Analytic Induction
with the object of determining whether or not
NORMAN K. DENZIN
Originally associated with the work of Florian
Znaniecki (1934), analytic induction is an inter-
pretive strategy that seeks universal explanations
of the phenomenon in question. Analytic induc-
tion involves a process of generating and then
testing hypotheses against each successive case or
instance of the phenomenon. Its decisive feature
“is the analysis of the exceptional or negative case,
the case which is deviant to the working hypoth-
esis” (Buhler-Niederberger 1985). Negative case
analysis may be regarded as a “process of revising
hypotheses with hindsight” (Lincoln & Guba
1985). Analytic induction directs the investigator
to formulate processual generalizations that apply
to all instances of the problem. This differentiates
analytic induction from other forms of causal
analysis, including the multivariate method
where concern is directed to generalizations that
apply, not to all instances of the phenomenon at
hand, but rather to most or some of them.
Description of Analytic Induction
Strategically, analytic induction represents an
approximation of the experimental model to
the extent that explicit comparisons are made
with groups not exposed to the causal factors
under analysis. Conceptually, this represents the
classic “before-after” experimental design, and
when employed in the field method it calls for
the investigator to search for empirical instances
that negate the causal hypothesis. This general
strategy, which combines the method of agree-
ment and the method of difference, involves
the following steps (see Robinson 1951; Buhler-
Niederberger 1985; Schwandt 2001; Silverman
1993; Flick 2002):
A rough definition of the phenomenon to be
explained is formulated.
A hypothetical explanation of that phe-
nomenon is formulated.
The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology. Edited by George Ritzer.
© 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Published 2007 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
DOI: 10.1002/9781405165518.wbeosa048
One case is studied in light of the hypothesis,
the hypothesis fits the facts in that case.
If the hypothesis does not fit the facts, either the
hypothesis is reformulated or the phenomenon
to be explained is redefined so that the case is
excluded.
Practical certainty can be attained after a small
number of cases have been examined, but the
discovery of negative cases disproves the expla-
nation and requires a reformulation.
This procedure of examining cases, redefin-
ing the phenomenon, and reformulating the
hypotheses is continued until a universal
relationship is established, each negative case
calling for a redefinition or a reformulation.
Alfred Lindesmith’s (1947, 1968) research on
opiate addiction provides an illustration of this
method. The focus of his investigation was the
development of a sociological theory of opiate
addiction. He began with the tentatively formu-
lated hypothesis that individuals who did not
know what drug they were receiving would not
become addicted. Conversely, it was predicted
that individuals would become addicted when
they knew what they were taking, and had taken
it long enough to experience distress (withdrawal
symptoms) when they stopped. This hypothesis
was destroyed when one of the first addicts inter-
viewed, a doctor, stated that he had once received
morphine for several weeks, was fully aware of
the fact, but had not become addicted at that
time. This negative case forced Lindesmith (1947:
8) to reformulate his initial hypothesis: “Persons
become addicts when they recognize or perceive
the significance of withdrawal distress which they
are experiencing, and that if they do not recognize
withdrawal distress they do not become addicts
regardless of any other consideration.”
This formulation proved to be much more
powerful, but again negating evidence forced
its revision. In this case persons were observed
who had withdrawal experiences and understood
withdrawal distress, but not in the most severe
form; these persons did not use the drug to
alleviate the distress and never became addicts.
2 A N A LY T I C I N D U C T I O N
Lindesmith’s (1947: 8) final causal hypothesis
involved a shift on his part from “the recognition
of withdrawal distress, to the use of the drug after
the insight had occurred for the purpose of alle-
viating the distress.” The final hypothesis had the
advantage of attributing the cause of addiction
to no single event, but rather to a complex chain
of events. All the evidence unequivocally sup-
ported this theory, and Lindesmith (1947: 165)
concluded: “This theory furnished a simple but
effective explanation, not only of the manner in
which addiction becomes established, but also of
the essential features of addiction behavior, those
features which are found in addiction in all parts
of the world, and which are common to all cases.”
Advantages of Analytic Induction
Before reaching the conclusion that his theory
explained all cases of opiate addiction. Linde-
smith explicitly searched for negative cases that
would force revision or rejection of the theory
or the definitions of central concepts. Analytic
induction provides a method by which old
theories can be revised and incorporated into
new theories as negative evidence is taken into
account. The method, with its emphasis on the
importance of the negative case, forces a close
articulation between fact, observation, concept,
proposition, and theory. It leads to developmental
or processual theories, and these are superior to
static formulations which assume that variables
operate in either an intervening or an antecedent
fashion on the processes under study.
Still, as Turner (1953) has suggested, analytic
induction is too frequently employed in a defini-
tional rather than a causal fashion. For example,
predictions concerning who would take a drug
and who would not, or under what conditions
withdrawal symptoms would be severe or not
severe, are not contained in Lindesmith’s theory.
Instead, it is a predictive system that explains the
behavior of persons who have taken opiates.
The goal of seeking interpretations that apply
to all instances of a phenomenon is admirable, as
is the use of negative cases to reach that goal. As
a strategy for interpreting qualitative materials,
analytic induction has a great deal in common
with grounded theory analysis and the constant
comparison method (Glaser & Strauss 1967;
Lincoln & Guba 1985; Silverman 1993; Schwandt
2001).
SEE ALSO: Emic/Etic; Experimental Design;
Experimental Methods; Hypotheses; Methods;
Negative Case Analysis; Znaniecki, Florian
REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED
READINGS
Buhler-Niederberger, D. (1985) Analytische Induktion
als Verfahren qualitativer Methodologie. Zietschrift
fur Soziologie 14 (4): 475–85.
Flick, U. (2002) An Introduction to Qualitative Research,
2nd edn. Sage, London.
Glaser, B. & Strauss, Anselm L. (1967) The Discovery of
Grounded Theory. Aldine, Chicago.
Lincoln, Y. S. & Guba, E. G. (1985) Naturalistic Inquiry.
Sage, Beverly Hills.
Lindesmith, A. (1947) Opiate Addiction. Principia
Press, Bloomington.
Lindesmith, A. (1968) Addiction and Opiates. Aldine,
Chicago.
Robinson, W. S. (1951) The Logical Structure of Ana-
lytic Induction. American Sociological Review 16:
812–18.
Schwandt, T. (2001) Dictionary of Qualitative Inquiry,
2nd edn. Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA.
Silverman, D. (1993) Interpreting Qualitative Data.
Sage, London.
Turner, R. H. (1953) The Quest for Universals in Soci-
ological Research. American Sociological Review 18:
604–11.
Znaniecki, F. (1934) The Method of Sociology. Farrar &
Rinehart, New York.