Page 6 B

Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leongson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola,
Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang, Lasam, Palma, Bongalon, Ongtioco, Casungad, Villamayor, Lopez, Santiago
Torts_2015
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, FERDINAND E.

MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, ROSENDO D. BONDOC, CESAR E. A. VIRATA,
RUBEN ANCHETA, JAIME C. LAYA, PLACIDO MAPA, JR., ROBERTO ONGPIN and
CESAR C. ZALAMEA (1994)
Facts: Before 1986, the Landoil Group of Companies spearheaded by then Congressman Jose
de Venecia, Jr., was able to obtain foreign loans syndicated by various banks aggregating
approximately one hundred twenty million US dollars ($120 M). These foreign loans were
guaranteed by PHILGUARANTEE, whose Board of Directors was then composed of private
respondents, Rosendo D. Bondoc, Cesar E. A. Virata, Ruben Ancheta, Jaime C. Laya, Placido
Mapa, Jr., Roberto Ongpin, and Cezar Zalamea. Congressman de Venecia's group of companies
was unable to seasonably service these foreign loans and this compelled PHILGUARANTEE to
assume its obligation as guarantor.
With the EDSA revolution in February 1986 swept the Marcoses out of power. President
Aquino then ordered the creation of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG)
under E.O No. 1 which was given the difficult task of recovering the illegal wealth of the
Marcoses, their family, subordinates and close associates. In due time, the Marcoses and their
cronies had to face a flurry of cases, both civil and criminal, all designed to recover the
Republic's wealth allegedly plundered by them while in power. Case No. 0020 for
Reconveyance, Reversion, Accounting, Restitution and Damages was one of these cases. It was
filed by the petitioner Republic against Jose de Venecia, Jr., Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R.
Marcos, Rosendo D. Bondoc, Cesar E. A. Virata, Ruben Ancheta, Jaime C. Laya, Placido Mapa,
Jr., Roberto Ongpin and Cesar C. Zalamea. We quote its relevant allegations:
From the early years of his presidency, t Ferdinand E. Marcos took undue advantage of
his powers as President. Marcos, together with other defendants, acting singly or collectively,
and/or in unlawful concert with one another, in flagrant breach of public trust and of their
fiduciary obligations as public officers, with gross and scandalous abuse of right and power and
in brazen violation of the Constitution and laws of the Philippines embarked upon a systematic
plan to accumulate ill-gotten wealth.
Among others, in furtherance of said plan and acting in unlawful concert with one
another and with gross abuse of power and authority, Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R.
Marcos. Jose de Venecia, Jr. taking undue advantage of his relationship, influence and
connection with Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, acting by himself
and/or in active collaboration with the other Defendants, embarked upon devices, schemes and
strategems to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of Plaintiff and the Filipino people.
Issue: Whether the defendants are liable for damages under torts.
Ruling: Petitioner contends that the emerging rule in the US is that the release of one tortfeasor
does not automatically result in the release of the other tortfeasor, hence the case against the
private respondents should not dismissed even if it had consented to the dismissal of the case
against de Venecia Jr. We fail to see how the principles of tort can apply to the case at bench.
Furthermore, the case can hardly be classified as a tort case for it is one for reconveyance,
reversion, accounting, restitution and damages. The petitioner has never taken the stance that its
cause of action is predicated in tort.
1
Torts_2015
Assuming that the principles of tort are applicable, we still affirm the ruling of the
Sandiganbayan that the complaint against the former directors of PHILGUARANTEE should be
dismissed. In that case at bench, petitioner released de Venecia Jr and some of his companies not
because its claim has already been satisfied by a sufficient consideration but because of the fact
that it could not establish its cause of action against them. Petitioner’s showed that de Venecia Jr.
was not a crony of the former Pres. Marcos and that it obtained the guarantees to his foreign
loans in the regular and ordinary course of business. In other words, de Venecia Jr. and company
did not commit any actionable wrong, including tortious act. The complaint against de Venecia
Jr. and these respondents are inseparable, especially because petitioner relied on the theory of
conspiracy.
Dissenting; (Davide, J.)

Under American Jurisprudence, three rules have developed which deal with the question of
whether the release of one joint tortfeasor releases other tortfeasors who are not parties to or
named in the release.
1.) the ancient common law rule that a release of one jont tortfeasor releases all other
parties liable regardless of the intent of the parties.
2.) First Restatement Rule states that a release of one co-conspirator normally releases all
others unless the plaintiff expressly reserves his rights against the others unless the
plaintiff expressly reserves his rights against the others.
3.) The effect of the release upon co-conspirators shall be determined in accordance with
the intentions of the parties.
CHAPTER 3
ACTS OR OMISSION
A. CONCEPT OF ACT AND TEST OF NEGLIGENCE
Corinthian Gardens Association, Inc. vs. Tanjangco (2008)
Facts: Spouses Reynaldo and Maria Luisa Tanjangco (the Tanjangcos) own Lots 68 and 69
located at Corinthian Gardens Subdivision, Quezon City, which is managed by petitioner
Corinthian Gardens Association, Inc. (Corinthian). On the other hand, respondents-spouses
Frank and Teresita Cuaso (the Cuasos) own Lot 65 which is adjacent to the Tanjangcos’ lots.
Before the Cuasos constructed their house on Lot 65, a relocation survey was necessary.
As Geodetic Engineer Democrito De Dios, operating under the business name D.M. De Dios
Realty and Surveying, conducted all the previous surveys for the subdivision's developer,
Corinthian referred Engr. De Dios to the Cuasos. Before, during and after the construction of the
said house, Corinthian conducted periodic ocular inspections in order to determine compliance
with the approved plans pursuant to the Manual of Rules and Regulations of Corinthian.
Unfortunately, after the Cuasos constructed their house employing the services of C.B. Paraz &
Construction Co., Inc. as builder, their perimeter fence encroached on the Tanjangcos’ Lot 69 by
87 square meters. No amicable settlement was reached between the parties. Thus, the Tanjangcos
demanded that the Cuasos demolish the perimeter fence but the latter failed and refused,
2
Torts_2015
prompting the Tanjangcos to file with the RTC a suit against the Cuasos for Recovery of
Possession with Damages.
Cuasos filed a Third-Party Complaint8 against Corinthian, C.B. Paraz and Engr. De Dios.
The Cuasos ascribed negligence to C.B. Paraz for its failure to ascertain the proper specifications
of their house, and to Engr. De Dios for his failure to undertake an accurate relocation survey,
thereby, exposing them to litigation. The Cuasos also faulted Corinthian for approving their
relocation survey and building plans without verifying their accuracy and in making
representations as to Engr. De Dios' integrity and competence. The Cuasos alleged that had
Corinthian exercised diligence in performing its duty, they would not have been involved in a
boundary dispute with the Tanjangcos. Thus, the Cuasos opined that Corinthian should also be
held answerable for any damages that they might incur as a result of such construction.
The RTC ruled that Cuacos were builders in good faith. The CA reversed the RTC’s
decision and ruled that Cuacos were builders in bad faith. On the third-party complaints,
Corinthian, C.B. Paraz and Engr. De Dios were all found negligent in performing their respective
duties and so they were ordered to contribute five percent (5%) each, or a total of fifteen percent
(15%) to all judgment sums and amounts that the Cuasos shall eventually pay under the decision,
also with interest of six percent (6%) per annum. Only Corinthian filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the CA Decision within the 15-day reglementary period.
Issue: Whether Corinthian was negligent under the circumstances and, if so, whether such
negligence contributed to the injury suffered by the Tanjangcos.
Ruling:
A negligent act is an inadvertent act; it may be merely carelessly done from a lack of
ordinary prudence and may be one which creates a situation involving an unreasonable risk to
another because of the expectable action of the other, a third person, an animal, or a force of
nature.
The test to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as
follows: Did the defendant in committing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and
caution which an ordinary person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty
of negligence. The law, in effect, adopts the standard supplied by the imaginary conduct of the
discreet paterfamilias in Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not
determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The
law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in a man of ordinary
intelligence and prudence, and determines liability according to that standard.
By this test, we find Corinthian negligent. Corinthian cannot and should not be allowed to
justify or excuse its negligence by claiming that its approval of the Cuasos’ building plans was
only limited to a so-called "table inspection;" and not actual site measurement. To accept some
such postulate is to put a premium on negligence. Corinthian was not organized solely for the
defendants Cuasos. It is also the subdivision of the plaintiffs-spouses Tanjangcos - and of all
3
Torts_2015
others who have their dwelling units or abodes therein. Pertinently, its Manual of Rules and
Regulations stipulates in Section 3 thereof (under the heading Construction), thus:
A. Rules and Regulations
“No new construction can be started unless the building plans are approved by the Associationand the
appropriate Builder’s cash bond and pre-construction fees are paid. The Association will not allow the entry of
construction materials and process identification cards for workers if the above conditions are not complied with.
Likewise, all renovations, repairs, additions and improvements to a finished house except electrical wiring, will have
to be approved by the Association. Water service connection of a homeowner who undertakes construction work
without prior approval of the Association will be cut-off in addition to the sanctions previously mentioned.”
It goes without saying that this Manual of Rules and Regulations applies to all - or it does
not apply at all. And then again third party defendant-appellee Corinthian Garden required the
posting of a builder’s cash bond (Exh. 5-Corinthian) from the defendants-appellants Cuasos and
the third-party defendant C.B. Paraz Construction to secure the performance of their undertaking.
Surely, Corinthian does not imply that while it may take the benefits from the Builder’s cash
bond, it may, Pilate-like, wash its hands of any responsibility or liability that would or might
arise from the construction or building of the structure for which the cash bond was in the first
place posted. That is not only unjust and immoral, but downright unchristian and iniquitous.
Under the same parity of reasoning, the payment by the appellants-Cuasos to the appellee
Corinthian of pre-construction and membership fees in the Association must necessarily entail
the creation of certain obligations on the part of Corinthian. In sum, Corinthian’s failure to
prevent the encroachment of the Cuasos’ perimeter wall into Tanjangcos’ property – despite the
inspection conducted – constitutes negligence and, at the very least, contributed to the injury
suffered by the Tanjangcos.
Porfirio P. Cinco vs. Hon. Mateo Canonoy, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance
of Cebu, Hon. Lorenzo B. Barria, City Judge of Mandaue City, Romeo Hilot, Valeriana
Pepito and Carlos Pepito (1979)
FACTS:
Porfirio P. Cinco filed a complaint in the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu for the recovery of
damages on account of a vehicular accident involving his automobile and against a jeepney
driven by Romeo Hilot and operated by Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito.
Subsequent thereto, a criminal case was filed against the driver, Romeo Hilot, arising from the
same accident.
At the pre-trial in the civil case, counsel for private respondents moved to suspend the civil
action pending the final determination of the criminal suit, invoking Rule 111, Section 3 (b) of
the Rules of Court, which provides:
4
Torts_2015
(b) After a criminal action has been commenced. no civil action arising from the same offense
can be prosecuted, and the same shall be suspended, in whatever stage it may be found, until
final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered.
City Court: ordered the suspension of the civil case
CFI by certiorari: dismissed the Petition for certiorari on the ground that there was no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the City Court in suspending the civil action since damage to
property is not one of the instances when an independent civil action is proper.
That petitioner has another plain, speedy, and adequate remedy under the law, which is to submit
his claim for damages in the criminal case.
ISSUE: Whether or not there can be an independent civil action for damage to property during
the pendency of the criminal action
HELD:
It is evident based from the complaint that his action was quasi-delict predicated principally on
Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code, which provide:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence
is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict.
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages cause by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business
or industry.
The responsibility shall cease when the persons mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
Liability being predicated on quasi-delict the civil case may proceed as a separate and
independent civil action, as specifically provided for in Article 2177 of the Civil Code.
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate
and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the
plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
In construing the laws, courts have endeavored to shorten and facilitate the pathways of right and
justice. True, there is such a remedy under our laws, but there is also a more expeditious way,
5
Torts_2015
which is based on the primary and direct responsibility of the defendant under article 1903
of the Civil Code
The primary and direct responsibility of employers and their presumed negligence are principles
calculated to protect society. Workmen and employees should be carefully chosen and
supervised in order to avoid injury to the public. It is the masters or employers who principally
reap the profits resulting from the services of these servants and employees. It is but right that
they should guarantee the latter's careful conduct for the personnel and patrimonial safety of
others.
The separate and independent civil action for a quasi-delict is also clearly recognized in section
3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 3. When civil action may proceed independently.—In the cases provided in Articles 32,
33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be
brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover
damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.
Secs. 3(a) and 3(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which should be suspended after the
criminal action has been instituted is that arising from the criminal offense not the civil action
based on quasi-delict
Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code is so broad that it includes not only injuries to persons but also
damage to property. The word "damage" is used in two concepts: the "harm" done and
"reparation" for the harm done. It makes no distinction between "damage to persons" and
"damage to property". And with respect to harm it is plain that it includes both injuries to person
and property since "harm" is not limited to personal but also to property injuries.
Respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in upholding the Decision of the City Court of
Mandaue City, Cebu, suspending the civil action based on a quasi-delict until after the criminal
case is finally terminated.
WHEREFORE, granting the Writ of certiorari prayed for, the Decision of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu sought to be reviewed is hereby set aside, and the City Court of Mandaue City,
Cebu, is hereby ordered to proceed with the hearing of Civil Case of that Court.
B. ELEMENTS OF QUASI-DELICT
6
Torts_2015
Natividad v. Andamo and Emmanuel R. Andamo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (First
Civil Cases Division) and Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc. (1990)
Facts: Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land
situated in Biga (Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private respondent,
Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation.
Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances, including an artificial
lake, were constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land, caused a young
man to drown, damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the
lives of petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants and
other improvements to destruction.
Petitioners instituted a criminal action against Efren Musngi, Orlando Sapuay and Rutillo
Mallillin, officers and directors of herein respondent corporation, for destruction by means of
inundation under Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code.
Subsequently, petitioners filed another action against respondent corporation, this time a civil
case, docketed as Civil Case No. TG-748, for damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction before the same court.
Issue: Whether a corporation, which has built through its agents, waterpaths, water conductors
and contrivances within its land, thereby causing inundation and damage to an adjacent land, can
be held civilly liable for damages under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-
delicts such that the resulting civil case can proceed independently of the criminal case.
Decision: Quoted hereunder are the pertinent portions of petitioners' complaint in Civil Case
No. TG-748:
4) That within defendant's land, likewise located at Biga (Biluso), Silang, Cavite, adjacent on the right
side of the aforesaid land of plaintiffs, defendant constructed waterpaths starting from the middle-right
portion thereof leading to a big hole or opening, also constructed by defendant, thru the lower portion of
its concrete hollow-blocks fence situated on the right side of its cemented gate fronting the provincial
highway, and connected by defendant to a man height inter-connected cement culverts which were also
constructed and lain by defendant cross-wise beneath the tip of the said cemented gate, the left-end of the
said inter-connected culverts again connected by defendant to a big hole or opening thru the lower portion
of the same concrete hollowblocks fence on the left side of the said cemented gate, which hole or opening
is likewise connected by defendant to the cemented mouth of a big canal, also constructed by defendant,
which runs northward towards a big hole or opening which was also built by defendant thru the lower
portion of its concrete hollow-blocks fence which separates the land of plaintiffs from that of defendant
(and which serves as the exit-point of the floodwater coming from the land of defendant, and at the same
time, the entrance-point of the same floodwater to the land of plaintiffs, year after year, during rainy or
stormy seasons.
5) That moreover, on the middle-left portion of its land just beside the land of plaintiffs, defendant also
constructed an artificial lake, the base of which is soil, which utilizes the water being channeled thereto
from its water system thru inter-connected galvanized iron pipes (No. 2) and complimented by rain water
7
Torts_2015
during rainy or stormy seasons, so much so that the water below it seeps into, and the excess water above
it inundates, portions of the adjoining land of plaintiffs.
6) That as a result of the inundation brought about by defendant's aforementioned water conductors,
contrivances and manipulators, a young man was drowned to death, while herein plaintiffs suffered and
will continue to suffer, as follows:
a) Portions of the land of plaintiffs were eroded and converted to deep, wide and long canals,
such that the same can no longer be planted to any crop or plant.
b) Costly fences constructed by plaintiffs were, on several occasions, washed away.
c) During rainy and stormy seasons the lives of plaintiffs and their laborers are always in danger.
d) Plants and other improvements on other portions of the land of plaintiffs are exposed to
destruction. ...
A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that the civil action is one
under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi-
delict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the
defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause
and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the
plaintiff.
Clearly, from petitioner's complaint, the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent
corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion
of a causal connection between the act of building these waterpaths and the damage sustained by
petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes fault or negligence which may be the basis for the
recovery of damages.
While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the public domain and the
property subject of the instant case is privately owned, the fact remains that petitioners'
complaint sufficiently alleges that petitioners have sustained and will continue to sustain damage
due to the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation. Indeed, the recitals of the
complaint, the alleged presence of damage to the petitioners, the act or omission of respondent
corporation supposedly constituting fault or negligence, and the causal connection between the
act and the damage, with no pre-existing contractual obligation between the parties make a clear
case of a quasi delict or culpa aquiliana.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on a person for damage caused by
his act or omission constituting fault or negligence, thus:
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this chapter.
Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence", covers not only acts "not
punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or
negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act,
8
Torts_2015
whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the
offended party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually charged also criminally), to recover
damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of
the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.
The distinctness of quasi-delicta is shown in Article 2177 of the Civil Code, which states:
Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal
Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant.
According to the Report of the Code Commission "the foregoing provision though at first
sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and
civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and
independent negligence, which is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having
always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such
distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa extra-contractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been
sustained by decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain.
C. MODALITIES OF AN ACT
1. Contrary to Morals, Good Customs and Public Policy
DELIA R. SIBAL, petitioner, vs. NOTRE DAME OF GREATER MANILA, NATIONAL

LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
Facts: Petitioner Delia R. Sibal was employed as school nurse by private respondent Notre
Dame of Greater Manila starting January 1973. She was compensated on a 12-month basis,
although she worked only during the ten-month period of classes. She was not required to report
for work for the entire Christmas and summer vacations. Respondent's director, Fr. Enrique
Gonzales, requested her to shorten her summer vacation to report during that summer to help in
the library. Petitioner contested the order, stating that it will necessitate a change in the terms and
conditions of her employment and that library work is alien to her profession as nurse. Fr.
Gonzales was replaced by Fr. Pablo Garcia. Fr. Garcia required petitioner to report for work
during the summer before the beginning of school year 1981-1982. Petitioner informed him that
her contract does not require her to report for work during the summer vacation. Petitioner failed
to receive her vacation pay. Petitioner was assigned to teach health subjects to 900 students
spread out in nineteen (19) sections. Petitioner, however, was not given compensation for
teaching, notwithstanding the fact that other teachers were duly compensated for extra work
done. Petitioner tried to arrange for a meeting with Fr. Garcia regarding her vacation pay, but to
no avail because Fr. Garcia was always busy. Petitioner received her 13th month pay which was
computed on the basis of a 10-month period only. Fr. Garcia again required petitioner to work
during that summer to update all the clinical records of the students. Petitioner objected to the
order by reiterating that her contract does not require her to report for work during summer.
Also, petitioner was not entitled to extra compensation for teaching because teaching was
9
Torts_2015
allegedly part of her regular working program as a school nurse. Petitioner called the attention of
Fr. Garcia to the school's failure to pay her salary for the summer of 1981 and of the deficiency
in her 13th month pay for that year. The following day, Fr. Garcia adamantly refused to consider
petitioner's demands and threatened to take drastic measures against her if she remains obstinate
in her refusal to follow his order to report for work that summer. Failing to receive the
compensation demanded, petitioner filed a complaint for non-payment of vacation pay;
compensation for teaching health subjects; and deficiency in the 13th month pay. That very day
when petitioner reported for work, respondent school served petitioner her letter of termination
effective immediately. The following day, petitioner filed an amended complaint, adding two
more charges: illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice. The Labor Arbiter gave the award of
separation pay instead of reinstatement and further ruled that the petitioner is not entitled to
compensation for teaching health subjects. Respondent filed opposition to the appeal. Petitioner
informed the NLRC that Fr. Pablo Garcia had been replaced by Fr. Jose Arong, a Filipino, as
new director effective September 8, 1983. NLRC rendered the questioned decision which
affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to separation pay instead of reinstatement;
compensation for teaching health subjects; moral damages.
Ruling: This Court finds merit in the petition.
The Labor Arbiter herself had found that the termination of petitioner was not supported
by any just cause or reason. Yet, she erroneously ordered separation pay instead of reinstatement
with backwages based on the alleged reason that petitioner's working relations with the former
director had become so strained. Petitioner simply claimed benefits which, under the law, she
was entitled to and legally due her. It was only after the school refused to satisfy her money
claims that she filed the formal complaint with the proper NLRC branch. Ironically, however, the
director gave her a downright shabby treatment by terminating her services without prior notice
and without first filing a case against her wherein she could have defended herself. One's
employment, profession, trade or calling is a "property right", and the wrongful interference
therewith is an actionable wrong. The right is considered to be property within the protection of a
constitutional guaranty of due process of law. Consequently, Fr. Garcia was replaced then the
alleged "strained relations" or "irritant factors" which the Labor Arbiter capitalized on had been
totally eliminated. Respondent NLRC obviously failed to consider this and thus perpetuated the
error committed by the Labor Arbiter in her prior decision.
The respondent NLRC erred in sustaining the Labor Arbiter's ruling that petitioner is not
entitled to compensation for teaching health subjects allegedly because petitioner taught during
her regular working hours. Petitioner's teaching the subject in the classroom and her
administering to the health needs of students in the clinic involve two different and distinct jobs.
They cannot be equated with each other for they refer to different functions. After all it has been
the practice of the school to pay extra compensation to teachers who were given extra load even
during regular working hours. Hence, petitioner should likewise be paid compensation. Besides,
justice and equity demand that since the principle of equal work has long been observed in this
jurisdiction, then it should follow that an extra pay for extra work should also be applied. In
arguing for petitioner's entitlement to moral damages, the Solicitor General has aptly summed up
10
Torts_2015
her plight. The Solicitor General has submitted this valid justification for the award of moral
damages under Art. 1701 of the Labor Code. Petitioner had been the subject of discrimination for
over a year before she was ultimately dismissed. Again, petitioner, unlike the teachers who
accepted extra load, was not given extra compensation when she taught health subjects to 900
students. Petitioner's 13th month pay was likewise underpaid.
Private respondent is hereby ordered to REINSTATE petitioner to her former position

without loss of seniority rights and with backwages for three (3) years from the time of her
illegal dismissal; to pay her the regular extra compensation relative to her teaching health
subjects; and to pay her moral damages.
Conrado Bunag vs Court of Appeals (1992)
Facts: On the afternoon of September 8, 1973, Bunag, Jr. brought plaintiff-appellant to a motel
or hotel where they had sexual intercourse. Later that evening, said defendant-appellant brought
plaintiff-appellant to the house of his grandmother Juana de Leon in Pamplona, Las Piñas, Metro
Manila, where they lived together as husband and wife for 21 days, or until September 29, 1973.
They filed their respective applications for a marriage license with the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of Bacoor, Cavite. On October 1, 1973, after leaving plaintiff-appellant, defendant-
appellant Bunag, Jr. filed an affidavit withdrawing his application for a marriage license.
Plaintiff contends that on the afternoon of September 8, Bunag, Jr., together with an unidentified
male companion, abducted her in the vicinity of the San Juan de Dios Hospital in Pasay City and
brought her to a motel where she was raped. Before that, they were sweethearts, but two weeks
before September 8, they had a quarrel, and Bunag, Jr. wanted to talk matters over with plaintiff,
so that he invited her to take their merienda at the Aristocrat Restaurant in Manila, to which
plaintiff obliged, as she believed in his sincerity, instead she was forcibly abducted and was
raped.
Defendants-appellants, on the other hand, deny that defendant-appellant Conrado Bunag,

Jr. abducted and raped plaintiff-appellant on September 8, 1973. On the contrary, plaintiff-
appellant and defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. eloped on that date because of the opposition of the
latter's father to their relationship.
A complaint for damages for alleged breach of promise to marry was filed by herein
private respondent Zenaida B. Cirilo against petitioner Conrado Bunag, Jr. and his father,
Conrado Bunag, Sr.. The TC held that petitioner had forcibly abducted and raped private
respondent, and ordered petitioner Bunag, Jr. to pay private respondent P80,000.00 as moral
damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, P20,000.00 by way of temperate damages, and
P10,000.00 for and as attorney's fees, as well as the costs of suit. CA dismissed the appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred in awarding plaintiff-appellant damages for the
breach of defendants-appellants' promise of marriage.
Held: Petition denied.
11
Torts_2015
Petitioner asserts that since action involves a breach of promise to marry, the trial court
erred in awarding damages.
It is true that in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the time-honored rule that an action for
breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover
money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. Generally, therefore,
a breach of promise to marry per se is not actionable, except where the plaintiff has actually
incurred expenses for the wedding and the necessary incidents thereof.
However, the award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified in or analogous to

those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Correlatively, under Article 21 of said Code, in
relation to paragraph 10 of said Article 2219, any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate
the latter for moral damages. Article 21 was adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes
which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless even though they have actually suffered
material and moral injury, and is intended to vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold
number of moral wrongs.
Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, the acts of petitioner in forcibly
abducting private respondent and having carnal knowledge with her against her will, and
thereafter promising to marry her in order to escape criminal liability, only to thereafter renege
on such promise after cohabiting with her for twenty-one days, irremissibly constitute acts
contrary to morals and good customs.
In the instant case, the dismissal of the complaint for forcible abduction with rape was by
mere resolution of the fiscal at the preliminary investigation stage. There is no declaration in a
final judgment that the fact from which the civil case might arise did not exist. Consequently, the
dismissal did not in any way affect the right of herein private respondent to institute a civil action
arising from the offense because such preliminary dismissal of the penal action did not carry
with it the extinction of the civil action.
Gashem Shookat Baksh v. Court of Appeals (1993)
Facts: Private respondent Marilou T. Gonzales, without the assistance of counsel, filed with the
trial court a complaint for damages against the petitioner for the alleged violation of their
agreement to get married. She alleges in said complaint that: she is twenty-two (22) years old,
single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her
community; petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano
Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student taking a medical course at the
Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City; before 20 August 1987, the latter courted and
proposed to marry her; she accepted his love on the condition that they would get married; they
therefore agreed to get married after the end of the school semester, which was in October of that
year; petitioner then visited the private respondent's parents in Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to
secure their approval to the marriage (Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after
defendant had informed them of his desire to marry Marilou, he already looked for sponsors for
the wedding, started preparing for the reception by looking for pigs and chickens, and even
12
Torts_2015
already invited many relatives and friends to the forthcoming wedding); sometime in 20 August
1987, the petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano Apartments; she was a virgin
before she began living with him; a week before the filing of the complaint, petitioner's attitude
towards her started to change; he maltreated and threatened to kill her (Defendant would tie
plaintiff's hands and feet while he went to school, and he even gave her medicine at 4 o'clock in
the morning that made her sleep the whole day and night until the following day. As a result of
this live-in relationship, plaintiff became pregnant, but defendant gave her some medicine to
abort the fetus); as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries; during a confrontation
with a representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a day before the filing of the complaint,
petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and;
the petitioner is already married to someone living in Bacolod City.
RTC, CA- in favor of private respondent
Issue: Whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case of mere breach of promise
to marry.
Ruling: Yes provided that such breach of promise to marry was coupled with moral seduction.
Mere breach of promise to marry per se is not an act liable for damages.
In the general scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission
responsible for drafting the New Civil Code, intentional and malicious acts, with certain
exceptions, are to be governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or omissions are
to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. In between these opposite spectrums are
injurious acts which, in the absence of Article 21, would have been beyond redress. Thus, Article
21 fills that vacuum. It is even postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code,
Article 21 has greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs.
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so
hold, that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his
love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate
cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no
intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to
entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the
award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of
the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed
thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. In other words, the essential feature is
seduction, that in law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage;
it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on
the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded.
In his annotations on the Civil Code, Associate Justice Edgardo L. Paras, opined that in a
breach of promise to marry where there had been carnal knowledge, moral damages may be
recovered. In other words, if the CAUSE be the promise to marry, and the EFFECT be the
13
Torts_2015
carnal knowledge, there is a chance that there was criminal or moral seduction, hence
recovery of moral damages will prosper. If it be the other way around, there can be no
recovery of moral damages, because here mutual lust has intervened). . . .together with
"ACTUAL damages, should there be any, such as the expenses for the wedding
presentations. However, when the sexual act is accomplished without any deceit or qualifying
circumstance of abuse of authority or influence, but the woman, already of age, has knowingly
given herself to a man, it cannot be said that there is an injury which can be the basis for
indemnity.
In the case at bar, the private respondent is a plain high school graduate and a mere
employee or a waitress in a luncheonette. It is clear that petitioner, a medical student harbors a
condescending, if not sarcastic, regard for the private respondent on account of the latter's
ignoble birth, inferior educational background, poverty and, as perceived by him, dishonorable
employment. Obviously then, from the very beginning, he was not at all moved by good faith
and an honest motive. Marrying with a woman so circumstances could not have even remotely
occurred to him. Thus, his profession of love and promise to marry were empty words directly
intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman into believing that indeed, he
loved her and would want her to be his life's partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he
wanted satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of love and
proposal of marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of ease and security. Petitioner clearly
violated the Filipino's concept of morality and brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos
have for their women and hence should be liable for damages.
Amelita Constantino and Michael Constantino vs. Ivan Mendez and the Honorable Court
of Appeals (1992)
Facts: Petitioner Amelita Constantino filed an action for support, recognition and damages
against met respondent Ivan Mendez with the CFI. Amelita alleged that she and Ivan first in a
restaurant where the former worked, and the next day Ivan invited Amelita to dinner, where he
confessed his love for the latter. Later that evening Ivan was able to have sexual intercourse with
Amelita after a promise of marriage. After the act Ivan confessed that he was a married man;
nonetheless sexual contact between the two was repeated for months. Amelita bore a child and
sought recognition for the child, Michael; and support from Ivan.
Ivan denied having sexual relations with Amelita. The CFI ruled in favor of Amelita, ordering
Ivan to pay the latter actual and moral damages. Both parties prayed for reconsideration, with
Ivan claiming that the award for damages was unsubstantiated by evidence while Amelita
seeking the recognition and support of her son Michael. The CFI granted Amelita’s motion.
On appeal, the CA set aside the CFI decision.
Issue: Whether the CA erred in setting aside, among others, the award of damages to Amelita.
Decision: Petition DISMISSED.
As regards Amelita's claim for damages which is based on Articles 19 3 & 21 4 of the Civil Code
on the theory that through Ivan's promise of marriage, she surrendered her virginity, we cannot
but agree with the Court of Appeals that m[e]re sexual intercourse is not by itself a basis for
14
Torts_2015
recovery. Damages could only be awarded if sexual intercourse is not a product of voluntariness
and mutual desire. At the time she met Ivan at Tony's Restaurant, Amelita was already 28 years
old and she admitted that she was attracted to Ivan. Her attraction to Ivan is the reason why she
surrendered her womanhood. Had she been induced or deceived because of a promise of
marriage, she could have immediately severed her relation with Ivan when she was informed
after their first sexual contact sometime in August, 1974, that he was a married man. Her
declaration that in the months of September, October and November, 1974, they repeated their
sexual intercourse only indicates that passion and not the alleged promise of marriage was the
moving force that made her submit herself to Ivan.
Michael London for and in behalf of his minor son Nicholas London vs Baguio Country
Club Corporation (2002)
Facts: Nicholas London, then 11 years old, was playing video games at the recreation center of
the Baguio Country Club, when Francis Simalong, obviously drunk, placed his hand around
Nicholas and touched the latter’s penis. Frightened, Nicholas immediately informed by telephone
his parents about it. Immediately his parents fetched him and proceeded to the police station to
report the matter.
Michael London, the father of Nicholas, executed and filed before the office if the City
Prosecutor in Baguio City a complaint for “Child Abuse and/or Acts of Lasciviousness and
Unjust Vexation”. The private complainant reserved his right to institute an independent civil
action.
Thus, Nicholas, represented by his father, filed a complaint for damages before Baguio
City against Baguio Country Club, the club’s General Manager Anthony De Leon and Francis
Simalong. The civil action was predicated on the civil liability of defendants for culpa aquiliana
under the provisions of the Civil Code.
The Baguio Country Club and Anthony de Leon filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
on the ground that the it did not disclose the existence and status of the criminal case pending
before the court. RTC granted the motion to dismiss. London filed the instant petition for review
assailing the dismissal of his complaint in the civil case.
Issue: Whether the dismissal of the civil case was proper?
SC Ruling: No.
While, in this instance, both the criminal action and the civil complaint for quasi-delict
have arisen from an act of lasciviousness claimed to have been committed by Simalong against
the person of Nicholas Frederick London, there are, however, material differences between the
two actions. In the criminal case, the real party plaintiff is the “People of the Philippines” and the
defendant is accused Simalong alone. In the civil case, the parties are plaintiff Michael London,
for and in behalf of his minor son Nicholas Frederick London, and the defendants include not
only Simalong but also the Baguio Country Club and its general manager Anthony de
Leon. Given the circumstances, a judgment of conviction or acquittal in the criminal case
against Simalong cannot at all be invoked as being one of res judicata in the independent suit for
damages.
15
Torts_2015
2. Negligence (Art. 20 and 1173, NCC)

3. Willful or intentional (Art. 21 and 22, NCC)
B.F. METAL CORPORATION vs.
SPS. ROLANDO M. LOMOTAN and LINAFLOR LOMOTAN And RICO UMUYON
Facts:
In the morning of 03 May 1989, respondent Rico Umuyon ("Umuyon") was driving the
owner-type jeep owned by respondents, Spouses Lomotan. The jeep was cruising along Felix
Avenue in Cainta, Rizal at a moderate speed of 20 to 30 kilometers per hour. Suddenly, at the
opposite lane, the speeding ten-wheeler truck driven by Onofre Rivera overtook a car by
invading the lane being traversed by the jeep and rammed into the jeep. The jeep was a total
wreck while Umuyon suffered "blunt thoracic injury with multiple rib fracture, fractured scapula
(L), with pneumohemothorax," which entailed his hospitalization for 19 days. Also in view of
the injuries he sustained, Umuyon could no longer drive, reducing his daily income from
P150.00 to P100.00.
Respondents instituted a separate and independent civil action for damages against
petitioner BF Metal Corporation and Rivera. The complaint essentially alleged that defendant
Rivera’s gross negligence and recklessness was the immediate and proximate cause of the
vehicular accident and that petitioner failed to exercise the required diligence in the selection and
supervision of Rivera.
In the Answer, petitioner and Rivera denied the allegations in the complaint and averred
that respondents were not the proper parties-in-interest to prosecute the action, not being the
registered owner of the jeep; that the sole and proximate cause of the accident was the fault and
negligence of Umuyon; and that petitioner exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employees.
The trial court rendered its judgment holding the petitioners liable for damages and
attorney's Fees, and finding Rivera negligent when he failed to determine with certainty that the
opposite lane was clear before overtaking the vehicle in front of the truck he was driving. It also
found petitioner negligent in the selection and supervision of its employees when it failed to
prove the proper dissemination of safety driving instructions to its drivers.
CA affirmed the trial court’s finding of Rivera’s negligence, and that petitioner was liable
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE: WON Umoyan and the spouses Lomotan are entitled to damages and attorney's fees
HELD:
Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation

only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is
referred to as actual or compensatory damages. To justify an award of actual damages, there
16
Torts_2015
must be competent proof of the actual amount of loss. Credence can be given only to claims,
which are duly supported by receipts.
In the instant case, no evidence was submitted to show the amount actually spent for the
repair or replacement of the wrecked jeep. Spouses Lomotan presented two different cost
estimates to prove the alleged actual damage of the wrecked jeep. Following the case of Viron,
neither estimate is competent to prove actual damages. Courts cannot simply rely on speculation,
conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and amount of damages.
Petitioner also questions the award of moral and exemplary damages in favor of Spouses
Lomotan. It argues that the award of moral damages was premised on the resulting physical
injuries arising from the quasi-delict; since only respondent Umuyon suffered physical injuries,
the award should pertain solely to him. Correspondingly, the award of exemplary damages
should pertain only to respondent Umuyon since only the latter is entitled to moral damages,
petitioner adds.
In culpa aquiliana, or quasi-delict, (a) when an act or omission causes physical injuries,
or (b) where the defendant is guilty of intentional tort, moral damages may aptly be recovered.
This rule also applies, as aforestated, to breaches of contract where the defendant acted
fraudulently or in bad faith. In culpa criminal, moral damages could be lawfully due when the
accused is found guilty of physical injuries, lascivious acts, adultery or concubinage, illegal or
arbitrary detention, illegal arrest, illegal search, or defamation.
Undoubtedly, petitioner is liable for the moral damages suffered by respondent Umuyon.
Its liability is based on a quasi-delict or on its negligence in the supervision and selection of its
driver, causing the vehicular accident and physical injuries to respondent Umuyon. Rivera is also
liable for moral damages to respondent Umuyon based on either culpa criminal or quasi-delict.
Since the decision in the criminal case, which found Rivera guilty of criminal negligence, did not
award moral damages, the same may be awarded in the instant civil action for damages.
However, there is no legal basis in awarding moral damages to Spouses Lomotan whether
arising from the criminal negligence committed by Rivera or based on the negligence of
petitioner under Article 2180. Article 2219 speaks of recovery of moral damages in case of a
criminal offense resulting in physical injuries or quasi-delicts causing physical injuries, the two
instances where Rivera and petitioner are liable for moral damages to respondent Umuyon.
Article 2220 does speak of awarding moral damages where there is injury to property, but the
injury must be willful and the circumstances show that such damages are justly due. There being
no proof that the accident was willful, Article 2220 does not apply.
Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the
public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. While the
amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved, the plaintiff must show that he is entitled
to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of
whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded.
17
Torts_2015
As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, Spouses Lomotan have shown that they
are entitled to compensatory damages while respondent Umuyon can recover both compensatory
and moral damages. Because exemplary damages are awarded, attorney’s fees may also be
awarded in consonance with Article 2208.
4. Meaning of Gross Negligence in Tort
Ilao-oreta vs. Ronquillo (2007)
Facts: Despite several years of marriage, Spouses Ronquillo is still childless. They consulted Dr.
Concepcion Ilao-Oreta, an obstetrician-gynecologist-consultant at St. Luke’s and Chief of the
Reproductive Endocrinology and Ifertility section. Eva Marie agreed to undergo a laparoscopic
procedure where a laparoscope would be inserted through her abdominal wall to get a direct
view of her internal reproductive organ in order to determine the real cause of her infertility. The
procedure was scheduled on April 5, 1999 at 2 o’clock in the afternoon. Dr. Ilao-Oreta did not
arrive at the scheduled time and no prior notice of its cancellation was received by the
Ronquillos. Dr. Ilao-Oreta was on her honeymoon in Hawaii. She estimated that she would
arrive in manila in the early morning of April. However, she failed to consider the time
deiffernece between Hawaii and Philippines. Ronquillos filed a complaint against Dr. Ilao-Oreta
and St. Luke’s for breach of professional and service contract and for damages. RTC awarded
Eva Marie only actual damages upon finding that the doctor’s failure to arrive on time was not
intentional. The CA found Dr. Ilao-Oreta grossly negligent.
Issue:Whether or not Dr. Ilao-Oreta was grossly negligent in not arriving on time for the
scheduled laparoscopy.
Held:
“Gross negligence” implies a want or absence of or failure to exercise slight care or
diligence, or the entire absence of care. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences
without exerting any effort to avoid them. It is characterized by want of even slight care, acting
or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and
intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences in so far as other persons may be
affected.
The records show that before leaving for Hawaii, Dr. Ilao-Oreta left an admitting order
with her secretary for one of the spouses to pick up, apprised Eva Marie of the necessary
preparations for the procedure, and instructed the hospital staff to perform pre-operative
treatments. These acts of the doctor reflect an earnest intention to perform the procedure on the
day and time scheduled.
On realizing that she missed the scheduled procedure, Dr. Ilao-Oreta, upon arrival in
Manila, immediately called the hospital and asked the nurses about Eva Marie. She also wanted
to call the Ronquillos but she did not have their number at that time. So the next morning, she
went to her office to get the Ronquillos contact number, which is written on Eva Marie’s chart,
and called them right away. Noel admitted that indeed Dr. Ilao-Oreta called him up after she
arrived in Manila.
18
Torts_2015
Although petitioner’s act is not grossly negligent, she was negligent when she scheduled
to perform professional service at 2 pm without considering the time difference between
Philippines and Hawaii. Having travelled to the US, where she obtained a fellowship in
Reproductive Endocrinology and Infertility, more than twice, she should have been mindful of
said difference.
According to the Supreme Court, it bears noting that when she was scheduling the date of
her performance of the procedure, Dr. Ilao-Oreta had just gotten married and was preparing for
her honeymoon, and it is of common human knowledge that excitement attends its preparations.
Her negligence could then be partly attributed to human frailty which rules out its
characterization as gross.
Petitioner is only liable for actual damages bearing the corresponding interest from the
time of the filing of the complaint. However, the doctor’s negligence not being gross, the spouses
are not entitled to recover moral damages. Neither are the spouses entitled to recover exemplary
damages in the absence of a showing that Dr. Ilao-Oreta acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive or malevolent manner, nor to award of attorney’s fees as, contrary to the finding of
the Court of Appeals that the spouses “were compelled to litigate and incur expenses to protect
their interest,” the records show that they did not exert enough efforts to settle the matter before
going to court.
B. PROXIMATE CAUSE DEFINED
Lambert S. Ramos vs. C.O.L. Realty Corporation(2009)
FACTS: On or about 10:40 o’clock in the morning of 8 March 2004, along Katipunan (Avenue),
corner Rajah Matanda (Street), Quezon City, a vehicular accident took place between a Toyota
Altis owned by C.O.L. Realty Corporation, and driven by Aquilino Larin (“Aquilino”), and a
Ford Expedition, owned by x x x Lambert Ramos (Ramos) and driven by Rodel Ilustrisimo
(“Rodel”). A passenger of the sedan, one Estela Maliwat (“Estela”) sustained injuries. She was
immediately rushed to the hospital for treatment.
C.O.L. Realty averred that its driver, Aquilino, was slowly driving the Toyota Altis car at
a speed of five to ten kilometers per hour along Rajah Matanda Street and has just crossed the
center lane of Katipunan Avenue when (Ramos’) Ford Espedition violently rammed against the
car’s right rear door and fender. With the force of the impact, the sedan turned 180 degrees
towards the direction where it came from.
Upon investigation, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City found probable
cause to indict Rodel, the driver of the Ford Expedition, for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Damage to Property. In the meantime, C.O.L. Realty demanded from Ramos reimbursement for
the expenses incurred in the repair of its car and the hospitalization of Estela in the aggregate
amount of P103,989.60. The demand fell on deaf ears prompting (C.O.L. Realty) to file a
Complaint for Damages based on quasi-delict before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Metro
Manila (MeTC), Quezon City.
19

Page 6 B

Загружено:

Сведения о документе

Исходное описание:

Оригинальное название

Авторское право

Доступные форматы

Поделиться этим документом

Поделиться или встроить документ

Параметры публикации

Этот документ был вам полезен?

Это неприемлемый материал?

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

Page 6 B

Загружено:

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leongson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola,

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, FERDINAND E.

Dissenting; (Davide, J.)

A. CONCEPT OF ACT AND TEST OF NEGLIGENCE

Corinthian Gardens Association, Inc. vs. Tanjangco (2008)

A. Rules and Regulations

City Court: ordered the suspension of the civil case

xxx xxx xxx

1. Contrary to Morals, Good Customs and Public Policy

DELIA R. SIBAL, petitioner, vs. NOTRE DAME OF GREATER MANILA, NATIONAL

Ruling: This Court finds merit in the petition.

Private respondent is hereby ordered to REINSTATE petitioner to her former position

Conrado Bunag vs Court of Appeals (1992)

Defendants-appellants, on the other hand, deny that defendant-appellant Conrado Bunag,

Held: Petition denied.

However, the award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified in or analogous to

RTC, CA- in favor of private respondent

2. Negligence (Art. 20 and 1173, NCC)

Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation

4. Meaning of Gross Negligence in Tort

Ilao-oreta vs. Ronquillo (2007)

B. PROXIMATE CAUSE DEFINED

Lambert S. Ramos vs. C.O.L. Realty Corporation(2009)

Вам также может понравиться