Traditionally, the rule in Rylands v Fletcher1has been regarded as a rule of strict liability.

Liability is strict in cases where the defendant is liable for damage caused by his act, irrespective
of any fault on his part. Imposing liability without proof of negligence is controversial and
therefore a restrictive approach has been taken with regards to liability under Rylands v Fletcher.
This case speaks to a situation where the defendants employed independent contractors to
construct a reservoir on their land. The contractors found disused mines when digging but failed
to seal them properly. They filled the reservoir with water. As a result, water flooded through the
mineshafts into the plaintiff’s mines on the adjoining property. Blackburn J purported that things
within the rule include “likely to do mischief if it escapes”.

This case has carved out salient ingredients to which a claimant must show to be successful
under this umbrella of tort. These include 1) That the defendant brought something onto his land,
2) That the defendant made a “non-natural use” of his land, 3) The thing was something likely to
do mischief if it escaped, The thing did escape and cause damage and a recent requirement as
“Foreseeability has been included.

Firstly, the defendant must have brought the thing onto his land and accumulated it there as the
rule only apples to things artificially brought or kept upon the defendant’s land. Contradistinctive
to this, Blackburn J held in Bartlett v Tottenham that if the thing is already on the land or is
there naturally, no liability will arise under Rylands v Fletcher. This contrary aspect was
celebrated in the case of Seeds from some thistles on the defendant’s land blew into neighboring
land owned by the claimant and damaged his crops. The defendant was not liable as he had not
brought the thistles onto his land and there cannot be liability under Rylands v Fletcher for a
thing which naturally accumulates on land. A similar view was shared in the case of Ellison v
Ministry of Defence where the court held that the construction work was an ordinary use of the
land and necessary for the use of the land as an airfield and therefore there was no non-natural
use. Also, the rain water accumulated naturally and was not artificially kept there. Consequently,
the defendant was not liable under Rylands v Fletcher. These latter cases seem to suggest that
Rylands would be of little use in the field of environmental as they usually do not satisfy the
requisite requirements ingrained in Rylands fletcher.

1
(1866) LR 1 Exch 265, affirmed (1868) LR 3 HL 330.
 Furthermore, the defendant must have made a non-natural use of his land. The word natural is
used in two distinct sense. First it means “that which exists in or by nature and is not artificial
and secondly that which is ordinary and usual even though it may be artificial. Lord Moulton
explained it to mean that “it must be some special use bringing with it increased danger to others,
and must not merely be the ordinary use of land or such a use as is proper for the general benefit
of the community. It has been made pellucid that non-natural user is a question of fact and all the
circumstances of time and practice of mankind must be taken into consideration, so that what
may be regarded as dangerous or non-natural may vary according to the circumstances. Thus, in
deciding whether a particular user is non-natural, the court will look not only at the thing or
activity in isolation also to the place and manner in which it is maintained and its relation to its
surroundings. This element has created flexibility in the law to the extent that it serves to
circumvent the difficulties the scope in rylands may create and this is on the ground that what
may have een a non-natural user in 1900 would not necessarily be so in 1960 or 1990. In
Cambridge water co v eastern counties leather plc, the trial judge held that the accumulation of
chemicals by the defendants was a natural user of the land because the creation of employment in
the defendant’s tannery was for the benefit od the local community.

However, Lord Goff was not in agreement with this view as he posited that the storing of large
quantities of industrial chemicals on industrial premises was an excellent example of non-natural
user. Lord Goffman concluded by suggesting that since it is now settled that foreseeability of
harm is required for liability under Rylands, the courts should be less inclined to give a wide
definition to natural use.

In the caribbean jurisdiction, the case of Chandat v Reynolds, George J did not disregard the fact
that the bauxite industry to the economy of Guyana but this was not sufficient reason reason for
holding that the user of the land was natural.. It was concluded that the setting up and operaion of
a plant for the drying of bauxite ore mined elsewhere was a non-natural user of land and the D’s
were liable under Rylannds v Fletcher

Thirdly, there must be an escape of the accumulated substance from the land where it is kept to
place outside. The applicability of this element in Rylands’v Fletcger means escape from a place
where the defendant has occupation or control over land to place which is outside his occupation
or control. Thus, in Read v lyons, there was no escape and therefore no liability where the
plaintiff while carrying out her duties inside the defendant’s factory was injured by an explosion
which occurred within the factory premises. It was traditionally thought the term “escape” meant
the release of a dangerous thing had to be accidental.

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