Ending Ethnic War - The South Asian Experience

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International
© 2003 KluwerNegotiation 8: 403-440,
Law International. 2003.in the Netherlands.
Printed 403
Ending Ethnic War: The South Asian Experience
P. SAHADEVAN*
South Asian Studies Division, School of International Studies, JawaharlalNehru University,
New Delhi- 10067, India (E-mail: psahadevan@hotmail.com)
Abstract. Underscoring the linkage between war strategies and peace processes in seven
ethnic wars in the South Asian region, this article examines the conditions under which two
wars have ended in military victory, another two in negotiated settlement and the remaining
three wars still continue. War strategies of the South Asian governments have effectively
combined military tactics with a wide range of political measures to strengthen war processes
that, in turn, determine the result of peace processes. This article finds that the pattern of
ending a war or its effective prolongation is determined by the nature of power relations
between the adversaries, which is factored into the level of mobilization of support in the
society, structural cohesion of rebel groups, patterns of goal setting, and the nature of rebel
leadership and its commitment to the declared goal.
Keywords: assimilation, autonomy, external patron, fear of extinction, hegemonic majorities,

hurting stalemate, mobilization, negotiated settlement, peace process, power asymmetry,
relative deprivation, ripeness, secession
Peacemaking in ethnic war is an arduous task. Negotiation processes tend to

face tremendous constraints and challenges. This explains why ethnic wars
often end in military victory by one party - the government - and negoti-
ated settlement has proven hard to achieve (Zartman 1995; Stedman 1991;
Licklider 1995). As the ensuing discussion shows, ethnic wars in South Asia
share this global trend. However, the question that needs to be probed is, what
are the critical determinants of a successful negotiation process? It is argued,
and substantiated by the South Asian cases, that negotiation in ethnic war is
the culmination of an incremental process that is linked with the war process
itself. What really determine the initiation, sustenance and even conclusion
of a negotiation process are those strategies that adversaries adopt in pursuit
of winning a given war. How and why these strategies work to create peace
and what their end-results are constitute the principal concerns of this article.
The article has four sections. Section 1 maps South Asia's ethnic wars
against a conceptual background, highlighting their characteristics. In this
* P. Sahadevan is Associate Professor in South Asian Studies, School of International

Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. His publications include Conflict and Peace-
making in South Asia (New Delhi, 2001), and Ethnic Conflict and Militarism in South Asia
(University of Notre Dame, 1999).
HeinOnline -- 8 Int'l Negotiation 403 2003

P. SAHADEVAN
article, I deal with seven ethnic wars - four in India (in Assam, Naga-
land, Mizoram and Punjab) and one each from Pakistan (Baluch war), Sri
Lanka (Eelam war) and Bangladesh (Chittagong Hill Tracts or CHT war). In
Section 2, I discuss important war strategies of governments and show how
they have changed the power relations between adversaries. The implications
of such relations in terms of creating propitious conditions for negotiations
are examined in Section 3. Section 4 analyzes various reasons for different
patterns of ending wars, and why some wars still persist. The concluding
section presents some broad theoretical arguments.
Mapping Ethnic Wars
Both war and peace processes are linked in ethnic war because of its peculiar
characteristics. In other words, the structure of ethnic war, based on relative
power relations between the adversaries, determines parties' overall behavior
in favor of either a negotiated settlement or a military victory. Important
characteristics specific to ethnic war are found in its sources, goals, parties
and those parties' tactics.
Sources and Goals
As a serious hostile military program, ethnic war is rooted in socio-economic

and political grievances that, the affected group feels, cannot be redressed
by any normal political means. While rational grievances form the necessary
conditions, the impulse for group action involving a preparedness to harm
oneself while trying to harm another is largely generated from a group's
fear that sometimes ethnic entrepreneurs exaggerate to produce an intense
emotional heat, hate and anxiety that trigger in the group hostile behavior
(Kaufman 1997; Lake and Rothchild 1997). Ethnic fear may be related to the
survival or physical safety, and security or dominance of one or both groups.
Thus, grievance-formation at the onset of an ethnic war is a dynamic process
in which each group, with seemingly different ethno-ideological and value
structures, tries to consolidate and protect its identity and material interests
from any threat or invalidating behavior of the other (see Northrup 1989).
Therefore, an ethnic war is rooted in a situation where one group's core sense
of 'self' (identity)-'interest' (politico-cultural-economic position) is perceiv-
ably or really threatened by demands of or denials by another. This, then,
elicits a group's defensive response. As for the goals, ethnic wars are fought
for secession or autonomy purposes. Escalation or de-escalation of war can
possibly lead to transformation of the original goal.

ENDING ETHNIC WAR: THE SOUTH ASIAN EXPERIENCE
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P. SAHADEVAN
Secession has been the dominant goal of ethnic wars in South Asia. Out of
the seven wars addressed in this paper, only the tribal war in the Chittagong
Hill Tracts (CHT) was fought for autonomy. Most of India's ethnic wars -
Assamese, Mizo and Naga - originated with and pursued secessionist goals,
whereas the Khalistan war in Punjab attained a secessionist dimension after
the failed autonomy movement of the Akali Dal, a moderate Sikh party. This
is also true in regard to the Eelam war in Sri Lanka and the Baluch war in
Pakistan. The main difference between these wars is the alignment of the
party that established secession as a goal. While the militant leadership set
the secessionist goal of the Khalistan and Baluch wars, the moderate Tamil
United Liberation Front (TULF) declared and campaigned for secession in
Sri Lanka before the militant formations were born to pursue it further.
Thus, a group's grievances and the nature of the state's response determine
the goal and articulation of that goal. In South Asia the underlying grievances
and interests of groups that characterize ethnic wars are multifarious, and
the proximate causes of a bitter group contest are entrenched in the political
process itself. There are five clear, major causes for ethnic wars in South Asia,
most wars having had more than one source. The first relates to the groups'
fear of losing their identities, and results from the arbitrary nature of national
territorial formation in the post-colonial period. This fear haunted mostly the
'border minority groups.' They nurtured hopes for a separate nation-state
on the ground that they had been autonomous political entities in the pre-
colonial period, but the coercive post-colonial state apparatus subdued their
voice of dissent. In India, three wars - Naga, Mizo and Assamese - have been
rooted in what may be called the 'feeling of betrayal' or the legacy of colonial
rule. The minority nationalists from these border-states have questioned the
coercive integration of their ethnic territories into the Indian Union and have
made a strong claim for separate statehood (Verghese 1996; Bhaumik 1996).
Similarly, while disapproving of the forcible integration of Baluchistan with
Pakistan, the Baluch minority sought to regain its "nation's" independence,
which had been lost to the Punjabi-dominated Pakistani state because of
Britain's 'divide and rule' policy (Sayeed 1980; Baloch 1985).
Second, a fear of assimilation due to arbitrary maintenance of ethnic
boundaries has been a source of war. For instance, the mainspring of the
Khalistan war arose from Sikh cultural and religious traditions that were
observed to overcome the community's age-old cultivated fear of absorp-
tion into Hinduism. The fear stemmed mainly from two sources. First, the
Sikh nationalists perceived that their community was facing internal decline
because of the growing tendency among the educated Jat Sikh to dispense of
the distinct symbols of their faith (Ganguly 1993: 93). Second, they perceived

an external threat to the Sikh cultural and religious ethos arising from the
overarching attitude of Hindus to treat Sikhism as a sword arm of Hinduism
(Thomas 1994: 100; Kapur 1987). Rejuvenation of Sikhism and strength-
ening the distinct Sikh identity, therefore, became an ideological slogan of
the moderate and militant Sikh leaders.
If a fear of assimilation has mostly haunted those group members who
have lived amidst the dominant groups, the third source of ethnic war in
South Asia, fear of marginalization, results from domination by the out-
group. An out-group lacks a historical linkage with the ethnic territory of the
indigenous group but has become a part of it due to either of two processes:
voluntary migration or state-sponsored colonization. The migratory process
is by-and-large unassisted and does not carry, at least initially, the calcu-
lated task of dislodging the indigenous group from power and position. To
the contrary, colonization is a political program with strong ethnic consid-
erations. Through an ethnic-oriented, state-sponsored policy of demographic
engineering, colonization aims to neutralize the strength and status of the
indigenous group and convert those people into a minority within their own
territory. In both situations ethnic competition is the inevitable result. The Sri
Lankan and Bangladeshi governments followed a policy of ethnic coloniza-
tion that struck a nerve among the Sri Lankan Tamils and the tribal people
of CHT respectively. The resettlement of a large number of rural Sinhalese
in Sri Lanka's Eastern Province was a direct threat to the traditional Tamil
homeland (Manogaran 1994: 84-125). In total disregard to the CHT Regu-
lation of 1900, the concerted efforts of successive Bangladeshi regimes to
colonize tribal land with large-scale settlement of landless Bengalis proved
disastrous to tribal interests (Mohsin 1997). These minority groups sought
to protect their ethnic territoriality and thereby their survival by organizing
strong protest movements and even resorting to arms.
Fourth, a heightened sense of relative deprivation in some groups due
to denial of equality has also formed the core cause of ethnic war. In
South Asia the controlling hegemonic majorities have resorted to several
discriminatory policies against the contesting-minorities, consolidating their
position at the expense of the latter's core interests. Inter-ethnic relations have
been a state-controlled partisan affair, in that the majority considers itself
generous towards the helpless minority, whose presence is, in the opinion
of the former, a nuisance. Discrimination against the minorities is therefore
a 'state subject' and denial of equality is the worst threat to the minorities'
survival. In Sri Lanka, the majority Sinhalese, in the process of establishing
their hegemony, used the state power to homogenize society by imposing
their language on the resistant minorities and recognizing Buddhism as the

P. SAHADEVAN
state's official religion. The "Sinhala only" official language policy in the
1950s threatened the Sri Lankan Tamils' core cultural and economic interests
(Wriggins 1960; Kearney 1967). Their fear of losing equality was reinforced
when successive governments adopted open discriminatory education and
economic policies. Their representation in education and bureaucracy has
dwindled with every passing year since the early 1970s, and inferior resource
allocation to Tamil-dominated provinces guided by narrow ethnic considera-
tions has created greater economic disparities (de Silva 1984; Samarasinghe
1984; Tiruchelvam 1984). The Tamil nationalists have sought to prevent
the decline of their community through a sustained movement against the
hegemonic Sinhalese-dominated state.
Some minorities developed a strong feeling of relative deprivation as a
result of the open demonstration of 'internal colonialism' by certain major-
itarian governments. For instance, following the Khan of Kalat's abortive
attempt in 1958 to consolidate the Baluch territories on a linguistic basis,
the Pakistan government unleashed severe economic repression in two ways:
discrimination against the Baluch in government service and diminished
allocation of funds for developmental work. Simultaneously, the center party
(the Center) appropriated the lion's share of profits that were earned from
harnessing the natural resources of the province (Harrison 1981: 161-168).
Similarly, the tribal people of the CHT felt that their central government
pursued lopsided development programs that benefited the Bengalis more
than the tribal population. Ethnic policies, in the tribal nationalists' view,
subjugated their people to Bengali hegemonic rule at the Center; the govern-
ment played a partisan role in the resource competition between the two
groups in the CHT (Islam 1981; Moshsin 1997). In Mizoram, political discon-
tent among the Mizos, exacerbated by the Central and State (Assam) Govern-
ments' apathy towards the minority's suffering during the 1959 famine,
combined with the economic deprivation that arose from neglected devel-
opment in the hill region (Phadnis 1989: 152-155). The United Liberation
Front of Assam (ULFA) thus played on the Central Government's allegedly
discriminatory policy in sharing the benefits of oil, tea and forest resources
to encourage Assamese nationalism to take on a militant dimension. New
Delhi is, according to the ULFA, an exploiter that contributed to economic
and infrastructure underdevelopment in Assam (Bezbaruah 1996: 171-190;
Baruah 1994: 864-870).
Fifth and finally, hegemonic majoritarianism as the principle of govern-
ance in multiethnic societies has caused a sense of powerlessness among
some minority groups. If minority grievances are a product of competitive
ethnic relations, in which 'power' is a critical variable, ethnic conflict is

a form of power struggle between one group (the majority in most cases)
that controls the power and institutions, and another that seeks to acquire
power (mostly the minority). Each group has a goal of countering the other
to capture power. The political incumbent group seeks power through its
centralizing tendencies and intrusive behavior (into the cultural and political
space provided for the weaker minority). The minority group insists on power
sharing with the majority as the basis for interethnic amity because it believes
that its weak position in the structure of power relations is the fundamental
cause of all its problems. It is, therefore, a contest between the majoritarian
ethnic ideology, facing a real or perceived threat, and the minority/weaker
ethno-nationalist assertion for equality, aimed at ensuring its survival against
the threat of the powerful majority.
The level of threat that each group faces and its capabilities to adopt
offensive or defensive tactics determine the variations in the nature and
intensity of the power contest. In Pakistan, where the Punjabis dominate
the highly-centralized garrison-state structure, the rise of provincial power
centers was not allowed. Nor was the dominant ethnic group prepared for
a meaningful power-sharing arrangement with regional majorities like the
Baluchis. The display of hegemony by the Punjabi elite evoked countermeas-
ures and militant defensive postures from the minority as an assertion of its
equality. The Z.A. Bhutto government stifled the Baluch nationalists' aspir-
ations for autonomy and intruded too much in their provincial affairs. The
dissolution of the National Awami Party (NAP)-Jamiat Ulema-I-Islam (JUI)
coalition government in 1973 came about on partisan grounds. The arbitrary
way that the central government abolished powers given to the provincial
government triggered the Baluch movement's rebellion against an intolerant
central government (Hewitt 1996; Wirsing 1981).
In Sri Lanka, the contest for power resulted directly from the majoritarian
thrust of the post-colonial state that left little leeway for power dispersal to
local units. This structural framework evolved from constant tensions and
differences in perception between the Sri Lankan Tamils - who consider
themselves a dependent group - and the Sinhalese, who have an ingrained
feeling of vulnerability and fear of extinction. While the former group places
its faith in the federal framework as an effective safeguard against Sinhalese
majoritarianism, the latter believes that a powerful Center can alone contain
the threatening fissiparous tendencies of the Tamils (Oberst 1988). Similarly,
the Central government's intrusive behavior and hegemonic control over the
hill tribes in Bangladesh increased the latter's grievances and strengthened
their alienation. Treating the tribal nationalists' demand for autonomy as a
secessionist challenge to Bengali nationalism and as a conspiracy against

P. SAHADEVAN
the sovereignty of Bangladesh, successive regimes in Dhaka used political

and military power to contain aspirations of autonomy (Mohsin and Chakma
1992; Shelley 1992). The resulting alienation of the tribal minority from the
national mainstream provided the source for the calamitous ethnic war.
Although cultural and religious nationalism was the mainspring of the
Khalistan war, its political context cannot be ignored. Sikh nationalists
believed that the Indian political system was highly centralized; the Union
government exercised hegemonic control over Punjab through constitutional
subversion. The party in power at the Center made undue partisan political
interventions aimed at strengthening its electoral interests and de-legitimizing
claims of Sikh nationalism (Singh 1996; Chima 1994). Thus a strong desire
for political power arose within the Sikh community. In Assam, the nation-
alists believe that India's democratic process helped the 'capitalist forces' in
Delhi exploit their state economically and threatened to destroy their 'nation.'
A sovereign 'socialist Assam' is found in the ideological construction of the
ULFA as an essential condition for the liberation of the Assamese from New
Delhi's imperial rule (Bezbaruah 1996: 181-182).
Partiesand Their Tactics for Power
An ethnic war process entails two highly motivated and determined parties or
groups of parties with strong ethnic identities. Although each belligerent may
have a large constituency support and infrastructure behind the war process,
it is only those representative outfits (the security forces and militants) which
fight the battle that are considered combatants. But, in practice, the thin line
demarcating combatants and noncombatants gets blurred or deliberately viol-
ated when exchanges of violence become widespread to bring about civilian
casualties. This leads to the involvement of civilian people in the war. The
political incumbents involved in war are mostly represented by their own
ethnic soldiers, and only in some cases do they send multiethnic forces
drawn from various communities including their adversary's population to
the battlefield.
Most of the wars in South Asia have involved multiple warring factions
from the minority/weaker ethnic group's side (see Table 1), whereas the
political incumbents' forces in all wars except those in India by-and-large
have been drawn from the majority ethnic group itself. India's military is
a multi-ethnic force with an ethnically-integrated operation-command struc-
ture. Minority ethnic-group soldiers always participate in any war with utmost
loyalty to the government, even against their own kin group members - as
happened, for instance, in Punjab. Proliferation of militant organizations has
occurred in most of the wars, thereby indicating weak cohesion among the
minority group. Also, some of the militant groups have existed as a military

wing under the control of the political leaders (see Table 1). At the same
time, many groups have functioned as independent military entities, with
their highly dependent political wings being controlled by the militant leader-
ship. These different characteristics determine not only the party's battlefield
behavior, but also the process of ending war.
For war-initiation, the aggrieved ethnic group should enjoy at least a
minimum level of power. Otherwise the government's strong countermeas-
ures can undercut the militants' war efforts at the very start. Military strength,
not military balance, has been the fundamental prerequisite for the outbreak
of war. Military balance is not often present in ethnic war because the struc-
ture of such a war is strikingly asymmetric; governments tend to enjoy
preponderant power over militants (Zartman 1995: 7-12; King 1997: 40-50).
Militants' weaker military position results from the disadvantages imposed
on them by national and international legal structures (legal asymmetry),
their poor military organizational setup (organizational asymmetry) and their
disunity or lack of cohesion, exemplified by the formation of many splinter
groups (internal structural asymmetry) (Mitchell 1991: 23-38). Power asym-
metry, as a given structural problem, is quite instructive to the militants. They
seek to reduce its level mainly in three ways: by mobilizing on a large-scale
local constituency support; securing support from credible external patron(s);
and strengthening their commitment to the cause.
Mobilization of people - a process by which a mere member of a group
becomes an active participant in a cause (Gurr 1993; Esman 1991) - for war is
a major internal support-generating tactics. It proceeds in two independent or
interrelated phases. The first phase is political mobilization, in which group
members are essentially gathered and motivated by their moderate leadership
to enter as actors into the ethnic political arena. The second phase, military
mobilization, involves selection, recruitment and preparation of youth by the
militant leaders for a sustained military action. Often, the first phase trans-
itions into the second phase if there is no advancement of the group's conflict
goals, proving the non-violent agitation tactics a failure. The second phase
either enjoys the tactical support or disapproval of the moderate leadership.
A successful political mobilization tends to make military mobilization easy.
In some cases, both mobilization processes occur simultaneously under two
different leaderships - moderate and militant. In other cases, military mobil-
ization alone is pursued without first preparing the group for a collective
political struggle.
For a successful mobilization - defined as a high level of active participa-
tion by group members that elicits an upward rise in the sustainable level of
violence and a protracted peace process - both the ethnic elite and the general
public play a major role. Kaufman (1997: 170) suggests two broad patterns

P. SAHADEVAN
of mobilization: elite-led and mass-led. In an elite-led process, the belligerent

leaders create mass hostility by projecting the group's ethnic grievances.
This is a widely seen pattern that is distinguishable from the mass-led one,
in which "hostile masses choose belligerent leaders and engage in actions"
(Kaufman 1997: 170). Here, ethnic group members hold the key for mobil-
ization. The process's level invariably soars because intense mass hostility
arising out of their ethnic discontent induces group members to participate in
large numbers. The third pattern that can be added combines the two patterns.
It is equally elite-led and mass-led, in the sense that both ethnic leaders and
the general community jointly involve themselves in mobilization. Leaders
easily mobilize their communities by arousing feelings of intense hostility
directed at the government. The ethnic community willingly actively particip-
ates in collective actions because it senses a threat to its ethnic survival. The
greater the scale and intensity of their participation, the stronger the position
of militants and therefore the lesser the disparity in their power vis-A-vis the
government.
Mobilization in the South Asian wars has achieved varied levels of suc-
cess. The Eelam war became highly mobilized under the elite-mass-led
pattern. Both political and military processes took place separately under
different leaderships. Political mobilization consumed approximately 25
years before a militant leadership was born in the early 1970s to conduct
a decade-long process of military mobilization of Tamil youth. Rousing
nationalistic fervor, in 1956, the Federal Party (FP) launched a massive non-
violent movement (satyagraha and civil disobedience) for autonomy. By
1976, the entire Tamil society became the FP's support base, prompting its
leadership to change its goal in favor of a separate state. The party also re-
christened itself as the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF). The failure of
the moderate leadership's non-violent tactics to advance the Tamil goal led to
large-scale military mobilization beginning in the late 1970s. A great number
of educated, unemployed youth responded spontaneously to the call for
armed struggle. Of about half-a-dozen major militant groups that embraced
the Eelam goal, the LTTE emerged as the dominant force by systematically
recruiting cadres (including conscription) and eliminating rival groups (see
Wilson 2000; Swamy 1994).
The Baluch war marked a different pattern of mobilization in that the
ethnic elite singularly led both the political and military processes, yet in
different ways. In the aftermath of Baluchistan's integration with Pakistan,
the province witnessed a flurry of activities by nationalistic groups. This
sensitized the Baluch people to the fact that the Pakistani ruling elite was
denying them ethnic territoriality. Hence arose the impetus for the emergence
of a more organized political movement headed by the NAP in the heyday

of Baluch nationalism. As a testimony to their mobilization, the Baluch over-

whelmingly voted the party to power in 1972. While the use of state force
in 1958 increased the ranks of the NAP, Prime Minister Bhutto's coercive
political measures - such as the proscription of the NAP and the arrest of
its leaders - affected mobilization. This benefited militant organizations as
many Baluch youth joined their fold. The Baluch People's Liberation Front
(BPLF) deserved much of the credit for military mobilization, which began in
1963. The military mobilization began simultaneously with political mobiliz-
ation, and the latter process impinged on the former. Despite strong objective
conditions, neither of these processes achieved an optimum level of mobiliz-
ation due to cleavages in the society along tribal lines, fragmentation of the
leadership and success of the government's co-optive, divisive and coercive
strategies to contain Baluch mobilization (Phadnis 1989: 188-190).
In the CHT, the ParabotyaChattagramJanaSanghati Samity (PCJSS) and
its military wing Shanti Bahini (Peace Force) relied on tribal support. The
PCJSS was singularly responsible for preparing the people for war at a fast
pace by exploiting their anti-Bengali sentiments. Although a large number of
Chakmas joined the ranks of the PCJSS, two major tribal groups - Marmas
and Tripuris - did not fully support it (Moshin 1997).
In Punjab, the mobilization of Sikhs followed the elite-led pattern. The
Akali Dal leaders evoked the nationalist aspirations of the community
primarily to serve their electoral interests. Even though the Anandpur Sahib
Resolution directly held out an appeal to the Sikhs for political support,
they did not build a broad-based ethnic movement. However, their political
programs created a space for the rise, and mobilization, of the militant move-
ment (Telford 1992: 970). Disenchanted with Akali politics and dissatisfied
with the result of the Green Revolution, which quickened the process of
economic disparity, the educated and unemployed rural Jat Sikh youth from
farming families, which did not benefit much from the economic transform-
ation, responded to Sant Bhindranwale's message of rejuvenating Sikhism.
The discontent of a segment of the rural Sikhs who found the religious
symbolism and the appeal of Bhindranwale an attractive unifying force
against the Central government therefore provided the context for military
mobilization (Chima 1994). But military mobilization yielded limited success
for three reasons: the entire Sikh society was not attracted to the slogan
of its national revival, the militant groups were locked in a power rivalry
and the objective conditions marked by a deep sense of discrimination and
deprivation were not strong for mobilization.
In India's northeast, the ethnic elite mobilized political and military
support for wars. Military mobilization coincided with the outbreak of the
war, and preparation of the people politically for war had not been adequate.

P. SAHADEVAN
In the protracted Naga war, Z.A. Phizo, the leader of the Naga National
Council (NNC) played a dominant role. He gave a militant dimension to Naga
nationalism and sought the unstinted support of the people for the liberation
war. Both the NNC (until 1980) and, thereafter, two factions of the National
Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) succeeded in building a strong support
base due to the heightened ethnic consciousness of the Nagas. As the literacy
rate among the Nagas increased, external influences penetrated their society,
institutional decay became widespread and the army continued its repressive
tactics, the Nagas' resolve to fight for liberation has become correspondingly
strong.
Mobilization for the Mizo war had two distinct phases: the first phase
preparing the political ground for greater military mobilization of the Mizos
in the second phase. In the 1950s, the Mizo Union and other tribal organi-
zations carried out many political activities to create a strong sense of
"Mizo-ness." It benefited the Mizo National Front (MNF) led by Laldenga,
who developed the Mizo National Army (MNA) into a strong fighting force.
A powerful speaker, Laldenga used select tribal symbols and Christian values
for mobilization. He thereby stirred up tribal fervor and solidarity, which
crystallized "Mizo-ness" among the tribal people. These elements blended
into a "new political religion" of the MNF, which attracted all sections of
people into the Mizo society (Phadnis 1989: 153-155). The tribal youth who
joined the MNA were thoroughly indoctrinated into Mizo nationalism; the
lectures and demonstrations recalled the Mizos' brave past.
Similarly, in Assam, the anti-foreigners movement (1979-85) provided
a fertile base for military mobilization by the ULFA. The movement found
its critical support base among those middle class Assamese nationalists who
became disenchanted with the Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) that led the Assam
movement. Importantly, the state's repression intensified military mobiliza-
tion. This was reflected by the upward increase in grass roots support for
ULFA, to the extent that the state's tactics were frustrated (Gohain 1996:
2066). In other words, military operations provided a strategic advantage to
the ULFA, extending its breadth and reaching into new areas. "Every unjust
arrest, unreasonable harassment, ham-handed raid, actual or even believed
molestation or rape by the security forces simply means so much expansion
of space for the ULFA," stated a field report (Prabhakara 1992: 47). Whenever
the ULFA's nationalist ideology failed to evoke sufficient response, either in
view of the counter-mobilization strategies of the AGP and the Congress party
or its extreme chauvinistic ideals, the group has resorted to a populist strategy
of co-option through development programs and social welfare measures.
In extreme cases, whoever defied its call for support has been coerced into

joining. This confirms that the mobilization process has followed the elite-led
pattern.
Internal constituency support does not always satisfy the military needs
of insurgents during ethnic war. They therefore seek external patron support
(political, moral and military). External intervention is inevitable in ethnic
wars (Brown 1996; Ryan 1990; Midlarsky 1992; Gurr and Harff 1994);
and can alter the internal balance of ethnic power to change one or both
adversaries' goals and demands (Rothchild and Lake 1998: 217). External
patron involvement not only leads to internationalization of the war but
also changes its structure from "a doubly asymmetrical dyad to a wobbly
triad of great complexity" (Zartman 1995: 11-12). For insurgents in the
South Asian wars, external military assistance formed the vital source of
their strength. The Baluch militants' greatest strategic advantage was that
they operated from semi-desert and semi-mountainous terrain contiguous
to Afghan territory, wherein they established sanctuaries and found patron
support. Afghanistan remained the single most important patron on which the
Baluch militants relied for military, political and material support (Harrison
1981). The Shanti Bahini benefited from the CHT's contiguity to India's
northeast region, enabling it to find sympathetic military support from various
insurgent groups operating there (Ibrahim 1991). The Chakma refugees
(about 55,000) in India's northeast were also a source of support for the insur-
gents, who often crossed the border and mixed with refugees. Bangladesh
alleged that India willy-nilly allowed such cross-border movements. India's
supply of arms and grant of sanctuary to the Sri Lankan Tamil militants
during 1983-87 increased their firepower (Ganguly 1998: 193-232). Since
1987, the Sri Lankan Tamil expatriates have been an important source of
material support for the LTTE. The Sikh militants relied on Pakistan and the
expatriate Sikh community for military, material and political support (Joshi
1993). All the militant groups in India's northeast enjoyed the support either
of China, Bangladesh or Pakistan at differing scales. Some groups made use
of India's porous borders with Bhutan and Myanmar to set up sanctuaries for
their military training and operations (Marwah 1995; Bhaumik 1996).
Finally, as part of militants' efforts to reduce the imbalance of power, they
develop a supreme commitment to their cause. They create an 'asymmetry
of commitment' to countervail the 'asymmetry of power' enjoyed by their
adversary (Zartman 1993: 25). If the acuteness of the group's grievances and
its harsh experience at the hands of the security forces contribute to strength-
ening its commitment to the declared cause, it is the militant leaders who
ensure, either through indoctrination or coercion, the total commitment of
their cadres. Committed cadres are those who completely identify with the
goal of the group. Their commitment is reflected in their strict adherence to

P. SAHADEVAN
the group's ideology (based on vengeance, sacrifice and martyrdom) and total
loyalty and obedience to their leadership. Although all the militant groups in
South Asia have declared their commitment to their cause, only a few of
them have clearly demonstrated their determination to achieve their goal.
The LTTE is by far the strongest group with a supreme commitment to its
cause; this distinct characteristic makes the group a deadly force in the region
(Sahadevan 1995).
War Strategies and Their Effectiveness
If an ethnic war structure entails two unequal parties, it does not mean that
the stronger side can easily achieve its desired objective. For it depends on a
complete tilt in power balance towards the stronger party (the government),
as exemplified by that party's constant military pressure on the militants,
whose behavior - aimed at hurting the former - is effectively constrained by
its relative military weakness. To this end, the government adopts a number
of strategies - war for peace, winning patrons, winning hearts and minds
(of people), and divide and rule (of groups). These strategies, collectively or
individually, bring about an intended or unintended result depending upon the
pattern of power relations that eventually emerges between the adversaries.
War-for-Peace
Ethnic war is a purposive military program, requiring a huge investment

in terms of men and materials. For any government, use of force against
the militants is always the most preferred strategy. The principal aim is to
weaken the militants' militarily to a level at which they accept a negoti-
ated settlement or the war ends in a military victory for the government.
The premise is that peace, threatened by the militants' war efforts, can
be restored only after drastically eroding their military strength by force.
Thus, war itself is considered an appropriate means of managing or ending
insurrection. War is a strategic choice, decided upon by key leaders on the
basis of certain capability-related assumptions and interest-oriented compul-
sions. The government's main assumption is that it has enough military
power to subdue its weak faction-ridden adversary; this is based either on
the government's real strength or its miscalculated courage and unrelenting
determination combined with an underestimation of its adversary's actual
capability. Compulsions of the leaders arise from their desire to maintain
power or bolster the domestic opinion in favor of their regime. For them,
therefore, negotiated peace is less desirable than outright military victory
(King 1997: 30-32).

In South Asia, all governments have pursued war as an instrument of

peace, at least in the initial phase. Nowhere else is it so loudly proclaimed
as in Sri Lanka; many governments have tactically kept secret their battle-
line strategy for ending war militarily in order to thwart unwanted external
pressure and involvement by countries or organizations related to their human
rights concerns. Since 1983, the Sri Lankan government under three presid-
ents (J.R. Jayewardene, R. Premadasa and C. Kumaratunga) has assiduously
executed the war-for-peace strategy, despite different compulsions and calcu-
lations. In fact, the changing strategic situation on the war front has effectively
changed the objectives of the war strategy itself; it also has marked a
change in the government's perception of the militants. In 1983, President
Jayewardene launched military operations to defeat the Tamil militants. He
classified the ethnic conflict as a military problem that needed a "military
solution" (Times of India, January 27, 1986). However, following many
reverses in power and losses suffered by the security forces, the government
gave up its determination for a military victory. Since 1987, the objective of
the government's war-for-peace strategy has been to weaken the LTTE, so
as to pressure its leadership to negotiate peace (Muni 1993; Sardeshpande,
1992). But the LTTE's refusal to compromise on the Eelam goal and unwill-
ingness to commit itself to substantive negotiations has left the government
with no option except pursuing the non-workable war-for-peace strategy.
Unlike in Sri Lanka, the Pakistani government's aim in adopting this
strategy was to score a military victory in the Baluch war. Since negotiations
with the militants were not on the government agenda, the question of their
weakening military did not arise. If the killing of militants did not itself
constitute a victory, their fleeing to the mountains and Afghanistan under
heavy military pressure certainly did, and this brought maximum strategic
benefits to the army. Those militants who continued to fight were given two
options: either lay down arms within the stipulated time and avail amnesty or
face the might of the military. In light of severe hardships in the mountains
and growing disenchantment with their military mission, many gave up arms
or opted to cross over into Afghanistan.
In the CHT war, the Bangladeshi army unsuccessfully tried to emulate the
Pakistani army's experience. Until the mid-1980s, the government nurtured
a hope of gradually eliminating the insurgents and militarily ending the war.
The army's main operational task was to capture territories; some military
officers openly declared that they wanted "the soil and not the people" (Anti
Slavery Society 1984: 61). Ultimately the war did not proceed along the
expected lines: the defeat of highly motivated militants was hard to achieve,
and the army's realization of its difficulties on this count were reflected in the
government's emphasis on political negotiations.

P.SAHADEVAN
The Indian government has invariably followed the war-for-peace strategy

in all of its wars with the aim of military victory or, when it becomes difficult,
negotiated settlement. Its well-pronounced goal in the Khalistan war was
suppression of militancy and negotiated settlement only with the moderate
Akali Dal leaders. In the government's view, the militants were incorrigible
and unreasonable; their insistence upon a secessionist goal had foreclosed
the option for negotiated peace and thus justified its war efforts (White Paper
on the Punjab Agitation 1994). The government's firm resolve to suppress
militancy had both short and long-term goals. If ending the war militarily
remained its immediate goal, destroying the ground that bred militants would
mean preventing war in the future. Ultimately, various military operations
(like Operation Bluestar and Black Thunder) by the army, police and paramil-
itary forces accomplished both of these tasks by 1992, of course, at a heavy
human cost (Joshi 1993).
The same outcome has not been possible in Nagaland; the Nagas have
denied what the Sikhs conceded to the Indian government. This, however,
does not mean that the Nagas are militarily strong enough to defeat the
security forces that have superior firepower; nor does it mean that the security
forces enjoy enough of a strategic advantage to impose, at free will, a solution
on the Nagas. Thus, after prolonged, futile military efforts to defeat the Naga
Army and the NSCN, the government has changed its goal since the mid-
1960s in favor of substantively weakening the militants in order to reach a
negotiated end of the war.
The war-for-peace strategy worked differently in the Mizo war. While the
Indian government wanted to defeat the MNA militarily, the latter used its
armed resistance to compel the former to negotiate a settlement. Laldenga
made peace overtures even when the MNA was fighting the Indian army and
the government turned them down because its forces were sure to score a
military victory. Thus, the MNA fought a war for survival and desired a polit-
ical solution. Finally, in a move to avoid defeat, the NNF leader declared his
commitment to accept the Indian Constitution and abandon his secessionist
goal. Encouraged by this change of heart, the government changed its own
stand in favor of political negotiations with the MNF (Bhaumik 1996: 177-
187). The same situation could not develop in the Assamese war. Despite its
admittance of weakness, the ULFA is committed to its secessionist goal -
Swadhin Asom. Since negotiations on the issue of secession are unacceptable
to the Indian government - which derives its resolve to fight the secessionist
forces from their goal-rigidity - the war-for-peace strategy is geared towards
defeating or neutralizing the ULFA to the point that it would be forced to
abjure violence and accept the Indian Constitution. The government's desire
to exercise both options has been demonstrated on a number of occasions; the

failure of military coercion to subdue the militants has increased its interest
in negotiations but it reverted to the military strategy when the ULFA refused
to respond positively.
Winning Patrons
In many wars coercion alone does not bring about the governments' desired
results. In order to make their war-for-peace strategy workable they target
the insurgents' sources of power. External patrons are one such significant
source that political incumbents seek to win not so much to their side but
away from their adversary's side. The military situation on ground motivates
governments to undertake this complex task. Governments adopt three ways
to win the militants' patrons: (i) the use of bilateral or multilateral diplomatic
channels; (ii) through good offices of friendly third parties; and (iii) by under-
taking or threatening a retaliatory intervention. The last method, for example,
can include a warring government that extends its support to a third country's
adversary where that third country supports the warring government's dissid-
ents. Stated another way, country A extends its support to group B against
country C, which plays a patron role to group D in its war against country A.
Government efforts to win patrons have coexisted with war strategies
in all the ethnic wars in South Asia. This tactic was most successful in
the Baluch war. The targeted patron was Afghanistan because the Baluch
militancy thrived on its support. Pakistan tried first to use bilateral chan-
nels to normalize its relations with Afghanistan and thus end Afghanistan's
patron role in the war. When bilateral attempts failed, the Bhutto government
sought the help of Iran to create a rapprochement with Afghanistan. During
Afghan President Daoud's visit to Tehran in April 1975, the Shah of Iran used
his skillful diplomatic maneuvering to obtain Afghanistan's commitment to
cease its support to the Baluch dissidents in Pakistan and accept Pakistan's
territorial integrity as inviolable (Asian Recorder July 30-August 5, 1975:
12713). If because of the Shah's pressure Afghanistan changed its Baluch
policy, Iran's $2 billion economic aid worked as an incentive. A series of
visits by Pakistani and Afghan leaders followed and resulted in a diplomatic
thaw at the cost of Baluch interests. Gradually, by 1978, the Baluch issue lost
its importance to Afghanistan as a foreign policy tool; Afghanistan quickly
sacrificed the interests of its kin group to improve ties with Pakistan.
The same success story has been repeated in the Eelam war, with the
difference being that its overall impact on ending the war was marginal.
India has been the prominent patron of the Tamil militants. The Sri Lankan
government sought to win India away in order to achieve total subjugation of
the Tamils. Since India's militant-supportive role was dictated by its security
concerns, President Jayewardene addressed those concerns in the Indo-Lanka

P. SAHADEVAN
Agreement of 1987 (Muni 1993). In return, India promised to cease its

support of the militants. The agreement represented a significant diplomatic
victory for Sri Lanka, which not only caused the end of Indian aid to the milit-
ants, but also turned New Delhi against them. India's war to disarm the LTTE
(1987-90) indicated the success of Sri Lanka's strategy of winning patron.
After having withdrawn its support, India has never tried to resume the same
patron role. Since the mid-1990s, Sri Lanka has focused its diplomatic efforts
on curtailing LTTE's foreign activities that seek to mobilize material support
from Tamil expatriates (Kloos 1999). Responding to Colombo's sustained
diplomatic pressure, the United States, Great Britain, and Canada have listed
the LTTE as a foreign terrorist organization and imposed restrictions on its
activities. This has not stopped the LTTE's fund collection in these countries;
today the material support of Sri Lankan Tamil expatriates, which more than
compensates for the loss of Indian support and the revenue from the LTTE's
transnational activities (drug trafficking and many business ventures), has
been crucial for the tigers to sustain the war.
The main task of the Bangladeshi government in the 1980s and 1990s was
to obtain India's support in ending cross-border movements of the Chakma
rebels. Bangladesh's retaliatory support, which extended clandestinely to
India's northeast insurgents, did not help its war efforts in the CHT. In the
1980s, all diplomatic efforts to reach a bilateral understanding on this issue
failed. However, in 1997, the Awami League government played its pro-India
card to reach an understanding under which both governments made mutual
assurances not to provide any sanctuary or support to rebels from each other's
country (Rashiduzzaman 1998). For India, ending support from Bangladesh,
Pakistan and China to India's rebels in the northeast was also crucial. The
issue has been factored into the bilateral framework; it is seen as a cause
for bedeviling India's relations with these countries. For a long time, New
Delhi impressed upon Beijing the need to cease its role in India's internal
wars in order to improve relations between their countries. Nevertheless,
China continued to aid insurgency until very recently. Now, there has been
a noticeable decline in the level of Chinese involvement in India's northeast
partly due to the leadership's conscious decision not to complicate its rela-
tions with its neighbor, and partly because the insurgents have not served
Chinese interests in any manner. But Pakistan has been very consistent in its
support to various militant groups in India. It has been the toughest patron
to deal with politically, and India's diplomatic pressure to win over Pakistan
has never yielded the desired results (Joshi 1993). India, therefore, during
the Khalistan war, resorted to fencing off the Punjab border with Pakistan. It
also has relentlessly mobilized international opinion against Pakistan's covert
cross-border activities as an instrument of state policy.

Winning Hearts and Minds
Eliminating patron support does not always lead to the end of war. Nor
is this the only strategy that governments adopt. Instead, in conjunction
with winning over external patrons, governments seek to win over local
supporters of militants with the aim of breaking the rebels' strategic link
with the public and eroding their support base so vital to sustaining their
war efforts. Publicized politico-economic measures of warring governments
mark the strategy of winning hearts and minds, implemented in the following
ways: (i) announcement or undertaking of economic development projects in
areas afflicted by the war or where the militants' supporters are located; (ii)
effective relief and rehabilitation measures for people affected by the war;
(iii) protection of non-combatants' human rights and publicized punishment
for those soldiers who violate human rights; (iv) establish good civil-military
relations in the war zones by making the army undertake various civil duties
along with its military functions; (v) unilateral announcement of a peace
package with sufficient guarantees to the dissident group's ethnic interests;
and (vi) initiation of political processes by holding elections and establishing
civil administration in war-torn areas.
Every warring government in South Asia has tried this strategy at some
point to win its adversary's supporters. Intending to alienate the Baluch
militants from the community and bring about reconciliation in the society,
both the Bhutto and Zia regimes took various steps to develop Baluchistan.
The governments assumed that economic development would promote law
and order in much the same way as law and order would promote devel-
opment in areas that had experienced very little of either (White Paper on
Baluchistan 1974). Thus, they constructed roads, increased resource alloca-
tion (from Rupees 30 million in the 1970s to Rupees 210 million in 1974-75),
improved the agricultural sector, set up industries, and enhanced the intake of
Baluch into federal bureaucracy (Harrison 1981: 164-166; Sahadevan 2000:
94-97). Similarly, successive governments in Bangladesh - especially those
of Zia-ur Rahman and Ershad - found the root cause of the war to be the
backwardness of the CHT and undertook many development projects with
the help of the Asian Development Bank in a wide range of areas, including
infrastructure, communications, agriculture, education, industry, and social
welfare. Employment opportunities for the tribal people increased because
government positions were reserved for them. Separately, the army carried
out various civic functions to earn the goodwill of the people. At the political
level, the government took a unilateral step in 1989 to establish three district
councils in the CHT and devolved limited powers (Shelley 1992: 150-165).
Unlike in Baluchistan where the Pakistani government's measures were only
intended to benefit the Baluch, the Bangladeshi government was criticized for

P. SAHADEVAN
the pro-Bengali orientation of its projects in the name of tribal development

(Mohsin 1997: 124).
In Sri Lanka, until 1994, winning people was not the dominant strategy of
the government for three reasons. First, successive governments (except the
Kumaratunga regime) did not make a distinction between the Tamil militants
and the general public. Second, the tendency to combine combatants and non-
combatants for military classification purposes has created a perception that
economic development or reconstruction would eventually benefit the milit-
ants. Thirdly, the war never reached a desirable point of recession where the
government could make any meaningful non-military steps work in accord-
ance with its objectives. President Kumaratunga was the one leader who
initiated some goodwill measures during 1994-95 to win over the Sri Lankan
Tamils. Those measures, however, resulted from the cease-fire between the
LTTE and the army, and coincided with peace talks. Apart from lifting the
economic embargo imposed on the northern province, President Kumara-
tunga unilaterally announced a devolution package that envisaged a regional
council system (ICES 1996). After the breakdown of the government-LTTE
talks in April 1995, the government re-imposed the economic embargo. It has
since been lifted again (in early January 2002) following the declaration of a
cease-fire.
In India the strategy of winning the non-combatants has entailed both
economic and political measures to redress certain difficulties and assuage
the ruffled feelings of the warring communities. At the height of the Khalistan
war, Punjab witnessed a flurry of activities by the Central Government.
Besides providing support to promote the Sikh religion and culture, the
Goverment announced economic packages, ordered a judicial probe into
the 1984 Delhi riots against the Sikhs, revamped the state administration,
restored the democratic process, and extended rehabilitation assistance to
families that suffered losses due to violence (Sahadevan 2000: 106-111). All
of these steps, in the perception of the Sikhs, touched only the periphery of
their problem. In northeast India, the government's strategy centered more
on giving economic incentives to the region than addressing the core polit-
ical aspirations of the different ethnic groups. All three war-affected states
- Nagaland, Assam and Mizoram - received greater government attention
from the standpoint of development. Since the 1970s, there has been a steady
increase in the Central Government's annual allocation of funds to these
states. Between 1996-2000, it implemented a special economic package of
Rupees 70 billion. The periodic visits of the top central leaders to the region
were seen as an attempt to bring the alienated people closer to New Delhi and
to seek their total loyalty to the Indian state. In this context, while fighting the
war, the army was also engaged in developing good civil-military relations in

Nagaland and Assam (Sahadevan 2000: 111-116). However, these measures

have not yielded the desired level of success for the government.
Divide and Rule
Cohesion of a warring group indicates its strength; the greater the group cohe-
sion, the stronger that group is to fight a war. When trapped in a protracted
war, the warring government tries to divide the militants by offering certain
incentives and rewards like general amnesty, rehabilitation assistance, and
political positions in the government once they surrender arms and eschew
violence. It should be noted that dividing militants is one aspect of this
strategy; driving a wedge between them and the moderates is another. The
strategy works to the government's favor only if certain propitious conditions
exist. It is assumed that a group involved in a protracted war is more likely
susceptible to breakup, even if it has impressive battlefield performance,
due to the war-weariness experienced by its cadres. In such a situation, the
government, through political and economic rewards, easily buys second-
rung militant leaders, especially if the group itself has a weak structure.
A group with a highly-centralized leadership that wields tight control and
imposes strict discipline is not easily divisible. Sometimes the strategy can
also work against the government's interests. If the creation of more outfits
tends to weaken the parent group, it can also create more fronts and thus
increase contests and challenges to the government.
By adopting this divisive strategy in conjunction with other tactics the
warring South Asian governments have sought to influence war processes
to their advantage. Some governments are more successful than others in
dividing militants. In Pakistan, Bhutto and Zia made concerted efforts not
only to keep the moderates and militants divided but also to create disunity
- both political and militant - among the anti-centrist Baluch forces. At one
level, they offered political patronage to the tribal chieftains and talks to the
moderate political leaders on the question of regional autonomy; that none
of the regimes held any meaningful talks indicated the Pakistani leaders' real
motive to deprive the militants of the moderates' support. Simultaneously,
they offered amnesty to divide the rank and file of the BPLE Within a
month, about 5,500 rebels surrendered with 2,160 weapons (White Paperon
Baluchistan 1974). Zia was more considerate towards the BPLF because he
left the amnesty offer open until their return from the mountains. He also
allowed the surrendered militants to keep personal arms. As many militants
accepted amnesty under military pressure, their organizational structure was
in a state of disarray. Ultimately they lost their strength to fight the war. Thus
surrender became the easy option for everyone.

P. SAHADEVAN
Bangladesh also followed the same two-tiered strategy. To alienate the

PCJSS from the tribal society, the government cultivated the tribal leaders
from three hill districts by offering a nine-point peace package. Talks between
the National Committee (NC) and the tribal leaders resulted in the establish-
ment of three district councils in 1989. The army encouraged the dissidents
to set up rival organizations. Since the Chakmas dominated the PCJSS,
the government tried to cultivate the Manna and Murang tribes by special
development schemes. Using factionalism in the PCJSS, the government
announced as many as five amnesties from 1983-91 and the militants were
given cash awards for eschewing violence and surrendering weapons; the
amount varied according to the size of weapons (Shelley 1992: 141-148;
Moshin 1997: 176). About 2,850 militants surrendered by 1993. Yet, the
battlefield situation did not change; the Shanti Bahini had enough strength
left to sustain the war.
Similarly, the Sri Lankan government decided to negotiate with the TULF
from 1983-85 in order to drive a wedge between the moderates and milit-
ants. Although it could not penetrate the various militant groups by trying
to divide them, in the 1980s India used its intelligence agency's Research
and Analysis Wing to prevent unity among the militants by favoring one
group to the detriment of another. Military training and arms were provided
to some groups while others were ignored or favored less (Muni 1993: 72).
This created rivalry within the militant movement much to Colombo's satis-
faction. Eventually, the LTTE emerged as a formidable force and alienated
the TULF from the Sri Lankan Tamil society. After signing the peace accord
(1987) with Sri Lanka, India cultivated the non-LTTE groups, whereas the
Premadasa government befriended the LTTE to oppose India's peacekeeping
operations on the island. When hostilities between the government and the
LTTE resumed in 1990, the government chose to cultivate the non-LTTE
forces by offering to negotiate with them. Then, in 1994-95, came President
Kumaratunga's offer of dialogue with the LTTE. Once the talks broke down
and the war resumed, the government engaged the moderate Tamil groups
in political parleys to enlist their support for the 1995 devolution package.
Cumulatively, all of these efforts produced a complex result: they ensured
disunity among various groups but could not contain the LTTE. Neither India
nor Sri Lanka could infiltrate the LTTE and create an internal dissension or
split. Thus, the limitations of the divide and rule strategy are exposed through
the example of the Eelam war.
The two-tiered strategy produced a different result in India's Khalistan
war. Since the Akali Dal wielded considerable influence in the Sikh society,
the government cultivated its leaders to win the people away from the fold
of the militants. The process began in March 1985 when the Akali leader,

Harchand Singh Longowal, was released from jail and encouraged to re-
establish his leadership in the state. Many steps were taken quickly, including
the release of several detainees and the conclusion of the 1985 Rajiv Gandhi-
Longowal accord that sought to resolve the autonomy and territorial demands
of the Akali Dal within the framework of Indian Constitution (see Singh
1996). The government did not have the illusion that the accord itself would
lead to the militants' defeat. Instead, it hoped that the militants would be
denied the coveted support extended by the Akali leaders. Initially, this
result materialized. But the collapse of the moderate leadership by 1988 due
to internal rivalry returned the militants to center stage. Now, the govern-
ment focused on breaking the link between Sikh religious or quasi-religious
organizations and some militant groups; in 1985 it lifted the ban on the All-
India Sikh Students' Federation with the same motive. Simultaneously, the
police adopted certain disingenuous means to weaken the militants. They
created a unique system called "Cats," under which arrested militants were
recruited as agents. Hefty tags were put on the heads of fugitive militants,
encouraging "cats" to provide information about them. The cats were also
made to infiltrate the ranks of militant groups to gather information about
their strength, hideouts and modus operandi. They were also armed and
involved in operations to neutralize militants (India Today December 15,
1995: 101). Ultimately, the government emerged successful. The moderate-
militant divide was sharpened and the structure of many militant groups
crumbled to face defeat by the security forces.
As in Punjab, breaking the unity of the Nagas was an important activity
of the Indian government. In the 1950s, India nurtured the moderate Naga
People's Convention (NPC) to isolate the NNC from society. The NPC chal-
lenged the NNC but could not erode its support base. In the 1960s the
government's efforts to create dissension within the Naga Army succeeded
when a group calling itself the Revolutionary Government of Nagaland
emerged under the leadership of Scato Swu, who backed the government's
war to end militancy and sought a political solution to the Naga problem
(Maxwell 1973: 14-17). Since the split of the NNC and the birth of the NSCN
in 1980, New Delhi allegedly has been playing one group or tribe against
another. While obstructing moves to unite the militants under one common
platform, the Center has accorded a dominant status to the NSCN (Isak-
Muivah) (I-M) over the NSCN (Khaplang) (K) faction. Also, the government
allegedly used the tribal Kukis against the Nagas. The 1999 surrender-cum-
rehabilitation package for the northeast militants had a principal objective
of weaning the Naga youth away from militancy. However, the response has
been limited, proving that the government's divisive strategy has not been
very successful.

P. SAHADEVAN
Nevertheless, the scheme has evoked a favorable response in Assam where

about 500 ULFA militants surrendered by 1999. Over the years, with offers of
amnesty and cash rewards (resettlement benefits, jobs and loans for business),
the government has created a pro-peace faction of the ULFA. The army has
cultivated the SULFA (Surrendered ULFA) to its operational advantage. This
new group of former militants gives information to the intelligence agen-
cies regarding the movement of ULFA men and helps the security forces
liquidate them - such killings are mostly termed 'encounter deaths' (The
Hindu October 24, 1999). This divisive strategy has weakened the ULFA but
not demoralized the hardcore leadership that has shown determination to fight
for their goal.
In Mizoram, the Indian government's offer of political reconciliation
amidst sustained military pressure weakened the cohesion of the MNE
Taking advantage of the power rivalry within the MNF and the shaky position
of its leader Laldenga, the government declared amnesty several times in
the late 1960s and opened a line of communication with the anti-Laldenga
faction with an offer to talk in 1971. These tactics worked. Many militants
surrendered under incentives and pressures, and fearing a strong threat to
his authority, Laldenga himself favored negotiations. When Laldenga took a
tough position, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi engineered a moderate-militant
divide by promoting leaders like Lalthanhawla and Brigadier Sailo over
Laldenga. Further pressure mounted on Laldenga when the MNF split in 1978
and he was stripped of the party's leadership. The new leader, Biakchchunga,
led a section of the MNA to surrender and accept amnesty. As a result, when
Laldenga regained control of the MNF in November 1978, the MNA was
a totally weak force, incapable of fighting a war. By the early 1980s, the
MNF chief ran out of options and accepted peace talks. This constituted a
major success for the government's divisive strategy, this time succeeding in
an atmosphere of heavy military pressure.
A change in power relations is best assessed by comparing the parties'
current level of power asymmetry with the level that existed at the start of a
war. Therefore, a cumulative view of the efficacy of all war-ending strategies
together should be made. Perhaps success or failure of a single strategy does
not alter the asymmetry (either increase or decrease) to any significant extent;
a combined effect of more than one strategy may bring about that change.
This is evident from the South Asian wars. The Baluch rebels became weak
because all of the war-ending strategies used by the Pakistani government
were immensely successful in drastically tilting the power balance in the
government's favor. In this case, asymmetry was absolutely widened beyond
the rebels' capacity to regain their strength to confront the government. This
did not happen in the CHT war, where the government was able to curtail

only the rebel's external support. All other strategies failed to produce the
desired result. The same is true of the Eelam war; a partial success of ending
patron support amidst the failure of all other strategies has not altered the
level of power asymmetry. Results in India are mixed. In Punjab, the govern-
ment emerged powerful because most of its strategies were successful. The
same outcome has not been possible in Assam and Nagaland, where the rebel
groups have foiled the government's all-out attempts to weaken them on the
ground. The Mizo militants could not do the same against the government,
whose strategies strengthened its relative position in the war.
Negotiating Peace
These outcomes reflecting the power relations between combatants have

determined the war process. Three trends have emerged. Negotiations
between the combatants have taken place in some wars (Eelam, CHT, Naga
and Mizo) where asymmetry of power has not been drastically altered to
benefit totally either side. The countervailing power of each side has been
sufficient to prevent the other side from winning the war, but at the same time
insufficient to defeat it. In that sense, there emerged some sort of 'power equi-
valence' (defined not in a literal sense but in terms of efficacy of battlefield
behavior of the parties) to create a stalemate in the war process. The "ripe-
ness" (Zartman 1989) for negotiations is found in such a situation. Whereas a
'hurting stalemate' tends to encourage negotiated settlement, a 'simple stale-
mate' (that does not hurt unbearably one or both parties, which still perceive
the current impasse as tenable and as likely to improve later) promotes
negotiations but does not ensure settlement. The other trend resulting from
the war strategies in South Asia is that some rebel groups completely lost
their strength, indicating a drastic alteration of asymmetry to the warring
government's advantage. This happened in the Baluch and Khalistan wars
where negotiations did not constitute the Indian and Pakistani governments'
strategies. The third trend is seen in the Assamese war where, though the
government enjoys superior firepower vis-A-vis the ULFA, neither a hurting
stalemate nor a military end has been reached thus far. Since both parties seek
to change the course of the war, which presently is aimed at a military victory,
negotiations for settlement have not been favored.
It is thus clear that in South Asia, the search for a negotiated settlement
is not an integral part of war-ending strategies in all cases. Whenever the
adversaries opted for direct negotiations, the nature of their power relations
has remained a 'push factor.' As such, groups like the LTTE have used
negotiations as a political tactic to advance their strategic goals. Generally,
negotiations in most of the wars have turned protracted. Yet, not all wars have

P.SAHADEVAN
ended in negotiated settlement even after the conclusion of peace accords.

Barring the Eelam and CHT wars, negotiations started only after a prolonged
period of military operations. Also, those wars that ended in negotiated
settlement took more than ten years to do so.
The Eelam war peace talks have been held at regular intervals, either under
external (India's) pressure (in the 1980s) or whenever a new leader comes to
power. Since 1983, the Sri Lankan government has thrice negotiated with the
militants (1983-87, 1989-90 and 1994-95). With the declaration of a cease-
fire in December 2001, negotiations between the Sri Lankan government
and the LTTE are now under way for fourth time. None of the top leaders
from either side participated in any negotiations. Nor did they insist on any
preconditions for peace talks. The LTTE has always appeared to be slippery
on the issue of peace; its strong commitment to the Eelam goal has cast doubts
about its interest in negotiated settlement. During 1983-87, India negotiated
with the Sri Lankan government on behalf of the Tamil leaders, whose prior
approval, either under persuasion or coercion, was obtained before finalizing
any peace package. Thus the LTTE was not a direct party to negotiations
(except the 1985 Thimpu talks) and was therefore coerced to accept the 1987
Indo-Lanka peace accord. Incidentally, the accord remains the only nego-
tiated peace package since 1983, the non-implementation of which, under
pressure from the LTTE and Sinhalese hard-liners, created an imperative for
an alternative peace accord that the LTTE sought to negotiate in 1989-90 and
1994-95. On both occasions, the talks could not progress beyond the prelim-
inary stage. The parties discussed certain confidence-building measures, but
the substantive issue of devolution was not covered. In 1989-90, both parties
showed their insincerity during negotiations. They were forced to create a
temporary detente to pressure India to withdraw its peacekeeping forces from
Sri Lanka. Once this happened, the parties chose to end their talks and resume
the war. In 1994-95, the LTTE's public pronouncements in favor of a negoti-
ated settlement were not accompanied by a commitment to the peace process.
It became clear that the LTTE's participation in four rounds of talks was
merely to strengthen its military position in pursuit of the Eelam goal (see
Weerakoon 1998; Rajanayagam 1996; Muni 1993).
A similar trend is seen in the Naga war. If the military situation has forced
the government and Naga rebels to engage in peace talks three times (1964-
67, 1975 and since 1997), the failure of peace talks can be attributed to the
lack of space for a compromise settlement. The Nagas have not effectively
factored their military weakness into their peace policy because they hold
tight to their secessionist goal. Throughout the first phase of peace talks,
while contesting India's claim over Nagaland, the Naga delegation harped
on the theme of independence and sovereignty for Nagaland. India offered

to negotiate the state's autonomy within the confines of its constitution. The
difference between the parties' maximum-minimum goals was so wide that
the talks ended abruptly on a discordant note in October 1967 (Gundevia
1975: 173-174; Mankekar 1967: 122-124). The second phase of talks was
held between the government and a dissident Naga group in the early l 970s
and resulted in a peace accord in 1975 - a first of its kind in the Naga
war. The accord was not intended to redress the grievances of the Nagas but
instead to end the war by accomplishing the rebels' surrender, which formed
the precondition for formulating political issues that would be discussed in
future talks about a final solution. It was an unequal deal, rejected by the
frontline Naga leaders. The NSCN mobilized all of the anti-accord forces
and refused to engage in talks for about 22 years, until it realized that there
was a stalemate in the war process. Following the declaration of cease-fire
(August 1, 1997), the government appointed an interlocutor who held many
rounds of preparatory talks with the NSCN (I-M) leaders. Negotiations on
the substantive issues have not yet taken place. The rebel leadership has often
declared its commitment to political settlement, but has not been categorical
in renouncing its secessionist goal. At present, the war is suspended, but peace
is elusive.
The peace process in the CHT war was protracted, but proved to be a
productive exercise in the end. It has been one of the few wars in South Asia
that ended in negotiated settlement. Though the civil society's initiatives for
a negotiated end of the war came within a few years of the start of the war,
the government and the PCJSS became serious about peace talks only in the
mid-1980s when military gains were unimpressive for both sides. Initially,
however, between 1987-88, both adversaries took tough negotiating posi-
tions, reflected in their preconditions and counter-proposals and the lack of
concerted efforts by either side for a compromise solution (CHT Commission
1991). But they softened their positions in the 1990s. Although the CHT
war did not entail any external mediation, the government set up a broad-
based quasi-intermediary political structure (Parliamentary Committee for
the CHT, which became the National Committee in 1996) with a mandate
to draft a framework for peace. First, the Committee negotiated a cease-fire
that began August 1, 1992, and was extended every three months (about 35
times) until December 1997 (when a peace agreement was signed). In the
interim period spanning over five years, the Committee held fourteen rounds
of talks with the PCJSS. The group's several demands, varying from revision
of the constitution to withdrawal of Bengali settlers from the hills, made the
entire negotiation process bitterly tough and protracted. At last, with persever-
ance and patience, both the government and the PCJSS led the process to a
successful conclusion in December 1997.

430 P. SAHADEVAN
The peace agreement was a sincere attempt to reach a compromise solu-

tion and end the war. The government and PCJSS tried to accommodate each
other's interests. A main feature of the agreement was the introduction of a
regional council for tribal autonomy. Among its several functions, the council
is empowered to control the tribal land; the central government's power in
land allotment is limited. The PCJSS gave up its demand for eviction of the
Bengali settlers, and the government promised to return land if the Hill people
established their ownership rights. Economic development and rehabilitation
of refugees in the CHT assumed priority within the government. The rebels
agreed to surrender arms and the government granted amnesty (for details see
Daily Star, December 3, 1997). An immediate effect of the agreement has
been the end of the war. Neither the mainstream Bengali parties' opposition
nor some of the tribal leaders' discontentment has affected the implementa-
tion of the agreement. For the PCJSS, the agreement is a victory of sorts; the
protracted military engagement of its forces with the Bangladeshi security
forces has eventually yielded the expected result.
The experience in the Mizo war was quite similar. A sustained peace
process buttressed by mounting military pressure made peace a reality. It took
10 years for the MNF to realize the futility of war and an equal number of
years for the government to clinch a political deal with the enduring effect
of totally restoring peace. This is one of the few success stories in India and,
hence, remains an important point of reference in any discussion on ending
internal wars.
Yet, the road to peace was not smooth. Negotiations, held in three phases,
had seen backtracking (by the MNF) and breakdowns before a final peace
agreement was concluded in 1986. The first phase of the peace process started
in January 1976 and broke down in March 1978. The importance of this phase
was the agreement signed between the government and MNF chief Laldenga
on February 18, 1976, under which the latter declared his commitment to
end violence and acknowledged Mizoram as an integral part of India. The
government did not promise political concessions to satisfy the aspirations of
the Mizo people; rather it linked future talks on this matter with the surrender
of arms by the MNA (see Nibedon 1980: 263-264). Laldenga could not sell
the agreement to his cadres. When he failed to collect the underground cadres
with their arms and place them in camps, the government ended all peace
talks with him in March 1978. Nevertheless, the doors to negotiations were
not completely shut. For the government, Laldenga appeared tough, but he
was amenable to the government's strategies. He controlled the MNF, but
could not exercise a complete grip over the MNA. The government found his
weakness for power in the state structure and tried to use it to reach a political

settlement. He was not complex but contradictory in his stand due to internal
competition for power within the movement.
Therefore, in 1980 Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was keen to pursue peace
talks with the MNF chief who, in turn, declared a cease-fire and repudiated
militancy. Talks went on for about two years (1980-81) without any success.
A main issue of contention was that whereas the government held that it
would grant Mizoram statehood (within the Indian Union) only after the
MNA surrendered its arms, the MNF agreed to do so only after reaching
a political settlement of the war (Bhaumik 1996: 166-167). Yet, both parties
did not rule out future talks. This was a remarkable aspect of the peace process
in Mizoram. For whatever reason - be it the MNA's poor military capability
or the MNF's realization about its unattainable secessionist goal - the rebel
leadership put its faith in a political solution. Unlike in the Naga war, each
party's demand and position were not irreconcilable. It was merely a matter
of time before the parties reached a settlement in 1986. The process started
in 1984 when the government offered to resume talks and the MNF chief
unilaterally declared a cease-fire. De-linking the political solution from the
surrender of arms, the 1986 Mizo Accord conferred statehood on Mizoram,
guaranteed the Mizos special socio-cultural and political privileges and guar-
anteed the state additional funds for development (see the text in Marwah
1995: 455-459). Shortly thereafter, the agreement was fully implemented and
the MNF joined the political mainstream. Thus peace returned to the hills.
Ending and Unending Wars
Based on the outcomes of war and peace strategies, as mentioned earlier,

there are three categories of ethnic wars in South Asia: wars that ended
in outright military victory for governments, wars that ended in negotiated
settlement and wars that are unending. The Baluch and Khalistan wars form
the first category, the CHT and Mizo wars belong to the second, and the
Eelam, Naga and Assamese wars form the third category. We analyzed how
these outcomes were obtained. Now, it is necessary to explore why some
of the war and peace strategies worked or failed to bring about these varied
outcomes.
Why did the war strategies of the Indian and Pakistani governments
produce a resounding military victory in the Khalistan and Baluch wars
respectively? The answer lies in preparation for war itself; it is largely related
to mobilization. The success of an ethnic war is contingent upon a high level
of political and military mobilization, which is ensured only in the mass-elite-
led pattern. Both the Baluch and Khalistan wars merely followed the elite-led

P. SAHADEVAN
pattern. In the former, both political and military processes proceeded simul-
taneously under two different leaderships, indicating the inherent cleavage in
the society. In Punjab, both processes occurred at different points in time, but
the military mobilization that covered only one section of the Sikh society
(Jats) started even before the complete success of political mobilization. As a
result, both wars did not have the general public's broad-based support, which
is so necessary to sustain war in the face of mounting military pressure by the
government or increasing pressure to defeat the adversaries. Related to this
fact is the pattern of goal setting. Indeed, the militants set secession as a goal
in both wars. There was no consensus between the moderates and militants on
this crucial issue. A war that has its goal set by consensus is bound to help the
militants reinforce their total commitment to rebellion by fighting their more
powerful adversary. Thus, asymmetry of power enjoyed by the government
is redressed or at least challenged by asymmetry of commitment shown by
the militants. On the contrary, any dissension in goal setting is an indica-
tion of existing polarization in the war structure itself, even at the start of
the war.
Connected with the issues of mobilization and cleavage is the problem of
mititants' political links. It is argued that to achieve success, a militant move-
ment needs to institutionalize itself in the normal political process by forging
a permanent link with a legitimate political organization (Chima 1997: 1-
25). The idea behind this is to legitimize their movement, set its goal with the
approval of the entire society and involve a wide section of people in the war
through mobilization, carried out by the moderate and militant leaderships.
Apart from being well situated to engage the government in negotiations,
the moderate leaders can judiciously and realistically assess the strengths
and weaknesses of the movement, and decide their actions and strategies
accordingly. The underlying assumption is that the moderate leadership tries
to be more pragmatic and realistic than the militant leadership on the issue
of war and peace to avoid a total failure of its movement. The lack of such
institutional linkages between the Sikh militants and the Akali Dal in the
Khalistan war, and between the Baluch militants and the NAP in the Baluch
war, could be considered one factor that contributed to the outright defeat of
the militants.
Why did the CHT and Mizo wars end in political settlement? First, the
combatants' war strategies created a hurting stalemate in the war processes.
For the Bangladeshi security forces, which backed and facilitated the peace
process, the long-drawn-out war seemed a no-win affair as the rebels had
enough strength to deny government troops an outright victory. At the same
time, the PCJSS did not have any illusions of defeating the security forces.
It just wanted to use its limited military potential to strengthen its bargaining

position to win political concessions. Neither the rebel leaders nor successive
governments in Dhaka could ignore this strategic reality while deciding their
war and peace strategies. Similarly, although the MNA was not a match
for India's security forces, it continued to deny the government an outright
military victory by making strategic use of the terrain. The result was a stale-
mate that hurt the rebels more than the government. The latter's interest lay
in serious negotiations, borne out-of its desire to disengage from the war, and
restoration of order in the Mizo hills.
Second, serious negotiations in both wars were possible because the
parties were prepared to compromise on their original goals and accom-
modate each other's interests in a political framework. The goals were not
non-negotiable and the potential for a compromise was increased by military
factors like a hurting stalemate. Settlement was reached easily in the CHT
war since the issue in contention was autonomy and the re-composition of
the state was not in question. But one could have thought that given the seces-
sionist nature of the Mizo war, a negotiated settlement would be difficult to
achieve. Although it took 20 years for the war to end, the accord that brought
permanent peace in Mizoram was possible because the MNF - unlike the
LTTE or the NSCN (I-M) - was willing to compromise on its secessionist
goal. It showed that the goal setting for the war lacked a strong historical or
political base and a consensus in the society. The Mizos' grievances were
not so strong that they could not compromise. In this context, the Indian
government's divide and rule strategy helped expose the weak arguments of
the MNF and created a space for alternative forces to work for peace. It can be
hypothesized that autonomy wars are more amenable to negotiated settlement
than secessionist wars but the latter can be pushed to resolution if grievances
of the group have a weak base.
Third, the nature of the leadership that negotiates a settlement in ethnic
war is also important. We stated earlier that militant leaders invariably take
intransigent positions on negotiations and moderate leaders are more willing
to compromise. If a strong political wing controls a militant outfit, it is the
former that decides the issue of war and peace, and the latter generally accepts
it. The military wing is not necessarily kept away from discussions; the onus
of making crucial decisions simply lies in the political wing. The success of
the peace processes in the Mizo and CHT wars could be attributed to the fact
that the MNF and the PCJSS, which controlled the MNA and Shanti Bahini
respectively, subjected their military wings to negotiations and forced them
to accept peace with the governments. It was easier for the PCJSS to achieve
this task than the MNF, which initially faced challenges to negotiated peace
from its military wing.

P. SAHADEVAN
Why do three wars continue without any end? Although the Eelam,
Naga and Assamese wars have greater longevity, they have not yet reached
a situation marked by a mutually hurting stalemate. The simple stalemate
experienced in these wars has pushed the parties to engage in peace talks,
but not increased the prospects for negotiated peace. The warring parties'
determination to continue their fight until their goals are achieved has only
increased. Both the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE feel war-weariness,
but not strong enough to hurt them so much that they would accept a nego-
tiated settlement. They are confident that they will defeat each other even
though reality does not hold any such hope for them. They refuse to accept
that they are in a no-win war. They remain unrealistic, even at the cost of
their vital interests. The same can be said about the Naga and Assamese wars.
The NSCN and the ULFA leaders have shown determination to continue their
fight against the Indian government, largely arising from the fact that the latter
could not defeat them even after several years of military operations.
It is assumed that if militant groups survive the pressure of security forces
for a prolonged period, they gather confidence to tackle their adversary milit-
arily and refuse to accept negotiated settlement. The governments do not
come down from their intransigent positions to concede to the militants'
demands. Conscious of the fact that they have greater sources for military
and economic strength than do the militants, the latter cannot sustain them-
selves in war forever. Thus, governments seek to prolong wars as a 'tiring out'
strategy. It is assumed that militants' protracted involvement in a war tends to
tire them out at some point since they run out of strength and force. Even the
militants tend to think along these lines. Thus, the mutual expectation is that
protracted war will eventually end in military victory for one side - a hope
that forms an obstacle to the development of a mutually hurting stalemate in
the war process.
In this context, it is important to understand the role of belligerent leaders
in raising hopes of victory. Deciding war and peace is entirely the task of
leaders, who try to protect varied interests in the process. It is said that they
have fears and preferences that may be difficult to overcome (King 1997: 30).
The fears may be related to their power and position in the post-settlement
phase, and their preference may be to achieve the goal for which they have
developed a commitment and devotion. The first reason explains their self-
interest in continuing the war; accepting a negotiated settlement may help
the dissidents mobilize the disgruntled constituency members against the top
leaders. In the process, the original leaders get sidelined or overthrown, and
war becomes an agenda of the new leadership. This is also applicable to
the government (political) leaders, who are always concerned about their
electoral prospects when deciding their stand on a peace process. On the

ENDING ETHNIC WAR: THE SOUTH ASIAN EXPERIENCE 435
other hand, the leaders' commitments to their goals arise from the sacrifice
("entrapment" factor) made by the highly mobilized constituency members
and their conviction that theirs is a just cause.
It is evident that in all three wars, the militant leaders decided war and
peace. None of these groups [LTTE, NSCN (two factions) and ULFA] are
under the control of a strong political leadership. Instead, in many cases, a
strong military wing has controlled a weak political wing. Decision making
in these outfits is highly centralized and the top leadership wields absolute
power and authority in the entire structure. All of these militant leaders have
their own fears and preferences; they do not want to accept an ignominious
peace deal that will erode their power and authority or threaten their survival
in the post-settlement phase. This is most clearly spelled out in the Eelam
war. For LTTE chief Prabhakaran, autonomy to the Tamil provinces under
a negotiated settlement means accepting a democratic process in which the
competition for power will be open to all, and the victory and defeat of
leaders will be the people's decision. For a person who has enjoyed a hyper-
centralized position in the Tamil society, this is not just highly undesirable,
but even unacceptable (Sahadevan 1995: 279-280). Moreover, the LTTE
leadership suffers from an acute feeling of insecurity. While refusing to
surrender arms in 1987, Prabhakaran said that "in a situation where there is
no security, it is better to fight and die than to die on a large scale after laying
down arms" (The Hindu August 14, 1987). Likewise, the NSCN (I-M) leaders
feel that their acceptance of a negotiated peace deal with the government
may help their rival faction discredit them in the eyes of the Nagas. In the
process, they may lose their representative character and status of a dominant
force in Naga society. Similarly, for the ULFA leaders, all their glory and
significance comes from the war they wage against the Indian state; once they
accept peace, what will they be? They will be part of a democratic process
in which they may not have a chance to achieve power and position. Also,
some leaders and cadres want to continue the war as it is a highly prof-
itable military enterprise. Extortion and other illegal methods of collecting
money have made some of them prosperous. They, therefore, oppose any step
towards negotiated settlement.
The self-interest of leaders is not the sole reason for their rejection of nego-
tiated peace. Instead, their commitment to the cause remains an important
factor. This is evident from the position of militant leaders in all three
continuing wars (Eelam, Naga and Assamese wars). Secessionism as a goal
is non-negotiable as far as the LTTE, NSCN and ULFA are concerned. At
least in both the Naga and Eelam wars, the goal setting was based on a
consensual decision by society, which mobilized itself for a sustained war
until the goal was achieved. All war-torn societies, at the insistence of the

P. SAHADEVAN
leaders, have made immense sacrifices for their causes. This has given rise to
the feeling of "entrapment," meaning that each group is convinced that it has
invested so much in terms of men and material that it cannot give up the war
without actually accomplishing its original goal. Even economic incentives
provided by the governments have not changed the groups' minds. Accepting
anything less than their original goal will not be commensurate with their
investment. It is this factor that has made the position of the LTTE (Sahadevan
1995: 262-269) and the NSCN intransigent in negotiations. But, at the same
time, the governments' attitudes towards militants are dictated by their own
self-interest defined in terms of winning their goals. Therefore, there is very
little space for compromise and consensus. This shows how difficult it is to
negotiate peace in secessionist wars.
Conclusion
This article has tried to examine the conditions under which military victory
or negotiated settlement has been reached in South Asian ethnic wars. It
underscores the linkage between war strategies and peace processes, and
demonstrates that negotiated settlement is an unintended result as far as
many governments are concerned. War strategies are not merely military; they
include a variety of political tactics to strengthen war efforts. Likewise, even
though a peace process is essentially a political exercise, it is a result of the
war process itself. War strategies determine the success of a peace process.
Indeed greater modification of the parties' power positions sets the propitious
condition for a military victory or negotiated settlement.
In this context a number of observations are in order. First, the level and
extent of group mobilization play a crucial role in determining the pattern of
ending a war. A war in which both political and military mobilizations reach
a high level is less likely to end in military victory for the government or in a
political settlement. Second, it is easier for governments to reach a negotiated
settlement if a strong political wing controls a militant group. Dealing with
a militant organization that subordinates its political wing is always difficult.
Third, the seriousness of group grievances and the pattern of goal setting is
also important in determining the pattern of ending a war. It is difficult to
negotiate a war when the goal is endorsed by the entire community and is
based on that community's harsh experience at the hands of the adversary.
Fourth, the longevity of a war or a military stalemate, or both, do not always
create a hurting stalemate, without which it is hard to achieve a negotiated
settlement. Fifth, beyond some point, it is difficult for governments to impose
a political solution, as the militants who have sacrificed and are committed
to their goal may not accept any ignominious peace deal. Instead, they may

allow a military victory for their adversary. Sixth, and last, the participation
of multiple warring parties from the ethnic group's side has both advantages
and disadvantage for the government. Its advantages lie in the fact that the
group's cohesion is seriously eroded so that the war can be pushed to a
political or military end. Its disadvantage is that if one group is brought to
the political mainstream or defeated, another takes up the cause and thus, the
war continues.
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Ending Ethnic War - The South Asian Experience

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Ending Ethnic War: The South Asian Experience

Keywords: assimilation, autonomy, external patron, fear of extinction, hegemonic majorities,

Peacemaking in ethnic war is an arduous task. Negotiation processes tend to

* P. Sahadevan is Associate Professor in South Asian Studies, School of International

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Mapping Ethnic Wars

Sources and Goals

As a serious hostile military program, ethnic war is rooted in socio-economic

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the sovereignty of Bangladesh, successive regimes in Dhaka used political

Partiesand Their Tactics for Power

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of mobilization: elite-led and mass-led. In an elite-led process, the belligerent

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of Baluch nationalism. As a testimony to their mobilization, the Baluch over-

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War Strategies and Their Effectiveness

Ethnic war is a purposive military program, requiring a huge investment

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In South Asia, all governments have pursued war as an instrument of

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The Indian government has invariably followed the war-for-peace strategy

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Agreement of 1987 (Muni 1993). In return, India promised to cease its

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Winning Hearts and Minds

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the pro-Bengali orientation of its projects in the name of tribal development

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Nagaland and Assam (Sahadevan 2000: 111-116). However, these measures

Divide and Rule

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Bangladesh also followed the same two-tiered strategy. To alienate the

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Nevertheless, the scheme has evoked a favorable response in Assam where

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These outcomes reflecting the power relations between combatants have

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ended in negotiated settlement even after the conclusion of peace accords.

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The peace agreement was a sincere attempt to reach a compromise solu-

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Ending and Unending Wars

Based on the outcomes of war and peace strategies, as mentioned earlier,

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