NOTES ON USE

Circle bullets contain jurisprudence from the case list.

Solid square bullets are taken from the Primer or Greenbook.
Diamonds are either discussions, notes, or comments.

Text in italics are provisions.

TEXT LIKE THIS are main topics.
TEXT LIKE THIS are subtopics.
TEXT LIKE THIS are enumerations.

ARTICLE III
BILL OF RIGHTS
The Bill of Rights is a guarantee that there are certain areas of a person’s life, liberty, and
property which governmental power may not touch. It serves to limit the otherwise unlimited
power of the Government.
Not against private individuals. The restrictions found in the Bill are directed against the
State. They do not govern the relations between persons. However, almost all provisions found
in the Bill are made applicable in relations between private persons through Art 32 of the Civil
Code.
The provisions herein are self-executing; they do not need implementing legislation to be
enforceable.
o Rights during interregnum. The Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not
operative during the interregnum but individual rights were still protected under the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Convention on Civil and
Political Rights. The seizure in this case is illegal for not having complied with the particular
description requirement of a search warrant. Republic v Sandiganbayan
o Enforcement of foreign judgments. Is the award of damages by the Court of Hawaii for
Marcos’s human violations enforceable in the country? Yes, but it depends on the nature
of the case. If it involves judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon
the title to a thing. In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive
evidence of a right. Mijares v Ranada
KINDS OF RIGHTS
1. Natural Rights. Those possessed by every citizen without being granted by the State
2. Constitutional Rights. Those conferred and protected by the Constitution
a. Political rights
b. Civil rights
c. Social and economic rights
d. Rights of the accused
3. Statutory Rights. Those provided by law, promulgated by the law-making body and
consequently may be abolished by the same body.
Power of eminent domain (Art III, Sec 9). The power of the state to take private poverty for
public use upon payment of just compensation
Power of taxation (Art VI, Sec 28(1)) The power to raise revenue for the government to be
used for a public purpose.
Police power. That inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all that
is hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society. Rubi v Provincial Board
o It rests upon public necessity and upon the right of the state and of the public to self-
protection. US v Toribio.
o The power has been used to justify state intervention regarding matters related to public
health, public safety, and public morals. Lawful pursuits which are not per se offensive to
the moral welfare of the community is not a valid exercise of the power. City of Manila v
Laguio
o Vast as the power is, it must still be exercised within the limits set by the Constitution. The
exercise of the power insofar as it may affect the life, liberty, property of any person is
subject to the judicial inquiry. There is a presumption for its constitutionality which must
be overcome by factual foundation. Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operations v City Mayor.
o The Supreme Court has steadily departed laissez faire governance (no to little state
intervention) as an excuse from the valid exercise of police power. Estrada v Sandiganbayan
o Every holder of property, however absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it under
the implied liability that his use of it may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to
the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their property,
nor injurious to the rights of the community. US v Toribio
o The State may interfere wherever the public interests demand it, and legislature exercises
a large discretion to determine, not only what the interests of the public require, but also
what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests. Id

INHERENT POWERS OF THE GOVERNMENT

The totality of governmental power is contained in its Police Power, Power of Eminent
Domain, and Power of Taxation. These powers are inherent to the government and the
constitution only acts to define, delimit, and allocate their exercise between the government
agencies.

1

SECTION 1
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws
SECTION SUMMARY:
The two major concepts in this section are due process and equal protection of laws. Due
process is subdivided into procedural and substantive due process, both of which must be
complied for due process not to be violated.
As a precursor, it is important to note that human rights take precedence over property
rights (Hierarchy of Rights).
Procedural Due Process (PDP) varies depending on the nature of the proceeding. PDP
discussed in this section focuses on administrative proceedings. PDP in criminal proceedings
is discussed in Section 14, Due Process in Criminal Proceedings.
PDP in administrative proceedings are not as stringent as those in judicial proceedings but
parties must still be given notice and the opportunity to be heard. The main guideline is
provided in Ang Tibay v CIR. Deviations from this guideline are well-established exceptions
such as the case of nuisance per se, closure proceedings against banks, and protection orders
(Exceptions to the General Rule), and Academic Discipline.
Substantive Due Process (SDP) requires that laws or ordinances must have a lawful purpose
and a lawful means. Additionally, there must exist a nexus or reasonable relationship
between the two.
The Motel Trilogy tackles the Tests for Validity of SDP, namely: the rational basis test,
intermediate scrutiny test, and the strict scrutiny test. Note the table supplied in the sub-
section, as this provides the level of state interest and scope of means employed
commensurate with the right involved.
A discussion on the extraordinary Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data is also supplied in
this subsection. The two writs are compared and contrasted with the Writ of Habeas
Corpus, which is discussed extensively in Section 15.
Equal protection of laws requires a classification that rests on substantial distinctions, must
be germane to the purpose of the law, not limited to existing conditions, and applies equally
to all members of the same class.
2
LIFE, LIBERTY, PROPERTY
The right to life is not just a protection of the right to be alive or to the security of one’s limb
against physical harm. It involves the right to a good life, pertaining to the quality of living.
The right to liberty includes, but is not limited to, the following: right to exist, right to be free
from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude, right to contract, right to choose one’s
employment, right to labor, right to locomotion, right to marry, establish a home, and bring
children.
The right to property includes the ability to acquire property, own it, and dispose as one may
please.
Applicable to aliens. The provision can be availed of by all persons, be they citizens or aliens,
natural or corporate, within the territorial jurisdiction of the PH.
The shelter of protection under this provision is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens.
While the State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he
cannot be deprived of life and liberty without due process of law.
HIERARCHY OF RIGHTS
Human rights, in general, are given precedence over property rights.
o Impairment of contracts. Prohibiting mass demonstration against the State, not against
the company, on the ground that it violates the collective bargaining agreement, should
not be sustained. The primacy of human rights – the freedom of expression, of peaceful
assembly, and of petition for the redress of grievances – over property rights has been
sustained. Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization v Philippine Blooming Mills Co
o Non-impairment clause. It is a settled rule that property rights must give way for the
loftier purposes of the government. The period where the right to foreclose a mortgaged
property is subject to the purpose of public welfare. Goldenway Merchandising Corporation
v Equitable PCI
o Free exercise. It may not be amiss to point out that the free exercise of religious belief or
profession is superior to contract rights. In case of conflict, the latter must yield to the
former. Victoriano v Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union.
❖ Discussion: Remember the class discussion in White Light v City of Manila. A restriction
on a fundamental right (e.g. free speech, free exercise of religion) requires a compelling
state interest with least restrictive means to pass the strict scrutiny test, while for
property rights (e.g. non-impairment clause), only a legitimate state interest is required
to pass the rational basis test. Following this logic, the State protects fundamental rights
more than property rights.
- Note: See discussion under the Motel Trilogy for an in-depth look on how this
concept is applied.
 DUE PROCESS
The essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard. What the law prohibits is not
the absence of previous notice but its absolute absence and lack of opportunity to be heard.
Sufficient compliance exists when a party is given a chance to be heard.
o NBI preliminary investigations. The NBI findings are only recommendatory since the
functions of the agency are merely investigatory and informational in nature. The findings
are subject to the prosecutor’s and Secretary of Justice’s actions. There is no violation of
due process. Shu v Dee.
Dual aspects. Due process has a procedural and substantive aspect. Both must be complied
with for due process not to be violated.
As a substantive requirement, it is a prohibition against arbitrary laws. Banco Espanol Filipino
v Palanca
As a procedural requirement, it means that the mode of procedure which government
agencies must follow in the enforcement and application of laws. It is a guarantee of procedural
fairness. Id
ELEMENTS OF DUE PROCESS IN GENERAL:
1. There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the
matter before it;
2. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the
property which is the subject of the proceedings;
3. The defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and
4. Judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.
I. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS (PDP)
Note: Procedural due process, as discussed in this section, focuses on administrative
proceedings. However, due process applies to all types of proceedings involving the State. PDP
in criminal cases is more stringent – Section 14, on the rights of the accused in criminal
proceedings, finds application.
Administrative proceedings are not as stringent as judicial proceedings but are still covered
by due process. The heart of the procedure is the need for notice and an opportunity to
be heard. What is required for the former is not an actual hearing, but a real opportunity to be
heard. Ang Tibay v CIR
PDP IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS:
1. The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one’s case and submit evidence
in support thereof;
2. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
3. The decision must have something to support itself;
3
4. The evidence must be substantial; Substantial evidence means such reasonable evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion;
5. The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained
in the record and disclosed to the parties affected;
6. The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration
of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate;
and
7. The board or body should render its decision in such manner that the parties to the
proceedings can know the various issues involved and the reason the decision rendered.
o Violation of #5. The petitioner cannot use as an excuse the subsequent disclosure of the
evidence used in 1987 to justify the 1984 resolution. Glorious Sun was denied due process
when the Board failed to disclose evidence used by it in rendering the resolution. There
was a violation of due process. American Inter-fashion Corporation v OP
Nature of the administrative proceedings. Administrative proceedings which are executive
or legislative in nature, such as issuing internal rules and regulations, need not comply with the
requirement of notice and hearing. However, quasi-judicial proceedings need proper notice
and hearing. Corona v UHPAP
o Extradition case trilogy; quantum of evidence. It is the right of a foreign power to
demand the surrender of one accused or convicted of a crime. It is a sui generis proceeding,
not a criminal proceeding. Hence, the standard of due process in extradition proceedings
should not be the same as that in criminal ones. Clear and convincing evidence should be
used in granting bail in extradition cases. Govt of Hongkong v Olalia
o Same; requisites for extradition. Under the RP-HK agreement, the Gov’t of HK must prove
the following: (1) there must be an extradition treaty in force between the HKSAR and RP;
(2) there are criminal charges pending in the HKSAR against person to be extradited; (3)
crimes for which the person to be extradited is charged are extraditable within the terms
of the treaty; (4) the individual before the court is the same person charged in the HKSAR;
(5) the evidence submitted establishes probable cause to believe the person to be
extradited committed the offenses charged; and (6) the offenses charged are criminal in
both the HKSAR and the PH.
- Note: The preceding enumeration is exclusive to the RP-HK agreement and seems to
be inapplicable to other extradition cases.
o Same; double criminality rule. The charges must meet the element of double criminality,
or the act must be an offense for both jurisdictions for extradition to be available. Govt of
Hongkong v DOJ
o Arbitration proceedings. The Court adopts the reasonable impression of partiality
standard. There must be a showing that a reasonable person would have to conclude that
an arbitrator was partial to the other party to the arbitration. RCBC v Banco de Oro
 o Deportation proceedings. Unlike extradition proceedings, deportation cases are harsh
and extraordinary administrative proceedings. The provisions of the Rules of Court on
criminal procedure should apply. Therefore, a hearing is essential for due process. Lao Gi v
CA
o Fixing oil price increase. In fixing oil price rates, a hearing is indispensable. But the Energy
Regulatory Board can authorize an increase provisionally without need of a hearing, subject
to the final outcome of the proceeding. As an administrative agency exercising its quasi-
legislative function, it is not bound by the strict and technical rules of evidence. Maceda v
ERB
o Dismissal of an employee. Forcing the petitioner to sign a sworn statement and attend a
hearing without the presence of a counsel is a denial of due process. The right for notice
and hearing for a valid dismissal of an employee is inviolable. The former intends to inform
the employer’s intent to dismiss and the reason thereof; while the latter affords the
employee the opportunity to answer and defend himself. Salaw v NLRC
o Forfeiture of a cargo ship. Forfeiture proceedings under tariffs and customs laws are not
criminal in nature; they are purely civil and administrative in character. Hence, the degree
of proof is substantial evidence, which can be proved by circumstantial evidence. Feeder v
CA.
Same; right to counsel. Unless required by law, the assistance of a counsel is not necessary
to satisfy the requirements of due process in non-criminal case. Id
- Note: See also Cudia v PMA under Academic Discipline.
o Political ad airtime; administrative issuances. When an administrative rule is merely
interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing further than its bare issuance for it
gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed. However,
if rule substantially increases the burden of those governed, the agency must accord, at
least to those directly affected, a chance to be heard, and to be duly informed, before the
new issuance is given the force and effect of law. In this case, the COMELEC resolution
reducing airtime for TV and radio ads must be declared invalid for being promulgated
without a public consultation. GMA Network, Inc. v COMELEC
EXCEPTIONS TO THE GENERAL RULE
Some instances where notice and hearing are not required include the cancellation of the
passport of a person sought for the commission of a crime, preventive suspension of civil
servants facing administrative charges, abatement of nuisance per se, and the arrest of person
caught in flagrante delicto.
o VAWC protection order; time is of the essence. A protection order is an order issued
to prevent further acts of violence against women and their children. Since time is of the
essence, the court may issue a temporary protection order before notice and hearing.
Garcia v Drilon
4
o Closure proceedings against banks; practical consideration. The ‘close now and hear
later’ scheme is grounded on legal considerations to prevent unwarranted dissipation of
the bank’s assets and as a valid exercise of police power. Closure proceedings against banks
do not require prior notice and hearing; it is an exception to the general rule. Central Bank
v CA
o Clamping for illegally parked cars; nuisance per se. The clamping of the petitioner’s
vehicles falls under the category of a nuisance per se. Legaspi v City of Cebu
o Overreaching fence; nuisance per accidens. Unless a thing is a nuisance per se, it may
not be abated summarily without judicial intervention. A nuisance per accidens may be so
proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. Perez v Madrona.
- Note: Concept of nuisance discussed under substantive due process.
ACADEMIC DISCIPLINE
There exist specific due process guidelines for disciplinary cases in schools due to the need
to balance the rights of students to education and the right of schools to academic freedom.
For this specific type of administrative hearing, the guidelines set in Guzman v NU, as cited by
ADMU v CA, takes precedence over the Ang Tibay guidelines. These are essential for procedural
due process in academic discipline cases.
PDP IN ACADEMIC DISCIPLINE:
1. The student must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against
them;
2. They shall have the right to counsel, if desired;
3. They shall be informed of the evidence against them;
4. They shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
5. The evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official
designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.
ACADEMIC FREEDOM
As corporate entities, institutions of higher learning are endowed with the right to establish
policies unhampered by external control. They may decide:
1. Who may teach;
2. What may be taught
3. How it shall be taught; and
4. Who may be admitted to study.
Disciplinary sanctions. The SC has always recognized the school’s power to discipline their
students and impose disciplinary sanctions on students who violate rules. The even extends
even after graduation for any done by the student prior thereto. UP BoR v CA
o Fraternity hazing; right to cross-examine. Disciplinary proceedings involving students
do not necessarily include the right to cross examination. Nor does it entail proceedings
and hearings identical to actions and proceedings in the courts. ADMU v Capulong
 o Highschool member of fraternity. The courts should only interfere when there is marked
arbitrariness with the academic judgment of the school faculty and the proper authorities.
Spouses Go v Lao
o Honor code violation; right to counsel. There is nothing in the 1987 Constitution stating
that a party in a non-litigation proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel. The
assistance of a lawyer, while desirable, is not indispensable. Cudia v PMA
VOID FOR VAGUENESS AND OVERBREADTH
Void for vagueness. A law that is utterly vague is defective because it fails to give notice of
what it commands. It is said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men ‘of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application’. For
an act to be void for being vague, it cannot be clarified by either a saving clause or by
construction. It is repugnant because:
1. It violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it,
fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and
2. It leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provision and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the government.
o Fishpen caretaker considered a manager. A perfectly vague act must be distinguished
from legislation couched in imprecise language but specifies a standard though defectively
phrased – it may be saved by proper construction. It may also be distinguished from
statutes apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities. People v
Nazario
o ‘combination’, ‘series’, ‘pattern’ not vague. The anti-plunder law is not vague. A statute
is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used therein, or
because of the employment of terms without defining them. Estrada v Sandiganbayan
o Same; facial test. The void for vagueness challenge is only applicable in testing free speech
statutes “on their faces” for a possible chilling effect. “On its face” validation is only a last
resort. To determine if a statute is unconstitutional, its provisions must be examined in the
light of the conduct with which the defendant is charged. Id
Overbreadth doctrine. The doctrine decrees that ‘a governmental purpose may not be
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected freedoms.’
o Same; chilling effect. A facial challenge is allowed to be made in vague and overbroad
statutes because of possible ‘chilling effects’ upon protected speech. Id
o Cybercrime law. The terms ‘aiding’ and ‘abetting’ constitute broad sweep that generates
chilling effect on those who express themselves through cyberspace. Hence, Section 5 of
the law punishing the acts of aiding or abetting libel on the cyberspace is a nullity. Disini v
Exec Sec
5
o Discussion on chilling effect: Simply put, instead of encouraging free speech and
expression, people may opt to restrain themselves in speaking out grievances because of
such statutes. Facial challenges do not apply to penal statutes because they prohibit
committing the acts in the first place. More on this in Section 4.
II. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS (SDP)
The heart of substantive due process is the requirement of ‘reasonableness’ or absence of
exercise of arbitrary power. For there to be a substantive due process, the following must be
met (US v Toribio):
ELEMENTS OF SDP:
1. The interests of the public, generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require such interference (lawful purpose); and
2. The means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals (lawful means).
NUISANCES
A nuisance per se affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily
abated under the undefined law of necessity.
A nuisance per accidens is, by its nature, not immediately injurious to the rights of property,
of health, or of comfort of the community. The abatement of the latter must be proven in a
hearing conducted for that purpose. Lucena Grand Terminal v Jac Liner
o Overreaching fence; summary abatement. Unless a thing is a nuisance per se, it may not
be abated summarily without judicial intervention. A nuisance per accidens may be so
proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. Perez v Madrona.
o Slaughter of carabaos for human consumption. The particular use of property may
sometimes be forbidden, where, by a change of circumstances, and without fault of the
owner, that which was once lawful is now a public nuisance. The means are reasonable
considering the purpose of the law. US v Toribio
o Confiscation of transported carabaos. Outright confiscation is not reasonably related to
the purpose which is to prevent the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos. Moreover, it is
unduly oppressive. The EO is unconstitutional. Ynot v Intermediate Appellate Court
o Prohibition of motels, hotels. The enumerated establishments are not per se offensive to
the moral welfare of the community. It is important to distinguish the punishable activities
form the establishments themselves. These establishments are recognized as legitimate
enterprises and activities. City of Manila v Laguio, Jr.
 AESTHETICS o Real estate industry; license. The new requirement of engaging the services of licensed
o Removal of nuisance billboards. Local jurisprudence does not accept the American rule real estate professionals is an unavoidable consequence of a reasonable regulatory
that aesthetic considerations are a matter of luxury and do not justify the exercise of police measure. The proper regulation of a profession, calling, business, or trade is upheld as a
power. The ordinance allowing the Collector of internal revenue to remove any sign he legitimate subject of a valid exercise of police power. Remman Enterprises v PRC
considers as nuisance is justified by prevailing morality or strong and preponderating o Radio-technologist license; right to security of tenure. The exercise of this right may be
opinion. Churchill v Rafferty reasonably regulated pursuant to police power to safeguard the general welfare of the
o Building destroys plaza view. The ordinance preventing the issuance of a building people. St Luke’s Medical Center Employees Assoc v NLRC
because it ‘destroys the view of the plaza’ is unreasonable and oppressive because it
A vested right is when the right to the enjoyment, present or prospective, has become the
operates to permanently deprive the appellants of the beneficial use of their property for
property of some particular person as present interest; mere expectancy of future benefits or
the aesthetic appearance of the community. People v Fajardo.
contingent interest in property founded on anticipated continuance of existing laws does not
- Note: Police power that acts to restrict use of property permanently is tantamount to
constitute vested right. Black’s Law Dictionary
a ‘taking’. See Section 9, on power of eminent domain.
o Harbor pilots; vested right through appointment. Their [harbor pilots] license is granted
in the form of an appointment which allows them to engage in pilotage until they retire at
ORDINANCES
the age of 70. This is a vested right. The administrative order unduly restricts their right to
TEST OF A VALID ORDINANCE (CUPPGU)
enjoy the profession before their compulsory retirement. The pre-evaluation cancellation
1. Must not Contravene the constitution or any statute;
makes it a deprivation without due process of law. Corona v UHPAP
2. Must not be Unfair or oppressive;
o GSIS pension plan; mandatory payment creates vested right. In a pension plan where
3. Must not be Partial or discriminatory
employee participation is mandatory, employees have contractual or vested rights in the
4. Must not Prohibit but may regulate;
pension. When the employee retires and meets the eligibility requirements, he acquires a
5. Must be General and consistent with public policy; and
vested right that is protected by the due process clause. GSIS v Montescarlos
6. Must not be Unreasonable.
o Military pension; gratuity no vested right. Petitioner’s retirement benefits were only
o Cinema discount for children; no lawful purpose. The ordinance prescribing a discount future benefits and do not constitute a vested right. Before a right to retirement or pension
to children has no discernible relation to the promotion of public health, safety, morals, benefits vests in an employee, he must have met the stated conditions of eligibility. Further,
and the general welfare. There is a lack of lawful purpose. Balacuit v CFI retirement benefits of military personnel are purely gratuitous in nature. Parreno v COA
o Ordinance banning legal gambling, violation of #1. Gambling is not illegal per se. An
VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER
ordinance banning such should comply with the test of a valid ordinance. In this case, it
o Car impounded because husband fucks prostitute. An owner’s interest in property may
does not pass the test. Magtajas v Pryce Properties
be forfeited reason of the use to which the property is put even though the owner did not
o Ordinance banning bus terminals in Lucena. Whether an ordinance is effective is an issue
know that it was to put to such use. Forfeiture of property prevents illegal uses by
different from whether it is reasonably necessary. It is its reasonableness, not its
preventing further illicit use and by imposing an economic penalty. The means are
effectiveness, which bears upon its constitutionality. While there exists a lawful purpose in
reasonable, considering its purpose of banning public indecency. Bennis v Michigan
abating traffic, there are less oppressive means in achieving this purpose. Lucena Grand
o Right to bear arms not a right. The right to bear arms is merely a statutory privilege. A
Terminal v Jac Liner. Also see MMDA v Viron
license to carry one does not grant a property or property right, nor does it create a vested
PROPERTY RIGHTS right. Even assuming arguendo that it does, the license is not beyond the State’s police
The proper regulation of a profession, calling, or business is a legitimate subject of a valid power. The regulation is reasonable. Chavez v Romulo
exercise of police power, particularly when it affects execution of governmental function, o MMDA closing bus terminals along EDSA. Closure of bus terminals along EDSA cannot
preservation of the state, or public health and welfare and public morals. Exec Sec v CA be considered a reasonable necessity to ease traffic congestion in the metropolis. Even
o Harbor pilots; license. Public office is not property but a public trust or agency. However, then, MMDA does not have the authority to exercise police power. MMDA v Viron
it is still covered by due process to protect the security of tenure. The licenses granted to o Taking down a candidate’s endorsement billboards. The prohibition of premature
harbor pilots already constitute vested rights. Corona v UHPAP campaign propaganda has a lawful purpose. The means employed do not suffer from

6
 overbreadth because the provision is limited in time and scope. Lastly, there is no violation JUS TERTII (3RD PARTY RIGHTS)
of the non-impairment clause. Chavez v COMELEC 1. Litigant must have suffered an injury-in-fact;
- Comment: Applies several concepts (Sections 1,4, and 10) in a single situation. Good 2. Litigant must have a close relation to the third party; and
review for “solve all issues” type of problems. 3. There exists some hindrance to the third-party’s ability to protect his or her own interests.

CASE BREAKDOWN: MOTEL TRILOGY ❖ Discussion: The White Light Corporation v City of Manila case is important because the
The three cases all involved various ordinances regulating the various motels located in Malate, litigants were able to successfully invoke jus tertii standing. If they only invoked their
Manila. Of the three, only the first ordinance was held to be constitutional by the SC; the rest standing as business owners, only their property rights would have been injured; hence,
were invalidated. the test to be used is the rational basis test. The rational basis test only requires legitimate
- Comment: The second case is good review as it tackles numerous guarantees of the Bill of State interest and rationally-related means employed. But since their customers’ right
Rights. The last case is notable for providing the tests of validity of SDP grounds. to liberty is at stake, the strict scrutiny test was used, which requires compelling state
interest and absence of less restrictive means. It then became harder for the State to
o Log-in required for motels. Unless the ordinance is void on its face, the necessity for
justify the regulation. In the end, the ordinance was struck down as unconstitutional.
evidence to rebut its validity is unavoidable. In the case at bar, there being no factual
❖ Comparison of the Ermita-Malate case and White Light case. A comparison of these
foundation laid for overthrowing the statute, the presumption of constitutionality must
two cases illustrates the preceding discussion. In the former case, the petitioners had the
prevail. Ermita-Malate v City of Manila
burden of producing evidence to support their position. As they were unable to, the
TESTS OF VALIDITY ON SDP GROUNDS ordinance was held to be valid. On the other hand, in the latter case, by invoking jus tertii,
SDP asks whether the State has an adequate reason for taking away a person’s life, liberty, or the burden shifted to the State to prove that it had compelling state interest and there
property. The justification depends on the nature of the right taken. were no less restrictive means. It failed to do so, hence, success for the petitioners.
LEVEL OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
TEST TYPE OF RIGHT MEANS EMPLOYED
INTEREST
o Comatose patient; right to self-determination, right to refuse treatment. The doctrine
Fundamental rights (e.g. Speech, Absence of less restrictive
Strict
expression, religion, etc.)
Compelling
means/narrowly drawn
of informed consent implies the right to refuse treatment. In cases where the person is
Classification of suspect class (e.g. incompetent (vegetative, in this case), a legal guardian may substitute his decision upon
Intermediate Substantial Availability of less restrictive means
gender, race) presenting ‘clear and convincing’ evidence in a trial that the incompetent wished to refuse
Rational
Equal protection cases, classification Legitimate Rationally-related treatment. Cruzan v Dir of Health, Missouri
basis
o ID system; right to privacy. The right does not bar the adoption of reasonable ID systems.
o Ban on motels and the like. The prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not In this case, the disclosure requirements are benign and routinely collected. Petitioners also
per se protect and promote social and moral welfare of the community. Furthermore, these failed to provide factual foundation showing how their right was violated. Kilusang Mayo
establishments are lawful pursuits which are not per se offensive to public morals. City of Uno v Director-General NEDA
Manila v Laguio o Motorcycle ban in highways; right to travel. The right does not mean the right to choose
- Note: The case also covers eminent domain, EPC, test for valid ordinance, and any vehicle (motorcycles) in traversing a toll way. Public interest and safety require the
nuisances. See Section 9 for eminent domain discussion. imposition of certain restrictions that do not apply to ordinary roads. Mirasol v DPWH
o Distinguishing the ordinances in the Ermita-Malate case and City of Manila case. The o Radio-technologist license; right to security of tenure. The exercise of this right may be
former regulated the mode in which motels may conduct business in order to put an end reasonably regulated pursuant to police power to safeguard the general welfare of the
to practices which may encourage vice and morality. The latter is not a regulatory measure people. St Luke’s Medical Center Employees Assoc v NLRC
but is an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit. Even in the exercise of police power,
WRIT OF AMPARO
an ordinance must not prohibit (See Test of a valid ordinance, #4) City of Manila v Laguio
The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty, and security
o Infringement of customers’ right to privacy, washed-up rates. Litigants may bring
is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of
actions on behalf of third-party litigants, provided the following criteria are met (White a private individual or entity.
Light Corporation v City of Manila): The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.

7
The Amparo rule was intended to address the problem of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances. Extralegal killings are killings committed without due process of law.
Enforced disappearances are attended by the following elements:
ELEMENTS OF ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCE
1. There be an arrest, detention, abduction, or any form of deprivation of liberty;
2. It be carried out by, or with the authorization, support, or acquiescence of the State or
political organization;
3. It be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or give
information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and
4. The intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the law
for a prolonged period of time.
It is both preventive and curative: preventive, in that it breaks the expectation of impunity; and
curative, in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators. Quantum of evidence
required to successfully acquire the writ is substantial evidence.
o Manalos abduction; right to security. The right to security of person includes the
following: (1) freedom from threat; (2) a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or
security; and (3) a guarantee of protection of one’s rights by the government. Sec of DND
v Manalo
o Girl got tortured but no proof; parties to be impleaded. Impleading public respondents
on the ground of command responsibility is incorrect – the proper ground is responsibility
or accountability. Roxas v GMA
o Child given up for adoption; wrong use of writ. The writ is only confined to the case of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, with the concurrence of the
abovementioned elements. Caram v Segui
o Communist list; actual threat. The writ is sought individually and granted individually.
Furthermore, there must be actual threats. There is no evidence of such in the cases of each
petitioner. Zarate v Aquino III
WRIT OF HABEAS DATA
The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty, or security
is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or of a private
individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting, or storing of data or information regarding the
person, family, home, and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
See extensive discussion under Section 4.
o Meralco girl demands report; actual or threatened violation. It is an indispensable
requirement that there must be a showing, by at least substantial evidence, of an actual or
threatened violation of respondent’s right to privacy vis-à-vis the right to life, liberty, or
security. Meralco v Lim, Roxas v GMA
8
o Communist list; legal standing. The rule presupposes that the aggrieved party is still alive.
Hence, the heirs of Crispin Beltran do not have the legal standing to file the petition. Zarate
v Aquino III
III. EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE (EPC)
Nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws
The clause guarantees ‘legal equality or the equality of all persons before the law.’ It does not
prohibit classification, but the classification must be reasonable. It must meet the following
requisites:
REQUISITES OF A VALID CLASSIFICATION:
1. Must rest on substantial distinctions;
2. Must be germane to the purpose of the law;
3. Must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
4. Must apply equally to all members of the same class.
Essential consideration: In the absence of government interference, the liberties guaranteed
by the Constitution cannot be invoked. The Bill of Rights is not meant to be invoked against
acts of private individuals. Private actions, no matter how egregious, cannot violate the equal
protection guarantee. Yrasuegi v PAL
o Fat flight attendant. Employment in particular jobs may not be limited to persons of a
particular sex, religion, or other classification unless the employer can show that sex,
religion, or such classification is an actual qualification for performing the job. This is called
the Bona Fide Occupational Qualification. In this case, maintaining the prescribed weight
counts as a continuing qualification for flight attendants. Id
VALID CLASSIFICATIONS
Classifications in law is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree
with one another in certain particulars. Victoriano v Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union
o Cityhood laws. The 16 municipalities were substantially distinct for prior to the passage of
the law amending the income requirement, said municipalities have already met the P20 M
requirement, and had a bill pending before Congress. The exemption was germane because
it was meant to eliminate the inequality suffered by the 16 municipalities, since their
respective bills were not acted upon due extraneous circumstances. The exemption is not
limited to existing conditions for it is intended to apply as long as a cityhood bill has been
passed prior to the enactment of the amending law. Lastly, the exemption applies to all
municipalities with pending cityhood bills prior to the enactment of the amending law and
were compliant with the requirements under the LGC. League of Cities v COMELEC
o Fair Election law; appointive officials different from elective officials. The classification
is valid because appointive and elective officials do not belong to the same class. Elected
officials, by the very nature of their office, engage in partisan political activities all year
round, whereas appointive officials are not allowed to participate in such. Also, the former
is voted by the electorate; the latter is only designated by some authority. Quinto v
COMELEC
o Marital rape and statutory rape. No persons or class of persons shall be denied the same
protection of laws, which is enjoyed, by other persons or other classes in like circumstances.
The law affords protection to women raped by their husband and those raped by any other
man alike. People v Jumawan
o 5-year qualification requirement for judge. If a law neither burdens a fundamental right
nor targets a suspect class, the classification stands as long as it bears a rational relationship
to some legitimate government end. A five-year stint in the judiciary provides evidence of
the integrity, probity, and independence of judges seeking promotion. Villanueva v. JBC
o Public order laws, anti-vagrancy. Art 202 (2) does not violate the equal protection clause
and neither does it discriminate against the poor and the unemployed because offenders
of public order laws are punished not because of their status but for conducting themselves
under such circumstances as to endanger the public peace or cause alarm and
apprehension in the community. Being poor or unemployed is not a license or justification
to act indecently or to engage in immoral conduct. People v Siton
- Note: Vagrancy has already been decriminalized.
o Socialized Housing Tax. It is inherent in the power to tax that a state is free to select the
subjects of taxation. Inequities which results from a singling out of one particular class for
taxation or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation. Ferrer v City Mayor
NO SUBSTANTIAL DISTINCTIONS
o Garbage collection fee. For the purpose of garbage collection, there is no substantial
distinction between an occupant of a lot, and an occupant of a unit in a condo or socialized
housing project. Ferrer v City Mayor
o Tax collected on aliens in Manila. It is imperative that the classification should be based
on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the
particular legislation. In this case, it fails to consider valid substantial differences in situation
among individual aliens. Villegas v Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao
o BSP employees’s salaries. While the purpose of legislation may support the difference in
treatment between the rank-and-file and the officers of BSP, it does not for the inequality
between BSP rank-and-file and other GFIs’ who are similarly situated. They should all be
considered under the same classification. But they are not. BSP employees are
discriminated against. Central Bank Employees Assoc v Bangko Sentral
9
o Prohibition of election propaganda in PUVs and public terminals. If owners of private
vehicles and properties are allowed to express their political ideas and opinion on their
properties, there is no cogent reason to deny the same preferred right to owners of PUVs
and public terminals. Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification. 1-Utak v
COMELEC
NOT GERMANE TO THE PURPOSE OF THE LAW
o Prohibition of election propaganda in PUVs and public terminals. The COMELEC’s
power only extends to the franchise or permit to operate of transportation utilities, not to
the ownership of such, for the purpose of ensuring fair elections. Since the expression of
ideas or opinions are acts of ownership, COMELEC has no power to regulate such. 1-Utak
v COMELEC
o Garbage collection fees. The classification between housing types does not have a cogent
relation to the ‘promotion of shared responsibility with the residents to attack mindless
attitude in over-consuming and in generating waste’. Ferrer v City Mayor
LIMITED TO EXISTING CONDITIONS ONLY
o Tax imposed on Ormoc Sugar Company. The tax only applies to the Ormoc Sugar
Company. It should be applicable to future conditions as well. As it is now, even if later a
similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax. The classification is unreasonable.
Ormoc Sugar Company v Treasurer of Ormoc City
DOES NOT APPLY EQUALLY TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE SAME CLASS
o BSP employees’s salaries. Legal history shows that GFIs have long been recognized as
comprising one distinct class, separate from other governmental entities. The disparate
treatment of BSP rank-and-file from other GFIs cannot stand judicial scrutiny. Central Bank
Employees Assoc v Bangko Sentral
RELATIVE CONSTITUTIONALITY
A provision of law, initially valid, becomes subsequently unconstitutional, on the ground that its continued
operation would violate the equal protection of the law.
The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be determined by a mere
comparison of its provisions with applicable provisions of the Constitution, since the statute
may be constitutionally valid as applied to one set of facts and invalid in its application to
another. Central Bank Employees Assoc v Bangko Sentral
o Moratorium law. The enactment and operation of the moratorium law is a valid exercise
by the State of its police power but the continued enforcement of the otherwise valid law
would be unreasonable and oppressive. Its continued operation would be grossly
discriminatory and lead to the oppression of creditors. Rutter v Esteban
o BSP employees’s salaries. A statute valid when enacted may become invalid by change in
the conditions to which it is applied. Even if the statute is not discriminatory on its face, it
may be in its operation. The subsequent creation of seven other government financial
institutions (GFI) made the policy discriminatory against the BSP employees. Central Bank
Employees Assoc v Bangko Sentral

10
 SECTION 2
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
SECTION SUMMARY:
The Section discusses the concepts of unreasonable searches and seizures, requirements of
a valid warrant, warrantless searches and seizures, and warrantless arrests.
Generally, searches and seizures without warrant are unreasonable (See Kind of Search
and Seizure Prohibited). Warrantless searches and seizures are only allowed for
reasonable searches and selected situations established in jurisprudence (See Reasonable
Search and Allowable Warrantless Search).
The landmark case for the issuance of a warrant is the Stonehill v Diokno case. A valid
warrant must be issued at probable cause determined personally by a judge who examines
the complainant and witnesses whose knowledge of the facts are personal. Lastly, the
warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and the person to be seized
(Test of a Valid Warrant).
Probable cause is determined by a judge. There must be probable cause for no more than
one specific offense.
The next requisite depends on what warrant shall issue (See Determined Personally). For
a search warrant, personal examination is necessary; whereas for an arrest warrant, personal
determination is enough.
Particular description of a place is sufficient if the officer can, with reasonable effort,
identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the area.
For an object, the warrant does not require a technical precision, such as its weight or
amount, particularly where the description must be general.
For a person, the person must be named. John Doe warrants are generally illegal, unless a
descriptio personae is provided.
Allowable warrantless searches and seizures are as follows: search incidental to a lawful
arrest, seizure of evidence in plain view, search of a moving vehicle, consented warrantless
search, customs search, and stop-and-frisk situations.
11
Allowable warrantless arrests are limited to crimes committed in flagrante delicto, arrest
in hot pursuit, and arrest of escapees. In flagrante delicto arrests, the accused has just
committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense in the presence or view of the
arresting officer. In hot pursuit arrest, an offense had just been committed and there is
reasonable ground that the person to be detained is the perpetrator of the offense.
Whatever was obtained by virtue of an invalid search warrant or illegal warrantless search is
inadmissible as evidence (See Exclusionary Rule; read with Section 4, Right to Privacy).
A person arrested by virtue of an invalid arrest warrant or through an illegal warrantless
arrest must be released.
Purpose. To protect the privacy and the sanctity of the person and of his house and other
possessions against arbitrary intrusion by state officers. It is aimed at preventing violations
of private security in person and property, and unlawful invasions of the sanctity of home by
officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction and to give remedy against such
usurpation.
o Marijuana in packages; acts committed by private persons. The packages containing
dried marijuana leaves were opened by the business proprietors as part of standard
operation procedure, and not by government agents. Mere presence of NBI agents did not
convert the reasonable search by the proprietor into a warrantless search and seizure.
Hence, in the absence of governmental interference, the right against unreasonable search
and seizure cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it
within the ambit of lawful intrusion by the government. People v. Marti
KIND OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE PROHIBITED
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable…
Unreasonable searches. The provision does not prohibit all kinds of searches and seizures – it
only prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. Normally, unless authorized by a valid
warrant, searches and seizures are considered unreasonable. There is no presumption of
regularity in a search and seizure.
o Mandatory drug testing; reasonableness. The right to privacy yields to certain
paramount rights of the public and defers to the state’s exercise of police power.
‘Reasonableness’ is the touchstone of the validity of a government search or intrusion. The
standard is judged by the balancing of the government-mandated intrusion on the
individual’s privacy interest against the promotion of some compelling state interest. Social
Justice Society v Dangerous Drugs Board
o Same; reasonable search; employees’ reduced expectation of privacy. The drug-testing
policy for employees is in the nature of an administrative search wherein the probable
 cause standard is not required or even practicable. The statute was held to be constitutional
because the reduced expectation of privacy on the part of employees, the compelling state
concern likely to be met by the search, and the well-defined limits set in the law. Id
o Same; unreasonable search; persons accused of crimes. However, there is no valid
justification for the mandatory drug testing of persons accused of crimes. In their case, the
testing is neither random nor suspicionless. Not only does this violate their right to privacy
under Art III, Sec 2, but the accused are forced to incriminate themselves in violation of Art
III, Section 19. Id
▪ Checkpoints. Checkpoints are not illegal per se. Checkpoints may be allowed and installed
by the government. Routine inspection and a few questions do not constitute unreasonable
searches. If the inspection becomes more thorough to the extent of becoming a search,
this can be done when there is deemed to be probably cause. Valmonte v General de Villa
“…Of whatever nature and for whatever purpose.” The phrase effectively extends the search
and seizure clause to at least two areas: sub poena duces tecum under Rule 27 of the Rules of
Court and building inspection by administrative officers. Primer
o Rules of Court, production of documents. The court may order any party to produce and
permit the inspection and copying of any designated documents, papers, etc., not
privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the
action which are in his possession, custody, or control (Rule 27, Rules of Civil Procedure).
The trial court has power and jurisdiction to issue the order for the production and
inspection of the books in virtue of the constitutional guarantee making an express
exception in favor of the disclosure of communication and correspondence upon lawful
order of a court of justice. Material Distributors v Natividad.
o Building inspection. The appellant was convicted for refusing to let inspectors enter the
premises who demanded entry on the grounds of a possible violation of the city’s Housing
code. The SC held that administrative searches at issue are significant intrusions protected
by the Fourth Amendment, that such searches without warrant lack safeguards which the
Amendment guarantees the individual. The standard for such a search is reasonableness,
and since there is no emergency in this situation, the appellant had a right to insist that the
inspectors obtain a search warrant. Camara v Municipal Court
Examination of bank deposits. Governed by the secrecy of bank deposits law (RA 1405). In
general, examination is prohibited except on the following grounds (Primer):
1. Where the depositor consents in writing;
2. Impeachment case;
3. By court order in bribery or dereliction of duty cases against public officials;
4. Deposit is the subject of litigation; and
5. Sec 8, RA 3019, referring to cases of unexplained wealth. Marquez v Desierto
12
CASE BREAKDOWN: STONEHILL V DIOKNO
Petitioners contest the validity of 42 search warrants issued against the petitioners and
corporations of which they were officers. Books of accounts, financial records, and other
documents showing business transactions were seized for violation of ‘Central Bank Laws, Tariff
and Custom Laws, Internal Revenue Code, and the Revised Penal Code.
Corporations have their own legal personality. The petitioners have no cause of action to
assail the legality of the search warrants and seizures made in the offices of their corporations
for the simple reason that corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct
from those of the petitioners. The legality of the seizure can be contested only by the party
whose rights have been impaired, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is
purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties.
Warrants must be issued upon probable cause. The warrants were not issued based upon
probable cause. The same were issued based on violations of various laws but no specific offense
had been alleged. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants
to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of
competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or
committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. The Court had
even amended the Rules of Court so that ‘no search warrant shall issue for more than one
specific offense.’
General warrants. The warrants issued were illegal for authorizing the search for and seizure of
records pertaining to all business transactions of petitioners, regardless of whether the
transactions were legal or illegal. A general warrant violates the constitutional requirement that
the things to be seized be particularly described.
Effect of illegal searches and seizures. The exclusionary principle finds application. Any
evidence obtained in violation of this section shall be deemed inadmissible as evidence for any
purpose in any proceeding. Art III, Section 3(2)
REQUISITES OF A VALID WARRANT
A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the constitutional and statutory
provisions under which it is issued. Otherwise, it is void. The warrant will always be construed
strictly without going the full length of requiring technical accuracy. No presumptions of
regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify under it.
People v Veloso
1. It must be issued upon probable cause;
2. Probable cause must be determined personally by a judge;
3. Such judge must examine under oath or affirmation the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce; and
 4. The warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and the person or things
to be seized.
5. Additional: The applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them.
People v Francisco
PROBABLE CAUSE
… no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause…
Probable cause means such facts and circumstances antecedent to the issuance of a warrant
that are in themselves sufficient to induce a cautious man to rely upon them.
o Warrants must be issued upon probable cause. The warrants were not issued based
upon probable cause. The Court had even amended the Rules of Court so that ‘no search
warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.’ Stonehill v Diokno
o Relying on stenographer’s notes. The determination of whether or not a probable cause
exists calls for the exercise of judgment after a judicial appraisal of facts and should not be
allowed to be delegated in the absence of any rule to the contrary. By relying solely on the
stenographer’s notes, the judge failed to personally examine the complainant and his
witness. Bache & Co. v Ruiz
o Same; multiple violations of the Tax code. The search was issued for more than one
specific offense. It was issued for at least four distinct offenses under the tax code. Id
▪ Probable cause as a quantum of evidence. Probable cause is concerned with probability,
not absolute or even moral certainty. The prosecution need not present at this stage proof
beyond reasonable doubt. The standards of judgment are those of a reasonably prudent
man, not the exacting calibrations of a judge after a full-blown trial. Microsoft Corporation
v Maxicorp
▪ Note: A warrant and finding of probable cause are unnecessary in a public-school context
because such requirements would unduly interfere with the maintenance of swift and
informal disciplinary procedures that are needed. Greenbook
Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest means such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that the offense has been
committed by the person sought to be arrested.
Probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant means such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that the offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought
to be searched.
WHO DETERMINES PROBABLE CAUSE
A judge, for the purpose of issuing a warrant.
A fiscal, for the purpose of filing an information.
13
▪ Commissioner on Immigration cannot issue a warrant of arrest, but he may order the arrest
of an alien pursuant to a deportation order that has already become final. Qua Chee Gan v
Deportation Board
▪ The PCGG may not issue a search and seizure order which has all the features of a search
warrant because only a judge may issue a search warrant. Republic v Sandiganbayan
DETERMINED PERSONALLY
…determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce…
The accurate interpretation of this provision is that the exclusive and personal responsibility of
the issuing judge is to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. However, the role
varies depending on what warrant is to be issued.
Warrant of arrest. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of
a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and
his witnesses. Sound policy dictates this procedure to prevent judges from being unduly laden
with preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints. Soliven v Makasiar
(1998)
RULES OF COURT
Circular No. 12, Series of 1987
1. The judge shall personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal
regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, make a personal determination of
the existence of probable cause; or
2. If he is not satisfied that probable cause exists, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the
submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence
of probable cause.
o Assassination of Masbate congressman. The determination of probable cause is a
function of the judge. The preliminary inquiry made by a prosecutor does not bind the
judge. By itself the Prosecutor’s certification of probable cause is ineffectual. It is the report,
the affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes, and all other supporting documents
behind the certification which are material in assisting the judge to make his determination.
Lim, Sr. v Judge Felix
o Same. If a judge relies solely on the certification of the prosecutor as is in this case where
all the records of the investigation are in Masbate, he or she has not yet personally
determined probable cause. The determination is made by the provincial prosecutor. The
judge commits a grave abuse of discretion by issuing a warrant of arrest. Id
Search warrant. The implementing rule in Revised Rules of Court, Sec 4, Rule 126, is more
emphatic and candid, for it requires the judge, before issuing a search warrant, to ‘personally
examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce.’ Bache &
Co. v Ruiz
o Stenographer’s notes; relying solely on the notes insufficient. The determination of
whether or not a probable cause exists calls for the exercise of judgment after a judicial
A search warrant may be said to particularly describe he things to be seized when:
appraisal of facts and should not be allowed to be delegated in the absence of any rule to
the contrary. By relying solely on the stenographer’s notes, the judge failed to personally
examine the complainant and his witness. Id
o Illegal possession of firearms; complainant’s deposition. The respondent judge did not
take the applicant’s deposition on the basis that the applicant relied on the information
provided by the witnesses whose deposition had already been taken. In other words, the
applicant was asking for the issuance of a search warrant on the basis of mere hearsay and
not of information personally known to him. His application, standing alone, was
insufficient to justify the issuance of the warrant. Roan v Gonzales
o Illegal possession of firearms: Probing examination. The examination must be probing
and exhaustive, not merely routinary or pro-forma, if the claimed probable cause is to be
established. The examining magistrate must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit
but must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the application. Id
PARTICULARITY OF DESCRIPTION
…particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Particular description. The evil sought to be remedied by the provision is that of general
warrants.
o General warrants. The warrants were illegal for authorizing the search for and seizure of
records pertaining to all business transactions of petitioners, regardless of whether the
transactions were legal or illegal. A general warrant violates the constitutional requirement
that the things to be seized be particularly described. Stonehill v Diokno
o Central bank law; general warrant pertaining to general pattern of business. The
warrant authorized the search and seizure of books, accounting records, and other
documents and articles which are being used in unauthorized banking activities. However,
the search and seizure was not unreasonable because the transactions objected to by the
A descriptio personae must be a description that sufficiently:
bank constitute the general pattern of the business of the organization, which the General
Banking Act expressly prohibits. Central Bank v Morfe
❖ Stonehill and Central Bank case, distinguished. The former failed to specify what specific
violations of the laws the petitioners therein committed whereas the latter specifically
pointed to a violation of the statute. Moreover, it is the general pattern of the business that
14
was a violation of the law, not that of isolated transactions distinct and detached from the
type of business the organization was engaged in. Hence, a search and seizure of all
documents pertaining to business transactions is justified.
TEST FOR PARTICULARITY
Bache & Co. v Ruiz
1. The description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow;
2. When the description expresses a conclusion of fact – not of law – by which the warrant
officer may be guided in making the search and seizure; and
3. When the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense
for which the warrant is being issued.
o Stenographer’s notes case; invalid warrant. The warrant does not conform to the
foregoing tests. If the articles desired to be seized have any direct relation to the offense
committed, the applicant must necessarily have some evidence, other than those articles,
to prove the said offense; and the articles subject of search and seizure should come in
handy merely to strengthen the evidence. Id
o Wrong house address; identification. The rule is that a description of a place to be
searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain
and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. Any
designation or description known to the locality that leads the officer unerringly to it
satisfies the constitutional requirement. In this case, the police officer serving the warrant
failed to correctly identify the house to be searched because of the wrong description in
the warrant. People v Francisco
o John Doe search warrant. A warrant for the apprehension of an unnamed party or a ‘John
Doe’ is void, except in those cases where it contains a desriptio personae such as will enable
the officer to identify the accused. People v Veloso
o Same; exception, not rule. John Doe search warrants should be the exception and not the
rule. The police should particularly describe the place to be searched or things to be seized,
wherever and whenever feasible. Id
DESCRIPTIO PERSONAE
1. Indicates clearly the proper person upon whom the warrant is to be served;
2. States his personal appearance and peculiarities;
3. Gives his occupation and place of residence; and
4. Gives any other circumstances by means of which he can be identified.
 ▪ Undetermined amount of marijuana; technical description. The description is (when bulge on his waist caught the attention of the searching officer), taken as a whole,
permissible. It is not required that technical precision of description be required, particularly gave rise to probable cause that justified the warrantless search. People v Malmstedt
where, by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description must be rather general.
TEST
People v Tee
1. The item to be searched was within the custody or area of immediate control of the person
▪ Mistake in the identification of the owner. Such mistake does not invalidate the warrant
arrested. United States v Tarazon
provided that the place is properly described. Frank Uy v BIR
2. The search was contemporaneous with the arrest. Shipley v California, Padilla v CA

ALLOWABLE WARRANTLESS SEARCHES
Reasonable search. The constitutional prohibition does not apply when the search is
reasonable. It must conform to the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy test (See Art III, Sec
4), i.e., a person exhibits an actual expectation of privacy and the expectation is one that society
is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Example of reasonable searches are airport searches
(See People v Canton), seaport searches, bus searches, and even in private property accessible
to the public such as malls or hotels. Saluday v People
Case-to-case basis. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable
are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to
be resolved according to the facts of each case. Valmonte v de Villa
Reasonable search and warrantless search, distinguished. While both state intrusions are
valid even without a warrant, the underlying reasons for the absence of such is different. The
former arises from a reduced expectation of privacy. In contrast, the latter is presumed to be
an unreasonable search, but for reasons of practicality, a search can be dispensed with. Id
Probable cause requirement. For a warrantless search and seizure to be valid, there must be
a probable cause. The only exception is a stop and frisk search, but such search must still be
reasonable.
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as a proof of the
commission of an offense without a search warrant. Section 12, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.
o Seizure of boy scout uniforms; sufficient time. Evidence did not justify the warrantless
search and seizure. Despite the sufficiency of time, they did not apply for a warrant and
seized the goods of private respondents. The search and seizure was clearly illegal; there
was no probable cause. MHP Garments Inc. v CA
o Hashish from Sagada; insufficient time. The receipt of information that a Caucasian
coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession hours before his apprehension
(insufficient time to obtain warrant), plus the suspicious failure to produce his passport
o Cardinal drug buy bust; immediate control. The defense’s argument that the shabu
inside the car is inadmissible because the accused was arrested outside the car has no merit.
The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to lawful arrest, may extend beyond the
person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate
control. People v Ang Chung Kit (Section 12 case)
2. Seizure of evidence in plain view.
o Illegal possession of firearms; malum prohibitum. The Colt Magnum revolver seized was
not included in the list of articles included in the warrant. It does not follow that because
an offense is malum prohibitum, the subject is necessarily illegal per se. The subjects of this
kind of offense may not be summarily seized simply because they are prohibited. Prohibited
articles may be seized but only as long as the search is valid. Roan v Gonzales
REQUISITES
a. Prior valid intrusion into a place;
b. Evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who
had the right to be where they are;
c. The illegality of the evidence must be readily apparent; and
d. Illegality of evidence is noticed without further search.
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Searches and seizures without warrant are valid if made upon
probable cause that an automobile or other vehicle contains that which by law is subject to
seizure and destruction. It is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. People
v CFI
o Blue dodge car smuggling watches. He [customs officer] has the power to open and
examine any box or other container wherever found when he has reasonable cause to
suspect the presence of dutiable or prohibited articles introduced into the Philippines
contrary to law, and likewise to stop, search, and examine any vehicle or person reasonably
suspected of holding or conveying such articles. Id
o Gun ban; checkpoints. Search conducted at police or military checkpoints are not illegal
per se, provided that the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body

15
 search, and the inspection of the vehicle is merely limited to a visual search. An extensive
search without warrant could only be resorted to if the officers conducting the search had
reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that either the motorist was a
law offender or that they would find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to the
commission of a crime in the vehicle to be searched. Aniag, Jr. v COMELEC
o Same; search of moving vehicles. Stop-and-search without warrant conducted by police
officers on the basis of prior confidential information which were reasonably corroborated
by other attendant matters are valid. Id
- Note: See People v Malmstedt, where the information given to the police was
corroborated by the conspicuous bulge in the accused’s waistline and his suspicious
failure to produce his passport and other identification papers.
o Movie star selling drugs; urgency of search. The petitioner was already identified as an
alleged shabu dealer. He was also reportedly using different cars in going to and from the
area. Lastly, there was probable cause as the same police officers had a previous encounter
with the petitioner. Thus, when the former sighted the car as indicated by their informant,
they obviously no longer had the time to apply for a search warrant. The dictates of urgency
necessitated the flagging of the vehicle. Asuncion v CA
- Note: Petitioner in the case sought for the application of the ruling in Aminnudin (See
discussion under Stop and Frisk). While both involved a moving vehicle, said ruling
cannot be applied because, in the Aminnudin case, there was no urgency. The officers
therein could have acquired a warrant at least two days before the arrival in the port.
GUIDELINES FOR BUS SEARCH
Prior to entry, passengers and their bags and luggages can be subjected to a routine
inspection. While in transit, a bus can still be searched in three instances: (a) Upon receipt of
information that a passenger carries contraband or illegal articles (See People v Malmstedt); (b)
whenever a bus picks up passengers en route; and (c) when flagged down at military or police
checkpoints. Saluday v People
For both cases stated above, the following conditions must be satisfied to qualify as a valid
reasonable search:
1. The search must be least intrusive and must uphold the dignity of the person being
searched, minimizing, if not eradicating, any cause for public embarrassment, humiliation,
or ridicule.
2. Neither can the search result from any discriminatory motive such as insidious profiling,
stereotyping, and other similar motives.
3. The purpose of the search must be confined to ensuring public safety.
4. As to the evidence seized from the reasonable search, courts must be convinced that
precautionary measures were in place to ensure that no evidence was planted against
accused.
16
o Bus search. The guideline also applies to any moving vehicle that similarly accepts
passengers at a terminal and along its route. However, it does apply to privately-owned
cars or for moving vehicles dedicated to private or personal use which are hired a passenger
such that the vehicle can no longer be flagged down by any person until the passengers
on board alight from the vehicle. An example of the latter are taxis. Id
4. Consented warrantless search.
o Bus search. The constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches is a personal right,
which may be waived. But the consent must be voluntary such that it us unequivocal,
specific, and intelligently given uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. In this case, the
petitioner’s answer of “yes, just open it” constitutes a clear consent by petitioner for the
search of his bag. Id
VALID WAIVER OF A RIGHT
1. The right exists;
2. The person involved had actual or constructive knowledge of the existence of such right;
3. The person had actual intention to relinquish such right.
o Search allowed by maid; waiver of rights personal in nature. The constitutional
immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right that cannot be
waived by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded or who is expressly
authorized to do so in his or her behalf. In this case, the accused was absent during the
search and there was no showing that the helper had the authority to open the house in
his absence. People v. Damaso
o Illegal search and seizure; scope of consented search. The consent of Veroy only
extended as to ascertain the presence of alleged rebel soldiers, not the room to room
search of the house. The items taken were products of an illegal search and are therefore
inadmissible as evidence. Spouses Veroy v. Layagu
VOLUNTARINESS OF A CONSENT
1. Age of consenting party;
2. Whether he was in a public or secluded location;
3. Whether he or she objected to the search or passively looked on;
4. Education and intelligence;
5. Presence of coercive police procedures;
6. Belief that no incriminating evidence will be found;
7. Nature of the police questioning;
8. Environment in which the questioning took place; and
9. Possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting.
5. Customs search and seizure of goods. The authority of persons duly commissioned to
enforce tariff and customs laws is quite exceptional when it pertains to the domain of
searches and seizures of goods suspected to have been introduced in the country in violation
of custom laws. People v CFI
o Blue dodge car smuggling watches. He has the power to open and examine any box or
other container wherever found when he has reasonable cause to suspect the presence of
dutiable or prohibited articles introduced into the Philippines contrary to law, and likewise
to stop, search, and examine any vehicle or person reasonably suspected of holding or
conveying such articles. Id
6. Stop and frisk situations. A police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an
appropriate manner approach a person for the purpose of investigating possible criminal
behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest. Terry v Ohio
REQUISITES
1. Where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him to reasonably believe
that the person with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous;
2. Where in the course of investigation he identifies himself as a policeman and makes
reasonable inquiries; and
3. Where nothing in the initial stages of encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his
own or others’ safety.
o Buri bag. The petitioner was carrying a buri bag and acting suspiciously when he was
apprehended by the police. When officers checked the bag, it contained a revolver,
ammunition, and a tear gas. The search and seizure may be justified as akin to a ‘stop and
frisk’ whose object is either to determine the identity of a suspicious individual or to
maintain the status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more
information. Posadas v CA
Search incidental to a lawful arrest and stop and frisk, distinguished as to scope of search.
In the former, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made –
the process cannot be reversed. Assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search the
person of the arrestee and the area, and seize any money or property found which was used in
the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which may be used as evidence
or which might furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or committing violence.
The latter entitles the police officer, for the protection of himself and others, to conduct a
carefully limited search of the other clothing of persons in an attempt to discover weapons
which might be used to assault him. Malacat v CA
17
o “eyes moving very fast”; justifying a stop and frisk. There was nothing in petitioner’s
behavior or conduct which could have reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other than
that his eyes were ‘moving very fast.’ While probable cause is not required to conduct a
stop and frisk, a mere suspicion or hunch will not validate such a search. A genuine reason
must exist, in light of the police officers’ experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant
the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. Id
o Illegal transportation of marijuana; invalid search incidental from an invalid
warrantless arrest. The search was not an incident of a lawful arrest because there was no
warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not come under the exceptions allowed by
the Rules of Court. Hence, the warrantless search was also illegal. People v Aminnudin
o Shabu found through strip search in the airport. The search was not conducted
incidental to an arrest because, prior to the strip search, the airport personnel had no
knowledge of what was hidden (Note: warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto, knowledge
must be present); hence, they did not know yet whether a crime was being committed. Nor
was the search a stop and frisk under the Terry search doctrine, for the doctrine is limited
to a search for weapons. The scope of a search pursuant to airport security procedure
comes from Sec 9 of RA 6235, which allows for the search of prohibited materials or
substances (See Reasonable Search). People v Canton
PERSONAL PROPERTY TO BE SEIZED
Section 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
Section 3: Personal property to be seized – A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure
of personal property:
a. Subject of the offense;
b. Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or
c. Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.
o Shabu found through strip search in the airport. Clearly, the seizure of Susan’s passport,
plane tickets, and girdles exceeded the limits of the provision. They, therefore, have to be
returned to her. People v Canton
ALLOWABLE WARRANTLESS ARREST
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court
General rule. No peace officer or person has the power or authority to arrest anyone without
a warrant of arrest, except in those cases expressly authorized by law. The law expressly
allowing such is Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court (previously Section 6). Umil v Ramos
 SECTION 5, RULE 113 OF THE RULES OF COURT
Section 5: A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or attempting
to commit an offense;
b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested has committed it; and
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.
IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO
Section 5(a). The officer arresting a person who has just committed, is committing, or is about
to commit an offense must have personal knowledge of that fact. The offense must also be
committed in his presence or within his view. People v Burgos
o Firearm location given by wife; personal knowledge. There is no such personal
knowledge in this case. The location of the firearm was given by appellant’s wife. Neither
was he in actual possession of the firearm, nor was he committing an act which could be
described as subversive. Id
o Hashish from Sagada. Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited
drugs. A crime was actually being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante
delicto. Considering that the information regarding the Caucasian was only received a few
hours beforehand, there was no time to obtain a warrant. People v Malmstedt
o Pedophilia; probable cause for a warrantless arrest. The arrest of petitioners was based
on probable cause determined after three months of close surveillance. The existence of
probable cause justified the arrest without warrant. Harvey v Defensor-Santiago
o Same; petition for habeas corpus. A writ of habeas corpus will not be granted when the
confinement is or has become legal (in this case, by a warrant of arrest later issued),
although such confinement was illegal at the beginning. Id
o Illegal transportation of marijuana. Expediency or urgency could not be invoked to
dispense with the requirement of a warrant. It is clear that the PC had at least two days in
which they could have obtained the warrant. At the moment of his arrest, accused was not
committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had done so.
To all appearances, he was just another passenger disembarking from the vessel. People v
Aminnudin
- Note: See note under warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest and search of a
moving vehicle.
o Eight consolidated cases; Rebellion and subversion a continuing offense. The crimes
of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or
18
offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith are in the nature of
continuing crimes. The arrest need not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of
offenses which requires the determination by a judge of the existence of probable cause
before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Umil v Ramos
o Same; probable cause. Notably, in the cases involving illegal possession of firearms, none
were arrested with a warrant. However, considering that the accused (in three of the cases)
arrived at the NPA safehouses after the latter were searched and were carrying
incriminating evidence such as ammunition and subversive documents, the warrantless
arrests were deemed reasonable. Id
- Note: Compare with the situation in People v Burgos.
o Looking from side to side. There is nothing to support the arresting officers’ suspicion
other than Mengote’s darting eyes and his hand on his abdomen. By no stretch of the
imagination could it have been inferred from these acts that an offense had just been
committed, or was actually being committed, or was at least being attempted in their
presence. People v Mengote
o Red eyes in cemetery. The patrolman observed that appellant had red eyes and was
wobbling like a drunk along the cemetery, which according to police information was a
popular hangout of drug addicts. From his experience as a member of the Anti-narcotics
unit, such suspicious behavior was characteristic of drug addicts who were high. Therefore,
they had sufficient reason to stop petitioner to investigate. Manalili v CA
HOT PURSUIT ARREST
Section 6(b). A crime must in fact or actually have been committed first. It is not enough to
suspect that a crime may have been committed. The fact of the commission of the offense must
be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator.
People v Burgos
o Eight consolidated cases; positive implication by co-accused. The arrest of Nazareno
was effected after he was positively implicated by his co-accused and after investigation by
police authorities. For detention to be perfectly legal, it is sufficient that the agent or person
in authority making the arrest has reasonably sufficient grounds to believe in the existence
of an act having the characteristics of a crime and that the same grounds exist to believe
that the person sought to be detained participated therein. Id
o Road rage murder; ‘had just been committed’. An arrest effected six days after the
shooting is not within the ambit of ‘had just been committed’ as contemplated by Section
5(b). Go v CA

SECTION 3
(1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon
lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as
prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
SECTION SUMMARY:
This section must be read with the previous one, especially with respect to the application
of the Exclusionary Rule. A more thorough look at the Writ of Habeas Data is also
covered here.
The right to privacy works hand-in-hand with the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures. The exclusionary rule renders inadmissible any violation by the State of the two
rights. Emphasis must be given on the protection against the State, and not against private
individuals. The Hing v Choachuy case discusses the provision applicable in intrusions
between private individuals. Also note the Zulueta v CA case, which seems to be a stray
decision from the Court.
The Vivares v St Theresa’s College dissects the writ of habeas data, explaining each line
of the writ. It also includes the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test, which determines
when there is a violation of the right to privacy. It provides that, in a situation, there is a
reasonable expectation of privacy when, by his conduct, an individual exhibits this
expectation and the expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable.
Right to privacy is defined as “the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of one’s
person or from intrusion into one’s private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a
person’s ordinary sensibilities.” Simply put, the right to privacy is “the right to be let alone.”.
The Bill of Rights guarantees the people’s right to privacy and protects them against the State’s
abuse of power.
The right to privacy means the right to be from unwarranted exploitation of one’s person
or from intrusion into one’s private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a
person’s ordinary sensibilities.
Police power. However, the right to privacy yields to certain paramount rights of the public
and defers to the state’s exercise of police power. The validity of a government search or
intrusion depends upon its reasonableness.
19
Whether the search meets the reasonableness standard is judged by the balancing of the
government intrusion on the individual’s privacy interest against the promotion of some
compelling state interest.
This provision covers letters, messages, telephone calls, telegrams and the like.
EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.
o Anti-wiretapping law. RA 4200 provides that, ‘it is unlawful for any person, not being
authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any
wire…’ In the absence of the consent of the wife, the recordings should be inadmissible as
evidence. Salcedo-Ortanez v. CA
o Wife ransacked office of doctor husband. The constitutional injunction declaring the
privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable is no less applicable simply
because it is the wife who is the party against the constitutional provision is enforced.
Individuals do not shed their right to privacy by contracting marriage. Zulueta v. CA
- Comment: The ruling questionable; the violation of the right of privacy was raised
against another private individual and there was no government intervention
whatsoever. At most, the husband can file for damages under Art 32 of the Civil Code.
To reiterate, the Bill of Rights protects the citizen against the State, not against other
private citizens.
o Marijuana in packages; mere presence of government agents. The packages were
opened as part of standard operation procedure, and not by government agents. Mere
presence of NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search by the proprietor into a
warrantless search and seizure. In the absence of governmental interference, the right
against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be extended to acts committed by private
individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of lawful intrusion by the government. People
v. Marti
o Waiver of rights personal in nature. The constitutional immunity from unreasonable
searches and seizures is a personal right that cannot be waived by anyone except the
person whose rights are invaded or who is expressly authorized to do so in his or her behalf.
The accused was absent during the search and there was no showing that the helper had
the authority to open the house in his absence. People v. Damaso
o Corporations have their own legal personality. The petitioners have no cause of action
to assail the legality of the search warrants and seizures made in the offices of their
corporations for the simple reason that corporations have their respective personalities,
 separate and distinct from those of the petitioners. The legality of the seizure can be
contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired, and that the objection to an
unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties.
Stonehill v Diokno
o Illegal search and seizure; scope of consented search. The consent of Veroy only
extended as to ascertain the presence of alleged rebel soldiers, not the room to room
search of the house. The items taken were products of an illegal search and are therefore
inadmissible as evidence. Spouses Veroy v. Layagu
o Same; malum prohibitum. illegal possession of firearms is malum prohibitum, hence
intent is immaterial for conviction under the crime. Be that as it may, the subjects of these
searches are not illegal per se that would warrant a summary abatement. They cannot be
arbitrarily examined without a search warrant. Id
II. WRIT OF HABEAS DATA
The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty, or security
is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or of a private
individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting, or storing of data or information regarding the
person, family, home, and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
o Meralco girl demands report on her. It is an indispensable requirement that there must
be a showing, by at least substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of
respondent’s right to privacy vis-à-vis the right to life, liberty, or security. Meralco v Lim,
Roxas v GMA
o Communist list. The writ is personal in nature; it presupposes that the aggrieved party is
still alive. Hence, the heirs of Crispin Beltran do not have the legal standing to file the
petition. Zarate v Aquino III
o Sex video. It is crucial in habeas data cases to prove the nexus or connection between
one’s privacy rights and cogent rights to life, liberty, or property. Lee v Ilagan
CASE BREAKDOWN: VIVARES V ST THERESA’S COLLEGE
Photos of the children of the petitioners were uploaded to Facebook. The photos became the
basis of the respondent school’s disciplinary sanctions against the students. Petitioners prayed
for the issuance of a writ of habeas data, claiming that the respondent’s use of the photos as
evidence is in violation of their children’s right to privacy.
Scope of the writ. The writ seeks to protect a person’s right to control information regarding
oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful
means in order to achieve unlawful ends. The writ is not confined to cases of extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances.
20
Persons covered. Nothing in the rule would suggest that the writ shall be available only against
abuses of a person or entity engaged in the business of gathering, storing, and collecting data.
What matters is that the person or entity must be gathering, collecting, or storing said data on
information about the aggrieved party.
Reasonable expectation of privacy. The law protects people whose right to privacy might be
violated, it must also be coupled with the existence of a threat of violation to his rights to life,
liberty, and property. Petitioners failed to show such. Also, it is incumbent upon internet users
to exercise due diligence in their online dealings and activities and must not be negligent in
protecting their rights.
Comment: It was a third-party (Angela) who posted the photos online. Therefore, it wasn’t the
expectation of privacy of the girls that was examined, but the conduct of the third-party who
uploaded the photos.
REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY TEST
This test determines whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and whether the
expectation has been violated. Id
1. Whether, by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and
2. The expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable.
Comment: This is the same test used to determine whether a search is reasonable or not. There
are three scenarios possible: the presence of both requisites; the absence or reduced
expectation of the individual’s privacy; and the absence or reduced recognition by society.
In the first scenario, there is a reasonable expectation of privacy. If the State intrudes upon it,
then the search becomes unreasonable – it will only be legal in the cases provided in Section
2. That is, there must be a warrant (lawful order of the court) legalizing the search, or it falls
under allowable warrantless search (which falls under the right of the State to maintain public
safety and order).
In the second scenario, there is no expectation of the individual at all – similar to a waiver of
the right. The Vivares case is the illustration of this scenario. A person uploading a photo in
social media on public settings exhibits no expectation of privacy.
The third scenario has the effect of ‘lowering the bar’ on a person’s privacy. What society deems
as reasonable expectation sets the scope of the search allowed. See the cases of SJS v
Dangerous Drugs Board, People v Canton, and Saluday v People for illustrations.
KINDS OF PRIVACY
1. Locational or situational privacy
2. Decisional privacy
3. Informational privacy
 PRIVACY IN THE CIVIL CODE
Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and
other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall
produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:

(1) Prying into the privacy of another’s residence

o Surveillance cameras. A business office is entitled to the same privacy when the public is
excluded therefrom and only such individuals are allowed to enter may come in. An
individual’s right to privacy under Art 26(1) of the Civil Code is not confined to his house
or residence. As long as his right is recognized by society, other individuals may not infringe
on his right to privacy. Hing v Choachuy

21

SECTION 4
No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances.
SECTION SUMMARY:
The four rights covered in the section are right to the freedom of speech, of expression, of
the press, and right of the people to peaceably assembly and petition the government for
redress of grievances.
The first three rights require that no laws shall be passed placing previous or prior restraint,
or subsequent punishment to the exercise of these rights. However, the freedoms are not
unlimited – there are unprotected forms of speech which the State has the right to regulate
or suppress (Unprotected Speech).
Prior restraint refers to government restrictions before actual publication or dissemination.
They may either be content-neutral or content-based regulations. For the former, the
O’Brien test is used; for the latter, the Clear and Present Danger test. A separate test is
used for commercial speech: Central Hudson test.
Subsequent punishment refers to penalties imposed for the exercise of the freedoms.
There are three tests: dangerous tendency test, clear and present danger test, and
balancing of interests test. For the first, there must be a rational connection between the
speech and evil apprehended. For the second, there must be a clear and present danger (u
did not expect this) of substantive evils that the State has the right to suppress. For the last,
it involves balancing the interests of the legislature vis-à-vis the protection of the freedoms.
Not all forms of speech are permissible. Unprotected speech includes libel, defamatory
remarks against public officials, and obscenity. For libel, remember Privileged
Communication. For defamatory remarks, New York Times. For obscenity, Miller Test.
Additionally, it would be important to note that the rights of school children automatically
coextensive with the rights of adults in some settings. For disruptive speech in the school
setting, apply the Tinker Test.
The Right to peaceably assemble and redress of grievances makes use of various tests
previously discussed in this section. We see the application of the clear and present danger
test, and a modified version of the Tinker test. For the latter, read with Section 8, Right of
government employees to form associations.
22
SPEECH, EXPRESSION, PRESS
These include every form of expression, whether oral, written, tape, or record. They also include
movies as well as symbolic speech.
These rights are considered as fundamental rights. Restrictions or regulations are generally
construed against the State and in favor of the exercise of these rights.
There is to be no previous or prior restraint on the communication of views or subsequent
liability whether in libel suits, prosecution for sedition, or action for damages, or contempt
proceedings unless there be a clear and present danger of substantive evil that Congress has a
right to prevent. Gonzales v COMELEC
PRIOR RESTRAINT
Prior restraint means official government restrictions on the press or other forms of expression
in advance of actual publication or dissemination. Examples are licensing, censorship, and
licensing fees.
The prohibition is not absolute, albeit there exists a heavy presumption against any form of
prior restraint. A regulation may be allowed if it passes certain tests, depending on what kind
of speech is regulated.
o Censorship of newspaper as a nuisance per se; censorship. Liberty of speech, and of the
press, is not an absolute right and the State may punish its abuse. There must be no prior
restraint, but unprotected speech is not free from censure. Preventing the publisher from
publishing future works is tantamount to a censorship. The law cannot also be justified by
saying that publishers must first show that the content is true and published in good faith.
To do so would give the legislature unlimited discretion to restrain publication. Near v
Minnesota
o Vietnam War Decision-Making Process; national security. The Government carries a
heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of a prior restraint in the interest
of ‘national security’. There was an empty assertion of national security in this case. New
York Times Co v US
o Prohibition of election propaganda on PUVs and public terminals. The resolution
places a prior restraint be prohibiting the freedom of individuals, i.e. the owners of PUVs
and terminals, to express their preference through posting of election campaign materials.
1-Utak v COMELEC
o Prohibition of election survey. The COMELEC resolution lays a prior restraint by
prohibiting the publication of election surveys a few days before the election. SWS v
COMELEC
o Movie censorship. The statute in this case prohibits the distribution of a motion picture
without prior license obtained from the Board of Censors. There is no time limit within
which the Board will decide, and no statutory provision for judicial participation in the
procedure, which bars assurance of prompt judicial review. The process is a form of prior
 restraint. The US SC gives the following rules for it to be valid: (1) the burden of proving
that the film is unprotected expression rests upon the censor; and (2) the requirement
cannot be administered in a manner which would lend an effect of finality to the censor’s
determination. Freedman v Maryland
▪ Movie censorship; PH jurisprudence. While noted by our SC, PH jurisprudence does not
recognize Freedman v Maryland. As such, an administrative body that has quasi-judicial
functions such as MTRCB can validly preview and classify TV programs and movies and
enforce its decisions subject to the review of the courts. INC v CA
▪ Regulation of election propaganda. A regulation prohibiting the sale of print space or
airtime for campaign purposes except to the COMELEC was allowed because it served the
substantial purpose of creating equal opportunity for political candidates. National Press
Club v COMELEC
Commercial speech is communication which no more than proposes a commercial transaction.
Advertisement of goods is an example. To enjoy protection, it must not be false, nor shall it
propose an illegal transaction. Furthermore, it is subject to the Central Hudson Test Rubin v
Coors Brewing
CENTRAL HUDSON TEST (COMMERCIAL)
1. Government has a substantial interest to protect;
2. The regulation directly advances the interest; and
3. It is not more extensive than is necessary to protect that interest.
CONTENT-NEUTRAL VS CONTENT-BASED
Content-neutral regulations are merely concerned with the incidents of free speech, that is,
it controls the time, manner, or place under well-defined standards.
Content-based regulations restrict the subject matter of the utterance or speech. Content-
based laws are generally frowned upon and subject to more stricter standards.
O’BRIEN TEST (CONTENT-NEUTRAL)
The O’Brien test is generally used for determining the validity of content-neutral
regulations. A sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech
element can justify incidental limitations on free speech.
1. It is within the constitutional power of the government;
2. The law furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;
3. The interest is unrelated to the suppression of free speech; and
4. If the incidental restriction on alleged freedom is no greater than is essential to that interest.
o Prohibition of election survey release; violation of #3 and #4. The prohibition on release
of election surveys right before the elections is invalid because it failed to meet the 3 rd and
4th criterion of the O’Brien test. The prohibition has the effect of suppressing a whole class
of expression, while allowing the expression of opinion on the same subject by columnists,
radio, and TV commentators. The prohibition may be for a limited, but the curtailment is
23
direct and substantial. There are other less restrictive means than total prohibition. SWS v
COMELEC
The clear and present danger test is used for content-based regulations. Diocese of Bacolod
v COMELEC
o Team patay, team buhay tarpaulins. Since the size of the tarpaulins is essential in
conveying the political message purported by the petitioners who were not candidates, the
limitations set on the size has the effect of being a content-based regulation. Id
o Censorship of movies. Where the movies, theatrical productions, radio scripts, TV
programs, and other such media of expression are concerned- included as they are in
freedom of expression - censorship is allowable only under clearest proof of a clear and
present danger of a substantive evil to public morals, public health, or any other legitimate
public interest. Gonzales v Kalaw-Katigbak
▪ Newsounds has been operating a radio station but was denied a permit to continue
operation based on a zoning ordinance. While the zoning ordinance is, on its face, a
content-neutral regulation, it was found out that the real purpose of the ordinance was to
silence the radio station because of its adversarial position to the local government;
therefore, the ordinance must be struck down for being content-based. Newsounds
Broadcasting v Dy
SUBSEQUENT PUNISHMENT
The clause also prohibits systems of subsequent punishment which have the effect of unduly
curtailing expression. The three standards used in our jurisprudence are: (1) the dangerous
tendency test; (2) the clear and present danger test; and (3) the balancing of interests
test. The second and third are favored.
DANGEROUS TENDENCY TEST
“The word or speech creates a dangerous tendency which the State has the right to prevent”.
All it requires, for speech to be punishable, is that there be a rational connection between
the speech and the evil apprehended. The test was preferred in early speech and court
contempt cases.
o Pugot ulo with the bolo si General Wood. Criticism, no matter how severe, is within the
range of liberty of speech, unless the intention and effect be seditious. The Court held that
Perez was guilty of the Treason and Sedition act because his speech has the tendency to
instigate the people to commit unlawful acts. People v Perez
❖ Discussion: Use of the test was prevalent earlier Supreme Court decisions. It is not favored
because of its possible chilling effect on free speech. However, in contempt cases in the
Supreme Court, the test finds application because contemptuous actions against the
highest court may have the effect of corroding the efficacy and supremacy of the SC.
 CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER TEST
“The words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that legislature has a right to prevent.”
It is a question of proximity and degree. Dennis v US
Clear points to a causal connection between the utterance and the danger. Present points to
the time element. The danger must not only be probable but very likely inevitable.
o Communist party of the USA. Overthrow of the government by force and violence is
certainly substantial enough interest for the government to limit speech. Dennis v US
o Posting decals in mobile places; lack of #2 and violation of #3 of O’Brien. The posting
of such does not endanger any substantial government interest. A rational connection
between the remedy provided and the evil to be curbed will not suffice. There must be
clear support in public danger, actual or impending. Only the greatest interests,
endangering permanent interests, give occasion for possible limitation. On the contrary,
the prohibition has the effect of curtailing free speech of the owners of private vehicles
because once the car owner agrees to post the stickers on his vehicle, it becomes his speech
and not of anybody else. Adiong v COMELEC
o RH law tarpaulins. A content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity. It
will pass constitutional muster only if justified by a compelling reason, and the restrictions
are neither overbroad nor vague. Diocese of Bacolod v COMELEC
❖ Discussion: This test is used in contempt cases in lower courts because the implications
are not as far-reaching as in the Supreme Court.
BALANCING OF INTERESTS TEST
“It is the Court’s function to balance the interests served by legislation in one hand and the freedom of
speech, expression, or the press on the other, and to arrive at a judgment where the greater weight shall be
placed”.
The test rests on the basis that constitutional freedoms are not absolute and that they may be
abridged to some extent to serve appropriate and important interests. The test was created for
the purpose of determining the validity of regulations which had to protect interests not
inherently evil. Used in commercial speech.
o Premature campaigning and early nomination. RA 4880 prohibits the too early
nomination of political candidates and limits the period for partisan political activities.
While the interests of freedom of speech and the right to associate where infringed, the
Court held that interest of ensuring equal opportunity and denying the evils of long
campaigns were weightier, thereby holding the statute to be valid. Gonzales v COMELEC
o EDSA documentary, Enrile. The right of privacy cannot be invoked to resist publication of
matters of public interest. What the right to privacy protects is the right against
unwarranted intrusions and wrongful publication of the private affairs and activities of
individuals which are outside the sphere of legitimate public concern. Enrile’s role as a
24
public figure in the events of EDSA is a matter of public interest. Ayer Productions Pty Ltd v
Judge Capulong
POLITICAL SPEECH
Political speech refers to speech both intended and received as a contribution to public
deliberation about some issue. Greenbook
▪ Politicians. Regulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns made by candidates
or the members of their political parties or their political parties may be regulated as to
time, place, and manner. Osmeña v. COMELEC and National Press Club v. COMELEC
▪ Non-candidates. Regulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns made by
persons who are not candidates or who do not speak as members of a political party is
unconstitutional. Such regulation is inconsistent with the guarantee of according the fullest
possible range of opinions coming from the electorate including those that can catalyze
candid, uninhibited, and robust debate in the criteria for the choice of a candidate. Id
REGULATION OF ELECTION PARAPHERNALIA OF NON-CANDIDATES
1. The regulation must be provided by law;
2. Reasonable;
3. Narrowly tailored to meet the object of enhancing the opportunity of all candidates to be
heard while considering the primacy of the guarantee of free expression; and
4. Demonstrably the least restrictive means to achieve that object.
o Submission of election survey subscribers. Petitioner’s freedom of speech and
expression must be balanced with the State purpose of equality of opportunities. For
regulation of election paraphernalia, if it reaches into speech of non-candidates, to be valid,
it must be complied accordingly. SWS v COMELEC
- Note: These were not used in the Diocese case because the court said the tarpaulins
did not amount to election paraphernalia but should be taken as social advocacy
instead.
▪ COMELEC’s resolution prohibited commentators and columnists from campaigning for and
against the plebiscite during the campaign period. The authority granted to the
Commission is to assure the equality of opportunity for candidates. Petitioner is not a
candidate. Moreover, the people’s choice of forum for discussion should not be restricted.
Sanidad v COMELEC
UNPROTECTED SPEECH
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and
punishment of which has never been thought to raise any constitutional problems. Primer
 LIBEL
Art 353, Revised Penal Code
It is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or a defect, real or imaginary, or any act,
omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural
or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of someone who is dead.
ELEMENTS
1. Allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another;
2. Publication of the charge;
3. Identity of the person defamed; and
4. Existence of malice.
Publication means making the defamatory matter, after it has been written, known to someone
other than the person to whom it has been written. A communication of the defamatory matter
to the person defamed cannot injure his reputation though it may wound his self-esteem.
Primer
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION
Art 354, Revised Penal Code
Art 354. Requirement for publicity. Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it
be true if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is known, except:
1. Private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral, social
duty;
2. Fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any juridical, legislative,
or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report, or speech
delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their
functions Policarpio v Manila Times; and
3. Fair commentaries on matters of public interest (this is jurisprudence) Borjal v CA
o Hoax of the year. A newspaper should not be held to account to a point of suppression
for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words. However, there should be the
added requirement of reasonable care. Lopez v CA
o Libel case that made things look worse. To enjoy immunity, a publication containing
derogatory information must be not only true, but also, fair, and it must be made in good
faith and without comments or remarks. In this case, not only did the publication contain
derogatory information, but it placed Policarpio in a worse predicament than in which she
was. Saying that the complaint against her was filed by PCAC makes it seem that she was
guilty, as compared to the filing of a complaint by a private individual. It was not a fair and
true report of the proceedings before the courtPolicarpio v Manila Times Publishing Co.
▪ The prevailing rule is that parties, counsel, and witnesses are exempted from liability in libel
or slander for words otherwise defamatory published in the course of judicial proceedings,
provided the statements are relevant to the case. Armovit v Judge Purisima
25
DEFAMATORY REMARKS AGAINST PUBLIC OFFICIALS
Actual malice. The constitutional guarantee (US) requires that a federal rule that prohibits a
public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official
conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with actual malice.
New York Times v Sullivan Rule. Actual malice means with knowledge that it was false or
with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. This rule extends to defamation of private
sector public figures.
PH application. The rule applies to our jurisprudence. However, public figures are not
unprotected. If the utterances are false, malicious, or unrelated to a public officer’s performance
of his duties or irrelevant to matters of public interest involving public figures, the same may
give rise to criminal and civil liability.
OBSCENITY
Obscenity falls under unprotected speech. State regulation of obscenity so as to make it
unavailable to non-consenting adults and non-adults is constitutionally permissible. The Miller
Test is used for determining whether a work is obscene or not. Miller v California
Note that the portrayal of sex is not of itself sufficient reason to deny the material the
constitutional protection of freedom of speech and press. Sex is a great and mysterious force
in human life and has been a subject of interest to mankind through the ages. Gonzales v Kalaw-
Katigbak
MILLER TEST
1. Whether the average person, applying contemporary modern standards, would find the
work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest;
2. Whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable law; and
3. Whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value (SLAPS).
o Kapit sa Patalim movie censure; PH Miller test. Through EO 876, local jurisprudence has
adopted the Miller test, with the slight alteration of ‘applying contemporary Filipino cultural
values as standard’. However, a more stringent standard ought to be used for television
than for motion pictures, because the former reaches a wider audience than the latter.
Gonzales v Kalaw-Katigbak
o Pinoy playboy; procedure for seizure. Immoral literature comes within the ambit of free
expression, although not its protection. For seizure of obscene materials to be valid, the
following procedure must be observed. Pita v CA
SEIZURE OF OBSCENE MATERIALS:
1. The authorities must apply for the issuance of a search warrant from a judge, if in their
opinion, an obscenity rap is in order;
2. The authorities must convince the court that the materials sought to be seized are ‘obscene’
and pose a clear and present danger of an evil substantive enough to warrant state
interference and action;
3. The judge must determine whether or not the same are indeed obscene: the question is
resolved on a case-to-case basis;
4. If probable cause exists, it may issue the search warrant;
5. The proper suit is brought under Art 201 of the RPC; and
6. Any conviction is subject to appeal.
actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concern. It is only when the
decision to censor a school-sponsored publication, theatrical production, or other vehicle
of student expression has no valid educational purpose that the First Amendment is so
directly and sharply implicated as to require judicial intervention to protect students'
constitutional rights. Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier
▪ The same is true with respect to adults. Attempts to ban obscenity on the internet have
failed on the argument that regulations deprive adults of shows which do not come under
the definition of obscenity and are therefore legitimate for adults. Reno v ACLU.

O’Brien Test. The O’Brien test is applicable to content-neutral regulations on obscenity.

RIGHT TO PEACABLY ASSEMBLE AND PETITION FOR REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES
Emphasis is given to the third criterion, because the regulation must be unrelated to the
exercise of free speech and expression; otherwise, the clear and present danger test should be
These rights are equally as fundamental as freedom of expression, therefore allowing the same
applied.
standards to be used in deciding whether they are impaired or not. Assembly means a right on
o Strippers in Indiana. The perceived evil that Indiana seeks to address is not erotic dancing,
the part of citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. Gonzales v
but public nudity. The regulation is narrowly tailored so as to allow strippers, but only that
COMELEC.
they wear pasties and g-strings. Barnes v Glen Theatre
o Permit before rallies. The requirement of permits to conduct assemblies is not an absolute
o Adult theaters. Zoning ordinances designed to combat the undesirable secondary effects
ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place, and manner
of adult film theaters are to be reviewed under the standards applicable to content-neutral
of assemblies. Furthermore, permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present
regulations. It is the secondary effects that are targeted, not the dissemination of ‘offensive’
danger to public order, safety, convenience, morals, or health. As such, the requirement of
speech. Renton v Playtime Theatres
obtaining permits before rallying is merely a content-neutral regulation that does not
RIGHTS OF SCHOOL CHILDREN violate the freedom of speech, expression, assembly and petition for redress of grievances.
The rights of students in public schools are not automatically coextensive with the rights of Bayan v Ermita
adults in other settings. It does not follow that simply because one form of expression is o Permit before rallies. The proper governmental response to peaceful assemblies is
permissible for adults makes it permissible to children as well. Bethel School District v Fraser ‘maximum tolerance’. The term ‘calibrated preemptive response’ is ultra vires. Id
❖ Note: Although a different right [right to travel] is exercised in Spark v Quezon City, the o Wearing t-shirts not disruptive. Those who enter the government service are subject to
same logic applies. The differential treatment is justified because of the following: (1) a different degree of limitation on their freedom to speak their mind but it is not
peculiar vulnerability of children; (2) inability to make critical decisions in an informed and tantamount to the relinquishment of their right to expression otherwise enjoyed by
mature manner; and (3) importance of the parental role in child rearing. ordinary citizens. Concerted mass action is not prohibited so long as there is no intent to
o Black armband protesting Vietnam war, Tinker test. Students do not shed their effect work stoppage or service disruption. Davao City Water District v Aranjuez
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate, but o Denied permit; public places. The Court held that the Mayor possessed reasonable
student speech that has the potential to materially and substantially interfere with the discretion to determine or specify the public places to be used for the assembly in order to
requirements of appropriate discipline, ‘substantial disruption’, is not protected by the First secure convenient use and provide adequate and proper policing. Navarro v Villegas.
Amendment. Tinker v Des Moines Independent Community School o Clear and present danger standard. However, this discretion is not unlimited. It is an
o Lewd speech before school assembly. The First Amendment does not prevent the school indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger
officials from determining that to permit a vulgar and lewd speech such as respondents test be the standard for the decision reached. JBL Reyes v Bagatsing, Ruiz v Gordon
would undermine the school’s basic educational mission. The obscene speech falls within
the ambit of ‘disruptive conduct’. Bethel School District v Fraser
o Pregnancy and divorce stories in school newspaper; valid educational purpose.
Educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style
and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their

26

SECTION 5
No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be
required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
SECTION SUMMARY:
The provision is divided into two parts: non-establishment clause and the free exercise
clause.
The Non-Establishment Clause (NEC) means that the state cannot establish or sponsor
any religion. However, there are constitutionally created exceptions to the rule.
Permissible aid is subject to the Lemon Test. Incidental benefits to religion is not
prohibited.
The Free Exercise Clause (FEC) comprises of two parts – the freedom to believe and the
freedom to act. The first is absolute, while the second is not.
There are two streams of jurisprudence with respect to FEC: Separation and Benevolent
Neutrality. The first mainly applies to American Jurisprudence (AmJur). The test is the
Smith Test. The second is used in PH jurisprudence (PHJur). The test is the Sherbert Test.
The leading case for the FEC is Estrada v Escritor. The case comprehensively discussed
AmJur and PHJur on NEC and FEC. The result was the categorical declaration of the Court
adopting the Accommodation or Benevolent Neutrality view for PHJur. The resulting test
was the Sherbert Test, a modified version of the clear and present danger test specifically
suited for infringement of religious freedom. Prior to Estrada, the clear and present danger
test was used in PHJur.
This provision has two parts: non-establishment clause and free exercise clause. The second
sentence is merely a reiteration of the first.
Free exercise and non-establishment, distinguished. How to tell whether a case is a free
exercise case or a non-establishment case? Every violation of the free exercise clause involves
compulsion whereas a violation of the non-establishment clause need not involve compulsion.
NON-ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion
In short, it means the state cannot establish or sponsor an official religion. It reinforces that wall
of separation between Church and State. Re: Letter of Tony Q. Valeciano
27
It means that:
1. The State cannot set up a Church or pass laws which aids one religion, aid all religion, or
prefer one religion over another nor force/influence a person to go to or remain away from
church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion;
2. The state cannot punish a person for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or
disbeliefs, for church attendance or nonattendance
3. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activity or
institution whatever they may be called or whatever form they may adopt or teach or
practice religion;
4. The state cannot openly or secretly participate in the affairs of any religious organization
or group and vice versa.
CONSTITUTIONALLY CREATED EXCEPTIONS TO THE NON-ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
Article 6, Sec 29(2): No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly
or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system
of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such
priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or
government orphanage or leprosarium.
Article 6, Sec 28(3): Charitable institutions, churches and personages or convents appurtenant thereto,
mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and
exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation.
Article 14, Section 3(3): At the option expressed in writing by the parents or guardians, religion shall be
allowed to be taught to their children or wards in public elementary and high schools within the regular
class hours by instructors designated or approved by the religious authorities of the religion to which the
children or wards belong, without additional cost to the Government.
ALLOWABLE VS NON-ALLOWABLE AID
The non-establishment clause does not prohibit all government aid that might redound to the
benefit of religion. To distinguish allowable from non-allowable aid, we use the Lemon test.
LEMON TEST
1. The statute must have a secular legislative purpose;
2. Its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and
3. The statute must not foster "an excessive government entanglement with religion.
Additionally, to determine if there is excessive entanglement, there is a need to examine:
1. The character and purposes of the institutions that are benefited;
2. The nature of the aid that the State provides; and
3. The resulting relationship between the government and the religious authority.
o Salary Supplement Act; violation of #3. Rhode Island’s salary supplement to teachers
was unconstitutional because of the religious activity and purpose of the church-affiliated
 schools. Continuing State surveillance required to ensure that teachers do not teach
religious ideas in secular education constitute excessive entanglement. Lemon v Kurtzman
o Pennsylvania Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary Education Act; violation of #3.
The state provides reimbursement for the school’s expenses for salaries, textbooks, and
instructional materials used for secular services, and not for subjects that contain religious
teaching. Schools were required to adopt accounting procedures that separate the cost of
secular and religious services. The government was given a post audit power to inspect the
books and records of the school, thus creating a prohibited entanglement. Id
o Higher education facilities act. The government provides facilities that are themselves
religiously neutral. The risks of aid to religion and the corresponding need for surveillance
are reduced. However, the 20-year provision has the effect of advancing religion; it must
be struck down. Tilton v Richardson
❖ Discussion: The Lemon test has been scrutinized for its inherent assumption that teachers
are not able to restrain themselves from teaching religious ideas in secular education.
However, while criticized, the test has not yet been abandoned.
INCIDENTAL BENEFITS
Incidental benefits are allowed. Government programs that neutrally provide benefits to a
broad class of citizens defined without reference to religion are not automatically subject to an
Establishment Clause challenge for the reason that sectarian institutions may receive an
attenuated financial benefit. Zobrest v Catalina
o Stamps. The appropriation of money for the purchase of stamps in commemoration of the
33rd International Eucharistic Congress was permissible because the benefit to the Church
was merely incidental. The secular purpose of promoting the PH remains to be the central
objective. Aglipay v Ruiz
o Image and fiestas. Not every governmental activity which involves the expenditure of
public funds and which has some religious tint is violative of the constitutional provisions
regarding separation of church and state, freedom of worship and banning the use of
public money or property. Garces v Estenzo
o Distribution of books. A statute allowing local school boards to purchase textbooks and
lend them without charge to all children residing in such district who are enrolled in public
or private schools, including parochial school, was upheld since the primary secular purpose
was the furtherance of the educational opportunities for the young, and not the
advancement of any particular religion. The benefit derived by the parochial school was
merely incidental. Board of Education v Allen
o Sign-language interpreter. A statute providing a sign-language interpreter to a deaf-
mute student even if he was enrolled in a Catholic or sectarian school was upheld, because
such government action had a secular purpose and the benefit to sectarian institutions is
28
merely incidental. Religious institutions are not excluded by the First Amendment from
participating in publicly sponsored social welfare programs Zobrest v Catalina
o Closed-shop policy. RA 3550 exempted employees whose religion prohibits membership
in labor organizations from joining such as a requisite for employment. This statute was
upheld as non-violative of the non-establishment clause because its primary secular
purpose was to advance the constitutional right of free exercise of religion and that the
benefit to religious sect is merely indirect and incidental. Victoriano v Elizalde
Religious symbols. The government’s use of religious symbolism is unconstitutional if it has
the effect of endorsing religious beliefs, and the effect of the use of religious symbolism must
depend upon context. County of Allegheny v American Civil Liberties Union.
An ecclesiastical affair is a religious affair; one that concerns doctrine, creed, or form of
worship of the church. In matters purely ecclesiastical, the decision of the proper church
tribunals is conclusive upon the civil tribunals.
o Classifying a food as halal is a religious function because the standards used are drawn
from the Qur’an and Islamic beliefs. In the absence of compelling state interest, the state
cannot exercise such function. Islamic Dawah v Executive Secretary.
▪ The dismissal of a pastor is a purely secular and has no relation whatsoever with the practice
of faith, worship, or doctrines of the church, Austria v NLRC
▪ However, excommunication of members is an ecclesiastical affair best left to the discretion
of the appropriate church officials. Taruc et al v Bishop
Free speech in relation to NEC. Religious expression cannot violate the Establishment Clause
where (1) it is purely private; and (2) occurs in a traditional or designated public forum, publicly
announced and open to all on equal terms. Capitol Square Review Board v Pinette and KKK
o Cross in public square. The case of the erection of a cross in the Capitol Square was upheld
as a private religious expression made in a public forum. Id
FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE (FEC)
No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion nor prohibiting the free exercise thereof
Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of
worship as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law. The amendment embraces
two concepts – freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute, but in the
nature of things, the second cannot be. Cantwell v Connecticut
TWO-FOLD ASPECT OF RELIGIOUS PROFESSION AND WORSHIP
1. Freedom to believe
2. Freedom to act
 o Saint Germain. This embraces the right to maintain theories of life and of death. Men may
believe what they cannot prove. Hence, when it comes to issues on free exercise, the
question is not the truth or falsity of the beliefs of the accused. Rather, it is WON they
believed in good faith that what they believed in are true. This is because the law knows no
heresy and is committed to the support of no dogma or establishment of a sect. US v
Ballard
o Santeria, animal sacrifice. Religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or
comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protection. Church of Lukumi
v City of Hialeah
▪ The moment belief flows over into action, it becomes subject to government regulation. It
does not follow that everything which may be so called part of religious doctrine can be
tolerated. Crime is not the less odious because sanctioned by what any particular sect may
call religion. David v Beason.
FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE AND MORALITY
Morality is what is good or right conduct under the circumstances. It may be:
1. Religious- depends on moral prescriptions of a high moral authority
2. Secular- depends on independent moral sense as shared by humans
o The non-establishment clause bars the State from establishing, through laws and rules,
moral standards according to a specific religion. When they form part of our laws, rules,
and policies, morality must be secular. Perfecto v Esidera.
o Neutrality. In the same way, the courts are bound to remain neutral in resolving cases that
❖ Discussion: The Wisconsin case is the only true exemption case. No case followed it
touch issues of morality. When the laws refer to morals or immorality, of lawyers and judges
for purposes of determining administrative liability, the law refers to such that which relates
to their conduct as officers of the court.
o Morality and NEC. Otherwise, if government relies upon religious beliefs in formulating
public policies and morals the non-believers would therefore be compelled to conform to
a standard of conduct supported by a religious belief. Likewise, if government based its
actions upon religious beliefs, it would tacitly approve or endorse that belief and thereby
also tacitly disapprove contrary religious or non-religious views that would not support the
policy.
PRIOR RESTRAINT TO RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
The Smith rule requires that the government justify any substantial burden on religiously
The test used is the clear and present danger test. The State must show compelling state
motivated conduct by a compelling state interest and by means narrowly tailored to
interest enforced through the least restrictive means. Ebralinag v Division Superintendent.
achieve that interest when the formal neutrality and general applicability tests are left
- Note: We do not have any assigned that showed a compelling state interest that
wanting. Church of Lukumi v City of Hialeah
regulated the free exercise of religion.
o Halal certification. Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security
and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. There is
29
no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim organizations of their
religious right to classify a product as halal. Islamic Dawah v Exec Sec
o Closed-shop agreement. When general laws conflict with scruples of conscience,
exemptions ought to be granted unless some compelling state interest intervenes.
Victoriano v Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union
o Jehovah’s witness, solicitation license. To condition the solicitation of aid upon the
procurement of a license is to lay a burden upon the exercise of religion. Cantwell v
Connecticut
o Selling Bibles. The guaranty of free exercise carries with it the right to disseminate religious
information. The power to impose a license tax on the exercise of these freedoms is indeed
as potent as the power of censorship. American Bible Society v City of Manila
o Flag salute law. Nevertheless, their right not to participate in the flag ceremony does not
give them the right to disrupt such patriotic exercises. This should not be taken to mean
that school authorities are powerless to discipline them if they commit breaches of peace
that offends the sensibilities of other persons. Ebralinag v Division Superintendent.
o Amish. Only those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can
overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion. It was held in this case that a
way of life, however virtuous and admirable, may not be interposed as a barrier to
reasonable state regulation if it is based on purely secular considerations. To have the
protection of Religion Clauses, the claims must be rooted in religious beliefs. Wisconsin
vs Yoder
because of the inherent difficulties in toeing the line between religious tolerance and state
interest.
STREAMS OF JURISPRUDENCE
1. Separation (strict or tame) – protects the principle of church-state separation with a rigid
reading of the principle. Dominating view in AmJur
2. Accommodation/benevolent neutrality – protects religious realities, tradition, and
established practice with a flexible reading of the principle. Principal view in PH
Jurisprudence
SMITH RULE
1. The law must be neutral – its minimum requirement is that it must not be
discriminatory in its face. A law lacks facial neutrality if it refers to a religious practice
 without a secular meaning discernible from the language or content. The effect of a law in o That very long case; Sherbert test. The government failed to demonstrate the ‘gravest
its real operation is strong evidence of its object; and abuses, endangering paramount interests’ which could limit respondent’s right to religious
2. The law must be of general applicability – it must not be underinclusive so as to target freedom. The government must assert the objectives at risk if exemption is to be given, and
a particular class. it must precisely show how and to what extent those objectives will be undermined if
3. In the case that the preceding requisites are lacking, the law must be justified by a exemptions are granted. It failed to do so. Estrada v Escritor
compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored to advance that interest. o Judge contracting a second marriage. Art 350 of the RPC may be of doubtful
constitutionality when applied to religious exercise and expression because it puts a burden
o Santeria, animal sacrifice. The law is not neutral, for the animal sacrifice for religious
upon the exercise of beliefs by criminalizing marriages performed in accord to those beliefs
specifically targeted by the ordinances. Nor is it of general applicability, for it failed to
but lack some or all requisites of a valid marriage. However, benevolent neutrality cannot
prohibit nonreligious conduct that endangers public health and preventing cruelty to
shield respondent judge from liability for misconduct under our laws. Perfecto v Esidera
animals in a similar or greater degree than Santeria sacrifice does. Because it failed these
o RH Law; FEC and the duty to refer. Freedom of choice guarantees the liberty of the
two tests, it becomes subject to the strict scrutiny test. The ordinances ultimately fail
religious conscience and prohibits any degree of compulsion or burden, whether direct or
because they are not drawn in narrow terms to accomplish the stated interests. Church of
indirect, in the practice of one’s religion. Accordingly, a conscientious objector should be
Lukumi v City of Hialeah
exempt from compliance with the mandates of the RH law. Imbong v Ochoa
o Amjur. The Smith rule is the prevailing test for the validity of statutes infringing the free
o Same; Exception: life-threatening cases. An exception must be in life-threatening cases
exercise clause for AmJur. Estrada v Escritor
that require the performance of emergency procedures. Id
ACCOMMODATION, BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY
Accommodation is a recognition of the reality that some governmental measures may not be
imposed on a certain portion of the population for the reason that these measures are contrary
to their religious beliefs. As long as it can be shown that the exercise of the right does not
impair public welfare, the attempt of the State to regulate or prohibit such right would be an
unconstitutional encroach. Re: Letter of Tony Q. Valeciano
o Closed-shop agreement. A religious objector is not required to do a positive act – to
exercise the right to join or to resign from the union. He is exempted by operation of law
without need of any positive act. Victoriano v Elizalde Rope Worker’s Union
o That very long case; benevolent neutrality. Benevolent neutrality allows accommodation
of religion under certain circumstances. Accommodations are government policies that
take religion specifically into account not to promote the government’s favored form of
religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance.
Estrada v Escritor
SHERBERT TEST (INFRINGEMENT OF FEC)
1. Has the statute or government action created a burden on the free exercise of religion?
2. Is their sufficiently compelling state interest to justify this infringement of religious
liberty?
3. Has the state in achieving its legitimate purposes used the least intrusive means possible
so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate
goal of the state?

30
 o Right to travel, motorcycle ban in highways. The right does not mean the right
SECTION 6
to choose any vehicle (motorcycles) in traversing a toll way. Public interest and
The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not
be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be
safety require the imposition of certain restrictions that do not apply to ordinary
impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may roads. Mirasol v DPWH
o Curfew laws. The right to travel is a fundamental right guaranteed by our Constitution;
be provided by law.
therefore, the strict scrutiny test should apply. Thus, the government has the burden of
SECTION SUMMARY: proving that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest, and is the
This section is one and a half column long. least restrictive means to protect such interest or the means chosen is narrowly tailored to
accomplish the interest. In this case, children’s welfare and State’s mandate to protect them
A restriction on the right to travel must pass the strict scrutiny test, that is, there must be
as parens patriae constitute compelling interests to justify the regulations. However, the
a compelling state interest and the employment of least restrictive means narrowly-tailored
means employed in the Navotas and Manila ordinances are not narrowly tailored. Only the
to protect State interests such as national security, public safety, or public health.
Quezon ordinance is constitutional. Spark v Quezon City
o Hold-departure orders. There are only three considerations that may permit a restriction
The rights of choosing one’s abode and the right to travel both at home and going out of the on the right to travel: national security, public safety, or public health. As a further
country are protected under Section 6. requirement, there must be an explicit provision of statutory law or the Rules of Court
providing for the impairment. The law does not provide for such power unto the DOJ. Only
The liberty of abode may be limited only upon lawful order of a court whereas the right to
the courts, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs (thru the Philippine Passport Act), and the
travel may be limited by administrative authorities as may be provided by law in the interest of
Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration (thru the Anti-trafficking in Persons Act) are
national security, public safety, public health.
empowered to issue HDOs. Genuino v De Lima
o Prostitutes deported to Davao; right to travel. The forcible taking of these from Manila
by officials who deposited them in a distant region deprived these women of freedom of
locomotion just as efficiently as if they have been imprisoned. Placed in Davao without
either money or personal belongings, they were prevented from exercising liberty of going
when and where they pleased. Villavicencio v Lukban
o Same; habeas corpus. The proper remedy is filing a writ of habeas corpus. Its essential
object and purpose is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint and to relieve the
person therefrom if it be illegal. Id
o Marcos return. The right to return to one’s country is not among the rights specifically
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights. It is a part of the law of the land because of the ICCPR but
it enjoys a different protection. That is, the standard is against being ‘arbitrarily deprived’
thereof, not the standards stated in Section 6 (national security, public safety, or public
health. The president cannot be said to have acted arbitrarily and capriciously in
determining the return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat to the national interest and
welfare. Marcos v Manglapus
- Note: The case is unique. It should not set a precedent.
o Certification from Mayor re abode. The right to change abode and travel within the
Philippines are not absolute rights. Petitioner is not prevented from changing abode; he is
merely required to inform the court in case he does to ensure that he will make himself
available at all times whenever the Court requires his presence. Yap v CA

31

SECTION 7
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided
by law.
SECTION SUMMARY:
The rights guaranteed under this section are the right to information on matters of public
concern and the right to access of official records and documents.
The proper action to exercise this right is Mandamus. In order for mandamus to lie, the
information sought to be acquired must be of public interest or public concern, and not
exempted from the guarantee by the law. As such, one needs to know when a document or
information is imbibed with public interest and what are the particular documents
exempted from the guarantee.
The deliberative process privilege protects communication between agencies that are
pre-decisional and deliberative. The concepts are discussed in the Chavez v PEA and DFA
v BCA cases. Remember that the privileged nature of communication is not lost even when
a definite proposition or official recommendation is reached.
The rights guaranteed under Section 7 are the (1) right to information on matters of public
concern; and (2) right to access of official records and documents. These are political rights
available to citizens only.
PROCEDURE (MANDAMUS)
Mandamus is the proper action to exercise this right. A Petition for Mandamus must have
been instituted by a party aggrieved by the alleged inaction of any tribunal, corporation, board,
or person which unlawfully excludes said party from the enjoyment of a legal right. The party
in every case must possess a legal right to be enforced and a direct interest in the duty or act
to be performed. Legaspi v CSC
Citizen. Since this is a public right, any citizen is considered a real party in interest. Standing is
satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen and therefore part of the general public
which possesses the right. Id
MANDAMUS AS APPLIED TO RIGHT TO INFORMATION
1. The information must be of public interest or public concern; and
2. It is not exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee.
32
o Civil service records of sanitarians. For mandamus to lie, the information sought must be
of public interest and it must not be among the species exempted by law. Civil service
eligibility is a matter of public concern and there are no express limitations upon access to
such. Mandamus lies. Id
o List of those who acquired clean loans. The right to information does not accord them a
right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries, and the
like in their desire to acquire information. Valmonte v Belmonte
PUBLIC INTEREST OR PUBLIC CONCERN
These embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either
because these directly affect their lives or because such matters arouse the interest of an
ordinary citizen. Legaspi v CSC
o Civil service records of sanitarians. A distinction has to be made between the discretion
to refuse outright the disclosure of or access to particular information, and the authority to
regulate the manner in which the access is afforded. The first is a limitation upon the
availability of access to information, which only the Legislature may impose. The second
pertains to the authority of a government agency to regulate access to be exercised solely
to the end that damage to, or loss of, public records may be avoided. The second is
discretionary; the first is not. Id
o Clean loans from GSIS. The public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public
officers held by the alleged borrowers make the information sought clearly a matter of
public interest and concern. Valmonte v Belmonte
o MTRCB voting results. The term private has been defined as belonging to or concerning,
an individual person, company, or interest, whereas, public means pertaining to, or
belonging to, or affecting a nation, state, or community at large. The decisions and
individual voting slips are neither personal nor private but rather public in character.
Aquino-Sarmiento v Morato
NOT EXEMPTED BY LAW
These rights are subject to limitations as may be provided by law. The standards that have
been developed for the regulation of speech and press and of assemble and petition and of
association are applicable to the right of access to information.
RECOGNIZED LIMITATIONS
1. National security matters;
2. Trade secrets and banking transactions;
3. Criminal matters or classified law enforcement matters;
4. Intelligence information;
5. Diplomatic correspondence;
6. Closed-door cabinet meetings;
7. Executive sessions of either house of Congress;
 8. Internal deliberations of the SC; and
9. Other confidential matters.
o Minutes of the meeting, closed-door cabinet meetings. Executive privilege is properly
invoked in relation to specific categories of information, not to categories of persons. What
should determine whether or not information was within the ambit of the exception from
the people’s right to access to information was not the composition of the body, but the
nature of information accessed. The meeting took the character of a closed-door cabinet
meeting; thereby, mandamus cannot lie. Sereno v Committee on Trade and other matters

DELIBERATIVE PROCESS PRIVILEGE

Deliberative process privilege contains three policy bases: (1) to protect candid discussions
within an agency; (2) to prevent public confusion from premature disclosure of agency opinions
before the agency establishes final policy; and to protect the integrity of an agency’s decision.
To be successfully invoked, these requisites must concur:
1. The communication must be pre-decisional – antecedent to the adoption of an agency
policy; and
2. The communication must be deliberative – a direct part of the deliberative process in that
it makes recommendations or expresses opinions on legal or policy matters.

▪ Definite propositions. Information on ongoing evaluation or review of bids and proposals

is not immediately accessible under the right to information. There are no official acts,
transactions, or decisions. However, once the committee makes its official
recommendation, there arises a definite proposition on the part of the government. The
right to information attaches, and any citizen can access all the non-proprietary information
leading to such definite proposition. Chavez v Public Estates Authority
▪ Deliberative process privilege. A frank exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments,
free from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect
the independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative,
and Judicial power. Id
o DFA arbitration; privileged information. There is nothing in the Chavez ruling which
states that once a definite proposition is reached, the privileged character of a document
no longer exists. Once the committee makes its official recommendation, there arises a
definite proposition on the part of the government and, accordingly, the public’s right to
information attaches. However, this right to information has certain limitations and does
not cover privileged information to protect the independence of decision-making by the
government. Future quality of deliberative process can be impaired by undue exposure of
the decision-making process to public scrutiny after the court decision is made. DFA v BCA
International

33
 PURCHASE OF PROPERTY WITH CONDITION TO BECOME A MEMBER OF AN
SECTION 8 ASSOCIATION
The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to o Right not to join an association. SC held that this is not a violation of the right to
form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be association because PADCOM was never forced to join the association. It could have
abridged. avoided such membership by not buying the land from TDC. Nobody forced it to buy the
land when it bought the building with the annotation of the condition or lien on the
Certificate of Title thereof and accepted the Deed. PADCOM v Ortigas Center
The right to form associations shall not be impaired except through a valid exercise of police
power.
It is an aspect of general liberty and an aspect of freedom of contract. Insofar as associations
may have for their object the advancement of beliefs and ideas, freedom of association is an
aspect of expression and belief. The right also covers the right not to join an association

RIGHT OF GOVT EMPLOYEES TO STRIKE

It is clear that they do not [have the right to strike], however justifiable their reasons. Manila
Public School Teachers Association v Laguio, Jr
o Right to strike. The Constitution recognizes the right of government employees to
organize, it is silent as to whether such recognition also includes the right to strike. The
right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees [Art. IX(B)] SSS
Employees Assoc v CA
o But in recognizing the right of government employees to organize, the commissioners
intended to limit the right to the formation of unions or associations only, without including
the right to strike. Id
o The terms and conditions of employment in the government are governed by law. The
administrative heads of government fix the terms and conditions of employment, which
are effected through statutes or administrative circulars, rules, and regulations, not through
collective bargaining agreements. Id
o Wearing t-shirts not disruptive. Those who enter the government service are subject to
a different degree of limitation on their freedom to speak their mind but it is not
tantamount to the relinquishment of their right to expression otherwise enjoyed by
ordinary citizens. Concerted mass action is not prohibited so long as there is no intent to
effect work stoppage or service disruption. Davao City Water District v Aranjuez
- Note: In the previous cases, the government employees substantially disrupted the
normal operation of the respective agencies they were employed in. As such, their mass
action or, more appropriately, strike is prohibited.
▪ CSC Memorandum Circular No. 6 enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all
government officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves,
walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or
disruption of public service

34

SECTION 9
Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
SECTION SUMMARY:
Eminent domain is the power of the State to take private property for public use upon
payment of just compensation. The discussion in this section focuses on the three
requirements for the exercise of this power: taking of private property, taking must be for
public use, and just compensation.
Taking is not limited to physical possession of private property; it includes instances where
the owner is deprived of economic use or any beneficial use of the property. Private
property includes both movables and real property. Note the requisites and the
qualification for each requisite under Requisites for a Valid Taking.
The public use requirement is satisfied as long as the purpose is for the general welfare of
the public.
Just compensation is the payment equal to the market value of the property taken.
EMINENT DOMAIN
This is the power of the state to take private property for public use upon payment of just
compensation.
ELEMENTS
1. Taking of private property
2. Taking must be for public use
3. There must be just compensation
Inherently, this is possessed by the state and is exercised by the National Government. In the
hands of Congress, the scope of power is like the scope of legislative power itself. Alternatively,
it can be stated that the Executive primarily executes this power. The Legislature can also
exercise such through legislation. The Judiciary can determine whether the former is
appropriate or not, but the latter, when exercised by Congress itself, is a political question not
subject to review.
o Charter of instrumentality expires; agent of the republic. When the statutory term of
a non-incorporated agency expires, the powers, duties and functions as well as the assets
and liabilities of that agency revert back to, and are re-assumed by, the Republic of the
Philippines, in the absence of special provisions of law specifying some other disposition
35
thereof. The State has the power to replace the Iron and Steel Authority in the expropriation
proceedings. Iron and Steel Authority v CA
o Exercise of judicial power in expropriation proceedings. With due recognition then of
the power of Congress to designate the particular property to be taken and how much
thereof may be condemned in the exercise of the power of expropriation, it is still a judicial
question whether in the exercise of such competence, the party adversely affected is the
victim of partiality and prejudice. That the EPC will not allow. De Knecht v Bautista
o Legislative intervention. Expropriation proceedings may be undertaken by the
government not only by voluntary negotiation with the landowners but also by taking
appropriate court action or by legislation. Republic v de Knecht
o Political question. Despite the final judgment of the Court regarding the non-
expropriation of the subject property, Legislature may pass a law expropriating the same
property. The decision is no obstacle to the legislative arm of the Government in thereafter
making its own independent assessment of the circumstances then prevailing as to the
propriety of undertaking the expropriation of the properties in question and thereafter by
enacting the corresponding legislation. Id
Eminent domain of local government units. It is essential that an ordinance will authorize
the exercise of the power for LGUs. A sanggunian resolution is not enough.
It is likewise subject to the limitations specified by law. Thus, there are mandatory limits with
respect to (1) order of priority in acquiring land for socialized housing, and (2) the resort to
expropriation proceedings as a means to acquiring it.
RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE OWNER
o Deprivation of ownership rights. Until expropriation proceedings are instituted in court,
the landowner cannot be deprived of its right over the land. Greater Balanga Devt Corp v
Municipality of Balanga
o Reconveyance. The expropriator should commit to use the property pursuant to the
purpose stated in the petition for expropriation. If not, it is then incumbent upon the
expropriator to return the said property to its private owner, it the latter desires to reacquire
the same. MCIAA v Lozada, Sr
o Returned to their original position. Equity and justice demand the reconveyance of the
litigated lands in question. In the same token, justice and fair play also dictate that the
petitioners return to MCIAA what they received as just compensation plus legal interest
computed from default, which runs from the time MCIAA complies with the reconveyance
obligation. Anunciacion Vda. De Ouano
o Payment. No piece of land can be finally and irrevocably taken from an unwilling owner
until compensation is paid. The Court, in Republic v Lim, even went further and recognized
 the right of the unpaid owner to recover the property if within five years from the decision o Ban on motels, hotels; types of taking. The ordinance also substantially divests the
of the expropriation court, the expropriator fails to effect payment of just compensation. respondent of the beneficial use of property. A ‘possessory’ taking occurs when the
San Roque Realty Corp v Republic government confiscates or physically occupies property. A ‘regulatory’ taking occurs
when the government’s regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use of the
I. TAKING property. City of Manila v Laguio
o Same; regulatory taking. A restriction on use of property may also constitute a ‘taking’ if
There can be taking of municipal property provided that it is patrimonial in nature. not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial public purpose or if it has an
Taking does not only come in the form of physical possession. Neither acquisition, nor total unduly harsh impact on the distinct investment-backed expectations of the owner. Id
destruction of value is essential to taking. The following are essential requisites for a valid o Grand Central Station. New York’s Landamarks Law has not effected a ‘taking’. The
taking. restrictions imposed are substantially related to the promotion of the general welfare and
REQUISITES FOR A VALID TAKING permit reasonable beneficial use of the landmark site. Penn Central Transpo v New York
1. Expropriator must enter a private property; City
2. Entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period; POLICE POWER V EMINENT DOMAIN
3. Entry of property should be under warrant or color of legal authority; POLICE POWER EMINENT DOMAIN
Regulates or even destroys private
4. Property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or
property
injuriously affected; and No transfer of ownership; no There is transfer of ownership to
5. Utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and compensation the government; there is just
deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. compensation

o Taking of land by AFP; momentary. The word ‘momentary’ when applied to possession o Parking fee collection. When there is a taking or confiscation of private property for public
or occupancy of real property should be construed to mean a ‘limited period’ – not use, the State is no longer exercising police power, but eminent domain. A police regulation
indefinite or permanent. Republic v Vda de Castellvi that unreasonably restricts the right to use business property for business purposes
o Lack of circumstance #2 and #5. It is evident from the foregoing that AFP’s lease on the amounts to a taking of private property and the owner may recover thereof. OSG v Ayala
property did not constitute ‘taking’ in 1947 because the entrance and occupation was not Land
of a permanent nature, and that the owner was not yet ousted from the property and DUE PROCESS IN TAKING
deprived of its beneficial use. Id
Due process in taking. It is imperative that before a writ of possession is issued by the Court
o Chicken farm near airport. Flights over private land are not a taking, unless they are so
in expropriation proceedings, the following requisites must be met. It is violative of due process
low and so frequent as to be a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and
to deny to the owner the opportunity to prove that the valuation in the tax documents is unfair
use of land. US v Causby
or wrong. Sumulong v Guerrero
o Telephone lines; compel to contract. While RP cannot compel PLDT to contract with
DUE PROCESS IN TAKING
them, it may still require PLDT, in the exercise of the power of eminent domain to permit
1. There must be a Complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and in substance;
interconnection of the government telephone system and that of the PLDT, as the needs
2. A provisional determination of just compensation for the properties sought to be
of the government service may require, subject to compensation. Republic v PLDT
expropriated must be made by the trial court on the basis of judicial (not legislative or
- Note: Private property is not confined to real property. In this case, movables can be
executive) discretion; and
subject to the power of eminent domain.
3. The deposit requirement under Section 2, Rule 67 must be complied with.
o Parking fee collection. A regulation that deprives any person of the profitable use of his
property constitutes a taking and entitles him to compensation, unless the invasion of
rights is so slight as to permit the regulation to be justified under police power. OSG v Ayala
Land

36
 CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES IN TAKING
General rule: Just compensation to which the owner of the condemned property is entitled to
is the market value.
Exception: Where only a part of a certain property is expropriated. In this case the owner is not
restricted to compensation for the portion actually taken, he is also entitled to recover the
consequential damage, if any, to the remaining part of the property.
o No actual taking of the building is necessary to grant consequential damages.
Consequential damages are awarded if as a result of expropriation, the remaining
property of the owner suffers from an impairment of decrease in value. Republic v BPI
- Note: This means that for consequential damages to be awarded, it is presumed that
only a portion, not the whole, of the property is taken.
▪ To determine just compensation, the trial court should first ascertain the market value of
the property, to which should be added the consequential damages after deducting
therefrom the consequential benefits which may arise from the expropriation. If the
consequential benefits exceed the consequential damages, these items should be
disregarded altogether as the basic value of the property should be paid in every case. B.H.
Berkenkotter & Co. v. Court of Appeals
II. PUBLIC USE
At present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the
requirement of public use.
o Socialized housing; qualification. The public character of housing measures does not
change because units in housing projects cannot be occupied by all but only by those who
satisfy prescribed qualifications. Sumulong v Guerrero
o Socialized housing; broader definition. That only a few could actually benefit from the
expropriation of property does not diminish its public use character. It is simply not possible
to provide all at once land and shelter for all who need them. Public use now includes the
broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage, including in particular, urban land
reform, and housing. Philippine Columbian Assoc v Panis
o Land taken by AFP; public purpose mandatory. The mandatory requirement of due
process ought to be strictly followed; the state must show, at the minimum, a genuine need,
an exacting public purpose to take private property. Anunciacion Vda de Ouano v Republic
o Same; authority on expropriated property. Upon abandonment of real property
condemned for public purpose, the condemning authority has control of the land if it is
used for public purpose. Id
37
o But if the authority ceases to use it for public purpose, property reverts to the owner in fee
simple. Heirs of Moreno v Mactan Cebu International Airport.
o Cebu airport; restitution. If the expropriator does not use the property for the purpose
specified in the petition, the property must be returned to the owner, and the owner must
return the compensation it had received with legal interest and must pay the expropriator
for the benefits that the lot may have obtained. MCIA v Lozada
o Public use; essential. The taking of private property, consequent to the Government’s
exercise of its power of eminent domain, is always subject to the condition that the property
be devoted to the specific public purpose for which it was taken. Vda de Ouano v Republic
o Same; reconveyance. Corollary, if this particular purpose or intent is not initiated or not at
all pursued, and is peremptorily abandoned, then the former owners, if they so desire, may
seek the reversion of the property, subject to the return of the amount of just compensation
received. Id
III. JUST COMPENSATION
This is payment that matches the market value
Just compensation is the just and complete equivalent of the losses which the owner of the
thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation.
Reasonable time period considered. Aside from the determination of proper amount, it
includes the payment of the amount within a reasonable period of time from its taking.
Market value. In expropriation proceedings, the owner of the land has the right to its value for
the use for which it would bring the most in the market. The owner may thus show every
advantage that his property possesses, present and prospective, in order that the price it could
be sold for in the market may be satisfactorily determined.
Form of compensation. The compensation need not be in money. It can be in some form that
embodies certainty of value and of payment, such as government bonds.
o Time element. The value of the property as of the date of the actual taking or at the time
of judgment by the court, whichever comes first. Manotok v NHA
o Recovery of property. No piece of land can be finally and irrevocably taken from an
unwilling owner until compensation is paid. The unpaid owner even has a right to recover
the property if within five years from the decision, the expropriator fails to effect payment
of just compensation. San Roque Realty v RP
o Inflation and payment of interest. In the computation of compensation, inflation is
disregarded. The valuation of the land for purposes of determining just compensation
should not include the inflation rate of the Philippine Peso because the delay in payment
of the price of expropriated land is sufficiently recompensed through payment of interest
 on the market value of the land as of the time of taking from the landowner. NPC v
Manalastas
COMMISSIONER’S ESTIMATE
The judgment of the court is rendered after a consideration of the commissioner’s report and
the exceptions thereto submitted upon the hearing of the report. The court may overrule the
award of the commissioners in the whole or in part and substitute its own. City of Manila v
Estrada
Admission of testimonies for just compensation should consider the following:
1. Testimony as to mere offers for the property desired or for contiguous property is not
admissible.
2. Testimony relative to real estate transactions in the vicinity of the land is usually admitted,
but with reservation – that the location and character of such property should be similar,
and the sales are at least reasonably near in point in time as the inquiry.
3. Testimony relative to the prices paid for neighboring land under eminent domain
proceedings is not admissible.

ENTRY PRIOR TO COMPENSATION

General rule: For purposes of entry into property prior to full payment, RA 7160 requires a
deposit of at least 15% of the FMV of the property based on the current tax declaration.
Exception: Where the expropriation is public works, prior full payment is required.

IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW

With respect to the following, the exercise of the power of eminent domain is subject to
judicial review:
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF EMINENT DOMAIN
1. Necessity of taking
2. The public use character of the purpose of taking
3. The adequacy of compensation

Exception: When the power is exercised directly by Congress and not through subordinate
bodies, it becomes a political question.

38

SECTION 10
No law shall be passed impairing the obligations of contracts.
Impairment of contract. A law which changes the terms of a legal contract between parties,
either in the time or mode of performance, or imposes new conditions, or dispenses with those
expressed, or authorizes for its satisfaction something different from that provided in its terms,
is a law which impairs the obligation of a contract is null and void. Clemens v Nolting
The prohibition is not absolute and unqualified. While non-impairment of contracts is
constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the
legitimate exercise of police power
Despite the constitutional prohibition the State continues to possess authority to safeguard the
vital interests of its people.
Legislation appropriate to safeguard said interest may modify or abrogate contracts already in
effect.
o All contracts made with reference to any matter that is subject to regulation under the
police power must be understood as made in reference to the possible exercise of said
police power. Our jurisdiction guarantees sanctity of contract and is said to be the 'law
between the contracting parties. But while it is so, it cannot contravene law, morals, good
customs, public order, or public policy. Anucenscion v NLRC
o Above all, it cannot be raised as a deterrent to police power, designed precisely to promote
health, safety, peace, and enhance the common good, at the expense of contractual rights,
whenever necessary. Presley v Bel-Air Village Assoc
o To come under the constitutional prohibition, the law must effect a change in the rights of
the parties with reference to each other and not with reference to non-parties. Abella v
NLRC
o There is no yardstick that may be used to determine the constitutionality of a legislation
that impairs contract of obligations. Each case must be decided upon its own
circumstances. Legislation impairing the obligation of contracts can be sustained when it is
enacted for the promotion of the general good of the people, and when the means
adopted are legitimate, i.e. within the scope of the reserved power of the state construed
in harmony with the constitutional limitation of that power. Anucenscion v NLRC
o Mining agreements. Obligations of contracts must yield to a proper exercise of the police
power when such power is exercised to preserve the security of the State and the means
adopted are reasonably adapted to the accomplishment of that end and are not arbitrary
or oppressive. In this case, the utilization of the country’s natural resources is vital to public
interest, and the production-sharing agreements imply negotiation, not compulsion or
automatic conversion, which are reasonable means. Miners Association v Factoran, Jr.
39
MORATORIUM LAWS
Moratorium laws are valid exercises of police power. They are a postponement of fulfillment
of obligations and are used to secure peace and order during times of war or financial crisis.
o Not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix obligations as between the
parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into
contracts as a postulate of the legal order. The policy of protecting contracts against
impairment presupposes the maintenance of a government by virtue of which contractual
relations are worthwhile, a government which retains adequate authority to secure the
peace and good order of society. Home Building and Loan Assoc v Blaisell
o In upholding the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law, SC held in Home Building and Loan
Assoc v Blaisell that "Although conceding that the obligations of the mortgage contract
was impaired, the court decided that what it thus described as an impairment was,
notwithstanding the contract clause of the Federal Constitution, within the police power of
the State as that power was called into exercise by the public economic emergency which
the legislative had found to exist
The Test of Constitutionality of a moratorium statute lies in the determination of the period
of suspension of the remedy. It is required that such suspension be definite and reasonable,
otherwise it would be violative of the constitution. Rutter v Esteban
The question is not whether the legislative action affects contracts incidentally, or directly or
indirectly, but whether the legislation is addressed to a legitimate end and the measures taken
are reasonable and appropriate to that end.
Aside from being definite and reasonable, the impairment should refer only to the remedy and
not the substantive right.
CONTRACTUAL STIPULATIONS ON USE OF LAND
o Hot pandesal. The contractual stipulations on the use of the land, even if said conditions
are annotated on the Torrens title, can be impaired if necessary to reconcile with the
legitimate exercise of police power. Presley v Bel-Air Village Assoc
o Subdivision in Mandaluyong, Rizal. Similarly, a stipulation requiring the buyer to use the
lot for residential purposes only cannot be sustained over the State’s rezoning of the area
to an industrial and commercial zone. Ortigas & Co. v FEATI Ban
 SECTION 11
Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not
be denied to any person by reason of poverty.

SIGNIFICANCE
This is an expanded version of its counterpart in the 1973 Constitution. The old provision merely
said that free access to the courts shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty. The
provision now includes free access to quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance as
well.

This is the basis for the provision of Section 17, Rule 5 of the New Rules of Court allowing
litigation in forma pauperis
▪ This means one is allowed to litigate as a pauper upon proper showing that he has no
means to prosecute an action or institute a defense.
▪ However, the provision has been interpreted to the effect that persons protected need not
be so poor that they must be supported at public expense. It suffices that the plaintiff is
indigent. Acar v Rosal
▪ The difference between a pauper and an indigent is that an indigent has no property or
sources of income sufficient for their support aside from their own labor, though self-
supporting when able to work and in employment. Acar v Rosal

40

SECTION 12
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right
to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel,
he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in
the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the
free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or
other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this Section as well
as compensation to the rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their
families.
SECTION SUMMARY:
The Section discusses the rights of a person under custodial investigation: the right to
remain silent, to have a competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice,
and to be informed of such rights. The section is our inculcation of the Miranda rights (See
Miranda Rights).
Most critical in this section is knowing when the rights become applicable, i.e., when does
a custodial investigation begin and what constitutes such (See When Applicable). The
investigation begins when inquiry has begun to focus on a particular suspect and the police
start eliciting incriminating statements. For better understanding of incriminating
statements, read with Section 17, Right against Self-Incrimination.
Right to counsel is qualified with the phrase, ‘competent and independent’. Emphasis on
independent, as this was the pitfall of several cases (See Right to Counsel). The counsel
must be present at all stages of the investigation.
If the rights are violated, whatever confession or admission taken shall be inadmissible as
evidence. Objection, however, must be timely (See When must objection be raised).
RIGHTS OF A PERSON UNDER INVESTIGATION
Article 3, Section 12(1)
1. The right to remain silent;
2. The right to have competent and independent counsel preferably his own choice; and
3. The right to be informed of such rights.
41
WHEN APPLICABLE
Custodial investigation. The right attaches once custodial investigation begins. A custodial
investigation refers to any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.
It is only after the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins
to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the police carries out a
process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements that the rule
begins to operate. People v Marra, citing Escobedo v Illinois.
o Philippine marine murdered; no presumption of regularity. The prosecution must
prove during the trial that prior to questioning, the confessant was warned of his
constitutionally protected rights. The presumption of regularity does not apply during in-
custody investigation. And even if the confession was gospel truth, if it was made without
assistance of counsel, it is inadmissible in evidence. People v Camat
o 100 checks for PNP equipment; general inquiry. The fact that she was invited by the
investigating committee does not by itself determine the nature of the investigation as
custodial. The investigator’s reminder of Tugaoen of her Miranda rights during the
investigation cannot be determinative of the nature of the investigation. In this case, it was
simply a general inquiry to clear the reported anomalies and irregularities within PNP. What
was conducted is an ordinary administrative investigation. Luspo v People
▪ “Invited for questioning”. RA 7438 has extended the constitutional guarantee to
situations in which an individual has not been formally arrested but has merely been invited
for questioning. People v Dumantay
MIRANDA RIGHTS
“You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law.
You have the right to an attorney. If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided for you. Do you
understand the rights I have just read to you? With these rights in mind, do you wish to speak to me?”
In Miranda v Arizona, the US Supreme Court said that the following constitutional requirements
must be observed in custodial investigations:
1. The person in custody must be informed at the outset in clear and unequivocal terms that
he has a right to remain silent.
2. After being so informed, he must be told that anything he says can and will be used against
him in court.
3. He must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the
lawyer with him during the interrogation. He does not have to ask for a lawyer; the
investigators should tell him that he has the right to counsel at that point.
 4. He should be warned that not only has he the right to consult with a lawyer but also that if
he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him.
5. Even if the person consents to answer questions without the assistance of counsel, the
moment he asks for a lawyer at any point in the investigation, the interrogation must cease
until an attorney is present.
6. If the foregoing protections and warnings are not demonstrated during trial to have been
observed by the prosecution, no evidence obtained as a result of the interrogation can be
used against him.
Miranda rights in PH Jurisprudence. The Miranda rights were incorporated in our
Constitution but were modified to include the statement that any waiver of the right to counsel
must be made ‘in writing and in the presence of counsel.’
The invocation of these rights applies during custodial investigations, i.e. after an arrest has
been made. However, with the effectivity of RA 7438, the definition of custodial investigation
expanded to ‘include the practice of issuing an 'invitation' to a person who is investigated in
connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability
of the 'inviting' officer for any violation of law." This means that even those who voluntarily
surrendered before a police officer must be apprised of their Miranda Rights. People v Chavez
o Murder of Barbie; voluntary surrender. The same pressures of a custodial setting exist
in the voluntary surrender. Chavez was also questioned by an investigating officer in a
police station. Lastly, he may have been compelled to surrender to surrender by his mother
who accompanied him to the police station. People v Chavez
CIRCUMSTANCES NOT COVERED
o Metrobank employee estafa; does not apply to administrative proceedings. The right
to counsel referred in Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is meant to protect a suspect in a
custodial investigation and thus applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation.
It does not apply to statements made during a time when the person was not arrested nor
restrained of his liberty nor when questioning was not initiated by a law enforcement
authority but by an internal affairs manager of the bank. Tanengee v People
▪ An open and public confession before media men is admissible as the confession does not
form part of custodial investigation because it was not given to police officers. People v
Endino
▪ A confession made to a private individual is not covered because the person is not under
custodial investigation. People v Tawat
42
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
…and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice.
The right to counsel involves more than just the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or the
mere propounding of standard questions and objections; rather it means an efficient and
decisive legal assistance and not a simple perfunctory representation. In particular, the
independent counsel for the accused in custodial investigations cannot be a special counsel,
public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is
averse to the accused. That is, there is conflict of interest. People v Sunga
o Rape in Palawan; City legal officer not allowed. A legal officer of the city provides legal
aid and support to the mayor and the city in carrying out the delivery of basic services to
the people, which includes maintenance of peace and order and, as such, his office is akin
to that of a prosecutor who unquestionably cannot represent the accused during custodial
investigation due to conflict of interest. Id
o Same; Right to counsel applicable in preliminary investigations. The preliminary
investigation can be no different from the in-custody interrogations by the police, for a
suspect who takes part in a preliminary investigation will be subjected to no less than the
State's processes, oftentimes intimidating and relentless, of pursuing those who might be
liable for criminal prosecution. In the case at bar, Sunga was thrust into the preliminary
investigation and while he did have a counsel, for the latter's lack of vigilance and
commitment to Sunga's rights, he was virtually denied his right to counsel. Id
o Same; Testimony of the accused may be inadmissible even if accused himself chose
the counsel. In the same case above, it is of no moment that the accused himself chose
the city legal officer as his counsel because it does not appear that duty of law enforcers to
inform him of his Constitutional rights during custodial interrogations to their full, proper
and precise extent has been discharged. Having a low educational attainment, he could
not have known the ramifications of his decision. Id
o Firing range robbery and murder; right to counsel. An effective and vigilant counsel
requires that a lawyer be present and able to advise and assist his client from the time the
confessant answers the first question asked by the investigation officer until the signing of
the extrajudicial confession. People v Ibanez
o Effective and vigilant counsel. The lawyer called to be present during custodial
investigations should, as far as reasonably possible, be the choice of the individual
undergoing questioning. If the lawyer is furnished by the police for the accused, it is
important that the lawyer should be competent, independent and prepared to fully
safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused, as distinguished from one who would
 merely be giving a routine, peremptory and meaningless recital of the individual's
constitutional rights. Id
o This is intended to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit
something false. However, the lawyer should not prevent the accused from saying
something true. People v Layuso
o This constitutional right extends only to testimonial compulsion and not when the body of
the accused is supposed to be examined. People v Gamboa
Police line-ups. Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It may
be done thru police line-ups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons
lined up for the purpose. In resolving the admissibility of and relying on such identification of
suspects, the courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test.
TOTALITY OF CIRCUMSTANCES TEST
1. The witness’ opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime;
2. The witness’ degree of attention at that time;
3. The accuracy of any prior description, given by the witness;
4. The level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification;
5. The length of time between the crime and the identification; and
6. The suggestiveness of the identification procedure.
o Firing range robbery and murder; police line-up. The failure to state relevant details
surrounding the police line-up is a glaring omission that renders unreliable the out-of-
court identification. People v Ibanez
o Vagrancy case; no right to counsel yet. The police line-up is not a part of the custodial
inquest. Hence, Gamboa was not yet entitled, at such stage to counsel. When the process
had not yet shifted from the investigatory to the accusatory as when police investigation
does not elicit a confession, the accused may not yet avail of the services of his lawyer
Gamboa v Judge Cruz
❖ Discussion: However, if a person already under custodial investigation is placed in a police
line-up, he is already entitled to these rights. People v Macam
Res inter alios acta. The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or
omission of another. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the
confessant and is not admissible against their co-accused because it is considered as hearsay
against them. People v Ibanez
An exception to the rule is an admission made by a conspirator. In order that the admission of
a conspirator be received against their co-conspirators, the following requisites must be met.
43
ADMISSION OF A CO-CONSPIRATOR
1. The conspiracy must first be proved by evidence other than the admission itself;
2. The admission relates to the common object; and
3. It has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy.
o Firing range robbery and murder; circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence
consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the main fact in issue
may be inferred based on reason and common experience. People v Ibane
o Same; Conviction from circumstantial evidence. A conviction can be secured on the
basis of circumstantial evidence if the established circumstances constitute an unbroken
chain leading to a fair and reasonable conclusion proving that the accused is the author of
the crime to the exclusion of all the others. Id
CONVICTION BY CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
1. There is more than one circumstance;
2. The facts from which the inferences are derived have been established; and
3. The combination of all the circumstances unavoidably leads to a finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
Buy bust operations. Consider the same conditions/jurisprudence for right against self-
incrimination (Section 17).
o Marijuana cigarettes; marked money. Although the accused was not assisted by counsel
when he initialed the P10-bills (the marked money), his right against self-incrimination was
not violated for his possession of the marked bills did not constitute a crime – he was being
prosecuted for selling marijuana cigarettes. People v Linsangan
o Cardinal Santos buy bust; signature on list of items seized. The accused’s signature on
the receipt or list of items confiscated from him is inadmissible in evidence as there is no
showing that he was assisted by counsel. Conformance to these documents are
declarations against interest and tacit admissions of the crime charged, since merely
unexplained possession of prohibited drugs is punished by law. People v Ang Chun Kit
o Same; booking sheet and arrest report. When an arrested person signs a Booking Sheet
and Arrest Report at a police station, he does not admit the commission of an offense nor
confess to any incriminating circumstance. The booking sheet is merely a police report; it
is not an extra-judicial statement and cannot be the basis of a judgment of conviction. Id
When must objection be raised. Objection to evidence must be made after the evidence is
formally offered. In the case of documentary evidence, offer is made after all the witnesses of
the part making the offer have testified, specifying the purpose for which the evidence is being
offered. It is only at this time, and not at any other, that objection to the documentary evidence
may be made. Macasiray v People
- Note: The court also noted that this does not preclude the parties from objecting to the
admissibility of document during the trial. The period after the evidence is formally offered
is only the final point where a party may object.

CONFESSION V ADMISSION
Confession. A confession is the declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the
offense charged, or any offense necessarily included therein.
Admission. An admission is the declaration or omission of party as to a relevant fact.
o Metrobank employee estafa. A confession or admission is presumed voluntary until the
contrary is proved and the confessant bears the burden of proving the contrary. Tanengee
v People
ADMISSIBILITY OF EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSIONS
1. The confession must be voluntary;
2. The confession must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel;
3. The confession must be express;
4. The confession must be made in writing; and
5. The confession must be signed or, if the confessant does not know how to read and write,
thumb marked by him.

44

SECTION 13
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired
even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not
be required.
SECTION SUMMARY:
The right to bail is available to everyone except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong.
For a long time, the right is only available to criminal proceedings but with the development
in Gov’t of HK v Olalia, the right has been extended to extradition proceedings.
Excessive bail is prohibited. There are factors which are used in determining bail, but the
overriding consideration is that the amount must not tantamount to a refusal of the right
and render nugatory the right to bail.
Take note of the Enrile v Sandiganbayan case, where the SC allowed Enrile to post bail
even though his case falls within the exception of the right on humanitarian grounds (See
Humanitarian ground). The ruling differs from the doctrines in several cases cited in the
Primer, particularly on the mandatory nature of hearings, consideration of mitigating
circumstances, and age or illness as a grant to bail. It is recommended that one read the
ruling.
Right to bail. Bail is a mode short of confinement which would, with reasonable certainty,
insure the attendance of the accused at his trial. It usually takes the form of a money deposit
or its equivalent as a guarantee of such attendance and which deposit is forfeited upon failure
to appear.
REASONS FOR GRANTING BAIL
1. To honor the presumption of innocence until guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt.
2. To enable him to prepare his defense without being subject to punishment prior to
conviction.
Who may avail of the right. All persons actually detained, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua or death when evidence is strong. Additionally, a soldier
under court martial does not enjoy the right to bail.
o Extraditee. An extradition proceeding, while administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal
process. A potential extradite may be subjected to arrest and to a prolonged restraint of
liberty. While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extradite, there
is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail. Govt of HK v Olalia
45
o Not a flight risk. The prospective extradite bears the onus probandi of showing that he or
she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail. The standard for granting bail in
extradition cases is clear and convincing evidence. Id
NO RIGHT TO BAIL
1. The accused is charged with an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or death; and
2. The evidence against him is strong.
The loss of the right to bail can only be determined after hearing.
BAIL, WHEN DISCRETIONARY
Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1997 Rules of Court
Section 5: Bail, when discretionary – Upon conviction the RTC of an offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, the court, on application may admit the accused to bail.
XXX
If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six years, but not more than twenty years, the
accused shall be denied bail, or his bail previously granted shall be cancelled, upon a showing of the
prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or similar circumstances:
a. That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime
aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
b. That the accused is found to have previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence or has
violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
c. That the accused committed the offense while on probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
d. That the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or
e. That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, the accused may commit another crime.
Duties of the trial judge. Bail hearings are mandatory in character. When bail is a matter of
right, the hearing determines the amount of bail. On the other hand, when the accused is
charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the hearing
determines both the amount of the bail and the determination of whether the evidence of guilt
is strong. Cortes v Catral
DUTIES OF THE TRIAL JUDGE
1. Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his
recommendation.
2. Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution
refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused strong for the purpose of
enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion.
3. Decide whether the evidence of guilt is strong based on the summary of evidence of the
prosecution.
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the
bail bond. Otherwise, petition should be denied.
Prohibition against excessive bail. Where the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered Humanitarian ground. Before, humanitarian ground on the mere claim of illness or old age is
nugatory by requiring a sum that is excessive. If there were no such prohibition, the right to not a ground for discretionary grant of bail. People v Fitzgerald. However, with the decision of
bail becomes meaningless. De la Camara v Engage Enrile v Sandiganbayan, the Court has allowed humanitarian considerations as a ground for
o P5,500,000 bail. Bail is not intended as a punishment, nor as a satisfaction of civil liability granting bail.
which should necessarily await the judgment of the appellate court. Yap, Jr. v CA o Enrile case. Comment before the actual ratio: The ruling in this case is TERRIBLE. See the
dissenting opinion of J Leonen to see why.
FACTORS TO CONSIDER IN GRANTING BAIL o Tumakbo pa nga para sa senado, humanitarian reason. The national commitment to
Villasenor v Abano uphold the fundamental human rights has authorized the grant of bail not only to those
1. Ability to post bail; charged in criminal proceedings but also to extradites upon a clear and convincing showing
2. Nature of the offense; that (1) the detainee is not a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) there exist
3. Penalty imposed by law; special, humanitarian, and compelling circumstances. Enrile v Sandiganbayan
4. Character and reputation of the o Buti natalo. Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged,
accused; should be allowed independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued
5. Health of the accused; incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger his life. Id
6. Strength of the evidence; - Comment: Does this mean that a bail hearing to determine whether the evidence of
7. Probability of appearing for trial; guilt is strong is no longer necessary provided continued incarceration is injurious or
8. Forfeiture of bonds; endangers the life of the accused? It seems so.
9. Whether the accused was a fugitive - Note: Plunder is punishable by RP to death. Hence, there must be a hearing to
from justice when arrested; and determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong. For purposes of bail, the presence
10. If under bond in other cases. of mitigating circumstances is not considered. These are only appreciated in the
imposition of the property penalty after conviction.
Important consideration. Discretion is with the court called upon to rule on the question of
Recognizance. It is an obligation of record entered into before a court guaranteeing the
bail. We must stress, however, that where conditions imposed upon a defendant seeking bail
appearance of the accused for trial. It is in the nature of a contract between the surety and the
would amount to a refusal thereof and render nugatory the constitutional right to bail, we will
state.
not hesitate to exercise our supervisory powers to provide the required remedy. Id
Note: In other words, while the above-stated factors are important, the decisive consideration
is that the amount must not be tantamount to a refusal of the right to bail.

Strong evidence of guilt. This means proof evident or presumption great. The test is not
whether the evidence establishes guilt beyond reasonable doubt but rather whether it shows
evident guilt or great presumption of guilt.
There is proof evident when there is clear, strong evidence which leads a well-guarded
dispassionate judgment to the conclusion that the offense has been committed as charged,
that accused is the guilty agent, and that he will probably be punished capitally if the law is
administered.
There is presumption great when the circumstances testified to are such that the inference of
guilt naturally to be drawn therefrom is strong, clear, and convincing to an unbiased judgment
and excludes all reasonable probability of any other conclusion.

46

SECTION 14
(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary
is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and
public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to
secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf.
However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the
accused provided that he has been duly informed and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable.
SECTION SUMMARY:
The provision guarantees the right to due process in criminal proceedings. A violation of
any of the rights enumerated is a violation of the right to due process.
An accused is presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable
doubt. But this does not preclude the State from designating what acts constitute prima
facie evidence of guilt, thus shifting the burden of proof to the accused (See Presumption
of Innocence).
The rights are as enumerated: right to be present at trial, to be assisted by counsel, to be
informed, to a speedy trial, to an impartial judge, to a public trial, to confrontation, and to
compulsory process.
The right to be present at a trial is straightforward. Notably, the provision provides a
situation wherein the accused can waive this right – trial in absentia. The right to
compulsory process is also related to this right.
The right to be assisted by counsel is no longer qualified by ‘preferably of his own choice’,
nor is the requirement of an independent counsel imposed.
The right to be informed mostly involves the technical accuracy required in the
Information.
The right to a speedy trial is a relative term, decided on a case to case basis. Read with
Section 16, Right to speedy disposition of cases.
The rights to an impartial and to a public trial are straightforward.
47
DUE PROCESS IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
This simply means that the procedure established by law should be followed. US v Ocampo The
clause is limited to the procedures. US v Grant
This criminal due process clause presupposes that the penal law being applied satisfies the
substantive requirements of due process.
The Court held that due process is satisfied if the accused is informed as to why he is proceeded
against and what charge he has to meet, with his conviction being made to rest on evidence
that is not tainted with falsity after full opportunity for him to rebut it and the sentence being
imposed in accordance with valid law. It is assumed that the court that rendered the judgement
is one of competent jurisdiction. Nunez v Sandiganbayan
o “Do you have an attorney, or do you plead guilty?” Not only did the question fail to
inform the accused that it was his right to have an attorney before arraignment, but, worse,
the question was so framed that it could have been construed by the accused as a
suggestion from the court that he plead guilty if he had no attorney. This is a denial of fair
hearing in violation of the due process clause. People v Holgado
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
The accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.
The Constitution mandates that an accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved beyond reasonable doubt. In a criminal prosecution, the burden is upon the State to
prove every fact and circumstance constituting the crime charged, for the purpose of showing
guilt of the accused. US v Luling
The quantum of evidence needed to overcome the presumption is proof beyond reasonable
doubt. For as long as the defense is able to present evidence enough to create reasonable
doubt, the presumption remains.
Reasonable doubt is that doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an
inability after such investigation to let the mind rest upon certainty of guilt.
o Shifting the burden of proof to the accused. The state having the right to declare what
acts are criminal has a right to specify what act or acts constitute a crime, as well as what
proof shall constitute prima facie evidence of guilt, and then to put upon the defendant
the burden of showing that such act or acts are innocent and are not committed with any
criminal intent or intention. US v Luling
o Filing of charges disqualifies candidacy. The challenged proviso contravenes the
constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running from
public office on the ground alone that charges have been filed against him. In effect, no
distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of disloyalty and one whom charges
have been filed for such acts. Dumlao v COMELEC
▪ Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by law to convict a criminal, but moral certainty
is required as to every proposition of proof requisite to constitute the offense. Mupas v
People
 ▪ Equipose rule. The rule provides that where the evidence of the parties in a criminal case RIGHT TO BE ASSISTED BY COUNSEL
is evenly balanced, the constitutional presumption of innocence should tilt the scales in …and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel…
favor of the accused. Malana v People The accused enjoys this right because there is a realistic recognition that the average defendant
does not have the professional skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with
RIGHT TO BE HEARD power to take his life or liberty. Johnson v Zerbst
The right to be heard represents the totality of the rights available to the accused in a criminal
PRE-ARRAIGNMENT DUTIES OF A TRIAL JUDGE
execution.
1. Inform the accused that he has the right to have his own counsel before being arraigned;
RIGHTS AVAILABLE
2. After giving such information, to ask accused whether he desires the aid of counsel;
1. Right to be present at the trial;
3. If he so desires to procure the services of counsel, the court must grant him reasonable
2. Right to counsel;
time to do so; and
3. Right to be informed;
4. If he so desires to have counsel but is unable to employ one, the court must assign counsel
4. Right to a speedy trial;
de oficio to defend him.
5. Right to an impartial judge;
6. Right to confrontation; o “Do you have an attorney, or do you plead guilty?” In criminal cases, there can be no
7. Right to a public trial; and fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. People v
8. Right to compulsory process to Holgado
secure the attendance of witnesses. Counsel of his own choice. The preference in the choice of counsel pertains more aptly and
RIGHT TO BE PRESENT AT TRIAL specifically to a person under custodial investigation (Art III, Sec 12 (1)) rather than one who is
However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that the accused in a criminal prosecution (Art III, Sec 14(2)). Amion v Judge Chiongson
he has been duly informed and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. ❖ Discussion: This means that the qualification of a ‘competent and independent’ counsel is
no longer required for an accused in a criminal proceeding. However, the counsel must still
The scope of this right covers the period from arraignment to promulgation of sentence.
be qualified in the sense that he must be a member of the bar (See Delgado v CA, primer).
However, the trial may proceed even in the absence of the accused, provided that certain
requisites have been met. This is called a trial in absentia. RIGHT TO BE INFORMED
…to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him…
REQUISITES FOR TRIAL IN ABSENTIA PURPOSE OF THE RIGHT
1. The accused has already been arraigned; 1. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him
2. He has been duly notified of the trial; and to make his defense;
3. His failure to appear is unjustifiable. 2. To avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution
Valid waiver. The right may be waived provided that after arraignment he may be compelled for the same cause (See Art III, Sec 21, on double jeopardy); and
to appear for the purpose of identification by the witnesses of the prosecution, or provided he 3. To inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient
unqualifiedly admits in open court after arraignment that he is the person named as the in law to support a conviction.
defendant in the case on trial. Carredo v People With regard to this last requirement, facts must be stated instead of conclusions of law. In
o It is not enough that the accused allows himself to be identified by the witnesses in his other words, the complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and
absence. In order for him to be completely excused from appearance, he must unqualifiedly circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged.
admit that every time a witness mentions a name by which he is known, the witness is Information. An information is an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense,
understood as referring to him. Id subscribed by the prosecutor and filed with the court. The purpose of the requirement for the
- Note: See Right to Compulsory Process for the clarification on trial in absentia. information’s validity and sufficiency is to enable the accused to suitably prepare for his defense

48
since he is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the
offense. People v Ching
REQUIREMENTS OF A VALID INFORMATION
A valid and sufficient information must state:
1. Name of the accused;
2. Designation of the offense given by the statute;
3. Acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense;
4. Name of the offended party;
5. Approximate date of the commission of the offense; and
6. Place where the offense was committed.
o Homicide in Masbate town fiesta; complex must be proven. The accused cannot be
convicted of the complex crime of murder with assault upon an agent of a person in
authority. The killing cannot be qualified as murder because neither treachery nor evident
premeditation can be properly appreciated. Moreover, the appellant cannot be convicted
of the complex crime with assault because information filed did not allege the essential
elements of assault. That the accused did not object cannot likewise cure the defect in the
information, because to do so would be convicting the accused of a crime not properly
alleged in the information in violation of his constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him. People v Regala
o Qualified rape; circumstance wrongly alleged. The Court ruled has ruled that the
circumstances that qualify a crime should be alleged and proved beyond reasonable doubt
as the crime itself. The technical flaw in this case comes from the information which alleged
that the accused is the stepfather of the victim, whereas he was actually the common law
spouse of the mother of the victim. Since the qualifying circumstance of ‘common law
spouse’ was not alleged in the information, he could not be convicted of qualified rape as
he was not properly informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. People
v Begino
o Exact date not required in rape. Section 11, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides that it is not necessary to state in the information the precise date the
offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient of the offense, and the
offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual
date of its commission. People v Ching
o Exact date not required in rape. In rape cases, failure to specify the exact dates or times
when the rapes occurred does not ipso facto make the information defective on its face.
The date or time of the commission of the rape is not a material ingredient because the
gravamen of rape is carnal knowledge of a woman through force and intimidation. Id
49
RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL
…to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial…
The concept is necessarily relative and determination of whether the right has been violated
must be based on the balancing of various factors. Length of the trial is certainly a factor to
consider; but other factors such as the reason for the delay, the effort of the defendant to assert
his right, and the prejudice caused the defendant must also be considered.
o Midwife blues. Where a prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures postponements
of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable period of time, as in this
instance for more than a year, the accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus
to compel a dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas
corpus to obtain his freedom. Conde v Rivera
- Note: Dismissal for violation of the right to speedy trial is equivalent to acquittal and
is a bar to another prosecution for the same offense (See double jeopardy, Art III Sec
21).
RIGHT TO AN IMPARTIAL TRIAL
…to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial…
Due process of law requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal and that
every litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. People v
Angcap
o Homicide in Masbate town fiesta. While the quoted portions of the judgment are
interspersed with statements and phrases which properly should not have been made, such
statements and phrases do not per se constitute evidence of bias and partiality in the
conduct of the trial. The record shows that the trial judge examined extensively the
testimonies of all the eight witnesses of the defense. People v Regala
o Repudiation of extrajudicial statement. Rolando Reyes made an extra-judicial statement
purporting to describe the manner of the commission of the crime before respondent
judge. However, this statement was later on repudiated by accused as the product of
intimidation. Respondent judge’s refusal to inhibit himself from deciding the case,
considering that Reyes’ action almost certainly affronted the judge, does not meet the
requirement of due process for the ‘cold neutrality of a judge’ is not met. Mateo, Jr. v Villaluz
o Maguindanao massacre; media coverage. Petitioners correctly explain that prejudicial
publicity insofar as it undermines the right to a fair trial must pass the ‘totality of
circumstances test’, that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free
press, that pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to said right, and that there must be
an allegation and proof of the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision.
Mere fear of possible undue influence is not tantamount to actual prejudice resulting the
deprivation of the right to a fair trial. In re Ampatuan
o Same. In this case, the Court granted the media request for live broadcast by television and
radio of the court proceedings of the Maguindanao Massacre cases. Id
▪ Impartiality is imperative even in the investigations that precede the trial, and also in the
decision-making process that follows the trial. As opposed to the interpretation in People
v Jose, these rights are not merely applicable upon prosecution (arraignment). It is possible
for a judge who inherits a case from another judge to decide a case fairly.It is sufficient in
such circumstances that the judge, in deciding the case, must base it completely on the
cold record before him, in the same manner as appellate courts when they review that
evidence of the case raised to them on appeal. People v Narajos
Effect of a partial trial. If it appears that the appellant was not given a fair and impartial trial
because if the trial judge’s bias or prejudice, the Court will order a new trial, if it deems it
necessary, in the interest of justice.
RIGHT TO A PUBLIC TRIAL
…to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial…
Public trial. A trial is public when attendance is open to all irrespective of relationship to
defendants. However, when evidence to be presented may be characterized as ‘offensive to
decency or public morals’, the proceeding may be limited to friends, relatives, and counsel.
Garcia v Domingo
Purpose. The purpose of the guarantee is to serve ‘as a safeguard against any attempt to
employ our courts as instruments of persecution.
When available. The right becomes available during trial which begins only upon arraignment,
and not during the preliminary investigation.
o One-man grand jury. Summary trials for alleged misconduct called the contempt of court
have not been regarded as an exception to the universal rule against secret trials. It is the
law of the land that no man’s life, liberty, or property be forfeited as a punishment until
there has been a charge fairly made and fairly tried in a public tribunal. In re Oliver
RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION
…to meet the witnesses face to face…
Purpose. The right has a two-fold purpose: (1) to afford the accused an opportunity to test the
testimony of the witness by cross-examination, and (2) to allow the judge to observe the
deportation of the witness.
o Philippine Marine murdered. An accused’s right to meet the witnesses face to face is
limited to proceedings before the trial court. According, this is not available to him during
a custodial investigation. People v Camat
o Yamin, Islamic oath. Under Section 7 of the Special Rules of Procedure under Shari’a
Courts, if the plaintiff has no evidence to prove his claim, the defendant shall take the oath
(‘yamin’) and judgment shall be rendered in his favor. Said provision effectively deprives a
litigant of his right to due process. It denies a party his right to confront the witnesses
against him and to cross-examine them.
50
EXCEPTIONS
1. The admissibility of ‘dying declarations’
2. Trial in absentia under Section 14(2)
RIGHT TO COMPULSORY PROCESS
…to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his
behalf.
In relation to trial in absentia. The provision authorizing the trial in absentia of the accused
simply means that he thereby waives his right to meet the witnesses face to face among others.
However, such waiver of appearance and trial in absentia does not meant that the prosecution
is thereby deprived of its right to require the presence of the accused for purposes of
identification by its witnesses which is vital for the conviction of the accused. The accused may
waive his right but not his duty or obligation to appear in court whenever required. Carredo v
People
MILITARY TRIBUNALS
Since it is the primary business of armies and navies to fight or be ready to fight wars should
the occasion arise, the military is a specialized society distinct from civilian. Greenbook
For this reason, military justice has traditionally been characterized by features which emphasize
summary procedures, speedy convictions and stern penalties with a view to maintaining
obedience and fighting fitness in the ranks.
▪ In American jurisprudence, military courts cannot have jurisdiction over civilians when
civilian courts are open and functioning. Ex parte Milligan
▪ However, such doctrine did not sit well with the PH SC, at least in cases decided before the
promulgation of the 1987 Constitution.
▪ Aquino, Jr. v Military Commission (1975): When absolutely imperative for public safety, legal
process can be superseded, and military tribunals authorized to exercise jurisdiction
normally vested in the courts.
▪ Olaguer v Military Commission No 34 (1987): this overturned the doctrine above. It was held
that a military commission or tribunal cannot try and exercise jurisdiction, even during
martial law, over civilians for offenses allegedly committed by them as long as the civil
courts are open and functioning, and that any judgment rendered by such body relating to
a civilian is null and void for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the military tribunal
concerned.
▪ However, it was held in Tan v Barrios that the doctrine is applicable only to future cases
and cases still ongoing or not yet final when the decision was promulgated. The trial of
thousands of civilians for common crimes before military tribunals is on operative fact that
may not justly be ignored.
 SECTION 15
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of
invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it.

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

The writ is directed to the person detaining another, commanding him to produce the body of
the prisoner at a designated time and place, with the day and cause of his caption and
detention, to do, submit to, and receive whatever the court or judge awarding the writ shall
consider in that behalf.
Hence, an essential requisite for the availability of the writ is actual deprivation of personal
liberty.
Privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. It is the right to have an immediate determination of
the legality of the deprivation of physical liberty.
o The writ does not lie when the person has been lawfully detained. Harvey v Defensor
Santiago
o The writ does not lie against those who have been released on bail. Umil v Ramos

51
 SECTION 16
All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial,
quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.

Speedy trial and speedy disposition of cases. Speedy trial in Section 14 covers only the trial
phase of criminal cases, whereas Section 16 covers all phases of any judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative proceedings.

Speedy disposition of cases. The concept is a relative term and flexible concept. In
determining whether the right has been violated, the factors considered and balanced are
length of delay, reason for delay, assertion of the right or failure to assert it, and prejudice
caused by the delay. Caballero v Alfonso, Jr.
Remedy. The proper remedy is mandamus.

CASE BREAKDOWN: BINAY V SANDIGANBAYAN

Applies to all cases and proceedings involving the administration of justice. The
constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases is not limited to the accused in criminal
proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases and in all proceedings. Hence, any party to a
case may demand expeditious action on all officials who are tasked with the administration of
justice.
Violation of the right. The right is deemed violated only when the proceedings is attended by
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or unjustified postponements of the trial are asked
and secured; or when without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to
elapse without the party having the case tried.
Factors to consider. The conduct of both prosecution and defendant is weighed against
factors such as the length of the delay, reasons for the delay, the assertion or failure to assert
such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay. (See also Right to Speedy
Trial)

52

SECTION 17
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
SECTION SUMMARY:
The right to self-incrimination generally applies only to testimonial compulsion, but it has
been extended to all giving or furnishing of evidence (See Handwriting, Beltran v Samson).
This excludes the body of the accused, or objects and substances on his person (See
Physical Examination).
The right can be asserted in judicial, administrative, or legislative inquiries or proceedings
(See Asserting the Right). In such proceedings, the accused cannot be compelled to be a
witness or to take the witness stand. He can, however, waive the right.
Purpose. The right against self-incrimination was created on the grounds of public policy and
humanity. It was established to remove the temptation on the side of the accused to commit
perjury or to prevent the extorting of confession by duress.
o Illegal detention (circa 1904). The provision has the effect of forcing a defendant to
become a witness in his own behalf or to take a much severer punishment. The evidence
necessary to clear the defendant, under Art 483 of the Penal Code, would have the effect
of convicting him under Art 481. This should not be. US v Navarro
o Same; in relation to presumption of innocence. It is the duty of the prosecution to
produce evidence showing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; and the accused cannot be
called upon either by express words or acts to assist in the production of such evidence,
nor should his silence be taken as proof against him. He has a right to rely on the
presumption of innocence until the prosecution proves him guilty of every element of the
crime charged. Id
Incriminating question. A question tends to incriminate when it elicits one of the elements of
a criminal act. The right thus includes the right to refuse to testify to a fact which would be a
necessary link in a chain of evidence to prove the commission of a crime by a witness.
Physical examination. What is prohibited by the constitutional guarantee is the use of physical
or moral compulsion to extort communication from the witness, not an inclusion of his body in
evidence, when it may be material. US v Tan Teng
Stated otherwise, the right against self-incrimination applies only to testimonial compulsion.
o Gonorrhea case. The accused was not compelled to make any admission or answer any
questions, and the mere fact that an object found upon his body was examined seems no
more to infringe the rule invoked (self-incrimination) than would the introduction of stolen
property taken from the person of a thief. Hence, the semen collected from the accused,
used as proof of the accused having gonorrhea, corroborates the victim’s testimony of
being raped. US v Tan Teng
53
o Morphine discharged from the mouth. It would be forced construction to hold that any
article, substance, or thing taken from a person accused pf crime could not be given in
evidence. There is no violation of the right. US v Ong Siu Hong
o Pregnant woman. The constitutional guarantee is limited to a prohibition against
compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. On a proper showing and under an order of the
trial court, an ocular inspection of the body of the accused is permissible. People v Otadora
Handwriting. The privilege is not limited precisely to testimony but extends to all giving or
furnishing of evidence. It is well-established that the constitutional inhibition is directed not
merely to giving of oral testimony but embraces as well as the furnishing of evidence by other
means than by word of mouth. Beltran v Samson
o Handwriting; an intelligent action. Writing is something more than moving the body; it
is not a purely mechanical act; it requires intelligence and attention. The present case is
more serious than that of compelling the production of documents, because the witness is
compelled to write and create, by means of writing, evidence which does not exist, and
which may identify him as the falsifier. The petitioner cannot be compelled to provide his
handwriting for the purpose of submitting it for comparison. Id
o Same; Waiver of right. The privilege, while absolute when claimed, may be waived by
anyone entitled to invoke it. Id
Persons protected. The self-incrimination clause only protects natural persons. Thus, a
corporation may be compelled to submit to the visitorial powers of the State, even if this will
result in disclosure of criminal acts of the corporation. Wilson v US
ASSERTING THE RIGHT
The right is available for any judicial or administrative proceeding, or in any official government
enquiry (e.g. legislative inquiry). The provision applies whenever the proceeding is not ‘purely
remedial’ or intended as a redress for a private grievance, but primarily to punish ‘a violation
of duty or a public wrong and to deter others from offending in a like manner. Cabal v Kapunan,
Jr
Criminal proceedings. In a criminal proceeding, the right can be asserted from the moment
that the accused is asked to testify. He has an absolute right to be silent. For the witness who
is not the accused, he may assert the right only when the incrimination question is asked.
Civil proceedings. In a civil case, the petitioner must wait until the incriminating question is
asked. Bagadiong v Gonzales
Administrative proceedings. It depends on the nature of the hearing. If a penalty may be
imposed by the administrative body, such as the forfeiture of property or the revocation of a
license, then the right may be asserted.
o AFP Chief of Staff corruption allegations, criminal proceedings. It is not disputed that
the accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory questions, but,
also, to take the witness stand. Cabal v Kapunan, Jr.
o Same; forfeiture penal in nature. The petitioner refused to be sworn to as a witness or
take the witness stand before a committee tasked to investigate allegations of unexplained
wealth. The Court ruled that a person may not be compelled to answer any question as a
witness which would subject him to a penalty of forfeiture, or to testify in an action against
him for a penalty. The privilege applies even though the action or proceedings for its
enforcement is not brought in a criminal court but is prosecuted through the modes of
procedure applicable to an ordinary civil remedy. Id
o Hearing for malpractice. In an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for
alleged malpractice, the respondent Board cannot compel the person proceeded against
to take the witness stand without his consent. Pascual, Jr v Board of Medical Examiners
o Same; right to silence. Respondent Board is mistaken in assuming that the constitutional
guarantee is limited to allowing a witness to object the questions which would incriminate
him. The guarantee also protects the right to silence. ‘The accused has a perfect right to
remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a presumption of guilt.’ The Court has also
affirmed the right of a defendant to ‘forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses
to take the witness stand – with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free genuine will.’
Id

54
 SECTION 18
(1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and aspirations.
(2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.

Involuntary servitude. It is every condition of enforced or compulsory service of one to

another no matter under what form such servitude may be disguised.

EXCEPTIONS TO INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE

1. Involuntary servitude may be served as punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have
been duly convicted. Art III, Sec 18(2)
2. In the interest of national defense, all citizens may be compelled by law to render personal
military or civil service. Art II, Sec 4
3. A return to work order.

55

SECTION 19
(1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading, or inhuman punishment
inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty
already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
(2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any
prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under
subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law.
SECTION SUMMARY:
The Section covers the prohibition against excessive fines, and cruel, degrading, or inhuman
penalties as well as the requirements for the re-imposition of the death penalty.
The prohibition looks at the character or form of the punishment, rather than the severity
of the penalty (See Excessive Fines and Cruel, Degrading, or Inhuman Punishments). In
case the penalty is severe relative to the offense committed, Art 5 of the RPC is applied.
Death penalty, per se, is not cruel or inhuman. However, it was still abolished in the 1987
Constitution but allowing for future imposition through Congress. The case of People v
Echegaray discusses the death penalty extensively: why it was abolished, the requirements
for re-imposing it, and what classifies as crimes punishable by death.
EXCESSIVE FINES
A fine is excessive when under any circumstance it is disproportionate to the offense.
DUTY OF THE COURT IN CASES OF EXCESSIVE PENALTIES
Article 5(b) of the RPC
Section 5: Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but which are not
covered by the law, and in cases of excessive penalties
XXX
In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such
statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict
enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty,
taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense
Duty of the courts. The duty of the court is merely to apply the law in such a way that it shall
not usurp legislative powers by judicial legislation and that in the course of such application or
construction, it should not make or supervise legislation or under the guise of interpretation,
modify, revise, or rewrite the law.
56
PROPORTIONALITY OF SENTENCE TO CRIME
1. Compare the nature and gravity of the offense, and the harshness of the penalty;
2. Compare the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction, i.e., whether
more serious crimes are subject to the same penalty or to less serious penalties; and
3. Compare the sentences imposed for the commission of the same crime in other
jurisdictions.
CRUEL, DEGRADING, OR INHUMAN PUNISHMENTS
It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a penalty to
be obnoxious to the Constitution.
o Illegal possession of firearms. The fact that the punishment authorized by the statute is
severe does not make it cruel and unusual. In other words, it has been held that to come
under the ban, the punishment must be flagrantly and plainly offensive, wholly
disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community.
People v Estoista
o Excessive fine. The prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is generally aimed at the
form or character of the punishment rather than its severity in respect of duration or
amount, and applies to punishments which public sentiment has regarded as cruel or
obsolete. People v Corpuz
DETERMINING CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENTS
1. A punishment must not be so severe as to be degrading to the dignity of human beings.
2. It must not be applied arbitrarily.
3. It must not be unacceptable to contemporary society.
4. It must not be excessive – it must serve a penal purpose more effectively than a less severe
punishment would.
Note: The ‘unusual’ expression has been dropped and replaced with ‘degrading and inhuman’
in the 1987 Constitution.
LEADING CASE: PEOPLE V ECHEGARAY
The following subtopics are discussed extensively in the case of People v Echegaray, where the
accused-appellant contested the constitutionality of RA 7659, the death penalty law, for (1)
being unable to meet the constitutional requirement of compelling reasons therefor; and (2)
being cruel, excessive, and inhuman.
(1) REIMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY
The constitutional framers of the 1987 Constitution abolished the death penalty at the time of
its effectivity but it did not prohibit the Congress from re-imposing the penalty, provided it
meets certain requirements.
 REASONS FOR ABOLISHING THE DEATH PENALTY 3. When upon appeal or automatic review of the case by the Supreme Court, the required
1. It inflicts traumatic pain not just on the convict but also on the family, even if the penalty is majority vote is not obtained for the imposition of the death penalty.
not carried out;
Judicial and legislative facts. The mandatory character of the death penalty for heinous crimes
2. There is no convincing evidence that it acts effectively as a deterrent of serious crime;
as prescribed and defined under RA 7659 does not preclude the courts from, given mitigating
3. Penology favors reformation rather than vindictive penalties;
factors or conditions duly established in evidence, (a) declaring the crime to be non-heinous in
4. Human life is too previous a gift to be placed at the discretion of a human judge; and
character, or (b) from concluding that no compelling reasons exist to warrant imposition of the
5. The law itself, by imposing so many safeguards before a death penalty is carried out,
death penalty.
manifests a reluctance to impose the death penalty
(2) DEATH PENALTY NOT CRUEL.
Note that there is nothing in the said provision imposing a requirement that for a death penalty Both the 1973 and 1987 Constitution, by recognizing the death penalty, implicitly admits that
bill to be valid, a positive manifestation in the form of a higher incidence of crime should first per se it is not a cruel and inhuman punishment. Jurisprudence observes that punishment is
be perceived and statistically proven following the suspension of the death penalty. cruel, degrading, or inhuman if it involves torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of
In other words, the requirements, as listed below, are the only requirements for reimposing death is not cruel, within the meaning of the word as used in the constitution. People v Mercado
death penalty. Note: The death penalty is no longer imposed.
REQUIREMENTS FOR REIMPOSING
1. That Congress define or describe what is meant by heinous crimes;
2. That Congress specify and penalize by death only crimes that qualify as heinous, and/or
designate crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death in which latter case, death can
only be imposed upon the attendance of circumstances duly proven in court that
characterize the crime to be heinous. In both cases, heinous must be in accordance with
the definition or description set in the death penalty bill; and
3. That Congress, in enacting this death penalty bill be singularly motivated by ‘compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes.’
Heinous crimes. Crimes punishable by death under this Act are heinous for being grievous,
odious, hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness,
viciousness atrocity, and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards
and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized, and ordered society. RA 7659
Two types of crimes in RA 7659: Crimes punished by reclusion perpetua to death, and by
mandatory capital punishment. The crimes under the former are not capital crimes per se.
That is, it is premature to demand for a specification of the heinous elements of each of
foregoing crimes because they are not mandatorily penalized with death. There must first be
judicial determination of whether the crime made heinous by attending circumstances, thereby
justifying the imposition of the death penalty, as the case may be.
The latter squarely applies the test of heinousness. That is, the crimes identified as such are
heinous by their very nature thereby warranting the imposition of the death penalty.

DEATH PENALTY NOT TO BE IMPOSED

Art 47 of the RPC
1. Below 18 years of age at the commission of the crime;
2. More than 70 years of age; or

57

SECTION 20
No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax.
Debt. A sum of money due by a certain and express agreement, or a sum of money due by a
contract. Black’s law dictionary
In law, it is an action to recover a certain specific sum of money alleged to be due. In the SC of
Illinois, it is any liability to pay money growing out of a contract, express or implied.
In relation to the right to liberty. The right to personal liberty is one of the most valuable
and cherished rights appertaining to men in society and one of which he cannot be deprived,
except by the judgment of the courts, or by the law of the land. However, in the barbaric age
of law, an unfortunate debtor could be deprived of his inestimable right if he failed to pay an
honest debt, and his creditor could keep him in his own custody or send him to jail. Tan Cong
v Stewart
Prohibition on debt imprisonment. The prohibition means that, ‘No person may be
imprisoned for debt in virtue of an order in a civil proceeding, either as a substitute for
satisfaction of a debt or as a means of compelling satisfaction.’
▪ But a person may be imprisoned as a penalty for a crime arising from contractual debt and
imposed in a proper criminal proceeding. Much less will detention be allowed when it is
imposed without any judicial process at all. Makapagal v Santamaria.
▪ Subsidiary imprisonment not a penalty. Subsidiary imprisonment for failure to refund
the embezzled amount is not considered imprisonment for debt. It was because of the
violation of the penal statute and not as an imprisonment for the nonpayment of debt.
Freeman v US.
▪ Same; rationale for the prohibition. Statutes relieving from imprisonment for debt were
not intended to take away the right to enforce criminal statutes and punish wrongful
embezzlement or conversions of money. It was not intended to interfere with the
enforcement of penal statutes, although such statutes provide for the payment of money
as a penalty for the commission of an offense. Rather, the intent was to prevent the
commitment of debtors to prison for liabilities arising upon their contracts. Id
▪ Conversion of fine to imprisonment. The conversion of a criminal fine into a prison term
does not violate the provision because in such a case, imprisonment is imposed for a
monetary obligation arising not ex contractu but ex delicto (Translation: not from contract
but from delict). Ajeno v Judge Inserto.
▪ Estafa. The prohibition for imprisonment for debt does not include imprisonment for estafa
or embezzlement. The Court said that it was neither imprisonment for debt nor involuntary
servitude, but merely a penalty for the crime of estafa. Ramirez v de Orozco
CASE BREAKDOWN: LOZANO V MARTINEZ
58
The petition assails the constitutionality of the Bouncing Check Law, which penalizes the person
who “makes or draws and issues any check on account or for value, knowing at the time of
issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with drawee bank…” One of the issues
presented is the alleged contravention of Section 20. Ultimately, the Court held the Statute
constitutional.
Provision explained. The provision was intended to prevent commitment of debtors to prison
for liabilities arising from actions ex contractu. The inhibition was never meant to include
damages arising in actions ex delicto, for the reason that damages recoverable therein do not
arise from any contract entered into between the parties but are imposed upon defendant for
the wrong he has done and are considered as punishment, nor to fines and penalties imposed
by the courts in criminal proceedings as punishments for crime.
Purpose of the Bouncing Check Law. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the
law punishes. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanction, the making of
worthless checks and putting them in circulation. The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by
the legislature that the making of and issuance of a worthless check is deemed a public
nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions.
In sum, the enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of the police power of the State and is not
repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.
Poll tax. This also known as the cedula tax, which is a capitation tax imposed on all persons of
a certain age. At present, it is the tax one pays or his or her residence certificate which generally
serves as a personal identification instrument.
In American law, poll tax is a pre-requisite for the exercise of the right to vote. This
interpretation cannot hold in PH law because of the Constitutional prohibition on the
imposition of literacy, property, or other substantive requirements on the exercise of the right
of suffrage.
The prohibition on imprisonment for non-payment of poll tax was intended for the protection
of the poor. Prior to the 1935 Constitution, imprisonment for non-payment of poll tax was
authorized.

SECTION 21
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is
punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a
bar to another prosecution for the same act.
SECTION SUMMARY:
The Section covers the right against double jeopardy.
Most critical in this section is knowing when a jeopardy attaches, when it terminates, and
the same offense rule, along with its exceptions.
The requisites for the defense of double jeopardy is the attachment of the first jeopardy,
its corresponding termination, and the attachment of the second jeopardy.
A jeopardy attaches when there is a valid complaint or information made before a court
of competent jurisdiction and the accused has been arraigned and pleaded. The absence
or defect in one of these conditions while not make a jeopardy attach.
Termination of jeopardy occurs in three ways: by acquittal of the accused, by final
conviction, and by dismissal of the case. The last one is subdivided into dismissal without
express consent of accused and dismissal on merits. Dismissal can be confusing because
there are instances where dismissal with the consent of the accused that are counted as
dismissal based on merits. Correlate with Right to Speedy Trial under Section 12.
For the defense to be valid, both offenses must be the Same Offense. They must either be
identical, or an attempt or frustration of the other, or necessarily included in the other.
There are two exemptions to the same offense rule: Same Act, which the second sentence
of the provision, and the presence of Supervening facts.
Double jeopardy. There are two kinds of double jeopardy: (1) punishment for the same
offense; and (2) punishment for the same act.
Under the first, one may be twice put in jeopardy of punishment of the same act, provide he is
charged with different offenses, or the offense charged in one case is not included in the crime
charged in the other case. Yap v Lutero
Under the second, if the two offenses are based on one and the same act, conviction or acquittal
under either the law or ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the other. Id. See discussion
under Same Offenses.
Comment: The Primer has a lot of jurisprudence for this section. We suggest review of the
primer to understand the nuances of each case, as we only included the ruling in each case.
59
REQUSITES FOR DOUBLE JEOPARDY
1. A first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second;
2. The first jeopardy must have terminated; and
3. The second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first.
ATTACHMENT OF JEOPARDY
A jeopardy attaches when the accused is placed on trial with the following conditions: (a) upon
a valid complaint or information; (b) before a court of competent jurisdiction; (c) after he
has been arraigned; and (4) after he has pleaded to the complaint or information. People v
Ylagan
o Shooting the house, dead children, and dismissed charges; no first jeopardy.
Reinvestigation against the companions of the accused would not subject them to double
jeopardy. The case against them was dismissed before they were arraigned. People v
Jugueta
▪ Defective complaint. A defective complaint will not place the accused in jeopardy. People
v Judge Consulta
▪ Same; waiver of right. A motion to quash constitutes a waiver of the right against double
jeopardy. Id
▪ Withdrawal of original plea; lack of 4th requisite for attachment. Even though the
defendant was acquitted in the first case, his defense in that case amounts to complete
self-defense whereas his plea was guilty. In effect, the defendant withdrew his original plea.
And since no new please was entered, there was no first jeopardy. People v Balisican
▪ Not a competent court. First court had no jurisdiction, therefore, no first jeopardy.
TERMINATION OF JEOPARDY
A first jeopardy is terminated by the following:
1. By acquittal;
2. By final conviction;
3. By dismissal without express consent of the accused; and
4. By ‘dismissal’ on the merits.’
o Rebellion and subversion charges. Petitioner has a pending case before the CFI of Manila
for subversion while the case for rebellion had already been decided by the CFI of Laguna.
The case is an appeal of the latter decision. Petitioner contends that he cannot be legally
prosecuted for both offenses without violating his right against double jeopardy. The Court
held that he cannot avail of the right for the rebellion case, because the subversion case is
still pending, that is, the first jeopardy had not yet terminated. Bulaong v People
o Same; footnote. In the footnote, the Court noted that petitioner should direct his plea to
the CFI of Manila for his subversion case. Simply put, he may now avail of the defense in
the subversion case, because he had now been convicted by final judgment in the rebellion
case. Id

❖ Same; comment. But still, the case still has no merit because rebellion and subversion are
punished by two different statutes (RPC and Anti-Subversion Act, respectively). Hence, he
may be prosecuted for both cases. See Same Offenses for prosecution under different
statutes.
TERMINATION
General rule. The dismissal or termination of the case after arraignment and plea of the
defendant to a valid information shall be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense
charged (See Same Offense below for the complete rule).
Exception. An appeal by the prosecution from the order of dismissal by the trial court shall not
constitute double jeopardy if:
1. The dismissal is made upon motion, or with the express consent of the defendant;
2. The dismissal is not an acquittal or based upon consideration of the evidence or of the
merits of the case; and
3. The question to be passed upon by the appellate court is purely legal so that should the
dismissal be found incorrect, the case would have to be remanded to the court of origin
for further proceedings, to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant.
Termination with consent. Two instances where termination with the consent of the accused
allows for the defense of double jeopardy: (1) dismissal with respect to the right to a speedy
trial and/or speedy disposition of cases; and (2) dismissal due to prescription.
o Silence. The mere silence of the defendant or his failure to object to the dismissal of the
case does not constitute a consent within the meaning of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
The right not to be put in double jeopardy is as important as other constitutional rights of
the accused in a criminal case. Its waiver cannot, and should not, be predicated on mere
silence. People v Ylagan
▪ Right to a speedy trial. A dismissal on the ground of denial of the right to a speedy trial
amounts to an acquittal. Esmena v Pogoy
▪ Verbal dismissal. A verbal dismissal is not final until written and signed by the judge.
Rivera, Jr. v People
▪ Delays were justifiable. There was no denial of the right to a speedy trial and the dismissal
was upon the instance of the accused. No double jeopardy. Almario v CA
▪ Grave abuse of discretion. But when the dismissal of a case clearly constitutes grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, the dismissal, even if made on the merits, is
invalid and is therefore no bar to a reinstatement of a case.
▪ Preliminary investigation. An order of dismissal in a preliminary investigation does not in
any way terminate a case. As long as the crime has not yet prescribed, the city court may
conduct a preliminary investigation. Tandoc v Judge
60
WAIVER OF RIGHT
▪ Motion to dismiss; lack of jurisdiction. Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction constituted waiver of the defense of double jeopardy. People v Salico
▪ Motion to dismiss; facts not constituting a crime. The dismissal was not on the merits
of the case and it was with the consent, upon the motion to dismiss on the grounds of the
facts not constituting an offense, of the accused. People v Cuevo
▪ Second plea. By pleading not guilty to the second charge instead of moving to quash, the
accused waived the defense of double jeopardy. Silvestre v Military Commission
▪ Provisional dismissal. By consenting to the provisional dismissal, the accused waived his
right to the defense of double jeopardy. Andres v Judge Cacdac
SAME OFFENSE
Identity of offenses test. The test is whether one offense is identical with the other or
whether it is an attempt or frustration of the other or whether one offense necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the other.
What this test shows is that identity of offenses does not require one-to-one correspondence
between the facts and law involved in the two charges.
It is necessary that one offense is completely included in the other.
▪ Jason Ivler case; same offense. Following a vehicular collision, Jason Ivler was charged
with two different offenses: (1) Reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries, and
(2) reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property. Ivler pleaded guilty
to the former (lighter) offense and was subsequently meted the penalty of public censure.
He then invoked the defense of double jeopardy for the second charge. The Court held
that the defense is valid. Ivler v San Pedro
▪ Same; reckless imprudence. Both cases stem from the same provision: Reckless
imprudence from Art 365 of the RPC. Reckless imprudence is a single quasi-offense by itself
and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such
quasi-offense bars subsequent for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various
resulting acts. The reason for this doctrine is that the law penalizes the negligent or careless
act, not the result thereof. Hence, the offense remains one and the same and cannot be
split into different crimes and prosecutions. Id
▪ Same; note: Because of the ruling in this case, it has been the practice of prosecutors to
prosecute for the crime with the higher penalty, rather than that of the lower penalty. Id
▪ Primer illustration: Q: if the accused is charged with homicide and pleads not guilty, may
the charge be dismissed in order to ament it to murder? A: No. That would place him in
second jeopardy. Comment: Hence, the practice to prosecute for the heavier crime.
Two different statutes or two different provisions of a statute. The rule in such cases is that
if the one act results in two different offenses, prosecution under one is not a bar to prosecution
to another.
 o Illegal possession of firearms and homicide; SPL and RPC. The accused cannot plead amounting to loss of jurisdiction. Hence, the proceedings were invalid, and the ‘acquittal’
one as a bar to the other; or stated otherwise, the rule against double jeopardy cannot be did not really acquit and therefore did not terminate the case. Galman v Sandiganbayan
invoked because the first is punished by a special law while the second, homicide or murder, ▪ Violation of due process. Where the prosecution had not been given due process,
is punished by the RPC. People v Tiozon acquittal or dismissal is no bar to refiling of the case. People v Bocar.
▪ Erroneous acquittal. A judgment of acquittal, even if erroneous, ends the case finally.
EXCEPTIONS TO SAME OFFENSE RULE
People v Hernando
Second type of double jeopardy. The second sentence of the provision is an exemption from
▪ Higher penalty. A penalty higher may be imposed than that of the original conviction
the general rule. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under
could be imposed to an accused who appealed the decision of a lower court. The appeal is
either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
n waiver of his right against double jeopardy. Trono V US
o Illegal installation of electrical devices and theft; ordinance and RPC. The defendant
was initially charged with the former offense under Ordinance No 1 of Batangas City. The
charge was dismissed on the grounds of prescription. Another information was filed, this
time charging him with theft under the RPC. The Court ruled that defendant can avail of
the right against double jeopardy through the second sentence of the provision. People v
Relova
Supervening facts. The rule of identity does not apply when the second offense was not in
existence at the time of the first prosecution, for the simple reason that in such case there is no
possibility for the accused, during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was
then inexistent. People v Melo
o Frustrated homicide to consummated homicide; the Rule. The rule is that, where after
the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the defendant is responsible, which
changes the character of the offense and together with the facts existing at the time,
constitute a new and distinct offense, the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy
if indicted for the new offense. Id
o Same; penalty. When a person who has already suffered his penalty for an offense, is
charged with a new and greater offense, said penalty may be credited to him in case of
conviction for the second offense. Id
o Slight physical injuries to serious physical injuries. There is no new supervening fact that
could be said to have developed or arisen since the filing of the case. The second
medication disclosed the existence of a fracture that must have existed when the first
examination was made. People v Buling

APPEALS
A judgment of acquittal is unappealable. A judgment of acquittal is immediately final. A
judgment of conviction is final when the period for appeal has lapsed or when the sentence
has been totally or partially served or when the defendant has expressly waived his right to
appeal. Bustamante v Maceren
▪ Travesty of justice. Where there was travesty of justice, there was no valid trial, and
therefore, no termination of the first jeopardy. The decision herein rested on the premise
that the proceedings in the Sandiganbayan were characterized by grave abuse of discretion

61

SECTION 22
No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.
SECTION SUMMARY:
The provision prohibits the enactment of ex-post facto law and bills of attainder.
An ex-post facto law must be penal in character and places the accused at a
disadvantageous position after its enactment.
A bill of attainder inflicts punishment without a trial.
A bill of attainder is necessarily an ex-post facto law but an ex-post facto law is not
necessarily a bill of attainder.
The passage of an ex post facto law is the passage of retroactive penal laws prejudicial to the
accused.
This is embodied in the words ‘nulla poena sine lege’, meaning ‘no punishment without law.’
The same principle is embodied in Article 21 of the RPC, “No felony shall be punishable by
any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its commission”.
EX-POST FACTO LAW (MACADAE)
1. Makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law, which act was innocent when
done, and punishes the same act
2. Aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was when committed
3. Changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the
crime when committed
4. Alters the legal rules of evidence and allows conviction upon less or different testimony
than the law required at the time of commission
5. Assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation
of a right for something which when done was done lawful
6. Deprives the accused some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the
protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or proclamation of amnesty.
Additionally, the Lacson v Exec Sec case notes another circumstance.
7. Every law which, in relation to the offense and its consequences, alters the situation of a
person to his disadvantage.
Note: The amendment of a law under which a person is being prosecuted can be applied
retroactively if the amendment is favorable to him.
Scope of the prohibition. The clause does not prohibit all retrospective laws. It only prohibits
retrospective penal laws.
62
Penal laws. A law is penal when it prescribes a criminal penalty imposable in a criminal trial.
However, a law is also a penal law if it prescribes a burden equivalent to a criminal penalty (e.g.
disqualification from the practice of a profession) even if such burden is imposed in an
administrative proceeding. Pascual v Board of Medical Examiners
o PCGG charter; ex-post facto. For both civil and criminal cases covered by the Charter,
nothing has been altered in terms of the quantum of proof required for an adverse
judgment against the defendants or a judgment of conviction against the accused.
▪ Forfeiture. An act declaring forfeiture in favor of the State of any property illegally
obtained by a public officer has the nature of a penalty; hence, it may not be given
retroactive effect. Katigbak v Solicitor General
▪ Criminal procedure. A law on criminal procedure may be an ex-post facto law if it alters
the legal rules of evidence or mode of trial (Calder v Bull), unless the changes operate only
in a limited and unsubstantial manner to the disadvantage of the accused. Beazell v Ohio
▪ The prohibition applies only to criminal legislation which affect the substantial rights of the
accused. Santos v Secretary of Public Works and Communications
▪ It is improper to apply the prohibition to an executive proclamation suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Montenegro v Castaneda
▪ Suspension. Art 24 of the RPC says that suspension of an officer during trial shall not be
considered a penalty. The suspension in this case is merely a preventive and not a penal
measure which therefore does not come under the ex-post facto prohibition.
Test for validity. The test is whether the new law takes away rights ‘vital for the protection of
life and liberty.’ Nunez v Sandiganbayan
o Sandiganbayan. Granted that the previous procedure has been altered, the new procedure
prescribed still gives him adequate protection and leaves untouched all the substantial
protections surrounding the accused. The removal of the right to appeal does not have the
effect of taking away the right; the SC still has the right to review to determine if the
presumption of innocence has been overcome. Id
Greenbook examples of violations.
▪ Change in the manner of execution from garrote to hanging. US v Merlin
▪ Increase in the penalty. US v Ang Kan Ko
▪ Imposition of a penalty on a previously unpenalized act. US v Diaz Conde
▪ A law shortening the prescriptive period of a crime. People v Sandiganbayan
▪ An interpretation of a penal law given by the DOJ Secretary which is changed to the
prejudice of one who had relied on an earlier interpretation. Co v CA
Bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial. Its essence is the
substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt. People v Ferrer
It substitutes legislative act for judicial process of the determination of guilt. It is a provision the statutory right of appeal is not included in the prohibition against ex post facto laws.
that is a general safeguard against legislative exercise of the judicial function—trial by RA pertains only to matters of procedure, and being merely an amendatory statute it does
legislature. US v Brown not partake the nature of an ex post facto law. Id
▪ Passage of a state law requiring an oath affirming past loyalty to the US as a prerequisite
to the exercise of a profession, and where the petitioner was disqualified from his
profession without trial. Cummings v Missouri.
▪ Passage of a law that made it a crime for a member of the Communist Party to serve as an
officer or an employee of a labor union. US v Brown.
▪ Specific names. It is not necessary for the law to specify by name the person being
punished for it to be a bill of attainder. It is enough that legislative acts, no matter what
their form, that apply either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a
group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without judicial trial are bills of
attainder prohibited by the Constitution. US v Lovett
ELEMENTS OF A BILL OF ATTAINDER
1. There must be a law;
2. The law imposes a penal burden on a named individual or easily ascertainable members
of a group; and
3. The penal burden is imposed directly by the law without judicial trial.
o Anti-subversion act; not focused on individuals, but on conduct. The Act simply
declares the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) to be an organized conspiracy for
the overthrow of the Government for the purposes of the prohibition against membership
in the outlawed organization. The term, CPP, is used solely for definitional purposes. The
Act applies also to ‘any other organization having the same purpose [of the CPP] and their
successors. Its focus is not on individuals, but on conduct. People v Ferrer
o Same; judicial determination of guilt. The undeniable fact is that their guilt still has to be
judicially established. The Government has yet to prove at the trial that the accused joined
the Party knowingly, willfully, and by overt acts, and that they joined the Party, knowing its
subversive character and with specific intent to further its basic objective. Id
o PCGG charter; bill of attainder. Nothing in the executive orders can be reasonably
construed as a determination or declaration of guilt. On the contrary, it is clear that any
judgment of guilt in the amassing or acquisition of ‘ill-gotten wealth’ is to be handed down
by judicial tribunal, upon complaint filed and prosecuted by PCGG. Also, the no punishment
is inflicted by the EOs. Virata v Sandiganbayan
o Kuratong Baleleng gang; substantive law. Ex-post facto law, generally, prohibits
retrospectivity of penal laws. RA 8249, which expands the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
is not a penal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character.
Lacson v Exec Sec
o Same; right to appeal a statutory right. The right to appeal is not a natural right but
statutory in nature that can be regulated by law. The mode of procedure provided for in

63
 The core of citizenship is the capacity to enjoy political rights, that is, the right to participate
ARTICLE IV
in government principally through the: right to vote, right to hold public office, right to petition
CITIZENSHIP the government for redress of grievances, among others.

ARTICLE SUMMARY: MODES OF ACQUIRING CITIZENSHIP

Section 1: Who are Filipino citizens. Note the differences between the 3 constitutions and 1. Jus Sanguinis (Right of Blood). Acquisition of citizenship on the basis of blood
when they became effective. They spell the difference in knowing whether a person is a relationship. Basic Philippine law follows the rule of jus sanguinis
natural-born citizen or an alien who must elect citizenship or naturalize. But there is nothing in the Constitution that prevents legislature from adopting the
principle of jus soli or any of its features as supplementary to the law on citizenship.
There are five governing Naturalization Laws but the most important are Judicial
▪ This principle applies only to natural filiation and not to filiation by adoption. Ching
naturalization (CA 473) and Administrative Naturalization (RA 9139).
Leng v Galang
Section 2: Natural-born citizens and naturalized citizens are of equal standing in most ▪ Only legitimate children follow the citizenship of the father, and that illegitimate
regards. children are under the parental authority of the mother and follow her nationality. Ching
Leng v Galang But the illegitimate child of a Filipino father and an alien mother is a
Section 3: Loss of Citizenship is governed by CA 63 and CA 473. Repatriation is governed
Filipino, provided that paternity is clear.
by RA 9225.
2. Jus soli (Right of the Soil). Acquisition of citizenship on the basis of place of birth
RA 9225 differentiates those who reacquire and retain their citizenships. Though discussed 3. Naturalization. The legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the privilege
at a later section, knowing the nuances of Dual Citizenship and Dual Allegiance helps in of a native-born citizen
citizenship cases with respect to Running for Public Office. The Valles v COMELEC case COMPARISON OF PROVISIONS
elucidates on this topic. 1935 1973 1987
Section 4 should be read with RA 9225. Those who are citizens of the Those who are citizens of the Those who are citizens of the
Philippine Islands at the time of Philippines at the time of the Philippines at the time of the
Section 5 prohibits dual allegiance. the adoption of this adoption of this Constitution adoption of this Constitution
Constitution
Those born in the Ph Islands of
SECTION 1 foreign parents who, before
The following are citizens of the Philippines: adoption of this Constitution,
had been elected to public
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
office in the PH.
Constitution;
Those whose fathers are Those whose fathers or Those whose fathers or
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines; citizens of the Philippines; mothers are citizens of the mothers are citizens of the
(3) Those born before January, 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine Philippines; Philippines;
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and Those whose mothers are Those who elect Philippine Those born before January 17,
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with the law. citizens of the PH and, upon citizenship pursuant to the 1973, of Filipino mothers, who
reaching the age of majority, provisions of the 1935 elect Philippine citizenship upon
elect Philippine citizenship Constitution. reaching the age of majority.
Citizenship is the personal and more or less permanent membership in a political community. Those who are naturalized in the Those who are naturalized in the Those who are naturalized in the
It denotes possession within that particular political community of full civil and political rights accordance with law. accordance with law. accordance with law.
subject to special disqualifications such as minority. Reciprocally, it imposes the duty of
allegiance to the political community.

64
 EXPANDED PROVISION OF JUS SANGUINIS
Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines
In the 1935 Constitution, only those whose fathers are citizens of the PH become PH citizens
automatically at birth.
However, this was expanded under the 1973 Constitution, placing the Filipino woman on the
same level as the male in matters of citizenship.
Retroactive application. The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not
only to those who elect PH citizenship after February 2, 1987, but also to those who, having
been born of Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before that date. Hence, it covers those who
elected Filipino citizenship under the 1973 Constitution. CO v HRET
This should not be read as having the effect of curing any defect in the acquisition of citizenship
under the 1935 or 1973 Constitutions. If a person’s citizenship was subject to judicial challenge
under the old law, it remains subject to challenge under the new law whether the judicial
challenge had been commenced prior to the effectivity of the new Constitution.
Citizenship of Children. In Q&A format:
Q: Illegitimate child, Filipina mother?
A: Filipino under all Constitutions.
Q: Illegitimate child, Filipino father and alien mother?
A: Filipino, if paternity is clear. Jus sanguinis makes no distinction as to legitimacy of child.
Tecson v COMELEC
Q: Child born of a Filipina mother and alien father, before January 17, 1973?
A: Not Filipino, unless child elected Filipino citizenship at age of majority.
Q: Foundlings?
A: Foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. Poe-Llamanzares v COMELEC
o Poe-Llamanzares case. Resorting to the intent of the framers with respect to the
citizenship of foundlings, the answer becomes clear: ‘These cases are few and far in
between that the constitution need not refer to them. By international law, the principle
that children or people born in a country of unknown parents are citizens in this nation is
recognized, and it is not necessary to include a provision on the subject exhaustively.’ Id
CITIZENSHIP BY ELECTION
Procedure for election of PH citizenship is prescribed by Commonwealth Act No 625. The
statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are:
ELECTING PH CITIZENSHIP
1. A statement of election under oath;
2. An oath of allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the Philippines; and
3. Registration of the statement of election and of the oath with the nearest civil registry
65
o Born under the 1935 Consti; Alien Registration Act. No election of PH citizenship shall
be accepted for registration unless the party exercising the right of election has complied
with the requirements of the Alien Registration Act of 1950. In other words, the person
electing PH citizenship should first be required to register an alien. Republic v Sagun
o Same; requirement by law. Respondent cannot assert that the exercise of suffrage and
the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of PH citizenship
since the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of citizenship by
election. Id
ALIEN REGISTRATION ACT OF 1950
1. He should register as an alien
2. He should file a petition with the BI for the cancellation of his alien certificate of registration
based on his election of PH citizenship and the BI will decide the validity or invalidity of the
election.
3. The case will be elevated to the DOJ for final determination and review.
o No judicial action for declaration of citizenship. Under our laws, there can be no action
or proceeding for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual. Courts of justice
exist for settlement of justiciable controversies, which imply a given right, legally
demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of said right, and a remedy,
granted or sanctioned by law, for said breach of right. Tan v Republic
o Positive acts of election. The respondent was born in an outlying rural town of Samar
where there are no alien enclaves and no racial distinctions. The respondent has lived the
life of a Filipino since birth. His father applied for naturalization when the child was still a
small boy. He is a Roman Catholic. He has worked for a sensitive government agency. His
profession requires citizenship for taking the examinations and getting a license. He has
participated in political exercises as a Filipino and has always considered himself a Filipino
citizen. There is nothing in the records to show that he does not embrace Philippine
customs and values, nothing to indicate any tinge of alien-ness, no acts to show that this
country is not his natural homeland. Because of his acts since childhood, the voters of
Samar have considered him as a Filipino. CO v HRET
o Election is required only for aliens. An election of PH citizenship presupposes that the
person electing is an alien or that his status is doubtful because he is a national of 2
countries. If he is already a Filipino citizen, election would be unnecessary. Id
▪ When must election be made. The election must be made within a reasonable period
after reaching the age of majority. The SC cited with approval the ruling of the Secretary of
Justice to the effect the 3 years after reaching the age of majority is the reasonable period
within which the child must make the election. Dy Cuenco v Secretary of Justice
▪ Same; extensions. However, justifiable circumstances, such as when the person concerned
has always considered himself a Filipino citizen, may justify the extension of the 3-year
period. Id
 ▪ Informal election of citizenship. Participating in elections and campaigning for 2. Special naturalization law. An act of the legislature making a named individual a citizen
candidates, and other similar acts done prior to June 7, 1941, have been recognized as of the PH.
sufficient to show one’s preferences for PH citizenship. In re Florencio Mallare, 3. Mass naturalization law. The PH Bill of 1902 made Filipino citizens of ‘all inhabitants of
the PH Islands continuing to reside in them who were Spanish subjects’ on 11 April 1899
CITIZENSHIP BY NATURALIZATION
‘and then resided in said islands.’
Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the rights that belong
4. General law of naturalization applied through a combination of administrative
to a natural-born citizen.
process and presidential legislation.
▪ It is not a matter of right, but one of privilege of the most discriminating, as well as delicate
5. Administrative naturalization law (RA 9139). The matter is handled through the Special
and exacting nature, affecting as it does, public interest of the highest order, and it may be
Committee on Naturalization chaired by the Solicitor General and is governed by RA 9139,
enjoyed only under the precise conditions prescribed by the law therefor. Cuaki Tan Si v
Sections 3, 4, 5, and 6
Republic.
The law covers native-born aliens who lived here in the Philippines all their lives, who never
▪ Every independent nation has the inherent and independent right to determine for itself
saw any other country and all along thought that they were Filipinos; who have
what classes of people shall be entitled to its citizenship. US v Wong Kim Aok.
demonstrated love and loyalty to the Philippines and affinity to the customs and traditions,
▪ The grant of citizenship to a parent also extends citizenship to minor children under
R.A. No. 9139 was enacted as a remedial measure intended to make the process of
parental authority.
acquiring Philippine citizenship less tedious, less technical and more encouraging. It
▪ The repatriation of the mother also entitles her son to a declaration that he is entitled to
likewise addresses the concerns of degree holders who, by reason of lack of citizenship
PH citizenship. Republic v Judge Tandayag.
requirement, cannot practice their profession, thus promoting "brain gain" for the
▪ However, the effect on the citizenship of the wife upon the naturalization of the husband
Philippines.
is that she becomes a Filipino citizen provided that she shows that she has none of the
disqualifications, even if she does not have all the qualifications. Primer o Separate and distinct laws. The requirements under RA 9139 do not apply to applications
for naturalization by judicial act. So v Republic
NATURALIZATION LAWS AND PROCEDURES
1. Judicial naturalization (Revised Naturalization Law, CA 473). The law has both ROLE OF LEGISLATURE. The role of legislature includes: (1) control over processes through
substantive and procedural requirements. The applicant becomes a Filipino citizen upon which citizenship is acquired or lost; (2) determination of substantive criteria for admission to
taking the oath provided by law after satisfactorily completing the probation period. citizenship, and (3) fixing the consequences of the grant of citizenship on the wife or minor
children of the grantee.
SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENTS o Witness must be credible. In naturalization proceedings, it is the burden of the applicant
a. Age, to prove not only his own good moral character but also the good moral character of
b. Residence, his/her witnesses, who must be credible persons. This implies that such person must have
c. Moral character and political belief, a good standing in the community; that he is known to be honest and upright; that he is
d. Real property or lucrative occupation, reputed to be trustworthy and reliable; and that his word may be taken on its face value,
e. Language, as a good warranty of the applicant's worthiness. But the educational attainment of such
f. And education of children. witnesses does not equate to good moral character. So v Republic

PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS
SECTION 2
a. Declaration of intention
Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
b. Filing of petition
c. Hearing and initial judgment having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who
d. Period of probation elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with Paragraph 3, Section 1 hereof shall be
e. Rehearing and final judgment deemed natural-born citizens.

66
The purpose of the addition of the 2nd sentence was to equalize the status of those born of
Filipina parents before January 17, 1973 and those born of Filipina parents on or after January
17, 1973. Without the 2nd sentence, those who elect PH citizenship would not be a natural-born
Filipino.
Treatment of natural-born vis-à-vis naturalized citizens. The law treats both classes equally,
except in the instances where the Constitution itself makes a distinction, such as the
requirement for running for the position of President and Vice-President. Naturalized citizens
are not second-class citizens.
SECTION 3
Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law.
LOSS OF CITIZENSHIP
Loss and reacquisition of citizenship are governed by 2 laws:
a. Commonwealth Act No. 63 as amended by RA No. 106, which applies to natural-born
and naturalized citizens.
b. Commonwealth Act No. 473 which applies to naturalized citizens.
COMMONWEALTH ACT 63, SEC 1
A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the following ways and/or events: robles virtual
1. By naturalization in foreign country.
2. By express renunciation of citizenship.
3. By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign country upon
attaining twenty-one years of age or more:
Provided, however, that a Filipino may not divest himself of Philippine citizenship in any manner while the Republic of the Philippines
is at war with any country;
4. By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country.
Provided, That the rendering of service to, or the acceptance of such commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country, and the
taking of an oath of allegiance incident thereto, with the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, shall not divest a Filipino of his
Philippine citizenship if either of the following circumstances is present:
The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance with the said foreign country;
The said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philippine territory with the consent of the Republic of the Philippines:
Provided, That the Filipino citizen concerned, at the time of rendering said service, or acceptance of said commission, and taking the
oath of allegiance incident thereto, states that he does so only in connection with his service to said foreign country:
And provided, finally, That any Filipino citizen who is rendering service to, or is commissioned in, the armed forces of a foreign country
under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph (a) and (b), shall not be permitted to participate nor vote in any election of
the Republic of the Philippines during the period of his service to, or commission in, the armed forces of said foreign country. Upon
his discharge from the service of the said foreign country, he shall be automatically entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil and
political rights as a Filipino citizen;
5. By cancellation of the certificates of naturalization.
6. By having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of the Philippine armed forces in time of
war, unless subsequently, a plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted.
7. In the case of a woman, upon her marriage to a foreigner if, by virtue of the laws in force in her
husband's country, she acquires his nationality."
67
CANCELLATION OF CERTIFICATE OF NATURALIZATION
Commonwealth Act No. 473, Section 18
Certificate of naturalization may be cancelled:
1. When found to have been fraudulently or illegally obtained;
2. By permanent residence in the country of origin within 5 years from naturalization;
3. When petition is found to have been made on an invalid declaration of intent;
4. Upon failure to comply with the requirements education of minor children; and
5. If the person allows himself to be a dummy for aliens
▪ Fraudulently or illegally obtained. A certificate of naturalization may be cancelled if it is
shown to have been obtained fraudulently or illegally, or if the person is shown to have
violated the prohibitions imposed on him by CA 473, Section 18. But to justify the
cancellation, the evidence must be clear, unequivocal, and convincing, and not merely
preponderant. Republic v Cokeng
▪ Actions constituting renunciation. Petitioner continued declaring himself as Portuguese
and acquired a Portuguese passport even after naturalization. His action constitute
renunciation. Willie Yu v Defensor-Santiago
▪ Same; adversary proceedings. Normally, the question of whether or not a person has
renounced his PH citizenship should be heard before a trial court of law in adversary
proceedings. In this case, however, this has become unnecessary as this Court, upon
insistence of the petitioner, had to look into the facts and satisfy itself on petitioner’s
continued claim of citizenship. Id
▪ Res judicata. A decision in a naturalization proceeding is not res judicata (i.e. conclusive
fact) as to any of the matters which could support a judgment cancelling the certificate for
illegal or fraudulent procurement. In fact, a certificate may be cancelled for acts committed
after naturalization. Republic v Cesar Guy
▪ Naturalization law. The Naturalization law allows cancellation of a certificate of
naturalization if it is found to have been obtained ‘fraudulently or illegally.’ Id
▪ Possession of an alien registration certificate. Possession of an alien registration
certificate alone, unaccompanied by proof of performance of acts whereby PH citizenship
had been lost, was not adequate proof of loss of citizenship. There was no proof that he
had been naturalized in a foreign country, or had expressly renounced PH citizenship, or
sworn allegiance to a foreign country Aznar v COMELEC
REACQUISITION OF CITIZENSHIP
Commonwealth Act No. 63, Section. 2
Citizenship may be reacquired:
1. By naturalization
Provided, That the applicant possesses none of the disqualification's prescribed in section two of Act
Numbered Twenty-nine hundred and twenty-seven
2. By repatriation of deserters of the Army, Navy or Air Corp
 Provided, That a woman who lost her citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien may be
repatriated in accordance with the provisions of this Act after the termination of the marital status
3. By direct act of the National Assembly.
REPATRIATION
Repatriation is accomplished by taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic and registering
in the proper Civil Registry and in the Bureau of Immigration. The Bureau of Immigration shall
thereupon cancel the pertinent alien certificate of registration and issue the certificate of
identification as Filipino citizen to the repatriated citizen.
Registration is an essential element.
o Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a
naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural born citizen
before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-
born citizen. Bengson v HRET
o Same; RA 8171. Under RA 8171, only the following may be repatriated: (1) Women who
lost citizenship by marriage; and (2) those who lost citizenship for political or economic
reasons. Id
o Same; other situations. Repatriation may also be availed by those who lost their
citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; (2) service in the armed forces of the
allied forces in World War II; (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any
other time; (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and (5) political and economic
necessity. Id
▪ The effective date of repatriation is the date of application and not the date when
repatriation is approved. Lee v COMELEC and Fivaldo.
DUAL CITIZEN LAW
RA 9225
Section 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all PH citizens of
another country shall be deemed not to have lost their PH citizenship under the conditions of this Act.
Section 3: Retention of PH Citizenship. – Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-
born citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have
re-acquired PH citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic: x x x
Natural born citizens of the PH who, after the effectivity of this Act, becomes citizens of a foreign country
shall retain their PH citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
The law liberalizes the reacquisition and retention of natural-born PH citizenship. It deals with
two classes of persons: (1) Filipinos who lost their citizenship prior to enactment of RA 9225,
and (2) Filipinos who become citizens of another country after the effectivity of RA 9225.
The first class has to reacquire their citizenship by stating the oath of allegiance. Once
reacquired, the person is deemed not to have lost or never to have lost his PH citizenship.
68
The second class, under the last paragraph of Section 3, has the effect of allowing dual
citizenship.
o Citizenship at the time of the purchase of the land. Petitioner falls under the first class
of persons under the Act. At the time he made the falsification, he was still a Canadian
citizen, albeit his application for reacquisition six months later. David v Agbay
RUNNING FOR OFFICE
Section 5(2), RA 9225
This section compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign
country, but who reacquired or retained their PH citizenship to:
1. Take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of RA 9225; and
2. For those seeking elective public offices in the PH, to additionally execute a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer
prior or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates
in the PH election.
o Use of foreign passport; positive act of renunciation. The use of foreign passport after
renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of representation as to
one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship regained by
repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an
elective position. Maquiling v COMELEC
o Same; effect on bid for public office. The act of using a foreign passport after renouncing
one’s foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnado’s bid for public office, as it effectively imposed
on him a disqualification to run for an elective local position. Id
o Same; continuing requirement. The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a
continuing one. It must be possessed not just at the time of the renunciation of the foreign
citizenship but continuously. Any act which violates the oath of renunciation opens the
citizenship issue to attack. Id
▪ Dual citizenship and running for office. Where a person is natural born Filipino because
of his Filipino mother, and also a natural born American for having been born in the US, he
has dual citizenship. The fact that he had dual citizenship did not disqualify him from
running for office. Nor did he have to renounce his American citizenship through RA 9225.
Cordora v COMELEC
▪ Domicile. Reacquisition of Filipino citizenship under RA 9225 does not have the effect of
restoring PH domicile. To reacquire domicile, he must provide proof of intent to stay in the
PH. After he does that, his occasional absence does not have the effect of removing him
from his domicile as long as he manifests animus manendi et revertendi. Japzon v Ty
CASE BREAKDOWN: VALLES V COMELEC
Primer case: Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born in Australia to a Filipino father and an Australian
mother. Valles claims that Lopez had renounced her Filipino citizenship because she applied
for an Alien Certificate of Registration and Immigrant Certificate of Residence, and she was
issued an Australian passport. She further maintains that Lopez is disqualified because the Local
Government Code of 1991 disqualifies those with dual citizenship. Lastly, she claims that the
issue of citizenship is not considered res judicata, therefore, allowing the same to be threshed
out anew.
Express renunciation. In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation
must be express. An application for an alien certificate of registration was not tantamount to
renunciation of PH citizenship (Aznar v COMELEC), nor is holding a foreign passport (Mercado
v Manzano). Thus, the mere fact that private respondent Lopez had these documents does not
constitute an effective renunciation of citizenship and do not militate against her claim of
Filipino citizenship.
Dual citizenship in the Local Government Code. In Mercado v Manzano, the Court clarified
‘dual citizenship’ as used in Section 40 of the LGC and reconciled the same with Art IV, Sec 5 of
the 1987 Constitution on dual allegiance. The Court explained that dual citizenship as a
disqualification must refer to citizens with dual allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere
dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.
Dual citizenship and running for office. It was ruled that for candidates with dual citizenship,
it is enough that they elect PH citizenship upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy (COC),
to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship. The filing of a certificate of candidacy
sufficed to renounce foreign citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification as a dual
citizen. The declaration found in the COC, which is under oath, operates as an effective
renunciation of foreign citizenship. Therefore, when the respondent filed her COC, such fact
alone terminated her Australian citizenship.
Res judicata. The general rule is the principle of res judicata generally does not apply in cases
hinging on the issue of citizenship. However, the rule has exceptions. In order for res judicata
to apply, (1) a person’s citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a controversy where
said person is a party; (2) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took part in the
resolution thereof; and (3) the finding on citizenship is affirmed by this Court.
Discussion. Massacre question in our class ☹
Q: When it comes to running for public office, what is the difference between a repatriated
citizen and a dual citizen?
A: For the former, they have to comply with the requirements of Section 5(2) of RA 9225; that
is, they must swear the oath in Section 3, RA 9225, and execute a sworn renunciation of foreign
citizenship. For the latter, they need only to elect PH citizenship upon filing of their COC. This
has the effect of impliedly terminating their dual citizenship.
SECTION 4
Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless by their
act or omission they are deemed, under the law to have renounced it.
69
Note that the provision makes no reference to sex, making it applicable to both males and
females on the chance that some country might have a law which divests a foreign husband of
his relationship.
However, this provision is prospective.
It does not serve to restore citizenship already lost by marriage under the old law.
o Representative of Marinduque. Under RA 9225, the petitioner must take the oath of
allegiance and make a personal and sworn renunciation of her American citizenship to
reacquire her PH citizenship. In the case at bar, there is no showing that respondent
complied with the aforesaid requirements. Unless and until she can establish that she had
availed of the privileges of the law by becoming a dual Filipino-American citizen, she
remains to be an American citizen and is, therefore, ineligible to run for and hold any
elective public office in the Philippines. Reyes v COMELEC
SECTION 5
Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.
urpose. The target of this new provision is not dual citizenship, but dual allegiance arising from
mixed marriages or birth in foreign soil The Constitution leaves the disposition of the problem
between dual citizenship and dual allegiance to ordinary legislation.
As such, RA 9225 is the prevailing law on dual citizenship.
o RA 9225; dual citizenship. Petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of the law because
it allegedly contravenes the prohibition on dual allegiance. The problem of dual citizenship
is transferred from the PH to the foreign country because the latest oath that will be taken
by the former Filipino is one of allegiance to the PH and not to the foreign country. Also,
by swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his
foreign citizenship. Calilung v Datumanong
o Same; dual allegiance. The problem of dual allegiance is created wherein a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines takes an oath of allegiance to another country and in that oath
says that he abjures and absolutely renounces all allegiance to his country of origin and
swears allegiance to that foreign country. In the present measure, a person is required to
take an oath and the last he utters is one of allegiance to the country. The problem of dual
allegiance is no longer the problem of the Philippines but of the other foreign country. Id
o Same; not a self-executing provision. Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a
declaration of a policy and it is not a self-executing provision. The legislature still has to
enact the law on dual allegiance. Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would
set specific parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance. Until this is done, it would
be premature for the judicial department, including this Court, to rule on issues pertaining
to dual allegiance. Id
 ARTICLE V Residence. The term residence as so used is synonymous with domicile, which imports not only
intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with
SUFFRAGE conduct of such intention. Nuval v Guray.

ARTICLE SUMMARY: REQUISITES OF DOMICILE

Remember Who May Exercise the Right. 1. Residence or bodily presence in the new locality;
Remember the prohibition on additional Substantive Requirements. 2. Intent to remain there or animus manendi; and
Remember that Procedural Requirements, such as voter’s registration and biometrics, are 3. Intent to abandon the old domicile or animus non revertendi.
not violations of the prohibition.
o ‘resided in the Philippines for at least one year’. Residence here means domicile. Gallego
Remember Absentee Voting has been enabled by RA 9189.
v Vera
o ‘resided in the place wherein they propose to vote, for at least six months.’ Residence
The North remembers.
here means either domicile or a temporary residence of at least six months. Id
o Presumption. There is a strong presumption that one’s domicile of origin remains his
SECTION 1 domicile until clearly abandoned for another. Faypon v Quirino.
Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by o Same; voter registration. Registration of a voter in a place other than his residence of
law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines origin has not been deemed sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence.
for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months One may leave the place of his birth to look for greener pastures and it may be the case
immediately preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement that he may not absent himself from the place of his professional or business activities and
shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage. it may be necessary for him to register as voter therein. Despite such registration, the
animus revertendi to his domicile or residence of origin, has not forsaken him. Id
❖ Note: If a person retains his domicile of origin, the six-month period is irrelevant for
WHO MAY EXERCISE THE RIGHT
purposes of the residence requirement because he is deemed to be a resident of his
1. All citizens of the Philippines, not otherwise disqualified by law;
domicile of origin wherever he may be. If a person re-establishes a previously abandoned
2. Who are at least 18 years of age; and
domicile or acquire a new one, the six-month requirement must be satisfied.
3. Who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein
they propose to vote, for at least 6 months immediately preceding the election. SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENTS
No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.
COMPARISON OF PROVISIONS
No literacy test. The removal of this requirement is in keeping with the trend for the
1935 1973 1987
broadening of the electoral base. This is in keeping with the desire to continue the alienation
Male citizens Citizens of Ph All citizens of Ph
and exclusion of millions of citizens from the political system and from participation in the
21 years old 18 years old 18 years old
political life in the country.
Read and write - -
1 year in PH 1 year in PH 1 year in PH Property. The imposition of the property requirement is inconsistent with the nature and
6 months in municipality 6 months in municipality 6 months in municipality essence of the Republican system ordained in our Constitution and the principle of social justice
- - Absentee voting underlying the same.
Procedural requirements. The prohibition of imposition of additional substantive
Citizenship. Aliens are denied participation in the government. Citizenship is made the requirements does not preclude Congress from establishing procedural requirements in the
essential foundation of the right of suffrage. nature of implementing regulations designed to ensure the purity of the electoral process.
o Voter’s registration act. RA 8189 provides that there shall be no registration 120 days
Age. One is 18 on one’s 18th birthday. The age requirement was lowered to broaden the
before a regular election and 90 days before a special election. This was challenged as an
political base of democracy.

70
 unconstitutional limitation on the right of suffrage. However, the Court held that the State,
in the exercise of its police power, may enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of
voter’s registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly, and peaceful
election, to the end that pre-election activities can be performed by the duly constituted
authorities in a realistic and orderly manner. Akbayan v COMELEC.
o Biometrics. Biometrics is only part of registration and not a requirement to vote.
Registration is a mere procedural requirement as it only regulates the exercise of the right
of suffrage. Kabataan Party-List vs COMELEC.
o Same; police power. The State, in the exercise of its inherent police power, may enact laws
to safeguard and regulate the act of voter's registration for the ultimate purpose of
conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election. Thus, RA 10367 (Act Providing for
Mandatory Biometrics Voter’s Registration) is constitutional. Id
▪ Highly-urbanized cities. Where voters in a HUC were prohibited from voting for elective
provincial officials, the court said that this was not an imposition of additional substantive
requirements. The residents of the HUC had full suffrage rights in the city of their residence.
Their exclusion in the provincial elections was merely based on the Provision of the
Constitution that places HUCs, as distinct from component cities, outside the jurisdiction
of government of provinces. Ceniza v COMELEC.
DISQUALIFICATIONS
Disqualifications are grounds for the forfeiture of the right of suffrage. Because suffrage, like
any other civil or political rights, may be lost. While the enumeration of the qualifications is
made exclusive by the Constitution, the legislature is at the same time given the power to
prescribe disqualifications.
Clearly, the disqualifications should not be in the form of additional qualifications.
SOME DISQUALIFICATIONS
The following are disqualified:
1. Any person sentenced by final judgment to suffer imprisonment of not less than 1 year.
The right to vote shall be automatically restored upon expiration of 5 years after service of
sentence.
2. Any person adjudged of having committed any crime involving disloyalty to the
government, such as:
a. Rebellion
b. Sedition
c. Violation of the anti-subversion and firearms laws
d. Crime against national security
The right to vote shall be automatically restored upon expiration of 5 years after service of
sentence.
3. Insane or incompetent persons
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SECTION 2
The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as
well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.
The Congress shall also design a procedure for the disabled and the illiterates to vote
without the assistance of other persons. Until then, they shall be allowed to vote under
existing laws and such rules as the Commission on Elections may promulgate to protect the
secrecy of the ballot.
ABSENTEE VOTING
Absentee voting. Process by which qualified citizens of the Philippines abroad exercise their
right to vote. This provision is a result of a number of Filipinos working abroad, who are
deprived of their right of suffrage due to the Constitutional residency requirement.
The details of the mechanics for absentee voting have been left to Congress. The current law is
RA 9189 or the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003.
OVERSEAS ABSENTEE VOTING ACT
RA 9189
Section 4: Coverage. – All citizens of the PH abroad, who are not otherwise disqualified by law, at least
eighteen (18) years of age on the day of elections, may vote for president, vice-president, senators, and party-
list representatives.
RA 9189 allows citizens residing abroad to vote even if they are recognized as immigrants by
the country of their residence.
Affidavit requirement. The law requires them to file an affidavit declaring that they shall
resume actual physical permanent residence in the PH not later than 3 years from approval of
registration under the said law. This is meant to be a statement that they never intended to
abandon his or her domicile in the PH.
DISQUALIFICATION
Such absentee voters shall be disqualified if:
1. The affidavit is not submitted; and
2. They do not reestablish physical residence within 3 years.
Application. This provision applies to: (1) Persons who have all the qualifications but who
happen to be temporarily abroad; and (2) qualified voters who are in the PH but are temporarily
absent from their voting places.
CASE BREAKDOWN: MACALINTAL V COMELEC
Petitioner assails the constitutionality of Section 5(d) of RA 9189 because it is alleged to have
violated the residence requirement under Art V, Sec 1 of the 1987 Constitution. Ultimately, the
Court ruled that the law does not violate the residency requirement in Section 1 of Article V of
the Constitution.
Constitutionality. The law was enacted in obeisance to the mandate of the first paragraph of
Section 2, Art V that Congress shall provide a system for voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.
The strategic location of Section 2 indicates that the Constitutional Commission provided for
an exception to the actual residency requirement of Section 1 with respect to Filipinos abroad.
Executing an affidavit of intention to return. Section 5(d) specifically disqualifies an
immigrant or permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country unless he
executes an affidavit. The reason lies in the implication that immigration or permanent
residence in another country implies renunciation of one’s residence in his own country.
However, by executing an affidavit, he is presumed not to have abandoned his domicile by
reason of his physical absence from this country. The execution of the affidavit itself is not the
enabling or enfranchising act. It serves as an explicit expression that he had not in fact
abandoned his domicile of origin.

o Absentee voting, with respect to dual citizens. RA 9225 allows those who reacquire or
retain their citizenship to vote under Sec 5(1) of the law. The Court notes that there is no
provision in said law that requires dual citizens to actually establish residence and physically
stay in the PH first before they can exercise their right to vote. Accordingly, these citizens
are allowed to vote under the system of absentee voting under RA 9189. Nicolas-Lewis vs
COMELEC
- Note: Primer is pissed at this decision because the ruling seems to suggest that the
residency requirement in the Constitution can be amended through the absentee
voting system. It is notable that RA 9225 does not require dual citizens to execute an
affidavit while RA 9189 requires absentee voters to execute an affidavit.

72
 security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and
ARTICLE XIII
decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.
SOCIAL JUSTICE and HUMAN RIGHTS The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers and the
preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes, including conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual
compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.
SECTION 1
The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers, recognizing the right of labor to its
The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of
just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns on investments, and
all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural
to expansion and growth.
inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.
To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and disposition of property and its
RIGHTS TO LABOR
increments.
Although all workers are protected, the rights guaranteed are not necessarily the same for all.
Distinctions can arise either from the public or private character of the employment or nature
Social justice embodies the principle that those who have less in life should have more in law.
of the work.
There is a legal bias that favors the underprivileged.
Social rights are different from the civil and political rights found in the Bill of Rights.
In legal effectiveness, they are primarily the things people expect government to satisfy or their COLLECTIVE RIGHTS OF WORKERS
ideals which government is expected to expect. 1. Self-organization
2. Collective bargaining and negotiations
CASE BREAKDOWN: INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE V QUISIMBING 3. Peaceful concerted activities
Salary difference between foreign and local hires. The Constitution specifically provides that 4. Right to strike – “in accordance with the law”
labor is entitled to “humane conditions of work”. These conditions are not restricted to the a. Traditionally, the right to strike has been denied to certain work sectors (firemen
physical workplace — the factory, the office or the field — but include as well the manner by peacekeeping forces, and government workers (constituent functions)
which employers treat their employees. 5. Security of tenure
Equal work, equal pay. Similarly, the Labor Code provides that the State shall “equal work
6. Humane conditions of work
opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed”.
7. Living wage
Salaries. Salaries should not be used as an enticement to prejudice local-hires. There is no
8. Participate in policy and decision-making process “as may be provided by law”
evidence here that foreign-hires perform 25% more efficiently or effectively than the local-hires.
Both groups have similar functions and responsibilities, which they perform under similar
working conditions. Just share. The right of a just share of fruit production does not mean mandatory profit-sharing
but a voluntary sharing that is born of the acceptance of the social functions of the means of
SECTION 2 production.
The promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to create economic opportunities based on Balance of protection and right. The Court tries to balance the protection of labors and the
freedom of initiative and self-reliance. right of employers.
LABOR o A retirement plan with an automatic retirement after 35 yrs. of service before the statutory
SECTION 3 retirement age of 65 is valid if it was voluntarily entered into by the employee. Jaculban v
The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote Siliman University.
full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all. o A policy banning employees from marrying employees of a competitor company in order
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and to guards its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies and other
peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to

73
 confidential information from competitors is valid because it was reasonable. Duncan vs Farmers have a tenancy relationship with the landowners which may be present or historical.
Glaxo. The tenancy of the relationship is generally seen as a source of many inequities.
Farm workers are either regular or non-regular.
Solidary liability of employers is for the protection of workers. This joint and several liability • Regular farm worker – has the right to claim lands
of the contractor and the principal is mandated by the Labor Code to assure compliance of the • Non-regular – right to a just share in the fruits of production
provisions therein including minimum wage. The contractor is made liable by virtue of his status The scope of ownership of land reform is subject to limitations set by Congress.
as direct employer. The principal is made the indirect employer of the contractor’s employees • Congress has the right to limit the beneficiary’s right to sell, dispose, or even mortgage
for purposes of paying the employees their wages should the contractor be unable to pay them. the property.
This solidary liability facilitates, if not, guarantees payment of the workers’ performance of any • As to retention limits which is the size of the land an individual owner will be allowed to
work, task, job or project, thus giving the workers ample protection as mandated by the 1987 keep (whether cultivator or not), the general guideline is that it should be reasonable.
Constitution. Eagle Security vs. NLRC In other words, Congress is given the discretion set priorities and limits. The overriding
guideline for Congress is reasonableness.
SECTION 4
AGRARIAN AND NATURAL RESOURCES REFORM The agrarian land reform program mandated by the Constitution is not a land confiscation
The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular
program.
farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other
farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake JUST COMPENSATION
the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the The Constitution requires just compensation.
Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and subject • PD 76 - Just compensation is the assessed value of the land or the value declared by the
to the payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of owner in his tax-declaration, whichever is lower.
small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing. o FR BERNAS: this is prima facie declaration of just compensation as it is still within the
SC to determine if it is in fact just compensation.
AGRARIAN REFORM • RA 3844 – just compensation depends on the farmer’s ability to pay and not on the
standard of fair market value.
The wording of Art. XIII, Sec. 4 is unequivocal—the farmers and regular farmworkers have a
• Bill of Rights - just compensation is the fair market value of the property as between one
right to own directly or collectively the lands they till. The basic law allows 2 modes of land
distribution: direct and indirect ownership. who receives and one who desires to sell.
o DIRECT – there is a direct transfer to individual farmers thus a direct ownership of • RA 6657 - just compensation as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its
owner by the expropriator. The equivalent must be real, substantial, full and ample.
agricultural land by individual farmers. This is the most commonly used method by DAR
It not only refers to the correct amount to be paid to the owners but also payment within a
and widely accepted
reasonable time from its taking.
o INDIRECT – there is an indirect transfer through collective ownership of the agricultural
land.
VOLUNTARY LAND SHARING
By using the word “collectively,” the Constitution allows for indirect ownership of land and not
State must offer incentives like tax incentives for voluntary land sharing to be attractive. But it
just outright agricultural land transfer. Hacienda Luisita vs PARC
should not be a mode of circumventing agrarian reform.
Moreover, the provision of Sec. 4 states that the laws on agrarian reform simply speak of the
COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM LAW
“landowner” without qualification as to under what title the land is held or rights to the land
RA 6657
the landowner may exercise.
The law is an exercise of police power and eminent domain:
• POLICE POWER - in the form of setting retention limits.

74
 • EMINENT DOMAIN - the taking of private lands for redistribution which is revolutionary in
character because it affects all private agricultural lands wherever found and whatever kind
as long as they are in excess of the maximum retention limits allowed by their owners.
Association of Small landowners vs Secretary of Agrarian Reform.
Administrative authorities initially determine what is just compensation but is subject to review
by the courts.
Compensation may be in the form of financial instruments and not money to allow government
time to raise the money needed.
SECTION 5
The State shall recognize the right of farmers, farmworkers, and landowners, as well as cooperatives, and
other independent farmers’ organizations to participate in the planning, organization, and management of
the program, and shall provide support to agriculture through appropriate technology and research, and
adequate financial, production, marketing, and other support services.
Right to participate in a management of program Refers only to participate in the management
of a land reform program and not a privately- owned farm. Support services to a land reform
program is indispensable.
SECTION 6
The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship, whenever applicable in accordance
with law, in the disposition or utilization of other natural resources, including lands of the public domain
under lease or concession suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers,
and the rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral lands.
The State may resettle landless farmers and farmworkers in its own agricultural estates which shall be
distributed to them in the manner provided by law.
SECTION 7
The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of local communities, to the preferential
use of local marine and fishing resources, both inland and offshore. It shall provide support to such fishermen
through appropriate technology and research, adequate financial, production, and marketing assistance,
and other services. The State shall also protect, develop, and conserve such resources. The protection shall
extend to offshore fishing grounds of subsistence fishermen against foreign intrusion. Fish workers shall
receive a just share from their labor in the utilization of marine and fishing resources.
Subsistence fishermen. Not limited to the poorest fishermen. This includes all real and actual
fishermen in the area who fish for a living.
75
Right to expect support from the government by way of appropriate technology and research,
adequate financial, production, and marketing assistance, and other support services.
Fish workers also have the right to a just share from their labor in the use marine and fishing
resources.
SECTION 8
The State shall provide incentives to landowners to invest the proceeds of the agrarian reform program to
promote industrialization, employment creation, and privatization of public sector enterprises. Financial
instruments used as payment for their lands shall be honored as equity in enterprises of their choice.
SECTION 9
URBAN LAND REFORM
The State shall, by law, and for the common good, undertake, in cooperation with the public sector, a
continuing program of urban land reform and housing which will make available at affordable cost decent
housing and basic services to underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlements
areas. It shall also promote adequate employment opportunities to such citizens. In the implementation of
such program the State shall respect the rights of small property owners.
SECTION 10
URBAN LAND REFORM AND HOUSING
Urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their dwellings demolished, except in accordance with
law and in a just and humane manner.
No resettlement of urban or rural dwellers shall be undertaken without adequate consultation with them
and the communities where they are to be relocated.
“Urban and rural poor dwellers” – Informal settlers.
The intent of the provision is to prevent the recurrence of past abuses of law enforcement
agents would move in. bulldoze dwellings and even inflict violence on persons.
Eviction is not prohibited. If there should be an eviction, it must be conducted in a just and
human manner and in accordance with the law.
The Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 (RA 7279) is constitutional because it
provides situations where eviction and demolition is allowed:
1. When it occupies a dangerous area and (railroads, garbage dumps, esteros, riverbanks,
shorelines, waterways, and other public places etc.)
2. Government infrastructure projects
3. Court order for eviction and demolition Macasiano vs NHA
PROCEDURE FOR EXECUTION OF EVICTION AND DEMOLITION
 1. Notice is given 30 days before actual eviction
2. Adequate consultation regarding resettlement
3. Presence of local government officials or their representatives during eviction or demolition
4. Identification of all persons taking part in the demolition
5. Execution of the eviction is only during office hours (M to F) and on good weather, unless
the families consent otherwise
6. No use of heavy equipment for demolition except for structures that are permanent
7. Identified police are present to ensure proper disturbance control.
8. Adequate relocation Macasiano vs NHA
Note: The constitutionality of the law should be raised by a proper party. Macasiano vs NHA
REQUISITES FOR JUDICIAL INQUIRY
1. Must be an actual case or controversy
2. Must be filed by a proper party
a. A proper party is one who has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an immediate
injury
3. Constitutional question is raised at the earliest opportunity
4. Issue of constitutionality is the lis mota of the case. Macasiano vs NHA
MANNER OF EVICTION MUST BE
1. “In accordance with the law.” Due process must be observed. or have an opportunity to
controvert the allegation of his unlawful occupation or possession of the property.
2. “Just and human manner”
a) Occupant must be notified before the actual eviction or demolition is done.
b) No loss of lives, physical injuries or unnecessary loss of or damage to properties.
Just and human manner does not mean that the validity or legality of the demolition or eviction
is hinged on the existence of a resettlement area designated or earmarked by the government.
People vs Leachon
HEALTH
SECTION 11
The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall
endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable
cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children.
The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
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SECTION 12
The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug regulatory system and undertake
appropriate health manpower development and research, responsive to the country’s health needs and
problems.
SECTION 13
The State shall establish a special agency for disabled persons for rehabilitation, self-development and self-
reliance, and their integration into the mainstream of society.
WOMEN
SECTION 14
The State shall protect working women by providing safe and healthful working conditions, taking into
account their maternal functions, and such facilities and opportunities that will enhance their welfare and
enable them to realize their full potential in the service of the nation.
SECTION 15
The State shall respect the role of independent people’s organizations to enable the people to pursue and
protect, within the democratic framework, their legitimate and collective interests and aspirations through
peaceful and lawful means.
People’s organizations are bona fide associations of citizens with demonstrated capacity to promote the
public interest and with identifiable leadership, membership, and structure.
SECTION 16
The right of the people and their organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social,
political, and economic decision-making shall not be abridged. The State shall, by law, facilitate the
establishment of adequate consultation mechanisms.
SECTION 17 (4)
BUDGET
There is hereby created an independent office called the Commission on Human Rights.
The Commission shall be composed of a Chairman and four Members who must be natural-born citizens of
the Philippines and a majority of whom shall be members of the Bar. The term of office and other
qualifications and disabilities of the Members of the Commission shall be provided by law.
Until this Commission is constituted, the existing Presidential Committee on Human Rights shall continue
to exercise its present functions and powers.
The approved annual appropriations of the Commission shall be automatically and regularly released.
Fiscal autonomy. It is a constitutional grant that entails freedom from outside control and
limitations, other than those provided by law. CHR Employees vs CHR
CHR’s fiscal autonomy is limited to the automatic and regular release of appropriations as CASE BREAKDOWN: CARINO V CHR
provided by the constitution. It does not have any other aspects of fiscal autonomy such as the No adjudicatory power, no contempt. The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights
ability to increase salaries and salaries classification on its own. CHR Employees vs CHR has no such power to adjudicate cases.
Power to investigate. It has the power to investigate all forms of human rights violations
BODIES EXERCISING FULL FISCAL AUTONOMY MANDATED BY THE CONSTITUTION: involving civil and political rights.
1. Judiciary No power to adjudicate. But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as
2. Civil Service Commission courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or
3. Commission on Audit adjudge.
4. Commission on Elections Fact-finding is not adjudication and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of
5. Office of the Ombudsman justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official.
CHR HAS NO INJUNCTIVE POWER
The fiscal autonomy of these bodies gives them the power to levy, assess and collect fees, and o CHR acted beyond its mandate in citing the private respondents in contempt and issuing
fix rates of compensation. CHR Employees vs CHR an order to desist. Such is not within its investigatory powers for it is adjudicative in nature.
The members of the fiscal autonomy group still need the approval of DBM to classify and create Only an adjudicative body has injunctive power. Simon vs CHR
positions and upgrade salary classification pursuant to the Compensation Standardization o CHR was established to focus on more severe cases of human rights violations such as
Law. CHR Employees vs CHR treatment of prisoners, rights of political detainees, fair and public trials, cases of
disappearances, etc. Id
SECTION 18 o Thus, the Court was not prepared to rule that demolition falls within the ambit of “human
POWERS OF THE COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS rights violations involving civil and political rights.” Id
1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving
civil and political rights; CIVIL RIGHTS - rights that belong to every citizen of the state appertaining to him/her by virtue
2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations of his/her citizenship (right to property, marriage, contract). Id
thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;
3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the
POLITICAL RIGHTS are those rights that allow a person to participate in the administration of
Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid
services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection; government (right to suffrage, public office). Id
4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;
5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the
primacy of human rights;
6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for
compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their families;
7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights;
8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents
or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it
or under its authority;
9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its
functions;
10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and
11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.

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ARTICLE XIV
EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, ARTS,
CULTURE, AND SPORTS
SECTION 1
The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education at all levels and
shall take appropriate steps to make such education accessible to all.
QUALITY AND ACCESSIBLITY OF EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM
CASE BREAKDOWN: DECS V SAN DIEGO
How to begin a decision. “The issue before us is mediocrity.” Oof.
Best quote award. “While his persistence is noteworthy, to say the least, it is certainly
misplaced, like a hopeless love.”
One big oof.
Failed NMAT five times, power to regulate admission. The Court feels that it is not enough
to simply invoke the right to quality education as a guarantee of the Constitution: one must
show that he is entitled to it because of his preparation and promise.
Admission test. The government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a
means of achieving its stated objective of upgrading the selection of applicants into our medical
schools and of improving the quality of medical education in the country. The ultimate end of
such regulation is the protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of
incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for
disease or trauma.
Police power. It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to ensure that the medical
profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives
and health. The three-flunk rule is a valid exercise of police power intended to insulate the
medical schools and ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified
to be doctors.
No right to be a doctor. While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not
have a constitutional right to be a doctor.
Equal protection. A substantial distinction exists between medical students and other students
who are not subjected to the NMAT and the three-flunk rule. The medical profession directly
affects the very lives of the people, unlike other careers which, for this reason, do not require
more vigilant regulation.
78
Same. There would be unequal protection if some applicants who have passed the tests are
admitted and others who have also qualified are denied entrance. In other words, what the
equal protection requires is equality among equals.
SECTION 2
The State shall:
Establish, maintain, and support a complete, adequate, and integrated system of education relevant to the
needs of the people and society;
Establish and maintain, a system of free public education in the elementary and high school levels. Without
limiting the natural rights of parents to rear their children, elementary education is compulsory for all
children of school age;
Establish and maintain a system of scholarship grants, student loan programs, subsidies, and other incentives
which shall be available to deserving students in both public and private schools, especially to the under-
privileged;
Encourage non-formal, informal, and indigenous learning systems, as well as self-learning, independent,
and out-of-school study programs particularly those that respond to community needs; and
Provide adult citizens, the disabled, and out-of-school youth with training in civics, vocational efficiency,
and other skills.
SECTION 3
All educational institutions shall include the study of the Constitution as part of the curricula.
They shall inculcate patriotism and nationalism, foster love of humanity, respect for human rights,
appreciation of the role of national heroes in the historical development of the country, teach the rights and
duties of citizenship, strengthen ethical and spiritual values, develop moral character and personal discipline,
encourage critical and creative thinking, broaden scientific and technological knowledge, and promote
vocational efficiency.
At the option expressed in writing by the parents or guardians, religion shall be allowed to be taught to their
children or wards in public elementary and high schools within the regular class hours by instructors
designated or approved by the religious authorities of the religion to which the children or wards belong,
without additional cost to the Government.
DUTY OF INSTITUTIONS
o Kaskas mo babe. The Campus Journalism Act states that the school cannot suspend or
expel a student solely on the basis of the articles he or she has written, except when such
article materially disrupt class work or involve substantial disorder or invasion of the
rights of others. Miriam College vs CA.
- Note: It da Tinker Test. See Rights of Children, Unprotected Speech, Section 4,
Article III.
 ART. 6, Sec. 28 (3)
- Exempts charitable institutions, churches, parsonages
or convents, mosques, and non-profit cemeteries from
tax which refer only to the assets
- "all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually,
directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable,
or educational purposes...,"
ART. 14 Sec. 4 (3) a. For a non-stock, non-profit educational institution to avail of the exemption, the
revenue and assets must be used actually, directly and exclusively for educational
- Includes assets AND revenues purposes.
- "All revenues and assets... used actually, directly, 2. Proprietary educational institutions – tax exemptions are subject to the limitations
and exclusively for educational purposes shall be
exempt from taxes and duties."
imposed by Congress. CIR vs DLSU
REQUISITES FOR AVAILING TAX EXEMPTION UNDER ART. 14 SEC. 4 (3):
1. The taxpayer falls under the classification non-stock, non-profit educational institution
2. Income is used actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes.

The tax-exemption constitutionally granted to non-stock, non-profit educational institutions,

o Power to discipline. That power, like the power to suspend or expel, is an inherent part of
the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning guaranteed by the Constitution. Id
o Academic freedom. What may be taught - Discipline is an indispensable value in any field
of learning. How it shall be taught - power to enforce discipline students because a school
cannot function in an atmosphere of anarchy. Who may be admitted to study - if a school
has the freedom to determine whom to admit, logic dictates that it also has the right to
determine whom to discipline (exclude or expel) as well as upon whom to impose lesser
sanctions such as suspension and the withholding of graduation privileges. Id
SECTION 4 (3)
(3)** All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educational institutions used actually, directly, and
exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from taxes and duties. Upon the dissolution or cessation
of the corporate existence of such institutions, their assets shall be disposed of in the manner provided by
law.
EXEMPTION FROM TAX
Revenues and assets used for educational purposes are exempt from taxes. The tax
exemption granted by the Constitution to non-stock, non-profit educational institutions is
conditioned only on the actual, direct and exclusive use of their assets, revenues and income
for educational purposes. CIR vs DLSU
is not subject to limitations imposed by law. Id
Article XIV, Section 4 (3) does not require that the revenues and income must have also been
sourced from educational activities or activities related to the purposes of an educational
institution. Id
RULE: The crucial point of inquiry then is on the use of the assets or on the use of the
revenues. These are two things that must be viewed and treated separately. But so long as the
assets or revenues are used actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes, they are
exempt from duties and taxes. Id
SECTION 5
The State shall take into account regional and sectoral needs and conditions and shall encourage local
planning in the development of educational policies and programs.
Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning. Every citizen has a right to select a
profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic
requirements.
The State shall enhance the right of teachers to professional advancement. Non- teaching academic and
non-academic personnel shall enjoy the protection of the State.
The State shall assign the highest budgetary priority to education and ensure that teaching will attract and
retain its rightful share of the best available talents through adequate remuneration and other means of job
satisfaction and fulfillment.

There are two types of institutions contemplated in ART. 14, Sec. 4 (3): ACADEMIC FREEDOM OF “INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER LEARNING”
1. Non-stock, non-profit educational institutions Denied admission to theology. An institution of higher learning decides for itself its aims and
objectives and how best to attain them, free from outside coercion or interference when the

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overriding public welfare calls for some restraint, and has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly
extending to the choice of students. Garcia vs Faculty Admission
- Note: “institutions of higher learning” – refers only to college, post-grad.
The internal conditions for academic freedom in a university are that the academic staff should
have de facto control of the following functions:
1. Admission and examination of students
2. Curricula of courses of study
3. Appointment and tenure of office of academic staff; and
4. Allocation of income among the different categories of expenditure.
Mandamus. An institution of higher learning cannot be compelled through mandamus to
admit a student because it has no clear duty to admit such student. Id
Freedom to give honors. Schools of learning are given ample discretion to formulate rules
and guidelines in the granting of honors for purposes of graduation due to their academic
freedom. Within the parameters of these rules, it is within the competence of universities and
colleges to determine who are entitled to the grant of honors among the graduating students.
Since it is discretionary, the matter may not be controlled by the courts unless there is grave
abuse of discretion. Mandamus is not a proper remedy. University of San Carlos vs CA.
LANGUAGE
Section 6
The national language of the Philippines is Filipino. As it evolves, it shall be further developed and enriched
on the basis of existing Philippine and other languages. Subject to provisions of law and as the Congress
may deem appropriate, the Government shall take steps to initiate and sustain the use of Filipino as a
medium of official communication and as language of instruction in the educational system.
Section 7
For purposes of communication and instruction, the official languages of the Philippines are Filipino and,
until otherwise provided by law, English. The regional languages are the auxiliary official languages in the
regions and shall serve as auxiliary media of instruction therein. Spanish and Arabic shall be promoted on a
voluntary and optional basis.
Section 8
This Constitution shall be promulgated in Filipino and English and shall be translated into major regional
languages, Arabic, and Spanish.
Section 9
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The Congress shall establish a national language commission composed of representatives of various regions
and disciplines which shall undertake, coordinate, and promote researches for the development,
propagation, and preservation of Filipino and other languages.
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
Section 10
Science and technology are essential for national development and progress. The State shall give priority to
research and development, invention, innovation, and their utilization; and to science and technology
education, training, and services. It shall support indigenous, appropriate, and self-reliant scientific and
technological capabilities, and their application to the country's productive systems and national life.
Section 11
The Congress may provide for incentives, including tax deductions, to encourage private participation in
programs of basic and applied scientific research. Scholarships, grants-in-aid, or other forms of incentives
shall be provided to deserving science students, researchers, scientists, inventors, technologists, and specially
gifted citizens.
Section 12
The State shall regulate the transfer and promote the adaptation of technology from all sources for the
national benefit. It shall encourage the widest participation of private groups, local governments, and
community-based organizations in the generation and utilization of science and technology.
Section 13
The State shall protect and secure the exclusive rights of scientists, inventors, artists, and other gifted citizens
to their intellectual property and creations, particularly when beneficial to the people, for such period as may
be provided by law.
ARTS AND CULTURE
Section 14
The State shall foster the preservation, enrichment, and dynamic evolution of a Filipino national culture
based on the principle of unity in diversity in a climate of free artistic and intellectual expression.
Section 15
Arts and letters shall enjoy the patronage of the State. The State shall conserve, promote, and popularize the
nation's historical and cultural heritage and resources, as well as artistic creations.
Section 16
All the country's artistic and historic wealth constitutes the cultural treasure of the nation and shall be under
the protection of the State which may regulate its disposition.
 Section 17
The State shall recognize, respect, and protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to preserve and
develop their cultures, traditions, and institutions. It shall consider these rights in the formulation of national
plans and policies.

Section 18.
The State shall ensure equal access to cultural opportunities through the educational system, public or
private cultural entities, scholarships, grants and other incentives, and community cultural centers, and other
public venues.
The State shall encourage and support researches and studies on the arts and culture.

SPORTS
Section 19
The State shall promote physical education and encourage sports programs, league competitions, and
amateur sports, including training for international competitions, to foster self-discipline, teamwork, and
excellence for the development of a healthy and alert citizenry.
All educational institutions shall undertake regular sports activities throughout the country in cooperation
with athletic clubs and other sectors.

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