REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, 

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND ANGELINA M. CASTRO, respondents

The controlling facts are undisputed:

On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony
performed by Judge Pablo M. Malvar, City Court Judge of Pasay City. The marriage was celebrated
without the knowledge of Castro's parents. Defendant Cardenas personally attended to the processing of
the documents required for the celebration of the marriage, including the procurement of the marriage,
license. In fact, the marriage contract itself states that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued in the
name of the contracting parties on June 24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro Manila.
The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the marriage was unknown to
Castro's parents. Thus, it was only in March 1971, when Castro discovered she was pregnant, that the
couple decided to live together. However, their cohabitation lasted only for four (4) months. Thereafter, the
couple parted ways. On October 19, 1971, Castro gave birth. The baby was adopted by Castro's brother,
with the consent of Cardenas.
The baby is now in the United States. Desiring to follow her daughter, Castro wanted to put in order her
marital status before leaving for the States. She thus consulted a lawyer, Atty. Frumencio E. Pulgar,
regarding the possible annulment of her marriage. Through her lawyer's efforts, they discovered that there
was no marriage license issued to Cardenas prior to the celebration of their marriage.
As proof, Angelina Castro offered in evidence a certification from the Civil Register of Pasig, Metro
Manila. It reads:
February 20, 1987
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that the names EDWIN F. CARDENAS and ANGELINA M. CASTRO who
were allegedly married in the Pasay City Court on June 21, 1970 under an alleged
(s)upportive marriage license 
no. 3196182 allegedly issued in the municipality on June 20, 1970 cannot be located as
said license no. 3196182 does not appear from our records.
The trial court denied the petition. 2 It held that the above certification was inadequate to establish the
alleged non-issuance of a marriage license prior to the celebration of the marriage between the parties. It
ruled that the "inability of the certifying official to locate the marriage license is not conclusive to show that
there was no marriage license issued."
As stated earlier, respondent appellate court reversed the Decision of the trial court. 3 It declared the
marriage between the contracting parties null and void and directed the Civil Registrar of Pasig to cancel
the subject marriage contract.
The core issue presented by the case at bench is whether or not the documentary and testimonial
evidence presented by private respondent are sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued
by the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior to the celebration of the marriage of private respondent to Edwin F.
Cardenas.
We affirm the impugned Decision.
At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law governing marital relations
was the New Civil Code. The law 4 provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage
license first issued by a local civil registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage,
absence of a license would render the marriage void ab initio. 5
Petitioner posits that the certification of the local civil registrar of due search and inability to find a record
or entry to the effect that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued to the parties is not adequate to prove
its non-issuance.
We hold otherwise. The presentation of such certification in court is sanctioned by Section 29, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court, viz.:
Sec. 29. Proof of lack of record. — A written statement signed by an officer having
custody of an official record or by his deputy, that after diligent search, no record or entry
of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a
 certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office
contain no such record or entry.
The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent search, a particular
document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a
register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter
alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all applications for marriage licenses,
including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and such other relevant
data. 6
The certification of "due search and inability to find" issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative
value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a
marriage license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of "due search and inability to find" sufficiently proved that his office
did not issue marriage license no. 3196182 to the contracting parties.
The fact that private respondent Castro offered only her testimony in support of her petition is, in itself, not
a ground to deny her petition. The failure to offer any other witness to corroborate her testimony is mainly
due to the peculiar circumstances of the case. It will be remembered that the subject marriage was a civil
ceremony performed by a judge of a city court. The subject marriage is one of those commonly known as
a "secret marriage" — a legally non-existent phrase but ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage
celebrated without the knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of either or both of the contracting parties.
The records show that the marriage between Castro and Cardenas was initially unknown to the parents of
the former.
Surely, the fact that only private respondent Castro testified during the trial cannot be held against her.
Her husband, Edwin F. Cardenas, was duly served with notice of the proceedings and a copy of the
petition. Despite receipt thereof, he chose to ignore the same. For failure to answer, he was properly
declared in default. Private respondent cannot be faulted for her husband's lack of interest to participate
in the proceedings. There was absolutely no evidence on record to show that there was collusion
between private respondent and her husband Cardenas.
It is noteworthy to mention that the finding of the appellate court that the marriage between the
contracting parties is null and void for lack of a marriage license does not discount the fact that indeed, a
spurious marriage license, purporting to be issued by the civil registrar of Pasig, may have been
presented by Cardenas to the solemnizing officer.
In fine, we hold that, under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence
presented by private respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the subject marriage
license.
Domingo vs. CA
226 SCRA 572

FACTS:

Soledad Domingo, married with Roberto Domingo in 1976, filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of
marriage and separation of property.  She did not know that Domingo had been previously married to
Emerlinda dela Paz in 1969.  She came to know the previous marriage when the latter filed a suit of
bigamy against her.  Furthermore, when she came home from Saudi during her one-month leave from
work, she discovered that Roberto cohabited with another woman and had been disposing some of her
properties which is administered by Roberto.  The latter claims that because their marriage was void ab
initio, the declaration of such voidance is unnecessary and superfluous.  On the other hand, Soledad
insists the declaration of the nullity of marriage not for the purpose of remarriage, but in order to provide a
basis for the separation and distribution of properties acquired during the marriage.

ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration should only be filed for purposes of remarriage.

HELD:
RULING:
Yes. A declaration of the absolute nullity of marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action
or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for
purpose of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for the said projected
marriage be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.

The requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the spouse
who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of
the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.

Article 40  as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes that final judgment declaring the
previous marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage. A person can conceive of
other instances other than remarriage, such as in case of an action for liquidation, partition, distribution
and separation of property between the spouses, as well as an action for the custody and support of their
common children and the delivery of the latters' presumptive legitimes. In such cases, however, one is
required by law to show proof  that the previous one was an absolute nullity.

Marriage is an “inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family;” as such, it “shall be protected
by the State. As a matter of policy,  there should be a final judgment declaring the marriage void and a
party should not declare for himself or herself whether or not the marriage is void.
.  Soledad’s prayer for separation of property will simply be the necessary consequence of the judicial
declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage.  Hence, the petitioner’s suggestion that for their properties
be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be instituted for that purpose is baseless.  The Family Code
has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of
property according to the regime of property relations governing them.

In such cases, evidence needs must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of
grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an
earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. Hence, in the instance where a
party who has previously contracted a marriage which remains subsisting desires to enter into another
marriage which is legally unassailable, he is required by law to prove that the previous one was an
absolute nullity. But this he may do on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void.
This leads us to the question: Why the distinction? In other words, for purposes of remarriage, why should
the only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity be a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void? Whereas, for purposes other than remarriage, other evidence is
acceptable?
Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an "inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family;" as such, it "shall be protected by the State."20 In more explicit terms, the Family
Code characterizes it as "a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered
into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal, and family life." 21 So crucial are marriage
and the family to the stability and peace of the nation that their "nature, consequences, and incidents are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation . . ." 22 As a matter of policy, therefore, the nullification of a
marriage for the purpose of contracting another cannot be accomplished merely on the basis of the
perception of both parties or of one that their union is so defective with respect to the essential requisites
of a contract of marriage as to render it void ipso jure and with no legal effect — and nothing more. Were
this so, this inviolable social institution would be reduced to a mockery and would rest on very shaky
foundations indeed. And the grounds for nullifying marriage would be as diverse and far-ranging as
human ingenuity and fancy could conceive. For such a social significant institution, an official state
pronouncement through the courts, and nothing less, will satisfy the exacting norms of society. Not only
would such an open and public declaration by the courts definitively confirm the nullity of the contract of
marriage, but the same would be easily verifiable through records accessible to everyone.
That the law seeks to ensure that a prior marriage is no impediment to a second sought to be contracted
by one of the parties may be gleaned from new information required in the Family Code to be included in
the application for a marriage license, viz, "If previously married, how, when and where the previous
marriage was dissolved and annulled." 23
Reverting to the case before us, petitioner's interpretation of Art. 40 of the Family Code is, undoubtedly,
quite restrictive. Thus, his position that private respondent's failure to state in the petition that the same is
filed to enable her to remarry will result in the dismissal of SP No. 1989-J is untenable. His
misconstruction of Art. 40 resulting from the misplaced emphasis on the term "solely" was in fact
anticipated by the members of the Committee.
Dean Gupit commented the word "only" may be misconstrued to refer to "for purposes of
remarriage." Judge Diy stated that "only" refers to "final judgment." Justice Puno
suggested that they say "on the basis only of a final judgment." Prof. Baviera suggested
that they use the legal term "solely" instead of "only," which the Committee
approved. 24 (Emphasis supplied)
Pursuing his previous argument that the declaration for absolute nullity of marriage is unnecessary,
petitioner suggests that private respondent should have filed an ordinary civil action for the recovery of
the properties alleged to have been acquired during their union. In such an eventuality, the lower court
would not be acting as a mere special court but would be clothed with jurisdiction to rule on the issues of
possession and ownership. In addition, he pointed out that there is actually nothing to separate or
partition as the petition admits that all the properties were acquired with private respondent's money.
Other specific effects flowing therefrom, in proper cases, are the following:
Art. 43. xxx xxx xxx
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be,
shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad
faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community property or conjugal partnership
property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the
children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or, in default of children, the innocent
spouse;
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the donee
contracted the marriage in bad faith, such donations made to said donee are revoked by
operation of law;
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who acted in
bad faith as a beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such designation be stipulated
as irrevocable; and
(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be disqualified
to inherit from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate succession. (n)
Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage shall
be void ab initio and all donations by reason of marriage and testamentary disposition
made by one in favor of the other are revoked by operation of law. (n) 26
Based on the foregoing provisions, private respondent's ultimate prayer for separation of property will
simply be one of the necessary consequences of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their
marriage. Thus, petitioner's suggestion that in order for their properties to be separated, an ordinary civil
action has to be instituted for that purpose is baseless. The Family Code has clearly provided the effects
of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to the regime
of property relations governing them. It stands to reason that the lower court before whom the issue of
nullity of a first marriage is brought is likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide the incidental questions
regarding the couple's properties. Accordingly, the respondent court committed no reversible error in
finding that the lower court committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's motion to
dismiss SP No. 1989-J.
Navarro vs. Domagtoy
AM No. MTJ 96-1088, July 19, 1996
Rodolfo Navarro was the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. He submitted evidence in relation
to two specific acts committed by Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he
contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law. First, on
September 27, 1994, said judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga,
despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife. On his part, Domagtoy
claimed that he merely relied on an affidavit acknowledged before him attesting that Tagadan’s wife has
been absent for seven years. The said affidavit was alleged to have been sworn to before another judge.
Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and
Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court’s jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Domagtoy counters that he
solemnized the marriage outside of his jurisdiction upon the request of the parties.
ISSUE: Whether or not Domagtoy acted without jurisdiction.
Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:
"A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and
void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already
dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the
provisions of Articles 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse." (Emphasis added.)
There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In fact, the law is clear and
simple. Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead, a
summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a
subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement which has been precisely incorporated into the Family
Code to discourage subsequent marriages where it is not proven that the previous marriage has been
dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead, in accordance with pertinent provisions
of law.
In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his
first wife's presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida
Pearanda. Whether wittingly, or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent judge to have
accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a
bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, "The following marriage
shall be void from the beginning: (4) Those bigamous x x x marriages not falling under Article 41."
The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony outside the court's jurisdiction,
covered by Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code, thus:
"Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction
Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open court, in the
church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be,
and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote
places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both parties request the solemnizing
officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by
them in a sworn statement to that effect."
Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justifications for his having solemnized
the marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside of his court's jurisdiction. As the
aforequoted provision states, a marriage can be held outside of the judge's chambers or courtroom only
in the following instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29 or
(3) upon request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect. There is no pretense that
either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in a remote place. Moreover, the written
request presented addressed to the respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario.[4]
More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of the
solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the "authority of the
solemnizing officer." Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, "any incumbent
member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only
to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing
officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage.
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the faithful, is authorized to
do so only within the area of the diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a
Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the
venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges who are appointed to
specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge
solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal
requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the
officiating official to administrative liability.[5]
Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, he
was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By
citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced authority,
respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic principles of civil law.
Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law. The legal
principles applicable in the cases brought to our attention are elementary and uncomplicated, prompting
us to conclude that respondent's failure to apply them is due to a lack of comprehension of the law.
PILAPIL vs. HON IBAY-SOMERA, VICTOR AND GEILING et al
G.R. No. 80116
June 30, 1989
FACTS: Petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Geiling, a German
national, were married in Germany. After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial
disharmony eventuated in Geiling initiating a divorce proceeding against Pilapil in Germany. The Local
Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage
of the spouses.
More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, Geiling filed two complaints for adultery
before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging in one that, while still married to said Geiling, Pilapil “had an affair
with a certain William Chia.” The Assistant Fiscal, after the corresponding investigation, recommended the
dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. However, upon review, the respondent
city fiscal Victor approved a resolution directing the filing of 2 complaint for adultery against the petitioner.
The case entitled “PP Philippines vs. Pilapil and Chia” was assigned to the court presided by the
respondent judge Ibay-Somera.
A motion to quash was filed in the same case which was denied by the respondent. Pilapil filed this
special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a TRO, seeking the annulment of the
order of the lower court denying her motion to quash.
As cogently argued by Pilapil, Article 344 of the RPC thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still
subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery.
ISSUE: Did Geiling have legal capacity at the time of the filing of the complaint for adultery, considering
that it was done after obtaining a divorce decree?
HELD: WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner’s MTQ is SET ASIDE and another one
entered DISMISSING the complaint … for lack of jurisdiction. The TRO issued in this case … is hereby
made permanent.
NO
Under Article 344 of the RPC, the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written
complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long since been established, with unwavering consistency,
that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily
follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the
filing of the criminal action. This is a logical consequence since the raison d’etre of said provision of law
would be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender
at the time of the filing of the criminal case.
Stated differently, the inquiry would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal action
for adultery that the marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing
at the time of the institution of the action by the former against the latter.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines
insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter
of status of persons Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer
the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that
he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who can
legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the offenses of
seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, no provision is made for the prosecution of the
crimes of adultery and concubinage by the parents, grandparents or guardian of the offended party. The
so-called exclusive and successive rule in the prosecution of the first four offenses above mentioned do
not apply to adultery and concubinage. It is significant that while the State, as parens patriae, was added
and vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with the power to initiate the criminal action for a
deceased or incapacitated victim in the aforesaid offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of
lasciviousness, in default of her parents, grandparents or guardian, such amendment did not include the
crimes of adultery and concubinage. In other words, only the offended spouse, and no other, is authorized
by law to initiate the action therefor.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily
follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the
filing of the criminal action

In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that —

'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the complaint of the husband
or wife.' Section 4932, Code. Though Loftus was husband of defendant when the offense
is said to have been committed, he had ceased to be such when the prosecution was
begun; and appellant insists that his status was not such as to entitle him to make the
complaint. We have repeatedly said that the offense is against the unoffending spouse,
as well as the state, in explaining the reason for this provision in the statute; and we are
of the opinion that the unoffending spouse must be such when the prosecution is
commenced. (Emphasis supplied.)
We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our jurisdiction,
considering our statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We are convinced that in cases of such
nature, the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as of the time the
complaint was filed. Thus, the person who initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by
this is meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines
insofar as private respondent is concerned 23 in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the
matter of status of persons.
The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the decree of divorce
for lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this case. When said
respondent initiated the divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no longer be a family nor
marriage vows to protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would there be a danger
of introducing spurious heirs into the family, which is said to be one of the reasons for the particular
formulation of our law on adultery, 26 since there would thenceforth be no spousal relationship to speak of.
The severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other,
hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner, v. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR. AND RICHARD
UPTON, respondents.
No. L-68470.      October 8, 1985.
Facts:
Petitioner Alicia Reyes Van is citizen of the Philippines while private respondent Richard Upton is a citizen
of the United States, were married on 1972 at Hongkong. On 1982, they got divorced in Nevada, United
States; and the petitioner remarried to Theodore Van Dorn.
On July 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner, asking that the petitioner be ordered to
render an accounting of her business in Ermita, Manila, and be declared with right to manage the
conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred
by previous judgement in the divorce proceeding before Nevada Court where respondent acknowledged
that they had no community property. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that the
property involved is located in the Philippines, that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case.
Respondent avers that Divorce Decree abroad cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines.
Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal property
because of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the American Court that they
had no community of property; that the Galleon Shop was not established through conjugal funds, and
that respondent's claim is barred by prior judgment.
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over
the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a
foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of
jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not the divorce obtained the spouse valid to each of them.
(2) Whether or not Richard Upton may assert his right on conjugal properties.
Held:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United
States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private
respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this
case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law
and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5 only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. 6 In this case, the
divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law,
under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States
in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of
competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband
and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie when thus severed as to
one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is
unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty. that the guilty
party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from
the bond of the former marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would
have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married
to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code
cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and
render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible
rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of
justice are to be served.
Quita vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 124862, December 22, 1998
FACTS:
Fe Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on May 18, 1941 and were
not blessed with children. Their relationship soured and eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in U.S.A
and in July 1954, she obtained a final judgment of divorce. Three weeks after, she married a certain Felix
Tupaz in the same locality but their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married
for the third time, to a certain Wernimont.
On 16 April 1972 Arturo died and left no will. In August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of letters of administration concerning the estate of
Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company. Respondent BlandinaDandan, claiming to be the
surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, all
surnamed Padlan, named in the children of Arturo Padlan, opposed the petition and prayed for the
appointment instead of Atty. Leonardo Casaba, which was resolved in favor of the latter. Upon motion of
the oppositors themselves, Atty. Cabasal was later replaced by Higino Castillon. On 30 April 1973 the
oppositors submitted certified photocopies of the 19 July 1950 private writing and the final judgment of
divorce between petitioner and Arturo. Later Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming to be the sole surviving brother
of the deceased Arturo, intervened.
Petitioner moved for the immediate declaration of heirs of the decedent and the distribution of his estate.
At a scheduled hearing, the trial court required the submission of the records of birth of the Padlan
children within ten days from receipt thereof, after which, with or without the documents, the issue on the
declaration of heirs would be considered submitted for resolution. The prescribed period lapsed without
the required documents being submitted.
In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, Blandina and her children assigned as one of the errors
allegedly committed by the trial court the circumstance that the case was decided without a hearing, in
violation of Sec. 1, Rule 90, of the Rules of Court, which provides that if there is a controversy before the
court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each
person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
Respondent appellate court found this ground alone sufficient to sustain the appeal; hence, on 11
September 1995 it declared null and void the 27 November 1987 decision and 15 February 1988 order of
the trial court, and directed the remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings.[8] On 18 April
1996 it denied reconsideration.[9]
Should this case be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings? Petitioner insists that there
is no need because, first, no legal or factual issue obtains for resolution either as to the heirship of the
Padlan children or as to their respective shares in the intestate estate of the decedent; and, second, the
issue as to who between petitioner and private respondent is the proper heir of the decedent is one of law
which can be resolved in the present petition based on established facts and admissions of the parties.
ISSUE:
Who between petitioner and private respondent may validly claim as the spouse of the decedent
RULING:
We cannot sustain petitioner. The provision relied upon by respondent court is clear: If there is
a controversy  before the court as to who are the  lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and
decided as in ordinary cases.
We agree with petitioner that no dispute exists either as to the right of the six (6) Padlan children to
inherit from the decedent because there are proofs that they have been duly acknowledged by him and
petitioner herself even recognizes them as heirs of Arturo Padlan;[10] nor as to their respective hereditary
shares. But controversy remains as to who is the legitimate surviving spouse of Arturo. The trial court,
after the parties other than petitioner failed to appear during the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987 of
the motion for immediate declaration of heirs and distribution of estate, simply issued an order requiring
the submission of the records of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after
which, with or without the documents, the issue on declaration of heirs would be deemed submitted for
resolution.
We note that in her comment to petitioner's motion private respondent raised, among others, the
issue as to whether petitioner was still entitled to inherit from the decedent considering that she had
secured a divorce in the U.S.A. and in fact had twice remarried. She also invoked the above quoted
procedural rule.[11] To this, petitioner replied that Arturo was a Filipino and as such remained legally
married to her in spite of the divorce they obtained.[12] Reading between the lines, the implication is that
petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from Arturo. This should have
prompted the trial court to conduct a hearing to establish her citizenship. The purpose of a hearing is to
ascertain the truth of the matters in issue with the aid of documentary and testimonial evidence as well as
the arguments of the parties either supporting or opposing the evidence. Instead, the lower court
perfunctorily settled her claim in her favor by merely applying the ruling in Tenchavez v. Escao.
 Then in private respondent's motion to set aside and/or reconsider the lower court's decision she
stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the ruling in Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr.
[13]
 that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are
valid according to their national law. She prayed therefore that the case be set for hearing.[14]Petitioner
opposed the motion but failed to squarely address the issue on her citizenship.[15] The trial court did not
grant private respondent's prayer for a hearing but proceeded to resolve her motion with the finding that
both petitioner and Arturo were "Filipino citizens and were married in the Philippines."[16] It maintained that
their divorce obtained in 1954 in San Francisco, California, U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine
jurisdiction. We deduce that the finding on their citizenship pertained solely to the time
of their marriage as the trial court was not supplied with a basis to determine petitioner's citizenship at the
time of their divorce. The doubt persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen when their divorce
was decreed. The trial court must have overlooked the materiality of this aspect. Once proved that she
was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and
petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from Arturo.
We emphasize however that the question to be determined by the trial court should be limited only to
the right of petitioner to inherit from Arturo as his surviving spouse.  Private respondent's claim to heirship
was already resolved by the trial court.  She and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while the prior
marriage of petitioner and Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous marriage considered
void from the beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code. Consequently, she is not a surviving
spouse that can inherit from him as this status presupposes a legitimate relationship. [20]

RECTO V. HARDEN (1959)

Short summary: Recto was hired by American wife to represent her in RP case for protection of her
interest in the conjugal property, vs. American husband, in conjunction with the divorce proceeding she's
going to file in US. They won in TC, but on appeal, American H & W agreed to settle. Recto now wants to
collect fees for services, but as defense, Harden spouses argues that the contract's object was unlawful
(Divorce not allowed in RP) so it is invalid, thus, Recto cannot enforce it against them. Court ruled for
Recto
Facts:
Mrs. Harden, US Citizen, engaged services of Claro M. Recto, for suit
…to secure an increase in the amount of support she was receinging
…to preserve her rights in the properties of the conjugal partnership
…in contemplation of a divorce suit she's going to file in the US.
Compensation for RECTO: 20% of value of her share of conjugal partnership after liquidation
TC: for Mrs. Harden
CA: Harden Sps. Mutually released and forever discharged each other from all actions, debts, duties, and
claims to the conjugal partnership
-Recto filed motion contesting agreement
-defense: contract of services invalid: to secure a divorce decree in violation of our laws
WON RECTO COULD ENFORCE THE AGREEMENT? YES
*CONTRACT OF SERVICES IS NOT CONTRARY TO LAW, MORALS, GOOD CUSTOMS, PUBLIC
ORDER, OR PUBLIC POLICY
 The contract has a lawful object: it is to protect the interests of Mrs. Harden in the conjugal partnership
during the pendency of a divorce suit
-NOT
…to secure divorce
…to facilitate or promote procurement of divorce
 Divorce can be granted to the Sps Harden, they being nationals of country whose laws allow divorce
(following the nationality principle in determining the status and dissolution of the marriage)
*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*
 LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION V. JUDICIAL JURISDICTION
*status, once established by the personal law of the party, is given universal recognition. (UNIVERSALITY
OF STATUS)
-once status is set by Country A, Country B is bound to attribute to a person of Country A the status that is
established in Country A
-Courts of Country B also cannot introduce exceptions or qualifications that are not set in Country A
If ALIENS sue and are sued in RP Courts
*RP would apply RP Procedural rules relevant to status and capacity (JUDICIAL JURISDICTION)
BUT would apply personal law of the alien to determine status and capacity (LEGISLATIVE
JURISDICTION)

The first question for determination therein is the validity of the above-quoted contract of services, which
the Appellants assail as void, mainly, upon the ground:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (1) that Mrs. Harden
cannot bind the conjugal partnership without her husband’s consent; chan roblesvirtualawlibrary(2) that
Article 1491 of the Civil Code of the Philippines in effect prohibits contingent fees; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrary(3) that the contract in question has for its purpose to secure a decree of divorce,
allegedly in violation of Articles 1305, 1352 and 1409 of the Civil Code of the Philippines; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryand (4) that the terms of said contract are harsh, inequitable and oppressive.
The first objection has no foundation in fact, for the contract in dispute does not seek to bind the conjugal
partnership. By virtue of said contract, Mrs. Harden merely bound herself  — or assumed the personal
obligation — to pay, by way of contingent fees, 20% of her share in said partnership. The contract neither
gives, nor purports to give, to the Appellee any right whatsoever, personal or real, in and to her aforesaid
share. The amount thereof is simply a basis for the computation of said fees.
For the same reason, the second objection is, likewise, untenable. Moreover, it has already been held that
contingent fees are not prohibited in the Philippines and are impliedly sanctioned by our Cannons (No.
13) of Professional Ethics. (see, also, Ulanday vs. Manila Railroad Co., 45 Phil., 540, 554.) Such is,
likewise, the rule in the United States (Legal Ethics by Henry S. Drinker, p. 176).
“ cralaw in the United States, the great weight of authority recognizes the validity of contracts for
contingent fees, provided such contracts are not in contravention of public policy, and it is only when the
attorney has taken an unfair or unreasonable advantage of his client that such a claim is condemned.”
(See 5 Am. Jur. 359 et seq.; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryBallentine, Law Dictionary, 2nd ed., p. 276.)
Needless to say, there is absolutely nothing in the records before us to show that Appellee herein had, in
any manner, taken an unfair or unreasonable advantage of his client Mrs. Harden.
The third objection is not borne out, either by the language of the contract between them, or by the intent
of the parties thereto. Its purpose was not to secure a divorce, or to facilitate or promote the procurement
of a divorce. It merely sought to protect the interest of Mrs. Harden in the conjugal partnership, during the
pendency of a divorce suit she intended to file in the United States. What is more, inasmuch as Mr. and
Mrs. Harden are admittedly citizens of the United States, their status and the dissolution thereof are
governed — pursuant to Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain (which was in force in the Philippines at the
time of the execution of the contract in question) and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines — by
the laws of the United States, which sanction divorce. In short, the contract of services, between Mrs.
Harden and herein Appellee, is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.
The last objection is based upon principles of equity, but, pursuant thereto, one who seeks equity must
come with clean hands (Bastida, et al., vs. Dy Buncio & Co., 93 Phil., 195; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrary30 C.J. S. 475), and Appellants have not done so, for the circumstances
surrounding the case show, to our satisfaction, that their aforementioned agreements, ostensibly for the
settlement of the differences between husband and wife, were made for the purpose of circumventing or
defeating the rights of herein Appellee, under his above-quoted contract of services with Mrs. Harden.
Indeed, having secured a judgment in her favor, acknowledging her rights to the assets of the conjugal
partnership, which turned out to be worth almost P4,000,000 in addition to litis expensae in the sum of
P175,000, it is inconceivable that Mrs. Harden would have waived such rights, as well as the benefits of
all orders and judgments in her favor, in consideration of the paltry sum of $5,000 allegedly paid to her by
Mr. Harden and the additional sum of $20,000 to be paid by him in installments, at the rate of $500 a
month. In fact, no explanation has been given for this most unusual avowed settlement between Mr. and
Mrs. Harden. One cannot even consider the possibility of a reconciliation between the spouses, the same
being inconsistent with the monetary consideration for said alleged settlement. What is more, the records
show that the relations between said spouses — which were bad indeed, not only in July, 1941, when
Mrs. Harden engaged the services of the Appellee, but, even, before, for Mr. and Mrs. Harden were
separated since 1938 — had worsened considerably thereafter, as evidence by an action for divorce filed
by Mr. Harden in New Jersey, in July 1948, upon the ground of repeated acts of infidelity allegedly
committed by Mrs. Harden in 1940 and 1941.
Again, it appears that Appellee had rendered, under the contract in question, the following services, for
the benefit of Mrs. Harden:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1.  He succeeded in defeating Defendants’ motion for the dissolution of the writ of preliminary injunction,
issued by the Court on July 12, 1941, and amended on July 19, 1941.
2.  On November 12, 1946, Appellee moved for the appointment of a receiver, upon the ground that,
despite said writ of preliminary injunction, the Defendants had been disposing of the properties of the
conjugal partnership for the purpose of defrauding Mrs. Harden. After due hearing, the court, by an order
dated November 20, 1946, directed the appointment of Abelardo Perez as receiver of said properties,
upon the filing of a P10,000 bond. Defendants asked, on February 13, 1947, that the receivership be
suspended, or else, that they be allowed to file a bond for the discharge of the
receivership. Appellee replied objecting thereto, unless the Defendantsposted a P4,000,000 bond.
Subsequently or on March 5, 1947, the Defendants sought a reconsideration of the order of November
20, 1946, and the discharge of the receiver. By an order dated March 21, 1947, the Court authorized said
discharged upon the filing, by the Defendants, of a bond in the sum of P500,000, provided that Mr.
Harden “should bring back all the 368,553 shares of the Balatoc Mining Co., in his name to the
Philippines for deposit with the Clerk of Court, or with the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China, at
Manila  cralaw
“3.  On motion of the Appellee dated March 4, 1947, the Court, by an order dated April 5, 1947, directed
Mr. Harden to remit to Mrs. Harden the sum of $2,500, to be charged against her litis expensae. Upon
similar motion, filed by Appellee on or about April 26, 1947, the Court ordered Mr. Harden, on May 13,
1947, to furnish Mrs. Harden the sum of $5,000, under the same conditions.
4.  On June 21, 1947, the Defendants instituted Civil Case No. G. R. No. L-1499 of this Court, entitled
“Fred M. Harden and Jose Salumbides vs. Emilio Peña, Abelardo Perez and Esperanza P. Harden” for
the purpose of annulling and setting aside, by writ of certiorari, the aforementioned orders of the lower
court dated July 12, 1941, November 20, 1946, and April 5 and May 13, 1947, and to restrain, in the
meantime, the enforcement thereof. After appropriate proceedings, in the course of
which Appellee appeared as counsel for Mrs. Harden, and like counsel for the Petitionerstherein, filed
several lengthy, detailed pleadings and memoranda, decision was rendered on November 21, 1950,
denying the writ of certiorari prayed for.
5.  On or about September 9, 1947, Appellee filed a motion alleging that despite the writ of preliminary
injunction above mentioned, the Defendants had, fraudulently and without judicial consent, remitted
abroad several sums of money aggregating P1,000,608.66, and praying that Mr. Harden be ordered to
return this sum to the Philippines, within a stated period, said sum to be deposited with the account of the
Plaza Lunch at the Manila Branch of the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China. Mr. Harden
objected to said motion. Appellee filed a rejoinder, to which Mr. Harden replied. Appellee filed a rejoinder
to the rejoinder. On October 7, 1947, the Court granted Appellee’s motion. Mr. Harden sought a
reconsideration, which was opposed by the Appellee on October 27, 1947, and denied by an order dated
November 13, 1947. Mr. Harden moved, on November 18, 1947, for the suspension of this order, which
was immediately objected to by the Appellee and then denied by the Court.
6.  Inasmuch as said order of November 13, 1947 had not been complied with, Appellee filed on
November 27, 1947, a motion praying that Mr. Harden be declared in contempt of court and punished
accordingly. Meanwhile, or on November 24, 1947, Mr. Harden had instituted case G. R. No. L-1816 of
this Court against Hon. Emilio Peña, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and Mrs. Harden.
In the petition therein filed, Mr. Harden applied for a writ of certiorari annulling said orders of Judge Peña
of October 7 and November 13, 1947, and prayed that, pending disposition of the case, a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued restraining the Respondentstherein from enforcing said orders,
particularly through contempt proceedings. Hence, the lower court deferred action on the aforementioned
motion of November 27, 1947. After due hearing, this Court, in a resolution dated February 12, 1948,
refused to issue the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for. Subsequently, or on November 21,
1950, decision was rendered denying the petition for a writ of certiorari.
7.  Soon after the issuance of our resolution in said case G. R. No. 1816, dated February 12, 1948, or to
be exact on March 27, 1948, the lower court issued an order directing Mr. Harden to comply, within five
(5) days from notice, with the order of October 7, 1947. On April 6, 1948, Appellee filed with the lower
court the corresponding formal charges against Mr. Harden for contempt of court. After due hearing, Mr.
Harden was, by an order of April 28, 1948, found guilty as charged and ordered confined “until he
complies with the aforementioned orders” of October 7, 1947 and March 27, 1948. On motion of Mr.
Harden, said order of April 28, 1948 was suspended until May 4, 1948, on which date he was arrested
and placed in confinement at the New Bilibid Prison, in Muntinglupa, Rizal. On July 10, 1948, he filed with
this Court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus against the Director of Prisons, (G. R. No. L-2349,
entitled “Fred M. Harden vs. The Director of Prisons”), which, in due course was denied in
a decision promulgated on October 22, 1948.
8.  During the military occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese, the Appellee made representations
with the Japanese Government to prevent the commandeering of a business establishment belonging to
Mr. and Mrs. Harden. Moreover, he succeeded in persuading the Japanese to refrain from interning Mrs.
Harden and her daughter and to allow her to withdraw, from the former’s deposit in a local bank, from
P200 to P250 a month, for their subsistence. He, likewise, lent her money to meet her needs and spent
the sum of P55,000 in the preservation of the records and papers pertaining to the business and other
properties of the conjugal partnership of Mr. and Mrs. Harden.
9.  Appellee assisted, also, the receiver, as his counsel and, in such capacity, took all steps essential for
the proper discharge of the duties of the former. Among other things, Appellee sought and obtained
judicial authority for some important acts of administration of, and disposition by, the receiver. He
(Appellee) secured judicial intervention for the protection and preservation of the assets of the conjugal
partnership, including orders for the delivery of certificates of stock, the return thereof and/or its deposit
with the clerk of court. He, likewise, represented the receiver in seeking war damage payments.
10.  In civil case No. 6222 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled “Francisco Dalupan vs. Fred M.
Harden” for the recovery of P113,837.17, it was decided, through Appellee’s intervention, that the
conjugal assets would bear the payment of P22,767.43 only, the balance to be chargeable exclusively
against Mr. Harden’s share of the conjugal partnership.
11.  Appellee instituted civil case No. 6940 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled “Abelardo
Perez vs. Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China and Fred M. Harden”, for the recovery of
P1,000,608.66 and the return of stock certificates of the Balatoc Mining Co., which had been sent abroad.
12.  He (Appellee) represented Mrs. Harden in connection with a million-peso federal tax case against Mr.
and Mrs. Harden.
13.  Appellee successfully blocked Mr. Harden’s attempts to withdraw:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (1)
$53,000 and forward the same to the Collector of Internal Revenue of Los Angeles, California; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrary(2) $50,000.00, allegedly to defray expenses in resisting a new tax assessment
against him in the United States; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand (3) P65,000 for his expenses.
Then too, the conjugal partnership had varried and extensive business interests and its assets were worth
almost P4,000,000. The pleadings, motions, oppositions, rejoinders, and memoranda filed, and the
evidence introduced, in the aforementioned cases — in which Appellee was pitted against one of the most
experienced and able members of the Philippine Bar — were numerous, extensive and exhaustive. For
instance, the record on appeal in one of those cases, namely, G. R. No. L-3687, consisted of 966 pages.
In short, considering the character of the services rendered by the Appellee, the nature and importance of
the issues in said litigations, the amount of labor, time (1941 to 1952) and trouble involved therein, the
skill displayed in connection with said cases, the value of the property affected by the controversy, the
professional character and standing of the Appellee, the risks assumed and the results obtained, we are
of the opinion, and so hold, that the contract of services in question is neither harsh nor oppressive or
inequitable.
Under their second assignment of error, Appellants maintain that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“The lower court erred in failing to find as a fact borne out by the evidence that the legal services of
Attorney Claro M. Recto to Mrs. Esperanza P. de Harden, payment, for which is sought by him in this
case, have already been paid by his immediate execution pending appeal of the decision in Civil Case
No. CFI-R-59634 (SC-G.R. No. L- 3687), wherein he collected the sum of P176,000.00 for all such legal
services.”
Said decision, however, states clearly that the aforementioned sum of P175,000 represents litis
expensae, and the contract between the Appellee and Mrs. Harden explicitly declares that said litis
expensae shall be “in addition to” Appellee’s share of 25% of the increase in the allowance of Mrs.
Harden and his attorney’s fees of 20% of her share in the conjugal partnership. The second assignment
of error is, therefore, devoid of merit.
Appellants, further contend, that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
3.  The lower court erred in holding that the inchoate share of the wife, Esperanza P. de Harden, in the
undissolved and unliquidated conjugal partnership properties of the Harden spouses, is capable of certain
valuation before such dissolution and liquidation, and summarily assessing the value of Mrs. Harden’s
share in such conjugal properties without proper evidence.
4.  “The lower court erred in awarding 20% of such inchoate share to Attorney Claro M. Recto from Mrs.
Harden’s interests in the Harden conjugal properties, summarily assessing such 20% inchoate share as
of a value of P384,110.97, and ordering the payment of said sum to Attorney Recto in pursuance of the
provisions of paragraph 3 of the Contract of Professional Services.”
Appellants’ arguments in support thereof may be summarized as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary The
contract of services in question provides that Appellee’s contingent fees shall be 20% of the share of Mrs.
Harden in the conjugal partnership. Pursuant to law, the share of Mrs. Harden shall be determined upon
the liquidation of said partnership, which has not taken place, as yet. What is more, it cannot be effected
until the dissolution of the marriage relation between Mr. and Mrs. Harden. Inasmuch as this relation
subsists, it follows that the amount of attorney’s fees due to Appellee herein should not have been
determined in the decision appealed from.
This line of argument overlooks the fact that said contract of services was made, principally, in
contemplation of a suit for divorce that, according to Mrs. Harden, she intended to file before a competent
court in California, “and of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership between” her and Mr. Harden. Had
she filed said action for divorce and secured a decree of divorce, said conjugal partnership would have
been dissolved and then liquidated, and the share of Mrs. Harden therein would have been fixed.
However, this cannot take place, either now, or in the foreseeable future, owing to the aforementioned
agreements between Mr. and Mrs. Harden, which were made for the evident purpose of
defeating Appellee’s claim for attorney’s fees. In other words, the occurrence, within the time
contemplated by the parties — bearing in mind the nature of, and the circumstances under which they
entered into, said contract of services — of the event upon which the amount of said fees depended, was
rendered impossible by Mrs. Harden. Hence, whether such event be regarded as a condition or as a
period, she may not insist upon its occurrence, prior to the enforcement of the rights of the
herein Appellee, for “the condition shall be deemed fulfilled when the obligor voluntarily prevents its
fulfillment” (Art. 1186, Civil Code) and “the debtor shall lose every right to make use of the period” when
he “violates any undertaking, in consideration of which the creditor agreed to the period.” (Art. 1198, Civil
Code.)
It should be noted, also, that the compensation agreed upon for Appellee’s services, consists of three (3)
parts, namely:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (a) 25% of the increase in the allowance of Mrs. Harden; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrary(b) litis expensae; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand (c) 20% of her share in the
conjugal partnership. The first part was dealt with in the first paragraph of their contract of services. The
second and third parts were the object of the second and third paragraphs, respectively. The first
paragraph limited the rights of Appelleethereunder to two (2) years, in the event of termination of the case
or amicable settlement thereof within two (2) years from the filing of the complaint. No such limitation
appears in the second and third paragraphs of said contract. Hence, the same were intended by the
parties to be fully operative under any and all conditions.
It may not be amiss to add that the value of the properties involved has been assessed, not summarily,
but after due notice and full dress hearing, in the course of which both parties introduced testimonial and
documentary evidence. Appellants presented Exhibits 1 to 58, whereas those of the Appellee were so
numerous that, having begun with Exhibit A, his last piece of documentary evidence was marked Exhibit
26 Y’s. The transcript of the hearing, which lasted ten (10) days, covers over 220 pages.
The other assignments of error made by Appellants herein are mere corollaries of those already disposed
of, and, hence, no further discussion thereof is necessary.
In conclusion, it appears that the assets of the conjugal partnership between Mr. and Mrs. Harden are
reasonably valued at P3,841,109.70. One-half (1/2) thereof, representing the share of Mrs. Harden, is
therefore, worth P1,920,554.85. Twenty percentum (20%) of this sum is P384,110.97, which is the
contingent fee due to the Appellee, apart from the litis expensae already paid to him. Inasmuch as
the Appellee has collected, also, the sum of P80,000.00, on account of said contingent fees, there results
in his favor a balance of P304,110.97.
Subject to this qualification, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, therefore, with costs against
the Appellants. SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, P e t i t i o n e r ,- versus- CRASUS L. IYOY, R e s p o n d e n t

FACTS:

Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Cebu City. After the celebration of their marriage,
respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was “hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant.” In 1984, Fely left
the Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children, the youngest
then being only six years old, to the care of respondent Crasus.

Barely a year after Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a letter from her requesting that
he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded the said request. Sometime in 1985, respondent
Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married to an American,
with whom she eventually had a child. At the time the Complaint was filed, it had been 13 years since Fely
left and abandoned respondent Crasus, and there was no more possibility of reconciliation between them.

Respondent Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint that Fely’s acts brought danger and dishonor to the
family, and clearly demonstrated her psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of
marriage. Such incapacity, being incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity of
marriage under Article 36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of the Philippines.

Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim with the RTC on 05 June 1997. She asserted therein that she
was already an American citizen since 1988 and was now married to Stephen Micklus. She argued that
her marriage to her American husband was legal because now being an American citizen, the law of her
present nationality shall govern her status.

n December 16, 1961 Crasus Iyoy and Ada Rosal-Iyoy married each other, they had 5 children. In 1984,
Fely went to the US, inthe same year she sent letters to Crasus asking him to sign divorce papers. In
1985, Crasus learned that Fely married an Americanand had a child. Fely went back to the Philippines on
several occasions, during one she attended the marriage of one of her children inwhich she used her
husband’s last name as hers in the invitation.
Fely denied the claims and asserted that Crasus was a drunkard, womanizer, had no job, and thatsince
1988 she was already an American citizen and not covered by our laws. The RTC found the evidences
sufficient and granted thedecree; it was affirmed in the CA.

ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
 
 . [P]sychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly cognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as
so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly
any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated
Does abandonment and sexual infidelity per se constitute psychological incapacity?
Held:
The evidences presented by the respondent fail to establish psychological incapacity.
Furthermore, Article 36 “contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to
assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part
of the errant spouse. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by
themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the said Article.”
Finally, Article 36 “is not to be confused with a divorce law thatcuts the marital bond at the time the causes
therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting aparty even before the
celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the
duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.”

The only substantial evidence presented by respondent Crasus before the RTC was his

testimony, which can be easily put into question for being self-serving, in the absence of any other

corroborating evidence. He submitted only two other pieces of evidence: (1) the Certification on the

recording with the Register of Deeds of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely, such

marriage being celebrated on 16 December 1961; and (2) the invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr.,

their eldest son, in which Fely used her American husbands surname. Even considering the admissions

made by Fely herself in her Answer to respondent Crasuss Complaint filed with the RTC, the evidence is

not enough to convince this Court that Fely had such a grave mental illness that prevented her from

assuming the essential obligations of marriage.

The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts that hurt and embarrassed respondent Crasus

and the rest of the family. Her hot-temper, nagging, and extravagance; her abandonment of respondent

Crasus; her marriage to an American; and even her flaunting of her American family and her American

surname, may indeed be manifestations of her alleged incapacity to comply with her marital obligations;

nonetheless, the root cause for such was not identified. If the root cause of the incapacity was not

identified, then it cannot be satisfactorily established as a psychological or mental defect that is serious or

grave; neither could it be proven to be in existence at the time of celebration of the marriage; nor that it is

incurable. While the personal examination of Fely by a psychiatrist or psychologist is no longer mandatory

for the declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, by

virtue of this Courts ruling in Marcos v. Marcos,[29] respondent Crasus must still have complied with the

requirement laid down in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina [30] that the root cause of the incapacity

be identified as a psychological illness and that its incapacitating nature be fully explained.

According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines

 
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated
and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him
or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.

As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple

getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated. By

its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the case of respondent

Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino

citizen. Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed before the

RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after she left for the United States in

1984, after which she married her American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged that she
had been an American citizen since 1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino

citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the

Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal

capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow

and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce

from respondent Crasus.

That Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor General does not bar him or his Office from
intervening in proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages. Executive Order No. 292,
otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, appoints the Solicitor General as the principal law
officer and legal defender of the Government.[33] His Office is tasked to represent the Government of the
Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding,
investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. The Office of the Solicitor General shall
constitute the law office of the Government and, as such, shall discharge duties requiring the services of
lawyers

The psychological incapacity must be characterized by

(a)              Gravity It must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying

out the ordinary duties required in a marriage;

(b)             Juridical Antecedence It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the

marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and

(c)              Incurability It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be

beyond the means of the party involved.[22]

More definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code of

the Philippines were handed down by this Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,[23] which,

although quite lengthy, by its significance, deserves to be reproduced below

 
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage
and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution
and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our
Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the
nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution at
the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be protected by the state.
 
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
 
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or
one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not
have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given
valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so
as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
 
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of
the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their I do's. The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
 
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job
 
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities,
mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor
in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.
 
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to
71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and
225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.
 
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts
 
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for
 resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.[24]
 
 
 

A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,[25] further clarified that there is no requirement that the

defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a

condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Such

psychological incapacity, however, must be established by the totality of the evidence presented during

the trial.

FACTS:
Alicia( 2nd wife)  Lorenzo N. Llorente --- Paula (1ST wife) --- Ceferino Llorente (brother)
Crisologo Llorente(son)
 Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United States Navy from
March 10, 1927 to September 30, 1957
 February 22, 1937: Lorenzo and Paula Llorente were married before a parish
priest, Roman Catholic Church, in Nabua, Camarines Sur
 Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United States
and Paula stayed in the conjugal home
 November 30, 1943: Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and
Certificate of Naturalization
 1945: When Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave to visit his wife and he
visited the Philippines, He discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and was “living in”
and having an adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente
 December 4, 1945: Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the Office of the
Registrar of Nabua as Crisologo Llorente with the certificate stating that the child was not
legitimate and the line for the father’s name was left blank
 Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her
 February 2, 1946: the couple drew and signed a written agreement which was
witnessed by Paula’s father and stepmother to the effect that
1.    all the family allowances allotted by the United States Navy as part of Lorenzo’s salary and all other
obligations for Paula’s daily maintenance and support would be suspended
2.    they would dissolve their marital union in accordance with judicial proceedings
3.    they would make a separate agreement regarding their conjugal property acquired during their marital
life; and
4.    Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for her adulterous act since she voluntarily admitted her fault and
agreed to separate from Lorenzo peacefully. 
 November 16, 1951: Lorenzo returned and filed for divorce with the Superior
Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego
 December 4, 1952: the divorce decree became final
 January 16, 1958: Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila and lived together
as husband and wife and bore 3 children: Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente
 March 13, 1981: Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament where he
bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their three children
  December 14, 1983: Lorenzo filed with the RTC, Iriga, Camarines Sur, a petition
for the probate and allowance of his last will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved that
Alicia be appointed Special Administratrix of his estate
 January 18, 1984: RTC denied the motion for the reason that the Lorenzo was
still alive
 January 24, 1984: RTC admitted finding that the will was duly executedthe will to
probate
 June 11, 1985: before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died
 RTC on the petition for letters of administration filed by Paula over Lorenzo’s
estate contending that she was the surviving spouse and WITHOUT terminating the
testate proceedings filed by Alicia, gave due course to Paula’s petition
o divorce decree granted to the late Lorenzo Llorente is void and
inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the marriage he contracted with Alicia
Fortunato at Manila is void
 Paula T. Llorente: 1/3 estate and ½ conjugal estate
 illegitimate children, Raul, Luz and Beverly: 1/3 estate
 RTC denied Alicia’s motion for reconsideration but modified that Raul and Luz
Llorente are not children “legitimate or otherwise” of Lorenzo since they were not legally
adopted by him thus, Beverly Llorente as the only illegitimate child of Lorenzo, entitles
her to 1/3 of the estate and one-third (1/3) of the free portion of the estate
 CA: Affirmed with modification

ISSUE: W/N the divorce is valid and proven

HELD: YES. Petition is GRANTED. REVERSES the decision of the Regional Trial Court and
RECOGNIZES as VALID the decree of divorce granted in favor of the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente by
the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego, made final on December
4, 1952. REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo N.
Llorente’s will and determination of the parties’ successional rights allowing proof of foreign law with
instructions that the trial court shall proceed with all deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of the
deceased within the framework of the Rules of Court.

The Applicable Law

The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before and at the time of: (1)
his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly established,
admitted and undisputed.
Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by foreign law.
The Civil Code clearly provides:
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons
are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to the
amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated
by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the
nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. (emphasis ours)
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.i[37]
While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court of Appeals did not admit the foreign law.
The Court of Appeals and the trial court called to the fore the renvoi doctrine, where the case was referred
back to the law of the decedents domicile, in this case, Philippine law.
We note that while the trial court stated that the law of New York was not sufficiently proven, in the same
breath it made the categorical, albeit equally unproven statement that American law follows the
domiciliary theory hence, Philippine law applies when determining the validity of Lorenzos will.ii[38]
First, there is no such thing as one American law. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil
Code cannot possibly apply to general American law. There is no such law governing the validity of
testamentary provisions in the United States. Each State of the union has its own law applicable to its
citizens and in force only within the State. It can therefore refer to no other than the law of the State of
which the decedent was a resident.iii[39] Second, there is no showing that the application of the renvoi
doctrine is called for or required by New York State law.
The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it contained dispositions in favor of Alice,
who in the trial courts opinion was a mere paramour. The trial court threw the will out, leaving Alice, and
her two children, Raul and Luz, with nothing.
The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice entitled to one half (1/2) of whatever
property she and Lorenzo acquired during their cohabitation, applying Article 144 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.
The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will, already probated as duly
executed in accordance with the formalities of Philippine law, is fatal, especially in light of the factual
and legal circumstances here obtaining.
Validity of the Foreign Divorce
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.iv[40] we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the
Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. In the same case, the Court ruled that
aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law.
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals,v[41] that once proven that
respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van
Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from him.
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,vi[42] we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent in his country, the
Federal Republic of Germany. There, we stated that divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the
Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the
status of persons.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be reversed.vii[43] We hold
that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this
jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the
decedent) are matters best left to the determination of the trial court.
Validity of the Will
The Civil Code provides:
Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by
the laws of the country in which they are executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the
Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their
execution. (underscoring ours)
The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and children by her is glaringly
shown in the will he executed. We do not wish to frustrate his wishes, since he was a foreigner, not
covered by our laws on family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity.viii[44]
Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved by foreign
law which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed in accordance with the formalities
required is answered by referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated.
As a guide however, the trial court should note that whatever public policy or good customs may be
involved in our system of legitimes, Congress did not intend to extend the same to the succession of
foreign nationals. Congress specifically left the amount of successional rights to the decedent's national
law.ix[45]
Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the other issues raised.
i

ii

iii

iv

vFACTS:
Orbecido and Villanueva were married ad had two children. Wife went to US to work and later became a US citizen.
Thereafter he learned from his son that his wife obtained divorce and married another man. Orbecido filed a petition for
authority to remarry under the Article 26 (2) of the Family Code. RTC Zamboanga del Sur granted his petition. The
SolGen's motion for reconsideration was denied. Orbecido filed a petition for review of certiorari on the Decision of the
RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 (2).

RULING:
Yes. Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the
marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce
decree.  The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage.

The reckoning point is not their citizenship at the time of celebration of marriage, but their citizenship at the time the
divorce decree is obtained abroad by alien spouse capacitating him/her to remarry.

vi

However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by respondent concerning the divorce

decree and the naturalization of respondents wife. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it

and mere allegation is not evidence.[13]

Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[10] The Van

Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree

validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to

remarry under Philippine law.

 Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were

Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by naturalization?

The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals.[11] In Quita, the parties were, as

in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a

divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized

foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.

Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of

Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were

Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The

Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization

of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute

according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature,

it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may

therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent. [12]

If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains

married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case

must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.

In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:

1.                  There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner;
and

2.                  A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
 The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their

citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has

been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid

divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both

present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.

We are also unable to sustain the OSGs theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino spouse is to file either a

petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation. Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in this

particular case, not even feasible, considering that the marriage of the parties appears to have all the badges of validity. On

the other hand, legal separation would not be a sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the legally

separated Filipino spouse would still remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.

vii

viii
ix