CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW

Case Digest Compilation

Law on Public Officers & Art. IX-B
Art. IX-D The Commission on Audit
Art. XI Accountability of Public Officials

LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS and ART. IX-B

1.) Ong vs. Office of the President, G.R.No. 184219, Jan. 30, 20121
ISSUE: Is a co-terminous appointment, co-terminous with the term or tenure of the appointing
authority?
RULING: Yes. Under Sec. 14 (2) of the Omnibus Implementing Rules of the 1987
Administrative Code in relation to CSC Res. No. 91-1631 a co-terminous appointment is
defined as co-existent with the tenure of the appointing authority or at his pleasure.
Petitioner’s appointment falls under this category. Thus, his appointment may be
recalled at any time according to the President, the appointing authority. The assailed
M.C. did not dismiss him—it merely informed him of the impending end of his tenure.
But even without the M.C., his appointment is essentially of a temporary nature and he
can be terminated at any time for any cause without need of prior notice. This is
because in the career executive service, security of tenure requires a permanent
appointment, which in turn requires: 1) CES eligibility; and 2) appointment to the
appropriate CES rank. Ong lacked CES eligibility for the position of Director-III. His
dismissal and Bessat’s appointment were both valid.

2.) Re: Application of Judge Macarambon, A.M. No. 14061- Ret, June 19, 2012
ISSUE: Can a judge who voluntarily resigned from his judicial office before reaching the
optional retirement age be allowed to receive retirement benefits under RA No. 910, as
amended?

RULING: No. Under RA 910, the general rule is that the benefits therein may be
availed through optional retirement only if a judge/justice has retired or resigned upon
attaining the age of sixty (60) and rendering fifteen (15) years of government service,
the last three (3) of which in the Judiciary.
As an exception, the benefits under RA 910 may be availed of without said
requirements provided that the resignation has an element of involuntariness, which
must spring from the intent of the judge/justice who would not have parted with his
judicial employment were it not for circumstances or factors beyond his control. Also as
an exception to the age requirement, the judge/justice may comply with such if he
accumulates a certain amount of leave credits, as in the case of Re: Gregorio Pineda.
Judge Macarambon’s voluntary resignation did not fulfill the requirements under the
general rule or under the exceptions.

3.) CSC vs. Guevarra, G.R. No 176162, etc., Oct. 9, 2012

ISSUE: Can CSC only take cognizance of a case filed directly before it if the complaint
was made by a private citizen?

1
Petitioner Ong entered the NBI as a career employee and eventually became NBI Director-II in 1998. In 2001, he was
appointed Director-III by the President. In his appointment paper, it read that his appointment was “co-terminous with the
appointing authority. In early June 2004, he received M.C. No. 02-S.2004, informing him that his tenure would end on June 30,
2004, the day that the President’s term would also end, and that he would be sitting on a de-facto basis until the President re-
appoints him or makes a different appointment. In December 2004, he was notified that he was to cease his functions as
Director-III upon the appointment of respondent Bessat to said position. Thus, he filed a petition for quo warranto questioning
his removal and the appointment of Bessat on the ground that the M.C. was issued with malice and thus his removal was
arbitrary, supposedly contrary to the constitutional protection under Art. IX-G, Sec. 2 (b) of the Constitution.

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CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW
Case Digest Compilation
Law on Public Officers & Art. IX-B
Art. IX-D The Commission on Audit
Art. XI Accountability of Public Officials

RULING: No. Textually, Sec. 47, Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V, of E.O 292,
would tend to show that only private citizens can file a direct complaint to the CSC.
However, the Court ruled that give a literal reading to such a provision would result in
injustice and absurdity, disenfranchising public employees from a mode of redress for
their grievances against erring officials. Said provision should be read with Sec. 2, Art.
IX-B of the Constitution and Sec. 12 (11), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V, of E.O.
292, which both confers upon the CSC the power to “hear and decide administrative
cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal.”

4.) Posadas vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. 168951, July 17, 2013 2

ISSUE: By holding concurrent positions as University Chancellor and TMC Project
Director, did Dr. Posadas violate the constitutional provision against double employment
and double compensation?

RULING: Yes. The MOA between UP and the CIDA for the establishment of the TMC
Project provided that the “services of the contractual personnel of the University for the
Project shall be discontinued upon its completion or termination.” His multiple positions
fall under the prohibition since there is no distinction in Sec. 7, Art. IX-B as to
employment status, whether permanent, temporary, or coterminous with the TMC
Project’s period. Said constitutional provision and Sec. 1 & 2, Rule XVIII of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing Book V of EO 292 provides that double compensation is only
allowed if so authorized by law. Petitioners failed to cite any law providing so.

5.) Camarines Norte vs. Gonzalez, G. R. 18574, July 23, 2013

ISSUE: Being a primarily confidential employee, does Gonzales have security of
tenure?
RULING: No. Prior to RA 7160, PD 807 and the Court’s ruling in Laurel vs CSC
established the position of provincial administrator as a career service position. With the
passage of RA 7160, i.e. the current LGC, the office of Provincial Administrator is now a
primarily confidential position under the non-career branch of the civil service. It is now
co-terminous with the tenure of the governor considering the close and intimate
relations between the Office of the Governor and the Provincial Administrator. The
Court ruled that Gonzales did not have vested right to said position just because it was
a career service position when she was appointed. The reclassification of the character
of the office falls under Congress’ legislative power, which the Court ruled was
exercised without violating Gonzales’ security of tenure.

6.) Baldoz vs. COA, G.R. No. 199114, July 16, 20133
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Petitioner Dr. Posadas, then UP Chancellor, appointed co-petitioner Dr. Dayco as Office in Charge while the former was on
travel for the institution. As OIC, Dr. Dayco appointed Posadas as Project Director of TMC, the budget for which was approved
by the NEDA upon Posada’s proposal. It was also Posada who had executed the MOA with the Canadian International
Development Agency (CIDA) for the establishment of TMC with NEDA as designated implementor for the government. As
Project Director, Posadas would be paid consultancy fees and honoraria on top of his compensation as UP Chancellor.

3
Leonel Labrador was the former Chief of the POEA’s Employment Services Regulation Division. He was dismissed from service
for bribery. A criminal case for direct bribery was instituted against Labrador in view of the same infraction. Consequently, the
Sandiganbayan convicted him of the aforementioned crime.

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CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW
Case Digest Compilation
Law on Public Officers & Art. IX-B
Art. IX-D The Commission on Audit
Art. XI Accountability of Public Officials

ISSUE: Does the grant of probation justify a public employee’s retention in the
government service?

RULING: No. Unlike pardon, probation does not obliterate the crime for which the
person under probation has been convicted. It cannot justify the probationer’s retention
in the government service. He may seek to re-enter government service, but only after
he has shown that he is fit to serve once again.

7.) City of General Santos vs. COA, G.R. No. 199439, April 22, 20144
ISSUE: Can government agencies and local governments provide supplementary
retirement or pension plans for their employees?

RULING: No. The Government Service Insurance Act bars the creation of any
retirement plan other than the GSIS in order to prevent the undue and iniquitous
proliferation of such plans as it will result to double/additional compensation.

8.) NTC vs. COA, G.R. No. 204800, Oct. 14, 2014 5
ISSUE #1: Are re-hired employees, who avail of the separation benefits under the
EPIRA Law, entitled to loyalty award?

RULING: Yes. The purpose of the EPIRA Law and its IRR was only to limit the claim for
future separation benefits of employees who may be absorbed or re-hired by any
government agency or GOCC. It was not meant to curtail the grant of loyalty awards to
employees who decided to work for the government for more the ten years, but were
unfortunately terminated in between die to reorganization.

ISSUE #2: Is the grant of separation pay and loyalty award allowed in the 1987
Constitution?

RULING: Yes. The grant of loyalty award and separation pay are not inconsistent with
each other and they have distinct noble purposes. Pensions or gratuities shall not be
considered as additional, double, or indirect compensation.

Thus, entitlement to separation pay does not disqualify the separated employee who is
likewise qualified to receive loyalty award pursuant to the CSC Memorandum Circular.
Verily, when an employee has complied with the statutory requirements for the grant of
loyalty award, his right to receive what is due him by virtue thereof becomes vested and
may not thereafter be revoked or impaired.

9.) Funa vs. Duque, G.R. No. 191672, Nov. 25 2014

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On Aug 13, 2009, the city of General Santos enacted Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009. It is entitled An Ordinance Establishing
the GenSan Scheme on Early Retirement for Valued Employees Security (GenSan SERVES). On January 20, 2011, respondent
Commission on Audit declared Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, as illegal. The city of General Santos filed this special civil
action of certiorari on the ground of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission on Audit.

5
The NPC underwent reorganization pursuant to the EPIRA Law. Due to such reorganization, the services of all the employees
of NPC were terminated, wherein they received their separation benefits and terminal leave pay. Consequently, Tansco
acquired all the transmission assets of NPC and rehired some of the said employees.

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CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW
Case Digest Compilation
Law on Public Officers & Art. IX-B
Art. IX-D The Commission on Audit
Art. XI Accountability of Public Officials

ISSUE #1: Is the ex officio designation of CSC Chairman Duque, pursuant to E.O. 864,
as member of the government boards of the GSIS, PHIC, ECC and HDMF --- valid and
constitutional?

RULING: No. Being an appointive public official who does not occupy a Cabinet position
(i.e., Pres., VP, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants), Duque was thus
covered by the general rule enunciated under Sec. 7, par. 2, Art. IX-B of the
Constitution. He can only hold any other office or employment in the government during
his tenure if such holdings are allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position.

The GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are tasked to perform other corporate
powers and functions that are not personnel-related. All of these powers and functions,
whether personnel-related or not, are carried out and exercised by the respective
Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF. Hence, when the CSC Chairman
sits as a member of the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF,
he may exercise these powers and functions, which are not anymore derived from his
position as CSC Chairman.

The Court also notes that Duque’s designation as member of the governing Boards of
the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF entitles him to receive per diem, a form of
additional compensation that is disallowed by the concept of an ex officio position by
virtue of its clear contravention of the proscription set by Section 2, Article IX-A of the
1987 Constitution. This situation goes against the principle behind an ex officio position,
and must, therefore, be held unconstitutional.

Apart from violating the prohibition against holding multiple offices, Duque’s designation
as member of the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF
impairs the independence of the CSC.

ISSUE #2: Is Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of the Executive Order No. 292 ---
valid and constitutional?
RULING: Yes. Said provision is clear that the CSC Chairman’s membership in a
governing body is dependent on the condition that the functions of the government
entity where he will sit as its Board member must affect the career development,
employment status, rights, privileges, and welfare of government officials and
employees. Based on this, the Court finds no irregularity in Section 14, Chapter 3, Titla
I-A, Book V of EO 292 because matters affecting the career development, employment
status, rights, privileges, and welfare of government employees are among the primary
functions of the CSC and are consequently exercised through its Chairman. The CSC
Chairman’s membership therein must, therefore, be considered to be derived from his
position as such.

10.) Garafil vs. Office of the President, G.R. Nos. 203372, June 16, 20156

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Prior to the conduct of the May 2010 elections, then President Arroyo issued more than 800 appointments to various
positions in several government offices. For purposes of the 2010 elections, 10 March 2010 was the cut- off date for valid
appointments and the next day, 11 March 2010, was the start of the ban on midnight appointments. Section 15, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution recognizes as an exception to the ban on midnight appointments only “temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.” None of the
petitioners claim that their appointments fall under this exception.

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CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW
Case Digest Compilation
Law on Public Officers & Art. IX-B
Art. IX-D The Commission on Audit
Art. XI Accountability of Public Officials

ISSUE #1: What are the four concurring requisites for a valid appointment?

RULING: The following elements should always concur in the making of a valid
appointment: 1) authority to appoint and evidence of the exercise of the authority; 2)
transmittal of the appointment paper and evidence of the transmittal; 3) a vacant
position at the time of appointment; and 4) receipt of the appointment paper and
acceptance of the appointment by the appointee who possesses all the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications.

ISSUE #2: Is E.O. No 2 constitutional?

RULING: Yes. All of petitioners’ appointments are midnight appointments and are void
for violation of Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioners have failed to
show compliance with all four elements of a valid appointment. They cannot prove with
certainty that their appointment papers were transmitted before the appointment ban
took effect. On the other hand, petitioners admit that they took their oaths of office
during the appointment ban. Petitioners have failed to raise any valid ground for the
Court to declare EO 2, or any part of it, unconstitutional. Consequently, EO 2 remains
valid and constitutional.

2 0 0 8 B A R The Mayor of San Jose City appointed his wife, Amelia, as City Treasurer from
among tree (3) employees pf the city considered for the said position. Prior to said
promotion, Amelia had been an Assistant City Treasurer for ten (10) years, that is, even before
she married the City Mayor. Should the Civil Service Commission approve the promotional
appointment of Amelia? Why or why not?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The Civil Service Commission should disapproved the promotional appointment if at the
time of appointment Amelia is already married to the appointing authority, the Mayor,
because it violates the rule on nepotism which prohibits the appointment of relatives by
consanguinity or affinity within the third degree of the appointing authority in public
office. This is to ensure that entrance to public office should be based on merits and
fitness. The rule on nepotism also extends to promotional appointment. However, if at
the time of appoint the Mayor and Amelia is not yet married and thereafter married each
other, the promotional appointment should remain as valid appointment.

2011 A temporary appointee to a public office who becomes a civil service eligible
BAR during his tenure _____.
(A) loses his temporary appointment without prejudice to his re-appointment
as permanent.
(B) has the right to demand conversion of his appointment to permanent.
(C) automatically becomes a permanent appointee.
(D) retains his temporary appointment.

2 0 1 1 B A R X, an administrative officer in the Department of Justice, was charged with grave

misconduct and preventively suspended for 90 days pending investigation. Based on the
evidence, the Secretary of Justice found X guilty as charged and dismissed him from the
service. Pending appeal, X's dismissal was executed. Subsequently, the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) reversed the Secretary’s decision and the reversal became final and
executory. What is the effect of X's exoneration? _____.
(A) X is entitled to reinstatement and back salaries both during his 90 day
preventive suspension and his suspension pending appeal.
(B) X is entitled to reinstatement and back salaries corresponding only
to the period of delay caused by those prosecuting the case against him.
(C) X is entitled to reinstatement but not to back salaries on ground of

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CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW
Case Digest Compilation
Law on Public Officers & Art. IX-B
Art. IX-D The Commission on Audit
Art. XI Accountability of Public Officials

“damnum absque injuria.”

(D) X is entitled to reinstatement and back salaries during his suspension
pending appeal.

2011 When the Civil Service Commission (CSC) approves the appointment of the
BAR Executive Director of the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board
who possesses all the prescribed qualifications, the CSC performs _____.
(A) a discretionary duty. (C) a ministerial duty.
(B) a mix discretionary and ministerial duty. (D) a rule-making duty.

2013 MCQ. Patricio was elected member of the House of Representative in the May
BAR 2010 Elections. His opponent Jose questioned Patricio's victory before the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and later with the Supreme Court. In a decision
promulgated in November 2011, the Court ruled in Jose's favor; thus, Patricio was ousted from
his seat in Congress. Within a year from that decision, the President can appoint Patricio _____.
(A) only as a member of the board of directors of any government owned and controlled
corporation
(B) only as a deputy Ombudsman
(C) only as a Commissioner of the Civil Service Commission
(D) only as Chairman of the Commission on Elections
(E) to any position as no prohibition applies to Patricio

ART. IX-D. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT

11.) Dela Llana vs. COA, G.R. No. 180989, Feb. 7, 2012

ISSUE: Is COA Circular No. 89-299, which lifted its system of pre-audit of government
financial transaction, violative of Section 2, Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution?

RULING:
No, it is not. Section 2, Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution does not require the COA to
conduct a pre-audit of all government transactions and for all government agencies. The
only clear reference to a pre-audit requirement is found in Section 2(1) on the
mandatory post-audit of certain government or private entities with state subsidy or
equity and only when their internal control system is inadequate. In that situation, the
COA may adopt measures, including a temporary or special pre-audit, to correct the
deficiencies.

The conduct of a pre-audit is not a mandatory duty that the SC may compel the COA to
perform. This discretion is consistent with the constitutional pronouncement that the
COA has the exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and examination. When
the language of the law is clear and explicit, there is no room for interpretation, only
application. Neither can the scope of the provision be unduly enlarged by the SC.

12.) Funa vs. COA Chair Villar, G.R. No. 192791, April 24, 2012

ISSUE: Whether or not Villar’s promotional appointment as COA Chairman, after having
served for four (4) years of his seven (7) year term as COA commissioner, is valid?
And if valid, for how long can he serve?

RULING: No, Villar’s promotional appointment is invalid. Villar’s appointment from COA
Commissioner to COA Chairman is in the nature of a promotional appointment. At the
outset, it is not invalid because it is a promotional appointment. There is nothing in Sec.
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CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW
Case Digest Compilation
Law on Public Officers & Art. IX-B
Art. IX-D The Commission on Audit
Art. XI Accountability of Public Officials

1(2), Article IX(D) that explicitly prohibits a promotional appointment from Commissioner
to Chairman, provided the Commissioner has not yet fully served his full term of 7 years
and that the period of his appointment as Chairman will only be for the unexpired
portion of the predecessor’s term.

The appointment is invalid for the following reasons:

1. The promotional appointment of Villar is for a stated fixed term of less than 7
years. This is contrary to Sec.1(2), Art. IX-D that clearly mandates that the
appointment of a COA member shall be for a fixed 7-year term if the vacancy
results from the expiration of the term of the predecessor 7.
2. Allowing Villar to serve a full term of 7 years as COA Chairman violates the 7-
year aggregate rule or the prohibition of service to the commission for an
aggregate term of more than 7 years.
3. Villar’s appointment as chairman ending February 2, 2011 will destroy the
rationale and policy behind the rotational system or the staggering of
appointments and terms in COA as prescribed in the Constitution.

NOTES: The following are the Rules on Reappointment:

1. The appointment of members of any of the three constitutional commissions, after the
expiration of the uneven terms of office of the first set of commissioners, shall always be
for a fixed term of seven (7) years; an appointment for a lesser period is void and
unconstitutional. The appointing authority cannot validly shorten the full term of seven
(7) years in case of the expiration of the term as this will result in the distortion of the
rotational system prescribed by the Constitution.
2. Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes (death, resignation,
disability or impeachment) shall only be for the unexpired portion of the term of the
predecessor, but such appointments cannot be less than the unexpired portion as this
will likewise disrupt the staggering of terms laid down under Sec. 1(2), Art. 9(D).
3. Members of the Commission, [COA, COMELEC or CSC] who were appointed for a
full term of seven years and who served the entire period, are barred from
reappointment to any position in the Commission. Corollarily, the first appointees in the
Commission under the Constitution are also covered by the prohibition against
reappointment.
4. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than seven
years is eligible for an appointment to the position of Chairman for the unexpired portion
of the term of the departing chairman. Such appointment is not covered by the ban on
reappointment, provided that the aggregate period of the length of service as
commissioner and the unexpired period of the term of the predecessor will not exceed
seven (7) years and provided further that the vacancy in the position of Chairman
resulted from death, resignation, disability or removal by impeachment.
5. Any member of the Commission cannot be appointed or designated in a temporary or
acting capacity.

13.) Baldoz vs. COA, G.R. No. 199114, July 16, 2013

ISSUE: Does the authority of COA to rule on the legality of the disbursement of
government funds include the authority to disallow its disbursement?

RULING: Yes, it does. Section 2(1), Article IX-D sets forth COA’s authority to rule on
the legality of the disbursement of government funds when COA conducts its audit
7
As against a vacancy resulting from either death, resignation, disability, or impeachment. In those cases, there can be a valid
and constitutional promotional appointment if the Total Service Years as Commissioner + Total Unexpired Portion of
Predecessor Chairman < or = 7 years.

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CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW
Case Digest Compilation
Law on Public Officers & Art. IX-B
Art. IX-D The Commission on Audit
Art. XI Accountability of Public Officials

functions. The last part of Section 2(2), Article IX-D grants to COA the authority to
promulgate ... rules and regulations… [that include] the prevention and disallowance of
irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures or uses
of government funds and properties.

14.) Funa vs. MECO, G.R. No. 193462, Feb. 4, 2014

ISSUE: Is MECO8 a governmental entity? If not, are its accounts subject to the COA
audit?

RULING: The MECO is a non-governmental entity. However, under existing laws, the
accounts of the MECO pertaining to the "verification fees" it collects on behalf of the
DOLE as well as the fees it was authorized to collect under Section 2(6) of EO No. 15,
s. 2001, are subject to the audit jurisdiction of the COA because such fees pertain to the
government and should be audited by the COA.

The MECO Is NOT a GOCC nor Government Instrumentality

GOCCs, are "stock or nonstock" corporations "vested with functions relating to public
needs" that are "owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities." By
definition, three attributes thus make an entity a GOCC: first, its organization as stock or
nonstick corporation; second, the public character of its function; and third, government
ownership over the same. Possession of all three attributes is necessary to deem an
entity a GOCC. It is the last attribute that MECO lacks. The directors and officers of
MECO are appointed in accordance to its bylaws and not by the “desire letters” of the
President of the RP, which are treated as merely recommendatory in nature.

The MECO is not an instrumentality because it was incorporated under the

Corporation Code.

MECO is uniquely situated as compared with other private corporations. From its
overreaching corporate objectives, its special duty and authority to exercise certain
consular functions, up to the oversight by the executive department over its operations
—while maintaining its legal status as a non-governmental entity— the MECO is
deemed a sui generis entity.

MECO is subject to COA audit limited only to the public funds it collects

Authority of COA to audit NGEs, see footnote. 9

8
The Philippines continued to maintain unofficial ties with Taiwan through the MECO, despite ending its diplomatic relationship
with the same. From the moment it was incorporated [under the Corporation Code], the MECO became the corporate entity
"entrusted" by the Philippine government with the responsibility of fostering "friendly" and "unofficial" relations with the
people of Taiwan, particularly in the areas of trade, economic cooperation, investment, cultural, scientific and educational
exchanges. To enable it to carry out such responsibility, the MECO was "authorized" by the government to perform certain
"consular and other functions" that relates to the promotion, protection and facilitation of Philippine interests in Taiwan.

At present, it is the MECO that oversees the rights and interests of Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) in Taiwan; promotes the
Philippines as a tourist and investment destination for the Taiwanese; and facilitates the travel of Filipinos and Taiwanese from
Taiwan to the Philippines, and vice versa.
9
Under Section 2(1) of Article IX-D of the Constitution, the COA was vested with the "power, authority and duty" to "examine,
audit and settle" the "accounts" of the following entities: xxx 5. Non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly
or indirectly, from or through the government, which are required by law or the granting institution to submit to the COA for
audit as a condition of subsidy or equity.

The term "accounts" mentioned in the subject constitutional provision pertains to the "revenue," "receipts," "expenditures"
and "uses of funds and property" of the foregoing entities.

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Case Digest Compilation
Law on Public Officers & Art. IX-B
Art. IX-D The Commission on Audit
Art. XI Accountability of Public Officials

MECO receives "verification fees" for overseas employment documents it collects on

behalf of the DOLE. The entire "verification fees" being collected by the MECO are
receivables of the DOLE. Such receipts pertain to the DOLE by virtue of Section 7 of
EO No. 1022. MECO also collects "consular fees," or fees it collects from the exercise
of its delegated consular functions, as authorized by Section 2(6) of EO No. 15, s. 2001,
in behalf of the Government. These fees are subject to COA audit.

2014 Towards the end of the year, the Commission on Audit (COA) sought the
BAR remainder of its appropriation from the Department of Budge t and Management
(DBM). However, the DBM refused because the COA had not yet submitted a report on the
expenditures relative to the earlier amount released to it. And, pursuant to the "no report, no
release" policy of the DBM, COA is not entitled to any further releases in the meantime. COA
counters that such a policy contravenes the guaranty of fiscal autonomy granted by the
Constitution. Is COA entitled to receive the rest of its appropriations even without complying with
the DBM policy? Explain.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Section 5, Article IX of the Constitution is clear in that: “The Commission shall enjoy
fiscal autonomy. Their approved annual appropriations shall be automatically and
regularly released.” In Bengzon v. Drilon 10 the SC defined the scope and extent of fiscal
autonomy as “a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the
wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. It recognizes the power and authority to
levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding the highest rates
authorized by law for compensation and pay plans of the government and allocate and
disburse such sums as may be provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of
the discharge of their functions. Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control.”

In the deliberations of the Framers of the Constitution, fiscal autonomy meant at the very
least the automatic and regular release of the funds once approved. It was suggested
that fiscal autonomy included the non-imposition of any other procedures, for example, a
pre-audit system in the commissions or bodies that enjoy fiscal autonomy.

Considering the foregoing, COA entitled to receive the rest of its appropriations even
without complying with the DBM policy as the DBM policy is contrary to the
constitutional guarantee of fiscal autonomy to the COA.

ART. XI. ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS

15.) Gutierrez vs. House Com. on Justice, G.R. 193459, Feb. 15, 2011

Complementing the constitutional power of the COA to audit accounts of "non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or
equity xxx from or through the government" is Section 29(1)80 of the Audit Code, which grants the COA visitorial authority over
the following nongovernmental entities:
1. Nongovernmental entities "subsidized by the government";
2. Nongovernmental entities "required to pay levy or government share";
3. Nongovernmental entities that have "received counterpart funds from the government"; and
4. Nongovernmental entities "partly funded by donations through the government."

Section 29(1) of the Audit Code, however, limits the audit of the foregoing non-governmental entities only to "funds xxx coming
from or through the government." This section of the Audit Code is, in turn, substantially reproduced in Section 14(1), Book V of
the Administrative Code.
10
G.R. No. 103524, 15 April 1992, 208 SCRA 133, 150.

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Case Digest Compilation
Law on Public Officers & Art. IX-B
Art. IX-D The Commission on Audit
Art. XI Accountability of Public Officials

ISSUE # 1: Did the House Committee on Justice fail to ascertain the sufficiency of form and
substance of the complaints on the basis of the standards set by the Constitution and its own
Impeachment Rules?

RULING: No. Contrary to petitioner’ contention, the Impeachment Rules are clear in

echoing the constitutional requirements and providing that there must be a "verified
complaint or resolution," and that the substance requirement  is met if there is "a recital
of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the
committee.” In fact, it is only in the Impeachment Rules where a determination of
sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment complaint is made necessary.
This requirement is not explicitly found in the Constitution which merely
requires a "hearing." (Section 3[2], Article XI). In the discharge of its constitutional duty,
the House deemed that a finding of sufficiency of form and substance in an
impeachment complaint is vital "to effectively carry out" the impeachment process,
hence, such additional requirement in the Impeachment Rules.

ISSUE # 2: Should the impeachment against Gutierrez be considered a prohibited second

impeachment proceedings initiated within one-year?

RULING: No. The Francisco doctrine states that the term "initiate" means to file the

complaint and referral of the complaint to the Committee on Justice.
Once an impeachmentcomplaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint
may not be filed against the same official within a one year period. Therefore, the one-
year period ban is reckoned not from the filing of the first complaint, but on the date it is
referred to the House Committee on Justice. Petitioner submits that referral could not be
the reckoning point of initiation because "something prior to that had already been
done.” This is wrong. Following petitioner’s line of reasoning, the verification of the
complaint or the endorsement by a member of the House – steps
done prior to the filing – would already initiate the impeachment proceedings

ISSUE # 3: Should an impeachment complaint only allege one impeachable offense under the
“one offense, one complaint” rule of the Rules on Criminal Procedure?

RULING: No. The Constitution allows the indictment for multiple impeachment offenses,

with each charge representing an article of impeachment, assembled in one set known
as the "Articles of Impeachment". It, therefore, follows that an impeachment
complaint need not allege only one impeachable offense.

16.) Pichay vs. Ochoa, G.R. No. 196425, July 24, 2012

ISSUE: Does the IAD-ODESLA encroach upon the powers and duties of the Ombudsman?

RULING: The primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute

cases refers to criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and not to
administrative cases. Since the case filed before the IAD-ODESLA is an administrative
disciplinary case for grave misconduct, petitioner may not invoke the primary jurisdiction
of the Ombudsman to prevent the IAD-ODESLA from proceeding with its investigation.
Moreover, the Ombudsman's function goes into the determination of the existence of
probable cause and the adjudication of the merits of a criminal accusation, the
investigative authority of the IAD-ODESLA is limited to that of a fact-finding investigator
whose determinations and recommendations remain so until acted upon by the
President. As such, it commits no usurpation of the Ombudsman's constitutional duties.

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CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW
Case Digest Compilation
Law on Public Officers & Art. IX-B
Art. IX-D The Commission on Audit
Art. XI Accountability of Public Officials

(MAY BE OMITTED: It is only in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction that the
Ombudsman may, at any time, take over the investigation being conducted by another
investigatory agency. In any event, the Ombudsman's authority to investigate both
elective and appointive officials in the government, extensive as it may be, is by no
means exclusive. It is shared with other similarly authorized government agencies.)

17.) Gonzales vs. Ochoa, G.R. No. 196231, Sept. 4, 2012

ISSUE # 1: What constitutes betrayal of public trust warranting immediate removal from office?

RULING: The Court ruled that commission of gross negligence in the discharge of their
duties shall be the basis for the removal of a public officer from office. Gross negligence
refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting to
act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with
a conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected. In the case
of public officials, there is gross negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable.

(MAY BE OMITTED: Acts that should constitute betrayal of public trust as to warrant removal
from office may be less than criminal but must be attended by bad faith and of such gravity and
seriousness as the other grounds of impeachment. In the case at bar, Gonzales cannot be guilty
of gross neglect of duty and/or inefficiency since he acted on the case forwarded to him within
nine days. Thus, the OP’s ruling that Gonzales had been grossly negligent for taking nine days,
instead of five days, to review a case was totally baseless. The OP’s claims that Gonzales could
have supervised his subordinates to promptly act on Mendoza’s motion and apprised the
Tanodbayan of the urgency of resolving the same are similarly groundless.)

ISSUE # 2: Does the Ombudsman have the power to discipline and remove his deputies and
the Special Prosecutor?

RULING:  Yes and no, respectively. The Court ruled that subjecting the Deputy
Ombudsman to discipline and removal by the President, whose own alter egos and
officials in the Executive department are subject to the Ombudsman’s disciplinary
authority, cannot but seriously place at risk the independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman itself. What is true for the Ombudsman must equally and necessarily be
true for her Deputies who act as agents of the Ombudsman in the performance of their
duties. Thus, Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770, providing that the President may remove a
Deputy Ombudsman, should be declared void. 

The Court, however, resolved to maintain the validity of Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770
insofar as the Special Prosecutor is concerned. The Court does not consider the Office
of the Special Prosecutor to be constitutionally within the Office of the Ombudsman and
is, hence, not entitled to the independence the latter enjoys under the Constitution.

18.) Pia vs. Gervacio, G.R. No. 172334, June 5, 2013

ISSUE: What is the quantum of evidence required in proceedings before the Ombudsman?

RULING: The settled rule provides that factual findings of the Office of the Ombudsman
are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence and are accorded due respect
and weight, especially when they are affirmed by the CA. Section 5, Rule 133 of the
Rules of Court defines substantial evidence as: “that amount of relevant evidence which
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.”

19.) People vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 185729-32, June 26, 2013

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CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW
Case Digest Compilation
Law on Public Officers & Art. IX-B
Art. IX-D The Commission on Audit
Art. XI Accountability of Public Officials

ISSUE: Does the Ombudsman have the power to grant immunity?

RULING: Yes. Section 17 of R.A. 6770 enables the Ombudsman to carry out his constitutional
mandate to ensure accountability in the public service by vesting in him the power to grant
immunity. The authority to grant immunity is not an inherent judicial function. Indeed, Congress
has vested such power in the Ombudsman as well as in the Secretary of Justice.

(MAY BE OMITTED: Section 17 of R.A. 6770 provides: Section 17. Immunities. – Under such
terms and conditions as it may determine, taking into account the pertinent provisions of the
Rules of Court, the Ombudsman may grant immunity from criminal prosecution to any person
whose testimony or whose possession and production of documents or other evidence may be
necessary to determine the truth in any hearing, inquiry or proceeding being conducted by the
Ombudsman or under its authority, in the performance or in the furtherance of its constitutional
functions and statutory objectives. The immunity granted under this and the immediately
preceding paragraph shall not exempt the witness from criminal prosecution for perjury or false
testimony nor shall he be exempt from demotion or removal from office.)

20.) Ombudsman vs. Capulong, G.R. 201643, March 12, 2014

ISSUE: Did Capulong’s non-disclosure of his wife’s business interest in his SALN constitute
serious dishonesty or grave misconduct?

RULING: No. Capulong’s nondisclosure of his wife’s business interest does not
constitute serious dishonesty or grave misconduct. Nothing in the records reveals that
Capulong deliberately placed "N/A" in his SALN despite knowledge about his wife’s
business interest. As explained by Capulong, the SEC already revoked the registration
of the corporations where his wife was an incorporator; hence, he deemed it not
necessary to indicate it in his SALN.

2 0 1 1 B A R The Office of the Special Prosecutor may file an information against a public
officer for graft_____.
(A) on its own initiative subject to withdrawal of the information by the Ombudsman.
(B) independently of the Ombudsman, except in plunder cases.
(C) only when authorized by the Ombudsman.
(D) independently of the Ombudsman.

2011 Upon endorsement from the Senate where it was first mistakenly filed, the House
BAR
of Representatives Committee on Justice found the verified complaint for
impeachment against the President sufficient in form but insufficient in substance.
Within the same year, another impeachment suit was filed against the President who
questioned the same for being violative of the Constitution. Is the President correct? _____.
(A) No, "initiated" means the Articles of Impeachment have been actually filed with the Senate
for trial; this did not yet happen.
(B) No, the first complaint was not deemed initiated because it was originally filed with the
Senate.
(C) Yes, the dismissal of the first impeachment proceeding bars the initiation of another during
the same term of the President.
(D) Yes, no impeachment proceeding can be filed against the President more than once
within a year.

2 0 1 2 B A R The President cannot grant pardon in cases of impeachment. He may however

exercise such power when: _____.

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CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW
Case Digest Compilation
Law on Public Officers & Art. IX-B
Art. IX-D The Commission on Audit
Art. XI Accountability of Public Officials

(A) A person convicted in an impeachment proceeding is subject to prosecution, trial

and punishment in an ordinary criminal action;
(B) A person convicted in an impeachment proceeding is granted an absolute pardon;
(C) A person convicted in an impeachment proceeding files his appeal before the Supreme
Court;
(D) None of the above.

2 0 1 2 B A R A public officer impeached and removed from office shall: _____.

(A) nevertheless be immune from prosecution, trial and punishment according to law;
(B) nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial and punishment under the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act;
(C) nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial and punishment according to
law;
(D) nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial and punishment only for criminal
acts under the law.

2012 BAR Who are required by the Constitution to submit a declaration under oath of his
assets, liabilities, and net worth?

SUGGESTED ANSWER
All public officers and employees are required to submit a declaration under oath
of their assets, liabilities and net worth. (Section 17, Article XI of the
Constitution.)

2012 SALN means: _____.

BAR
(A) Summary of assets, liabilities and net worth;
(B) Statement of assets in banks, liabilities and net worth;
(C) Statement of assets, liabilities and net worth;
(D) Statement of personal assets, liabilities and net worth.

2012 A verified impeachment complaint was filed by two hundred (200) Members
BAR of the House of Representatives against Madam Chief Justice Blue. The
complaint was imrhediately transmitted to the Senate for trial. Madam Chief Justice Blue
challenges such immediate transmittal to the Senate because the verified complaint was 1) not
included in the order of business of the House, 2) was not referred to the House Committee on
Justice for hearing and consideration for sufficiency in form and substance, and 3) was not
submitted to the House Plenary for consideration as enumerated in Paragraph (2), Section 3,
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. Decide with reasons.

SUGGESTED ANSWER
Since the verified complaint was filed by 200 Members of the House of Representatives
and they constituted at least one third of its Members, it need not undergo the procedure
in Paragraph 2, Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution. The verified complaint
constitutes the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate should proceed forthwith
(Section 3(4), Article XI of the Constitution).

2012 Judge Red is the Executive Judge of Green City. Red is known to have
BAR corrupt tendencies and has a reputation widely known among practicing lawyers
for accepting bribes. Ombudsman Grey, wishing to "clean up" the government from errant
public officials, initiated an investigation on the alleged irregularities in the performance of
duties of Judge Red.

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CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW
Case Digest Compilation
Law on Public Officers & Art. IX-B
Art. IX-D The Commission on Audit
Art. XI Accountability of Public Officials

(A) Judge Red refused to recognize the authority of the Office of the Ombudsman over him
because according to him, any administrative action against him or any court official or
employee falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Decide with reasons.

SUGGESTED ANSWER
Since the complaint refers to the performance of the duties of Judge Red, Ombudsman
Grey should not act on it and should refer it to the Supreme Court. His investigation will
encroach upon the exclusive power of administrative supervision of the Supreme Court
over all courts. (Maceda vs. Vasquez, 221 SCRA 464.)

(B) Does the Ombudsman have authority to conduct investigation over crimes or offenses
committed by public officials that are NOT in connection or related at all to the official's
discharge of his duties and functions? Explain.

SUGGESTED ANSWER
The Ombudsman can investigate crimes or offenses committed by public officers which
are not connected with the performance of their duties. Under Section 13(1), Article XI of
the Constitution, the Ombudsman can investigate any act or omission of a public official
which is illegal. (Deloso vs. Domingo, 191 SCRA 545.)

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