line behaviour of the leaders
may bring them all down in the end. These people exist,
and there are more than we can imagine. They are in the
higher spheres of the army, administration, wealthiest
bazaar merchants, and even the Pasdaran.

There are especially, within the Shia inner circles, religious

dignitaries convinced that Iran’s regime is, in the long haul,
dangerous for Islam. The West probably imagines that
mosques Iran are always full since the Revolution of 1979.
It is the exact reverse. Today, places of worship in my
country are deserted. Religion is no longer in the peoples’
good graces, so to speak, since it rules the country’s
politics. Even in the holy city of Qom, traditionally more
conservative and traditionalist than Tehran, there is a
growing disaffection of the population, and especially the
younger, with religious matters.



 


106

Divisions within the very regime

So, these people do exist in the regime, and are even in the
highest spheres of power. But the conditions in which
they can reveal themselves and especially take action do not
exist yet.

This is why these “privileged” protesters will not move as

long as they do not sense that they can leave their cover.
And they are more useful in their positions than in prison,
where they are likely to be sent by Ahmadinejad if they
take action too soon. So that they can successfully
uncover, there must be more street protests, and fiercer than
after the announcement of the tyrant’s fixed re-election.


5
People are suppressed, not
resigned



Mass unemployment among the youth, rampant inflation,

widespread corruption, prostitution and drug addiction due
to poverty, growing insecurity… this is the day-to-day
burden of the people of one of the region’s richest
countries, boasting 2,500 years of culture and civilisation.
During the great student protests of 1999, divorce was
already consummated between Iranian society and its
Islamist leaders, but the divide is still growing.

Except an infinitely small proportion who still support the



 


109



regime —the very few who still gain direct profit—,

Iranians have since long been aware of the failure of
political Islamism. Almost 10% of the population of Iran
lives today with less than 2 dollars per day. This is all the
more scandalous for a country that is the world’s 4th oil
exporter and had in 2007 over $26 billion trade surplus.
In fact, the regime only redistributes its petrodollars in the
least proportion through a subsidised economy. As for the
rest, the money goes into the pockets of several thousands
of freeloaders. Not to mention, of course, the enormous
amounts engulfed in the costly nuclear military programme,
and imperialist plan distributing funds to Hezbollah and
Hamas.

But this system has reached its limits with rock-bottom oil
prices that fell in six months from $150 per barrel to less
than $50. In 2008, inflation was officially 30%, but
actually closer to 50%, and seems to have gone yet further
down to 60% in the first quarter of 2009. As for
unemployment, considerably minimised by official figures,
it



 


110
 People are suppressed, not resigned

reaches 30% of workers, and more important, astronomical

proportions amongst the youth.

But although the Islamists’ economic results are disastrous,

and the regime can no longer lean on the middle classes and
the underprivileged that had supported the Revolution of
1979, the Iranians, despite their resentment and
disappointment, have not yet taken collective action. For
one reason, repression remains fierce. And especially
because the growing fringe of the population that aspires to
change has no political organisation. Due to ever-present
censorship, there is no movement today to lead Iran to the
Gates of Liberty. And there is no leader able to
structurally and enduringly mobilise people’s rebellion.
Mousavi simply followed the spontaneous movement in the
streets. He never was leader of this movement.

He could have been, the day Khamenei made the fixed

re-election of Ahmadinejad official, by asking the people to
rebel against the regime. But he did not. At that
moment, Mousavi missed his rendezvous with History. At
best he will be remembered —and his wife maybe even
more so—



 


111

as one of the leading personalities of the movement in the

summer of 2009.

Moreover, with the information that I have, I can suppose

that Ahmadinejad did not actually perform a coup d’état in
the ballot boxes, but a regular coup d’état. And from then,
Khamenei was under his influence, not to say control.

Details are irrelevant. From the moment the Guide made

the cheating official, Ahmadinejad and Khamenei were
“two of a kind”, as people put it.

In these conditions, to make a mass rebellion possible, a

resistance organisation must be structured. It would
support and oversee the people’s rebellion, especially its
most active players: the youth and women, who still hope to
lift their heads high, despite thirty years of bullying, as
shown by their brave behaviour during the protests that
followed the fixed re-election of Ahmadinejad.
My country’s population in 1979 was a mere 40 million,
against nearly 70 million today, with 10 million university
graduates and 2.5 million more students. Most

112
 People are suppressed, not resigned

of the Iranians have therefore not seen the Shah’s regime,

and the youth in particular have only lived under strict
Islamic control. How much longer will they accept such a
locked and repressive political system, depriving them of
the simple joys of life: listening to music, meeting up with
boy and girl friends…, and prevents them from living
carefree lives? For now, they seem resigned, indulging in
private in the free behaviours that are forbidden in public.
But I am convinced that the time has come to let them rip,
all the more that economic recession burdens future
prospects a little more every day.

Although the memory of the fierce repression of the student

protests of 1999 was still alive after the elections of June
2009, the youth of my country demonstrated its maturity
and will to bring the people in. If tomorrow they perceive
from abroad the encouraging signs that they did not receive
in June, then we will win.





6
A powerful and responsive
diaspora



The Iranian diaspora is today’s second-ranking in size and

power, after the Jewish one, and was certainly the fastest to
form. Only a few years! According to various
estimations, 1 million Iranians have fled my country since
1979, in two successive phases: the first during the months
and years that directly followed the Revolution of 1979; the
second after 1995, when it became obvious that the regime
would be unable to reform and offer our people



 


115



the economic welfare they could legitimately aspire to.

Including the children born abroad since 1979, the diaspora
should count some 2.5 million people. And emigration
continues, especially the Iranian brain drain.

The United States hosts today the highest share of exiled

Iranians, with almost 1 million people. So mush so that
the Los Angeles metropolitan region, with the largest
community, is nicknamed “Tehrangeles”, or “Irangeles”.
But Iranians spread everywhere: Canada, South America,
Turkey, Australia, all Persian Gulf countries, Israel, Japan,
Philippines, and of course Europe – especially England,
Germany and Sweden, but also France, where Iranian
expatriates are some 15,000. Everywhere, these Iranians
who fled the regime are perfectly integrated, with a high
level of education and often wealthy.

Studies revealed that in the United States one

Iranian-American in three has annual income of over
$100,000, against one American in five.



 


116
 A powerful and responsive diaspora

But, more important, this diaspora has remained viscerally

tied to its country of origin, and never cut ties with
homeland. The mail, telephone, and now the Internet and,
for many, trips back home have contributed to preserve the
connection between our people and Iranians from abroad.
In the early years, when emigration mainly involved the
opponents to the new regime who often were beneficiaries
of the fallen regime, this diaspora could be considered
“elitist”.

But since 1995 economic emigration drew away from my

country simple executives or employees, and even
workmen. As a result, the interpenetration between the
diaspora and original Iranian population occurs today all
social classes.

Albeit very impressive in numbers and economic power,

this diaspora is not structured, if only in a multitude of
political, economical, or cultural associations, and
acknowledges no leader. It does not even have political
homogeneity, although the largest part is republican and
secular. But with the threat of war looming ahead, I am
convinced



 


117



that Iranians abroad will find a unity to fight the Islamist


regime, and that our diaspora will play a significant part in
its necessary inflection. I expect three things from them:
first, that they use all their influence to inform all the
western leaders on the reality of the Iranian threat to world
peace; second, that they use the above mentioned
interpenetration with the Iranians inside the country to
elude official censors and enable our people to understand
that the world will not remain indifferent to events in
Tehran; and third, when the moment comes, I expect the
more politically active members who consider themselves
as opponents to the regime, to return and fight with the
people, at their sides.
7
Role of the Great Powers



President Obama wished to start negotiations with Iran for

the sake of “progress”. I could have approved his logical
decision if he were outstretching his hand to someone else
than Ahmadinejad.

But it is he who is in power today.

Even if specific objectives are defined for these

negotiations —which should besides be limited in time to
avoid them replicating what happened last time negotiations
were started in vain by the European enabling the



 


119



Iranian regime to come closer every day to the point of no

return in its quest for the bomb—, I am convinced that all
this will unfortunately be useless.

Indeed, America enters forcefully into these negotiations

thanks to a new president who is popular, credible and
therefore legitimate. However, for these discussions to
succeed, this president must say: “We do not accept your
imperialist strategy, and we will not let you do this, for
Israel will not allow you to have the bomb, and we may not
be able to stop Israel from attacking you, which would set
the region ablaze. In other terms, if the negotiations lead
to no concrete result, that is you stop your military nuclear
programme, we will use the all pressure required to make
you give in”.

The only possible usefulness of these negotiations —in

which I plainly do not believe— would be to allow the
fringe of Iranian leaders (those who want to put an end to
the imperialist policy to avoid war) to understand that the
Americans have made their decision, and they will carry
their threats through. In this case, these



 


120
 Role of the Great Powers

leaders, in their own interest, will eventually reveal

themselves and the dissensions inside the regime, the scope
of which was clear in the light of the events of last summer.
The people will do the rest.

In any case, political and economic sanctions only, in a UN

resolution, would defeat the Islamist regime. Time is
running out, but we can still escape the worst.

As for the sanctions, I see six major series of measures:

– Cut oil imports. 45% oil consumed in Iran comes from

abroad, mostly India, Abu Dhabi, and a Dutch company.
If the world decides that Iran should no longer receive a
single drop of oil —even if that means compensating the
suppliers—, the Islamist government will keep the
remaining 55% for the police, the army, Pasdaran, and the
public and medical administrations, leaving an infinite part
to the people.

The endless queues at the petrol stations would be back like

in 1979 when the oil workers went on strike



 


121

creating a general dissatisfaction towards the Shah’s

regime.

– Stop buying Iranian oil. Most of Iran’s oil is exported to

China. If, within a global sanction policy, we can
convince the Chinese to refuse Iranian oil, we would then
simply compensate supplies to China and the other
countries who buy oil in Iran by increasing Saudi Arabia’s
production. The situation would be globally break-even,
but the Islamist regime would no longer have oil income.

– Forbid all transactions with Iran. Iranians cannot use

dollars, but they use euros or other currencies. We must
forbid commerce in euros and yens.

– Freeze imports and exports —except, of course, for

pharmaceuticals, medical equipment or basic foodstuffs.

– Confiscate all assets owned abroad by the regime and its

dignitaries. There already are lists, and in the current
context of bank transparency,



122
Role of the Great Powers

this measure is perfectly feasible technically.

– Strictly limit visas for western countries to regime

dignitaries.

These sanctions, which will eventually bring the regime

down to its knees, will indeed inflict the people for several
months. But I am absolutely convinced that they are
prepared to pay that price to recover freedom.

I simply expect from the free world that they trigger it. It
will then be up to us, Iranians, to do the rest.

This pressuring will be equivalent in my opinion to refusing

to sign the Munich Agreement.

In 1938, it would have been brave to not sign the

Agreement and go to war. Today, the brave solution
would be to take widespread action in a worldwide effort,
but with the purpose of avoiding war.

Of course, this will be impossible if China and Russia stay

out of it.
The problem in China is relatively uncomplicated, for it is
mostly economical and based, as I wrote before, on Iran oil
purchases. I do not think that it would be very difficult to
get the Chinese to sign

123

this sanctions programme, or at least not oppose to the

application of these sanctions.

As for Russia, it might be more complicated. They are

even in my opinion the key to the plan’s success. The
reason is very simple: Russia is the only great power
continuously present in Iran since the Revolution of 1979,
and they could counter the Americans and have the UN
vote a firm sanctions programme. It is not in Moscow’s
interest to have aggressive nuclear-armed Iran nearby, but
we will never get them to agree if we do not account for the
role and weight of Russia in my country and the region but
also the legitimate aspirations of Russia in the world.

I think that we will have Russia’s support on three

conditions:

First: provided the United States put a halt to the antimissile

shield plan in Poland and the Czech Republic, an
unjustified and dangerous provocation of the Bush
administration against Russia. Moreover, the US secretary
of state, Mrs Clinton, clearly said



124
 Role of the Great Powers

that the United States would be prepared to come back on

their decision in order to solve the Iran struggle.

Second: if we accept Russia as a great power and stop

treating it as Europe’s outcast every time the country wants
to invest in Europe. Let us accept them as a full-fledged
partner of the free world.

Third: Russia must be reassured about its relations with

Iranian people and place in the future Iran.





8
Yes, it must end!



Once again, the sanctions that I have stated in the previous

chapter, harsh as they may be for the Iranian people, are not
intended against them but on the contrary supposed to
support them so that they can take their destinies in their
own hands. And the Iranian people are ready and
prepared to understand this reasoning. Everyone recalls,
as I mentioned earlier, that in 1977 the determination of
Washington to make the Shah free his political prisoners
was enough to trigger the Revolution. The people, at the
time, were right in thinking that they had backing from the
West, and overthrew the monarch.



 


127



There could be a repeat soon.

The free world must unite and resolve, show that they will
no longer accept the slightest indulgence towards
Ahmadinejad’s imperialist regime, and that they will
certainly not let him threaten peace in the region. Then a
whole population craving for freedom, led by youth and
women, will massively take to the streets. And then those
within the very regime who wish above all to avoid war
with the West will be able to publicly uncover and try to get
the Supreme Leader to significantly soften the regime.
For these people know very well that war with Israel and
the West will inflict an exorbitant cost in lives and
prospects on the country, and they are well aware that they
could also loose everything in this unfortunate affair.

If they feel that the people are on the move, they will dare
reunite despite their diverging interests —some simply
want to save their fortunes, others wish to impose a more
modern regime like Turkey, and some only want to



 


128

Yes, it must end!

save Islam— and find a way out of the crisis.

And once they are revealed, it will be too late to retract.

There will a choice of only two outcomes: the Supreme
Leader accepts to soften the regime by deposing
Ahmadinejad, which is unlikely for Ahmadinejad has
already locked the situation to his advantage; or there will
be a coup-de-force.

In the meantime, the opposition must get organised and

carry out strikes, which are most cramping and easily done
in transports, a much segmented sector and therefore harder
to control than the public energy sector.

I am absolutely convinced that hypothetical Israeli air

strikes against my country’s nuclear sites will certainly not
defeat the Islamist regime, but Iranian society itself. We,
Iranians, have always been fatalistic individually but very
ambitious collectively, proud of our past and aware of our
role and duty in the region. We have resigned to fatalism
some thirty years ago, after having powerlessly watched the
religious seize our ideals in 1979. Now

129



that we know that the ballot boxes will not voice the
population’s wishes, the time for collective duty and
ambition has come. Thirty years later, it is time for my
country to sign, in its very birthplace, the death warrant of
political Islamism. Its termination in my country will be
its termination in the world. That is our duty, all Iranians,
and we will take it on.

Then we will create the Second Republic.

PART THREE

Creation of the Second

Republic: for a new wealthy
and democratic Iran





To recover our freedom and guarantee a better life for our

children and future generations, enthusiastic and fair, we
must accept every sacrifice, even the most sacred. But the
conquest for freedom, that I am sure we will win, even if
the price to pay is probably high, will impose duties upon
us. The first will be to implement a true long-lasting
democracy so that no man or ideology will ever question it
and take it away from us again. But our biggest challenge
will be to establish immediately, and without loosing any
time,



 


133
 


the conditions of a pacified and peaceful society. Order

will be re-established without seeking revenge or splitting
Iranian society, in a spirit of national reconciliation. Many
will claim vengeance for all the lost years, all the
confiscated riches, summary executions, stonings, deaths,
and all the barbaric and inhumane deeds, all the crimes
committed by the Islamic regime. But we must find the
strength to forgive from deep within ourselves, because that
is the price to pay to build the foundations of a peaceful
society.

This is why all those who, within the circles of power, with
their support, neutrality, or simply by refraining from
interfering, will have made the change possible will not be
exposed to any trial, and their assets will not be seized
unlike in 1979. This is the only way to end Islamic
tyranny that took the Revolution of 1979 away from the
people.

There will therefore be no need for a referendum on the

nature of the new regime, for Iran is a republic, but it will
be rid of its Islamist and antidemocratic yoke



 


134
 Creation of the Second Republic

to give rise to the Second Republic.

When the republic is restructured, we will permanently

install in Iran a fair and shared prosperity based on the
immense resources under our feet, our youth, graduates,
diaspora, and the rest. But whatever our economic success
and place among the developed and prosperous nations of
the region and world, the greatness and power of our
country cannot and must not be a reflection of our military
force or ideology, but that of our capacity to lead the whole
region towards long-lasting and therefore pacified
prosperity —I shall explain this in the fourth part.


1
Reform of the Constitution



After the Revolution of 1979, the first version of the new

Republic was directly inspired from the Constitution of
1906. But the Islamists diverted the Constitution from its
noble democratic ambition to the benefit of a tyrannical and
imperialist purpose by substituting the organic text and
greatly changing its form and purpose. In doing this, they
created the impression of a democracy with elected
institutions —President of the Republic and



 


137



Parliament, who appoint and support the government— but

supervised by non-elected institutions, the Council of
Guardians of the Islamic Revolution, the Expediency
Discernment Council of the System and the Assembly of
Experts, genuine Islamic control structures, under the
authority of the Supreme Leader, appointed for life with
absolute power. So when the democratic institutions of
the Republic were placed under the control and sponsorship
of Islamist non-elected institutions, democracy therefore
disappeared.

For thirty years, this system worked for the people never
confronted the regime, until the election of 12 June 2009.
For the first time, the people dared voice their wish to break
away from Ahmadinejad’s Islamism and expansionism.
But he did not intend to move an inch away from his
guideline. Neither did he intend to grant the youth and
women of this country the freedom that they claimed. So
the votes were massively rigged.



 


138
 Reform of the Constitution

The Second Republic’s Constitution will obviously be

cleared of all the non-democratic articles, and we will
dissolve all the non-elected bodies mentioned above.

There will be no religious institution or authority to

supervise or interfere in the operations of institutions
elected by the people. Individual liberties will be restored,
as well as freedom of the press, political parties, trade
unions…

However, modernity must not rime with loss of identity.

Democracy and intangible principles of freedom must not
lead to denying our traditions and religion. Our nation has
two thousand five hundred years of history. We have a
past that we are proud of, a religion —Shia Islam— that
90% of the population are attached to. The foundations of
modern and progressive Iran cannot persist to the detriment
of its past, culture and religion. Reza Shah had made a
major mistake —we paid the price of it sixty years later—
in forbidding the Islamic scarf and making men shave.

Future Iran must protect itself from excesses such as those

of Reza Shah against our traditions, and



 


139



from the prohibitions of the Islamic regime.

My father was a Muslim, my mother a Christian. I

therefore am Muslim. Nevertheless, I consider that
individual religion and belief must remain private. This
must not mean that individuals cannot freely express their
faiths, individually or collectively. But the State cannot
ordain its citizens’ beliefs or clothing. The State must on
the contrary guarantee free choice.

Although it is imperative, in the future Constitution of

democratic Iran, to separate once and for all religious and
political affairs, we need not however copy the French
secularity model, meaning a Republic without State
religion. If we want to avoid repeating past mistakes, we
must build our democracy by following our own paths, not
conform to others. The Iranian Republic will therefore
have an official religion: Shia Islam.

But of course, there will be no modern Iran without a

Constitution intent on guaranteeing



 


140
 Reform of the Constitution

equal rights to every Iranian, whatever their ethnic

extraction, religion, belief, or political views. Here is an
example, among so many others, of what our Republic will
no longer tolerate: the insult made to the Bahá’ís.
Bahá’ísm was founded in Persia in the 19th century, and has
expanded worldwide.

Founded by Islam “dissidents”, who wanted to modernise

it, Bahá’ísm is now considered as an independent religion,
like Islam, Christianity, or Hinduism. Bahá’í Faith
emphasizes social justice, tolerance and more importantly,
an unforgivable crime for the Islamic regime, equality
between men and women. There are an estimated 6
million Bahá’ís around the world. 300,000 stayed in Iran,
birthplace of the religion, despite the fierce repression they
encountered. Since 1979, Bahá’ís are considered
“infidels” and “non-people” who have no rights or
protection: they are not entitled to pension, do not have the
right to engrave names on the tombs of their deceased, are
not allowed to gather and practice their religion, etc. This
is unacceptable. In a wealthy country



 


141

like Iran, with 70 million inhabitants, the Bahá’í

community represents nothing politically. Its weight is
minimal, not to say inexistent. But it will be all credit to
our country if we grant them to right to exist, and endow
upon them the same rights as any other Iranian citizen.

As I have mentioned the gender equality issue in Bahá’ísm,

I would like to say this: equality between men and women
will obviously be one of the first articles of the Second
Republic’s Constitution. The Islamic government,
claiming to apply the Sharia, Islamic non-written law,
purely and simply institutionalised inequality between
Iranian men and women. Divorce is always to the benefit
of the husband. In homicide inquiries, a man’s evidence is
worth that of two women. A man inherits twice as much
as a woman, etc. Not to mention the segregation inflicted
on women in the working world, public life, and leisure.

I am ashamed of what our society imposes on our women

for the past thirty years, and we will



142
 Reform of the Constitution

make sure that this kind of segregation never happens again

in our country, for our women and every single category of
our population.





2
Legal system



In the Islamic regime, the Supreme Leader incarnates full

judiciary authority. But that is not the only intrusion of
religion in justice. In practice, most Court Presidents are
appointed by the religious authorities.

Violation of defence laws is commonplace. Besides, the

judiciary system is completely disrupted by special courts
that are only created to serve the regime. The
revolutionary courts, which should have disappeared with
the continued establishment of the Islamic Republic, are
still active…



 


145



My country’s legal system in is back to where it was before

the Revolution of 1906, when every jurisdiction was the
prerogative of the clergy and the members discussed
litigious affairs before courts formed and presided over by
the religious. Only in 1906 the Constitutional Revolution
created a “law reform commission” to adapt Iran’s juridical
system to the modern world. A new system was created,
highly inspired from French law, establishing prosecutors,
examining magistrates, judgement jurisdictions, and
specialised judges.

That was when the lawyer’s profession was established,

totally independent from 1952, under Mossadegh. But the
Islamist regime is guilty of a criminal regress. Today, the
judiciary authority —therefore religious— grants lawyer
practice permission, and also decides how many lawyers
are required in each administrative region of Iran! The
courage and self-will of my country’s lawyers is
remarkable, despite the many more unacceptable
hindrances to their profession, they go on



 


146

The justice

following their vocation, which is to ensure the

imprescriptible right to be defended.

But the judiciary system today is not only subjected to

religious fundamentalists: it is also corrupted.

The reorganisation of the country’s justice will therefore be

another absolute priority. Justice will be restored to serve
general interest and protect citizen rights.

We will create a judiciary authority independent from the

administration. We will organise higher education
specialised in training judges and lawyers, so that they are
competent, which is far from being the case today,
especially judges. We will obviously remove the special
courts. And put an end to torture, all forms of
ill-treatment, and inhuman and degrading corporal
punishments —stoning, amputation…— instituted by the
Islamist regime in the name of the Sharia.
The death penalty issue remains. The Islamists have made
it a formidable judiciary weapon. Every year tens of

147



convicts are executed by the regime. Worse still:

regardless of all international conventions, convicts who
were underage at the time of the crime are executed on the
very day they become adults. Usually, the crimes they are
accused seem trivial compared to the sanction, but this is
how the regime terrorises Iranian ethnic minorities,
particularly the Baloch people, many of which have been
executed. These poor teenagers are held in prison until the
day they come of age, and are then remorselessly executed.
These unacceptable actions will obviously be banished on
the very first day, hour, and second of the Second Republic.

In a broader sense, I am personally opposed to death

penalty, whatever the crime involved.

I see it as inhumane, barbaric, and disgraceful of a modern

society —think about miscarriage of justice! My
conviction was formed during the Revolution of 1979 when
every morning I listened to the day’s list of convicts on the
radio, dreading to hear my father’s name,






148
 The justice

praying to God that he would be spared another day. I

considered my father innocent. I therefore found his
possible execution unacceptable. In those days, I realised
that other people in my country and throughout the world
could be sentenced to death when they were probably
innocent. My conviction is based on that feeling: if only
to avoid miscarriage of justice, death penalty is intolerable.

In saying this, I know that I will outrage most of my

fellow-countrymen who are not yet ready for such a
change. My country’s tradition is still dominated by
capital punishment as in the whole region. But I hope that
one day Iran will have a government brave and strong
enough to impose the abolition of death penalty through
Parliamentary law.


 


3
State machinery



The Islamic regime is based on an overstaffed and perniciously

sprawling administration, in charge of almost everything, not
to improve the nation’s welfare, but to better impose its
stranglehold over the Iranians’ lives and destinies. Its
incompetence, pathetic management and ideological scope
have laid waste to the country. It is therefore imperative to
reorganise the State. It must henceforth refocus on its
political functions. I have already mentioned justice. I shall
develop health and social protection in the next chapter. I
will also save a chapter to define the main economic lines of
the nation.



151



Lastly, there is domestic and international security, as well

as education, and world influence.

Regarding domestic and international security, I will make

it short and clear: a democratic and modern State must rely
on a single army and a single police, one and the other
serving the people under government control, and under
authority of the head of State elected by the people. We
will remove all the unofficial forces of the Islamic regime
that serve Islamist power exclusively. The Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps will merge with the regular
army, which will also save substantial amounts in the State
budget.

As for the Basij and other repression forces of the Islamic

regime, they will simply be disbanded, and members
employed more usefully to rebuild the country.

Moreover, we will obviously free the media.

Public television and radio will be subjected to an

independent high authority.

And we will open the waves to new actors,




152
State machinery



from the private sector, in line however with government

specifications.
As for education, I would like to put forward three figures.
Almost 80% of the population is literate, the highest rate in
the region. The country has some 10 million graduates and
2.5 million young students in university. Unfortunately, this
intellectual wealth, which will be very useful to rebuild the
country, has no economical effect. For virtually all young
Iranians, the university, under Islamic dictatorship, represents
the only space for freedom and emancipation, including the
young women who have access to university and outnumber
young men. By going to university they demonstrate their
thirst for knowledge, wish for self-assertion, to come together
and prove that they exist. Even if they have little hope in
their future and know that unemployment looms ahead.
Or they have a go at expatriation; since the early 2000s, the
brain drain due to lack of freedom and



153



professional prospects corrupts and cramps the country.

Education and university policy will be a priority for the

Second Republic.

We will organise it efficiently.

We will help the students to better choose their studies and

adapt education to the needs of the reconstruction economy
and most importantly, we will create professional vocations
in line with the country’s needs.

Slimmed down, restructured, and more efficient, the State

will be an essential wheel in the workings of new Iran.
The success of the reform will dictate most of the rest.
But we cannot build a prosperous and modern Republic
without the cooperation of all citizens. This leads me to
the unpleasant but essential subject of tax.

Today, Iran’s tax administration is so disorganised that tax

collection is virtually inexistent. Only the civil servants
pay tax, then again not even all of them. The rest of the
population gets

154
 State machinery

away without paying. And without the slightest remorse,

for most of them do not want to hand anything over to the
Islamic regime. But Iran is too large a country to only rely
on its natural resources to fund its State organisation. The
people will understand, when Liberation comes, that it is
absolutely necessary for everyone to join the effort. But I
fear not: my fellow-countrymen will feel themselves
responsible for rebuilding their country.

The administration will implement a simple and reasonable

tax system, pay-as-you-earn for individuals, with maximum
rate hypothetically under 20% of income. Business
taxation will be very simple: any productive and non
speculative investment of any origin will be completely
tax-exempt after five to ten years, depending on the type of
investment. The rest will be subjected to a single rate that
will not exceed 30% benefits or gains.



 


155
 


Lastly, when preparing this chapter, I was shocked by the

striking absence of credible and more importantly
structured figures on the state of Iran’s economy and
accounts. We must immediately create a national statistics
authority, to provide the indicators required for any modern
and democratic country.
We will also create a national audit office, in charge of
certifying all the State’s accounts. Without these two
bodies, most of our reconstruction efforts would be useless.
4
Health and social protection



The situation in this region is pathetic and intolerable for a

country that has, despite its subsoil resources, the human
development rate of an underdeveloped nation: of the 179
countries classified, it comes in 96th…

Over a third of the population has no social security

insurance. And for those who do, mainly civil servants,
with several different funds, coverage is insufficient, not to
say inadequate for the



 


157



modern society needs. Major operations or heavy

treatments requiring several years of a regular family’s
income, and the best social protection funds only pay for an
infinite part of these treatments.

One of my friends, director and main stockholder of one of

Tehran’s largest clinics, recently told me that a patient of
his with cancer was unable to pay for the operation “even if
he sold his house and all his family assets”.

My friend paid for everything, but alas, the whole

population is not that lucky.

The rate of non-coverage of the elderly reaches 60%, and I

refer here to the main sectors of social coverage: health and
pension. In 1996, people over 60 years only represented
6.6% of the population, but they are estimated at 25% for
2030. While the biggest part of our country’s population
is now under 30, and is therefore unlikely to need costly
treatments, soon natural population ageing will
astronomically raise our needs for



 


158
 Health and social protection

public healthcare, and the global cost will then rocket as

well. The country is under-equipped to fund or treat these
generations. We are therefore heading strait for general
disaster.

And besides, all ages included, social protection

deficiencies are greater for women than for men. And
these deficiencies lead a significant part of the female
population to prostitution, a national plague that reveals its
poverty.

Moreover, there are over 4 million drug addicts, another

plague of our society, mainly among the younger people.
Treatments are not covered, and consequently a large
proportion of the country’s youth looses itself further in the
vicious circle of misery, drugs, and delinquency. It is too
late to simply deliver free healthcare to solve this problem,
we need a true economic incitation policy to steer our youth
clear from this plague that infects entire sections of society.

We must implement a universal health coverage system for

the whole population, and an



 


159

ambitious construction or restorative programme for our

hospitals. We must re-organise the pensions system, and
allocate a decent minimum pension to the elderly who were
unable to contribute to a fund during their working lives, so
that they can end their lives decently.

Lastly, we must launch a birth encouragement programme.

For it is often ignored that Iran is dying! From 1981 to
2001, the birth rate fell from 5.3 to 2.6 children per woman.
And the primary analyses of the latest census of 2006
reveal that the situation is getting worse: the birth rate is
now below 2 children per woman, and is even down to 1.5
around Tehran!

No country has ever experienced such a quick or

spectacular de-escalation. In France, the same evolution
took decades. And it was due to modernity: lower infant
mortality, higher living standards, working women, etc.
Whereas Iran, one of the planet’s most converted societies,
is the world record breaker in fecundity rate collapse for
one and single reason: with no hope



160
 Health and social protection

in their future, my fellow-countrymen unmotivated and

depressed by theocratic dictatorship have stopped bearing
children.

All these measures, of course, will be very costly. But

health and social protection, as well as pensions for the
elderly, are one of our State’s primary duties. Due to the
opacity of the regime’s statistics, it is impossible to
anticipate these costs today. But one thing is certain; our
country has the means to build in less than a decade the
foundations of social protection and a modern and dignified
health policy.

Moreover, we will create a great State fund in charge of

managing the assets of the Guardians of the Islamic
Revolution and all the foundations, and we will distribute
their income to create new hospitals, renovate existing
establishments and fund pensions. They will also serve to



161

restore our population plagued by drugs and prostitution.

These foundations are a speciality of Iran.

They were created after the Revolution of 1979, initiated by

Khomeini. The idea at the time was to seize the fortunes
of all the great families in connection with the former
regime, and redistribute them to the people through charity.
A considerable amount of assets were seized: plants, banks,
farms, hotels, buildings…, and wound up in the pockets of
some ten now immensely wealthy foundations. For these
assets have yielded profit over the past thirty years. The
foundations now have control over a third of the country’s
wealth. Besides the fact that they are tax exempt, they are
not requested to publish their books. Chairmen are
appointed by the Supreme Leader, and do not answer to
anyone. The two most prominent, the Foundation for the
Oppressed and Disabled in Tehran (former Pahlavi
foundation, initiated by my father in 1958) and the Imam
Reza Foundation in Mashhad, are so powerful that they are
said to be “States within the State”. The money they deal
with is only intended to line the



 


162
 Health and social protection

pockets of the regime or fund the spreading of Islamism.

Hezbollah is funded with this money.


5
Regions



For the past thirty years, the Islamic regime has constantly
despised the minorities that contribute to the richness and
diversity of our country. These minorities are religious,
but also ethnical, and are mainly located in the Iranian
border provinces.

I have already mentioned the Bahá’ís. But the Kurds,

Azeri, Baloch, etc., of Iran are subjected to the same
oppression. In February 2009, an Azeri protest claiming
the right to learn their language in school was severely
repressed and leaders imprisoned. In the Sistan and
Baluchestan Province, the second largest of the country,



 


165

in the south-east of Iran, bordering Afghanistan and

Pakistan, and one of the poorest and least developed
provinces, the strong Sunni minority legitimately consider
themselves as oppressed, and certain members are also
tempted to start guerrilla movements. Likewise in
Kordestan, where live a strong Kurdish minority.

In general, these peoples feel frustrated for not being

acknowledged their particularity, culture, or history, and are
legitimately angry for being systematically denied
involvement in managing their province.

As soon as there is disruption in one of these regions, the

regime of Ahmadinejad always reacts with fierce
repression, and claims, an old tune of his, that the United
States seek to destabilise the country. Separatist
campaigners, if they even exist in these regions, remain a
minority, and the country’s integrity is not compromised for
now. Nevertheless, if we do not take regional
particularities into account, as well as the melting-pot of
inequalities that thirty years of Islamism have created, we
may be in trouble in the future.

166
 The regions

The Second Republic will naturally give more autonomy to

the provinces for managing their current affairs. It is
however important that all the minorities feel at home in
Iran, that their languages and beliefs are respected.
Likewise, their representation in the Central Administration
bodies will be significantly increased. Lastly, as I said in
the chapter on economy, we will redirect production
investments towards these provinces so that they benefit
from the general reconstruction effort of the country, in
order to reduce the unforgivable lag that the Islamic regime
has inflicted on its territories.

This pro-active policy of integration is the key to avoiding

instability in our provinces.





6
Economy



After thirty years of dictatorship, fraudulent management,

and dilapidation of national resources to satisfy the
expansionist policy of the Islamic regime, the economic
situation of our country is totally disgraceful for its calibre
and historical aspirations. How can a nation with 10% of
the world’s oil resources and second-ranking country for
natural gas reserves have such an outrageous
unemployment rate, crushing inflation, and general
economic situation brining it down amongst the
under-developed?



 


169



The boon of our natural resources was not only massively

siphoned away from collective welfare to serve the
imperialist plans of power, it has also, because there is no
coherent industrial policy, created blatant inequalities
within the country, breaking up its cohesion and
jeopardising its sovereignty. For years, most of Iran’s
development benefited the North-South axis, literally
tracing the line between the oil deposits and Tehran, to the
detriment of the eastern and western regions. But the
worst is that our country, despite its considerable resources,
was unable to industrialise. Tremendous fortunes have
emerged with the Islamic dictatorship, thanks to the trade
liberalisation in the 1990s, but these fortunes were created
from import and redistribution circuits of foodstuffs or
finished products—in other words, a middle-man economy
rather than entrepreneur and builder economy. The
meagre industrial sector inherited from the former regime is
now in ruins.

Public and para-public orders are monopolised by several

great powerful groups sufficiently connected to



 


170
 Economy

the regime to not worry about financial and fiscal

constraints. As for the privatisation of former public
companies, it was carried out in an unacceptable climate of
opacity, to the sole profit of several clans connected to the
regime.

Since Ahmadinejad has come into power, it has been even

worse. The money is massively concentrated in the
pockets of a few, or distributed as grants to favour a
pro-Ahmadinejad clientele, impoverishing part of the
population, while making it dependent on State subsidies
—a model shared by all dictatorships. Reversely,
productive investments that could have fostered growth and
employment were never made.

This is terrifying: it all needs reconstructing.

This reconstruction will require a true mega plan

—“marshally” speaking, not “marxistically”, of course!
We must define an economic and industrial policy that will
account for the country’s natural resources but also its
intellectual resources (number of graduates) and resources
abroad that



 


171



can support it (the diaspora force), and most importantly the

craving of our people, especially the younger ones, for
building a modern, prosperous and powerful Iran.

To immediately stamp out our country’s two main plagues,

mass unemployment and hyperinflation, leaving a whole
part of the population off the train and jeopardising our
nation’s cohesion, we must reorganise the country’s
economy by encouraging private initiatives, whether great
or small. Firstly, because Iran must be built by Iranians
—and Iranians must invest in their future—, we must create
a class of small and medium-sized entrepreneurs to create
jobs in the country; but we must also encourage industrial
investors to turn towards the various branches of Iran’s
economy, for the State has no resources or desire to do it
all.

As for the existent wealthy consortiums, provided that there

are no antitrust issues and that they do not try to stop the
people’s desire to conquer their freedom, they must simply
be prompted —not to say compelled—



 


172
 Economy

to invest in projects in line with the industrial policy

defined and designed by the country.

For national interest, and economical, strategic, but also

environmental reasons, the energy resources extraction
policy —as well as price-fixing for domestic consumption,
in line with national economy requirements— will remain
under the authority of the State. These deposits belong to
the whole nation. However, we will need private capital
to exploit them. There is a simple reason to this: to
improve the production tool, we will need to invest
considerable amounts. The petrochemical industry is
practically wrecked. The refining potential is chronically
insufficient: Iran imports almost half of its petrol.
Maximum oil production is 4 million barrels per day, when
it should reach 5 to 6 million barrels. And we import gas!

Some fifty billion dollars would be needed to simply bring

our oil production capacity from 4 to 6 million barrels per
day for the five coming years, without mentioning



 


173



investments in refining, petrochemistry, and gas extraction

and production.

This is why the capital of the company that will be in

charge of extracting and distributing these resources will be
accessible to private investors (the State will keep a
majority stake to stay in control).

The same will be implemented for the water policy: the

State will keep major guidelines, but subcontract the
management of water to private companies, with the
obligation to comply with State-set specifications to
guarantee quality and fixed prices. This will be the same
with electricity production.

But no coherent industrial policy is possible without

developing communication infrastructures at the same time.
Roads are insufficient. The railway is obsolete. We
need a real major projects policy, funded by loans, to create
railway and motorway networks worthy of a modern
country over the next decade. Bearing in mind
environmental concerns, we recommend goods transport by
railway and reserve



 


174
 Economy

roads for people transport mainly.

Lastly, we must completely reform the agricultural policy,

which is a major key to our independence, a must have for a
strong and lasting development.

Our soil is rich with a wide variety of climates, fertile to

produce just about anything, so it is outrageous to see Iran
importing so many agricultural foodstuffs. We must set
the basis of a new agricultural policy to guarantee our
self-sufficiency.

The State must subsidise small agricultural units to

revitalise rural regions, which will consequently curve
rural-urban migration, which creates enormous pockets of
poverty on the outskirts of the country’s major cities that
are uncontrollable and explosive in the long run.





7
Role of the diaspora



As I have already explained, the Iranian diaspora is one of

the world’s most significant and powerful. It is thereby
one of our country’s greatest assets.

But most Iranians abroad are perfectly integrated in their

host countries, where most of them have done very well,
and will never return home; whatever their ties with Iran,
and although they “live” and think Iran. We must
therefore make their implication in Iran’s future possible,
without compromising their ties with their host countries.
I have the utmost conviction



 


177



that they will wish to take part in building modern Iran, by

investing directly in economic projects; and defending the
interests of their homeland in their host countries.

We must encourage them and make their initiatives

possible. As there are so many of them and they are
important people, I think that the country will need a
Ministry of the Diaspora.

The influence of the new Iran outside its borders will not be
forced militarily nor ideologically, but through its capacity
to lead the whole region towards prosperity, a necessary
prelude to its pacification.

This is the raison d’être of this book’s fourth part, our duty
towards coming generations: the creation of an economic
community of countries in the Near East, Middle East and
Central Asia.
PART FOUR



Community of Countries of
the Near and Middle East
and Central Asia: a great
regional plan





1
Iran and its neighbours



Deep down, I am definitely Iranian; although I have spent

over half of my life away from my country, and mostly in
Europe. Even though my wife and children are European,
and I have built my life here in Europe. And still, after
thirty years of exile, I still think and reason like an Iranian,
and easterner. I still feel like the child from the region that
birthed me, and I feel close to these people and their
preoccupations, past, vision of the world, but also their
suffering and shattered dreams.



 


181



Considering its historical weight and also geographical

location, my country cannot overview its role in the region:
from Turkey to Pakistan, Azerbaijan to Iraq, Turkmenistan
to Qatar… with its land borders and neighbours from across
the narrow Persian Gulf and the strategic Strait of Hormuz,
Iran directly borders thirteen countries

This is considerable. Thanks to this central position,

Ahmadinejad would like to spread his evil Islamist
ideology. I, on the contrary, want for my country to
spread peace and prosperity instead of war and nuclear
threat. I want for my country to transform its hegemonic
and expansionist vision into a righteous leading drive for
the whole region.

These borders separating us, which in some cases are

apparently impassable divides, were not always as they are
now. The roots of our populations often bear proof of the
interpenetration of diverse influences throughout our
history, and their fecundity for our culture.



 


182
 Iran and its neighbours

As for my family, my father’s side came from a 14th

century Turkmen tribal federation, the Black Sheep. The
federation ruled over what now is east of Anatolia,
Armenia, Iranian Azerbaijan and north of Iraq. Some
years before 1400, their ruler Qara Yusuf, extended their
territory with his conquest policy. The Black Sheep
captured Baghdad and Tabriz. His son, Jahan Shah,
known as Sultan Jahan Shah, turned his inheritance to good
account. Under his reign, the Black Sheep territory
became the fourth great Islamic State of the region,
covering the equivalent of half of Iran today, and its
prosperity knew its apogee. But Jahan Shah was not only
a conqueror, he also was a wise sovereign who encouraged
culture and science —he himself wrote poems in Turkish
and Persian— and he left the perpetual image of a great
builder. Closer to our time, my mother’s grandfather,
Sheikh Khaz'al Khan, reigned over the Sheikhdom of
Mohammerah, an autonomous province at the time that
bordered over the south of today’s Iran, Iraq and Kuwait.
When oil was discovered in 1909 my great-grandfather



 


183
 


signed with the English the creation of the Anglo-Persian

Oil Company, the first to exploit black gold in the region.
After resisting against Reza Shah, he was eventually
defeated by himself. His assets were seized; his territories
were placed under the authority of the central government:
they now are the province of Khuzestan.

My origins, childhood, and life therefore explain the belief

that is rooted within me that we, the peoples of the region
must henceforth work together hand-in-hand, and not
fist-against-fist. And that we must forget past and present
differences, overcome our disagreements, to build the
conditions of a pacified region, founded on our common
interests.

This belief has become in time a conviction: that of the

necessary elaboration of a grand regional plan leading to
the construction of an Economic Community of Countries
in the Near and Middle East and Central Asia. For if we
want to guarantee prosperity, security, and therefore peace
for all, we must accept that no country of the region will



 


184
 Iran and its neighbours

bring a reliable and lasting solution if it is national and

disconnected from a global process.

I know that I may be called naïve, utopian, and a dreamer.

I may even jeopardise my credibility. But I claim loud
and strong that I am sure the plan I am about to outline here
is perfectly in line with history. It will not be simple or
easy to implement, doubtless it will impose sacrifices on
everyone, but we must do it for we have no other choice.

All major challenges like this one seem utopian at first, but
mankind’s will and driving force can lead us beyond the
unimaginable. This is how World War II was won; this is
how we sent man to the Moon; this is how the Berlin Wall
fell; this is how Apartheid disappeared, and a man walked
out of prison to rule, without no bloodshed or revenge,



 


185



the country that imprisoned him thirty years earlier.

If all these challenges were a success, it was because those

who initiated them, individually or collectively, did not shy
away from the insurmountable wall of obstacles that stood
against their dreams and duties. They committed to climb
it with the conviction that they would succeed, for there just
was not any other choice; failure was simply not possible;
they simply felt it was their duty to lead the masses that
trusted them.

This is how our predecessors changed their dreams into

reality, and this is how this region nearing 500 million
inhabitants will rise from its chronic underdevelopment,
repeated wars, and barbaric and destructive ideologies.
2
Peace and democracy will
derive from prosperity



Half of the region’s populations live in countries at war:

Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and Occupied Palestinian
Territories. Sixty two million Iranians are subjected to the
merciless yoke of dictatorship that did nothing but
impoverish the country. Israel, the only true regional
democracy and also wealthiest country for all its
inhabitants, is permanently on the alert or fighting along its
borders. The other peoples of the region live in more or
less wealthy, more or less authoritarian countries. As for
the



 


187
 


Gulf countries, they are relatively prosperous —relatively

because this does not stem from a development and
resource creation policy, but from the exploitation of their
natural resources — although, for the past ten years, these
States have showed a will to diversify their income and
better distribute their riches, although still very
sub-standard.

Unless we install in all these countries the conditions of fair

and diffused prosperity in all social strata, we will not have
peace, and without peace, there will be no true and lasting
democracy. Bush’s America wanted to democratise Iraq
from the top, by imposing western values. We all know
the outcome. It was a major mistake to think that
democracy will bring peace and prosperity: it will be the
reverse.

I would like to recall an example: the founding of Europe.

Who would have thought back in 1945, that after such an
awfully deadly conflict that killed tens of millions of people
around the world, that France and Germany, two relentless
rivals that dragged



 


188
 Peace and democracy will derive from prosperity

other nations into their fratricide conflicts over decades,

would decide, five years later, to cooperate for the welfare
of the population?

This was the great idea of Jean Monnet to place

French/German coal and steel productions under a common
high authority, within an organisation open to other
European countries. As main resource of western
countries, steel played an important role throughout the
three major conflicts that opposed France and Germany
since 1870. Jean Monnet’s plan, developed on 9 May1950
by Robert Schuman in a famous speech, was to organise
free circulation of coal and steel and free access to
production sources. The objective was dual: facilitate the
reconstruction of the European continent, all its economies
were shattered by five years of war, and ensure eternal
peace: “We are at the very beginning of the effort that
Europe must make to eventually achieve unity, prosperity
and peace”, said Robert Schuman in his speech. With
Jean Monnet, he was convinced that peace comes mainly
through



 


189



economic reconciliation, which then creates political

appeasement. Time has proved them right. In April
1951, Italy and Benelux decided to join France and
Germany.

The European Coal and Steel Community was born. It

was the first step towards today’s Europe.
3
Outlines of the Community



This Community of Countries in the Near and Middle East

and Central Asia will encompass twenty countries:
Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, United
Arab Emirates, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon,
Oman, Uzbekistan, Palestinian territories, Pakistan, Qatar,
Syria, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Yemen. It will
border China, Russia, India, the Mediterranean, Europe,
and Africa.



 


191



Two other countries could legitimately be included: Turkey

and Egypt. However, it seemed logical not to. The
greatness of Egypt, the importance of its people, its
richness, and historical role in pacifying the region would
fully justify its integration into this Community, but then,
why not also extend to Libya and Northern Africa? There
must be a limit. And although Egypt will obviously have
privileged ties with the Community of Countries in the
Near and Middle East and Central Asia, I am convinced
that it will also become one of the flagship nations of the
Union for the Mediterranean initiated by President Sarkozy.

As for Turkey, although I believe that its interests lie in this

Community, and it would be the interest of the whole
region, the will of the Turkish people, and most of their
leaders, directs Turkey inexorably towards Europe.
Anyway, the creation of our Community will facilitate its
European Union membership, for one of the main blocking
elements for the European is that



 


192



Two other countries could legitimately be included: Turkey

and Egypt. However, it seemed logical not to. The
greatness of Egypt, the importance of its people, its
richness, and historical role in pacifying the region would
fully justify its integration into this Community, but then,
why not also extend to Libya and Northern Africa? There
must be a limit. And although Egypt will obviously have
privileged ties with the Community of Countries in the
Near and Middle East and Central Asia, I am convinced
that it will also become one of the flagship nations of the
Union for the Mediterranean initiated by President Sarkozy.

As for Turkey, although I believe that its interests lie in this

Community, and it would be the interest of the whole
region, the will of the Turkish people, and most of their
leaders, directs Turkey inexorably towards Europe.
Anyway, the creation of our Community will facilitate its
European Union membership, for one of the main blocking
elements for the European is that



 


192
 Outlines of the Community

it borders an instable region and therefore is a danger for

Europe’s stability.

Inwardly, the creation of a common space for these twenty

States will favour an equitable and indispensable circulation
of riches from the most developed countries to the least
developed. This can eventually jeopardise regional
stability. Let’s go over the example of Iran, with its 70
million inhabitants. Even once we will be rid of the
regime of Ahmadinejad and when Iran will be wealthy,
powerful and democratic again, how could we eternally
guarantee security in our country if there are 200 million
Afghani and Pakistani next door living in unacceptable
misery? Let’s also recall the unbearable misery of the
Palestinians condemning any attempt at peace even before
it is created. I could list elsewhere in the region other
similar disparities, as striking and unfair. If we do not
solve them collectively, they will lead sooner or later to
war.



193



I am convinced that the Iranian people, like they proved to

be mature during the events of June 2009, are mature
enough to understand that if they want peace, the
reconstruction of Iran will also require the economic
reconstruction of the region.

To protect our people from outside attacks, the solution is

not to develop, as was too often the case, increasingly
oversized armies, but to boost these countries’ economies.
We must make the vicious circle —more misery creating yet
more inequalities, therefore increasing conflict threat and
military expenses— a virtuous circle —more prosperity, less
inequalities, therefore lower conflict threats, and less
military expenses, and more money available for social and
economic development.

Outwardly, the creation of this Community will increase the

political and economic weight of the region. Each member
country, even the largest and wealthiest, is not very
significant individually in global politics. But if they are
united, these twenty countries, with



 


194
 Outlines of the Community

their 480 million inhabitants and resources, will

indisputably be heard in every international organ.

Besides, the constitution of this Community will contribute

to global growth with its boosted domestic market. I am
convinced that this region can eventually become the
second-ranking global growth relay, behind China.

Lastly, regarding peace, the creation of this Community of

Countries in the Near and Middle East and Central Asia
will serve not only the interests of its people, but also
western democracies. Establishing perennial peace in one
of the most restless regions of the world will contribute to
reducing military expenses in developed countries,
therefore leaving more resources for their economic
development.








4
Organisation



The immediate mission of the Community of Countries in

the Near and Middle East and Central Asia will be to
establish a common policy in three essential fields: energy,
agriculture and water management.

It must first create a supranational authority, that I call

high authority, with members to defend not the interests of
their countries, but the common interest of all member
countries. This high authority will be the supervision and
implementation body for the common policy, designed by
member countries in the three fields. It will be
headquartered, symbolically, in



 


197



one of the poorest or most restless countries of the region

—Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, or Palestine. This high
authority will be financially autonomous: its operation
budget will be fed by a tax on energy production in member
countries.

A Council of Ministers from member countries will be the

decision-making body of the Community. Lastly, a Court
of Justice will ensure the observance and application of
joint decisions.

It must be very clear that this Community is a purely

economic plan. It must never be planned at any time to
change it into a political federation or union. This being
said, all economic plans, whether national or supranational,
have political goals. Ours will be to stop rivalries, and
therefore wars, within our region, by creating the conditions
of the union of our peoples in their diversity and in
compliance with their liberties. And like France and
Germany, yesterday’s two brother enemies, had a decisive
role to play in founding

ECSC and the “French/German couple” still remains one of

the main driving forces of



198

Organisation

the European Union enlarged to 25, I am convinced that

Iran and Israel, whose peoples are not hostile towards one
another, but whose governments are temporarily the two
main enemies of the region, will have a significant role to
play in creating this Community. With the cooperation of
other States, each one, whatever its size or economic
weight, having the same importance in making this plan a
success, upon which depends the future of our region.

What is more, the founding act of this Economic

Community must clearly state the will of all member
countries to commit to their progressive democratisation.

The Community will naturally ambition to eventually

enable the free circulation of goods, people, and services.
But this last point is a progressive goal that will only be
possible with preset conditions, accepted by the member
States, on the level of domestic security, democracy and
economic development of each country.
Lastly, we must also plan to make the region totally
nuclear-free. This

199



will probably take decades, maybe even a whole century,

but one thing is certain, we will make it, for the emergence
of a homogenous prosperity in the region will contribute to
pacifying it for ever. And facilitate the convergence of
minds towards a new vision of our priorities, which is
directing our means and resources towards development
and improvement of collective welfare, not means of
protection against possible attacks from our neighbours.

Is it possible to create a single currency in this vast

Community?

This would be completely illusory, given the disparity of

economies of the countries in the Community of Countries
in the Near and Middle East and Central Asia —not before
a very, very long time.
However, it is indispensable to create, very soon, a
common currency for the Gulf countries, for their
economies have converging wealth, growth, and

200
 Organisation

development. This plan has, in fact, been implanted for

several years already in certain countries. Six, to be
specific: Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain and
the United Arab Emirates. In 2007, the plan also failed
once, when Oman decided to withdraw and keep its
currency, the dirham, bound to the dollar.

But the following year, the five other countries announced

their wish to continue the plan, and even mentioned 2010 as
a deadline for launching the Gulf countries’ currency. The
withdrawal, in May 2009, of the United Arab Emirates,
concerned about the outstanding role that Saudi Arabia
might have in this monetary union, definitely stopped it.

Once my country will be freed from the Islamist regime,

this plan will become highly relevant with the inclusion of
Iran. But it will only have a true chance to come through
if it is strongly justified, regionally but also globally. In
this case, serve to set oil prices. This currency of the Gulf
countries must therefore not only involve the wealthier
oil-producing countries



 


201



of the region. And it will be designed to prepare what

several great economies in the world, particularly China
and Russia, increasingly demand: that oil prices be set in
another currency than the US dollar. If Iran and all the
oil-producing countries of the Gulf decide to create a
single, stable, and strong currency, it shall not only enable
to regionally establish monetary stability beneficial to other
countries, but it will also be a pretext to create a basket to
set oil prices. This basket will hold dollars, euros, yens,
Chinese money, maybe even roubles, and lastly Gulf
money.

In any case, the elaboration of this Gulf currency is a totally

different step (but why not lateral?) from creating the
Community of Countries in the Near and Middle East and
Central Asia, and limited to a sub-group of countries in the
Community
5
Energy policy



The Community’s Energy policy must encompass all the

needs of the region, lower production costs, and more
importantly, thanks to the common management policy,
favour true solidarity which will be a factor of peace.

Each country will obviously keep control over subsoil

resources, but the region will jointly set prices and define
production capacities.

Indeed, I understand that at first such a concentration —the

region has almost two thirds of the world deposits— can be



 


203



awesome, especially to the Americans. With their

privileged relationship with Saudi Arabia, they have
always been tempted to influence the production
quotas of the world’s first-ranking oil producer
depending on their own needs.

But America must know that the pacification of the

region prevails over any other partisan consideration.
To this day, they have not even been able to solve the
problems in Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan —despite
the tremendous efforts they have deployed in these
countries—, so they must admit that they will only
barely contribute to the pacification of one of the
world’s most explosive regions if they were simply
deprived of their influence on the adapting of Saudi
Arabia’s production capacity to global geopolitical
problems.

As for Saudi Arabia, they will probably subscribe to

this community plan, for I have a feeling that the
present sovereign is extremely intent on directing his
country towards democracy, and even more on
pacifying the region, and I know that he is as
preoccupied as we are about the future of the area,
should we not find together a global solution.
6
Agriculture



Although rural tradition in all the region’s countries is very

ancient, discovering and exploiting hydrocarbons in many
of them has generally curbed agriculture modernisation.
Besides the fact that in these countries, economies
cannibalised by the oil resources have become
non-productive failing to make productive investments, the
oil “manna” has increased migration of rural populations
towards the mirage of urban areas.

These populations settle in shanty towns where insecurity

is rising. As a result, half the region’s countries today



 


205



are totally dependant for food and must import meat,

cereals, and other foodstuffs to feed their populations. But
agriculture in the region is not only chronically behind
(yields, especially, are notoriously insufficient everywhere),
it is also threatened by other more recent dangers: the
degradation of soils, due to the growing water drought and
increased desertification due to global warming.

Only a communitarian agricultural policy, modern,

region-scale, and carefully concerted in the observance of
the needs, resources, and capacities of the member
countries, will steer us away from the risk of de growing
food unbalances, which could be socially explosive, and
rural populations will put down roots in their land. Food
security in the region is a perquisite for long-lasting peace.
7
Water, a major problem



In the 1980s, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Egypt’s Foreign

Affairs Minister at the time predicted that “the next war in
the Middle East will be a war for water, not politics”. In
1990, King Hussein of Jordan foresaw the same: “Water is
the only reason that could lead Jordan to war”. I am not
sure that these words can be defined as pessimistic.
Historians have only noted one war for water in the history
of humanity, and it happened four thousand five hundred
years ago, in the south of today’s Iraq, when two
Mesopotamian cities fought



 


207

over the Tigris and the Euphrates. Some fifty centuries

later, the Tigris, Euphrates, but also Jordan Rivers, three
historical rivers, are at the heart of one of the major stakes
that the region will have to quickly deal with: water
management.

The situation is simple: all the rivers in the region have

stagnating flows, or even decreasing due to recurring
droughts or uncontrolled pumping, and ground waters are
overexploited and not renewed fast enough. Not all the
region’s countries have the same conditions: Turkey or
Lebanon, relatively well endowed, appear as mini “water
towers”, whereas other countries like Syria, Jordan and the
Palestinian territories are permanently under water stress.
And while pollution and global warming threaten to further
darken the picture, we already know that the availability of
drinkable water per inhabitant will only fall further due to
the growing demographic pressure of the region. This
rising water shortage will intensify within each country
competition between agriculture, urban consumption,



 


208
 Water, a major problem

and industrial needs. Combined with the unequal

distribution of the resource between countries, this shortage
is likely to quickly become, in the region, explosive and
eventually create conflicts far more bloody and destructive
than the territorial ones known to this day.

Indeed, initiatives have already been implemented, but they

almost all stem from bilateral agreements. The
management of the Jordan River, for example, was agreed
upon by Syria and Jordan on the one hand, Jordan and
Israel on the other, and Israel and the Palestinians on yet
another.

As for the Arab Water Council created in 2004 and its

offshoot, the Arab Water Academy, founded in 2008, they
have to this day developed no concrete plan. Yet, the
situation is urgent: in 1955, only three Arab countries had
water shortages; there are eleven today and forecasts say
that there will be eighteen in 2025!

What we need is to quickly define a global management

policy for river basins supplying the region. The resource
may be limited, but we can work on optimising its use with
a sustainable development perspective.



209

But of course, there is a prerequisite to implementing this

major regional plan. This prerequisite is not, as it is too
often believed to be, the solving of the Palestinian question.
For the Israeli–Palestinian conflict is the only conflict of all
humanity’s history with a predictable outcome: one day
both States will coexist, Israel one side, Palestine on the
other. The Oslo Accords came very close to this. The
happy end will come along soon.

No, the real prerequisite is to end Ahmadinejad’s

expansionist dictatorship. This dictatorship smothers our
people and their future, seriously threatens peace in the
region and world, and consequently hundreds of thousands
of human lives on either side of our borders.
Conclusion



The weeks and months to come will be decisive for the

region and world. If we cannot bring the regime of
Ahmadinejad to its knees, if we do not get rid of Iran’s
Hitler, then there will be war in the region, and the world
will experience one of the most disrupted eras of its history.

We, the Iranian people, must prepare over the coming

weeks the conditions for a wide resistance movement
against Ahmadinejad and his troops. For on June19th,
when Khamenei made the coup d’état of Ahmadinejad
official (influenced by him), the regime became a Force of
Occupation.


 







211



We must structure and organise this Resistance, mobilise

and drive our living forces: youth, women, bazaar
merchants, unionists, military, religious, diaspora, etc., all
those who refuse dictatorship and do not want to see Iran
rouse a crushing war on the region and world. We must
also secretly prepare the role and support of all the
dignitaries who, from within the regime, want to get rid of
Ahmadinejad, and negotiate with them the outlines of a
temporary government in charge of succeeding to the
tyrant. We must coordinate and structure a policy to circle
and constrict the regime with repeated and targeted strikes;
gain massive and unquestionable support from the free
world in our struggle by isolating the regime with strong
political and economical sanctions. And lastly, we must
prepare the population for a long and costly fight, sacrificial
even in a sacred way. This is the price, and these are the
conditions, to guarantee our victory against the oppression
and obscurantism of Ahmadinejad’s regime.

Once the dictator is overthrown, I personally wish to work

on defining the



 


212
 Conclusion

Community of Countries of the Near and Middle East and

Central Asia outlined in these pages. I will start by
creating with the region’s key figures a non governmental
and independent organisation, maybe a private foundation,
in charge of further designing this plan, defining an
assessed and structured vision. This think tank will
encompass former political leaders, intellectuals,
industrialists, economists… chosen for their competence,
analytical ability and knowledge of the region’s problems.
I am convinced that we can present a first detailed
proposition in under a year. Then we must convince the
leaders of every country, including mine, of why the
Community must be created.

But once again, although the road to success will be long, I

have no doubt on the outcome. We will succeed, for what
seems unthinkable today may well be on track sooner than
we are able to think forward.





Contents



Foreword. Why I fight ..... 9

PART ONE

Why Ahmadinejad wants the bomb

1. “Imposing Koranic law throughout the

world”................... 21

2. The Hezbollah “octopus”...................... 27

3. September 11th: a “godsend” for

Iran.................................................... 31

4. Taking over the Israeli–Palestinian

conflict........................................... 35

5. The early days of a dictator.................... 39

6. The bomb, the ultimate “bayonet”... 45

7. The risk of world upheaval……………..51

215



8. Long-term vision .................... 57

9. Fiendish allies ............................ 65

10. Dormant networks ......................... 71

11. The “Gate of Tears” ....................... 75

PART TWO

Workings of the Iranian society

1. Aftermath of the Revolution of 1906 . 83

2. A people crushing machine ............ 89

3. Pre-June 12th, 2009: why oppositions

failed........................ 97

4. Divisions within the very regime ….. 103

5. People are suppressed, not
resigned................................................. 109

6. A powerful and responsive diaspora ....... 115

7. Role of the Great Powers ............. 119

8. Yes, it must end! ....................................... 127

216
 Contents

PART THREE

Creation of the Second Republic: for a new wealthy and

democratic Iran

1. Reform of the Constitution ............. 137

2. Legal system ............................................. 145

3. State machinery .................................. 151

4. Health and social protection ........... 157

5. The regions ........................................... 165

6. Economy .......................................... 169

7. Role of the diaspora ........................... 177

PART FOUR

Community of countries of the Near and Middle East and

Central Asia: a great regional plan

1. Iran and its neighbours .............................. 181

2. Peace and democracy will derive from
prosperity............................................. 187

3. Outlines of the Community ......... 191

4. Organisation .................................. 197

217
 


5. Energy policy ...................... 203

6. The agriculture ........................................ 205

7. Water, a major problem .................. 207

Conclusion ................................................. 211