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The Choice Between Market Failures and Corruption
comparativestatic result may help us in analyz- bribes they can extract.However, in all of these
ing the variationsin the degree of government papers, the approachis partialequilibrium,and
involvement across countries and over time. the costs and benefits of government interven-
Another result is that corruption should be tion are not analyzed together. In contrast,our
observed as part of an optimal allocation when general-equilibriumapproach is importantfor
the marketfailure in question is important,and many of our key results, including the finding
the fraction of "dishonest"bureaucrats(those that the numberof bureaucratsand their wages
who are harderto detect when taking bribes) is should be higher when they are harderto mon-
relatively low. This result may suggest that sit- itor, and the nonmonotonic relation between per
uations where the majority of bureaucratsare capita income and governmentintervention.
corrupt, as in some less developed countries The plan of the paper is as follows. The next
(LDCs) are harder to rationalize as "optimal" section outlines the basic environmentand char-
governmentinterventionthan instances of more acterizes the optimal allocation in the absence
occasional corruptionin the OECD. of corruptionconstraints.Section II character-
Many other studies emphasize the costs of izes the optimal allocationwhen bureaucratsare
corruption(e.g., Robert Klitgaard, 1989; Shle- corruptible. This section obtains most of the
ifer and Vishny, 1993; Paulo Mauro, 1995). We importantresults of this paper but because all
depart from these papers by emphasizing the bureaucratsare homogenous, there is no equi-
unavoidability of corruption (see also Rose- libriumcorruption.Section III extends the anal-
Ackerman, 1978). We argue instead that in ysis to the case of heterogenousbureaucratsand
many instances, markets malfunction and gov- determinesthe conditions under which the op-
ernment intervention is necessary. Corruption timal allocation will involve some of these bu-
associated with such interventions may there- reaucratsacceptingbribes. Section IV considers
fore be the lesser of two evils. This is relatedto some extensions, and Section IV concludes.
an argument made by Nathaniel Leff (1964),
but there is a crucial difference. According to I. The Basic Model
Leff (1964), and more recently DeSoto (1989),
corruptionis often unavoidablebecause govern- We consider a static economy consisting of a
ments distort the allocation of resources, and continuum of risk-neutralagents with mass l.
corruptionis the way that the marketbypasses For now all agents are homogeneous. They can
the regulations. The optimal policy, in Leff's choose between two activities:they can become
view, is therefore to eliminate government in- entrepreneurs,or if there is a government,they
tervention. In our story, the market, not the can become government employees (bureau-
government,is the culprit. The governmentin- crats). Entrepreneursalso have two choices.
tervenes to redress marketfailures, and corrup- They can choose one of two technologies: "bad"
tion emerges as an unpleasant side effect of or "good." Both technologies generate output
necessary intervention.Our work is also closely equal to y. However, their costs differ. The bad
related to the principal-agent approachto law technology costs 0, whereas the good technol-
enforcement (e.g., Becker, 1968; Becker and ogy costs e where 0 < e < y.
Stigler, 1974; Rose-Ackerman, 1978; Dilip We choose the terminology "bad" and
Mookherjee and I. P. L. Png, 1992, 1995; Ab- "good"because good technologies create a pos-
hijit Banerjee, 1997) and to the literature on itive externality.Let n be the mass (fraction)of
optimal regulation under asymmetric informa- entrepreneursin this economy and x c n be the
tion and regulatory capture (see Jean Jacques mass of entrepreneurschoosing the good tech-
Laffont and Jean Tirole, 1993). In a related nology. We assume that there is a positive non-
contribution,Banerjee(1997) considersa model pecuniary effect on the payoff of all agents
where bureaucratshave superior information equal to O3x.Moreover, we have f3 > e so that
relative to the governmentwishing to allocate a this externalityis strongenough to outweigh the
limited set of goods to agents who are not the private costs. We also assume that the cost of
ones with the highest willingness to pay. Bu- choosing the good technology, e, is nonpecuni-
reaucratsare corrupt and may even introduce ary. These assumptionssimplify the analysis by
red tape in order to increase the amount of making maximum taxes independent of tech-
VOL.90 NO. 1 ACEMOGLUAND VERDIER:MARKETFAILURESAND CORRUPTION 197
nology choices, but do not affect our basic In this section, we ignore the corruptionprob-
results. lem, and assume that bureaucratsalways report
truthfully.In the absence of furtherconstraints,
A. The Laissez-Faire Equilibrium the optimal strategy for the governmentwould
and the First Best be to have a trivialproportionof agents become
bureaucrats, randomly inspect entrepreneurs,
In the decentralizedequilibrium,there is no and impose infinite taxes/subsidies. This strat-
government, so all agents become entrepre- egy would minimize the withdrawalof agents
neurs, hence n = 1. The payoffs to the two from the productive sector. However, in prac-
activities are: tice, there will be limited liability constraints
limiting taxes, and a government budget con-
(1) Trg= y + 3 x-e, straintdeterminingthe amountthatcan be given
away in subsidies. This is the first important
7Tb= y + f3 x. role of the limited liability constraints in this
economy.
Therefore, 7Tb > lTg for all x, and the unique We denote the tax that an entrepreneurwith
equilibriumhas n = 1 and x - 0. the bad technology has to pay by T, and denote
Since , > e, the firstbest is given by n - 1 the subsidy that an entrepreneurwith the good
andx = 1: all agents become entrepreneursand technology receives by s (both of these are
choose the good technology. However, this out- imposed only if the entrepreneuris inspected).
come is not sustainableas a decentralizedequi- Note that we do not assume s ? 0, so entre-
librium because, as in a standard prisoner's preneurs with good technology may be taxed
dilemma, each individual has a dominantstrat- too. We denote the wage of a bureaucratby w.
egy, which is to choose the bad technology. Since before inspection,it is not known who has
Essentially, entrepreneursdo not take into ac- chosen bad technologies, inspection is random.
count the externalities they create on other Therefore, the probabilitythat an entrepreneur
agents. is inspected is p(n) max{(1 -- n)In, 11,
which is the fraction of bureaucratsdivided by
B. OptimalRegulation WithoutCorruption the fraction of entrepreneurs,unless there are
more bureaucratsthan entrepreneurs.4
We now consider governmentinterventionto
regulate technology choice. Throughoutthe pa-
per, we assume that the governmentintervenes anothermeasureof the efficacy of governmentintervention.
to maximize social surplus. So there are no In particular,as 0 -- 0o, government intervention is ex-
distributionalconcerns or rent seeking by the tremelyeffective, and all marketfailurescan be preventedat
government itself. If technology choices of minimal cost.
4 Notice that in this environment, it is not possible to
agents were publicly observable, the first best collects taxes withoutinspection.We discuss the case where
could be achieved. It is realistic, however, to the governmentcan impose "poll taxes" without inspecting
assume thattechnology choices are not publicly technology choices in AppendixC (availableupon request).
observed. The government needs to employ In this case, without corruption,the government raises a
large tax revenue via poll taxes, and then sets a large
some agents as bureaucratsto inspect entrepre- subsidy, a large public-sector wage, and employs a very
neurs, and find out what technology is being small fractionof agents to inspect technology choices. How-
used. We assume that one bureaucratcan in- ever, when bureaucratsare corruptible, similar results to
spect only one entrepreneur.This assumptionis those in the text apply. A high subsidy to good technology
of no major importance,but the fact that regu- creates strong incentives for corruption,so only moderate
subsidies can be set, and a sizable bureaucracyis necessary
lation requiresthe employmentof bureaucratsis to inspect technology choices. In any case, we view the
crucial for our analysis. assumptions in the text, that taxation is costly, and that
taxation and inspection can be carried out together, as
plausible. Suppose, for example, that the bad technology in
our model correspondsto misleadingshareholdersand cred-
3Appendix B (availableupon request)gives the analysis itors, and/or taking excessive financial risks. Then, inspec-
for the case in which each bureaucratinspects 0 entrepre- tors who collect taxes can also determine whether a
neurs. The qualitative results are identical, and 0 gives company has chosen the "bad"technology.
198 THEAMERICANECONOMICREVIEW MARCH2000
The exact timing of events is as follows: see thatthe optimalallocationwould never have
n < 1/2. Hence, we use p(n) (1 - n)ln as
1. The governmentannouncesthe public wage, the probability of getting inspected for an en-
w, the tax T, the subsidys, and the maximum trepreneur,and then check whethern ? 1/2. As
numberof bureaucratsit will hire (1 - n). a result,the second constraint,which we referto
2. Agents choose their profession. If there are as the technology choice constraint, 7rg?
9 Xb,
more applicants to the government sector takes the form
than 1 - n, then 1 - n of them are chosen
n
randomlyand the remainderenterthe private (4) T + s 1n - e.
sector. l-- n
3. Those who enter the private sector choose a
technology. Their technology choice is not This constraintensures that all agents prefer to
observed by any other agent at this stage. choose the good technology.
4. Each bureaucratrandomly inspects one en- The government cannot force its citizens to
trepreneur5and discovers whether he has become bureaucrats. The third condition, the
chosen the good or the bad technology. allocation of talent constraint, therefore en-
5. Each bureaucratthen reportson the technol- sures that agents are willing to become bu-
ogy choice of the entrepreneurhe has in- reaucrats rather than entrepreneurs. This
spected. If his report is "good," the requires w +? f x? -ag, that is, the payoff
entrepreneurreceives the subsidy s. If the to bureaucracy must be as large as the return
report is "bad,"then the entrepreneurpays to entrepreneurship.Or:
the tax T.
1-n
As noted above, for now, all bureaucratsal- (5) w?y-e + - s.
n
ways reporttruthfully,hence there is no corrup-
tion. The government is utilitarian, and
maximizes total net surplus: Finally, we need the revenues of the govern-
ment not to fall shortof its expenses.The govern-
(2) SS= ny + (f-e) x ment will have a wage bill equal to (1 - n) - W9
and as long as n /2, it will pay subsidiesequal
to (1 - n) xln s (since there will be 1 - n
e
Second, choosing the good technology must It is straightforwardto see that the limited
yield a payoff as high as the bad technology. liability constraint(3) has to hold as an equality:
The expected payoff to the two technologies otherwise, T and n could be increased without
are: -g y + x-e
x + p(n) * s and 7Tb= violating (4), (5), or (6). The technology choice
y + f3 x - p(n) * T. It is straightforward to constraint, (4), also has to hold as an equality
for the same reason. Then, from (3) and (4) we
have T - y and s = nl(1 - n) - e - y.
5There is no coordinationissue here so an entrepreneur Substitutingthese into (5) now gives us a sim-
never gets inspectedby two bureaucrats,and as long as n >
1/2, each bureaucratinspects one entrepreneur.Introducing
plified form of the allocation of talent con-
coordinationproblems does not change our results, though straint: w ?> y - (1 -- n)ln - y, for n ?> 1/2. If
it complicates the expressions. this inequality did not hold, the public-sector
VOL.90 NO. 1 ACEMOGLUAND VERDIER:MARKETFAILURESAND CORRUPTION 199
-
(7) i (I ~ n)' y} n}
x -<min1 SSng sSg
\
n 1 x
The characterizationof the optimal allocationis FIGURE 1. OPTIMAL GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION WITHOUT
THE POTENTIAL OF CORRUPTION
thereforegiven by the maximizationof (2) sub-
ject to (7) and n - 1/2. This problem is repre-
sented diagrammatically in Figure 1. Only
combinations of x and n in the triangulararea Government regulation is costly as it with-
are permissible. The objective function to be draws agents from productionto employ them
maximized, (2), is linear in n and x, thus the in monitoring activities. It is therefore only
contours are straightlines. Since the constraint worthwhileif the externalityin question is suf-
set is nonconvex, it is clear that an optimum ficiently pronounced. In particular, since the
must be either at n =1 (with x = 0), or at x = cost of governmentinterventionis the diversion
n, i.e., at point E in the figure. Which of these of agents from production, the benefit of the
will be preferreddepends on the slope of the intervention,f, needs to be sufficiently large as
contours of (2). comparedto y.
If n = 1 and x = 0, then social surplus is
SSng y. Insteadwith x = n in (7), we obtain II. Optimal Regulation With Corruption
a unique solution:
A. Analysis
11
---
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - line would be reached at point E, ratherthan at
1
E as in Figure 1. We also need to check thatn '
1/2, since all these equations are written assum-
x -1- n)2y/ne U =ny +(P-x
ing this condition to hold. Even though this
Sg9c constraint was never binding in the previous
section, it may bind when bureaucrats are
corruptible.
n -- - Ec Optimal governmentinterventionwill there-
nc : fore take one of the following three forms:9
y
(12) nc- 1-q
omy. The role of governmentinterventionis to y +e+e*- (J e
make ex post transfersconditional on technol- q
ogy choice so that ex ante decisions are af-
fected. When bureaucratsare corrupt,transfers (iii) n = 1/2 andx is chosen so as to balance the
are unconditionaland governmentintervention governmentbudget constraint,thus
no longer affects ex ante choices.
In contrast, when (10) holds, no bureaucrat
will demand bribes. Hence, we simply need to (13) x = max{( - 1q );
make sure that the corruptionconstraint,(10),
and the other constraintson governmentpolicy,
summarized by (7), are satisfied. Combining In this last case, governmentrevenues fall short
(10) with the simplifiedform of the government of supportingan allocation in which all entre-
budget constraint,w + x/(l - n) = y, gives preneurschoose the good technology, and the
the corruptionconstraintin the (x, n) space as: only way of increasingrevenuesis to have some
of the entrepreneurschoose the bad technology
and pay the tax T = y. We have the following
(11) x 'e (e + q ) proposition (proof in the Appendix).
starting from the nineteenth century (see, for solutions. Either there is no government reg-
example, Peter H. Lindert, 1989, 1994). An ulation, thus n = 1 and x = 0. Or there is no
important aspect of government involvement corruption and Proposition 2 from the previ
was indeed an attempt to correct certain mar- ous section applies with q replacing q (and
ket failures. For example, investment in edu- n X
>x 1/2 or n I/2 and x < 1/2, in this
cation for the masses, which stood at a very case, w ? (1 -q) * a e (T + s)lq, so neither
low levels, increased substantially after the "honest" nor "dishonest" bureaucrats accept
intervention (see Franz Ringer, 1979). In bribes). For future reference, let us refer to
contrast, the 1980's experienced a shift in the social surplus of this allocation as S,1, (see
political attitudes with politicians such as Proposition 2). What we will show in this
Thatcher, Reagan, and Mulroney, emphasiz- section is that there is a third possible solution
ing costs of government and attempting to re- which will feature equilibrium corruption:in-
duce the scope of government involvement. tervention with partial corruption.
Observethatso far the optimalallocationdoes Let us first characterizethe optimal govern-
not feature"equilibrium" corruption;eitherthere ment regulationwith partialcorruption.This is
is laissez-faireor all bureaucratsare honest.This an allocation in which there are sufficient bu-
is because bureaucratsare homogenous,and all reaucraticrents so that "honest"bureaucratsdo
corruptionopportunitiesare the same. We will not take bribes, but the remaining fraction m,
generalizethis aspectin the next section. the "dishonest,"do. Equation (4), the technol-
ogy choice constraint, becomes:
III. Heterogeneity and Equilibrium Corruption
ni 1
A. Analysis (14) T+ -2 n e.
I m
reasoning to above, we obtain the new partial- This differs from (5) for two reasons. First,
corruptionconstraint: agents recognize that if they enter bureaucracy,
with probabilitym, they will be good at taking
1 q bribes, and thus make more than w. And they
(15) w *(T + s) also realize that by becoming an entrepreneur
q
they will have to deal with corruptbureaucrats,
lq n uf thus the third term is added to the right-hand
e. side.
q 1-n 1-m The characterizationof optimal government
The budget constraintwith partialcorruption interventionis more involved than before, and
is differentas well, because some of the corrupt in orderto simplify the algebrafrom now on we
bureaucratsare caughtand theirreturnsare con- assume oa= 1; so entrepreneursget taxed fully
fiscated: when they meet a corrupt bureaucrat.Then,
combining the partial-corruptionconstraint,the
x budget constraint and the allocation of talent
(16) (1-n) w+ -n) (1-m) -* s
n condition yields the constraint set for govern-
ment interventionwith partial corruptionas:
+ (1n) *m * q *s
-q)
(18) x min{n;(1-n) *e
<(1I n)- m q (w + T)
L,m
+ (1n) * (1m) * I1-- *T.
paper that as long as three plausible condi- of the distinction between bureaucratic cor-
tions are satisfied, optimal government inter- ruption and corruption in the private sector.
vention aimed at correcting important market The conventional wisdom is that the former is
failures will be associated precisely with much more harmful, but we are not aware of
these observed government failures. These any formal analysis of this issue. This paper
three conditions are: emphasized the role of government policy in
modifying ex post returns and thus affecting
1. Government intervention requires "bureau- ex ante behavior. Corruption prevents this
crats" to gather informationand implement useful role of government intervention. If pri-
policies. vate corruption has less scope for influencing
2. At least some of the agents who enter bu- ex ante behavior, it will be less harmful.
reaucracy are corruptible,in the sense that Nevertheless, in many situations, corruption
they are willing to misrepresenttheir infor- in the private sector may hinder contracting
mation at the right price. between agents and lead to similar inefficien-
3. There is some amount of heterogeneity cies. The analysis of these issues is also an
among bureaucrats. obvious area for future research.
are accepting bribes. The optimal allocation is while the feasible set (DP, for interventionwith
given as: corruptionis:
(A3)
1. If yle < I + A, thenn = 1/2. In this case,
the partial-corruptionconstraint is binding (x, n) suchthatn : 1/2; and
and the allocation of talent constraint is FI)c{x?minjn(1 n) -A(q,m,q)-n;
slack. The numberof entrepreneurschoosing
the good technology is: x = max{ 1/2 [yle -
A]; 01. Social surplus is SS, V/2y + '/2